[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 22, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-110
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
TOM EMMER, MinnesotaUntil 5/18/
15 deg.
DANIEL DONOVAN, New YorkAs
of 5/19/15 deg.
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MATT SALMON, Arizona GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
TED S. YOHO, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TOM EMMER, MinnesotaUntil 5/18/
15 deg.
DANIEL DONOVAN, New YorkAs
of 6/2/15 deg.
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Doug Farah, President, IBI Consultants....................... 4
Vladimir Rouvinski, Ph.D., Director of the CIES Interdisciplinary
Research Center, Universidad Icesi in Colombia................. 18
Constantino Urcuyo, Ph.D., Academic Director, Centro de
Investigacion y Adiestramiento Politico Administrativo in Costa
Rica........................................................... 26
Diana Villiers Negroponte, Ph.D., Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars....................... 36
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Doug Farah: Prepared statement............................... 7
Vladimir Rouvinski, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................... 20
Constantino Urcuyo, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................... 28
Diana Villiers Negroponte, Ph.D.: Prepared statement............. 38
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 54
Hearing minutes.................................................. 55
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the
Middle East and North Africa: Material submitted for the record 56
RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
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THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Duncan. A quorum being present, the subcommittee will
come to order. I now would like to recognize myself for an
opening statement.
This subcommittee hearing is the third in a series of
hearings that we have held to examine the presence and
activities of certain countries operating here in the Western
Hemisphere. In February, we looked at Iran and Hezbollah's
presence in the region, the failure of the State Department to
prioritize these actors in view of a potential Iran nuclear
deal and the limited U.S. intelligence capabilities focused on
these issues.
In July, we examined China's extensive engagement with the
region through trade and the investment of hundreds of billions
of dollars, energy cooperation, infrastructure projects and a
range of security activities including satellite cooperation,
arms sales, and military exchanges.
So today we will meet to consider Russia's engagement in
Latin America and Caribbean. Following the Cold War, Russia
began taking more of a pronounced interest in the region
especially during the 2008 crisis in Georgia. When the U.S.
responded to Russia's aggression in Georgia by sending naval
forces to the Black Sea, Russia deployed nuclear-capable
bombers to the Caribbean and a four-ship naval flotilla to
conduct military exercises with the Venezuelan navy and make
port calls in Cuba and Nicaragua.
Let there be light.
Russia also stepped up its diplomatic outreach with a visit
to the region from then-President Medvedev, and subsequent
visits from the Presidents of Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and
Ecuador to Moscow. Following Russia's invasion of the Ukraine
in 2014, Russia again ushered in another wave of military and
diplomatic activities with particular emphasis on anti-American
and undemocratic countries, those with close proximity to U.S.
borders, or those with unique capabilities of interest to
Russia.
Last year proved a very eventful year for Russia in the
Western Hemisphere. Reportedly, Russia began talks on
Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela about establishing bases for
resupplying Russian warships and potentially refueling Russian
long-range bombers. In April, the U.S. observed two Russian
ships operating in waters close to Cuba near the U.S. naval
station in Mayport, Florida. That same month, the Russian
foreign minister visited Nicaragua, Cuba, Peru and Chile.
In June, NORAD reported it had scrambled two F-22s and two
F-15s after seeing a fleet of Russian bombers off the coast of
Alaska and California. In July, Russian President Putin
traveled in the region to visit Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina and
Brazil. At that time, Russia forgave 90 percent of Cuba's debt,
and reportedly Russia and Cuba agreed to reopen the Lourdes
base only 150 miles from the United States coast.
End of September, U.S. intercepted Russia fighter jets and
tankers in airspace near Alaska, and just in November of last
year, Russia announced that it had planned to send its long-
range bombers to the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. The
United States did very little in response to all these
developments.
Subsequently, this past January, Russia sent a ship to Cuba
on the eve of Assistant Secretary Roberta Jacobsen's visit.
This was followed by a visit from the Russian foreign minister
to Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela in February, and a visit from
the Russian defense minister to Cuba, Colombia, Nicaragua and
Guatemala in March.
Most recently, as Russia has deepened its military efforts
in Syria, reportedly Cuban troops have been sent to Syria to
operate Russian tanks. Such Russian overreach in its own
region, in the Middle East, and now in the Western Hemisphere
does not send a positive message to the United States and our
freedom-loving allies. Indeed, in view of Russia's aggression
in its own neighborhood, violations of arms control treaties,
cyberattacks on U.S. infrastructure, and continued partnerships
with Iran, Syria, Cuba and Venezuela, Russian actions do not
signal an interest in peace nor of global stability.
In the Western Hemisphere, Russia's engagement appears
driven primarily by geopolitical and security considerations
rather than solely economic interest. After all, in 2013,
Russia's bilateral trade with the region was only $18 billion,
14 times less than China's trade with the region.
In contrast, from 2001 to 2013, Russia sold Latin America
almost $15 billion in arms which amounts to 40 percent of the
arms purchased by the region from external actors. Similarly,
from 2008 to 2011, Russia sold more than 3,000 surface-to-air
missiles to the region, and multiple countries also have
Russian helicopters.
Beyond arms sales Russia has sought positions of influence.
Reportedly, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Argentina have all
granted Russia access to their airspace and ports. Russia's
only transoceanic shipping line to South America runs from
Russia to Ecuador, and multiple countries have agreed to or are
considering participating in Russia's GLONASS satellite
navigation system. Furthermore, Russia seems to have
prioritized relations with countries close to U.S. borders.
Russia has provided armored vehicles, aircraft missiles and
helicopters to Mexico, and assistance in Mexico's fight against
criminal organizations.
Several of El Salvador's leaders received training in the
Soviet Union, and Nicaragua has agreed to host a new Russian
counterdrug center, Russian munitions disposal plant, and a 130
Russian counternarcotics trainers who conduct joint patrols
with the Nicaraguans. In addition, Russia has cultivated a
strategic alliance with Brazil and a strategic partnership with
Argentina as Russia's top two trading partners. Furthermore,
Russian engagement in Peru has resulted in strong military ties
with that country, counterdrug cooperation, and reportedly the
planning and executing of joint strategic operations.
Today, Venezuela remains a key linchpin for Russia activity
in Latin America, and in return Russia has provided Venezuela
with arms sales, a $2 billion loan, and energy cooperation in
the Orinoco River Basin.
In conclusion, Russia's engagement in the Western
Hemisphere is deeply troubling. At a time when Russia is
flexing its geopolitical muscles in other parts of the world,
its power projection in our very region should be met with U.S.
strength, resilience and clarity. In 2009, President Putin
called cooperation with Latin American states one of the key
and very promising lines of Russian foreign policy. The United
States should recognize this and adapt accordingly in our
response.
