[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NORTH KOREA: BACK ON THE STATE SPONSOR
OF TERRORISM LIST?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 22, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-118
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
TOM EMMER, MinnesotaUntil 5/18/
15 deg.
DANIEL DONOVAN, New YorkAs
of 5/19/15 deg.
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
PAUL COOK, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Sung Kim, Special Representative for North Korea
Policy, U.S. Department of the State........................... 5
Ms. Hilary Batjer Johnson, Deputy Coordinator for Homeland
Security, Screening, and Designations, Bureau of
Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State..................... 12
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Sung Kim: Prepared statement....................... 8
Ms. Hilary Batjer Johnson: Prepared statement.................... 14
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 30
Hearing minutes.................................................. 31
The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade: Internet link for material
submitted for the record....................................... 32
Written responses from Ms. Hilary Batjer Johnson to questions
submitted for the record by the Honorable Brad Sherman, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California........ 33
NORTH KOREA: BACK ON THE STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM LIST?
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in
room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order.
Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record,
subject to the limitations in the rules.
In 1987, North Korea bombed Korean Air Flight 858, killing
115 people. For its role in the bombing and its history of
other terrorist acts, North Korea was designated as a state
sponsor of terrorism from 1988 to 2008.
In 2008, North Korea was taken off the list of state
sponsors of terrorism, not because most of the reasons cited in
the State Department had changed. Instead, the decision, to me,
was purely diplomatic and based on the nuclear agreement
reached as a result of the Six-Party Talks. North Korea was to
freeze and disable its nuclear program. In exchange, the United
States would remove North Korea from the state sponsor of
terrorism list.
The agreement fell apart because North Korea did not hold
up its end of this bargain. Since 2008, North Korea has made
significant advances in its nuclear program. North Korea
conducted two nuclear weapons tests since 2008: One in 2009 and
one in 2013. Earlier this month, there were rumors of yet
another test in the works that may come.
The other reasons the State Department cited for keeping
North Korea on the state sponsors of terrorism list for 20
years are still relevant today. North Korea had a long history
of abducting Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. Some of
these kidnapped Japanese are still unaccounted for. North Korea
has maintained its support for terrorist organizations. North
Korea harbored Japanese Red Army terrorists who participated in
the hijacking of a jet in 1970. These terrorists are still
living peaceably in North Korea today.
In 2009 alone, three North Korean arms shipments bound for
terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas were seized by the
UAE, Israel, and Thailand. In 2014, Western security sources
reported that Hamas brokered an agreement to purchase
communications equipment and rockets from North Korea. Hamas
fighters reportedly used North Korean anti-tank guided missiles
against Israel as recently as 2014.
A U.S. district court ruling in 2014 determined that North
Korea materially supported Hezbollah's terrorist attacks in
Israel in 2006. And, without objection, the Chair will submit
to the record the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, the plaintiffs in cause of action 10-483, where
the Federal judge, and I quote, on page 4:
``The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
Hezbollah carried out the rocket attacks that caused
plaintiffs' injuries and that North Korea provided
material support. North Korea provided Hezbollah with a
variety of material support, including a professional
military and intelligence training and assistance in
building a massive network of underground military
installations, tunnels, bunkers, depots, and storage
facilities in southern Lebanon.''
And it continues. And that will be a part of the record.
North Korea's ties to these terrorists do not end with the
weapons sales. North Korean experts advised both Hezbollah and
Hamas in the construction of their terrorist tunnel networks.
Beyond its ongoing ties to terrorist groups, North Korea
remains a major proliferator of weapons of mass destruction.
North Korea has cooperated with Iran on ballistic missiles
since in the 1980s. North Korea is now believed to be working
on an intercontinental ballistic system. If fully developed,
this missile could drop a nuclear bomb as far away as the
United States.
There is growing evidence that Iran and North Korea are
cooperating on developing nuclear capabilities. North Korea
helped set up the nuclear reactor in Syria, which could have
been used to produce plutonium for a nuclear weapon. Since
2009, several North Korean shipments of equipment used in
chemical weapons programs have been directed to Syria. U.S.
Government officials have also said that North Korea provided
nuclear material to Libya in the 2000s.
North Korea engages in the harassment, abduction, and
murder of refugees, dissidents, and foreigners attempting to
help North Koreans defect. The most prominent of these cases is
the abduction and murder of Reverend Kim Dong-sik, a U.S.
permanent resident from northeastern China.
North Korean cyber attacks have reportedly targeted the Web
sites of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, and others. Last
year, North Korea carried out a cyber attack against Sony
pictures that included direct threats against its employees and
warning to ``remember the 11 of September 2001.''
Meanwhile, the administration has been exercising a policy
of ``strategic patience'' against North Korea. As a judge, it
certainly wouldn't have been good policy for me to have
strategic patience for the criminals committing crimes in
Texas.
North Korea has not stopped sponsoring terrorism, even if
our Government has said it has. The Kim regime not only fails
to take substantial steps to combat terrorism, it has provided
weapons and other support to designated foreign terrorist
organizations.
So North Korea is still manufacturing weapons of mass
destruction, and its nuclear program has grown more advanced
than in 2008. So it appears that North Korea's actions have
gotten bolder and more flagrant. So the purpose of this hearing
is to consider putting North Korea back on the state sponsor of
terrorism list.
The Chair now yields to the ranking member from
Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, for his opening statement.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Chairman Poe, for conducting
this hearing.
And I thank our witnesses for being here today.
North Korea is a rogue state which engages in all sorts of
nefarious activities. This is not in dispute. The North Korean
regime is involved in international organized crime,
perpetrates terrible human rights abuses on its own citizens,
and continually engages in internationally provocative actions.
Its nuclear capabilities remain an ever-present threat for
its neighbors and for the United States. North Korea has not
held back from conducting nuclear tests, engaging in cyber
attacks, and ratcheting up military tensions with South Korea.
