[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SECURING THE MARITIME BORDER: THE FUTURE OF CBP AIR AND MARINE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 14, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-25
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama Loretta Sanchez, California
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Brian Higgins, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Martha McSally, Arizona Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Paul L. Anstine, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Michigan, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Filemon Vela, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and
Maritime Security.............................................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. Randolph D. Alles, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air and
Marine, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. John Roth, Inspector General, Office of Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
SECURING THE MARITIME BORDER: THE FUTURE OF CBP AIR AND MARINE
----------
Tuesday, July 14, 2015
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Miller, Vela, and Torres.
Mrs. Miller. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the future of
CBP's Office of Air and Marine. In the interest of time, and
though we don't have too many other Members here, we are going
to begin. The Democratic conference, I think, has Hillary
Clinton there and our conference is just concluding, so we are
waiting on some folks to get here, but--our Ranking Member has
got another committee hearing I know as well, and so we want to
accommodate his schedule.
But we are very pleased to be joined today by General
Randolph Alles, who is the assistant commissioner for the
Office of Air and Marine, and Mr. John Roth, who is the
inspector general for the Department of Homeland Security. We
welcome both you gentlemen. I will more formally introduce them
in just a moment.
But among the CBP's missions and responsibilities, maritime
security is not often front-page news. Nonetheless, this does
not mean that it is not an important part of their overall
border security efforts. Our coastal and maritime borders are
long and they cover millions of square miles. My home State of
Michigan alone has over 3,000 miles of Great Lakes coastline
and shares many, many miles of maritime border. We call it our
long liquid border with Canada.
Illicit drug and migrant flows remain principal concerns of
our border security agencies, and rightly so. However, as we
have seen on our Nation's California coast as we strengthen
security along the southern land border, the cartels adapt,
sending Panga boats as far north now as San Francisco.
From the Great Lakes to the coast of California to the Gulf
of Mexico, Caribbean and Central American transit zones, the
maritime security components of the Department of Homeland
Security have a lot of sea to cover, and as a result, they must
coordinate effectively, share intelligence to understand the
threat, and smartly position resources to stop it. The need for
maritime domain awareness or the ability to understand where
illicit traffic is most likely to occur cannot be understated.
Without this understanding, drugs will continue to transit the
maritime corridors and migrants will make the perilous journey
to this country.
Radar coverage of the Great Lakes and other areas along the
border is far from complete, which could allow low-flying
aircraft, it does actually allow, low-flying aircraft and
vessels to move drugs and other contraband with ease. Within
Customs and Border Protection, CBP's Office of Air and Marine
has a fleet of over 280 marine vessels and more than 250
aircraft, making it essentially the largest civilian law
enforcement air force in the world. They have enormous
responsibility to interdict drugs and migrants using the sea as
a means to enter the country.
So today we want to explore how CBP Air and Marine, a
relatively small operational component of CBP, fits into the
larger maritime security strategy of DHS and how Air and
Marine's authorities support and complement the Coast Guard's
security and interdiction missions. Border Patrol's
responsibilities provide aviation support to other components
like ICE and FEMA and, most importantly, examine the security
value that American taxpayers are getting for the roughly $750
million that they spend every year.
Without question, the work that the men and women of Air
and Marine do is very dangerous. Last month one of their
helicopters was struck by two bullets fired from the Mexican
side of the border. Thankfully, our agents were not harmed. Air
and Marine as well has had other serious incidents over the
last few years, including the complete loss of a maritime
variant of the Predator on a maritime mission off the coast of
California. There was an incident where a smuggler fired
multiple rounds from an AK-47 at our agents near the Virgin
Islands. Then we had a recent collision with another vessel off
the coast of California that resulted in the capsize of the
vessel and loss of life.
The vessels and aviation assets that our agents use to
perform this dangerous work are aging. Recapitalization of the
aging CBP Air and Marine fleet has long been a priority and a
significant budgetary challenge as well for our Nation. For
example, Air and Marine has experienced difficulty procuring a
new coastal interceptor vessel to replace the Midnight Express,
which is a boat that they first acquired long before the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security.
While I am pleased that CBP has awarded a contract to
procure up to 52 coastal interceptor vessels just 2 weeks ago,
this award does come after a series of delays and nearly 5
years from the time that CBP initially announced its intent to
purchase new marine vessels to replace the aging fleet, which
has been in service, again, since the 1980s.
Better planning between the Office of Air and Marine and
the Coast Guard has the potential to save taxpayers' dollars,
especially when components conduct similar missions and have
recently procured similar boats, fixed-wing aircraft, and
helicopters. The Department needs to ensure components are
working together to ensure efficiencies can be gained both
operationally and with procurement of additional assets.
In addition, this subcommittee and committee has been on
record multiple times calling for robust border security
metrics that measure the state of border security, and they are
largely absent in the border security debate, and a valuable
tool to help CBP deploy resources appropriately or come to
Congress with additional needs. Finding the right set of
metrics to gauge performance is not an easy task, but it must
be done.
Air and Marine, as the inspector general has recently
reported, has struggled to develop clear, concrete performance
metrics that will help Congressional decision makers and the
American people understand how they contribute to border
security at the air and maritime domain and at what costs.
So we look forward certainly to hearing from Mr. Roth on
the two controversial inspector general reports that cast some
doubt on the true cost of the UAV program and missed
opportunities to save the taxpayers' dollars by leveraging
existing DHS resources to upgrade Air and Marine helicopters. I
am sure that the general has his own views on these reports as
well.
When it comes to outlining the future of this agency, I
certainly understand that Air and Marine strategy is currently
in its final stages of approval, but was not yet ready in time
for this hearing. So I hope the general will be able to share
key aspects of his new strategy with Members to help us
understand where he sees this organization going and present
his vision for the future of CBP Air and Marine.
Finally, last month the House passed for the second time
CBP authorization language that I actually authored, and this
clearly demonstrates that this committee is keenly interested
in the future of this organization and the maritime security
value that it provides to the Nation.
So we look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. I
want to thank you both for appearing here today as well.
[The statement of Chairman Miller follows:]
Statement of Chairman Candice Miller
July 14, 2015
Amongst CBP's missions and responsibilities, maritime security is
not often front-page news. Nonetheless, this does not mean it is not an
important part of their overall border security efforts. Our coastal
and maritime borders are long and cover millions of square miles. My
home State of Michigan alone has over 3,000 miles of Great Lakes
coastline and shares many miles of maritime border with Canada.
Illicit drug and migrant flows remain principle concerns of our
border security agencies, and rightly so. However, as we have seen on
our Nation's California coast, as we strengthen security along the
southern land border, the cartels adapt--sending panga boats as far
north as San Francisco.
From the Great Lakes, to the coast of California, to the Gulf of
Mexico, Caribbean and Central America transit zones, the maritime
security components of the Department of Homeland Security have a lot
of sea to cover. As a result, they must coordinate effectively, share
intelligence to understand the threat, and smartly position resources
to stop it.
The need for maritime domain awareness, or the ability to
understand where illicit traffic is most likely to occur, cannot be
understated. Without this understanding, drugs will continue to transit
the maritime corridors and migrants will make the perilous journey to
this country. Radar coverage of the Great Lakes, and other areas along
the border, is far from complete, which could allow low-flying aircraft
and vessels to move drugs and other contraband with ease.
Within Customs and Border Protection, CBP's Office of Air and
Marine has a fleet of over 280 marine vessels and more than 250
aircraft, making it essentially the largest civilian law enforcement
air force in the world. They have an enormous responsibility to
interdict drugs and migrants using the sea as a means to enter the
country.
Today, I want to explore how CBP Air and Marine, a relatively small
operational component of CBP, fits into the larger maritime security
strategy of DHS. How Air and Marine's authorities support and
compliment the Coast Guard's security and interdiction missions, Border
Patrol's riverine responsibilities, provide aviation support to other
components like ICE and FEMA, and most importantly, examine the
security value that American taxpayer is getting for the roughly $750
million dollars they spend every year.
Without question, the work that the men and women of Air and Marine
do is dangerous. Last month, one of their helicopters was struck by two
bullets fired from the Mexican side of the border. Thankfully our
agents were not injured. And Air and Marine has had other serious
incidents over the last few years including: The complete loss of a
maritime variant of the Predator on a maritime mission off the coast of
California, an incident where a smuggler fired multiple rounds from an
AK-47 at our agents near the Virgin Islands and a recent collision with
another vessel off the coast of California that resulted in the capsize
of the vessel and the loss of life.
The vessels and aviation assets our Agents use to perform this
dangerous work are aging. Recapitalization of the aging CBP Air and
Marine fleet has been a long-term priority and a significant budgetary
challenge. For example, Air and Marine has experienced difficulty
procuring a new Coastal Interceptor Vessel to replace the Midnight
Express, a boat they first acquired long before the creation of DHS.
While I am pleased CBP awarded a contract to procure up to 52
Coastal Interceptor Vessels just 2 weeks ago, this award comes after a
series of delays, and nearly 5 years from the time CBP initially
announced its intent to purchase new marine vessels to replace the
aging fleet, which has been in service since the '80s.
Better planning between the Office of Air and Marine and the Coast
Guard has the potential to save taxpayer dollars, especially when
components conduct similar missions and have recently procured similar
boats, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. The Department needs to
ensure components are working together to ensure efficiencies can be
gained both operationally and with the procurement of additional
assets.
In addition, this subcommittee and committee has been on record
multiple times calling for robust border security metrics that measure
the state of border security. They are largely absent in the border
security debate, and a valuable tool to help CBP deploy resources
appropriately or come to Congress with additional needs.
Finding the right set of metrics to gauge performance is not an
easy task, but it must be done.
Air and Marine, as the Inspector General has recently reported, has
struggled to develop clear, concrete performance metrics that will help
Congressional decision makers and the American people understand how
they contribute to border security in the air and maritime domain, and
at what cost.
I look forward to hearing from Mr. Roth on the two controversial
Inspector General Reports that cast some doubt on the true cost of the
UAV program and missed opportunities to save the taxpayer dollars by
leveraging existing DHS resources to upgrade Air and Marine
helicopters. And I'm sure General Alles has his own views on these
reports.
When it comes to outlining the future of this agency, I understand
Air and Marine strategy is currently in its final stages of approval,
but was not yet ready in time for this hearing. I hope General Alles
will be able to share key aspects of his new strategy with Members to
help us understand where he sees this organization going and present
his vision for the future of CBP Air and Marine.
Finally, last month the House passed, for the second time, CBP
authorization language I authored. This clearly demonstrates that this
committee is keenly interested in the future of this organization and
the maritime security value it provides to the Nation.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and thank you both for
appearing before us today. With that I recognize the Ranking Member of
the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Vela, for any opening
statement he may have.
Mrs. Miller. With that, I would like to recognize the
Ranking Member from the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas,
Mr. Vela, for his statement.
Mr. Vela. Thank you. The purpose of today's hearing is to
examine the future of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
Office of Air and Marine. Air and Marine's mission covers both
aerial and maritime surveillance of our borders as well as
interdiction of people and goods crossing illegally into our
country in the areas between the ports of entry.
As the Ranking Member of this subcommittee and representing
a district along the Texas-Mexico border, I have a strong
interest in Air and Marine's efforts to better secure our
Nation's borders. Indeed, Air and Marine has a marine unit
based out of Brownsville, Texas, the largest city in my
Congressional district, right on the Gulf of Mexico.
Given that Air and Marine provides specialized air and
marine support to various Federal, State, and local law
enforcement partners, I believe today's discussion should help
us all better understand Air and Marine's specific role in
border security.
