    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 114-47]

                         THE FUTURE OF AIR FORCE LONG-

               RANGE STRIKE--CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                               SEPTEMBER 9, 2015

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                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

                      J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman

    K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas            JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
    BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama               JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
    ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia          RICK LARSEN, Washington
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Vice      MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
        Chair                            HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri                 Georgia
    PAUL COOK, California                SCOTT H. PETERS, California
    JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana             GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
    RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana               SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
    STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
    STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma
                    Bruce Johnson, Professional Staff Member
                  Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
                            Katherine Rember, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces.........     2
    Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces.................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Elder, Lt Gen Robert J., Jr., USAF (Ret.), Ph.D., Faculty, George
      Mason University...............................................     3
    Grant, Rebecca, President, IRIS Independent Research.............     6
    Gunzinger, Mark, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and
      Budgetary Assessments..........................................     4

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Elder, Lt Gen Robert J., Jr..................................    27
        Grant, Rebecca...............................................    49
        Gunzinger, Mark..............................................    35

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Ms. Bordallo.................................................    57

    THE FUTURE OF AIR FORCE LONG-RANGE STRIKE--CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT
                                    CONCEPTS

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
                          Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 9, 2015.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m., in
    room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
         FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
                           PROJECTION FORCES

        Mr. Forbes. Today the subcommittee meets to discuss the
    future of Air Force long-range strike capabilities and
    employment concepts. Our distinguished panel of guests
    testifying today includes Lieutenant General, retired, Robert
    J. Elder, Jr., Ph.D., faculty, George Mason University; also
    Mr. Mark Gunzinger, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic
    and Budgetary Assessments; and Dr. Rebecca Grant, president,
    IRIS Independent Research.
        These distinguished guests, we are glad to have you here.
    You have all done a lot of great work, and we look forward to
    your testimony this afternoon.
        During World War II, America gained the ability to strike
    targets at long range with its massive bomber force. The Air
    Force flew thousands of conventional daylight precision bombing
    missions over Europe and Asia. Crossing thousands of miles of
    ocean, the war in the Pacific was brought to a decisive end by
    the nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From that point,
    the United States maintained the robust conventional and
    nuclear long-range strike capabilities needed to deter the
    aggression of hostile states and assure the security of our
    allies around the globe.
        As the threat environment evolved, so have our
    capabilities. Stealth and precision standoff weapons enable our
    Navy and Air Force to penetrate anti-access environments. Our
    increasing ability to process, exploit, and disseminate
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information
    helps deter future conflicts and deescalate regional tensions.
        That said, our long-range strike capabilities must evolve
    further to address the range of challenges posed by the rapid
    and threatening rise of China; a resurgent and expansionist
    Russia; a subversive and terrorist-supporting Iran; and an
    unpredictable and provocative North Korea. China, Russia, and
    North Korea are established nuclear powers, and Iran,
    regardless of the negotiated P5 agreement, remains a nuclear
    threat in the not-so-distant future.
        Adding to this complex security environment, I am concerned
    about Russia and China rapidly fielding highly capable
    integrated air defense systems and other anti-access
    capabilities. The proliferation of these weapon systems is
    eroding our ability to perform long-range strike with our
    legacy bomber fleet and standoff precision weapons, thus
    diminishing our ability to deter and respond to aggression.
        The current state of our bomber force is of great concern.
    The newest B-52 bomber is 53 years old. In at least one Air
    Force family, three generations of airmen have piloted the
    Stratofortress in combat engagements from Vietnam to Enduring
    Freedom. As of September 2015, our Air Force bomber force
    structure consists of 158  total bombers--63 B-1s, 20
    B-2s, and 76 B-52 aircraft--with an average age of 39 years. Of
    the total, only 96 are currently funded for combat service.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Correction for the record: The total number of bombers is
    159.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Air Force plans on recapitalizing B-1 and B-52 force
    structure with a smaller fleet of 80 to 100 Long-Range Strike
    Bombers. As we grapple with the proliferation of anti-access
    systems in contested environments, dwindling force structure,
    and continuing budget constraints and uncertainty, it is
    critically important that we identify the long-range strike
    capabilities and concepts that we need for the future.
        Once again, I want to thank our witnesses for participating
    in our hearing this afternoon, and I look forward to discussing
    this important topic.
        With that, I turn to my good friend and colleague the
    ranking member of the subcommittee, Joe Courtney.

         STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
       CONNECTICUT, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
                           PROJECTION FORCES

        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
    holding this hearing on our Air Force long-range strike
    capabilities. Given the impending award of the contract for the
    Long-Range Strike Bomber in the coming weeks, this is an
    excellent opportunity to discuss the future of this critical
    part of our Nation's power projection abilities.
        The Air Force long-range bomber fleet has long provided our
    Nation with a flexible and effective deterrent tool. From
    composing one the three legs of our strategic triad to
    providing a full complement of conventional long-range strike
    options for decision makers, the ability to project power and
    convincingly strike from far distances is one of the most
    important components of our military arsenal today.
        Our long-range strike fleet, composed of our B-52s, B-1s
    and B-2s, are also amongst the oldest aircraft inventory today.
    However, the current timeline projects that the Long-Range
    Strike Bomber will not actually be ready for operations until
    2030, adding 15 years to the average ages of our existing
    bombers, effectively making the B-52 eligible for Social
    Security by the time the Long-Range Strike Bomber comes online.
        I am interested in hearing from our witnesses about the
    kinds of ideas they have in regards to sustaining our current
    fleet in the years before the new bomber comes on line as well
    as lessons that we should draw from the longevity of these
    aircraft as they would apply to this new class. The strategic
    importance of demonstrating our Nation's long-range strike
    capability cannot be overstated, especially as it applies to
    the Asia-Pacific region. As noted by one of our witnesses
    today, Lieutenant General Elder, our bombers were an important
    part of deterring North Korean sabre-rattling in 2013. When B-
    52 bombers flew 6,500 miles from Missouri to South Korea to
    drop bombs on a test range, North Korea quickly toned down its
    threatening rhetoric, and the bombers effectively deterred
    further provocation in a volatile region.
        As our near-peer competitors, especially China, develop
    formidable anti-access/area denial technologies, our ability to
    maintain a military advantage hinges on our ability to
    penetrate those defenses. I hope our witnesses will share their
    views with the committee on how the Long-Range Strike Bomber
    and long-range strike capabilities generally fit into the
    strategic priorities of the Asia-Pacific rebalance.
        This new program is going to occur at a time of intense
    budget pressure, not just within the Air Force alone but also
    the entirety of the Department of Defense. Yet, with the
    aircraft expected to be in service well into this century, it
    is important that we get this right. As such, it is important
    that this panel and this Nation fully understand the challenges
    ahead and the options available to ensure that we retain a
    credible and robust long-term strike capabilities well into the
    future.
        Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to the
    discussion today.
        Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Joe.
        And I guess we are going to line up.
        If you guys are comfortable, we will start with General
    Elder and work our way across.
        General, we look forward to any comments that you may be
    willing to offer us today.

