    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

         RIDDING CENTRAL AFRICA OF JOSEPH KONY: CONTINUING U.S. SUPPORT

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
                            GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
                          INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               SEPTEMBER 30, 2015

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 114-99

                                   __________

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    PAUL COOK, California                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            GRACE MENG, New York
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
    DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
    TOM EMMER, Minnesota
    DANIEL DONOVAN, New York

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

        Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
                          International Organizations

                   CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         KAREN BASS, California
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida                DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          AMI BERA, California
    DANIEL DONOVAN, New York

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Paul Ronan, co-founder and project director, The Resolve LRA
      Crisis Initiative..............................................     4
    Mr. Sasha Lezhnev, associate director of policy, Enough Project..    14
    Ms. Francisca Mbikabele Thelin, founder and president, Friends of
      Minzoto........................................................    22

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Mr. Paul Ronan: Prepared statement...............................     7
    Mr. Sasha Lezhnev: Prepared statement............................    17
    Ms. Francisca Mbikabele Thelin: Prepared statement...............    24

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    44
    Hearing minutes..................................................    45
    Mr. Sasha Lezhnev: Evidence of the LRA's presence in Sudan-
      controlled territory...........................................    46
    The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
      from the State of Texas: Nigerian President Buhari's speech to
      the U.N. General Assembly......................................    54

         RIDDING CENTRAL AFRICA OF JOSEPH KONY: CONTINUING U.S. SUPPORT

                                  ----------

                         WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2015

                           House of Representatives,

                     Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,

             Global Human Rights, and International Organizations,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H.
    Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Smith. The hearing will come to order. And good
    afternoon to everybody.
        Since 1987, the Lord's Resistance Army, or LRA, has killed,
    raped, kidnapped, enslaved, or robbed thousands of people in
    the Great Lakes region of Africa and beyond. In October 2011,
    the Obama administration deployed about 100 military advisers
    to help Ugandan and other military forces in the region set out
    and capture or kill the members of a terrorist force that has
    now dwindled from thousands of fighters in late 1990s and early
    2000s to fewer than 200 today, but remains a very real danger
    to people in the east and central regions of Africa.
        This hearing will look at why the efforts to end the LRA
    are so critical for the international community and especially
    for the people who live in that region and how the United
    States counter-LRA program has worked so far.
        Today's hearing is being held even in the absence of the
    Department of Defense or the State Department, whose relevant
    officials are unavailable for a few weeks--and we will invite
    them and do a second hearing with them--because it will serve
    as an acknowledgment of the importance of countering the LRA
    prior to the administration's decision on whether to continue
    the program. The decision of renewing the American deployment
    will come in the next few weeks. We trust the administration
    will decide to continue this worthy effort.
        We hope to cover U.S. counter-LRA policy with
    administration witnesses, like I said. They have been invited,
    and we are just waiting for them to give us a date.
        One can use a number of metaphors to describe the LRA
    today. It is like a wounded animal, less capable but still very
    dangerous. It is like a vulture, feeding off the existing
    misery it finds in countries otherwise troubled by conflict.
    The LRA is like a fire that is tamped down but not extinguished
    and can reignite at any time. However, the danger posed by the
    LRA is not metaphorical. It is very real to those who still
    live in fear in eastern and central Africa and certainly to the
    hundreds of child soldiers whose lives have been harmed by its
    work.
        The LRA is a vivid example of how ethnic strife can provide
    a cover for wanton viciousness. In the name of protecting the
    rights of Uganda's northern Acholi tribe, LRA founder Joseph
    Kony has brought only wretchedness to his people and their
    neighbors as well as the people living in surrounding
    countries. Efforts to come to a negotiated settlement have all
    come to naught because Kony apparently has no coherent demands.
    His terrorist group seems to want nothing more than chaos,
    murder, and destruction.
        The international community has been much too quick to
    abandon humanitarian activities, largely because the number of
    victims has been reduced significantly. In confirmation
    hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee last year,
    General David Rodriguez referred to the counter-LRA effort as
    ``a good success story,'' citing the group's decline and the
    American determination to support African officials to finish
    off the LRA.
        Unfortunately, this is where the metaphors about the group
    must be kept in mind. Whenever the LRA has had a setback due to
    international efforts to eliminate it, the group's retaliation
    has been ruthless. Ongoing conflict in Central African
    Republic, South Sudan, and the eastern Democratic Republic of
    the Congo has provided a welcoming environment in which the LRA
    can hide and resume its deadly activities with less fear of
    regional government action against it. When you take your eyes
    off the LRA, they have enhanced maneuverability and opportunity
    to regroup.
        Thanks to the #Kony2012 campaign by the advocacy group
    Invisible Children, who also paid a visit to my office in New
    Jersey, LRA became notorious worldwide and garnered
    international support, especially among the young, on behalf of
    a robust counter-LRA effort. Yet the staying power of social
    media is fleeting. There are always new causes, also legitimate
    and important, to draw attention away. Remember the ``Bring
    Back Our Girls'' campaign on behalf of the Chibok schoolgirls
    kidnapped by Boko Haram?
        Our caring has to extend to the victims of the LRA and
    other such groups, which not only include those whom they
    attack but also those whom they cruelly use in their
    destructive campaigns. We have one such victim with us today,
    who can describe the ongoing desolation the LRA brings to so
    many young lives. We also have witnesses familiar and expert
    with the LRA and its terrorist activities, who will describe
    the ongoing threat that the group poses, however diminished
    their ranks may be.
        Countering terrorist groups cannot depend on Twitter
    campaigns. The United States and other members of the
    international community must retain our resolve to capture and
    remove the leaders of the LRA and any terrorist group that
    threatens the lives and wellbeing of innocent people worldwide.
    Whether such groups pose a direct, confirmable threat to the
    homeland or not, by terrorizing those whom we help they oppose
    U.S. interests, and they must be dealt with.
        I would like to yield to my good friend and colleague,
    Karen Bass, for any comments she might have.
        Ms. Bass. Good afternoon, everyone.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership and for calling
    for today's hearing and the continuing U.S. support toward that
    effort.
        This hearing offers us an opportunity to discuss the
    current state of affairs related to the movements and
    activities of the LRA and its notorious leader. My hope is that
    today's hearing will inform us of what the next steps are that
    the U.S. Government should take to help end the violence,
    kidnapping, and abuse that has been the standard practice of
    the LRA for decades.
        I would also like to thank today's witnesses for agreeing
    to participate in the hearing, including regional experts from
    civil society, as well as Mrs. Thelin, who lost over two dozen
    members of her family in the Congo at the hands of members of
    the LRA.
        I commend your dedication and commitment to working on this
    issue and helping to seek an end to the senseless violence that
    it produces. I look forward to hearing your testimony on the
    latest developments in the search for Kony as well as your
    insights into the devastation the LRA has wrought throughout
    central Africa and what can be done to stop it.
        The Obama administration deployed close to 100 military
    advisers to Uganda in 2011 to help Ugandan and other military
    forces in the region to seek out and capture Kony and members
    of the LRA. The U.S. has also provided significant logistical
    support to Uganda's counter-LRA operations beyond its borders
    since 2008, while U.S.-based advocacy groups have contributed
    to U.S. policymakers' interest in the issue as well as public
    awareness among U.S. citizens.
        While it is reported, as the chairman mentioned, that the
    numerical strength of the LRA has dwindled to maybe as small as
    200 fighters today, their intimate knowledge of the
    inhospitable central African landscapes and total disregard for
    human life continues to make them a clear and present danger.
        Though it originated in northern Uganda, the LRA now
    operates across a broad range of remote border regions between
    the CAR, the DRC, South Sudan, and even Sudan, according to
    reports. I don't know if people saw the Washington Post article
    today.
        Mr. Chairman, did you mention that?
        And there is also the concern as to maybe cooperation with
    Seleka, and maybe we will hear about that today.
        Given the LRA's wide range of operations, I should also
    highlight the broad grouping of international bodies and actors
    involved in the effort to end the threat of this terrorist
    group. These include African governments, the U.N. political
    missions and peacekeeping operations, as well as the AU and the
    EU.
        In 2012, the AU launched a regional task force against the
    LRA, which is led by Uganda, though it hasn't reached its full
    authorized troop strength of 5,000. And this is the kind of
    collaboration that is necessary to deal with and address the
    cross-border dimensions of the LRA activities.
        In closing, I would like to encourage my colleagues in
    Congress and other U.S. Government agencies to sustain our
    effort to rid central Africa of Joseph Kony and to continue
    working with the international community to ensure that the LRA
    is no longer a threat to the innocent men, women, and helpless
    children it has preyed upon since its inception.
        I am committed to joining you all in that effort and hope
    to learn from today's hearing how I can and we can be of
    greater assistance.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Ranking Member.
        I would like to now introduce our three distinguished
    witnesses, who are expert and also extraordinarily brave in the
    work that they have done, and thank them for their leadership
    and for informing our subcommittee and, by extension, members
    of the full committee and the Congress by what you are able to
    convey to us, past and especially today as an update.
        We will begin with Mr. Paul Ronan, who is co-founder of The
    Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative and currently serves as the
    project director. He also co-manages the LRA Crisis Tracker, a
    project that provides analysis of trends in LRA violence and
    activity to policymakers, humanitarians, and affected
    communities. He travels frequently to Uganda and LRA-affected
    areas in the CAR, DR Congo, and South Sudan. He also a frequent
    contributor to media outlets, congressional briefings, and
    think-tank fora. Prior to co-founding The Resolve, he worked at
    Caritas International and Franciscans International's U.N.
    advocacy office in New York.
        We will then hear from Mr. Sasha Lezhnev, who is the
    associate director of policy at the Enough Project, where he
    focuses on peace, conflict, and corporate responsibility issues
    in central Africa. He is also founding director of the
    Grassroots Reconciliation Group, an organization that runs
    projects with former child soldiers in northern Uganda. He was
    based in Uganda for 2\1/2\ years as senior program officer with
    the Northern Uganda Peace Initiative and adviser to the chief
    mediator of the peace process with the Lord's Resistance Army.
    He is author of the book, ``Crafting Peace: Strategies to Deal
    with Warlords in Collapsing States.''
        And, finally, we will hear from Ms. Francisca Mbikabele
    Thelin, who was born and raised in Dungu territory in the DR
    Congo. She was a founding teacher of Minzoto School. Though she
    moved away from the DR Congo in 1989, she travels to Dungu
    biannually. Because Francisca's family in the Dungu region has
    suffered profound losses of life during the LRA violence, her
    commitment to improving conditions in Dungu is strong and very
    personal. She founded the Friends of Minzoto in response to the
    dire conditions, extensive suffering, and pleas for help that
    she encountered in that region in 2010. She has made numerous
    public presentations on DRC history, culture, and the ongoing
    humanitarian crisis at universities, schools at every level,
    community, educational, and church events.
        I would like to begin with Mr. Ronan.
        And thank you again, all three, for being here.