North Korea's continuation of its nuclear and ballistic missile
programs is a direct violation of numerous U.N. Security
Council resolutions and previously held commitments. Even more
disturbing, because of the regime's desperation, its need for
hard currency make proliferation and extortion an ongoing
threat.
With these violations in mind, I, along with Chairman Poe,
co-sponsored legislation introduced by Chairman Royce in this
Congress to improve the enforcement of sanctions against North
Korea. It is important that we, along with our allies, uphold
our commitments to North Korea's denuclearization. It is also
important that North Korea face consequences when intentionally
engaged in prohibited activities.
With respect to North Korea's ties to terrorism, I remain
concerned about reports of potential recent North Korean
support of Hamas and Hezbollah and reports of attempted and
successful kidnappings and assassinations of North Korean
dissidents living abroad.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses regarding
these reports and, more generally, how the State Department
currently assesses whether North Korea is a state sponsor of
terrorism and what factors it considers when making this
assessment.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentlemen from Massachusetts.
The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from California,
Mr. Sherman, for an opening statement.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
This hearing raises a number of questions. Clearly, for
reasons both prior speakers have indicated, North Korea
deserves to be on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. So
we will want to know why we took them off, why we haven't put
them back on, and why Congress just sits by and lets the
executive branch make all the foreign policy decisions, where,
in this case, the decision to take them off and leave them off
is so questionable.
But then we look at House leadership, which seems to be
putting us in a position where the foreign ops bill is going to
be presented to Congress in a way in which no member of this
committee can offer an amendment. No Member of the House will
be able to offer an amendment. And I look forward to working
with people here to make sure that just because you stick it in
an omnibus bill doesn't mean you can have a whole year or, in
this case, several years of foreign ops appropriations with no
Member of the House and certainly no member of the Foreign
Affairs Committee being able to offer an amendment.
A decade ago, North Korea wanted a nonaggression pact with
the United States. We turned them down because we don't do
nonaggression pacts, which is perhaps the silliest reason not
to do it. Just, ``Well, we don't do that here.'' Now they want
a peace treaty. I don't think we should give it to them unless
we get something in return, but to dismiss it out of hand seems
absurd.
We have taken them off the terrorist list. I don't think we
got much for it.
I want to focus our attention on their--we had hearings in
this subcommittee with my Asia Subcommittee and others on the
North Korea-Iran alliance. I got to spend an hour with the
President in the Oval Office. It is amazing how nice the
administration is before you announce your position on the Iran
deal. And I spent most of that time focusing on the possibility
of a transfer of fissile material from North Korea to Iran.
Well, where are we at present? We have one country that
desperately wants nuclear weapons and is about to get its hands
on, let us say, $100-billion-plus of money. We have another
country that has nuclear weapons and fissile material and
desperately needs money. What could go wrong? And, certainly,
just North Korea's nuclear involvement with Syria and Iran is
reason enough to put them on all of the lists.
Israel, roughly 5 years ago, 6 years ago, took out the Al
Kibar nuclear facility. The sole purpose of that facility was
to help Syrian and/or Iran develop nuclear weapons. At that
time, North Korea was unwilling to sell, or apparently
unwilling to sell, fissile material because I think they need
about a dozen nuclear weapons to defend themselves from us, or
at least the speculation is that that is what they think they
need. Well, now they will be creating enough fissile material
for four additional nuclear weapons every year.
Now, I am not saying their thirteenth weapon goes on eBay,
but they have already sold for hundreds of millions of dollars
nuclear technology to Syria and/or Syria and Iran. One would
suspect more Iran than Syria. And now Iran has a lot more
money. And North Korea has more fissile material than it needs
as its minimum defense requirement.
So I think we should focus not only on what terrorist and
proliferation activities North Korea has engaged in but what
they are likely to do in the future.
I thank you for the time, and I yield back.
Mr. Poe. Without objection, all the witnesses' prepared
statements will be made part of the record. I ask that each
witness keep their presentation to no more than 5 minutes. I
will introduce each witness and then give time for their
statements, and then questions will follow.
Ambassador Kim is the Special Representative for North
Korean Policy and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Korea and
Japan. Previously Ambassador Kim served as Special Envoy for
the Six-Party Talks and is a former prosecutor.
Mrs. Hilary Batjer Johnson is the Deputy Coordinator for
Homeland Security, Screening, and Designations in the Bureau of
Counterterrorism. Ms. Johnson oversees the designations of
foreign terrorist organizations and individuals under
authorities of the Secretary of State.
Ambassador Kim, we will start with you, and you have 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SUNG KIM, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR
NORTH KOREA POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE
Mr. Kim. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me today, along with
Deputy Coordinator Johnson, to testify about the global
security threat posed by North Korea.
North Korea's provocative and repressive policies and
actions constitute one of the most difficult and complicated
challenges the United States faces. Mr. Chairman, we share your
concerns about the grave threat posed by North Korea.
Multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions
require North Korea to abandon its nuclear and ballistic
missile programs and prohibit countries from engaging with the
DPRK to buy or sell weapons and related items and technologies.
North Korea itself committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons
and existing nuclear programs in the Six-Party process.
Yet North Korea continues to violate these commitments and
obligations through its pursuit of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles and its proliferation of weapons and
technologies abroad. This conduct poses a growing threat to the
United States, our friends in the region, and the global
nonproliferation regime.
We are committed to using the full range of tools--
deterrence, diplomacy, and pressure--to counter the threat and
to make clear: North Korea will not achieve security or
prosperity while the regime pursues nuclear weapons, abuses its
own people, and rejects its obligations and commitments.
We have refused to respond to North Korean provocations
with concessions. Instead, since 2009, we have tightened
sanctions and consistently underscored to the DPRK that the
path to a brighter future begins with authentic and credible
negotiations that produce concrete denuclearization steps.
