[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE
RESPONSE TO AVIAN INFLUENZA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LIVESTOCK AND FOREIGN AGRICULTURE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 30, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-25
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agriculture.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas, Chairman
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas, COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota,
Vice Chairman Ranking Minority Member
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma JIM COSTA, California
STEVE KING, Iowa TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio
GLENN THOMPSON, Pennsylvania JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts
BOB GIBBS, Ohio SUZAN K. DelBENE, Washington
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia FILEMON VELA, Texas
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
DAN BENISHEK, Michigan SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
JEFF DENHAM, California ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
DOUG LaMALFA, California PETE AGUILAR, California
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands
TED S. YOHO, Florida ALMA S. ADAMS, North Carolina
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
RICK W. ALLEN, Georgia BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
MIKE BOST, Illinois
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan
DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
______
Scott C. Graves, Staff Director
Robert L. Larew, Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Livestock and Foreign Agriculture
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina, Chairman
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia JIM COSTA, California, Ranking
STEVE KING, Iowa Minority Member
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri FILEMON VELA, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Conaway, Hon. K. Michael, a Representative in Congress from
Texas, opening statement....................................... 3
Costa, Hon. Jim, a Representative in Congress from California,
opening statement.............................................. 4
Peterson, Hon. Collin C., a Representative in Congress from
Minnesota, opening statement................................... 3
Submitted reports............................................ 45
Rouzer, Hon. David, a Representative in Congress from North
Carolina, opening statement.................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Walz, Hon. Timothy J., a Representative in Congress from
Minnesota, prepared statement.................................. 6
Witnesses
Swayne, D.V.M., Ph.D., David E., Director and Supervisory
Veterinary Medical Officer, Southeast Poultry Research
Laboratory, Agricultural Research Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Athens, GA........................................ 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Clifford, D.V.M., John R., Deputy Administrator, Veterinary
Services, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C..................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Submitted questions.......................................... 55
Meckes, D.V.M., R. Douglas, State Veterinarian, North Carolina
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Raleigh, NC... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Hartmann, D.V.M., William L., Executive Director and State
Veterinarian, Minnesota Board of Animal Health, St. Paul, MN... 20
Prepared statement........................................... 22
EXAMINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE RESPONSE TO AVIAN INFLUENZA
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 30, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Livestock and Foreign Agriculture,
Committee on Agriculture,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 8:31 a.m., in
Room 1300, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. David Rouzer
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Members present: Representatives Rouzer, Newhouse, Kelly,
Conaway (ex officio), Costa, Nolan, Bustos, and Peterson (ex
officio).
Staff present: Caleb Crosswhite, Carly Reedholm, Haley
Graves, Jessica Carter, John Goldberg, Matt Schertz, Mollie
Wilken, Mary Knigge, Matthew MacKenzie, and Nicole Scott.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID ROUZER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM NORTH CAROLINA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Livestock
and Foreign Agriculture on the examination of Federal and state
response to avian influenza, will come to order.
I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing before
the Subcommittee this morning, and I appreciate the attendance
of our colleagues here on the dias as we begin our formal
review of the recent outbreak of highly-pathogenic avian
influenza, or the bird flu, for short.
As we will hear from our witnesses, this was, without a
doubt, one of the worst, if not the worst, animal disease
outbreaks our country has ever faced. More than 220 farms were
infected in 21 states, nearly 48 million chickens and turkeys
were depopulated, and hundreds and millions of dollars have
been spent.
The Subcommittee has been following these events for some
months, but specifically chose to delay any formal oversight
until the disease was under control to prevent diversion of the
agency's attention in the middle of a crisis. As we begin this
review, let me state that it is not, again, it is not, our
intent to be a Monday-morning quarterback in any shape or form;
rather, we want to learn from experience.
We want to highlight what was done right by identifying
areas where improvement was made, where opportunities for
further improvement exist, and most importantly, figure out
where we need to focus as we prepare for another possible
outbreak this fall.
As most observers know, the heat of the summer is primarily
responsible for the interruption in disease transmission, but
as fall approaches and temperatures begin to drop, we need to
be prepared for more cases, possibly covering a larger
geographical area.
A number of issues have arisen that need further
discussion. For instance, the approval of an effective vaccine
is on the horizon. But if we utilize this tool, we will need to
ensure that trade is not disrupted. Questions persist regarding
the efficacy of the industry's biosecurity plans, while many
farms have exceptional biosecurity procedures and mechanisms in
place.
Some observers have raised questions regarding the degree
to which biosecurity protocols are being followed. We are
certainly aware of some of the resource limitations that
delayed depopulation, disposal, and disinfection early in the
outbreak. And as repopulation commences, several Members have
heard from constituents raising questions related to some of
the challenges that lie ahead.
We recognize that preventing further outbreaks is a
critical priority. That said, we are mindful of the financial
burdens producers are facing, particularly if they are unable
to get back up and running in a timely fashion. After all, as
my grandfather used to always tell me, time is money.
We will likely also hear about concerns related to
indemnification. The law is fairly clear regarding the payment
of fair-market value for animals that are destroyed. But how
fair-market value is defined and determined, obviously, is
subject to some discretion. We are faced with a set of issues
here that are complex, and we will welcome any and all
suggestions on how this Subcommittee might be helpful as we
move forward.
In particular, I am aware of the program created in the
Plant Protection Act for disease management and prevention, and
wonder if it might not be time to examine whether a similar
mechanism in the Animal Health Protection Act might yield a
more responsive funding mechanism to facilitate a quicker and
perhaps a cheaper and more effective response.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rouzer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David Rouzer, a Representative in Congress
from North Carolina
Good morning. I appreciate the attendance of our colleagues and
witnesses as the Subcommittee begins its formal review of the recent
outbreak of highly-pathogenic avian influenza.
As we will hear from our witnesses, this was without a doubt one of
the worst, if not the worst animal disease outbreaks our country has
ever faced. More than 220 farms were infected in 21 states, nearly 48
million chickens and turkeys were depopulated, and hundreds of millions
of dollars have been spent.
The Subcommittee has been following these events for some months
but specifically chose to delay any formal oversight until the disease
was under control to prevent diversion of the agency's attention in the
middle of a crisis.
As we begin this review, let me state that it is not our intent to
be a Monday morning quarterback. Rather, we want to learn from
experience. We want to highlight what was done right by identifying
areas where improvement was made; where opportunities for further
improvement exist; and most importantly, figure out where we need to
focus as we prepare for another possible outbreak this fall.
As most observers know, the heat of the summer is primarily
responsible for the interruption in disease transmission, but as fall
approaches and temperatures begin to drop, we need to be prepared for
more cases, possibly covering a larger geographical area.
A number of issues have arisen that need further discussion. For
instance, the approval of an effective vaccine is on the horizon, but
if we utilize this tool, we will need to ensure trade is not disrupted.
Questions persist regarding the efficacy of the industry's
biosecurity plans. While many farms have exceptional biosecurity
procedures and mechanisms in place, some observers have raised
questions regarding the degree to which biosecurity protocols are being
followed.
We are certainly aware of some of the resource limitations that
delayed depopulation, disposal and disinfection early in the outbreak.
As repopulation commences, several Members have heard from
constituents raising questions related to some of the challenges that
lie ahead.
We recognize that preventing further outbreaks is a critical
priority. That said, we are mindful of the financial burdens producers
are facing, particularly if they are unable to get back up and running
in a timely fashion. After all, time is money.
We will likely also hear about concerns related to indemnification.
The law is fairly clear regarding the payment of fair market value for
animals that are destroyed, but how fair market value is defined and
determined appears to be subject to some discretion.
We are faced with a set of issues here that are complex, and we
would welcome any and all suggestions on how this Subcommittee might be
helpful as we move forward. In particular, I am aware of the program
created in the Plant Protection Act for disease management and
prevention, and wonder if it might not be time to examine whether a
similar mechanism in the Animal Health Protection Act might yield a
more responsive funding mechanism to facilitate a quicker, and perhaps
a cheaper and more effective response.
I now yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. Costa for his opening
statement.
The Chairman. I will now yield to the Chairman of the full
Committee, if he has any comments that he would like to make.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM TEXAS
Mr. Conaway. No. Just anxious to hear from our witnesses.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also see that we have the Ranking Member, Collin
Peterson. Mr. Peterson, if you have any comments you would like
to make.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. COLLIN C. PETERSON, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM MINNESOTA
Mr. Peterson. Thank you, Chairman Rouzer, and Chairman
Conaway. Thank you for holding this hearing today.
My district is probably ground zero of the outbreak that
has happened. And as everybody knows, avian influenza has
impacted the poultry growers not only in my district but in
other places of the country. I think USDA and my State of
Minnesota have done good work, and I want to especially single
out Dr. Clifford and Dr. Hartmann for the work that they have
done, and welcome Dr. Hartmann from our State of Minnesota here
today, and to the Secretary.
As I have gone through this, I have been on the phone I
don't know how many times talking about problems that have
arisen, and they really responded, I don't think you could have
done a better job in responding to the things that developed.
The situation, it hasn't been perfect, but perfection is
hard to come by when you are in the middle of a crisis. So as
the Chairman said, now is the time to go over the lessons that
we have learned and figure out how this will help us develop a
better plan if we have this kind of an outbreak in the future.
There are three areas that I would like to address today
that have been brought forward by my growers. One of them is
simplifying the indemnification process. I keep hearing that
people are concerned about the amount of paperwork that they
have to fill out. One grower had 77 pages of paperwork, so we
have to do a better job of figuring out how to deal with that.
The other thing that comes up is this case manager issue,
where, I, in fact, just last week, I had a grower I met with
was on his seventh case manager. And so in that particular
situation, they are still rolling them over. So somehow or
another we have to figure out a way to address that.
And, Dr. Hartmann, I don't know if Minnesota has resources
to help with that, but I may ask you about that later.
I also look forward to a status update on the workable
vaccine. Dr. Swayne, we appreciate the work that you do and
have done. Having an available vaccine is something that is
very much high on the agenda of my growers as they repopulate.
If we have a recurrence this fall, that is something that they
want to have in their toolbox. And, I want to discuss that with
you, how that all is going to come forward, when we get into
questions.
And I also want to look at ways to speed up the
depopulation effort. That is an area that I think we have
learned a great deal about. It is especially in the layer
operation it has been a real problem and this is one area that
we need to focus more on.
So, again, I thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for
holding today's hearing, and look forward to the witness'
testimony and the question-and-answer period. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Peterson.
As always, our Ranking Member has impeccable timing. Mr.
Costa.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COSTA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM CALIFORNIA
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Timing is all about what we do. And the time for this
hearing is today because the avian flu that has taken various
regions of this country is serious, and it is dramatic. And it
has been devastating when we look at the amount of flocks of
poultry that has been impacted, not only as my colleague, the
Ranking Member of the full Committee, stated, but also in
California.
We have had a number of poultry farmers and processors that
have been impacted, some in my home district, where the first
reported cases of avian influenza took place. But unlike the
Midwest, we have been able to contain it, and we have been able
to control it. So my heart goes out to those in other parts of
the country where it has continued to progress.
Two key producers in my state have reported the cases
relayed to me and actions that were taken by the United States
Department of Agriculture as well as California Department of
Food and Agriculture, and they were very positive in their
response. We were lucky, bottom line, in the outbreak, and it
was contained and it didn't spread, due to a combination of
factors. And I am looking forward to hearing the testimony
today by our witnesses as to how we can take those examples but
also others that are being implemented around the country.
Our program, we think, is sophisticated. We think it is
strong as it relates to biosecurity and one of the reasons our
producers were able to, we think, control the spread in
California. But there are other examples and methods that other
states are employing that I hope we will hear about here this
morning within the Eastern Flyway to prevent the spread of the
disease.
As we know, it has been a part of the various flyways of
the transmigration of this avian influenza that has caused the
impacts. And while state regulations and biosecurity measures
can only do so much, we need to do more to provide a vaccine
for high-path avian influenza, and there needs to be more
research and funds dedicated to that.
One thing we have heard industry representatives say is the
need for more investment in the Southeast Poultry Research
Laboratory, and I am pleased that Dr. Swayne is here to testify
on that part. And while the Southwest Poultry Research Lab
plays a critical role, especially when it comes to the
development of possible vaccination, we also have research done
in institutions in California, like at Fresno State, my alma
mater, as well as Davis, where we have had a lot of efforts to
provide support and assistance in discovering more information
about the high-path avian influenza.
The new national poultry improvement plan, which we will
hear more about this morning, has allowed companies to
participate in a surveillance program, coupled with 100 percent
indemnity. And of course, that has been a part of the
discussion in terms of how we deal with this. I can't say that
our response in California was perfect, but we certainly didn't
face the same scale of outbreak that has been faced in the
Midwest.
And I hope through this hearing, Mr. Chairman, we can
better understand what practices work best and learn from the
successes of each state to minimize the negative impact that
the high-path avian influenza has had during the spring fly
season. And we know that there is going to be on upcoming fall
fly season. Certainly, Congressman Peterson can testify to
that; as an avid hunter, he is very familiar with the various
seasons.
So I very much look forward to the testimony of those from
the United States Department of Agriculture, the state
representatives, and I hope this morning we can learn from each
other. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Costa.
Mr. Peterson. Mr. Chairman, I forgot, I would like to enter
these economic impact analyses that were done by the University
of Minnesota extension into the record. I was going to do that
earlier.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to is located on p. 45.]
The Chairman. The chair would request that other Members
submit their opening statements for the record so the witnesses
may begin their testimony and to ensure that there is ample
time for questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Timothy J. Walz, a Representative in
Congress from Minnesota
Farmers have long known that the financial health of our
agricultural sector is beholden to certain external factors. Droughts,
floods, disasters and disease can all have an impact on the farm which
ripples outward and impacts the entire rural community. This dynamic
necessitates effective government programs which can provide the tools
for farmers to get back on their feet when calamity occurs and maintain
farm country as the bedrock of our national economy.
In MN and the Midwest, we are facing such a calamity now with the
onset of avian flu. This outbreak places both a financial and emotional
strain on the producers in harm's way. You don't have to have a flock
test positive to be impacted. The stress created just knowing the
possibility of loss is out there is enough of a burden. I heard one
producer describe it as living in a ``constant tornado warning.''
USDA has done an admirable job thus far in their response. The
challenge is staggering, and the numbers bear this out, with reports of
48 million birds from 211 commercial barns in 21 states.
USDA cannot, and should not have to, address this situation alone.
Congress should continue to provide the necessary resources which
support efforts to enhance biosecurity research and deployment. Boots
on the ground, visiting farms and sharing information on best practices
will be invaluable, going forward.
Furthermore, we should continue to support development of a viable
commercial vaccine while engaging in talks with our trading partners to
make certain that vaccine use will not significantly impact export
potential.
While it may be true that external factors affect the financial
health of farm country, it is the resilience of our farmers working in
concert with experts from State Departments of Agriculture and USDA who
can overcome disaster and continue to feed and fuel the world.
The Chairman. The chair would like to remind Members that
they will be recognized for questioning in order of seniority
for Members who were present at the start of the hearing. After
that, Members will be recognized in order of their arrival, and
I certainly appreciate Members' understanding.
Witnesses are asked to limit their oral presentations to 5
minutes, if you can, please. All written statements will be
included in the record.
I would like to welcome our witnesses to the table, and
please note that in the interest of time, we have combined the
two panels. Dr. David Swayne, Laboratory Director, Southeast
Poultry Research Laboratory, USDA Agricultural Research Service
in Athens, Georgia. Thank you for being here.
Dr. John Clifford, Deputy Administrator, Veterinary
Services, USDA Animal Health and Inspection Service,
Washington, D.C.
We also have Dr. Douglas Meckes, State Veterinarian North
Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services in
Raleigh, North Carolina.
And Dr. Bill Hartmann, Executive Director, Administrative
Board of Animal Health, St. Paul, Minnesota.
Dr. Swayne, begin when you are ready.
STATEMENT OF DAVID E. SWAYNE, D.V.M., Ph.D., DIRECTOR AND
SUPERVISORY VETERINARY MEDICAL OFFICER, SOUTHEAST POULTRY
RESEARCH LABORATORY,
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
ATHENS, GA
Dr. Swayne. Chairman Rouzer, Ranking Member Costa, Members
of the Committee, I am Dr. David Swayne, as I have been
introduced, the Laboratory Director at the Southeast Poultry
Research Laboratory in Athens, Georgia. We are part of the
newly-formed U.S. National Poultry Research Center.
The Agricultural Research Service is committed to
eradicating the high-path AI virus at the center of the current
North American outbreak through providing cutting-edge research
in diagnostics, molecular epidemiology, pathology, and
vaccinology.
In response to the first detections of HPAI in the U.S.,
ARS refocused its high-path research program to the most
imminent research needs. Within weeks, a rapid molecular test
was developed to detect this unique Asian H5 high-path AI
virus, which allowed quick differentiation from our North
American low-path AI viruses.
This test was transferred to the National Veterinary
Services Laboratories of APHIS, and is the core test used in
diagnostic effort to rapidly identify infected flocks. We
conducted studies to understand how the early high-path AI
virus is infected and cause disease in birds. In chickens and
turkeys, these initial viruses took high-exposure doses that
were needed to produce those infections and bird-to-bird
contact transmission was very inefficient. But all the infected
chickens and turkeys became ill and died.
By contrast, domestic ducks and also mallards, a wild-type
duck, became infected with lower doses of the virus and had
more efficient contact transmission, but they did not become
ill, nor did they die. Subsequent experiments using the later
viruses from the Midwest, from Minnesota and Iowa and the
Dakotas, found these viruses required less actual virus to
infect chickens and contact transmission occurred more easily,
thus indicating the later viruses had changed or were more
easily transmissible to and among chickens and turkeys.
In extending laboratory data to the field, ARS researchers
have teamed up with APHIS virologists and epidemiologists, as
well as field and poultry veterinarians at universities by
providing some genetic analysis of the high-path AI viruses in
order to focus epidemiologic investigations. Genetic analysis
support a point source introduction from infected waterfowl to
poultry in the Pacific Flyway and in the early Midwestern
cases.
However, the later Midwest viruses showed evidence of
common-source introductions from outbreaks supporting farm-to-
farm spread. In the United States, there is no vaccine approved
or currently in use in commercial poultry for high-path AI.
While some nations have attempted to utilize vaccine to protect
poultry against the H5N1 high-path AI, their use of it as a
primary focus through control has not always lead to immediate
eradication.
Ninety-nine percent of all high-path AI vaccine has been
used in only four countries, China, Egypt, Vietnam, and
Indonesia, where the H5N1 virus is endemic. In these countries,
their prolonged use of vaccine has been associated with vaccine
failure and emergence of vaccine resistance, and this has
necessitated continued surveillance for vaccine-resistant
strains and periodic change of vaccine seed strains to more
closely match those circulating field viruses for more
effective control.
In support of APHIS, ARS conducts high-path AI vaccine seed
development, and testing is one of our routine research
activities. But we do not manufacture vaccines nor decide when
or if vaccines should be used in the field. The licensing and
the use of vaccine is determined by APHIS. Currently, ARS has
developed a new vaccine seed strain for use in an inactivated
vaccine and is conducting the final protection studies in both
chickens and turkeys.
If viable, this vaccine strain will be transferred to a
commercial vaccine manufacturer or manufacturers. In addition,
ARS is evaluating some registered AI vaccines for protections
in chickens and turkeys against the current outbreak viruses.
Vaccination can play a helpful role in disease eradication
if it is properly implemented. But globally, vaccination has a
negative impact on poultry exports, which is a crucial part of
the U.S. poultry industry. Efforts to mitigate the effect of
vaccination on exports include identifying infected poultry
within vaccinated populations through reliable and cost-
effective serological and virological testing. Such a strategy
is often called DIVA testing. So development and validation of
DIVA-testing strategies for our potential vaccine programs is a
high-research priority for Southeast Poultry, and we have those
studies underway.
In conclusion, the current HPAI outbreak represents unique
and unprecedented challenges to the U.S. poultry industry with
ARS and collaborators: first, immediately shifting their
research programs to high-priority areas, infectivity and
transmission studies in poultry and wild birds; second, rapid
diagnostic test development for detecting Asian H5 high-path AI
virus; third, molecular epidemiologic studies on virus spread;
and fourth, development of efficacious vaccines and an
effective vaccination strategy.
Thank you, again, for this opportunity to testify and for
Congressional support as we continue to fight this virus.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Swayne follows:]
Prepared Statement of David E. Swayne, D.V.M., Ph.D., Director and
Supervisory Veterinary Medical Officer, Southeast Poultry Research
Laboratory, Agricultural Research Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Athens, GA
Chairman Rouzer, Ranking Member Costa, and Members of the
Subcommittee, I am Dr. David Swayne, Laboratory Director and
Supervisory Veterinary Medical Officer, at the Southeast Poultry
Research Laboratory (SEPRL) which is part of the Agricultural Research
Service's (ARS) U.S. National Poultry Research Center in Athens,
Georgia.
