[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ADMITTING SYRIAN REFUGEES: THE INTELLIGENCE
VOID AND THE EMERGING HOMELAND SECU-
RITY THREAT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 24, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-22
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
John Katko, New York Filemon Vela, Texas
Will Hurd, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Mandy Bowers, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 26
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Dr. Seth G. Jones, Director, International Security and Defense
Policy Center, Rand Corporation:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Thomas Fuentes, Assistant Director (Retired), Federal Bureau
of Investigation............................................... 14
Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Senior Fellow, Foundation for
Defense of Democracies:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Statement of HIAS.............................................. 32
Statement of Syrian Community Network (Chicago, IL), Syrian
American Medical Society, Karam Foundation, Syria Relief and
Development, Syrian Expatriates Organization, Watan USA,
Rahma Relief Foundation, Hope for Syria...................... 32
Statement of Mirna Barq, President, Syrian American Council.... 34
Statement of Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service.......... 35
Statement of CWS, Church World Service......................... 37
ADMITTING SYRIAN REFUGEES: THE INTELLIGENCE VOID AND THE EMERGING
HOMELAND SECURITY THREAT
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Wednesday, June 24, 2015
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Barletta, Katko, McCaul,
Higgins, Keating, Vela, and Thompson.
Mr. King. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to
order. We are waiting for the Ranking Member, who has been
detained. He has graciously said we could start the hearing
without him. He will be coming shortly, as will, I believe, the
Chairman of the full committee.
So, the subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony
from three distinguished experts regarding the security
situation in Iraq and Syria and to review potential
vulnerabilities in the refugee screening process. I would like
to welcome the Members of the subcommittee and express my
appreciation to the witnesses who are here today. Now I will
make an opening statement.
For Americans opening our doors to those who flee violence
or exploitation, this is part of who we are as a Nation.
America has a long and proud history of providing safe harbor
to refugees. Refugees admitted to America include our former
colleague, the late Congressman Tom Lantos from Hungary,
scientist Albert Einstein from Germany, among thousands more
who have contributed to American society. But we have also had
refugees and asylum seekers who take advantage of U.S. safe
haven to plot and carry out attacks.
Over the last 4 years, the conflict in Syria has forced
more than 3.9 million Syrians to flee their country, in large
part due to the continued violence and savagery of ISIS, making
this one of the world's biggest refugee crises without an end
in sight. This year, the United States is expected to admit
several thousand Syrian refugees, a number only expected to
rise over the next few years, as well as almost 70,000 refugees
from approximately 70 countries.
We have heard open and closed testimony from Government
officials and security experts expressing concerns that
terrorist groups may seek to use Syrian refugee programs as a
gateway to carry out attacks in Europe and America. It is
essential that we have a discussion of the humanitarian crises
and the security risks inherent in the process. I agree that
the vast majority of Syrian refugees do not have ties to terror
groups. However, we have been reviewing the current security
vetting procedures for a number of months. I have a number of
concerns, not the least of which is the lack of on-the-ground
intelligence necessary to identify terror links.
With the lack of stable foreign governments, foreign
intelligence agencies, military intelligence, U.S. Embassies
abroad, and access to human intelligence on the ground in
Syria, the information and intelligence that we are able to
acquire regarding individuals who seek to enter the United
States is limited and oftentimes unverifiable. This
significantly degrades the quality and accuracy of our vetting
process.
The United States has seen the danger of flawed refugee
vetting, as well as the potential for refugees to be
radicalized once they are in the United States. In 2011, I held
a hearing on Islamic radicalization within the Somali-American
community. This included the 20-plus cases of individuals, many
refugees or children of refugees, who left the United States to
join al-Shabaab. Since that time, we have seen about a dozen
other Somali-American youths join ISIS.
On May 25, 2011, two Iraqi refugees were arrested in
Bowling Green, Kentucky and charged with conspiracy to kill
U.S. nationals abroad, attempting to provide material support
to terrorists and to al-Qaeda in Iraq, and 21 other charges.
According to a July 2011 news article, the FBI was looking into
potential terror ties for approximately 300 additional Iraqi
refugees. Other cases include the blind sheik, Omar Abdel
Rahman, the 1993 World Trade Bomber Ramzi Yousef, Mir Qazi
involved in the 1997 CIA headquarters shooting, and, of course,
the Tsarnaev brothers in Boston. While these bad actors
represent a small percentage of the total number of refugees in
the United States, we have to continuously monitor the changing
threat environments.
In just the past 3 weeks, there have been at least 10
arrests by the FBI of U.S. individuals connected with ISIS and
plotting attacks on the homeland. The on-line radicalization
and calls by ISIS leadership for Islamists to carry out attacks
in the United States are resonating with small pockets of U.S.
society. There is little doubt that these calls for attacks are
also resonating within the refugee community both domestically
and those still abroad. This does not mean we should close our
borders and not accept anyone. But we certainly need to be
thoughtful and deliberative about the process and provide the
American people with the most assurance that we are not
importing terrorists.
There is no doubt that a number of significant improvements
were made to the refugee vetting process in 2011 after the
alarming cases involving the Iraqi refugees. At the same time,
there have been procedural failures that resulted in denial of
refugee status for a number of Iraqi and Afghani nationals who
put their lives on the line to help the United States during
the military campaigns.
We have invited a distinguished panel of experts testifying
today to assess the current threat environment, to share their
perspectives on refugee vetting, and to solicit their
recommendations on what additional security measures should be
considered.
[The statement of Chairman King follows:]
Statement of Chairman Peter T. King
For Americans, opening our doors to those who flee violence, war,
and exploitation is part of who we are as a Nation. America has a long
and proud history of providing safe harbor for refugees. Refugees
admitted to America include Congressman Tom Lantos (Hungary) and
scientist Albert Einstein (Germany), among thousands more who have
contributed to U.S. society. But we have also had refugees and asylum
seekers take advantage of U.S. safe haven to plot and carry out
attacks.
Over the last 4 years, the conflict in Syria has forced more than
3.9 million Syrians to flee their country, in large part due to the
continued violence and savagery of ISIS, making this one of the world's
biggest refugee crises without an end in sight. This year, the United
States is expected to admit several thousand Syrian refugees--a number
only expected to rise over the next few years as well as almost 70,000
refugees from approximately 70 countries.
We have heard open and closed testimony from Government officials
and security experts expressing concerns that terrorist groups may seek
to use Syrian refugee programs as a gateway to carry out attacks in
Europe and America. It is essential that we have a discussion of the
humanitarian crisis and the security risks inherent in the process.
I agree that the vast majority of Syrian refugees do not have ties
to terror groups. However, we have been reviewing the current security
vetting procedures for a number of months, and I have a number of
concerns, not the least of which is the lack of on-the-ground
intelligence necessary to identify terror links.
With the lack of stable foreign governments, foreign intelligence
agencies, military intelligence, U.S. embassy support, and access to
human intelligence on the ground in Syria, the information and
intelligence that we are able to acquire regarding individuals who seek
to enter the United States is limited, and oftentimes unverifiable.
This significantly degrades the quality and accuracy of our vetting
process.
The United States has seen the danger of flawed refugee vetting, as
well as the potential for refugees to be radicalized once they are in
the United States.
In 2011, I held a hearing into Islamist radicalization within the
Somali-American community. This included the 20-plus cases of
individuals, many refugees or children of refugees, who left the United
States to join al-Shabaab. Since that time, we have seen about a dozen
other Somali-American youth join ISIS.
On May 25, 2011, two Iraqi refugees were arrested in Bowling Green,
Kentucky and charged with conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals abroad;
attempting to provide material support to terrorists and to al-Qaeda in
Iraq; and 21 other charges. According to a July 2011 news article (LA
Times), the FBI was looking into potential terror ties for
approximately 300 additional Iraqi refugees.
Other cases include the Blind Sheikh--Omar Abdel Rahman, 1993 World
Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef, Mir Aimal Kansi the 1997 CIA
Headquarters shooter, and the Tsarnaev brothers.
While these bad actors represent only a small percentage of the
total number of refugees in the United States, we have to continuously
monitor the changing threat environment. In just the past 3 weeks,
there have been at least 10 arrests by the FBI of U.S. individuals
connected with ISIS and plotting attacks in the homeland.
The on-line radicalization and calls by ISIS leadership for
Islamists to carry out attacks in the United States are resonating with
small pockets of U.S. society. There is little doubt that these calls
for attacks are also resonating within the refugee community--both
domestically and those still abroad. This doesn't mean that we should
close our borders and not accept anyone, but we certainly need to be
thoughtful and deliberative about the process and provide the American
people with the most assurance that we are not importing terrorists.
There is no doubt that a number of significant improvements were
made to the refugee vetting process in 2011, after the alarming cases
involving several Iraqi refugees. At the same time, there has been
procedural failures that resulted in the denial of refugee status for a
number of Iraqi and Afghani nationals who put their lives on the line
to help the United States during the military campaigns.
We have invited a distinguished panel of experts testifying today
to assess the current threat environment, share their perspectives on
refugee vetting and solicit their recommendations on what additional
security measures should be considered.
Mr. King. Now I recognize the Ranking Member of the full
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is good
to see you. Let me welcome the witnesses to the hearing. I
appreciate you holding this hearing.
It is important for us in looking at the United States
refugee program and see how it was impacted by the terrorist
attacks of September 11. In the aftermath of those attacks, a
review of refugee-related security procedures were undertaken.
Refugee admissions were briefly suspended. Enhanced security
measures were implemented. However, more than a decade after
the enhanced security measures have been undertaken, with
limited instances of fraud, there are those who believe that
certain populations are unable to be properly vetted for
security purposes.
Rather than focus on the fear and concern surrounding
Syrian refugees, I think we should focus on the known facts
about the Syrian refugee population. The Syrian people are the
primary victims of the violent conflict in Syria and the brutal
actions of ISIL. They are the most vulnerable to the violence,
and have known first-hand the cruelty of ISIL and other groups
that have brought harm upon their communities. These refugees,
like most others that arrive in the United States, are fleeing
difficult, even life-threatening situations. The idea that they
would be met with suspicion and hate upon arrival in the United
States is an affront to the values we uphold and promote.
Like Americans, most Syrians consider ISIL to be their
enemy as well. Within the United States, the Syrian American
Council has already partnered with the Office of Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties within the Department of Homeland Security
to organize community briefings for Syrian Americans focused on
countering violent extremism. Groups like this encourage a
robust Congressional debate on how ISIL can be stopped both at
home and abroad. In fact, the leading demographic of those
seeking or joining ISIL is in the United States who were born
U.S. citizens, including citizens with no ancestry from major
Muslim countries. Therefore, preventing vulnerable Syrian
refugees from entering the United States will not address the
Unites States issue with violent extremism.
Time and time again, I have urged this committee not to
have a narrow view of violent extremism which ignores violent
extremist activities of domestic groups. Regrettably, last
week's attack at the Emanuel AME Church in Charleston brought
this issue into stark focus. Congress, the President, and the
Department of Homeland Security need to come together with the
State and local governments to honestly acknowledge that
domestic terrorism is a threat to the safety and security of
the American homeland, including the refugees who resettle
within our borders.
We must move beyond the perceived fears of the unknown and
focus on credible threat information and allow the security
vetting systems we have in place to work. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
June 24, 2015
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing to
examine the United States' security screening process of Syrian
refugees and the threats those refugees may pose to the United States.
The United States refugee program was greatly impacted by the
terrorist attacks of September 11. In the aftermath of those attacks, a
review of refugee-related security procedures was undertaken, refugee
admissions were briefly suspended, and enhanced security measures were
implemented.
However, more than a decade after these enhanced security measures
have been undertaken with limited instances of fraud, there are those
that believe certain populations are unable to be properly vetted for
security purposes. Rather than focus on the fear and concern
surrounding Syrian refugees, I think we should focus on the known facts
about the Syrian refugee population. The Syrian people are the primary
victims of the violent conflict in Syria and the brutal actions of
ISIL.
They are the most vulnerable to the violence and know first-hand
the cruelty of ISIL and other groups that have brought harm upon their
communities. These refugees, like most others that arrive in the United
States, are fleeing difficult, even life-threatening, situations. The
idea that they would be met with suspicion and hate upon arrival in the
United States is an affront to the values we uphold and promote.
Like Americans, most Syrians consider ISIL to be their enemy, as
well. Within the United States, the Syrian American Council has already
partnered with the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties within
the Department of Homeland Security to organize community briefings for
Syrian Americans focused on countering violent extremism. Groups like
this encourage a robust Congressional debate on how ISIL can be stopped
both at home and abroad.
In fact, the leading demographic of those seeking or joining ISIL
in the United States are U.S.-born citizens, including citizens with no
ancestry from majority-Muslim countries. Therefore, preventing
vulnerable Syrian refugees from entering the United States will not
address the United States' issues with violent extremism.
Time and time again, I have urged this committee not to have a
narrow view of violent extremism, which ignores violent extremist
activity of domestic groups. Regrettably, last week's attacks at the
Emanuel AME Church in Charleston brought this issue into stark focus.
Congress, the President, and the Department of Homeland Security need
to come together with State and local governments to honestly
acknowledge that domestic terrorism is a threat to the safety and
security of the American homeland, including the refugees who resettle
within our borders.
We must move beyond the perceived fears of the unknown and focus on
credible threat information and allow the security vetting systems we
have in place to work. I yield back.
Mr. King. The Ranking Member yields back.
I recognize the Chairman of the full committee, the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
for holding this important hearing. We have been sounding the
alarm for months on this issue and for good reason. America has
a proud tradition of welcoming refugees and immigrants. But we
need to make sure the extremists do not exploit this pathway to
our country, especially from terrorist safe havens.
Last year, the administration announced plans to surge the
admission of Syrian refugees into the United States, including
plans to resettle roughly 2,000 of them this year and thousands
more next year. This is concerning for two reasons. First,
terrorists have made it known that they want to manipulate
refugee programs to sneak operatives into the West. Second, top
National security officials have admitted that intelligence
gaps in Syria will make it hard to weed them out of refugee
pools.
Testifying before our committee in February, the director
of the National Counterterrorism Center called these refugees a
population of concern given the expansive presence of ISIS and
al-Qaeda in Syria. At the same hearing, the FBI's assistant
director, Michael Steinbach, for counterterrorism, argued that
identifying potential operatives would be difficult because,
``our databases won't have the information we need.'' Simply
put, we cannot screen applicants confidentially if we don't
have good intelligence on the ground. We can't vet them
properly if we don't have the proper databases.
In light of these concerns, I sent a series of letters to
the administration this year highlighting the risk of
accelerating Syrian refugee admissions and requesting greater
assurances regarding the screening process. The responses were
inadequate. The administration was vague in explaining how the
screening process would overcome the intelligence gaps. I just
wrote the President 2 weeks ago, again, asking for answers and
a Classified briefing for Members of this committee. We are
still waiting for a serious response. I do not take this issue
lightly. Terrorists are constantly probing our defenses and
would not hesitate to exploit a program meant to save innocent
people fleeing from violence for the purpose of attacking our
homeland.
I remind you that members of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the
predecessor to ISIS, have already managed to sneak in to our
country through refugee settlement programs. Two of these
terrorists, arrested in 2009, were responsible for killing four
Pennsylvania National Guard soldiers in Iraq. Yet they were
gained entry and resettled in Bowling Green, Kentucky. That was
when we had far better intelligence on the ground in Iraq to
vet refugees, where in Syria we are dark.
The situation today in Syria is even more chaotic, making
it difficult to get the biometric, biographic, and other
information needed to ensure individuals being admitted into
our country do not intend to do our people harm. Since its
founding, America has welcomed refugees from conflict zones in
the darkest corners of the globe. We will not abandon that
tradition. It embodies the compassion of our people and
represents our deepest values. But we must also not abandon our
vigilance. We cannot be naive.
In Syria, we are witnessing the largest convergence of
Islamist terrorists in world history. Some of these fanatics
want to turn our refugee programs into a Trojan horse to carry
out attacks here at home. We cannot allow that to happen. I
hope the White House will do more to convince Congress and the
American people that it is moving forward cautiously,
appropriately, but most importantly with the security of the
American people as a priority. If it does not, we may need to
consider taking additional steps here on Capitol Hill. With
that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. King. I thank the Chairman of the full committee for
his statement.
Now we will proceed to the witnesses. Other Members of the
committee are reminded opening statements may be submitted for
the record. We are pleased to have a very distinguished panel
of witnesses before us today on this important topic: Dr. Seth
Jones, Mr. Tom Fuentes, and Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross.
Beginning with Dr. Jones, he is the associate director of
the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the
Rand Cooperation, as well as an adjunct professor at Johns
Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies.
He served as the representative for the commander of the U.S.
Special Operations Commands, the assistant secretary of defense
of special operations. Prior to that position, he served as a
plans officer and an adviser to the commanding general U.S.