Part of our effort to change North Korea's strategic
calculus is maintaining the strongest possible deterrent
capabilities. The DPRK should have no doubt that the United
States stands ready to defend our interests and our allies. In
this, we could have no better partners than in our allies in
Seoul and Tokyo. We have made it a priority to modernize these
alliances for the 21st century, and this important goal was
reaffirmed during the recent visits here by President Park and
Prime Minister Abe.
By maintaining credible deterrence and by applying
sustained sanctions pressure on the regime, we increase the
cost to the DPRK of its destructive policy choices. Vigorous
sanctions enforcement is the key to cracking down on North
Korea's proliferation activities which finance and facilitate
North Korea's dangerous programs. Strong sanctions
implementation also helps prevent North Korea's weapons from
spreading, potentially destabilizing other global hotspots or
reaching groups that would seek to harm the United States and
our allies.
We of course monitor very closely all available
intelligence on North Korea's global arms trade, and we take
action, together with our partners, to mitigate those
transactions and to impose consequences on those responsible.
In January, President Obama issued a new Executive order
giving us an important, powerful, and broad new sanctions tool.
We immediately began using this Executive order to apply
additional pressure on wrongdoers in the DPRK, imposing
sanctions against the DPRK's primary intelligence agency known
to be responsible for its cyber operations as well as its main
arms trade agency and several of its overseas arms dealers, and
we will continue to use this new tool, along with our other
sanctions authorities.
Our sanctions are always more effective when supported by
our partners, and so we have focused on strengthening
multilateral sanctions against North Korea. The sanctions that
we have successfully pushed for in the United Nations Security
Council give countries the authorities they need to crack down
on North Korea's proliferation networks.
When North Korea's major shipping firm was involved in an
illegal weapons shipment, we led efforts at the United Nations
to sanction the firm. Since then, the company's ships have been
denied port entry, scrapped, impounded, or confined to their
homeports in North Korea, and the shipping firm has lost its
contracts with many foreign-owned ships.
We have engaged countries across Southeast Asia, Africa,
and the Middle East that have been targeted by North Korea for
proliferation-related activities, reminding them of their
obligation to implement United Nations sanctions and
strengthening their capacity to do so. As a result of our
outreach, key countries have reemphasized their commitment to
the United Nations Security Council sanctions and have taken
some positive steps on enforcement.
We also continually review all available intelligence to
determine whether North Korea is subject to additional
measures. Naturally, this includes reviewing available
information to determine whether the facts indicate the DPRK
should be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Equally important is North Korea's political isolation,
driven by the overwhelming international consensus that North
Korea cannot fully participate in the international community
until it abides by its obligations and commitments. We have
built that consensus through our active and principled
diplomacy, and that diplomacy, of course, begins with our
partners in the Six-Party process: South Korea, Japan, China,
and Russia. Our coordination ensures that, wherever Pyongyang
turns, it hears a strong, unwavering message that it must live
to up to its obligations.
Mr. Chairman, holding North Korea accountable and combating
its illicit activities requires a sustained and international
effort. We and our partners will continue to deploy the full
range of tools--deterrence, pressure, and diplomacy--to counter
the threat and to lead Pyongyang to different choices.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kim follows:]
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Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes Ms. Johnson for your opening
statement. You have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MS. HILARY BATJER JOHNSON, DEPUTY COORDINATOR FOR
HOMELAND SECURITY, SCREENING, AND DESIGNATIONS, BUREAU OF
COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Johnson. Thank you.
Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to join
my colleague, Special Representative for North Korea Policy
Sung Kim, to testify today about the process for designating a
country as a state sponsor of terrorism and North Korea's
designation in 1988.
Special Representative Kim already expressed our shared
concern for the global security threat posed by North Korea and
summarized clearly our policy and tools of deterrence,
diplomacy, and pressure. So, with the chairman's permission, I
would like to briefly outline the criteria and the process for
designating a country as a state sponsor of terrorism ahead of
our broader discussions.
First, in order to designate a country as a state sponsor
of terrorism, the Secretary of State must determine that the
government of such country has repeatedly provided support for
acts of international terrorism. The standard for applying and
rescinding this designation are set out in the three separate
statutes: Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act; section
40 of the Arms Export Control Act; and section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act. The standard for designation is the
same in all three.
In making such a determination, the Secretary's evaluation
generally includes but is not limited to the following
criteria. And, I if may, I will read those as well: Allowing
the use of its territory as a safe haven from extradition or
prosecution for terrorist activity; furnishing arms,
explosives, or lethal substances to individuals, groups, or
organizations with the likelihood that they will be used in
terrorist activities; providing logistical support, such as
transportation, to individuals, groups, or organizations
involved with terrorist activities; providing safe houses or
headquarters for any individuals, groups, or organizations
involved with terrorist activities; planning, directing,
providing training, or assisting in the execution of terrorist
activities; providing direct or indirect financial backing for
terrorist activities; and providing direct or indirect
diplomatic facilities, such as support or documentation,
intended to aid or abet terrorist activities.
A state-sponsor-of-terrorism designation is made only after
careful review of all available evidence in its entirety to
determine if a country meets the statutory criteria for
designation. Such a designation involves a number of laws, and
the four main categories of sanctions of an SST would include:
A ban on arms-related exports and sales; restrictions over
exports of dual-use items; restrictions on foreign assistance;
and imposition of miscellaneous trade and other restrictions,
including potential liability in U.S. courts for acts that fall
within the terrorism exception of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act.
The Secretary of State designated North Korea as a state
sponsor of terrorism on January 20, 1988, for repeatedly
providing support of acts of international terrorism,
particularly the bombing of Korean Airlines Flight 858 on
November 29, 1987, that killed 115 people and the Rangoon
bombing of 1983 that killed 17, including 4 South Korean
cabinet ministers.