I am sure you are aware of the great hardships that the U.S.
poultry industry and producers have suffered because of Highly-
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). It goes without saying that ARS, and
particularly the research staff at SEPRL, are committed to eradicating
the H5N8 or H5N2 viruses at the center of the current North American
outbreak through cutting edge research in diagnostics, epidemiology,
pathology, molecular biology, and vaccinology. ARS is determined to aid
our sister agency, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS), and the poultry industry to ensure that this strain of avian
influenza is understood and can be scientifically managed to protect
animal agriculture and the food supply.
Background
ARS's Exotic and Emerging Avian Viral Diseases Research Unit at
SEPRL has been conducting research on avian influenza since the mid-
1970s. Our research has helped U.S. poultry farmers increase exports,
led to the eradication of low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) in U.S.
poultry, and contributed to the overall global efforts to combat LPAI
and HPAI. Today, SEPRL is USDA's national research laboratory for avian
influenza and an international reference laboratory recognized by both
the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. We also work
within the OIE/FAO Animal Influenza Expert Laboratory Network (OFFLU)
that cooperatively works internationally to control influenza in all
agricultural species.
Initial Research Response
In response to the first detections of H5N8 and H5N2 in wild
waterfowl and captive raptors in the United States in December of 2014,
ARS refocused its HPAI research direction to the most imminent research
needs to address the U.S. outbreak. Within weeks, scientists at SEPRL
developed a rapid molecular test to detect the Asian H5 HPAI, which
would quickly differentiate it from the North American LPAI viruses.
The test was quickly validated by researcher at SEPRL for sensitivity
and specificity, and transferred to the National Veterinary Services
Laboratory (NVSL) of APHIS. In addition, SEPRL developed a rapid test
for the identification of the N8 gene of the Asian HPAI viruses and
helped NVSL optimize its neuraminidase sequence test.
Infectivity and Transmission
Representative H5N8 and H5N2 HPAI virus strains from the United
States were tested in terrestrial poultry, domestic ducks, and captive
mallards to determine how easy it was to infect birds and produce
disease. The initial HPAI viruses required high intranasal doses of
virus to infect chickens and turkeys, and contact transmission to birds
was inefficient. However, all infected chickens and turkeys became ill
and died. By contrast, the domestic ducks and mallards became infected
with lower doses of virus and had more efficient contact transmission.
They did not become ill or die, but shed virus into the environment
through the feces and oral secretions for up to 14 days.
These studies suggest the early H5 HPAI viruses were best adapted
to waterfowl and difficult to transmit from wild waterfowl to poultry.
The HPAI virus detections in wild birds from the Pacific Flyway
corroborate this observation as detections were observed at an
unexpectedly high rate in several duck species, with more limited
detection in backyard flocks and only two commercial poultry flocks.
However, the later outbreak of the H5N2 virus in the Midwest
required less virus to infect chickens, and contact transmission
occurred more easily than with the initial HPAI viruses. This
demonstrated that the wild bird viruses had changed and were more
easily transmitted to and among chickens and turkeys, potentially
allowing for farm-to-farm spread of the virus.
Molecular Analysis of Virus Spread
It is critical in developing control and eradication strategies to
understand how the viruses are introduced onto farms and how they
spread. SEPRL researchers have been working with APHIS virologists and
epidemiologists as well as field and university poultry veterinarians
to provide molecular network analysis of the HPAI viruses. The data
produced by this analysis supports the idea that the early outbreak
viruses were likely introduced by wild birds. However, the analysis of
later viruses showed molecular sequence evidence of clustering, which
is a sign of farm-to-farm spread.
Vaccine Issues
In the United States, there is no vaccine approved or currently in
use in commercial poultry for H5N8 or H5N2 HPAI. While some nations
have attempted to utilize vaccine to protect poultry against the H5N1
HPAI virus, a primary focus on vaccines has not led to immediate
eradicate of HPAI. Ninety-nine percent of the vaccine use to this point
has been in China, Egypt, Vietnam and Indonesia were H5N1 HPAI is
endemic.
Issues associated with vaccine use, including vaccine failure and
vaccine resistance, have been identified in countries using the vaccine
long-term. In addition, vaccine efficacy is limited over time. Similar
to human influenza, avian influenza viruses change over time, and
vaccine efficacy decreases as the outbreak viruses change. This has
necessitated continued surveillance for vaccine-resistant field strains
within vaccinated poultry populations of these countries, and periodic
change of the vaccine seed strain to more closely match the circulating
field HPAI virus for optimal protection. In countries vaccinating
against HPAI, virological surveillance in vaccinated flocks is crucial
to collect viruses for genetic and antigenic analysis to assess field
protection between vaccine seed strains and current circulating field
viruses.
ARS plays a critical role with APHIS and other public health
authorities in providing scientific information and countermeasures to
significantly and measurably mitigate the impact of HPAI disease
outbreaks. When addressing the need for vaccination, SEPRL first
evaluates new avian influenza outbreak viruses by sequence analysis and
serologic characteristics, which provides a good estimation of how
close the new viruses are to other influenza viruses and existing
vaccines. Then we select the most representative challenge viruses to
use in vaccine efficacy and challenge studies. Because these are HPAI
viruses, the studies must be conducted in high biocontainment
facilities.
Vaccine and Testing
SEPRL conducts vaccine seed strain development and testing as well
as routine research activity, but it does not manufacture vaccines nor
decide when or if vaccines should be used in the field. The licensing
and use of a vaccine is determined by APHIS. Currently, SEPRL is
evaluating registered HPAI vaccines and has developed a H5 vaccine seed
strain for protection in chickens and turkeys against the current H5
HPAI outbreak viruses. If viable, the appropriate vaccine seed strain
will be transferred to a commercial vaccine manufacturer.
Measuring Efficacy
Vaccine protection or efficacy is measured primarily by two means
in vaccinated poultry: (1) prevention of clinical disease and death;
and (2) a reduction in virus shedding, which reflects the growth of the
challenge virus and release of the virus in body secretions (oral
secretions and feces). Decreased virus shedding is important in
reducing environmental contamination, and thus reducing virus
transmission and infection. Low quality vaccines or vaccines with
antigenic mismatches do not prevent infection. Thus birds challenged
with a high dose of HPAI virus will become infected and excrete a great
deal of virus into the environment.
Vaccination can play a helpful role in disease eradication if
properly implemented, but historically vaccination negatively affects
poultry exports, which is a crucial part of the U.S. poultry industry.
Efforts to mitigate the effect of vaccination on exports include the
use of testing that can identify infected birds within a vaccinated
poultry population using reliable and cost effective serological and
virological testing; i.e., so termed DIVA strategy. This
differentiation approach has been shown to work experimentally, but
with only limited field experience for HPAI vaccine. SEPRL is
evaluating all the vaccines being tested for the ability to identify
infected birds within vaccinated poultry. Because of the many types of
vaccines proposed for use, some strategies need more research work for
development and validation. The validation of this approach is a
priority for SEPRL and its collaborators.
Conclusion
The current HPAI outbreak presents unique and unprecedented
challenges to the U.S. poultry industry. The widespread presence of
HPAI in wild birds provides an ongoing threat to the U.S. poultry
industry. That is why SEPRL immediately began to work to identify
specific strains of the virus, and develop a test to detect the HPAI
virus in affected poultry. In addition, SEPRL continues to work,
develop and test an effective vaccine for the specific strains of the
virus impacting the U.S. As mentioned before, we are in the initial
testing phase for the H5 HPAI strain. While testing looks promising,
much more work is needed before a registered vaccine is found to be a
viable option.
We will continue to develop new and improved tools for containment
of the virus, and work to make these tools commercially available,
where possible, as a means to prevent the widespread losses the poultry
industry and producers have sustained during this outbreak. The
Agricultural Research Service, along with Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service, will continue to work hard to address this complex
problem. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and for
Congressional support as we continue to fight this virus.
The Chairman. Dr. Clifford.
STATEMENT OF JOHN R. CLIFFORD, D.V.M., DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, VETERINARY SERVICES, ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH
INSPECTION SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, WASHINGTON,
D.C.
Dr. Clifford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the
Committee. I would like to thank you again for the opportunity
to testify on behalf of the United States Department of
Agriculture.
As I sit here today, it has been almost 2 full months since
our last detection of high-path AI in Minnesota and about 7
weeks since any detections in Iowa. Over 60 farms have started
restocking with new, healthy poultry. Over 30 have finished the
cleaning and disinfection process and are on their way to
restocking.
Those numbers will continue to climb in the coming weeks as
a positive sign that we are recovering from this devastating
outbreak, the largest animal health emergency in our country's
history. USDA will continue to stand with those producers
helping them to get back into production as quickly as they
can.
Much of our effort in recent weeks has been with an eye
toward the future. We have been meeting with our state and
industry partners to plan for any potential fall outbreaks. We
learned a lot from what happened in the spring, and we are
taking those lessons, identifying gaps and needs, and revising
our plans. I can assure you that we will be ready to face any
outbreaks in the fall.
I just came from a conference in Des Moines where we, along
with our state and industry partners, discussed the outbreak
and steps for the fall. Our conversations there and in previous
meetings have identified several key things: First, we all need
to improve our biosecurity. It is truly a shared
responsibility. We need to wash equipment, limit the number of
people on farms, and we need to take steps to limit contact
with wild birds. As part of this effort, we need to improve
outreach to producers. We have been working with the industry
in states to share information and materials so we can be ready
to stop disease spread.
Second, we recognize the importance for rapid depopulation
of birds. The longer we take to depopulate sick birds, the more
virus they produce; and with more virus in the environment, the
greater its chances to overwhelm our biosecurity efforts. We
are working with our partners on all the logistical challenges,
and we need to have the right equipment and materials in the
right places and the right disposal options to eliminate any
unnecessary delays.
Third, we need to continue to have discussions about the
vaccine policy. We have made the decision to stockpile vaccine
but have not decided whether or not to use it to control
disease spread. Our discussions with trading partners to date
suggest that many of them would ban all poultry exports until
they could complete a risk assessment.
We will continue to actively engage these partners about
how to minimize the effects on trade should we need to use
vaccine in the future. But if we want the conversation and
attitude of our trading partners to change, it is likely that
all of us will have to change some of our policies and concerns
about the use of vaccines for high-path AI and other foreign
animal diseases.
We are planning for a worst-case scenario, and we will be
ready for it. While I don't think it will come to that, this
planning is important to ensure that we can handle any
potential outbreaks in the fall no matter the size. To that
end, we are adding additional staff, over 450 term positions,
including 210 animal health technicians, and 90 veterinary
medical officers. We are working with our Federal and state
partners to increase surveillance of wild birds which brought
the disease here initially.
Close monitoring of wild birds let us identify and respond
to this disease as a rapidly as possible. Our hearts go out to
everyone affected so far, producers, their employees, and the
communities they live in and support. And we are making sure we
are doing everything we can to help those who may be possibly
affected in the months ahead.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony, and I would be
happy to answer any questions you or the Members of the
Subcommittee may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Clifford follows:]
Prepared Statement of John R. Clifford, D.V.M., Deputy Administrator,
Veterinary Services, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.
Chairman Rouzer, Ranking Member Costa, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). I serve as the Deputy
Administrator for USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS). In this capacity, I am the Chief Veterinary Officer of the
United States.
Today, we are facing the largest animal health emergency in this
country's history. We are dealing with an unprecedented outbreak of
highly-pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) that is taking a heavy toll on
the poultry industry. People have lost their jobs and have seen their
livelihoods put in grave danger by this outbreak, and our hearts go out
to them. I can assure you, however, that this disease has USDA's
fullest attention, and we are committed to standing with our producers
and industry to get them--and the communities they live in and
support--back on their feet.
USDA has been and will be there every step of the way with
producers, industry, and our state partners. We've worked closely with
them to respond quickly and decisively to this outbreak. More than 400
USDA staff and nearly 3,000 USDA-contracted personnel have been working
around the clock in every affected state on the response. We've
delivered over $190 million in indemnification payments to producers to
control the spread of disease, and to help them recover from it. Should
the need arise, we have the authority to request even further funding.
All told, USDA has committed over $700 million--an amount more than \1/
2\ of APHIS' yearly discretionary budget--in addressing this outbreak.
We've seen trade cut off by trading partners concerned about the
devastating effects of this disease, causing over $1 billion in poultry
products to be directed to other markets at a cost to producers. We
understand the devastating impact this outbreak has had upon all, and
we are committed to helping those affected. And we will help protect
those producers who have not yet been--and we certainly hope, will not
be--impacted by this disease.
The Outbreak
The outbreak started in December 2014. Western Hemisphere migratory
birds commingled with Asian birds in the northwestern part of the
continent. These birds acquired a variant of HPAI that is currently
widespread in Asia. Wild ducks and geese (which have lower mortality
for this variant) brought the disease first to the Pacific flyway, and
later to the Central and Mississippi flyways. Initial detections in the
United States were in wild birds and backyard flocks, and may have
resulted from direct contact with sick migratory birds. As the virus
spread through the Midwest, it came into contact with some of the
largest segments of the poultry industry; it took an especially heavy
toll on turkeys and egg-laying chickens, primarily in Minnesota and
Iowa.
APHIS scientists have been conducting an epidemiological
investigation into the origins of the disease. Based upon the results
of the preliminary investigation the agency released in June, we
believe wild birds were responsible for introducing HPAI into the
environment, and from there it was spread into commercial poultry
houses. However, given the number and proximity of farms affected by
HPAI, it appears the virus is spreading in other ways as well. For
instance, one analysis provides evidence that a certain cluster of
farms was affected by identical viruses, pointing to possible
transmission among those farms. In addition, genetic analyses of the
HPAI viruses suggest that independent introductions as well as
transmission between farms are occurring in several states
concurrently.
Our investigation shows that the virus has been introduced into
commercial poultry facilities from the environment (i.e., water, soil,
animal feces, air) or from farm-to-farm transmission on human sources
such as boots or equipment. After conducting an analysis of over 80
commercial poultry farms, APHIS cannot associate transmission of the
disease with any single one of those factors, but it seems clear that
lateral spread occurred when biosecurity measures that are sufficient
in ordinary times were not sufficient in the face of such a large
amount of virus in the environment.
USDA--through the APHIS National Veterinary Services Laboratories--
has confirmed HPAI in 21 states, which includes nine states where we
identified it in commercial poultry. We have confirmed the disease in
232 total poultry premises, with 211 of those being commercial
facilities. As part of our disease control strategy, we've depopulated
7.5 million turkeys and 42 million chickens and pullets. This is
approximately 3% of the U.S. annual turkey production, and
approximately 10% of the egg-laying chicken population.
USDA's Response to HPAI
USDA has extensive experience in responding to animal disease
outbreaks, especially in poultry. In 2003 and 2004, we successfully
fought off an outbreak of Exotic Newcastle Disease in the southwestern
United States and low-pathogenic avian influenza, which spread through
the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia. The bulk of our response to the
current outbreak has been based upon the existing USDA avian influenza
response plans we've developed and refined over the years. These
existing plans have allowed USDA and its state partners to respond
quickly and decisively to address this outbreak using the authorities
given to us under the Animal Health Protection Act and state laws and
regulations.
The goals of USDA's HPAI response plans are to (1) detect, control,
and contain HPAI in poultry as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate HPAI
using strategies that seek to protect public health and stabilize
animal agriculture, the food supply, and the economy; and (3) provide
science- and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity
of business for non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal
products. In addition we want to ensure that the Federal Government,
producers, states and local governments are well-positioned to
effectively respond to future outbreaks. Achieving these goals will
allow individual poultry facilities, states, Tribes, regions, and
industries to resume normal production as rapidly as possible and
minimize losses from future outbreaks. They will also allow the United
States to regain disease-free recognition from our trading partners
without the response effort causing more disruption and damage than the
disease outbreak itself would be were it left unchecked.
The plan has five basic steps when the disease is detected:
quarantine, eradicate, monitor, disinfect, and test.
Quarantining allows us to restrict the movement of poultry
and poultry-moving equipment into and out of the control area.
Simply, we must stop the spread and transfer of the disease as
much as we can.
Eradication is part of our ``stamping-out'' approach to
HPAI, which requires the depopulation of clinically affected
and in-contact susceptible poultry to eliminate the disease
where it exists and to further reduce the risk of spread. USDA
has provided indemnification payments to producers for those
birds that must be depopulated, which helps serve as an
incentive for them to report potential infections quickly,
which can further reduce the potential for virus spread.
USDA monitors the region to better understand the viral
spread. We monitor birds in a broad area around the quarantine
area to see if there are other incidents to which we must
respond.
Cleaning and Disinfection of the premises where affected
flocks are located is a key piece toward eradication. We must
know that facilities are clean and disease-free before we can
allow them back into production.
Testing is the last step. After the disinfection is complete
and before we can release the quarantine, we test the premises
and environment to ensure that it is disease-free, so that
operations may safely resume.
USDA has the best avian influenza surveillance system in the world.
Our program exceeds international standards and allows us to identify
the disease, and upon detection, to ramp up our emergency response
activities. Our strong surveillance system assures our trading partners
that we take disease eradication and control seriously and will be of
great benefit to us as we try to resume trade with the foreign trading
partners who have cut off access to U.S. poultry and poultry products.
How This Works for Producers
USDA wants impacted producers to get back into business as quickly
as possible, and APHIS and its state partners work very closely with
those affected.
Following confirmation of HPAI in their operation, a producer will
need to develop a flock plan for all premises with confirmed infections
or exposure. The flock plan sets out the steps to eradicate the virus
and prevent its spread to other flocks. It also specifies the
procedures required to get the facility back into production, including
requirements for quarantine release. The flock plan will include
cleaning and disinfection requirements. The flock plan must be signed
by the owners, a state animal health official, and an APHIS official
before an indemnification payment can be processed. An APHIS case
manager will work with the producers to walk them through the process
and the information required to complete all steps.
APHIS will then prepare an appraisal document for indemnification
and present it to the producer as quickly as possible. Affected
producers need to sign the appraisal document before depopulation can
occur. The Animal Health Protection Act limits indemnity to the fair
market value of the animal being depopulated; our indemnity payments
are not intended to make the producer whole, such as by covering
production losses during the time a barn is down for the disease
response activities. APHIS economists developed a series of species-
specific appraisal calculators that use publicly available prices,
costs, and productivity data to develop a value per animal that varies
by the age of the animal. The calculators are updated monthly to
account for changing feed costs, values, and assumptions.
The value per animal type multiplied by the number of each animal
type is used to calculate total indemnity. For HPAI, APHIS provides 100
percent of that indemnity amount. One important distinction: the Animal
Health Protection Act limits indemnity to the fair market value of the
animal being depopulated.
A compliance agreement must be developed if depopulation, disposal,
or cleaning and disinfection will be performed by personnel other than
Federal or state officials, and if the producers will request indemnity
for those activities. A compliance agreement is separate from the flock
plan. The flock plan specifies the necessary procedures for the
premises to resume normal production; a compliance agreement indicates
what tasks will be completed, who will be responsible for each task,
and how much the work is expected to cost. A compliance agreement is
comparable to a statement of work--a plan that lays out the activities
to be done and the expected costs to accomplish those activities.
Provided the terms of the compliance agreement are met, USDA will
provide funding for those cleaning and disinfection activities, and
compensation or indemnification for any items or equipment that are
destroyed or damaged as a result of the cleaning and disinfection
process.
The Importance of Biosecurity
One of the lessons we've learned is that we all need to be vigilant
about maintaining stringent biosecurity measures, especially in the
face of a disease outbreak. In June, APHIS released a partial
epidemiology report on the Agency's findings about the origins and
spread of the virus. While the results of our preliminary
epidemiological investigation didn't show a single source of
transmission, it did emphasize the importance and need for improved
biosecurity. The strength of our biosecurity efforts depends entirely
on all of us--producers, their employees, USDA, and our contractors who
are responding to this outbreak.
Part of this involves more outreach to producers. We've made more
information about basic biosecurity practices available on our website,
and we've shared materials such as a checklist of best practices and
information sheets with industry groups for distribution to their
members. These recommendations include items such as allowing only
essential personnel access to poultry premises and thoroughly
disinfecting boots, equipment, and vehicles that enter and exit those
locations.
We're also meeting directly with State Veterinarians and industry
to discuss the need for more biosecurity. On July 28 and 29, 2015, we
held a stakeholder meeting with those groups to discuss those issues to
ensure that our collective biosecurity is more stringent and that we
are prepared for any future outbreaks. We also participated this week
in an industry-sponsored meeting in Des Moines, Iowa to talk about the
importance of our shared biosecurity responsibilities, as well as to
stress the importance of proper planning for the fall.
