[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-48]
OPTIMIZED FLEET RESPONSE PLAN
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 10, 2015
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman
ROB BISHOP, Utah MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Vice JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
Chair TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SCOTT H. PETERS, California
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma
Craig Collier, Professional Staff Member
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Katherine Rember, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 1
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness............................ 1
WITNESSES
Harley, RADM Jeffrey A., USN, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy (OPNAV N3/5B);
and CAPT Thom Burke, USN, Director, Fleet Readiness (N43)...... 2
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Harley, RADM Jeffrey A., joint with CAPT Thom Burke.......... 29
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 43
Mr. Courtney................................................. 43
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
OPTIMIZED FLEET RESPONSE PLAN
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Thursday, September 10, 2015.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 8:01 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J.
Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Wittman. I call to order the House Armed Services
Committee Subcommittee on Readiness.
I want to welcome folks to our hearing this morning, on the
Optimized Fleet Response Plan. I want to thank our witnesses
for being here with us this morning, Rear Admiral Jeffrey A.
Harley and Captain Thom Burke.
And as I said, I especially want to thank Rear Admiral
Jeffrey Harley, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, for
Operations, Plans and Strategy, and Captain Thom Burke,
Director of Fleet Readiness, for being here today. Thank you
for joining us here at this hour of the morning.
We are looking forward to hearing about the Navy's
Optimized Fleet Response Plan [O-FRP], and we have heard about
the stress that recent and current operations have put on our
fleet. And I look forward to hearing the Navy's plan to address
these issues.
I would now like to turn to my ranking member, Ms.
Madeleine Bordallo, for her opening comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Ms. Bordallo. Good morning, and thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. And I thank the witnesses--and I like calling this
hearing so early in the morning.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo. I enjoy it. Today we will discuss the Navy's
Optimized Fleet Response Plan, which is a new readiness
construct that should enable the Navy to provide a predictable
deployment schedule for our sailors, and support the growing
operational tempo for the fleet and growing mission
requirements across the globe.
The O-FRP is a readiness construct that arises from
significant strains on the force that pose challenges for the
Navy's continued readiness.
The O-FRP has been developed to respond to current day
requirements, and is intended to endure into the future. The O-
FRP is certainly a solid plan to address readiness challenges,
but questions remain about its viability into the future.
This subcommittee has been tracking development of the O-
FRP, and directed the GAO [Government Accountability Office] to
review the plan to get greater fidelity on the plan's ability
to adapt to changing circumstances that are beyond anyone's
control.
For example, what would significant delays in shipbuilding
or ship maintenance availabilities do to the O-FRP, and how
would forces be generated without disrupting dwell time and
predictability for our sailors?
Further, I hope our witnesses can touch on how they are
ensuring the readiness of logistics and support vessels in the
Military Sealift Command [MSC] fleet to support the carrier
strike groups [CSGs].
A key component of the O-FRP is to ensure that our Navy
remains forward deployed, and the MSC is critical to supporting
that effort. The O-FRP does a good job in outlining the
deployment cycle for carrier strike groups, but I would like to
get better fidelity on MSC ship maintenance and repair to
support the carrier strike groups.
And further, this level of fidelity would be welcomed by
the shipyards, so that they have even more predictability to
support the readiness of the fleet.
I also hope our witnesses can touch on the value of having
shipyards or robust ship repair capabilities in forward
locations to truly support a forward deployed Navy.
As our witnesses have indicated and news articles have
highlighted, full implementation of the O-FRP will take years
and years. So, it is important to fully explore the plan and
make sure that it works, not just for today's requirements, but
enduring into the future.
So, I look forward to a robust discussion about the plan
and how it will endure, as well as how we overcome unforeseen
challenges.
And again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.
We will now go to our witnesses, Admiral Harley and then
Captain Burke, for your opening comments.
STATEMENT OF RADM JEFFREY A. HARLEY, USN, ASSISTANT DEPUTY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS, AND STRATEGY
(OPNAV N3/5B); AND CAPT THOM BURKE, USN, DIRECTOR, FLEET
READINESS (N43)
Admiral Harley. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, Captain Burke and I
are honored to be here today to discuss the Optimized Fleet
Response Plan, known as O-FRP.
O-FRP is the Navy's sustainable readiness generation model,
and it is how we will maintain and train our ships to deploy in
support of our national security interests. It provides a force
that is ready for any challenge, from a high-end conflict
against a peer competitor to humanitarian operations.
We would like to begin this statement by providing an
overview of O-FRP, and then some highlights of how O-FRP will
balance global presence with warfighting readiness and the
long-term health of the force.
Our Navy has managed force generation using the Fleet
Response Plan since it was adopted in 2003 and fully
implemented in 2007. This cyclic process was designed to
synchronize periodic deep maintenance and modernization
necessary to readiness with the training of the fleet, to
achieve global force management allocation plan forward
presence objectives and provide contingency response capacity.
The reality of the past decade has seen a smaller fleet,
along with continuing employment of our contingency response
capacity to generate increased presence. This drove up
maintenance requirements and in turn, compressed the time
available to complete required maintenance and training.
In testimony over the last several years, the Navy has
described this practice as unsustainable.
This prolonged period of high operational tempo resulted in
a loss of scheduled predictability, personnel gaps, deferred
maintenance and modernization, and overall reduction in the
health of the force.
From 2008 to 2011, carrier strike group deployments
averaged about 6.5 months in length. From 2012 to 2014, this
increased to an average of 8.2 months as the Navy extended
deployment lengths to meet global commitments to the combatant
commanders.
More recently, Nimitz and Harry S. Truman completed 8.5-
month deployments in fiscal year 2014. George H.W. Bush
completed a 9-month deployment, Carl Vinson completed a 9.5-
month deployment, and Theodore Roosevelt will complete an 8.5-
month deployment this year.
Maintenance is the key factor to the health of the force.
To meet national tasking, we have extended deployment lengths,
which increased the wear on our ships, and resulted in
additional maintenance and repairs that lengthened planned
maintenance availabilities.
Operational schedule changes to meet combatant commander
requirements, funding shortfalls, shipyard loading constraints,
late modernization adds, and other factors led to inefficient
maintenance and modernization planning, contracting, and
completion.
Given these increased maintenance demands and shipyards, we
should have been hiring more workers. Instead, because of the
continuing resolution and sequestration-driven hiring freeze
and overtime restrictions through much of fiscal year 2013, we
were losing people to other employment opportunities or to
retirement, without replacement.
We are still hiring to try to recover that shortfall. But
we have to train those workers who do not have the requisite
skills. This lack of skilled shipyard labor has further
impacted performance and completion timelines. These
operational and budget decisions directly contributed to the
maintenance challenges that we now face.