So I will look forward to hearing from the expert panelists
on this topic. And I want to just emphasize that this is just a
series of hearings that we are having focused on not only the
involvement of other countries in this hemisphere, but I want
to emphasize the lack of U.S. engagement in this hemisphere,
and so I would love for the panelists to touch on that as well.
With that I will turn to the ranking member Mr. Sires for
his opening statement.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. Thank
you for our witnesses for being here today.
Today we are examining Russia's engagement in Latin America
and the Caribbean. Russia has been involved in Latin America
since its support for Cuba and Nicaragua during the Cold War.
The post-Cold War era saw a decline in Russian engagement, but
as Russia-U.S. relations have become tenser in recent years,
Putin is reviving these old ties to the Western Hemisphere.
Russia has had a series of high profile state visits, proposed
investment and most important an increase in military sales and
military exercise in the region.
According to General John F. Kelly, commander of the U.S.
Southern Command, Russia has courted Cuba, Venezuela and
Nicaragua to gain access to airbases and ports for resupply of
Russian naval assets and strategic bombers operating in the
Western Hemisphere. Putin's high level visit included travel to
Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina and Brazil, while the Russian prime
minister has also made trips to Cuba and Nicaragua.
Russia's interests in the region are to increase military
cooperation, find new partners in the wake of U.S. and EU
sanctions on Russia's economy, and try and promote the
perception that they are a global power. Though these high
level visits and proposed agreements are just for the Russian
investment in the region, experts doubt Russia's ability to
fulfill its economic commitment.
What concerns me is Russia's continued arms sales to the
region, especially on the heels of their support for ruthless
dictators like Syria's Bashir al-Assad. Now we are seeing
reports of the Cuban military on the ground in Syria assisting
Russia in bombing innocent civilians and moderate anti-
government forces.
For too many years the United States has focused on other
parts of the world which has led to the neglect of our
neighborhood. We must remain vigilant on what the long-term
consequences might be and reaffirm our own commitment to the
region. And I look forward to hearing from our panelists today.
Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. Wow. That was a short opening statement.
Mr. Sires. I want to hear what they have got to say.
Mr. Duncan. I appreciate the ranking member. I do as well.
The bios are in your binders and so I won't do the bios. I will
just start with recognizing each member will have 5 minutes.
There is a light system, so when it gets close to running out
of time you will have yellow and then red, and then if you
could wrap it up when the red light comes on.
So Douglas Farah, welcome back. You have been a great
panelist in the past and a tremendous asset for me. I have
learned a lot from you. I look forward to learning more from
you today. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. DOUG FARAH, PRESIDENT, IBI CONSULTANTS
Mr. Farah. Thank you, Chairman Duncan, I appreciate your
kind words. And thank you, Ranking Member Sires and members of
the committee for the opportunity to discuss Russia's----
Mr. Duncan. Now if you could pull that microphone just a
little closer. We are recording this and I want to make sure we
get it all. So thank you.
Mr. Farah. Is that better? Okay, thank you.
Over the past 3 years, as you have noted, President Putin
has made no secret of his desire to create a multipolar world
where the United States is not dominant. Leaders of the U.S.
defense and intelligence communities have responded to Russia's
growing global assertiveness by singling out Russia as the
primary military and strategic threat to the United States,
particularly following Russia's annexation of the Crimea and
other hostile activities. However, that threat assessment is
seldom applied to Latin America. Yet, given its current
positioning one could argue that Russia now has more influence
in Latin America than ever before, even including the height of
the Cold War.
This will likely remain true despite the recent
announcement of the normalization of diplomatic relations
between Cuba and the United States. During most of the Cold
War, the Soviet Union's only reliable ally in Latin America was
Cuba, which in turn helped sponsor insurgent movements across
the hemisphere. With the 1979 triumph of the Sandinista
Revolution, the Kremlin gained a second state partner, but when
the Berlin Wall fell 12 years later, Russia's regional
influence ebbed to almost nothing.
But since 2005, riding the wave of radical anti-U.S.
populism sponsored by the late President Hugo Chavez of
Venezuela, Russia is now firmly allied with the ranks of Latin
America's populist, authoritarian and strongly anti-American
leaders of the Bolivarian Alliance bloc known as ALBA. The
Putin government is providing all the nations with weapons,
police and military training and equipment, intelligence
technology and training, nuclear technology, oil exploration
equipment, financial assistance, and an influential friend in
the United Nations Security Council and other international
forums. With Russia's help the once shared hemispheric values
of functioning and democratic systems are being replaced by a
toxic mix of anti-democratic values, massive corruption, and a
doctrine that draws on totalitarian models.
The ALBA bloc embraces terrorism and terrorist groups such
as the FARC in Colombia, Hezbollah, and the Spanish ETA and its
military doctrine includes the justification of the use of
weapons of mass destruction against the United States. In
return, these allies are shielding Russia from international
isolation, providing political and diplomatic support, and
opening access to financial markets for sanctioned Russian
banks and companies.
Russia has also helped create an important regional media
and social media network offering coordinated messages of
unstinting support for Putin while casting the United States as
the global aggressor. At the same time, ALBA countries are
increasing Russia's military access to the hemisphere's ports
and airspace and ultimately increasing Russia's sphere of
influence in a region where the United States has seldom been
so directly challenged.
As noted in his July visit, President Putin made multiple
gifts to his friends in the region, including the forgiveness
of Cuban debt, declaring a strategic alliance with Argentina,
and discussing nuclear energy agreements over dinner with
Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Putin also
promised President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua Russia's military
protection for the canal which will likely never be completed,
but would provide Russia with coveted deep sea seaports.
It is worth noting that with the establishment of these
strategic alliances, delegations of senior Russian military and
foreign relations officials routinely travel through the
region, including individuals under sanctions by the United
States and the European Union. As noted, General Kelly is aware
of this issue and has said that over the past three decades,
``It has been over three decades since we last saw this type of
high profile Russian presence in Latin America.'' He added that
under Putin we have seen a clear return to the Cold War
tactics.
It is not that the nature of the Russian state is not
understood. In March 2015, Director of National Intelligence
James Clapper labeled Russia a ``threat actor'' and an example
of a nation where ``the nexus among organized crime, state
actors, and business blurs the distinction between state policy
and private gain.''
While one can observe the accuracy of this assessment of
Russia's intentions and capability in many parts of the world,
the growing mixture of Russian state presence, business
ventures, soft power overtures, criminal activity and proxy
activities in Latin America have gone largely unexamined. One
repeat visitor to Latin America who provides a particularly
useful lens to understand Russian activities in the region is
General Valery Gerasimov, chief of staff of the Russian
Federation and chief architect of the Gerasimov Doctrine. The
influential doctrine posits that the rules of war have changed
and that there is a ``blurring of the lines between war and
peace.'' He advocates an asymmetrical series of actions in a
permanently operating front through an entire territory of the
enemy state.