After a thorough review conducted in accordance with the
relevant statutory criteria for SST recision, on October 11,
2008, North Korea's state-sponsor-of-terrorism designation was
rescinded.
In May 2015, the United States recertified North Korea as a
country not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism
efforts, pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control
Act, as amended. In making this annual determination, the
Department of State reviewed North Korea's overall level of
cooperation with U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, taking into
account U.S. counterterrorism objectives with North Korea and a
realistic assessment of North Korea's capabilities.
Of note, the standards are different for certification as a
not-fully-cooperating country versus the designation of a state
sponsor of terrorism. The determination of whether a country is
not fully cooperating is made based on a review of the
country's cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism efforts,
whereas, again, a state-sponsor-of-terrorism determination is
based on whether a country has repeatedly provided support for
acts of international terrorism.
In addition to annually reviewing North Korea's
certification as a not-fully-cooperating country, the
Department of State regularly reviews the available information
and intelligence on North Korea to determine whether the facts
indicate that it should be, once again, designated as a state
sponsor of terrorism. These judgements are not based solely on
the news of the day, and we look systematically at what has
been done to make these determinations.
In conclusion, I would like to thank you and the
subcommittee for the opportunity to appear today along with my
colleague, Special Representative Kim, to outline the state-
sponsor-of-terrorism process and its history with respect to
North Korea, and I am happy to answer any questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
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----------
Mr. Poe. Thank you both.
When North Korea was put on the state sponsor of terrorism
list, and whatever the reasons were it was put on, which of
those no longer apply today in 2015?
Ms. Johnson. So, when we rescinded the SST designation, we
again go back through the statutory criteria, which require us
to go back 6 months that they are listed for the review and
determine. And so, at this point, from 2008 on, we, again,
review all credible information, all information and
intelligence from all sources, and, again, we look to
corroborate that, make sure----
Mr. Poe. So which of those that were available to you that
you said, ``These are the reasons we are putting them on the
state sponsor of terrorism''--which of those no longer apply in
2015?
Ms. Johnson. Well, I would have to look at what exactly was
included in the recision package. But, again, for recision, it
is really only a looking back--for the statute requirements--is
looking back at 6 months, did they commit any acts of
international terrorism. And they also must produce assurances
that say they will not commit or provide support for acts of
international terrorism going forward. That is the requirement
for the SST statute for recision.
Mr. Poe. All right.
Ambassador Kim, does North Korea have nuclear weapons?
Mr. Kim. So I think in this setting it is difficult for me
to answer clearly, but, obviously, we are very concerned about
the advances they have made in their nuclear program.
Mr. Poe. Are they developing ICBMs?
Mr. Kim. Well, again, very concerned about the advances
they have made in their delivery capabilities.
Mr. Poe. And are they working with Iran in the development
of ICBMs?
Mr. Kim. So we have long been concerned about relations
between Iran and North Korea, and this is a matter that we
watch very closely. We have a number of sanctions, both
multilateral and U.S. Sanctions, that prohibit any such
dealings. And this is obviously something that we will pursue
vigorously whenever we have credible information.
Mr. Poe. Ambassador and Ms. Johnson, are you familiar with
the District Court for the District of Columbia case that I
cited earlier, Kaplan v. Hezbollah case? I am sure you have
read it. Let me read you another portion that I have not read
from the district judge, July 23, 2014:
``Moreover, North Korea worked in concert with Iran and
Syria to provide rocket and missile components for
Hezbollah . . .''
Hezbollah terrorist organization.
``North Korea sent these rocket and missile components
to Iran, where they assembled and shipped to Hezbollah
in Lebanon via Syria. These rocket and missile
components were intended by North Korea and Hezbollah
to be used and were, in fact, used by Hezbollah to
carry out rocket and missile attacks against Israeli
civilian targets.''
Now, to me, that sounds like a terrorist act on the end.
Would that information be used to consider or reconsider
putting North Korea back on the state sponsor of terrorism
list? Either one or both of you.
Ms. Johnson. I will go ahead first.
So I wouldn't want to comment on the alleged activities in
the district court ruling. Again, I think we--and I believe----
Mr. Poe. Well, assume they are true. Just assume that is
true. Whether you agree or not, assume it is true. The judge
says this, but--I don't want to violate any security things,
but assume that is true. Would that be, as we called it in law
school, a weight factor to consider putting them back on the
list as a state sponsor of terrorism?
Ms. Johnson. So, again, I would go back to the statutory
criteria requires us to look at all available evidence. We
would, again, look at unclassified information, press
reporting, other information, including intelligence. And,
again, we would be verifying----
Mr. Poe. Okay. Excuse me, Ms. Johnson. You read the
criteria. I gave you some examples. Would that fit the
criteria?
Ms. Johnson. Well, I don't want to get into hypotheticals.
So, again, you would have to look at a variety of information
and sources, again, look if it is, you know, true, credible,
corroborated. And you look at it in its entirety.
So I can't speculate, again, on alleged activities and be
able to comment----
Mr. Poe. Well, that information is disturbing. Would you
not agree?
Ms. Johnson. A lot of activities in North Korea----
Mr. Poe. Mr. Kim?
Mr. Kim. If I may, if true--and I think you are asking us
to assume that that report is true, that allegation is true--
certainly, it would be a relevant factor for consideration in
determining whether North Korea meets the criteria of having
repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism.
Mr. Poe. All right.
And my understanding is that the policy of the
administration in dealing with North Korea is strategic
patience. Is that correct?