The pace of operations, and providing ``just in time''
readiness to deploy, also affected our people, our sailors--
including a number of last-minute ``cross-deck'' moves, which
means pulling sailors off one ship and putting them onto
another just in time for the next deployment.
Consequently, we were challenged to retain our best sailors
due to uncertain schedules and increased time away from home,
and the attendant loss of stability for sailors and their
families. We are now paying the price for the prolonged high
operational tempo experienced these last few years. We have
testified to the unsustainability of that operational tempo.
Combatant commander requirements, meanwhile, continue to
grow and although we have historically sourced to our capacity
we are routinely asked to surge additional forces or to extend
forces on station. In these cases we are not so much generating
new readiness as we are consuming the future presence and
future surge capacity.
This year, the Navy began implementation of the O-FRP to
try to reset in stride, to address these challenges. Designed
to stabilize maintenance schedules and provide sufficient time
to maintain and train the force while maximizing employability,
O-FRP also aligns supporting processes and resources to improve
the overall health of the force. Importantly, it will provide a
more predictable schedule for our sailors and their families.
We will continue O-FRP implementation across the Future
Years Defense Program with a goal of full implementation by
2020.
The CNO's [Chief of Naval Operations] overarching guidance
was to establish a balanced, sustainable and predictable force
readiness generation cycle that would maximize the
employability of our force structure.
O-FRP is intended to deliver several specific outcomes.
First, O-FRP will permit us to preserve the time necessary for
maintenance and training. We need to protect maintenance time
to preserve the long-term health of the force.
Delaying or deferring maintenance plans places equipment at
increased risk and increases the risk of equipment casualties
at sea when we need those equipment the most. Disruptions to
maintenance planning also increases cost, reduces public
shipyard productivity, and increases the risk to the private
ship repair industrial base.
Furthermore, stable and predictable maintenance and
modernization supports our warfighting readiness and
interoperability. If we don't complete maintenance on time, we
can't start training on time. If we have to compress training
to meet global presence requirements, this negatively impacts
our full-spectrum readiness over the long term.
The improvements in maintenance will lead to overall
greater operational availability. Greater operational
availability means less likelihood of lengthened or multiple
deployments in the same cycle.
O-FRP will also improve the quality of work and enhance the
quality of life for our sailors. O-FRP will lead to enhanced
quality of life through more predictable schedules for our
sailors and their families. Stabilized manning also reduces the
likelihood of last-minute cross-deck personnel actions and will
result in fewer operational holds of sailors who have already
served their time at sea.
O-FRP will provide standardized manning, training,
equipping, and alignment of operational and tactical
headquarters. It will provide a consistent chain of command
throughout the O-FRP cycle. Ultimately, these factors are
interrelated. For the investment in maintenance and training,
an increased period of operational availability supports both
forward presence commitments and recovering our contingency
response capability.
Our transition, as noted, to O-FRP will occur over several
years. Carrier strike group and amphibious ready group [ARG]
transitions are already in progress. We project the last CSGs
and ARGs will enter O-FRP in fiscal year 2018. We have approved
and are implementing O-FRP cycles for our remaining units,
including ships homeported overseas, attack submarines,
maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, and our
expeditionary forces such as explosive ordnance disposal,
coastal riverine forces, and naval construction forces.
For our ships and submarines, completing maintenance
availabilities on time is essential to reducing deployment
durations. Maintenance delays may result in other ships
completing extended deployment to meet global commitments.
The fiscal year 2016 President's budget [PB-16] made a
significant investment to increase available naval shipyard and
aviation depot capacity. We have moved some submarine work to
the private sector and increased the size of the workforce.
Navy is making significant investments in workforce
training to improve worker productivity. The combination of
these improvements will reduce the number of availabilities
that exceed scheduled end dates.
Additionally, in support of O-FRP implementation, we have
synchronized carrier and surface combatant maintenance periods,
standardized the training of our headquarters staffs, and
consolidated and streamlined inspection processes.
We have made significant progress in ensuring our ships are
properly manned prior to commencing the training cycle. We are
continuing to work to ensure maintenance and modernization
periods are completed on time.
For the progress we have made, we must be prepared to
address potential roadblocks to O-FRP implementation. We will
need to fund O-FRP to the right standards for manpower,
maintenance and training, and across all readiness pillars.
PB-16 does that, but a return to Budget Control Act levels
will certainly disrupt O-FRP implementation.
We need to meet not only the numbers for manpower fit and
fill, but ensure the quality of the fit is correct, ensuring a
trained sailor with the right skills arrives at the right time.
We need to closely manage ship schedules and alignment of
surface combatant and amphibious ships with the aircraft
carriers and big-deck amphibious ships.
This is complex because it involves coordinating
maintenance and modernization schedules across numerous
shipyards.
We need to invest in increasing shipyard capacity by
addressing workforce manning and training requirements. We will
have to execute the planned PB-16 investment to increase
available naval shipyard capacity by moving submarine work to
the private sector and increasing the shipyard workforce to
33,500 full-time equivalents by fiscal year 2017.
Finally, responding to emerging crises with surge or
extended deployments will disrupt schedules and could further
delay O-FRP implementation.
We are carefully managing the O-FRP implementation and
execution and will be prepared to adjust course as necessary.
Lastly, I would like to talk about the risks we face if we
do not implement O-FRP. We cannot continue doing business as
usual and expect to maintain an operational and tactical
advantage over our adversaries. If we do not implement O-FRP,
our challenges will continue to grow.
We will be unable to retain our best sailors due to high
operational tempo and schedule unpredictability. Through the
cumulative effect of high operational tempo and maintenance
challenges, we also will be unable to reach the expected
service life of our ships, submarines, and aircraft.
Additionally, degraded material readiness leads to reduced
warfighting readiness, ineffective training, and increased
safety risks. We will be unable to preserve the required
industrial support base. We will continue to have inefficient
maintenance/modernization planning and scheduling, which will
lead to unacceptable and unaffordable cost overruns, training
entitlement impacts, and deployment delays.
Lastly, we continue to consume our contingency surge
capacity for routine operations. It will be more challenging to
meet Defense Strategic Guidance objectives of the future.
Ultimately, this is a ``pay me now or pay me later''
discussion. If we are not given time to reset the force through
O-FRP, and are forced to source beyond sustainable levels, we
will remain challenged in all of these areas.
So in conclusion, after years of operating above
sustainable levels, we remain challenged to meet the necessary
surge capacity in quantity and readiness across a wide array of
forces. Moreover, a return to Budget Control Act authority
levels will further challenge our maintenance, readiness,
training, and risks reversing recent gains.