This is the prism through which the Russian's engagement in
Latin America should be viewed. This is how and why Russia is
engaging with select Latin America states. If you look closely
at what they are doing they are focusing on four distinct
areas. As noted, the sale of weapons; also police, military and
intelligence assistance; access to financial institutions,
which I detail in my written testimony at some length; and
creating this counter-narrative which I talked about before
where the United States is constantly portrayed as the
aggressor and Russia as an alternative to that.
In addition, IBI Consultants research has mapped out an
interesting and opaque network of former senior military and
KGB officials operating in Central America. This network
deserves extensive more research. Russia's rise underscores, as
Chairman Duncan said, the significant loss of Washington's
ability to shape events in a region close to home and of
significant strategic interest. While the U.S. position remains
preeminent due to geographic proximity, cultural ties and trade
ties, it is eroding more quickly than is often understood.
In a time of resource scarcity, Russia has managed to
leverage a small amount of resources into significant gain. The
Russia agenda is aided and abetted by the ALBA bloc of nations
in which there is no independent media and where the official
media magnifies each statement and donation. The United States
needs a much more visible return to the region to counter the
perception and the reality that Russia is again a major
strategic influence in the region. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:]
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Mr. Duncan. Thank you. Before I recognize Dr. Rouvinski, I
want to thank you and Dr. Urcuyo for traveling from Costa Rica
and Colombia. You all have traveled quite a distance and we are
glad we are able to make this hearing happen today. So thank
you for that and on behalf of the committee. And Dr. Rouvinski,
you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF VLADIMIR ROUVINSKI, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF THE CIES
INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH CENTER, UNIVERSIDAD ICESI IN
COLOMBIA
Mr. Rouvinski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Ranking Member, and the other esteemed committee members, for
the opportunity to speak today before the committee. Let me
begin my testimony by sharing some general observations with
regard to the Russian presence in Latin America, placing a
particular emphasis on the evolution of Russian goals and
objectives in the Western Hemisphere from the beginning of the
1990s until now.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political
and military, economic and cultural contacts between Russia and
Latin America declined sharply. But during the first decade of
the 21st century, the situation changed dramatically. Already
by 2008, Russian trade with Latin America had doubled in
comparison with 1996. The same year, in a new vector, Russia
declared its foreign policy to be a strategic partnership with
Latin America. By 2015, Russia is maintaining diplomatic
relations with all countries in the Western Hemisphere.
With many of these countries the Russian Government signed
a visa-free agreement allowing greater ease of travel between
the regions. Taking into consideration the dynamic relations
between Russia and Latin America, the political leaders in
Russia began to talk about the Russian return to Latin America,
referring to similarities between the current state of affairs
and the policy promoted by the Soviet Union during the Cold
War. However, characterizing the Russian presence in the
Western Hemisphere as a ``return'' is inaccurate, since the
Russian objectives only partially match those pursued by the
Soviet Union.
The current Russian strategy in the Western Hemisphere is
to strengthen diplomatic relations with all Latin American
countries while promoting economic cooperation and the arms
trade, as well as military contact with some of the countries.
Three groups of countries in the region can be
distinguished in light of these efforts. The first group
consists of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, which have offered
full support to Russia in the Ukrainian and Syrian crises.
These countries benefit from Russian cooperation in the energy
sector, have been recipient of Russian aid and are major buyer
of Russian arms. Their political contacts with Moscow pave the
way for military cooperation, thus explicitly challenging the
United States in its ``near abroad.'' Russia also seems to
expand the area of cooperation with this group by offering
collaboration in sensitive issues such as drug trafficking and
international organized crime.
The second group includes Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil,
the most economically important countries for the region, as
well as several other Latin American nations. While the leaders
of these countries may not fully collaborate with the Kremlin's
international agenda, Russia still counts on their support in
various multilateral arrangements including the United Nations,
BRICS, and G-20.
The third group of countries has strong ties with the
United States and are unwilling to risk their relations with
the West, but do not want to antagonize Russia either. An
example is Colombia, which is maintaining its alliance with the
United States while avoiding confrontation with Russia.
The current Russian economic presence in the Western
Hemisphere is very significant if comparing to the state of
Russian commerce and trade with the region in the 1990s.
However, the Russian economic engagement with Latin America is
rather modest in comparison of some other extra-hemispheric
actors, firstly, the People's Republic of China. Moreover, it
is important to underline that Russia's capacity to further
build up its presence in the Western Hemisphere is limited
because of the low price of petroleum on international markets
and the effect of economic sanctions imposed on the country by
the United States and Europe.
While the relations between Russian leaders and many of
their Latin American counterparts can be characterized as
strongly sympathetic, some of them lack a long-term commitment
and may crumble under new leaders. In addition, in the
challenging global geopolitical context, Russia has managed to
maintain stable relation with all Latin American countries and
therefore effectively undermined the efforts of the United
States and its allies to isolate Moscow in order to pressure
the government of Vladimir Putin to change its current policy
in Europe.
I would like to invite the United States House of
Representatives to consider the following: The Russian re-
engagement with Latin America is evidence that the processes
that are taking place in Latin America and the Caribbean are
part of the changing global geopolitical landscape, and the
answers to the challenges posed to the United States economic
and security interests as a result of the Russian return to the
region are to be considered from a global perspective.
It is also important to open possibilities for a more
comprehensive study of the Russian presence in Latin America by
academic institutions and think-tanks in the United States.
Whereas in recent years, research activities concerned, for
example, with China's presence in the region have been booming,
the Russian presence in Latin America has been mostly
neglected. However, to better understand the Russian long-term
interest in this part of the world, support for academic
research is pivotal. Thank you for your time, and I look
forward to the questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rouvinski follows:]
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Mr. Duncan. Thank you so much for your testimony.
Dr. Urcuyo, is that microphone on?
Mr. Urcuyo. Yes.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. Make sure it is pointed right at your
mouth too. That will be good.
STATEMENT OF CONSTANTINO URCUYO, PH.D., ACADEMIC DIRECTOR,
CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION Y ADIESTRAMIENTO POLITICO
ADMINISTRATIVO IN COSTA RICA
Mr. Urcuyo. Okay. Thank you for the invitation. Russia has
been present in the region in a new way since the last decade,
although Moscow did have great activity during the Cold War.
This inheritance will play a role in the current phase because
thousands of Latin Americans were trained in the USSR. What is
happening in what the Russians call their ``near abroad'' is
interacting in real time with events in Latin America. Russia's
diplomatic and military penetration in Latin America is a
response to what it sees as an excessive presence of the U.S.A.
and NATO in what it considers its influence area.