Mr. Kim. Sir, no. I think the term ``strategic patience''
was used to describe an approach we were taking to any
resumption of negotiations. And the idea was that we wanted to
avoid the mistakes that had been made previously with attempts
at negotiations with the North Koreans, so we wanted to be more
cautious about resuming the negotiations, that we weren't going
to rush back to negotiations, that we weren't going to offer
any concessions to North Koreans in order to get them to the
table.
We wanted to coordinate very closely with our partners. We
wanted to deliver to them--we wanted to make sure that we gave
us the best chance possible to actually making some lasting
concrete progress on the inquisition.
It was not meant to describe our policy. I think our policy
is what we both described, which is the combination of
deterrence, pressure, sanctions, as well as diplomacy.
Mr. Poe. All right. I am out of time.
I will yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Keating, who talks faster than I do.
Mr. Keating. We both have accents, just different ones.
Again, thank you for being here.
I just want to just dwell on one practical aspect of this.
What practical effect would the designation of North Korea as a
state sponsor of terrorism have? I mean, they are already
heavily sanctioned. There are not many countries more isolated
economically in the world than they are.
So, if this occurred, hypothetically, what other added
restrictions would be in place? And what would be the effect if
it was symbolic? Would that have a practical and an important
effect, too?
Ms. Johnson. Well, again, if I may, so the SST designation
leads to bans on arms-related exports and sales, controls over
exports of dual-use items, restrictions on foreign assistance,
and other miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.
So when you look at North Korea currently, which is one of
the heaviest sanctioned countries around, there is no real
practical--I mean, practically speaking, it would not enhance
or necessarily alter any of the current sanctions that are
applicable to the DPRK at this time.
Mr. Keating. Yeah. What do you think in terms of a symbol
or message that that would make?
Mr. Kim. I mean, I think there is obviously some symbolic
value in designating them as a state sponsor of terrorism, but
only if they actually meet the criteria for that designation.
If I may, sir, I would just add, I mean, sort of, the flip
side of your question is, did they gain anything when we
delisted them? And I think the answer is the same. Because, as
you pointed out, they are so heavily sanctioned already, both
multilaterally and unilaterally, that they really did not gain
anything from delisting other than whatever symbolic
appreciation they might have had.
Mr. Keating. Yeah. Just as a process, how does the
Department factor in, in this instance North Korea but in any
instance, participation in cyber attacks and cyber crime when
determining whether it is a designated state sponsor of
terrorism?
Ms. Johnson. Yeah, and I think, cyber being new, you know,
it is an important area.
Mr. Keating. Yeah.
Ms. Johnson. And so we would look at all of that
information. And, again, cyber acts is something we would look
at. And, again, we would look at the statute, its repeated
acts, and, again, if it meets the criteria.
So, again, looking at all intelligence related to a
particular cyber attack, we would definitely take a look at it
closely.
Mr. Keating. Yeah.
And, again, getting to the process, as a whole, of the
designation, is it--you know, some of the bad acts they are
doing and some of the actors they are involved with are actual
state sponsors. Can you comment on how the fact that these are
state actors, how that might affect the designation process?
Ms. Johnson. Well, I mean, it is certainly alarming for us
that the DPRK has close relationships with Iran and Syria, both
state sponsors of terrorism. But, again, we go back to the
legal criteria, and we look at it very closely, of course,
because these are state sponsors of terrorism. And we, again,
look for repeated acts and, again, verifying and corroborating
and making sure credible information exists if there are
linkages there, and, again, looking at the relevant criteria.
Mr. Keating. Yeah.
Now, I know that we are limited, and that is what is a
little frustrating in a, you know, open setting. So, to the
extent you can--you can follow through in a classified setting,
of course--but touching on the support of Hezbollah and Hamas,
what would that have as an impact in the designation to any
country?
Ms. Johnson. And, again, we would be very concerned with
any relationships with foreign terrorist organizations and,
again, would go back to look at, again, repeated acts. I mean,
it sounds very process-oriented, but it is, to make sure that
the standard remains the same. Again, are they doing repeated
acts or support for acts of international terrorism, and then
again looking at the intelligence to see if that backs it up to
make----
Mr. Keating. Yeah. Clearly, would you weigh--it would be
much more influential than perhaps state acts, working with
state actions of----
Ms. Johnson. Yeah, the concern--I mean, very much a concern
of state sponsors of terrorism, or STS.
Mr. Keating. All right.
Well, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back because we are
limited in the terms of what we can ask in an open setting
along the lines that I was going to pursue. So I yield back my
time.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts.
The Chair will yield to the gentleman from California,
Colonel Cook, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am not an attorney, so I don't understand a lot of the
process you are talking about. And I thank my lucky stars.
Ms. Johnson. I am not either, if that helps.
Mr. Cook. But the answers you gave there about what you
would have to do, I kind of get the feeling that it would take
a nuclear event and then it might take 6 months to examine the
radioactive material that would be available before you made a
decision.
And I am being somewhat caustic, maybe sarcastic, but it
almost seems that you are very, very reluctant to establish
what line they have to cross that they haven't already crossed.
Because I thought they would have met this based upon their
past behavior and the terrorist groups that they are associated
with.
Ms. Johnson. I appreciate the question.
I would definitely say that we take this very seriously,
and ``seriously'' means we look, again, at all of the relevant
criteria and intelligence and information. And I don't think we
want to put countries on the list willy-nilly, so we do a very
close examination of all the evidence.
Mr. Cook. Well, it is hard to think of another country that
should be closer to the all-star list there, in terms of their
behavior.
All right. We will switch gears. I am one of those ones
that I think they are just going to thumb their noses at us.
But there is one country in the area there that can make a
difference and will probably, and that is China. Do you agree
with that, that if they were going to change their behavior in
a lot of ways, that the fulcrum point is China?
Mr. Kim. Sir, there is no question that China has a special
relationship with North Korea, that they have significant
leverage over North Korea. And we have urged China to exercise
that leverage, use their leverage more effectively to persuade
Pyongyang to start making some smart, positive decisions.