Your great Navy will continue to man, train, and equip
combat-credible forward naval presence--being where it matters,
when it matters--as well as supporting our commitment to allies
and partners. Our naval functions--deterrence, sea control,
power projection, maritime security, and all-domain access--
remain essential to our strategy.
But we cannot sustain the health of the force indefinitely
without adopting and fully implementing O-FRP as our
sustainable force generation model. We thank the subcommittee
for your continued support and we look forward to answering
your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Harley and Captain
Burke can be found in the Appendix on page 29.]
Mr. Wittman. Admiral Harley, thank you. Thank you for that
comprehensive overview about O-FRP and what it means and the
challenges that we face ahead. I appreciate you putting your
perspective, too, what Congress's obligation needs to be to
make sure that we create that readiness and make sure that we
are creating it faster than we are consuming it. Great--great
perspectives.
What I will do is begin with just a single question, and
then I want to make sure we go to the members here and then I
will come back.
You spoke at length about making sure that there is proper
capacity there, both in the private yards and the public yards,
increasing staffing there. One of the things we look at as far
as maintenance availabilities, as you so eloquently stated, the
maintenance availabilities have backed up based on deployment
schedules from 2012 through 2014.
So now we have this bow wave of maintenance availabilities
that have to be taken care of, getting those ships to the yard.
That also creates a bow wave, as you said, in capacity in our
yards. The key, though, is to make sure that we maintain that
capacity moving forward past taking care of the bow wave that
comes in and getting these ships maintained.
How does O-FRP make sure we are not in this roller coaster
ride again where we have all this work that goes to the yards
and then all of a sudden the need for that capacity now goes
away? So we ramp up to that 33,000 staffing level in the yards,
both public and private, and then once that work is done, you
know, we drop off and the demand is not there.
So give us a perspective about how O-FRP, you know, keeps
that certainty for all of our yards to make sure, as you have
talked about, and we have seen this where we lose people from
the yards because the work goes away and then we scramble to
get folks back and those skills never return. And when we do
have to hire folks, as you know, it takes a significant amount
of time for them to develop the skills to be effective and for
efficiencies to be found in the yard.
So give me an idea about how as we go into 2015, 2016, and
2017, and then obviously into 2018, how do you manage those
peaks and valleys?
Admiral Harley. And sir, I will let Captain Burke provide
more detail, but what you are really addressing is this ideal
of providing predictability for our industrial base. And that
same predictability, if we can get to a place where the
maintenance ends on time, that predictability translates over
into our ability to generate force employability to meet our
obligations for our global force presence.
That predictability is the--underpinned by exactly that, by
having that industrial base capable of generating the
maintenance outcomes that we absolutely need for our program.
Captain Burke. Sir, good morning. That is a fantastic
question. It is right on the point. And so I think what O-FRP
is helping us do is there is a subset of O-FRP, which is this
new master plan we are creating to give our process
sustainability, discipline, and stability. And so our plan is
to try and look out much further into the future with this
disciplined process and be able to see 9 years out, this is
when this ship is going to be in availability.
So it should allow us to do a much better job of placing a
trajectory on the size of the shipyards throughout the country,
both public and private, and what our private demand would even
be, and be able to put a more level load throughout that long
cycle.
Now as we transition, there is churn there. Because we do
it--we have a lot of work to do, to hire folks, which we are
doing pretty well at, but getting those folks trained and
getting them to perform at the journeyman level takes a few
years. They are not going to show up as experts.
So the transition is going to be--is a big challenge for
us. But once we get there, we will be able to look much further
into the future and look at what the load is across our yards
so we are not causing those ups and downs. Absolutely right,
yes, sir.
Mr. Wittman. As well as talking, obviously, with the folks
in the public yards, are you having conversations with folks in
the private yards to make sure you work with them so they can
work with you and maintaining for them that certainty, but also
helping them manage the workforce so we are not on that roller
coaster ride?
Captain Burke. Yes, sir. And I think we are doing it in
better ways than we have ever done in the past, honestly. It is
more of a challenge. We don't have the fidelity we have with
our public yards of exactly what skill sets we have available.
We have great fidelity in our public yards.
In the private yards, folks are more inclined to say they
will take the work no matter what, so we have to be--we have to
be honest partners with each other and understand what the
realities are so that we are not causing them a lot of churn,
yes, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a couple of questions, real quick questions.
Admiral, for you, where along the O-FRP timeline does the most
risk lie? Who is responsible for enforcing it and who has the
authority to disrupt it?
Admiral Harley. Most of the risk within the 36-month
timeline for the Optimized Fleet Response Plan is the
maintenance cycle itself. There are a number of unknowns within
the maintenance cycle. Things get discovered that need repair.
One of the examples is the Dwight D. Eisenhower's
maintenance cycle was supposed to be significantly shorter,
ended up to be twice as long, a function of a major system
casualty that was discovered once they got into the discovery
phase in preparation for the maintenance.
So there are things that place the maintenance portion
particularly at risk.
The deployments are scheduled years in advance. It is part
of our force offering adjudicated by the Secretary of Defense.
And what our global force presence will be allocated with the
capacity that we can offer.
The shock absorber for that becomes the training cycle, and
it is why the CNO has testified that there are maintenance
backlogs and training backlogs that impact the ability to
execute the Fleet Response Plan and now have potential to
disrupt the Optimized Fleet Response Plan.
It is why so much effort is going into ensuring the
predictability and the completion of the maintenance cycles.
The force generation models, the readiness generation model
that is described in the Optimized Fleet Response Plan is
obviously a Chief of Naval Operations responsibility, under his
title 10 authorities of manning, training, and equipping.
However, the commander of Fleet Forces Command is the
executive agent for delivering the readiness of the fleet. That
is the person who can disrupt, modify, re-organize the Fleet
Response Plan and its goals under the auspices of the Chief of
Naval Operations.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Admiral, for your direct
answers to my questions.
Now can you detail how the O-FRP implementation sequences
MSC or other logistics and support vessel maintenance over the
coming years? Again, I want to stress, the plan for the carrier
strike groups is pretty straightforward, but it is not--but it
is unclear how this would work for MSC.
Admiral Harley. The O-FRP has nine lines of effort and one
of those is MSC support. But the Military Sealift Command ships
are not part of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan's
methodologies. They are funded to a certain level of readiness,
a certain number of days. They are certified to Coast Guard
standards and civilian maintenance standards.
So they play a significant role in supporting the rest of
the fleet through their readiness, through their support of the
ships and assets that are going through the Optimized Fleet
Response Plan.
But in terms of the processes, the alignment of manning the
training and logistics, it is not a driver for the Military
Sealift Command ships and platforms.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.