Besides, Russia is nostalgic for having lost the Soviet
empire and wants to show the world that it still a member of
the major powers and capable of projecting power in its main
adversary's backyard. On the other hand, Putin plays to his
domestic audience. The resurgence of great Russian nationalism
is fostered by the audacity of its leader. From the perspective
of Russian Grand Strategy, forays into the region may not
provide significant immediate returns in terms of the global
scenario, but in the event of a more generalized future
conflict they could enable Russia to use regional internal
conflicts to its advantage.
I will focus on Nicaragua due to Russia's importance to
this country as well as the potential consequences of its
activity for Costa Rica and the rest of Central America. Russia
has a historical background of close relations with Managua.
Currently, though, collaboration links have become closer. The
Russian ministers of defense and foreign affairs visit
frequently and a Russian anti-drug training center has opened
near Managua.
Russia has also shown interest in deploying satellite
stations in Nicaragua for their global positioning system.
Russia's focus on anti-drug cooperation is paradoxical if one
considers that the drug-dealing routes that go through
Nicaragua are not headed to Moscow. Some observers interpret it
as a form of covert and strategic expansion. Russia's intention
could be to obtain military bases or to trade political
military assets as it did during the Cuban missile crisis.
On the other hand, Nicaragua's ongoing maritime conflict
with Colombia suggests that its rearmament is aimed more at the
confrontation with this country than the fight against
organized crime. Such remilitarization has raised concerns.
There is great unease about its consequences for the regional
balance of forces.
The link between Russia and Nicaragua goes beyond military
issues. It involves the diplomatic arena. Since 2008, Nicaragua
recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia in alignment with Russian
diplomacy. The alignment was repeated when Nicaragua voted
against the disapproval Crimea's annexation at the United
Nations. The Russian military and diplomatic presence in
Central America is a factor of regional instability. It is
threatening for Costa Rica because the country does not have an
army and has a border dispute with Nicaragua. If a conflict
arises with Colombia, Bogota's level of armament and military
training will escalate its dimensions, threatening peace
throughout the Caribbean Basin.
Conclusions and recommendations. Russia is trying to
transfer its conflict with the U.S. to Latin America while
profiting from weapons sales and challenging and provoking the
U.S. Latin American countries must be aware that they cannot be
trapped in a Russian conflict. Russia's regional old friends
and new allies provide a haven for extra-hemispheric powers
that seek to counterbalance the power of the U.S.A. by
strengthening anti-imperialist nationalism.
Russia's overtures revolve around the military and not
around human development. That Russian activity raises
apprehension in Washington is understandable. However, the
answer cannot be unilateral. It must emerge from a dialogue
with Latin American countries that considers all national
interests and defines multilateral political partnerships.
China's active economic cooperation frees some of Moscow's
Latin American allies from economic pressures enabling Russian
military and diplomatic penetration. The recent Chinese-Russian
partnership could develop in the future through greater
coordination in the hemisphere. There are speculations about
the likely participation of Russia in the defense of the
Nicaraguan Canal by the Chinese.
Russian actions in Central America demand a more detailed
accounting of its intense military cooperation with Nicaragua.
Russia actually is trying to play a new role in Central America
becoming an observer member of the Central American Integration
System. Some Latin American countries have given a positive
response to Vladimir Putin's initiatives, which shows that
inter-American relations have shifted qualitatively. It is
important, last, to develop a shared and strategic doctrine in
the Americas adapted to the new architecture of the
international system. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Urcuyo follows:]
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Mr. Duncan. Thank you so much.
Dr. Negroponte, for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DIANA VILLIERS NEGROPONTE, PH.D., PUBLIC POLICY
SCHOLAR, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
Ms. Negroponte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Sires, for the opportunity to present ideas this afternoon.
Having listened to my three colleagues I am going to adapt
somewhat my remarks this afternoon, but I have left with you a
written testimony.
I wish to look at the issue of Russian engagement in a
somewhat distinct way and analyze why Russia has become more
active in this hemisphere. I would argue there are three
reasons. First, Russia needs markets, markets for its military
equipment, its heavy industrial goods, and its growing IT
sector. It was interesting when President Putin visited
Nicaragua last year and it was at the last moment that he asked
Nicaragua to sell fruits, vegetables, coffee, and meat given
that Russia had banned the import of these important products
from its natural and normal sources. Markets, I would argue, is
one of the reasons why Russia has expanded its interest and its
presence.
Secondly, Russia needs friends. It needs friends at the
U.N. General Assembly. It needs friends who will vote with it
against the United States when we condemn the annexation of
Korea and activities in Ukraine.
The third reason for Russia is as the West has expanded its
presence in the Baltics, in Ukraine and Poland, Russia has
sought to meddle in what might be called by some ``our
backyard.'' The response from both Nicaragua and Cuba has been
interesting because of its distinctiveness. In the case of
Nicaragua, as Dr. Urcuyo has pointed out, Daniel Ortega is
playing high risks. He discusses the purchase of MiG-29s, eight
of them, from Russia. He has developed a training center for
military helicopters and there are no funds to pay for this.
So there is a lot of rhetoric and hype, but the reality on
the ground is that we are bumbling along. What is not bumbling
along and what is of interest to the Central Americans is the
development of the regional training center for anti-drug
cooperation, and that is useful for the Hondurans, Salvadorans
and Guatemalans. Were the United States to be more effective
and more general in its anti-drug and its anti-narcotics
program, those countries would have less reason to look toward
Russia.
In the case of Raul Castro, he is more cautious and more
calculating than Daniel Ortega. Raul Castro has been blind-
sided by the Russians and previously the Soviet Union. You will
recall 1962. And in 2008, a similar by Russia to place missile
systems in Cuba was found out only later by Raul Castro much to
his disapproval and irritation. Therefore, on the part of Raul
Castro, there is skepticism and care in dealing with Russia. He
is not going to be blind-sided again.
What is the recommendation for us in the United States? We
should pass the billion-dollar program to support Central
America. The underlying problems of the region are poverty and
unequal distribution of wealth. If we are not to show that we
care about these underlying problems exacerbated further by the
drug trade, exacerbated further by the presence of military
weapons, then we should expect that others will fill that
space. I sincerely hope that space is not filled by Russia.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Negroponte follows:]
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Mr. Duncan. Well, thank all the panelists, great testimony.
And now we will enter into the questioning phase and I will
recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
First one, how does Russia cultivate ties with Latin
American countries? Mr. Farah.
