    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                           RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT IN THE
                               WESTERN HEMISPHERE

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                             THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                OCTOBER 22, 2015

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 114-110

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
                                      or
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                            U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    PAUL COOK, California                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            GRACE MENG, New York
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
    DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
    TOM EMMER, MinnesotaUntil 5/18/
        15 deg.
    DANIEL DONOVAN, New YorkAs
        of 5/19/15 deg.

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

                     Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

                     JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    TED S. YOHO, Florida        ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    TOM EMMER, MinnesotaUntil 5/18/
        15 deg.
    DANIEL DONOVAN, New YorkAs
        of 6/2/15 deg.
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Doug Farah, President, IBI Consultants.......................     4
    Vladimir Rouvinski, Ph.D., Director of the CIES Interdisciplinary
      Research Center, Universidad Icesi in Colombia.................    18
    Constantino Urcuyo, Ph.D., Academic Director, Centro de
      Investigacion y Adiestramiento Politico Administrativo in Costa
      Rica...........................................................    26
    Diana Villiers Negroponte, Ph.D., Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow
      Wilson International Center for Scholars.......................    36

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Mr. Doug Farah: Prepared statement...............................     7
    Vladimir Rouvinski, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................    20
    Constantino Urcuyo, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................    28
    Diana Villiers Negroponte, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.............    38

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    54
    Hearing minutes..................................................    55
    The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
      from the State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the
      Middle East and North Africa: Material submitted for the record    56

                  RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

                                  ----------

                           THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2015

                           House of Representatives,

                    Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m.,
    in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Duncan. A quorum being present, the subcommittee will
    come to order. I now would like to recognize myself for an
    opening statement.
        This subcommittee hearing is the third in a series of
    hearings that we have held to examine the presence and
    activities of certain countries operating here in the Western
    Hemisphere. In February, we looked at Iran and Hezbollah's
    presence in the region, the failure of the State Department to
    prioritize these actors in view of a potential Iran nuclear
    deal and the limited U.S. intelligence capabilities focused on
    these issues.
        In July, we examined China's extensive engagement with the
    region through trade and the investment of hundreds of billions
    of dollars, energy cooperation, infrastructure projects and a
    range of security activities including satellite cooperation,
    arms sales, and military exchanges.
        So today we will meet to consider Russia's engagement in
    Latin America and Caribbean. Following the Cold War, Russia
    began taking more of a pronounced interest in the region
    especially during the 2008 crisis in Georgia. When the U.S.
    responded to Russia's aggression in Georgia by sending naval
    forces to the Black Sea, Russia deployed nuclear-capable
    bombers to the Caribbean and a four-ship naval flotilla to
    conduct military exercises with the Venezuelan navy and make
    port calls in Cuba and Nicaragua.
        Let there be light.
        Russia also stepped up its diplomatic outreach with a visit
    to the region from then-President Medvedev, and subsequent
    visits from the Presidents of Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and
    Ecuador to Moscow. Following Russia's invasion of the Ukraine
    in 2014, Russia again ushered in another wave of military and
    diplomatic activities with particular emphasis on anti-American
    and undemocratic countries, those with close proximity to U.S.
    borders, or those with unique capabilities of interest to
    Russia.
        Last year proved a very eventful year for Russia in the
    Western Hemisphere. Reportedly, Russia began talks on
    Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela about establishing bases for
    resupplying Russian warships and potentially refueling Russian
    long-range bombers. In April, the U.S. observed two Russian
    ships operating in waters close to Cuba near the U.S. naval
    station in Mayport, Florida. That same month, the Russian
    foreign minister visited Nicaragua, Cuba, Peru and Chile.
        In June, NORAD reported it had scrambled two F-22s and two
    F-15s after seeing a fleet of Russian bombers off the coast of
    Alaska and California. In July, Russian President Putin
    traveled in the region to visit Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina and
    Brazil. At that time, Russia forgave 90 percent of Cuba's debt,
    and reportedly Russia and Cuba agreed to reopen the Lourdes
    base only 150 miles from the United States coast.
        End of September, U.S. intercepted Russia fighter jets and
    tankers in airspace near Alaska, and just in November of last
    year, Russia announced that it had planned to send its long-
    range bombers to the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. The
    United States did very little in response to all these
    developments.
        Subsequently, this past January, Russia sent a ship to Cuba
    on the eve of Assistant Secretary Roberta Jacobsen's visit.
    This was followed by a visit from the Russian foreign minister
    to Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela in February, and a visit from
    the Russian defense minister to Cuba, Colombia, Nicaragua and
    Guatemala in March.
        Most recently, as Russia has deepened its military efforts
    in Syria, reportedly Cuban troops have been sent to Syria to
    operate Russian tanks. Such Russian overreach in its own
    region, in the Middle East, and now in the Western Hemisphere
    does not send a positive message to the United States and our
    freedom-loving allies. Indeed, in view of Russia's aggression
    in its own neighborhood, violations of arms control treaties,
    cyberattacks on U.S. infrastructure, and continued partnerships
    with Iran, Syria, Cuba and Venezuela, Russian actions do not
    signal an interest in peace nor of global stability.
        In the Western Hemisphere, Russia's engagement appears
    driven primarily by geopolitical and security considerations
    rather than solely economic interest. After all, in 2013,
    Russia's bilateral trade with the region was only $18 billion,
    14 times less than China's trade with the region.
        In contrast, from 2001 to 2013, Russia sold Latin America
    almost $15 billion in arms which amounts to 40 percent of the
    arms purchased by the region from external actors. Similarly,
    from 2008 to 2011, Russia sold more than 3,000 surface-to-air
    missiles to the region, and multiple countries also have
    Russian helicopters.
        Beyond arms sales Russia has sought positions of influence.
    Reportedly, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Argentina have all
    granted Russia access to their airspace and ports. Russia's
    only transoceanic shipping line to South America runs from
    Russia to Ecuador, and multiple countries have agreed to or are
    considering participating in Russia's GLONASS satellite
    navigation system. Furthermore, Russia seems to have
    prioritized relations with countries close to U.S. borders.
    Russia has provided armored vehicles, aircraft missiles and
    helicopters to Mexico, and assistance in Mexico's fight against
    criminal organizations.
        Several of El Salvador's leaders received training in the
    Soviet Union, and Nicaragua has agreed to host a new Russian
    counterdrug center, Russian munitions disposal plant, and a 130
    Russian counternarcotics trainers who conduct joint patrols
    with the Nicaraguans. In addition, Russia has cultivated a
    strategic alliance with Brazil and a strategic partnership with
    Argentina as Russia's top two trading partners. Furthermore,
    Russian engagement in Peru has resulted in strong military ties
    with that country, counterdrug cooperation, and reportedly the
    planning and executing of joint strategic operations.
        Today, Venezuela remains a key linchpin for Russia activity
    in Latin America, and in return Russia has provided Venezuela
    with arms sales, a $2 billion loan, and energy cooperation in
    the Orinoco River Basin.
        In conclusion, Russia's engagement in the Western
    Hemisphere is deeply troubling. At a time when Russia is
    flexing its geopolitical muscles in other parts of the world,
    its power projection in our very region should be met with U.S.
    strength, resilience and clarity. In 2009, President Putin
    called cooperation with Latin American states one of the key
    and very promising lines of Russian foreign policy. The United
    States should recognize this and adapt accordingly in our
    response.
        So I will look forward to hearing from the expert panelists
    on this topic. And I want to just emphasize that this is just a
    series of hearings that we are having focused on not only the
    involvement of other countries in this hemisphere, but I want
    to emphasize the lack of U.S. engagement in this hemisphere,
    and so I would love for the panelists to touch on that as well.
        With that I will turn to the ranking member Mr. Sires for
    his opening statement.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. Thank
    you for our witnesses for being here today.
        Today we are examining Russia's engagement in Latin America
    and the Caribbean. Russia has been involved in Latin America
    since its support for Cuba and Nicaragua during the Cold War.
    The post-Cold War era saw a decline in Russian engagement, but
    as Russia-U.S. relations have become tenser in recent years,
    Putin is reviving these old ties to the Western Hemisphere.
    Russia has had a series of high profile state visits, proposed
    investment and most important an increase in military sales and
    military exercise in the region.
        According to General John F. Kelly, commander of the U.S.
    Southern Command, Russia has courted Cuba, Venezuela and
    Nicaragua to gain access to airbases and ports for resupply of
    Russian naval assets and strategic bombers operating in the
    Western Hemisphere. Putin's high level visit included travel to
    Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina and Brazil, while the Russian prime
    minister has also made trips to Cuba and Nicaragua.
        Russia's interests in the region are to increase military
    cooperation, find new partners in the wake of U.S. and EU
    sanctions on Russia's economy, and try and promote the
    perception that they are a global power. Though these high
    level visits and proposed agreements are just for the Russian
    investment in the region, experts doubt Russia's ability to
    fulfill its economic commitment.
        What concerns me is Russia's continued arms sales to the
    region, especially on the heels of their support for ruthless
    dictators like Syria's Bashir al-Assad. Now we are seeing
    reports of the Cuban military on the ground in Syria assisting
    Russia in bombing innocent civilians and moderate anti-
    government forces.
        For too many years the United States has focused on other
    parts of the world which has led to the neglect of our
    neighborhood. We must remain vigilant on what the long-term
    consequences might be and reaffirm our own commitment to the
    region. And I look forward to hearing from our panelists today.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Duncan. Wow. That was a short opening statement.
        Mr. Sires. I want to hear what they have got to say.
        Mr. Duncan. I appreciate the ranking member. I do as well.
    The bios are in your binders and so I won't do the bios. I will
    just start with recognizing each member will have 5 minutes.
    There is a light system, so when it gets close to running out
    of time you will have yellow and then red, and then if you
    could wrap it up when the red light comes on.
        So Douglas Farah, welcome back. You have been a great
    panelist in the past and a tremendous asset for me. I have
    learned a lot from you. I look forward to learning more from
    you today. You are recognized for 5 minutes.

