[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-55]
U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
OCTOBER 8, 2015
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fourteenth Congress
WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
ROB BISHOP, Utah RICK LARSEN, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JOHN GARAMENDI, California
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado Georgia
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado SCOTT H. PETERS, California
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
MO BROOKS, Alabama DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
PAUL COOK, California MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama PETE AGUILAR, California
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
THOMAS MacARTHUR, New Jersey
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Alex Gallo, Professional Staff Member
Mike Casey, Professional Staff Member
Michael Tehrani, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 1
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1
WITNESSES
Campbell, GEN John F., USA, Commander, Resolute Support and
United States Forces-Afghanistan............................... 2
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Campbell, GEN John F......................................... 53
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac''.......................... 51
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 75
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Hunter................................................... 79
U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, Thursday, October 8, 2015.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:32 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
The committee meets today to hear testimony from General
John Campbell, our commanding general in Afghanistan, about the
situation there. And we are going to have a hard stop at 12
o'clock. So I am going to ask unanimous consent that my full
opening statement be made part of the record, without
objection.
And just to expedite things, I would say, General Campbell,
we very much appreciate having you here. My view is we are in
Afghanistan today for the same reason we were in Afghanistan in
the fall of 2001, to prevent it from becoming a safe haven for
terrorists for attacking us. Afghanistan is always going to be
attractive for terrorism because of its history, because of its
ungoverned spaces, because of its narcotics, and the financing.
And so without us there until the Afghan Government is able to
provide for its own security, we have a lot at stake there. We
also have a government that is willing to work with us. And we
haven't always had that. But they have challenges, and I know
we will talk more about those as the day goes.
So I think this is an important time in Afghanistan's
future, and important for us to hear from you. So thank you for
being here.
I will yield to Mr. Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
the Appendix on page 51.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you. I will also ask that my full
statement be submitted for the record without objection and
follow----
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Smith [continuing]. The chairman's lead and try to move
quickly.
And I agree with everything you said. It is a very, very
difficult part of the world. I would include Pakistan in that
conversation as well. And I have often said that I wish that we
didn't have national security interests in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. It is a very, very difficult place to work with. But
we do have national security interests in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and they are precisely the ones the chairman said.
Many different terrorist groups, not just Al Qaeda [AQ],
would love to make a safe haven out of the ungoverned spaces
and the difficulties that are there. So trying to maintain some
stability in Afghanistan, and it is, as the chairman said, good
that we have a partner in President Ghani, that we did not
really have for a long period of time, that gives us some hope.
But the challenges are enormous. As the general knows only too
well in terms of having any sort of, you know, overall control
of the country, it is still very fractious and still very
difficult.
The only thing I would conclude with is a couple things
that I would like to make sure that we hear from the general on
is, one, his view of going forward what our troop levels should
be. And what the utility of that is. What do we need them for,
what is going to be critical in the next year, two or three,
and how many troops do you think we and our NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies must have there to achieve
those goals?
And then also the issue of the bombing of the Kunduz
hospital. You know, it has definitely, you know, set us back
and it is the kind of thing that we don't want to see happen.
Would like to learn more about how it happened, what we are
going to do to prevent that type of thing in the future.
And with that I will yield back and look forward to the
testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
General Campbell, again, welcome. The floor is yours.
Without objection your full written opening statement will be
made part of the record, and the floor is yours for any
comments you would like to make.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN F. CAMPBELL, USA, COMMANDER, RESOLUTE
SUPPORT AND UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
General Campbell. Sir, thank you. Good morning, Chairman
Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I am honored to lead and represent the service men and
women of the United States Forces-Afghanistan that have been
there for the last 14 years. And I have been in Afghanistan for
this tour for the last 14 months.
I would like to begin by thanking the committee for your
steadfast support of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
and civilians, and due to your leadership and commitment, they
are the best trained, equipped force our Nation has ever
deployed. Their outstanding performance bears testimony to your
backing and the backing of the American people.
I am also profoundly grateful for your continued support of
the Afghan Security Forces Fund [ASFF]. Our ongoing efforts to
build the Afghan National Army [ANA] and the police could never
have been possible without your financial commitment and your
trust. Every day we strive to be good stewards of the American
taxpayers' money to ensure that our efforts result in increased
security.
Members of the committee have also been staunch supporters
of women in the Afghan Security Forces [ASF]. Your efforts are
making a difference. An integrated force is better and a more
effective force. And you deserve to be proud of the advances
that the courageous Afghan women are now making in the Afghan
National Army and Afghan police.
I would also like to pay tribute to our military families.
They are the unsung heroes of the last 14 years of conflict. In
many ways, our frequent absences from home are harder on them
than they are on us. And without their love and support we
couldn't succeed.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge and honor the over
2,200 service men and women who have been killed in Afghanistan
since 2001, and the over 20,000 who have been wounded.
Tragically we lost 14 personnel, to include 6 airmen and 4 U.S.
contractors last Friday in an aircraft mishap. And we always
remember the Afghan and our own fallen and the loved ones that
they have left behind. Every day we honor their memories by
assisting the Afghans to build a stable and secure country, and
by protecting our own homeland.
Over 14 years have passed since the 9/11 attacks, and we
haven't forgotten why we first came to Afghanistan and why we
remain. Since 2001, the exceptional efforts and courage of our
forces have ensured that another terrorist attack originating
from Afghanistan and directed against the U.S. homeland has not
occurred.
Seven months have passed since I last appeared before this
committee. And much has changed since then. Afghanistan, its
government, security forces, the enemy, and our other coalition
have undergone tremendous transitions. These changes have
ensured that this fighting season has been fundamentally
different. It can't be compared to previous years. I would like
to emphasize how political, military, economic, and social
transitions are affecting the operational environment in order
to place our campaign in context.
Afghanistan is at a critical juncture. And so is our
campaign. But before I further explain the formidable
challenges and opportunities before us, I would like to address
a few topics that have been in the headlines lately.
First, I would like to discuss the tragic loss of lives on
the strike on the hospital in Kunduz. By way of background, the
U.S. Special Operations Forces have been providing training,
advice, and assistance to Afghan Security Forces who have been
engaged in a tenacious fight with the Taliban. On Saturday
morning, our forces provided close air support to Afghan forces
at their request. But to be clear, the decision to provide
aerial fires was a U.S. decision made within the U.S. chain of
command. A hospital was mistakenly struck, and we would never
intentionally target a protected medical facility. I must allow
the investigation to take its course, and, therefore, I am not
at liberty to discuss further specifics at this time. However,
I assure that the investigation will be thorough, objective,
and transparent. And I will get those results back to this
committee.
I would also like to remind the committee and the American
people that we continue to make extraordinary efforts to
protect civilians. No military in history has done more to
avoid harming innocents. We have readily assumed greater risk
to our own forces in order to protect noncombatants. To prevent
any future incidents of this nature, I have directed the entire
force to undergo in-depth training in order to review all of
our operational authorities and rules of engagement.
Our record stands in stark contrast to the actions of the
Taliban. They have repeatedly violated laws of war by
intentionally targeting civilians. The United Nations [U.N.]
attributes more than 70 percent of noncombatants killed and
wounded in this war to the Taliban.
Second, I would like to discuss the sexual exploitation of
children by some members of the Afghan Security Forces. All of
us consider it reprehensible. This criminal practice is
entirely unacceptable to the Afghans as well. President Ghani,
Chief Executive Abdullah have reiterated that they will not
tolerate violations of their policies and the Afghan law. And
they are committed to strict enforcement within their security
forces. We will do everything within our power to defend and
protect human rights. That is our moral obligation to you, the
American people, and ourselves.
I have ordered 100 percent training of the force to ensure
that they understand our human rights policy, which has been in
place since at least 2011. And this policy requires that our
personnel report any suspected human rights violations
committed by the Afghan Security Forces, to include any sexual
abuse of children. Whenever and wherever our personnel observe
human rights abuses, they will be conveyed through our chain of
command, and in turn, to the Afghan Government. Perpetrators
must and will be held accountable.
With so many weeks left in the traditional fighting season,
intense combat continues in many parts of the country. The
Afghan Security Forces have been severely tested this year. But
they continue to fight hard.
In the wake of the coalition's redeployment, the Afghan
Security Forces and insurgents both accepted that this fighting
season could be pivotal. There was no winter lull, and since
February, the fighting has been nearly continuous. Casualties
on both sides have risen. And the violence has moved beyond the
traditional insurgent strongholds.
Pakistan military operations this year moved foreign
fighters into eastern and northern Afghanistan. The emergence
of Daesh or the Islamic State-Khorasan Province, IS-KP, has
further complicated the theater landscape and potentially
expanded the conflict. More recently, the Taliban increased the
tempo of their operations following the announced death of
their spiritual leader Mullah Omar.
We are also now seeing how our redeployment and our
transition from combat operations to an advisory role has
really changed the battlefield dynamics. Only a few years ago
our coalition numbered over 140,000 military personnel. Now our
forces comprise of fewer than 14,000, of which approximately
10,000 are U.S. service men and women.
In years past, our aircraft provided responsive and often
decisive close air support to coalition and Afghan troops in
contact. This is no longer the norm but the exception.
Collectively the Afghan Security Forces are adapting to these
changes, and in some places they are struggling. Within this
context, the fluidity of the current security situation is not
surprising. This fighting season started well for the Afghan
National Army and the police as they successfully conducted
multi-corps cross-pillar operations in Helmand, Zabul, and
Ghazni provinces, and in the southern approaches into Kabul. In
April, they fought back significant Taliban pressure in the
north. And in August and September, they reversed almost all of
the Taliban gains in the northern Helmand, but after
considerable effort.
Yet there have been setbacks, and most recently the Taliban
overran Kunduz City. Still the Afghan National Army, the
police, and the special forces rallied, and they have regained
control of most of the city. Just as they have successfully
retaken other ground temporarily lost through this fighting
season.
The Afghanistan Security Forces' inconsistent performance
in Kunduz underscores several of their shortcomings. They must
improve their intelligence fusion, command and control, and
utilization of their forces. They don't possess the necessary
combat power and numbers to protect every part of the country.
This makes it very difficult for the Afghan Security Forces to
counter the Taliban's ability to temporarily mass, seize an
objective, and then blend back into the population. Ultimately,
the Afghan Security Forces and their leaders need to discern
better when to fight, when to hold, and where to assume risk.
Despite these shortcomings, however, the Afghan Security
Forces have displayed courage and resilience, and they are
still holding. The Afghan Government retains control of Kabul,
of Highway 1, its provincial capitals, and nearly all of the
district centers. The Afghan Security Forces are effectively
protecting the principal population centers.
It is also apparent that our advisory support and financial
backing are strengthening their resolve and building their
systems and processes for the future.
The Afghan National Army and police have repeatedly shown
that without key enablers and competent operational level
leaders, they cannot handle the fight alone in this stage of
their development. Ultimately I am convinced that improved
leadership and accountability will address most of their
deficiencies, but it will take time for them to build their
human capital.
The Afghan Security Forces' uneven performance this
fighting season also underscores their shortfalls that will
persist well beyond this year. Capability gaps still exist in
fixed- and rotary-wing aviation, combined arms, intelligence,
and maintenance. One of the greatest tactical challenges for
the Afghan Security Forces has been overcoming the Afghan Air
Force's still extremely limited close air support capability.
Despite a myriad of challenges, the fundamental partnership
between the coalition and the Afghan Government remains
durable. The difference between the Ghani administration and
the previous administration is like night and day. And at every
level the coalition of Afghan leaders continue to work together
in pursuit of shared strategic objectives. The Afghan
Government, civil leaders, and military commanders demonstrate
a growing appreciation for the coalition's efforts.
President Ghani has asked NATO and the U.S. to provide some
flexibility in our planning to account for the fact that his
government remains in transition while the threats it faces are
changing. He has asserted that a sustained coalition and a U.S.
presence provides actual and psychological stability to the
country as a new government solidifies. He recognizes that his
new administration must invest considerable time and effort to
address the challenges of systemic corruption. He has also
acknowledged that while the Afghan Security Forces are better
equipped and trained then ever, much work remains to build
their systems and processes and improve their leader
development.
I have offered my chain of command several options for a
future laydown in 2016 and beyond. It was envisioned in mid-
2014 that we would transition to a normalized embassy presence
by January 2017. That remains our planning assumption. Since
that time much has changed. We have seen the rise of Daesh
[Arabic acronym for ISIL] or ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant], an increased Al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan due
to Pakistan military operations, and now we have a strong
partner in President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah. And as
a result, I have put forward recommendations to adjust to this
new environment while addressing our core missions of train,
advise, and assist the Afghan Security Forces, and to conduct
counterterrorism operations to protect the homeland.
An upsurge in the insurgent violence in northern Helmand
and Kunduz shows that Afghanistan is at a critical moment in
their history. President Obama is well aware of the tenuous
security situation. And I also appreciate that he has many
other global issues to weigh as he considers my
recommendations. My role is to provide him my best military
advice based upon my assessment of conditions on the ground,
weighed against the risks both to the force and to the mission.
I am unable to discuss further details on the options I
provided to the President. In the past, when flexibility has
been requested of him, he took it under serious consideration
and made his decision. He provided flexibility this year. The
same decision process is being worked through now for 2016 and
beyond.
In closing, the challenges before us are still significant.