We know that proper biosecurity begins at the farm's edge. What
this outbreak has taught us is that the biosecurity measures that
extend on the farm into each individual barn or facility are equally
or, at times, more important than the farm's edge approach. Based on
the belief that ``an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,'' we
plan to work with our producer and state and local partners to
strengthen biosecurity measures. This may require changes to current
practices or assumptions, and USDA is engaging our partners in these
critical issues.
APHIS appreciates the cooperation of poultry producers in providing
the information needed for these epidemiology investigations. APHIS
values its partnership with industry and believes that with their
continued support and assistance, the agency will be well positioned to
learn all it can about this virus. We all have a role in--and a
responsibility for--our nation's agricultural health, and we will work
together to ensure that we are in the best position possible to address
this disease.
Preparedness for the Fall
USDA is treating the potential threat of more infections in the
fall with the utmost seriousness. Although we hope that we will not
have additional or more wide-spread outbreaks, it's very likely that
wild birds will carry the virus with them when they begin migrating
south in the fall. Although states in the Atlantic flyway have not been
affected by this HPAI outbreak, it's important that our state and
industry partners begin preparations should the disease occur there.
I can assure you that this need for preparedness has the attention
of all of USDA. The Secretary is leading these efforts, and has
directed USDA to do everything it can to respond to this virus, assist
producers, and maintain trade markets. As we look to the fall, we plan
to be ready for the challenge.
To that end, we recently concluded a planning workshop with our
partners focusing on the worst-case scenarios and the responses needed.
We're identifying the resources we would need under various scenarios
and how we can better partner with states and industry to manage this
disease.
We've encouraged our partners to review the existing avian
influenza response plans so they understand what we will expect and
what actions we will need them to take should the disease strike. Along
those lines, we've urged states and industry to develop site- and
county-level specific depopulation plans for landfilling or composting
birds. Our experience in the Midwest showed that the biggest roadblock
to efficient depopulation (which is key to reducing the spread of the
virus) is the lack of ready sites to receive and process dead birds.
Should the disease strike in the fall, USDA and its partners will
be ready to tackle it head-on.
Vaccination and Trade Issues
As part of USDA's ongoing response, the Department evaluated the
efficacy of current vaccine options for HPAI in addition to the
economic impacts of vaccination. Some in the poultry industry asked if
USDA would consider allowing the emergency use of vaccines to halt the
spread of the disease. In June, after conducting that evaluation, USDA
determined that we would not, at this time, allow for the use of
vaccines to assist in the eradication of HPAI.
Right now, we do not have a closely matched vaccine to the outbreak
H5N8 or H5N2 HPAI viruses. USDA's Agricultural Research Service (ARS)
is evaluating a current vaccine in chicken and turkey protection
studies against our specific outbreak viruses. In addition, ARS has
developed a reverse genetic H5 vaccine seed strain that antigenically
matches the field virus and it is undergoing the same protection
studies. Only the most efficacious vaccines should be considered for
field use as any infection in the vaccinated population would still
require the entire barn to be depopulated.
Aside from questions about its effectiveness, USDA believes that if
a vaccine were used, some additional trading partners would ban all
U.S. exports of poultry and eggs and not necessarily just those from
the states currently affected by HPAI until they could complete a full
risk assessment. The loss of these markets could cost U.S. producers at
least $3 billion in trade revenue with uncertain reductions to the
mortality rate of birds from this disease.
In the weeks and months ahead, we will continue to support efforts
to develop more effective vaccines. ARS scientists are working
diligently on a better vaccine based on the specific genetics of this
strain of the virus. We have said that we may reevaluate our
vaccination decision as more effective vaccines are developed and ready
for use, carefully considering both the efficacy of the vaccine and the
potential trade impacts. If used, vaccines will serve as an additional
tool in our eradication efforts and will be targeted in the states and
poultry sectors where they can be most effective.
USDA has been working very closely with our trading partners to
minimize the effects of this outbreak on producers. The World
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) guidelines encourage a
regionalized approach to animal diseases, and we have urged our trading
partners to adopt that approach, just as we would with them should they
be struck by an animal disease. Despite the OIE guidelines, 18 trading
partners have suspended imports of all U.S.-origin poultry and poultry
products. However, 38 trading partners have adopted a regionalization
approach, limiting imports of poultry and poultry products only from
those states or counties affected. We speak with our partners
regularly, and are already working with them to restore market access
from the areas where the outbreak was limited and has been controlled.
We'll continue to work with them to restore full market access as
quickly as possible as the overall outbreak subsides.
Conclusion
There are a few key points I want to leave you with. There have
been no human infections from these viruses and the risk to the general
public is low. It's also important to understand that our food supply
is safe. Properly prepared and cooked poultry and eggs are safe to eat.
I think despite the difficulties we've faced, we've had some good
news. We have not had a single detection of the disease since June 17,
well over a month ago, and 60 farms are eligible to repopulate with new
poultry. The restocking guidelines we and our state partners have put
in place give us the assurance that the premises and the local
environment are free from the disease, and that we have enhanced
biosecurity measures in place to reduce the threat of re-contamination.
Most importantly, successful restocking is a sign that our techniques
and approaches in confronting this disease can and do work. That might
not seem like much consolation for the producers who've lost so much,
but it should provide reassurances to those nervous about the potential
approach of the disease through wild waterfowl come fall.
I really want our producers to understand that they have USDA's
support. Our experience in quickly and successfully responding to
previous animal disease outbreaks and the lessons we've learned from
the Spring on this outbreak will inform our response and allow us to
minimize the effects of this disease, going forward. Every day, we are
further refining our prevention, detection, and response based on the
latest science and the lessons from this outbreak. We will continue
sharing what we learn with our state and industry partners through
regular conversations and meetings. We will also continue to work with
Congress to ensure that we have the necessary tools and resources to
fight this disease. Together, we will meet this challenge and protect
the health of the nation's poultry.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Meckes.
STATEMENT OF R. DOUGLAS MECKES, D.V.M., STATE
VETERINARIAN, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, RALEIGH, NC
Dr. Meckes. Yes. Chairman Rouzer, Ranking Member Costa,
Members of the Livestock and Foreign Agriculture Subcommittee,
I am Dr. Doug Meckes. I am the State Veterinarian in North
Carolina and the lead for the veterinary division in the North
Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. Thank
you for the opportunity to be here today to speak to our
efforts to prepare for and to respond to highly-pathogenic
avian influenza should it come our way this fall.
First and foremost, please understand that in North
Carolina the department has approached this task knowing that
appropriate response is beyond the scope of any single entity
in state government. From the beginning of the endeavor, we had
fully embraced our colleagues in the department and in
particular the staff of the emergency programs division, which
includes both emergency responders and veterinarians who are
uniquely qualified through their training and experience to
address this disease.
In addition, we have aligned ourselves with the
department's environmental programs leads, who serve as the
liaison with the Soil and Water Conservation Division in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. North
Carolina's diverse topography from the mountains to the coast
necessitates consideration of environmental impacts of every
aspect of response activity should we experience unprecedented
mass mortality.
Other partners in the department--Marketing, Forestry, and
Food and Drug Laboratory--have also been included to varying
degrees. Outside of the department, we have engaged with the
poultry industry, our Federal partners, North Carolina State
University, the cooperative extension service and state
emergency management in our efforts to assure a unified
approach to the potential for disease outbreak.
The department's efforts for preparedness began in earnest
after requests for disease management assistance were received
from Minnesota in March. We immediately responded and deployed
depopulation teams to support Minnesota's efforts. And during
the early April period, the Midwest experienced a blowup in
premise numbers of infected with the avian influenza virus and
existing resources were overwhelmed, leading to a backlog in
disposal efforts.
During two additional deployments, North Carolina response
teams traveled to Minnesota and to Iowa and, again, assisted
the state's response team in depopulation of infected birds.
Recent reports indicate that the presence of this backlog of
infected birds contributed to the lateral spread of the virus
in several areas, but by the time our teams returned to North
Carolina, that backlog had been managed.
These deployment experiences were the cornerstones for our
preparedness efforts in North Carolina. And over the past 3
months, we have established work groups to address many of the
lessons learned during deployments. Those groups include
operations, biosecurity, laboratory capacity, disposal, decon,
and disinfection, communications, outreach, and permitting.
Internally, the Emergency Programs Division, the Veterinary
Division, and the Environmental Programs staff are fully
engaged in every aspect of these working groups.
Our external partners are also participating in each of
those areas. Three particular areas are deemed critical and
effective timely management of disease outbreak, operations,
particularly depopulation, biosecurity, and disposal. As
previously noted, the delay in depopulation contributed to the
lateral spread of the virus in the Midwest. We are determined
that will not be the case in North Carolina.
The department has long conducted training sessions for
staff and others in the use of North Carolina foaming
equipment, typically twice a month in the eastern and western
parts of the state. More recently, the department conducted
foam training for industry partners on 2 successive days and
held three regional meetings in the eastern, central, and
western North Carolina for industry and agency partners to
discuss preparations for a robust response to high-path avian
influenza.
In addition, our marketing division and Commissioner of
Agriculture Troxler have solicited funding from our industry
partners for construction of ten additional units. Once these
units are completed, North Carolina will have 16 foam units
available, ten of which will be fully manned and ready for
deployment in the event of disease outbreak. The department has
also worked with our colleagues in forestry to rent fire trucks
with foaming equipment suitable for use in depopulation
activities.
While delays in depopulation are believed to have
contributed to the lateral spread of a virus, of equal
significance and consequence are the breaches in biosecurity
that have been documented by USDA. Suffice it to say, all would
be well served to implement more stringent biosecurity
procedures. Our goal in North Carolina is no lateral spread.
And to accomplish this, the biosecurity lead on each of our
response teams will seek to ensure compliance with biosecurity
protocols by our team members, by all grower staff, and all
movements on and off premises.
Since North Carolina grower facilities are typically in
much closer proximity to one another than in those states which
have already been affected, there is greater need for
comprehensive biosecurity practices to reduce the spread of
high-path AI. Consider, for example, that in some identified 10
kilometer control areas in North Carolina we have over 500
individual poultry houses contained within that perimeter.
Disposal is the third critical tenet of the department's
response effort, and given constraints on burial throughout of
North Carolina and the limitations on landfill and rendering
facilities, composting is the first choice for management of
poultry carcasses as has been the case throughout the Midwest.
Finally, the economic impact of catastrophic mass mortality
disease outbreak could have profound implications for counties,
and for the state. The North Carolina poultry industry is
responsible for as much as $34 billion in total economic
activity and creates and supports as many as 109,000 jobs.
North Carolina has a longstanding commitment to agriculture
and has responded to and recovered from agriculture disasters
in the past: Drought, disease, and weather events. But high-
path AI's unprecedented in its potential to impact our state
and the entire Southeast.
The department and its partners are committed to preparing
for and responding to this disease should it arrive on the
wings of migratory birds this fall, and we are at the ready to
quickly and effectively manage the disease to the best of our
ability. If successful, we will minimize the impact on North
Carolina poultry industry, on its growers, on our economy, and
the citizens of our state.
I am prepared to answer any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Meckes follows:]
Prepared Statement of R. Douglas Meckes, D.V.M., State Veterinarian,
North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services,
Raleigh, NC
Chairman Rouzer, Ranking Member Costa, and Members of the Livestock
Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you about the ongoing
efforts of the North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services (NCDA&CS) to prepare for and to develop capability to respond
to Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). First and foremost, please
understand that in North Carolina, the Department has approached this
task understanding that appropriate response is beyond the scope of any
single entity in state government. From the beginning of this endeavor,
the Veterinary Division has fully embraced our colleagues in the
Department, in particular the staff of the Emergency Programs Division
which includes both emergency responders and veterinarians who are
uniquely qualified, through their training and experience, to address
this disease. In addition, we have closely aligned ourselves with the
Department's Environmental Programs lead who serves as the Department's
liaison with the Soil and Water Conservation Division. We have also
engaged colleagues within the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), including Solid Waste, Air and Water Quality and
Confined Animal Feeding Operations Specialists. North Carolina's
diverse topography, from the mountains to the coast, necessitates
consideration of environmental impacts of every aspect of response
activity should we experience unprecedented mass mortality.
Other partners in the Department--Marketing, Forestry, and the Food
and Drug Laboratory have been included in varying degrees as well.
Outside of NCDA&CS, we have engaged with the poultry industry, our
Federal Partners, North Carolina State University, the Cooperative
Extension Service, NC Department of Labor, NC Department of
Transportation, NC Public Health and State Emergency Management in our
efforts to assure a unified approach to potential disease outbreak. NC
Emergency Management has agreed to handle all HPAI logistical support
at the state and local level.
The Department's preparedness efforts began in earnest, after
requests for disease management assistance were received from the state
of Minnesota in March; we immediately responded and deployed
depopulation teams to support Minnesota's efforts. During the early
April period, the Midwest experienced an unprecedented increase in
numbers of HPAI-infected premises. According to the State Veterinarian
of Minnesota and USDA officials, existing resources were overwhelmed,
leading to a backlog in depopulation and disposal needs.
During three additional deployments, North Carolina response teams
traveled to Minnesota and Iowa to assist those states in the
depopulation of infected birds. Recent USDA epidemiological reports
indicate that the presence of this ``backlog'' of infected birds
contributed to the lateral spread of the virus in several areas;
however, by the time of our team's return to North Carolina, the
``backlog'' of infected birds had been managed.
These deployment experiences became the cornerstones for
preparedness efforts in North Carolina. Over the past 3 months, we have
established Work Groups to address many of the lessons learned during
deployments. Those groups include: operations, biosecurity, laboratory
capacity, disposal, decontamination and disinfection, communications,
outreach and permitting. Internally, the Emergency Programs Division,
the Veterinary Division and Environmental Programs staff are fully
engaged in every aspect of the Working Groups; our external partners
are also participating in each of these areas.
The Laboratory Capacity group is collaborating with the North
Carolina Veterinary Laboratory Diagnostic System's four state
laboratories which will be a critical component in the response
efforts. These facilities provide the first line of defense and have
the capability to diagnose highly-pathogenic avian influenza virus and
perform tests required for movement of poultry to maintain the flow of
commerce. The Communications Group developed messaging early in the
process to ensure consistent information to the public; that
information is posted on the NCDA&CS web site and is available for
public reference. The Outreach group has worked across a spectrum of
players to ensure timely release of information. Significant amongst
this group is the State's Cooperative Extension Service; they are ``on
the ground'' on a daily basis and have close working relationships with
both small and large producers and back yard poultry owners. North
Carolina also reached out early to special avian collections and
created an annex to our HPAI Response Plan. Special Avian collections
include birds of special value due to their endangered status or exotic
birds on display to the public such as those in the NC Zoo in Asheboro.
Four working Groups have been focused on specific operational
aspects of response, to include Biosecurity, Depopulation, Disposal and
Decontamination. These working groups include a variety of subject
matter experts.
As previously noted, the delay in depopulation is believed to have
been significant to the lateral spread of the virus in the Midwest. We
are determined that inadequate depopulation capability will not cause
similar problems in North Carolina. The Department has long conducted
training sessions for staff and others in the use of our North Carolina
foaming equipment, typically twice a month, in the eastern and the
western part of the state. More recently, the Department conducted Foam
Training for industry partners and interested parties from other states
on 2 successive days. Three Regional Meetings (eastern, central, and
western North Carolina) were held for industry and agency partners to
discuss preparations for a robust response to HPAI emerging from the
Atlantic flyway this fall.
Breaches of biosecurity documented in the current United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) Epidemiologic Report are believed to
have contributed to lateral spread of the virus. During response
activities, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
personnel observed sharing of equipment between infected and non-
infected farms, employees moving between infected and non-infected
farms, lack of cleaning and disinfection of vehicles moving between
farms, and rodents or small wild birds inside poultry houses. APHIS is
compiling their observations and will present those findings in a final
report. Stringent biosecurity will be paramount to preventing lateral
spread.
Our goal in North Carolina is ``No Lateral Spread'' and to
accomplish this, the Biosecurity lead on each positive farm will ensure
compliance with biosecurity procedures by our team members, all grower
staff, and for all movements on and off the premise.
Since North Carolina grower facilities are typically in much closer
proximity to one another than in states which have already been
affected, there is a greater need for comprehensive biosecurity
practices to reduce the risk of HPAI spread. Consider, for example,
some identified 10 kilometer Control Areas in North Carolina's Animal
Health Data Base have over 500 individual poultry houses within the
perimeter. Given that all movement between farms and within farms need
to be conducted under the assumption that the disease may be present,
the biosecurity mechanism is monumental, but doable.
Disposal is another critical tenet of the Department's response
effort. Given constraints on burial throughout much of North Carolina
and limitations on landfills and rendering facilities, composting is
recommended as the first choice for management of poultry carcasses as
has been the case throughout the Midwest. The compost disposal method
is also a preferred biosecurity measure in that no diseased birds need
to leave the farm. Rapid establishment of mortality compost windrows on
site is key to disposal of birds and inactivation of the influenza
virus. Timely and effective composting also aims to minimize ``down
time'' for the impacted farms to the extent possible.
The Disposal Work Group is actively pursuing the identification of
various carbon sources across the state that are of appropriate type
and of sufficient quantity to develop effective compost recipes on each
infected premise. The Work Group is also in the process of developing
guidance for land application of finished compost for agronomic use as
a soil amendment with ``fertilizer'' value. Additionally, the Workgroup
has planned a composting demonstration associated with Commissioner
Troxler's annual Food Safety Forum in August. The Department's Incident
Management team will create a working ``mortality compost pile'' near
the meeting location for growers from around the state to attend.
Finally, the economic impact of a catastrophic mass mortality
disease outbreak in North Carolina could/would have profound
implications for counties, regions, and even the entire state. The
North Carolina poultry industry is responsible for as much as $34
billion in total economic activity and creates/supports as many as
109,000 jobs. For each $100 million loss in North Carolina poultry farm
and poultry processing industries, total state spending falls by
$230,000 million, total income in the state falls by $68.8 million,
total labor earnings fall by $44.6 million and total employment falls
by 1,010 jobs. We've already seen that Minnesota and Iowa have realized
a $1 billion economic loss associated with HPAI infection on 180
premises. As many as 500 premises nationwide could be affected this
fall.
North Carolina has a long-standing commitment to agriculture and
has responded to and recovered from agriculture disasters in the past--
drought, disease and weather events, but HPAI is unprecedented in its
potential to impact our state and the entire Southeast. The North
Carolina Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services and its partners
are committed to preparing for and responding to HPAI, should it arrive
on the wings of migratory birds this fall, and we are at the ready to
quickly and effectively manage the disease to the best of our ability,
incorporating the latest USDA lessons learned. If successful, we will
minimize impact on the North Carolina poultry industry, its growers,
our economy, and the citizens of our state.
I am prepared to answer any questions you might have.
The Chairman. Thank you, very much.
Dr. Hartmann.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM L. HARTMANN, D.V.M., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
AND STATE VETERINARIAN, MINNESOTA BOARD OF ANIMAL HEALTH, ST.
PAUL, MN
Dr. Hartmann. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my
name is Bill Hartmann. I am the Executive Director of the Board
of Animal Health and the State Veterinarian in Minnesota. I
want to thank you for providing me with an opportunity to
testify to this group on the outbreak of high-path avian
influenza that we had in Minnesota.
First, I wanted to thank Congressman Peterson for his
efforts in Minnesota and for his support during this event.
I also wanted to acknowledge John Clifford and the USDA for
what they have done in Minnesota. Our success depended on them
being there, and we really appreciate the help that we have
received from them. At one point, there were 140 USDA employees
working on high-path AI in Minnesota.
It is an understatement to say that high-path AI in
Minnesota has been devastating and extremely difficult for all
involved. A University of Minnesota study estimated the losses
to the economy of Minnesota at $650 million and that was a few
weeks ago. The hardest part of this disease has been to see the
emotional impact this disease has had on those growers who have
affected farms and on the whole industry in Minnesota.
Why Minnesota was so affected, a few reasons: One, we are
the Land of 10,000 Lakes and so we have a lot of migratory
waterfowl that stop in Minnesota. We produce more turkeys than
any other state in the United States, and there is a
concentration of those turkey farms in the west central part of
Minnesota. And last, the weather was right. It was nice and
cool and damp in Minnesota during the spring and that is what
the virus likes.
The outbreak started on March 4, and we haven't had any new
cases, as Dr. Clifford said, since June 5. So we have gotten a
break this summer. And, as Dr. Clifford said, we are making
great progress in recovering. There was a 3 week gap between
the first case we had and the second case, but then after that
we had cases almost every day.
And at the height of the outbreak we had eight cases; that
is eight farms that were found affected in 1 day. This included
farms that are relatively large in size. We had a turkey farm
that had 310,000 turkeys on it and a chicken layer operation
that had over two million birds in the facility.
During the course of the outbreak, over nine million birds
died or were depopulated to prevent the spread of the virus.