        STATEMENT OF MR. DOUG FARAH, PRESIDENT, IBI CONSULTANTS

        Mr. Farah. Thank you, Chairman Duncan, I appreciate your
    kind words. And thank you, Ranking Member Sires and members of
    the committee for the opportunity to discuss Russia's----
        Mr. Duncan. Now if you could pull that microphone just a
    little closer. We are recording this and I want to make sure we
    get it all. So thank you.
        Mr. Farah. Is that better? Okay, thank you.
        Over the past 3 years, as you have noted, President Putin
    has made no secret of his desire to create a multipolar world
    where the United States is not dominant. Leaders of the U.S.
    defense and intelligence communities have responded to Russia's
    growing global assertiveness by singling out Russia as the
    primary military and strategic threat to the United States,
    particularly following Russia's annexation of the Crimea and
    other hostile activities. However, that threat assessment is
    seldom applied to Latin America. Yet, given its current
    positioning one could argue that Russia now has more influence
    in Latin America than ever before, even including the height of
    the Cold War.
        This will likely remain true despite the recent
    announcement of the normalization of diplomatic relations
    between Cuba and the United States. During most of the Cold
    War, the Soviet Union's only reliable ally in Latin America was
    Cuba, which in turn helped sponsor insurgent movements across
    the hemisphere. With the 1979 triumph of the Sandinista
    Revolution, the Kremlin gained a second state partner, but when
    the Berlin Wall fell 12 years later, Russia's regional
    influence ebbed to almost nothing.
        But since 2005, riding the wave of radical anti-U.S.
    populism sponsored by the late President Hugo Chavez of
    Venezuela, Russia is now firmly allied with the ranks of Latin
    America's populist, authoritarian and strongly anti-American
    leaders of the Bolivarian Alliance bloc known as ALBA. The
    Putin government is providing all the nations with weapons,
    police and military training and equipment, intelligence
    technology and training, nuclear technology, oil exploration
    equipment, financial assistance, and an influential friend in
    the United Nations Security Council and other international
    forums. With Russia's help the once shared hemispheric values
    of functioning and democratic systems are being replaced by a
    toxic mix of anti-democratic values, massive corruption, and a
    doctrine that draws on totalitarian models.
        The ALBA bloc embraces terrorism and terrorist groups such
    as the FARC in Colombia, Hezbollah, and the Spanish ETA and its
    military doctrine includes the justification of the use of
    weapons of mass destruction against the United States. In
    return, these allies are shielding Russia from international
    isolation, providing political and diplomatic support, and
    opening access to financial markets for sanctioned Russian
    banks and companies.
        Russia has also helped create an important regional media
    and social media network offering coordinated messages of
    unstinting support for Putin while casting the United States as
    the global aggressor. At the same time, ALBA countries are
    increasing Russia's military access to the hemisphere's ports
    and airspace and ultimately increasing Russia's sphere of
    influence in a region where the United States has seldom been
    so directly challenged.
        As noted in his July visit, President Putin made multiple
    gifts to his friends in the region, including the forgiveness
    of Cuban debt, declaring a strategic alliance with Argentina,
    and discussing nuclear energy agreements over dinner with
    Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Putin also
    promised President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua Russia's military
    protection for the canal which will likely never be completed,
    but would provide Russia with coveted deep sea seaports.
        It is worth noting that with the establishment of these
    strategic alliances, delegations of senior Russian military and
    foreign relations officials routinely travel through the
    region, including individuals under sanctions by the United
    States and the European Union. As noted, General Kelly is aware
    of this issue and has said that over the past three decades,
    ``It has been over three decades since we last saw this type of
    high profile Russian presence in Latin America.'' He added that
    under Putin we have seen a clear return to the Cold War
    tactics.
        It is not that the nature of the Russian state is not
    understood. In March 2015, Director of National Intelligence
    James Clapper labeled Russia a ``threat actor'' and an example
    of a nation where ``the nexus among organized crime, state
    actors, and business blurs the distinction between state policy
    and private gain.''
        While one can observe the accuracy of this assessment of
    Russia's intentions and capability in many parts of the world,
    the growing mixture of Russian state presence, business
    ventures, soft power overtures, criminal activity and proxy
    activities in Latin America have gone largely unexamined. One
    repeat visitor to Latin America who provides a particularly
    useful lens to understand Russian activities in the region is
    General Valery Gerasimov, chief of staff of the Russian
    Federation and chief architect of the Gerasimov Doctrine. The
    influential doctrine posits that the rules of war have changed
    and that there is a ``blurring of the lines between war and
    peace.'' He advocates an asymmetrical series of actions in a
    permanently operating front through an entire territory of the
    enemy state.
        This is the prism through which the Russian's engagement in
    Latin America should be viewed. This is how and why Russia is
    engaging with select Latin America states. If you look closely
    at what they are doing they are focusing on four distinct
    areas. As noted, the sale of weapons; also police, military and
    intelligence assistance; access to financial institutions,
    which I detail in my written testimony at some length; and
    creating this counter-narrative which I talked about before
    where the United States is constantly portrayed as the
    aggressor and Russia as an alternative to that.
        In addition, IBI Consultants research has mapped out an
    interesting and opaque network of former senior military and
    KGB officials operating in Central America. This network
    deserves extensive more research. Russia's rise underscores, as
    Chairman Duncan said, the significant loss of Washington's
    ability to shape events in a region close to home and of
    significant strategic interest. While the U.S. position remains
    preeminent due to geographic proximity, cultural ties and trade
    ties, it is eroding more quickly than is often understood.
        In a time of resource scarcity, Russia has managed to
    leverage a small amount of resources into significant gain. The
    Russia agenda is aided and abetted by the ALBA bloc of nations
    in which there is no independent media and where the official
    media magnifies each statement and donation. The United States
    needs a much more visible return to the region to counter the
    perception and the reality that Russia is again a major
    strategic influence in the region. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Duncan. Thank you. Before I recognize Dr. Rouvinski, I
    want to thank you and Dr. Urcuyo for traveling from Costa Rica
    and Colombia. You all have traveled quite a distance and we are
    glad we are able to make this hearing happen today. So thank
    you for that and on behalf of the committee. And Dr. Rouvinski,
    you are recognized for 5 minutes.