Special Ops in Afghanistan.
He specializes in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism,
including a focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and al-Qaeda. I
have been reading all his bio. But the fact is, Dr. Jones has
testified before this committee many times. He is a good friend
of the committee and he works with us. We appreciate having you
back here again today. Dr. Jones, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Chairman King. Thank you, Ranking
Member Thompson and other distinguished Members of the
committee. This is a very important hearing. I will divide my
comments into three sections.
The first is an update on the wars in Syria and, to a
certain extent, Iraq. The second is to try to tie that back to
the homeland. The third is to bring in the refugee issues. Let
me start with a brief update. As all of us here know, the wars
in both Syria and Iraq, which are deeply intertwined, continue
to impact U.S. National security and continue to contribute to
large refugee flows. At least by my assessment, in Syria, while
the United States is providing limited support to some Syrian
rebels through such programs as the Congressionally-approved
Train and Equip Program and is conducting some limited air
strikes against groups like Daesh and the Khorasan Group, the
rest of 2015 is, indeed, concerning.
Daesh or ISIS is likely to remain highly capable in Syria
because of its access to resources and its ability to replace
killed and captured leaders, as well as to continue to get
pretty significant funding streams. In addition, the al-Qaeda-
affiliated group, Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria has also increased
its control of territory. In fact, at least by my estimates,
al-Nusra may be more capable now. By that, I mean more
fighters, more funds, and more territory controlled than at any
time since its creation in 2011, including in such strongholds
as Idlib, Syria.
That brings us to the connection to the homeland. The two
groups in Syria, they also operate in Iraq, remain Daesh or
ISIS and the Khorasan Group. They present high threats to the
U.S. homeland. Both appear to be plotting attacks and certainly
trying to inspire attacks in the U.S. homeland, as well as
other places in the West. I think the issue that is worth
noting is that we have more foreign fighters in this broader
battleground that is Syria and Iraq than we have had in any
jihadist battlefield in the modern era.
This is a slightly different problem set than what I had to
deal with in Afghanistan, what we had to deal with in Libya,
and other places. Over 20,000 foreign fighters, about 17
percent or so appear to be coming from the West. Roughly 200
Americans are known to have attempted to travel to Syria to
fight with Islamic militants. Obviously, of additional concern
is the growing number of attacks we have seen across the West
with links either directly or indirectly back to this region.
Garland, Texas, Copenhagen, Denmark in February 2015,
Paris, France in January 2015, Sydney, Australia in December
2014, Ottawa, Canada in October 2014, Brussels, Belgium in May
2014, just to name a few. The broader issue, as we look to the
ties between Syria and the United States, is, first, more
foreign fighters than we have seen on any modern battlefield,
and, second, our intelligence picture is clearly much worse
than at least my own experience in several battlefields
overseas where we had a sustained American presence on the
ground to collect information.
So this brings me briefly back to refugees. I am happy to
discuss this in more detail. Got roughly 4 million refugees
based on the Syria problem set. Refugees has, as the Chairman
noted, historically played and will continue to play a critical
role in ensuring U.S. economic prosperity and cultural
diversity. But the risks associated with refugees may be higher
from Syria for several reasons. First, Syria and neighboring
Iraq have the highest number of foreign fighters than any
modern jihadist battlefield as I have already noted. There has
been an exodus of some fighters to the West.
Second, several groups in the region, like Daesh or ISIS,
have planned to put operatives in the West, including in
Europe, by having them seek political refugee status. This is
not just in Syria by the way. We have seen this effort in
Libya, among other places. Third, the U.S. intelligence
community's understanding of extremists in Syria is worse. I do
think it is worth considering a range of issues, improving data
management of potentially concerning refugees, rescreening
procedures, holding data collected at refugee camps, some DNA
checks, and a few other issues.
But let me just say in conclusion, that the United States
does have a long-standing tradition of offering protection and
freedom to refugees who live in fear of persecution. The
Chairman mentioned a number of ones, including Albert Einstein.
An integral part of that mission, however, in my view, needs to
be ensuring that those refugees considered for entry into the
United States, including from such jihadist battlefields as
Syria, do not present a risk to the safety and security of the
United States. I think what we are looking for is a balance. I
am happy to talk more about those specifics in the Q and A
period. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement of Seth G. Jones \1\ \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local
legislative committees; Government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a non-
profit research organization providing objective analysis and effective
solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private
sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily
reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
\2\ This testimony is available for free download at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT433.html.
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June 24, 2015
Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, thank you for
inviting me to testify at this important hearing, ``Admitting Syrian
Refugees: The Intelligence Void and the Emerging Homeland Security
Threat.'' I have divided my comments into four sections. The first
provides an overview of the wars in Syria and neighboring Iraq, the
second focuses on the terrorism threat to the United States, the third
outlines the foreign-fighter problem from Syria and Iraq, and the
fourth examines the implications for Syrian refugees.
i. update on the wars in syria and iraq
The wars in Syria and Iraq, which are deeply intertwined, continue
to impact U.S. National security.
In Syria, the United States is providing limited support to some
Syrian rebels against Daesh--also known as the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), or
simply Islamic State (IS)--under the Congressionally-approved train-
and-equip program.\3\ However, U.S.-led airstrikes have been
insufficient to seriously degrade Daesh in Syria. Over the rest of
2015, Daesh is likely to remain highly capable because of its access to
resources and its ability to replace killed and captured leaders. Daesh
has recently strengthened control in such Syrian areas as Homs, Dayr az
Zawr, and Ar Raqqah. In addition, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-
Nusrah has also increased its control of territory. In fact, Jabhat al-
Nusrah may be more capable now--with more fighters, funds, and
territory--than at any time since its creation in 2011, and it retains
a stronghold in northwestern Syrian areas such as Idlib. The recent
capture of the town of Jisr al-Shughour in northern Idlib province was
just the latest in a string of battlefield victories by rebel forces,
which have made advances in both the north and the south of the
country.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Daesh is an acronym from the Arabic name of the group, al-
Dawlah al-Islamiyah fil `Iraq wal-Sham.
\4\ See, for example, Liz Sly, ``Assad's Hold on Power Looks
Shakier Than Ever as Rebels Advance in Syria,'' Washington Post, April
26, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In neighboring Iraq, the United States is engaged in a
counterinsurgency campaign against Daesh and its allies. After nearly
10 months of bombing and U.S. military, intelligence, and diplomatic
support to the Iraqi government and local actors, Daesh has lost ground
in some areas--including most recently in Tikrit. But Daesh still
retains substantial territory in the predominantly Sunni provinces of
Anbar, Salaheddine, and Nineveh. In addition, Daesh remains well-
funded, allowing it to continue operations. Its funding comes from such
activities as smuggling oil, selling stolen goods, kidnapping and
extortion, seizing bank accounts, and smuggling antiquities.\5\ Daesh's
capture of Ramadi in May 2015--despite an intensified U.S. bombing
campaign--indicates that the organization retains significant
capabilities in some areas.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See, for example, Patrick B. Johnston, Countering ISIL's
Financing: Testimony Presented Before the House Financial Services
Committee on November 13, 2014, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,
CT-419, 2014. On antiquities, see Financial Action Task Force,
Financing of the Terrorist Organization Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL), Paris: Financial Action Task Force, February 2015.
\6\ See, for example, Tim Arango, ``ISIS Captures Key Iraqi City
Despite Strikes,'' New York Times, May 18, 2015; Hugh Naylor and
Mustafa Salim, ``Key City in Iraq Falls to Militants,'' Washington
Post, May 18, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. the terrorist threat to the u.s. homeland
In understanding the threat from Syria and Iraq, it is important to
understand the broader context. Not all terrorist groups present a
direct threat to the U.S. homeland. As Table 1 highlights, terrorist
groups can be divided into three categories: Those that pose a high
threat because they are involved in plotting or instigating attacks
against the U.S. homeland; those that pose a medium threat because they
are involved in plotting attacks against U.S. structures, such as
embassies and U.S. citizens overseas (though not against the U.S.
homeland); and those that pose a low threat because they are focused on
targeting local regimes or other countries.\7\ Two terrorist groups
operating in Syria--Daesh and the Khorasan Group--present high threats
(Table 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Seth G. Jones, A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of Al Qa'ida
and Other Salafi Jihadist, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-
637-OSD, 2014.
TABLE 1.--EXAMPLES OF TERRORISTS THAT THREATEN THE UNITED STATES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Threat Medium Threat Low Threat
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Characteristics.................. Plotting or instigating Plotting attacks against Limited or no active
attacks against the U.S. U.S. targets overseas plotting against U.S.
homeland and U.S. (e.g., U.S. embassies homeland or U.S.
targets overseas (e.g., and citizens). targets overseas.
U.S. embassies and
citizens).
Examples......................... Al Qa'ida in the Al Shabaab..... East Turkestan
Arabian Peninsula. Jabhat al- Islamic Movement
Core al Qa'ida Nusrah. Suqor al-Sham
(including the Khorasan Ansar al-Sharia
Group). Libya groups.
Daesh........... Al Qa'ida in
Some inspired the Islamic Maghreb.
individuals and networks. Boko Haram.....
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, some groups pose a high threat. Since its expansion in Iraq
and Syria, Daesh has become a growing threat to the United States.
Rather than the complex attacks on 9/11, which involved years of
training and meticulous planning, the most likely Daesh threat today
comes from smaller, less-sophisticated attacks from inspired
individuals who may have limited or no connections to the organization.
Core al Qa'ida, based in Pakistan, also presents a threat to the U.S.
homeland. But their leaders have had difficulty recruiting--or even
inspiring--competent operatives in the West. That's why Ayman al-
Zawahiri sent a small group of operatives, referred to as the Khorasan
Group, to Syria to plot attacks in Europe and the United States.
Another is al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, which provided training
to two of the operatives involved in the Charlie Hebdo attacks, Said
and Cherif Kouachi. Several Yemen-based operatives--including leader
Nasir al-Wuhayshi--continue to plot attacks against the United States.
In addition, a small number of inspired individuals, such as the
Tsarnaev brothers, who perpetrated the April 2013 Boston Marathon
bombings, pose a threat. Still, terrorists have had difficulty striking
the U.S. homeland because of robust counterterrorism steps by the
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
intelligence community, and other Federal and local agencies.
Second, several extremist groups pose a medium-level threat because
of their interest and capability to target U.S. citizens overseas,
though they have little interest or ability to strike the U.S.
homeland. Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia, for instance, has planned attacks
against U.S. diplomats and infrastructure in Tunis, including the U.S.
Embassy. Several groups with a presence in Libya--such as the various
Ansar al-Sharia Libya branches and al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb--
also pose a threat to U.S. embassies and citizens in North Africa; so
does al-Shabaab in Somalia. Its objectives are largely parochial: To
establish an extreme Islamic emirate in Somalia and the broader region.
Al-Shabaab possesses a competent external operations capability to
strike targets in East Africa. The September 2013 Westgate Mall attack
in Nairobi, Kenya, was well-planned and well-executed, and involved
sophisticated intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance
of the target.
Third, some extremist groups present a low-level threat to the
United States. These groups do not possess the capability or intent to
target the United States at home or overseas. They include such
organizations as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which is
primarily interested in Chinese targets.
iii. foreign fighter challenge from syria and iraq
Of particular concern for the United States is the growing number
of extremists--both Sunni and Shi'a--that have traveled to (and from)
Syria and Iraq to fight. The Syrian-Iraqi battlefield likely has the
largest concentration of foreign extremists of any jihadist battlefield
in the modern era. There have been over 20,000 foreign fighters who
have traveled to Syria to fight. Approximately 3,400 fighters, or 17
percent, appear to be coming from the West. Approximately 200 Americans
are known to have attempted to travel to Syria to fight with Islamic
militants.\8\ It is difficult to predict whether most of the foreign
fighters will remain in Syria, Iraq, and other countries over the long
run to fight or die on the battlefield; move to future war zones; or
return to the United States and other Western countries. Even if some
return, it is uncertain whether they will become involved in terrorist
plots, focus on recruiting and fundraising, or become disillusioned
with terrorism. Still, foreign fighters have historically been agents
of instability. Volunteering for war is often the principal stepping
stone for individual involvement in more extreme forms of militancy--
including in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The data are from the National Counterterrorism Center. See
Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Current Terrorist Threat to the United States:
Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February
12, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, there have been a growing number of attacks and plots
across the West tied either formally or informally to Syria and Iraq.
These include attacks in Garland, Texas, in May 2015; Copenhagen,
Denmark, in February 2015; Paris, France, in January 2015; Sydney,
Australia, in December 2014; Ottawa, Canada, in October 2014; and
Brussels, Belgium, in May 2014. More broadly, there were over 20
terrorist plots in the West either directed or provoked by extremist
groups in Syria between October 2013 and January 2015.\9\ Daesh has
been linked directly or indirectly to plots in such countries as
France, Australia, Belgium, Libya, Tunisia, and the United States.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The data are from the UK's Security Service, or MI5. See Andrew
Parker, Director General of the Security Service (MI5), ``Terrorism,
Technology and Accountability,'' Address to the Royal United Services
Institute (RUSI) at Thames House, January 8, 2015.
\10\ These attacks have generally not involved returned foreign
fighters, but rather individuals inspired directly or indirectly by
Daesh.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is also significant concern among America's European allies
about the threat from Syria and Iraq. For instance, more than 600
British extremists have traveled to Syria and Iraq.\11\ Many have
joined Daesh. ``We know that terrorists based in Syria harbor the same
ambitions towards the United Kingdom--trying to direct attacks against
our country, and exhorting extremists here to act independently,'' said
MI5 director-general Andrew Parker in a January speech.\12\ Similar to
the United States, the British face a complex threat, with more
extremists than MI5 and the Metropolitan Police Service's Counter
Terrorism Command, or SO15, can cover at any one time. Despite these
challenges, MI5 and the police remain aggressive. In England and Wales,
there has been a 35-percent increase in terrorist-related arrests since
2011. And more than 140 individuals have been convicted for terrorism-
related offenses since 2010.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Parker, 2015.
\12\ Parker, 2015.
\13\ Parker, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The British are not alone. Counterterrorism agencies across Europe
and North America are under tremendous pressure to prevent terrorist
attacks. French authorities report that nearly 1,400 French citizens
have gone to Syria--or tried to go. French authorities arrested 91
persons suspected of extremist activity in 2012--and another 143
persons in 2013.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Brian Michael Jenkins and Jean-Francois Clair, ``Predicting
the `Dangerousness' of Potential Terrorists,'' The Hill, March 26,
2015; Jenkins and Clair, ``Different Countries, Different Ways of
Countering Terrorism,'' The Hill, February 27, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iv. implications for refugees and the u.s. homeland
Based on these threats, it is important to examine potential risks
from increased refugee flows from the region. In February 2015, the
Department of State noted that it was ``likely to admit 1,000 to 2,000
Syrian refugees for permanent resettlement in Fiscal Year 2015 and a
somewhat higher number, though still in the low thousands, in Fiscal
Year 2016.''\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Jen Psaki, U.S. State Department Daily Press Briefing,
Washington, DC, February 13, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Refugees have historically played--and will continue to play--a
critical role in ensuring U.S. economic prosperity and cultural
diversity. In addition, the threat to the U.S. homeland from refugees
has been relatively low. Almost none of the major terrorist plots since
9/11 have involved refugees. Even in those cases where refugees were
arrested on terrorism-related charges, years and even decades often
transpired between their entry into the United States and their
involvement in terrorism. In most instances, a would-be terrorist's
refugee status had little or nothing to do with their radicalization
and shift to terrorism.
But risks associated with refugees from Syria may be higher today
for several reasons. First, Syria and neighboring Iraq have the highest
numbers of foreign fighters on any modern jihadist battlefield, and
there has already been an exodus of some fighters to the West. Second,
several groups in the region like Daesh have planned to put operatives
in the West, particularly in Europe, by having them seek political
refugee status. Daesh has also been active in some refugee camps in
Syria. Third, the U.S. intelligence community's understanding of
extremists in Syria is worse than in many other jihadist battlefields,
such as Iraq and Afghanistan, because of more limited intelligence
collection capabilities.
Individual terrorists and terrorist groups have multiple options to
attack the U.S. homeland. First, they can inspire and encourage locals
to conduct attacks through magazines like Dabiq (published by Daesh)
and Inspire (published by al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula). Second,
they can infiltrate members into the United States from overseas to
conduct attacks or recruit operatives from U.S. communities. Third,
they can target aircraft or vessels coming into the United States. In
2010, for example, al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula attempted to
target cargo planes using plastic explosives hidden in printer
cartridges.
Refugees have occasionally been involved in the first two types of
plots. Perhaps the best-known case involved Waad Ramadan and Alwan
Mohanad Shareef Hammadi, who were arrested on Federal terrorism charges
in 2009 in Bowling Green, Kentucky. They had been granted refugee
status despite their insurgent activities in Iraq and their role in
attacking U.S. troops. The Bowling Green arrests led to numerous
changes in how the United States processed refugees and asylum-seekers.