Obviously, there is more that the Chinese can do. But I can
assure you that they have made very clear publicly, including
when Xi Jinping was here just a few weeks ago, that they remain
committed to the shared goal of denuclearization and that they
strongly oppose any actions by North Korea in violation of
Security Council resolutions.
We will continue to work with the Chinese to try to
persuade them that they need to be doing more, they need to be
doing more effectively, to persuade North Korea back to some
credible negotiations, to persuade them to take some concrete
actions toward denuclearization.
Mr. Cook. So, officially, the word from China to us is they
will not get involved. That is my understanding.
Mr. Kim. Well, I don't think that is accurate, sir. I mean,
I think----
Mr. Cook. It is not? You just admitted, you said that they
were the one country that probably has the most leverage over
that. And they came here and everything, and if we ask them
point-blank, the one country there to make a difference, so
that they can perhaps save lives or cut down on this influence,
and we don't want to go there? Or am I misunderstanding this?
Mr. Kim. No, sir, I wasn't suggesting that the Chinese are
not doing anything or that they are not working with us at all.
What we have seen has not been completely satisfactory. And
this is why we are continuing to remind the Chinese that North
Korea's irresponsible behavior and repressive actions hurt
China's own interests, and, therefore, Beijing needs to get
more serious, more focused about persuading North Korea.
Mr. Cook. But they haven't done it yet, and they won't do
it. Is that correct?
Mr. Kim. I think they are continuing to make an effort,
but, obviously, less than satisfactory from our perspective.
Mr. Cook. Effort means a communique to North Korea, ``Hey,
knock off the following events. Do this. It is in the best
interest of North Korea and China and everyone else to do it.''
Have they done anything? Obviously, I am being allegorical here
to a certain extent.
Mr. Kim. I mean, I can tell you that Chinese efforts and
sanctions enforcement and implementation have improved over
recent years. Is it perfect? No. But we have seen tighter
border controls. We have seen stricter controls over export of
dual-use items from China to North Korea. So we have seen some
improvements, but we need to see more is what I am trying to
say.
Mr. Cook. Well, I am running out of time here. I don't
agree with you. I don't agree that China has leaned on them at
all. And I don't even think they have agreed to the United
States that they are going to lean on them. And I think they
are the country that probably has the most influence.
And I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from California.
The Chair now recognizes the other gentleman from
California, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. I think the previous gentleman from California
had it right. China is subsidizing North Korea, and China will
occasionally send us a statement that says they love us very
much and they wish that North Korea wasn't acting so badly.
When we threaten or impose taxes on Chinese exports to the
United States, we will get their attention. Until then, we will
get statements that I describe as love letters--they may even
have little hearts directly from President Xi--saying that they
love us very much and they share our goals.
We may need to clarify the state-sponsor-of-terrorism
statute because, Ms. Johnson, is there any doubt that--let's
say Syria engages is planning terrorism, and they go to North
Korea and say, ``Hey, you guys have a special explosive that
will help us blow up more people.'' North Korea provides it to
Syria. And Syria, not a nonstate actor, Syria itself commits
the act of terrorism and kills extra people because they have
the good explosives.
Are you saying that, under the statue, it is unclear that
that would get a country put on the state sponsor of terrorism
list? After all, they didn't help a terrorist group; they
didn't carry out an act of terrorism themselves. They just
supplied special terrorist equipment to another state sponsor
of terrorism.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you for the question.
I would say that, again, we look back to the statue, which
says repeated acts, that they would provide support for
repeated acts of international terrorism.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. Let's say they did it four or five
times, but all of their aid was to a state actor, not a
nonstate actor.
Ms. Johnson. So we would look at the intelligence and the
available information to be able see----
Mr. Sherman. Say it is perfect intelligence; five times,
they provided things to Syria that Syria used for terrorism.
They are building the barrel bombs.
Ms. Johnson. Well, I don't want to get into hypotheticals,
but I would say, again, we would look at all----
Mr. Sherman. How can I possibly understand how you
interpret this statute if we don't get into hypotheticals?
I am asking you a simple question. Is support for a state
sponsor of terrorism a reason to put a country on the state
sponsor of terrorism list?
Ms. Johnson. Again, we would look at----
Mr. Sherman. ``We would look at''--can you give me an
answer?
Okay. Look, it is pretty obvious you are not following the
statute.
Mr. Kim, North Korea abducted Japanese citizens. Are some
of them still imprisoned in North Korea, as far as you know?
Mr. Kim. So we don't have that information. In fact----
Mr. Sherman. Have they returned the bones, or have they
returned the people? All of them. I know they have done on
occasion.
Mr. Kim. No.
Mr. Sherman. No. Okay. So I would think that kidnapping
Japanese citizens is an act of terrorism not only on the day
you kidnap them but a month later when you are still holding
them, 10 years later when you are still holding them, two
decades later when you are still holding them.
Ms. Johnson, I am going to try and understand this 6-month
rule. A country is on the state sponsor of terrorism list, but
they periodically issue statements saying they don't believe in
terrorism. So they have met one of the two prongs. The other
prong is they have to go 6 months without engaging in a
terrorist act or at least us knowing about it.
Let's say a country meets those two standards. The intel
briefs you and says, ``It has been 6 months and a day since
they have engaged in terrorism that we can document. And, oh,
by the way, here is a copy of their most recent statement
opposing terrorism.''
Under those circumstances, are you saying you can take them
off the terrorist list or you are required by law to take them
off the terrorist list?
Ms. Johnson. So there is nothing under the statute that
talks about reviewing. The not-fully-cooperating country list,
for instance, there is an annual review, and if you don't
recertify, you are off the list.
Mr. Sherman. Right. Okay.