Mr. Farah. It cultivates them largely through, as was
mentioned numerous times, weapons sales and a constant stream
of high profile visitors going through to give the impression
that they care a great deal. You see the defense minister, you
see the foreign minister, you see the head of counternarcotics,
you see the head of Parliament, all parading through there
multiple times a year. So, and they also offer a lot of things
that aren't delivered, as I think Dr. Negroponte said. They
create the illusion of doing more than what they do. But they
also have an echo chamber that they have created with the ALBA
nations particularly where that is never reported, and you hear
the constant great things that the Russians are doing.
But I also think the more dangerous element, and I will be
very brief on this, is the cultivation of much more significant
intelligence ties and the providing of much more sophisticated
intelligence apparatuses to the ALBA nations. You see it
particularly in the newest member in El Salvador. You see a
great deal of Russian equipment coming in. Nicaragua has it.
Venezuela has it. Greatly increasing the power of the
intelligence services which are geared entirely to monitoring
their own people and suppressing dissent, and I think that is
an incredibly dangerous but it is an enticing element.
And the reason they have some success in the weapons and
other things is they attach no conditions. So if you are going
to give them a lot of toys and no conditions, they would prefer
that to getting issues from the United States where they may
have to account for how they use those things.
Mr. Duncan. So in your opinion, Russia is getting something
of value in return for their involvement? Are they getting what
they want?
Mr. Farah. I think that they wouldn't keep doing it if they
weren't, sir. And I think that if you look at their, and I have
a great deal in my testimony, particularly in the financial
sector where they have made great inroads into the banking
system to avoid international sanctions that the United States
and the European Union have provided to them. I think that is
very significant to their well-being. I think as others have
mentioned, the ability to offload for some profit, aging arms
systems that they can't really unload anyplace else but are
useful in regions like Central America.
And as several other panelists have mentioned, friendship.
They have a group of people who will support them against any
charges in the United Nations and elsewhere, and whom they will
protect. When Venezuela is up on human rights issues who is
going to veto that in the Security Council? It is going to be
Russia. They have culled to this a mutually beneficial
relationship, yes.
Mr. Duncan. All right. Do you think Russia is seeking to
provide political or military challenge to the United States in
the Western Hemisphere? I will ask one of the others that. Dr.
Rouvinski, do you think Russia is seeking to provide a
political or military challenge to the United States in this
hemisphere?
Mr. Rouvinski. I think Russia has pursued different
interests if we take into consideration the period before the
war in Georgia in 2008 and after the war. I think before the
war, Russian interests in Latin America were mostly linked with
the possibility to promote the interests of their Russian
private and state enterprises. And we have seen actually the
efforts not only directed toward the arms sales, but also to
promote the interest of the Russian energy companies and oil
companies in Latin America.
However, after the Georgian crisis of 2008, I think,
following the support obtained by Russia from Nicaragua and
Venezuela, Russia started to reevaluate its policy and
objective in Latin America and started looking for more
opportunities from that perspective. So I think definitely
there are some signs that Russia is challenging the United
States, building strong military ties with the group of
countries that I was mentioning, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba,
though I would agree with Dr. Negroponte that Cuba seems to be
much more cautious in dealing with Russia than Nicaragua was.
Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. And just to kind of summarize what you said if
I heard you correctly, early on since 2008 with Georgia, Russia
basically said you meddle in my neighborhood, I am going to
come over and meddle in your neighborhood. And is that sort of
a simplified summation of what you are saying?
Mr. Rouvinski. I would agree with you. And also I think it
is very important the recognition that what even by Nicaragua
of the breakaway republics at present South Ossetia, because
Russia was actually facing a great trouble in getting any
recognition of those breakaway republics, and it seemed that
Daniel Ortega offer of recognizing those republic came with no
previous consultation. So I would agree it was a certain risk
there on his behalf, but Nicaragua also quickly obtained some
important benefits from Russia. Russia supplied some aid to
Nicaragua in recognition of its support of the Russian state.
Mr. Duncan. I agree. From what I have learned about
Nicaragua, it concerns me probably more than Venezuela here in
October 2015.
Doug, we have seen all this naval activity and air space
incursions, what do you think Russia is up to? Why do you think
we are seeing them sail so close to our shores, come into the
Gulf of Mexico, come close to our airspace both on the east
coast and west coast? What do you think they are up to, in your
opinion? Yes.
Mr. Farah. I think they are very explicit if you read their
own literature. And I was fortunate in a project I was doing to
work with a Russian analyst who spoke both Russian and Spanish
who was able to read a lot of their media and their papers,
academic papers. They are very explicit, as I think Dr.
Negroponte said, the idea they are very upset that we are, that
they view the United States as in their backyard and they want
to come in our backyard.
And they have this doctrine, the Gerasimov Doctrine, of
creating this constant state of conflict in every sphere, not
just military, economic and counternarcotics, all of these
things. And if you see where they move into the region it is to
directly challenge what the United States does best and has
been in the region for. That is why I think they put in the
counternarcotics center.
I disagree a little bit with Dr. Negroponte in that it is a
benefit to a lot of countries. It is primarily--I have been to
the center there and the training is not of high quality at all
and everybody acknowledges that. But what they do do is select
out from there their best elements and take them back to Moscow
and train them and then send them back into the region gaining
access to a great deal of intelligence and operational capacity
in the region.
So I think that there are multiple reasons that feed into
their view that they need to be another superpower, regain
their superpower status. And I think this doctrine, and it is
fascinating because it is the basis of what Russia does all
over the world and they are very explicit about it. This isn't
some dark secret. They view conflict as a permanent state and
we don't. We generally think if you overcome a certain conflict
then you are in peace.
And this doctrine explicitly says you are going to be in
constant conflict in an asymmetrical way until you are able to
overcome the enemy, and you see that in a lot of what they do
in Latin America. It is not military, but it is certainly in
this sphere of the social media and the other media they
control and the training they are giving and the recruitment
they are doing is a very different type of thing.
Mr. Duncan. Well, my time is expired. The ranking member is
younger than I am, but this really seems like a throwback to
the Cold War and what we experienced when I was growing up with
then, the Soviet Union and their incursion and probing and what
not. So I will turn to the ranking member for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sires. Chairman, you would be surprised how old I am.
Dr. Negroponte, did I detect a sense that Russia is really more
interested in markets than the military?
Ms. Negroponte. Yes. Russia needs markets for its newly
developed and sophisticated military equipment. It participates
in military shows in Chile and in Peru in order to show what it
has produced and for it not to be treated as some 1950
industrial base. So show is important, sales are important, and
as of now, income is even more important.
Mr. Sires. Thank you. Dr. Urcuyo, did you say that you felt
that Americas are excessively in South America and Central
America in the Western Hemisphere in your comments? And that is
why the Russians----
Mr. Urcuyo. Excessively what? Excuse me.
Mr. Sires. That is the word you used because I wrote it
down.