     STATEMENT OF VLADIMIR ROUVINSKI, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF THE CIES
        INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH CENTER, UNIVERSIDAD ICESI IN
                                COLOMBIA

        Mr. Rouvinski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
    Ranking Member, and the other esteemed committee members, for
    the opportunity to speak today before the committee. Let me
    begin my testimony by sharing some general observations with
    regard to the Russian presence in Latin America, placing a
    particular emphasis on the evolution of Russian goals and
    objectives in the Western Hemisphere from the beginning of the
    1990s until now.
        Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political
    and military, economic and cultural contacts between Russia and
    Latin America declined sharply. But during the first decade of
    the 21st century, the situation changed dramatically. Already
    by 2008, Russian trade with Latin America had doubled in
    comparison with 1996. The same year, in a new vector, Russia
    declared its foreign policy to be a strategic partnership with
    Latin America. By 2015, Russia is maintaining diplomatic
    relations with all countries in the Western Hemisphere.
        With many of these countries the Russian Government signed
    a visa-free agreement allowing greater ease of travel between
    the regions. Taking into consideration the dynamic relations
    between Russia and Latin America, the political leaders in
    Russia began to talk about the Russian return to Latin America,
    referring to similarities between the current state of affairs
    and the policy promoted by the Soviet Union during the Cold
    War. However, characterizing the Russian presence in the
    Western Hemisphere as a ``return'' is inaccurate, since the
    Russian objectives only partially match those pursued by the
    Soviet Union.
        The current Russian strategy in the Western Hemisphere is
    to strengthen diplomatic relations with all Latin American
    countries while promoting economic cooperation and the arms
    trade, as well as military contact with some of the countries.
        Three groups of countries in the region can be
    distinguished in light of these efforts. The first group
    consists of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, which have offered
    full support to Russia in the Ukrainian and Syrian crises.
    These countries benefit from Russian cooperation in the energy
    sector, have been recipient of Russian aid and are major buyer
    of Russian arms. Their political contacts with Moscow pave the
    way for military cooperation, thus explicitly challenging the
    United States in its ``near abroad.'' Russia also seems to
    expand the area of cooperation with this group by offering
    collaboration in sensitive issues such as drug trafficking and
    international organized crime.
        The second group includes Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil,
    the most economically important countries for the region, as
    well as several other Latin American nations. While the leaders
    of these countries may not fully collaborate with the Kremlin's
    international agenda, Russia still counts on their support in
    various multilateral arrangements including the United Nations,
    BRICS, and G-20.
        The third group of countries has strong ties with the
    United States and are unwilling to risk their relations with
    the West, but do not want to antagonize Russia either. An
    example is Colombia, which is maintaining its alliance with the
    United States while avoiding confrontation with Russia.
        The current Russian economic presence in the Western
    Hemisphere is very significant if comparing to the state of
    Russian commerce and trade with the region in the 1990s.
    However, the Russian economic engagement with Latin America is
    rather modest in comparison of some other extra-hemispheric
    actors, firstly, the People's Republic of China. Moreover, it
    is important to underline that Russia's capacity to further
    build up its presence in the Western Hemisphere is limited
    because of the low price of petroleum on international markets
    and the effect of economic sanctions imposed on the country by
    the United States and Europe.
        While the relations between Russian leaders and many of
    their Latin American counterparts can be characterized as
    strongly sympathetic, some of them lack a long-term commitment
    and may crumble under new leaders. In addition, in the
    challenging global geopolitical context, Russia has managed to
    maintain stable relation with all Latin American countries and
    therefore effectively undermined the efforts of the United
    States and its allies to isolate Moscow in order to pressure
    the government of Vladimir Putin to change its current policy
    in Europe.
        I would like to invite the United States House of
    Representatives to consider the following: The Russian re-
    engagement with Latin America is evidence that the processes
    that are taking place in Latin America and the Caribbean are
    part of the changing global geopolitical landscape, and the
    answers to the challenges posed to the United States economic
    and security interests as a result of the Russian return to the
    region are to be considered from a global perspective.
        It is also important to open possibilities for a more
    comprehensive study of the Russian presence in Latin America by
    academic institutions and think-tanks in the United States.
    Whereas in recent years, research activities concerned, for
    example, with China's presence in the region have been booming,
    the Russian presence in Latin America has been mostly
    neglected. However, to better understand the Russian long-term
    interest in this part of the world, support for academic
    research is pivotal. Thank you for your time, and I look
    forward to the questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rouvinski follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Duncan. Thank you so much for your testimony.
        Dr. Urcuyo, is that microphone on?
        Mr. Urcuyo. Yes.
        Mr. Duncan. Okay. Make sure it is pointed right at your
    mouth too. That will be good.