Certainly the Southwest Border is a very active region in
terms of both legitimate trade and with respect to security
concerns. As the Chairman mentioned, just last month we know
that one of OAM's helicopters was patrolling the river near
Laredo, Texas, and was hit by gunfire. Today I hope that we are
able to have a rigorous and thorough discussion on Air and
Marine's overall operations and how they fit in with the
Department of Homeland Security's broader border security
strategy.
In particular, I would like to learn more about how the
marine and air assets under Air and Marine's purview are being
used to support DHS's border security operations. Last year's
report by the DHS Office of Inspector General on CBP's unarmed
aircraft system program underscores the need to ensure that our
limited border security resources are being used in the most
effective way possible.
Lastly, I would be interested in hearing how Air and Marine
works with other components within the Department of Homeland
Security to meet the Department's border security mission;
specifically, learning how Air and Marine partners with the
Coast Guard on marine patrols and interdictions would be very
beneficial. On the surface, it would seem there is some overlap
in these sorts of operations, and gaining a clear understanding
of how the two DHS components complement each other will help
our committee's border security oversight and legislative work.
I would like to close by thanking the Chair for holding
this hearing and our witnesses for joining us today, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman from Texas very much for
his opening statement. Other Members are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
July 14, 2015
In order to fulfill its mission, Office of Air and Marine (OAM)
uses its integrated air and marine force to detect and interdict the
unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and other contraband moving
toward or crossing the borders of the United States. As Ranking Member
of the Committee on Homeland Security, I am aware of the varied border
security surveillance and interdiction operations OAM carries out both
on the water and in the air.
OAM's authorities also allow it to provide specialized air and
marine support to various Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies, such as assisting FEMA in response to natural disasters.
Unfortunately, various reviews conducted by DHS's Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
have raised concerns about certain OAM programs.
In response, the OIG and GAO have made a number of recommendations
over the past several years to ensure OAM's assets and personnel are
best positioned to effectively meet mission needs and address border
security threats. For instance, in December 2014, the OIG published a
report on CBP's unmanned aircraft system (UAS) or ``drone'' program.
The report concluded that despite spending 8 years and hundreds of
millions of taxpayer dollars on its UAS program, CBP cannot prove the
program is effective and that its impact in stemming illegal
immigration has been minimal.
The report also concluded there are serious questions about whether
the program has led to a greater number of apprehensions, reduced
border surveillance costs, or increased efficiency by the U.S. Border
Patrol along our Southwest Border.
The Inspector General summarized their findings saying,
``Notwithstanding the significant investment, we see no evidence that
the drones contribute to a more secure border, and there is no reason
to invest additional taxpayer funds at this time.'' Among the OIG's
recommendations was for OAM to establish attainable performance
measures to determine the effectiveness of the UAS program at enhancing
border security.
Additionally, the OIG recommended the development of ``policies and
procedures to ensure that [the Office of Air and Marine] accumulates
and reports all costs associated with the UAS program and other OAM
flight programs.'' I know OAM vehemently disagrees with the OIG report,
and I am aware that Members of this committee have asked the GAO to
look at many of the same issues. Today, I would like to hear about what
steps OAM has taken, if any, to respond to the OIG's recommendations,
given the UAS program's significant cost and its purported benefits to
border security.
Lastly, I am concerned about use of force issues within CBP
generally, and would like to hear today about how these issues are
handled within OAM in particular. I am aware that the CBP commissioner
has begun implementing new policies and procedures regarding use of
force incidents.
Given that in the past few months OAM has been involved in two
fatal use of force incidents--one off the California coast and another
near the British Virgin Islands--I would like to know more about OAM's
use of force protocols and whether they are being modified as a result
of the commissioner's recent initiatives. Finally, I hope to hear about
what this committee can do to assist the Office of Air and Marine in
meeting its mission as effectively and efficiently as possible.
Mrs. Miller. At this time, again, we are pleased to be
joined by our two distinguished witnesses to discuss this very
important topic today.
General Randolph Alles is the assistant commissioner for
CBP's Office of Air and Marine. It is a position that he has
held since January 2003. In this role, the general is charged
with overseeing the OAM mission of using aviation and maritime
assets to detect, interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism and
the unlawful movement of drugs and other contraband from
entering the United States. Before joining OAM, he spent 35
years in the United States Marine Corps, retiring in 2011 as a
major general.
Mr. John Roth became the inspector general for the
Department of Homeland Security in March 2014. He has a long
record of public service, which includes time at the Food and
Drug Administration, where he served as director of the Office
of Criminal Investigations, and the Department of Justice,
where among many other positions, he served as the assistant
U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan. Glad to
note that as well.
Their full statement, full written statement will appear in
the record.
The Chair now recognizes General Alles for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF RANDOLPH D. ALLES, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE
OF AIR AND MARINE, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Alles. Good morning, ma'am, Chairman Miller, and
Ranking Member Vela. It is great to appear before you this
morning and to see you again, and also the distinguished
Members of the committee.
I would like to discuss this morning the role of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's Office of Air and Marine, OAM,
as I will abbreviate it during my discussion here, in securing
our Nation's maritime border, since that is the focus of our
conversation today.
So I realize the intent today is to assess operations and
organization of OAM to ensure we are effectively and
efficiently serving the American people. I support the
committee's effort to do this in its oversight. I appreciate
the opportunity to share with you the important mission set and
capabilities OAM brings to CBP's border security effort and
also the larger homeland security effort.
The threat in the maritime environment is dynamic.
Smugglers continually adjust their tactics in order to counter
our latest efforts to apprehend them. Increasingly smugglers
exploit normal traffic patterns to conceal their intent, often
mimicking a legitimate recreational or commercial voyage. Small
vessels in particular are ideal conveyances for this tactic,
because they operate in a largely unregulated environment,
while providing opportunity for concealing people or cargo.
Addressing this dynamic maritime threat requires a
specialized, agile, and adaptive law enforcement organization
with a cadre of professional agents empowered to investigate
complex cases and a unique blend of the authorities and
expertise to pursue investigations across multiple
environments, the sea, the air, or the land, and jurisdictional
boundaries.
So OAM thrives by being adaptive and efficient. Our unique
authorities and specialized capabilities enable us to bridge
border environments and jurisdictions, providing important
continuity to investigations.
OAM's maritime interdiction agents have a singular law
enforcement mission. They are empowered to take necessary
action, including conducting searches and investigations,
obtaining and serving warrants, and making arrests and
seizures. Our agents undergo intense training in maritime
tactics in order to swiftly and safely interdict smuggling
threats and mitigate the dangers of prolonged pursuits.
Additionally, they are experts in interview technique and they
are well-versed in applicable laws.
Our professional law enforcement agents in their broad
investigative authorities are critical to maritime border
security efforts. OAM agents, sometimes in plain clothes or
undercover, routinely collaborate with investigative partners,
some of which you have already mentioned, on covert
surveillance and enforcement operations in the maritime domain.
This capability is essential in combatting a threat that
thrives on concealment in legitimate traffic, which is one of
our biggest threats.
OAM's specialized fleet of vessels, particularly our next
generation coastal interceptors, are built from the hull up for
interdiction. These high-performance vessels enable our agents
to respond quickly and effectively to incursions to our
territorial waters.
With limited number of agents and assets, OAM has a
substantial impact on efforts to protect our Nation's borders.
OAM efforts have resulted in the seizure of significant
quantities of contraband and disrupted considerable illicit
activity before it reaches our shores. In fiscal year 2014, OAM
efforts resulted in nearly 5,000 arrests of suspects, 80,000
apprehensions, the seizure of nearly 800 weapons, $148 million
in currency, and more than 1 million pounds of illegal drugs.
Ultimately, maritime security requires a unity of effort,
something already discussed. No single entity has the
capability or capacity to address all aspects of maritime
security. Information sharing and strong partnerships are
critical to understanding and addressing maritime threats.
We frequently participate in joint operations with a
variety of Federal partners, including the U.S. Coast Guard,
the U.S. Navy; we work closely with multiple investigative
components, particularly the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. We are the leading provider of airborne detection
and monitoring to the Joint Interagency Task Force South. There
are counternarcotic efforts in the Southeast coastal, and the
source and transit zones where maritime radar is necessary to
detect threats moving towards the United States.
The recently implemented Southern Border approaches
campaign leverages the various roles and responsibilities and
capabilities of multiple DHS agencies to comprehensively
address border and maritime threats. OAM has been extensively
involved in the planning and development of all three of the
campaigns' joint task forces. The JTF East deputy commander is
actually an OAM employee, Mr. Merton Cox.
So moving forward, we will continue to enhance our
detection, investigation, and interdiction capabilities to
address emerging threats and adapt to changing conditions in
the maritime domain. We will fully network our fleet and
operational centers to share critical information in real time.
OAM is an integral part of CBP's border security mission. We
blend specialized interdiction capabilities, skilled
investigators, a modern domain awareness network, and
seamlessly apply them all across multiple environments and
jurisdictions. In doing so, we add a critical layer of cohesion
and coordination to maritime border security that no other
agency is providing.
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished
Members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to
testify today. I look forward to your questions. Thank you
again.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Alles follows:]
Prepared Statement of Randolph D. Alles
July 14, 2015
introduction
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members of
the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to
discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Air and
Marine (OAM) efforts to secure our Nation's maritime borders. OAM is a
Federal law enforcement organization dedicated to serving and
protecting the American people.
As America's front-line border agency, CBP is responsible for
securing America's borders against threats while facilitating the
lawful flow of people and goods entering the United States. OAM is a
critical component of CBP's border security mission and the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) risk-based and multi-layered approach to
homeland security. We apply advanced aeronautical and maritime
capabilities and employ our unique skill sets to protect our Nation's
borders and preserve America's security interests.
OAM's mission falls into four broad categories that reflect our
core competencies: Interdiction, Investigation, Domain Awareness, and
Contingencies and National Taskings. These competencies are
interdependent and complementary and leverage our expertise in the air
and maritime environments. We prioritize the development of this
organizational expertise throughout our recruitment and training,
material acquisitions and program development, and we tailor our law
enforcement capabilities and assets to our specialized mission.
A relatively small organization, OAM thrives by being extremely
efficient and adaptive. Additionally OAM leverages its capabilities by
empowering its operational units to forge crucial partnerships.
In the maritime environment, we operate effectively with a variety
of Federal, State, and local partners, including frequent joint
operations with the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and the United
States Navy. Through our integration with CBP, as well as our legacy
history with U.S. Customs, we enjoy a close working relationship with
other investigative components within DHS, particularly U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). These relationships, coupled
with our broad authorities, allow OAM to follow cases wherever they
lead--from the air, to the sea and on to land, or from an investigative
lead to an interdiction at sea. We also frequently cooperate directly
with foreign governments. In this way, OAM lends critical capabilities
and cohesion to an array of border security and maritime law
enforcement efforts.
One example of these efforts is a recent operation conducted by OAM
Marine Interdiction Agents (MIAs) based in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
After boarding and searching a sailing vessel arriving from the
Bahamas, the team discovered approximately 220 pounds of cocaine
concealed in a bilge area. The agents elected to pursue the
investigation further, and asked the suspect if he would facilitate a
``controlled delivery,''--a ruse whereby a smuggling suspect agrees to
deliver the contraband as planned, but under observation by law
enforcement. The suspect agreed, and the agents contacted their
partners on the local Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) to
help coordinate the delivery. OAM and other BEST agents completed the
delivery successfully, resulting in the arrests of two suspects and the
seizure of the cocaine, one sailboat, one truck, and $1,650 in cash.