In an extremely tough fight, the Afghan Security Forces to
continue to hold. They have remained resilient and they haven't
fractured. Fully supported and led by an engaged commander in
chief in President Ghani, embraced by the Afghan people, and
backstopped by our military advisors, our resources, and our
enablers, the Afghan Security Forces' future and Afghanistan's
prospects for an eventual peace still remain promising. If we
fail in this worthwhile mission, Afghanistan will once again
become a sanctuary for Al Qaeda and other terrorists bent on
attacking our interests and citizens abroad and at home.
Likewise, if we withdraw from Afghanistan, a security vacuum
will arise, and other extremist networks such as Daesh could
rapidly expand and sow unrest throughout Central and South
Asia, and potentially target our homeland.
The hard work and sacrifices of countless coalition
military personnel and civilians over the last 14 years have
created the conditions in which the Afghans can and are taking
responsibility for their own security and governance. The
Afghans welcome the opportunity to share their destiny, but
they still desire, need, and deserve our assistance. Our
support cannot and should not be indefinite or unconditional.
The Afghans must continue to do their part. And if they do,
we should continue to exercise strategic patience and sustain
our commitment to them. Working together we can be successful.
A proactive, cooperative Ghani administration, a committed
Afghan Security Force, offer us a unique opportunity to further
develop a meaningful strategic relationship in a volatile but
vital area of the world. Our continued efforts to stabilize
Afghanistan will benefit the entire region, and in turn offer
greater security for the U.S. homeland and Americans abroad and
here at home.
Thank you, sir, again for the opportunity to testify before
this committee. Thank you for your steadfast support of our
campaign. I look forward to your questions, and, sir, as you
already said, request that my remarks--written statement be
taken for the record. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Campbell can be found in
the Appendix on page 53.]
The Chairman. Great. Thank you, sir.
General, there were two statements you made in the early
part of your testimony that jumped out at me. One was, and I
will read the sentence back, ``Since 2001, the extraordinary
efforts of both our conventional and special operation forces
have ensured that another terrorist attack originating from
Afghanistan and directed against the U.S. homeland has not
occurred.''
You know, I think there is a lot of frustration when you
read the news from day-to-day about the ups and downs. But I
think it is really important for all of us to keep that basic
fact in mind. For 14 years there has not been another attack
from there directed against our homeland. And I got to tell
you, on the morning of September 11, 2001, I would have never
expected us to go 14 years without another attack. And the
reason it hasn't is because of what you say, extraordinary
efforts, heroism by men and women who have served there,
including some members of this committee who have served there.
So I think it is important to just keep in mind the broader
accomplishment.
The other thing that jumped out at me was your comment
about Afghan casualties. When I was there a month ago, I stood
next to you at a ceremony where we remembered and honored the
Afghans who lost their lives. All of us get frustrated when we
are there to try to help somebody who is not willing to stand
up and fight for themselves. My impression is, and you can
correct me if I am wrong, the Afghans are willing to stand up
and fight for themselves. And they have lost a lot of lives in
doing that, which is part of the reason that our partnership is
working better.
If you want the make a comment on that?
General Campbell. Sir, you are absolutely right. I mean,
the Afghan Security Forces, the Afghan people in general, are
warriors. They want to protect their homeland. The Afghan
people absolutely think that the Afghan Army, the police, they
rate them as their number one institution in the country. But
there is no doubt in my mind that they have the resilience,
they have the will of character to continue to stand and fight
to protect their homeland.
The Chairman. Thank you. General, I just want to ask some
numbers right quick. I understand you have made recommendations
to the President. You cannot talk about those. But today we
have about 9,800 American service members in Afghanistan.
Correct?
General Campbell. Sir, that is correct.
The Chairman. Okay. About how many of them are involved in
the counterterrorism efforts?
General Campbell. Sir, if I could take that for record, I
could get you the exact number.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
General Campbell. But roughly we are talking probably 1,300
of those 9,800 directly day-to-day tied into train, advise, and
assist [TAA]. It takes a lot to continue to support that, but
at least 1,300 are everyday what we call level one TAA.
The Chairman. Okay. I am sorry. So about 1,300 of them are
involved in day-to-day training and assisting the Afghan
forces. Does that include the people who are helping the
bureaucracy inside Kabul?
General Campbell. Sir, that is inside Kabul and outside
Kabul. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Okay. Do you have any estimate, and I realize
I am stretching you, but do you have any estimate about how
many people are in day-to-day contact training and advising
Afghan forces outside of Kabul?
General Campbell. Sir, that number is probably about 500.
The Chairman. Okay. So about 500 American service men are
really doing what I see as the train and equip. About how many
are involved in the counterterrorism mission, you reckon?
General Campbell. Sir, I would rather cover that in a
closed hearing with you if I could.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
The Chairman. Okay. I guess what I am trying to think is,
if we have some reduction in the 9,800 that are there now, we
will be able to do less, right, of something?
General Campbell. Sir, it would limit our ability to train,
advise, and assist. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Okay. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Can you talk to us a little bit, General, about the
relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the various
groups that are involved there? And I guess related to that is
the conversation about reconciliation talks between the Taliban
and the Afghan Government. You know, first of all, what hopes
do you have for that? Second of all, no matter what comes out
of that, there will always be groups on both sides of the
border that aren't part of it.
What is sort of your--can you tell us a little bit about
the groups that would be involved, who might be reconcilable,
who we might still have to fight, and how the relationship
between Afghanistan and Pakistan factors into those
negotiations?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question. Sir, as you
know, very complicated between Pakistan and Afghanistan. I do
try to maintain ties with Pakistan. I talk to General Raheel
Sharif, the chief of the army in Pakistan, probably once a
week. I try to get to Pakistan once a month. We really work
hard to make sure that the Afghans and the Pakistan military
conduct mil-to-mil discussions to continue to improve upon
their ability to fight the same common enemy on that border.
Reconciliation is going to take time, sir. It is going to
take both Afghanistan and Pakistan working together, although
President Ghani has said many times that reconciliation will be
Afghan-led. And he and the rest of the government there
continue to work that very hard. They have had at least one
really sanctioned talk on reconciliation that has been out in
public, and that was back probably in the June timeframe,
facilitated by Pakistan to bring some Taliban to the table to
talk.
Working toward a second talk, but that happened the same
week that the announcement of Mullah Omar's death. So that kind
of stopped that talk. I think reconciliation talks will
continue, but it is going to take some time to bring the right
people to the table to do that. The Taliban currently are a
little bit in disarray based on who is in charge. Mullah
Mansoor is trying to take charge from his perspective, but
there are a lot of other fragments of the Taliban because they
do fight really decentralized. But a lot of other factions of
the Taliban are trying to not follow Mansoor.
So I think it is going to take a good couple of months
before we see them coming back to any kind of peace
negotiations. But Afghanistan and Pakistan both realize that
there has to be a political solution to this problem, that they
are not going to kill everybody. I think Afghanistan and
President Ghani especially has expended a lot of political
capital the last 6 or 7 months to try to work that with
Pakistan. He has not seen a lot in return. Therefore, it has
taken, again, a lot of challenges from within his own
government, but I think he has been very courageous in how he
has reached out. I think General Raheel, the same way with his
leadership, is trying to work that very hard. But, sir, this is
years and years of mistrust that they are trying to work
through. But they know that they have to get there to come to
the solution.
Your question on who would reconcile and who wouldn't. Sir,
the estimates that I have heard both from an Afghan perspective
and probably from the intel community [IC] is anywhere between
60 or 70 percent is potentially reconcilable. On the Taliban
side, you probably would not have Haqqani who continues to be a
very, very--an enemy that is dangerous to both the coalition
and the Afghan civilians, because they attack civilians. They
are the ones that are responsible for the high-profile attacks
in Kabul for the VBIEDs, the vehicle-borne IEDs [improvised
explosive devices]. Haqqani probably would not reconcile. And
there are probably members of AQ that would not reconcile. But
60, 70 percent is kind of the number that is out there, sir.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and, General
Campbell, thank you and all of our men and women in uniform for
the responsibility and also the dedication. You all are very
special to all of us in America.
In March when you were here, I asked you a question, and
this will not be my question. But it leads up to a question. My
question was, Will there ever be anyone in the diplomatic corps
or the military who will say to the President: You know, we
have done about all we can do. And one of your answers back to
me was this, ``For very little continued investment, we can
make this,'' meaning Afghanistan, ``the shining light of
Central Asia and that part of the world.''
We have spent about $686 billion there since the year 2001.
You have already mentioned the number who have been killed and
wounded. Then, recently we had in the newspaper, and you have
acknowledged one of these, these titles ``U.S. Wasted Billions
of Dollars Rebuilding Afghanistan.'' That was in the papers
back in September. Then in October, ``Afghan Forces on the
Run.'' This was in the New York Times. Also in the New York
Times, which you have acknowledged, ``U.S. Soldiers Told to
Ignore Sexual Abuse of Boys by Afghan Military.''
You know, you, I think, are number 15 or 16. I have been
here 20 years. A general, Marine and Army, sitting right here
telling us what you have told us. And I believe you. There is
no question about that. I believed the other 15 who sat where
you are today. Then I go back to an email that I got from the
former Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chuck Krulak. A few
years ago I asked him, I said, ``General, I don't have the
military background. How successful can we be in training the
Afghans to be soldiers and policemen?'' And of course we
realize there is a problem with education in that country, and
I understand that. But let me read what he said very quickly.
``Get real in training an army and police force. All we are
doing is training eventually new members of the Taliban.
Trainers are doing a wonderful job, but we don't have the time
to make--we don't have the time to make an Army.'' And he
closed by saying, ``Every day somebody dies.''
My question to you, we are faced with a debt of $18
trillion. We are going to be debating in about a month a debt
ceiling increase so we can borrow more money from foreign
governments primarily to pay the bills for last year. The
American taxpayer has got to know at some point in time there
is going to be an end to this investment. Money, blood, there
has got to be an end to it.
And I heard something you were saying a while ago, and this
is going to lead to the question. At some time I have been
hearing for 15 years from the generals like yourself that
training the Afghans to be policemen and security forces, it is
going pretty well. It is a little fragile, but it is going
pretty well. It has been going pretty well for 15 years. That
is not a criticism. I am just making an observation. We at some
point in time as a Nation and Members of Congress have got to
understand that we cannot continue to, as John Sopko says,
waste, fraud, and abuse is worse today than it was 15 years
ago. That is not your responsibility. I understand that.
But this thing has got to have an end to it. Is that when
the security forces can say: We don't need any advisors from
the coalition forces or the American military? Will you give me
some idea of how this thing is going to end the best you can?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question. Sir, if I
could correct the record first, you said I acknowledged that we
ignored the abuses. And that is not what I said. We do not--I
do not--and in my statement I said that we have policies to say
you do not ignore the abuses. You report the abuses through
your chain of command. So I would like to correct the record
there if I could for what you just said.
Sir, again, on the financial piece and the continued
support to the Afghan Security Forces and to Afghanistan and
the people, you know, yesterday was 14 years. So it has been a
very, very long time. But as the chairman said, we have not
been attacked. Sir, we live in the world we have. Maybe not the
world we want, but it is the world we have. And this world is
going to continue to be a very dangerous world. We are going to
have people that want to continue to do harm to the men and
women here back in the United States. And I think, as I said
earlier, and I would say for a modest continued investment, and
we can protect not only our homeland but continue to build----
The Chairman. General, I apologize for cutting you off,
particularly after a 4-minute question. But we have limited
time and numerous members. If you ever want to extend your
answer in writing, please feel free to do so. But we are going
to have to try to keep to the time limits today.
Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, I for one appreciate the 4-
minute question. Thank you, Mr. Jones, for reminding this
committee what is happening in Afghanistan. So it has pretty
much been a failure.
General, do you know how many people we have recruited and
trained over the years for the Afghan Army and police forces?
General Campbell. Ma'am, currently today we are authorized
to have 352,000. That includes the army----
Ms. Sanchez. No, no, no. I am not asking you what you are
authorized as far as billets. I am asking you how many people
have we paid on the payroll to be, over these 14 years, in the
Afghan Army and police?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I will have to take that for the
record. I don't have that answer. The army really----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 75.]
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. You can stop. I have only got 5 minutes.
So I have plenty of friends in Afghanistan who have gone over
there. You know, we have phantom people on the rosters. We have
60-year-old men, uneducated, signed up for these Afghan forces.
We have tons of people we are paying that aren't even showing
up for work. This has been going on and on and on.
Of those 360,000 billets that you say we have, how many are
filled today, General?
General Campbell. Ma'am, the police are authorized 157,000.
They have about 156,000 that are filled today. The army are
authorized 195,000. There is probably in the area of 173-,
174,000 that are filled today.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. I think it would be important to get
that number of how much we have spent training these people.
You said in your testimony, ``I remain concerned about the
long-term viability of the Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces.'' Succinctly, Afghanistan cannot afford its security
forces. You mentioned that 90 percent of paying for these
forces are from the coalition, and the majority of the money is
coming from the U.S. So within your own current testimony, let
alone the testimony that Mr. Jones brought before you from
before, you basically are saying: I don't know that there is a
long-term viability for these security forces. We are paying
the majority of that. How much is the--how much money does that
mean to have a force that you don't believe has a long-term
viability?
General Campbell. Ma'am----
Ms. Sanchez. How much? How much? That is the question. How
much?
General Campbell. Yes, ma'am. Today for calendar year 2015,
United States put $4.1 billion to build the Afghan Security
Forces. For 2016----
Ms. Sanchez. $4.1 billion.
General Campbell [continuing]. $3.86 billion.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. $4.1 billion.
General Campbell. Every year we will continue to reduce
that by gaining efficiencies. We are not providing----
Ms. Sanchez. General, I have heard this. I have heard this
for 14 years. We are going to get better. It is going to be
more efficient. We are getting there. You know, the reality is
that we are not. We are not. I mean, Mr. Jones was right.
