[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING DHS'S MISPLACED FOCUS ON CLIMATE CHANGE
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND
MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 8, 2015
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Serial No. 114-24
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Curt Clawson, Florida Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia Norma J. Torres, California
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Ryan Consaul, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Cedric C. Haynes, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight
and Management Efficiency:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Oversight and Management Efficiency......................... 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 5
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Thomas P. Smith, Acting Assistant Secretary for Strategy,
Planning, Analysis, and Risk, Office of Policy, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Roy Wright, Deputy Associate Administrator, Federal Insurance
and Mitigation Administration, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Robert Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Infrastructure
Protection, National Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Panel II
Mr. Marc A. Levy, Deputy Director, Center for International Earth
Science Information Network, Columbia University:
Oral Statement................................................. 38
Prepared Statement............................................. 40
EXAMINING DHS'S MISPLACED FOCUS ON CLIMATE CHANGE
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Wednesday, July 8, 2015
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight and
Management Efficiency,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:12 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Scott Perry
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Perry, Duncan, Clawson, Carter,
Loudermilk, Watson Coleman, Torres, and Thompson.
Mr. Perry. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Oversight and Management Efficiency will come to order.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine the Department of
Homeland Security's rhetoric and actions regarding the subject
of climate change and homeland security.
The Chair now recognizes itself for an opening statement.
Our Nation is facing serious threats to our security.
Thousands of foreign fighters have joined the ranks of ISIS to
wage a global jihadi war. Hundreds of these fighters are
returning to Europe and the United States, raising the risk of
domestic terror attacks.
Our cyber networks are under siege by foreign governments,
hacktivists, and other groups. In the latest cyber attack
against the Office of Personnel Management, untold millions of
current and former Federal employees' information was stolen,
including highly sensitive background information used for
vetting security clearances.
The threats we face are significant, numerous, and on
multiple fronts. Yet the recent reports of a 96 percent failure
rate by airport screeners show that our security programs are
vulnerable and of questionable effectiveness.
Considering all these threats and a myriad of others, I am
shocked that the Department of Homeland Security continues to
make climate change a top--top--priority.
Last year, one of Secretary Jeh Johnson's first acts was to
approve and sign the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review,
known as the QHSR. This is the key document for DHS, intended
to guide strategic planning, budget, and operations--strategic
planning, budget, and operations. The QHSR was over 6 months
late, in part to allow time for the Secretary to review it.
According to the final document, trends associated with
climate change present major areas of homeland security risk.
The QHSR goes on to note how climate change and associated
trends can act as threat multipliers. It includes examples of
how weather changes may lead to increased illegal immigration
and melting sea ice could lead to increased smuggling and
trafficking.
The QHSR concludes that climate change fundamentally will
alter the homeland security strategic environment. I wonder if
the conclusion is based on fact or propaganda.
The rhetoric used in the 2014 QHSR largely parallels past
strategic documents released by DHS under this administration,
including a Climate Change Adaptation Policy and Climate Change
Action Plan. In these documents, DHS was bold enough to assert
that climate change poses a direct security risk--direct
security risk--to the Nation.
Former DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano stated that climate
change was one of the greatest challenges of our time. No
doubt. DHS also implied that extreme weather conditions can
lead to militant groups to become active. Are the American
people to believe that the increased operation by ISIS or al-
Qaeda or Khorasan or Boko Haram are due to hot weather or a
shortage of water? Such assertions, to me, are ridiculous and,
frankly, insulting.
The QHSR focus on climate change raises serious questions
about this strategy and, candidly, the associated judgment
therewith. Last year, this subcommittee voiced concern when the
QHSR strategy was released about how it failed to address
threats from nation-state actors such as Iran, China, and
Russia. With so many threats facing us, it is utterly
incomprehensible to highlight climate change while remaining
silent on foreign threats.
In fiscal year 2016, DHS requested over $16 million on
critical infrastructure analysis and FEMA workshops related to
climate change--more than the Secret Service requested to
improve its training facilities following the high-profile
breach of the White House last September. Yet, in preparation
for this hearing, even the Congressional Research Service was
unable to ascertain the total amount being spent by DHS on
climate change.
In addition, the Government Accountability Office has
reported that numerous Federal offices and committees work on
issues related to climate change. Given the lack of
transparency with the budget, the American people have no
assurance as to how their tax dollars are being spent. I hope
to hear from DHS witnesses with regard to activities on-going
related to climate change and how taxpayer dollars are being
spent.
At the Coast Guard Academy graduation in May, President
Obama said that climate change constitutes a serious threat to
global security, an immediate risk to our National security.
Statements like these boldly contrast with the President's
efforts to broker a deal with Iran and his failure to call the
enemy what it is--radical Islamist extremism--and show just how
misplaced are the priorities of this administration.
DHS faces enormous challenges protecting our citizens from
an array of global threats, and we appreciate the work they do
in that vein. Ignoring the factual, very real, and true
security risks facing our Nation in order to satisfy political
constituencies is irresponsible, to say the very least, and
puts our Nation at grave risk.
Thus endeth the Chairman's statement.
[The statement of Mr. Perry follows:]
Statement of Chairman Scott Perry
July 8, 2015
Our Nation is facing serious threats to our security. Thousands of
foreign fighters have joined the ranks of ISIS to wage a global jihadi
war. Hundreds of these fighters are returning to Europe and the United
States, raising the risk of domestic terror attacks. Our cyber networks
are under siege by foreign governments, ``hacktivists'', and other
groups. In the latest cyber attack against the Office of Personnel
Management, untold millions of current and former Federal employees'
information was stolen, including highly sensitive background
information used for vetting security clearances. The threats we face
are significant, numerous, and on multiple fronts; yet, the recent
reports of a 96 percent failure rate by airport screeners show that our
security programs are vulnerable and ineffective. Considering all of
these threats--and a myriad of others--I am outraged that the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to make climate change
a top priority.
Last year, one of Secretary Jeh Johnson's first acts was to approve
and sign the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, known as the
QHSR. This is the key document for DHS intended to guide strategic
planning, budget, and operations. The QHSR was over 6 months late, in
part to allow time for the Secretary to review it. According to the
final document, ``trends associated with climate change present major
areas of homeland security risk.'' The QHSR goes on to note how climate
change and associated trends can act as ``threat multipliers''; it
includes examples of how weather changes may lead to increased illegal
immigration and melting sea ice could lead to increased smuggling and
trafficking. The QHSR concludes that climate change fundamentally will
alter the homeland security strategic environment.
The rhetoric used in the 2014 QHSR largely parallels past strategic
documents released by DHS under this administration--including a
Climate Change Adaptation Policy and Climate Change Action Plan. In
these documents, DHS was bold enough to assert that climate change
poses a direct security risk to the Nation. Former DHS Secretary Janet
Napolitano stated that climate change was one of the ``greatest
challenges of our time.'' DHS also implied that extreme weather
conditions can lead to ``militant groups to become active.'' Are the
American people to believe that the increased operations by ISIS are
due to hot weather or a shortage of water? Such assertions are
ridiculous and, frankly, insulting.
The QHSR focus on climate change raises serious questions about
this strategy. Last year, this subcommittee voiced concern when the
QHSR strategy was released--about how it failed to address threats from
nation-state actors, such as Iran, China, and Russia. With so many
threats facing us, it's utterly incomprehensible to include climate
change, yet stay silent on foreign threats.
In fiscal year 2016, DHS requested over $16 million on critical
infrastructure analysis and FEMA workshops related to climate change--
more than the Secret Service requested to improve its training
facilities following the high-profile breach of the White House last
September. Yet in preparation for this hearing, even the Congressional
Research Service was unable to ascertain the total amount being spent
by DHS on climate change. In addition, the Government Accountability
Office has reported that numerous Federal offices and committees work
on issues related to climate change. Given the lack of transparency
with the budget, the American people have no assurance as to how their
tax dollars are being spent. I want to hear from the DHS witnesses with
regard to activities on-going related to climate change and how
taxpayer dollars are being spent.
At the Coast Guard Academy graduation in May, President Obama said
that ``climate change constitutes a serious threat to global security,
an immediate risk to our National security.'' Statements like these
contrast with the President's efforts to broker a deal with Iran and
failure to call the enemy what it is--radical Islamist extremism, and
show just how misplaced are the priorities of this administration. DHS
faces enormous challenges protecting our citizens from an array of
global threats. Ignoring the true security risks facing our Nation in
order to satisfy political constituencies is irresponsible and puts us
at grave risk.
Mr. Perry. The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority
Member of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from New Jersey,
Mrs. Watson Coleman, for any statement she may have.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the opportunity to include Democratic Members' concerns with
this hearing.
The title of this hearing presumes that Department of
Homeland Security programs and DHS's coordination by the
Executive Office of the President demonstrates a misplaced
focus on security risks linked to climate change. Chairman
McCaul's May 20 statement belittles these necessary efforts as
``climate politics,'' and I strongly disagree with this
assessment.
The DHS fiscal year 2016 budget request includes several
important activities designated as responses to climate change,
among other purposes, such as hazard mapping and risk analysis
to support the National Flood Insurance Program; planning and
implementation of physical measures to avoid or reduce damage
associated with natural disasters; critical infrastructure
assessments; and DHS State, local, and Tribal workshops to
build their capacity, inform preparedness activities, and
validate their capabilities.
Mr. Chairman, I recognize that today's hearings will
probably not lead you and me to agree on the sources or
implications of carbon that is released into our atmosphere by
human activity. Nonetheless, to me, it is essential for DHS to
pursue activities like those I described earlier, regardless of
the Department's views on the sources of climate change.
In fact, last year, our colleagues in the Senate Homeland
Security Committee held a hearing titled ``Extreme Weather
Events: The Cost of Not Being Prepared.'' At that hearing,
Senator Johnson, who now chairs that committee, described the
lack of investment in disaster mitigation as penny-wise and
pound-foolish.
Mr. Chairman, we cannot afford to be penny-wise and pound-
foolish when it comes to disaster mitigation. Events from New
Jersey to the Gulf Coast have required the deployment of DHS
capabilities, ranging from search-and-rescue, to humanitarian
relief, to law enforcement assistance. Neither my constituents
nor yours will soon forget the devastation of Hurricane Sandy,
which cost $67 billion in damages caused.
Beyond just weather and climate events, Mr. Chairman,
social scientists, including some within the U.S. intelligence
community, have indicated that weather changes across the globe
may play a role in dislocating populations, intensifying
violent conflict and crime, promoting disease transmission, and
aggravating economic and social stresses that destabilize
governments. These factors make populations more vulnerable to
incitement by extremist elements and are squarely in the
purview of the Department's most vital duties.
At the publication last month of Pope Francis' Encyclical
Letter ``On Care for Our Common Home,'' my Democratic colleague
on the committee, Mr. Langevin of Rhode Island, noted the
emphasis on the disproportionate impacts that climate change
will have on the world's poor and those living in developing
countries. Indeed, in the letter, the Pope noted, ``it is
foreseeable that once certain resources have been depleted the
scene will be set for new wars.'' Pope Francis adds that ``the
control of water may become a major source of conflict in this
century.'' He notes ``the premature death of many of the poor
in conflicts sparked by the shortage of resources.''
I welcome the testimony today from our distinguished
witnesses, and look forward to hearing from the Department on
its activities and the nexus between its core mission and
climate change issues. I also welcome the testimony from
Professor Levy, who has assessed the National security
implications of climate shift for the National Intelligence
Council.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I know that many residents of your
district acutely suffered in the events of September 11, 2001,
an attack that also took the lives of 48 people from my own
district. I take personal note in the fact that we have not had
a similar situation since that time and since this Department
has been created. I have no doubt that we will not, and should
not, compete in our dedication to confront and disrupt violent
extremism. I am confident that we share the commitment to
mitigate each of the conditions which allow violent extremism
to develop.
So I support the interest my colleagues in the Majority
have demonstrated to countering violent terrorism wherever it
rears its head. I look forward to the committee's acting
favorably on Ranking Member Thompson's letter to Chairman
McCaul, requesting that the committee hold hearings to address
threats to homeland security from domestic terrorism, such as
the shooting at Emanuel AME Church in Charleston and several
suspicious church fires.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I hope that this hearing will
prove a fair discussion of the wide range of security risks
posed by the climate phenomena, rather than an opportunity to
play politics or otherwise misplace the focus of Congressional
oversight.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time, and I thank
you.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman and is
privileged to have the Ranking Member of the full committee
present. I recognize Mr. Thompson for a statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for holding this hearing. I appreciate the witnesses' appearing
today.
Today's hearing title mischaracterizes the Department of
Homeland Security's programs that address security risks linked
to climate change as ``climate politics'' and a ``misplaced
focus.'' These Department programs and activities provide
resources to address other National priorities, such as
preparedness for and response to natural disasters.
After living through the effects of Hurricane Katrina on
the Gulf Coast, not to mention the recent flooding in Texas and
Oklahoma, I find it confusing that the Majority would see a
misplaced focus in DHS's efforts on hazard mapping and risk
analysis to support the National Flood Insurance Program;
producing physical measures to avoid or reduce damage
associated with natural disasters; assessing the safety and
security of critical infrastructure; and conducting workshops
requested by State, local, and Tribal leaders, intended to
build their preparation and response capabilities.
In addition to the relevance of the Department's core
disaster preparation and mitigation efforts as a response to
climate change trends, an even-handed treatment of DHS's
response to climate change would be to acknowledge assessments
produced for the United States intelligence community over the
past decades. These studies have provided ample evidence that
trends in global climate act--as well as what the 2014
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review described--as threat
multipliers, aggravating stresses abroad that can enable
terrorist activity and violence such as poverty, environmental
degradation, and social tensions.
For example, as the U.S. Institute of Peace has found,
threats we face today from the extremist group Boko Haram first
emerged and expanded during a period coinciding with major
droughts in and around northern Nigeria.
Two months ago, the Chairman of this committee stated that
the Obama administration, particularly the Department of
Homeland Security, is placing more emphasis on climate change
than on countering violent extremism (CVE). Despite the
Chairman's unwarranted criticism of DHS's valuable initiatives
related to climate change, I too have concerns about the
Department of Homeland Security's approach to countering
violent extremism.
I have asked the Chairman to hold hearings on the
Department's approach to countering violent extremism and to
receive testimony from the DHS Countering Violent Extremism
Coordinator. I have also expressed the need to receive
testimony on this topic to the Department of Homeland Security.
However, rather than provide testimony, the Department has
chosen to have a briefing in our committee's Classified space.
Unfortunately, to date, this committee has not received
testimony in an open setting from the Department on what it is
doing with regard to CVE. Consequently, the Department has not
adequately afforded the Members of the committee with the
opportunity to hear what it is doing on countering violent
extremism.
With the surge in domestic terrorist activity, such as what
was carried out in Charleston, South Carolina, on June 17, and
the continuing threat from international terrorist groups, such
as ISIL, it is important and well past time that this committee
receives testimony from DHS, not outside entities, on CVE.