The exploitation of the initial seizure was only possible due to the
authorities and expertise of the OAM agents, and close working
relationships with other investigators.
Our greatest resources are the sound judgment and experience of our
agents, who average 17 years of law enforcement experience with OAM.
Over 60 percent of these sworn agents are veterans of the Armed
Services, and many have prior experience in law enforcement. All agents
receive intensive training in applicable law, use of force,
investigative techniques, Spanish language, and more upon entrance into
service. Soon after, they undergo additional advanced training in
tactics and the safe operation of vessels and aircraft. All agents are
empowered to apply the full range of their legal authorities when
conducting interdictions or investigations, in strict accordance with
the law. This high level of training and experience allows us to
empower our agents to make critical, real-time decisions on-scene,
allowing for an informed, rapid response to exigent scenarios.
OAM is uniquely positioned--organizationally, via broad enforcement
authorities and jurisdiction, and with unequaled specialized training,
equipment, and domain awareness capability--to protect America's
security interests beyond the Nation's border in source and transit
zones, between ports of entry, in our coastal waters, and within the
Nation's interior.
a secure maritime border
Thousands of vessels enter or operate in U.S. territorial sea
daily. Though the vast majority do so for purposes of recreation or
legitimate commerce, a small percentage engage in smuggling and other
illegal activity. Apprehending these smugglers can be daunting, as many
mimic legitimate traffic while others elude detection altogether.
This challenge is similar to one faced by the United States in the
1970s and 1980s, as air smugglers exploited known gaps in offshore
radar coverage to deliver narcotics, often by air-drop or by ``popping
up'' inside U.S. airspace and emulating a domestic flight. The United
States response in those situations included increasing air domain
awareness by deploying and linking additional air surveillance radars,
and increasing its coordinated response capability via air interceptors
and other assets. With increased awareness and response, U.S. Customs
was able to leverage a highly-regulated air environment to identify
evasive or non-compliant aircraft and target them for enforcement. The
result was an unprecedented state of air security that persists today,
with OAM maintaining air domain awareness via the functionality at the
Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) and an air intercept capability
in its present-day fleet.
A secure maritime border presents additional challenges. Unlike air
traffic, small vessels \1\ inbound to the United States are generally
not required to announce their arrivals in advance, nor are they
required to make their initial landing at a designated port of entry.
Additionally, small vessels have no requirement to continually
broadcast their position via transponder.\2\ Therefore, many of the
tools used to sort legitimate air traffic from the illegitimate are not
available in the maritime environment. A secure maritime border is one
where there is an effective understanding of the maritime domain, with
awareness of traffic moving in or toward U.S. waters, and the ability
to infer intent and interdict as necessary. Achieving this state
requires:
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\1\ ``Small vessels'' are characterized as any watercraft,
regardless of method of propulsion, less than 300 gross tons. Small
vessels can include commercial fishing vessels, recreational boats and
yachts, towing vessels, uninspected passenger vessels, or any other
commercial vessels involved in foreign or U.S. voyages. DHS, Small
Vessel Security Implementation Plan Report to the Public, January,
2001, page 1. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-uscg-small-vessel-
security-strategy-report-to-public-012011.pdf.
\2\ While the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA)
and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
require many commercial, passenger, and commercial fishing vessels to
operate with an Automatic Identification System (AIS), a tracking
system to, among other things, increase maritime awareness, the
requirement does not cover many small vessels.
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Maritime Domain Awareness.--Detection capability in the form
of fixed and mobile sensors, an effective distribution network,
and current information that facilitates evaluation and
decision making, such as track history and projected movements.
Law Enforcement Information.--Knowledge of criminal intent
or practices typically gained through law enforcement activity,
such as case information, confidential human sources,
undercover work, covert surveillance, classified intelligence,
etc.
Response Capability and Capacity.--The ability to interdict
quickly and effectively in the maritime domain. This is a
function of personnel, equipment, training, and expertise.
Unity of Effort.--The various attributes of maritime
security and law enforcement agencies are complimentary by
design. No single entity has the capability or capacity to
address all aspects of maritime security. Unfettered
information sharing is critical to understanding the nature of
maritime threats. Effective coordination must occur across
organizational and jurisdictional lines.
Small Vessel Accountability.--Increased accountability of
small vessel arrivals from foreign countries and transmission
of position via beacon or transponder while underway. This will
dramatically improve maritime domain awareness and result in
non-compliant vessels self-selecting for further investigation.
OAM believes that a secure maritime border is achievable. We are
focusing our strategic planning efforts to this end, with emphasis on
domain awareness, investigations, enhanced interdiction capabilities
and a networked approach to coordination with our partners.
oam overview
Prior to the establishment of DHS, the assets and personnel that
comprise OAM were distributed between multiple legacy agencies,
including the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Border Patrol. Under
DHS, these resources were consolidated and integrated into CBP to
realize greater operational effectiveness and efficiencies in executing
the new homeland security mission. Today, OAM operates in accordance
with the Secretary's Unity of Effort memorandum, with goals aligned to
those delineated in the DHS 2014-2018 Strategic Plan, the DHS Southern
Border and Approaches Campaign and CBP's Vision and Strategy 2020.
One immediate benefit gained through the merger was consolidated
aircraft maintenance. OAM integrated maintenance and logistics for its
aircraft under a single contract to provide standard support across
locations, improve accountability and aircraft safety, and ensure
common configurations.
OAM operations are divided into three regions: The Southwest
Region, the Northern Region, and the Southeast Region. Each region is
split into Air and Marine Branches, and then further divided into Air
and/or Marine Units. OAM also operates two unique operational entities:
National Air Security Operations (NASO) and AMOC. NASO, operating out
of six centers Nation-wide, coordinates operational activities, long-
range planning and project oversight for the P-3 Long Range Tracker
aircraft and unmanned aircraft system (UAS) programs. AMOC is a state-
of-the-art law enforcement operations coordination and domain awareness
center that conducts air and marine surveillance operations and fuses
numerous sources of intelligence.
OAM's 1,272 law enforcement personnel operate 257 aircraft, 283
vessels,\3\ and a sophisticated domain awareness network across the
United States. These assets provide critical aerial and maritime
surveillance, interdiction, and operational capability in support of
OAM's maritime border security mission. OAM continues to modernize its
fleet and sensor systems to enhance our operational performance in
diverse marine environments and increase our ability to adapt to the
challenges of securing the maritime border and approaches to the United
States.
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\3\ OAM owns and maintains CBP's 283 vessels, including riverine
vessels that are operated by the U.S. Border Patrol.
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oam law enforcement authorities
An integral part of CBP's border security mission, OAM agents are
credentialed law enforcement officers with a broad range of authorities
that enable them to transcend land, air, and sea domains and
jurisdictions, providing a critical layer of continuity in enforcement
efforts. First and foremost, OAM agents are sworn Federal law
enforcement agents. They are authorized to carry firearms, obtain and
serve warrants, subpoenas and summons, make arrests for any offense
committed in their presence and make felony arrests without warrant.\4\
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\4\ See 19 U.S. Code 1589a.
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Within the ``customs waters''\5\ of the United States, or at any
place within the United States, OAM agents may board a vessel for the
purpose of enforcing customs law, and to use all necessary force to
compel compliance.\6\ Additionally, OAM enforces laws on any American
vessel on the high seas,\7\ and vessels subject to U.S. jurisdiction
under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act \8\ which concerns the
trafficking of controlled substances aboard vessels in extraterritorial
waters. These authorities enable OAM to extend our zone of security
surrounding our maritime border and littorals of the United States.
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\5\ See 19 U.S. Code 1401.
\6\ See 19 U.S. Code 1581.
\7\ See 19 CFR 162.3.
\8\ See Title 46, 46 U.S. Code 70501-70502 ``vessel subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States'' includes--a vessel without
nationality; a vessel assimilated to a vessel without nationality under
paragraph (2) of article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas; a
vessel registered in a foreign nation if that nation has consented or
waived objection to the enforcement of United States law by the United
States; a vessel in the customs waters of the United States; a vessel
in the territorial waters of a foreign nation if the nation consents to
the enforcement of United States law by the United States; and a vessel
in the contiguous zone of the United States, as defined in Presidential
Proclamation 7219 of September 2, 1999 that--is entering the United
States; has departed the United States; or is a hovering vessel as
defined in section 401 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
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In their capacity as CBP law enforcement agents, OAM agents also
enforce immigration laws in the territorial sea, on land, and in the
air. Agents within OAM have the same broad immigration authority \9\ as
the U.S. Border Patrol; however, OAM is in the unique position to
enforce this authority in the maritime environment. Similar to other
investigative agencies, our agents recruit confidential sources,
develop criminal cases, support prosecutors, and testify in court in
addition to their enforcement actions in the air, land, and maritime
domains.
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\9\ See Title 8, Aliens and Nationality.
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This combination of authorities enables OAM to conduct successful
investigations in the maritime domain.
maritime assets and capabilities
OAM's unique maritime law enforcement mission requires the use of
marine assets and capabilities--including fixed- and rotary-wing
aircraft, as well as patrol and interdiction vessels and a
sophisticated domain awareness network across the United States. OAM's
maritime assets are tailored to the conditions of the threat
environment in which we operate, and equipped with the capabilities
required to interdict illicit smuggling attempts of drugs and
undocumented aliens.
Often, there is little time to interdict inbound suspect vessels,
and OAM has honed its maritime border security response capability
around rapid and effective interception, pursuit, and interdiction of
these craft. OAM employs high-speed Coastal Interceptor Vessels (CIV)
that are specifically designed and engineered with the speed,
maneuverability, integrity, and endurance to intercept and engage a
variety of suspect non-compliant vessels in offshore waters, as well as
the Great Lakes on the Northern Border.
Our vessels are manned by highly-trained and experienced OAM crews
authorized to deploy any required use of force, including warning shots
and disabling fire to stop fleeing vessels. Over the last decade, OAM
has evolved to counter the egregious threat of non-compliant vessels.
OAM has developed capabilities to disable non-compliant vessels and to
bring dangerous pursuits to a conclusion and prevent these vessels from
reaching our shores. Since 2003, OAM has engaged in 123 cases involving
marine warning and/or disabling rounds, and three cases involving air
to vessel warning and disabling rounds.
OAM often works in partnership with ICE-HSI, the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
conducting covert operations in the maritime border environment;
utilizing unmarked and undercover vessels when situations dictate that
the surveillance of drug loads or transnational criminal organization
(TCO) activity can yield larger seizures as a part of on-going
investigations. Some of these covert missions involve OAM agents
facilitating controlled deliveries with partner agencies through the
utilization of undercover vessels and the incorporation of undercover
or plainclothes agents. OAM has a number of unmarked vessels typical to
local traffic, which are used for this purpose.
OAM specializes in the installation of covert trackers aboard
suspect vessels and often conducts these covert missions under hours of
darkness using plainclothes or undercover tactics. Additionally, OAM
periodically augments vessel crews from investigative partner agencies
when a specific vessel certification coupled with investigative
authority and experience is needed when operating these assets. OAM
develops and retains confidential human sources in the maritime
environment, which have been instrumental in effecting significant
seizures.