     STATEMENT OF LT GEN ROBERT J. ELDER, JR., USAF (RET.), PH.D.,
                    FACULTY, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY

        General Elder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Courtney,
    members of the committee, it is a privilege to have been
    offered this opportunity to talk with you today about the value
    of the Long-Range Strike Bomber to U.S. national security. As
    both of you have already mentioned, our capabilities are
    withering, and we have less than 100 combat-ready bombers with
    an average age of 38 years.
        Quite frankly, the older bombers we have are simply not
    survivable in the face of modern air defenses. And as you
    pointed out, we are going to have to live with them for quite a
    bit longer. The newer B-52s remain potent but are few in
    number. And my belief, quite frankly, is the 80 to 100 aircraft
    number is not going be enough to replace the B-1, B-52 fleet,
    even though its capability against a target set will be
    greater, but what amounts to the rotational commitments, it is
    not going to satisfy that.
        Unlike most military systems which are designed to provide
    utility for a small number of missions, bombers provide value
    in time of peace, crisis, and conflict. It takes many different
    platforms combined to do all the things that a bomber can do.
    Long-range strike bombers serve as a global strike air sensor
    platform, but they are distinctly capable of providing a range
    of effects against dynamic targets anywhere on the globe, and
    they can use their own organic queuing.
        Study after study has shown that bombers do more than
    simply strike targets. They offer structural stability for both
    conventional nuclear scenarios and, as you point out, provide
    the most flexible component of the U.S. strategic triad. And
    they are the best way to reassure allies of our commitment to
    extend a deterrence because they can signal. In other words,
    the bomber is more than just a strike and sensor platform; it
    is also a powerful tool of diplomacy.
        Long-range strike capabilities provide the Nation practical
    alternatives for global security and regional stability and
    provide combatant commanders increased effectiveness in the
    conduct of joint operations across the full range of conflict.
    They are absolutely critical for our national security. Because
    of their versatility, I believe they provide the Nation
    exceptional value, and I look forward to getting your
    questions, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of General Elder can be found in
    the Appendix on page 27.]
        Mr. Forbes. General, thank you.
        Mr. Gunzinger.

        STATEMENT OF MARK GUNZINGER, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
                  STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS

        Mr. Gunzinger. Yes, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member
    Courtney, members of the subcommittee, thank you as well for
    inviting us to talk to you today about this really important
    topic.
        I would like to suggest a framework that might help you
    think about the LRS-B [Long-Range Strike Bomber] and other
    capabilities in the long-range strike family of systems. Now
    what I postulate is two competitions. One we call the hiders-
    finders competition; the other is a salvo competition.
        Now the hiders-finders competition, what that is about is
    developing the capabilities to penetrate contested airspace,
    contested areas, and an enemy, a thinking enemy who develops
    countermeasures. It is a cycle. As we develop advantages, they
    develop countermeasures. Keeping advantage in that cycle in
    this competition is critically important.
        In the 1950s, for example--the B-52 was designed about
    then; 1952 I think was the first flight--the most significant
    threat to our bombers was aircraft, interceptors, and surface-
    to-air fires--artillery. So the B-52 was designed to fly at
    high altitudes, and they gave it a gun in the tail to defend
    against fighters until SAMs, surface-to-air missiles, came on
    the scene in the latter half of that decade in the early 1960s.
    So the Air Force adapted and started flying B-52s at low
    altitude so it could terrain mask and hide in ground clutter,
    and fighters couldn't find them effectively, and it designed
    the B-1 to be a low-altitude, high-speed sprinter to penetrate
    contested airspace.
        Until, about 1979, DOD [Department of Defense] announced
    that, well, Russia, or the Soviet Union has developed ``look-
    down/shoot-down'' radars for its fighters, capable of fighting
    our bombers at low altitude. So they started a program called
    the Advanced Technology Bomber Program, which led to the B-2
    program to buy 139 B-2s to replace the B-52, and that would be
    a high-altitude stealthy penetrator. 1990, end of the Soviet
    Union, we essentially disengaged from this competition. DOD
    shifted its attention from preparing to fight two regional
    conflicts against North Korea, Iran, Iraq. They didn't have
    advanced air defenses, so while it continued to invest in
    stealth technologies for future platforms, it stopped the B-2
    buy at 21 aircraft. And it also shifted the weight of its
    effort in terms of strike campaigns toward its fighter forces
    under the assumption that, well, we will be able to deploy our
    fighter forces very quickly into a theater of conflict, stage
    them at bases on the borders of our enemies; to bring the high-
    volume fires. We just didn't need the bombers to do that after
    the opening stages of a conflict.
        The problem is our competitors didn't stop. China, Russia,
    Iran, and others have developed advanced air defenses--
    developed them or bought them--that are a real challenge to our
    current force. So while we modified our current bomber force to
    stay current and give it new radars and so on over the
    intervening years, we didn't invest in a new bomber.
        Now the second competition is what we call the salvo
    competition, and that occurs between two adversaries who both
    have PGMs [precision guided munitions], not just the ability to
    attack with precision but also defend against the PGMs of an
    enemy. That is the situation we have today, certainly with
    Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. They have capabilities to
    attack our bases in the western Pacific and the Middle East,
    all of them. So the assumption DOD made in the 1990s, it said:
    Well, we will rely mostly for strike on our fighters, and we
    will stage them really close to bases. Those bases are now at
    risk. That is an increasingly risky proposition. But we can
    compensate for that by beginning to use bases that are further
    away from our adversaries that, frankly, are out of the most
    immediate threat, out of range of those short-range cruise
    missiles and ballistic missiles.
        And we can also disperse our fighter forces at those close-
    in bases to expeditionary airfields, civil airfields suitable
    for military use, as well as military airfields, to complicate
    the targeting problem of our enemies who have their own PGMs.
    So what this suggests, both the hider-finder competition and
    the salvo competition, is we might start thinking about
    reversing priorities that we established for bombers and
    fighters back in the 1990s.
        Perhaps future air campaigns, the weight of the strike
    should be provided by long-range strike capabilities. They are
    stealthy and have large payloads staged at more distant bases.
    Whereas our fighters at the close-in dispersed posture provide
    counter-air, help kick down the door, provide close-air
    support, and other missions rather than relying on those
    fighters, which have about one-tenth the payload of a bomber
    and one-fifth the range of a bomber primarily for strike.
        The Air Force has made a great start--and DOD has as well--
    at reengaging in both these competitions with the LRS-B, but it
    is just a start, and it is only one element of a long-range
    strike family of systems, which I hope we can get into in your
    questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Gunzinger can be found in
    the Appendix on page 35.]
        Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mark.
        Dr. Grant.