The process had been haphazard, partly because there were so many
refugees and asylum-seekers--including from Iraq--being processed
through the system. But there were also challenges because the data
were not well organized across the U.S. Government.
Overall, there are a small number of cases in which refugees have
been arrested on terrorism-related charges in the United States.
Examples include the following:
a Bosnian refugee in St. Louis (arrested in 2015)
a Somali refugee in Minneapolis (2015)
an Uzbek refugee in Boise, Idaho (2013)
two Chechen refugees in Boston (2013)
an Uzbek refugee in Aurora, Colorado (2012)
two Iraqi refugees in Bowling Green, Kentucky (2011)
a Somali refugee in Columbus, Ohio (2011)
a Somali refugee in St. Louis, Missouri (2010)
a Somali refugee in Portland, Oregon (2010)
an Afghan refugee in Aurora, Colorado (2009)
There have been other cases in Canada. Ahmed Ressam, the millennium
bomber who was convicted in 2001 of planning to bomb Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX) on New Year's Eve 1999, had applied to
Canada as a refugee. He was denied refugee status, but still managed to
remain in Canada before attempting to attack the United States. Raed
Jaser, who pled guilty in March 2015 to involvement in a terrorist plot
that targeted a train route between Toronto and New York City, had
applied for refugee status in Canada as a Palestinian. The Canadian
government rejected his family's refugee claims. But since the family
was stateless, the government allowed family members to stay in the
country under Canada's ``deferred removal'' program. Finally, Sayfildin
Tahir Sharif (also known as Faruq Khalil Muhammad `Isa), who was
arrested in Canada in 2011 on a U.S. warrant, had moved to Canada as a
refugee from Iraq.
Because of these concerns, the United States should reassess its
refugee program and make sure it safeguards National security. As
already noted, a number of changes were implemented after the Bowling
Green arrests. It is worth examining whether there needs to be enhanced
screening and data collection for applicants, such as
additional background checks and other screening protocols
in place at the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for screening refugee applicants--
including Syrian applicants--through the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program (USRAP).
improved data management of potentially concerning refugees.
Some of the mistakes in the past were not due to screening
errors, but rather caused by poor data management. Information
on terrorist links never made it to the right databases.
an enhanced U.S. intelligence community role in implementing
heightened measures to vet potential refuges from countries of
concern, including Syria. Some of this has already occurred
through such programs as the National Counterterrorism Center's
Kingfisher Expansion program.
enhanced re-screening procedures for refugees who have
entered the United States
better engagement with Visa Waiver Program countries out of
concern that refugees from Syria, Iraq, or other high-risk
countries could be resettled there and then enter the United
States with a lower level of scrutiny
additional authorities to hold data collected in refugee
camps.
The United States has a long-standing tradition of offering
protection and freedom to refugees who live in fear of persecution,
some of whom are left to languish in deplorable conditions of temporary
asylum. An integral part of that mission needs to be ensuring that
those refugees considered for entry into the United States, including
from such jihadist battlefields as Syria, do not present a risk to the
safety and security of the United States.
Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Jones.
Our next witness, Tom Fuentes, served in the Federal Bureau
of Investigation for 25 years, retiring in 2008 as an assistant
director. His distinguished career focused particularly on
organized crime, cyber crime, and international law enforcement
cooperation. For any of us who watch television, he is
currently serving as a law enforcement analyst for CNN. I am
glad you took a break from the jailbreak itself today to join
with us. Seriously, I certainly always get a lot out of
listening to your commentaries and your analysis on these
issues. It is a privilege to have you testifying here today. I
thank you. Mr. Fuentes, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS FUENTES, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (RETIRED),
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Fuentes. Thank you, Chairman King. Thank you, other
Members of the committee, for inviting me here today. I did not
submit a prepared statement in advance. I knew that my
distinguished colleagues would very well illustrate the number
of Syrian refugees, the scope of the issue of trying to
determine how many will come, how they will come in, what
processes will occur for them to try to vet them.
My point with this would be that the last 5 years of my
career in the FBI, I served as the head of the International
Program, running the legal attache offices around the world. I
was the Bureau's first on-scene commander in Iraq in 2003. I
also served as a member of Interpol's executive committee and
have worked closely with Interpol issues for more than 25
years.
The issue of international police cooperation is essential
in everything we do. In all aspects of American business,
students overseas, vacationers overseas, the issue of having
countries that we work closely with, that we can rely on is
essential for all aspects. But this particular issue, it comes
down to do we have working partners in Syria. The fact is we do
not.
When I was in charge in Iraq in the summer of 2003 into the
fall of 2003, even simple things there became difficult because
the looters had taken the computers of Iraq's Department of
Motor Vehicles and other Government computers, the actual
computers that had the data on them, and the servers. So we had
no way to vet immediately in the summer of 2003, but we built
that up over time as we had the intelligence assets. I opened
the FBI's formal legal attache office in October 2004. The
United States has been able to work with Iraqis and get
information.
We have had some success, again, in Afghanistan and other
countries that we were working with. But currently in Syria, we
don't have that capability. We do not have an FBI office. Our
human sources are minimal. Our, obviously, signals intelligence
are also going to be minimal to understand what is actually
occurring there. We don't have a Government we can partner
with. That is the key thing. If any of these individuals would
be in a database, you know, that is why they are refugees in
many cases. If they are on the Government's radar in Syria, it
could be for negative reasons which would cause them to want to
come out and possibly seek a life here.
So, for me, I would completely agree that the ideals of
this country are that we take in immigrants and refugees from
all over the world seeking the American Dream, seeking a better
life, and especially the refugees that seek it for their
children obviously. That becomes a problem as well when the
children come, as we saw with the Somali refugees. As we saw in
the Tsarnaev case, the Boston bombers, you see children who 4
or 5 years later are old enough to become radicalized even with
their parents being completely unaware.
So my issue with this is how the vetting process would
work, how it could possibly succeed, and recognizing that I
know the FBI does not have the ability to really do an adequate
vetting on this issue. Thank you.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Fuentes.
Our next witness, is Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior
fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, an adjunct
professor at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program,
and a lecturer at the Catholic University of America.
He is also the chief executive officer of Valens Global, a
consulting firm focusing on the challenges posed by violent,
non-state actors. Doctor, it is a privilege to have you here
today. You are recognized. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION
FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking
Member Vela, distinguished Members of the committee. In this
testimony, I want to talk about how we have significant
interests in alleviating the refugee situation in the region.
The refugee situation caused by the Syria conflict is very
grave. Both for humanitarian reasons and also for reasons of
National interest, we should care about the situation deeply.
This committee has also quite clearly raised issues about
domestic radicalization. I think declining domestic capacity is
something that should be considered, as well as the overall
coherence of our migration policies.
With respect to the region, as Dr. Jones said, there are
about 4 million registered refugees outside of Syria right now.
You also have a significant amount of, millions of Syrians who
can be classified as internally displaced persons. You have
significant upheaval and strain that this is causing in
neighboring states. In Jordan, which is already a state which
is strapped for water, which has a sky-high unemployment rate,
in Lebanon, in Turkey, this has caused multiple challenges,
both internal security challenges, domestic unrest, pitting
native citizens against refugees. You have 155,000 registered
refugees from Syria in North Africa and a significant movement
of refugees into Europe from Libya's human trafficking
networks. The collapse of the state in Libya has caused massive
inflows through what is called the central Mediterranean route.
Now, when this committee looks at this situation, there is
both, as I said, humanitarian concerns and also strategic
concerns related to the impact this has on the United States'
partners in the region. When we look at, however, the risks
associated with this, I think there is two specific
radicalization concerns. One which was already raised is the
concern that you might try to insert, a terrorist group might
try to insert operatives into the United States in this way.
This is not, I would say, the primary concern in my view. The
reason why is because in order to get an operative into the
United States, a group like Jabhat al-Nusra or the Islamic
State would have to land them in a refugee camp and then hope
they got picked up in the lottery process, in this case, being
considered one of the neediest by the United Nations and then
move to the United States.
Now, this could happen. But there is much easier ways to
move into Europe such as coming in through Libya, given the
fact that a large number of Syrian refugees or those who can be
classified as refugees are now moving into Europe through the
Libyan route. However, despite the fact that I think the danger
isn't particularly high, when you look at the security
procedures, they are layered but they really look like the
TSA's layered procedures, where the TSA checks a lot of boxes.
But at the end of the day and the tests that have been done
recently, it hasn't found the bomb. Other than the interview
procedure, if that is done effectively, I am not convinced
there is anything that really stands a chance of preventing a
terrorist operative from getting in.
Now, the second thing is radicalization concerns. If you
look at the narrative that could be used for a Syrian refugee,
it is going to depend upon whether they were displaced by the
Islamic State, by al-Nusra, or by the Assad regime which is
extraordinarily brutal. I think we would be foolish to ignore
the fact that not the Islamic State, but Jabhat al-Nusra, al-
Qaeda's affiliate in Syria, has recently managed to position
itself as at the forefront of opposing Assad and has managed to
make itself popular both with other opposition groups and also
with many Syrian people. For someone in the United States who
has a special interest in Syria, sees the West as not acting,
and looks at Nusra as cooperating with people, providing
governance, and being at the forefront of opposing Assad, I
think there is an elevated risk of radicalization that needs to
be a part of this conversation.
The final two things I want to point to, our declining
domestic capacity. When we talk about violent non-state actors
in the United States of all stripes, one thing that is of
concern is that our resources are going to become fewer and
fewer in the future. We have a National debt that is
skyrocketing, that should soon surpass $20 trillion. Right now,
it is at the $18 trillion mark. Looking at our own resources to
handle problems that exist within the United States should be
part of any conversation that involves outlays both on the
security and humanitarian end.
Finally, I want to say a word about the coherence of U.S.
migration policies. I would say the United States has not met
its basic obligations to people who helped us in Iraq and in
Afghanistan, serving as translators or contractors for U.S.
efforts. When we talk about taking in people from abroad, those
who are needy, those who help the United States should be part
of any conversation and should be at the forefront of those who
we try to help. The United States deservedly has a bad
reputation for not standing behind people who help us. When we
deal with a situation where there are more conflicts at the
sub-state level where we have to liaise with sub-state actors,
making sure that we garner the right reputation for standing by
our friends is an important part of what U.S. policy should
promote.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gartenstein-Ross follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
June 24, 2015
Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and distinguished Members of
the committee, on behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies,
it is an honor to appear before you to discuss the humanitarian and
security issues posed by admitting Syrian refugees, and what the
Government can do to address this challenge.
The Syrian refugee crisis represents the tragic consequences of
politics gone awry in the Middle East. Millions of Syrians have been
displaced due to the fighting, which has also produced a near-complete
fracturing of Syrian society. The refugee crisis must be considered
with an emphasis on both humanitarian and security issues, as they are
deeply linked. This testimony thus seeks to highlight the competing
considerations that should inform our thinking and policies on this
issue by focusing on both the deep humanitarian and geopolitical
challenges associated with the Syrian refugee crisis, but also reasons
why policymakers have legitimate concerns about the admission of large
numbers of Syrian refugees into the United States. Even though rebel
groups seem to have recently broken the stalemate with Bashar al-
Assad's regime, this doesn't mean that the Syrian civil war will
imminently end, and even an end of the civil war doesn't mean an end to
the refugee crisis: The proliferation of jihadist groups in the country
is a demonstration of just how enduring the refugee crisis may be.
The United States is now asking whether it should accept those
Syrian refugees left most vulnerable by the conflict. While there may
be both moral and pragmatic considerations counseling in favor of such
a course of action, there are also challenges involved in doing so, and
the risk exists that the United States could end up with an incoherent
set of migrations policies, given its failure to admit the many Afghans
and Iraqis who directly aided U.S. efforts during the major wars in
both countries. Put simply, the United States has not met its
obligation to locals in those two countries who assisted the U.S.'s
military efforts, and whose lives are endangered as a result. Thus, any
discussion of admitting Syrian refugees should recognize these
obligations as a part of the discussion, one that should take priority.
My testimony begins by outlining, country by country, the impacts
of the Syrian refugee crisis, detailing where refugees have ended up in
the Middle East, Europe, and North America. It examines the conditions
of refugee camps, as well as humanitarian efforts of host nations and
international organizations. The Jordanian response will be
specifically highlighted, as Jordan has been particularly challenged by
the sudden influx of refugees. The testimony concludes by describing
potential problems related to resettling Syrian refugees in the United
States, including security concerns.
the humanitarian crisis related to syrian refugees
The Syrian refugee crisis, now entering its fourth year, presents
dire humanitarian concerns. The exodus of Syrians to neighboring states
has created a myriad of challenges for host countries and aid
organizations alike. Syrians displaced from the conflict now number
almost 4 million in such neighboring countries such as Turkey, Lebanon,
Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, as well as European and North American states.
Syrian refugees have been removed from the violence that continues
to plague their home country, but they remain an at-risk population in
the countries to which they have fled. Conditions in refugee camps
vary, but they have created numerous humanitarian issues. Outside of
the camps, displaced Syrians struggle to afford housing and find work,
while host nations grapple with the implications of trying to integrate
a refugee population that has become more likely to stay as the crisis
continues.
Scope of the crisis.--According to the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), the UN's refugee agency, nearly 4 million registered
Syrian refugees live outside of Syria.\1\ There is also an unknown,
though sizable, number of Syrian refugees who have not been registered,
leaving them in legal limbo and without access to services provided by
humanitarian agencies. Additionally, the Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that there are approximately 7.6
million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Syria, making it the
country with the largest population of individuals displaced by
conflict and violence in the world.\2\
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\1\ The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ``Syria Regional Refugee
Response,'' May 31, 2015, available at http://data.unhcr.org/
syrianrefugees/regional.php.
\2\ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, ``Syria IDP Figures
Analysis,'' December 2014, available at http://www.internal-
displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/; Global Overview
2014: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence (Geneva:
Norwegian Refugee Council and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre,
May 2014), p. 11, available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/
assets/publications/2014/201405-global-overview-2014-en.pdf. Note: The
distinction between IDPs and refugees is that refugees have fled their
country of citizenship, whereas IDPs have left their home but remain in
their country of citizenship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Countries bordering Syria have borne most of the burden of housing
Syrian refugees. Turkey, with over 1.7 million registered refugees,
holds more registered Syrian refugees than any other country. Second to
Turkey is Lebanon, which houses nearly 1.2 million registered refugees,
along with approximately 300,000 unregistered refugees.\3\ Jordan
houses approximately 620,000 refugees, with the majority (80 percent)
residing in urban areas such as the capital, Amman.\4\ Iraq houses
around 250,000 Syrian refugees, in addition to 3 million-plus IDPs who
have been displaced by the current conflict in Iraq.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Nour Samaha, `` `I Wasn't Afraid, but Now I Am': Syrians Fear
Lebanon's Visa Rules,'' Al Jazeera, January 5, 2015.
\4\ European University Institute and Migration Policy Centre,
``Syrian Refugees: A Snapshot of the Crisis--in the Middle East and
Europe,'' August 2014, available at http://syrianrefugees.eu/
?page_id=87.
\5\ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, ``Iraq IDP Figures
Analysis,'' January 2015, available at http://www.internal-
displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/iraq/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Syrian refugees have also sought asylum or temporary residency in
other countries in the region. According to UNHCR, there are 155,000
registered Syrian refugees in North Africa; of those, approximately
130,000 reside in Egypt, though conditions for Syrian refugees in that
country have deteriorated since Mohamed Morsi's regime was overthrown
in July 2013.\6\ A growing number of Syrian refugees based in Egypt
have attempted the treacherous journey to Europe by sea. A significant
number of Syrian refugees also live in Libya, though most of them are
unregistered. Many Syrian refugees still residing in Libya do not
intend to remain, and are planning to travel to Europe via Libya's
well-established human smuggling networks.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Tom Rollins, ``Syrian Refugees in Egypt Determined to Get to
Europe,'' Al-Monitor, July 24, 2014.
\7\ ``What's Behind the Surge in Refugees Crossing the
Mediterranean Sea,'' New York Times, May 21, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Europe is home to a steadily-growing population of Syrian refugees.
Nearly 150,000 Syrians have sought asylum in Europe since 2011 and
European Union (E.U.) member states have pledged to resettle another
33,000 Syrians in the coming months.\8\ Though E.U. law states that
refugees must register in their country of entry, many Syrian refugees
evade migration officials in southern and eastern European countries,
and travel to northern European countries, where they then apply for
asylum. Among European states, Germany and Sweden have received the
most Syrian refugees, with both countries processing over 50,000 Syrian
asylum applications from 2011-2014.\9\ Of the 33,000 refugees whom E.U.
member states have vowed to resettle, the vast majority (30,000) will
be resettled in Germany.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ European University Institute and Migration Policy Centre,
``Syrian Refugees: A Snapshot of the Crisis.