Although OAM routinely makes seizures through maritime border
patrols, the majority of arrests and seizures are the result of
actionable information or detection by aircraft. CBP's P-3 Long Range
Tracker and Airborne Early Warning aircraft are multi-role high-
endurance aircraft capable of performing border security mission sets
in the air and maritime environments. Equipped with a multitude of
highly sophisticated communications equipment, radar and imagery
sensors, operated by highly-trained professional sworn law enforcement
agents and officers, the P-3 is accredited with the interdiction of
122,427 pounds of cocaine and 5,918 flight hours within the Western
Hemisphere Transit Zones in fiscal year 2014, which equated to 20.7
pounds of narcotics interdicted per flight hour.
The integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) have provided
critical enhancements to OAM's air, land, and maritime border domain
awareness and capabilities. UAS provide high-endurance intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance of land borders, inland waters,
littoral waters, and high seas with multiple advanced sensor arrays.
The use of UAS in the maritime environment has increased OAM's ability
to effectively detect, monitor, and track both personnel and
conveyances involved in illegal activity.
Another important maritime security asset is the DHC-8 Maritime
Patrol Aircraft (MPA). It is a medium-range airplane that bridges the
gap between the strategic P-3 and UAS, and smaller aircraft operating
in the littoral waters. It is outfitted specifically for maritime
patrol with state-of-the art sensors and systems. The DHC-8 has
provided game-changing detection capability in the Caribbean, Florida,
and the Gulf of Mexico.
CBP's aerial surveillance capabilities in the maritime environment
have been enhanced through recent investments and deployments of a
Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft (MEA). The MEA provides OAM a
replacement for several of its older maritime patrol aircraft,
enhancing OAM's ability to maintain domain awareness of the U.S.
littorals and coastline. Additionally, the multi-role function of the
aircraft provides OAM agents the ability to continue investigations
seamlessly into the interior of the United States, landing at small
remote airports to interdict suspected air smugglers. OAM's Tethered
Aerostat Radar System (TARS)\10\ is an effective surveillance asset
providing radar detection and monitoring of low-altitude aircraft and
surface vessels along the U.S.-Mexico border, the Florida Straits, and
a portion of the Caribbean. With eight aerostat sites--six along the
Southwest Border, one in the Florida Keys, and one in Puerto Rico--the
TARS elevated sensor mitigates the effect of the curvature of the earth
and terrain-masking limitations associated with ground-based radars,
greatly increasing long-range radar detection capabilities. The eight
TARS sites represent approximately 2 percent of the total radars
integrated by OAM, yet they account for over 50 percent of all suspect
target detections.
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\10\ CBP assumed responsibility of TARS from the U.S. Air Force in
2013, but the aerostat surveillance system had been used by the
Department of Defense since 1978.
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Perhaps the most important advancements come in the area of data
integration and exploitation. Downlink technology, paired with the
BigPipe system, allows OAM to provide video feed and situational
awareness in real-time. In addition, the Minotaur mission integration
system will allow multiple aircraft and vessels to share networked
information, providing a never-before-seen level of air, land, and sea
domain awareness.
A vital component of DHS's domain awareness capabilities, the AMOC
integrates multiple sensor technologies and sources of information to
provide comprehensive domain awareness in support of CBP's border
security mission. Utilizing extensive law enforcement and intelligence
databases and communication networks, AMOC's operational system, the
Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System (AMOSS), provides a
single display that is capable of processing up to 700 individual
sensor feeds and tracking over 50,000 individual targets
simultaneously.
AMOC coordinates with the Department of Defense (DoD), Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), the North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD), and international law enforcement partners in the
governments of Mexico (GoM), Canada, and the Bahamas, to detect,
identify, track, and support interdiction of suspect aviation and
maritime activity in the approaches to U.S. borders, at the borders,
and within the interior of the United States. This relationship,
enhanced through the deployment of shared surveillance technology has
allowed GoM to focus aviation and maritime enforcement efforts to
better combat transnational criminal organization (TCO) operations in
Northern Mexico and the contiguous U.S./Mexico border. For example,
this past January, officers working at the AMOC detected a suspicious
aircraft travelling north towards the United States. AMOC subsequently
alerted GoM, via the AMOSS, of the activity, and both the Mexican
Federal Police (PF) and Air Force (SEDENA) responded to investigate.
The abandoned aircraft was located by Mexican officials a short time
later, where 27 bags containing approximately 389 kilos
methamphetamine, 79 kilos of cocaine, 79 kilos of white heroin, and 1.5
kilos of black tar heroin were discovered and seized.
operational coordination
Secretary Johnson's Unity of Effort initiative has put in place new
and strengthened management processes to enable more effective DHS
component operations. In addition, DHS-wide border and maritime
security activities are being strategically guided by the new Southern
Border and Approaches Campaign. Aimed at leveraging the range of unique
Department roles, responsibilities, and capabilities, the Campaign
enhances our operational approach to working together in a more unified
way to address comprehensive threat environments. OAM has been
extensively involved in the planning and development of all Joint Task
Forces, particularly Joint Task Force--East (JTF-E), where OAM holds
the Deputy Director position. Working closely with the USCG, ICE and
others, we have played a key role in developing the Concept of
Operations, the DHS Force Management plan and led the critical Mission
Analysis planning efforts, which are all vital to meet the objectives
outlined in the SBACP. OAM will continue to invest in and fully support
the Joint Task Forces and looks forward to playing a key role in the
unity of effort outlined by the Secretary in the SBACP.
In 2011, the CBP commissioner, the USCG commandant and ICE
assistant secretary signed the cross-component Maritime Operations
Coordination (MOC) plan. The plan addresses the unique nature of the
maritime environment and sets forth a layered, DHS-wide approach to
homeland security issues within the maritime domain, ensuring
integrated planning, information sharing, and increased response
capability in each area of responsibility. In accordance with the MOC
plan, OAM has been a key stakeholder in the implementation of the
Regional Coordinating Mechanism (RECOM). Through this mechanism, OAM
coordinates maritime operational activities through integrated
planning, information sharing, and intelligence integration.
OAM agents participate in ICE HSI-led BEST task forces across the
Nation. This practice has multiple benefits. OAM agents provide
maritime law enforcement expertise and ready access to OAM assets and
capabilities. In turn, information shared through the BEST refines OAM
operations and enables more targeted enforcement. OAM recently became a
member of the BEST in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Working in conjunction
with the San Juan BEST, OAM operations have yielded 24 arrests, 1,453
pounds of narcotics, and $948,953 in currency over the current fiscal
year.
CBP OAM is the largest aviation contributor to the Joint
Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S), and is an integral part to
their aviation capability and success to counter illicit trafficking
within the maritime environment. P-3s patrol in a 42-million-square-
mile area that includes more than 41 nations, the Pacific and Atlantic
Oceans, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and maritime approaches to the
United States.
joint technology development
OAM has identified Domain Awareness as a core competency and an
essential element of a secure border. To that end, we will fully-
network our fleet and centers to share critical information in real
time. We are pursuing that vision through joint efforts with
technological partners.
OAM is engaged with the USCG and DoD to identify and deploy
technologies that expand overall maritime domain awareness and
integrates information and sensor data throughout DoD and DHS. AMOC has
begun to integrate data from airborne DOD assets and seeks to expand
further into the maritime domain. With the support of DHS S&T and the
USCG Research and Development Center, prototype technologies such as
the Integrated Maritime Domain Enterprise have been deployed to the
AMOC, USCG Sectors San Diego and Los Angeles/Long Beach, and are
currently under evaluation. This network is being developed to manage
and coherently integrate maritime sensors and data sources, such as
Minotaur and the Coastal Surveillance System, into a user-defined
operating picture, which can be then shared between stakeholders.
OAM works closely with the Science & Technology Directorate (S&T)
to identify and develop technology to improve our maritime surveillance
and detection capabilities, including low-flying aircraft detection and
tracking systems and data integration/data fusion capabilities.
Currently under development is Coalition Tactical Awareness and
Response (CTAR), a space-based system which can be used tactically
against maritime threats. OAM is also working with the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) to develop and field radiological and nuclear
(R/N) detection and nuclear forensics systems. For example, DNDO and
OAM are collaborating in the development of technology to detect R/N
threats aboard small vessels.
indicators of success
OAM efforts have resulted in the seizure of significant quantities
of contraband, and disrupted considerable illicit activity before it
reaches our shores.
In fiscal year 2014, OAM conducted 90,739 flight hours and 42,859
underway hours, resulting in the arrest of 4,725 suspects, the
apprehension of more than 79,672 illegal migrants, the seizure of 763
weapons, $147,805,097 in currency, and the interdiction of more than
1,155,815 pounds of illegal drugs, including 155,143 pounds of cocaine.
OAM recognizes the need for relevant, verifiable performance
measures that point towards outcomes as well as output, and has
initiated an effort to develop them. This is a new process for us. We
have engaged a Federally-funded research and development center to
assist in developing metrics particular to domain awareness. We plan to
refine a methodology for developing such measures, and apply it to
operations across our organization.
conclusion
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify today. OAM is a
critical component of CBP's border security mission. Our highly-trained
agents, together with our authorities, specialized assets, and tactics
comprise a well-rounded, experienced, and established law enforcement
organization, fully engaged in protecting the United States' maritime
borders from threats to the homeland.
I look forward to answering any questions you may have at this
time.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, General.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Roth for his testimony as
well.
STATEMENT OF JOHN ROTH, INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Roth. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss
our work at the U.S. Customs and Border Protections Office of
Air and Marine. We have conducted a number of audits which I
believe illustrate several persistent challenges facing the
Department of Homeland Security. Specifically, DHS components
do not engage in the kinds of basic management practices, such
as analyzing mission needs and deciding best how to meet those
needs before completing an acquisition that would better ensure
the components are able to carry out their missions
effectively.
Second, many complicated and expensive programs lack
performance measures, which are vital in ensuring the
effectiveness of those programs and operations.
Lastly, many programs fail to capitalize on efficiencies by
integrating their efforts with other DHS components, thus
hindering the Department's mission to achieve unity of effort.
CBP's unmanned aircraft program is an example of the
challenges the Department faces. In December 2014, we published
an audit report regarding the effectiveness and the cost of the
unmanned aircraft program. We found that the aircraft did not
fly as much as CBP had anticipated. The unmanned aircraft
logged a total of only about 5,100 hours in fiscal 2013. That
means each of the 10 aircraft available to CBP flew an average
of only 1.4 hours per day.
According to CBP, the aircraft do not fly more primarily
because of budget constraints, which prevented them from
obtaining the personnel, spare parts, and other infrastructure
for operations and maintenance necessary for more flight hours.
Other contributing factors included flight restrictions and
weather-related cancellations.
Although the program is about 10 years old, CBP has never
established formal metrics, which greatly impedes any effort to
determine whether the program has been successful. This lack of
relevant metrics is a barrier to fully understanding whether
the taxpayers' investment is a good one.
Our report did note that according to CBP's own figures,
the program was responsible for less than 1 percent of all
apprehensions in the sector in which it operated, which is only
about 170 miles of the 2,000-mile Southwest Border.
Additionally, at the beginning of the program, CBP expected
unmanned aircraft to reduce border surveillance costs by
between 25 and 50 percent per mile. However, CBP does not
currently track this metric, so we have no way of evaluating
whether they have met that. Additionally, by our measures, CBP
was not recognizing all the costs of operating the program.
To determine the full costs of the unmanned aircraft
program, we took an approach that is standard within Government
and private industry, managerial cost accounting, which really
requires answering a very simple question: How much does it
cost to do something? What is the total cost of ownership of a
specific program?