My next question for you is, operationally, what is our
strategy in Afghanistan? What is our strategy? I heard the
chairman, we haven't had 14 years of attacks coming out of
Afghanistan. I will remind the chairman, instead they went to
Somalia. Instead they went to Yemen. Instead they went to Iraq.
Instead they went to Syria. Instead they went to Libya. So, you
know, we can say we have concentrated our forces and our monies
in one place. But the reality is, and you and I both know this,
they move. So what is the plan for Afghanistan?
General Campbell. And the plan is to continue to build the
Afghan Security Forces so they can protect the Afghan people,
to have a stable government so they can provide for the Afghan
people, so the Afghan people can have jobs, their kids go to
work, that they can be a viable country and----
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. Thank you. So $4.1 billion this
year. You don't believe it is a long-term viable strategy. Let
me ask you one last question before my time is up, General.
Oh, and by the way, I just want to say I just have a son
who will be full-time in the U.S. Infantry. We just found out.
I love our forces. I think they are doing a good job. I am
talking about what we are doing as policymakers. Did we ever
find out how much money Karzai and his cronies stole, and put
in Swiss banks?
The Chairman. General, if you want to provide that for the
record. Again, we are going to try to keep to the time limits.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 75.]
The Chairman. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing.
General, thank you for your service. You were educated at one
of the best military academies we have in the world, West
Point. You have not just served, but you have commanded for 35
years, leading men and women defending this country. You have
commanded in Germany, Haiti, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the United
States. You get to see with a set of eyes that few of us ever
get to be able to look through. It is very easy for people to
come in here and recount the price tag we paid in Afghanistan.
That is pretty easy. And there are people across America who
ask what Mr. Jones asked: For what?
What I am going to ask you today is if--because as I look
at your testimony, you have told us kind of what would have
happened if we hadn't have been there. And you said in 2015 Al
Qaeda has attempted to rebuild its support networks and
planning capabilities.
Could you paint two pictures for us today? One, taking all
that experience you have, give us in your best professional
military judgment the danger to the United States homeland and
the risk of loss of life in the United States had these
individuals not made the sacrifices that you talked about and
that we as a Nation not made those sacrifices. And then also in
your best professional military judgment, paint a picture for
us of the danger to the United States homeland and the risk of
loss to the life in the United States if we pull out and do not
continue to make those kinds of investments and sacrifices.
General Campbell. Sir, thank you for the question. Sir,
again, we have been so fortunate in our country we have brave
men and women that continue to join an organization that is not
about them but about the greater good. I think all of our men
and women understand that piece of it. Without their great
sacrifice and the sacrifices of their families, the people back
here in the homeland, the people in Europe, would be at much
greater risk of terrorist attacks. I mean, there is--I don't
think there is any doubt about that. I think in the future as
we move forward, you know, we have a lot of talk about ISIL in
Syria and Iraq. We have a lot of talk about Daesh growing up in
Afghanistan. If it is not Daesh in 2 years, it is going to be
something else. This is a generational issue. Terrorism knows
no boundaries. So if we think that this is going to be cleared
up in a couple years, we are fooling ourselves. And we have to
position ourselves to ensure that we can do everything we can
to mitigate this impact. And the way to do that is continue to
apply pressure with the great special operating forces [SOF],
the great men and women that we have in all of our services,
and also to build the CT [counterterrorism] capability of
Afghanistan and the other countries in the region so they can
take that on themselves. And without that, the homeland would
be at much greater risk.
Mr. Forbes. And, General, if you could, give me a little
specificity. When we talk about a greater risk of terrorism
that can be kind of a general term. But if we hadn't had been
in Afghanistan, if we hadn't had done this, how would it have
strengthened their hand? How would they have had a greater
opportunity to strike the United States and to do harm to us
here at home?
General Campbell. Sir, they would have had sanctuary to
continue to plan and devise ways that they could attack the
homeland, they could attack Europe. There is no doubt, I think,
in anybody's mind that there are people out there that want to
do harm to people throughout the world. And this terrorism will
continue for years to come. And we have to continue to do
everything we can to prevent that. And the way to do that is to
continue to keep pressure on it.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General. Thanks for your service and
for the sacrifice that the men and women under you have made
throughout the years.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
General Campbell. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General Campbell,
thank you for your invaluable service to our country, and all
your sacrifices.
You mentioned in your testimony that our support is not
unconditional. And I wonder if you could tell us within the
context of the relationship that you have built with President
Ghani, which is really a quite extraordinary one, and in some
ways I guess you would say you are fortunate that you have a
willing partner. Tell us more about what we could, should--
where have we actually put--used our leverage, and, clearly,
you know, the fact that they can't really afford their own
military and we need to be there on their behalf, what could we
be doing, what have you seen that has helped to direct, to
provide the impetus to move forward in governance that is
really important?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I have seen it really at my level
through MOI and MOD, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense,
where everything that we do is based on conditionality. They
sign letters of commitment because we appropriate and move the
money around based on different conditions. So we asked them--
there are certain gates they have to be able to do. And if you
don't do this, we are going to hold this. If you don't do this,
we are going to do that. And what that is, is a change of
behavior. You know, for many, many years, if the Afghans needed
this, we would provide that to them. And what we need to do now
to make sure they are not very, very dependent upon that, we
have to break that. We have to change behavior. And I think by
putting conditionality on the money at the MOI and MOD level we
are able to do that. At the presidential level, and we are very
fortunate we have President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah in a unity
government that wants to work not only with the U.S. but the
entire international community. The conditionality of getting
after corruption. So President Ghani personally chairs a
national procurement meeting every week that he looks at
contracts and he has a board that does that to get after
corruption. And we have asked him to go after that. We have
asked him to make some tough choices as he and Dr. Abdullah
work on governors and provincial police chiefs and in naming
the right leadership and picking leadership based on merit, not
based on pay patronage or who they knew. And so those are ways
we can help with the governance level as well to put those kind
of conditions as we move forward.
If I could add, ma'am, President Ghani welcomes
conditionality.
Mrs. Davis. Has that been effective in just moving some
discussions as well with even Pakistanis as we move into, you
know, negotiations at some point with the Taliban? I mean, is
there anything that we have seen with that conditionality that
has kind of pushed that situation along?
General Campbell. Yes, ma'am. On the Pakistan side I think
it was noted a couple months ago that both State Department and
Department of Defense work every day with Pakistan to look at
how they can continue to do more to fight terrorism and how
they can go after Haqqani, how they can do things that enable
their forces and their people to be safe, but at the same time
not destabilize Afghanistan. And so I think there are
conditions that we can use with Pakistan there.
Mrs. Davis. Are we able to do that as well in talking about
the constitution and the ability to not withdraw, I guess, from
that human rights issues? How have we been effective with that?
And what--I guess what else needs to be done as we move forward
to ensure that those issues are dealt with?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I think if I saw that we needed to
apply conditionality to something like that I would absolutely
do that. When I went to President Ghani on the abuse of sexual
children, he absolutely got that and said: We have a law. Our
constitution covers that. But I will reinforce that. I will
make sure that all of my security forces understand that. And
if he didn't do that, that would be something I can go back and
say: Mr. President, if you don't do this, we need to look at
that. But I didn't see that in that case. And we will continue
to work very hard. But, again, President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah
welcome the conditions. It makes them tougher. It makes them
accountable. And they understand that the money, not only the
money, but the blood, sweat, and tears, the ultimate sacrifice
that all the nations have provided, that is special to them.
Not only their own that have been lost, but the international
community. So they welcome conditions and they want to make
sure that we understand that they are very appreciative of
that. And so unlike where we were, you know, over a year ago
without the national government, we are in a completely
different place.
Mrs. Davis. And you have all the authorities that you need
or no additional help from the Congress to do that.
General Campbell. Ma'am, I am comfortable with the
authorities I have today. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, in 2014 a decision was made to have a troop level
of 9,800. And my question I think is simple, but it may not be.
And the question is, is the security situation in Afghanistan
better or worse today. And if it is not better than it was
then, how in the world could we even entertain talking about
troop levels of 5,000 or 1,000?
General Campbell. Sir, again, in 2014, the number of U.S.
forces, coalition forces, we had verse what we have today is
different. So the security on them, I think, is one thing
because unfortunately we have lost some great men and women
over the last year, even with Resolute Support. But I think we
have balanced that based on the number of people we have had
there and the security and looking at the force protection.
From an Afghan perspective, you know, again, this has been
a very, very tough fighting season, and they knew it was going
to be a very tough fighting season, and the Taliban knew
because we were redeploying, because our numbers were going to
go down, because they didn't have the same amount of close air
support, they would try to send a message. And so not having
close air support like we had it in the years past emboldened
the Taliban in some places to go ahead and attack in large
numbers that we hadn't seen before. But, again, the Afghan
forces I think have stepped up for the most part. They have
made corrections.
They are resilient. There have been some setbacks like in
Kunduz and Northern Helmand. But unlike Iraq, and people try to
compare Iraq and Afghanistan, and they are not the same, the
Afghans have planned, have reorganized, have resupplied, have
put the right leadership in place and continue to fight and
protect the people, but overall if you take the number of
security attacks and then compare it from 2014 to 2015, it is
very, very difficult because, again, we are not out there in
the numbers we were before. But it has been a very tough fight,
sir, on both sides.
Mr. Miller. And I will yield the balance of my time to Mr.
Turner. But I have one comment to make. And it is a plea. And I
know you can't discuss the gunship incident in Kunduz, but I
would plead with you, sir, please don't let the crew of that
aircraft nor those Americans that were on the ground that
guided that fire where they did become scapegoats.
General Campbell. Sir, I will look--we have an
investigation, sir, as you know, and the investigation will
give me the facts. And I will make sure the committee has all
of that as we learn more.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, sir. To Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to echo Mr. Miller's comments. I think everyone is very
concerned about that investigation and how it--and that those
who certainly had no involvement in a mistake, no culpability
in mistake not have consequences.
General, you and I had a conversation about the 9/11
Commission Report. When we first got the 9/11 Commission Report
delivered to this Congress, it had a chapter in it, chapter 12,
that detailed what we needed to do in the future and what we
shouldn't do. It specifically said that our fight was not
against Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden solely. And if we viewed
our fight as that, that we would lose. That it was Islamic
extremism and worldwide terrorism. When we look at Iraq, it is
clear that we have not heralded chapter 12 because we have seen
ISIS take hold and now threaten our homeland. You have made
recommendations that we continue to hold troops in Afghanistan.
You have both ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and
Daesh--ISIL and Daesh now there.
Could you tell us if you did withdraw our troops down to
the level of 1,000, its effect on both the safety of our troops
and the ability of our effectiveness for counterterrorism
actions in Afghanistan?
General Campbell. Sir, if we came down to 1,000, the
embassy presence as you just discussed, there is no
counterterrorism structure force in those numbers. And then if
you draw down to that size in one location, you are solely
dependent upon the force protection for that particular site
by, with, and through outer layers that we would not have that
we have had in the past. I am not sure if that answers your
question.
Mr. Turner. It does, which it totally cripples our ability
to undertake those actions. Now also when you withdraw to those
level of forces, aren't the forces that are left behind at a
greater risk without a larger footprint?
General Campbell. Sir, they are in one location. The enemy
would know where they are at. But we would do everything we can
to make sure we mitigate, again, force protection number one
concern for me. As we continue to draw down, every commander
would make sure they do everything they can to ensure the right
force protection. It would be higher risk.
Mr. Turner. Isn't it a fact that they entered the country,
the effects of your ability to counter Daesh as they entered
the country?
General Campbell. Sir, again, at the thousand number, at an
embassy presence, there is no CT allocation in that.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Mr. Miller.
The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General,
for your service and testimony here today. You have probably
one of the most complex missions, I think, almost you could
possibly even imagine. So, again, we really appreciate your
efforts.
And, again, I want to associate myself with Mr. Miller's
remarks about the investigation. I think it is also important
to underscore, when you are talking about Doctors Without
Borders, I mean, it was almost exactly a year ago that they
were working hand in hand with our military in Africa taking on
the Ebola challenge. They are a valuable international
resource. And that is why I do think this requires the absolute
top level of scrutiny and independence in the investigation.
I would like to just turn for a moment again on your
comments regarding the Afghan Security Forces which at the end
of the day I really do think is the kind of the, you know, the
linchpin in terms of a strategy to hand off, you know, power
and security in that part of the world. In particular, the ALP
[Afghan Local Police]. You made sort of an interesting comment
in your testimony about how they were misemployed. And clearly
when we are talking about corruption issues and the need to
sort of root out corruption, I mean, they frankly have been a
big topic of conversation, again, not with just sort of knee-
jerk critics of U.S. forces over there, but frankly even people
who want to help the mission.
Can you talk a little bit about where President Ghani is in
terms of the ALP, and, you know, because, again, the criticism
is they have kind of gone rogue out there a lot. And there has
been complaints within the civilian population about how they
operate.
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question. We have
looked at the ALP or the Afghan police very hard here the last
several months. They are authorized about 30,000 in 174
different districts in Afghanistan. And they belong to the
Minister of Interior on the police side. What Minister Ulumi
has done here recently is assigned a new directive to go back
out to all the provincial police chiefs to make sure that they
have done all the right vetting, all the right training, they
have got the right leadership in place. And that they don't
misuse them.