The Department can and must manage in ways that develop
robust, versatile, and adaptable activities and capabilities to
address the full spectrum of threats from both man-made and
natural disasters to the American people and the homeland. In
doing so, DHS leaders must work to find ways for the Department
to make the fullest contribution to a whole-of-Government
response to climate change phenomena, employing programs and
systems also used to respond to drug trafficking, threats to
transportation, and threats to infrastructure generally.
Similarly, we can find ways to counter violent extremism that
robs American lives, whether originating at home or abroad, by
sharpening the same kind of smart and flexible management.
With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member of the full
committee.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
before us today on this important topic.
Let me remind the witnesses that their entire written
statement will appear in the record. I will introduce each of
you first and then recognize you for your testimony.
Mr. Thomas Smith is the acting assistant secretary for
strategy, planning, analysis, and risk in DHS's Office of
Policy. He is responsible for the development of DHS strategic
planning and decision-making documents, including the
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Mr. Smith joined DHS in
July 2013. Prior to DHS, Mr. Smith served over 29 years as an
engineer officer in the U.S. Army, and we thank him for his
service to the Nation.
Mr. Roy Wright serves as FEMA's deputy associate
administrator for mitigation. He is responsible for FEMA's risk
analysis and risk reduction programs. Mr. Wright joined FEMA in
2007 and was appointed to the Senior Executive Service in 2013.
Mr. Robert Kolasky is the deputy assistant secretary for
the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Infrastructure
Protection. He assists the assistant secretary in addressing
risk to the Nation's critical infrastructure. Mr. Kolasky has
served in numerous positions at DHS and began his Federal
service in 2008.
Thank you all for being here today.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Smith for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS P. SMITH, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
STRATEGY, PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND RISK, OFFICE OF POLICY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Smith. Well, good morning. Chairman Perry, Ranking
Member Watson Coleman, Members of the subcommittee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our
efforts to assess climate change as a risk within the 2014
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, often referred to as the
QHSR.
I am Thomas Smith, the acting assistant secretary for the
Department's Office of Policy, Strategy, Plans, Analysis, and
Risk. I joined the Department in the summer of 2013 and the
Office of Policy last summer in 2014. Prior to that, I served a
career in the United States Army for approximately 30 years.
First, please allow me to put the QHSR in context. First
and foremost, the QHSR is a validation of the five enduring
missions of the Department: Preventing terrorism and enhancing
security; securing and managing our borders; enforcing and
administering our immigration laws; safeguarding and securing
cyber space; and strengthening National preparedness and
resilience.
The first QHSR in 2010 articulated that homeland security
is ultimately about managing the risk to the Nation posed by a
wide range of threats and hazards. With the second QHSR, we
comprehensively examined the homeland security strategic
environment and identified strategic shifts in areas of on-
going priority, with an emphasis on the Nation's long-term
homeland security strategy.
With respect to climate change, the first QHSR noted that
climate change was expected to increase the severity and
frequency of weather-related hazards, which could in turn
result in social and political destabilization, international
conflict, or mass migration.
The experts involved in the second QHSR collectively
identified that natural disasters, pandemics, and climate
change are key drivers of change and risk to the homeland
security environment, and each of these drivers may indirectly
act as threat multipliers or stressors abroad that contribute
to challenges in poverty and security and environmental
degradation and social tensions that can enable terrorist
activity and violence.
These drivers aggravate stressors that have the potential
to cause severe consequences, examples including: More frequent
and severe droughts and tropical storms in Mexico, Central
America, and the Caribbean, which could increase population
movements, both legal and illegal, toward or across the U.S.
border; and higher temperatures that may change patterns of
human, animal, and plant diseases, putting our workforce and
the American public at a higher risk of illness.
Therefore, climate, just like pandemics and natural
disasters, is a factor, but it is certainly not the only factor
that impacts this strategic environment, threats, and hazards
facing our homeland security.
In the second QHSR, a number of activities took place to
understand the threats and hazards that affect the strategic
environment analysis that we collectively called the Homeland
Security Strategic Environment Assessment. This assessment
characterized the risk, threats, current and future trends, and
critical uncertainties in the time frame for 2015 to 2019 and
beyond.
DHS sought input from industry, academia, and across the
Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments,
other stakeholders, all to ensure we had a comprehensive
understanding of the homeland security strategic environment to
make sure that priorities highlighted in the Quadrennial Review
were risk-informed.
Under the umbrella of the Homeland Security Strategic
Environment Assessment, the Office of Policy analyzed direct
and indirect impacts of many risks, including climate change.
The Department studies that analyzed and assessed trends and
risks included the Homeland Security National Risk
Characterization, which profiled steady-state and contingent
homeland security risks; a current strategic environment
report, which focused on an examination of current trends and
drivers underpinning the homeland security strategic
environment, spanning society, technology, the economy, the
environment, and governance; and, finally, a future strategic
environment report, which highlighted key uncertainties,
influential drivers, and associated sets of strategic
indicators relevant to the missions and operations of Homeland
Security out to the year 2030.
In conclusion, the best way to posture the Department
effectively to address emerging threats and accomplish the
Department's five enduring missions is to ensure that tough
policy, strategy, and resource decisions are informed by
considerations of the strategic environment with a clear sense
of the associated risk and resource implications. It is through
candid and thorough assessment of these risks that we will
strengthen the security and the resilience of the United
States.
I look forward to addressing your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas P. Smith
July 8, 2015
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the
subcommittee; thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss our efforts to assess climate change as a risk within the
2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.
I am Thomas Smith, acting assistant secretary for DHS's Office of
Policy--Strategy, Plans, Analysis and Risk (SPAR). I have been with DHS
since July of 2013 and with SPAR since the summer of 2014. Prior to
joining the Department, I served 29 years in the United States Army,
culminating with an assignment as the Chief of Operations, Plans, and
Training (G-3) for the Army Corps of Engineers. The mission of SPAR is
to develop analytically-driven, high-impact products that improve DHS
and the homeland security enterprise's strategic direction,
integration, and decision making; design and refine DHS processes
necessary for the strategic management of the Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review (QHSR) missions; and to ensure DHS strategy, planning,
and analysis have the intended, beneficial impact on homeland security
activities.
First and foremost, the QHSR is a validation of the five enduring
missions of the Department:
1. Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security;
2. Secure and Manage Our Border;
3. Enforce and Administer Our Immigration Laws;
4. Safeguard and Secure Cyber Space; and
5. Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience.
The first QHSR, published in 2010, articulated that homeland
security is ultimately about managing the risk to the Nation posed by a
range of threats and hazards. The second QHSR, published in 2014,
comprehensively examines the homeland security strategic environment
and identifies strategic shifts as well as areas of on-going priority
and renewed emphasis for the Nation's long-term homeland security
strategy. In developing the 2014 QHSR, the Office of Policy conducted a
number of activities to understand threats and hazards, as well as the
strategic environment we operate in--analyses collectively known as the
Homeland Security Strategic Environment Assessment (HSSEA). The HSSEA
characterizes those risks, threats, current and future trends, and
critical uncertainties with the greatest potential to affect homeland
security in the 2015-2019 time frame. As part of this process, DHS
sought input from industry, academia, and Government\1\ to provide a
greater understanding of the homeland security strategic environment
and to ensure that the priorities highlighted in the quadrennial review
were risk-informed. Experts involved in the HSSEA collectively
identified natural disasters, pandemics, and climate change as key
drivers of change to the homeland strategic environment.
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\1\ USG Components included in the formation of the 2nd QHSR
included: DHS, DOJ, DOS, DOD, HHS, Treasury, USDA, ODNI, Commerce,
Education, DOE, EPA, Housing and Urban Development, DOI, DOT, GSA,
Labor, VA, and SBA.
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As articulated in the 2014 QHSR, natural disasters, pandemics, and
climate change and associated trends continue to present a major area
of homeland security risk, and may indirectly act as ``threat
multipliers.'' Each of these factors aggravates stressors abroad that
can enable terrorist activity and violence, such as poverty, food
insecurity, environmental degradation, and social tensions. Over time,
these drivers have the potential to cause severe consequences:
More frequent severe droughts and tropical storms,
especially in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, could
increase population movements, both legal and illegal, toward
or across the U.S. border.
Melting sea ice in the Arctic may lead to new opportunities
for shipping, tourism, and legal resource exploration, but may
also lead to new routes for smuggling and trafficking,
increased risk of environmental disasters, and illicit resource
exploitation.
Higher temperatures may change patterns of human, animal,
and plant diseases, putting the workforce, plant and animal
health, and the general public at higher risk of illness.
Higher temperatures and more-intense storms may also damage
or disrupt telecommunications and power systems, creating
challenges for telecommunications infrastructure, emergency
communications, and the availability of cyber systems.
The inclusion of climate change in the 2014 QHSR built upon
previous findings from the first QHSR in 2010, which also recognized
the potential disruptions caused by climate change. The first QHSR
noted that climate change was expected to increase the severity and
frequency of weather-related hazards, which could, in turn, result in
social and political destabilization, international conflict, or mass
migrations. This assessment was further validated through extensive
engagement during the 2014 QHSR process, including outreach across the
Department and with interagency stakeholders; State, local, Tribal, and
territorial governments; and our private-sector partners. DHS also
employed IdeaScale and an on-line ``Community of Practice'' to solicit
on-line engagement from homeland security practitioners.
Under the umbrella of the HSSEA, the Office of Policy analyzed the
direct and indirect impacts of climate change. The Department's
foundational research studies that analyzed and assessed current trends
and risk included:
Homeland Security National Risk Characterization
The Homeland Security National Risk Characterization (HSNRC) is a
profile of steady-state and contingent homeland security risks which
considered and compared a variety of threats and hazards, including
those stemming from natural disasters, adversarial threats, and
accidental technological or human-caused hazards. The Risk
Characterization identified those risks that have the potential to
significantly impact the Nation's homeland security. The HSNRC
identified the direct and indirect effects of climate change as a
National risk. These risks included hurricanes, tornadoes, wildfires,
and floods.
A significant amount of outreach was involved in developing the
HSNRC. Elements such as data sources, methodology, and/or key results
were shared with senior leadership and members of technical staffs from
other governments, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Mexico,
Australia, and New Zealand, who also conduct National risk assessments.
The methodology was also shared at professional society conferences
such as the Association of Federal Enterprise Risk Management Annual
Summit, the Institute for Operations Research and the Management
Sciences Practitioner Conference, and the Society for Risk Analysis
Annual Conference.
Current Strategic Environment 2012
The Current Strategic Environment (CSE) report provided a focused
examination of current trends and drivers underpinning the homeland
security strategic environment. It outlined important current trends
and key statistics within 16 homeland security strategic drivers that
span society, technology, the economy, the environment, and governance.
The CSE is the product of months of focused research and analysis of
the current trends and key statistics. The CSE noted that while it is
not appropriate to attribute any single extreme weather event to
climate change, climate change can affect the likelihood of certain
types of extreme events.
As part of analyzing the CSE, team members reached out to subject-
matter experts from outside the Department (including think tanks and
universities) in order to find new trends and verify that identified
trends were generally perceived to be correct.
Future Strategic Environment 2013
The Future Strategic Environment (FSE) report highlighted key
uncertainties, influential drivers, and associated sets of strategic
indicators relevant to the missions and operations of homeland security
out to the year 2030. The key insights of the FSE stem from a
structured process of data collection and analysis that leveraged
structured discussion and decision working groups, and the qualitative
judgement of a diverse body of participants and subject-matter experts,
including over 100 participants from across DHS, the intelligence
community, and the broader U.S. Government. The FSE concluded that the
effects of climate change were one of the top six areas of key
uncertainties and challenges, and was particularly resistant to
influence by the homeland security enterprise efforts.
FSE team members discussed elements of the future strategic
environment with Federal partners in a variety of working meetings with
the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services,
State, Treasury, Veterans Affairs, and the Environmental Protection
Agency. The results were also raised at the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security's University-Based Centers of Excellence Directors' Meeting
and the National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism
Events 10th-Year Anniversary Celebration.
In addition to our own risk assessments and analysis efforts, DHS
drew upon previous work conducted under Executive Order (E.O.) 13514,
Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance,
and follow-on work, including: the Climate Change Adaptation Report,
October 2010; the Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, June 2012; and the
DHS Climate Action Plan, September 2013. The work performed during the
QHSR utilized and included work from these previous efforts to
understand the impact of climate change on Departmental missions. The
2012 DHS Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap fulfilled the Executive
Order 13514 requirement for all Federal agencies to reinforce and
comply with the U.S. Government's efforts to develop a National climate
change adaptation strategy and to meet Federal Requirements of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions to integrate climate change adaptation into
both the culture and operations of the Department.
In conclusion, the best way to posture the Department to
effectively address emerging threats and accomplish the Department's
five enduring missions is to ensure that tough policy, strategy, and
resource decisions are informed by a consideration of the strategic
environment, with a clear sense of the associated risk and resource
implications. To disregard natural disasters, pandemics, and climate
change would be ignoring how these factors may indirectly act as
``threat multipliers''; and neglect our shared responsibility to
strategically manage risk and build a more prepared, resilient Nation.
It is through the thorough and candid assessment of these risks that
that we will strengthen the security and resilience of the United
States.
I look forward to addressing your questions.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks you.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Wright for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF ROY WRIGHT, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL INSURANCE AND MITIGATION ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Wright. Good morning, Chairman Perry, Ranking Members
Watson Coleman and Mr. Thompson, and other Members of the
committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today.
My name is Roy Wright, and I am FEMA's deputy associate
administrator for insurance and mitigation. So I lead the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's mission responsibility
over hazard mitigation planning, mitigation grants, the
National Flood Insurance Program, and our work to help build
community resilience across the Nation.
FEMA has an all-hazards mission, supporting our citizens
and first responders to ensure as a Nation we continue to
build, sustain, and improve our capabilities to prepare for,
protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all
hazards. We are a consequence management agency.
Within the mitigation mission space, we are particularly
attuned to understanding and managing risks, both current and
future. These include a wide array of changes: Shifting
demographics, aging infrastructure, and the prospect for
increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events.
Climate change is just one of many future risks but one
that could significantly alter the types and magnitudes of
hazards impacting communities and the emergency management
professionals that serve them.
FEMA's attention to these evolving risks and their impact
on the future of communities has a long history. In 1988,
Congress passed the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act. In its original form and through
amendment in 1993, Congress instructed FEMA to address future
risks and help ensure Federal taxpayer dollars are used
responsibly and, in doing so, will substantially reduce the
risk of future damage.
Through the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, which amended
Stafford, Congress requires actions by communities in such a
way that they plan for and address future risks.
In the regulations promulgated in 2002, State, local, and
Tribal mitigation plans are now required and they need to
include, ``the probability of future hazard events'' occurring
in a given jurisdiction. The plans must also contain a
mitigation strategy that speaks to reducing or avoiding the
long-term vulnerabilities that the hazards pose to the future
loss of life or property.
With more than $260 billion worth of flood-related damage
across the Nation since 1980, our attention to understanding
our risks and doing something to reduce them must be
unwavering.