      STATEMENT OF CONSTANTINO URCUYO, PH.D., ACADEMIC DIRECTOR,
           CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION Y ADIESTRAMIENTO POLITICO
                      ADMINISTRATIVO IN COSTA RICA

        Mr. Urcuyo. Okay. Thank you for the invitation. Russia has
    been present in the region in a new way since the last decade,
    although Moscow did have great activity during the Cold War.
    This inheritance will play a role in the current phase because
    thousands of Latin Americans were trained in the USSR. What is
    happening in what the Russians call their ``near abroad'' is
    interacting in real time with events in Latin America. Russia's
    diplomatic and military penetration in Latin America is a
    response to what it sees as an excessive presence of the U.S.A.
    and NATO in what it considers its influence area.
        Besides, Russia is nostalgic for having lost the Soviet
    empire and wants to show the world that it still a member of
    the major powers and capable of projecting power in its main
    adversary's backyard. On the other hand, Putin plays to his
    domestic audience. The resurgence of great Russian nationalism
    is fostered by the audacity of its leader. From the perspective
    of Russian Grand Strategy, forays into the region may not
    provide significant immediate returns in terms of the global
    scenario, but in the event of a more generalized future
    conflict they could enable Russia to use regional internal
    conflicts to its advantage.
        I will focus on Nicaragua due to Russia's importance to
    this country as well as the potential consequences of its
    activity for Costa Rica and the rest of Central America. Russia
    has a historical background of close relations with Managua.
    Currently, though, collaboration links have become closer. The
    Russian ministers of defense and foreign affairs visit
    frequently and a Russian anti-drug training center has opened
    near Managua.
        Russia has also shown interest in deploying satellite
    stations in Nicaragua for their global positioning system.
    Russia's focus on anti-drug cooperation is paradoxical if one
    considers that the drug-dealing routes that go through
    Nicaragua are not headed to Moscow. Some observers interpret it
    as a form of covert and strategic expansion. Russia's intention
    could be to obtain military bases or to trade political
    military assets as it did during the Cuban missile crisis.
        On the other hand, Nicaragua's ongoing maritime conflict
    with Colombia suggests that its rearmament is aimed more at the
    confrontation with this country than the fight against
    organized crime. Such remilitarization has raised concerns.
    There is great unease about its consequences for the regional
    balance of forces.
        The link between Russia and Nicaragua goes beyond military
    issues. It involves the diplomatic arena. Since 2008, Nicaragua
    recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia in alignment with Russian
    diplomacy. The alignment was repeated when Nicaragua voted
    against the disapproval Crimea's annexation at the United
    Nations. The Russian military and diplomatic presence in
    Central America is a factor of regional instability. It is
    threatening for Costa Rica because the country does not have an
    army and has a border dispute with Nicaragua. If a conflict
    arises with Colombia, Bogota's level of armament and military
    training will escalate its dimensions, threatening peace
    throughout the Caribbean Basin.
        Conclusions and recommendations. Russia is trying to
    transfer its conflict with the U.S. to Latin America while
    profiting from weapons sales and challenging and provoking the
    U.S. Latin American countries must be aware that they cannot be
    trapped in a Russian conflict. Russia's regional old friends
    and new allies provide a haven for extra-hemispheric powers
    that seek to counterbalance the power of the U.S.A. by
    strengthening anti-imperialist nationalism.
        Russia's overtures revolve around the military and not
    around human development. That Russian activity raises
    apprehension in Washington is understandable. However, the
    answer cannot be unilateral. It must emerge from a dialogue
    with Latin American countries that considers all national
    interests and defines multilateral political partnerships.
        China's active economic cooperation frees some of Moscow's
    Latin American allies from economic pressures enabling Russian
    military and diplomatic penetration. The recent Chinese-Russian
    partnership could develop in the future through greater
    coordination in the hemisphere. There are speculations about
    the likely participation of Russia in the defense of the
    Nicaraguan Canal by the Chinese.
        Russian actions in Central America demand a more detailed
    accounting of its intense military cooperation with Nicaragua.
    Russia actually is trying to play a new role in Central America
    becoming an observer member of the Central American Integration
    System. Some Latin American countries have given a positive
    response to Vladimir Putin's initiatives, which shows that
    inter-American relations have shifted qualitatively. It is
    important, last, to develop a shared and strategic doctrine in
    the Americas adapted to the new architecture of the
    international system. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Urcuyo follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Duncan. Thank you so much.
        Dr. Negroponte, for 5 minutes.

     STATEMENT OF DIANA VILLIERS NEGROPONTE, PH.D., PUBLIC POLICY
       SCHOLAR, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS

        Ms. Negroponte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
    Sires, for the opportunity to present ideas this afternoon.
    Having listened to my three colleagues I am going to adapt
    somewhat my remarks this afternoon, but I have left with you a
    written testimony.
        I wish to look at the issue of Russian engagement in a
    somewhat distinct way and analyze why Russia has become more
    active in this hemisphere. I would argue there are three
    reasons. First, Russia needs markets, markets for its military
    equipment, its heavy industrial goods, and its growing IT
    sector. It was interesting when President Putin visited
    Nicaragua last year and it was at the last moment that he asked
    Nicaragua to sell fruits, vegetables, coffee, and meat given
    that Russia had banned the import of these important products
    from its natural and normal sources. Markets, I would argue, is
    one of the reasons why Russia has expanded its interest and its
    presence.
        Secondly, Russia needs friends. It needs friends at the
    U.N. General Assembly. It needs friends who will vote with it
    against the United States when we condemn the annexation of
    Korea and activities in Ukraine.
        The third reason for Russia is as the West has expanded its
    presence in the Baltics, in Ukraine and Poland, Russia has
    sought to meddle in what might be called by some ``our
    backyard.'' The response from both Nicaragua and Cuba has been
    interesting because of its distinctiveness. In the case of
    Nicaragua, as Dr. Urcuyo has pointed out, Daniel Ortega is
    playing high risks. He discusses the purchase of MiG-29s, eight
    of them, from Russia. He has developed a training center for
    military helicopters and there are no funds to pay for this.
        So there is a lot of rhetoric and hype, but the reality on
    the ground is that we are bumbling along. What is not bumbling
    along and what is of interest to the Central Americans is the
    development of the regional training center for anti-drug
    cooperation, and that is useful for the Hondurans, Salvadorans
    and Guatemalans. Were the United States to be more effective
    and more general in its anti-drug and its anti-narcotics
    program, those countries would have less reason to look toward
    Russia.
        In the case of Raul Castro, he is more cautious and more
    calculating than Daniel Ortega. Raul Castro has been blind-
    sided by the Russians and previously the Soviet Union. You will
    recall 1962. And in 2008, a similar by Russia to place missile
    systems in Cuba was found out only later by Raul Castro much to
    his disapproval and irritation. Therefore, on the part of Raul
    Castro, there is skepticism and care in dealing with Russia. He
    is not going to be blind-sided again.
        What is the recommendation for us in the United States? We
    should pass the billion-dollar program to support Central
    America. The underlying problems of the region are poverty and
    unequal distribution of wealth. If we are not to show that we
    care about these underlying problems exacerbated further by the
    drug trade, exacerbated further by the presence of military
    weapons, then we should expect that others will fill that
    space. I sincerely hope that space is not filled by Russia.
    Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Negroponte follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                              ----------