Mr. Urcuyo. No, but I didn't follow your question.
Mr. Sires. That you felt that the Americas were excessively
in the Western Hemisphere and that is why
Russia----
Mr. Urcuyo. No, no. Not at all. I think that the U.S. has
been distracted in all the theaters of action and of war so you
haven't been paying enough attention to what is happening in
the Western Hemisphere. And suddenly you find out that there is
vacuum, and that that vacuum has been occupied by China,
economically speaking, and by Russia that tries to fill that
vacuum. But I wouldn't be that dramatic.
And it may be I didn't explain myself in my first
presentation, but I think that there is space for the strategic
expansion of Russia but not in absolute terms.
Mr. Sires. Because that is how I feel. I feel we haven't
focused enough on the Western Hemisphere over the years, so
when you said that it sort of struck a key in my head here.
There is an awful lot of talk about how the Russians were so
magnanimous and forgave Cuba its debt of $20 billion or
whatever it was. First of all, Cuba could have never paid that
debt.
Mr. Urcuyo. Yes.
Mr. Sires. So, I mean, this magnanimous effort by Russia,
it really is nothing more than reality that Cuba can't pay
whatever they owe Russia. So I would love to read that in the
press how they play that up as something so big.
I have a comment here from SOUTHCOM Commander General
Kelly. He has referred to the Russian's activity in Latin
America as more of a nuisance as opposed to a threat, but has
noted that the Russian presence underscores the importance of
the United States remaining engaged with its partners in the
region. Is it a nuisance or is it a threat? Dr. Negroponte?
Ms. Negroponte. Ranking Member Sires, I believe that I
support what General Kelly has said that it is a nuisance.
There is so much hype, so much rhetoric, but when you come down
to the real practical answer, who pays? Russia? Russian banks?
They are not in a position to. Nicaragua? Nicaraguan banks?
They are not in a position to. Cuba? The same. We have a term
and a time of pragmatism in Cuba which does not permit Cuba to
become a recipient of highly expensive equipment. So how did
they pay for it?
Those restructuring of loans were undertaken in order to
reduce the interest payments and then at the same time lease
Ilyushin and Tupolev aircraft so-called to develop the tourist
trade. I can understand Russians want to leave Russia in
January, February and March, but the cost of those aircraft to
carry tourists has been the reduced interest payments on those
Cold War debts.
Mr. Sires. Anybody else like to do that, whether it was a
threat or----
Mr. Urcuyo. Well, I was--in my original testimony there is
a quote from a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences trying
to explain where they are in Latin America at this moment and
he says we are playing on Washington nerves. So for me, they
are playing deliberately to irritate the region with their
presence, but I will say there is a natural dramatic threat in
this moment. But of course they are placing their dates and
their points in the region looking for the median or long term,
but I don't think that the immediate moment, an immediate term,
Russia is a threat to the United States because of its
activities in the Western Hemisphere. Maybe in the future, yes,
taking into account this actual situation.
Mr. Rouvinski. Yes, I think we have to understand now what
motivates Russia, do what Russia do with the military
exercises, with the visits of the strategic bombers and with
the navy.
Latin America, in the recent years transformed to be a very
useful instrument for the Russian propaganda inside the
country. More Russians worry about Latin America, and the image
of Latin America I think it is quite different from reality. I
have been living in Latin America and I had a chance to travel
extensively. But because of this constructed image, Russian
authorities are capable of taking advantage of these actions to
show actually the capacity that perhaps not mesh exactly what
Russia can do in real terms as a threat to the United States,
but to show actually the Russian authority, Russian army is
capable to mitigate the United States in the near abroad. So I
think there is a great value for the Russian propaganda machine
attached to what Russia is doing.
Mr. Sires. My time--sorry, Mr. Farah, but my time has just
expired.
Mr. Duncan. I want to thank the ranking member. Good line
of questioning. I knew Cuba would be the thrust of your
questioning and Russia's involvement there. I am going to go to
the gentle lady who is now chair of the Middle East and North
Africa Subcommittee and former chairman of the full committee,
chairwoman of the full committee, Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member. And thank you to my colleagues to my right. Thank you
for bringing the spotlight on this expanding activities of
Russia in our hemisphere. Putin's careful engagement seeks to
create geopolitical allies in the region that support Russia's
expansionist policies. It is not a coincidence that Argentina,
Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela were some of the very few nations
voting against the U.N. resolution declaring Crimea's
independence referendum null and void.
The Russian Federation's activities in Latin America have a
clear intent, eroding U.S. influence in our region, increasing
military cooperation with the adversaries of democracy, of
transparency, of the rule of law in Latin America. By forming
military alliances and increasing defense cooperation, Russia
has effectively gained power projection of forces right in our
backyard.
According to the Russian defense minister, supersonic
bombers are regularly patrolling the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf
of Mexico to ``monitor foreign military powers, military
activities and maritime communications.'' And have on occasion
made landings in Venezuela just as they did precisely 2 years
ago today.
Earlier this year, a Russian intelligence vessel, as we
know and you have talked about it, docked in Havana the day
before the U.S.-Cuba talks were due to be held. And in
testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, as Mr.
Sires has pointed out, General John Kelly has asserted that the
very same vessel has conducted operations in the Gulf of Mexico
and the U.S. east coast. And we cannot forget that press
reports from months ago stated that Russia intends to reopen
the Lourdes spy facility in Cuba. We are hearing rumors that
Cuban armed forces are helping to fight alongside Russian
soldiers in Syria to come to the rescue of the murderous Assad
regime.
But this provocation from Russia to seek to spy on our
interests, to undermine our national security does not stop in
Cuba. This year, Ortega agreed to allow Russia to establish a
satellite station in Nicaragua, and Nicaragua recently
expressed an interest in acquiring top of the line MiG-29
fighters to be used in counternarcotics operations, fueling
fears that the Russians may have a continuous military
footprint so close to our nation.
Russia has invested heavily in the development of Latin
America, from the development of a nuclear plant in Argentina,
Gazprom's gas ventures in Bolivia, technology transferred to
the Nicaraguan Canal to the construction of a weapon factory in
Venezuela. And the economic engagement, sir, which I read in
your written testimony, Mr. Farah, has pointed out, in the past
has opened the door for Russian organized crime to engage in
new markets.
The Venezuelan regime, similarly, has a tradition of mixing
business with criminal activities, and one example of this has
been the Cartel de los Soles which had significant influence
over senior officials in the Venezuelan regime. So I would ask
you, sir, what impact, if any, has Russian organized crime had
in the region, and are these groups working with organizations
such as the Cartel de los Soles or perhaps the Mexican drug
cartels? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duncan. Mr. Farah.