\9\ Harriet Grant, ``UN Plan to Relocate Syrian Refugees in
Northern Europe,'' Guardian (U.K.), March 11, 2015.
\10\ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ``Resettlement
and Other Forms of Admission for Syrian Refugees.'' May 13, 2015,
available at http://www.unhcr.org/52b2febafc5.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States has admitted a small number of Syrian refugees.
According to the State Department, 700 Syrian refugees have been
accepted since the civil war began, and the State Department has
revealed plans to accept as many as 2,000 additional refugees by the
fall of 2015.\11\ Canada has pledged to accept 11,000 refugees in the
near future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Somini Sengupta, ``U.N. Calls on Western Nations to Shelter
Syrian Refugees,'' New York Times, April 17, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conditions for refugees inside and outside of refugee camps.--The
massive forced migration out of Syria has necessitated a huge
humanitarian response. Camps have been established in several countries
to address the inflow of refugees. Yet with dwindling funds and
resources, conditions are deteriorating.
There are over 3.5 million Syrian refugees in Jordan, Iraq, Turkey,
and Lebanon. Camps provide food, water, electricity, cash vouchers,
basic medical services, education, and shelter. The camps, and the
services they provide, are jointly managed by the host governments,
UNHCR, and several participating NGOs. Some camps, notably the Kilis
camp in Turkey, have relatively high standards of living.\12\ But the
quality of services is not standardized across all camps; and even in a
well-run camp like Kilis, the refugees want nothing more than to
leave.\13\ Many camps have seen overcrowding and major budget
shortfalls, and some camps reportedly lack electricity.\14\
Malnutrition, poverty, and disease are endemic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Mac McClelland, ``How to Build a Perfect Refugee Camp,'' New
York Times, February 13, 2014.
\13\ Ibid.
\14\ Michael Kimmelman, ``Refugee Camp for Syrians in Jordan
Evolves as a Do-It-Yourself City,'' New York Times, July 4, 2014
(discussing the Azraq camp).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But these camps represent the living situation for only 11 percent
of refugees. Eighty-nine percent live in communities outside the camps,
among the native population. Egypt and Lebanon, both of which have
accepted a large number of refugees, do not even have official camps.
The sudden influx of refugees has caused tensions with local
populations, in part due to rising property costs, unemployment rates,
and the overburdening of public institutions such as health care and
education. Indeed, conditions outside of the camps are arguably worse
for Syrian refugees than conditions within the camps. A recent report
by UNHCR concerning the refugees in Jordan living outside of official
camps (84% of the total for that country) found that nearly half were
living in bad or uninhabitable conditions, two-thirds were living at or
below the poverty line, and one-sixth lived in abject poverty.\15\
Refugees living outside of official camps lack many of the essential
services that are at least partially provided inside the camps. This
has caused even further substandard living conditions for Syrian
refugees who resettle among the native population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Living in the
Shadows: Jordan Home Visits Report 2014 (January 2015), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/54b685079.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conditions for refugees, both inside and outside of official camps,
are likely to worsen. Only 20 percent of the $4.5 billion funding
request for UNHCR to sustain its 2015 operations assisting refugees has
been fulfilled.\16\ Food aid has already been cut, as the Associated
Press explains:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Data taken from the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, ``Syria Regional Refugee Response,'' last updated May 31,
2015, at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php.
``The World Food Program reduced the number of Syrian refugees eligible
for food vouchers from 1.9 million to 1.7 million in January to focus
on the neediest. Since then, it has twice reduced benefits, most
recently in May by a total of about 30 percent, and the neediest among
more than 520,000 refugees living outside camps in Jordan now receive
just $21 per person per month.''\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ ``Syrian Refugees Struggle Amid Aid Cuts, Lack Labor Rights,''
Associated Press, May 19, 2015.
The situation can be expected to further deteriorate. Lacking money
and resources, UNHCR and host governments will not be able to sustain
their current efforts without more assistance from the international
community.
The case of Jordan.--The impact of Jordanian refugees on Jordan
demonstrates that the current crisis is not just humanitarian, but also
has real strategic implications for the region--and for the United
States as well. Jordan's current population is approximately 8 million,
of which about 628,160 are Syrian refugees.\18\ This 8.5 percent
increase in population attributable to the inflow of refugees from
Syria has strained the country in multiple ways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ UNHCR, ``Syria Regional Refugee Response: Jordan,'' May 28,
2015, at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most Syrian refugees have settled in either Jordan's urban centers
or refugee camps, with about 80% going to urban areas. A statistical
analysis my research team performed on Syrian refugees in Jordan
suggests that 51.3 percent are in the northern region, while only 3.5
percent are in the south; and the distribution of Syrian refugees in
Jordan is even more uneven on a governorate scale. The Mafraq
governorate, which makes up most of Jordan's border with Syria, has
absorbed most of the refugees in the north, and 25% of all Syrian
refugees in Jordan overall. Refugees now make up 35% of Mafraq's
population, with the two major destinations being the capital city of
Mafraq and the Za'atari refugee camp.
Syrian refugees in Jordanian cities, initially welcomed with a high
degree of hospitality, are encountering rising tensions with the host
community. A September 2012 report showed that 80% of Jordanians in the
city of Mafraq would prefer that the refugees leave the city to live in
camps.\19\ The rising population produced by the inflow of refugees has
caused, among other things, a drastic rise in housing prices.\20\ Many
Jordanians also fear that Syrian refugees are competing for their jobs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Elena Buryan, Analysis of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in
Mafraq, Jordan, MercyCorps, October 2012.
\20\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conditions in Jordanian refugee camps, especially the Za'atari
camp--with 85,000 residents--are comparatively well-suited for a long-
term stay, and the camps have appeared more permanent over time. (This
is not to say that the conditions can be considered good.) Za'atari has
a significant black market economy, but also signs of normalcy that
include barber shops, paved streets, electric poles, private toilets,
private gardens, a pet store, a flower shop, and an ice cream parlor.
In July 2014, 3,500 businesses could be found in Za'atari.\21\ Another
indicator of the camps' potential permanence is rising levels of school
attendance. One resident observed that most parents kept their children
out of school initially, electing to wait and continue their education
once they returned to Syria. Now, however, Za'atari residents send
their children to school ``because they don't have any hope to go
back.''\22\ Jordan's government has begun to acknowledge, at least
implicitly, that Syrian refugees could be permanent in the country.
UNHCR's external relations officer noted that the new Azraq refugee
camp is designed to function like a city instead of a temporary
camp.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Kimmelman, ``Refugee Camp for Syrians in Jordan Evolves as a
Do-It-Yourself City.''
\22\ Alice Speri, `` `We Don't Have Any Hope to Go Back': Syrian
Refugees' Lives Turn Permanent in Zaatari Camp,'' Vice, May 9, 2014.
\23\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This refugee population has placed significant demands on Jordan's
resources. The government of Jordan is currently able to satisfy the
basic needs of the refugee community, but it may not be able to do so
in the long run. Jordan is one of the most water-scarce countries in
the world, and before refugees arrived the country's groundwater
resources were on track to be depleted as early as 2060.\24\ The
government's strategy to manage water use and increase sustainability
did not account for the sudden addition of large numbers of Syrian
refugees to the population. Water resources could now depleted years
earlier than previously projected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ ``Tapped Out: Water Scarcity and Refugee Pressures in
Jordan,'' Mercy Corps, March 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The locations hardest hit by the refugee influx have seen average
daily supply of water per person plummet to 30 liters, far below the 80
liters per day necessary to satisfy basic needs. At this level,
``sanitation standards decline, diseases rise, subsistence crops
wither, and children go thirsty.''\25\ In Za'atari, refugees are
allocated 35 liters of water per day, compared to the 70 to 145 liters
per person per day provided in pre-conflict Syria.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Ibid.
\26\ Alaa Milbes, ``Getting Water to Zaatari During Drought
Season,'' Oxfam Policy and Practice Blog, August 19, 2014, at
www.policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/blog/2014/08/getting-water-to-zaatari-
during-drought-season.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The entry of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees has caused
food prices to rise sharply, especially in the north. For example, in
Mafraq governorate, food prices have increased by 27 percent.\27\ A
study has found that more than 60 percent of Syrian refugees in the al-
Ramtha, Beni Obaid, Irbid, and al-Badiya districts and the Jarash and
Ajloun governorates do not have adequate access to food.\28\
Compounding this problem has been substantial cuts in food assistance
to Syrian refugees, as the World Food Program reduced the number of
Syrian refugees eligible for food aid in January 2015, and has further
reduced benefits twice since then.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Food and Agricultural Organisation, ``Plan of Action: Jordan,
2014-2018,'' January 2014, at www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/rne/
docs/Jordan-Plan.pdf.
\28\ Ibid.
\29\ Karin Laub, ``Syrian Refugees Struggle Amid Aid Cuts, Lack of
Labor Rights,'' Associated Press, May 19, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, the electricity generation sector has been strained, which
has been expensive for Jordan's government due to its subsidization of
energy.\30\ Compounding the problem, Jordan imports 96 percent of its
oil and gas, so it is exposed to fluctuations in energy prices on the
supply side, and to population changes and increased consumption on the
demand side.\31\ Pressure on Jordan's sanitation, education, and health
systems is also increasing.\32\ Many schools are running two shifts at
the expense of quality to accommodate Syrian refugee children, who are
perceived to be at a lower educational level than Jordanian children
due to curriculum differences and their interruption in education.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Khalid Al Wazani, The Socio-Economic Implications of Syrian
Refugees on Jordan: A Cost-Benefit Framework (Amman: Issnaad
Consulting, 2014), available at www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_37808-1522-2-
30.pdf?140522145513.
\31\ U.S. Commercial Service, U.S. Department of Commerce,
``Jordan: Renewable Energy Market,'' 2011, available at http://
export.gov/jordan/static/Jordan%20Renewable%-
20Energy%20Market_Latest_eg_jo_034925.doc.
\32\ Wazani, The Socio-Economic Implications of Syrian Refugees on
Jordan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The influx of refugees also places significant strains on Jordan's
economy. A January 2014 USAID study estimated that the direct and
indirect costs of managing the Syrian refugee population amounted to
2.4 percent of Jordan's GDP.\33\ The study found that growing
government expenditures on refugees caused a decline in Jordan's
ability to provide services and security to the general population.\34\
A separate study by the U.N. Development Programme found that the cost
of hosting refugees in Jordan totaled $5.3 billion for 2013-2014, and
most of these costs were covered by Jordan's government.\35\ And
refugee-related economic costs extend to several other sectors of
Jordan's economy. As previously noted, rental prices have increased as
Syrian refugees drive up demand for rental units.\36\ The uptick in
rental prices, along with other factors related to the refugee
population, has contributed to a rise in inflation. Jordan's informal
economy has also expanded as Syrian refugees look for jobs in informal
industries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ USAID, The Fiscal Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on
Jordan (January 2014), p. xi.
\34\ Ibid., p. 38.
\35\ United Nations Development Programme, Municipal Needs
Assessment Report: Mitigating the Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis
on Jordanian Vulnerable Host Communities (2014), p. 11.
\36\ Yasser Abdih, Andrea Gamba, and Rafik Selma, Jordan: Selected
Issues (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, April 2014), p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All of this has fueled resentment among native Jordanians, who have
consistently opposed opening their border to Syrian refugees. In a
survey conducted in 2013, 71 percent of Jordanians opposed allowing
more Syrian refugees into the country, while 58 percent said that the
quality of service had declined in neighborhoods where Syrian refugees
lived.\37\ Resentment and opposition to the refugee presence has only
grown over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Khaled Neimat, ``Majority of Jordanians Call for End to Syrian
Refugee Influx,'' Jordan Times, April 15, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jordan has been forced to adapt its policies to deal with the
growing number of Syrian refugees residing within its borders. Jordan
initially welcomed Syrian refugees with what can be termed an ``open-
border policy'' at the start of the conflict in 2011. But as the Syria
crisis intensified and became more protracted, Jordan has adjusted its
control over the Jordan-Syria border, its management of refugee camps,
and its legal framework concerning Syrian refugees. In September and
October of 2014, for example, the border was closed to refugees, though
the government's official stance remained that it was open to women,
children, and injured refugees.\38\ In November, Human Rights Watch
found that Syrian refugees attempting to cross into Jordan were being
forcibly returned.\39\ Jordan again closed its border with Syria at the
beginning of April 2015 due to the nearby outbreak of violence.\40\
Jordan also began restricting the movement of Syrian refugees to urban
areas by impeding their ability to exit camps and move around the
country in 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Rana Sweis, ``No Syrians Are Allowed Into Jordan, Agencies
Say,'' New York Times, October 8, 2014.
\39\ Human Rights Watch, ``Jordan: Vulnerable Refugees Forcibly
Returned to Syria,'' November 24, 2014, at http://www.hrw.org/news/
2014/11/23/jordan-vulnerable-refugees-forcibly-returned-syria.
\40\ Suleiman al-Khalidi, ``Jordan Shuts Border Crossing with Syria
after Fighting,'' Reuters, April 1, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For these reasons, the Syrian refugee crisis is not just a
humanitarian concern, but a strategic concern for one of the key U.S.
allies in the region.
concerns related to accepting more syrian refugees into the united
states
The biggest concern related to the United States admitting greater
numbers of Syrian refugees is that it has failed to meet its basic
obligations to foreign nationals who assisted U.S. efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Only a fraction of the Afghans who served U.S. military
efforts, including as interpreters or contractors, have been admitted
into the United States.\41\ Emerson Brooking and Janine Davidson note
that ``when American servicemen rotate away,'' their ``translators
remain--often becoming top-priority targets for reprisal attacks.''\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Peter Cobus, ``Where the Grave Isn't Free: One Afghan
Interpreter's Trials of U.S. Resettlement,'' Voice of America, April
22, 2015.
\42\ Emerson Brooking and Janine Davidson, ``Why is a Comedian the
Only One Talking About the Plight of Afghan Interpreters?,'' Council on
Foreign Relations, October 23, 2014, available at http://blogs.cfr.org/
davidson/2014/10/23/why-is-a-comedian-the-only-one-talking-about-the-
plight-of-afghan-interpreters/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States has a fundamental obligation to the men and women
who worked with us in Iraq and Afghanistan, risking their lives and
their families' lives. The situation for refugees from Syria is tragic,
and is important for many reasons. But as we focus on the current
crisis, let us not forget those to whom we owe a direct debt: There are
both moral and also pragmatic reasons that we should put them at the
top of our migration priorities. Further, one concern policymakers have
about admitting Syrian refugees is whether some militants might be in
their midst, and the Afghans and Iraqis who helped the United States
should present a lower vetting burden.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Rusty Bradley, ``Heroes Left to Die,'' War on the Rocks, April
23, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond the concern that the United States should ensure that
Afghans and Iraqis who assisted U.S. efforts should not be left home to
die, there are pragmatic concerns related to increasing our admission
of Syrian refugees. The first one this testimony will discuss is
terrorism and lawlessness concerns.
Policies for screening refugees.--The United States has a set of
layered policies in place for screening and admitting refugees. The
system involves multiple checks across several agencies for medical and
security concerns. Though this lessens the probability that malevolent
actors will gain entrance into the United States, it fundamentally
depends on the quality of U.S. intelligence about the Syrian refugee
population. The biggest concern is a ``clean skin,'' an individual
connected with a jihadist organization whose connections to the group
are not known by American intelligence or law enforcement agencies.
Indeed, U.S. officials have expressed concern that they might lack the
assets to properly vet Syrian refugees for ties with militant groups
prior to resettlement in the United States. As FBI assistant director
Michael Steinbach said, ``You have to have information to vet.
Databases don't [have] the information on those individuals, and that's
the concern.''\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Justin Fishel and Mike Levine, ``U.S. Officials Admit Concern
over Syrian Refugee Effort,'' ABC News, February 12, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The White House has allotted up to 70,000 refugees for permanent
resettlement in fiscal year 2015, with 33,000 places reserved for
refugees from the Middle East and South Asia.\45\ Syrian refugees are
now seen as of special humanitarian concern to the United States, as
both UNHCR and the United States have determined that ``tens of
thousands of refugees living outside Syria are unlikely to ever be able
to return.''\46\ The UN's high commissioner on refugees, Antonio
Guterres, has called on industrialized countries to admit 130,000
Syrian refugees in the next 2 years.\47\ Candidates for resettlement to
the United States have been referred by UNHCR, and there are currently
11,000 refugees who will be screened by U.S. officials as the next step
in the process.\48\ The UN's refugee agency has said that those on the
United States' list include ``the most vulnerable,'' such as single
mothers and their children, victims of torture, and people with medical
needs; and they also include Syrians who have worked with Americans,
thus making them vulnerable to persecution.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Lauren Gambino, ``U.S. Steps up Syrian Refugee Admissions, But
Why Are Some Still Excluded?,'' Guardian (U.K.), March 11, 2015.