Minnesota has extensive experience with low-path avian
influenza. We have had that disease just about every year since
I have been there. The difference is that that virus doesn't
kill birds; it rarely makes them sick, but we still want to
make sure that we respond to it.
Working together with USDA, we followed the guidelines that
USDA has outlined for eliminating this disease. All 110 farms
were quarantined, appraised, and depopulated. After
depopulation, turkeys were composted in the barns, and when
that compost material was taken out of the barns, the barns had
to be cleaned and disinfected, which is quite a job, and then
the environment has to be tested before we can release
quarantine on the farms.
Neighbors with poultry had to be identified and tested, and
during the outbreak we tested over 1,000 flocks for high-path
AI. Over the last 10 years, USDA funded development of a
scientifically-based permitting system to allow for movement of
poultry and poultry products in control areas during a high-
path AI outbreak.
Fortunately, they did this because the economic impact
could have been much greater if we hadn't been able to move
poultry and poultry products out of these control zones. As a
matter of fact, Minnesota issued 6,000 permits for movement of
poultry and poultry products within Minnesota and out of
Minnesota.
We are working hard with our partners to get all the
affected farms back in business as usual. Of the 110 farms that
were quarantined and depopulated, 49 are no longer classified
positive, 38 have restocked, and eight have been released from
quarantine. All of the control zones have been eliminated, so
we no longer are required to do this permitting because all
those control zones have been taken care of.
What did we learn from this outbreak that we might share
with other states in preparation for the fall? It is very
important to develop relationships before a crisis, with not
only the state, Federal Government, but also local government.
We need to prepare and train. We need to be able to depopulate
farms within 24 hours. We need to identify a facility in the
area where poultry are raised in the state where we can
establish an emergency operation center.
We need to make sure that our laboratories have adequate
capacity to handle the incredible demands that are made of that
laboratory to run tests. All poultry farms should have an
emergency carcass disposal plan.
And finally, a new level of biosecurity is going to be
required to deal with this virus. We are doing these things in
Minnesota, and we are sharing our lessons learned with other
states.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hartmann follows:]
Prepared Statement of William L. Hartmann, D.V.M., Executive Director
and State Veterinarian, Minnesota Board of Animal Health, St. Paul, MN
Background
The Minnesota Board of Animal Health (Board) is the lead state
agency for emergencies involving domestic and foreign animal diseases.
When the first case of Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) was
found in Minnesota, the Board took the lead in responding. The Board
has a Memorandum of Understanding with the Minnesota Department of
Agriculture (MDA) to support the Board in the event of a foreign animal
disease because such a situation requires resources beyond what the
Board has available. So as we found more infected farms we enlisted the
assistance of MDA using the incident command structure. Eventually the
outbreak exceeded the capacity of Minnesota to respond and we requested
an incident management team from USDA:APHIS:Veterinary Services. On
April 23, 2015 Governor Dayton declared a peace time emergency. This
emergency declaration allowed for the State Emergency Operations Center
to be activated and provided access to all of the state government's
assets. Other agencies that assisted in the response include the
Minnesota Departments of Health, Natural Resources and Public Safety
and the National Guard.
Minnesota Poultry Industry
Minnesota is ranked number one for turkey production. The state's
450 turkey farmers raise approximately 45 million birds annually on 600
farms, bringing more than $600 million in income for farmers,
processors and other related industries. Minnesota has more independent
turkey farmers than any other state in the U.S. Many of these farmers
are third, fourth and even fifth generation family farmers. As the
nation's largest producer and processor of turkey, Minnesota is home to
three turkey processing companies with a total of seven processing
plants around the state. The state is also home to the largest turkey
hatchery company in the world. Every Minnesota turkey generates $17.46
of direct economic activity to the state, providing $807 million in
economic impact. The turkey industry also is responsible for 6,000
direct jobs in on-farm and processing activities. The majority of
turkeys raised in Minnesota are more likely to be shipped outside the
state.
Ninety (90) percent of turkey products processed in state
are exported out of Minnesota.
Of that 90 percent, approximately 15 percent are exported to
international markets.
Minnesota's egg farmers currently rank number 8 for egg production
in the U.S. Farmers care for approximately 11 million egg-laying hens
and produce about 2.9 billion eggs annually. The production value of
Minnesota's egg industry is approximately $170 million, and accounts
for over 2,900 jobs. Minnesota's broiler chicken farmers raise 47
million birds on an annual basis, with an economic value of $123
million. Processing activities add $19 million to the value of broilers
produced in Minnesota, and the industry contributes 1,300+ direct jobs
on farm and in processing.
The Outbreak
It is an understatement to say that HPAI in Minnesota has been
devastating and extremely difficult for all involved. The outbreak in
Minnesota started on March 4, 2015. This first case was in a turkey
breeding facility. Increased death loss led to samples being tested for
HPAI at the Minnesota Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory. The test was
positive and samples were sent to the National Veterinary Services
Laboratory for a confirmatory diagnosis. By the time a diagnosis was
made all but a few of the 20,000 turkeys in the affected barn had died.
The owner did not receive any compensation for the dead birds. There
was a 3 week break between that first case and the second case. After
that there were one or more new cases almost every day. On the worst
day, there were eight new cases. At the height of the outbreak we had
110 farms quarantined in 23 counties. This included a turkey complex
with 310,000 birds and a chicken layer complex with over two million
birds. Over nine million birds have died or were depopulated to prevent
the spread of this virus. The hardest part of this disease has been to
see the emotional toll it has taken on affected growers and the
industry as a whole.
Minnesota's Response
Minnesota has extensive experience in responding to animal disease
outbreaks, especially with low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI). In
the past turkeys were raised outside in Minnesota and exposed to wild
waterfowl. This resulted in many cases of LPAI each year in turkeys.
Representatives of the poultry industry, the University of Minnesota
and the state worked together to develop a prevention, notification and
response plan for LPAI. One of the changes made was that most turkeys
are raised indoors now. This greatly reduced the number of LPAI cases.
Working together with USDA Minnesota has followed the USDA guidelines
for responding to HPAI. All 110 farms that were quarantined were
appraised and depopulated with the USDA paying indemnity for the live
birds. After depopulation the birds were composted in the barns. When
the composted material is removed from the barns the barns have to be
cleaned and disinfected and finally environmental tests are run before
quarantine release.
Neighbors with poultry had to be tested and monitored for the
disease (over 1,000 flocks were sampled). A permitting system had to be
set up to allow poultry and poultry products to move into, within and
out of the control zones around the infected farms. We have issued
permits for over 6,000 movements. It was so vital to have a science
based, continuity of business permitting system in place prior to this
event so that safe poultry and poultry products were able to move.
Without this system in place the economic and animal welfare impacts of
the outbreak would have been much worse.
Current Status
We are working hard with our partners to get all of the affected
farms back to business as usual. As of July 21, 2015 of the 110 farms
that were quarantined and depopulated:
Forty nine are no longer classified as positive,
Thirty eight have restocked, and
Eight have been released from quarantine.
In addition, 98 of the control zones (6.2 mile radius around
infected farms) have been eliminated. Even though we haven't found an
infected flock in 7 weeks we still have over 100 state, Federal and
contract people working on the completion of this response.
Lessons Learned
This is the most extensive multi-state animal health emergency we
have ever faced. Our response was well coordinated and we worked well
with the poultry industry, state and local officials, and USDA. The
relationships the Board has built with key stakeholders over the years
greatly assisted in a unified response. The most important lesson
learned is that building relationships before a crisis is crucial.
It is also crucial that USDA and all states prepare and train. We
need to have the resources necessary to depopulate infected flocks
within 24 hours of diagnosis. When this is not done the virus quickly
infects more birds which then sheds the virus in large quantities
creating a heavily contaminated site, increasing the chance for lateral
spread. The needed resources include equipment for depopulation and
trained personnel. There should be facilities around the state where
you can set up an emergency operations center near where the cases are
found. Your laboratory must have enough trained technicians and
equipment to manage the increased volume of tests. All poultry farms
must have an emergency carcass disposal plan. A new level of
biosecurity is also necessary to stop the spread of this virus.
Preparations for the Fall
Having lived through the spring outbreak we understand what is
necessary to prepare for the possibility of a recurrence in the fall.
We are procuring depopulation equipment adequate to be able to
depopulate farms within 24 hours of diagnosis. We are exploring methods
to rapidly depopulate large chicken layer complexes. Our personnel are
well trained and ready to respond. We have identified a facility in the
heart of Minnesota's turkey industry to use as a center of operations
that is available to lease for a year. Our Veterinary Diagnostic
Laboratory has hired and trained staff to meet the anticipated increase
in volume of testing. Funding has been provided to increase the size
and capacity of our Minnesota Poultry Testing Laboratory that is close
to the poultry operations to supplement the testing of our diagnostic
laboratory. We are working with poultry producers to audit their
biosecurity and to make sure they have an emergency carcass disposal
plan. Several meetings have been held to discuss strategy for the
future bringing together industry, academia, local, state, and Federal
Government.
Though we know that new challenges may be presented in the months
to come, we are ready for and committed to a swift and unified
response.
The Chairman. I would like to thank each of the witnesses
very much for their testimony.
We will now go into a round of questions. And I have a few
here myself. In fact, we are not going to have the time limit
on Members, but I ask Members to try to keep their questions as
concise as possible, and I will certainly try to do the same so
that we can get through this in a timely manner.
Dr. Clifford, we, in North Carolina, are very fortunate
that the virus has not made it into our state or region yet,
but it certainly has a potential to come this fall. What
outreach is USDA currently doing to prepare states that have
not yet been impacted for a potential outbreak?
Dr. Clifford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have actually had several meetings with the industries
and with the states in preparing for this fall. We have
actually sent a survey to the states to prepare them and to
prepare us to make sure that the states have identified
beforehand the necessary needs for disposal of birds in those
states, whether it be a landfill, and have plans ready and
prepared so that we know exactly where those birds need to be
taken or how we plan to dispose of those birds in those states.
In addition, besides our other types of outreach that we
have done, we are planning on sending out a survey to the
industry itself throughout to address some of the questions
that we have for them in making sure that they are prepared.
From all of this outreach and things that we are doing, we
are preparing a USDA plan that will be provided to the
Secretary of Agriculture and then provided also to our
stakeholders across the U.S.
The Chairman. Are the states being fairly responsive?
Dr. Clifford. Absolutely.
The Chairman. Dr. Meckes and Dr. Hartmann, both of you
covered this to an extent in your testimony, but if you could
highlight again any changes that you think would be necessary
based on your experience, particularly in Minnesota, that
states need to be doing and prepared for?
Dr. Hartmann. Mr. Chairman, the most important thing that
we have all highlighted is that heightened biosecurity. That is
something that we think is so crucial to this. And to that end,
Minnesota is going to fund a group of poultry veterinarians who
are going to go out and visit each of the poultry farms in
Minnesota and go over their biosecurity plans with them in
detail so that we are prepared to make sure that we are not
spreading this disease.
The Chairman. Dr. Meckes, anything?
Dr. Meckes. Chairman Rouzer, we are quite fortunate in
North Carolina in that we have an Emergency Programs Division
within our Department of Agriculture. They have long served our
state, as I indicated, in a variety of different disasters,
from the disease outbreaks, the hurricanes that so frequently
befall North Carolina, drought several years ago. So they are
keenly attuned to preparedness activities.
And as I indicated, our teams worked with the foaming
machines every month for the last 6 years in preparation for
what might come to pass. And as a matter of fact, our USDA
colleague frequently had to fund the use of foam in North
Carolina when we reported our budget on an annual basis through
our cooperative agreement.
So I certainly think that we are well prepared. We are
looking forward. We are moving toward to be ready to respond
this fall.
The Chairman. Dr. Clifford, I know there is some interest
in the poultry industry to form a first responders team of
sorts that is already trained to handle these situations and
can work with government employees to provide the needed
assistance. Is this something that you all are exploring? Are
you familiar with this?
Dr. Clifford. So with regards to the first responders, as
we prepare for the fall, the first responders have to be able
to pass a test, a health exam basically, because of the
personal protective equipment. It is very strenuous work in
these houses that they are doing, and with that equipment on,
with the Tyvek suits, with the type of personal protective
equipment that is necessary in these cases.
So yes, we are preparing and the people that we will be
bringing on board, the additional 300 field personnel that will
be used for this purpose, one of the first things we will do is
preparing them and training them on that behalf.
In addition, the contractors that we use, part of that
contractual agreement is that they will have had personnel
trained as well prior to any outbreak.
And we are able to put systems of 300 to 600 people in a
matter of a few days, and about 1,000 within a week on the
contracting side. We are also using our National Animal Health
Emergency Response Corps, which is private veterinarians
basically willing to do work for them too.
We are training or have trained a number of them already
and will continue to do that, but our first priority is to
making sure our personnel are trained.
The Chairman. Are you finding that there is any
communication or logistical obstacle at all here?
Dr. Clifford. Well, not with this particular issue, per se,
but, it is a limiting factor. In other words, how many people
we can get trained and ready by the fall is, and plus how many
people that we have employed. It has been mentioned; we have
deployed about 1,100 people during this process on the past
outbreak, but that is 1,100 people that probably makes up
probably 200 or 300 individuals and many of them have had
multiple deployments.
We have four response teams within USDA APHIS Veterinary
Services. In a worst-case scenario we are going to be needing
probably ten response teams to prepare for a worst-case
scenario and maybe even more.
The Chairman. Outside the current research that is being
done on H5N2 and H5N8, what additional research is needed in
order for the industry and government to combat this virus long
term? Dr. Swayne.
Dr. Swayne. Yes. There are other threats around the world
besides just the H5N8, H5N2. For example, in Mexico, the south,
there is an ongoing H7N3 outbreak in the central part of the
country that is a high-path virus. And also throughout a large
part of the country there is a low-path H5N2. So those are
continual threats that could enter the U.S. so our laboratory,
as part of a global effort to control or eradicate high-path AI
works with the Mexican Government on these and we coordinate
this research with our partner to the north, Canada.
On research that is needed, there is a wide variety of
research that is needed for control programs. Of course, right
now, we are highlighting having vaccines prepared and ready to
use, but also there is research in other areas, which is
maintaining rapid diagnostic tests that are sensitive and
specific development of DIVA testing for potential use with
vaccines. That would allow us to identify infected flocks
within vaccinated populations.
And if we did find infected flocks that are vaccinated, we
would have to depopulate those just as if they were
unvaccinated. And then also studies looking at the way the
virus is transmitted on and off of farms and how to develop
mitigation strategies to prevent those transmissions from
occurring.
The Chairman. How is USDA working with the World
Organization for Animal Health to develop a policy favorable to
vaccine use? What are you hearing there? What has taken place?
Dr. Clifford. Mr. Chairman, the World Organization for
Animal Health sets basic international standards on animal
health issues, such as avian influenza. The policy and the
standards within the World Organization for Animal Health would
allow the use of vaccine. It is more the tradition in history
of the use of vaccine as being seen as potentially unable to
control a disease.
And that is what I was referring to in my testimony. It is
the culture of that that we need to move away from. We have
what Dr. Swayne has referred to as DIVA strategies, which means
that we can distinguish between a vaccine strain and a field
strain virus.
And it is those types of strategies that would allow us to
reduce the destruction of animals and be able to utilize more
the protein. And we need to develop those strategies and
implement them worldwide.
The World Organization for Animal Health recognizes that
today. It is the countries and some of our own regulations that
are, in my mind, I would say, a little outdated, but we are
trying to modernize many of those. And such as, right now,
today, in some of our own regulations, we wouldn't allow
product to come in, fresh product, or hatching eggs or day-old
chicks from countries that vaccinate for high-path AI.
Now, vaccine is a tool. It is a tool that we need to use
wisely. It is not something you should use consistently and
continue, because then its effectiveness is dropped. It is kind
of like with the human flu virus, they change that regularly.
It is the same thing here. And you would only use it in high-
risk areas and only use it when needed during those high-risk
times.
The Chairman. Have any of our top trading partners
indicated they will be seeking retaliatory trade measures if we
were to start vaccinating commercial birds?
Dr. Clifford. We spoke to a number of our members that we
are trading partners with, and basically what they said was, as
most of them indicated that still trade with us today and
regionalize us today, countries like Japan, they would do a
risk assessment first. They would initially shut us off, do a
risk assessment. And if the risk they felt was minimal or very
low, they would reopen the markets. But that risk assessment
can take months.
So the plan is, early this fall, actually in September,
late summer, I will be making trips as well as other members of
my staff, trips to members of countries around the world to
explain to them our specific plans and how we would use vaccine
to see if we can get them to accept that and not shut off
trade. Because right now, we would be concerned of losing as
much as $3 billion or $4 billion in trade annually through the
use of vaccine.
I would also like to say those many countries, countries
such as South Korea, countries such as China have shut off the
entire U.S., and it is not about a vaccine. It is they just
won't regionalize us. And so those countries we need to
continue to work on that issue and get them to recognize
regionalization, which is also well accepted by the OIE, or the
World Organization for Animal Health.
The Chairman. That will conclude my questioning for the
time being.
Mr. Costa.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Clifford, just to follow up on your last comment. As
you know, we are concurrently undergoing negotiations for the
TPP effort with many of these Asian nations and also with
Canada, and we have had a problem with Canada on the poultry
issue specifically.
One, has the high-path avian influenza impacted Canada, and
are they treating it in the same fashion? And number two, are
there any attempts by any of these countries to use this as an
excuse to invoke non-tariff-like barriers as it relates to our
ability to export poultry product. As you indicated, it is a
multibillion dollar industry for the United States, and
clearly, we want to do the right thing for the right reasons.
But I remember, in a more recent example, with Mad Cow
Disease, we saw certain countries use this not based on best
science but as a excuse, in my view, to invoke barriers, even
though we were following all the proper phytosanitary
protocols.
So could you give me an answer to those two questions. So,
one, is this taking place in terms of our negotiations vis-a-
vis TPP; and two, how has this impacted Canada? And if so, are
they treating it appropriately as we are attempting to do?
Dr. Clifford. Let me first address the question with
regards to Canada. With Canada and the U.S., we have had a
longstanding Memorandum of Understanding or actually an
Agreement. It really shouldn't be referred to as an MOU. It is
more of an agreement on how we would treat each other relative
to these types of issues.
So specifically, on AI, we have had agreement for a number
of years now where we definitely regionalize. So Canada and the
U.S. really have set the stage in developing a model for other
countries to follow. So, yes, Canada treats us very fairly and
we treat them the same way, and we do this very quickly based
upon the recognition that we both have similar types of animal
health systems and the protections of those systems. And so
that works very, very well.
And we have actually taken that model in trying to get
other countries to adopt something very similar with us. And we
have some discussion, actually, with that, with some of our
Asian partners as well. With regards to the TPP discussions and
non-tariff barriers, I think oftentimes sanitary, phytosanitary
issues are raised to a level that are not based on science.
Mr. Costa. Correct.
Dr. Clifford. And we definitely thought that this is the
case with a number of these countries. There are, though,
having said that, there are also a number of these countries
that have regionalized us and have done it in a complementary
way and have supported us.
And, in fact, my friend and counterpart in Japan, Dr.
Toshihiro Kawashima, was under a lot of pressure, I know, to
shut off the U.S. And he stood with us, and that I much
appreciated. In fact, he wants to develop some strategies that
we have with Canada between the U.S. and Japan, something we
are going to continue to talk about and move forward with.
Mr. Costa. All right. You might want to provide the
Subcommittee with more information on that effort. Let me move
back to the domestic front. What has the Department done with
the various states to prepare for this fall fly season? And do
you think we are adequately prepared for the fall fly season?
Dr. Clifford. I think that we are preparing for that
season. I think we are a lot more prepared than we were. But I
also think we will be totally prepared before the fly season
starts.
Mr. Costa. And you are talking about regionally, as we talk
about the Eastern Flyway and----
Dr. Clifford. I am talking about the entire U.S., sir.
Mr. Costa. That includes California?
Dr. Clifford. That includes California, yes, sir.
Absolutely.
Mr. Costa. You alluded to in your comments, and, again, we
all understand it is a multi-billion dollar industry and we
know a lot of flocks that have had to be eradicated as a result
of this, a worst case scenario. What is in your mind a worst
case scenario?
Dr. Clifford. So we just came through a pretty bad scenario
of nearly 50 million birds and 211 commercial premises
affected. In our worst case scenario evaluation, it would be
500 cases in commercial flocks and----
Mr. Costa. Give me the number again, how much have we just,
the number that----
Dr. Clifford. Two hundred and eleven.
Mr. Costa. Two hundred and eleven nationwide?
Dr. Clifford. No. In a worst case--oh, now, today?
Mr. Costa. Yes.
Dr. Clifford. We had 211 commercial flocks. We had more
than that.
Mr. Costa. Nationwide?
Dr. Clifford. Nationwide.