        Mr. Duncan. Well, thank all the panelists, great testimony.
    And now we will enter into the questioning phase and I will
    recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
        First one, how does Russia cultivate ties with Latin
    American countries? Mr. Farah.
        Mr. Farah. It cultivates them largely through, as was
    mentioned numerous times, weapons sales and a constant stream
    of high profile visitors going through to give the impression
    that they care a great deal. You see the defense minister, you
    see the foreign minister, you see the head of counternarcotics,
    you see the head of Parliament, all parading through there
    multiple times a year. So, and they also offer a lot of things
    that aren't delivered, as I think Dr. Negroponte said. They
    create the illusion of doing more than what they do. But they
    also have an echo chamber that they have created with the ALBA
    nations particularly where that is never reported, and you hear
    the constant great things that the Russians are doing.
        But I also think the more dangerous element, and I will be
    very brief on this, is the cultivation of much more significant
    intelligence ties and the providing of much more sophisticated
    intelligence apparatuses to the ALBA nations. You see it
    particularly in the newest member in El Salvador. You see a
    great deal of Russian equipment coming in. Nicaragua has it.
    Venezuela has it. Greatly increasing the power of the
    intelligence services which are geared entirely to monitoring
    their own people and suppressing dissent, and I think that is
    an incredibly dangerous but it is an enticing element.
        And the reason they have some success in the weapons and
    other things is they attach no conditions. So if you are going
    to give them a lot of toys and no conditions, they would prefer
    that to getting issues from the United States where they may
    have to account for how they use those things.
        Mr. Duncan. So in your opinion, Russia is getting something
    of value in return for their involvement? Are they getting what
    they want?
        Mr. Farah. I think that they wouldn't keep doing it if they
    weren't, sir. And I think that if you look at their, and I have
    a great deal in my testimony, particularly in the financial
    sector where they have made great inroads into the banking
    system to avoid international sanctions that the United States
    and the European Union have provided to them. I think that is
    very significant to their well-being. I think as others have
    mentioned, the ability to offload for some profit, aging arms
    systems that they can't really unload anyplace else but are
    useful in regions like Central America.
        And as several other panelists have mentioned, friendship.
    They have a group of people who will support them against any
    charges in the United Nations and elsewhere, and whom they will
    protect. When Venezuela is up on human rights issues who is
    going to veto that in the Security Council? It is going to be
    Russia. They have culled to this a mutually beneficial
    relationship, yes.
        Mr. Duncan. All right. Do you think Russia is seeking to
    provide political or military challenge to the United States in
    the Western Hemisphere? I will ask one of the others that. Dr.
    Rouvinski, do you think Russia is seeking to provide a
    political or military challenge to the United States in this
    hemisphere?
        Mr. Rouvinski. I think Russia has pursued different
    interests if we take into consideration the period before the
    war in Georgia in 2008 and after the war. I think before the
    war, Russian interests in Latin America were mostly linked with
    the possibility to promote the interests of their Russian
    private and state enterprises. And we have seen actually the
    efforts not only directed toward the arms sales, but also to
    promote the interest of the Russian energy companies and oil
    companies in Latin America.
        However, after the Georgian crisis of 2008, I think,
    following the support obtained by Russia from Nicaragua and
    Venezuela, Russia started to reevaluate its policy and
    objective in Latin America and started looking for more
    opportunities from that perspective. So I think definitely
    there are some signs that Russia is challenging the United
    States, building strong military ties with the group of
    countries that I was mentioning, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba,
    though I would agree with Dr. Negroponte that Cuba seems to be
    much more cautious in dealing with Russia than Nicaragua was.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Duncan. And just to kind of summarize what you said if
    I heard you correctly, early on since 2008 with Georgia, Russia
    basically said you meddle in my neighborhood, I am going to
    come over and meddle in your neighborhood. And is that sort of
    a simplified summation of what you are saying?
        Mr. Rouvinski. I would agree with you. And also I think it
    is very important the recognition that what even by Nicaragua
    of the breakaway republics at present South Ossetia, because
    Russia was actually facing a great trouble in getting any
    recognition of those breakaway republics, and it seemed that
    Daniel Ortega offer of recognizing those republic came with no
    previous consultation. So I would agree it was a certain risk
    there on his behalf, but Nicaragua also quickly obtained some
    important benefits from Russia. Russia supplied some aid to
    Nicaragua in recognition of its support of the Russian state.
        Mr. Duncan. I agree. From what I have learned about
    Nicaragua, it concerns me probably more than Venezuela here in
    October 2015.
        Doug, we have seen all this naval activity and air space
    incursions, what do you think Russia is up to? Why do you think
    we are seeing them sail so close to our shores, come into the
    Gulf of Mexico, come close to our airspace both on the east
    coast and west coast? What do you think they are up to, in your
    opinion? Yes.
        Mr. Farah. I think they are very explicit if you read their
    own literature. And I was fortunate in a project I was doing to
    work with a Russian analyst who spoke both Russian and Spanish
    who was able to read a lot of their media and their papers,
    academic papers. They are very explicit, as I think Dr.
    Negroponte said, the idea they are very upset that we are, that
    they view the United States as in their backyard and they want
    to come in our backyard.
        And they have this doctrine, the Gerasimov Doctrine, of
    creating this constant state of conflict in every sphere, not
    just military, economic and counternarcotics, all of these
    things. And if you see where they move into the region it is to
    directly challenge what the United States does best and has
    been in the region for. That is why I think they put in the
    counternarcotics center.
        I disagree a little bit with Dr. Negroponte in that it is a
    benefit to a lot of countries. It is primarily--I have been to
    the center there and the training is not of high quality at all
    and everybody acknowledges that. But what they do do is select
    out from there their best elements and take them back to Moscow
    and train them and then send them back into the region gaining
    access to a great deal of intelligence and operational capacity
    in the region.
        So I think that there are multiple reasons that feed into
    their view that they need to be another superpower, regain
    their superpower status. And I think this doctrine, and it is
    fascinating because it is the basis of what Russia does all
    over the world and they are very explicit about it. This isn't
    some dark secret. They view conflict as a permanent state and
    we don't. We generally think if you overcome a certain conflict
    then you are in peace.
        And this doctrine explicitly says you are going to be in
    constant conflict in an asymmetrical way until you are able to
    overcome the enemy, and you see that in a lot of what they do
    in Latin America. It is not military, but it is certainly in
    this sphere of the social media and the other media they
    control and the training they are giving and the recruitment
    they are doing is a very different type of thing.
        Mr. Duncan. Well, my time is expired. The ranking member is
    younger than I am, but this really seems like a throwback to
    the Cold War and what we experienced when I was growing up with
    then, the Soviet Union and their incursion and probing and what
    not. So I will turn to the ranking member for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Sires. Chairman, you would be surprised how old I am.
    Dr. Negroponte, did I detect a sense that Russia is really more
    interested in markets than the military?
        Ms. Negroponte. Yes. Russia needs markets for its newly