Mr. Farah. Thank you. I think that it is clear from what
the Colombian law enforcement and intelligence communities are
seeing in the Central Americas that there is a great deal of
unaccounted for Russian shipping activity. I think that we
don't pay a great deal of attention to it because it comes off
the Pacific Coast of Central America and then goes to Russia.
It doesn't come to the United States, so it is not something
that we monitor very closely. But there are several new tuna
fishing fleets who declare their primary market for tuna is
Russia, which is economically irrational, and it is unlikely
that they will be inspected as they come and go.
The Russians have very good access to Puerto Corinto into
several ports. They just won the licitation for the port near
San Miguel in El Salvador, where they are able to now come and
go without much supervision. I think that the proximity of--the
cocaine is produced largely the FARC and the FARC's ability to
move the cocaine is largely dependent on the Cartel de los
Soles. So if they are acquiring as they seem to be significant
amounts of cocaine, it would have to be through that lineup.
There is very little other way they could get significant
amounts of cocaine out with impunity as the way they are doing.
And my understanding of the operation is that it largely
goes to Nicaragua. It goes out Puerto Corinto. They have now
opened up Puerto Corsain in El Salvador which is a government-
controlled port, and they have free access there and they have
declared it a military installation, although it is not a
military installation. So no one can get in and out without
permission of the President which is very difficult to acquire.
So I think the contours are known, but I think that the details
are something that require a lot more research.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir, and thank you,
Mr. Chairman. Thank you to my colleagues.
Mr. Duncan. You are welcome. The chair will now go to Mr.
Yoho from Florida.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the panel
being here. Let's see here. Dr. Urcuyo, will Russia have more
presence and influence in Cuba, Central and South America with
the Obama administration's attempt to relax sanctions in Cuba,
in your opinion?
Mr. Urcuyo. No, I don't think so. This has structural
causes. First the inheritance of the past, for example, all the
people that were trained by the USSR during the Central
American wars. They are now in my--in the '60s and '50s. And,
for example, we in Costa Rica have this guy that he went to the
Frunze Military Academy, he graduated as a colonel, and he is
part of the equivalent right now of the Communist Party of
Costa Rica that has 70 years of existence.
Mr. Yoho. Okay, let me broaden my question and this will be
for everybody. Do you see Russia having more presence in Cuba
and Central and South America with the lack of response to
Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea, with no credible
response from the U.S., or the red lines drawn by our
administration in Syria on the use of chemical weapons, with no
response from us once we found out those happened, calls for
regime change and we did not act, and the Iran nuclear deal
where we operated from a position of weakness and really got
not a whole lot out of that but Iran got a whole lot? What is
your opinion on those negotiations of those things I just laid
out, allowing Russia to expand more? And we will start with Dr.
Farah if we can, or Dr. Negroponte, you are ready. Go ahead.
Ms. Negroponte. Thank you very much, Congressman Yoho. I
think we must make clear distinctions between Russian
expansionism in Central Europe, in Georgia and in Syria with
its activities within the Western Hemisphere. The Western
Hemisphere has traditionally been an area protected by the
United States. Our distraction----
Mr. Yoho. That is going to lead to one of my other
questions, so go ahead.
Ms. Negroponte. Very good. Our distraction by events in the
Middle East as serious as they are have taken us away from
recognizing that the Western Hemisphere is our border. Travel
to and from is plentiful and permanent. If we do not invest in
interests in Central America, in developing our trade ties with
South America, we should only expect that mischief makers will
come to seek to take our place.
Mr. Yoho. Dr. Rouvinski.
Mr. Rouvinski. Thank you very much. I think in terms of
Russian relations with Cuba it has been difficult for Russia to
find a way to go back to the level of relationship in the 1990s
when Cuba perceived Russia as a traitor, and abandoning of the
Russian aid to Cuba actually caused a lot of trouble for the
Russian political leaders. However, I think after the war with
Georgia in 2008, Russia realized that because of the certain
abandonment by the United States of Latin America it has a
window of opportunities. And I think what they will do during
that time and especially in the context of the crisis in
Ukraine is actually a benefit on that possibilities that they
have, and the forgiveness of the Cuban debt to Russia falls
within this context.
Mr. Yoho. Mr. Farah.
Mr. Farah. I think one has to distinguish between what the
Russians gain at a state level with the ALBA nations
particularly and what the popular perception, what people
actually believe on the ground. So I think that the perception
that the United States is not engaged is very widespread.
I think that while Russia is very engaged, and I think they
are doing some dangerous things in the region, it is a very, I
would say, shallow engagement. It is with the elites of regimes
that--Ortega is very ill; he probably won't be around much
longer. The Castro brothers can't live forever, one thing.
Sanchez Ceren in El Salvador is very ill. And so you have a
series of very personal relationships and past relationships
that are allowing Russia to do a great deal now, but it is not
that Russia is popular in the region or that people think that
they would rather align on a macro level with Russia. It is a
narrow and deep engagement with elites, and I think in very
dangerous ways, but something that doesn't affect how people
view the United States.
Mr. Yoho. Do you see a need to reinstate something like the
Monroe Doctrine, since John Kerry said it was gone, it is no
longer there? And I think that is a misstep on our foreign
policy that we are just saying we yield, basically.
Mr. Chairman, I am over my time so I don't know how you
want to handle that. Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman. I will now go to Mr.
Byrne from Alabama.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate being
included in this very important hearing. I am a member of the
House Armed Services Committee, not a member of this committee.
Dr. Rouvinski, I have just come back from your country,
Colombia, had a 4-day trip with Congressman Gallego, and we
learned that within the last year or so, Russian military
aircraft had transited Colombian airspace without Colombian
permission. First, is that your understanding as well, and if
so who are the Russian sending a message to, the United States
or Colombia, and what is that message?
Mr. Rouvinski. Yes, in fact, Russian strategic bombers, Tu-
160, penetrated the Colombian airspace twice without the
permission of the Colombian authorities. And the explanation
that was given by Russia that the pilot did it by mistake, but
they did it twice, and they flew from Venezuela to Nicaragua
and from Nicaragua to Venezuela.
So in Colombia it was a very difficult situation for the
Colombian Government to deal with it because it was widely
perceived by the Colombian public that it was a message to
support the Nicaragua stance in the territorial dispute between
Colombia and Nicaragua over the San Andres Island in the
Caribbean Sea. The Colombian Parliament had the special
hearings on that respect, but finally they accepted the apology
of the Russian side because I think Russians were not
interested in jeopardizing their relation with Colombia.
Colombia is very important for Russia because it does not
belong to those groups of the country that are especially close
with Russia.