Mr. Costa. And you say 500----
Dr. Clifford. Five hundred in ten states.
Mr. Costa. Is a worst case scenario?
Dr. Clifford. And that is the worst case scenario that we
are planning based upon some modeling work we did.
Mr. Costa. All right. Dr. Swayne, as a laboratory director,
do you believe that what we have done in California is a model
or applicable elsewhere? Or did we just get lucky?
Dr. Swayne. California had some very unique situations that
arose. In this case, there was the entry point of the virus
through the Pacific Flyway. And studies that we had done in our
laboratory clearly showed a couple of things.
One is that virus that came in was highly adapted to
migratory waterfowl but was not highly adapted to chickens and
turkeys. So transmission farm to farm was much more difficult.
And that was to the benefit of California and the farms within
that region.
The other thing about this particular scenario, we did some
high-level molecular analysis. And we could see that to
California's benefit, that those two commercial flocks and the
few backyard flocks that were in Washington, Oregon, and
California were really point-source introductions. The
waterfowl virus that was introduced into those commercial
farms, either directly or indirectly. And that was to your
advantage in that allowed the local officials to identify,
quarantine, and eliminate those before they could spread to
other farms.
This just emphasizes the lessons learned in California to
other states is that the identification quickly of infections
in farms and that rapid euthanasia, the 24 hour timeline, and
rapid disposal is key to keep it from spreading.
Mr. Costa. To get on top of it as quickly as possible?
Dr. Swayne. To get on top as quickly as possible. In the
Midwest----
Mr. Costa. Acknowledge it, eradicate it, and get rid of it.
Dr. Clifford. That is exactly right. In the Midwest,
unfortunately, the virus changed. And they didn't have as much
time as California did in that the virus in, after the first
several outbreaks became much better adapted to chickens and
turkeys, meaning it took a lot less virus to infect flocks.
And, therefore, the spreading was much more rapid, having farm-
to-farm spread.
And that is the part that really emphasizes excellent
biosecurity, early detection, rapid depopulation, and then
rapid disposal. We can't afford to have infected flocks sitting
around producing virus, shed in environment. And we also need
to get them in a proper disposal method to prevent that
transmission to other farms.
Mr. Costa. All right. Two final questions, Mr. Chairman,
and then I will submit the rest as written questions. Dr.
Swayne, I have been told that the funding for your facility
falls dramatically short of what you believe or what is
believed to be, maybe not you, needed for further efforts. Do
you agree and could you elaborate?
Dr. Swayne. Yes. I can provide you a little more
information. Science is essential in developing and
implementing control and eradication programs for high-path AI.
And that is what the role of research is. The research that we
generate and other partners at universities in many of your
states, as well as the CDC and other organizations, is
essential in developing control policies that become what is
used in the field. Those are long-term issues.
And for our laboratory, over the last 10 years, our
staffing for avian influenza has declined from 35 to 20 people.
And that is just the financial reality. Research is a long-term
process because you have to hire people. They have to be
trained. And we are all aware of the biosafety issues that we
have to deal with in laboratories. You have to train these
people, they have to operate in high-containment labs, work
with these viruses.
So, for us, the issue has become long-term permanent
funding has not kept up with the mission demands. And so,
therefore----
Mr. Costa. Could you give us an estimate what is needed? I
mean, simply replacing those 15 personnel that have been cut
back, is that a start?
Dr. Swayne. That is a start. And also we have had, of
course, a new emphasis to making sure we do all of our research
safely. And so that is not just replacing researchers, but it
is adding biosafety officers, animal care, our other issues
that are all part of the research process. And those are
permanent funds we need because you have to have the research
staff. The other issue is facilities----
Mr. Costa. On that point, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest
that maybe the Subcommittee considers, if there was some
interest to submitting a bipartisan letter to the
Appropriations Committee.
Obviously, it is going to be a fragmented approach I
believe again this year as we do our budget. But when they are
considering the final package later this fall, we might want to
make a suggestion or a recommendation. But we can consider that
among ourselves. Go ahead.
Dr. Swayne. And the second piece is facility issues. And
Southeast Poultry, our facilities are quite aged. The U.S.
Department of Agriculture did a critical infrastructure study
across all facilities in the Department for capital
improvements. And Southeast Poultry was the number one
requirement across the whole agency for the last 3 years.
Mr. Costa. So how close are we or where are we, would you
estimate, scientifically from developing a vaccine?
Dr. Swayne. So, yes, we are near completing the first phase
of the research data. We are now in discussions with APHIS on
the analysis of this data. So Dr. Clifford's office and my
office are, have started those discussions. We have started the
statistical analysis of that data. So next week we will have a
meeting to discuss the very specifics of what that data means.
And then we will have additional studies that we are working
with some university partners because that is the lab data we
are generating and then we have to work with the field as far
as how do you possibly implement an effective program or not--
--
Mr. Costa. From a layperson's perspective or for a poultry
farmer who may be facing this or for a local region where you
have a television station that is covering this and they are
making the report--and I see that Dr. Clifford, you are anxious
here to comment--I mean we have to, when these things happen,
we have to respond to the public. And so where are we?
Dr. Clifford. Congressman, we will have vaccine
availability in our stockpile for the migration period. To Dr.
Swayne's point, there are several companies actually, besides
the research that they are doing, there are several companies
that have vaccines that they are prepared to have available.
So we will be going out with a request for a proposal
specifically to be able to stockpile vaccines. And some of
these will come in in different levels and stages throughout
this period.
Mr. Costa. For this fall?
Dr. Clifford. For this fall and spring.
Mr. Costa. Okay. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this
very important Subcommittee hearing. And I want to thank my
Ranking Member, Congressman Peterson, who is always on top of
these issues, and the rest of the Committee Members. Certainly
we want to cooperate in every way possible to provide support
for our nation's poultry industry.
The Chairman. Mr. Newhouse.
Mr. Newhouse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, especially for
holding this hearing on this important topic. This is
certainly, seems to me, one of those things that is an all
hands on deck kind of situation. And I appreciate the focus on
it. I appreciate the panel being here this morning discussing
these issues.
As a former director of my state agency, my agriculture
department, I certainly appreciate the presence of our State
Veterinarians here and your approach to helping us learn and be
prepared for whatever happens into the future. It seems to me
that when the next outbreak occurs, there will be no time for
hand-wringing but positive action, quick action is what is key.
Certainly, in my experience, I appreciate Dr. Clifford's
valuable help in dealing with animal health issues in my state.
And we are very appreciative of you being here this morning. I
love this no time restraint. That is very valuable.
The Chairman. Well, be careful because we all may be in
trouble by the time this is over.
Mr. Newhouse. No, I appreciate the opportunity to delve
into this subject. It is very important to all of us. Just a
couple questions to begin with, Dr. Clifford, concerning the
National Animal Health Laboratory Network. My understanding is
that the funding, Federal funding currently supplies
approximately five percent of the costs of operating the state
lab system. The same system, though, is critical to detection,
response, recovery from disease outbreaks similar to what we
have just experienced.
So for this year, can you tell us how the initial cases in
any given state were detected and by whom? And then to follow
up on that question, as part of this year's outbreak, the Iowa
lab has been open I believe 24/7, running multiple shifts,
keeping up with all the demands for testing and so forth. Do
the labs, do you think, have the support they need to sustain
this type of workload and this effort?
Dr. Clifford. Thanks, Congressman, for that question. The
National Animal Health Laboratory Network is an extremely
important part of our infrastructure in the United States to be
able to address not just this issue, but a lot of animal health
issues. As you are probably well aware, there was language in
the farm bill that addressed this issue for the NAHLN
laboratories. But that did not come with funding. The NAHLN
laboratories throughout this country are at different levels of
funding, but we definitely need resources for those
laboratories to be able to do the work that we so urgently need
them to do and be prepared.
To speak to a specific lab in a specific state, we would
have to probably defer more to the states themselves and the
labs themselves to address those specifically. But, yes,
funding is needed for those laboratories. And we do the best we
can with the funding we have to provide them resources. I know
that the House markup had additional resources for the NAHLN
laboratories which was very welcomed and very much appreciated.
So as far as who does the diagnosis, it will vary in any
particular location or state. But I can tell you a lot of these
state NAHLN laboratories are very much involved in all this
testing. And I know, for example, in Minnesota and Iowa, during
this outbreak, there has been a huge effort there with regards
to putting and having personnel available to do around-the-
clock testing. We pay based upon or we basically destroy
animals, depopulate these animals based on presumptive
positives. And those presumptive positives are done by the
NAHLN laboratories.
Mr. Newhouse. Another question, Dr. Clifford, and you
touched on this in previous questioning, concerning trade and
economic issues and the steps that APHIS and USDA are taking as
far as negotiating with foreign governments about vaccines and
the potential that they hold as far as the impacts that that
could have on poultry exports. But, on the other hand, there is
interest in grocery and food producers industries about the
flexibility with imports of poultry products, egg imports
specifically, due to the many shortages that we are
experiencing. Could you talk about any progress on that front?
Dr. Clifford. Actually we have had shipments from the
European Union. And also we have had recent shipments of eggs
from layer facilities from Mexico into the U.S. now to help
address some of the shortages that we have.
And I know of two countries right now, one is Mexico, the
other is the Netherlands. And I am not sure if we are bringing
in from other countries from the European Union or not, right
off the top of my head. But that is something I can find out.
So that has definitively and will definitely continue to help
us be able to address some of the shortages we have in the U.S.
Mr. Newhouse. Thank you. Dr. Swayne, Mr. Costa asked you
some questions about the production of viable vaccination. So I
appreciate your comments there about steps in this process to
help stop the spread and eradicate the virus.
I hate to think about the sky is falling kind of scenario.
But based on your observations, when you are talking about the
spread of this disease and the additional or potential risk to
poultry operations around the world, specifically in other
countries, Central America, South America, certainly through
Europe and Asia, these flyways, obviously, go back and forth
every year. What are we looking at in the future here? Are we
just keeping our fingers in the dikes, so to speak, in trying
to control something that is way bigger than us?
Dr. Swayne. We can look back at data generated in Asia, for
example, from our Korean colleagues. So they have had 2 years
of incursions from migratory waterfowl into their country
bringing H5N8 high-path virus in. The worst year was actually
in the fall of 2013, winter 2014. The second year it reoccurred
but it was not as severe. The lesson, this has also been
repeated in the last 15 years, where you would have an
incursion with migratory waterfowl. You would have a real
severe year, then it gets mild, then it kind of disappears in
waterfowl, and it is only propagated in the farming system.
For us, the advantage we are at this point in the U.S. is
all the surveillance evidence would suggest that we don't have
the virus in current farms. So our real risk is what would come
back through the migratory flyways. And that emphasizes the
role of colleagues in wildlife health, including the USGS, USDA
Wildlife Services, and surveillance programs that are being set
up across southern Canada, northern U.S., even down the
Atlantic Flyway coast trying to get a handle on is the virus in
birds that are migrating or not. And if the virus is identified
in particular flyways in geographic areas, then there should be
information disseminated within those geographic areas for
farmers to be extra vigilant in biosecurity and to very quickly
report any abnormal clinical signs that might occur.
One thing that is really to our advantage is that the
flyways we have in North America do generally go north and
south in four different flyways. But the viruses don't readily
go into Central and South America from us, nor from their
viruses coming north. The mixing is much smaller, it is really
a small area with a very few number of species that cover
those, across both of our hemispheres. That is to our
advantage, and it is also to their advantage. It is sort of a
critical point, is if we can control outbreaks in poultry
populations by preventing those, we reduce the likelihood of
poultry infections and that would be a way of amplifying it.
And if we can do that, hopefully, the virus will self burn
out in wildlife populations. But surveillance by USDA Wildlife
Services, USGS, and university partners is critical to find the
virus.
Mr. Newhouse. Thank you. Dr. Clifford, going back to the
authorization for the National Lab Network, what beyond
diagnostic capabilities should we be considering to enhance
this disease prevention?
Dr. Clifford. Congressman, specifically to the NAHLNs
themselves?
Mr. Newhouse. Yes.
Dr. Clifford. I think probably making sure that we have the
proper infrastructure within those laboratories to deal with
diseases that are zoonotic and have zoonotic potential.
Mr. Newhouse. That would be your priority? Okay. Then I
have a question I would like to ask--Mr. Kelly from Mississippi
had to leave early. He had a flight to catch.
Mr. Costa. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Newhouse. Oh, Mr. Costa. Please.
Mr. Costa. Just for us lay people here, what is zoonotic?
Dr. Clifford. It is diseases that can cross from animals to
people.
Mr. Costa. Okay. Got you. Thank you.
Dr. Clifford. Like AI. This one doesn't, thank goodness
but----
Mr. Newhouse. Good question. Mr. Kelly has an extensive
broiler industry in his State of Mississippi and is concerned
about, apparently there are no infected birds, at least that
have been detected there yet. So his question was why? Why do
you think broilers have not yet been affected, if anybody has
an opinion on that? Maybe they just do a great job in
Mississippi as far as control.
Dr. Meckes. Congressman, it is age related. The broilers
typically go to market in 56 days. And most of the birds that
have been infected with this virus have been older than that.
As a matter of fact, one of the opportunities for managing the
virus has been the early marketing of birds, particularly
turkeys. I know in parts of the Midwest, some of the turkeys
have gone to market much sooner than they would under ordinary
circumstances. At least those are our thoughts in North
Carolina. I will defer to my USDA colleagues and Dr. Hartmann.
Dr. Hartmann. Well, Congressman, it is interesting to note
that it was, that did happen in Minnesota. We had broilers
right in the heart of our turkey growing area where there was
infection. And the broilers never were affected at all. I think
that chickens are a little harder to be infected, it takes a
higher dose, and they don't transmit it as much. But also the
age factor was there as well.
Dr. Swayne. If I might make just a quick comment. There are
probably two factors that have impacted the lack of broiler
infections.
One is that there appears to be from field information an
age susceptibility. So older birds are more susceptible than
younger birds. And broilers are all very young, so they are
less susceptible.
The second thing is that in farm operations, there are
fewer entry point on a broiler farm because generally most of
those have a family taking care of them and feed trucks only
come usually at the third or fourth week of grow out. So there
are very few points of entry versus if you look at a layer
farm, where you have very large farms, lots of people going on
lots of farms, lots of trucks, vehicles, equipment that may be
shared, turkey farms where the birds are on the ground longer,
you have a greater chance for moving a virus onto a farm that
is a turkey or a layer farm than you do a broiler farm.
Mr. Newhouse. Well, thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will submit my other questions for the record. But I
appreciate all your input.
The Chairman. Mr. Peterson.
Mr. Peterson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a series of
questions here that are from my producers back in Minnesota,
things that have come up.
Dr. Clifford, one of the big concerns that growers have is
the depopulation. I think you know that. You have heard it from
them. Talking about other kinds of methods that could be used
the next time around that would speed up this depopulation
process and I guess maybe for Dr. Hartmann too, you both have
talked about a goal of depopulation of 24 hours. And I can see
that the turkey operation is much simpler. But on the layer
operations, which some of these big layer operations, they have
two or three million birds, it took some of them 3 weeks to
depopulate. And during that time, the virus is pluming out of
the building and so forth, potentially causing other kinds of
problems.
So I guess the question is how can we, how are we going to
get to a 24 hour depopulation? Or can we even accomplish that.
Dr. Hartmann. Congressman, we are exploring a way that they
have depopulated in Canada. And they are using CO2
gas in the whole barn. I sent one of my employees up to a
demonstration that they had. We are hoping that that will be a
method that we could use in our layer barns.
One of the issues that I have been told may make it not
available in the United States or, at least, in Minnesota is
that our layer operations are five cages high. In Canada, they
are three cages high. So it is hard to get the CO2
up to the top level. But we are still exploring that.
And the only other method that we know of is to shut the
ventilation down in a barn and heat it up. And that is not an,
at this point, considered an acceptable manner of depopulation.
Mr. Peterson. But if you let the birds die over 3 weeks, I
am not sure that is very acceptable either. None of these
options are very good.
Dr. Hartmann. Right.
Mr. Peterson. Dr. Clifford?
Dr. Clifford. Thanks, Congressman Peterson. So basically
our goal is to get the birds dead as quickly as possible. And
24 hours is our goal. To do that, we are looking at several
options. There are some other things that we are looking at as
well, besides the CO2. And I have forgotten the
particular product, but we are looking at another product.
We care about the humane treatment of birds and putting
birds down as humanely as possible with regards to euthanasia.
There is a definite distinction between euthanizing a bird
versus mass depopulation. And so all these things have to be
considered with regards to the overall situation, the concern
for both animal health and human health. We need to basically
look at all of these tools as we go forward and try to get the
birds killed as quickly as possible, as humanely as possible,
without further spread of the virus.
And as you indicated, Congressman, it is important to get
that done within 24 hours. If we don't and we continue to have
more birds dying from the virus, then there is more virus in
the environment and more spread. And we know this to be a fact.
Mr. Peterson. Thank you. Also in this regard, I have had
concerns about disposal in the layer operations, where they
don't have room in the barns, and so they have been composting
them outside which people are concerned that this potentially
would spread the virus as well.
So I guess one of the things you are looking at, and maybe
Dr. Hartmann, you know about this, that there are some kind of
bio bags that they are using to try to put them in the
landfills. But there hasn't been agreements with the landfills
and so forth, and so that slowed that process down. Where is
that at? Is there going to be a way to deal with these layer
operations without doing this outside if we have another
outbreak?
Dr. Hartmann. Congressman, I think the key here is, and we
had one layer operation that did this, is if you can depopulate
that quickly, within 24 hours of a diagnosis, the composting
outside isn't as big a concern because you don't have a lot of
virus. You have a very, you maybe have in a two million bird
operation, you maybe have 50 dead birds that have virus. The
rest don't.
The key to not spreading the virus that way is you can
continue to compost outside, but you need to catch the disease
very quickly. And you need to depopulate within 24 hours.
Mr. Costa. Would the gentleman yield just for a point of
clarification?
Mr. Peterson. Yes.
Mr. Costa. I am trying to understand the pathology on this
and how the bacteria, these are unartful terms from a lay
person again, but the shelf life of the organism that is living
in this high-path influenza, from the time it is detected, from
the time the flock is terminated to the disposal, does that
bacteria, once the bird is no longer alive, does it still live
on until the time it is buried?
Dr. Hartmann. Yes. It does live on. And I might defer to
Dr. Swayne to talk about that.
Mr. Costa. So that is an important step then. I am just
trying to understand this better.
Dr. Swayne. In this process, I think the critical issue
that has been emphasized is that the quicker you can stop the
birds from living, that means you stop producing more of this
virus. And the influenza virus does not keep growing after the
body is dead, after the carcass is produced.
Whereas in bacteria, Salmonella, et cetera, is that the
bacteria can grow after you remove it from the carcass. But the
virus, the peak amount of virus is when the birds are alive. So
if you can euthanize, depopulate those birds, they stop
producing virus. And then over time, that virus is inactivated.
And it is very time and temperature dependent.
So composting is an excellent way to dispose of the carcass
and kill that virus, deactivate that virus. Because the
composting process has microbes that generates heat. And that
heat kills, inactivates that virus, and also digests that
virus. So that the compost itself is completely innocuous other
than it has nutrients that have value and could be land
applied.
Mr. Costa. So it is not just the euthanasia but it is
quickly burying or composting the carcasses?
Dr. Swayne. Right. Because if you just leave the virus
sitting in the environment, it can be tracked on people's shoes
or clothes. If it is on equipment moving farm to farm, you can
track it that way.
Mr. Costa. Yes, I have heard that is possible. I thank the
gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Peterson. Thank you. The other related issue that I
just heard about a couple days ago, in some of these layer
operations, it has been a real problem cleaning it up. With,
the belts and all of this sort of thing, it is a big problem.
And so this particular grower had heard about the potential
of having a 120 day period that would change the way, you
wouldn't have to go in and clean everything out, that the 120
day period would be, would potentially work, is that the case?
Dr. Clifford. Congressman Peterson, yes, it is. We are
looking at that and evaluating that, as well as maybe trying to
look at heating the buildings up during that process in order
to reduce the amount of cleaning and disinfection that has to
be done. Because our primary goal here is not to clean the
building, per se, it is to destroy the virus.
Mr. Peterson. Kill the virus, yes.
Dr. Clifford. So we are looking at those methods. And we
have had discussions with University of Minnesota researchers
as well as Dr. Swayne and his folks about that. And we are
going to continue to try to evaluate that.
So it is one option that we are definitely looking at. And,
hopefully, it will work. Because, to me, it would save and
reduce a lot of work and a lot of resources that are currently
having to be spent to clean these houses up.
Mr. Peterson. And this particular producer said that he is
probably going to be out 120 days anyway by the time he goes
through all this process.
Dr. Clifford. Right.
Mr. Peterson. So it would be a lot cheaper for everybody.
Dr. Clifford. Correct.