So in some places ALP even put out in smaller checkpoints
5, 10 kilometers from a village. And what they were designed to
do is be sort of that village security, that stabilization
there, and when they get taken out 5 kilometers, 10 kilometers
without any mutual supporting fires, without other support,
reinforcing support, then they become easy targets for the
Taliban and other insurgent groups.
So not only because of that and the casualties they have
taken, not only that because they do have potentially some
issues with leadership taking advantage of that, he has done a
holistic scrub of the ALP, and he has continued to try to force
the provincial police chiefs to meet all the same standards
that we have had in place. And in some places they haven't done
that well. So he has re-energized that. We are working hard
with him to do that.
This past weekend he had all the provincial police chiefs
back into Kabul, and the entire conference was on ALP and how
to make sure we don't have some of the issues that you just
talked about, sir.
Mr. Courtney. I mean, I think that would send a powerful
message that there is real change happening if there is reforms
that the government can really talk about.
General Campbell. And, sir, as Ms. Davis talked about, one
of the things on conditionality, we have really put
conditionality on the ALP. So if they don't get through with
the reforms, they don't abide by all the vetting procedures,
then we don't pay. So that is a condition that we put on them.
Mr. Courtney. Seems like a pretty good leverage. So thank
you, General. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am very grateful
to see largely general bipartisan support of your efforts.
I have had the great opportunity 12 times over the years of
my service in Congress to visit. I have seen a civil society
develop. It is just so inspiring to go along streets and see
little girls with white scarves going to school, carrying
books. It just warms your heart, and then to see little guys
with baseball caps. That is not indigenous to Afghanistan.
These are people who are truly working to develop a civil
society, and I just want to thank you.
It is also very personal, my appreciation of your service.
My youngest son, Hunter, served as an engineer for a year in
Afghanistan, and I just know he was making a difference by
helping build that country, rebuild--begin from the beginning,
to protect American families at home, and you have.
Additionally I am very grateful as a veteran. My unit, the
218th Brigade served there under General Bob Livingston, our
adjutant general. It was the largest deployment from South
Carolina since World War II, 1,600 troops, and they were spread
all over the country. And they were helping train forces, and
they were so inspired. These are lifelong friends of mine, and
they would really let me know what they think; and they think
and know that they were working with who they identified as
their Afghan brothers.
And I regret so much that--hey, I can remember the first
time I went to Afghanistan with Sheila Jackson Lee. She pointed
out that bad news has no feet--excuse me; what is it--good news
has no feet and bad news has wings. And wow. But the good thing
is that extraordinary progress has been made. And I agree with
the chairman, too, that success in Afghanistan is to deny
terrorists safe havens, which protects American families.
And that we cannot forget it was September 11, 2001, the
attacks on our country, they were actually originated, planned,
and culminated from caves in Afghanistan. So I am just very
appreciative of your efforts and the largely bipartisan support
we have here. With that in mind, with the special operations
reliance of support from conventional forces, if conventional
forces are reduced as has been called for, how can special
operations fill in this gap?
General Campbell. Sir, today we continue to tactical level
train, advise, assist with special operating forces. They
continue to build the Afghan capacity, and they do a tremendous
job. We don't have the conventional forces at the battalion or
brigade level. I only have them at the corps level, four of the
six corps and at the ministry level, so we are not really doing
that much with the conventional side. But our special operating
forces continue to do great, great work every single day, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Well, with your leadership. I appreciate it.
Additionally I am concerned about the information intelligence
sharing between the U.S. and Afghan national defense and
security forces as it leads to operations in Afghanistan. Can
you speak of whether it is necessary to improve the
coordination cells and advise and assist cells throughout the
country?
General Campbell. Sir, we have a dedicated effort, what we
call an Essential Function 7, which is strictly intelligence
and how we work with the MOI and MOD to not only share
intelligence, but at the same time build their intelligence
capability, their enterprise. I think we have made some great
strides there. This year they have recently established what
they call the Nasrat Center, which is basically a national
intel fusion cell that brings in intelligence from the MOI, the
MOD, the NDS [National Directorate of Security], their intel
organization. It has produced national level targets. They
never had that before, and the difference that that is making
is pretty huge. But I think we continue every day to build upon
their capacity, and we have seen some great, great progress in
some of the operations based even at the tactical level on the
intelligence structure, and not only in the hardware side, but
also in the human capital side for intelligence.
Mr. Wilson. And that is so important to prevent collateral
damage which, of course, is your goal. As I conclude, again, I
am just so grateful for your service, for the service of
American military personnel. I having been there, have seen, my
first visit there, the country was totally destroyed. It was
the consequence of a 30-year civil war. There was nothing
really to see except rubble, and then to see the rubble
removed, the streets paved for the first time, to see little
shops develop, to see opportunity for schools, for bridges to
be built, and we sent units to work on agriculture to advance.
Thank you very much. I yield my time.
General Campbell. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
General, for being here today. I appreciate very much your
testimony, and like so many, all of us here, and like many
Americans, I was so alarmed to learn of the tragedy at the
Doctors Without Borders facility in Afghanistan, and I look
forward to your investigation and a hopefully very transparent
one but appreciate how serious you are taking this.
But I wanted to go to a different place in questioning. As
you are wrestling, General, with how best to enable Afghans to
secure their country and what kind of support is necessary to
aid them in that effort, I'd really like to hear more about
what you are doing to ensure that Afghan women, 50 percent of
the country's population is part of your process?
I have been part of a delegation, at least six trips over
that focused on one visiting with our women who have so ably
served us and for whom we are all so grateful, but also with an
emphasis on learning more about the changes that our presence
has wrought in the lives of Afghan women. And it has been very
promising.
Over and over again we hear the real differences that have
taken place, and I remain concerned that whatever our way
forward may be, how best we secure those gains, that we don't
trade them away in a reconciliation process. That we don't
adequately train Afghan national security forces, whether it is
the local police, the national police, whatever it may be,
because it obviously requires a culture change, and that
culture change has begun, but it is very fragile.
So I would like to hear in your work with the train,
advise, and assist, with the security forces, how you address
the rights of women so that the security forces who hopefully
will remain in place to secure the future life of their country
also are committed to securing the lives of the women who are
very much a part of their country?
General Campbell. Ma'am thank you. Thank you for the
question. Every day President Ghani, Dr. Abdullah, they speak
of this. I think with their leadership and our continued train,
advise and assist, that the future for engaging women in the
military both on the police side and the army side continues to
improve, and they put more of a spotlight on it, and we
continue to assist. And this committee with some earmarked
money has helped us really emphasize not only infrastructure to
house, to take care of women in the military, to protect them,
I think it has been pretty critical. So we are very thankful of
that. I have a women's advisory committee that I co-chair with
Ms. Ghani that meets quarterly to talk about different issues.
At my level, her level we meet quarterly, but the committee
meets probably weekly. In fact, Ms. Ghani over the last month
or so has been meeting weekly to really push some issues with
the army, and that is very, very good. As you know, for the
police it is a little bit easier as you recruit women into the
police. They go through training. They can serve from where
they are at.
Ms. Tsongas. But General, the question I am asking really,
yes, I think it is very important that the security forces, the
local police, whatever, reflect the population. And I
appreciate the efforts, especially Congresswoman Davis, in
terms of making sure that we at least provide some element,
female presence in the Afghan national security forces. But the
reality is most of those forces are men, and they have had a
certain cultural--historic approach to women; so it is really
about how we train the men to protect the rights of women, and
I am curious as to how that piece is moving forward.
General Campbell. Ma'am, they do some of that in their
session training, their officer training, their basic training,
about rights of not only women, but men. So I think they are
continuing to work that. It is about education. It is about
training. It is holding people accountable, and I think they
continue to get after that. I think as they see more women in
positions of increased responsibility, they see more women that
are tied in with the special operating forces which they have
women that do that with them to help go on objectives, to
search other females, it is actually pretty incredible.
When the other men see this and how that they contribute, I
think it does have a change in attitude. But as you know, the
army, the police, have only been around for a couple of years.
It is going to take time as we move forward. We do put
conditions as well on recruiting women, how they do that, and I
think it will continue to improve. But as you said, it is going
to take time. And it took time for the United States Army that
has been around for 240 years to get above 15, 16 percent at
West Point. This is something they are focusing on and with the
leadership of President Ghani, Dr. Abdullah, I see good things
for it.
Ms. Tsongas. And you have spoken of conditionality, how you
use that as leverage to achieve certain goals that there may be
some resistance to. Is that a tool in your tool box as you move
forward?
General Campbell. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you. General, thank you for being here.
You mentioned in your opening remarks about your families and
the role they played. You thanked them, and I want to make sure
they hear that same kind of thanks and heartfelt admiration for
what they have done and how steadfast they are in allowing you
and your team to do what you do. So thank them very much on our
behalf.
The recent experience in Kunduz with the attack, the
Taliban, what can we glean from what the Taliban did, what
tactics and procedures, TTPs, they used, and then the Afghan
response, was it all, you got to give a grade for that. Walk us
through that, and what kind of advice and assistance did we
provide them in that response, or was it all organic?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks. Thanks for the family piece
as well. In Kunduz, quite frankly, the Afghan Security Forces
were surprised. President Ghani has directed a commission to
take a look, sort of an after-action, to figure out exactly
what happened. They are continuing to work that now. But in a
nutshell, Kunduz has about 250,000 people in it. Predominantly
inside the city is police. Outside the city there are pockets
of the army.
Over the period of Eid, a holiday, many of the senior
leadership of the police and some of the army were not present.
The Taliban probably had a lot already inside the town, but
right after that time period, they attacked from within the
city. The police fought, although they did not take a lot of
casualties, and when they didn't see reinforcements from the
army, they kind of melted out. I don't think the Taliban had
any intentions to continue to hold Kunduz, but they got a great
IO [information operation] victory going in there, raising
their flag. The difference though here I think is that the
Afghan Security Forces responded very quickly. They got the
right forces up there. They moved a lot of logistical
resupplies up there.
They changed some leadership out, and once they got right
back into the city, the Taliban for the most part left. There
are and today continue to be isolated pockets of resistance and
fighting. A very small group inside of an urban area can hold
up battalion's worth of people, but they continue to work that
very hard. I talked to Minister of Defense Stanekzai this
morning right before I came over here. He was in Kunduz earlier
today and told me that he sees great progress as they move
forward. He still said fragile in Kunduz, but he is very
confident that all the major areas of Kunduz they own.
What did we provide, sir? For the most part this was
Afghan-led. They got themselves back into the city. I had a
couple of special operating teams that were south of the city
that provided some planning, training advice for the special
operating forces. And then I also put in what we call an
expeditionary advisory team into an airfield south of Kunduz so
they could provide the corps-level headquarters some logistical
planning capability to oversight the Afghans.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you. Ghani and Abdullah have been in it
for about a year now. What kind of marks would they get for
running the trains on time, water, electricity, all the kind of
things you expect in governmental services, and what does that
tell us about the conversation that is out there that it is a
fragile government, that it is likely to not be able to be
resilient? Can you talk just about those two issues?
General Campbell. I think if you are in Kabul, for the most
part you would give them probably a C. Although with high-
profile attacks inside of Kabul that would be lower. I think if
you are on the outskirts, you are in a faraway province,
faraway district, your grade would be much lower because they
haven't seen some of the governance they need at that level.
But, again, they have been, the national government on the 29th
of September--that was a year. They continue to move forward.
It is a very, very tough environment, but they continue to
improve. They have made change in almost all the ministers.
They have changed out most of the governors. They have some key
positions that they have to continue to work on together.
On strategic level policies that Afghanistan has tied into,
both Ghani and Abdullah, I think there is no daylight between
them. I think the issues they have is when they come to picking
people and who is going to be the minister, who is going to be
the potential police chief. They understand how important that
is, and I think they will continue to do everything they can to
make this work, but they do have to engage better with the
Afghan people, not only in Kabul, but outside the city, much
better.
Mr. Conaway. From the time we have got left, can you give
us from your perspective, the international community's
continued financial support is going to be key obviously. It
has already been said: they can't already afford the forces
they have got. Can you talk to us about the expected or what
you see as the international community's heart to stay in the
fight?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks. Sir, I don't think right now
we have donor fatigue. I think that the international community
understands how important this is. Next year at the Warsaw
Summit, I think July of 2016, they will look at funding for
2018, 2019, and 2020, so that will be critical.
I think Afghanistan has to continue to show progress as
they move forward so they keep donor support, but that donor
support is absolutely crucial because Afghanistan cannot afford
what they have now. They are working it very hard. President
Ghani is the right guy to do that with his experience, but the
economic environment is going to be very tough.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, General.
The Chairman. Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, first I
want to thank you for your service and your leadership, and
through you I want thank all the men and women who are
currently serving in Afghanistan and who have served in the
past.
I want to ask you a couple of questions about the bombing
in Kunduz, or the attack on the hospital in Kunduz, and I
recognize that there is an investigation ongoing, but I want to
ask you per your knowledge why the Afghanistan National Army
called that strike at that location?
General Campbell. Sir, again, that is a question that we
are asking, sir, in the investigation. I wouldn't want to get
out in front of the investigation. I need to learn those facts
from the investigation. There is a DOD [Department of Defense]
investigation, a NATO investigation. The Afghans are doing an
investigation. It will be very thorough, very transparent, and
as soon as I get those details, I will make sure the committee
has those.
Mr. O'Rourke. Is there ever a scenario where it is okay to
strike a hospital?
General Campbell. Sir, a hospital is a protected facility.