        STATEMENT OF REBECCA GRANT, PRESIDENT, IRIS INDEPENDENT
                                RESEARCH

        Dr. Grant. Thank you very much for the opportunity. As my
    colleagues have said, America's bomber force is one of the
    truly unique tools of our national security and our
    international diplomacy. Sadly, today we have at any one time
    only 16 combat-ready B-2 bombers that are able to take on the
    most heavily defended types of targets, and it is this
    situation that we are setting out to correct.
        I want to speak very briefly to the capabilities and
    employment concepts of the bomber and then touch on how the Air
    Force will manage this program. The first capability, of
    course, is access, and that does still very much mean stealth.
    Stealth remains a fundamental design requirement, and we should
    expect to see improved stealth techniques that have advanced
    beyond the B-2 and will include electronic warfare and other
    state-of-the-art survivability techniques.
        Range and payload, of course, are what define a bomber and
    separate it from other types of aircraft. Recall that every
    bomber design has had to make a tradeoff from the B-17 right to
    the B-2. So we may expect to see, of course, excellent range,
    but that will be defined as range from leaving the tanker
    track. Payload will be a mix of munitions, both the small
    precise munitions and the heavy munitions for hardened and
    deeply buried targets. We don't know what parameters the Air
    Force has chosen this time, but we will expect to see something
    that has blurred the distinctions between global and theater
    attack.
        Also I think highly important and new in this Long-Range
    Strike Bomber program will be an open software architecture.
    That will be very important because this bomber will be new in
    its communications and data link relay abilities. It should be
    able to immediately join not only the SATCOM [satellite
    communications] but the aerial layer networks, those IP
    [Internet Protocol]-enabled networks that now define the gold
    standard in battlespace communications.
        We expect, of course, for this bomber to roll off with the
    basics of nuclear capability installed but to proceed to
    certify that capability quite a bit later after it completes
    initial flight tests. Most of all I want to see some upgrade
    capacity here in the winning design. Our bomber will reach
    initial operating capability perhaps in the mid-2020s--or just
    a touch later--but continue to operate and fly missions until
    2055 and beyond. This bomber, therefore, has to have the
    ability to do what is asked of it now and also to do a bit more
    as we look for upgrades and new mission capabilities over time.
    That means planning now for the airframe with the classic
    power, space, and cooling, and ability to accommodate those
    upgrades.
        What will this bomber do specifically? It will, of course,
    participate in the battlespace under joint force commander
    direction. It will draw on ISR [intelligence, surveillance,
    reconnaissance], on tankers, and many other things. It will be
    dependent on stealth fighters, too. But it will have some very
    unique roles, and those include direct attack; the ability to
    drop a bomb; not a cruise missile, per se, because cruise
    missiles are--and other standoff weapons--are not always of
    capable of taking out every type of target this bomber may be
    assigned to strike.
        We expect that targets in the future that are the most
    difficult will be a combination of mobile and of separate
    deeply buried targets. This is a very tough target set, and we
    need a penetrating bomber with the ability to take out those
    targets and hold them at risk. We also will see perhaps
    extensive target sets. A consideration we might not have
    thought through 5 years ago, but the bomber force here remains
    a unique strategic tool. It will have to do things like
    suppress airfields; counter enemy air defenses; and perhaps
    help hunt, destroy, and contain enemy surface naval vessels and
    submarines. This points us towards a highly capable force but
    one that also is big enough to be persistent across these
    missions. And I echo General Elder's concern; 80 to 100 is a
    start. I think closer to 150 might be better to assure the
    persistence in sortie generation.
        Let me conclude with a remark about risk reduction and how
    the Air Force will manage this program. We all are awaiting a
    down select, and we want to see the best possible stewardship
    of this important national security capability. The Air Force
    says that it has taken a rather different approach with this
    bomber. It has funded both teams to conduct extensive risk
    reduction of the designs. What this means to us is that the
    winning design will be far more mature than other types of
    aircraft programs. And specifically, I believe, quite a bit
    more mature than the B-2 at a comparable stage of development.
    This winning design should go into EMD [engineering,
    manufacturing, development] with some critical work already
    carried out. For instance, the Air Force has said that they
    have identified specific risk areas to include propulsion
    integration--that is the engines--and integration of apertures
    and antennae, and conducted specific risk-reduction work in
    these areas. This again marks a bold and different approach,
    something quite distinct from what we saw with B-2, F-22, or F-
    35. This means that the Department of Defense's final choice of
    a winner should reflect analysis of capability, of the ability
    to proceed quickly through engineering, manufacturing, and
    development. And it should also reflect some analysis of the
    winning team's ability to proceed directly toward
    manufacturing.
        To sum it up, the Air Force appears to have taken a rather
    bold approach, and what this means is we should expect to see a
    far more mature design. That should also give us in the end
    confidence in two things: One is the ability to adhere to cost
    targets from the EMD phase forward; and the second is that the
    Air Force should be certain that its winning design really has
    those mandated capabilities and the extra margins that it
    needs, not only for upgrade capacity for the future, power,
    cooling, et cetera.
        Of course, there are many things in the end that can affect
    a program, but the risk reduction is unique in this case, has
    been carried out with a great deal of forethought, and I think
    should give us a very confident basis from which to proceed to
    develop a new Long-Range Strike Bomber. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Grant can be found in the
    Appendix on page 49.]
        Mr. Forbes. Before we go to Mr. Courtney for his questions,
    can all three of you give us your thoughts about what happens
    if we don't get this long-range strike capability? And number
    two, how do you assess so far the process that we've used to
    get here as you look at the Air Force and what they have done?
    What is your thought on that?
        General Elder.
        General Elder. Mr. Chairman, that is an interesting
    question, I think the Nation will be in quite a bind, quite
    frankly, particularly with the threats that you highlighted in
    your initial marks, if we don't get this new capability, the
    Long-Range Strike Bomber. There is a perception that things
    aren't too bad right now. We seem to be holding things in check
    with the current force structure, but the reality is that our
    adversaries do know how to go after our strengths. They are
    looking for ways to exploit that. Actually, as Mark Gunzinger
    pointed out, this going back and forth, the LRS-B is a huge
    jump over where they are in terms of their ability to counter
    it. So it will be important from that standpoint.
        I also believe that as a Nation the types of things we do
    when we talk about our ability compared to others, what perhaps
    makes this a superpower is this capability to operate globally.
    And these other airplanes we have are getting too old, and so
    we basically will wither down to where we basically in the
    future will only have the B-2 fleet and then forces that we can
    deploy. These deployable forces are very important, that they
    provide a capability to operate globally, but they don't give
    you a global capability. And certainly from a time standpoint,
    in terms of giving options to the President, any adversary
    knows that there is going to be this long period of time before
    you would be able to get there. I think that is going to raise
    huge concerns among our allies, who are counting on us not only
    in some cases for nuclear umbrellas but also for kind of a
    strategic stability globally. And, of course, the bombers have
    been working for years now with the sea forces in terms of
    providing stability. Particularly in the Pacific, but not only
    there, in Europe and the Central Command region as well. So I
    think it would be disastrous for the Nation's force not to get
    this new airplane. It will be critical to our national security
    in the future.
        In terms of the process that was used. It is interesting
    that one of the challenges we have had when you try to bring
    out these new technologies and you want these new technologies
    to give you this asymmetric advantage, that asymmetric
    advantage works for a period of time until the adversary knows
    what they are, and then they are going to start trying to work
    these counters. So the one good thing about this approach for
    sure is that this whole period of time, the adversary knows
    that something new is being developed, but they have no
    opportunity to even start thinking about how they might counter
    it. There is a lot of discussion about ways it can be
    approached, but those things all depend on pretty fragile
    knowledge of how that would happen. So from a standpoint of
    trying to protect the way this airplane is going to give us
    this asymmetric increase in capability, I think it is a good
    thing we have done this because it basically saves the
    government a lot of money. It also means that when this
    airplane is produced, it has quite a bit more capability from
    the get-go.
        The second thing, which is actually something that Dr.
    Grant pointed out, the airplane is designed to be able to