Two specific ways I want to highlight this morning that
FEMA is supporting this work:
First, building on our long-standing mission in the
specific rebuilding experiences of Sandy, FEMA is supporting
the policy development of Executive Order 13690 that
establishes a Federal flood risk management standard. This new
resilience standard will help ensure taxpayer dollars are well-
spent on infrastructure that can better withstand the impacts
of flooding and help communities bounce back faster after
disasters.
Simply put, when investing Federal dollars to build or
rebuild infrastructure across the country, we should not spend
those dollars more than once on the same project.
Unfortunately, we are too often in the position of paying for
it twice.
Second, FEMA released an update to our State Mitigation
Plan Review Guidance earlier this year. This guide updates
FEMA's policy that was last published in 2008 on planning for
natural hazards.
State mitigation plans, which are updated every 5 years,
are one of the conditions of eligibility for certain FEMA
assistance, such as the Permanent Work Under Public Assistance
and Hazard Mitigation Assistance project grants. States must
provide an overview of all natural hazards that affect the
State. States are then asked to consider the probability of
future hazard events, including changing future conditions,
development patterns, and population demographics.
This policy clarifies that the probability of future hazard
events must include the effects of long-term changes in weather
patterns and climate on the identified hazards. Further, the
policy encourages States to take a holistic approach and
include not only emergency management but also the sectors of
economic development, land use, housing, health and social
services, infrastructure, and natural and cultural resources
into those plans.
Addressing future risks regardless of their cause is key to
FEMA's mission. We bring data to the table and work with
deference to State, local, and Tribal needs and priorities. By
addressing future risks, State, local, Tribal, and territorial
governments are best prepared for future disasters and are able
to bounce back faster. That kind of economic vitality helps
sustain and secure our Nation.
With that, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wright follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roy Wright
July 8, 2015
introduction
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the
subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.
My name is Roy Wright. I am the deputy associate administrator for
insurance and mitigation at the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA).
In my capacity, I oversee FEMA's work in hazard mitigation planning
and grants, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), and activities
to help build community resilience across the Nation. These areas cover
a vast mission space and an array of programs important to securing the
Nation against the many threats we face.
FEMA's mission is to support our citizens and first responders to
ensure we, as a Nation, continue to build, sustain, and improve our
capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from,
and mitigate all hazards. To continue to accomplish our mission in the
years to come, FEMA is working collaboratively with stakeholders across
the whole community to ensure the United States is preparing and
planning for both current and future risks. These future risks include
a wide array of changes, including shifting demographics, aging
infrastructure, and the possibility for increases in number and
severity of extreme weather events.
It is important to note that climate change is just one of many
future risks we plan for, but one that could significantly alter the
types and magnitudes of hazards impacting communities and the emergency
management professionals serving them. Accordingly, consistent with
FEMA's focus on enabling disaster risk reduction Nationally, we are
supporting State, local, and Tribal governments with efforts to prepare
for the impacts of climate change through adaptation, which means
planning for the changes that are occurring and expected to occur.
the stafford act
The Stafford Act sets the statutory framework from which we manage
our role in mitigation and address future risk. The Stafford Act
stipulates that post-disaster mitigation activities must
``substantially reduce the risk of future damage.'' This law mandates
that FEMA address future risk and helps ensure Federal taxpayer dollars
are used responsibly given the possibility of changing conditions.
Additionally, the Stafford Act requires actions by communities to
address future risk by requiring State, local, and Tribal governments
to develop plans for hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities in their
respective jurisdictions. State, local, and Tribal mitigation plans are
required to include the ``probability of future hazard events''
occurring in a given jurisdiction. Also, the plans must contain a
mitigation strategy that speaks to reducing or avoiding the long-term
vulnerabilities the hazards pose. Without this future look, a community
cannot adequately prepare to mitigate against future loss of life and
property.
The Stafford Act also requires future risk be considered when
addressing minimum standards for public and private structures.
Recipients of Federal assistance must meet a certain threshold in terms
of the standards and codes being employed during construction. Further,
FEMA is authorized to provide funding to applicants for eligible,
feasible, and cost-effective activities that have the purpose of
reducing or eliminating risks to life and property from flood hazards
and their effects in accordance with Section 203, Pre-disaster Hazard
Mitigation.
fema's work to reduce future risk
In accordance with our statutory requirements, FEMA is working
closely with the emergency management community to adapt to a wide
array of changing risks in order to build greater resilience in
communities across the Nation.
The DHS Climate Action Plan, which carries out direction in the
President's Executive Order, Preparing the United States for the
Impacts of Climate Change, includes a focus on ensuring resilience to
disasters. FEMA, along with every department or agency with relevant
authorities, is directed to provide tools and data, facilitate climate
resilient investments, and build climate adaptation knowledge and
capacity Nation-wide.
Recently, we have also taken a series of steps to address the
future risk of flooding. This is vital because we know that floods
damage our public health and safety, as well as our economic
prosperity. In fact, between 1980 and 2013, the United States suffered
more than $260 billion in flood-related damages.
Earlier this year, President Obama signed Executive Order 13690,
Establishing a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard and a Process for
Further Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder Input, as a flexible
framework to increase resilience against flooding and help preserve the
natural value of floodplains. This new resilience standard will help
ensure taxpayer dollars are well-spent on infrastructure that can
better withstand the impacts of flooding and help communities bounce
back faster from disasters. Since flooding is the most costly and
commonly occurring hazard in the United States, the standard will
protect both public and Federal investments.
Additionally, following Hurricane Sandy, FEMA worked with its
Federal partners through the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force to
ensure that all Federally-funded rebuilding projects undertaken as part
of the recovery from Sandy meet a single Government-wide flood risk
reduction standard that takes into account the increased risk the
region is facing from extreme weather events, sea level rise, and other
impacts of climate change.
FEMA is also working with our partners in Federal, State, local,
and Tribal government to continue and expand our work in the area of
mitigation by applying our existing statutes and authorities to
incorporate future risk into on-going plans, policies, and procedures.
state mitigation plan review guide
In early March 2015, FEMA announced the release of the State
Mitigation Plan Review Guide (``Guide''). Starting March 6, 2016, the
Guide will be FEMA's official policy on the natural hazard mitigation
planning requirements from Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations Part
201, and Federal regulations for State hazard mitigation plans,
inclusive of the District of Columbia and five U.S. territories. The
guide supports State, Tribal, and local government mitigation planning
to identify risks and vulnerabilities associated with natural disasters
and establish a long-term strategy for protecting people and property
in future hazards events. State mitigation plans are one of the
conditions of eligibility for certain FEMA assistance, such as Public
Assistance Categories C-G and Hazard Mitigation Assistance mitigation
project grants. States are required to update the State mitigation plan
every 5 years.
This guide asks States to consider the probability of future hazard
events, including changing future conditions, development patterns, and
population demographics. The Guide clarifies that the probability of
future hazard events must include considerations of changing future
conditions, including the effects of long-term changes in weather
patterns and climate on the identified hazards. States must continue to
provide an overview of all natural hazards that can affect the State,
using maps where appropriate.
To better reduce risk and enhance resilience, the Guide encourages
States to take a holistic approach and include not only emergency
management, but also the sectors of economic development, land use and
development, housing, health and social services, infrastructure, and
natural and cultural resources in their planning process and mitigation
program, where practicable. These hazard mitigation plans must be
adopted by the highest elected official or designee in the State, in
order to ensure to ensure a holistic, whole-of-community approach.
conclusion
Addressing future risks, such as those posed by extreme weather
events regardless of their cause, is key to our mission. Wherever
possible, we bring data to bear and work with deference to State,
local, and Tribal needs and priorities. By addressing future risks,
State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments are best prepared for
future extreme weather events and are able to bounce back faster at the
individual and community level.
Thank you.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks Mr. Wright.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Kolasky for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT KOLASKY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS
DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Kolasky. Thank you, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member
Watson Coleman, Mr. Thompson, and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
to discuss the National Protection and Program Directorate's
efforts to secure the Nation's critical infrastructure and make
it more resilient against all risk.
Risks to our critical infrastructure are wide-ranging,
including acts of terrorism, other potential attacks by
extremists, cyber threats, extreme weather, as well as impacts
of aging or failing infrastructure. The Department of Homeland
Security supports the preparedness efforts of critical
infrastructure owners and operators to address these risks,
with a particular focus on sharing information relating to
securing infrastructure from man-made attacks.
NPPD is responsible for leading and coordinating the
National effort to protect critical infrastructure from all
hazards by managing risk and enhancing resilience through
collaboration. To achieve this end, NPPD works with the
Nation's owners and operators of critical infrastructure to
address the risks they are most concerned about. This includes
climate change.
Critical infrastructure is subject to a wide variety of
natural phenomena and is typically designed to withstand the
weather-related stressors of a particular locality, but shifts
in climate patterns increase the range and intensity of
potential risks to our critical infrastructure.
Most infrastructure being built today is expected to
operate for 50 years or longer. Therefore, it is important to
understand how climate change might affect these investments
now and in the coming decades so that what we build today will
withstand the hazards of the future. This requires forward
planning that considers the risks and uncertainties associated
with climate change, rather than reliance on models solely
based on the past. It also means building awareness of how
depletion or alteration of natural resources may impact
infrastructure operations.
Over the past few years, we have seen how extreme weather
can compromise critical infrastructure, including energy,
transportation, water, and communications networks, often for
an extended period of time. In 2012, Superstorm Sandy flooded
shorelines and subways, resulting in billions of dollars of
damage, leaving tens of thousands of individuals without
transportation or power, and, most significantly, resulting in
loss of life.
Storms like Sandy and Hurricane Katrina remain a primary
concern for significant regions of the country. So, too,
however, do more localized incidents, such as the derecho we
faced here in the mid-Atlantic in 2012, tornados in the
Oklahoma region, and, more recently, the significant riverine
flooding in the State of Texas. The impact of drought
conditions in California and the rest of the Southwest is
currently stressing the ability of our infrastructure to
operate and threatening the water supply and, ultimately, the
related electricity and fuel supply.
Unfortunately, we do not anticipate this trend abating. The
analysis of infrastructure exposure to extreme weather events
we have conducted shows that rising sea levels, more severe
storms, extreme and prolonged drought conditions, and severe
flooding combine to threaten the infrastructure that provides
essential services to the American public. On-going and future
changes to the climate have the potential to compound those
risks and have a major impact on infrastructure operations.
To address these potential changes, the Nation must take a
long-term perspective. While it is always wise to consider
future conditions, it is even more important for critical
infrastructure. Infrastructure built now will be expected to
operate under future stressor conditions, whatever they may be.
As a result, it is a prudent investment to incorporate
resilience into asset and system design, promote mitigation in
existing infrastructure, rather than rebuild or redesign
infrastructure after incidents occur.
It isn't just us who believe this. The Nation's military
and business leaders are on record recognizing the challenge of
climate change and the importance of acting to improve our
Nation's infrastructure resilience.
We take such advice seriously at DHS and within NPPD, and
we are working in a measured manner, yet with urgency, to
engage communities to better understand locality-based risk to
critical infrastructure and to encourage smart adaptation
activities. By leveraging our capabilities, NPPD is effectively
using its skills and resources to build the Nation's resilience
to extreme weather. Specifically, let me highlight two
community-level engagements.
In Charleston, South Carolina, we are partnering with the
newly-formed Charleston Resilience Network to help the region
address chronic and long-term hazards. Rather than waiting for
the next flood to occur, Charleston is proactively building a
resilient community. It is improving their storm-water
management system, and now, based on the work we have performed
in the area, they have launched a public-private partnership to
address chronic and episodic hazards.
In the Casco Bay region of Maine, NPPD recently conducted a
regional resilience assessment program focused on the impacts
of climate change and other extreme weather. Through this work,
we identified a number of vulnerabilities and core spending
opportunities for proactive mitigation. With many of its
transportation, electrical, and drinking-water assets
vulnerable to sea-level rise, changing water temperature, and
storm surge, the safety, economic prosperity, and quality of
life of Maine residents could ultimately be at risk.
Our partners aren't debating the science, nor are they
waiting to see what happens. Instead, they are planning for an
uncertain future.
At DHS, waking up every day with the job to ensure the
security of the American people and the availability of
electricity, water, communications, transportation, and
financial networks, we must consider all hazards that could
threaten our communities and ways of life.
Working with the private sector and community leaders to
plan for the impacts of climate change is essential. Such
prudent long-term planning in the face of uncertainty is the
cornerstone of smart National and homeland security activities,
and we must be a Department that addresses the risk of today
while also preparing the country for the risks of the future.
In doing so, however, we remain mindful of the more
immediate challenges facing the Nation in the form of
extremists dedicated to attempting to commit acts of terrorism
to the Nation's critical infrastructure, as well as cyber
attacks. That is and will remain our priority and our focus.
Thank you for your time this morning. I look forward to any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kolasky follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Kolasky
July 8, 2015
Thank you, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and other
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you to discuss the National Protection and Programs
Directorate's (NPPD's) efforts to secure the Nation's critical
infrastructure and make it more resilient against all risks.
Our daily life, economic vitality, and National security depend on
critical infrastructure. Infrastructure provides essential services; it
is the engine of commerce, the basis of trade, the key to functioning
communities, but it is easily taken for granted. Often, it is only when
an incident occurs--leading to a disruption in services we have come to
expect--that most peoples' attention is drawn to the importance of
infrastructure itself.
Threats to our critical infrastructure are wide-ranging--including
acts of terrorism, cyber threats, aging and failing infrastructure
components, and climate change. The Department of Homeland Security
supports the preparedness efforts of owners and operators to prevent,
protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from incidents
affecting critical infrastructure. NPPD is responsible for leading and
coordinating the National effort to protect critical infrastructure
from all hazards by managing risk and enhancing resilience through
collaboration with the critical infrastructure community. To achieve
this end, NPPD works with the Nation's owners and operators of critical
infrastructure as well as the communities that rely on that
infrastructure to address all risks as part of our all-hazards approach
to building critical infrastructure security and resilience.
climate change threatens our nation's security
According to the U.S. Global Change Research Program's Third
National Climate Assessment released last year, the United States will
experience an increase in frequency and intensity of hurricanes,
massive flooding, excessively high temperatures, wildfires, severe
downpours, severe droughts, storm surge, and sea-level rise throughout
the 21st Century. Extreme weather strains our resources, serves as a
``threat multiplier'' that aggravates stressors both at home and
abroad, and destabilizes the lifeline sectors on which we rely. Higher
temperatures and more intense storms can cause damage or disruptions
that result in cascading effects across our communities.
Critical infrastructure is subject to a wide variety of natural
phenomena, and is typically designed to withstand the weather-related
stressors of a particular locality. But shifts in climate patterns
increase the range and intensity of potential risks to our critical
infrastructure. Most infrastructure being built today is expected to
operate for 50 years or longer. Therefore, it is important to
understand how climate change might affect these investments now and in
the coming decades so that what we build today will withstand the
hazards of the future. This requires forward planning that considers
the risks and uncertainties associated with climate change, rather than
reliance on models solely based on the past. It also means building
awareness of how depletion or alteration of natural resources may
impact infrastructure operations.