\46\ Anne Gearan, ``U.S. to Greatly Expand Resettlement for Syrian
Refugees,'' Washington Post, September 30, 2014.
\47\ Somini Sengupta, ``U.N. Calls on Western Nations to Shelter
Syrian Refugees,'' New York Times, April 17, 2015.
\48\ Ibid.
\49\ See ibid. (discussing how those on the list are among the most
vulnerable); Gearan, ``U.S. to Greatly Expand Resettlement''
(discussing the inclusion of Syrians who have worked with Americans).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To be admissible, a candidate must pass a series of security and
medical checks. A Department of State Resettlement Service Center (RSC)
compiles personal data and background information for the security
check process \50\ Some refugees go through an additional review, a
Security Advisory Opinion, which is conducted by multiple law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. While the methodology for
additional review selection is not public, it is reasonable to assume
that those who are flagged as potentially posing a more severe security
threat are selected. Candidates for refugee status are also
fingerprinted and interviewed in person by an officer from U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services. A medical screening is completed,
mostly to check for infectious diseases such as tuberculosis. Finally,
a second interagency security check is completed before the refugee's
departure to verify that all information remains correct, and that
there are no relevant additions since the process began. Only after all
these security and medical checks have been completed and analyzed can
a refugee be admitted to the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ The various steps of the refugee settlement process are
outlined in U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, ``Security
Screening of Refugees Admitted to the United States: A Detailed,
Rigorous Process,'' n.d., available at www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/
Refugee%20resettlement%20-%20step%20by%20step%20USCRI.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The process of resettling to the United States as a refugee can
take as few as 8 weeks, but on average it takes 18 to 24 months.\51\
However, the Department of State can expedite the process if there is a
need, including particular physical dangers to the refugees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ U.S. Department of State, ``U.S. Refugee Admissions Program,''
n.d., available at http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After refugees are approved for resettlement, they receive U.S.
Government support for moving and transitioning to life in the United
States. Though refugees are not given the option to pick where they
will live initially, if they have relatives in the United States, they
will likely be resettled with or near them.\52\ Otherwise, domestic
resettlement agencies match the resource capabilities of around 190
available communities to refugee needs in order to find the best match.
Various State and Federal agencies, in conjunction with private
organizations, are responsible for supporting refugees through the
resettlement process. Refugees are met at the airport, taken to their
new apartment, and given appliances, climate-appropriate clothing,
food, and a one-time sum to help with initial expenses.\53\ Refugees
can work immediately upon arrival in the United States. With proper
documentation, trips outside the country permitted, but the refugees
are not allowed to return to their country of persecution.\54\ One year
after resettlement, refugees are required to apply for permanent
residency, and after 5 years in the United States they can apply for
citizenship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ U.S. Department of State, ``The Reception and Placement
Program,'' n.d., available at http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/
receptionplacement/index.htm.
\53\ Ibid.
\54\ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of
Homeland Security, ``Refugees,'' April 11, 2013, available at http://
www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/refugees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security concerns.--There has been a great deal of concern related
to the current influx of refugees into Europe, which is degrees of
magnitude larger than the United States' intake of refugees.
Counterterrorism officials and even some refugees have warned that
militant groups such as the Islamic State may seek to infiltrate
Western Europe. One refugee in Germany warned about Italy's lax
security measures: ``Any ISIS terrorist could have entered Italy and
traveled further into Europe without any problem. ISIS members can take
their guns and hand grenades with them, because the Italians never even
checked any of the luggage.''\55\ Islamic State supporters have
similarly alluded to their interest in using migrant outflows to gain
entry into Europe.\56\ Though security concerns are lower for the
United States, they should still be acknowledged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ Harald Doornbos and Jenan Moussa, ``Italy Opens the Door to
Disaster,'' Foreign Policy, April 13, 2015.
\56\ See discussion in Charlie Winter, Libya: The Strategic Gateway
for the Islamic State (London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are several cases of refugees who have been involved in
terrorist activities in the United States, though the risks should not
be exaggerated. In May 2011, Waad Alwan and Mohanad Hammadi, two Iraqi
refugees who had been resettled in Kentucky, were arrested in a sting
operation and charged with attempting to provide arms to al-Qaeda in
Iraq (the group that would later become the Islamic State). In talks
with an undercover informant, the men also discussed the possibility of
carrying out attacks domestically. Both Alwan and Hammadi are believed
to have been involved in the Sunni insurgency in Iraq before coming to
the United States: Hammadi even boasted to an undercover operative
involved in the sting operation that he had planted IEDs in Iraq, while
Alwan told the same operative that he had killed U.S. soldiers with a
sniper rifle.\57\ Both men were admitted into the United States despite
having been detained in Iraq due to suspicions about their involvement
in insurgent activities.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Carrie Johnson, ``Terrorism Case Exposes Gaps In Refugee
Screening,'' NPR, June 8, 2011.
\58\ James Gordon Meek, Cindy Galli, and Brian Ross, ``Exclusive:
U.S. May Have Let `Dozens' of Terrorists into Country As Refugees,''
ABC News, November 20, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tamerlan and Dzokhar Tsarnaev, the brothers responsible for the
Boston Marathon bombing, arrived in the United States after their
parents received refugee status in 2002.\59\ Tamerlan was 15 and
Dzokhar was 8 at the time. They would subsequently radicalize and carry
out their notorious attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Peter Finn, Carol Leonnig, and Will Englund, ``Tamerlan
Tsarnaev and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Were Refugees from Brutal Chechen
Conflict,'' Washington Post, April 19, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Though distinct from the above instances due to the differences
between the admission of refugees and asylum seekers, several jihadists
involved in terrorist activities in the United States used asylum
applications to remain in the country. Mir Aimal Kansi, who shot and
killed 2 CIA employees and wounded 3 more in a January 1993 attack
outside the agency's Langley headquarters, entered the United States
illegally but applied for asylum, and was later allowed to stay in the
country under a general immigration amnesty. Omar Abdel Rahman applied
for political asylum to delay his deportation.\60\ Similarly, Ramzi
Yousef, a key leader of the 1993 World Trade Center attack, ``asked for
asylum and was released pending a hearing,'' and organized the attack
while his asylum application was still pending.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Ted Conover, ``The United States of Asylum,'' New York Times,
September 19, 1993.
\61\ Daryl Fears, ``Bill Shifts Burden to Asylum-Seekers,''
Washington Post, May 1, 2005. Both Kansi and Yousef exploited an asylum
process that, at the time, allowed any migrant who applied for asylum
to receive a work permit while his claim was being investigated.
Following Kansi's attack, the United States eliminated asylum seekers'
ability to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Post-traumatic stress and other vulnerabilities.--Syrian refugees
have been particularly susceptible to post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) because of their exposure to warfare, detachment from their
previous life, and the privations of refugee life. They have continued
to face hardships even after escaping a war zone. According to recent
academic study on Syrian refugees, up to a third of Syrian refugees
suffer from PTSD.\62\ PTSD can serve as a major impediment to
successful integration into society, including manifesting in
adjustment issues, language barriers, unemployment, and feelings of
isolation and exclusion. PTSD sufferers often experience severe
anxiety, panic attacks, insomnia, and erratic behavior. These symptoms
can reveal themselves through difficulty in completing daily tasks,
difficulty in school, substance abuse, and suicidal thoughts.\63\
Beyond PTSD, refugees' experiences with losing their home, family,
friends, and livelihood can produce their own sets of problems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Gotay Alpak et al, ``Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder among
Syrian Refugees in Turkey: A Cross-Sectional Study,'' International
Journal of Psychiatry in Clinical Practice 19(1), March 2015, pp. 45-
50.
\63\ Claudia Maria Vargas, ``War Trauma in Refugees: Red Flags and
Clinical Principles,'' Visions: BC's Mental Health and Addictions
Journal 3(3), Winter 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion
Thus, the Syrian refugee crisis presents a large number of
challenges, both humanitarian and strategic. As I said at the outset,
the United States should link its refugee policies to fulfilling our
obligations to Iraqis and Afghans who assisted U.S. efforts in those
countries. Fulfilling U.S. obligations to Iraqis and Afghans who
assisted U.S. war efforts should be seen as of paramount importance for
both moral and pragmatic reasons.
As this testimony has demonstrated, there are a variety of
considerations related to Syrian refugees, and while security
considerations should not be overstated, they do exist. (Some of the
specifics of the refugee population being considered for refugee
status, such as the fact that it represents the most vulnerable
members, may mitigate concerns about terrorism and radicalization.) In
addition to considering options related to refugee resettlement, U.S.
policy makers should look to crafting comprehensive policies that also
address such matters as targeted investments to alleviate the economic
hardship on countries with large refugee populations, measures such as
improved education to enhance the quality of life for Syrian refugees,
and appropriate law enforcement training for countries hosting these
populations.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify today. I look forward to
answering your questions.
Mr. King. Thank you, Doctor.
I would just add that to the extent that I am familiar with
that issue, I fully agree with the last point you made, that we
have not done enough for those who, especially in Afghanistan,
the translators who are going to be left behind. They are at
risk from the Taliban and others. I fully agree with that
statement.
You mentioned the importance of countries in the region,
that we assist them with the, in fact, you mentioned, let me
also ask the question to all three members of the panel, I have
Jordan in mind in particular, how important it is that we do
something to alleviate the pressure in Jordan. At the same
time, we have these real risks to the United States.
How much faith would any of the three of you have if we
focused on the refugees in Jordan and relied for assistance on
the Jordanian Government as far as vetting? It would seem to me
we would have a better chance of vetting those refugees who
have been in the camps in Jordan than we would just taking
other refugees. I mean it is still a risk.
But do you believe it would serve a purpose to focus on
refugees that are right now in Jordan and have gone through a
certain vetting process from the Jordanians?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. The Jordanians, obviously, have a
strong intelligence service. But the danger that we are talking
about here is a refugee who could be classified as a clean
skin. That is, if they don't have identifiable links to various
terrorist organizations in the region. I think it is fair to
assume, although I find that often when I assume things with
the U.S. Government I really shouldn't, but it is fair to
assume that there is already liaisons going on with Jordanian
intelligence. So that if someone is flagged as being connected
to Nusra or connected to ISIS, that we can get that information
from the Jordanians.
So I think that to the extent that there is identifiable
information, our layered screening procedure will pick that up.
The problem is that we have a layered screening procedure which
is not well-designed to pick up the clean skin. I think
liaising with Jordanian intelligence doesn't solve that
problem.
Mr. King. Mr. Fuentes and Dr. Jones.
Mr. Fuentes. I think I would agree with that. We have had a
very outstanding relationship with the Jordanians. I know I
worked closely with them back during the time of the beginning
of the Iraq war onward. Their intelligence service is
excellent. They were inundated during the Iraq war time by
hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees that poured into
Jordan. Now they have equal numbers of Syrians, if not more,
pouring in.
But the problem for the Jordanians is a similar problem for
us, do they have access to intelligence on the ground to be
able to vet people through Syria? Do they have enough of a
relationship with Assad and is that enough for us to be able to
rely on? I think one of the countries in the region that we
have had a lot of success, surprisingly, has been Yemen. Even
though we have removed many of the assets that we had in Yemen,
we have been able to still rely on the outstanding work of the
Saudi Arabians in Yemen. Because many of the Yemeni-Iraqi in
the Arabian Peninsula members are Saudis. They were able to
infiltrate that group from the beginning. They provide
tremendous intelligence to the United States, to the British,
to other services based on that.
A good example of that would be the printer cartridge bombs
that were mailed to the United States, destined for the United
States and for Western Europe. They had the exact shipping
document numbers of each box. That enabled the British services
at the airport there to actually open the box and find 80 grams
of PETN. They have had success but that is because we have a
service on the ground there that has already penetrated many of
the groups in that country.
We don't have a similar situation in Syria. That is the big
problem right now. We don't have any other reliable partner of
ours that is already in that country in a position to supply us
the information where if they were to get it, they would. But
we don't know if they can get it.
Mr. King. Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, I think when you look at the
refugee flows from Syria into the region, the highest numbers
are in Turkey at about 1.7 million, in Lebanon, about 1.2
million, in Jordan, about 629,000, and then in Iraq, about
249,000 Syrian refugees. Out of those four countries, I would
have notable concerns about the, what you are talking about in
Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon which brings me to Jordan.
The way I would answer your question is among those four
major countries, Jordan has, I think, by far the best
intelligence agency and the best handle on this problem for a
range of reasons, including concerns about the destabilization
of Jordan. So I would look at this as almost a layered defense.
We took a chunk of the refugees from Jordan, I think they have
got better access to intelligence on refugees. We would also
rely on U.S. allies, the Brits, others that have intelligence,
as well as U.S.-owned, SIGINT, human, and other collection.
But I would say the one concern I would have is if people
became aware we were primarily taking Syrian refugees from
Jordan, there would be an incentive by groups to get their
terrorists through Jordan at that point. So, you know, we might
be careful in how we publicly discuss that. Thank you.
Mr. King. Actually my time has expired. But I would just
say from listening to the testimony of each of you in answer to
the question, there seems to be no real answer here. Because we
do have some moral and diplomatic obligation to take some
refugees in. But there is really not even close to a reasonable
guarantee that we can vet any of them.
Then you have the other issue raised by Dr. Gartenstein-
Ross about those who come here and become radicalized. So it
would seem no matter how we proceed on this, it just may be a
question of trying to minimize the risk. But there is still
going to be significant risk there no matter what procedures we
follow there, more so than I would say refugees from other
countries we have had to deal with in the past so.
With that, I recognize the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being
late. I was at a meeting on the Iran nuclear negotiations.
Mr. King. Were you meeting at the White House? Are you
name-dropping?
Mr. Higgins. No, I didn't say. I apologize. I will ask for
unanimous consent to submit my opening statement for the
record.
Mr. King. Yes.
[The statement of Ranking Member Higgins follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Brian Higgins
June 24, 2015
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing to
examine the homeland security threat posed by terrorist groups trying
to exploit the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program in order to plan or
execute terrorist attacks in the United States and abroad. Today, I
know we will hear from those who believe this threat is significantly
amplified by the influx of Syrian refugees who are expected to be
admitted into the United States over the next few years.
While I acknowledge that there have been cases where terrorists,
their associates, or foreign nationals have attempted to use the U.S.
refugee process as a gateway to facilitate terrorist planning and
attacks. However, I would offer that the attempted fraud associated
U.S. Refugee program is no more or less than the attempted fraud that
exists within other programs. To prevent exploitation, the refugee
vetting process has been publicly characterized by a State Department
official as ``intensive, `` ``slow,'' and ``rigorous.''
Such a process exposes refugees to a great deal of scrutiny from
U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Along with the systems
and processes in place, the deliberateness of the process may
inherently complicate the timing and ability of terrorists' plans.
Throughout our history, the United States has been a haven for refugees
fleeing persecution and those who would play on our fears should not
derail that proud legacy.
The United States should commit to resettling more of the refugees
identified by the U.N. Refugee Agency as needing resettlement. Under
our current resettlement plans, the United States is projected to
rescue less than 1% of the refugees from Syria. This will not relieve
the burden on the other resettlement countries that are hosting
millions of refugees and spending billions of dollars on their care.
But it is a first step. I encourage us to find a balance. We must
continue to carefully screen refugee applicants for all National
security and terrorism concerns. I would urge both my Democratic and
Republican colleagues to ensure that sufficient resources and staff are
in place and available to ensure that the security vetting process is
thorough without hindering resettlement for legitimate refugees.
Prohibiting Syrian refugees from resettlement or lowering the
already minimal number of refugees in the United States now, when there
is no real evidence that they are a terror threat, would be to actively
and explicitly discriminate against them.
Again, I thank Chairman King for his leadership and focusing our
oversight on this hearing. However, I would warn us against overstating
fears and creating a level of suspicion on an already vulnerable
population.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. The situation
in Syria is, obviously, you know, placing extraordinary
pressures on Western countries and the United States to accept
more refugees from Syria than ever before. So today, you know,
how many refugees, Syrian refugees has the United States taken
in to date? I would ask each one of the members on the panel.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. The number has been relatively low. I
don't have the exact figure on hand. I actually was reading
about it this morning. But it is less than the tens of
thousands range.
Mr. Higgins. Okay.
Mr. Fuentes. That is my understanding, a few thousand. But
I don't have the exact numbers.
Mr. Jones. A few thousand again. But I don't have the exact
numbers on my fingertips.
Mr. Higgins. The United Nations is saying that Syrian
refugees, there is about 130,000, that over the next couple of
years that will have to go to Western countries and the United
States. But the concern, obviously, is the vetting process.