Mr. Peterson. The other thing, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, is there is a lot of concern about all the paperwork
that is being required. It is the Federal Government so I
understand that. But as we move forward, are you looking at
ways to try to streamline this?
Are you looking at things like standardizing these payments
based on the square footage of the barns or something, so that
you wouldn't have to have 80 pages of forms? And if you did
something like that, you might be able to actually lower the
amount that is paid. You would have more competition, people
competing to do it. Are you looking at that?
Dr. Clifford. So, Congressman Peterson, there are really
three different things we are talking about here. One is
indemnification. That process has and continues to be
simplified. It is not 70 to 80 pages long with regards to the
indemnity part.
Mr. Peterson. I should have mentioned, it is not----
Dr. Clifford. It is the flock plan.
Mr. Peterson. Right.
Dr. Clifford. And it is the other document that they need
to sign that deals with the C&D. That document can be very,
very extensive and long. We hope to definitely simplify that.
And I don't buy into the fact because we are the Federal
Government it should be that long and complicated.
Mr. Peterson. That is good.
Dr. Clifford. In fact, I believe simplification is much
better and oftentimes better understood. It is kind of like
having a biosecurity plan that thick that nobody reads versus
having a sheet of paper or two that somebody does read.
I think we can simplify this. One of the things that we are
doing with the industry in the states on this is looking at
maybe a square foot cost or a house cost with that and
basically allowing the producers to handle that themselves.
Mr. Peterson. There has been this discussion, the Secretary
alluded to it a couple of times, about having an insurance
system instead of the indemnification. I have some concerns
about that. The indemnification works pretty well because it
creates the incentive for people to find out as soon as they
can whether they have the virus and you can get in there and
depopulate quickly. I think it has worked pretty well.
And I have a real, I don't see how you can make the
insurance system work. Because you are going to substitute
APHIS employees for insurance companies it seems like if you
ended up doing that. There might be a role for insurance maybe
in the business interruption part of it. But the
indemnification, that part of it, I don't know that we want to
change that to some other kind of system because I think it is,
I don't know what you think about that but----
Dr. Clifford. Congressman, I am very much a believer in
indemnification. In fact, I am not sure that Secretary Vilsack
believes----
Mr. Peterson. Well, and I should clarify because it was
reported after he had the oversight hearing here that he was
pushing an insurance----
Dr. Clifford. Yes.
Mr. Peterson. But I don't think that is what he said.
Dr. Clifford. I think that is more for the downtime issues.
Mr. Peterson. Right. And that is not what he said. But the
impression was, and some people have talked about changing the
system and trying to have some, have this be like the Livestock
Disaster Program or have crop insurance, which the crop
insurance companies have said there is no way to underwrite
this. So they are not really interested.
So I just think it is good that we clarify this because it
has been reported a couple times, including yesterday, from
that Des Moines thing that said the Secretary was pushing
insurance. Well, I don't think he really is in terms of what
people think about this.
Dr. Clifford. Right. Let me make one comment about
indemnity. If you look at the countries around the world that
do a good job of controlling disease, they pay indemnity. If
you look at the countries that don't, they do not have
indemnification.
Mr. Peterson. Right. So, Dr. Hartmann, first of all, I want
to have you, compliment you, your folks there and also our
Governor and legislature for getting on the ball, setting up
that emergency center. I think it was part of why we had a good
response in Minnesota. And so you guys did an excellent job
responding as best as you could.
This issue of the consistent case manager, are you able to
augment what the USDA does in terms of personnel so we can have
a situation where these case managers can stay with the
operation the whole time and not be shifted every week.
Dr. Hartmann. Congressman, at one time, we had to manage
110 sites. And when we had to do that, Minnesota didn't have
the personnel. So we were relying on USDA employees as well.
And they rotate into Minnesota for 3 weeks at a time, and then
they rotate out. And that was the reason for the inconsistency
in case managers. We are getting down now to the point where
most of, we are about 50/50, Minnesota case managers and USDA
case managers. So we continue to improve on that.
But it is something that I have heard before too. I heard
somebody tell me that they had 12 different case managers. And
that is not good because some of them tell, they get a little
bit different story from everybody that comes in. So it is
something that is of great concern to us. And we are certainly
moving in the direction of having all Minnesota people working
on it because then they can stay with the person the whole
time.
Mr. Peterson. Dr. Clifford?
Dr. Clifford. Congressman, I agree too. And we are working
to this fall and winter migration period, that if we do have
those case outbreaks, that we want to try our best to provide
one case manager per producer.
So having said that, a lot of this is because of the
rotation of people. It is hard to take somebody away from their
home for 10, 12 weeks. That is really not fair to them as
individuals. So we are working on ways that we can do this a
lot better.
Mr. Peterson. Thank you. And I appreciate that. Dr.
Hartmann, one of the other concerns we had when this was really
going was getting these flocks tested and people having to
drive to Minneapolis or some of them drove to South Dakota.
Where is the situation of trying to beef up, well, move
some of the testing to Willmar? Is that being considered? Is
that a possibility? It would make a much better situation, it
would have been if we would have had that availability this
time.
Dr. Hartmann. Congressman, yes, the Minnesota Legislature
dealt with that and the Governor signed a bill for $8.5 million
for renovation of our laboratory in Willmar, to provide space
and the technology to do the PCR test out there. I was very
encouraged, they had put it on the fast track, and they said it
would be done by February. I just got a note that the State of
Minnesota slowed the process down. And I don't understand
exactly the mechanism of that. But instead of February, now
they are talking about next summer being done.
So anything you could do to encourage that move along
quicker would be appreciated. But that was the pinch point. And
we had to hire a courier service to get the samples from out in
west central Minnesota to St. Paul. And it cost a lot of money.
Mr. Peterson. Yes. And I went through the lab in St. Paul.
They had a problem keeping up when we had so many potential
positives out there. And even with the situation there, I mean
once they got the thing into the lab, they still had a back-up
there sometimes.
Dr. Hartmann. Yes. And they did get help from, some other
states sent some technicians to Minnesota. And that helped. And
then our laboratory hired three new technicians too. So one of
the issues was the timeliness of it. They were working nights
and weekends, which laboratory technicians aren't used to
doing. We are used to doing that. So we are going to have a
meeting with the University of Minnesota to talk about that
before the fall.
Mr. Peterson. Thank you. And last, I want to focus a little
on this vaccine issue. We appreciate you saying that you are
going to be commercializing this, stockpiling it. Did I
understand you to say that you are going to do it even if it is
not 100 percent?
That you are going to stockpile vaccine that is not a 100
percent? I thought that you were wanting to have the vaccine be
100 percent before you----
Dr. Clifford. Well, let me state it like this. We are going
to stockpile vaccine. We want the best vaccine possible that
matches best with this particular virus. So it doesn't mean
that vaccines that maybe don't match up can't be effective in
helping build immunity within the birds. It can be.
Mr. Peterson. So you might use more than one in
combination?
Dr. Clifford. It might be a combination of those. Dr.
Swayne could probably give you----
Mr. Peterson. Right. I was going to ask, I know you can't,
but you have 100 percent positive now on the chickens? Is that,
as I understand, you have a vaccine that tested 100 percent
positive?
Dr. Swayne. I can just give you a brief rundown. We are
doing multiple experiments, some using what we call an
inactivated vaccine that we have made from a modified virus
that is an outbreak virus.
And that virus vaccine, as was reported by the Secretary
last week, in chickens we can prevent morality, completely
prevent mortality in chickens. And that study also is being
done in turkeys. And we will have that data available next
week.
Mr. Peterson. So it is going to be next week that we will
know if we get the similar thing out of----
Dr. Swayne. The data will be available to APHIS. And we
have to have discussion. The other issue is not just looking at
an experimental setting of does this vaccine protect birds in a
laboratory, but we have to then take the vaccines and say how
can you use them in the field. There are different age of
birds, there are different types of birds, there are different
production scenarios.
So the other part, we call this vaccination effectiveness,
it is how can you use vaccines in combination in the field. And
the experience that we have working around the world in
countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, China, et cetera, is that
really to have an effective program in the field, you have to
have a minimum of two different vaccinations separated by 3
weeks. So that makes it a little more difficult logistically in
that you have to be able to in an economic way give it at least
twice. And if you have birds that are on the ground longer than
6 months, you probably need to give a booster.
So, for example, breeders and layers may have to have a
booster in their lifetime. And those are researchable questions
that are not just Southeast Poultry questions. These are
questions that we are working with university partners and
negotiating with them in helping us do some of these studies
that would use commercially produced birds under commercial
settings in an experimental protocol that we can control to
tell us how effective or how we can effectively use vaccines in
a targeted way.
Just one last digression, if you look globally at who has
used vaccines for high-path IA, the countries that have
eradicated most quickly have been the countries that have the
best veterinary services in their country, that is Federal and
state and county level veterinary services and excellent
poultry veterinarians. We have that in the U.S. We have one
thing in our favor.
The second thing is if a vaccination program is used, it is
not a nationwide vaccination for everything. It is a targeted
vaccination, surgical to the highest risk and the highest risk
areas. So it is not everybody. It is who needs it the most and
has the highest risk.
Mr. Peterson. Yes. And that goes to my final question and
that is on this trade issue. My people, and we had this
discussion, they are very pleased that you are going to be
stockpiling. And they see as having it available as a positive
situation. They understand the practicalities of the trade
situation and the pushback from some folks in the industry.
But in our part of the world, I have talked to the chicken
people and the turkey people, they think that in our part of
the world, the vaccine, they would give up their trade if they
can get the vaccine in the Midwest from what I am hearing.
So when you are talking to these other countries, is part
of the discussion whether it would be possible to kind of do it
in a targeted area and make that less of a trade issue, make it
easier to get this done.
Dr. Clifford. That is the idea. And to Dr. Swayne's point
and the point I also made earlier, it is using it in targeted
areas that are of higher risk.
Mr. Peterson. Is that how you are----
Dr. Clifford. And Minnesota is, as Dr. Hartmann said the
Land of 10,000 Lakes, there is a lot of waterfowl. So you
certainly probably meet that criteria. So that is the idea is
to try to get them to accept that and not shut off the entire
U.S.
Mr. Peterson. And is that the discussions that are going on
with these other countries now?
Dr. Clifford. That is the discussion, yes, that we are
having with them. That is the discussion. With my trip to Asia,
that will be in September, I am going to be visiting five
countries and talking to them about that, but also visiting
countries like China, just to try to get our markets reopened.
And so we are also going to be going to many other countries in
Europe and in Africa, as well as the Americas.
Mr. Peterson. Thank you. And, again, I want to thank you,
Dr. Clifford, Dr. Swayne, Dr. Hartmann, and you haven't been on
the frontline yet, Dr. Meckes, and hopefully you won't be.
But as I said, things haven't been perfect. But you have
responded when we have had concerns. And we appreciate it. And
also I thank the Secretary and your people, I talked to a
number of your folks who were at the Willmar emergency center
and they were from Maine and Oklahoma and all over the place.
And they were away from their families and working 7 days a
week. And so it is a tremendous effort. And we appreciate it
and look forward to working with all of you to get through this
fall.
Hopefully, we won't have a similar situation. But if it
does rear up, hopefully, we will have a much better response
ready to go. So thank you all very much for what you have done.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank, Mr. Peterson. Since I am the last one
left and the Chairman of the Subcommittee, I suppose I have the
right to ask one more question, if my staff will allow me.
Otherwise, I might be fired perhaps.
But sitting here, thinking about the testimony and the
questions back and forth, it occurred to me that we can get
this absolutely 100 percent correct, but we also have a growing
market, what some may call free-range, organic, locally grown,
locally produced. What is the nature of our outreach to the
very small mom and pop, organically grown, locally produced?
It strikes me that we can get it completely right on the
commercial side, but we may have a gap here with a lot of very
small, individual producers throughout all of our states. I am
just curious what thought or plan of action has been
contemplated there.
Dr. Clifford. So thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have been
doing outreach in this area for years. We have a very active,
what we refer to as Biosecurity for the Birds campaign that
really targets this sector of the industry.
So we also reach out through the poultry associations and
groups and through the National Poultry Improvement Plan and
many other groups to reach this sector of the industry. And I
know that the states, and Dr. Meckes and Dr. Hartmann can
probably add to this, the states do a lot, as well, with
outreach to backyard type birds or organic or birds that are
just raised outdoors. So there is quite a bit of outreach
there.
The Chairman. Dr. Meckes.
Dr. Meckes. Chairman Rouzer, we are in the process of
seeking to discern the location of all of our backyard flocks.
We have about 4,000 flocks, small backyard flocks that we are
aware of. And we have asked individuals within the State of
North Carolina that own poultry to please contact our office
and register with them.
Our desire is to be able to adequately convey information
to them in the event of a disease outbreak. And I liken it to
the red sticker in your children's window for the fireman to
see. If the fire comes, we want to know where the birds are.
And that way we will be able to adequately convey the needed
information to the individual bird owners and the smaller flock
owners throughout the State of North Carolina.
The Chairman. Mr. Peterson.
Mr. Peterson. This age of instant communication, we have an
e-mail in or a message from one of our growers that is watching
the hearing. They have the impression because of the discussion
we had about you going over to the Far East in September, that
USDA wasn't doing anything now.
So the question was why isn't USDA talking to our trading
partners now? And as I understand it, you are. The Secretary
has told me that you have been for some time already. Is that
correct?
Dr. Clifford. Yes, we are. We just had an international
meeting in Baltimore. And a lot of our trading partners were
invited to that and were present. And this was a topic that was
discussed.
Mr. Peterson. I just want to clarify. You are not the only
person at the USDA. There are a lot of other folks.
Dr. Clifford. No, sir. I am not. In fact, I get a lot of
kudos for the things that are really done by a lot of others.
So we much appreciate it. And I certainly appreciate----
Mr. Peterson. So you have, the Department has been on
this----
Dr. Clifford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Peterson.--ever since we started talking about----
Dr. Clifford. Yes, sir. We are on this.
Mr. Peterson. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Peterson. I would like to,
again, thank all of our witnesses for appearing before the
Subcommittee today. I think this has been very helpful and
informative. And those of you who have traveled longer
distances than other, particularly thank you for your time and
your effort to be here.
Under the rules of the Committee, the record of today's
hearing will remain open for 10 calendar days to receive
additional material and supplementary written responses from
the witnesses to any questions posed by a Member. This
Subcommittee on Livestock and Foreign Agriculture hearing is
now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:18 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
Submitted Reports by Hon. Collin C. Peterson, a Representative in
Congress from Minnesota
An Emergency Economic Impact Analysis
University of Minnesota Extension
Economic Impact of the Avian Flu, Updated 7/10/2015
July 16, 2015
To: Mary Knigge, House Agriculture Committee
From: Brigid Tuck, Senior Economic Analyst
University of Minnesota Extension Center for Community Vitality
RE: Economic Impact of the Avian Flu, State of Minnesota
In May of 2015, Extension released findings from an economic impact
analysis, using IMPLAN modeling, of the avian flu crisis in Minnesota.
We recently updated these numbers and are providing them to you to
inform proceedings of the House Agriculture Committee.
As of July 10, 2015, lost turkey and egg production and processing
as a result of the avian influenza have decreased output in Minnesota's
economy by an estimated $647.2 million. This includes $171.7 million of
lost wages, salaries, and benefits. In addition, 2,500 jobs have been
affected in some way by the avian influenza. These figures include
losses of current birds and account for the fact that producers cannot
immediately restock barns and therefore lose additional income. They
also take into account the time it takes to bring layers up to full
production of eggs.
The value of lost output in Minnesota's economy has more than
doubled since the report was published in May. There are two primary
reasons why the numbers have increased. First, the number of birds
affected continued to rise through the month of May. The initial report
was based on 5.7 million birds being affected. As of July 10, the
number of birds had risen to over 9.0 million. Second, the new analysis
accounts for lost production experienced by producers while their barns
were idled during the clean-up and disinfecting stages.
Top industries affected by lost production and processing related
to avian influenza include wholesale trade and truck transportation, as
shown in the chart below. There is also a feedback loop that occurs as
demand for new poults and chicks temporarily declines during the
outbreak. We would expect those impacts to mitigate as producers begin
to restock their barns. The chart also demonstrates that the impacts
are widespread and affect a variety of businesses including
agriculture, retail trade, restaurants, veterinarians, and corporate
headquarters (management of companies).
Top Industries Affected by Lost Poultry and Egg Production and
Processing Due to Avian Influenza, Minnesota, July 2015
2015 Regents of the University of
Minnesota. All rights reserved. University of Minnesota
Extension is an equal opportunity educator and employer. In
accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, this
material is available in alternative formats upon request.
Direct requests to 612-625-8233. Printed on recycled and
recyclable paper with at least ten percent post-consumer waste
material.
______
Economic Emergency Program
University of Minnesota Extension
Impact of Poultry and Egg Production Losses and Poultry Processing
Losses Due to the Avian Influenza
Executive Summary
In late winter 2015, avian influenza was discovered in a flock of
commercial turkeys in Minnesota. After the first flock was infected,
the virus spread rapidly. As of May 11, 2015, the disease has been
confirmed at 85 turkey and chicken farms in 21 Minnesota counties,
resulting in the direct loss of nearly 5.7 million birds in the
state.\1\ Approximately nine percent of all turkeys and 14 percent of
all laying chickens have been affected by the outbreak.\2\ In 2014, the
value of turkey production in Minnesota was $866.2 million. The value
of egg production was $265.9 million. Applying those figures to 2015,
as of May 11, an estimated $113.6 million of poultry production has
been lost in Minnesota. This does not include the value of future lost
production (due to the further spread of the disease or lost production
due to barn disinfection and cleaning).
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\1\ Source: Minnesota Board of Animal Health, https://
www.bah.state.mn.us/.
\2\ Source: Minnesota Agricultural Statistics Service.
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Farms with the disease lose not only the infected birds, but the
rest of their flocks on the same farm as well. Poultry and egg barns
need to be disinfected over a period of time, meaning barns will sit
empty, further decreasing poultry and egg production.
Clearly, these losses are affecting turkey, chicken, and egg
producers. However, producers are not the only businesses to be
affected by this incident. With fewer birds going to market and
potential delays in restocking the farms, producers will spend less on
local purchases of their traditional inputs into poultry and egg
production (such as feed and veterinary supplies). Producers and their
employees will also have less household income to spend at local
businesses. These are the ripple effects of avian influenza.\3\
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\3\ Note: Producers will have expenses related to clean up and
disinfection, as well as restocking their barns.
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In addition to losses at the producer level, a decline in poultry
and eggs produced has the potential to affect the processing industry
as well. On May 5, Jennie-O announced it will lay off 233 workers at
its turkey processing plant in Faribault. Obviously, idling of
processing plants will also have ripple effects on the local economy.
To quantify these ripple effects, University of Minnesota Extension
conducted an Emergency Economic Impact Analysis (EIA). This Emergency
EIA quantifies the ripple effects of the loss of $1 million in poultry
and egg production showing that $1 million in direct losses will likely
result in a decline of $1.8 million in economic output in Greater
Minnesota, including $450,000 in lost farm and household income. It
also quantifies the ripple effects of the loss of 100 poultry
processing jobs, showing that 100 lost jobs at poultry processing
plants will lead to a loss of 210 jobs across Greater Minnesota's
economy, including $9.3 million in lost household income.
Because the virus continues to spread, quantifying the exact loss
at a specific date and time may not prove useful. Knowing the impact of
$1 million in losses will allow the total economic impact to be
adjusted based on the latest information available on poultry and egg
production losses. Correspondingly, knowing the impact of 100 lost
processing jobs will allow the total economic impact to be adjusted
based on the latest information available on poultry processing losses.
This analysis is offered as a quick and initial look at the
immediate, short-term impacts of the avian influenza. It is intended to
provide context for decision makers in the midst of this economic
event. Extension recommends a more in-depth and complete analysis be
completed once the avian influenza has been contained in Minnesota.
What Is An Economic Emergency?
Communities can face a sudden and unanticipated change in their
local economy. A major employer announces it is reducing its workforce,
a fire destroys an operating facility, or a flood damages downtown. In
these situations, communities often need to make quick, but important,
decisions about how to react. They work closely with the local
business(es) affected and work to help the business(es) and community
recover. The University of Minnesota economic emergency program is
designed to provide community leaders with information to assist in
making decisions regarding the community's future. Information from the
IMPLAN (MIG, Inc.) input-output model is used in this analysis.\4\ This
report is presented in partnership with the EDA Center at the
University of Minnesota-Crookston.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ IMPLAN, Inc. www.implan.com.
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There are a few important things to note related to this analysis
and the tool used. Please see the section on assumptions and terms to
understand these factors.
Current Economy
In 2013, businesses in Greater Minnesota created $223.1 billion of
output. The agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing industry was
directly responsible for $20.0 billion (9%) of that output (Chart 1).