    continue to evolve with technology and with new threats because
    of the open architecture design. And so once the airplane is
    something that people can actually see and our adversaries can
    see, we will know that they will start working to look at ways
    to counter that. But it will be much easier with this platform
    than platforms we have had in the past to be able to bring
    those changes in and continue to maintain the LRS-B as a
    relevant platform for a very long time.
        Mr. Gunzinger. Excellent question. I am going to give you
    the U.S. perspective--our U.S. perspective--and an enemy's
    perspective on this question. First, we throw around numbers
    about the size of the force, and how many are combat capable
    and total aircraft inventory and so forth. Today our Nation can
    launch about 12 B-2 sorties on any given day. If B-2s have to
    operate from Guam or Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, that is
    about 12 sorties. That is our Nation's long-range penetrating
    strike capability and a handful of standoff cruise missiles. If
    we don't buy the LRS-B, well, the B-2 eventually will not be
    able to penetrate into China, into Iran, and some other areas.
    The B-1s and B-52s already can't penetrate into those higher
    threat areas. So we will be a Nation that will be able to fight
    on the periphery of some of our potential adversaries in the
    future.
        From the enemy's perspective, it would create a one-
    dimensional problem for them. All they have to do is defend
    against these standoff capabilities. They can project power out
    to attack our bases, to attack our aircraft orbiting to launch
    standoff cruise missiles and so forth. They don't have to
    defend their interior. Those deep targets are not at risk. So
    they can pour their money into their outer defenses and into
    offensive capabilities instead of having to defend their
    interior. So that would not help us impose costs on an enemy at
    all.
        Mr. Forbes. Dr. Grant, how do you assess where the Air
    Force has come so far in this process?
        Dr. Grant. In the process? In my opinion, the Air Force has
    taken a very deliberate and careful path. It has chosen an
    unusual and very, I think, successful acquisition strategy as
    it works through the process of taking the two teams down to
    contract award.
        I personally wish that the Air Force and the Department of
    Defense would minimize some of the classification around the
    acquisition aspects of the program, obviously not jeopardizing
    national security capabilities, but I would like to see the
    Department of Defense tell us a bit more about how they have
    conducted this process. Based on what the Air Force has said,
    they have taken unusual steps to take risk reduction much
    further than in any program we have seen in many a decade.
        Mr. Forbes. Mr. Courtney.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        In terms of just trying to assess the value, which the
    chairman's first question certainly zeroed in on, obviously,
    this program's ability to operate jointly with other branches
    in terms of the Navy or ground forces, I was just wondering if
    you could maybe help us sort of understand the value from that
    aspect.
        General Elder. That is a great question, and one of the
    things about this particular airplane--although when you are
    operating in a contested environment and people are shooting at
    you, you definitely don't want to present yourself as an easy
    target. But if you were to look today, even where it is
    relatively an uncontested environment in Afghanistan and you
    look at where the bulk of support to our ground forces is
    coming from, it is actually coming from B-1s that are providing
    that close air support. That wasn't something that was really
    that easy to do before we had the weapons we have today. They
    have the same type of targeting pods that the fighters have;
    they have the GPS [Global Positioning System]-guided weapons.
    The big thing they can do is they can persist for a long time
    and get there quickly. And because of that, you can provide
    quite a bit of coverage. So it is invaluable from that
    standpoint.
        If this were a contested environment, those airplanes
    wouldn't be able to just loiter there because they would become
    targets themselves. So having that advanced stealth, while not
    going to be a panacea, but they will have a capability to
    operate that our current platforms would have difficulty being
    able to operate in. From a naval standpoint, there is a
    different way of looking at this, and it goes back to all
    those--I guess it is going a little bit out of vogue now, the
    whole AirSea Battle.
        But there are advantages to air forces and vulnerabilities,
    and there are advantages to sea forces and vulnerabilities. But
    it turns out that when you put those together, they are
    actually pretty complementary, and that was the whole idea
    behind AirSea Battle: Let's take advantage of some of the
    things that the maritime force can do to help make the air
    forces be more effective and vice versa. This platform
    operating in conjunction with maritime forces is going to be
    able to do quite a bit. One of the things is, as a sensor
    platform itself, it is actually going to be able to see targets
    and relay that information back to where a maritime force could
    be launching weapons as well.
        And if you understand how special forces operate, there is
    a nice advantage to that because if you have one group that is
    actually doing the surveillance and another one is doing the
    shooting, you don't give away your surveillance position when
    you shoot and then you can leave. So operating together, you
    are going to have a nice complement there.
        Without going into any classification, there are a lot of
    things that maritime forces can do from a sensing standpoint. I
    wouldn't want to go into detail here; the committee I am sure
    is well aware of those. That information can be used to make
    bombers more effective and actually also help protect the
    bombers. So you can see that these different forces are
    supposed to have--particularly when you are talking about
    undersea forces--have their own kind of stealth, a different
    kind of stealth but they are a stealthy force. You put those
    together, and it provides a very complex environment for an
    adversary to believe that they could defeat us. That is useful
    not only actually when you go to fight, but when someone is
    trying to think about fighting, they might want to give it a
    second thought and say: You know, they have so many different
    ways they can deal with us; we might think we have a leg up,
    but in reality, we can't be sure because particularly when they
    put these capabilities together, we have no idea just how
    significant those forces, the synergistic capabilities that
    would come from bringing those forces together, would be.
        Mr. Gunzinger. Back when the debate was hot and heavy over
    whether or not we should start a new program, and I was still
    in the Department of Defense, the Air Force started looking at
    the problem as a families of systems problem. It is not--it
    wasn't rhetoric, and it is not rhetoric today. This isn't
    about, what should the Air Force buy to maintain its
    capability? It was, what does the joint force need to be able
    to maintain his capability to strike an enemy deep, to threaten
    and put at risk all of his most significant targets.
        Family of systems encompasses airborne electronic attack,
    penetrating ISR capabilities, service-based capabilities,
    carriers, submarine launch, cruise missiles, the whole family.
    So this was--it was born out of a concept to develop the future
    of long-range strike family of systems and also to figure out
    how it would be integrated in joint operations, not just what
    it could do to improve Air Force operations, but the joint
    force operations for the future. So I think that is a very
    important thing to keep in mind as you assess the value of the
    LRS-B. It hopefully will be able to execute missions in support
    of the Navy, for example, anti-surface warfare. Why not have
    the LRS-B capable of launching more LRASMs, Long-Range Anti-
    Ship Missiles, in the future? They can carry a lot of them, I
    hope. They will be able to cover large areas at sea and will
    have great sensors for wide-area surveillance, a perfect
    supporting mission for the Air Force to support the Navy. It
    may even be able to do future air dominance. Given enough
    space, weight, power, and cooling capacity, perhaps it could
    carry air-to-air missiles and, in the future, lasers to help
    support not just the Air Force but the Navy to counter enemy
    aircraft.
        Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway, is
    recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for being here.
        Being the only CPA [certified public accountant] on the
    subcommittee panel, I'm trying to do the math. The original
    version was $550 million a copy? At just--$31 billion or $33
    billion was the original cost. How do you buy 100 at $550
    million apiece for $33 billion? And how does that get less at
    $41 billion or $58 billion?
        Mr. Gunzinger. Right. Well, the answer is, you don't. The
    $550 million number was procurement costs in fiscal year 2010
    dollars. It did not include EMD, and of course, it didn't
    include inflation that will occur year by year. Plus, the
    number that you are citing--I think $33.1 billion--that was
    between 2015 and 2025. I am pretty sure.
        Mr. Conaway. So you are not buying 100.
        Mr. Gunzinger. Not by 2025, that is correct.
        Mr. Conaway. Okay. So, Ms. Grant, you mentioned that the
    Air Force is using a different procurement program that is
    successful. Maybe I got lost in the conversation, but the most
    recent--about the F-22 and F-35, how is the Air Force going to
    avoid--the years on the F-35 or the F-22, mid-1980s to 2006--so
    how does the Air Force avoid doing that same thing again?
        Dr. Grant. That is a very good question, and the first step
    of many in that is to go forward with a design that is closer
    to being ready to produce and go into flight test. And here I
    applaud what the Air Force says it has done, which is
    essentially to wait awhile on the award process. So instead--as