We will now go to Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, the best of managers, whether they are in the
public sector or the private sector, can't be efficient if they
don't know what their budget is in a timely manner. Do you know
what your budget will be for your fiscal year that starts
October 1?
Admiral Harley. We actually don't, sir. I think it depends
on the decision as to whether the Presidential budget is
approved or whether there is a continuing resolution [CR]. And
even within the continuing resolution, there is significant
discussion as to the lowest levels, whether it would be a House
number or Senate number.
And there is a significant difference between what could
potentially be a gap of something like $3.6 billion or even up
to a gap of $16.5 billion.
We can certainly get you more details, but you are
absolutely right--it creates an uncertainty and an
unpredictability that has the potential to destabilize our
naval execution of the Fleet Response Plan and the Optimized
Fleet Response Plan.
Mr. Scott. And just for the record, Mr. Chairman, for
people who may be watching this, it is September 10, so we are
20 days from the new fiscal year. And Admiral, I majored in
risk management. Forgive me for the question, but is it
possible to calculate the additional risk and cost to our
country in both dollars and national security with the
uncertainty that is surrounding the appropriations for the DOD
[Department of Defense]?
Admiral Harley. I think we have calculated the risk in
testimony, particularly in January with the Chief of Naval
Operations and the service chiefs discussing and testifying to
the impacts of sequestration.
Naval assets are somewhat different, I would suggest, than
so many other assets and programs. The maintenance cycles are
very long. The ability to produce readiness is an extensive
period of time. We absolutely rely on the predictability of
that funding.
Continuing resolution would have impacts of its own if we
end up there, even for a short period of time. We are likely to
have to start deferring some maintenance because of the lack of
predictability.
And this has a daisy chain effect of repercussions
throughout the maintenance schedule, a daisy chain effect in
terms of our ability to provide global presence required to
support and defend our allies and to meet our commitments in
accordance with the Defense Strategic Guidance.
Mr. Scott. I agree with you, Admiral. The only thing that a
continuing resolution is better than would be a shutdown and
the additional uncertainty that would come from that.
The House passed a Defense Appropriations measure June 11
by a vote of almost 2 to 1. I would just like to point that
out. And now here we are 20 days from the end of the fiscal
year and we don't have anything to tell you.
One last comment I would make--if I wanted to destroy the
United States, if I was their enemy, I would force their fleet
to stay at sea longer than their maintenance schedules allow
for, to allow us, if you will, to dilapidate the fleet.
One of the greatest advantages that we have had over any of
our adversaries is our ability to do depot and maintenance work
and the industrial workforce that we have. Could you speak to
the impact that this is having, the uncertainty has, and the
damage that we have done to that workforce with furloughs and
other budget maneuvers that have happened in the past?
Captain Burke. Sir, specifically talking about the
workforce and the furloughs, I think it is a pretty important
point. And the uncertainty associated with it can really cause
some serious damage.
The shutdown, for example, that we had resulted in not only
some furloughs and sequester results in some furloughs, but
then they resulted in a hiring freeze. And that was actually
more damaging because for 8 or 9 months afterwards we couldn't
hire. And so, for example, in our air depots, with our
aircraft, we just this summer got back to the level of folks
working in those depots, the level we had in 2013. So we just
got back to where we used to be.
And we know that capacity isn't enough to handle the amount
of aircraft we need as throughput right now. And you can make
the same--exactly the same statement for the shipyards, sir.
Mr. Scott. Captain, I represent Robins Air Force Base. We
will be happy to rebuild those Navy planes for you if you need
us to.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield the remainder of my time and I
appreciate the opportunity and gentlemen I appreciate your
service.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
We will now go to Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
both the witnesses this morning.
Admiral, I just want to get a little more clarification on
some numbers that you just recited in terms of the impact of a
CR and sequestration. You mentioned a $3 billion gap between
the President's budget and one of those scenarios and up to
$16.5 billion between the President's budget and one of those
scenarios.
Could you just say--is the $3 billion if we do a CR? And
the $16.5 is a sequestration number? Is that----
Admiral Harley. Sir, the difference between those numbers
is the difference between the inclusion of OCO [overseas
contingency operations] funding and the lowest common base and
whether you would take the House number or the Senate number.
And I understand it is one of the issues that is being
discussed and it would still have to be adjudicated between the
Senate and the House.
But it is a significant difference for us. And we have
argued that, you know, the President's budget is what we need
to execute our missions. A continuing resolution would
obviously place us at some number less than the President's
budget.
And as we look at those numbers, depending on whether it is
a House version or a Senate version that included what could
be--what could include a construct of the lowest base number
for that funding, it could be a significant difference between
those two numbers that I offered.
Mr. Courtney. And does the OCO sort of strategy, does
that--can that be applied towards this program, or is that just
not considered, you know, within OCO's reach? You know what I
am saying?
Admiral Harley. Sir, I don't know. And I can get that back
to you. I know----
Mr. Courtney. I would appreciate that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 43.]
Admiral Harley. As we look at how we include the overall
funding. Our goal is to reach the ultimate numbers provided
within the President's budget.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. The other question--I just wanted
to follow up, as long as we are talking about gaps, is the
carrier gap. That is the way it is referred to in the media.
And it looks like we are about to encounter a carrier gap,
both in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific. Is that something
that, again, is just episodic, that is because there was that
delay in some of the carrier repairs that you referred to
earlier?
Or is that sort of going to be a structural, recurring
phenomenon, because of O-FRP?
Admiral Harley. Sir, first I would talk to the idea that we
really ought to talk about capability gaps and not platform
gaps.
So, much has been said in the press about how we are not
going to have an aircraft carrier in the Arabian Gulf for
certain periods of time. And the truth is, what the Navy offers
is what we can produce. We tell the Secretary of Defense, that
given our readiness generation model, we can produce this
amount of carrier presence.
Based on global threats, the Secretary of Defense allocates
where those resources go. And sometimes it results in a carrier
not being assigned in the Central Command area of
responsibility. Or sometimes it results in not being assigned
in the Pacific Command area of responsibility, let alone all of
the other combatant commanders.
This phenomenon of not having a carrier present has
happened many times in the past; six times since 1991 for
Central Command, eight times since 1991 for the Pacific
Command. And appreciating the significant value that a carrier
brings to a fight and to things like deterrence, the idea of
discussing capabilities really is important.
Because when the carrier goes, the Joint Staff, working
with the combatant commanders, finds methodologies by which
they can mitigate that presence lack of the carrier.
And to that end, they are able to mitigate and provide the
capabilities that are required for that duration of time, until
a carrier can be provided in accordance with our presence
constructs.
Mr. Courtney. A number of us were over in Pearl Harbor last
week. And Admiral Harris and Admiral Swift sort of walked us
through that point.