     STATEMENT OF MR. PAUL RONAN, CO-FOUNDER AND PROJECT DIRECTOR,
                   THE RESOLVE LRA CRISIS INITIATIVE

        Mr. Ronan. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and members
    of the subcommittee, thank you very much for convening this
    timely discussion.
        I would like to express my deep gratitude for the
    bipartisan leadership that this subcommittee and Congress as a
    whole, has shown in support of efforts to stop atrocities by
    the Lord's Resistance Army, including the passage of the LRA
    Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act in May 2010.
        I have been traveling to areas that have been affected by
    the LRA for 10 years now, and I have seen firsthand how the LRA
    Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act set into motion a
    significant strengthening of the U.S. Government commitment to
    resolve the crisis, including the deployment of 100 U.S.
    military advisers.
        This support has greatly helped our African partners in the
    region to reduce the fighting capacity of the LRA by half from
    what it was in 2010, which was about 400. Kony now has fewer
    than 200 combatants left at his disposal, and this has greatly
    diminished the capacity of the LRA to commit atrocities. The
    graph up on the screen shows how the number of combatants has
    dropped. Killings by the LRA in eastern Central African
    Republic, northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
    western South Sudan have dropped dramatically, from 776 in 2010
    to just 13 in 2014.
        As encouraging as this progress has been, let there be no
    mistake: The LRA is not finished. Joseph Kony has outlasted
    three U.S. Presidents already, and, without renewed attention
    to this crisis, he will outlast both President Obama and the
    114th Congress. His LRA forces have abducted over 400 Congolese
    civilians so far this year, which is more than they abducted in
    any of the previous 4 years. And this demonstrates clearly, I
    think, the danger that if U.S. and regional partners withdraw
    before removing Kony the LRA could quickly rebuild and resume
    mass atrocities.
        The recent spike in attacks has also led to an increase in
    displacement and humanitarian needs, including in the areas
    where my colleague Francisca's family lives. And the next slide
    shows some of the trends there, including the uptick in
    abductions.
        Still, with less than 200 fighters remaining, the LRA is at
    its weakest point in more than two decades, and Congress can
    continue to play a galvanizing role in ending LRA atrocities
    for good. The Resolve is supportive of House Resolution 394,
    introduced in July by a bipartisan coalition of 12
    Representatives. The resolution outlines steps the
    administration should take to reinforce the counter-LRA
    strategy, including adjusting its priorities to put more
    emphasis on promising defection campaigns.
        My recommendation is that within the next 6 months the U.S.
    military double, literally, the saturation level and geographic
    scope of the defection messaging targeting the LRA. You can see
    from the next slide, which is a map, just how vast the area
    that the LRA is operating in is.
        We also urge Congress to ensure that the administration is
    adequately preparing for a post-Kony world. The LRA has long
    preyed on the communities that are marginalized by their own
    governments and face threats from other armed groups, and these
    challenges will remain long after Kony is finally brought to
    justice.
        The sectarian conflicts that have left dozens killed or
    injured in Bangui and other areas of the Central African
    Republic over the past several days is a sobering reminder that
    the U.S. counter-LRA strategy must be part of a broader, long-
    term regional strategy that invests in strengthening fragile
    states and preventing mass atrocities.
        USAID has invested in several innovative early recovery and
    civilian protection programs in LRA-affected areas, but most
    communities have been severely underserved by the U.S. and
    other donors. Too often, programming in these areas has been
    underfunded, delayed, and hampered by a lack of proper
    coordination. For the U.S. counter-LRA strategy to truly bear
    lasting fruit, USAID should invest in programs that spur
    longer-term economic recovery, reinforce community cohesion,
    and holistically reintegrate those who escape from the LRA.
        In particular, I would like to reiterate that last point. I
    have interviewed dozens of men, women, and children who have
    risked rugged terrain, starvation, and Kony's wrath to escape
    the LRA. Most were abducted as kids. And each of their
    courageous attempts to reunite with their families is a
    testament to the strength of the human spirit. Still, many
    struggle to overcome the poverty, the medical problems, and the
    mental trauma inflicted by years in Kony's captivity. Helping
    those brave souls to reintegrate into their communities is
    equally, if not more, important than finally bringing Kony to
    justice.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Ronan follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                          ----------

        Mr. Smith. Thank you so very much for that excellent
    testimony. And, without objection, your full statement, which
    had even more data and information, will be made a part of the
    record, as well as for all of our other witnesses.
        We will now go to Mr. Lezhnev.

     STATEMENT OF MR. SASHA LEZHNEV, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF POLICY,
                             ENOUGH PROJECT