We would not target a hospital. If I can go back maybe to the
first part of your question and maybe get at what you are
talking about here. When the Afghans call for fire, that is not
an automatic response. Every day the Afghans ask me for close
air support, and we just don't go fire someplace. It has to go
through a rigorous procedure to put aerial fires on the ground,
a U.S. process under the U.S. authorities. And so we have got
to figure out what happened in that case. I don't want the
people to think that just because the Afghans call fire, that
there is automatic fire anywhere they want it. That is not the
case.
Mr. O'Rourke. My last question on this is, are you aware of
press reports within Afghanistan that that hospital was
treating Taliban and non-Taliban combatants alike, which raised
the ire of the Afghan national forces who had conducted a raid
at that hospital days before or weeks before that strike?
General Campbell. I have seen the reports about Taliban
treating in the hospital but that is----
Mr. O'Rourke. That would not be a justification for a
strike on the hospital?
General Campbell. No.
Mr. O'Rourke. Okay. A related question and one that I think
you can speak openly about, can you talk about the terms of our
security agreement with Afghanistan and under which conditions
we can use lethal force? And I understand there are exceptions
for counterterrorism activities. There are exceptions for when
U.S. forces are under attack, and there are exceptions for
urgent situations. Can you characterize our involvement in
Kunduz under those exceptions or others that we may not be
familiar with?
General Campbell. Sir, again I am not going to talk about
Kunduz or what happened in Kunduz, and any time we talk about
in detail on authorities or rules of engagement, I would not do
that in a public hearing. I would be glad to discuss that with
you in a closed hearing, sir.
Mr. O'Rourke. This might be my last question. How do you
balance the need to ensure that we are adequately supporting
the Afghan Army, not abandoning them, and continuing with the
train, assist, and advise operations, and not at the same time
creating a prolonged moral hazard where they know that U.S.
support will be there year in, year out, and they may not make
some of the difficult political decisions, investment
decisions, in their own armed forces and capabilities,
decisions with accountability for their leadership, that
otherwise might be made?
General Campbell. Sir, that is a great question. And I
think we work that very hard every single day. We do--they
know, and that is why fighting season 2015 was completely
different. I said up front you can't compare it with other
fighting seasons. The number of forces we had, the level that
we had people at, where we do train, advise, and assist, made
this very different. The ability for us to provide close air
support like we had in the past was very different, so there is
no doubt in my mind.
There is no doubt in the senior military that I deal with
on the Afghan side that it is different, and they have to pick
up the fight. They have to want this more than we want it. So I
have seen a change in behavior on that. I don't see that as an
issue. What I think they are looking at now is how long will
our continued support from the international community and the
U.S. be there, and a decision to continue to provide support
would make a huge impact in supporting President Ghani,
supporting the Afghan people, supporting the Afghan Security
Forces. The impact that would make on the Taliban and the
message it sends to them, the message it sends to Pakistan, and
the message that it sends to NATO I think are pretty huge as
well, so decisions here upcoming as we look forward would have
an impact on all of those audiences.
Mr. O'Rourke. Quick question. When will we likely get the
results of your investigation of the Kunduz attack?
General Campbell. I talked yesterday with the investigating
officer. He is working it very hard. I should have some
preliminary investigation results here in the next--yesterday I
was asked, and I said within about 30 days. I don't have an
exact date, but as soon as I get those I will make sure I get
that to this committee.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you for
being here. Just a couple of quick questions. Then I want to
specifically get to the close air support capabilities. But
Harry Reid has promised earlier this week to uphold the
President's veto of the NDAA [National Defense Authorization
Act], and the President has not vetoed that legislation yet. I
wonder if you and the other leaders of our military have had
the opportunity to speak with the President about the
importance of the NDAA since it has passed? And how do you
assess the additional risk if that bill is vetoed and the veto
is upheld by Senator Harry Reid as he has promised to do?
General Campbell. Sir, to be candid with you, I have not
talked to the President on the NDAA, and for the last several
weeks I haven't had time to think about the NDAA. I have been
focused on Afghanistan, so I couldn't give you a good answer
there.
Mr. Scott. We ask you to do an awful lot on this end. With
no NDAA, no budget, and certainly you and your men and women
are being judged to a standard of perfection and that is kind
of an unfair scenario that I think that we put you in an
extremely important mission.
I represent Moody Air Force Base, home of the 81st. We are
training the Afghan pilots to fly the A-29 light air support
aircraft. One of the key aspects of the mission, one of the key
capability gaps you said is the close air support. You are
expecting these aircraft in theater pretty soon. We originally
planned for 40 of them. We are now expected to deliver 20. How
many do you expect to see delivered? How many do you need? And
could you speak to just that issue generally?
General Campbell. Sir, we are looking forward to getting
the Super Tucano. I will get about six in December timeframe. I
will get more in 2016, more in 2017. We don't close out the
program of record I think until mid to late 2018. It will bring
a great capability that the Afghan forces are lacking. I have
asked for a holistic study to take a look at the close air
support capability of Afghanistan both in a rotary-wing and a
fixed-wing capability. Until that goes through, sir, I couldn't
make a call on numbers, but right now we are looking at 20. But
again, I don't get the first five or six until the end of this
year, and we will get them in the fight as soon as we can, and
we look forward to that. The Afghans look forward to that, yes,
sir.
Mr. Scott. And you think that they have enough impact to
change the fight?
General Campbell. Sir, if they would have had the A-29 this
summer, it would have been a game changer in some locations,
yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, General, for your service and what
you and your men and women do. I yield the remainder of my
time.
The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I want to
thank you for your testimony here today and most especially for
your service to our Nation, which is invaluable, and I hope
you'll pass our appreciation on to the men and women under your
command.
First of all, General, again, I'd like to better understand
the current situation in Afghanistan, and I hope that today's
discussion will continue to not only inform our overall
strategy but will also serve to better protect our men and
women in uniform and our coalition partners on the ground. We
have seen too many lives lost in this conflict obviously, like
Master Sergeant Andrew McKenna from Bristol, Rhode Island, who
very recently was killed in a terror attack in Kabul. We
obviously have to do everything we can in our power to ensure
that our policies in Afghanistan maximize our strategic gains
while minimizing the tragic loss of lives that we have seen too
frequently across the headlines.
Make no mistake about it, General, the work that you and
the men and women in uniform there who are serving in
Afghanistan are doing vitally important work, and I know that
they are defending us here at home in preventing those who
would plot and plan against us from coming here. At the same
time there is still a big frustration on the part of the
committee and certainly on the part of my constituents that the
Afghan forces are not further along in their training and where
we need them to be. I would like to begin with a New York Times
article from yesterday in which a senior Afghan military
officer blamed the lack of coordination among Afghan units for
recent Taliban advances. This relates to your mention of the
need for improved leadership and accountability of ANDSF
[Afghan National Defense and Security Forces] in your
testimony.
So I would like to ask you directly, how do you explain to
the committee, how do I explain to my constituents back home,
as to why after the 14 years of effort and training and
presence there and the billions of dollars that we have spent,
lives that have been lost, the people that have been injured,
why the Afghan forces are not further down the pike in their
training, and why are they not where we need them to be? And
I'd also like to ask you directly what you need with regards to
time and resources in order to help build strong leaders ANDSF
are missing to sustain themselves beyond our eventual
withdrawal?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question. I think,
very quickly, where the Afghan forces--where they plan, where
they preplan, where they work together, both the cross-pillar
organization, the police and the army, they conduct operations
that they work together and preplan, they do very, very well.
Where they don't, where it is kind of crisis mode, that is
where they continue to need help in working that. When they
don't work together, you are right, sir; they don't do well.
But, again, I would say we have been there for 14 years,
but this army continues to be very, very young. We have just
started their air force the last 3, 4, 5 years. The army has
really only been around for about 8 or 9 years, the police
about the same timeframe.
So it continues to be a work in progress, but I would tell
you, they can do a lot of things very well; but the areas that
they have issues in are the areas that any army in a time of
war would have problems. So in logistics and sustainment,
maintenance, intelligence, close air support, special operating
force capability, those are all very tough pieces for a U.S.
Army to do. They have been fighting at the same time they have
been trying to build this army, so I see continued progress. I
have been there three times, the first time in 2002, 2003
timeframe; and where they are today is just light years from
where they were then, so I do see progress. Their special
operating capability, I mentioned probably the last time I was
here a story where you took four Mi-17s [transport helicopters]
flying version 5 flying from Kandahar into Helmand at night,
very low visibility, going into a small landing zone, special
operators coming off the back, a little iPad device talking to
an Afghan PC-12 [signals intelligence aircraft], giving them
full-motion video moving to a high-value target.
I told that story and asked people to close their eyes and
think about it. Open your eyes and think if that was the
Rangers, that was the SEALs [Sea, Air, Land forces], that was
Delta. That was the Afghan special operating forces. So they
have that capability today, and they continue to get better and
better. But they do have gaps and seams that we knew they would
have that we have to continue to train, advise, and assist on.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General. With respect to our
drawdown, can you talk about NATO's willingness to step up and
add additional forces there to supplement our drawdown?
General Campbell. From my discussions with senior members
of the partner countries, we have 42 right now with pledged
support. Most of them will continue to support, but it is going
to take a U.S. decision first before they do that.
The Chairman. Thank you, General. Thank you. I yield back,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Dr. Wenstrup.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you
for being here today as always. You know, on September 11,
2001, an attack was launched on America from a place that most
Americans never heard of and by a person that most persons had
never heard of. And when I think about the freedom that we
enjoy in this country that came flying in our face that day,
that it was at risk, I am reminded of what was etched in a wall
of an isolation cell that Congressman Sam Johnson spent time in
in Hanoi Hilton that said those that have fought and almost
died experience the taste of freedom the protected will never
know.
And I think sometimes your accomplishments and the
accomplishments of our military now and throughout history and
the freedom that we enjoy are often taken for granted in
America, and I think that that needs to be recognized. I think
that many in America, and some in this room don't fully
understand the effort and sacrifice that went behind every one
of those ribbons and pins that you wear and so many in our
military wear, and I want to thank you for that and all those
that serve us in that regard.
One of the things that you said today that really stuck out
to me, and I think you know why as a veteran of Iraq, what
stood out to me is when you said we honor their memory by
building a stable Afghanistan. I think there is a lot to be
said for that. I think history has shown, and I believe that
the greatest chance for peace on this Earth comes from a strong
U.S. military that can be reactive, can be postured well, and
can serve as a deterrent to evildoers. I think that is really
what we are after. I think that is what we want to see happen.
So my question today is what do you think would be the
bare-bones level that we can maintain in Afghanistan to prevent
a vacuum like we have seen in Iraq, and what level gives you
the most comfort or most assurance that that won't happen? And
also I want to get some of your thoughts on the benefits of the
idea that even if we had a stable Afghanistan that was able to
stand on its own two feet, would there be benefits to us still
being there in a postured position like we do in other parts of
the world?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question. And thank
you for the thanks. Sir, I don't want to go into details on
numbers and level. Again, I have provided options to the senior
leadership. I feel comfortable within those options that I have
laid it out in terms of risk. Higher is less. Less increase is
at risk in general terms.
But I feel comfortable in those options, and I know that
senior leadership will continue to look at those and weigh
those, and I have provided pros and cons of all of that. But it
is based on capability as we look forward. It is not numbers
but what capability is needed based on Afghan capability and as
you said, have a U.S. CT mission as well, and we took a hard
look and included that in there. I do think presence equals
influence, and if you have people on the ground, you have
influence.
If we are not there to provide influence, somebody else is
going to be there. Whether it is Russia, China, Iran, you name
it, the U.S. and having people on the ground provides
influence.
Dr. Wenstrup. Long-term benefits from even a stable
Afghanistan?
General Campbell. Sir, Afghanistan lives in a neighborhood
that doesn't follow the rules. You take a look at the countries
around it. Very, very tough neighborhood. Again, presence
equals influence. Building a stable Afghanistan to provide
stability in that region, having a partner that wants to
partner not only with the U.S. but with the other coalition
nations is key. We haven't had that the last several years, and
I think we have an opportunity today to take advantage of that
for a very modest continued investment in both money and
personnel.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you very much, General. I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General
Campbell, for being here with us today. You talked about
presence equals influence and other members have mentioned the
instability and the threat of this same brand of Islamic
extremism in other countries around the region. Would your
recommendation, your strategic recommendation, be to maintain
or deploy a U.S. presence and military service members to other
countries in the region such as Libya and Yemen that are facing
similar threats and far greater instability than we are seeing
in Afghanistan?
General Campbell. I think Chairman Dempsey before he left
talked about a regional presence throughout different areas of
the world, and I would concur with that.
Ms. Gabbard. How long do you suggest that given the track
record for the last 14 years in Afghanistan, that we continue
to ask our service members to deploy to Afghanistan on this
similar train-and-equip mission given the lack of progress that
we have seen and given the failures that we have seen in Iraq
and in Syria?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I can't talk Iraq, Syria. I would
disagree a little bit on lack of progress again in Afghanistan.
I think there has been great progress. I think this fighting
season has been very tough and I would probably say uneven
progress. But there are areas and capabilities that they
continue to have issues with that take any army a long time.
Building a pilot takes 2 or 3 years. Building a maintainer
takes 2 or 3 years. We started that late in Afghanistan, so
that is one area we have to continue to train, advise, and
assist on for years to come. They want to take this on; and
they have an attitude, they want to do this by themselves.
They welcome, I talked about conditionality, so we have an
opportunity here where we have a willing partner where they
want to continue to improve on their own capabilities so they
can be a productive country in that part of the region, not
only provide for stability and protection for their own
homeland and the people there, but also for the region.
Ms. Gabbard. So you are seeing an open-ended commitment
from the United States military to maintain a presence there?