Over the past few years, we have seen how extreme weather can
compromise critical infrastructure, often for extended periods of time.
In 2012, Hurricane Sandy flooded shorelines and subways, resulting in
billions of dollars of damage, leaving tens of thousands of individuals
without transportation or power, and most significantly, resulting in
loss of life. Storms like Sandy and Hurricane Katrina remain a primary
concern for significant regions of the country. So too, however, do
more localized incidents such as the derecho we faced in the Mid-
Atlantic in 2012; tornadoes in the Oklahoma region; and, more recently,
the significant riverine flooding in the State of Texas. The impact of
drought conditions in California and the rest of the Southwest is
currently stressing the ability of our infrastructure to operate and
threatening the water supply and, ultimately, the related electricity
and fuel supply.
Unfortunately, we do not anticipate this trend abating. The
analysis of infrastructure exposure to extreme weather events we have
conducted shows that rising sea levels, more severe storms, extreme and
prolonged drought conditions, and severe flooding combine to threaten
the infrastructure that provides essential services to the American
public. On-going and future changes to the climate have the potential
to compound these risks and have a major impact on infrastructure
operations.
There are a number of examples of the risk of delays, disruptions,
damage, and failure that the projected impacts of climate change pose
to our critical infrastructure systems. Many of the Nation's busiest
air and sea ports are located in low-lying coastal areas, making them
particularly vulnerable to flooding as a result of rising sea levels.
In the tri-state area of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, many
transportation infrastructure facilities (including Newark and
LaGuardia airports) lie within the range of current and projected 50-
year coastal storm surges. In the Gulf Coast--home to several of the
largest ports in the United States--the combination of relative sea
level rise and more intense hurricanes and tropical storms could lead
to significant disruptions and damage.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ USGCRP (2009). Global Climate Change Impacts in the United
States. Karl, T.R., J.M. Melillo, and T.C. Peterson (eds.). United
States Global Change Research Program. Cambridge University Press, New
York, NY, USA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the increasingly interconnected nature of our critical
infrastructure creates new vulnerabilities and opportunities for
disruption across supply chains. Three years ago, high temperatures and
high demand tripped a transformer and transmission line in Yuma,
Arizona, starting a chain of events that shut down the San Onofre
nuclear power plant, leading to a large-scale power outage across the
entire San Diego distribution system. Efforts have been made to address
the vulnerabilities that led to such outages, including enabling
automated switching and distribution SCADA (supervisory control and
data acquisition) systems to provide utilities with enhanced
capabilities for remote monitoring, and the ability to proactively
address outages. However, additional progress is needed to secure our
interrelated systems in the face of varied threats.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Technical Report to the U.S. Department of Energy in Support of
the National Climate Assessment (February 2012). Climate Change and
Infrastructure, Urban Systems, and Vulnerabilities. Oak Ridge National
Laboratory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These examples reinforce that the Nation must take a long-term
perspective and account not only for risks based on previous
experiences, but also consider evolving threats and hazards, including
those caused by extreme weather that are linked to change in climate.
Intergovernmental agencies and the scientific community, including the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the U.S. Global Change
Research Program, warn that extreme weather may occur with increasing
frequency. While it is always wise to consider future conditions, it is
even more important for critical infrastructure. Infrastructure built
now will be expected to operate under future stressor conditions,
whatever they may be. As a result, it is a prudent investment to
incorporate resilience into asset and system design and promote
mitigation in existing infrastructure, rather than rebuild or redesign
infrastructure after incidents occur.
dhs actions to ensure the threat of climate change is appropriately
addressed
The majority of the Nation's infrastructure is owned and operated
by the private sector. NPPD works with owners and operators primarily
on a voluntary basis to understand man-made threats and natural
hazards, to share information on these threats and hazards, and promote
best practices, training, and tools to help mitigate risks. By
leveraging our core capabilities, such as information and data sharing,
capacity development, vulnerability assessments, and situational
awareness, NPPD is effectively using its skills and resources to build
the Nation's resilience to extreme weather. Specifically, let me
highlight two community-level engagements:
In Charleston, SC, we are partnering with the newly-formed
Charleston Resilience Network to help the region address
chronic and long-term hazards. We know from our work that the
Charleston downtown area floods during periods of heavy rain
and/or high tide. Within 2 hours of high tide, much of the
storm water infrastructure fills with seawater, inhibiting
drainage of storm water. When high tide and a storm converge,
downtown Charleston begins to flood. Couple that with the fact
that the average seasonal rainfall is projected to increase 1
to 1.5 inches over the next 35 years, and the continued
prevalence of heavy, 24-hour rainfall events in the region, and
we can predict with fair certainty that Charleston will
experience chronic flooding. Rather than waiting for the next
flood to occur, Charleston is proactively building a resilient
community. They are improving their storm water management
systems, and now, based on the work we performed in the area,
they have launched a public-private partnership to address
chronic and episodic hazards.
In the Casco Bay region of Maine, NPPD recently conducted a
Regional Resilience Assessment Program (RRAP) focused on
climate change. This year-long program which included
workshops, assessments, open-source research, and subject-
matter expertise interviews with Federal, State, and local
officials as well as critical infrastructure operators helped
the community identify areas of risk associated with the
impacts of climate change. The assessment culminated in a
table-top exercise, the first ever focused on the consequences
of climate change. Through this exercise, Casco Bay residents
identified a number of vulnerabilities and corresponding
opportunities for proactive mitigation. With many of its
transportation, electrical, and drinking water assets
vulnerable to sea-level rise, change in water temperature, and
storm surge, the safety, economic prosperity and quality of
life of Maine residents could ultimately be at stake. As a
result of this exercise, the region is exploring ways to
proactively address these challenges.
Our partners aren't debating the science, nor are they waiting to
see what happens; instead they are planning for an uncertain future.
They are establishing their governance structures, actively engaging
the private sector to jointly fund initiatives, and taking action to
build resilience into their infrastructure, their planning, and their
community. We are doing what we can to support these initiatives, while
recognizing that this is just a small component of our overall mission.
balancing risks to critical infrastructure
The threats associated with climate change are just one of the many
risks facing our National infrastructure. While we are here today to
discuss the effects of climate change, we continue our efforts to
secure all areas of our critical infrastructure from the many threats
that face them. From preventing terrorism to safeguarding and securing
cyberspace, reducing the risks to critical infrastructure must be a
balance. Our focus remains on working with owners and operators of
critical infrastructure to protect the Nation's infrastructure from all
hazards.
Waking up every day with the job to ensure the security of the
American people, and the availability of electricity, water,
communications, transportation, and financial networks, we must
consider all hazards that could threaten our communities and ways of
life. Working with the private sector and community leaders to plan for
the impacts of climate change is essential. Long-term planning in the
face of uncertainty is the cornerstone of risk management and we must
address the risks of today while also preparing the country for the
risks of the future.
Thank you for your time this morning. I look forward to any
questions.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks Mr. Kolasky.
The Chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes for
questioning and some other things.
I would like to start out with just some clarifications
here based on some of the statements and testimony.
The question isn't whether the Department of Homeland
Security should be prepared for the consequences of climate
change, whatever causes it, or weather. We understand and
recognize and acknowledge that, that the Department needs to be
prepared to deal with that on behalf of the American people.
The question really is: Is it a core mission of the
Department when there are so many other agencies that do this
as their mission? We wonder, instead of the Department of
Homeland Security spending taxpayer dollars and focus on this
issue, shouldn't they just go to NOAA, shouldn't they just go
to NASA, shouldn't they just go to one of the myriad other
agencies and say, ``Hey, have you got this information, and, if
you don't, what would it take to get it?'' as opposed to,
``Let's just come up with it ourselves.''
I have run a business. I am not an accountant, but I use an
accountant. I mean, I could do my own books, I suppose, but it
was more efficient for me to employ someone that that was their
vocation, that was their expertise. So that is really the
question.
Then, finally, I just find it curious that the horrific
events that happened in South Carolina recently are being
discussed as terrorism; meanwhile, the horrific events that
occurred in Moore, Oklahoma, are somehow workplace violence. I
find that interesting and curious in this context.
But I digress, so let me move on. I will start with Mr.
Smith.
The Department has clearly been tracking its climate change
adaptation efforts closely enough to issue a number of detailed
reports and action plans on that over the past 3 years. Do you
know how many full-time employees work on climate-change-
related issues and DHS's strategic planning efforts, how many
individuals at DHS?
Mr. Smith. So, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Over the past 4 years, to produce those documents, I have
an estimate in terms of dollar values, which could be converted
by personnel----
Mr. Perry. Full-time equivalent or something like that?
Mr. Smith. Yes. It is a very limited number in the Office
of Policy. Probably around--well, in the range of $750,000 over
the past 4 years to produce those reports. So, at different
times, 2 to 4, using some of their capability as staff working
on these climate adaptation reports.
Mr. Perry. So do you know, in contrast, how many staff
members have been committed to CVE efforts or ISIS or foreign-
fighter travel?
Mr. Smith. So I wouldn't be able to put that, Mr. Chairman,
in a specific number.
I would stop, though, at that point and just comment that,
you know, as you described, we validate the missions of the
Department, the cornerstone of preventing terrorism. This
countering violent extremism, it cross-cuts through different
parts of our operations. So it is not as easy to put a specific
dollar value on the countering-violent-extremism number of
personnel----
Mr. Perry. Okay. So do you know what the ask was, what the
budgetary ask was, for climate-change-related research, et
cetera, last year, last budget cycle, versus CVE? Do you know
that?
Mr. Smith. I----
Mr. Perry. If you don't know that, do you know the current
ask for those two items?
Mr. Smith. I don't have the dollar figures specifically for
those items.
Mr. Perry. So one of the reasons we have these questions
is, per my records, $16 million for climate change directly
asked for by the Department, zero for countering violent
extremism.
So when we are looking for transparency and are wondering--
some folks are wondering why are we having this hearing, the
American people want to know where their money is going and how
it is being prioritized. When nothing is asked for for
countering violent extremism but $16 million is asked for
climate change, when we have a myriad of other agencies that do
it, we wonder, is this the best use of our money? I think that
is a reasonable question.
That having been said, let me ask you this. Why does the
Department have numerous--I think 11--climate change documents
but not one roadmap or other type of policy document for
preventing foreign-fighter travel?
Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, I think I would agree with parts
of your opening statement which describe the significance of
the threats we face. I mean, that is why the Secretary often
tells us we have the most privileged job in Government. The men
and women I work with and around work towards securing a safe
and secure homeland, particularly against terrorism.
As to a document, it is foundational in the QHSR that the
cornerstone mission is terrorism and identifies the
significance of that. It works through----
Mr. Perry. So, with all due respect, Mr. Smith, I want to
abide by my time for the other Members on both sides. Just look
at it from my perspective. This is what the Department has
produced on climate change. You can see it is volumes. This is
countering violent extremism.
Now, look, I didn't make this stuff up. This isn't Perry
stuff. This is the Department stuff. It would lead one to
believe that this is the priority, climate change is the
priority; violent extremism is not the priority. I mean, you
tell us, if you can, in the upcoming questioning how we are
wrong.
With that, I will yield my time. At this point, I am going
to turn to the Ranking Member, the gentlelady from New Jersey,
Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much for your testimony, gentlemen.
I guess I am a little bit confused, because I am not
certain that FEMA is doing anything different than it should be
doing and would have been doing and had been doing and is now
doing as a result of learning from things such as Hurricane
Katrina and Hurricane Sandy.
Mr. Wright. That is correct, ma'am. We have had a long-
standing responsibility to look at these risks, both the ones
that exist today and into the future.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Right.
Mr. Wright. This is consistent with our mission over the
last 30 years.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So the $16 million that my Chairman
refers to, I understand, really is in Mr. Kolasky's wheelhouse?
Is that infrastructure assessments, critical infrastructure
assessments, and workshops and information sharing and
preparedness activities?
Mr. Kolasky. My understanding of the $16 million he refers
to is $10 million is in NPPD's budget and----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Is what?
Mr. Kolasky. Six million dollars is in FEMA's budget. Ten
million dollars in NPPD's budget and $6 million in FEMA's
budget.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Okay. All right. Out of a total
Department budget of?
Mr. Kolasky. Forty billion dollars.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Forty billion dollars.
Sixty billion dollars? Okay.
First of all, it concerns me that we are having this
particular hearing and that we are spending our taxpayer money
on trying to create some sort of political theater around this
issue of your role in keeping our homeland safe, on any level,
with regard to any issue.
Certainly, we know by our experiences, our observations,
that communities have been devastated, that populations have
been shifted, that vulnerabilities have been exacerbated with
communities as a result of extreme weather patterns, flooding,
rising sea levels, drought, too much or too little. Certainly,
we have seen that some of these conditions have created fertile
ground for people to take advantage of people who are most
vulnerable.
So that kind-of says to me that we are where we should be
in the Department of Homeland Security. Because whether or not
it is protecting people from the natural occurrences, preparing
communities to be better positioned should these occurrences
come about, recognizing that we are expecting these things to
happen more so than ever in the past, not only are we looking
to protect the people from these dangers, we are also trying to
protect our communities from the vulnerabilities of those who
wish us harm.
So I am not quite sure where my colleagues on the other
side of the aisle are assessing or quantifying your
misallocation of priorities.
So I need you to tell me, in addition to the things that
you are already doing in FEMA and the assessments that you
already had to make in infrastructure, what is it, Mr. Smith,
Mr. Wright, or Mr. Kolasky, that could suggest to anybody,
either in Congress or anyplace else, that you are improperly
utilizing resources and placing a greater priority on the
implications of climate change and the security of the
homeland? Tell me what you think could cause one to think that.
Mr. Smith. Well, Ranking Member, thank you.
The first thing I would like to say is to affirm your
perspective by which you asked that question, which is where
the Department's priorities are focused. The Department's
priorities are on those five enduring missions that I described
in the statement. They are the foundation of what we do. It
really addresses what we do with the $40 billion writ large
versus an individual program that you have heard described
there.
So it is a little bit unclear to me how the perception is
created that we don't have the proper priorities. I would just
assure you that we do have those proper priorities. We are not
considering climate change a mission of the Department. We
consider it for its impact on the missions, statutory and
validated by the QHSR.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I have been in these hearings--I love
this committee, this Homeland Security Committee. I have been
in here numerous times on cybersecurity issues. I have been
here on lone-wolf issues. I have been here on risk associated
with ISIL or somebody else attacking us on a wide range here. I
have listened to the Department respond to each one of the
questions that has come to it about whether or not it is
employing its resources in a manner taking into consideration
the variety of risks associated with all of those occurrences.
Now, I am not going to suggest you are doing it all,
because we are not doing it all. But it just seems to me--and I
see that my time is up--it just seems to me that to haul you in
here to discuss whether or not you are misapplying your
priorities is a waste of taxpayers' money, when we have
sufficient reason to believe that the impact of climate change
on our people that live where they are drowning or where they
are homeless or where they are injured or lost, as well as a
possibility of extremists taking advantage of those
vulnerabilities, it is real. It is not fabricated, it is not
dreamland, it is real. We need to address it as such.