        Mr. Lezhnev. Thank you so much. As someone who has spent
    the last 12 years interviewing and running projects for former
    LRA combatants, I really deeply appreciate your attention and
    continued vigilance on this very important issue, Chairman
    Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and Mr. Meadows and other members
    of this subcommittee and I really appreciate and thank you for
    the opportunity to testify on this important issue right at
    this critical juncture in the fight against the LRA.
        From my years of working on the LRA, both with the Enough
    Project and in running projects for hundreds of former ex-
    combatants with the Grassroots Reconciliation Group, I have
    observed that the LRA is, frankly, one of the most resilient
    rebel groups on the planet in the face of adversity. It would
    win any ``Survivor'' competition.
        Today, I am deeply concerned about the LRA's new trade in
    ivory and other commodities and its ability to regenerate
    itself going forward.
        Strong bipartisan support in Congress to end the LRA's
    brutality has made a major impact, as Paul noted and as you
    noted in your opening statements, in improving human security
    and preventing atrocities in this war-torn region. Congress'
    LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act as well as the
    Obama administration's deployment of U.S. military advisers to
    the African Union forces in 2011 have helped lead to a 90-
    percent decrease in LRA killings and a 30-percent decrease in
    attacks and have decimated its leadership.
        When I started working in northern Uganda, over 1.8 million
    people were displaced, 90 percent of the population. Today,
    that number is down to 200,000. That is almost a 90-percent
    decrease, which is a huge impact on people's lives in that
    region.
        But I am here to talk about how the LRA is not yet down and
    out, and, with a new trade in ivory, gold, and diamonds, it
    could make, in fact, a serious comeback, as it has done several
    times in the past.
        Today, the LRA is increasingly poaching elephants for
    valuable tusks, trading that ivory for ammunition, supplies,
    and food in Sudan with the likely complicity of the Sudanese
    Government. This is actually the subject of last month's
    National Geographic magazine, where explorer Bryan Christy
    manufactured a fake ivory tusk and tracked it from LRA-held
    areas in Congo through to Sudan.
        Critically, the LRA has a safe haven in Sudan-controlled
    territory Kafia Kingi. Joseph Kony has rarely left that area
    since 2011, and that is the chief area where the LRA trades
    ivory. Our team at Enough just spent a month in this area
    tracking the ivory trade and worked with the satellite company
    DigitalGlobe to help predict where the poaching might happen
    next, and here is what we found.
        So, first of all, the elephants in Garamba National Park in
    Congo, which is a UNESCO World Heritage Site, are rapidly
    decreasing as a result of the poaching. From 20,000 elephants
    in the 1980s, there are fewer than 1,800 today. And this is a
    worrying, more global trend, with an estimated 35,000 elephants
    killed per year for tusks.
        The LRA is one of the key armed groups responsible for
    poaching elephants in this area, along with Sudanese and South
    Sudanese poachers. There is one unit of LRA fighters that is
    permanently stationed in Garamba National Park under direct
    orders from Kony. And also under direct orders from Kony,
    including leadership from one of his sons, a second LRA unit
    then takes those ivory tusks to Sudan-controlled territories to
    trade them near a Sudan Armed Forces garrison in a place called
    Dafak, also in Kafia Kingi.
        The main ivory trading town is called Songo. Sudanese
    forces have reportedly also provided valuable intelligence to
    the LRA, warning them of impending attacks. The ivory is then
    traded on by truck to Nyala, the capital of South Darfur in
    Sudan, and then likely to Khartoum for export to Asia.
        Garamba National Park rangers say that if the LRA and other
    poachers are not stopped, the entire elephant population of
    that area could be wiped out.
        Along with ivory, the LRA is also starting to trade in
    diamonds and gold. These resources give the LRA the ability to
    regroup and rearm. Looting and then trading in these items
    allows the LRA the opportunity to acquire food, ammunition, and
    other supplies. Over the past several months, LRA defectors
    that we have interviewed have come out with large amounts of
    fresh ammunition, along with rocket-propelled grenades.
        You can trade 1 tusk for up to 25 boxes of bullets, and
    there are over 700 bullets in 1 box. It only takes one bullet
    to kill an elephant. This is critically important because the
    LRA already has weapons, both with its fighters and more guns
    buried in the ground, acquired from Sudan and from looting. So
    all it needs now are bullets, supplies, and Joseph Kony.
        Kony is still in command and is central to the group
    despite the group's leadership decimation. With him in charge
    and with new ammunition, the LRA can abduct new fighters. And
    although overall LRA attacks are down significantly, as Paul
    pointed out, abduction numbers are up this year.
        Now is the time to double-down on the U.S. counter-LRA
    mission and help end the LRA's horrific reign of atrocities
    against civilians once and for all. This could be done with a
    low-cost investment in a few key areas.
        First, the Obama administration should reauthorize the U.S.
    advisers beyond October, the U.S. military advisers, with the
    primary goal of bringing Joseph Kony to justice. Simply
    managing or containing the problem will not stop Kony.
        The U.S. mission should also provide additional airlift
    capacity to the AU forces and increase its efforts to get LRA
    fighters to defect from the group. I second Paul's
    recommendation on that. To that end, I urge you to sign on to
    House Resolution 394 on the LRA, a bipartisan resolution
    introduced by Representatives Jim McGovern and Joe Pitts.
        Second, the United States should take a leading role in
    addressing Sudan's complicity in aiding the LRA. Sudan again
    denies that they are sheltering the LRA despite a wealth of
    evidence. I attach that evidence, compiled from the Enough
    Project, The Resolve, and Invisible Children, for the record
    with your permission.
        Mr. Smith. Without objection, it will be made a part.
        Mr. Lezhnev. Thank you.
        The United States should deploy advisers close to the areas
    controlled by Sudan in Kafia Kingi so that it can gather
    precise intelligence on Kony's whereabouts.
        Third, the United States should help shut down this blood
    ivory trade. To boost efforts on the ground, Congress should
    increase assistance to the Fish and Wildlife Service for
    antipoaching work in central Africa, for which it has
    experience. And the U.S. advisers on the counter-LRA mission
    should work more closely with the park rangers and help
    interdict the trade from Congo to Sudan, which is now a known
    route. You can go on the National Geographic Web site and find
    that exact route.
        More broadly, the Obama administration's draft rules to
    help ban the ivory trade are an excellent step in the right
    direction, but they should also include only a small, de
    minimus provision for ivory sales, similar to what the State of
    New York has on the books for ivory laws.
        I commend the many members of this subcommittee, including
    yourselves, for signing on to the Global Anti-Poaching Act,
    H.R. 2494, introduced by Chairman Ed Royce and Ranking Member
    Eliot Engel, and I urge other members of the subcommittee to do
    the same.
        Finally, in the Fiscal Year 2016 appropriations process,
    Congress should not forget about the LRA and should continue to
    robustly support the counter-LRA operations. The U.S.
    Government deserves tremendous credit for sapping Kony's LRA of
    most of its strength and helping allow 1.6 million people to go
    home. However, the LRA has a history of regrouping, and we
    should not forget that. And so I am deeply concerned that its
    trade in ivory and other commodities could allow it to do so
    again. Now is not the time to pull the plug but, instead, to
    finish the job and bring Kony to justice.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Lezhnev follows:]

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        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Lezhnev, for your
    testimony.
        I would like to now ask Ms. Thelin if she would proceed.

       STATEMENT OF MS. FRANCISCA MBIKABELE THELIN, FOUNDER AND
                     PRESIDENT, FRIENDS OF MINZOTO

        Ms. Thelin. Thank you. My name is Francisca Thelin. I want
    to sincerely thank the chairman, ranking member, and the entire
    subcommittee for this opportunity to speak today on behalf of
    those suffering from the violence of the LRA, the Lord's
    Resistance Army.
        Though I have lived in the United States for 26 years and
    am a U.S. citizen, I grew up in the Dungu territory in the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo, a region deeply affected by
    the violence of Joseph Kony and the LRA. I am the founder of a
    small nonprofit called the Friends of Minzoto, which supports
    local community efforts in the Dungu area to recover from the
    LRA violence.
        My dear friend Lisa Shannon authored a book entitled,
    ``Mama Koko and the Hundred Gunmen,'' which tells my family's
    story of experiencing the LRA crisis firsthand. Since 2008, 28
    members of my family have been murdered by the LRA. Most were
    chopped with the machete, many in front of their loved ones.
    Six children in my family were abducted and forced to become
    LRA's sex slaves or child soldiers. Although one eventually
    escaped, he came home so psychologically damaged that he is a
    danger to our other children and cannot live at home. We can
    only assume that the others who have not returned home have
    died.
        At the age of 69, my mother spent months at a time hiding
    in the bush with no blankets or supplies, taking care of
    multiple babies and teenagers, and getting sick with pneumonia
    before coming back home to nothing. The LRA had looted
    everything.
        For 5 years, my family and every family in the Dungu
    territory lived in total terror because of the LRA. Unable to
    go to the fields to grow their crops, everyone was hungry. Many
    who did not die at the hand of the LRA died of starvation and
    malnutrition.
        Even now, the situation is not fully back to normal.
    Thousands of internally displaced families that took refuge in
    the Dungu years ago still live there with no land of their own,
    barely surviving day to day. Many of them live in meager homes
    next to the river, the only place where they could settle, and
    they are regularly flooded out of their homes when the rains
    come.
        Life for them is so difficult, but they are afraid to go
    home to their villages--and with good reason. Many of those who
    did go back to their villages were killed, or many are still
    being forced to give all their crops and their belongings to
    the LRA when they attack.
        When I was in Dungu in 2010 interviewing survivors of the
    LRA, I would ask them, what do you want from the U.S.
    Government? Their answers were always the same: We want peace,
    we want Kony out. I promised to share their message with my
    Government in the United States, but I wasn't sure exactly how
    I would do that. Today, I am finally able to deliver on that
    promise, and I am very grateful for this opportunity.
        So I am here today to ask you, Honorable Members, in the
    strongest possible terms to continue to support the African
    Union and the U.S. advisers in their efforts to end LRA
    violence. Please do not allow this mission to lose strength
    until the LRA is stopped and Joseph Kony and his leaders have
    been held accountable for their horrific crimes.
        Why is continued support from the U.S. so important when
    the LRA threat seems diminished? LRA attacks are still taking
    place. Particularly in the Congo, abductions by the LRA have
    increased over the past year, which further traumatizes the
    population. In the minds of the communities, the LRA rules the
    bush. But the bush is our bank; it is where we find food, where
    we clear land to cultivate our crops in order to feed our
    families and to earn livelihoods.
        I have story after story of my connection to people
    attacked by the LRA, but it would take days to tell them all,
    and they are very painful to share.
        As I close, I want to emphasize that these communities
    targeted by the LRA are severely neglected. They do not have
    resources on their own to get rid of the LRA. And they have
    suffered long enough. The commitment of the U.S. is critical to
    their survival and to lasting peace. Please, do not give up
    before the crisis is actually over.
        I am speaking for all Congolese enduring LRA violence when
    I thank you for all that the U.S. Government has already done
    to help bring this crisis to an end. In light of how far we
    have come and how precious these lives are, I urge you and
    every Member of Congress to stay committed to seeing LRA
    violence finally ended.
        Specifically, I ask you to support House Resolution 394,
    which reinforces the U.S. Government's commitment to ending LRA
    violence. Secondly, I urge you to provide funding in the U.S.
    budget that would support the local recovery initiatives in the
    LRA-affected communities. And, lastly, I ask you to use your
    position of influence to press Congo's Government to promote a
    free and fair election on time. I ask you to use your help to
    make sure that the communities like Dungu do not continue to be
    so marginalized and vulnerable to groups like LRA in the
    future.
        I want to thank you again for your care for families, like
    my own, who have suffered from this crisis. And I thank you for
    this opportunity to fulfill my promise to them and to represent
    their voices here in Washington.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Thelin follows:]