That is challenged specifically by not having good intelligence
on the ground.
Dr. Jones, you had made reference to Jordan as having the
best intelligence. Is that a viable option for the United
States and other Western countries to have the vetting process
done by Jordanians?
Mr. Jones. I would say in order to protect and maximize
U.S. National security, I would never rely on anyone else. I
think what would make sense is a layered system. So the
Jordanians have a pretty good vetting process. But I think the
United States would have to rely on other allies and its own
intelligence that it collects by itself.
Mr. Higgins. How many U.S. agencies are involved in the
vetting process?
Mr. Jones. Well, I think if you are talking about agencies
that collect information and pass it, there are, obviously,
large numbers in the U.S. Department of Defense, in the U.S.
Department of Defense intelligence agencies, in the CIA, in the
Department of Homeland Security, and FBI, so a fair number.
Mr. Higgins. So one would argue that the current system in
place is perhaps a lengthy process but a thorough process?
Mr. Jones. Lengthy process. A thorough process, assuming
names get into the system.
Mr. Higgins. What is the obstacle to names getting into the
system?
Mr. Jones. Well, I think adequate intelligence that, that
an individual who is a terrorist or has been facilitating
terrorism in a country like Syria has been identified by
whether it is the United States or an ally and provided that
information. Not just that, but we have the names, the nom de
guerres, the spellings of that individual. I mean those are the
challenges.
Mr. Higgins. Okay. I yield back.
Mr. King. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Barletta.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In a February
hearing before the full House Homeland Security Committee,
Assistant Director for the Counterterrorism Division at the FBI
Michael Steinbach, commented on the intelligence community's
lack of information on the ground in Syria to adequately vet
those seeking admission to the United States. He stated that
you have to have information to vet.
So the concern in Syria is that we don't have systems in
place on the ground to collect the information to vet. Mr.
Jones and Mr. Fuentes, based on your experience, how would you
assess the intelligence community's ability to obtain the
information, necessary to properly screen Syrian refugee
applicants for admission? Dr. Jones, do you want to start?
Mr. Jones. Sure. I am not in Government anymore, so I don't
have full access to what the United States has in place. But
based on my broad understanding of what the United States had
in place and has in place in other countries, including Iraq
and Afghanistan where it has forces on the ground, that in
Syria it has far fewer human collectors, far fewer signals
intelligence and other capabilities. So, in that sense, it has
much fewer, it has a much weaker ability to collect information
that would be useful for the vetting process.
Mr. Barletta. Mr. Fuentes.
Mr. Fuentes. Mike Steinbach, the assistant director, worked
for me 10 years ago as assistant legal attache and then later
legal attache in Israel. He is a complete expert in what it
takes to gather information from a reliable partner, share
intelligence, have cooperation for the mutual security of both
sides, the United States and for the country he is working in.
So he knows exactly what the limitations are with Syria
when you have no partner, there is no FBI office on the ground
in Syria, we have no reliable partner there to gather
information from them. When I say reliable, again, these
refugees are going to be basically, they are refugees because
they are enemies of the state. So we can't rely on that state
to give us good information. Therefore, there is really no
source of adequate information to put in any database.
Mr. Barletta. Could ISIS and al-Qaeda operatives use our
Nation's refugee system to carry out another 9/11-style attack?
Is the United States putting itself at risk by accepting
refugees from a country where the Government admittedly has
insufficient intelligence? Both again.
Mr. Jones. It is possible. It has not generally been their
practice to get recruits into the United States through refugee
programs. Again, the probability is not zero. But they have
generally moved towards trying to inspire people already in the
United States through social media and other ways. It is
certainly possible though. They have talked about doing this in
Syria, Libya, and several other places. But it has not been
their main focus.
Mr. Fuentes. In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States,
the measures that were taken by U.S. law enforcement,
intelligence, DOD, other agencies of the Government, were very
extensive and very successful.
The strategy of al-Qaeda at that time was basically, we
referred to it in the Bureau as the big bang theory. They
wanted the giant, prolific attack that generated world-wide
publicity, which 9/11 almost could not be equalled or topped.
Other groups that we have seen over the years, Hezbollah,
Hamas, and others, believed in a different philosophy, death by
a thousand cuts.
So they were willing to do a bombing at a bus station in
Israel or at a discotheque or in a cafeteria, kill four or five
people at a time, maybe 50 people on a bus. But they were happy
with that because they were also killing people that were
engaged in everyday life which meant the whole population
thought wait a minute, I take a bus, I go to school, I go to a
cafeteria and eat, that could be me. So that generated terror
at a different level. Over the years, because we have tracked
international financing, the fact that Osama bin Laden would
not have been able to exert command and control like he did on
the 9/11 attack, personally meeting and vetting each of the
hijackers, approving the individuals submitted to him by Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed, you can't exercise that kind of control over
an attack by courier or remote control where you are not in
communication.
Communication is essential to fight them. It is essential
for them to carry out the attack. That is what was eliminated.
So in this situation, you know, we have a situation where I
don't think any Syrian refugee through that process, not any
Syrian but a Syrian refugee through this process is going to be
able to come in and mastermind a 9/11. Can they come in and do
the street corner attack, run over people, stab people, you
know, the death by a thousand cuts, in some cases literally,
yes. But any terrorist and any radicalized American, we are
seeing that every day with arrests by the FBI for people
willing to do so that type of attack and the difficulty in
stopping that.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Vela.
Mr. Vela. Dr. Jones, obviously, the challenges of
intelligence gathering in Syria are great. You started to talk
about our relationship with Jordan and what they are doing on
that end. I was wondering if you could elaborate on our
relationship with Jordan. Also, after Jordan, what are the
other countries that we should be looking at in terms of this
kind of information sharing?
Mr. Jones. So the U.S. relationship with Jordan has,
obviously, been long-standing. There is, my understanding, a
training going on with Jordan with rebels operating in Syria.
So there is, there has been intelligence sharing between the
United States and Jordan about individuals that are being
trained to fight against the Assad regime or actually as the
administration argues against the Islamic State in Syria.
There have been concerns about weapons of mass destruction
in Syria. So the Jordanians and the Americans have worked
fairly closely on building the capability to go in and seize
weapons of mass destruction if they were to be found,
additional ones were to be found in Syria. So the relationship
is fairly robust between the United States and Jordan. Where I
would have concerns is some of the other countries in the
region.
Lebanon has got a fairly weak government, has historically
had one. Hezbollah contains to play an important role in the
political system in Lebanon. Probably not as good of a way to
vet through Lebanon. Iraq, I have little faith that the Iraqi
Government will be helpful in vetting. It has had a hard time
controlling its own territory from ISIS.
Then Turkey, Turkey is a NATO country. It certainly has an
ability to monitor but Turkey has had a very difficult time
managing the foreign fighter route through its own country. So
Turkey's ability is circumspect to some degree. It is the
predominant pipeline, if you need to get to Syria, to get
there, you go through Turkey. So, again, I have concerns about
Turkey's ability, though it is a NATO country, to keep a close
eye on that.
Mr. Vela. So from the Syrian refugee standpoint, are those
four countries basically the first stop?
Mr. Jones. Yes. They are the largest, as far as I am aware,
they are the largest locations for Syrian refugees, yes.
Mr. Vela. Now, is there anything else you think we need to
do in terms of enhancing our relationship with Jordan?
Mr. Jones. In addition to continuing to provide
intelligence sharing between the United States and Jordan,
nothing off the top of my head, no.
I think the biggest challenge the United States is going to
have is probably in Turkey, in Lebanon, and then in Iraq where
its fidelity on the intelligence is just weaker.
Mr. Vela. I guess this is a question for both you and Mr.
Fuentes. From the standpoint of intelligence gathering overall
in Syria, what else do you think we can do? I mean, is it a
resource issue or----
Mr. Fuentes. I think with Syria, it is not a resource
issue. We have to have a stable government there. We have to
have, I think we are not going be able to do this until we have
the aftermath of whatever is happening now and some government
is in control of that whole country and, hopefully, becomes a
partner of the United States.
Now, we could have what we have in Libya where you just
have chaos and a failed state. That could occur. Or we could
have dual states there of the Assad regime controlling maybe
Damascus and part of the country, and ISIS or other groups, al-
Nusra, the other part of the country. So it is going to be
difficult for us to have a working partner there at any level
and a partner that we can trust their information if they give
it to us.
When you asked about Amman, I mean, about Jordan, the
United States has had a tremendous relationship all through,
you know, before the Iraq war, during the Iraq war, they served
as basically a base for us to go from, as did Kuwait at that
time. But also the Jordanians for us built a giant police
academy just outside of Amman so that Iraqi police officers
could be vetted by U.S. agencies, brought to that location by
the thousands, and trained and then returned back to Iraq.
You have noticed, we haven't had the issue in Iraq over the
years of police officers and Iraqis killing Americans like we
later faced in Afghanistan on several occasions. So that
program was successful. Also when the process of, as I
mentioned, I opened the FBI's office, the formal attache office
in Baghdad in 2004. At that time, it was decided that that
embassy was going to be either the largest or second-largest
embassy in the U.S. system. The largest being Cairo, Egypt.
So they were expecting about 1,000 people to be employed in
the service of that embassy. Jordan volunteered that the United
States could have a second partial embassy of Baghdad based in
Amman where it would be safer and, therefore, not need 1,000
people in Baghdad to service the Iraqi-Baghdad legal--I mean
Embassy at the time. So they have been tremendously helpful.
Their partnership has been strong. The cross-training that has
gone on between their personnel and American personnel has been
outstanding.
So I don't know that we could increase, you know, it is
hard to be a stronger partner with them. We have certain
partners like that in the world that you wonder how you could
be closer, whether it is Israel or whether it is the British or
the Australians. But, you know, the situation is what are they
able to get from Syria, can they do any better than we can? I
think at the moment, it is questionable that they can.
Mr. Vela. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. King. The gentleman yields back.
I would just add I don't know of any closer ally we have in
the world than Jordan, I mean, at every level of cooperation of
Jordan is first class, of Jordanians is first class.
I received five statements for the record from non-profit
groups that work with refugees. I ask unanimous consent that
they be included in the record. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Statement of HIAS
June 24, 2015
Throughout our history, America has been defined by our generosity
toward those who seek a safe haven from oppression. An asylum system
that is fair, effective, and humane honors both our country's history
and reflects the deeply-held American and Jewish tradition of offering
a chance at a new beginning to those who seek safety and freedom. Once
given that opportunity, refugees and asylees become active and
productive members of American communities.
In the aftermath of World War II, when the price for keeping doors
closed to refugees was made starkly clear, the international community
adopted the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, which to this day defines who is a refugee and what legal
protection a refugee is entitled to receive and is the basis for the
U.S. refugee and asylum law.
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides a way for those
fleeing persecution to seek refuge while preventing those who pose a
threat or danger to the United States from entering. The law
established mechanisms to screen for potential threats. The procedure
for screening out applicants for refugee status that may pose a threat
to the United States has only become more rigorous since September 11.
Today the refugee program has the most thorough security screenings of
any form of immigration relief.
Refugee applicants undergo multiple security screenings at almost
every step of the process of resettlement to the United States. The
Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security share in
the responsibility of screening refugee applicants. An applicant's
biographic information and biometric information are vetted against
multiple law enforcement and intelligence databases including the State
Department's Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), which
includes the Government's terrorist watch list information, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS), and DHS's Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT). This is in addition to the in-person
interview conducted by DHS staff to ascertain the validity of the claim
for refugee status.
HIAS believes that National security and assistance to refugees
from Syria are not incompatible. Syrian refugees are subject to the
rigorous security screening processes in place. Many of those seeking
asylum are victims of terrorism and are trying to find safety from
extremism. The U.S. refugee program can offer them that safety and
still protect the United States from possible threats.
There are some Syrian refugees who will never be able to return
home or live safely a country of first asylum. The United States can
help the countries of first asylum that have shouldered the
responsibility for so many Syrians fleeing the crisis by providing
assistance and resettling some of the most vulnerable refugees who are
unable to live in these countries in safety. By doing so, the United
States will proudly honor its tradition of providing safe haven for
refugees and ensure that the most vulnerable can rebuild their
shattered lives free of fear.
______
Statement of Syrian Community Network (Chicago, IL), Syrian American
Medical Society, Karam Foundation, Syria Relief and Development, Syrian
Expatriates Organization, Watan USA, Rahma Relief Foundation, Hope for
Syria
June 24, 2015
Dear Chairman Peter King, Ranking Member Brian Higgins, and Members
of the Subcommittee: We write to you as a group of non-political Syrian
American-led humanitarian organizations that provide multi-sector
relief inside of Syria, to refugees and host countries in the region,
and to Syrian refugees in the United States. Our efforts together help
millions of Syrians, both those who remain in Syria and those displaced
as refugees. Our programs cover the full range of humanitarian sectors,
including community services, education, food and non-food items,
health, protection, water/sanitation/hygiene, and women's empowerment.
In addition to emergency relief, our organizations have established
development projects that promote sustainable living and lay the
groundwork for voluntary refugee return, such as building schools,
facilitating jobs and skills training, and helping to establish
bakeries and flour mills. Together, we support over 100 health
facilities and almost 1,000 medical staff inside of Syria who operate
under the principle of medical neutrality and risk their lives to save
others. Our organizations prioritize education, psychosocial support,
and community healing. We've been fortunate to have leading
Congressional officials visit our field programs to see their impact on
Syrian refugees, and we've had the opportunity to advocate for
humanitarian support for Syria and Syrian refugees at the highest
levels of U.S. Government, from President Obama to Secretary Jeh
Johnson to leaders of the House and Senate.
We further represent a constituency of Syrian Americans,
humanitarian allies, and local volunteers throughout the United States,
from Texas to New York. As the crisis has become increasingly
protracted, our organizations have begun to work with local resettled
Syrian refugees in the United States, coordinating with volunteers,
refugee agencies, and civic and religious organizations to ensure that
Syrian refugees are welcomed and assisted in their transition. Our
built-in networks of Syrian American and partner communities have been
invaluable in these transitions.
We are humbled to submit this statement to the House Homeland
Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence on admitting
Syrian refugees. As you know, the United Nations estimates that about 4
million people have fled Syria and 7.6 million others are internally
displaced. Over 230,000 Syrians have been killed since 2011. As Mr.
Antonio Guterres, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
said recently: ``The Syrian war unleashed the worst humanitarian crisis
of our time.''
The enormous flow of refugees has created a strain on host
countries in the region, which are forced to deal with extreme economic
pressures, overcrowded hospitals, shortages of basic public services,
and growing resentment among host communities. The regional dynamics of
Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, which have taken on the majority of the
refugee burden, have been altered over the last few years. The conflict
in Syria has led to a regional crisis, and the sheer numbers of
refugees and lack of support for host communities threaten the
stability of these countries. However, as Anne Richard, the Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration at the
Department of State, said: `` . . . These very real burdens must pale
in comparison to the daily struggles of Syrians themselves. Imagine
losing practically everything--your loved ones, your home, your
profession, and your dignity.''
We commend the United States Government for taking a leadership
role to stand for these vulnerable refugees and to offer them a glimpse
of hope. Throughout history, the United States has always taken a
leadership role in assisting vulnerable refugees. The United States has
accepted the majority of all UNHCR referrals from around the world. In
2013, United States reached its goal of resettling nearly 70,000
refugees from nearly 70 countries. Now, the United States has put forth
invaluable efforts to resettle vulnerable Syrian refugees.
We have worked closely with our partners at the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program, coordinated by the Bureau of Population, Refugees,
and Migration at the Department of State and the Department of Homeland
Security, along the way. We commend their meticulous and exemplary
work. All Syrian refugee profiles being actively considered for
resettlement are reviewed thoroughly by the U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program with support and leadership from the White House and security
vetting agencies. These Syrians go through extensive security
background checks. The majority of Syrian refugees being considered for
resettlement are among the most vulnerable populations of women and
children seeking to flee the effects of conflict. With assistance from
the International Organization for Migration, they are provided with
medical exams and logistics for transportation before coming to the
United States.
Once Syrian refugees arrive, our groups work alongside a network of
resettlement agencies, non-profits, churches and mosques, civic
organizations, and local volunteers to welcome them. These U.S. groups
work in 180 communities across the country to ensure refugees have
access to work, education, opportunities to improve their English, and
what they and their families need to be comfortable and have a happy
and healthy future.
The Syrian Community Network is a prime example of a volunteer-led
organization working closely with resettled Syrian families to ease
their transition, focusing particularly on the Chicago area. The Syrian
Community Network works with 10 families that have been resettled
through various agencies. One family in particular stands out as an
upcoming success story. Resettled in Chicago in January 2015, Mayada is
a single mother with 6 children ranging between the ages of 4 and 19.