General Campbell. I think we have to continually assess
that, and as we have done over the last several years, we have
gone from 140,000 down to less than 10,000. The amount of money
continues to go down, so I think we have been very good in
continuing to assess that to bring that commitment down.
I said in my opening remarks this is not without conditions
and it can't be unlimited forever and ever. But I think we have
to continue to assess that and make those calls as we go, and I
have been asked to lay this out for this period in time where
the Afghan Security Forces are, and that is what I have
attempted to do.
Ms. Gabbard. Given the corruption that we have seen though
in all levels of the government there in Afghanistan, but
including at the lowest levels, and it has been talked about a
lot recently given what happened in Kunduz with the Taliban's
taking over that city for a short period of time, but also
people saying that it is likely that that was kind of the first
volley, and that one reason that they were able to do so is
that the local communities there, and we have seen this in
other parts of Afghanistan, because of corruption by the Afghan
local police and by local government.
People are getting shaken down multiple times and see
perhaps the Taliban as the lesser of evils in their daily life
and in their challenges. What is being done about stemming out
and getting rid of this corruption so that the Afghan folks who
you have been training can actually do this without us?
General Campbell. Thank you for the question. Again, I
think President Ghani, Dr. Abdullah, the MOI, the MOD, the
senior leadership I deal with every day tries to get after
corruption. They understand that is a huge issue. It has been
there for years and years. They are trying to get at it by
picking the right leadership, holding them accountable. They
are trying to get at it by looking at procurement. They are
trying to get at it by providing the right education for the
leadership and for the folks that join the army and the police.
I think if you ask most Afghans, they would tell you they
don't want the Taliban. The Taliban target--the Taliban kill
innocent women and children. The Taliban put suicide vests on
little kids and walk them into marketplaces and hold their
mother or father hostage and say you are going to blow yourself
up. I don't believe the Afghan people want that. I know the
Afghan people don't want that. They want to secure Afghanistan,
and they have that hope because of the Afghan Security Forces
and because of the great work that our men and women have done.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. Thank you. Just in closing, Mr.
Chairman, I think it is deeply concerning to consider the idea
that we would ask our service members to go on this nation-
building mission across the region and it is something we have
got to look at carefully. Thank you.
The Chairman. I appreciate the comments of the gentlelady.
I just want to highlight for members that week after next we
are going to spend a week in this committee looking at train
and equip around a variety of countries and what has worked and
what hasn't. Are there lessons to be learned, because I agree
with the gentlelady. This is a very important issue that we
need to dig down deeper on because there are a number of
instances where it has not worked very well. We need to
understand that. So I appreciate the comments.
Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and first of all, I
want to thank the General for your leadership to our troops,
your service. But as we move forward with the Taliban, what are
their abilities to recruit and train? Do we see an uptick in
that, or has that stayed level, or has it dropped off?
General Campbell. Sir, I think at least it has stayed
stable, or at least it has stayed level. Again, they have
surged really this fighting season because they know that this
is an opportunity for them because we don't have the coalition
out in the numbers we have had. They want to make a statement.
They want to remain relevant. They want to show as potentially
it moves to discussion of reconciliation that they can operate
from a position of strength. They have continued to be able to
recruit.
When you have somebody there that has no job, no money, no
future, and somebody comes and offers you $100, $200 to plant
an IED [improvised explosive device], that is pretty easy to
do. So I think what we have to continue to do is show the
people of Afghanistan that they have hope in a better future if
they continue to support their Afghan Security Forces and the
government. But for the most part, what I see is the Afghan
people do not support the Taliban.
Mr. Nugent. So if they don't support the Taliban, where are
they recruiting from? Are they recruiting within?
General Campbell. Both. They recruit from within
Afghanistan, and there is also reports of foreign fighters that
come in that assist the Taliban as well.
Mr. Nugent. And how are they trained? Do we have a metric
on how they are trained or where they train?
General Campbell. Sir, I think there are areas inside
Afghanistan that they have potential training areas. There are
areas outside of Afghanistan that have sanctuary that provide
them the opportunity to train. When they conduct attacks, sir,
it is not something that you would see from a large, modern
technological force command and control move. This is
counterinsurgency; one or two people put an IED out there, one
or two people killing a few people here, suicide vests going
on.
They don't follow the rules. All they have to do is go out
there and cause fear in the people, and that is what they want
to do, and so fear to make the government seem as though they
can't provide security for the people. So it is going to take
everybody in Afghanistan to fight this piece here, but I do not
believe the Afghan people support the Taliban for the most
part.
Mr. Nugent. And that is good to hear. I was there in 2011
and was struck with--I was in Iraq and Afghanistan--actually
struck with the security level in Afghanistan versus Iraq in
2011 when we were withdrawing troops. We had more freedom of
movement within Afghanistan. We had less restrictions on
movement in Afghanistan at that point in time, and now I wonder
where we are as compared to 2011?
Like I said, when I was in Iraq in 2011, everywhere we went
was fast, quick, with ballistic protection; and it was just the
opposite in Afghanistan. Has that changed? If I go to
Afghanistan today, will I see the same type of movements
available to us? I got to visit with the Afghan police training
facility.
General Campbell. Sir, quite frankly, where we were in 2011
to where we are today in 2015, we don't have that many areas,
so most of the areas that you would have to go to you would
probably travel by helicopter to it and you would land in a
small location just based on the downsizing, the number of
people we have.
So we don't have a lot of folks that end up driving
throughout Afghanistan at all, just based on location, based on
the density of people that we have there. As far as the
Afghans, I think they continue to have, as I said, freedom of
movement on Highway 1, which is a ring road, throughout Kabul.
Mr. Nugent. General, I don't mean to interrupt, but one
last question. In 2007, 2008, my older son was in Afghanistan
for 15 months. He said, Dad, a lot of folks talk about just
going back into the Stone Age. He said the problem is they are
already in the Stone Age. Has that changed at all?
General Campbell. Sir, absolutely. I think, especially in
the cities at least; in the outer parts of Afghanistan, you are
still going to see people that are living in very limited,
primitive housing, but inside the city, cell phones, business,
Internet, you name it, as was mentioned earlier today.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you again, General. My time is expired.
The Chairman. Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. General, I want to thank you again for your
service, and also specifically for your courage, your
willingness to come to Washington and say candidly when you
disagree with the policy that we are sending your way. So thank
you for that. As an Iraq war veteran, it was hard for me to
return to Iraq this winter, disheartening to say the least to
see so much of what my colleagues and I had fought for and
frankly achieved during the surge gone to waste. And so, I am
particularly interested in how you are learning from that
experience to make sure we don't repeat the same mistakes in
Afghanistan.
One thing I think that stands out in particular to me is
that it was not just our rapid withdrawal of troops, but our
failure to continue to support and influence the Iraqi
government that ultimately led to it falling apart. In many
ways what happened in Iraq was not just the failure of our
train-and-equip mission as far as our troops go. The Iraqi Army
just put their weapons down and went home because they had lost
faith in a government that had rotted from the inside. And so
it was pulling those advisors out of the ministries, out of the
prime minister's office. We disdain Maliki, but we forget he
was in power during the surge when we actually made a lot of
progress and had a relatively stable government.
But it was because of our influence. So who are you talking
with from the Iraq experience to make sure that you don't
repeat those same mistakes? And can you give us some examples
of things that you are notably doing differently than what we
did in Iraq?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question. In
Afghanistan, we have a lot of Iraq veterans. Thank you for your
service. So all of them, I think, feel as you do there and want
to make sure that we learn from our experience, and so as we do
different plans, as we have taken a look at the security
cooperation office in particular of what would remain in Kabul,
how they did that in Iraq versus how they did that in
Afghanistan, planners got together with planners that had done
that in Iraq.
They talked. They worked through that, and we made
adjustments based on that kind of discussion. I feel confident
that we have been able to take a look because as you know, the
military does AARs, or after action reports, on everything we
do, and so we have to learn by that. I think we have done that
in that particular case. We have also taken a hard look at how
we do set up advisor teams, how we can take expeditionary
advising teams as we continue to downsize and provide some
level of expertise in particular areas, and I think that has
helped us.
I think what you said is key, though, the fundamental
difference for me between Iraq and Afghanistan is that you have
a government that is a willing partner here, that wants to
continue to have a presence from the international community,
that favors that, that wants it, that asks for it, and wants to
continue to grow a professional army, a professional police,
different than what you saw with Maliki.
Mr. Moulton. I have heard some reports that that government
is suffering from a serious brain drain right now, where a lot
of talent is leaving. Are you seeing that? Is it a concern?
General Campbell. It is a concern; the overall refugee
piece where young people are leaving Afghanistan is a concern.
It is a concern for both President Ghani and Abdullah. They
have both spoken about that. But at the same time I see great
potential with the army, the police, and young men and women
that have been trained in the U.S. and the U.K. and Germany and
other countries as they continue to move up and increase
responsibility in leadership positions. I see there is some
really good talent there. We just got to get them into the
right positions.
Mr. Moulton. Now from the outside we are seeing cooperation
between President Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah. Are they
actually sharing power, or is that an area of concern as well?
General Campbell. I mean, the national government is hard,
and I think they have to continue every single day to work at
it. The President is the President. There is no doubt, I think,
in his mind or Dr. Abdullah's mind who the President is, but I
think again on policy matters they continue to work very close
on that. There is no daylight between them on that. They work
together in national security councils. They work together in
the cabinet meetings, but they know there is no other choice
there as they move forward.
Mr. Moulton. General, one last question following on Mr.
Scott's question earlier. Both the Chairman and the Secretary
of Defense have testified before this committee that using OCO
[overseas contingency operations] funds to fund the budget of
the Department of Defense is not a satisfactory way to ensure
our national security. Do you agree with that position?
General Campbell. Sir, what I agree with is I have been
very fortunate to have the resources that I need. I have had
the right people trained and equipped, and that is because they
have done it by OCO; but as I think everybody has mentioned, it
is very hard for any of the services to continue to plan when
you go year by year.
Mr. Moulton. I think it is important for you to understand
that that is the rationale the President has given for voting
against the NDAA. It is the rationale that myself and others
who have taken that tough vote have used as well. We hope that
we can change that situation by forcing the issue. It is in no
way a reflection of our lack of confidence in you and the
troops on the front lines. Thank you.
General Campbell. Thank you.
The Chairman. Ms. Walorski.
Mrs. Walorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General, I
again want to thank you for being here; and I so much, to my
colleague's comments, I so much appreciate your candor. It is
just a fresh moment to have a bottom-line general come in and
basically say here is what I think to the President. And I
guess a couple of comments that I have is that I think--and I
appreciate the gentleman's questions and opinion, but I happen
to have the opposite opinion--I think that we are talking about
symptoms in here.
And I think that we need to remind the American people that
over the last 3 years, certainly in my short tenure in
Congress, there really has been a vacuum of foreign policy, and
there has been a lot of reactionary things happen. There hasn't
been a whole lot of support that I have seen from this
administration, and I think that when you have a President that
stands up and is willing to volley back and forth politically
the entire defense budget, which absolutely has everything to
do with the allocation of the good people. You get the money to
support them.
I think it is very, very dangerous, and I think the
American people understand that. And I do appreciate so much
your not being able to talk to us specifically about the troop
drawdowns. The things I have seen in the media have been
anywhere from 1,000 to 5,000 to 8,000, and I guess I really
appreciate your comment where presence equals influence. I just
want to make sure that we are talking about, for the record,
when there is less presence, there is less influence, there is
greater risk. And that counts across the board. So that would
count with counterterrorism, train, advise, assist, and force
protection, and missions. Is that not correct? Isn't that what
presence equals influence means? The less presence, the greater
the risk?
General Campbell. I wouldn't argue with that statement,
ma'am.
Mrs. Walorski. And then my other question, General, nobody
has really talked about; but I am concerned because, and some
of my other colleagues talked about policy, that you are just
implementing the policy that we are sending. Well, again, I
think it is not we are sending policy. There is an
administration sending a policy that many times can't be
understood, has created a vacuum for the enemy, and the
American people certainly don't understand, as the losses in
Iraq, as the presence of Russia right now in Syria, and I think
certainly with the Iranian proposal that was signed. Do you
detect currently, are you concerned about increased Iranian
presence and what that means as you share a border now that we
are venturing in by the administration's desire to sign this
agreement with Iran?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I won't go into policy, but I will
tell you, I talked in the SASC [Senate Armed Services
Committee] as well about Iranian influence on the Taliban and
providing Taliban the support to fight ISIL as they sought. So
President Ghani, security forces are concerned and the impact
that would have from Iran on its western flank.
If I could add, though, on not really policy but as I have
gone forward and asked for flexibility for 2015, the
administration gave me that flexibility. As I asked for
enablers, a bridging strategy and authorities, I was able to
get that as well. So, again, I am very comfortable as I
provided options to my senior leadership, that they put due
diligence and scrutiny on that, and that is what I would
expect. I think that is what the American people would expect.
Mrs. Walorski. Sure. And just a further question on Iran
and the forces that you are suggesting, does that take into
account a new level of activity with Tehran and Kabul?
General Campbell. Maybe not specifically, ma'am, as we
looked at that. Again, we have seen reports of that. I have
talked with the Minister of Defense and the impact that would
have in Herat, specifically on the west, led by the Italians
out in TAAC-West [Train Advise Assist Command-West] that get
some of those reports. I don't think we looked at that
specifically as we looked at the capabilities that are
required.