Thank you. I yield back my time.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina,
Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. I want to thank the Chairman. I want to thank
you for holding this hearing.
Thanks to the panelists for being here.
A team from Harvard University examined evidence recently
from 240 scientific studies which show that today's
temperatures are neither the warmest over the past millennium,
nor are they producing the most extreme weather, in stark
contrast to the claims of the environmentalists and in stark
contrast to the claims of the administration.
They studied temperature proxies, tree ring data, ice core,
seabed settlement data. The data shows that during the medieval
warm period--that was between the 9th and 14th centuries--
global temperatures significantly were higher than they are
today.
So what caused that warming? Humans were present. Can you
guys tell me why the Earth was warmer during the medieval
times?
Mr. Kolasky. I don't think any of us can speak to that. We
aren't----
Mr. Duncan. Okay. But the Earth was warmer. The medieval
warming period, based on the data provided, shows that grapes
grew higher on the mountains, that the Earth was warmer.
Mr. Kolasky. So one of the----
Mr. Duncan. You are not going to refute that, I hope.
Mr. Kolasky. No, but one of the premises of this
conversation and each of our statements is understanding risk.
Risk is planning amidst uncertainty. I think all of us would
tell you, as security professionals, as risk-management
professionals, that we are not trying to predict or say exactly
what is going to happen in the future. We are talking about the
range of things that are a possibility. DHS is a contingency-
based organization. We have the duty to think about what could
happen and plan reasonably for doing so. That is what we are
doing.
I would also like to reiterate that we are doing that
because we are listening to, in my case, the infrastructure
owners and operators, who are telling us they need to have this
information to make smart decisions about future----
Mr. Duncan. Reclaiming my time, I believe the information
has already been provided by a lot of other agencies. I think
the redundancy is costing the American taxpayer a lot of their
hard-earned dollars.
The Chairman held it up. These are other agencies that the
Government is funding with American tax dollars. These are
hardworking American people that are paying money to the
Government, tax revenue, for redundancy.
The Earth has been warmer before, and it was warmer before
fossil fuels, before the industrial revolution. This notion
that man-made climate change is happening is, I think, wrong.
I think your priorities are wrong at the Department of
Homeland Security. I think that we have threats of ISIS, we
have cartels shooting at helicopters on the border, we have
unaccompanied children coming into this country, we have
illegal aliens murdering beautiful, innocent lives in San
Francisco, we have a woman that had her head blown off in Los
Angeles by someone. There are events after events going around
the world that are true threats to the United States, folks
that want to do great harm to Christians, want to do great harm
to others. They want to come to this country and end the
American way of life. That, for whatever reason, we are now
spending our hard-earned dollars on climate science and this
belief that that is one of the biggest threats to National
security.
So I would ask you, the Department has released a number of
documents in regards to climate change over the past 3 years.
These documents have used serious language, such as, ``More
extreme weather conditions in parts of the world with limited
ability to provide State aid create opportunities for militant
groups to become active in their communities''--Climate Action
Plan, 2013.
Does DHS leadership really believe that climate change is a
primary cause of militant and terrorist groups? Mr. Smith, is
that really what you guys believe?
Mr. Smith. Representative, that is not what we believe. In
those documents, which are focused on climate change impact on
our mission, we describe that climate change can aggravate
stressors such as poverty, such as food insecurity, such as
causing population migrations, that for vulnerable populations
with weak Government institutions, it may enable terrorist
ideology to take hold. At no point would we want to say that it
would be a primary factor.
Mr. Duncan. So do you believe that climate change is having
an effect on migration patterns that are causing the
unaccompanied children to flee north?
Mr. Smith. No, that is--we don't associate the----
Mr. Duncan. I have seen some indication in reading
documents that that is what you believe, as well, the
Department, not you necessarily personally----
Mr. Smith. Right.
Mr. Duncan [continuing]. That you believe that climate
change is going to cause migration patterns to change, and that
could have some impact on what we are seeing right now.
Let me ask you the final question. In your testimony, you
identify--this goes to Robert. In your testimony, you identify
terrorism, cyber threats, aging and failing infrastructure and
components, climate change as the main threats to our National
critical infrastructure.
Where do you rank climate change?
Mr. Kolasky. We worked with our partners in the private
sector and other levels of Government to identify five risks to
critical infrastructure to----
Mr. Duncan. So where does climate change rank? No. 1? No.
2? No. 5?
Mr. Kolasky. It was not one of the five primary risks. The
five risks that were identified were acts of terrorism--this is
in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan published in
December 2013--acts of terrorism, cyber attacks, pandemics,
aging infrastructure, and extreme weather.
We talk about climate change as something that could have
an impact on those patterns, but the five primary risks we used
to plan against critical infrastructure are those that I just
stated.
Mr. Duncan. I appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, thanks for this hearing.
Look, FEMA is part of Department of Homeland Security. I
get that. FEMA should be preparing for natural disasters that
occur and have occurred since the foundation of this country,
even before. Hurricanes, tornados, floods happen. I get that.
But I would hope that we would reevaluate where we are
spending the tax dollars that are earned by hardworking
Americans. Because that is where the money comes from. It is
not on the money tree out on West Lawn behind the Capitol.
Because that tree in there, I have looked for it; it is not
there.
Americans working every day, providing tax revenue to the
Government and hoping that you are going to--the Department of
Homeland Security--you are going to protect this country
against ISIS, against cartels and drug trafficking, against any
other threats like cybersecurity and all that. That is the true
mission of Homeland Security. We don't want to see another 9/
11. We don't want to see another cyber attack happen.
So I would continue to urge the Department to focus your
resources on where the Americans really, I think, believe you
need to focus those resources.
Mr. Chairman, thanks for the leniency, and I yield back.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
The Chair now is privileged to recognize the Ranking Member
of the full committee, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, we have heard a number of definitions about DHS's
mission. When the Department was created, it was created to
address natural disasters here at home but also to protect the
homeland from terrorists.
One of the issues that people have not focused on is, if
you look at who the bad people are in this country right now,
they are not Muslims, they are not people who identify with the
Islamic faith. They are these right-wing fanatics who go to
churches, who go to other institutions and do harm to people.
So, if you look at the statistical analysis of who the bad
people are in the country or you talk to law enforcement, law
enforcement will tell you that they are more concerned, from a
priority standpoint, with the growth of right-wing radicals in
this country.
Now, that is part of the broad countering violent terrorism
that we deal with here in this country. But the demographics
say that the bad people in this country who are doing more harm
and pose a greater threat are the people who live here right
now who are lone wolves.
I appreciate the medieval history reference, but now I am
trying to figure out, how does that identify with climate
change, what we are dealing with right now?
Hurricane Katrina impacted my district tremendously. We had
Hurricane Sandy--for which a number of Members of this
committee voted against the relief for that community until we
cowered them down and had a second vote and the relief came. So
people talk about all these things, but when it comes to the
reality of the facts, big difference.
We have to understand risk. We have to understand--we have
to manage risk. Part of the management of risk is understanding
what all these vulnerabilities are out here and how we address
it. If climate change is one of those risks, we have to task
the Department with coming up with an approach to manage it.
Now, you can't say to the people in California that drought
is not a problem. You can't say to people in other parts of the
country that wildfires are not a problem. You can't tell the
homeowners who participate in the Flood Insurance Program that
we shouldn't have a Flood Insurance Program. But you are tasked
with the responsibility of making sure that the analysis
associated with the Flood Insurance Program is, in fact, one
that meets the standards and requirements from a risk
perspective.
So here we go. Mr. Kolasky, with respect to the mission,
how does climate change address the Office of Infrastructure
Protection, in terms of analyzing risk?
Mr. Kolasky. Sure. As I discussed, Mr. Thompson, climate
change is one of the things that has the potential to impact
the risk to critical infrastructure. Our contribution from an
assessment perspective is to take the science from all the good
science agencies, NOAA and others, and link the science to what
the implications could be on the Nation's critical
infrastructure.
We have the responsibility in the office to work across 16
critical infrastructure sectors and to understand, whether it
be climate science, whether it be terrorist threat information,
whether it be things related to cyber attacks, what are the
things that can cause that infrastructure to fail?
There are other people in the intelligence community, in
the climate science community, in other analytic shops that are
doing the analysis of the problem. We are connecting that
analysis to the infrastructure owners and operators, and then
we are giving them tools to make smart decisions about what
they should do about it.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Wright, with respect to FEMA and its mission, everyone,
when something bad happens, they want to know, where is FEMA?
Mr. Wright. Uh-huh.
Mr. Thompson. Let's take the Flood Insurance Program. What
impact would climate change have from an emergency preparedness
standpoint and the fiscal soundness of the Flood Insurance
Program?
Mr. Wright. So this is something that Congress asked us to
look at, and we did a study to look at the impacts, really,
over the next 70 years. As we look at it, we do see the areas
of flood hazard continuing to grow. We see the number of the
population impacted by that continuing to grow.
It comes from a couple of dimensions. Some of it is changes
in these weather patterns. Some of it is also attributed just
to changes in the built environment as more structures are
built to house the next 10 million, 50 million, 70 million
people in this country.
So, when we look at it, this does over the next decades
have an impact on, what does it look like for us to have a
fiscally sound Flood Insurance Program? So we are looking at
these elements as part of some of the reform legislation that
was passed over the last 3 years. We have a Congressionally-
created advisory committee that is looking at this question of
future risk, how that should be reflected in our analysis and
ultimately be folded into the National Flood Insurance Program.
I am expecting the report from that advisory committee later
this year.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Clawson.
Mr. Clawson. Thank you.
Thank you to you three for coming today. I really
appreciate it.
These are topics that are important to my district because
we have lots of coast. We are Marcos Island all the way north
to Fort Myers. So flood maps mean something to us.
By the way, anything anybody can do to get that process so
maps can be done sooner--you know, I know that is not the
direct thing here, but, look, we have a lot of people, this is
important to them, and we have just been waiting a long time to
get some maps, because they want to be included in flood
insurance or anything else. Sorry to divert a little bit, but I
think you understand, Mr. Wright, what I am saying. Anything we
can do here, I got a lot of people it is important to.
Mr. Wright. I do. If I--just a couple moments on this, if I
could, sir, to tell you that I share that commitment to make it
happen faster.
I need to do it in two ways: (A), I need to make sure the
technology is there and we do it in ways that collaborate and
use the data. You have water management districts and stuff in
Florida that don't exist in other parts of the country who have
great data for us to use.
Mr. Clawson. I agree.
Mr. Wright. The other side is to ensure that we give people
due process under the law to review those maps. I have to hold
those in tension together.
Mr. Clawson. Okay, I got you. But now that we have done the
due process side and it has all been open, let's get going
while I have still got a few hairs on the top of my head.
Mr. Wright. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clawson. Let's get this done for the good of my
constituents. We all want Government--we want our constituents
to have confidence in Government and the money they are
spending. Then we say, you all got to wait years and years and
years and years for maps. Okay. Then give you more money after
that.
You understand what I am saying? I have a hard time with
that conversation back home, when the basics don't happen and
then we want more money. I think you see where I am coming
from.
Mr. Wright. I do.
Mr. Clawson. Now, I have always--and, look, we have met
with the top folks at FEMA off-line. We have a lot of
confidence that they are managing their business or their
organization on a year-over-year basis with some meaningful
measurables. We appreciate that.
But it still feels to me like, okay, if I have a
hurricane--and hurricanes have been going on forever, so let's
leave that other debate that we get bogged down in, let's leave
it aside for a minute and stay practical--our FEMA money is,
you know, the calvary that goes out to the front line when the
battle starts to, you know, bring reinforcements and to help us
get things under control, God forbid, if there were ever a
hurricane in my district, which we have had plenty.
I am not sure--it feels to me like the other kind of
incremental money, whether it is climate change, workshops, or
anything else that is being spent here, why doesn't that just
belong in NOAA or somewhere else? It feels to me like FEMA is
the calvary, not the prediction department.
Am I missing something here? So, when I saw all this money,
I was like, I am not connecting--there must be some obvious
dots that I am missing.
Mr. Wright. So let me try to connect those dots.
We, FEMA, rely on NOAA, the U.S. Geological Survey, NASA,
and other science agencies to provide us the core data. When we
look at issues like hurricanes, we are dependent on the
National Hurricane Center for the work that they do, and then
that feeds forward.
So the work that FEMA does--we have talked a bit about the
analysis of risk, like the flood maps, but you have mentioned
some of the other kinds of elements. So, in this past year, we
have set aside to do 75 exercises across the country. These are
exercises that are done at kind of a watershed scale across
multiple municipalities, working with a State, that says, when
an event comes ashore, how are we going to respond? What does
that integration look like?
So we look at these extreme events, because those are the
points that actually stress the system. We spend our dollars
there.
Mr. Clawson. To reclaim my time, that I like, right?
Because you guys are coming; we are prepared before the storm,
God forbid, hits my district.
Mr. Wright. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clawson. Now, what I don't understand is where--climate
change seems to be predictability. In this budget round, I went
out and asked for more money for NOAA so they would do better
at this sort of thing. What has FEMA got to do with that?
Mr. Wright. So NOAA's piece is they do the top-line
science, which then we need to apply. So we take those elements
and then use that related to discharges and changes in still-
water levels when the surge comes in. They provide us the core
science, and then we have to go through and actually map that
against that statistical risk.
So you will see in the budget request this year to increase
dollars to do that flood risk analysis. Much of that ties back
to the flood insurance rate maps, but we use those same data to
inform our response activities.
Mr. Clawson. That data come from NOAA.
Mr. Wright. NOAA provides the top-line----
Mr. Clawson. Correct.
Mr. Wright [continuing]. Science, and then we take and do
the calculations on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis.
Mr. Clawson. So it sounds to me like we would have been
doing that 20, 30 years ago, whether we were debating about
climate change or not. Let's just be prepared for the next
hurricane. All the chatter about whether it is climate change
or not, I am just not sure how that helps my constituents. I
would just like to be ready for the next hurricane and that be
that, all right?
Mr. Wright. I would share the sentiment, in that FEMA's
principal concern is the consequence management side of this.
Mr. Clawson. I like that.
Mr. Wright. I don't personally get into the debates that go
on. What I will tell you is we have events that are occurring,
they are wide-scale, and they are very expensive. We need to
ensure that we are trying to reduce that risk and, more
related, to ensure that we are pulling down the overall cost.
Mr. Clawson. Yeah, okay. I mean, as my final word, the more
you all concentrate on execution and actually delivering the
good, like a flood map or two and hurricane preparedness, and
less on this debate, the better off we will all be. I think you
can agree with that, right?
Mr. Wright. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clawson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Florida.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
Mrs. Torres.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
I want to piggyback, echo one comment, and that is
regarding the maps, for a different reason. My district, we are
eager to shift the cost of my homeowners to his homeowners,
because we have already done the infrastructure improvements,
that we no longer want to pay for flood insurance, because we
are covered, right?