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                       ----------

        Mr. Smith. Ms. Thelin, thank you so very much for your
    testimony.
        We do have two votes on the floor, but we don't have to be
    there just yet, although in a moment or so. But we will take a
    brief recess and then come back.
        I would like to ask just a couple of opening questions.
        Ms. Thelin, your nonprofit supports recovery efforts for
    the victims of the LRA. What are the greatest needs? Are
    individuals, especially children and women, getting the
    psychological help that they need after being traumatized? Is
    the faith community stepping up, whether it be Christian or
    Muslim, to meet those needs, in your opinion?
        Ms. Thelin. Actually, I cannot really tell you that there
    is something happening to help them now. But it was in 2010
    when I was there, there was a group helping them, and it seems
    like they are struggling now with funds, funding. They don't
    have the money to continue. But there is nothing really at
    present.
        Mr. Smith. All right. I appreciate it.
        Would either of our other witnesses like to comment on the
    psychological component of helping those who have been
    traumatized?
        Yes, Mr. Ronan.
        Mr. Ronan. That is a great question. And I think that the
    answer is that very little support is now available to the
    people that escape the LRA.
        Many of them might receive maybe a few days, when they
    first come out, of some basic medical treatment or some
    counseling. But, over the long term, the children and the women
    and especially the adult men who do escape, all of whom were
    abducted as kids, receive very little support.
        And that is, I think, a problem that will be manifested and
    will continue for years in the future if these people are not
    able to properly reintegrate into their communities.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you.
        Mr. Lezhnev. I would just add, if I may, the scars of war,
    of being a child soldier don't disappear overnight. And,
    unfortunately, many NGOs and organizations have pulled out of
    northern Uganda because there is no longer active conflict
    happening there, and that is an area of tremendous need.
        The organization that I helped found, the Grassroots
    Reconciliation Group, runs a psychosocial trauma counseling
    project for roughly 700 ex-combatants and their families, but
    it is really a drop in the bucket when you think that the LRA
    has abducted some 66,000 youth. And if you have spent 5 or 10
    or 15 years in the bush, constantly being forced to kill your
    friends and your family members, those psychological traumas
    will not go away overnight.
        So there is a lot more need for assistance in that area.
    And our groups are putting together a letter exactly on this
    issue now. We will be happy to send it to you.
        Mr. Smith. Okay.
        Let me just ask you, Mr. Lezhnev. You make a very ominous
    warning that it could make a serious comeback, as it has done
    in the past. In my opening comments, I tried to emphasize that,
    and I know Ranking Member Bass feels the same way.
        Is there any belief or any expectation that the
    administration will not continue this vital program, again,
    which all three of you have wholeheartedly embraced and
    endorsed?
        Mr. Lezhnev. I think that there is still a debate happening
    within the administration between those who really want to see
    the job finished and those who say, well, the leadership is
    decimated, attacks are down, the capacity is lowered, let's
    just contain the problem and move on to other priority areas.
        Mr. Smith. Is it because of cost? I mean, what is the
    reason?
        Mr. Lezhnev. I think part of it is cost. Part of it are the
    growing crises in South Sudan and CAR, other priority areas.
        But, from our experience, as long as Kony is there, he is
    very skillful at getting new resources and surviving and moving
    to territories where he has a safe haven. So, as long as he is
    there, we need to continue working.
        Mr. Smith. The committee will stand in brief recess,
    subject to the call of the chair. And I thank you. And sorry
    for this delay.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Smith. The subcommittee will resume its sitting. And,
    again, I apologize for that delay. Just a few additional
    questions. And I know Karen is on her way back, as well as Mark
    Meadows.
        Mr. Ronan, in your testimony, you talked about the Come
    Home defection campaign and how important that is. You make a
    point that I found very interesting. You talked about how some
    of the people, defectors, had walked for an entire month to
    reach the U.S. military base in eastern CAR.
        And I am wondering, is it because it is that dangerous to
    go anywhere else other than to the U.S. forces? And how is it
    that they knew where they were? A month of walking can take you
    many hundreds of miles. And I am just wondering if you could
    elaborate on that.
        Mr. Ronan. Yes. And thank you very much. That is, again, a
    very good question.
        And I think that, first of all, it is just important to
    reiterate the ability that Kony has to instill propaganda into
    the combatants in his force, which he has an advantage of, of
    course, because many of them were abducted when they were very
    young. So the starting point to try to convince these
    combatants to defect from the LRA is very difficult. It is very
    difficult to do that.
        So I really do think it is a testament to the ingenuity and
    the hard work of the U.S. advisers and the civil society
    partners that they work with that they have been able to devise
    messaging, whether it be by FM radio, by speakers that are
    strapped onto helicopters, or by leaflets, to really penetrate
    the propaganda that Kony tries to instill.
        And this most recent case from a few months ago, when these
    seven bodyguards to Kony who were operating near the Sudanese-
    controlled areas of the Kafia Kingi enclave with Kony, when I
    interviewed them after they had defected, they said that it was
    a result of this messaging that they had received that has been
    supported by the U.S. military that they knew that they could
    safely defect to where the U.S. base was. And they knew where
    the U.S. base was as a result of that messaging.
        So for me, to talk to these guys who had been abducted 15
    years ago when they were very, very young and hear them talk
    about how the U.S. base was in many ways a beacon for them that
    they were trying to reach, and then they did reach there, and
    they were received and were able to return to their families,
    again, was just a powerful reminder that these defection
    campaigns can really have a positive impact.
        Mr. Smith. Let me just ask you--all of you, if you would
    like to speak to it, but you have testified that the U.S.
    Government has not dedicated the appropriate mix of flexible
    context-appropriate intelligence and airlift capabilities to
    pursue the LRA. And given the heavily forested areas in which
    they operate, why do you think this strategy has developed, and
    what impact has it had on the success of the counter-LRA
    program?
        And I would just note parenthetically that in Vietnam,
    there was the defoliant Agent Orange; obviously, it caused many
    of our servicemembers and Vietnamese to become very, very sick.
    I used to chair the Veterans' Affairs Committee, and the number
    of illnesses attributable to that are huge.
        But, since then, we have developed--and I have been to
    military bases where this technology is being deployed and
    actually affixed to helicopters--the look-down capability which
    is enormous for the U.S. military. Are we using that kind of
    capability? The ability to see through foliage is enormous, and
    I am wondering if that is being deployed, as far as you know.
        Mr. Ronan. I would say that to recognize the challenges
    that the U.S. advisers in the field are dealing with, the LRA
    is now really composed of 200 combatants that are spread over
    an area the size of California. So you don't want to
    underestimate how difficult it is to find them in this area.
        At the same time, I do think that the U.S. could do a
    better job of ensuring that the helicopters and the ISR assets
    that are deployed out to these regions are appropriate to how
    the LRA operates. And I think that that is why it is very
    important that the U.S. continue to try to make sure that these
    assets and personnel are deployed in areas near the Kafia Kingi
    enclave and where Kony himself is operating.
        As far as the specific technology that is being used now,
    unfortunately, I don't know exactly what that is. I don't have
    access to that. But I would say that we have seen a very
    positive trend in what the advisers have been doing over the
    past year or so of really trying to talk to as many people as
    they can and to develop human intelligence. Because the LRA is
    interacting with many people in these areas, whether they are
    trying to sell ivory or acquire food, and that intelligence has
    led to actionable operations in the past that have been very
    successful. So that is an alternative approach that I think can
    be very useful.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you.
        Mr. Lezhnev. I would just also add that I think that the
    location issue that Paul highlighted is very important,
    because, for a while, U.S. advisers were deployed in an area of
    southeastern CAR that was pretty far away, frankly, from a lot
    of the LRA operating areas, so Kafia Kingi in northeastern
    Congo. We are learning that the U.S. advisers are moving closer
    to the LRA areas of operation now, which is good. That is
    something we have been advocating for, frankly.
        And it is difficult to operate in those areas. I mean,
    these are areas with no roads at all. It takes quite a bit of
    capacity from airlift to actually get there.
        I think that the defection issue and location of defection
    areas is another important consideration that the U.S. advisers
    and the Obama administration could put some more effort into,
    in terms of providing some more of these locations for LRA
    fighters to defect, right? They shouldn't have to walk for 400
    miles to get there, because that really is the safest area.
    There have been LRA people, LRA members who have been lynched