We estimated that in fiscal 2013, it cost at least $62.5
million to operate the program, or over $12,000 per flight
hour. CBP's estimates of the costs of operating the aircraft
were significantly lower, because it did not include the full
maintenance costs, depreciation, operation support, base
personnel, payment of rented air bases, and the cost of the
personnel to operate the program, as well as other costs.
The results for the 2015 audit were very similar to an
audit we did on the program 3 years before that. Given the
costs of the program as well as its current lack of performance
measures, we believe that CBP's decision not to expand the
program is a wise one.
Several other audit reports that we have conducted have
highlighted the need for renewed focus on management
fundamentals. For example, in January 2015, we issued a
management advisory describing the deficiencies in OAM's
management of its national aviation maintenance contract.
Unfortunately, we were unable to complete a detailed review of
the contract costs. This is a series of contracts worth in
excess of $930 million. We were unable to complete a detailed
review of the contract costs because of inconsistent and
unreliable data. This unreliable data precluded further
analysis. In essence, the state of the record-keeping within
CBP and its contractors made the program unauditable.
Likewise, in 2013, we reported that CBP was unwilling to
coordinate with the Coast Guard to upgrade its H-60 helicopters
even though both components were converting the same
helicopters. As a result, CBP may have missed an opportunity to
save significant taxpayer money.
Chairman Miller, this concludes my prepared statement. I
welcome any questions that you or other Members of the
committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roth follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Roth
July 14, 2015
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss our work
at U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Office of Air and Marine
(OAM).
In my testimony today, I will focus on our recent report on CBP's
unmanned aircraft systems, as well as other reports, which I believe
illustrate several persistent issues facing the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). Specifically:
DHS components often do not engage in the kinds of basic
management practices--such as analyzing mission needs and
deciding how best to meet those needs before completing an
acquisition--that would better ensure the components are able
to carry out their missions effectively.
Many complicated and expensive programs lack performance
measures, which are vital to ensuring the effectiveness of
those programs and operations. Components also continue to use
poor business practices that often result in less than ideal
stewardship of taxpayer dollars.
Finally, many programs fail to capitalize on efficiencies
that may be gained by integrating their efforts with those of
other components, thus hindering the Department's mission to
achieve a unity of effort.
unmanned aircraft system (uas)
From fiscal years 2005 to 2013, CBP invested about $360 million on
its Unmanned Aircraft System (i.e., ``drone'' program), which includes
Predator B aircraft, related equipment such as ground control stations,
as well as personnel, maintenance, and support. In 2014, we conducted
an audit to determine the effectiveness and cost of the UAS program.
Unfortunately, despite its 8-year effort and significant investment
of taxpayer dollars, CBP could not demonstrate how much the program has
improved border security, largely because the program lacks performance
measures and CBP was unaware of the true cost of the program.
Anticipated usage of the aircraft
When CBP established its UAS Concept of Operations in 2010, it
expected that by fiscal year 2013, it would be flying four 16-hour
unmanned aircraft patrols every day of the year, or 23,296 total flight
hours. However, the unmanned aircraft logged a combined total of 5,102
flight hours, or about 80 percent less than what OAM anticipated.
According to OAM, the aircraft did not fly more primarily because of
budget constraints, which prevented OAM from obtaining the personnel,
spare parts and other infrastructure for operations, and maintenance
necessary for more flight hours. Other contributing factors included
flight restrictions and weather-related cancellations.
Performance metrics
Although the UAS program is about 10 years old, OAM has never
established formal metrics, which greatly impedes any effort to
determine whether the program has been successful. OAM's failure to
establish relevant metrics is a barrier to fully understanding whether
the taxpayers' investment is a good one.
When OAM stood up the program, however, it did establish
performance expectations in order to justify the cost of the program.
These expectations are contained within the 2007 UAS Mission Need
Statement, Concept of Operations, and Acquisition Plan. Government
auditing standards permit us to compare such expectations against
current performance.\1\ The performance expectations included:
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\1\ Government Auditing Standards, 2011 Revision, section 6.37.
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Increased apprehensions.--CBP anticipated that UAS support
would increase apprehensions. For example, according to the UAS
Mission Need Statement, ``This investment expects to improve
the efficiency, effectiveness, and safety of Border Patrol
agents . . . by reducing response to false motion sensor
alerts, increasing the number of apprehensions of illegal
border crossings, and raising the agent's situational awareness
when moving towards and making arrests.''
Although it is not possible to determine whether the specific use
of unmanned aircraft increased apprehensions of illegal border
crossers, we can compare the United States Border Patrol's
total number of reported apprehensions to the number of
apprehensions OAM attributed to the use of unmanned aircraft.
For example, in the Tucson and Rio Grande Valley Sectors, where
UAS operations were concentrated, the Border Patrol reported
275,392 apprehensions; yet, CBP attributed only 2,272 of those
apprehensions, or less than 1 percent, to the UAS program.
Moreover, according to Border Patrol Agents and intelligence
personnel we interviewed in Arizona, the Border Patrol probably
would have detected the same people using ground-based assets,
without the assistance of unmanned aircraft.
Reducing border surveillance costs.--According to the UAS
Mission Need Statement, OAM expected unmanned aircraft to
reduce border surveillance costs by 25 to 50 percent per mile.
However, because OAM does not track this metric, it cannot
demonstrate that the unmanned aircraft have reduced the cost of
border surveillance.
Responding to sensor alerts.--According to the UAS Mission
Need Statement, unmanned aircraft would improve the Border
Patrol's efficiency by responding to sensor alerts, allowing
the Border Patrol to determine whether any action was necessary
before sending an agent to the location. However, we identified
only six instances in fiscal year 2013 of unmanned aircraft
responding to ground sensor alerts.
Border coverage.--According to DHS' Annual Performance
Report, Fiscal Years 2012-2014, the UAS program expanded
unmanned aircraft coverage to the entire Southwest Border.
However, unmanned aircraft do not currently cover the entire
Southwest Border. The Federal Aviation Administration permits
OAM to fly its unmanned aircraft over the Southwest Border from
California to the Texas Gulf Coast. Yet, of the 1,993-mile
Southwest Border, UAS operations focused on only about 100
miles of the Arizona border and 70 miles of the Texas border.
True cost of the program
By our measure, CBP was not recognizing all operating costs. To
determine the full cost of the UAS program, we took an approach that is
standard within the Government and private industry: Managerial cost
accounting. This requires answering a simple question--how much does it
cost to do something? In the case of unmanned aircraft, we wanted to
know how much it cost to own, operate, and maintain the aircraft and
sensors. Specifically, how much did it cost DHS, and the taxpayer, to
provide the capabilities of the Predator B unmanned aircraft?
We estimate that, in fiscal year 2013, it cost at least $62.5
million to operate the unmanned aircraft system program, or about
$12,255 per flight hour. CBP's estimates of the cost of operating the
aircraft were significantly lower because it did not include:
Full maintenance costs.--Our estimate, based on the amount
stated in the contract, was that all of the maintenance and
support of the aircraft would cost more than $24 million. OAM's
calculation of $9.4 million did not include the costs paid to
the contractor when mechanics were not performing maintenance
activities.
Depreciation.--The unmanned aircraft have a 20-year life
span, and based on ordinary straight-line depreciation, cost
about $7.6 million per year. OAM's lack of accounting for
depreciation is inconsistent with all generally accepted
accounting practices, both in the Government and the private
sector.
Operations support.--OAM paid a contractor for program
management and flight operations support services, including
flight operations support at four airbases and an operations
center in California, as well as incidental materials, travel,
training, and data deliverables. It did not include this in its
total cost calculation.
Base overhead.--OAM houses the unmanned aircraft at bases
around the country, and pays for services such as rent and
utilities, but does not recognize these services as costs of
doing business.
OAM personnel.--OAM does not count the cost of the pilot or
support personnel in its calculations--more than $11 million
per year--because they are funded through a separate
appropriation. However, according to OMB Circular A-126 and
General Services Administration requirements, a proper
accounting for costs must include these costs, which is why we
included them in our report. Specifically, OMB and GSA require
that agencies accumulate operations and ownership costs of
aircraft programs, as well as account for the cost of
acquiring, operating, and supporting their aircraft. In
addition, according to the Federal Accounting Standards
Advisory Board, ``the full cost of a program's output is the
total amount of resources used to produce the output . . .
regardless of the funding sources.''
Given the cost of the UAS program, as well as its current lack of
performance measures, we believe CBP's decision not to expand the
program at this time is a wise one. We are concerned about the
equivocal nature of their decision, however. Recent OAM documents
regarding the UAS program state that there is a $34 million shortfall
in funding and that OAM does not support program expansion without
additional funding.
As we said in our report, OAM's comments indicate that if it did
receive additional funding, it would support program expansion. We
recognize that ``at this time'' or ``currently'' OAM does not plan to
expand the program. To be clear, our recommendation addresses OAM's
long-term plan and requires an independent study to determine whether
the $443 million associated with the long-term plan could be put to
better use by investing in the current program or in alternatives. We
would encourage CBP to explore investing in alternatives, such as
manned aircraft and ground surveillance assets.
We are pleased to report that, as a result of our audit, CBP agreed
to establish program goals and performance measures, and the Department
agreed to conduct an independent study before acquiring more unmanned
aircraft, as well as establish a DHS-wide policy for accumulating all
program costs. The Department recently informed us that it expects to
complete its study to determine whether additional unmanned aircraft
are needed and justified by December 31, 2015. CBP is also in the
process of revising the UAS Concept of Operations to ensure it contains
attainable goals and verifiable performance measures. Additionally, the
Department has established a charter for the Flight Hour Program
Working Group, which is committed to transparent cost accounting for
all DHS aviation programs. We believe the Department, specifically, the
Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer, was very responsive to
the report and is especially committed to addressing two of our
recommendations. (U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Unmanned
Aircraft System Program Does Not Achieve Intended Results or Recognize
All Costs of Operations, OIG-15-17)
The results of our 2015 UAS report--that CBP logged only about 20
percent of its anticipated flight hours, could not demonstrate
performance, and had not accounted for all of its costs--were
predictable. Three years earlier, we assessed the drone program and
found that CBP's inadequate planning and project management resulted in
performance shortfalls. Specifically, in our May 2012 report, CBP's Use
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Nation's Border Security, we
reported:
CBP had not achieved its anticipated number of flight hours.
CBP desired 13,328 flight hours; however, staffing and
equipment shortages, coupled with FAA and other restrictions,
limited actual flight hours to 3,909;
CBP's lack of a specific operations and maintenance budget
request for the UAS program resulted in a $25 million budget
shortfall. From fiscal years 2006 through 2011, CBP reported it
spent $55.3 million for operations and maintenance, but it had
not made a specific operations and maintenance budget request
for the UAS program. As a result, CBP needed to transfer about
$25 million from other programs in fiscal year 2010 to address
the shortfall; and
CBP had not adequately planned to fund unmanned aircraft-
related equipment, such as ground control stations, cameras,
and navigation systems, which resulted in insufficient
equipment to perform UAS missions.
other audit work
Several other audit reports have highlighted the need for a renewed
focus on management fundamentals. Congress and the public must be
confident that CBP's financial practices and operations minimize
inefficient and wasteful spending, and that it is making informed
decisions to manage its programs and implement its policies.
Insufficient and unreliable data prevents analysis and accountability
Sound financial practices and related management operations are
critical to achieving the Department's mission and to providing
reliable, timely information that supports management decision making.
However, CBP has not consistently documented the analysis justifying
programs or conducted thorough needs assessments before moving forward
with acquisitions. In addition, it does not always collect the right
information and the data it does collect is too often inconsistent and
unreliable.