    was the case with B-2 in 1981, with F-22 in 1990, and F-35 in
    2001--you can do this either way, but in those prior programs,
    the Air Force did less analysis of the contenders prior to EMD.
    What they say they have now done building on some lessons of
    the past decade and using a different procurement organization,
    the Rapid Capabilities Office, which is a joint body between--
    obviously run by DOD--but with DOD and Air Force leadership.
        Mr. Conaway. How does that circumvent the normal
    procurement process?
        Dr. Grant. It is within the process, but it would have----
        Mr. Conaway. Is that the same group that did the MRAPS
    [mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles] and body armor?
        Ms. Grant. They apparently have done a great many things,
    but I am not sure of those specifically. Once this is done, if
    I may just address the case of Long-Range Strike Bomber, the
    Air Force says they have used a smaller team. They have funded
    both teams to do much more extensive risk-reduction work. So
    they have asked them to analyze not just how this aircraft will
    look and fly and meet some minimum standards, but to look
    several layers down into the produceability and
    maintainability. That is a very important step one. Sir, as you
    rightly point out, there are many steps to come with this, but
    moving into EMD with a more mature design is the best possible
    start for this to really set a new path and get us the
    capability more quickly and on cost.
        Mr. Conaway. From a complexity standpoint, the F-35 was a
    more complex platform than this or less complex?
        Dr. Grant. A difficult analysis to make. You know what?
    They are both very complex aircraft. All right? I would say F-
    35 is more complex because of its tri-service and allied
    requirements. And one more thing I think is important for us to
    understand: The Long-Range Strike Bomber will build on the
    lessons of at least the past two decades in development of
    stealth, integration of AESA [active electronically scanned
    array] radar, and many other things. So I think we are looking
    at a bomber program that this time is building on things that
    are already in hand, maybe even some things you and I don't
    know about, but that they know about and are able to put this
    into production more quickly. So I think they have done--by
    using more mature technology than we have seen in cases where
    technology had to be developed to meet the requirements, we see
    really a conservative approach to a great new capability.
        Mr. Conaway. Okay, is it fair to say, without describing
    what we are talking about, that there were certain breakthrough
    technologies on the F-35, that you won't have to reinvent that
    wheel on the bomber, that would shorten the delivery time?
        Dr. Grant. Right. Obviously, as we haven't done source
    selection, we don't know what we are talking about, and I'm not
    an official. But you are absolutely on the right track. What B-
    2, F-22, and F-35 asked was to develop technologies in order to
    meet those thresholds. Long-Range Strike Bomber I think will
    have some great new stuff but is able to take advantage of more
    mature technology development in several key areas, and that
    should make a difference.
        Mr. Conaway. I yield back.
        Mr. Gunzinger. I absolutely agree, the B-2 and F-22 are
    more inventions than the LRS-B. LRS-B is more of an integration
    program where it is taking very mature technologies from other
    programs, maybe even actual components and engines, and
    integrating it into a new platform that is going to be much
    more capable than the B-2 and other systems.
        It is also I think important to remember that it has been
    about 10 years since the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR]
    said: Let's start a new program for a penetrating bomber. And
    there was a previous program to do that that was canceled in
    2009. But the knowledge and technologies and the skilled
    workforce that were dedicated to that effort, they are still
    around, and they were able to pour a lot of that knowledge and
    technology into this program.
        Mr. Forbes. The gentleman is exactly right, though, on the
    cost situation. We are going to have to have a discussion with
    the Air Force. I don't think there was any bad intention or
    anything there, but still those numbers, it is a big gap from
    33 to 58 and then back down we think now to about 41, but still
    a huge discrepancy.
        The gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Graham, is recognized for
    5 minutes.
        Ms. Graham. Thank you so much. Thank you again for being
    here today.
        We talked a lot about what has gone into developing the
    proposed next generation of LRS [long-range strike]. Are we
    also looking at the adaptability for the future so that whoever
    is seated here 10 years from now isn't talking about an already
    obsolete LRS that we are again having to invest in building new
    aircraft? Something I think we all should be focusing on is we
    know what we are capable of today, but are we looking into the
    future in order of adaptability so we are not pouring
    additional--huge amounts of resources into future aircraft
    sooner than we need to? Thank you so much.
        Dr. Grant. If I may start with that, an excellent question.
    I think two things are highly important: One, our aircraft
    today are so information dependent. This new bomber will have a
    tremendous advantage because it is not like the B-2 that needs
    to be upgraded or B-52. It will come out with that open mission
    system architecture. That means that we can add devices in
    almost as easily as if you add an app [application] on a phone.
    So that is a tremendous advantage in keeping it relevant.
        The Air Force has also said that they intend to fund the
    science and technology development for continual upgrades and
    to feed that funding line through. So, yes, I think we have
    every confidence that it will be able to be upgraded and stay
    relevant across that 40-year service life.
        Mr. Gunzinger. Five years ago, before there was an LRS-B
    program--I have to caveat, I like that--CSBA [Center for
    Strategic and Budgetary Assessments] put out a report for the
    need for a new bomber and how it might be developed in a
    different way. We recommended that the first thing you do is
    ensure it has enough space, weight, power, and cooling so you
    could adapt it to new missions, integrate new components in the
    future, perhaps lasers, for example, to take on the air-to-air
    missions.
        But the second thing is to develop it so you can upgrade it
    or integrate block upgrades over time, to refresh its
    technologies, to be able to counter new threats as they emerge,
    to take on new missions. If you design it with the idea that
    you are going to be able to do these block upgrades over time,
    then you greatly reduce the risk that when it is produced and
    it is on the ramp, it is not going to be outdated. The second
    thing is it helps you to spread the cost over time because you
    buy new capabilities for these block upgrades rather than try
    to get everything into the first model.
        General Elder. Not to beat a dead horse, but one of the
    things about this airplane is that they really were smart about
    this. I was pulling out some testimony from Mr. LaPlante, who
    is the acquisition head for the Air Force, and this has been a
    big deal for this program, this concern about the fact that
    when they buy bombers, they have them for a long time, and they
    want to make sure that they can continue to bring these new
    capabilities in.
        The other thing that Dr. Grant pointed out is about this
    information piece, but the other thing I realize now--I don't
    know what the percentage is, but the percentage cost of an
    airplane these days, actually any system, military system, a
    huge amount is actually caught up in the software, the code
    that is being written for these systems. What they are
    enforcing here is the use of what the Air Force calls open
    mission systems. The Navy has a slightly different name. It has
    actually been mandated by OSD [Office of the Secretary of
    Defense], by the Department overall, that you have this. What
    it allows for is plug and play. They have different levels of
    integrated capability, but just ask for an iPhone or an
    Android, someone else can write the application besides Apple
    or Google, for example. You have the same thing here, and when
    someone has a better idea, they will be able to write that,
    test that module, and then plug it in. They won't have to go
    through the complete end-to-end test, which is what has driven
    us to these block upgrades in the past, where it was
    incrementally done. Now, as soon as you can write these things,
    you can plug them in. You also can also add new systems to the
    airplane because they are working with open standards in terms
    of the plugs of plug and play for actual boxes that would go
    into the airplane.
        So as we look to the future, as I mentioned to people in
    the past, the people in this room have no idea what this
    airplane is going to be able to do because we haven't given
    them to the captains yet. When the captains get a hold of this
    airplane, they are going to say, well, we can do this with
    this; the airplane will do this. The things that the B-2 does
    today, a lot of those things were never imagined until it
    actually got into the hands of these brilliant young captains
    to think about how to do this. The same thing is going to
    happen with this. The difference is that when a captain in 2025
    gets a great idea, if I could just write a piece of software,
    it would really help me out, they are going to be able to do
    that in 6 months to a year, instead of having to wait for a 3-
    or 4-year block upgrade. That is going to be the huge
    difference with this platform.
        Ms. Graham. All three terrific answers. Thank you very
    much. I appreciate it. I don't have any more time, but thank
    you for being here. Again, I appreciate it.
        Mr. Forbes. Colonel Cook is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Cook. Well, I am going to apologize in advance; I am
    going to be the cynic here. And, once again, at least with me,