Ms. Johnson. So, for the statutes, that is not the case. If
there is review called, we look back 6 months prior to the call
for the review for any acts of international terrorism and for
support or----
Mr. Sherman. And let's say you look back 6 months and you
don't see any. Do you then feel legally compelled to give
somebody a get-out-of-jail-free card because it has been 6
months and a day? Or is it just optional with the State
Department?
Ms. Johnson. Well, we provide the recommendation to the
Secretary of State, and then that would go to the----
Mr. Sherman. Are you required to recommend that a country
be taken off the state sponsor of terrorism list if, as far as
you know, they have gone 7 months without blowing anything up?
Ms. Johnson. I belive the answer is yes. And I could get
back to you on that. But yes.
Mr. Sherman. Well, please get back to us. Although, as to
North Korea, every day that those Japanese citizens are not
returned is a continuing act of terrorism. Every day that the
bodies of those who died in North Korea are not returned is a
continuing act of terrorism.
So, even if the law is as you describe it, the
recommendation of your bureau to take North Korea off the state
sponsor of terrorism list was certainly unjustified legally.
And then, as far as a matter of politics or international
foreign policy, hey, North Korea said it would disable its
nuclear installation in Yongbyun, it did, then it didn't, and
they are still off the list of--you know. I am not sure that
the removal is justified, as a matter of foreign policy.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. The Chair will have another round of questions
from the Members of Congress. We will go 2 minutes this time
instead of 5.
The Chair will yield to Colonel Cook from California.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to switch gears a little bit. And I understand that
the North Korean chamber of commerce and China has probably
given them a five-star rating for being good guys, but don't we
have the U.S. military that has Top Secret intelligence flying,
you know, satellite data, U-2s, and everything else?
And when you talk to the military and if you ask them that
question, they would probably say diplomatically, ``Not in our
area.'' But then they would tell you things and reasons why you
couldn't sleep at night and why the threat is so great, and
they would also talk about their affiliation with certain
terrorist groups.
Do you guys talk to the military and get that same take
that we get, maybe not in Foreign Affairs but the House Armed
Services Committee, where we get an analysis of a particular
country? And all I have gotten is--boy, if North Korea doesn't
qualify for that list, then no one does.
Ms. Johnson. Well, we look to the entire intelligence
community, and so----
Mr. Cook. But my question, does the military come to you
and do you have that exchange that we are having right now? Or
is that something outside your realm?
Ms. Johnson. No, we are consistently looking at the
intelligence and the information. So if military is coming with
information, yes, we would----
Mr. Cook. But do you have meetings together where you would
have a dialogue like this?
Ms. Johnson. We talk to the military intelligence
frequently on a number of countries. And, you know, we do have
discussions with them regularly, yes.
Mr. Kim. Sir, if I may, I think from our side, as well, we
remain in very close touch with our military colleagues.
And I served as U.S. Ambassador to Seoul until just
recently, and I know from my own experience that the
communication between us, the Embassy, and U.S. Forces Korea
continues every day, and it is very much focused on the threat
posed by North Korea.
And the same thing in Washington. I stay in very close
touch with my colleagues in the Pentagon, and we share
information about threats posed by North Korea.
Mr. Cook. Well, as somebody who was in the military a long
while, I had a different take on it than you did. So,
obviously, my 26 years in the Marine Corps was wasted, because
I am very, very worried about North Korea.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to try a thread of questioning that I started
and that Mr. Sherman tried to start, and maybe this will yield
an answer. Because we are interested in whether the process
needs to be altered in any way.
So, in the instance that we both led some questioning on,
where it is a state actor that is involved and it is repeated
sufficiently and it is credible, would you be precluded from
the designation because it is a state actor?
Ms. Johnson. If a country meets the criteria and we have
the intelligence, again, to support that criteria, we would
make a recommendation, yes.
Mr. Keating. Okay. So you are not precluded by that.
Ms. Johnson. But, again, yes, I mean, hypotheticals are
hard to answer in----
Mr. Keating. Oh, I am talking generally, not about North
Korea, in this instance.
Ms. Johnson. But, again, the criteria, I think, are--I
mean, there is no definition of ``acts of international
terrorism.'' So we have pulled from the statutes and
legislative history and then used----
Mr. Keating. Right. So the state-actor designation doesn't
preclude----
Ms. Johnson. So an SST, a foreign terrorist organization--
--
Mr. Keating. Right.
And just one other question, because we were talking about
sanctions and other issues. And I know this, but I would be
interested in Ambassador Kim's comments, you know, that might
be more recent or relevant.
They are among the most repressive countries in the world
with its own citizens--terrible human rights abuse of its own
citizens. How is our intelligence--to the extent that we can
talk about this, is there dissent among the people? Is there
significant feeling against a country that acts like this? Are
there indications that that is increasing recently?
Mr. Kim. Thank you.
I think it is difficult to tell. You would think that there
would be dissatisfaction, dissent among the North Korean
public, but North Korea remains a unique place. In many bad
ways, it is a unique place. The information flow is very
limited. The regime remains one of the most brutal. So I think
it is difficult for North Korean citizens to express dissent,
dissatisfaction in any way that we would be able to detect.
But, certainly, I mean, obviously, we monitor very closely
developments on the ground. And we are not seeing any
indication of any movement from the North Korean people.
Mr. Keating. Okay.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. The Chair yields to the gentleman from California,
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Ms. Johnson, I have, well, a hard question,
but it will be easy right now, and that is: I would like you to
furnish for the record from your bureau an analysis of how you
interpret the law. When are you required to list a state as a
state sponsor of terrorism? When are you allowed to do it? When
do you have to take them off the list, if ever? When are you
allowed to take them off?
And I will ask you to have a series of hypotheticals. If
country A--you don't have to name any countries--takes the
following action, then we are required to list them, we are
allowed to list them, we are required to delist them, we are
allowed to delist them.