For example, in January 2015, we issued a management advisory
describing deficiencies in OAM's management of its national aviation
maintenance contract. In 2009, CBP awarded a $938 million contract to
Defense Support Services, LLC to maintain about 265 aircraft to fly
approximately 100,000 hours per year. Even though the number of CBP
aircraft maintained, annual flight hours, and the average age of the
aircraft fleet decreased from fiscal years 2010 through 2013, contract
costs increased an average of nearly 9 percent per year.
Unfortunately, we were unable to complete a detailed review of the
contract costs because of inconsistent and unreliable data.
Specifically, we could not verify whether the contractor correctly
charged CBP for the maintenance labor hours it completed. The
contractor and CBP used two separate data systems for recording
maintenance labor hours. We tried to compare CBP's labor hour data to
labor hour data provided by the contractor, but the data was
inconsistent and did not match. This unreliable data precluded further
analysis. In essence, the state of the recordkeeping made the program
unauditable. CBP told us that it planned to improve verification and
tracking of maintenance labor hours. (U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's Management of National Aviation Maintenance Activities,
Management Advisory)
Unity of effort and leveraging other Department programs
Likewise, we have observed that, despite similar responsibilities
and challenges, DHS components are not always willing to work together
to realize economies of scale, which hinders the Department's overall
cost-effectiveness and efficiency. For example, in 2013, we reported
that CBP was unwilling to coordinate with the Coast Guard to upgrade
its H-60 helicopters, even though both components were converting the
same helicopters. In March 2010, DHS' Acquisition Review Board directed
the Coast Guard to collaborate with CBP and present a joint review on
possible helicopter program synergies. The Coast Guard hosted CBP
officials at its Aviation Logistics Center, but according to Coast
Guard and CBP officials, a senior CBP executive canceled any reciprocal
visits by Coast Guard officials and instructed CBP staff not to have
any further contact with Coast Guard H-60 personnel. Without CBP's
cooperation, the Coast Guard could not complete the joint review, and
neither the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management nor
the Acquisition Review Board followed up.
As a result, CBP may have missed an opportunity to save significant
taxpayer money. In fact, we determined that DHS could have saved about
$126 million if the two components had successfully coordinated the
conversion of CBP's H-60 helicopters at the Coast Guard's Aviation
Logistics Center. Instead, CBP chose to continue its conversion program
with the Army. When we contrasted the cost and number of helicopters
the Army converted and modified for CBP with Coast Guard's efforts, we
found that the Coast Guard was able to convert many more helicopters at
less cost and in a shorter period of time:
Between September 2008 and July 2012, the Army converted and
modified two CBP H-60s at an average cost of $22.3 million
each; the conversions took about 3.5 years.
In contrast, between January 2007 and July 2012, the Coast
Guard converted 27 of its H-60s; the last 7 conversions cost
about $5.3 million each and took an average of less than a year
to complete. At that time, we estimated that each future CBP
conversion would cost about $18.3 million and would take about
1.7 years to complete.
A subsequent H-60 Business Case Analysis by DHS' Office of Chief
Readiness Support Officer, the Aviation Governing Board, the Coast
Guard, and CBP confirmed the cost savings of having the Coast Guard
convert the helicopters but it was too late.\2\ CBP would not have
additional funds for its H-60 efforts until fiscal year 2017 and, based
on the condition of its H-60 helicopters, it had to remove many of them
from operations. Ultimately, the program simply ran out of money
because of mismanagement.
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\2\ According to the initial DHS H-60 Helicopter Business Case
Analysis (February 28, 2014), CBP estimated the recapitalization costs
at $25.6 million per aircraft (including modification requirements).
This would have equated to a total cost of $256 million for the
remaining 10 CBP H-60As. After further discussions with DHS, we
calculated that DHS could save as much as $132 million to convert and
modify the remaining 10 CBP H-60s if done at the Coast Guard's Aviation
Logistics Center.
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In response to one of our other recommendations, CBP is
coordinating with the U.S. Army to trade its older H-60As for newer H-
60Ls that the Army is decommissioning. This project is on-going. All
aircraft acquisitions and other significant investments must now be
submitted through the Department's Joint Requirements Council, which
was established to make better-informed investment decisions,
particularly as it relates to supporting a unified Department
acquisition strategy. One of the Council's emphasis areas is to ensure
better integration of aviation assets. We hope that this process, which
was created only a year ago, will assist in avoiding future acquisition
mismanagement. (DHS's H-60 Helicopter Programs (Revised), OIG-13-89)
CBP's acquisition of an aviation management tracking system
provides another example of missed opportunities to improve performance
and cut program costs. In August 2012, we reported that despite CBP's
and the Coast Guard's joint strategy to unify their aviation logistics
and maintenance systems, CBP planned to purchase a new aviation
management tracking system that would not be coordinated with the Coast
Guard's already operational system. We concluded that if CBP
transitioned to the Coast Guard's system instead, it would improve
tracking of aviation management and cost less. CBP did not concur with
our recommendations, but the former acting CBP Commissioner directed
OAM to stop the acquisition of the new system.
Subsequently, OAM directed the development of a new web-based
program under the current National Aviation Maintenance contract, which
will allow it to continue to use its existing aviation maintenance
tracking system. We closed this recommendation because the web-based
program, which is expected in March 2016, is not considered a new
computer system. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that CBP should
migrate to the Coast Guard's aviation management tracking system rather
than continuing with their current plan, which should only be
considered a stopgap measure. (CBP Acquisition of Aviation Management
Tracking System (Revised), OIG-12-104)
In its 2012 report on DHS's Air and Marine Assets, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) reported that DHS could improve certain
types of coordination, such as co-locating proximate OAM and Coast
Guard units, to better leverage existing resources, eliminate
unnecessary duplication, and enhance efficiencies. GAO also reported
that OAM had not documented its analyses to support its resource mix
and placement decisions for its air and marine assets across all
locations. (Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More
Effective Use of DHS's Air and Marine Assets, GAO-12-518, March 2012)
conclusion
The Department, CBP, and OAM have taken steps to implement our
recommendations, yet OAM's basic management practices continue to fall
short. Sound planning and strategies for efficiently acquiring, using,
and maintaining aviation assets that operate at full capacity, for
example, would go a long way toward improving overall operations.
Additionally, OAM should take advantage of every opportunity to
coordinate with the Coast Guard to eliminate duplication and leverage
assets. Finally, better performance measures and calculation of costs
would help enhance security, as well as safeguard taxpayer dollars.
Chairman Miller, this concludes my prepared statement. I welcome
any questions you or other Members of the subcommittee may have.
appendix.--oig reports referenced in this testimony
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Unmanned Aircraft System Program
Does Not Achieve Intended Results or Recognize All Costs of Operations,
OIG-15-17, December 2014
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Management of National Aviation
Maintenance Activities, CBP Management Advisory, January 2015
DHS' H-60 Helicopter Programs (Revised), OIG-13-89, May 2013
CBP's Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Nation's Border Security,
OIG-12-85, May 2012
CBP Acquisition of Aviation Management Tracking System (Revised), OIG-
12-104, August 2012
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
General, I am sure you want to respond to that. I had some
other questions, but I think I will just start right out after
listening to Mr. Roth talk about some of the findings from
the--let's start with the UAV program.
Honestly, I can remember about 10 or 11 years ago my first
trip to the Southern Border when I came to Congress, and there
weren't really UAVs being utilized at that time, and how
important everybody determined that it would be to use UAVs as
a critical component for border security, surveillance, et
cetera. Then the last time I had been down to the Southern
Border again was just recently, well, this year, and we looked
at a number of the UAVs and the drones, et cetera, and their
effectiveness and et cetera, et cetera.
But that being said, what is your response, I guess, to
this saying that drones and the resources that you have there
only being used 1 hour a day, or 1-point-whatever hours a day
out of a 24-hour day, and----
Mr. Alles. I would address the averaging across 365 days a
year for an aircraft fleet when you have limitations in terms
of how many hours you can operate on a maintenance contract,
how many employees you have, I think, is not a great comparison
of the program itself.
The program has delivered good returns for us year over
year. I will just mention the year that they did the audit for
us, as I have provided these numbers to the staff and also to
the Senate staff. The aircraft flew 5,100 flight hours, as Mr.
Roth indicates, that year. I would acknowledge the airplane is
not flying as many hours as it wanted to. It is never going to
fly the 23,000 hours that they put in the report. In fact, it
would be irresponsible of me to actually try to do that, as I
would wear the airframes out in probably 3 to 5 years. That is
about 2,500 hours for airframe per year with the current number
of airplanes I am operating, which is 8.
But in that year he talks about, we had substantial
contraband seizures in the amount of $341 million of contraband
at street value. That as a return on investment is $66,000 per
flight hour that the UAV flew. That is a pretty good return on
investment. Using his numbers of $12,000 per hour, that gave me
an ROI in that year of 444 percent. This year----
Mrs. Miller. Not to interrupt, but what was it--did you say
that it was only 1 percent of the interdictions that were done
by UAVs?
Mr. Alles. Well, he said 1 percent of the apprehensions,
which is a true statement, but it also detected 18,000 people
moving across the border in that same year, which is 15 percent
of the apprehensions made in the Tucson sector. So, I mean, it
depends on how you want to work the numbers.
The fact is for a platform using the VADER system that was
borrowed from the Army that year, we had one system borrowed
from the Army that was able to fly a limited amount of hours
per day, no more than 8, it got 18,000 detections of people
walking across the border. Those were used to bring Border
Patrol agents into apprehensions, I think with substantial
results.
So I would say we have to be careful about characterizing
the platform, not recognizing how much domain awareness it
actually provides us overall. It allows us to see the border in
ways we could never see it before with the systems on-board the
aircraft, and actually recognize where we don't need technology
and personnel, because there is nothing occurring in certain
sections of the border.
So it helps us risk reduce and provide an efficiency across
CBP and the Department, because I don't waste money in
locations that I don't need to put cameras and Border Patrol
agents and aircraft, because I can look and see if I have
movement across those borders. So that would be how I would
respond to it overall, ma'am.
Mrs. Miller. I appreciate that.
Mr. Roth.
Mr. Roth. Thank you. A couple things just to make sure we
actually understand. The 23,000 hours was not the number that
we came up with. That is what CBP Air and Marine in their
concept of operations said. They said that they wanted to have
four patrols up 16 hours a day 365 days a year. That is the
calculation we use. We are not in the business of determining
what metrics CBP Air and Marine need to use. We simply took the
metrics that they had at the beginning of the program and sort
of juxtaposed that against what is currently occurring.
Some of the metrics that have been mentioned here today, I
think, are probably pretty good ones, but to have a formal
sort-of metric program, you need to sort-of publish those and
you need to sort-of state what those metrics are, and more
importantly, you need to compare sort-of the metrics for, for
example, the unmanned systems against some of your other
aircraft.
One of the things that we would be advocating is, No. 1,
understand the true cost of ownership, which I know is a
different issue that we probably will talk about, but No. 2,
compare different kinds of aircraft. So is a drone, an unmanned
vehicle, more cost-effective than, say, a long-range fixed-wing
aircraft? We don't have the answer to that question, because
that calculation has never been done.
So what we advocate in all these is to have transparent
sort-of performance measures put upfront, not in response to an
audit or any other reason, but to put it upfront so we
understand, you know, when you talk about bang for the buck,
you need to talk about what the bucks are, so you have to have
accurate accounting, and then two, the bang, in other words,
what is it that you are trying to do.