So the urgency of getting those maps preapproved and
inspections of the infrastructure improvements in our
communities is really important.
Mr. Wright. Understood.
Mrs. Torres. I want to thank the three of you for being
here today. I want to apologize for the direction, the title of
misguided--or misplaced focus on climate change. I think we
might have found the misplaced focus on climate change here, as
we continue the dialogue of how much money is being spent on
prevention.
As a former 9-1-1 dispatcher, I spent almost 18 years
directing first responders where to go during disasters,
whether they are man-made disasters or natural disasters.
Listening to 9-1-1 calls for service from constituents during
their most vulnerable time in their lives--those are critical
times for the American people. So I want to thank you in
advance. As a former mayor, also, you know, I had to call for
disaster assistance in my community after a major earthquake
had a huge impact in our community.
You know, countering violent extremists, that is a cross-
Government mandate, just as climate change should be a cross-
Government mandate. I am not here to debate that, although I
will say that we continue to reinforce the border to the south
in fear of the bogeyman while neglecting the real risk to the
American people, and that is the next hurricane that is going
to hit and take down a bridge, or that is the next flood that
is going to impact our homeowners.
Katrina might have happened in Mr. Thompson's district,
but, during that time, California had major fires. The drought
is real. Whether we want to debate that the flood hazard is due
to the fires, that is due to the water drought, people don't
see that. Homeowners lost their homes. I lost my home to a
fire. I can tell you that I can go to the local lumber yard and
there was nothing available because all of that merchandise was
going to his district to help rebuild his community.
So, when we talk about National security--and my district
is impacted by the goods that come in through the ports. We are
fast-tracking, because we desperately need these materials to
rebuild our communities. What does that impact look like for
public safety at the ports?
As a 9-1-1 dispatcher, when an incident happens, a natural
incident happens, and I am directing our first responders into
an area that has been impacted, who is looking and responding
to those other calls for those local terrorists that are
creating havoc in our communities?
I see the young man that murdered a CHP officer on the
steps of my courthouse as a local terrorist. I see the
incidents that happen at that church in South Carolina as a
local terrorist. That is the focus of this committee.
I want to ask you, Assistant Secretary Smith, how would the
Department's understanding of homeland security threats and
risks be affected if the Department were to remove the analysis
of climate events from its assessment of the Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review?
Mr. Smith. So thank you, and thanks for your compelling
statements about, you know, your past experiences.
So, with regard to climate change, with regard to removing
it from the QHSR, first, that would be out of step with our
process, which intends to consider a range of uncertainties. We
started out with almost 500 and worked them down through a very
collaborative stakeholder thing. But it would not enable us to
project potentially the size and scope of potential challenges
at the border or even overseas, in terms of preparing the
Nation for future threats.
Mrs. Torres. On the issue of the $16 million, in
comparison--and I don't know what we spent on the Southern
Border for security, but let's pretend for the sake of argument
here that we spend $10,000 to secure our Southern Border. The
$16 million, in comparison, would equal to $3. So what are we
doing here?
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentlelady.
I am going to go for a brief second round for anybody that
is interested. I have a couple of questions.
I know in the grand scheme of the DHS and the Government
maybe $16 million seem paltry, but where I come from $16
million is a lot of money. It is real money. We have a duty, we
have a responsibility in oversight in this job and in this
committee, like all the others, and we are going to continue
with that duty.
This is to Mr. Kolasky. In DHS's fiscal year 2016 budget
request, there was $10 million allotted for analysis of climate
change impact on infrastructure. If I ask what is the intended
use of that money, I hate to say it, but I think I am going to
get some kind of long, rambling answer about we are going to
study this and study that.
Go ahead. Answer the question, if you can, succinctly and--
--
Mr. Kolasky. I hope that is not a statement of my
eloquence, but I suspect it may be.
Mr. Perry. It is not meant to be.
Mr. Kolasky. So $4\1/2\ million go to our Office of Cyber
and Infrastructure Analysis, which is working on analysis on
the impacts of drought, wildfires, extreme weather, and
flooding on critical infrastructure.
Five-and-a-half million dollars go to our Office of
Infrastructure Protection to do two additional regional
resilience assessment programs, which looks at how impact of
disaster to infrastructure could potentially impact the entire
infrastructure system that underpins a community. We have a
successful program where we have done 60 of those over the last
several years.
Mr. Perry. So are those disaster-related risks and
mitigation, or is that climate-change-related mitigation and
risk?
Mr. Kolasky. Those are intended to look at the resilience
of systems to disasters that they could be exposed to. The
other parts that are related to climate change, in part, are
the impacts of things like potential sea-level rise, potential
change in temperature, or potential change in precipitation
patterns. So it is not just the extreme weather event, but it
is also some of the underlying conditions that may occur that
would have impact on infrastructure operations.
Mr. Perry. There is nowhere else to get that data?
Mr. Kolasky. There is nowhere else to get that data in an
integrated manner on the impacts to infrastructure. We are
putting----
Mr. Perry. Have you asked?
Let me ask you this: Did the Department not analyze the
state of our critical infrastructure in the past? I know the
answer is going to be ``yes,'' right?
Mr. Kolasky. Yes.
Mr. Perry. Of course they have, right?
So did NPPD coordinate with the Department of
Transportation or the Federal Aviation Administration on this
analysis to determine if any duplicative studies exist? Did you
check?
Mr. Kolasky. Yes. So, for example, right now, to do a
scoping study, we have worked with an interagency process to
look at potential exposure to infrastructure to extreme weather
that involved the entire interagency process. We have a study
that will be published by the RAND Institute in the next 2
months that will have been peer-reviewed by all of the science
agencies as well as our partners in other critical
infrastructure. They participated in providing support and
reviewing to make sure we were not duplicating efforts.
Mr. Perry. Okay. Thank you.
Now, on this issue, further on this issue, according to the
GAO, there are no programs to monitor and independently
validate the effectiveness and sustainability of Federal
efforts in this regard.
So how will we ensure efficacy? How will success be
measured and validated? You are going to spend $10 million if
you get your request----
Mr. Kolasky. So, without knowing what ``this regard'' means
in the GAO, we publish annually, we send to Congress annually a
National annual report on the risks to the Nation's critical
infrastructure. We have published them and sent them up to
Congress for the last 2 or 3 years, and we will continue to do
it annually based on a statutory requirement from----
Mr. Perry. Are there metrics in there that said, we spent
$10 million and this is what we got?
Mr. Kolasky. There are metrics that talk about the degree
to which we have increased the security resilience of the 16
critical infrastructure sectors.
Mr. Perry. All right.
Moving on, last question for anybody that wants to answer
it. In the 2014 QHSR, pandemics are mentioned as a trend
associated with climate change. To that effect, can anybody
provide any modern example of a pandemic being linked with
climate change?
Mrs. Torres. I have one.
Mr. Perry. Okay.
Mrs. Torres. We have a--our trees are being eaten up from
the inside out by a mold that is increasingly growing because
of climate change and because of the dry weather in California.
Mr. Perry. I am not sure that classifies as ``pandemic,''
but I will accept your assessment there.
With that, I am just going to yield. I will recognize the
gentlelady from New Jersey.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I just kind of want to point out something,
that you all don't generate every one of your reports. You rely
upon information coming from other places with specialties and
expertise, and then you apply your assessment as it relates to
what your role would or would not be in those situations.
Basically, what I have heard is that what you do you do
anyway. Now that you recognize climate change as a multiplier
or a possible impact on those things that you already do, it is
something that you ought to take into consideration.
Mr. Smith, I wanted to talk to you about--I wanted to clear
up something, and then I wanted to ask you a question.
You were asked whether or not you were concerned about, as
a result of climate change, a shift in population and whether
or not that created a possible threat of some sort. You
specifically answered no. But then, in your testimony, you do
kind of speak to the shift in population associated with
tropical storms and droughts and the impact of those and the
increase in immigrants arriving at the U.S. borders. So the
question would be: What would be the impacts on some of the
component agencies, like ICE and CBP?
The last thing I want you to answer: Are you aware of the
impact of the northern migration of mosquitoes that is creating
exposure to a disease called dengue? Is that in any way
happening as a result of this change in climate? Does that have
an impact on our health and well-being?
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Ranking Member. You have made a few
comments, so I will try to work my way through each of those.
I think the first thing you brought up is the degree to
which we rely on other Government agencies and academia and
peer-reviewed documents. I think it is important to understand
that, really, we work with that data and then apply Homeland
Security expertise to assess risk. We do not do climate change
research in the Department of Homeland Security. So that was
the first point.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to clarify the
migration comment. Because I was answering a specific question
about whether last summer's surge of unaccompanied alien
children, adults, and family units--that we associated that
with climate change as a threat multiplier. We do not. Our work
that I have been exposed to--I am not in the current operations
of the Department--talk about our potential factors for that
and don't associate that surge with it.
More broadly, though, kind-of the methodology we applied to
look at climate change and its impact on our mission comes to
the conclusion that changes in weather, droughts, and other
things cause populations to displace. With regard to those near
our border, it could cause surges in what our ICE, Customs and
Border Protection, Coast Guard, and other law enforcement
personnel would be needed to be prepared to do to address those
surges.
Then with regard to the other missions of the Department,
those same population migration concerns can cause instability,
can lead to it, as a factor, not the factor, in the instability
of their institutions' ability and make them more susceptible
to terrorism, ideology, things of that nature.
As to the last question on a very specific technical, you
know, thought, I don't have an answer on that. If we can take
that back and try to come back to you with an answer for that
one.
[The information follows:]
``According to the World Health Organization, the geographic
expansion of the Aedes mosquitos that serve as reservoirs for dengue
beyond tropical and subtropical countries has been reported since the
1970s. In the last 40 years, the range of Aedes mosquitos have spread
northward from South America to Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean
as well as to southern and southeastern U.S. States and territories.
Temperature is a known factor in the survival and expansion of the
mosquito's range and associated cases of dengue. Increased
temperatures, humidity, and precipitation associated with global
climate change might contribute to the northward expansion of Aedes
mosquitos in areas with typically more temperate climates. A number of
other factors, such as international trade and travel, population
movement, urbanization, and discontinued use of DDT-containing
pesticides might also drive the mosquitos' geographic spread. Improper
water storage and waste disposal practices associated with poverty
might also contribute to the spread of dengue. Nearly all dengue cases
reported in the continental United States were acquired in another
country by travelers or immigrants. Most cases of locally-acquired
dengue among U.S. citizens are reported from Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands. In the past 15 years, there have been three outbreaks
of locally-acquired dengue in the United States outside its
territories, including Florida (2009-2010), the Texas-Mexico border
(2005), and Hawaii (2001). The outbreak in Hawaii was linked to the
first case recently travelling to French Polynesia where the case was
likely exposed to dengue. In U.S. territories where dengue is endemic,
continued surveillance and control of the mosquito population is
recommended to reduce the occurrence of dengue.''
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina,
Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, I guess the press and all will label me as a
climate-change denier. I am not a climate-change denier. I am a
man-made-climate-change denier, but I do believe the climate is
changing. I just don't believe man has that much control over
it.
Mr. Smith, the Department of Homeland Security is a
Cabinet-level agency, correct? The Secretary is on the Cabinet?
Mr. Smith. That is correct.
Mr. Duncan. So you work for the Secretary. So, ultimately,
you guys work for the President of the United States, correct?
Mr. Smith. That is correct.
Mr. Duncan. Okay.
So President Obama says that no challenge poses a greater
threat to future generations than climate change. His words.
Do you believe that climate change is a larger threat to
our National security than ISIS or other Islamic terrorist
groups, particularly their ability to use social media to
radicalize individuals in the United States? Do you believe
climate change is a greater threat than Islamic terrorists?
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. No, that--no. Thank you. That is not the way we
would characterize it. As I say, as a Department, our mission
is preventing terrorism. So climate change, it is a stressor,
it is a potential threat multiplier, but it is not the direct
threat, from the perspective of the missions of the Department
of Homeland Security.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. Okay.
So the 2014 QHSR, Homeland Security Review, neglects to
mention nation-states such as Iran, Russia, and China, but it
mentions climate change. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review
touches on all three of these nation-states--Iran is the
largest destabilizing actor in the world; Russia's violation of
other neighbors' sovereignty, such as Ukraine; and China's arms
buildup--as threats to our National security. But now the QHSR
fails to mention those three but mentions climate change. I
think that is in direct repudiation of what you just said.
So where does all this rank--Iran, Russia, China, Islamic
State, and climate change--when the QHSR neglects to mention
these three states but mentions climate change? So how do you
reconcile what you just said with that?
Mr. Smith. So you have also made reference to several--I
think the National Security Strategy, and there is a defense
component to it and then the homeland security component. We
look at the threats through the prism of our mission sets and
intend to adequately prepare the Nation for threats of
terrorism and all hazards. I would leave it at that.
Mr. Duncan. But your boss said that no challenge poses a
greater threat to future generations than climate change.
Mr. Chairman, I go back to Mrs. Torres from California said
that--she apologized for the ``misplaced focus on climate
change'' title of the hearing. I think the title is apropos. I
think that the priorities of the Department are misplaced.
You are spending taxpayer dollars on things that really, if
you go by your boss, okay, but the American taxpayer, I
believe, disagrees with you. I think that even the Quadrennial
Defense Review may disagree with you.
So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the hearing, and I yield
back.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from California.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
I also want to correct part of a statement that was made. I
think the President in his speech said that climate change
would perhaps be the greatest challenge that public safety
personnel would have.
Given that we haven't had funding for a new transportation
bill, given the fact that we know that we need to build higher
bridges, that we need to reinforce our infrastructure, we know
that the storms are getting bigger and impacting more and more
Americans, how much more funding would your Department need in
order to fully assess the threat of climate change on the
American people?
I know ``climate change'' is sort-of a, you know, four-
letter word, you know, across the aisle. But we can call it
anything that we want to call it, but we need to move forward
with an agenda that ensures that we are looking at the specific
issue that is causing a huge problem in our communities.
Mr. Wright. I would highlight a couple items for you.
The attention to flood risk in the future and the evolution
of that is one that was highlighted in the President's budget
request, to increase the investment that FEMA is making on an
annual basis to $400 million a year. This understands both our
current risk as well as helping to inform how people will build
in the future, which I think is an important element of this.
As the economic vitality of the country continues and we
continue to grow and have additional populations, there are
going to be sited somewhere. Much of these data begin to help
inform communities so that they ensure that that future
development happens outside of an area where they have a high
hazard of flood or need flood insurance.
I would point to those elements from an analysis
perspective as one of the ways that FEMA would play in that
space.
Mrs. Torres. Four hundred million dollars, that is only for
flood analysis.
Mr. Wright. That only deals with flood analysis on an
annual basis.
Mrs. Torres. What about earthquakes? What about fires? What
about droughts?
Mr. Wright. So this goes to the point in terms of which
agencies have primary responsibility. So there is an
Interagency Fire Center. I know you are very aware of that. We
collaborate with them, but it is really the Departments of
Interior and Agriculture, through the Forest Service, who take
the lead on that.