Her two oldest children, Zeyd and Zeynab, hold steady jobs and help to
pay rent, all while they attend ESL classes at the local community
college. The four younger children--Wedad, Zakaria, Shahed, and
Shaima--have been performing remarkably in school, exceeding
expectations. They all dream of graduating college and becoming
doctors, teachers, computer engineers, and so much more. The youngest
daughter, Shaima, decided that she wants to be a photojournalist after
a Chicago journalist interviewed her. Just recently, Wedad, who will be
in ninth grade in the fall, was accepted into the ``GirlForward''
summer program designed for bright adolescent refugee girls in the city
of Chicago. Syrians are known to have an entrepreneurial spirit and,
given the opportunity, Syrian refugees will become the next American
success story.
We strongly urge the Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence to support their counterparts at the
Department of State and Department of Homeland Security as they work to
further increase resettlement numbers for vulnerable Syrian refugees in
2015 and beyond. The families and individuals being considered for
resettlement face dire protection challenges and often need specialized
care. Among those being considered are victims of torture, women at
risk, persons with disabilities, LGBTQ persons facing risk, women-
headed households, and those facing acute security threats. To prohibit
Syrian refugees from the option of U.S. resettlement because of the
presence of ISIL and other extremist groups in Syria, and not based on
thorough U.S.-led security checks and humanitarian needs assessments,
discounts the commendable work of the Department of Homeland Security
and Department of State and amounts to blatant discrimination based on
nationality. The Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence should work to further ensure sufficient staffing and
capacity for security vetting agencies to increase their ability to
conduct thorough and quick security checks.
Our organizations function as implementing partners for many of the
major INGOs and U.N. agencies in Syria and coordinate with the U.S.
agencies taking the lead refugee resettlement here at home. Our
talented staff and volunteers have been the backbone of crisis relief
for Syria and have a comprehensive understanding of the changing
situation on the ground. From seeing the trends of displacement in
Syria and the region first-hand, we think that it is essential for the
United States to take a leading role in Syrian refugee resettlement for
the protection of Syria's vulnerable refugees, for the stability and
security of the region, and for the relevance of the United States as a
humanitarian and global leader. We strongly encourage the Homeland
Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence to work with
relevant U.S. departments and the administration to ensure that
vulnerable Syrian refugees continue to have the hope of resettlement
and a brighter future.
______
Statement of Mirna Barq, President, Syrian American Council
May 21, 2015
Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the
subcommittee: The Syrian American Council is the largest and oldest
Syrian American community organization in the United States. Founded in
2005 in Burr Ridge, Illinois, SAC is a multi-ethnic, multi-
confessional, non-partisan organization that incorporates all segments
of the Syrian American community. Our activities include community
organizing, youth empowerment, media outreach, advocacy, and support
for pro-democracy activists in Syria. SAC has 23 local chapters Nation-
wide.
SAC is honored to submit this statement for the record to the
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. Significant
communities of Syrian Americans exist in many areas of the United
States, including New York, Texas, Iowa, Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Michigan, and Ohio. Their income levels are above the median for
American citizens and many of them provide jobs and livelihoods for
other Americans in their locale. Older community members have found in
America a democratic haven from political persecution, while our youth
have grown up here and consider American culture their own.
As a young Christian growing up in Damascus, I personally was
blessed to have experienced the wonders and beauty of the holiday
season in my beloved Syria. The memories of festivities throughout the
Damascus old city, the carolers, the beautifully lit Christmas trees,
the nativity mangers, and the churches filled with celebrants will stay
with me forever. Each year, I take the time to describe my experience
to friends and family in my hometown of Orlando, Florida so they will
understand the inherent tolerance and diversity of the Syrian people.
That inherent tolerance and diversity is now under attack.
The Syrian American community shares your dismay at the rise of the
so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and at the urgent
home-grown terror threat that has resulted from this rise. We are also
painfully aware that ISIS has exploited the crisis in Syria to turn our
ancestral homeland into a locus for recruitment. ISIS has severely
impeded our ability to get help to ordinary Syrians in need. At times,
Syrian Americans have been forced into hasty exits from their
humanitarian work inside Syria after finding out that ISIS had marked
them for death.
We consider ISIS our enemies, and as such, we are keen to help
Congress and the U.S. Government as they work to stop these extremists.
SAC has already partnered with the Office for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties at the Department of Homeland Security to organize community
briefings for Syrian Americans. In addition, staff members of the SAC
have briefed senior White House officials on ISIS activities inside
Syria. We encourage a robust Congressional debate on how ISIS can be
stopped both at home and abroad.
Along these lines, it is important to note that Syrian immigrants
to the United States are in no way the leading demographic of foreign
fighters joining ISIS. Out of over 150 U.S. nationals who have
successfully joined or attempted to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq, we
know of only one potential case involving a Syrian American (who is not
charged with having joined ISIS). By contrast, many U.S.-born citizens
have joined ISIS, including citizens with no ancestry from majority-
Muslim countries. Clearly, barring vulnerable Syrian refugees from
entering America will not address this vast majority of cases.
America is a Nation of immigrants and always has been. Each year,
the United States admits some 70,000 refugees as new citizens, and the
Syrian refugee crisis is far and away the worst refugee crisis in the
world today. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio
Guterres has referred to the Syrian refugee crisis as ``the worst
humanitarian disaster since the end of the Cold War.'' Furthermore, the
majority of Syrian refugees up for resettlement are not fighting-age
males, but innocent women and children seeking to flee the vicious
conflict. They live in horrible conditions, and every winter, multiple
child refugees die for lack of heating and winter clothing. Many
refugees even have family members or close friends and associates
within the Syrian American community who are ready to care for them.
To bar Syrian refugees from resettlement in the United States now,
when their need is so great and when there is no real evidence that
they are a terror threat, would be to actively and explicitly
discriminate against them--against us--simply for being Syrian. We as
Syrian Americans encourage our Congress Members to support the fight
against ISIS and defend our country against home-grown terrorism
without contributing to the demonization of the entire Syrian
community.
Founded in 2005 in Burr Ridge, Illinois, the Syrian American
Council is the largest Syrian-American community organization in the
United States. It serves to amplify the voice of the Syrian-American
Community. SAC is a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, non-partisan
organization that includes members from all segments of Syrian society,
and has over 23 chapters Nation-wide. It is an organization devoted to
community organizing, awareness-raising, youth empowerment, media
outreach, advocacy, and support for Syrians seeking to build a free and
democratic Syria.
______
Statement of Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service
June 24, 2015
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (LIRS) appreciates the
opportunity to submit its views on the United States Refugee Admissions
Program as it pertains to Syrian refugees. As the national organization
founded by Lutherans to serve uprooted people, LIRS is committed to
helping those who have been forced to flee their homes find protection.
Following God's call in scripture to uphold justice for the sojourner,
LIRS serves as a leader in calling for the protection of vulnerable
migrants and refugees, including children and families from Syria.
For over 75 years, LIRS has worked to welcome over 400,000 refugees
to the United States on behalf of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America, the Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod and the Latvian
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. In fiscal year 2014, LIRS and
its Refugee Resettlement affiliates welcomed over 11,000 refugees to
their new communities and empowered them to build new lives.
Resettlement in a third country is considered a durable solution
and a last resort for only a small fraction of the world's most
vulnerable refugees. LIRS is proud to be one of nine agencies that
partners with the Federal Government, particularly the Department of
State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and the
Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement
(ORR) to be a part of this solution. LIRS is dismayed that despite the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) registering over
4 million Syrian refugees, half of whom are children, only a precious
few Syrian refugees have been resettled in the United States.
The United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) located within
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) agency continually achieves its dual
mission to offer resettlement opportunities to eligible refugees while
safeguarding the integrity of the program and the United States
National security. To protect U.S. National security, DHS provides
advanced training to its refugee adjudicators on security protocols,
fraud detention, and fraud prevention. In addition, each refugee
considered for resettlement in the United States goes through a multi-
layered screening process before coming to the United States. These
processes include multiple biographic and biometric checks by U.S.
security vetting agencies which are routinely updated, in-person
interviews with trained adjudication's officers and ``pre-departure''
checks. No case is finally approved until results from all security
checks have been received and analyzed.
To add unnecessary security screening mechanisms to this already
robust process would needlessly harm individuals who need protection by
delaying their resettlement. ``Sadly, the Syrian refugee population
includes severely vulnerable individuals: Women and girls at risk,
survivors of torture and violence, and persons with serious medical
needs or disabilities,'' said Linda Hartke, LIRS president and CEO.
``LIRS and our national network stand ready to do what it takes to
welcome into U.S. communities the most vulnerable Syrian refugees who
cannot return home or integrate in the countries currently hosting
them.''
The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program offers refugees safe haven and
a chance at a new life, while also bringing tangible benefits to the
communities that welcome them. Having endured incredible hardship and
unimaginable horrors in their home countries, refugees often spend
years exiled in host countries once they flee, awaiting the opportunity
to rebuild their lives. In the case of Syrian refugees, host countries
in the region are increasingly strained and unable to offer benefits or
stability. Once they are resettled in a third country, refugees
routinely become engaged and productive community members, contributing
economically, socially, and spiritually to our communities. The support
of welcoming communities, congregations, volunteers, employers,
schools, foster families, and others makes resettlement a successful
public-private partnership. The Federal Government, particularly PRM
and ORR, and State governments play a vital role.
The conflict in Syria only continues to worsen. As mentioned, UNHCR
has registered over 4 million refugees, half of whom are children, who
have been forced to flee to neighboring countries. It is LIRS's
position that the United States should commit to resettling a higher
number of vulnerable Syrian refugees. However, to achieve this goal,
more focus and resources must be committed to the admission process as
well as the resettlement and integration of newly-arriving refugees.
increased funding needs and necessary resettlement reforms
Resources available to refugee families and adults through ORR have
remained stagnant for many years. To ensure that Syrian refugees
resettled in the United States would receive the help they need to
locate housing, receive medical attention and employment assistance,
among other services, and to promote self-sufficiency and long-term
integration this funding must be increased. While private support plays
an important role in the reception and integration of refugees, Federal
resources are critical to ensure refugees receive essential services.
Refugee populations arriving to the United States have changed
significantly since the formal establishment of the resettlement
program in the Refugee Act of 1980. Today's refugee population is much
more diverse and vulnerable than it was more than three decades ago.
However, services lack flexibility to be responsive to the diverse
strengths and needs of refugees arriving today. Furthermore, ORR's
mandate has expanded over the years from serving resettled refugees to
include asylees, Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa recipients,
Cuban and Haitian entrants, survivors of human trafficking and torture
and unaccompanied children. Because funding has not kept up with these
changes in ORR's mandate and diversifying client needs, ORR has
strained to provide sufficient support and services to all of the
populations under its care.
reforms to terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds
Under immigration law, an individual cannot be admitted to the
United States if they have provided material support, including
insignificant material support, to an undesignated terrorist
organization; a member of such an organization; or to an individual the
individual knows, or reasonably should know, has committed or plans to
commit a terrorist activity. In 2001, Congress enacted legislation that
significantly broadened the definition of ``terrorist activity.''
As a result, refugees, including many vulnerable Syrian refugees,
who pose no threat to National security face denial of protection and
resettlement in the United States due to unintended consequences of the
overly-broad application of the ``material support to terrorist
organizations'' bar (and related bars) to admission. Indeed, current
law threatens to exclude any Syrians who fought with any armed
opposition group in Syria (regardless of whether or not the individual
applicant was involved in any violations of international humanitarian
law or other crimes), anyone who provided ``material support'' to any
opposition force or opposition fighter, anyone who solicited funds or
members for such a force, and even anyone whose spouse or parent is
found to have done these things.
These bars are duplicative and carry severe consequences. As
mentioned previously, refugees are required to pass intense security
screenings and background checks as part of the admission process.
People who commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, or who persecute
others are inadmissible to the United States under other provisions of
our immigration laws. However, overly broad ``terrorism'' bars prevent
the ability of the United States to provide welcome to bona fide
refugees seeking safety.
lirs recommendations
LIRS's expertise, experience, and compassion--drawn from decades of
welcoming vulnerable newcomers--inspires our advocacy. To address
current resettlement needs facing refugees, including millions of
Syrian refugees, and improve welcome for refugees in the United States,
LIRS makes the following recommendations to Congress:
Ensure robust funding of the Department of State's Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration and the Department of
Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement to
better protect and assist refugees overseas and those resettled
to the United States.
Enact pending legislation to strengthen refugee protections
and resettlement, including the bi-partisan Protecting
Religious Minorities Persecuted by ISIS Act of 2015 (H.R.
1568).
Amend problematic anti-terrorism provisions that define
``material support'' too broadly.
Increase the Presidential Determination from 70,000 refugees
in fiscal year 2015 to 100,000 refugees in fiscal year 2016 to
allow resettlement of Syrian refugees in addition to on-going
resettlement of other refugees from around the world.
If you have any questions about this statement, please contact
Brittney Nystrom, LIRS Director for Advocacy.
______
Statement of CWS, Church World Service
June 24, 2015
Church World Service, a 69-year-old humanitarian organization
representing 37 Christian denominations, works to assist refugees
through protection internationally and by providing resettlement
services to help refugees adjust to their new lives and integrate in
the United States.
The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program is a life-saving, public-
private partnership that helps rescue refugees who have no other means
of finding safety. To be considered a refugee, individuals must prove
that they have fled persecution due to their nationality, ethnicity,
religion, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group. Refugees face three options: Return to their home country,
integrate in the country to which they first fled, or be resettled to a
third country. For the millions who are unable to return home due to
significant threats to their safety and are rejected by the country to
which they first fled, resettlement is the last resort. While less than
1 percent of the world's estimated 15 million refugees are resettled to
a third country, resettlement saves lives and also helps encourage
other countries to provide durable solutions for refugees within their
borders, including local integration. The United States has a long
history of providing protection to persons fleeing persecution, and
U.S. communities, schools, congregations, and employers welcome
refugees and help them integrate in their new homes. In turn, refugees
contribute to their new communities with their innovative skills,
dedicated work, and inspiring perseverance.
Currently, Syria is experiencing the worst humanitarian crisis the
world has seen in 20 years, with approximately 4 million refugees who
have fled the country and 7.6 million internally displaced. Roughly
three-quarters of those displaced are women and children. Lebanon,
Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt currently host more than 3.9 million
registered Syrian refugees and thousands more who are not registered.
Specifically, religious minorities living in ISIS-held territories,
including Christians, Yezidids, Shabaks, Turkoman Shiites, Coptic
Christians, Druze, Mandeans and Assyrians have fled in the thousands.
While this crisis is complex and requires a variety of solutions,
refugee resettlement plays a strategic role in alleviating pressure on
host countries in the region, galvanizing international awareness of
the human costs of the crisis, and providing durable solutions and
opportunities for a new life for vulnerable populations fleeing
persecution. Many European countries have welcomed Syrians through
resettlement and humanitarian admissions schemes, including Germany
pledging to accept 30,000; Sweden to resettle 2,700 and with more than
9,000 asylum applications pending; and Norway, France, Austria,
Finland, and other countries working to provide protection and
resettlement to Syrian refugees. While traditionally a world leader in
refugee resettlement, the United States has resettled only a small
numbers of Syrian refugees.
The refugee resettlement program is the most difficult way to enter
the United States, routinely taking individuals referred to the program
longer than 1,000 days to be processed. Security measures are intrinsic
to the integrity of the refugee program, and over the years, the U.S.
Government has continuously fine-tuned the system to maximize domestic
security. All refugees undergo thorough and rigorous security
screenings prior to arriving to the United States, including but not
limited to multiple biographic and identity investigations; FBI
biometric checks of applicants' fingerprints and photographs; in-depth,
in-person interviews by well-trained Department of Homeland Security
officers; medical screenings; and other checks by U.S. domestic and
international intelligence agencies, including additional biographical
screening by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) since August
2011. www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/How_Refugees_Get_to_the_US_Chart.pdf.
In addition, mandatory supervisory review of all decisions; random case
assignment; inter-agency National security teams; trained document
experts; forensic testing of documents; and interpreter monitoring are
important checks in place to maintain the security of the refugee
resettlement program.
CWS urges the United States to welcome refugees and asylum seekers
impacted by the Syrian conflict and ensure access to resettlement by
the most vulnerable Syrian refugees, with special attention to women
and girls, children in adversity, and other highly vulnerable
populations. CWS stands committed to working with both chambers of
Congress and the administration to resettle Syrian refugees as part of
our foreign policy interests and humanitarian responsibilities. We urge
all Members of Congress to support these efforts to provide safety to
vulnerable refugees from Syria and beyond.
Mr. King. Now, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko.
Mr. Katko. Thank you. I want to echo the sentiments of the
Chairman that there is a moral imperative to try and do
something to help these refugees. There is no question about
that. I had the good fortune with the task force that I am part
of to go to the Middle East and see first-hand the gravity of
the situation in Baghdad and flying over Jordan and seeing the
camps and in Turkey, as well as in many other places.