But I will have to say that the performance measures, for
example, of seized narcotics, I mean, that is one of those
things that we can certainly talk about, either using the
retail value of those seized narcotics might not be appropriate
or it may, depending on sort-of how they decide to sort-of
judge effectiveness. But what we did was we simply took what it
is that they thought they were going to do and compare it
against current performance.
Mrs. Miller. You know, just following up on that, if I
could, and I know the Ranking Member--do you have to go right
now?
Mr. Vela. I will wait.
Mrs. Miller. Okay. All right. Good. I know you got to----
Mr. Vela. I don't want to leave you alone.
Mrs. Miller. All right.
In regards to the performance metrics, and I guess I would
just like you to talk a little bit about that, General,
because, as you know, this subcommittee, our full committee
actually has passed a border security bill, which unfortunately
we have not gotten floor time on yet, but I am hopeful that we
will do so sometime during this calendar year, and a very big
part of that is accountability, is using metrics so that we can
assure, obviously not just the Congress, but the American
people that we have operational control of the various sectors
of border around our Nation.
I think everyone that is involved in the border security
business is going to be--we are going to be looking at everyone
to assist us with making sure that we have those kinds of
metrics.
So as Mr. Roth is pointing out here, what is your thought
about performance metrics and what you might be able to put out
there for us?
Mr. Alles. So I think on the metrics side, that is an area
that we have struggled in overall. The Border Patrol is working
on new metrics for their organization in terms of how they
characterize the border. We are working on metrics, which have
never been done before, on how you characterize--how do you
characterize air support? So, you know, how do you characterize
the effectiveness of an aircraft for surveillances, how do you
put a dollar value on it, how do you do that? We don't have
good answers for that.
So we currently are engaging one of these Federally-funded
research and development organizations to help us try to
develop air metrics specifically for our organization, which
would hopefully address part of the issues that Mr. Roth is
bringing up. I think also we can work better with the IG in
terms of staff to staff on trying to figure out what these
metrics are.
I would acknowledge that ConOps, you know, lays out a very
ambitious and unattainable level of attainment for the UAV,
given the frictions of operating that. So I don't want to--I
want to be careful here to not say that, you know, that is not
in there, because that was in there, but, you know, it is an
unrealistic value.
But I think on the metrics, I think we have to acknowledge
that we need to do considerable work on that. For me, my part
of it is the air piece of this, how I characterize the use of
my air assets and how I value those air assets, you know,
across CBP, and that is what we are working on currently.
Mrs. Miller. Right. Obviously as you do those metrics,
flying hours are utilizing the resource is going to be an
important part of that metrics as well.
Mr. Alles. Yes, ma'am. We understand what we get. We
understand what the apprehensions are, we understand what we
see with the aircraft, we understand what the seizures are in
terms of cash, drugs, arrests. All those data I have, you know,
and we can look at that year over year and see how it has gone
up, gone down, and up slightly, and then down again this year.
All that information we have. Beyond that, in terms of the
information we don't know, the unknown movements, that is our
major struggle.
Mrs. Miller. All right. Thank you very much.
I would ask the Ranking Member to have his questions.
Mr. Vela. Commissioner Alles--are we pronouncing that
right?
Mr. Alles. Yes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Vela. Okay. What can you tell us about the incident in
Laredo, and if you could elaborate on the commissioning of the
two Blackhawks. I am curious, you know, do you think that is
sufficient, and then how is all that working now in light of
the episode?
Mr. Alles. I am not sure I understood the Blackhawk part,
sir.
Mr. Vela. Well, after the helicopter incident, two
Blackhawks were sent to Laredo, right?
Mr. Alles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Vela. I am just curious, I would like for you to assess
how you think that is working and whether you think that is
sufficient.
Mr. Alles. So in that particular instance there, that was
obviously a drug movement that was occurring across the Rio
Grande, our helicopter had moved in basically on a call from
the local police department that there was an event occurring
and they were watching it. As they came in over the top of the
smugglers, I think on the second trip they were fired at from
the Mexican side of the border by a member that is kind of, I
will call him a contractor, I hate to say it that way, but he
basically contracts his services out to different cartels at
different times.
He fired at the aircraft, we think a number of rounds,
probably 10 to 15 rounds, we have never recovered the weapon to
this point, but he struck the aircraft twice. We do know that
we were able to identify who he was. He has been apprehended at
this time by the FBI, so we are confident about that.
But one thing we did want to especially reinforce both on
the investigative side and also on the appearances side is we
want to make--we don't want to encourage cartel members to be
firing at our aircraft. So part of that is making sure that we
catch the cartel member and, if necessary, putting equipment
down there that is more heavily reinforced.
So a Blackhawk helicopter is obviously a military
helicopter. It can be armored. It has a ballistic armor kit
that goes on the aircraft. A recent Mexican helicopter,
Blackhawk just was shot up, seven bullets hit it, and it flew
just fine. So it is a much more survivable helicopter. We put
it down there really to emphasize that, you know, we are
serious about doing border security, we don't want our aircraft
fired at from the Mexican side.
So we are somewhat trying to send a message to the cartels
that this is not a good thing to do. I think it is important
for us to reinforce that for the protection of our own people
that are operating down on the border.
Mr. Vela. But were those two Blackhawks sent just to the
Laredo area or were they sent down to patrol the entire region
from----
Mr. Alles. Primarily the Laredo area. They did do wider
patrols, but primarily to the Laredo area where the shooting
occurred.
Mr. Vela. Are your personnel that are using helicopters
elsewhere, I assume they are not as protected?
Mr. Alles. I think if your question is--most of my
helicopter fleet, light enforcement helicopters cannot be
armored. The AS-350, the EC-120 do not have enough lifting
capacity to put armor on those aircraft. They just won't
operate. So the only aircraft I have that has that kind of
capacity is the Blackhawk.
Mr. Vela. When you----
Mr. Alles. Now----
Mr. Vela. I am sorry. When you say, ``armored,'' you mean
defensively armored? Right?
Mr. Alles. Right. Yes, sir. They can actually put armor--
there is an armor kit that actually goes on the Blackhawk
helicopter. So the other ones cannot be armored. We
traditionally have not had them fired at on the border. I mean,
it is a very rare instance.
Mr. Vela. Now, did I hear you say that the FBI captured
him? He was captured in Mexico, though, right, by Mexican----
Mr. Alles. Yeah. My understanding is they were working with
Mexican authorities, obviously. I mean, they had to work with
Mexican authorities in capturing him.
Mr. Vela. Can you tell us where that is in the adjudicative
process?
Mr. Alles. I do not know, sir. I haven't heard anything. I
have not gotten any updates on the investigation here since
about a week ago.
Mr. Vela. So just in general, can you tell us why it makes
sense to keep the Office of Air and Marine as a distinct
entity?
Mr. Alles. Well, I think it allows the commissioner of CBP
to basically enforce customs and immigration law in a holistic
way across, you know, the United States. Without that, he
would--you know, he would lack enforcement capability both on
the air and the marine side to effectively discharge their
responsibilities.
I mean, really as you all are aware, it was a 9/11 creation
that brought CBP into be a unified border agency. We are
frequently visited by other countries to look at the model that
was created really by the Congress in forming CBP, because that
is not what they have typically in their countries where they
have a holistic approach to both customs, immigration, and
border protection all in one agency, all with one
responsibility.
So from that standpoint, if you start pulling sections out,
I mean, it would leave the commissioner unable to really
enforce the laws that he has been given responsibility for.
Mr. Vela. How would you distinguish what you do from the
Coast Guard?
Mr. Alles. I think the main ways I would distinguish us
from the Coast Guard is really in terms of the types of
organizations we are. Now, like in many situations, I mean,
things look like they overlap. So you have the Navy operates
obviously in the maritime, the Coast Guard operates in the
maritime. There are areas where their missions look like--or
where they look like they overlap. They both operate down in
the transit zone. But we distinctly recognize that between the
Navy and the Coast Guard, they have distinct mission sets.
So the Coast Guard really is a military--is a military
organization. It is primarily working on the high seas. It uses
different equipment and different training from CBP, and it is
not focused entirely in the areas that we are. So its mission
set is different.
CBP is a law enforcement organization. Each of my agents
has on average 17 years of law enforcement experience. So that
is the average throughout the agency. We work primarily not on
the high seas; we work in U.S. customs water, so within 12
miles of the coast, and we have specifically equipped ourselves
to counter the threat that we are going after, which is
basically your small boat traffic, not so much your commercial
traffic, your go-fast type of vessels, which we have high-speed
interceptors to actually interdict those.
We work really in a law enforcement realm. So we are doing
unmarked operations, we are doing plain clothes operations. We
sometimes work with ICE in undercover operations to do law
enforcement work. We are working on investigations. We are
performing covert tracking in some cases, you know, via court
permission. We will do forensics. We obtain and execute
warrants. We are actually arresting U.S. citizens in a law
enforcement function.
So there is really a lot of differences between what the
Coast Guard is doing and ours. I really don't so much want to
speak to the Coast Guard, because I am not--you know, I am
kind-of talking out of school when I am talking about their
mission set, but as a law enforcement organization, we are
structured entirely differently from the Coast Guard, not as a
military organization, and our responsibilities and authorities
are much different from that regard.
Mr. Vela. Well, I look forward to speaking to you about
this in more depth at a future date. I am going to have to ask
both of you to excuse me, because I have got another hearing I
have got to attend to.
With that, I yield the balance of my time.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman very much. I think I am
going to pick up a little bit on his question.
Pardon me?
Oh, Mrs. Torres, excuse me. Would you like to take the seat
here or----
Mrs. Torres. Yes.
Mrs. Miller. Actually, I will yield your time to ask your
questions.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you very much, Chairman Miller.
Mr. Alles? Alles.
Mr. Alles. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Torres. Fiscal year 2014, the Department of Homeland
Security appropriations bill provided the Office of Air and
Marine with 55 additional positions. Can you tell me what the
status of that is?
Mr. Alles. So those are to our Air and Marine Operations
Center, which is a key part of our domain awareness across the
United States. It pulls in all of the FAA radar feeds, all the
military radar feeds, all of our TARs radar feeds, and also
coordinates all of our Air and Marine activity----
Mrs. Torres. Out of Riverside, correct?
Mr. Alles. That is in Riverside, yes, ma'am. Those
positions are going to the Air and Marine Ops Center so they
can get better coverage. We had a lot of uncovered positions
where we were receiving information, and we can't actually--we
could not process the information due to lack of personnel.
So those 55 positions have been very beneficial. Currently
45 of those positions have been selected. A high density of
veterans have been selected in those positions, so we are well
on our way to getting to the 55 number overall. So 45, 55
selected; not actually on-board yet, but they are well into the
process of being on-boarded at this time.
Mrs. Torres. In training, how long before they are actually
in the field?
Mr. Alles. Honest, I will have to check that. I know that a
number of them already have radar expertise coming out of the
military service, will not require so much training, but I
don't have an exact figure on that once they start down that
training rack.
Mrs. Torres. Did the 2014 Border Patrol Pay Reform Bill
have any impact on the Office of Air and Marine, and are there
any pay challenges within the Office of Air and Marine?
Mr. Alles. So the Border Patrol Act was, you know, as you
are probably aware, for the Border Patrol itself. One of our
primary pay challenges inside of Air and Marine is the diverse
pay set that we have. So we have members that are working on
your normal Federal overtime, FIFA; we have members that are
working on law enforcement AUO pay; goodness, also LEAP. I am
drawing a blank on what AUO means. Administrative
Uncontrollable Law of Overtime, and then the LEAP pay, the Law
Enforcement Availability Pay.