So for Russia it is really a possibility to demonstrate
that Russia can keep its diplomatic relationship not only with
those country that ideologically are very close to Vladimir
Putin, but also with Colombia. For example, this year Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov paid a visit to Colombia to
celebrate 18th anniversary of the establishment of the
diplomatic relation between Colombia and Russia, and he met
with President Santos and the minister of foreign affairs. So I
think it is the explanation.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you. Dr. Negroponte, I have a question for
you about American relations with Cuba. I would say our country
has made, or the President has made some unilateral efforts to
upgrade the relationship between our two countries. There is a
lot of suggestions that Congress should lift the trade embargo.
We wonder about your view on that.
Should we request, or demand, before we lift the trade
embargo that we have a clear understanding and agreement and
forceful agreement with Cuba that they will not be a staging
ground for foreign military actions or foreign intelligence
actions against our country, and we will not be a staging
ground against them? Do you think that is something we should
require before we lift the trade embargo?
Ms. Negroponte. Thank you, Congressman. I do not see it as
a necessary part of the very tough negotiations that are taking
place and will take place within this distinguished body over
the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo. I think within the trade
embargo, trade rules themselves, we have a number of very
difficult issues and I am not sure that introducing the
military element is necessarily going to aid either one side or
the other.
However, I would note Foreign Minister Lavrov made it very
clear in July this year that Russia welcomes the normalization
of relations with the United States, that is Cuba and the
United States, on two conditions. One is the sovereignty of
Cuba, namely Guantanamo; and secondly is the lifting of the
embargo. My reading of the discussions between the
administration and the Cuban Government is that Guantanamo is
not up for negotiation, and the issue of the embargo is an
issue which this illustrious body will discuss, not Russia.
So that leaves Foreign Minister Lavrov and his boss to
determine whether they are going to exert pressure on Raul
Castro to concede, or whether Raul Castro has the ability to
say thanks, Mr. Putin, this is an issue between Cuba and the
United States and within the United States and the Congress of
the United States, and would you please butt out. Thank you.
Mr. Byrne. Mr. Farah, do you want to take a quick stab at
that?
Mr. Farah. It is not honestly my area of expertise,
Congressman. I don't think it would be harmful to include the
conditions as you laid them out of not being a foreign
intelligence staging area and we agree not to do it to them. I
don't think it is realistic to expect that any country in the
region including that one would actually agree to that, so I am
not sure that introducing that would bring--I don't find it
unreasonable, but I don't think it is probably very realistic.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you. Appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duncan. I want to thank the gentleman. Not a member of
the subcommittee, but a valuable member of our full committee
and I appreciate his input.
And I am not a conspiracy theorist by nature, but I am a
conspiracy theorist by nature. If you look at Google Earth and
you go to the northeast corner of Nicaragua near the border of
Costa Rica you are going to see an airbase that--airfield,
rather--that is long enough to handle pretty much anything. It
is in the middle of the jungle. It is near Lagoon, Ebo, and
Spout Morris, close to the Costa Rican border, close to the
Atlantic Ocean.
Why it was built, what it is there for, were the Russians
involved, I was told they were. But anyway it is interesting to
start thinking about the Russian presence in this hemisphere
and delve into the questions that we have had today. The
biggest question is why, why they are here, what can we do
about it?
I think because there has been a vacuum of American
engagement in this hemisphere over the past couple of decades,
if not longer, that it provides an opportunity for Russia and
China and others to come here. I think that is part of what we
have been trying to investigate. I think if America gets more
engaged with our friends and allies and neighbors here in the
hemisphere we will all be better off and we will be able to
thwart some of these incursions by Russia and others.
I don't have any other questions. I think the ranking
member wanted to ask one more, so I am going to yield to him
for as long as he needs. Thanks.
Mr. Sires. Yes. I, just out of curiosity, just want to hear
what you have to say. There are 30,000 Cubans in Venezuela. We
have a government in Venezuela that is teetering on collapse.
There is a lot of Russian effort to befriend Venezuela. Do you
think that Russia would dare try to prop up another dictator in
this region if the government collapses? I mean, they are
building airfields here and there. I was just wondering, since
I didn't get a chance to get your response before.
Mr. Farah. Well, I think that the short answer, I think, is
probably not in our hemisphere. I think that the Venezuelan
regime has survived because of the Cuban intelligence apparatus
has allowed it to maintain control in ways that it never would
have been capable of on its own. I think that just as important
to the regime survival has been China's willingness to buy
everything with cash up front as they need cash, so that now
half of Venezuelan's oil exports don't generate them any cash
because they have already been paid for. So I think that there
are a series of anomalous events that have allowed this regime
to last as long as it can.
I would sincerely doubt because there is no other strategic
interest for Russia in the region, and I would assume but you
never know that that would be a bridge too far for them. And I
think that that would force the United States to react in ways
that they would have very difficult times maintaining supply
lines and doing all the things that they would need to do, and
I think that it would generate an enormous backlash in the
region.
But I think that the presence of the Cubans and the
Russians' willingness to engage with Venezuela and help them
financially and with intelligence and with weapons is an
important part of their ability to stay in power as long as
they have.
Mr. Rouvinski. I think in terms of the possibility that
Russians have an increased presence in Venezuela it is highly
unlikely. We have seen during several crises in Venezuela
that----
Mr. Sires. Is that because Cuba has 30,000 people in
Venezuela? I mean, they are basically doing the work for the
Russians.
Mr. Rouvinski. Yes, I think the Russian presence in
Venezuela has been because of the first place has stronger
personal and sympathies and relations between some strong men
in Russia and Venezuela, but I think there also have been some
concern about Russian involvement there. I would agree with Mr.
Farah that Venezuela is surviving, the Maduro regime is
surviving because of the Chinese buying everything and because
of the intelligence provided by Cuba. But Russian involvement,
I really don't see that there will be more in recent terms.
Mr. Sires. Dr. Urcuyo.
Mr. Urcuyo. I agree with my colleagues in the sense that I
think what props up Venezuela is the Chinese economic support
and also the Cuban intelligence through the medics and doctors
that are helping in the Misiones in Venezuela. But I don't
think that the Russians will go boots on the ground in
Venezuela or in any other country in Latin America.
Mr. Sires. How about you, Dr. Negroponte?
Ms. Negroponte. With the price of oil at under $50 a
barrel, Russia's interest in Venezuela is minimal.
Mr. Sires. Thanks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duncan. I want to thank the ranking member and I want
to thank the members of the committee. And I thought this was a
good hearing. I want to thank the panelists. I thought some
very valuable insight to some of the issues well beyond what I
expected. I want to thank the witnesses who traveled so far for
making the time to come and inform Members of Congress so that
we can make informed decisions going forward on good
information.
We are going to keep the record open for 5 days. If members
have additional questions, we will submit those to you. And
with there being no further business for the committee, we will
stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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