    developed and sophisticated military equipment. It participates
    in military shows in Chile and in Peru in order to show what it
    has produced and for it not to be treated as some 1950
    industrial base. So show is important, sales are important, and
    as of now, income is even more important.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you. Dr. Urcuyo, did you say that you felt
    that Americas are excessively in South America and Central
    America in the Western Hemisphere in your comments? And that is
    why the Russians----
        Mr. Urcuyo. Excessively what? Excuse me.
        Mr. Sires. That is the word you used because I wrote it
    down.
        Mr. Urcuyo. No, but I didn't follow your question.
        Mr. Sires. That you felt that the Americas were excessively
    in the Western Hemisphere and that is why
        Russia----
        Mr. Urcuyo. No, no. Not at all. I think that the U.S. has
    been distracted in all the theaters of action and of war so you
    haven't been paying enough attention to what is happening in
    the Western Hemisphere. And suddenly you find out that there is
    vacuum, and that that vacuum has been occupied by China,
    economically speaking, and by Russia that tries to fill that
    vacuum. But I wouldn't be that dramatic.
        And it may be I didn't explain myself in my first
    presentation, but I think that there is space for the strategic
    expansion of Russia but not in absolute terms.
        Mr. Sires. Because that is how I feel. I feel we haven't
    focused enough on the Western Hemisphere over the years, so
    when you said that it sort of struck a key in my head here.
    There is an awful lot of talk about how the Russians were so
    magnanimous and forgave Cuba its debt of $20 billion or
    whatever it was. First of all, Cuba could have never paid that
    debt.
        Mr. Urcuyo. Yes.
        Mr. Sires. So, I mean, this magnanimous effort by Russia,
    it really is nothing more than reality that Cuba can't pay
    whatever they owe Russia. So I would love to read that in the
    press how they play that up as something so big.
        I have a comment here from SOUTHCOM Commander General
    Kelly. He has referred to the Russian's activity in Latin
    America as more of a nuisance as opposed to a threat, but has
    noted that the Russian presence underscores the importance of
    the United States remaining engaged with its partners in the
    region. Is it a nuisance or is it a threat? Dr. Negroponte?
        Ms. Negroponte. Ranking Member Sires, I believe that I
    support what General Kelly has said that it is a nuisance.
    There is so much hype, so much rhetoric, but when you come down
    to the real practical answer, who pays? Russia? Russian banks?
    They are not in a position to. Nicaragua? Nicaraguan banks?
    They are not in a position to. Cuba? The same. We have a term
    and a time of pragmatism in Cuba which does not permit Cuba to
    become a recipient of highly expensive equipment. So how did
    they pay for it?
        Those restructuring of loans were undertaken in order to
    reduce the interest payments and then at the same time lease
    Ilyushin and Tupolev aircraft so-called to develop the tourist
    trade. I can understand Russians want to leave Russia in
    January, February and March, but the cost of those aircraft to
    carry tourists has been the reduced interest payments on those
    Cold War debts.
        Mr. Sires. Anybody else like to do that, whether it was a
    threat or----
        Mr. Urcuyo. Well, I was--in my original testimony there is
    a quote from a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences trying
    to explain where they are in Latin America at this moment and
    he says we are playing on Washington nerves. So for me, they
    are playing deliberately to irritate the region with their
    presence, but I will say there is a natural dramatic threat in
    this moment. But of course they are placing their dates and
    their points in the region looking for the median or long term,
    but I don't think that the immediate moment, an immediate term,
    Russia is a threat to the United States because of its
    activities in the Western Hemisphere. Maybe in the future, yes,
    taking into account this actual situation.
        Mr. Rouvinski. Yes, I think we have to understand now what
    motivates Russia, do what Russia do with the military
    exercises, with the visits of the strategic bombers and with
    the navy.
        Latin America, in the recent years transformed to be a very
    useful instrument for the Russian propaganda inside the
    country. More Russians worry about Latin America, and the image
    of Latin America I think it is quite different from reality. I
    have been living in Latin America and I had a chance to travel
    extensively. But because of this constructed image, Russian
    authorities are capable of taking advantage of these actions to
    show actually the capacity that perhaps not mesh exactly what
    Russia can do in real terms as a threat to the United States,
    but to show actually the Russian authority, Russian army is
    capable to mitigate the United States in the near abroad. So I
    think there is a great value for the Russian propaganda machine
    attached to what Russia is doing.
        Mr. Sires. My time--sorry, Mr. Farah, but my time has just
    expired.
        Mr. Duncan. I want to thank the ranking member. Good line
    of questioning. I knew Cuba would be the thrust of your
    questioning and Russia's involvement there. I am going to go to
    the gentle lady who is now chair of the Middle East and North
    Africa Subcommittee and former chairman of the full committee,
    chairwoman of the full committee, Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
    Member. And thank you to my colleagues to my right. Thank you
    for bringing the spotlight on this expanding activities of
    Russia in our hemisphere. Putin's careful engagement seeks to
    create geopolitical allies in the region that support Russia's
    expansionist policies. It is not a coincidence that Argentina,
    Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela were some of the very few nations
    voting against the U.N. resolution declaring Crimea's
    independence referendum null and void.
        The Russian Federation's activities in Latin America have a
    clear intent, eroding U.S. influence in our region, increasing
    military cooperation with the adversaries of democracy, of
    transparency, of the rule of law in Latin America. By forming
    military alliances and increasing defense cooperation, Russia
    has effectively gained power projection of forces right in our
    backyard.
        According to the Russian defense minister, supersonic
    bombers are regularly patrolling the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf
    of Mexico to ``monitor foreign military powers, military
    activities and maritime communications.'' And have on occasion
    made landings in Venezuela just as they did precisely 2 years
    ago today.
        Earlier this year, a Russian intelligence vessel, as we
    know and you have talked about it, docked in Havana the day
    before the U.S.-Cuba talks were due to be held. And in
    testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, as Mr.
    Sires has pointed out, General John Kelly has asserted that the
    very same vessel has conducted operations in the Gulf of Mexico
    and the U.S. east coast. And we cannot forget that press
    reports from months ago stated that Russia intends to reopen
    the Lourdes spy facility in Cuba. We are hearing rumors that
    Cuban armed forces are helping to fight alongside Russian
    soldiers in Syria to come to the rescue of the murderous Assad
    regime.
        But this provocation from Russia to seek to spy on our
    interests, to undermine our national security does not stop in
    Cuba. This year, Ortega agreed to allow Russia to establish a
    satellite station in Nicaragua, and Nicaragua recently
    expressed an interest in acquiring top of the line MiG-29
    fighters to be used in counternarcotics operations, fueling
    fears that the Russians may have a continuous military
    footprint so close to our nation.
        Russia has invested heavily in the development of Latin
    America, from the development of a nuclear plant in Argentina,
    Gazprom's gas ventures in Bolivia, technology transferred to
    the Nicaraguan Canal to the construction of a weapon factory in
    Venezuela. And the economic engagement, sir, which I read in
    your written testimony, Mr. Farah, has pointed out, in the past
    has opened the door for Russian organized crime to engage in
    new markets.
        The Venezuelan regime, similarly, has a tradition of mixing
    business with criminal activities, and one example of this has
    been the Cartel de los Soles which had significant influence
    over senior officials in the Venezuelan regime. So I would ask
    you, sir, what impact, if any, has Russian organized crime had
    in the region, and are these groups working with organizations