Mrs. Walorski. Sure. And so I guess my final question is as
we launch into uncharted waters with this agreement with Iran,
and should you see the need for things going awry for
additional training, help, forces, money, people, personnel,
should anything happen on that border, do you feel like you
have the flexibility with this administration to go back again
until the administration tells the American people, hey,
something is wrong here; we need help?
General Campbell. Ma'am, whether it is on the west, the
north, the south, or the east, my job is to provide the best
military advice. If I see issues that I have concerns on force
protection or the train, advise, assist, I would absolutely
raise that to my leadership.
Mrs. Walorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General Campbell,
thank you for your service to the Nation. I think Americans are
getting tired of being bogged down in Afghanistan. We have been
there for 13, 14 years, and it seems that there is no end in
sight. It seems like we are doomed to always maintain a troop
presence there, and I don't think that that is something that
is good for our country for us to be nation-building forever in
Afghanistan. That is exactly what the future holds for us.
There is no point in our plans or in the plans of those who
want to build the nation of Afghanistan. There is no stopping
point. Because whenever you do stop, there is going to be some
adjustments that have to be made, so why not make the
adjustment now? Why not draw down our troops?
If the Russians or the Chinese want to come in and be
players over there, good for them. I would think that they
would not want to embroil themselves over there. They would
probably want to see the locals work everything out. What do
you say to that?
General Campbell. Sir, I would say that we have continued
to redeploy and draw down our forces. We have continued to--you
know, we had that 300 or 400 different outposts when I was
there in 2010, 2011. We are down to less than 20 today, so we
have continued to draw down both our forces, and I think we
have drawn it down responsibly. I am thankful that we have had
the ability to do that. I think as we look forward, what we are
trying to do is make sure that we continue to provide the
Afghans support where they need it, and we can do that
reasonably and responsibly as we continue to draw down. But in
the areas that are very tough for them, in the close air
support and other areas, having a stable government, having a
stable Afghanistan is not only good for Afghanistan, it is not
only good for the region, but it is also good for the United
States.
Mr. Johnson. I understand that, but it just seems like
stability is not there, and there will be no stability in the
short term or in the foreseeable future. There won't be any
stability with the U.S. presence there with our 10,000 troops.
I mean, do you believe that we should just maintain that force
level for the foreseeable future, or should we think about
drawing down even further?
General Campbell. Sir, as I said earlier, I have provided
options to the senior leadership that weighs pros and cons of
different force levels based on different risk, and I said up
front, I don't believe it should be unconditional and it should
be forever and ever. We have to continue to work through that.
If you look at Korea, if you look at Germany and the amount of
forces that we continue to have in those countries 70 years
later, would Korea or Germany be as stable as they are today?
Mr. Johnson. Well, that is exactly what the American people
are looking forward to with Afghanistan, is a multi-decade
presence over there. And if we do maintain ourselves as targets
over there, as long as we are supporting the Afghan government,
a corrupt government, which does not have the full allegiance
of the people, that is highly factionalized over there, if we
maintain our presence over there and being a target for those
who just simply want to drive us out, then we are just stuck,
and I don't believe that is a good thing for America.
General Campbell. Sir, I am not sure of the question, but I
don't think they are trying to drive us out. The government
wants us there.
Mr. Johnson. I think we are getting sick and tired of being
sick and tired of the same thing happening over and over again
in Afghanistan, and I think it is time for us to look at
closing up shop. And with that I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
General Campbell, for your testimony today, for your service,
and for your family's support over your decades of service to
our Nation.
Earlier this year I had the opportunity to participate in a
delegation visit to Afghanistan with Mr. Wilson, Mr. Moulton,
and Mr. Ashford, my colleagues on this committee. And in
addition to meeting with our troops deployed, we also visited
with President Ghani. One of the issues that President Ghani
raised was the threat of Daesh within Afghanistan. And in your
written testimony today you state, quote, ``Daesh has grown
much faster than we anticipated, and its continued development
in Afghanistan presents a legitimate threat to the entire
region. In the last year we have observed the movement's
increased recruiting efforts and growing operational
capacity.'' I wanted to see if you could elaborate on
specifically what you are seeing on the ground in terms of that
increased recruitment efforts, their operational capacity, and
their presence in the 34 provinces in Afghanistan?
General Campbell. Thank you, ma'am. I am sorry I wasn't
there when you came through. In fact, I was back here, I think,
testifying. Thank you for taking the visit. Daesh, or ISIL-KP,
continues to be a concern to President Ghani, Dr. Abdullah, the
security forces. Pakistan has issues with Daesh as well. I have
talked to General Raheel about that. I think if you talk to
President Ghani about it in terms of recruiting what he would
have told you was Al Qaeda was Windows 1.0, Daesh is Windows
7.0 in their ability to use social media to get out and
recruit. Having said that, Daesh and Taliban ideology, they are
different and so they continue to fight each other specifically
in the province of Nangarhar in the east. That is where we have
seen the biggest presence of Daesh. There are reports
throughout the different provinces upward of probably 25-plus
provinces we have had reports of Daesh; but the significant
presence is really in the east and Nangarhar. It is down in
northern Helmand a little bit and probably in Sar-e Pol and
Herat and Ghor in the west.
I don't believe today--you know, when I was here in
February, March, I would have said it was nascent. Today I
would say it is operationally emergent. So we have to continue
to watch, and we have to continue to make sure that the Afghans
apply pressure on ISIS or Daesh to make sure that it doesn't
continue to grow. As you know, they are very barbaric, brutal,
and they've shown instances of that in Afghanistan as well by
cutting off heads of captives, by kidnapping, by taking men and
women, throwing them on a pile of IEDs and blowing that up. So,
again, the Afghan people have no time for Daesh there. And the
Afghan Security Forces want to continue to go after that.
Ms. Stefanik. What is your assessment of Afghanistan's
approach to countering recruitment efforts? You talked about
Daesh's successful social media which we are seeing throughout
the Middle East today. And, frankly, globally. What is your
assessment of what President Ghani and his administration are
doing in countering that?
General Campbell. I think a lot of it is the educational
piece. They are trying to work that in the universities. They
are trying to work that through radio, TV campaign ads, and
showing the benefits of having a unity government supporting
the Afghan Security Forces. You know, I don't think for the
most part they have to--well, they show a video of how brutal
Daesh is. You know, that really just turns the people away. So
they have to continue to work that very hard. I think they have
done a good job at that. And they will continue to try to work
together, both with the [Operation] Resolute Support forces on
the ground, and the neighbors in the region.
President Ghani is approaching this really from a regional
standpoint and has said, you know, we are fighting Daesh. We
are fighting this for the entire region. We have got to
continue to reach out. And they will hold a conference here I
think the end of October timeframe where they bring in all the
operational and the intelligence arms of all the surrounding
countries to talk specifically about Daesh and how they can
combat that together.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you very much. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Aguilar.
Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
General, appreciate you being here. Can you give us a size,
just as a follow-up to the last question, can you give us a
sense of the size of Daesh and ISIS and their presence in the
region?
General Campbell. Are you talking about just a number, sir?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
General Campbell. This would be, you know, a guess, but
open source reporting would be anywhere between 1,000 and
3,000.
Mr. Aguilar. And your best guess on what that will look
like in the next few years if not managed or contained?
General Campbell. Well, sir, they have a--you know, their
stated goal is to build a Khorasan province that includes
Afghanistan, parts of Pakistan. They want Jalalabad out in the
east to be the capital of the Khorasan province. So they are
going to continue to fight hard in Nangarhar. They want to
spread that north up into Kunar and Nuristan. And unchecked, I
mean, they will continue to grow a base.
But I do believe the Afghan Security Forces understand
this. There is operations ongoing today that are going after
Daesh in Nangarhar by both the army and the police in the 201st
Corps which is based in Nangarhar.
Mr. Aguilar. You know, we understand and we have read that
some members of the Taliban have gone over toward these
networks because of the change the leadership. Can you give us
any other discussion or comments about other reasons why they
have made that transition?
General Campbell. I think a lot of it, you know, there has
been a lot of TTP [Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan], Pakistan
Taliban, that has switched over. There has been regular Taliban
that has switched over, or have at least publicly expressed
allegiance to ISIL, Daesh. I think some of it is they think
they are going to get more resources. They look at it as maybe
more media attention.
And so I think for a lot of these reasons you have some
folks that don't want to come back into the government, that
don't want to reconcile, that want to continue to fight, and
they will join something new like Daesh that is coming up
there. And they see what is happening in Iraq and Syria. And
for whatever reason, why somebody would want to do that I
couldn't tell you, but, you know, they see that as something
they want to do and they continue to join that.
But, again, I think from a regional standpoint, President
Ghani, Dr. Abdullah, General Raheel, they want to fight this.
They want to continue to get it now before it grows out of
control as you talked about.
Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, General.
Appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Knight.
Mr. Knight. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General,
for your service.
I just had a couple quick questions. Can you give me an
idea of the definition of train and assist? When we went to--I
went over to Poland and some other countries with the chair and
other members, and I was thoroughly impressed with the Polish
soldiers and the interaction that we had with U.S. forces. So
can you give me an idea what train and assist means for the
Afghans? What is going to happen when they are done, when they
are through with their training? What can we expect from them?
How they are going to interact? Those types of things.
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question. Again, the
numbers that we have right now, as the chairman asked me early
on, we are really working on the ministerial level, and at the
ministerial level we are focusing on what we call eight
essential functions. So in the intelligence realm, in the
planning, programming, budgeting, execution realm, transparency
and accountability, sustainability, intelligence, strategic
communications.
What we do at that area is our trainers are now really our
new weapons systems, and we have much more senior folks. Where
this war would have been about privates and captains and
sergeants, lieutenants, our advisors are more senior, generals
and lieutenant colonels and colonels and great senior
civilians. And they are trying to bring this technical
expertise to build the capacity of the Afghan ministry.
So the Interior and the Defense. We don't have people at
their basic training. We don't have people providing them, you
know, marksmanship training. They do all that themselves. So
the Afghans for the most part do all their own training. EOD
[explosive ordnance disposal] training, all of that. The
technical areas that they don't have the expertise, the
maintenance areas and pilots, and growing their air force, that
is where we continue to have to do the train, advise, and
assist.
Mr. Knight. Okay. Very good. And, you know, with the recent
issues with Russia and their strikes in Syria, can you give me
an idea of the level of maybe the weekly or monthly interaction
that you get with, and I will use different terms than I am
sure you use now, but maybe between you, sir, commanders, and
people of that level that, you know, the four-stars are going
to get together and talk about what is happening in the region.
I know that this region is quite a bit to the west of you, but
it is going to affect maybe what happens in Afghanistan, maybe
what happens in--now that we are getting strikes from the
Caspian Sea. I would expect that there are kind of connective
interactions between the commanders between what is happening
now.
General Campbell. So I talk to General Austin, who is the
CENTCOM [Central Command] commander, several times a week. I do
have email and video teleconference and telephone conversations
with General Breedlove, who is the SACEUR [Supreme Allied
Commander Europe]. I have talked to General Rodriguez, the
AFRICOM [Africa Command] commander. I know that AFRICOM, EUCOM
[European Command], and CENTCOM talk quite frequently to
understand. Because, as I said up front, terrorism has no
boundaries.
Mr. Knight. Correct.
General Campbell. So a very good relationship between the
combatant commanders there. But I mostly talk to General Austin
through CENTCOM based on the region I am there. I did have the
opportunity couple weeks ago to go to India to talk to some of
the senior leadership in India to talk about Afghanistan, how
that plays--how they are tied in with Afghanistan, what that
means to China and Pakistan. Really quite helpful for me.
And also to explain how Afghanistan is tied into that.
President Ghani, again, is reaching out to the entire region. I
think is quite helpful. Last Monday, I was in Germany for a day
with General Austin. We brought the chiefs of defense from five
of the countries surrounding Afghanistan to bring them together
to talk, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, all
came together to talk about regional issues, border issues,
drug smuggling, what they can do to enable each other to fight,
you know, this common enemy. So, that was quite good.
Mr. Knight. Very good. Thank you, General.
General Campbell. Thank you.
Mr. Knight. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you
for being here. I want to talk a little bit about the capacity
of the Afghan troops that we are training. From your testimony,
you know, you characterize the security forces' performance at
the end of--the Afghan National Defense Security Forces as
uneven, inconsistent, required--still require broad support.
You know, you talk about the fact that without key enablers and
competent operational level leaders they can't handle the fight
alone.
In contrast, you talk about the ASSF [Afghan Special
Security Forces] and how they are actually able to mount
operations and seem to be much more successful. What I am
concerned is that we seem to be talking a lot in our metrics
about our training the security forces in terms of numbers. How
many do we think they need to accomplish the mission as opposed
to the capacity or the quality of the forces? I just think that
we are a little over-focused on building up troop levels in
terms of quantity. You laid out a few significant threats that
we face in Afghanistan and the region.
So as the President evaluates what right troop and advisor
levels are, could you explain what the primary issues and
variables are that continue to plague the security forces'
ability to carry out its mission independently? And compare
that to the ASSF who seem to be able to have the capacity to do
this on their own.
General Campbell. Thank you, ma'am, for the question. Yeah.
I was very tough on the Afghan Security Forces in my written
comments there. And I have talked to the Afghan partners about
all of those. And, again, you have to have that type of
relationship to be able to continue to improve. And I value
that with both the MOD and the MOI.
And, again, we are not at the levels of the Kandak
Battalion Brigade. We are on four of the six corps, and we are
at the ministry level. So some of those comments really focus
at the senior leadership. And what I have told President Ghani
is that if you pick the right leaders, you put the right
leadership in place, and you hold them accountable, that is
going to take care of about 70 percent of the issues that we
see day-to-day out there.