    in certain areas, as communities are afraid of the fighters.
        So I think there could be some more efforts there, but most
    of the attacks are happening now in northeastern Congo, so
    there is a need there, in particular.
        Mr. Smith. Ms. Thelin, you said that the communities now
    feel that the LRA rule the bush. And I am wondering how this
    has impacted the relocation of villagers. Are people combining
    settlements or moving to what they perceive are safer zones?
        Ms. Thelin. In general, people who are in the town of
    Dungu, they are safer than the people who live in the villages.
    Because the LRA have changed their strategies now. They come
    publicly by the side road and captured people. And then they
    take two and hold two back. If they capture four of them, then
    they hold the two, and they give the two others money, send
    them to the market to buy food for them and bring it to the
    bush in order to release all the group. And they give them an
    ultimatum: Go to the market, buy food, bring it to us, and we
    will release all of you, or we kill all of you now. And they do
    as they are told, and they go buy food, they bring it. Once
    they bring it, then they will release them.
        So they don't live far from the road, and now they are not
    scared. And I think they playing a mind game, just the way they
    started. At the beginning, they were in the market, people were
    thinking, oh, they are nice, they are just looking for a place
    to settle and they are not bothering us. And then the attacks
    started. And now the feeling is that they are getting very
    strong and powerful. They have money. They have everything.
        According to people who escaped them--it was in July when
    my brother, who works for the early warning radio system--so
    his group went to this village. So he was sick that day, didn't
    go with them, but that group was captured by the LRA. And then
    they hold two of them, send two to the market to Dungu. So they
    come, and they noticed the authorities of what was happening.
    They said, okay, the group was captured by the LRA, they send
    us to the market, we are buying food, we are taking it back to
    them so in order to release the rest of the group who were
    there. And then they did, they took the food back.
        So when they were there, they see that the LRA have
    everything. They have a solar panel, they have a radio, they
    have machine guns, they have enough food, a lot of money. And
    they released them after 2 days, and they come home.
        So now is that the feel is that pretty soon the attacks
    will start again.
        Mr. Smith. We have all read this morning's front-page
    Washington Post story, and I am just wondering if you might
    want to comment. A very provocative headline: ``U.S. Troops
    Have Turned to Some Unsavory Partners to Help Find Warlord
    Joseph Kony.''
        And the article talks about how U.S. forces have begun
    working closely with Muslim rebels, known as Seleka, who
    toppled the central government 2 years ago. And then it goes
    on. One official described the group as the mafia.
        And yet, as you read on, the answer from National Security
    Council spokesman Peter Boogaard is that U.S. forces do not
    provide intelligence or operational assistance to Seleka
    factions or other armed groups, though he acknowledged that our
    military advisers may meet with actors who have information on
    LRA activities.
        I would appreciate your comments on the article, because I
    know you have all read it. The $5 million that have been
    offered by State, have there been any takers or anything close
    to someone providing actionable information about what could be
    done?
        And, again, if I could again circle back to your testimony,
    Mr. Ronan, when you said that 417 Congolese civilians so far
    this year have been abducted, more than they abducted in any of
    the previous 4 years, as if there might be a shift in their
    modus operandi, what happens to those abductees?
        And then the 200 that we keep talking about that are still
    Kony's killers, who are they? Are they child soldiers now grown
    up? If you could give us a sense, a profile of who we think
    they are, at least, it would be very helpful. All three of you.
        Mr. Lezhnev. I will just start off with the first question.
    You asked a lot of questions at the same time, Mr. Smith, but
    that is perfectly fine.
        So, with regard to the Seleka Washington Post article,
    quite frankly, I think this is very misleading. First of all,
    U.S. forces need to be operating in that area, which is close
    to where Kony is located and, clearly, they need to communicate
    with any authorities or forces in that area, former Seleka
    commanders. Seleka is no longer an active force itself. There
    are former Seleka commanders who are in control of that area.
        This is not an Islamist, a jihadist group. They are not
    establishing Sharia law or anything like that. They have been
    in control of that area for roughly 10 years. So if anyone
    wants to move in and out of that area, they, of course, have to
    communicate to them.
        We have talked to our folks on the ground in that area. We
    do not have any knowledge that the U.S. has provided any
    financial assistance to the Seleka. We would obviously strongly
    condemn the U.S. providing any assistance, financial
    assistance, to those rebels, but we do not have any
    information.
        And, again, we think it is very important for the U.S. to
    be present in areas close to where Kony is. Otherwise, we will
    continue circling around here for another decade with this
    mission.
        Mr. Ronan. I would just like to reiterate everything from
    what Sasha just said. You know, I think that the Washington
    Post article did outline, you know, some of the challenges that
    U.S. forces in the region face, but an Islamist group that they
    are partnering with is not one of them. I think that the
    terminology that was used there was just inaccurate.
        As has been said, what the U.S. troops are doing is they
    are talking to people who have knowledge about where Kony and
    his fighters may be. They are not doing that in exchange for
    material support or for doing joint operations or anything like
    that.
        And, as I said before, I think that the human intelligence
    piece of this operation is something that we should be praising
    and not something that we should be overly concerned about in
    the way that was represented in that article.
        The one thing that I will add on to that is I do think that
    it is important for the State Department and the U.S. to
    clarify is that whatever conversations are happening between
    the U.S. military and these former Seleka, to make sure that
    those conversations are being coordinated with the response to
    the broader conflict in the CAR, which, as we have noted, has
    gotten much, much worse in the past few days. Again, we can't
    see the LRA as in a vacuum. It is very much interconnected with
    what is happening in the broader region.
        On the question of the patterns of LRA abductions in the
    DRC, in Congo, fortunately, what we have seen over the past few
    years is, with the pressure that the U.S. and Ugandan troops
    are putting on the LRA, Kony doesn't really have the capacity
    to do the mass child abductions and train them to join the LRA.
    We have seen a few cases of that, but a vast majority of the
    people that have been abducted over the past few years are
    adults, who are used to carry goods from their community into
    the bush for the use of the LRA, and then they are released.
        And I don't want to understate or say that that is not
    important. Even being abducted for a few days is very
    traumatic. And the people in these areas often have not very
    many goods. So if you take their farming tools and their
    harvest and their seeds, then that can be really a terrible
    thing.
        And, as far as the 200 combatants left within the LRA, most
    of them, over 100, are Ugandans who were abducted as kids and
    are now adults. So they have really grown up within the LRA.
    And then maybe another 30 to 50 of them would be Congolese,
    South Sudanese, or central Africans who have been abducted in
    the past 4 or 5 years and may be a bit younger.
        Mr. Smith. The U.S. armed services that are deployed there,
    have there been any injuries, fatalities, years to date?
        Mr. Ronan. Not that I am aware of, no.
        Mr. Smith. I have other questions, but I will yield to my
    good friend Ms. Bass and then come back.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you.
        Once again, thank you all for your testimony and taking the
    time out today to speak with us.
        I wanted to ask several questions. I wanted to follow up on
    a question that the chairman asked that I don't think you guys
    responded to, and that is the $5 million.
        So I wanted to know, first of all, earlier this year, one
    of the LRA commanders was surrendered, captured--a little bit
    of difference there in terms of how people view it. What
    happened? Because if he surrendered or was captured, did
    anybody contribute to that? Is the $5 million still there? That
    is such a huge amount of money, it is hard for me to understand
    why that isn't enough to generate his capture.
        Mr. Ronan. So, as far as Dominic Ongwen, who was a senior
    LRA commander indicted by the ICC in 2005, in late 2014, Kony
    basically put him under arrest within the LRA and indicated
    that he was going to kill him. So Dominic Ongwen, with the help
    of some other fighters within the LRA, was able to escape.
        And then, as you said, the sequence of events after that is
    a bit fuzzy, about whether he was captured or whether he
    surrendered. He was certainly trying to surrender. And he came
    into the custody of some former Seleka, who got in touch with
    the U.S. military in the town of Obo. And it is unclear if
    these former Seleka were even aware of who he was and the
    reward that they may have been eligible for, but they
    transferred him to the custody of the U.S. military. He was
    then taken to The Hague.
        So, again, to our knowledge, the $5 million, no part of
    that has been disbursed for Dominic's arrest or his capture.
        One of the challenges that I think that we have seen,
    talking to the U.S. military as they have tried to implement
    this plan, is that many people in the region don't believe it.
    And it is not because the $5 million is too little; it is