Because it is our job, when necessary, to rewrite statutes,
and if we don't know how you are interpreting this statute, we
don't know whether it needs to be rewritten or not. Now, in a
perfect world, we would just quickly write a new statue that
would be so clear we wouldn't have to ask you how you interpret
it. I have learned that Congress is not a perfect world. And if
you are interpreting the law in a certain way that seems to be
correct, you will save us a lot of time in trying to improve
it.
Ambassador Kim, there is a tendency for us to say, ``Well,
the guys are the bad guys, just do bad things and have no moral
compass at all.'' It has been my experience that bad guys don't
think they are the bad guys, and they have their own compass,
as distorted--I mean, it may be pointing due south.
And, in looking at North Korea, they seem to be very
legalistic, and they seem to care whether we have a
nonaggression pact with them--not that that would stop a single
division from moving north. They seem to care about whether
they are designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, when, in
fact, if we took them off the list, that would not improve
their economy in any way I can ascertain. And now they are
pushing for a peace treaty. And even if we had a peace treaty
with them, God knows they engage in activity that would justify
unpeaceful activity in the future.
How much do they care about these three things, and why?
What is their internal thinking?
Mr. Kim. Thank you very much, Congressman. I think that is
a very important question.
Frankly, I am skeptical about their call for a peace treaty
because I think they understand that we have certain
fundamental requirements. I mean, they would need to
denuclearize; they would need to abandon their pursuit of
dangerous delivery means, missile capabilities; and they would
need to improve their human rights situation. I mean, I cannot
imagine any circumstance in which we would enter into a peace
treaty with North Korea that continues to reject international
obligations and commitments.
So they know that. So for them to be proposing peace treaty
negotiations without addressing, sort of, the core issues that
we care deeply about, frankly, it is disingenuous. So it is
hard for me to, you know, sort of, decipher why Kim Jong-un is
so focused on this.
But I agree with you completely that they tend to be very
legalistic. And this is, I think, one of the lessons we learned
from our previous efforts in negotiating with the North
Koreans, is that we really have to be very careful in drafting
these documents and entering into any side agreements, because
they are very much focused on the most minute details and
looking for loopholes wherever possible.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. Just a couple more questions. I think we are
voting now or soon. Thanks again for both of you being here.
There was a report back in the 2000s, early 2000s, that
North Korea set up a nuclear reactor in Syria and then provided
nuclear materials to Libya.
Assume that is true. Would that fit the criteria of
abetting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
which is one of the issues to determine whether somebody should
be on the foreign terrorist organization/state sponsor of
terrorism list?
Is that right, Ms. Johnson, or not?
Ms. Johnson. The FTO list and statutes are different than--
--
Mr. Poe. I know. I meant state sponsor of terrorism. I am
not trying to make North Korea a foreign terrorist
organization. State sponsor of terrorism is the key here. Would
that be a criteria for putting them on the list?
Ms. Johnson. Again, I think we look at everything very
closely. I know----
Mr. Poe. But would it be one of the things that you would
look at, this fact?
Ms. Johnson. We would look at it very closely and make sure
that it is repeated acts for support for international
terrorism and, again, evaluate the criteria and look at it
holistically and as an entirety. Because, again, I think it is
very hard to do hypotheticals without looking at----
Mr. Poe. Okay. How about cyber attacks? That was mentioned,
but I am not sure I understood the answer. Would that be a new
criteria now that you could consider to put a country on the
state sponsor of terrorism list?
Ms. Johnson. Again, we would review cyber attacks just as
closely as any of the other acts. And, again, for cyber
attacks, you know, you could look at them in a variety of
different ways depending on what we are talking about as far
as----
Mr. Poe. Yeah. Some of us look at them as an act of war.
Ms. Johnson. So, again, we would look at it against the
relevant criterial and, again, in its entirety.
Mr. Poe. And there are----
Ms. Johnson. But repeated acts is an important element.
Mr. Poe. Ambassador, I understand there are three countries
that are state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Syria, and Sudan.
Is that correct?
Ms. Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Poe. Is there anybody else that we don't know about?
Ms. Johnson. No.
Mr. Poe. I mean, that I don't know about.
Kim Jong-un had a press conference, apparently, some time
ago. Maybe it was last year. During the press conference, he
had behind him a chart or a hit list of things he wanted to
destroy. It is kind of personal to me that his first target on
that list, with his ICBM capability that he wants, was Austin,
Texas. I take that a little personal.
Ms. Johnson. Why Austin? Yeah.
Mr. Poe. And that was my question. Why Austin, Texas?
But, bigger than that, it seems to me that the government
is doing everything it can to be a bad actor in the world. They
are helping all the bad guys. They want to be a bad guy. They
want nuclear weapons. They want to help sponsor terrorism,
Hezbollah, Hamas.
And when I was with the Pacific Command not too long ago,
the admiral, I asked him the question: Of the five countries
that are threats, or the five entities--China, North Korea,
Iran, ISIS, Russia--which one are you the most nervous about?
He told me North Korea he was the most concerned about because
you never know what they are going to do.
So, anyway, I want to thank both of you for being here. We
will have a classified hearing at some later time where we will
have more members, and we will have that hearing. Thank you
both.
We are voting now, and we are adjourned. Court is over.
[Whereupon, at 3:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[Note: The document submitted for the record by the Honorable Ted Poe,
a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and chairman,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, entitled,
``United States District Court for the District of Columbia: Civil
Action No. 10-483 (RCL) and Civil Action No. 09-646 (RCL),''
demonstrating a court ruling in 2014 that North Korea materially
supported Hezbollah's terrorist attacks in Israel in 2006, is not
reprinted here but may be found on the Internet at: http://
docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20151022/104081/HHRG-114-FA18-20151022-
SD001.pdf]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[all]