    such as the Cartel de los Soles or perhaps the Mexican drug
    cartels? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Duncan. Mr. Farah.
        Mr. Farah. Thank you. I think that it is clear from what
    the Colombian law enforcement and intelligence communities are
    seeing in the Central Americas that there is a great deal of
    unaccounted for Russian shipping activity. I think that we
    don't pay a great deal of attention to it because it comes off
    the Pacific Coast of Central America and then goes to Russia.
    It doesn't come to the United States, so it is not something
    that we monitor very closely. But there are several new tuna
    fishing fleets who declare their primary market for tuna is
    Russia, which is economically irrational, and it is unlikely
    that they will be inspected as they come and go.
        The Russians have very good access to Puerto Corinto into
    several ports. They just won the licitation for the port near
    San Miguel in El Salvador, where they are able to now come and
    go without much supervision. I think that the proximity of--the
    cocaine is produced largely the FARC and the FARC's ability to
    move the cocaine is largely dependent on the Cartel de los
    Soles. So if they are acquiring as they seem to be significant
    amounts of cocaine, it would have to be through that lineup.
    There is very little other way they could get significant
    amounts of cocaine out with impunity as the way they are doing.
        And my understanding of the operation is that it largely
    goes to Nicaragua. It goes out Puerto Corinto. They have now
    opened up Puerto Corsain in El Salvador which is a government-
    controlled port, and they have free access there and they have
    declared it a military installation, although it is not a
    military installation. So no one can get in and out without
    permission of the President which is very difficult to acquire.
    So I think the contours are known, but I think that the details
    are something that require a lot more research.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir, and thank you,
    Mr. Chairman. Thank you to my colleagues.
        Mr. Duncan. You are welcome. The chair will now go to Mr.
    Yoho from Florida.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the panel
    being here. Let's see here. Dr. Urcuyo, will Russia have more
    presence and influence in Cuba, Central and South America with
    the Obama administration's attempt to relax sanctions in Cuba,
    in your opinion?
        Mr. Urcuyo. No, I don't think so. This has structural
    causes. First the inheritance of the past, for example, all the
    people that were trained by the USSR during the Central
    American wars. They are now in my--in the '60s and '50s. And,
    for example, we in Costa Rica have this guy that he went to the
    Frunze Military Academy, he graduated as a colonel, and he is
    part of the equivalent right now of the Communist Party of
    Costa Rica that has 70 years of existence.
        Mr. Yoho. Okay, let me broaden my question and this will be
    for everybody. Do you see Russia having more presence in Cuba
    and Central and South America with the lack of response to
    Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea, with no credible
    response from the U.S., or the red lines drawn by our
    administration in Syria on the use of chemical weapons, with no
    response from us once we found out those happened, calls for
    regime change and we did not act, and the Iran nuclear deal
    where we operated from a position of weakness and really got
    not a whole lot out of that but Iran got a whole lot? What is
    your opinion on those negotiations of those things I just laid
    out, allowing Russia to expand more? And we will start with Dr.
    Farah if we can, or Dr. Negroponte, you are ready. Go ahead.
        Ms. Negroponte. Thank you very much, Congressman Yoho. I
    think we must make clear distinctions between Russian
    expansionism in Central Europe, in Georgia and in Syria with
    its activities within the Western Hemisphere. The Western
    Hemisphere has traditionally been an area protected by the
    United States. Our distraction----
        Mr. Yoho. That is going to lead to one of my other
    questions, so go ahead.
        Ms. Negroponte. Very good. Our distraction by events in the
    Middle East as serious as they are have taken us away from
    recognizing that the Western Hemisphere is our border. Travel
    to and from is plentiful and permanent. If we do not invest in
    interests in Central America, in developing our trade ties with
    South America, we should only expect that mischief makers will
    come to seek to take our place.
        Mr. Yoho. Dr. Rouvinski.
        Mr. Rouvinski. Thank you very much. I think in terms of
    Russian relations with Cuba it has been difficult for Russia to
    find a way to go back to the level of relationship in the 1990s
    when Cuba perceived Russia as a traitor, and abandoning of the
    Russian aid to Cuba actually caused a lot of trouble for the
    Russian political leaders. However, I think after the war with
    Georgia in 2008, Russia realized that because of the certain
    abandonment by the United States of Latin America it has a
    window of opportunities. And I think what they will do during
    that time and especially in the context of the crisis in
    Ukraine is actually a benefit on that possibilities that they
    have, and the forgiveness of the Cuban debt to Russia falls
    within this context.
        Mr. Yoho. Mr. Farah.
        Mr. Farah. I think one has to distinguish between what the
    Russians gain at a state level with the ALBA nations
    particularly and what the popular perception, what people
    actually believe on the ground. So I think that the perception
    that the United States is not engaged is very widespread.
        I think that while Russia is very engaged, and I think they
    are doing some dangerous things in the region, it is a very, I
    would say, shallow engagement. It is with the elites of regimes
    that--Ortega is very ill; he probably won't be around much
    longer. The Castro brothers can't live forever, one thing.
    Sanchez Ceren in El Salvador is very ill. And so you have a
    series of very personal relationships and past relationships
    that are allowing Russia to do a great deal now, but it is not
    that Russia is popular in the region or that people think that
    they would rather align on a macro level with Russia. It is a
    narrow and deep engagement with elites, and I think in very
    dangerous ways, but something that doesn't affect how people
    view the United States.
        Mr. Yoho. Do you see a need to reinstate something like the
    Monroe Doctrine, since John Kerry said it was gone, it is no
    longer there? And I think that is a misstep on our foreign
    policy that we are just saying we yield, basically.
        Mr. Chairman, I am over my time so I don't know how you
    want to handle that. Thank you.
        Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman. I will now go to Mr.
    Byrne from Alabama.
        Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate being
    included in this very important hearing. I am a member of the
    House Armed Services Committee, not a member of this committee.
        Dr. Rouvinski, I have just come back from your country,
    Colombia, had a 4-day trip with Congressman Gallego, and we
    learned that within the last year or so, Russian military
    aircraft had transited Colombian airspace without Colombian
    permission. First, is that your understanding as well, and if
    so who are the Russian sending a message to, the United States
    or Colombia, and what is that message?
        Mr. Rouvinski. Yes, in fact, Russian strategic bombers, Tu-
    160, penetrated the Colombian airspace twice without the
    permission of the Colombian authorities. And the explanation
    that was given by Russia that the pilot did it by mistake, but
    they did it twice, and they flew from Venezuela to Nicaragua
    and from Nicaragua to Venezuela.
        So in Colombia it was a very difficult situation for the
    Colombian Government to deal with it because it was widely
    perceived by the Colombian public that it was a message to
    support the Nicaragua stance in the territorial dispute between
    Colombia and Nicaragua over the San Andres Island in the
    Caribbean Sea. The Colombian Parliament had the special
    hearings on that respect, but finally they accepted the apology
    of the Russian side because I think Russians were not
    interested in jeopardizing their relation with Colombia.
    Colombia is very important for Russia because it does not
    belong to those groups of the country that are especially close
    with Russia.
        So for Russia it is really a possibility to demonstrate
    that Russia can keep its diplomatic relationship not only with
    those country that ideologically are very close to Vladimir
    Putin, but also with Colombia. For example, this year Russian
    Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov paid a visit to Colombia to
    celebrate 18th anniversary of the establishment of the
    diplomatic relation between Colombia and Russia, and he met
    with President Santos and the minister of foreign affairs. So I
    think it is the explanation.
        Mr. Byrne. Thank you. Dr. Negroponte, I have a question for
    you about American relations with Cuba. I would say our country
    has made, or the President has made some unilateral efforts to
    upgrade the relationship between our two countries. There is a
    lot of suggestions that Congress should lift the trade embargo.
    We wonder about your view on that.
        Should we request, or demand, before we lift the trade
    embargo that we have a clear understanding and agreement and
    forceful agreement with Cuba that they will not be a staging
    ground for foreign military actions or foreign intelligence
    actions against our country, and we will not be a staging
    ground against them? Do you think that is something we should
    require before we lift the trade embargo?
        Ms. Negroponte. Thank you, Congressman. I do not see it as
    a necessary part of the very tough negotiations that are taking
    place and will take place within this distinguished body over
    the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo. I think within the trade
    embargo, trade rules themselves, we have a number of very
    difficult issues and I am not sure that introducing the
    military element is necessarily going to aid either one side or
    the other.
        However, I would note Foreign Minister Lavrov made it very
    clear in July this year that Russia welcomes the normalization
    of relations with the United States, that is Cuba and the
    United States, on two conditions. One is the sovereignty of
    Cuba, namely Guantanamo; and secondly is the lifting of the
    embargo. My reading of the discussions between the
    administration and the Cuban Government is that Guantanamo is
    not up for negotiation, and the issue of the embargo is an
    issue which this illustrious body will discuss, not Russia.
        So that leaves Foreign Minister Lavrov and his boss to
    determine whether they are going to exert pressure on Raul
    Castro to concede, or whether Raul Castro has the ability to
    say thanks, Mr. Putin, this is an issue between Cuba and the
    United States and within the United States and the Congress of
    the United States, and would you please butt out. Thank you.
        Mr. Byrne. Mr. Farah, do you want to take a quick stab at
    that?
        Mr. Farah. It is not honestly my area of expertise,
    Congressman. I don't think it would be harmful to include the
    conditions as you laid them out of not being a foreign
    intelligence staging area and we agree not to do it to them. I
    don't think it is realistic to expect that any country in the
    region including that one would actually agree to that, so I am
    not sure that introducing that would bring--I don't find it
    unreasonable, but I don't think it is probably very realistic.
        Mr. Byrne. Thank you. Appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Duncan. I want to thank the gentleman. Not a member of
    the subcommittee, but a valuable member of our full committee
    and I appreciate his input.
        And I am not a conspiracy theorist by nature, but I am a
    conspiracy theorist by nature. If you look at Google Earth and
    you go to the northeast corner of Nicaragua near the border of
    Costa Rica you are going to see an airbase that--airfield,
    rather--that is long enough to handle pretty much anything. It
    is in the middle of the jungle. It is near Lagoon, Ebo, and
    Spout Morris, close to the Costa Rican border, close to the
    Atlantic Ocean.
        Why it was built, what it is there for, were the Russians
    involved, I was told they were. But anyway it is interesting to
    start thinking about the Russian presence in this hemisphere
    and delve into the questions that we have had today. The
    biggest question is why, why they are here, what can we do
    about it?
        I think because there has been a vacuum of American
    engagement in this hemisphere over the past couple of decades,
    if not longer, that it provides an opportunity for Russia and
    China and others to come here. I think that is part of what we
    have been trying to investigate. I think if America gets more
    engaged with our friends and allies and neighbors here in the
    hemisphere we will all be better off and we will be able to
    thwart some of these incursions by Russia and others.
        I don't have any other questions. I think the ranking
    member wanted to ask one more, so I am going to yield to him
    for as long as he needs. Thanks.
        Mr. Sires. Yes. I, just out of curiosity, just want to hear
    what you have to say. There are 30,000 Cubans in Venezuela. We
    have a government in Venezuela that is teetering on collapse.
    There is a lot of Russian effort to befriend Venezuela. Do you
    think that Russia would dare try to prop up another dictator in
    this region if the government collapses? I mean, they are
    building airfields here and there. I was just wondering, since
    I didn't get a chance to get your response before.
        Mr. Farah. Well, I think that the short answer, I think, is
    probably not in our hemisphere. I think that the Venezuelan
    regime has survived because of the Cuban intelligence apparatus
    has allowed it to maintain control in ways that it never would
    have been capable of on its own. I think that just as important
    to the regime survival has been China's willingness to buy
    everything with cash up front as they need cash, so that now
    half of Venezuelan's oil exports don't generate them any cash
    because they have already been paid for. So I think that there
    are a series of anomalous events that have allowed this regime
    to last as long as it can.
        I would sincerely doubt because there is no other strategic
    interest for Russia in the region, and I would assume but you
    never know that that would be a bridge too far for them. And I
    think that that would force the United States to react in ways
    that they would have very difficult times maintaining supply
    lines and doing all the things that they would need to do, and
    I think that it would generate an enormous backlash in the
    region.
        But I think that the presence of the Cubans and the
    Russians' willingness to engage with Venezuela and help them
    financially and with intelligence and with weapons is an
    important part of their ability to stay in power as long as
    they have.
        Mr. Rouvinski. I think in terms of the possibility that
    Russians have an increased presence in Venezuela it is highly
    unlikely. We have seen during several crises in Venezuela
    that----
        Mr. Sires. Is that because Cuba has 30,000 people in
    Venezuela? I mean, they are basically doing the work for the
    Russians.
        Mr. Rouvinski. Yes, I think the Russian presence in
    Venezuela has been because of the first place has stronger
    personal and sympathies and relations between some strong men
    in Russia and Venezuela, but I think there also have been some
    concern about Russian involvement there. I would agree with Mr.
    Farah that Venezuela is surviving, the Maduro regime is
    surviving because of the Chinese buying everything and because
    of the intelligence provided by Cuba. But Russian involvement,
    I really don't see that there will be more in recent terms.
        Mr. Sires. Dr. Urcuyo.
        Mr. Urcuyo. I agree with my colleagues in the sense that I
    think what props up Venezuela is the Chinese economic support
    and also the Cuban intelligence through the medics and doctors
    that are helping in the Misiones in Venezuela. But I don't
    think that the Russians will go boots on the ground in
    Venezuela or in any other country in Latin America.
        Mr. Sires. How about you, Dr. Negroponte?
        Ms. Negroponte. With the price of oil at under $50 a
    barrel, Russia's interest in Venezuela is minimal.
        Mr. Sires. Thanks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Duncan. I want to thank the ranking member and I want
    to thank the members of the committee. And I thought this was a
    good hearing. I want to thank the panelists. I thought some
    very valuable insight to some of the issues well beyond what I
    expected. I want to thank the witnesses who traveled so far for
    making the time to come and inform Members of Congress so that
    we can make informed decisions going forward on good
    information.
        We are going to keep the record open for 5 days. If members
    have additional questions, we will submit those to you. And
    with there being no further business for the committee, we will
    stand adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

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