    because that is such a huge number that many people simply
    think that it is a trick. So, I think that there is a learning
    process that needs to happen about how to advertise this in a
    way that will incentivize people to contribute.
        Ms. Bass. I can actually understand that.
        Ms. Thelin, could you respond to that question? I mean, if
    $5 million is so much that it seems a trick--and I could kind
    of understand that, because it sounds like trillions--should it
    would be done differently?
        And so your thoughts, too, on two things: One, why that
    hasn't delivered Kony; and then, two, in response to what Mr.
    Ronan was saying, does it need to be done differently? Is it a
    smaller amount? Outreach? How is it done?
        Ms. Thelin. Well, thank you for your question, but that is
    not in my expertise.
        Ms. Bass. Oh, no, no. Well, but I am asking you that from
    the perspective of you being from the area and given your past
    and continued relationship with the people, the culture, the
    community, the ties. That is why I am asking you.
        Ms. Thelin. So, first of all, I didn't know anything about
    the money.
        Ms. Bass. You didn't know about the $5 million?
        Ms. Thelin. I didn't know about the money.
        Ms. Bass. Oh, boy.
        Ms. Thelin. And, second of all, people are really thankful
    for when the African Union troops got there, they were so
    happy, and with the U.S. advisers, and the things were going
    very good. And the people actually started staying outside.
    They feel like there is life coming back.
        But they still wonder why it is taking too long to capture
    Kony. You have done all these things; U.S. advisers are there,
    the African troops are there. But in the town of Dungu itself,
    life is okay, but it is overpopulated because everybody in the
    villages moved into the town, who used to be only for 20,000
    people, but now I don't know the number, but I feel like the
    roads are packed. They are just thinking that it is taking too
    long to capture Kony.
        Ms. Bass. Well, that is pretty dramatic for me to hear that
    you were not aware of it, considering you are active in the
    area. So maybe there is something that needs to be examined in
    terms of how we are getting the word out there.
        I wonder, Mr. Lezhnev, what happens the day after we
    capture Kony? I worry sometimes that our focus--and, obviously,
    I would like to see him captured. But, you know, with Boko
    Haram, with al-Qaeda, with the Taliban, I mean, we have
    captured leaders before, only to have them replaced the next
    day.
        So, given that the LRA has really been reduced in size, do
    we know anything about intelligence, second-line leadership,
    what would happen the day after we captured Kony?
        Mr. Lezhnev. It is a great question. I think it is one that
    we have all been debating and talking about for several years.
        Frankly, the rest of the LRA's leadership is very much
    decimated according to what it used to be. There were several
    commanders who were there from the late 1980s and early 1990s.
    They have all either been killed, defected, or are awaiting
    trial in The Hague.
        The ones who are rising up in the leadership now are Kony's
    sons, who are young, 21, 23, 24. They are not--I do not think
    they have the capacity to lead this type of rebellion.
        I have spoken to so many ex-combatants who speak about
    Kony's ability and spiritual powers, and that is why they
    follow him. And they believe those spiritual powers. And he
    has, of course, manipulated his control of information so that
    he knows when something is going to happen, and so that will
    appear to someone locally as him having powers.
        But in terms of what would happen after we would capture or
    kill Kony, I think that there would probably be a couple of LRA
    groups who would try to operate in the local areas. But if they
    knew that Kony was not there backing them up, giving them
    orders, resupplying them with arms, ammunition, food, medicine,
    et cetera, you know, the defections would increase pretty
    dramatically.
        I don't think that the U.S. should give up then, that that
    should be the end of our program. I think that there need to be
    programs--recovery programs, rehabilitation programs,
    psychological programs like we talked about earlier, which are
    very important to help rebuild those areas. We are trying to
    get a specific road funded out in that area, which really
    hamstrings movement throughout that whole region. So that----
        Ms. Bass. Who are you trying to get----
        Mr. Lezhnev. I would want to say something one other thing
    with regard to the $5 million.
        Ms. Bass. No. Who are you trying to get the fund the road?
        Mr. Lezhnev. Well, the U.N., African Union----
        Ms. Bass. So go ahead about----
        Mr. Lezhnev [continuing]. World Bank.
        Ms. Bass [continuing]. The $5 million.
        Mr. Lezhnev. So, with the $5 million, one interesting thing
    that we uncovered in our new interviews with ex-combatants is
    that, for the first time in our lifetime of working on the LRA,
    there has been a serious attempt on Joseph Kony's life, that
    his bodyguards actually tried to kill him. They failed, and so,
    therefore, they ran very quickly away. But, you know, that
    speaks to some of the pressure.
        It is really too bad that many local communities are not
    aware of this $5 million reward, and so we obviously need to do
    a much better job at communicating that and also communicate it
    in local terms. But several of the military folks in LRA, they
    are aware of it.
        And, also, I think that helps Kony stick in an area that is
    pretty depopulated. There is, of course, the possibility and
    many rumors circulating that he would go to south Darfur, which
    would be further in Sudanese territory, et cetera. The fact
    that he is not moving in there, I think, is largely a result of
    this $5 million, because people are more aware there, and they
    would like to get that money. And that is a much more populated
    area.
        Ms. Bass. Did the bodyguards escape? You said they ran
    away. Did they escape?
        Mr. Lezhnev. They defected, yeah.
        Ms. Bass. They did?
        Mr. Lezhnev. Uh-huh.
        Ms. Bass. Do you know if there is any effort to involve
    them in the search for him?
        Mr. Lezhnev. Absolutely. Yeah.
        Do you want to talk about that?
        Mr. Ronan. Yeah. Just to add that these same defectors that
    tried to kill Kony were the ones that I was talking about
    before. When they did escape, they made a beeline for the U.S.
    base, because they knew that that was a place where they----
        Ms. Bass. I see.
        Mr. Ronan [continuing]. Could safely go. And as a result of
    intelligence that they gave to the U.S. and the Ugandan troops,
    there was an arms cache and some food stores that were
    destroyed on the central African side of the border with Sudan.
        Ms. Bass. You know, you mentioned at the beginning--I am
    not sure which one; it might have been you, Mr. Ronan--about
    the gold and diamonds, I think. Where is that coming from? Is
    that coming from the DRC? How are they lined up to get that? I
    understand the poaching; that is obvious.
        Mr. Lezhnev. So it is mostly looting in the Central African
    Republic. That area is pretty well known for its gold and
    diamond mines. Of course, CAR diamonds are some of the most
    famous in the world for their quality.
        The defectors that we interviewed talked about Kony having
    jars of gold nuggets and, sort of, a half-liter bottle of
    diamonds waiting to sell for the right time. There were some
    rumors that he was going to buy anti-personnel land mines to
    encircle him so that no one could attack his positions. That,
    of course, doesn't work very well if you have helicopters and
    so forth, but anyways.
        So, yeah, it is mostly looting and from artisanal mining.
    They have not set up, as far as we know, more complex conflict-
    minerals type of operations where they actually operate mines.
    Not yet.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you.
        And, Ms. Thelin, you might have mentioned this earlier
    before I returned, but could you talk about your organization,
    the work your organization does? And then do you receive any
    support from the U.S. Government?
        Ms. Thelin. Well, my organization is very small. I can call
    it just a baby organization. So I got my 501(c)(3) in December
    2014. And basically I started working at a school. I give them
    nice, clean water. They dig a well and put a pump. And then now
    we are in the process of building latrines and handwashing
    stations.
        And, also, I have big ambitions, but I don't know where the
    money would come from. But it will happen someday.
        Ms. Bass. It is okay. What are the ambitions? Ambitions
    first, money second.
        Ms. Thelin. So I want to help because to have a good
    community, that means a healthy community. So if we want to be
    really good, like, we need strong people, good health, so they
    need clean water. And I have to build some 60 more wells and
    build latrines. Now they don't have public latrines. And we
    have many people, and it is really not good, the sanitation is
    not good.
        And also I need, like, some kind of equipment for the
    hospital. We have a big hospital, it is an original hospital.
    But the only thing, when I visited this January, the only
    equipment that was there was a 60-year-old microscope and a
    refrigerator with vaccines. So people with broken legs and all
    kinds of critical conditions, they take the bus and go on this
    nightmarish road, dusty road, to Goma or to Bunia to get the
    treatment. They don't have x-ray, MRI, or any kind of salt. And
    that is my ambition.
        So, this summer, I made some Congolese food and some
    barbecue in my backyard to raise money for latrines, and I did
    well. I think I did a little over $10,000.
        Ms. Bass. That is great from a barbecue.
        Ms. Thelin. Some people of goodwill helped me. They were
    just so passionate about my speech and what my community is
    going through, and they helped, and now that latrine is in the
    process.
        Ms. Bass. Great. Thank you. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Ms. Bass.
        Let me just ask you, Mr. Lezhnev. You have reminded us of
    the terrible toll that the LRA has imposed upon innocent
    people--the abduction of more than 66,000 children, 100,000