We would like to get the--we would like as an efficiency to
get all of our agents onto the LEAP statute. That would
actually be a budget efficiency for us, it would save us money,
it would help correct the very diverse pay sets that we have
inside of OAM overall. So I think getting our members onto--the
remaining members we have in OAM onto the LEAP statute would be
very helpful for us overall and would actually save us some
money.
Mrs. Torres. What does your rank-and-file feel about that?
Mr. Alles. They are overall are in favor of that. It
provides more predictability for them since it is an
availability pay and not on overtime pay. So it is more
predictable in terms of the pay coming each year than when you
are working in the AUO and the AUO area.
Mrs. Torres. How does that impact their retirement?
Mr. Alles. It would actually--whether it is AUO or LEAP, I
mean, that is all going to factor into their retirement pay. It
would really depend on if the LEAP pay was higher than the AUO
pay as whether that would make it better or worse for
retirement. I think overall it is generally neutral, as I talk
to folks about the effect it would have on them.
Mrs. Torres. Okay. Thank you. I yield back my time.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentlelady very much.
General and Mr. Roth, I am going to go back to what Mr.
Vela was talking about in regards to the authorities between
the Air and Marine and the Coast Guard, and I want to sort-of
follow up on that, because--and I know we always talk about the
Southern Border, but on the Northern Border, actually in my
district, we have--at Selfridge Air National Guard Base, we
have an Air and Marine division there who are very, very
effective, I think.
Let me just take this opportunity to thank everybody that
works at the Air and Marine, all of your brave men and women
that are out on our front lines each and every day. They just
do remarkable, remarkable work, and we all have the utmost
gratitude and respect for the work that they do.
But at the Air and Marine in our area, you know, they have
got obviously all the personnel and then the air assets, the
water assets. Air assets, they both have fixed wings and rotor,
et cetera. Also on the same Air National Guard base actually as
Air and Marine as a tenant, we also have under the Homeland
Security umbrella, Coast Guard Air Station Detroit is there.
Then in addition to that, the Border Patrol is actually
operating something that we call the Operational Integration
Center, which is all the high-tech bells and whistles of really
trying to analyze all the information that they are fed from
the various stakeholders about assessing the threat, responding
to the threat, and so on and so forth.
But I will tell you with all of that, sometimes I am a bit
confused myself about the overlap of the Air and Marine and the
Coast Guard, and whether or not the missions are so different,
and the type of equipment that they need and you need is so
different. I will just tell you that because the Coast Guard
right now in the Great Lakes doesn't have any ability to have
their helicopters with de-icing equipment on it, so they are
looking for some Blackhawks also as opposed to the equipment
that they have.
But anyway, it just sort-of always leads to conversations
about the kind of equipment that Air and Marine has and the
kind of equipment that the Coast Guard has, and in the Great
Lakes sector and along the Northern Border there, the two of
you operating in a similar--in the identical environment, quite
frankly.
So if you could, could you just talk a little bit more
about your mission being so different that you do have to have
specialized equipment different than the Coast Guard, just for
my own clarification?
Mr. Alles. So one thing I should point out is that when it
comes to the maritime equipment, there is a Boat Commodities
Council inside of DHS that helps us coordinate equipment
purchase between ourselves and what the Coast Guard is doing.
So in the areas that we can get commonality with the Coast
Guard because the mission set matches closely, we do. For
instance, we have received a number of safe boats from the
Coast Guard that we are using in our operations on the Riverine
that the Coast Guard had accessed that have gone right into our
inventory and have performed well for us. So that BCC, as we
call it, is actually coordinating these activities.
We do the small engine repair for the Coast Guard down at
our National Marine Center in St. Augustine, so we--that,
again, is an efficiency that we perform for the Coast Guard. We
have to do engine repair ourselves anyways, because we have a
lot of small--I would call them small boats. They are fairly
large for you know, for pleasure boats, but they are a smaller
asset compared to what the Coast Guard operates.
But I would say beyond that, as I think about the Northern
Border, the main difference is, as I think about the maritime
and Northern Border is, how do you tackle these open spaces? I
think the issue for us is that we have to develop information
of what I will call law enforcement intelligence, and that
really involves casework with ICE or other Federal and State
and local agencies task force that we participate in, that is
strictly law enforcement type of work.
It also involves a use of Classified intelligence in some
situations, it involves potentially buying criminal sources
through the confidential human source program. All these kinds
of things along with maritime domain awareness and patrols and
the capability to respond are all necessary to actually enforce
the laws of the United States in these open areas.
Now, in the areas where we are operating with the Coast
Guard, we cooperate in a very high manner. I would say this
probably is probably less apparent in the Great Lakes area, we
do cooperate with the Coast Guard, but when you start talking
about operating on the high seas, I have no capacity to do
anything really outside territorial waters. That is not so much
of a legal issue, although that is a factor for us, it is
really equipment that I am operating.
The Coast Guard operates equipment such as cutters that can
do these kinds of interdictions out there, and we are
frequently coordinating now through these joint task forces
east and west of our operations with the Coast Guard so that we
don't have overlap in patrol. When we have detections out
there, we are at actually coordinating the response for the
local Coast Guard sector or local Coast Guard district if we
don't have an asset to respond to it or if it is too far out
for us to actually get to.
So I think the degree of cooperation is very impressive
from that standpoint. I think there is a good synergy between
the two organizations. I don't see it so much as an overlap in
missions here. I think there would be substantial problems here
if we thought we were going to try to drive this all one
direction or the other in terms of how you would actually
characterize it, what CBP does as a mission set.
But, again, I think this aspect that we are talking about
in terms of our law enforcement kind of primary mission set is
important to securing both the maritime and the Northern Border
overall, because the areas are so large and there is such a low
density overall of assets, whether it is Coast Guard or Air and
Marine, to actually address such a large and open area.
Mrs. Miller. Mr. Roth, do you have any comment on that?
Mr. Roth. I think you raise a very good point. I think one
of the Secretary's signature efforts in his time in office has
been to try to do a unity of effort. Really what that means is
that you have to step back from what the roles currently are to
understand what problem you are solving and what sort of tools
you can bring to that problem.
So as a result of that, I think for the first time in DHS's
history, we have a Joint Requirements Council, for example,
that drives components into the table, into the sort of
bargaining table to understand, okay, Coast Guard, you are
doing this, we are going to be doing this. So there has been a
lot of coordination that has occurred. One of the terrific
developments, I think, in the last year is the fact the Air and
Marine program is now part of, for example, an acquisitions
review process in which they had never been before. So there
was a higher degree of jointness at least in sort of
acquisition management.
As far as the mission set, I would agree, you raise a very
good question as to if the purpose is to protect the U.S.
border, and both components have that mission, is this really
the best way to do it? Historically we have grown up with
Customs as one single entity and Coast Guard obviously is a
separate one in two different cabinet departments. So asking
those questions, I think, is fair. I don't have an answer for
you, but it is certainly an interesting question to explore.
Mrs. Miller. Well, you did mention in your report, talking
about Coast Guard assets and work that they can do, and perhaps
jointness in sharing the taxpayer--with the best bang for the
buck for the taxpayers, et cetera, what you mentioned in your
opening comments about the Blackhawks and whether or not Air
and Marine should have had the Coast Guard refurbish them. Do
you want to talk about that?
Mr. Roth. Sure. That was, I think, a lesson that the
Department learned with regard to unity of effort. It happened
before any of the efforts that have happened the last year,
but, you know, we did an audit that said it was in the
neighborhood of hundreds of millions of dollars that could have
been saved if CBP had used the Coast Guard Elizabeth City
station to do the refurbishing. Likewise, the Office of
Management within DHS commissioned an independent study,
independent of ours, which basically confirmed what it is that
we found.
As a result of those two things, I am gratified to say that
these kinds of things are now being forced into the Department
for high-level decision making. There is, for example, an
aviation governance board that both Coast Guard and CBP
participate in to try to hash out these problems. So there is a
unity of effort and we can save some money as we go.
Mrs. Miller. You know, the last question I want to ask
here, because, again, not to go into the Northern Border, and I
appreciate all the challenges we have at the Southern Border,
but because the Northern Border gets, I think, short-changed on
resources for the kinds of challenges that we have there. I
know that Air and Marine had done a pilot program on the Great
Lakes with using a radar surveillance to a much greater degree.
I think you did that in 2013 and then into 2014, actually. I
don't know if you are familiar with what I am talking about,
but I know our locals were very, very enthusiastic about all of
that, not just the local Air and Marine wing or the Coast
Guard, but, I mean, our local Marine, sheriff patrols, and
everybody else amongst an entire swath of area there.
I am just wondering if you have any comment on that or what
your thought was. I think it was a pilot program that----
Mr. Alles. Right, it was a pilot program, ma'am. It was the
sea speed radar that we utilized up there. We did do a
demonstration with it last year for air targets. It looked
promising in that area. We would like to do another
demonstration in the maritime possibly in the San Diego area.
Right now the issue is, you know, most things are, is
funding for it. There are a number of unfunded requirements
inside CBP. This one did not break high enough to get funding
for that demonstration. It does compete with a number of other
efforts that we have underway, one being SEATAR, which is a
satellite-based, commercial satellite-based system we have been
using in the maritime for detection, and then also an effort
that was done by Science and Technology called the coastal
surveillance system that was also looked at in San Diego.
It is not so much of a radar system like Sea Speed is; it
is really a system that integrates existing feeds together and
to bring a picture together overall. So that is kind-of where
we are in that program there. It just didn't break high enough
on the unfunded list to get funding for this next demo phase.
Mrs. Miller. Okay. I appreciate that.
Well, I want to thank both the witnesses for being here
this morning. Mr. Roth, I don't know, did you have any
additional comment on that or----
Mr. Roth. I did not. Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. Okay. All right. I certainly thank you for
being here. As I say, we certainly honor the brave men and
women in the Air and Marine. I see them every day back in my
district and certainly around the entire Nation.
That being said, I think because of the Department of
Homeland Security coming into existence after 9/11 and sort-of
cobbling together all of these various agencies, we always want
to have the unity of purpose, as the Secretary keeps talking
about. So the purpose of this hearing was to look at some of
those kinds of things, not in an adversarial way, obviously,
but in a way that we are able to always--I always say that the
largest room is the room for improvement in any agency.
Another thing with this subcommittee and this committee, we
always look for is your suggestions to us, being proactive to
this committee on the kinds of things that we need to be doing
and to be aware of to make sure that you are resourced properly
and then that you are using your resources as we need you to do
so.
So we are looking forward to some of those things. As we
talked about, the metrics. This border security bill as it is
moving through is obviously critically important. We will be
looking for everybody in the environment there for assisting us
as this border security bill moves through, everybody that is
involved in border security, and metrics, performance metrics,
et cetera, so that we are able to satisfy the American public
about operational control of all of our borders. So we
appreciate that.
Any other questions that any of the other Members may have,
we are going to leave the committee record open, and so you may
be getting some additional questions, and we will appreciate
any answers that you may have to that.
Before I conclude, is there anything else that either of
you would like to add or questions that you think we should
have asked that we did not? Mr. Roth?
Mr. Roth. No. Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. All right.
Mr. Alles. No, ma'am.
Mrs. Miller. No?
Mr. Alles. Just appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you all and appreciate the committee's overall support to CBP
and Air and Marine has been very helpful to us over the years
and has been fundamental in the capabilities we now have.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much. With that, the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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