Manufacturers using agricultural products in their processes produced
$23.3 billion of the $62.7 billion (37%) in manufacturing output in
Greater Minnesota.
Chart 1: Output by Sector, Greater Minnesota, 2013
Poultry and egg producers, in turn, created $1.4 billion of output
in 2013, or approximately seven percent of Greater Minnesota's
agricultural production (Chart 2). In addition, poultry processing
facilities produced $1.6 billion of output. Together, the industries
produce $3.0 billion of output annually in Greater Minnesota.
Chart 2: Agricultural Output by Sector, Greater Minnesota, 2013
Economic Impact of Lost Poultry and Egg Production
Since it's unknown how long avian influenza will continue to spread
in Minnesota (and thus the full impact of outbreak), this analysis will
focus on the loss of $1 million of poultry and egg production. With
careful interpretation, the impact of this $1 million of loss can be
brought to the current scale of losses in the poultry and egg industry
in Minnesota by multiplying the estimated total losses presented here
by the current value of lost production. These figures should not be
applied to the poultry processing industry.
Total Economic Impact
Each $1 million loss in poultry and egg production means that an
estimated three jobs at poultry and egg farms themselves will be
affected. At this time, the avian influenza is expected to decrease
poultry and egg production for a short period of time. If producers are
able to return to full production within a few months, it is possible
these jobs will not be permanently lost. However, these jobs will be
affected in the short-term (for example, employees may go several weeks
without work or income).
During this period, an estimated $283,260 in labor income for the
producer and the producer's employees will be lost (see the direct
effect in Table 1). Labor income includes both proprietor income
(income for the self-employed which would include income to poultry
producers) and employee compensation (wages, salaries, and benefits for
farm workers). Most of the direct loss (85 percent) is lost income for
poultry producers.\5\ Losses may be even greater in the short-term for
poultry producers, as some will retain employees during the cleaning
and disinfecting stages. The producers, at that point, will be paying
wages to their employees without receiving any revenue to pay those
wages.
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\5\ Note: some poultry producers may receive government payments to
compensate for birds lost, as producers will receive payment for birds
euthanized to prevent the spread of the disease. This will partially
offset some the lost proprietor income.
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Poultry and egg production generates additional economic activity
in Greater Minnesota as a result of purchases by poultry and egg
producers. These are described as indirect and induced impacts. When
poultry and egg producers make purchases of inputs and supplies in the
local economy, this creates indirect, or business-to-business impacts.
When poultry and egg producers, their families, and their employees
make purchases in the local economy, this creates induced, or consumer-
to-business, impacts. When these purchases decrease, as a result of
declines in poultry and egg production, the corresponding local
purchases will also decrease, causing a ripple of economic losses in
Greater Minnesota.
Each loss of $1 million in poultry and egg production will have
significant impacts on Greater Minnesota, as displayed in Table 1. For
every $1 million decline in poultry and egg production, an estimated
additional $808,590 in output in Greater Minnesota industries that
serve producers and their employees will be lost. In total, output in
the region declines by an estimated $1.8 million per $1 million of lost
production. Of that $1.8 million of lost output, $450,000 will be lost
labor income (includes proprietary/net farm income and employee
compensation). For every $1 million decline in poultry and egg
production in Greater Minnesota, Minnesotans will lose $450,000 in
household income. Finally, poultry and egg losses will impact other
jobs in Greater Minnesota. For every $1 million of lost poultry and egg
production, an estimated seven jobs will be affected across all
industries.
Table 1: Total Economic Impact of a $1 Million Loss of Poultry and Egg
Production, Greater Minnesota
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Output Employment Labor Income
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Direct ^$1,000,000 ^3 ^$283,260
Indirect ^$564,160 ^2 ^$94,910
Induced ^$244,430 ^2 ^$71,830
-----------------------------------------------------
Total........... ^$1,808,590 ^7 ^$450,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimates by University of Minnesota Extension.
The focus of this analysis is on Greater Minnesota, because the
majority of Minnesota's poultry and egg production is in Greater
Minnesota (the 80 counties not in the seven county metro). The economic
impact of a $1 million decrease in poultry and egg production on the
entire state of Minnesota (including the metro area) is $2.1 million
including eight jobs affected and $560,000 of lost income (proprietor
and employee compensation).
Top Industries Impacted
The IMPLAN input-output model can also provide estimates of the
industries in Greater Minnesota that will feel the largest magnitude of
impacts from the loss of poultry and egg production (Chart 3). The
largest losses will be in ``other'' animal food manufacturing. Since
poultry will not be raised, demand for poultry feed will decline. For
every $1 million of lost poultry production, nearly $230,000 of demand
for poultry feed will be lost in Greater Minnesota. Poultry and egg
production itself will also be affected, as shown in Chart 3. Likely,
these impacts are those related to demand for poults and for chicks.
Therefore, this decrease may be temporary. In fact, this subsector of
the poultry industry may experience a sharp spike in demand when
producers are ready to restock their barns. Grain farming and oilseed
farming also appear in the table as industries that will be affected.
This chart reflects the number of grain and oilseed farm that provide
inputs into poultry feed. Likely, grain and oilseeds not used for
poultry feed will be exported.
Chart 3: Top 15 Industries Affected by a $1 Million Decline in Poultry
and Egg Production, Sorted by Output
Modeling the Scale of Losses
As mentioned, the scale of the lost poultry and egg production is
yet not clear for Greater Minnesota. Depending on the duration of the
avian influenza outbreak, the scale of the impacts could change. Thus,
Extension modeled a $1 million change in poultry and egg production.
However, it is useful to think how these impacts might change based on
the scale of the event. The following examples are provided only for
illustrative purposes and not as predictions for the future.
Example 1: A $10 million loss of poultry and egg production
If poultry and egg production were to decline by $10 million in
Greater Minnesota, then in total Greater Minnesota would lose an
estimated $18.1 million in economic activity, including $4.5 of lost
labor income. Across all industries, 70 jobs would be affected.
Example 2: A $113.6 million loss of poultry and egg production
As of May 11, 2015, Extension estimates approximately $113.6
million of poultry and egg production has been lost (based on 2014
production figures). The loss of an estimated $113.6 million in poultry
production would result in a loss of $205.5 million in economic
activity in Greater Minnesota, including $51.1 million of lost labor
income. Nearly 800 jobs would be affected. These are estimates based on
production values from 2014. They should be interpreted with caution.
They do not include the value of lost production due to the barns being
empty during the cleaning and disinfecting stage. If poultry producers
lose another entire cycle of production, these estimates could double.
Example 3: A $200 million loss of poultry and egg production
Poultry and egg production losses may increase with time. If
poultry and egg production were to decline by $200 million, then in
total Greater Minnesota would lose an estimated $361.7 million in
economic activity, including $90 million of lost labor income. Across
all industries, 1,400 jobs would be affected.
Economic Impact of Lost Poultry Processing Jobs
Since the effects of the avian influenza are only beginning to be
felt by the processing industry, this analysis will focus on the loss
of 100 poultry processing manufacturing jobs. With careful
interpretation, the impact of these 100 lost jobs can be brought to the
current scale of losses in the poultry processing industry in Minnesota
by multiplying by the current value of lost jobs. These figures should
not be applied to the poultry and egg production industry.
Total Economic Impact
According to the IMPLAN input-output model used in this analysis,
the loss of 100 poultry processing jobs in Greater Minnesota is
associated with a direct loss of an estimated $27.3 million in poultry
processing output. The lost output includes an estimated $4.9 million
worth of wages, salaries, and benefits for the affected workers.
When a processing plant idles and employees are laid off,
businesses beyond the processing plant will be affected. The processing
plant will decrease purchases of its material supplies leading to
indirect or business-to-business losses. With a drop of 100 jobs at
processing plants, an estimated 50 jobs will be lost in other
industries. Note, since this analysis examines poultry and egg
production impacts separately, lost poultry production jobs are not
included in the indirect effects. The model estimates 30 poultry
production jobs are affected for each 100 poultry processing jobs lost.
When the processing plant idles, workers will be without incomes.
The model estimates that lost incomes for plant workers will affect 60
jobs in other industries in Greater Minnesota.
In total, the loss of 100 poultry processing jobs in Greater
Minnesota will result in an estimated 210 jobs being affected across
all industries. The total economy will experience a decrease in output
of an estimated $44.8 million, including $9.3 million in labor income.
Table 2: Total Economic Impact of 100 Lost Poultry Processing Jobs,
Greater Minnesota
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Output Labor Income
(millions) Employment (millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Direct ^$27.3 ^100 ^$4.9
Indirect ^$10.8 ^50 ^$2.4
Induced ^$6.7 ^60 ^$2.0
-----------------------------------------------------
Total........... ^$44.8 ^210 ^$9.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Note: Estimates do not include lost poultry production.
Estimates by University of Minnesota Extension.
The focus of this analysis is on Greater Minnesota, because the
majority of Minnesota's poultry processing is in Greater Minnesota. The
economic impact of a 100 job decrease in poultry processing on the
entire state of Minnesota (including the metro area) is $64.5 million
including 275 jobs affected and $15.8 million of lost income.
Top Industries Impacted
The top industries affected by lost poultry processing jobs are
highlighted in Chart 4. A loss of 100 poultry processing jobs will
affect nearly nine trucking jobs, seven poultry processing jobs (likely
at processors that perform specialty processing tasks), and six
wholesale trade jobs.
Chart 4: Top 15 Industries Affected by a 100 Job Decline in Poultry
Processing, Sorted by Employment
Modeling the Scale of Losses
As mentioned, the scale of the lost poultry processing is yet not
clear for Greater Minnesota. Depending on the duration of the avian
influenza outbreak, the scale of the impacts could change. Thus,
Extension modeled a 100 job change in poultry processing. However, it
is useful to think how these impacts might change based on the scale of
the event. The following examples are provided only for illustrative
purposes and not as predictions for the future.
Example 1: 233 Lost Poultry Processing Jobs
The loss of 233 poultry processing jobs will result in 490 jobs
across all industries in Greater Minnesota being affected. It will
result in the loss of $104.4 million of lost output, including $21.7
million in labor income.
Example 2: 500 Lost Poultry Processing Jobs
It is possible additional poultry processing jobs will be affected
as a result of the avian influenza. If 500 poultry processing jobs are
lost, then 1,050 jobs across all industries would be affected. The lost
jobs would translate into $224.0 of lost economic activity, including
$46.5 million in lost labor income in Greater Minnesota.
Considerations
Given the ever changing nature of the avian influenza in Greater
Minnesota, Extension elected to analyze using a unit loss of $1 million
in poultry and egg production and 100 lost poultry processing jobs.
There are several layers of additional considerations when thinking
about the overall impact of the avian influenza in Greater Minnesota.
Age and maturity of bird losses. Producers with older birds
will have higher investments in their birds than producers
whose birds were younger at time of infection.
Fixed prices. This analysis assumes prices remain fixed.
This is an important assumption, as decreased demand for inputs
into poultry and egg production may decrease the cost of
inputs. Decreased input prices will affect expenditures for
those inputs. Further, changes in the price of poultry and
eggs, which could rise as supply decreases, would also change
farm incomes. The input-output model used in this analysis does
not account for price changes.
Insurance or government reimbursement. Some of the producers
affected may receive compensation for lost birds, mitigating
the effects of some of the lost farm income. However, impacts
on the supplying industries (identified as indirect effects in
this report) will not be offset.
Impacts of barn cleaning and disinfecting. This analysis
focuses on a loss of poultry and egg production using a fixed
model of production. The avian influenza will cause some
spending and activity to occur that is outside the normal for
producers. For example, there will be producer costs associated
with purchasing cleaning supplies and then resetting the barns
for production (for example, added bedding). These will be
costs to the poultry producers in the short-term, but might
actually spur additional economic activity as suppliers of
poultry bedding increase production to meet demand.
Long-term effects on the poultry and egg industry. This
analysis focuses on the short-term effects of lost poultry and
egg production. If producers are able to return to full
production within a few months, these effects will dissipate.
However, this is a point of high uncertainty in the industry.
If avian influenza persists as an issue, producers may not be
able to return to full production, leaving them vulnerable to
leaving the industry. Uncertainty may affect credit
availability, further hindering operations.
Purchasing Patterns for Producers and Processors
The input-output model, IMPLAN, estimates ripple effects based on
industry purchasing patterns (production functions). Extension is
providing the production functions here to allow decision makers to
understand supply linkages. Note: IMPLAN adjusts the amount spent in a
local economy based on supply available in the study area.
Poultry and Egg Producer Purchases
Table 3 shows purchases by poultry and egg producers. According to
the IMPLAN input-output model, for every $1 spent by poultry and egg
producers, $0.68 is spent on inputs (goods and services). The other
$0.32 is spent on labor, indirect business taxes, and property income.
Table 3: Purchases by Poultry and Egg Producers
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount of
Item Every $1
Spent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Animal food $0.40
Labor income, indirect business taxes, and property income $0.32
costs
Poultry and egg products $0.09
Wholesale trade $0.05
Grains $0.02
Energy $0.02
Truck transportation $0.01
Soybean and oilseed processing $0.01
Support activities for agriculture $0.01
Veterinary services $0.01
All other inputs $0.06
------------
Total $1.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: IMPLAN.
Poultry Processing Purchases
Table 4 shows purchases by poultry processors. According to the
IMPLAN input-output model, for every $1 spent by poultry processors,
$0.79 is spent on inputs (goods and services). The other $0.21 is spent
on labor, indirect business taxes, and property income.
Table 4: Purchases by Poultry Processors
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount of
Item Every $1
Spent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Poultry and egg products $0.45
Labor income, indirect business taxes, and property income $0.21
costs
Processed poultry meat products $0.11
Truck transportation services $0.04
Management of companies $0.02
Wholesale trade $0.02
Paper bags and coated and treated paper $0.01
Paperboard containers $0.01
Meat processed from carcasses $0.01
Other plastics products $0.01
All other inputs $0.11
------------
Total $1.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: IMPLAN.
Prepared By
Brigid Tuck, Senior Economic Impact Analyst, [email protected], 507-389-
6979
With peer-review by:
William Lazarus, Extension Economist--Farm Management and Professor
Kent Olson, Interim Associate Dean and Extension Economist--Farm
Management
Matt Kane, Program Leader
Liz Templin, Extension Educator
Neil Linscheid, Extension Educator
Assumptions and Terms
Economic impact analysis is based on several critical assumptions.
An understanding of the assumptions ensures the results are interpreted
properly. Here are the key assumptions made in this analysis.
One job is one job, regardless if the job is full-time,
part-time, or seasonal. The jobs considered here are not full-
time equivalents. Therefore, it isn't unusual for industries
with high levels of part-time employment to experience higher
employment impacts.
The model is linear. Changes in output or employment can be
modeled in a linear fashion. For example, if the estimated lost
production of poultry and eggs in Greater Minnesota are $10
million, one may multiply the amounts noted in this report for
losses in total output and employment from $1 million in lost
production by ten to obtain estimates for the $10 million in
lost production.
The database is built on data available publicly. When data
is not available for a specific industry, say due to data
disclosure issues, econometric models are used to create
estimates for the industry.
Key Terms
The following are a few key terms used in economic impact analysis.
Output
Output is measured in dollars and is equivalent to total sales. The
output measure can include significant double counting. For example,
think of corn. The value of the corn is counted when it is sold to the
mill, again when it is sold to the dairy farmer, again as part of the
price of fluid milk, and then yet again when it is sold as cheese. The
value of the corn is built into the price of each of these items and
then the sales of each of these items are added up to get total sales
(or output).
Employment
Employment includes full- and part-time workers and is measured in
annual average jobs. Total wage and salaried employees as well as the
self-employed are included in employment estimates in IMPLAN. Because
employment is measured in jobs and not in dollar values, it tends to be
a very stable metric.
In the model, one job is one job, regardless if the job is full-
time, part-time, and seasonal.
Labor Income
Labor income measures the value that is added to the product by the
labor component. For example, in the corn example, when the corn is
sold, a certain percentage of the sale goes to the farmer for his/her
labor. Then when the mill sells the corn as feed to the dairy farmer it
includes in the price some markup for its labor costs. When the dairy
farmer sells the milk to the cheese manufacturer, he/she includes a
value for his/her labor. These individual value increments for labor
can be measured. This is labor income. Labor income does not include
double counting.
Labor income is comprised of employee compensation (wages,
salaries, and benefits) and proprietor income. Proprietor income
includes income for the self-employed, which is how many agricultural
producers register their income.
Property Income
Property income is a computation of the value that accrues due to
ownership of property. This includes payments for rents, royalties, and
dividends.
Indirect Business Taxes
Indirect business taxes are taxes a business pays for normal
operations. It includes excise, sales, and property taxes. Fees, fines,
licenses, and permits are also included in this category.
Direct Impact
The direct impact is equivalent to the initial change in the
economy.
Indirect Impact
The indirect impact is the summation of changes in the local
economy that occur due to spending for inputs (goods and services) by
the industry or industries directly impacted. For instance, if
employment in a manufacturing plant increases by 100 jobs, this implies
a corresponding increase in output by the plant. As the plant increases
output, it must also purchase more of its inputs, such as electricity,
steel, and equipment. As it increases its purchase of these items, its
suppliers must also increase its production, and so forth. As these
ripples move through the economy, they can be captured and measured.
Ripples related to the purchase of goods and services are indirect
impacts.
Induced Impact
The induced impact is the summation of changes in the local economy
that occur due to spending by labor--employees in the industry or
industries directly impacted. For instance, if employment in a
manufacturing plant increases by 100 jobs, the new employees will have
more money to spend to purchase housing, buy groceries, and go out to
dinner. As they spend their new income, more activity occurs in the
local economy. This can be quantified and is called the induced impact.
Total Impact
The total impact is the summation of the direct, indirect and
induced impacts.
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Minnesota. All rights reserved. University of Minnesota
Extension is an equal opportunity educator and employer. In
accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, this
material is available in alternative formats upon request.
Direct requests to 612-625-8233.
______
Submitted Questions
Response from John R. Clifford, D.V.M., Deputy Administrator,
Veterinary Services, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture
Questions Submitted by Hon. David Rouzer, a Representative in Congress
from North Carolina
Question 1. On the issues of decontamination and sanitizing
equipment impacted by the AI, are farmers sanitizing the equipment,
replacing it, or some combination of the two?
Answer. As part of the virus elimination process, APHIS has
provided funding for producers to clean and disinfect equipment and, in
some cases, replace it. Our determination is based upon the
circumstances at each particular farm and what steps and actions are
necessary to eliminate the virus.
Question 2. Do your regulations account for the most cost-effective
disinfection measure or just require disinfection? We have heard that
replacement of equipment may actually be cheaper than disinfection in
some cases. If that is the case, do your policies allow for this
option?
Answer. In some cases where cleaning and disinfecting was difficult
or impossible, APHIS did in fact replace equipment, consistent with 9
CFR Part 53. While our policy for cleaning and disinfecting had been to
remove organic material from the facility before washing equipment and
applying a disinfectant, we will focus more heavily on virus
elimination moving forward. This will allow us, in certain cases to use
dry cleaning methods wherein heat and temperature ensure the virus is
eliminated. These methods still ensure the elimination of the virus
while being more cost effective than wet methods.
In addition, in conversations with industry and stakeholders, we
heard repeatedly about the need for a flat rate (such as per bird, or
per square foot) for virus elimination. This approach, which we are
examining, would simplify the process, by reducing the amount of
paperwork, ensuring consistency, and shortening the time it takes for
the virus to be removed--thereby allowing most producers to begin
restocking sooner.
Question 3. With regard to private sector contractors, it doesn't
surprise anyone that the quality of the work performed would be related
to the experience and expertise of the contractors. Understanding that
this was an all-hands-on-deck operation, were any problems encountered
with the quality of the work done by contractors that needs to be
addressed moving forward?
Answer. As part of our fall planning, we've evaluated the work of
contractors and will continue to work to ensure that they are
implementing our response plan. Although limited in number, when we did
identify issues with the performance of contractors, we moved quickly
to correct those issues or, when appropriate, to dismiss the
contractors. Moving forward, we are committed to ensuring that an APHIS
employee is present at each affected facility to ensure the quality of
work being performed through direct oversight.
Question 4. Recognizing that there was a tremendous volume of birds
to be depopulated, can you expound on the time it took, on average from
identification of the virus to depopulation of the flock, and
specifically touch on the policy changes that enabled quicker response
times later in the outbreak?
Answer. While we don't have an average depopulation time, we do
know that times varied widely depending on the type of poultry
population and the location of the facility. Much of the initial delay
for depopulation of turkey flocks at the beginning of the outbreak in
the spring in Minnesota was related to time needed to transport
resources to affected sites. APHIS brought in additional resources
through contracting for personnel and equipment, which decreased the
time for completion of depopulation. Depopulation of egg-layer sites
posed challenges because of the number of personnel needed to manually
remove birds from individual cages, rather than a lack of equipment.