But we pull those pieces in. I will highlight this, and I
know that you guys are experiencing this in California right
now. After the drought and the increased fire, kind-of, danger
that is there, two things begin to happen. When rain does come,
it doesn't absorb into the ground, and it creates flash floods.
Then when the fires come, it creates a fire scar that
ultimately is like a slick of asphalt, so when the next rain
comes it exacerbates this. We have seen this throughout
southern California.
We are working with folks as they do experience those fires
to ensure that they have the right kind of information and
insurance so that when the floods come behind that--it may just
be an inch of rain. In some parts of the country, we wouldn't
think that is very much, but an inch of rain coming in
California right now, particularly right after a fire, can be
devastating.
Mrs. Torres. So, in regards to floods, your agency has
identified bridges and certain infrastructure that needs
immediate attention.
Mr. Wright. We have highlighted areas by which the
infrastructure doesn't provide the level of protection that it
once did.
Mrs. Torres. Where can I get that information?
Then I will yield my time.
Mr. Wright. So we will do this in a collaboration with
other agencies. On the levy side, I have a database that looks
at about 36,000 miles of levy in the country. That is the first
place I would highlight with you. Then we do it in
collaboration with the work that goes on in infrastructure
protection, as they work across all of the sectors.
Collectively, we will work with you.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman from California
and recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Clawson.
Mr. Clawson. So, Mr. Wright, before you leave today, let's
you and I exchange telephone numbers, okay? We can be buddies.
Mr. Wright. Absolutely.
Mr. Clawson. Anything to do with executing preparedness for
the next hurricane, God forbid, and some maps would just be
wonderful for us. In exchange for that, anything I can do to
help you all, I am all ears too.
Mr. Wright. We will exchange phone numbers. I will make a
phone call before I get back to the office to see some of that
move faster.
Mr. Clawson. I really appreciate that. Look, you know, we
have a fair amount of confidence in what is going on here. If
we could just nail that down on the maps, it would make a whole
lot of people in Florida a lot happier.
Now, I want to go back to Mr. Smith, just to make sure--
just to change topics totally. Dengue fever or Chikungunya,
outbreak all over the world. You know, you go to the monsoon
season in India or Southeast Asia, at the end you are going to
have big breakouts because you have pooling water. It is an
urban, indoor, mosquito-based virus. Knocks old folks and young
folks off their feet totally.
I am told that in Florida we don't have as much risk. I am
always thinking about it, always talking about it, because it
is big in the Caribbean, it is big in South America, because
you have a lot of water that pools. I am told that in our case
these sorts of mosquitoes, the big black ones, don't move from
south to north because there is not as much pooling of water.
Therefore, although I am concerned about it because I see the
blood tests in the Keys that show a certain amount of
penetration, it is not something that I have to be in south
Florida overly concerned about. Dengue is not fun, dengue
fever.
So I have two questions. No. 1 is: I think you would
probably agree with what I just said as kind of a broad-based
synopsis. No. 2: Is this even in your area, or is this totally
managed by CDC? What goes on here with respect to Chikungunya
and dengue?
Mr. Smith. So I do believe that you are predominantly
referring to expertise that resides in other agencies. To the
extent to which we then take information and then we assess
risk as to border security, you know, the flows across borders,
both legal and illegal, what is inside of packaged goods and
things like that, that is where we would consider it. Then
there is always a resilience aspect of our population that is
being worked, as well.
Mr. Clawson. So is dengue and Chikungunya--which, you know,
they have a week gestation. You know, it takes the sickness a
while to--do we do anything different in, you know, Miami
International Airport or anywhere elsewhere where we have
flights coming back from these countries? Do we have any sort
of different screening process? I don't know.
Mr. Smith. I would have to get back with you on that. I am
sure there is some variation, expertise about local
considerations. But it is a global, you know, market, so there
are probably some standards across, and then there are some
probably unique at different regional places. But I can get
back with you.
[The information follows:]
``DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Field Operations
(OFO) conducts passive surveillance on all passengers on international
travel to the United States through our airports. This surveillance
includes observing passengers for sickness that warrants further review
by the Center for Disease Control. They do not have a specific protocol
for Dengue fever and Chikungunya. CBP OFO is in regular communication
with CDC and is prepared to implement increased protocols consistent
with the need.''
Mr. Clawson. Yeah, I mean, my district, that is--you know.
Then, just secondarily, the second question is because of,
as I understand it, less pooling water because we have more
modern drainage, I understand it is less of a risk. But, look,
we want to keep folks from getting it. I have had it, and it
ain't fun.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Mr. Clawson. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
Just to make sure--none of us want the President to be
misquoted here. So I am going to read the quote that I think
everybody is referring to from the questioners today.
I quote: ``I'm here today to say that climate change
constitutes a serious threat to global security, an immediate
risk to our National security.'' Those remarks were made at the
U.S. Coast Guard Academy graduation, May 20, 2015.
With that, I want to thank the witnesses. We appreciate
your indulgence and your willingness to be in the hot seat
here. Your testimony and your insight is valuable.
I thank the Members for their questions, as well.
The Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses, and we will ask that you respond
to these questions in writing.
Mr. Perry. The first panel of witnesses are excused.
We will take a momentary break while we set up the second
panel.
Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chair will now introduce our witness for the second
panel. It seems like it will be a much more up-close and
personal exchange, for better or worse.
Professor Marc Levy is the deputy director of the Center
for International Earth Science Information Network at Columbia
University. His research focuses on environmental security and
other areas. He is also an adjunct professor in Columbia
University's School of International and Public Affairs.
Thank you very much for your indulgence. I noticed you were
present throughout the last panel, as well. I would like to
recognize you now for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MARC A. LEVY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL EARTH SCIENCE INFORMATION NETWORK, COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY
Mr. Levy. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Perry, Ranking
Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the subcommittee. My name
is Marc Levy. I am deputy director of CIESIN, a unit of the
Earth Institute at Columbia University. I appear before you in
my personal capacity.
I have been studying the interactions between environmental
change and National security for over 20 years, with a
particular focus on climate change. I served as the lead author
on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth
Assessment Report's chapter on human security, and I have
regularly provided advice to U.S. Government bodies on these
questions.
I will show that the premise of this hearing is backwards;
the Department of Homeland Security is not doing enough to
prepare the country for security threats from climate change.
Consider first threats to the homeland. Last year, a
bipartisan commission analyzed the economic risks of climate
change and found that the U.S. economy faces potential losses
of tens of billions of dollars over the next 5 to 25 years as a
result of increased storm damage, large-scale crop losses, and
disruptions to the energy system. In addition, heat waves
threaten to kill tens of thousands of Americans per year. Some
risks are with us right now already. In Alaska, climate change
impacts are already rendering entire towns virtually unlivable.
If a group were to adopt the goal of inflicting these harms
on the homeland, they would immediately jump to the top of our
terrorist threat list.
If we look overseas, those charged with defending U.S.
National security have concluded that extreme events from
climate change are likely to create security problems that
could require deployment of U.S. forces or provide openings for
the expansion of influence of organizations and governments
hostile to our vital interests.
The Defense Department labels climate change an immediate
security threat. This view emerged rapidly and without partisan
divisions. A 2003 Department of Defense study and a 2008
National Intelligence Assessment are among the key milestones.
We are not alone; our allies see things the same way.
This is not mass hysteria. Three central developments
explain this convergence.
First, a rapidly expanding set of scientific studies has
examined the historical data and shown that there is a very
strong statistical correlation between climate stress and
political violence and instability. One example is in the
upper-left corner of that slide.
Second, the climate stresses that have historically
elevated security risks are now manifesting with higher
frequency, greater magnitude, and even in new alarming forms.
That is the second slide in the middle on the top.
Third, there are global changes underway that are making
security more tenuous even before climate change enters the
picture, so this multiplier effect is now more serious. For
example, the number of partially democratic regimes, which are
at very high risk of instability, is at an all-time historic
high. That is the graph on the lower left. Food prices have
jumped about 60 percent over the last decade and have stayed
there. That is the middle bottom graph. Then uncertainty over
the evolving balance of power is triggering more conflict over
territory.
So all these things together are making the world more
dangerous, and we are seeing signs of that danger. The graph on
the lower right is showing the increase in violence around the
world, instability over the last 10 years.
These overseas risks affect the homeland, too. Terrorist
organizations are more likely to succeed where weak governments
have low authority. The loss of such authority can be
accelerated by the dynamics associated with climatic stress.
So it is time to shift gears and move beyond understanding
the threats and get about the task of mounting an effective
response. This is where I think the administration should be
doing more, not less.
A National Research Council study on climate and security
recommended that the United States develop a whole-of-
Government strategy for monitoring threats and for doing a
series of regular stress tests. But the White House has not
done this. In fact, if you look at what is publicly available
in the press, it seems that we are moving backward in some
ways. The CIA Center for Climate Change was closed in 2012, and
MEDEA, a program that enabled climate scientists to work with
intelligence data, has also been shut down. In my view, MEDEA
should be brought back.
So, in summary, a simple logic explains why DHS should
incorporate climate change into its risk framework: Climate
change is endangering Americans and disrupting our economy. It
threatens to destabilize regions of high National interest.
That same logic renders inexcusable the slow pace of meaningful
action responding to that threat.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Levy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marc A. Levy
July 8, 2015
Good morning Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and
Members of the subcommittee. My name is Marc Levy, and I am deputy
director of the Center for International Earth Science Information
Network, which is a unit of the Earth Institute at Columbia University.
I appear before you in my personal capacity.
I have been studying the interactions between environmental change
and National security for over 20 years, with a particular focus on
climate change. I served as a lead author on the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report's chapter on
Human Security (Adger et al 2014) and have regularly provided expert
advice to U.S. Government bodies.
I will show that the premise of this hearing is backwards. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not doing enough to prepare
the country for security threats from climate change.
Consider threats to the homeland.
Last year a careful analysis of the economic risks that climate
change poses for the United States, overseen by a bipartisan
commission, found that the U.S. economy faces potential losses of tens
of billions of dollars over the next 5-25 years as a result of
increased storm damage, large-scale crop losses, and disruptions to the
energy system (Risky Business Project 2014). In addition, heat waves
threaten to kill tens of thousands Americans per year. The U.S.
National Climate Assessment found similar dangers looming. Some risks
are with us now: In Alaska climate change impacts are already rendering
entire towns virtually unlivable (Melillo, Richmond, and Yohe 2014).
A group that adopted the goal of inflicting such harm on the
homeland would immediately jump to the top of our terrorist threat
list.
Those charged with defending U.S. National security abroad have
also converged around a view that extreme events from climate change
are likely to create security problems that could require deployment of
U.S. forces or provide openings for the expansion of influence of
organizations and governments hostile to our vital interests.
This view emerged rapidly and without partisan divisions, with a
2003 DoD study (Schwartz and Randall 2003) and a 2008 National
Intelligence Assessment (Fingar 2008) key initial milestones. Since
2009 every National Threat Assessment by the Director of National
Intelligence has pointed to climate change as a major security threat.
The Department of Defense (2014) has identified climate change as an
immediate threat. A complete list of U.S. Government assessments of
climate-security risks can be found at http://climateandsecurity.org/
resources/u-s-government/.
The speed and depth of the transformation in our thinking that I
have outlined is analogous to the way George Kennan's famous ``Long
Telegram'' came to reorient U.S. foreign policy after WWII around the
strategic goal of containing Soviet expansionism. In both cases initial
skepticism gave way to both the strength of the logic and the power of
the evidence that unfolding events provided.
We are far from alone. Our allies see things the same way (American
Security Project 2014). The most recent IPCC report says that ``human
security will be progressively threatened as the climate changes''
(Adger et al 2014, p. 758). A G7-commissioned study concludes
categorically that ``Climate change is a global threat to security in
the 21st Century'' (Ruttinger et al 2015).
This is not mass hysteria. Three central developments explain the
remarkable convergence.
1. A rapidly expanding set of scientific studies has examined the
historical data and shown that climate stress is very strongly
statistically associated with political violence and
instability (Hsiang et al 2013).
2. The climate stresses that historically have elevated security
risks are manifesting with higher frequency, higher magnitudes,
and even in new alarming forms (McElroy and Baker 2012).
3. There are global changes underway that are making security more
tenuous even before climate change enters the picture, making
the incremental effect of climate stress more dangerous. For
example, the number of partially democratic regimes, which are
at very high risk of instability, is at an all-time high
(Goldstone et al 2010, Center for Systemic Peace 2014). Food
prices, also a major risk factor, have jumped about 60% above
their long-term average (Bellemare 2014, Food and Agricultural
Organization 2015). And uncertainty over the evolving balance
of power is triggering more conflict over territorial access
and control (Mead 2014).
These risks affect the homeland. Terrorist organizations are more
likely to succeed where weak governments have low authority. The loss
of such authority can be accelerated by the dynamics associated with
climatic stress (NRC 2013, 75-96).
It is now time to shift gears and focus on the hard task of
mounting an effective response. And this is where the administration is
failing to meet the challenge.
Consider some core recommendations made by a National Research
Council (2013) study on climate and security, carried out at the
request of the U.S. intelligence community, which was released 2\1/2\
years ago.
Improve the ability to quantify the risk of disruptive
climate events, including single extreme climate events as
clusters and sequences of events (7).
Improve understanding of the conditions under which climate
impacts lead to security breakdowns (8).
Develop a whole-of-Government strategy for monitoring
threats linked to climate change (10).
Establish a system of regular ``stress testing'' to identify
potential problems concerning the ability of countries and global
systems to manage disruptive climate events (11).
The need for an operational capability to understand and respond to
climate-triggered security problems abroad was identified as far back
as a 2003 in a DoD study (Schwartz and Randall 2003).
But the White House has not responded. In fact, if one examines
publicly accessible information it seems that we are moving backwards
in some critical areas. The CIA's Center for Climate Change was closed
in 2012 (Broder 2012), and MEDEA, a program that enabled university
scientists to work with intelligence data to deepen understanding of
the security aspects of climate change, has since also shut down
(McDonnell 2015). In my view, it is imperative that MEDEA be
reinstated.
In this context, what the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (DHS
2014) says about climate change is far too tame. Our knowledge of the
threat is growing, the risks are rising, and Government responses are
weak and uncoordinated. Someone should be ringing alarm bells.
In summary, the reason DHS is obligated to incorporate climate
change into its risk framework is simple: Climate change is endangering
Americans and disrupting our economy. It threatens to destabilize
regions of high National interest. This logic justifies all the high-
level statements about climate as a National security threat. The same
logic renders inexcusable the slow pace of meaningful action.
References
Adger, W.N., J.M. Pulhin, J. Barnett, G.D. Dabelko, G.K. Hovelsrud, M.
Levy, Oswald Spring, and C.H. Vogel (2014) ``Human security''
in: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and
Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B.,
V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E.
Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B.
Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea,
and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 755-791.
American Security Project (2014) ``The Global Security Defense Index on
Climate Change,'' http://globalsecuritydefenseindex.org
(accessed February 25, 2015).