    I am not as smart as you guys. If you are going to talk with a
    bunch of acronyms that I don't understand, right away my eyes
    start to gloss over. If you could kind of ``keep it simple,
    stupid'' for me, I would appreciate it a little bit.
        You know, I am probably one of the biggest hawks on this
    committee, but it bothers me about things in the future and the
    amount of money. And maybe I have had too many briefs about the
    number of missiles that the Chinese are going to throw against
    aircraft carriers and cruisers and what have you. And they are
    going to build as many as--maybe one aircraft carrier, they
    might be able to build, I don't know, 5,000 missiles. I am just
    looking at it from the CPA standpoint, and maybe that is--and
    that is ironic because I am an infantry guy, but in terms of by
    the time you get there and the changes in technology, I don't
    know if we can do that, predict the future.
        I am still upset that we cut back on the F-22s. I thought
    it was a great airplane. I think everybody is going back: Oh,
    we shouldn't have done that. Well, we did that. It was a
    mistake. Can you tell me why, when the F-4 Phantom came out, we
    said, ``Oh, we don't need any machine guns on that plane''?
    This was going to be missile to missile; this is the new
    warfare. This is talking to a ground guy in Vietnam that was
    probably saved because they modified that airplane before some
    of you were born--let me correct that, before most of you in
    this room were born. But that was a failure to anticipate what
    was going on with the Air Force.
        I am a big, big supporter of airpower and what you have to
    do. I just have--I don't know if we can predict the future. I
    would hope that we could have modified the B-1 and the B-2. It
    scares me when you said we only are going to have 12 flights of
    B-2s--God almighty--with all of the missiles of the Chinese.
    Aren't the Russians still flying turbo prop [propeller] bombers
    around scaring everybody when they come down the English
    Channel, or maybe that is--but how old is that aircraft? It is
    not at as old as me, but close. And I am saying they modified
    that, just like the Chinese, one of the figures I heard was--
    what?--their budget was 300 percent in the last--increase--in
    the last 10 years. So I think when we are talking about some of
    these programs. And as I said, I have been around this planet
    for a long while. I have seen the F-4, and I have seen that
    plant on the Connecticut River in the ranking member's district
    where they spent, I don't know how much money, Pratt & Whitney,
    to develop a nuclear energy--excuse me, a nuclear engine for an
    airframe. I won't tell you how many years and how much money
    that went in. You can tell where that went.
        So I have some serious reservations about this. I think we
    have got to get it right. And I just hope because the more you
    stick on there and everything else, it gets so expensive that
    it's going to fail the budgetary wars. And everybody is going
    to come down and say, what are we going to cut? And I still
    want more C-17s, I want more lift for marines who have got to
    go across the Pacific. We can't do it, but you definitely got
    my attention when you said we are going to go have 12 sorties
    of B-2s. We have a real problem.
        I am going to support it. I just want to make sure we do it
    right, and I am going to--I notice your name, sir, is very,
    very close to how I feel right now. And maybe I am the
    gunslinger here. And you probably have heard something
    comparable. I don't have a question. I think what you are
    doing--but we have got to get this right.
        The other thing is we don't have 5 years, 10 years, 20
    years, because this is a very, very, dangerous--and I wish we
    could do it just like that. If it was World War II, how long
    did it take to get the B-29 on line? When we had planes flying
    around at Pearl Harbor day, the B-18--anyone ever seen that?
    Whatever happened to B-36, the B-47, the B-58 Hustler? I could
    go on and on, and I was a marine, but I read a few Air Force
    books. So thank you very much for your presentation. Sorry I
    vocalized so much.
        Mr. Forbes. And Paul finishes that with, isn't that true?
    That is his question.
        Mr. Knight is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Knight. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Boy, I love the colonel. He brings up a lot of good points,
    though, he does. In the 1950s, we built the Sentry series in
    about 5 years, put F-100s in the air, put F-106s in the air in
    about a 5- or 6-year period. And I bring this up all the time,
    that building something today with today's knowledge and then
    thinking 30 years from now might not be the way we should do
    this. What we might want to do is look back at the 1950s, look
    back at the 1960s, when we were building multiple aircrafts
    over a shorter time period. If we are going to build something
    today and fly the wings off it--we are going to fly the F-35
    for 50 years. There is no doubt in my mind that we are going to
    do that. We are building a bomber right now that we are
    projecting probably for a 40- or 50-year timeframe. And then
    probably in 20 years from now, we will start talking about a
    new bomber.
        So I might ask that we think about a new strategy of not
    flying the wings off and of not buying 100, and then when we
    need them or when they are down--and I have Edwards Air Force
    Base in my district. I get to watch the B-2 all the time
    because there is always one or two of them over there. That
    means if we have 20 of them and 2 of them are at the test
    facility, those are not 2 that are capable of going out. And we
    have to refurbish, and we have to go through the whole process.
    I have seen this, and I understand that we have learned a whole
    lot from the B-2 to what we are going to do with a Long-Range
    Strike Bomber with stealth technology, with the reapplication
    of the skin, with all these types of technology.
        But I would just ask if this is the proper--I will support
    this as long as we keep the price down and it accomplishes the
    mission. But is this the proper stance that America should look
    at? Or maybe should we look at two or three aircraft in a 50-
    year timeframe, where they overlap, and we are not looking at a
    10- or 12-year time period of when we are thinking about it,
    when we are building it, and when we are testing it, and then
    it goes IOC [initial operating capability], because this
    aircraft will not be in the air for that young captain to fly
    until about 2025? That means today, until then, we have the B-
    52, the Bone [B-1], and the B-2. So that is my question.
        General Elder. Congressman Knight, your point is actually
    accurate, and I believe, I'm not read in on the program, but
    based on everything I have heard about the program and the
    public testimony that--why I keep referring back to this open
    mission systems and the open architecture. It is a physics
    problem basically to design a stealth platform in terms of
    plan, form, and the basic shape that actually makes it
    stealthy. There are other things you can add to it that make it
    stealthier, but in terms of adding the capabilities to the
    platform, in the past, the problem that we had was that if you
    were going to try to change these things, you had to break into
    the airplane basically to do it. What they realized after the
    work, particularly with the B-2, was that they needed to have a
    way that they could make substantial capability improvements to
    the airplane, whether that was a weapon system. You have to
    remember so much of this is involved with the code, but it also
    has to do with communications. If you need to put a new
    aperture, as they call it, a new antenna, an aperture on the
    plane, it would require this major amount of testing. They
    don't have the problem with the LRS-B, and they have already
    demonstrated--all three of the vendors involved with this have
    demonstrated their ability to comply with these open mission
    standards, and they have various different tests that show that
    they can make this work. So, in effect, they are actually doing
    what you have suggested because the airplane that is built in
    2025 will be different than the one that is built in 2030 in
    terms of capabilities it has, but the neat thing is that they
    will be able to take the one that was built in 2025 and bring
    it up to that 2030 capability, because they can put the same
    software and because of the way it has been designed in the
    first place.
        Mr. Knight. General, I am not going to cut you off, but I
    am going to grab some time here. I understand that, and
    software is what F-35, F-22, to much of the extent F-16 and F-
    15 do today. You cannot change the structure of an aircraft. So
    if I built the structure of an aircraft today, that will be the
    structure that I have in 2050. That will be it. So if something
    changes in that time period, that they can see our bombers
    quicker or they can address our bombers quicker, because of the
    structure, I am stuck, I am done. I might be able to do some
    sort of software, I might be able to do some sort of jamming
    upgrades, but if something happens in the next 40 years that
    stops me from doing that because of the structure, I am stuck.
        Mr. Gunzinger. Very quickly, sir, you are right. It is very
    difficult to change the plan, form, shape, and size of an
    aircraft after it has been designed and produced. You can do
    things like give it new codings. You can put maybe new leading
    edge treatments on it, things that can improve its stealth
    characteristics. You might also be able to do some things to
    give it active as well as passive measures to improve its
    ability to survive. But like we all understand, I believe,
    stealth is the product of active and passive measures, and not
    just one aircraft but multiple platforms operating together to
    include cyber operations to create the environment where you
    defeat the enemy's kill chain, the air defense kill chain. And
    it does not remain invisible, but all you have to do is prevent
    him from getting a good shot.
        Mr. Knight. I appreciate that, and I appreciate the chair
    letting me go over just a little bit. I understand that, and I