So, yeah, we do have a moral imperative; but we also have a
duty as leaders of this great Nation to protect our citizens.
That therein lies the rub, I guess, right? So, I want to
analyze this a little bit in a bifurcated manner and first just
ask you each a simple question. Do any of you think it is a
good idea to allow refugees into this country when you can't
properly vet them? Forget about the moral side of it. Just
answer me; from a security standpoint, is it a good idea? Does
anybody think it is? No. I think we are unanimous in that. Am I
right?
Okay. So then the question then becomes, what do you do?
Can we help them somehow in other ways, other than bringing
them here? Is that something that anyone has contemplated, and
if they have, how can we do that? I would like to hear from
each of you on that.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I agree with that, and I think that
looking at this through a National interest perspective is
important. At the end of the day as American policymakers,
there is a strong duty, obviously, to the American public.
Actually addressing the situation over there, is I think,
very important and arguably may get more bang for the buck
because if you look at the percentage, you know, right now we
are looking at taking in 70,000 refugees this year of which
about 33,000 would be from the region, so the maximum is about
33- to 35,000 Syrian refugees. That is a drop in the bucket.
If you look at the situation on the ground in the camps,
trying to improve the situation in the camps, providing job
opportunities, educational opportunities, often people who are
in camps are set back significantly in their education,
particularly because as the populations initially went there,
they thought that they would be there temporarily; and so
children ended up missing a year or more equivalent of school
in addition to the situation that is there.
The one thing I would point to that I would be cautious of
is that, particularly in Jordan, since most of the refugees
there are not in camps, there is a great deal of tension
between the native Jordanian population and the refugees; and
so any sort of jobs program that is aimed specifically at
refugees may generate more resentment. But I think thinking
about that angle and what you can for the region, is both from
a security perspective and probably from a domestic resource
perspective, has advantages and may actually be from kind of
the overall humanitarian perspective, the best use of our
money.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much. Mr. Fuentes.
Mr. Fuentes. Yes, I would agree with that. If you provide
the type of resources that maybe make these camps more livable,
make them, you know, better in terms of humanitarian cause, not
just care and feeding and shelter, but also educational
programs and other opportunities, the length of time that you
would be providing those services would also be a deterrent to
terrorists because they wouldn't want to take the time to have
to have somebody go through a 1- or 2-year program to go
through that process.
Then they would have to worry that they would lose them,
that they would become pro-United States or pro-West as opposed
to whatever cause they thought they were sending them to. So I
think that if we did more for the refugees before they got here
and it took a longer time to do that, it might in itself be a
deterrent.
Mr. Katko. Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. I think a range of those steps would be helpful.
I would have two additional comments. One is I think a long-
term strategy for Syria right now is lacking, and I think in
addition to refugee issues, finding ways to wind down the war
through political, military, and other steps would be useful. I
don't believe we have a long-term strategy at the moment, and I
would urge whatever administration comes next as well as this
one to make this a priority based on the threats that we are
talking about.
The other issue I would just note is I think we have got
these vetting challenges in a range of countries we are now
seeing extremists; Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen,
Somalia, Iraq. The Islamic State has expanded into a range of
these countries. So, again, I would also note that this vetting
issue is problematic in a number of them, and even in the Yemen
case our presence there has declined significantly over the
last several years, including our intelligence picture. So we
have got this problem in several places.
Mr. Katko. Yeah. I am glad to hear you all pretty much
agree with what I believe to be the issue is; we can't have
people coming into this country where we can't properly vet
them. Especially in this day and age where ISIS is trying
different ways to probe and get in here as well.
So, I think maybe taking a fresher look at what we can do
while they are still over there is something which might
fulfill the moral imperative we have to help them, and that is
something we should probably think about a little bit more and
talk about a little more fully going forward. So thank you,
gentleman.
Mr. King. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Getting back to our
own intelligence in Syria, we talked about what we can gain
from other countries. Now since we have had limited, you know,
people on the ground there, how much has it improved our own
internal intelligence on Syria? Any idea? It had to have gotten
better because it was at a very low ebb.
Mr. Jones. My assessment is if you look at the U.S.
intelligence and military's targeting in Syria, including of
Khorasan targets, it is obviously good enough to take out some
very serious al-Qaeda, al-Nusrah, and some Islamic State
targets, so I think the capability is better today than it was
a year or 2 ago. So better. That doesn't mean good.
Mr. Keating. We have had witnesses at other hearings in
other committees testify that Assad's position is much more
precarious than it was.
How would you speculate things might change in terms of the
refugee situation if he is gone, if he is out of power
personally, you know, whether or not he is replaced by someone
more or less aligned to his own administration or someone else?
I know it is speculative, but how significant would that be,
given the fact that I do believe that he is in a much more
precarious situation.
Mr. Fuentes. I think it would depend on who he is replaced
with. If we have ISIS take over the whole country or Khorasan
Group or other al-Qaeda affiliates, we have gone from bad to
worse, but actually it is bad already. So I think that the
intelligence assets that we do have on the ground in Syria
right now to help target who we want to get in terms of members
of adversarial groups is one thing.
To have them be in a position to vet refugees, they are not
going to be able to do that. They are in a covert, very
dangerous, precarious situation. So I think that is a different
ability for our intelligence services.
Mr. Keating. The same people testified, just for the
record, you know, that it would be highly unlikely, you know,
that it would be one of those groups that would be able to take
over in that kind of change.
Dr. Jones had a comment with the Visa Waiver Program, how
we should be more engaged in that. Clearly there is a concern
that if people resettle and they are there and there is a lower
level of security, how do you propose we better engage with
that program, the Visa Waiver Program?
Mr. Jones. I think part of this is continuing to work with
European allies. I think some of that has improved over the
last year or two in getting names on lists. The Germans have
been more cooperative in providing names of individuals they
have been concerned about. So I think part of the issue on Visa
Waiver is continuing to get more granular information on names
of individuals of concern for terrorist activity. Different
spellings of names, noms de guerre. That is the direction I
would encourage on Visa Waiver.
Mr. Keating. The other question I have, of the small number
of refugees we have in the United States now, how is that
broken down with women and children? Any figures in that
respect? Any estimates in that respect at all? None.
Well, the other issue really is one in the larger sense of
our allies. You have referenced, you know, one country,
Germany, that is vetting this as well. I was a part of the same
group that went through not only through the Mideast, but
through Europe, looking at any pathways for foreign fighters.
But I think the same thing can be said, too, in terms of the
concern with the refugees in Turkey, 1.9 million, they told us,
refugees are there. They have 40 million people coming in and
out of the Istanbul Airport, largely with people leaving there,
having no information provided to us.
When you mentioned how there is a disparity among some of
our allied countries in Europe, can you name some of the things
that should be done, and particularly what countries could use
more engagement on our part?
Mr. Fuentes. I think in terms of international cooperation,
you know, we do have outstanding relationships with our
European allies and almost all of the Middle East countries
where we have a partner relationship. Some places we don't have
it.
I mentioned that I served as a member of the Executive
Committee of Interpol, and many of these countries are also,
including Iran, members of Interpol. So there is some dialogue
even in those channels that we often can use in spite of the
public stance that a country might be our enemy, you know, back
channel, we do on occasion get some help from a number of these
countries if they see the same threat to them that we see to
us. That becomes the issue here.
In terms of Germany, there is a large Turkish population in
Germany, so they have had some degree of success in getting
cooperation, having sources of information, from the Turkish
population; and the Germans have been very welcoming of the
immigrant population from Turkey that has come there and now in
some cases, you know the other groups that come there also.
But our European allies again, many of these countries are
underresourced in terms of these kind of threats, and the Visa
Waiver Program does give an opportunity. I know Director
Mueller over the time when he was director of the FBI
repeatedly testified that he opposed the Waiver Program because
of the ease of access or the easier access for individuals if
they were radicalized in Europe that have European passports
that could come here.
That being said, there was no intention ever of changing
that policy based on the business between Europe and the United
States and the complete other concerns of interaction that we
have that would become more difficult if visa program was
eliminated.
Mr. Keating. Okay. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I yield
back.
Mr. King. The gentleman yields back. I have one question I
would like to pursue. Dr. Gartenstein-Ross, in your testimony
you mentioned the perhaps greater threat if Syrian refugees do
come in of those who are vetted but yet have family members,
children perhaps, who become radicalized after they are here.
I would like to ask Mr. Fuentes first: Is it possible; what
is the practicality of the FBI surveilling, maintaining a
surveillance of Syrian refugees when they come in? Would that
violate FBI procedures? Are there sufficient resources to do
it? Could it be effective? Then I will ask the other two
witnesses for their comments on that.
Mr. Fuentes. I think the answer would be no to all of that.
I think the policy of just following people for the sake of it
doesn't exist. There has to be some predication that there has
been information received or some indication that they are
either involved in criminal activity or some activity that
threatens National security.
The fact is that when you look at the number of instances
that come up that you and I have both been on CNN talking
about, is this an intelligence failure? When you have over 1
million names on the TIDE list for example, and a few thousand
FBI agents and analysts, there is going to be no way to keep
track of that. We hear this over and over. Well, at one time
this person was on the FBI's radar. Well, a million people are
on the FBI's radar unfortunately. So you really have to have
that narrowed down with some degree of specificity and
predication before you can actually initiate it.
Now, right now the FBI, as Director Comey has mentioned,
they have active counterterrorism investigations in every
single State. Then when you take some locations, if that is
just one per State minimum, let's say New York, let's say in
Chicago, in the District of Columbia, those could be in the
dozens; they could be in the hundreds, with that many more
number of subjects.
So you could be looking at tens of thousands of potential
subjects that there is a reason to follow them but it can't be
done, not in every case. They have to prioritize. They have to
triage who they are looking at and how many resources are
devoted to it. So the practicality in a refugee vetting
process, I think just doesn't exist.
Mr. King. Dr. Gartenstein-Ross, based on what Mr. Fuentes
just said, do you see any answer to the question that you
raised about the threat of radicalization of those who come to
the country?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I think it is a community for which
you would have an elevated level of risk in that regard. I
mean, there is a standard narrative in a group like Jabhat al-
Nusrah could use, and the reason I focus on al-Nusrah is
because I think the Islamic State would actually have more
trouble recruiting in this population. It wouldn't be
impossible, but it would have a bit more trouble because they
understand what the Islamic State has done. It is much more
overtly brutal.
Nusrah in contrast is brutal, but it doesn't, you know,
tweet out photos of people they have beheaded recently. They
don't release videos of them drowning people in a cage in a
swimming pool. They also, unlike the Islamic State, work very
well with other groups at a local level. So in that regard, the
risk would be there as I stated it. The area where I think in
the future we can reduce risks is in terms of vetting people as
they come in because that is one of the significant questions
that has been raised. I should point out that our vetting
system is very antiquated. You know, when we are talking about
what we look for, what we look for, has Acunia come up? Is
their name in a database?
One thing that we should think about is the world is moving
towards a big data solution for intelligence across the board.
It is not always the solution to everything. There are
downsides to big data, but we haven't thought about it in this
context. Now, let me say I do work, you know, on this from both
sides. I am a security studies person. I also do work on asylum
cases for asylees as an expert witness, often pro bono. I talk
about country conditions in places like Somalia or Afghanistan.
One of the things that is disturbing about our asylum
process is it is really hard to determine if someone is lying.
You have their story, and when I am an expert witness, I am not
there to say if they are telling the truth. I am just there to
say, does their story match with what we know about the
country? Now, when we talk about the big data approach, what we
don't have, if someone says okay I was in Somalia, I was in
Mogadishu in September 2010, and my family was massacred by
Shabaab. Well, did that happen?
What I think we should start to move towards is a situation
where we take sig acts, significant acts, from these theaters
and put them in a database that can be cross-checked in
multiple ways so we can see, does their story actually match
with what was going on on the ground at that particular time at
a granular level?
No. 2, when you look at where they were coming from, do
they match with people who were known as militants? Right now
we don't have the sort of system in place where you can
actually start to get a chance of getting at clean skins or
getting at people who there might be some corroborating
evidence or some evidence that would tend to refute their story
or show that they pose a risk.
That is something we should figure out for the future
because this will not be the last refugee crisis that we face,
and getting better at our screening will make us safer as a
Nation.
Mr. King. Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Very briefly, on your first FBI question having
served last year on the FBI Director's 9/11 Commission and
looking at FBI resources now, I mean I strongly agree with Mr.
Fuentes' comment, especially when you add the rise in social
media use by these groups, the cyber attacks, et cetera. It
would not be good for U.S. freedom to be following people
without prior indications that they were involved in terrorism.
But I would also note, just to complicate this a little
bit, that based on past individuals that have been plotting or
have attacked in the United States, it is not clear to me that
refugees are more likely to radicalize than others. We have
lots of people in the United States that are not refugees that
have radicalized, that have converted. So, you know, the
problem is clearly much bigger than this.
The last thing I would note--and this goes to a question
that Mr. Keating noted earlier, too--is I think the more
information we have about these individuals, DNA, biometrics,
et cetera, the better it will be, including I do think it is
worth considering rescreening procedures before they become
eligible for permanent resident status, so potentially looking
at several layers here.
Mr. King. I would just conclude by saying that I think we
have raised issues today that there are no, in no way any
definitive answers for. I heard what Mr. Katko said about we
should never allow refugees in if there is a threat of
terrorism. I understand that.
On the other hand, from talking to Jordanian officials, and
they are our closest ally, if nothing else just for the
diplomatic help that it would give Jordan, we have to show we
are doing something. Otherwise King Abdullah could be losing
some of his support in Jordan, so it is in our National
interest, apart from any moral imperative or whatever, that
something be done, and we have to find ways to do it, though,
where the vetting is increased, I think or vetted.
So with that, I would--does the Ranking Member have any
questions?
Mr. Higgins. Yes. For context, the United Nations has
indicated that of Western nations resettling Syrian refugees,
Germany will resettle the largest number, some 30,000; followed
by Canada, about 11- or 12,000. According to the State
Department, the United States will resettle about 1,000 to
2,000 this year. More in coming years but, this year. That
disparity is attributed to what? Less of a rigorous assessment
screening process in Germany and Canada versus the United
States? Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. I don't know what the process is for why Germany
any has allowed more and what the policy discussions are; but I
will say that when you look at the foreign fighter problem in
Europe, including in Germany, that is connected to Syria, the
threat in Germany is serious. They have got more people in
Syria than we have.
Mr. Higgins. Mr. Fuentes.
Mr. Fuentes. I think we as Americans have pretty much been
unaware for many years of the nature of the threat in Europe,
and particularly al-Qaeda. Back when 9/11 happened, that
obviously dominated U.S. news for weeks and months. What most
Americans never heard of was that very week, a couple days
after 9/11, al-Qaeda was going to blow up the U.S. Embassy in
Paris and conduct bombing attacks in the Netherlands and in
Belgium at NATO facilities.
Seven European countries were working with the FBI on those
al-Qaeda cells at the time and neutralized them, and I think 14
people were arrested, stood trial, were convicted, served jail
sentences. One of them that was the coordinator of the Embassy
attack in Paris later was released from jail and helped conduct
or coordinate the Charlie Hebdo attack. So these are cells that
go back more than a decade in those countries, Germany
included. You know, this has been on-going, and I think most
Americans don't realize the extent of the threat that has
already been in Europe all these years and most of the time
successfully neutralized but not always.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. When you are asking about the
disparities, I think one of the primary things that is at play
with respect to Germany is that you have had a large amount of
Syrian refugees come into Europe through the central
Mediterranean route. It is a route coming in through Libya. In
the third quarter of last year, there were over 75,000
refugees, not refugees rather, but irregular migrants who went
in through this route.
One of the majority groups, one of the two largest groups
for that quarter, was Syrians of whom they are refugees. Now
when Syrians get to Europe, you have in international law, a
rule against refoulement, that is a rule against returning them
to the country that they were forcibly expelled from. So when
they are there, something has to be done with them. In part,
Europe trying to set a policy for what to do with Syrians who
have gotten there through this route I think plays somewhat of
a role in terms of why Germany has taken such high numbers.
With respect to Canada, they have kind of a different set
of policies and norms with respect to refugee populations than
the United States does, but I wouldn't attribute this to there
necessarily being worse screening in any of these countries
than in the United States.
Mr. Higgins. Got it. Thank you very much. The panel has
been very helpful, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. I want to thank all the witnesses for their
testimony. This has been I think a very illuminating meeting.
It certainly brought out information that I think is vital for
the record. It has also raised questions that we have address.
I would perhaps indulge on you if we could consult with you as
we go forward. Any thoughts or advice you have as this matter
goes forward, we would greatly appreciate it.
Also the Members of the subcommittee may have some
additional questions for you, and we ask you to respond in
writing if you would. With that, pursuant to Committee Rule
7(E), the hearing record will be held open for 10 days. Without
objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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