I guess the question I still would like to understand is
that, is this something, though, that is going to be recurring
with O-FRP?
Admiral Harley. So, first I would say that O-FRP is not the
creator of gaps. O-FRP is a model that generates the optimal
employability of the--for the number of ships that we have. Our
goal, as stated by the CNO is to have two carriers deployed and
a surge capacity of three other carriers.
Where those two carriers are allocated is decided based on
threats, and determined by the Secretary of Defense, but
through the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Will there be
gaps--so-called gaps in the future? Well, I would say that the
capabilities, we find ways to mitigate that through adding
additional fighter aircraft as a representative example.
But our goal is to get to a sustainable generation model
for the highest levels of readiness, that are then offered to
the Secretary of Defense, and he makes that allocation.
Will there be shortages of carrier presence in the future?
I would say, most likely, because of the number of demands and
global threats throughout the world.
Mr. Wittman. We will now go to Mrs. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen.
I was wondering, how does the delay of the USS Gerald R.
Ford impact the O-FRP and the operational availability of the
Navy's carrier strike group?
Admiral Harley. The delay of the Gerald R. Ford is a
function of desiring to do shock trials to support the optimal
understanding of the safety parameters, before we deploy that
aircraft carrier.
It does modify our ability to restore our plus-three surge
capacity by a designated period of time that is still under
review by Fleet Forces Command.
Mrs. Hartzler. So, you don't have an idea right now what
that looks like? You are still reviewing when it will be
available?
Admiral Harley. Well, we know, without talking through
classified schedules that it represents about a 2-year delay in
being able to deploy that carrier. And consequently, it means
that we won't get back to 11 carriers able to deploy for about
an additional 2-year period.
We are looking at ways to mitigate our presence
requirements to get back to our two carriers deployed and three
surge-capable, but it does have a significant impact.
Mrs. Hartzler. What is the relationship now between public
and private maintenance in the shipyards?
How much of it is done in public, how much is done in
private? And how would you rate the capability, as well as the
economic feasibility of doing that? Is it cost-effective or
beneficial to have more private than public, or vice versa, or
how do you view that?
Captain Burke. Ma'am, the relationship is--essentially
the--sort of straightforward roll-up is that our nuclear work
is done in our public shipyards. Our kind of highest skill set,
highest standard work is done in our public yards.
And then the work for our cruisers and destroyers, our
amphibious fleet, is done in our private--is done in the
private yards, is sent out to those yards, contracted out.
And then there is some work that is contracted out that is
done on what we call top-side work, not in the propulsion
plans, that kind of thing, in our public yards.
So, the relationship is crucial to O-FRP being successful
that we have the balance between both our public sector and our
private sector understood. We have--as the chairman was talking
about in his question as well, that we have a trajectory to the
future, we understand what the loading is across those yards,
so that we are not throwing major wrenches into either the
public sector or the private sector, because it really screws
up the planning.
And that is a big part of why we are trying to take this
breath, and get O-FRP, which really isn't that big a change,
really. It is just trying to deliberately fence the time for
maintenance, so that we can get these ships back up where they
belong. And then we have time to offer that post-deployment
sustainment, and really offer that surge capability again,
which we kind of lost in our scramble to just be present over
the last several years. Because our numbers were higher than we
could sustain.
Mrs. Hartzler. Certainly, predictability is important in
industry and--you are talking employing, and training and all
of the aspects. So, that certainly makes sense.
What measures does the Navy use to track the performance of
its shipyards to ensure that it is meeting its maintenance
goals?
Captain Burke. The big roll-up measures, ma'am, are all
about cost and schedule. Those are the key parameters that we
use, and we have a number of ways to measure the trajectory of
how we are doing on cost and how we are doing on schedule,
beyond the big roll-ups.
So, from a business standpoint in the shipyard, that is
what they are worried about. How long is this supposed to take
to change this out? Is it a 5-day job? Why did it take 7
[days]? That sort of thing. Why did it cost extra, et cetera?
That is what we focus on.
From a fleet perspective, they are more focused on
operational days, the time that that ship is available at sea.
We call that metric ``lost operational days.'' If a ship is
supposed to be out there and able to be used by the fleet
commander, and it wasn't available, that is an X. That is a bad
thing. So, we want to minimize the number of lost operational
days.
So, we roll up all those metrics to see how we are doing.
Mrs. Hartzler. In the initial contract, is there a penalty
for the private contractor if they go beyond the time that they
were originally allotted to have the maintenance done?
Captain Burke. There can be. And it depends in the
contracting strategy. In the private side, we are changing
contracting strategies to go to a more firm, fixed-price type
of strategy, which will have more of those kinds of incentives,
or if you will, disincentives in the contract.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mrs. Hartzler.
We will now go to Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
joining us today.
I wanted to follow up a little bit with that--with some of
those questions. How are we catching up? Because I think that
the tracking is critical, and we know that reducing the
maintenance backlogs, it just snowballs, as you all know, in
terms of how long the fleet has to--is active, and corrosion
issues in terms of the ships.
I mean, there are so many things that are causing many of
the concerns that you have. And some of those are not
necessarily to the sequestration that we have experienced, but
longstanding.
So, how are we catching up with that? I mean, what are the
strategies that are working and those which are not?
Captain Burke. That is absolutely the right question,
ma'am.
So, the things I can say now are--there are a couple of
good news stories, and then there are a couple of--we are still
looking ats. So, the good news is the metric I just mentioned,
lost operational days. How many days are those ships available
to the fleet commanders?
That has been coming down all of the last 4 years, the
number of lost days were had for our ships at sea. So, that is
a good thing.
We have got a good method now to show that we are resetting
the fleet. So we have been very concerned about the fact that
we were trying to fix the bicycle as we rode it over the last
number of years, and we decided we really needed to try and
more deliberately capture how far we were off of the class
maintenance plan for our ships. Sort of the warranty manual for
your car throughout the life cycle. Are we on that plan? Or are
we off that plan?
So we have a way to capture that now and show that we are
putting more effort against that plan and we are actually
putting maintenance above--doing maintenance above the plan to
catch back up. And so we can track that metric now. Those are
the good news stories.
The worrisome side is what we--is what I talked about
earlier, with all these new folks we are hiring. All these new
faces. We got to get them trained and we have got to get them
up and performing effectively. And that is not going to happen
overnight so we have to work through that over the next few
years.
Mrs. Davis. Admiral Harley, you know the problems that we
are facing now is that they didn't just occur, we know that
they have been going for some time. Is there--what is it that--
I think the role of the Congress obviously is critical in this
and how we respond. Where do we fit into that?