    will be highly supportive of this, again, if we can stay within
    the budget and within the parameters we have set forth. I just
    think that this should be a discussion that we move forward
    with in the future, that we talk about these programs that
    overlap more than talking about a program that--now the B-2 is
    25 years old. I was there at the rollout, and I was there at
    the 25th anniversary. It is still our top bomber with 10 or 15
    years from where we are going to get to the next bomber. Thank
    you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Forbes. Well, we want to thank our witnesses for being
    here today. As we mentioned at the outset to each of you, we
    would love to give you some time to do a wrap-up of what you
    think we need to have on the record for this program. So we are
    going to give you that time now if you need it. And any
    clarifications for anything on the record or any additions, we
    would love to hear from you at this time.
        General, we will once again start of off with you, and we
    will finish with Dr. Grant.
        General Elder. Well, Mr. Chairman, and the committee,
    again, I really do appreciate the opportunity to be here. This
    platform, I am not read in on this platform. I was very
    familiar with the airplane that was going to be built in 2018,
    and they made a conscious decision at that time that they were
    going to lock in the requirements and they were going to work
    with technologies that were well known, well developed. When I
    was still on Active Duty, I remember I had some great ideas
    myself. I said that this would be a great thing to have on this
    new airplane, and they said: We will put it into the mix for a
    possible adaptation down the road, but it is not a proper TRL
    [technology readiness level] level or the level of
    sophistication that we are willing to consider because we only
    want to bring things into this platform that we know will work
    when we integrate them together.
        But at the same time, they said: Don't worry because we are
    building this airplane so that these new capabilities can be
    added later on. We have gone to great efforts to make sure they
    do that, and they have had programs to continue to do that.
        As Dr. Grant pointed out, the teams that developed the 2018
    bomber, the Department of Defense right away provided money to
    keep those teams working, so as they put together the new,
    which then became the LRS-B, so these teams have been
    consistent for a long period of time, which is part of the
    reason that I am very confident that this airplane is going to
    have the great capabilities that we are attributing to it. And
    I also believe it is going to have the adaptability and, from
    talking to people who are involved with the program, who say: I
    wish I could tell you about the program, I wish I could tell
    you. It is just absolutely phenomenal what they have done with
    this program. I have talked to logisticians, who are usually
    the biggest ones to complain about a program, because they say
    they forgot about us. And they said: It is phenomenal. They
    thought about us. They thought about how to maintain it. There
    has been a big push to keep high emission-capable rates, which
    means that you have to make it easy to maintain. All these
    things have been worked in.
        So while I haven't been read into the program, the people I
    know that are very familiar with this--and I guarantee would
    have no qualms at all to complain to me if they thought there
    was an issue--are just ecstatic about this. I have always liked
    to think of myself, I grew up in Strategic Air Command, and I
    was someone who thought a lot about deterrents. And with the
    fall of the Berlin Wall, there was a lot of people who thought
    we did not need to think about deterrence anymore because we
    didn't have a Soviet Union. They were right that we didn't need
    to worry about the Soviet Union anymore, but they were wrong to
    think that we didn't need to worry about someone else coming
    and finding some way to attack us. And we have had these
    various different ways. We have grown much more sophisticated
    in terms of our understanding of how to use military force in
    concert with other instruments of national power to be
    effective, and we have seen not only bombers but all of our
    military force.
        But I will try to highlight the bombers, how they have been
    used in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Afghanistan, in Libya, in Iraq,
    to be able to do things that we typically don't think about the
    airplanes doing. And, again, this goes to those great captains
    who say: Hey, you know, I know what we can do this with
    airplane. And then you have some great strategic leaders or
    operational leaders who say: Boy, now that you have showed me
    we could do that, we can work this thing in, and we can make it
    effective.
        The LRS-B provides a platform. It is kind of like, I like
    to use-- You buy an iPhone or you buy an Android--it doesn't
    matter--and it gives you capabilities to bring all these
    different apps that you can put on. And as Mr. Gunzinger was
    pointing out, these apps--there are a lot of apps. They can be
    electronic warfare apps. They can be ISR apps. They can be
    bombing apps. They might be cyber apps. All these things are
    possible because this particular platform was designed not only
    to be something that is easily adaptable, but it also was
    designed to be part of a family of systems. So this ability to
    interoperate with maritime forces, with ground forces, with
    space forces, it really is an important aspect of this.
        And whereas the B-2 was largely developed, initially at
    least, that it would try to go in alone and unafraid and that
    is why you weren't going to see it because there wasn't much
    around. This time they are recognizing you are going to want to
    use this platform in cases where people are looking for you, so
    you are just going to make it really difficult for them to pick
    you out. And because the plan form of this thing, that is the
    physics of it, it makes it very difficult for acquisition and
    particularly for the radars that are actually used to target,
    to be able to hit, but it is bringing in all of the different
    types of stealth. It is stealth across the entire
    electromagnetic spectrum to make this thing very hard to go
    through as, Mr. Gunzinger, the kill chain. You can't--not just
    enough to see it, to actually put a weapon against, it is going
    to be very difficult. And I believe from the people that I have
    talked to, although I can't personally witness to because I
    haven't seen it, but I believe that the Nation is going to be
    very impressed when they see this airplane. And I believe that
    the Department is going to be able to use this platform in
    conjunction with the Navy, the Army, and the Marine Corps to do
    some very good things for national security for the Nation.
        Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
        Mr. Gunzinger.
        Mr. Gunzinger. Yes, very quickly. We did essentially end up
    with a silver bullet force in the B-2s in the 1990s, and pretty
    much the F-22s, I would have continued production of that as
    well. Because we devalued stealth, the air defense strike
    wasn't there, but today it is. And it is just going to be
    increasing in the future, and these technologies are
    proliferating, so stealth increasingly is going to be the price
    of admission into future fights.
        The second is long range and large payloads. Aircraft that
    can fly from more distant airfields out of the immediate threat
    of the short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise
    missiles is going to be very important to us. That might
    reshape the kind of force we want in the future.
        The third, we have said it has been about 10 years since
    the 2006 QDR. It is going to be about another 10 years for LRS-
    Bs to show up in numbers. That period could be longer. We
    focused on, should it be 80 to 100 or something more? And I
    agree with my fellow witnesses that, yes, I think the number is
    eventually going to be much larger than that, but that is a
    2020s decision. Of more importance to me is, how quickly can we
    field this force? And if the yearly procurement rate is set
    pretty low due to budget problems, budget caps, budget
    constraints, then it is just going to extend into the future
    our long-range penetrating strike capability gap. So that is
    something that you might focus on as well. Thank you.
        Mr. Forbes. Dr. Grant, we are going to let you have the
    last word.
        Dr. Grant. It comes down to two things: First, your
    excellent question. What happens if we don't get a new bomber?
    If we don't get a new bomber, our adversaries will hide and
    keep in sanctuary hostile military capabilities, like anti-
    satellite weapons, like potential weapons of mass destruction.
    And these capabilities will threaten our national security and
    the world we live in, and we won't be able to do anything about
    it.
        Second question, should we buy this bomber, the one that is
    coming to down select? And I say yes. I think this is the one.
    But from what the Air Force has said, they have conducted more
    risk reduction. They have taken a new approach, and they have
    built on tremendous technologies from other programs. This is
    the one to buy. We can't afford the risk of waiting. Thank you
    very much.
        Mr. Forbes. We want to thank all three of you for being
    here. We give you, as I told you before, an open invitation as
    you see this process. What Mr. Cook raised, what Mr. Knight
    raised, great questions. We actually posed some of these to
    them before this hearing because these are important things to
    do.
        Mr. Courtney and I recently were at some briefings, and I
    think we were both informed and both concluded that probably
    cutting that F-22 production line was one of the worst mistakes
    we made for national defense in some time. So we need to get
    these things correct and make sure that we are able to produce
    them.
        But we thank you for giving us your expertise, your wisdom,
    and your knowledge on this. If no one has anything else, then
    we are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                               September 9, 2015