One of the reasons that the Afghan Special Forces, the
ASSF, are where they are at is because we continue to provide
train, advise, assist at the tactical level with them today. We
don't do that with all the conventional forces. They also have
the ability, based on their size, much smaller, and the
training that they go through, that they have a very good force
generation cycle. So they are able to go training, they are
able to take some leave, and then they know they are going to
go into the fight.
For the most part, in the rest of the police, and the rest
of the operational force, they don't have that. So if you are
down in Helmand and you have been there for 3 years, you have
probably been in a consistent fight for 3 years. And you have
had very little opportunity to train. You have had very little
opportunity to take leave. And they are really working hard at
trying to figure out how they can work this force generation
cycle into the conventional side. And they really want to get
after that as one of their priorities if they have sort of a
winter lull after this fighting season. I think if they can get
there, their performance would continue to improve.
They have some very good young leadership at the captain,
the lieutenant colonel level. But they have got to continue to
progress. They need more experience. So although I was very,
very tough in some of the words there, I do believe that they
continue to improve and that they are very resilient. And with
continued time, it will get much, much better.
Ms. Duckworth. So would one of key contributing factors to
their high AWOL [absent without leave] rates be this lack of
sufficient force generation level? And then I would just ask my
second question. You can take the rest of the time to answer
them. Since it is throwback Thursday, I am going to use an old-
fashioned term.
I do feel like that there is a real lacking in the Green
Tab leadership training that is going on here, that those
frontline leaders who--and in your testimony you talk about the
fact that when they do execute deliberate cross-pillar
operations that are planned and resourced, they are actually
successful. So what is going on there? We have the high AWOL
levels at that Green Tab leaders, you know, the young--even
more junior than your lieutenant colonels. But even younger
than that. Is that what is going to company grade folk?
General Campbell. Yeah, I think you're absolutely right.
The attrition level or a lot of the reason because the
attrition and the AWOL is because of poor leadership. They
don't have sergeants, they don't have company commanders,
platoon leaders that know everything about them and take their
welfare into consideration like we do back in all of our
services here. They don't have that non-commissioned officer
corps.
We are trying to build that, that is the backbone of all
our services, that would look after those type of things. So
they are working on that. And then, as you said, the force
generation cycle, if they got that better, that would reduce
the level of attrition as well.
What we are trying to do on the leadership piece is, and I
know you would be familiar with this, on pre-command course. We
have initiated a pre-command course for their lieutenant
colonels. Before you are a battalion commander, you have to go
through a leadership pre-command course. Before you are a
brigade commander, you have to go through the same thing. We
have started, have not run yet, a capstone type course for
their general officers, and that will get initiated. So their
human capital and leadership piece we have to continue to work.
Ms. Duckworth. It is year 14, though. We have--I don't know
how many more years we can keep doing this. But thank you for
your testimony.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Russell.
Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess as I look at
these colors on the wall behind us, on them are 11 streamers
from the Philippine campaign. And from 1899 to in the mid-1913
to 15 period is when those 11 streamers were earned. And we
debated these same things in this Congress about the worthiness
of can we train the Philippine constabulary.
Can we track down Emilio Aguinaldo and bring him to
justice? Can we deal with the insurgents and the Moro warriors?
Can we? Can we? Can we? And yet we did. We transitioned a
government successfully. We did capture Emilio Aguinaldo and
execute him, bring him to justice. And we saw our warriors
achieve all of that despite what we here in the Halls of
Congress often question.
I look back on 9/11; at that time two-thirds of the country
was under the control of the Taliban. Very little of it was
under the hands of anyone that had freedom. Girls weren't
allowed to go to school; couldn't fly a kite. It was ``haram''
[forbidden] to play a radio or to play chess in Kabul. I
remember it. We have seen successful elections and the
transition of government successfully.
I remember working with the British 2nd Parachute Regiment
and 3rd Special Forces when the Afghan National Army was
nothing but 600 people that showed up. And now we see 150,000.
And, Mr. Chairman, what strikes me is that isn't it wonderful
that we are debating 150,000 troops in the field and their
capacity for intelligence and command and control and complex
operations in an urban and rural environment.
Thank God we have reached that point to get to that point,
and that we are having the debate and these discussions. And it
is due to warriors like this that are sitting before us that
makes that possible.
General Campbell, thank you for your perseverance and
patience and enduring our questions. The Status of Forces
Agreement--often we saw that that was problems with the Iraq
experience. And I know we are much further along with President
Ghani.
And I know from having worked personally with Dr. Abdullah
at a Afghan National Security Conference in Geneva,
Switzerland, in 2002 that we do have some capability there in
Kabul with the leadership. Are there any limitations on the
status of forces that you can see moving forward as we morph
the troops, they are based embassy, not strike force, not train
and assist, any shortcomings that we can assist you with on the
Status of Forces Agreement.
General Campbell. Sir, I have seen none. And if we have had
issues, I have gone to President Ghani and we have worked
through those. But absolutely none right now.
Mr. Russell. That's very encouraging. And you also made
note that the strength of the ANA [Afghan National Army] was
that it was not fractured. I think that is an important point.
They haven't broken. They have retaken ground. They have
regrouped. They are determined to fight. They don't drop their
weapons and run. Could you speak to that a little bit?
General Campbell. Sir, absolutely. And, you know, people
try to compare Iraq and Afghanistan. I tell them it is
absolutely different. In Helmand in July timeframe, Taliban
took over District Center Musa Qala. It took the Afghans a
little bit of time to reorganize. They changed out some
leadership. They put a battalion commander in jail because he
ran. So they did make the right corrections. They resupplied.
They got back into Musa Qala, took over the district center.
But it took them a couple of weeks to do that. They were very
methodical as they went about that. They eventually got that
done.
In Kunduz, they did that much quicker, and within a couple
days they were back inside of the city. And they have taken a
hard look just like all of our services will to figure out why
that happened, to make sure it doesn't happen someplace else.
And that is a sign of a professional army, a professional
police, and a sign of a government that wants and cares for
their security forces. Quite frankly, you know, President Ghani
is a commander in chief. And that is different than what we
have had there before.
Mr. Russell. Well, I appreciate that. In fact, I think
about our history in the United States Army. Forty years after
our formation we broke and ran and left this capital exposed in
1812, and it was set on fire. I am glad that our Nation didn't
give up on us at that time.
The authority to strike Daesh, are you allowed any
independent or are there any prohibitions on your command level
to strike Daesh independently, or does it have to go through
the Afghan structure?
General Campbell. Sir, I can strike insurgents if force
protection issue to our forces.
Mr. Russell. Thank you. And thank you, sir, for your
dedicated service to our Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. McSally.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Campbell,
good to see you again. Thanks for your continued service to our
country and everything you are doing in Afghanistan. It was
great to see you in May when we were over there on the
congressional delegation. I know the current situation with the
hospital is under investigation, but I wanted to just ask about
the targeting process in general. Since the last time I was
over there in uniform with my A-10s, we were--and when my time
in the Air Operations Center, we would usually strike under two
different circumstances.
Either counterterrorism dynamic targeting in which case the
decisions and positive identification and collateral damage,
all that stuff was done back at the headquarters with approval
to then strike. Or we were under a joint terminal attack
controller's control, a JTAC, in close air support. And
obviously we had U.S. troops very much deployed all over the
nation at that time. But even sometimes the JTAC was back at
headquarters and not, you know, in the fight that we were
hitting, but they were still the ones that were, you know,
calling the shots and making sure we had the PID [positive
identification] and the collateral damage assessment.
Can you just walk me through what the--and maybe this is
not in this setting, it may be a classified answer, what the
targeting process is right now, both if it is just on the U.S.
side but also if, you know, the Afghans are asking for support.
How do we go through that and make sure we have PID and CDE
[collateral damage estimation], and do you see any--I can
imagine you see challenges as we have left forward presence and
being able to get that PID and CID [combat identification] done
correctly. So if you could just share that. And, again, if you
need to talk classified, we can do that afterwards.
General Campbell. Ma'am, I would go to a classified session
and give you that. I would say that we continue to ensure that
we have PID. And we are very, very precise, and, you know, it
is very rigorous. And so I can cover all those in a----
Ms. McSally. Great. But, I mean, but is it safe to say that
with the troops being pulled back more to centralized locations
and less numbers that it is just more challenging for us to get
that good intel in order to reach PID?
General Campbell. It may be more challenging, but, you
know, that means I would not----
Ms. McSally. Absolutely. I totally agree with that. Great.
So it just becomes more of a challenging situation. And what
about if the Afghans ask for support? Again, we can--if you
want to talk about that in a classified setting.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
General Campbell. As I said up front, if the Afghans ask
for support like they do almost every day, then it still has to
go through our processes.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Great. Thank you.
When we talked to you in May, there was some setbacks, I
would say, or delays in moving some of the things forward that
we were trying to do with the ANSF because of the fragility of
the unity government being formed and some delays in obviously
setting a defense minister and a lot of that seemed to have
brought some things a standstill.
Similarly, the uncertainty as to whether we were going to
be there and how long we were going to be there and at what
time we were pulling out was creating--when we talked to
individuals in the Afghan Security Forces and parliament and
others that uncertainty was creating a lot of angst and just
delaying a lot things that we were trying to move forward. Has
anything changed since we talked in May and have things gotten
better?
General Campbell. I think in some areas better, some they
are about the same. I think on the Ministry of Defense,
although Mr. Stanekzai is an acting minister, he has really
taken charge. I've got great trust and confidence in him. He
has got a great vision for the future of the Ministry of
Defense. We all thought that he would be the minister, and on
July 4 he didn't get through parliament, but has been in an
acting capacity, and he is doing quite well. And I think it
would do good for the parliament there to ensure that Minister
Stanekzai continues to serve in that position.
In other areas, there have been some holdbacks waiting
for--I mean, there is going to be people that are waiting to
find out where the U.S. is going to go post-2016. I think they
are pretty comfortable for 2015 into 2016. But after that we do
get a lot of questions on that.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks. What else can we do to help
build the Afghan National Air Force and the close air support
[CAS] capability that they need? Is there something else you
need from us, whether it is authorities, resources, platforms?
I know you have touched on it in your testimony, but can you
just share what else we need to do to be able to--because if
they don't have CAS, then that is obviously that is a
significant shortfall for them.
General Campbell. Right. I think everybody back here, OSD
[Office of the Secretary of Defense], everybody is working very
hard to get after that. So part of it is just going to take
time. It takes 2 to 3 years to get a pilot through. Afghanistan
understands they have to make some tough decisions, you know,
kind of left of the boom.
So 2 or 3 years out they got to put the right number of
people in with the right training to get through pilot
training. And if they don't make those decisions now, you know,
it is going to take longer and longer. So we work with them
very hard on that. But I think everybody's working hard to get
there. There are some restrictions that inhibit or have
inhibited in the long haul on their Mi-35s [multi-role
helicopter], Mi-17s [transport helicopter], we are all working
through. Quite frankly, when they started the fighting season,
they had five Mi-35s. Today they have two. And at the end of
this fighting season, just based on structural integrity of the
aircraft, they won't be able to fly and they will be down to
Mi-17s, which are not designed to be a close air support
platform.
We do have MD 530 Little Bird helicopters coming in, and as
soon as we get the fixed-wing aircraft that we talked about
earlier, the A-29 [Super Tucano aircraft], that will help. But
we are taking a holistic look at what they really need based on
the continued fight, wear and tear, the attrition level of the
aircraft, that kind of thing.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks. And, again, thanks to you and
your family for your continued faithful service to the country.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. General, appreciate you patiently
answering all of our questions. More importantly, very much
appreciate you and those who serve with you for what you do
every day to protect the security of our Nation by working with
the Afghans and in other ways. It is challenging circumstances.
Part of those challenges are external environment. Part of
them are placed upon you by the chain of command. But I think
it is clear to all of us that you are making the most of the
situation for the country's security. And we are very grateful
for your service.
With that, the hearing stands adjourned.
General Campbell. Thank you, Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
October 8, 2015
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
October 8, 2015
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
October 8, 2015
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
General Campbell. Detailed records are not on hand to completely
answer how many people have been recruited and trained over the 14
years in the Afghan Army and Police. Resolute Support staff was able to
obtain records that show from 2009 to 2015 a total of 233,966 police
were recruited and trained. From 2013 to 2015, a total of 97,051 army
forces were recruited and trained. [See page 11.]
General Campbell. Resolute Support does not have the authority to
determine what, if any, amount was allegedly stolen by Mr. Karzai or
his associates. [See page 13.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
October 8, 2015
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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. Hunter. General Campbell, I would like your assessment how the
Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) is impacting U.S. contractors'
ability to support your mission. These contractors are a critical part
of our total force and it is my understanding that they are being
frustrated at every turn in their efforts to operate in compliance with
Afghan laws. If these contractors can't perform the jobs we have asked
them to do, we increase our odds of mission failure. General, resolving
this problem requires a government-to-government solution, will you
commit to engaging directly with President Ghani in an effort to remedy
this problem?
General Campbell. The BSA subjects contractors to Afghan law and
policy. Prior to the BSA, contractors in Afghanistan were not required
to obtain visas and business licenses. These requirements are now
integral to Afghanistan's status as a sovereign nation. We have
processes in place to help resolve most problems as they arise,
including dialogue through a joint U.S.-Afghanistan commission
established by the BSA. In areas we cannot agree, I will continue to
work with Ambassador McKinley and President Ghani for constructive
solutions to matters of common concern.
[all]