As specifically--I mean it is obviously the sequestration
and whether it is a continuing resolution. But I wonder if you
could expand a little bit more on that? Where else do you see
the role?
Admiral Harley. Yes ma'am, we appreciate the great
partnership with Congress and congressional leadership in so
many of these areas. As you know Admiral Greenert, our Chief of
Naval Operations, released his maritime strategy in March in
which he talked to force design construct and the things that
our great Navy needs to be able to meet the five naval
functions. There are things that are needed to support the O-
FRP and I have outlined some of them.
We do use the optimization of the existing Fleet Response
Plan to achieve a better alignment within training, within
manning, within maintenance; to create those kinds of
maintenance efficiencies. As we move into the long term,
Congress can help us with ensuring the wholeness of our
programs. We do that through looking at the logistics, through
the parts, through the ordnance.
Probably the most critical factor is being able to provide
predictable and stable funding because of the differences.
Because of the inherent difference in our Navy long-term
processes that need that stability; with a predictability that
goes to your industrial base. A predictability of the product;
of the readiness that is going to be provided to the combatant
commanders.
All of those things is what the optimization of the Fleet
Response Plan will offer. But it is the dialogue with Congress,
it is the strategic underpinning, and it is particularly the
stability of the funding is I think what the enhanced role of
Congress would be.
Mrs. Davis. I was a little concerned though in the
discussion with Representative Courtney that in terms of trying
to really help members see where this gap is because there is a
concern about how--what is included in OCO and how we move
forward? How we have an understanding of that.
So I think to the extent that we can really look at that a
little clearer would be helpful.
Thank you.
Admiral Harley. Yes ma'am, we can certainly set up a
briefing for you or your staff.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mrs. Davis, we will now go to Ms.
Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you
gentlemen for your testimony today. I wanted to build on Mr.
Courtney's previous line of questioning. I represent Fort Drum,
home of the 10th Mountain Division and engaged from the 10th
Mountain Division are brigades currently forward deployed in
Afghanistan and Iraq. And on a recent CODEL [congressional
delegation] with Chairman Wittman to Top Gun, I was able to see
the significance and the critical role that the Navy has in
providing close air support for troops on the ground,
specifically for the 10th Mountain Division.
Can you explain to me how the implementation of O-FRP
restricts, impedes, or helps the Navy's ability in a joint
environment, and in particular in the Middle East AO [area of
operations]?
Admiral Harley. I would say that O-FRP actually optimizes
our readiness to support not only naval functions and missions
but optimizes our ability to participate as a joint partner.
For over a decade we have fought wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
providing things like close air support. We are currently
engaged in operations now against ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant] providing air support to enable our objectives
in that fight as well.
When you look at jointness, we are a joint force. We
certainly have maritime mission tasks that we execute, critical
missions tasks to support maritime security over the globe, the
underpinning of the global economy. But we operate frequently
in joint exercises and joint forces. It is part of our DNA now
to be able to do that.
So we can optimize the readiness that delivers the global
presence that enables the joint force excecution of missions
like those in Afghanistan. And the Fleet Response Plan is
simply that, it is a readiness generator. The Optimized Fleet
Response Plan simply optimizes the existing plan that we have.
We are also using the Optimized Fleet Response Plan to
reset our stride, to get back to our ability to provide the
global force presence that we need as well as a surge capacity.
It is going to take several years to get there but it is
absolutely critical for our ability to maintain global
requirements in terms of presence, but also the ability to
respond to crises.
Ms. Stefanik. My second question--I am sorry go ahead,
Captain.
Captain Burke. I wanted to just add--I would just like to
thank you for saying that. I think a lot of people don't really
realize how busy the Navy has been supporting our troops on the
ground, in the Middle East especially. I had the privilege of
spending 5 months out there while I was CO [commanding officer]
of the USS Ronald Reagan.
We took great pride in the fact that we never missed a
sortie that was going over land to go support our troops on the
ground. We always had the section that whatever it was--the
package that was flying to go check in was ready to support
those troops on the ground.
So I think a lot of folks don't really understand that.
This is, ``Well that is the Navy, they are not busy doing this
ground fight,'' and we sort of let it sneak up on us, our
collective understanding of how much we were stressing our
force to be able to provide that; that air cover, that air
presence, and all the ships associated with providing from the
sea support. So I really appreciate you mentioning that.
Thank you.
Ms. Stefanik. Well, we certainly are grateful and I know
the soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division that I represent
are grateful for that support.
My second question, which deals with a different topic, has
to do with retention. As you know, retaining the best and the
brightest soldiers is a huge issue and it is at the top of the
priority list for the Army right now. And you touched on this a
bit, Admiral, in your opening statement.
Can you please elaborate on why and how the O-FRP helps
retain sailors and any impact on their quality of life and more
stability for their families?
Admiral Harley. Absolutely, so one of the dilemmas that our
people face under the demands of global presence in the past
has been a lack of predictability. Deployments get extended,
people get surged early. Because we haven't been able to align
our manpower systems, you will be pulled off of one ship and
put onto another.
The ships suffer in readiness in terms of what we call fit
and fill, having the right person with the right skills. And
this translates into not being--not having the resources that
you need to do your job. And so it leads to a frustration that
probably culminates in reduced retention.
We have settled in the O-FRP on a 7-month deployment. It is
the optimal deployment length that meets the ability to enable
the transit distances of the globe to get where we need to be,
to be where it matters when it matters, and yet at the same
time, we don't want those deployments to be too long. There are
physical things that start to happen around the 8-month point
on ships. And we have done the rigorous analysis to show that
extended deployments have impacts on retention.
So what the Optimized Fleet Response Plan will do is not
only giving you better tools of fit and fill, it should give
our sailors and their families a predictability that we haven't
had in the past.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Stefanik.
We will now go to Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Gibson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
panelists. Thank you for your service and your leadership.
My questions are going to really follow up on the previous
one and Mr. Courtney. And in particular, with regard to the
Global Response Force, I will be interested in your personal
assessments as to the processes we have in place right now.
Certainly very detailed and informative commentary this
morning in terms of the Navy's aspects and impacts on
operations and on deterrents.
The Global Response Force put a lot of focus on that over
the last several years as a means of really empowering our
diplomats, really revitalizing deterrence, having agility in
the American response. And I am interested in your assessment
from the vantage point of the Navy of how we are doing as far
as a joint force using the Global Response Force construct.
Oftentimes in the media we hear reports of a carrier strike
group is, you know, in the Central Command or--and so obviously
very important, but as you have earlier stated this morning, I
mean, this is all part of a joint force.
How satisfied are you that the Pentagon is putting enough
emphasis on this, especially given the war that we have been
fighting for so long and, you know, in terms of impacts of
meeting current requirements for the war on terror?