    deaths over the past 28 years. And then you talked about the
    displaced, down from 1.8 million to 200,000 today.
        200,000 is an enormous number of people displaced, and I am
    wondering if you can tell us, maybe break that out a little bit
    further--who they are, where they are, how they are faring, and
    the prospects, if there are any, in the near term, intermediate
    term for return.
        And then you also, in talking about the blood ivory trade,
    point out that--and I thought this was amazing, sadly, tragic--
    that you can trade one tusk from an elephant for up to 25 boxes
    of bullets. And there are over 700 bullets in a box. That comes
    out to 17,500 bullets. That is a lot of ammo. And you have
    talked about how Kony seems to have more resources like more
    ammo recently.
        Who is buying the ivory, and how much of that clientele
    might be Americans?
        Mr. Lezhnev. I will answer the ivory question first, and I
    will defer to Paul on the displacement figures.
        With regard to the ivory, we are heavily investigating
    that. It is pretty difficult to access the Kafia Kingi area
    because it is controlled by Sudan, and they don't like to allow
    visas for people like us on the panel to access that area. But,
    nevertheless, we are doing our best to investigate it, and
    particularly with LRA defectors who were involved in the ivory
    trade.
        I interviewed one of the big LRA ivory traders a few months
    ago. There are a couple of buyers that are based in Sudan.
    There are some merchants in this town called Songo. We are told
    that there are some Sudan Armed Forces commanders who were also
    buying the ivory. They obviously have the bullets. The LRA is
    also needing food and medical supplies and so forth, so the
    local merchants will supply those. And then it mainly gets
    traded to Asia.
        So there is a lot more effort needed in terms of helping
    law enforcement inspect ports. And that trade is likely going
    from Port Sudan on to places like Dubai and then onward to
    China, and so there is a need to help the customs and border
    patrol and law enforcement in those areas to intercept those
    containers.
        Frankly, right now, it is pretty difficult to identify
    which containers they are, but we started a new initiative at
    Enough called The Sentry, and The Sentry is really conducting
    these investigations into the financing of conflicts. So we
    hope to come with new information about this, about which
    containers need to be intercepted and which traders need to be
    sanctioned.
        Mr. Ronan. And on the issue of displacement, I want to
    thank you, actually, for how you framed that. Because I think
    many times people say, oh, there has been a drop from 1.8
    million to 200,000, and that is not very many. And you are
    absolutely right to point out that is an enormous amount of
    people. And, in fact, the vast majority of them are Congolese
    and live right in the areas near where Francisca is from.
        And I would also like to say that there are some analysts
    that actually think that that 200,000 number is quite a bit
    higher.
        And just to reiterate, the reason why many people are
    displaced, even if the number of attacks has gone down, is
    because the memory of the massacres that the LRA did in 2008,
    2009, and 2010, they are never going to leave the memories of
    the people that had to witness them. So, even if the LRA is not
    as violent as it once was, the legacy that they have really has
    a ripple effect that will keep people displaced as long as Kony
    is free.
        I would also like to point out that, in these same areas
    where a majority of displaced people live in Congo are, due to
    a drop in funding from the donor community, there has been a
    withdrawal of 16 of the 19 international humanitarian groups
    that had been providing much-needed food, water, and
    sanitation. Many of the groups that were operational there have
    had to withdraw, and it is not because there is a decrease in
    the number of people that need the services.
        And, of course, I have seen, myself, the incredible work
    that the Congolese themselves are doing in trying to address
    these needs, but there is a need for renewed international
    funding, as well.
        Mr. Smith. The African Union forces that are being advised
    by the 100 Americans deployed there, could you maybe give us
    some insights that might be unique to your experiences about
    who they are, how well they are doing, how many are there? What
    kind of capabilities do they have, like airlifts, or is that
    all ours? I am just wondering how robust of an effort is that
    by the AU.
        Mr. Ronan. Yeah. Thanks.
        On the question of the AURTF and the troops that are
    deployed out there, again, I want to recognize the bravery of
    many of those soldiers, who are often not very well-equipped
    and are tasked with walking through some dangerous, dangerous
    jungles in order to find dangerous people.
        Now, that said, it is unfortunate that I have to report
    that none of the countries that have dedicated troops to the AU
    force to track the LRA have been able to fulfill the
    obligations that they signed up for.
        And this, again, brings back the issue of regional
    instability, where in South Sudan and in the Central African
    Republic we have seen, you know, massive problems that have
    prevented those governments----
        Mr. Smith. How far short have they been?
        Mr. Ronan. I believe that the Ugandan Army has come the
    closest. They have around 1,000 troops, I believe, is the
    number that they said that they have dedicated, which is about
    half of what they were committed for. And the Ugandan troops
    are really doing the bulk of these operations. They are the
    ones that we can largely attribute the decrease in the number
    of combatants to.
        The South Sudanese and the central Africans really have
    hundreds, if not dozens, of troops that they have been able to
    dedicate, which is far, far lower than what they had said.
        There has been a ray of hope, I think, with the U.S.
    advisers working with the very small number of Congolese troops
    that have been doing operations in and around Garamba Park,
    which is where the LRA gets much of its ivory. So that hasn't
    provided much success yet, but I think it is a positive step.
        Mr. Smith. Can I just ask you, should the administration
    phase out or terminate the U.S. deployment, what impact would
    that have on the Ugandans and others in terms of their
    commitment to troops?
        Mr. Lezhnev. It would have a devastating and debilitating
    impact.
        Paul and I were witness to the solely Ugandan-led
    operations for many years in northern Uganda and further.
    Frankly, although, overall, over many years, it was a war of
    attrition and LRA numbers slowly went down, there were so many
    botched operations, many times when the Ugandans supposedly
    wouldn't have the fuel for a helicopter to go and chase Kony. A
    third of the Ugandan Army were listed as ghost soldiers during
    that time.
        So the intelligence collection, the efforts to pursue Kony,
    the decimation of their leadership--again, four of the five top
    commanders are no longer in action--those are results of
    successful operations that the U.S. has helped really
    coordinate and really improve the capacity. So if the U.S.
    advisers were to go away, I think we would definitely see a
    resurgence in the LRA.
        Mr. Smith. A very timely caution. And we will convey that
    to the administration immediately and take your words, if you
    don't mind, backed up by our observations. And I am sure Karen
    and I and others on the committee will want to put into a
    letter immediately that kind of question, because that would be
    devastating.
        I would like to yield to Sheila Jackson Lee, the gentlelady
    from Texas.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, forgive me for rushing in
    and rushing out. I want to thank you for your courtesies. I am
    not a member of the committee, and you have always extended to
    me a courtesy.
        Forgive me. The loud phone that was ringing was calling me
    to the floor, so I apologize.
        I want to thank Ms. Bass, as well, for always being
    gracious. This is a passion of mine, the continent. And these
    issues of conflict, we have worked on these for a number of
    years. So I want to thank you for your leadership and the
    leadership of this subcommittee.
        I will be asking cross-examination questions, and I thank
    you for indulging me on these.
        It looks as if Mr. Kony has been here since the beginning
    of civilization. It looks like it has been so long that my
    frustration level has gone--now you are telling me that his
    children--and if we are here and blessed by life and you come
    back and tell me his grandchildren, then I know that we are--
    not that you are doing something--that we haven't done what we
    needed to do.
        So if I might draw something to the chairman's attention,
    and I want to submit into the record--and please note that I am
    going to make the connection, as we do sometimes in the
    courtroom in a prosecution case. But I want to note, Mr.
    Chairman, the speech of President Buhari of Nigeria before the
    United Nations, and I want to commend some language very
    quickly.
        I would ask unanimous consent if I might put this in the
    record.
        Mr. Smith. Without objection, so ordered.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. He speaks about peace. He talks about the
    sustainable efforts of the United Nations. And he says, Nigeria
    has contributed to U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Ethiopia,
    Liberia, Sierra Leone, et cetera, just to reflect upon what
    they have done in the past.
        Then he goes on to say that ``[p]eace . . . is close to the
    hearts of Nigerians, as we are in the front line in the war on
    terror. Boko Haram's war against the people of Nigeria, Chad,
    Niger, and Cameroon may not attract as much worldwide attention
    as the wars in the Middle East'' but the people are suffering.
        ``This war is about values between progress and chaos;
    between democracy and the rule of law. Boko Haram celebrates
    violence against the weak and the innocent and deplorably, they
    hide behind their perverted interpretation of Islam. Boko Haram
    is as far away from Islam as anyone can think of.''