Bellemare, Marc F. 2014, ``Rising Food Prices, Food Price Volatility,
and Social Unrest,'' American Journal of Agricultural Economics
doi:10.1093/ajae/aau038.
Broder, John (2012) ``C.I.A. Closes Its Climate Change Office,'' New
York Times (online) http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/
c-i-a-closes-its-climate-change-office/, accessed July 1, 2015.
Center for Systemic Peace (2015) ``Global Conflict Trends'' http://
www.systemicpeace.org/conflicttrends.html (accessed June 3,
2015).
Fingar, Thomas (2008), ``National Intelligence Assessment on the
National Security Implications of Global Climate Change to
2030,'' Statement for the Record, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (June 25).
Food and Agriculture Organization (2015) ``FAO Food Price Index,''
http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/
accessed February 25, 2015.
Goldstone, Jack A., et al. (2010) ``A global model for forecasting
political instability.'' American Journal of Political Science
54.1, 190-208.
Hsiang, S. M., Burke, M., & Miguel, E. (2013). ``Quantifying the
influence of climate on human conflict,'' Science 341(6151)
Maliniak, Daniel; Susan Peterson; Ryan Powers; and Michael J. Tierney
(2015) ``The Best International Relations Schools in the
World'' Foreign Policy http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/03/top-
twenty-five-schools-international-relations/.
McDonnell, Timothy (2015) ``The CIA Is Shuttering a Secretive Climate
Research Program,'' Mother Jones (May 21) http://
www.motherjones.com/environment/2015/05/cia-closing-its-main-
climate-research-program, accessed July 1, 2015.
McElroy, Michael and D. James Baker (2012), ``Climate Extremes: Recent
Trends with Implications for National Security,'' available at
www.environment.harvard.edu/climate-extremes.
Mead, Walter Russel (2014) ``The Return of Geopolitics'' Foreign
Affairs (May/June) 93:3, 69-79.
Melillo, Jerry M., Terese (T.C.) Richmond, and Gary W. Yohe, Eds.
(2014) Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third
National Climate Assessment. U.S. Global Change Research
Program, 841 pp. doi:10.7930/J0Z31WJ2.
National Research Council (2013) Climate and Social Stress:
Implications for Security Analysis. Committee on Assessing the
Impacts of Climate Change on Social and Political Stresses,
J.D. Steinbruner, P.C. Stern, and J.L. Husbands, Eds. Board on
Environmental Change and Society, Division of Behavioral and
Social Sciences and Education. Washington, DC: The National
Academies Press.
Risky Business Project (2014) Risky Business: The Economic Risks of
Climate Change in the United States, www.riskybusiness.org.
Ruttinger, Lukas; Dan Smith; Gerald Stang; Dennis Tanzler, and Janani
Vivekananda (2015) ``A New Climate for Peace: Taking Action on
Climate and Fragility Risks,'' Independent report commissioned
for G7 members, available at http://www.newclimateforpeace.org/
.
Schwartz, Peter and Doug Randall (2003) ``An Abrupt Climate Change
Scenario and Its Implications for United States National
Security,'' available at http://www.climate.org/PDF/
clim_change_scenario.pdf.
U.S. Department of Defense (2014) Climate Adaptation Roadmap,
www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/CCARprint_wForeword_c.pdf.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2014) The 2014 Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Professor Levy.
The Chair now recognizes himself for a few moments of
questioning.
Can you go back to a portion of your statement--I am sorry,
I don't have the written text here, but you mentioned crop
damage and something else. It was closer to the front, or the
beginning of your statement. Can you refresh my memory?
Mr. Levy. Sure. So this was a summary of the Risky
Business----
Mr. Perry. Right.
Mr. Levy [continuing]. Study. The particular risks that
they tried to itemize and quantify were losses from storm
damage, crop losses, and disruptions to the energy system. That
refers to the fact that there will be big swings in demand for
electricity in different regions, different times, as the
climate changes.
Mr. Perry. Sure.
But you would also acknowledge--because I am looking at
your different graphs and so on and so forth here. I mean,
there has to be a cause-and-effect relationship. While there
may be more crop damage now based on storms or natural events
that may or may not have anything to do with climate change--
may or may not, so I will acknowledge both sides--or storm
damage or energy system utilization that has increased, but you
also must acknowledge, or should, I would think, that there
could be more crop damage because we can get more into an acre
of ground than we ever have before. There may be more storm
damage because we are more tightly compressed in urban centers.
We have become more efficient. But the down side to that is,
when these weather events occur, the damage is much more acute.
So it is not necessarily directly causal. Yes, it does
happen, but it is not necessarily just because of climate
change or the weather event alone. Is that fair to say?
Mr. Levy. You are reflecting something that is genuine and
relevant and true, which is that the damage that occurs in any
one event is a function of the value of the assets that are
exposed and the magnitude of the risk. So the damage can go up
as a function of the value of the assets going up. That is
certainly true. When you look at the historical data, you have
to take that into account.
What is especially valuable about this Risky Business
project is that they were only looking at the incremental risk
from the effect of climate change, keeping the other things
constant. So these risk estimates that they came up with are
the risks only from the additional stress attributable to
likely climate change.
Mr. Perry. Okay.
You are a vocal proponent that climate change acts as a
threat multiplier, particularly in respect to a rise in
militant groups or terrorism.
What are the other threat multipliers? Where would you say
climate change ranks in the panoply of threat multipliers?
Mr. Levy. That is an excellent question. It is one of the--
answering that question is one of the recurring recommendations
on the part of virtually every organized group to assess this
risk for the U.S. Government. It is one of the things that
requires more investment, not less.
Some of the other multipliers include the spread of radical
ideology; the growth of income inequality; the uncertainty
about, you know, the shift in the balance of power
geopolitically; the rise of globalization, which opens up
access to markets and potentially creates grievances. There are
a number of threats that we face, and they interact in
complicated, potentially quite dangerous ways.
The ability to understand how to rank-order all of those
threats is currently quite low. It is a very challenging task
because they interact, and so, in any one case, what you see is
the resultant of all of them acting together.
What has been done over the past 10 years is to isolate a
small number of these threat multipliers and to ask the
question, can we rule out the possibility that this one threat
is not making any difference? Because one possibility is that
all of this dangerous activity we see around the world is a
function of all of those other threat multipliers and climate
stress is not relevant.
The statistical work that has been done over the last
several years has enabled us to say that climate stress is
adding a significant additional set of stresses to that mix. If
we were lucky enough to live in a world without that stress,
the world would currently be less dangerous. The bigger
question you are asking has not been fully answered.
Mr. Perry. So this might be a little off, based on that
answer, but, in your opinion, then, what is the direct
motivator for Islamic terrorism?
Mr. Levy. That is outside of my area of expertise. I can
comment on how that question is factored into aggregate risk
assessments, but I cannot comment on the direct motivator of an
Islamic terrorist.
Mr. Perry. The President, in his speech that I referenced
earlier and at the end of the last panel, in his speech before
the Coast Guard Academy on May 20, linked climate change, more
specifically droughts, with the rise of Boko Haram.
Would you say that climate change was the primary cause of
Boko--I am assuming you are familiar with Boko Haram.
Mr. Levy. Yes.
In a particular case that has multiple causes, it is
virtually impossible to identify a prime cause or even to rank-
order the many different causes. Moreover, even if the drought
in northern Nigeria was a major causal factor, that certainly
does not mean that the many other things that are going on are
irrelevant, and it doesn't take away any blame on the part of
the people who chose to respond in the way that they did.
What we can say from the evidence is that, when you look at
all of the dangerous things that are happening, all of the
threats to regional stability around the world, climate is
stressing that overall mix in a more dangerous direction. It
doesn't mean that you can take any one of those dangerous
events and attribute it, yes or no, to climate stress. It means
that the overall mix is more dangerous than it would have been
without it.
Mr. Perry. Let me ask you this. This may be a little out of
your wheelhouse too, but just based on your publications and
your body of work, if I were to tell you that there is not one
agency at DHS, there is not one office, so to speak, not one
program office to coordinate activities countering violent
extremism, would you consider that a weakness?
Mr. Levy. Well, I think it would depend on what is going on
in the rest of Government. So, I have thought a lot about your
comparison over the morning between----
Mr. Perry. I mean, we looked at--this is what the
publications, the whole of publications are for one topic, on
violent extremism, and this is the whole of publications on
climate change. So based on that.
Mr. Levy. So the question of how much focus, how many
publications there should be on countering violent extremism
within DHS is a function of what kind of coordination is going
on in the rest of Government and what kind of coordination is
taking place that maybe is not showing up in published
documents. So that I cannot comment on that whatsoever.
I can say that the coordination to provide a response to
the threats of climate-triggered security breakdowns within the
U.S. Government is far below what every single expert body that
has looked at the question has recommended.
Mr. Perry. So--I am going to wrap up here, but I have one
more.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Go ahead.
Mr. Perry. So would you advise focusing--I mean, I know you
are a proponent, but I just want to make sure I understand your
position--focusing more on climate change at the expense of
increasing CVE efforts, countering violent extremism?
Mr. Levy. No, I would not. I----
Mr. Perry. Okay. All right.
You know, I have looked at--you are well-published, I am
sure well-read, well-respected, and involved in a whole host of
things that I can't imagine how you get through your day. You
look like you should be 150 years old based on your resume, et
cetera, here.
I don't know if this is in your wheelhouse either, but if
you are familiar with history, and somewhat recent history,
World War II, there was a thing called the terror famine
carried out by the Communist Russians in Ukraine and
surrounding areas. Then there was an issue of the Kaytn
massacre of Polish officials, which were denied by the Soviet
Union for decades, decades upon decades, and not only denied by
the Soviet Union and the Russians, but also that denial was
upheld by experts and governments around the world, including
this one.
My only reason to bring those things into light regarding
this discussion is--you have a master's on advanced
international studies and a bachelor's from Dartmouth in
government, right? So you take the information from the climate
scientists and you take information from political scientists,
all that information, and you sublimate that and then put it
back together and make some sense of it and put it in graphs
for us to see, right?
But if that information is flawed, if it could be flawed,
if it may be flawed, as the two examples that I gave--we walked
around for the last 60 or 70 years thinking that the Russians
didn't do this, that the Germans did, or the Russians didn't do
it at all, and we were wrong. We were wrong.
So my only point is that, while you are compiling the
information from all these different groups that we all have
consensus on, it doesn't necessarily mean that it is correct.
With that, I yield to the gentlelady from New Jersey.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Levy.
When I read your testimony last night, it actually alarmed
me. I was like, oh, my God, it is almost Armageddon here,
calling for--or not doing the things that we need to do in
order to protect ourselves.
I need to understand from you, what do you think--do you
think that there is a high potential of radicalization of
individuals here in our country based upon some of the factors
that they see that have come about as a result of droughts and
other situations caused by climate change in the world, across
the sea? Do you think that that has in any way, shape, or form
spurred on any of our young people to become radicalized?
Mr. Levy. I am not aware of any evidence that that is the
case.
I think that, on balance, the response of the U.S.
Government to climate-related stresses within our own borders
has been fairly good. We could do more, but I think the
response is, for the most part, appropriate.
But where you get radicalization is more commonly where you
have a very big threat, very big impacts on livelihoods and
lives, and the Government is either doing nothing or they are
actually making it worse. So you see this in many parts of the
world. You have seen it, for example, in Syria over the last 8
years. When that happens, things can get very bad very fast.
I think in this country that particular linkage is
something we probably don't have to worry a whole lot about,
but, you know, I have always been surprised at how things
unfold.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Do you have a sense of our
vulnerability to diseases coming our way as a result of
population shifting or migration of even other birds, bees, and
whatever to our country as a result of--or just coming north or
coming from wherever, wherever there are these sort of stresses
on the environment in which they are native?
Mr. Levy. So this is a question that is very relevant. It
turns out to be a question that is hard to provide a specific
predictive answer to. So the exact date by which dengue may
become a significant disease in the United States, things like
that are--the existing science does not really support that
sort of thing.
But what we can do is point to large bodies of research
that identify that the risk framework is radically changing
because of the interaction of climatic stress and population
movement and globalization, so that people who are charged with
protecting Americans from major epidemics have to take into
account the effect that climate change will have on those
risks, because the likelihood that it will have a big effect is
quite high, even if we can't point to a specific disease, a
specific date.
An example is, if you look at historically the major global
influenza pandemics, there is now growing evidence that there
is a likelihood that the timing of those global pandemics of
influenza were triggered by climatic anomalies. It has not been
proven beyond a doubt, but the evidence is suggestive that that
is a very strong possibility.
So that becomes a risk that we have to take into account
when we think about what is the likelihood that our country
could be hit with the consequences of a global flu pandemic.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So when you said--thank you.
When you said that the question here for us is not whether
or not we are doing too much or our priorities are askew
because there is too much emphasis on this issue, you said it
is the exact opposite.
Were you speaking just with regard to the Department of
Homeland Security, or are you speaking about Federal
Government, you know, and its other departments?
Mr. Levy. So I was speaking specifically about the
functions that have been identified in some of these recent
high-level studies which call for coordination, systematic risk
assessment, and periodic stress-testing to be able to provide
warning about likely high-magnitude threats.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So that is beyond just the one
department.
Mr. Levy. Exactly.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So my question to you: What would you
recommend that we think about doing that would put us in a
position to be more, sort-of, proactive and more able to assess
these risks, to anticipate and to sort of assign and align?
Mr. Levy. So are you speaking specifically about the
Department or the Government as a whole?
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I was actually speaking about the
Government as a whole. Then my question would be: Do you see
DHS as a coordinator of some of this? Because its function is
to keep the homeland--its mission is to keep the homeland safe.
So, with that, that would be my only question--those two
questions, actually.
Mr. Levy. So, if you go back to the idea of a threat
multiplier, the net risk comes about as climate stress
interacts with a range of other things. In each place, the
suite of those factors that combine are different and unique.
So what we need is an ability to do first-order estimates
of how those things are interacting in places that are of vital
interest and to anticipate how those interacting threats might
unfold in a way that would make a big difference to us, and
then to provide adequate warning to people that can take steps
to either mitigate those risks or to respond to them after they
unfold.
At present, there is no organized effort to do that for
these climate security risks. We have people talking about the
dangers; we don't have people acting on the recommendations.
So, within the purview of DHS, I think a very simple thing
could be taking some of these recommendations and doing a
survey of all the Government agencies that are responsible in
some way for monitoring and assessing and warning about these
risks, to see what they are doing to contribute to that need
and see where the gaps can be filled most efficiently.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman, the Ranking
Member from New Jersey.
With that, I also thank you, Professor. Sorry it was short,
but I hope the whole thing was instructional. Your testimony
and insight is valuable to us, as well.
I also thank the Members for their questions.
Members of the subcommittee may have some additional ones
for the witness, and so we would ask you to respond with those
in writing, if you could.
With that, pursuant to Committee Rule 7(e), the hearing
record will be open for 10 days, without objection.
This subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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