And then how we are doing in relation to that? And in some
cases taking risk in revitalizing the Global Response Force--
what--and so, towards that end, your assessment, what
recommendations would you have for us, the Congress, that might
enhance or improve our ability to model and simulate,
participate in a meaningful way in exercises that all work
toward revitalizing the Global Response Force?
Admiral Harley. Sir, the Optimized Fleet Response Plan is
designed as a readiness generation model, as I have said.
Another way of articulating that is it creates employability.
It creates predictable and sustainable employability.
So by that I mean the CNO has testified of his goal to be
able to achieve a two-plus-three construct, which is really
getting to the issue of a response force. It is more than the
one carrier ready to respond. It is creating a vision where we
have three carriers in a surge capacity ready to respond, on
top of the two-plus presence that is already being provided
globally.
So when you talk about providing a response force, that is
really what we are talking about, is the ability to surge to
crises or to areas of responsibility in the event of a conflict
or in the event of a humanitarian disaster, as an example.
CNO has stated this goal. The Optimized Fleet Response Plan
builds towards that goal. We have lost that surge capacity as a
function of the overuse of our ships and platforms these last
several years. We testified that it would be unsustainable. It
has proven to be so. And now we are dealing with the
consequences of that.
We are resetting in stride to get back to that surge
capacity so that we can best enable the accomplishment of our
Defense Strategic Guidance requirements.
In terms of its interoperability with the joint force, we
operate as a joint force frequently. We do joint exercises to
make sure that we ensure our tactical and operational prowess.
The AirSea Battle concept, soon to be the Joint Concept for
Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons, is simply an
extension of a joint synergy and operational capability that
will ensure all-domain access.
In terms of where I think the Congress can fit into this
process, it is through enhancing your knowledge of how these
joint capabilities fit together, participating in some of the
special trips that you have done recently up to the Naval War
College to see the extraordinary modeling, the extraordinary
war-gaming that goes on, the joint interfaces and connections.
Getting--receiving briefs, out briefs, on the major joint
exercises that take place, as well as the real world operations
that take place at the joint level in support of the ongoing
conflicts that still continue.
And again, I would be remiss if I didn't say the biggest
role I think is being able to provide that stability for us,
for that funding that goes to not only the ability to meet our
maritime functions but our joint functions.
Mr. Gibson. Thank you, Admiral. My time has expired.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Gibson.
Admiral Harley, the Optimized Fleet Response Plan is a
great model to integrate decision making, to create the balance
between maintenance, between training and deployment. And you
talk about those metrics we want to make sure we maintain, and
that is to keep ships on schedule to be maintained, make sure
sailors get enough training, make sure deployment schedules are
at 7 months.
You talk about predictability and sustainability.
The challenging part of that is the world we live in is not
predictable. Whether it is Congress and what happens in the
funding stream or whether it is what our adversaries do, that
predictability in that realm is what you have to deal in.
So the question then becomes, of the metrics that you speak
of, which ones do you say are so important that you have to
adjust others to move in order to compensate for let's say
staying on a 7-month deployment cycle, or saying that we will
not skip a maintenance availability in the yard because we know
what then happens to the fleet down the road?
Give us a perspective about how when you meet those
unpredictable elements, the contingencies that invariably come
up, give us a perspective because we have seen what happens in
the past when those situations happen and how certain things
throw an O-FRP out of whack, and then we find ourselves back in
what do we do to compensate for that.
So give me your perspective as you face this contingency or
that uncertainty, what--how the O-FRP would respond to that.
Admiral Harley. Sir, the O-FRP is designed to be a
sustainable model. And what you are talking about are things
that can throw the timing and the sequence of events out of
line, whether it is global events or some significant
maintenance discovery that results in a very extensive
maintenance for a particular carrier, as an example.
In terms of providing that perspective, the O-FRP is
tracked through a master O-FRP production plan, which outlines
the alignment of all these different programs, manpower,
logistics, personnel, parts, ordnance, to create that wholeness
in readiness for a specific strike group, as an example.
Real world events will cause changes to the production
planning. If somebody's maintenance gets extended beyond our
ability to absorb it within the shock absorber that is built
into the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, we would have to adjust
accordingly and modify the schedules to be able to do that.
We have the capacity to do that. We have picked a 7-month
deployment in particular to give us flexibility if we really
had to go to 8 months. It is not optimal. It is not what we
want to do for all the reasons that are described today. But it
is one of the options available to us.
Another option is to reduce our global input as to what we
can provide for a designated period of time and to mitigate
that presence, that carrier presence, in some other way, using
our joint partners, using joint aircraft to cover a gap in time
where we may not actually have a carrier present.
But we do have methodologies, we do have tools that we can
use to deal with real world contingencies. Now our hope, of
course, and because probably the most pressing of the issues
that you identified is if there is a real world contingency
that requires. Of course we have the Global Response Force and
its ability to respond.
We track daily the ability of being able to surge aircraft
carriers and all other platforms and how quickly they can
respond to a crisis. Our desire is that our global force
offering as adjudicated by the Secretary of Defense will be
adequate.
But your Navy maintains a readiness to respond to all of
those issues. Our desire is to be able to reset in place, to
reset in stride so that we can get to a place where that two-
plus-three surge capacity is the norm and not merely a goal.
Captain Burke. And sir, if I could just add briefly, the
world is not predictable, as you very correctly said, but
maintenance should be. So if we get a disciplined process in
place and we get back to predictable maintenance and we build
back the surge capacity, as the Admiral said, well, there--once
we build back that surge capacity, there is a lot of
sustainment time for our ships after they come back from
deployment.
That gives you a lot of flexibility. But we need to get--we
need to get back to a disciplined maintenance schedule, get it
done--get these ships out on time, build back that surge and
then you are going to see a lot of flexibility. But it is going
to take a little while.
Mr. Wittman. One thing, too, that doesn't get mentioned in
O-FRP, to have another tool to buffer this unpredictability in
the world around us is the total number of ships in our fleet.
And looking at what ship construction takes us to in the
future. And as we know, we put more and more pressure on our
sailors, on our ships, if the number of ships in our fleet are
static.
So Admiral Harley and Captain Burke, give me your
perspective, too, on how important it is to make sure that we
get to that fleet number, whatever it may be, 311 is I guess
the most recent number--tell me how important it is to make
sure not only that we stay on track to do the maintenance, but
that new ship construction stays on schedule?
Admiral Harley. Sir, the CNO has testified and has placed
in his maritime strategy the need for at least 300 ships to be
able to execute all of the missions within the Defense
Strategic Guidance. Reduced numbers of ships make achieving all
of our mission sets certainly more difficult.