        So I make the nexus to--first, I want to congratulate the
    newly-elected President, Mr. Buhari. We met with him in
    Nigeria, and he made a commitment that he was going to end the
    siege of Boko Haram by the end of 2015.
        So I raise these questions about the involvement--first, my
    number-one question is--and let me mind my manners and thank
    all of the witnesses.
        And, particularly, Ms. Thelin, thank you for your passion.
    And, of course, $10,000, as you well know, the story of the
    fishes and loaves--you may know it; it is in the Christian
    faith--which means you get a little bit and then it multiplies.
    And we look forward to seeing your work multiply.
        But my question is to you. And I again want to offer
    sympathy to Ms. Thelin for losing over two dozen of your family
    members, and I think sometimes we tend to forget that.
        But on this issue of Mr. Kony, who is now passing his
    legacy on, I have several questions. One, where is the African
    Union in this, and where are the surrounding nations? I know,
    obviously, in central Africa, he is surrounded by Uganda,
    Rwanda. But where is the African Union, as its ability under
    its charter to utilize troops in this instance?
        The other is on the question of the gold, the diamonds,
    and, obviously, the ivory. What role do American consumers,
    purchasers, individuals like the dentist who went to Zimbabwe
    almost as I was there and that unfortunately saw the demise of
    Cecil the lion--but what role do we play in that?
        And have you any comment on the--or let me say that I thank
    them, but I just want to know what the comment might be as the
    U.S. special operations are pointedly working and have drawn
    together some unique characters as their collaborators under
    the African Command.
        I happen to be a strong supporter of AFRICOM, because it
    was under our watch a couple years ago that we fought for
    AFRICOM--in this instance, the Foreign Affairs Committee and
    the Congressional Black Caucus. And I think they play a vital
    role for peace in Africa.
        So I see you taking notes, so I will yield on those
    questions. And I know that you will, in your answers, as you
    did to the chairman, say what we can do. But I don't think I
    can hear one more moment that the grandchildren now have taken
    over from Kony without us bringing this to an end.
        Let me thank you very much.
        Ms. Thelin. So I would have to say that, when the African
    Union got to Dungu, everybody--I received a lot of calls from
    my family that everybody was happy that their presence was
    there at that time, because in 4 years that was the first time
    people could be outside of the compound in the morning, early
    morning or in the evening, the hours that mostly LRA was
    supposed to attack.
        And, also, when U.S. special advisers came, everything
    seems to be nice. But, again, it just looks like they are not
    pursuing Kony, and it is taking too long. Because even though
    the presence is there, the LRA are still abducting people. They
    will come past the United Nations compound--I don't know how--
    and in a few meters from the compound and abduct people in the
    light, bright light day, and attack and killing.
        So people sometimes are so disappointed that, okay, America
    is a superpower, so if really they decided to capture Kony,
    they would do so in no time, but it is taking too long. But
    they are thankful that you are doing what you are doing
    already, and they are hoping that he will be captured some time
    soon.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, ma'am. And I would only say to
    you that, when we have our U.S. special ops on the ground, you
    can be assured they are focused and pointed, and maybe
    sometimes unseen, but purposely functioning.
        I hope that the chairman--I heard his question before, but
    I would like to find a way to get a further answer from the
    African Union--not from you; I heard what you said--for their
    enhanced work. They may be at the limits of what they can do.
    And with that collaboration, the African Union of course doing
    what they are doing and the limits of what we can do with our
    particular guidelines of use on the continent, I can assure you
    that the special ops of the United States military,
    particularly AFRICOM there, that they are focused. But I thank
    you.
        You two gentlemen, if you could take a stab at the other
    two, and I will listen as I have to run to the floor. But thank
    you so very much.
        Thank you, madam, very much for that answer.
        Ms. Thelin. Thank you.
        Mr. Lezhnev. Thank you so much for your questions.
        Just regarding the ivory and the gold and the diamonds,
    most ivory goes to China for consumption there, but there is
    still some that comes here. And so Congress' efforts to combat
    wildlife trafficking are very important. And the new Obama
    administration draft regulations that are starting to put in
    place a ban on the ivory trade in the United States are very
    important.
        The Fish and Wildlife Service came out recently with a de
    minimis exception for some very limited ivory trade, for
    example, in bows of violins and cellos and those kind of
    things. There is a danger that if you allow that de minimus
    exception to be too high that, in fact, that would be a major
    loophole, and we would not want that. You can break a tusk into
    100 pieces----
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Yeah.
        Mr. Lezhnev [continuing]. Or 1,000 pieces, you know, that
    doesn't make the trade any less valuable.
        So what we really need to do is cut that trade down and
    make sure that that de minimus exception is very low. So any
    efforts from Congress to weigh in with the administration on
    that issue would be more than welcome.
        New York State already has that de minimus exception.
    California is also passing a law on this, waiting for the
    Governor's signature.
        So with regard to pressing China on this issue.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Yeah.
        Mr. Lezhnev. We were very happy to see the President
    pressing the Chinese President just last week on the ivory, and
    they did come out with a pretty strong statement on that. But
    that needs followup. This is a pretty lucrative business out
    there.
        With regard to gold and diamonds, gold is still a commodity
    that is used for money laundering, terrorist financing. There
    was a recent FATF report which talked about gold and money
    laundering in use by various rebel groups around the world,
    including in Congo. And, in particular, there are some conflict
    traders out there that need to be the focus of investigations
    and targeted sanctions.
        We, ourselves, are investigating some of those in the
    Middle East at the moment and will be happy to provide the
    subcommittee with more information on that as we get it. We are
    writing a report and have some whistleblowers within some of
    these organizations that are trading the conflict gold.
        I will let Paul answer, though.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. Thank you.
        Mr. Ronan. On the AU involvement, I think that the African
    Union's approach to counter the LRA was unique, in the sense
    that the force that they have deployed is an AU-authorized
    force and not an AU-mandated force. And that distinction has
    basically meant that the AU itself is providing very little
    support to the Ugandan, the South Sudanese, the Central
    African, and the Congolese troops that are out there. So it is
    really up to the countries themselves to equip their troops,
    which would be different than how most AU and U.N. peacekeeping
    operations work.
        And, unfortunately, if the LRA is operating in your
    country, it is the canary in the coal mine. It is not the
    reason why your country is allowing a group like this to
    operate, but it is taking advantage of that.
        So, by leaving it up to the countries themselves to provide
    all of the support to their troops, we are left where we are
    now, which is that the Ugandans are really the only force out
    there that is capable of really pursuing the LRA, and even
    their capacity has been very, very limited.
        So I think that this has revealed some of the weaknesses
    from an AU and an international perspective as far as how they
    approach this and reinforces the need to make sure that we have
    adequate troops there and that they have the equipment that
    they need to actually pursue the LRA in an effective manner.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        Thank you so much. You have given me work to do.
        Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman, for your kindness.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you. We are glad to have you.
        That concludes the hearing. I, first of all, want to just
    thank you on behalf of the subcommittee for your testimonies
    and your leadership. It is a privilege to receive expert
    testimony from such highly informed, highly motivated, and wise
    leaders. We really benefit greatly. The people who are
    suffering will benefit from this, as they have already by your
    leadership.
        And we will contact the administration; I know that is why
    we did it now, to get your insights right now so that they make
    the right decision, which I believe they will do, to keep this
    important program going.
        So anything you want to ever add within the period of time
    for this hearing but also on the issue itself, particularly as
    it relates to the other countries. The members of this
    subcommittee, including the chairman and Greg Simpkins, our
    staff director, and other members of the staff, we are in
    constant contact with the leaders of these countries and if
    there is something we need to convey to any of these other
    people, please let us know, and we can bring that word to them,
    again, from such experts.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

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             Material Submitted for the Record
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       Material submitted for the record by Mr. Sasha Lezhnev, associate
                       director of policy, Enough Project

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    Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee,
              a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas

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