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                               September 9, 2015

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        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                               September 9, 2015

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                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

        Ms. Bordallo. The LRS-B will have a much higher per-unit cost than
    our current fighter aircraft. However, achieving the strike power of a
    single long-range bomber takes dozens of fighters. Given that operating
    a dozen fighter aircraft presents an operation and sustainment bill far
    in excess of what it would take to support a bomber, What can the Air
    Force and DOD do to more clearly articulate a long-term enterprise view
    for the LRS-B?
        General Elder. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the
    Soviet Union changed the focus of the entire DOD from deterrence and
    preservation of global stability to expeditionary operations focused on
    regional instabilities and restoration of regional stability. No longer
    did the U.S. face a global threat, and with the implementation of
    Goldwater-Nichols, combatant commanders rightly emphasized planning for
    regional contingency operations with assigned forces rather than
    depending on out-of-area capabilities such as long-range strike
    bombers. The success of Desert Storm strengthened the belief that long-
    range airpower had become a niche capability, although this perspective
    failed to consider the impact of bombers flying from bases outside the
    region. Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo reinforced this misperception.
    Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq again highlighted the value of
    bombers. LRS-B and the legacy bombers are not niche capabilities--
    sufficient numbers are important.
        It is important to ensure that the American people, particularly
    key decisionmakers, understand the unique role of long-range strike
    bombers to the success of U.S. military operations abroad.
    Specifically, long-range strike bombers can reach targets across the
    globe without the need for costly and time-consuming expeditionary
    deployment. This provides the Nation a rapid response capability at the
    outset of a crisis which can be transformed later into one providing
    persistence strike capabilities for extended operations.
        LRS-B benefits from the Open Mission System (OMS) lessons gained on
    other Air Force platforms. The OMS approach will enable LRS-B to
    incorporate new technologies throughout its long service life at much
    less cost than its predecessors. To put this in perspective, the
    capabilities of today's bomber fleet are significantly greater than the
    capabilities these same platforms possessed when they first entered
    service. The same evolution in capability will be true for the LRS-B,
    but upgrades will occur more often and at less cost.
        With a fleet properly sized to meet Combatant Commander demands,
    which should equate to one combat-coded bomber squadron for each of the
    ten Expeditionary Air Forces, the Air Force will also be able to obtain
    economy of scale when sustaining the LRS-B fleet, making it less costly
    to operate.
        Finally, the LRS-B will provide never-before-seen advantages for
    operations in contested (anti-access/area denial) environments.
    Leveraging low probability of intercept (LPI) networking capabilities
    developed for use in current fighter platforms will enable the LRS-B to
    employ new concepts of operation which will increase its survivability
    and mission effectiveness.
        Ms. Bordallo. We have learned a lot over the past 14 years of
    operations in Afghanistan and Iraq about the need to securely link ISR
    data with responsive firepower and access to the command and control
    network. The MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper were pioneers in this
    regard--linking sensors, firepower, and data links in an incredibly
    potent fashion. What steps need to be taken to ensure the LRS-B
    harnesses a similar approach?
        General Elder. Earlier bombers were initially designed to fly as
    standalone platforms incorporating all the necessary sensors and self-
    protection capabilities to ensure individual bombers could deliver
    their weapons on target using only their organic capabilities. When
    datalinks and other technologies which provide connectivity to external
    sources of information were developed, the legacy bomber fleets were
    modified to incorporate these new systems. This postured them to
    operate more effectively as part of large force packages and employ
    precision weapons with ``real-time'' information. But in general, these
    external data capabilities were ``strap on'' modifications rather than
    fully integrated system solutions. The LRS-B was designed to be a key
    element in the future networked force, so it will incorporate existing
    stealth communication technologies equal to, or better than those on
    today's most advanced platforms. Unlike legacy bombers, these
    capabilities will be fully integrated into the operation of the LRS-B
    weapon system. With the use of Open Mission Systems (OMS), the LRS-B
    will be able to easily incorporate new C2 network capabilities, links
    and other sources of data as they become available, and fully integrate
    new external sensors and other sources of information. In short, next
    steps to ensure the LRS-B can securely link ISR data with responsive
    firepower and access to the command and control network throughout its
    service life should focus on advancing and implementing open mission
    systems to the greatest extent possible.
        Ms. Bordallo. The LRS-B will have a much higher per-unit cost than
    our current fighter aircraft. However, achieving the strike power of a
    single long-range bomber takes dozens of fighters. Given that operating
    a dozen fighter aircraft presents an operation and sustainment bill far
    in excess of what it would take to support a bomber, What can the Air
    Force and DOD do to more clearly articulate a long-term enterprise view
    for the LRS-B?
        Mr. Gunzinger. While unit costs and operation and sustainment (O&S)
    costs should inform development of the future force, DOD and the Air
    Force should articulate how requirements for bombers and fighters are
    driven by different operational needs. They should also explain how
    fundamental aeronautics principles govern the design of advanced
    military aircraft. Combat aircraft designed to carry bomber-sized
    payloads over very long ranges may not have the ability to out maneuver
    surface-to-air and air-to-air threats. Similarly, combat aircraft
    designed to optimize their stealth characteristics--such as the B-2
    ``flying wing''--may not be highly maneuverable.
        I anticipate that DOD has sought to optimize the LRS-B's stealth,
    range, and payload capabilities simultaneously. These characteristics
    will greatly increase our Nation's penetrating strike ``magazine
    depth.'' LRS-Bs should also be capable of carrying large, specialized
    munitions that are effective against hardened or deeply buried targets
    that cannot be carried in the internal weapons bays of much smaller
    fighter aircraft.
        That said, pairing heavy strike aircraft such as the LRS-B with
    high-performance fighters will increase options for U.S. commanders and
    complicate the defensive challenge for our Nation's enemies. For
    instance, high-performance fighters can escort penetrating bombers or
    help suppress enemy defenses to allow LRS-Bs to achieve their missions.
        Bottom line, while fighters and bombers have different unit and O&S
    costs, they are complementary capabilities. DOD and the Air Force
    should articulate a case for why both are needed by our Nation's
    warfighters.
        Ms. Bordallo. We have learned a lot over the past 14 years of
    operations in Afghanistan and Iraq about the need to securely link ISR
    data with responsive firepower and access to the command and control
    network. The MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper were pioneers in this
    regard--linking sensors, firepower, and data links in an incredibly
    potent fashion. What steps need to be taken to ensure the LRS-B
    harnesses a similar approach?
        Mr. Gunzinger. MQ-1 Predators and MQ-9 Reapers are the product of
    ad hoc requirements and development processes. Their C2/ISR linkages
    are far more ``clunky'' compared to what should be expected of the LRS-
    B. Moreover, while Predators and Reapers were effective in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, they are not well suited for operations in contested or
    denied environments. LRS-B design teams have the advantage of applying
    lessons-learned from development of the MQ-1 and MQ-9 as well as the
    most advanced stealth airplanes in the world, the B-2, F-22, F-35, and
    B-2. They also have considerable experience in designing advanced low
    probability of intercept/low probability of detection (LPI/LPD)
    communications systems. As a consequence, it should be expected that
    LRS-Bs will have advanced data link technologies--high bandwidth, low
    latency, LPI/LPD--and associated methods for fusing information. These
    capabilities would enable LRS-Bs to maintain near-real-time awareness
    of the threat environment using information from off-board and on-board
    sources. The LRS-B's sensor suite should also be a significant step
    forward from anything the Air Force now operates. The combination of
    advanced sensors, a state-of-the art communications suite, and large
    weapons capacity would make the LRS-B much more than a ``bomber.'' It
    should have the potential to act independently with a vast array of
    weapons, perform as a key node that provides real-time situational
    awareness to other penetrating capabilities, and conduct net-centric,
    collaborative warfare operations as part of the long-range strike
    family of systems. In summary, the LRS-B should be capable of doing
    anything MQ-1s and MQ-9s can do with greater speed, range, payloads,
    and in highly contested operational conditions.
        Ms. Bordallo. The LRS-B will have a much higher per-unit cost than
    our current fighter aircraft. However, achieving the strike power of a
    single long-range bomber takes dozens of fighters. Given that operating
    a dozen fighter aircraft presents an operation and sustainment bill far
    in excess of what it would take to support a bomber, What can the Air
    Force and DOD do to more clearly articulate a long-term enterprise view
    for the LRS-B?
        Dr. Grant. Previous analyses have shown that one long-range bomber
    can often hit more targets than a dozen or more fighters. Add in extra
    supporting aircraft and the efficiency of the bomber stands out.
    Aircrew and maintainers are key drivers in combat aircraft sustainment
    costs. Crewing a dozen fighters may require up to 16 pilots based on
    war readiness manning. A bomber like the B-2 may require only 2-4
    aircrew to meet the same standards. This is just one quick example of
    how bombers provide significant aircrew cost savings from an enterprise
    perspective.
        Ms. Bordallo. We have learned a lot over the past 14 years of
    operations in Afghanistan and Iraq about the need to securely link ISR
    data with responsive firepower and access to the command and control
    network. The MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper were pioneers in this
    regard--linking sensors, firepower, and data links in an incredibly
    potent fashion. What steps need to be taken to ensure the LRS-B
    harnesses a similar approach?
        Dr. Grant. Building a new long-range strike bomber will actually
    make it easier to ensure the bomber has sensors and datalinks to
    securely link to the command and control network. Software-programmable
    communications, the flexibility of AESA radar, and even potential
    laser-based communications links can be part of the bomber from the
    start. The Open Mission Systems practice developed by the USAF and used
    on systems like the B-2 will ensure that the new LRS-B can add in new
    communications, sensor and processing capabilities as technology
    advances.

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