So I am sure the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of
Naval Operations and probably every naval officer would testify
to the fact that we need to get to the designated number of
ships as rapidly as possible. It gives us greater flexibility,
greater agility, our ability to meet our Defense Strategic
Guidance.
Captain Burke. And sir, as you alluded to, the cheapest
ship we have out there is one we already have. We have just got
to take care of it and make sure that it lasts for its full
expected service life. So that is step one.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have a couple of quick questions here. Captain,
maybe--I think you may be able to answer this one. I am
concerned about the continued degradation of the workforces in
some private shipyards. The lack of consistent work has created
challenges across the country, including my own district of
Guam.
So I do appreciate the efforts to address the challenges we
have regarding the ship repair capabilities on Guam, but there
are broader issues.
What actions is the Navy taking to address the challenges
at public and private shipyards that could affect the Navy's
ability to complete ship maintenance on schedule?
Captain Burke. So a very important question, ma'am. And we
are trying to make sure that we--by using O-FRP, we are looking
out on a longer timeline and so we are able to tell those
private yards, give them a sense much earlier than we have in
the past of when we are going to want that ship to come into
the yards so they can have their business model correct and
their shipyard sized appropriately to bid for the work
effectively and get it.
Because we want them all to succeed, right? We want them to
come into the yards and not throw them curve balls. We have
been throwing them a lot of curve balls. Bringing--having ships
come in out of cycle, having one ship go long, causing another
ship's availability to be delayed or canceled or significant
parts of it deferred.
And then we are throwing all kinds of curve balls at both
our public and our private yards and asking them to somehow
succeed. And that hasn't been effective for us. So we are
trying to stop chasing our tail and get this disciplined plan
in place that allows everybody to execute to a schedule and
breathe easier.
And once we get it in place we will have a lot of
flexibility to deal with the real world.
Ms. Bordallo. Okay. So they would be part of the plan
then----
Captain Burke. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo [continuing]. To give them time to get ready
for whatever is coming to their shipyard.
Admiral, how many ship maintenance availabilities were on
time in fiscal year 2014, and how many are on schedule in the
current fiscal year? The Captain, I guess----
Captain Burke. Ma'am, the----
Ms. Bordallo. 2013.
Captain Burke [continuing]. Roll-up--the roll-up metric we
have for that, is that we want to be on cost and on schedule
with 60 percent of our availabilities.
It is not honestly a great metric, because it doesn't tell
you if you are 5 days late on availability or 50 days late, $1
million over or $10 million--it doesn't give you much sense of
things.
But our goal is 60 percent. We haven't met that in 2\1/2\
years.
So in my mind--
Ms. Bordallo. What is the percent then?
Captain Burke. Right now? It is probably--I could get back
to you for the record, ma'am, but it is probably in the 40s.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 43.]
Ms. Bordallo. I was going to say, under 60. Maybe 40.
Captain Burke. Yes, ma'am. That is right. And it has been a
few years----
Ms. Bordallo. Is that 2013?
Captain Burke. It has been a few years since we have been
able to get to 60 percent.
Ms. Bordallo. I see.
Captain Burke. So that, I think, is the primary driver that
drove Admiral Gortney and Fleet Forces to say, ``Hey, we gotta
do something to--spend some more time for maintenance to start
getting the maintenance done,'' because he was seeing that
impact, and he was also, of course, seeing compressed training
cycles and other things that O-FRP is working on.
But in my mind, the main driver for O-FRP is--it is all
about maintenance. It is all about fencing the time to do
maintenance effectively.
Ms. Bordallo. So Captain, between 2013 and 2014, it still
remains about the same on a percentage scale?
Captain Burke. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.
Now we go to Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I have got basically two last points I would
like to have answered if you could help me with them.
One is, we talked a lot about the workforce. What are the
tradeoffs between using U.S. shipyards, whether they be public
or private, and overseas maintenance and the potential to
degrade our industrial capacity if we begin to rely too heavily
on the work that is done overseas?
Captain Burke. Well, we rely on work done overseas when we
need to, and that--we do that in case we have ships forward
deployed overseas, and it just makes sense to be able to keep
that ship in the operating environment it is supposed to be in,
forward deployed, present, to do work over there. So that is
when we do it.
In general, all the work is done in the United States
unless we have some reason that it really needs to be done
elsewhere.
Mr. Scott. Okay. So what we are doing overseas is a small
percentage, and it would basically all be necessary
maintenance----
Captain Burke. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, and in some cases, our
nuclear maintenance, for example, we send our people overseas
to do the work, so we are still having our folks do the work.
Mr. Scott. One last question, especially with regard to
aircraft, for example, a radar system doesn't necessarily need
to be maintained at a Navy facility if it can be done more
affordably somewhere else.
What institutional or statutory barriers do we face with
regard to the ability to leverage our other services'
capabilities in areas where they are more efficient?
Captain Burke. We do that as a matter of course.
The Secretary of Defense's Office has an office that does
what we call depot source of repair [DSOR]. The DSOR process
decides that a particular service is more economical for a
particular function and looks to streamline and put that
business, if you will, towards the most effective agency to do
it.
And so Navy has work done with the Army and the Air Force
and vice versa in a variety of ways.
Mr. Scott. And there are no statutory barriers?
Captain Burke. Not to my knowledge, sir.
Mr. Scott. All right. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for coming to join us today
and for your perspective on O-FRP. We know that our job is to
make sure we supply you with that predictability and
sustainability to help you do your job. That is our job, and as
Mr. Scott pointed out, as well as other members, we have our
work cut out for us here.
But thanks again for what you do. Please continue to stay
in touch with us, too, on things that we can do to make sure
that we are gaining your perspective so decisions made up here
coincide with what you are charged to do under O-FRP.
So thanks again for your testimony today, and thanks for
your service to our Nation.
[Whereupon, at 9:15 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 10, 2015
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 10, 2015
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
September 10, 2015
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Captain Burke. 13 of the 59 (22%) Fiscal Year 2014 CNO
availabilities completed on time or early. In Fiscal Year 2015, 19 of
52 (36%) completed on time or are still in progress tracking to
complete on time. This includes both naval shipyards and private ship
repair facilities. [See page 21.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY
Admiral Harley. OCO is essential to OFRP execution because 20% of
baseline ship depot maintenance requirements are paid by OCO, as are
some non-deployed steaming days. However, OCO is not a remedy for
baseline shortfalls caused by sequestration or a continuing resolution.
The FY 2016 President's Budget, which is a combination of baseline and
OCO funding, reflects the balanced readiness program required to
generate trained forces to meet the Navy's worldwide commitments to the
regional Combatant Commanders, while at the same time executing the
maintenance required to preserve the long term health of the force.
[See page 11.]
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