The changes we made as the event progressed were to be more proactive
in acquiring resources faster and in larger numbers. As part of our
fall planning efforts, we've taken a number of steps that should allow
us to respond more quickly to new outbreaks of the disease. Among these
efforts include an itemization of essential equipment and strategic
stockpiling of it in key areas; an increase in the number of employees
who are immediately able to respond to outbreaks; and the stated goal
of depopulating sick birds within 24 hours, which will help reduce the
amount of virus present in the environment.
Question 5. It is my understanding that rendering of the birds did
not occur because of significant hurdles, but that rendering could
speed up the cleanup phase because the process does eliminate the virus
and renderers have good capacity to handle the material. I know that
this technique has been used in Europe with High-Path birds and it
seems that it could really help with the sheer volume during an event
like this. So do you believe that rendering is a good option?
Answer. Thus far in this HPAI event, no renderers have been
interested in participating in the disposal process. We continue to
look at rendering and are in discussions with renderers on the
possibility of using this option.
Question 6. In regards to the larger conversation of disposal, to
your knowledge have any universities engaged in new research regarding
options for more efficient disposal methods?
Answer. Several companies have approached USDA with new methods for
disposal. Most of the companies are working with universities to
validate or develop their prototypes and are also looking for Federal
funding to assist in that development process. To this point, no new or
novel approaches have been validated that would meet the demands of
large-scale disposal, although USDA continues to advertise for sources
of disposal services in FedBizOps and to work with researchers to
identify and validate new technologies.
Question 7. It is my understanding that some of the incinerators
used did not hold up very well or the process was slow. Is that
correct?
Answer. Incineration overall was a very expensive and troublesome
process. One key factor is that poultry carcasses contain a high degree
of moisture, making incineration difficult, especially given the number
of depopulated birds. The smaller units worked well but could not
handle the demand. The large units did not function well, were
continuously in need of repairs, and could not stay operational.
Overall, incineration was not a successful endeavor during this
outbreak for carcass removal, although it was useful for disposal of
some contaminated products and fluids.
Question 8. I know that FEMA used some fairly powerful incinerator
systems after Hurricane Katrina that worked fairly well and I was
wondering if conversations took place with FEMA or any other agency
about what resources that might work better in disposing this type of
material and this much volume?
Answer. We did not have any conversations with FEMA about
incineration, but it was a tool we used. Incineration proved useful
only for certain materials, like bedding/litter, fluids and other more
traditional materials for which they were designed. However, they did
not function well for the incineration of bird carcasses.
Question 9. Does APHIS intend to spend any Federal resources in
developing better disposal methods?
Answer. APHIS has established a system for individuals and
companies to present their proposals for funding considerations.
Several proposals are in the review process now.
Question 10. When do you plan to allow farmers to repopulate their
farms?
Answer. USDA has criteria in place that must be met before farmers
are allowed to restock, to minimize the risk of re-infection. This
process can begin, provided those criteria--including virus testing--
are met, 21 days after the completion of cleaning and disinfection. We
are making steady progress in restocking.
Question 11. How close are we to determining how to stop the spread
or recurrence of the virus?
Answer. With what we already knew about HPAI and the lessons we
learned from the spring outbreak, we know there are a number of actions
we can take to slow the spread of HPAI should it come back in the fall
or winter. First, we've increased wild bird surveillance, which will
allow us to more quickly identify where the disease may strike. We've
also learned that we all need to reemphasize biosecurity. The industry
has provided guidance about best practices and we have distributed
information about biosecurity best practices as part of the fall plan
we recently released. We've also identified the need to depopulate
affected flocks within 24 hours to reduce the amount of virus they
produce, which will decrease the likelihood of the virus contaminating
the surrounding environment. In combination, these steps, along with
the proper disposal of dead birds and an emphasis on virus elimination
in affected barns, gives us the best chance to slow and stop the spread
of the virus.
Question 12. What have you found regarding the implementation and
efficacy of biosecurity measures being utilized by growers?
Answer. One of the lessons we've learned is that we all need to be
vigilant about maintaining stringent biosecurity measures, especially
in the face of a disease outbreak. The strength of our biosecurity
efforts depends on all of us--producers, their employees, USDA, state
and local governments and our contractors who are responding to this
outbreak. While standard biosecurity efforts practiced by the poultry
industry may have been sufficient in the past, evidence of farm-to-farm
spread of the HPAI virus strain circulating in the Midwest shows that
stricter biosecurity is needed. Guidance for enhancing biosecurity
provided by the poultry industry, as well as in our fall preparedness
plan, will help to address the gaps in biosecurity that led to some
lateral transmission of the disease in the spring outbreak.
Question 13. What further biosecurity measures can be taken by
growers to prevent the spread of avian influenza?
Answer. As part of our fall planning efforts, USDA developed ideas
to strengthen biosecurity. To support producers in this effort, APHIS
has developed educational materials and a biosecurity self-assessment
checklist, which are available online or as a webinar through the U.S.
Poultry and Egg Association. As we improve our understanding of what
biosecurity measures will be most effective against HPAI, we will
update these publications and communicate them to poultry producers. We
will also continue to engage other Agencies that conduct on-farm
regulatory functions (Agricultural Marketing Service, Food and Drug
Administration, etc.) and provide them with suggested biosecurity
protocols for their activities. Additionally, APHIS is developing an
interim rule on HPAI indemnity that will contain a provision requiring
all future HPAI-affected commercial poultry producers to self-certify
that biosecurity procedures were in place at the time HPAI was
detected. This represents the first step in creating a system of
greater accountability for biosecurity. Following this, we will
collaborate over the next year with industry to design a biosecurity
auditing system. An industry-driven initiative, or an addition to the
National Poultry Improvement Plan, are two possible approaches.
Question 14. What are some challenges associated with controlling
disease spread for the different poultry industries?
Answer. Different segments of the poultry industry have different
practices, which mean that a one-size biosecurity plan isn't always
appropriate. With egg-laying facilities, for example, there are often
huge numbers of birds in multiple buildings on a premise. These birds
are often in various stages of their life cycle and workers are
constantly entering facilities and moving between barns. With turkey
farms, their facilities are often not as fully enclosed as the
structures are often designed to allow for increased access to air and
shade from the sun, which may expose them to wild birds or airborne
disease in a way that other segments of the poultry industry may not
be. Additionally, we know that one of the keys to reducing lateral
spread is to reduce the amount of virus in the environment, which can
be achieved by rapid depopulation of sick birds. The preferred
depopulation methods are water-based foam or carbon dioxide. Those work
well at turkey facilities, where birds live on a floor, but in other
segments of industry, we faced challenges that increased the amount of
time it took to depopulate sick birds. Specifically, egg-layer
facilities, where birds are housed in individual cages that may be
stacked in multiple levels, present challenges to depopulate quickly.
APHIS, with concurrence from the State and the producer, will consider
alternate methods when depopulation cannot be carried out within 24
hours using foam or carbon dioxide.
Question 15. In response to the recent outbreak, it is our
understanding that APHIS had developed a plan to employ as many as 800
veterinarians for a 13 month period at a GS11 wage scale. If APHIS had
more veterinarians employed prior to the outbreak, could they have
responded to better minimize the economic damages?
Answer. APHIS staffing reductions over the last few years
necessitated that we contract much of the response work and limited the
number of APHIS employees--who are doing critical work in the field
assisting businesses and producers with critical import and export
issues--who could assist with the emergency response. APHIS is hiring
more than 350 additional temporary employees--including 210 animal
health technicians, and 90 veterinary medical officers. These
additional employees will assist in reducing the potential size and
spread of an outbreak, and thereby will reduce the economic impact to
producers and the cost to the Federal Government. We are also confident
that the policy and operational changes we have made as part of our
fall preparedness plan will help to quicken our response efforts and
minimize economic impacts to producers should HPAI return in the fall
or beyond.
Question 16. The Veterinary Medicine Loan Repayment Program
authorizes the Secretary to enter into 1 year agreements with
veterinarians enrolled in the program to assist in emergency
situations. Has APHIS been able to make emergency use of veterinarians
enrolled in the student loan forgiveness program?
Answer. The emergency services aspect of the National Veterinary
Medical Services Act (which VMLRP partially implements) has never been
implemented due to insufficient appropriations to support more than the
primary objective of the program, i.e., incentivizing veterinarians to
fill food supply veterinary service shortage situations.
Question 17. How many accredited veterinarians are available to
assist APHIS in managing this outbreak?
Answer. Accredited veterinarians are encouraged to apply to the
National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps, a program through
which veterinarians become temporary USDA employees in emergency
situations. One hundred and one NAHERC personnel volunteered and were
hired this year to respond to HPAI out of the 4,000 NAHERC
veterinarians and technicians who have signed up to potentially assist
USDA. Although 4,000 may have volunteered, there is no requirement that
any of them actually deploy. Some may choose not to volunteer for a
particular outbreak due to the location of the outbreak or their
specific expertise.
Question 18. I support USDA-APHIS getting the funding needed to
allow for proper training and education of those that may be required
to react to another outbreak. It is my understanding that APHIS is
planning on hiring some 300 people to help in the fall for a 12 month
appointment. How will those that are hired be managed and focused on
helping industry, and where will they be located?
Answer. APHIS is in the process of advertising and hiring more than
350 term positions (hired for a 13 month period with possible
extension) related to HPAI. These veterinarians and technicians will be
trained by APHIS to be ready to respond to HPAI, located across the
United States and managed by local supervisors. They will be deployed
to an HPAI incident when needed, and when not deployed they will assist
with preparedness and conduct routine animal health duties in the
field.
Question 19. A lot of very different types of farms--with
significantly different business models--have been affected by this
epidemic. For example, the repopulation of egg-producing farms proceeds
on a very different, and considerably longer, timeline than broiler or
turkey operations. What steps can be taken by APHIS to ensure that the
formula for fair market value is adequately compensating growers for
losses associated with disease outbreaks?
Answer. APHIS provides indemnity to pay for animals destroyed as
part of its disease response activities. Indemnity is calculated based
upon the fair market value of the birds at the time they are disposed.
For animals such as turkeys, this largely involves replacement costs of
the bird itself. For egg-laying hens, their value is a function of the
costs to raise the birds to lay and of the eggs they produce. At the
industry's request USDA lengthened the assumed period of lay in the
layer indemnity calculator from 80 to 90 weeks, which will help to
ensure that producers receive fair market value for egg-laying chickens
depopulated as a result of HPAI. We have recently received a request
from some in industry to provide indemnity compensation for downtime
losses. We have determined that these payments would not be consistent
with the purpose of indemnity payments, as outlined by the Animal
Health Protection Act (AHPA). Under the law and the applicable
indemnity regulations, USDA provides affected producers with indemnity
equal to the fair market value of euthanized birds.
Question 20. As you are aware, indemnification is an important
issue for our growers. I have heard from egg producers in my district
and they have expressed concern that the amount they are receiving
falls short of the value of the hens' future egg production. Is there
an opportunity to review the formula in this regard? Can you outline
what the current formula covers and how it's being applied?
Answer. The calculator APHIS uses to determine bird value is
updated regularly, based on current market prices, and APHIS has
discussed the calculator with various industry sectors over the course
of the current outbreak. The calculator incorporates pullet chick
prices, pullet feed and other pullet growing costs plus feed and other
costs associated with egg production into the bird values generated. By
including such costs the calculator ensures that egg producers will
always receive value equal to their cost of production for pullets
being raised and unrecouped costs for hens that are producing eggs. In
addition, during periods of favorable egg prices the calculator adds a
portion of net revenue to bird value. At the request of industry, USDA
adjusted the calculator to increase the laying period from 80 to 90
weeks. This change increases net revenue and in turn bird value.We will
continue to engage all sectors of the poultry industry to assure a
transparent understanding of the assumptions and data used within the
APHIS indemnity calculators.
Question 21. Are there different indemnification formulas used
based on the type of AI outbreak? Specifically would a farmer whose
flock was destroyed because of Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)
be compensated differently than a farmer whose flock was destroyed by
Low-Pathogenic Avian Influenza (LPAI)? If the formulas are different,
which formula is APHIS using to compensate affected egg farmers?
Answer. The formula for calculating the fair market value of
poultry is the same for HPAI and LPAI. However, the regulations provide
for payment to owners only for HPAI, while LPAI regulations allow
payments to be split between growers and owners in contract-growing
situations. While we have worked with owners to ensure growers are
treated fairly according to the terms of their contracts, APHIS is
developing an interim rule to harmonize the two regulations and provide
split payments for HPAI.
Question 22. Are there ways that the indemnification process might
be streamlined and improved?
Answer. APHIS continues to review the indemnification process to
ensure that payments are fair and processed as quickly as possible.
Because indemnity is based on the inventory of birds at the time of
infection, we are encouraging producers to keep accurate records. We
will also compile the inventory as quickly as possible: as soon as a
suspect flock is identified, or a foreign animal disease investigation
is started, or presumptive positive result is obtained from a
laboratory. We also allow state animal health officials to prepare the
inventory, which can save additional time and help speed indemnity
payments to producers.
Question 23. I understand that as a result of USDA restrictions on
re-populating and due to the nature of the egg production business,
farmers will not be able to immediately re-populate their farms to
normal, pre-destruction egg-producing capacity. Instead, it will take
months or even years for a commercial-sized farm to resume full egg
production. In light of this hardship, do USDA or the states have
programs in place, risk management or otherwise, to account for the
substantial lost income that will result from this unplanned downtime?
Answer. USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) can provide direct and
guaranteed loans to operators of a family farm who meet program
eligibility requirements and can project a feasible plan based on
reliable projected income. The maximum loan amount for a direct
operating loan is $300,000, and for a guaranteed operating loan is
$1,392,000. Direct and guaranteed operating loan funds may be used to
pay operating expenses, develop farmland and make facility
improvements, including biosecurity improvements, buy livestock and
equipment, and pay family living expenses. Use of an FSA guarantee may
allow a lender to restructure a borrower's debts and continue
financing. FSA is working with lenders and producers in affected areas
in an effort to address credit needs.
In addition, FSA offers servicing options to assist producers who
have outstanding loans and are not able to make scheduled payments. FSA
is committed to using all available authorities to assist borrowers
impacted by HPAI.
USDA's Risk Management Agency (RMA) awarded a contract to conduct a
feasibility study as required by the 2014 Farm Bill for insuring
poultry producers against catastrophic loss due to disease. Due to the
HPAI outbreaks, RMA extended the timeline so that the contractor could
gather as much information as possible from impacted producers by this
event. RMA anticipates transmitting the draft report to Congress in the
fall of 2015. Based on the outcome and recommendations of the study,
RMA will then determine next steps for moving forward on the potential
development of an insurance product.
Question 24. What has been the economic impact, to date, of the
avian influenza outbreaks on the poultry industries?
Answer. We estimate that net economic losses at the national level
for U.S. feed, livestock, and poultry producers combined total $1.0
billion from the first quarter of 2015 through a recovery period ending
the fourth quarter of 2017. The largest losses occur for broiler meat
and turkey meat due to embargoed trade and for crop producers due to
reduced demand for feed. We estimate that producer net losses over the
same 3 year period would have been as much as two to three times
greater absent the APHIS response to stamp out spread of the disease as
quickly as possible.
Question 25. How do trading partners make the decision to restrict
trade? Which guidelines do they follow?
Answer. Veterinary officials in each country determine if there is
risk to their poultry industry stemming from importations of different
commodities. Processes vary by country and should be--but are not
always--based on science (risk determinations) and international
standards. The World Organization for Animal Health guidelines advise a
regionalized approach for trade restrictions, and we encourage our
trading partners to adhere as closely as possible to these standards as
we do when we decide what products we can or cannot allow into the
country.
Question 26. Regarding trade implications, when can a restricted or
control zone be declared disease free? When will this declaration be
recognized by trading partners?
Answer. The control zone is released when the State determines it
is free of risk. Some States chose to keep control zones in place
longer than others. In general, once the flock has been depopulated and
there has been adequate surveillance of the poultry in that zone to be
sure there are no active infections, the zone can be released. We
consider the zone as free of infection 90 days following the date that
cleaning and disinfection has been completed, which is consistent with
international animal health guidelines. Once the 90 days is up, we
notify trading partners through our updates to the World Organization
for Animal Health (OIE) or individually as per our trade agreements.
Trading partners make individual determinations on when to recognize
the elimination of these zones, although we urge all of them to adhere
to international standards, which recognize HPAI-free status after 90
days of eradication.
Question 27. What is the chain of command in place in each state to
respond to an outbreak?
Answer. HPAI outbreaks are managed at the local or state level
until local resources are overwhelmed. Upon request by the state, APHIS
will then supply additional resources to assist in the incident. When
that occurs the state and APHIS work collaboratively under a joint
command structure to manage the incident.
Question 28. Have any gaps in communication between response team
members been identified during the previous outbreak? How can these be
addressed?
Answer. Communication is always an area for improvement, and APHIS
is working on ways to better communicate within teams. APHIS held a
meeting of the Incident Management Teams on September 1-3, 2015, and
one of the topics was to develop better processes that will reduce or
minimize any communication gaps. Among those processes, we have
developed plans to expand public outreach to producers and communities
impacted by HPAI to ensure that a more consistent and timely message is
delivered. We have also identified the need for unified joint commands
where APHIS and state officials are physically together to share
information and make decisions. We intend to establish joint commands
for any future HPAI response efforts that require state and APHIS
partnership and coordination.
Question 29. We know USDA along with the poultry industry recently
finished a 2 day conference on ``lessons learned'' in Iowa. Can you
share any preliminary results from that meeting? What is APHIS doing to
ensure the knowledge gained from this disaster is captured, analyzed
and utilized for future disasters?
Answer. APHIS used the knowledge gained from the Iowa conference to
enhance preparedness for fall. Among the topics discussed at the Iowa
conference were setting a goal of depopulation within 24 hours,
establishing a flat rate for payments to eliminate virus from affected
facilities, and preparing to be able to utilize vaccination as a
response tool. APHIS incorporated input from that conference in those
three areas--as well as input received from the other meetings and
conferences held throughout the summer--into the Fall plan, which it
released publicly in September.
Question 30. We have learned from this AI outbreak that it takes a
tremendous amount of human resources to deal with all of the challenges
associated with something this size. Has Congress given you all of the
resources needed to be able to address this problem adequately? Do we
have enough trained resources to handle a similar outbreak in multiple
locations this fall?
Answer. Under the Animal Health Protection Act, the Secretary has
the authority to request funding from the Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC) to deal with outbreaks of foreign animal diseases. We have used
this authority to fund our emergency response activities to this point,
and should we identify additional needs, we will consider requesting
the use of additional CCC funds . . . As part of our previous funding
requests, and to prepare for any potential fall outbreaks, we received
funding to begin hiring additional term employees, including veterinary
medical officers and animal health technicians and the production of
vaccine to be used if deemed necessary. APHIS has also added another
Incident Management Team composed of employees who are specifically
trained to respond to an animal health emergency.
Question 31. This question is directed at the broader work USDA and
APHIS conducts regarding the vaccine strategy for future foreign animal
disease outbreaks. We have been advised there is a serious shortage of
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) vaccine needed to manage an outbreak. Can
you enlighten the Committee on this issue and how you plan to deal with
this shortage? Do you have an estimate of the cost of improving vaccine
availability and have you requested additional appropriations to
address the problem? We have also been advised the Administration
believes the livestock industry should help pay for an expanded FMD
vaccine bank. How would you propose that industry help pay for FMD
vaccine? Have you offered a plan to the industry?
Answer. APHIS considers the use of vaccines a key tool in our
ability to eradicate FMD should it enter the country. Accordingly, we
maintain a supply of about 25 million doses of vaccine across multiple
strains in the North American Vaccine Bank. However, this amount of
vaccine on-hand will not be sufficient to eliminate a large outbreak of
the disease.
Estimates of the amount of vaccine needed to address an outbreak of
FMD in the United States vary. Dr. Jim Roth of the Iowa State
University Center for Food Security and Public Health did a study that
recommends 250 million doses of vaccine across multiple strains, which
would cost $150 million per year for 5 years. APHIS has set a
preliminary goal of increasing to 35-40 million doses of vaccine across
multiple strains.
APHIS' 2016 appropriations request included $1.2 million for the
North American Vaccine Bank. This amount is a continuation of baseline
funding and would only maintain the vaccine bank at its current size.
Given the mismatch between estimates of vaccine need and what APHIS
currently has access to, the Agency has had discussions with industry
about how best to address the gaps in vaccine coverage. Those
discussions have included a range of alternatives, including Federal-
industry cost-sharing, to fund efforts to eliminate the shortage, and
those conversations with industry are ongoing. APHIS and industry
recognize the need for an increased vaccine stock, and we are committed
to working with our partners to identify solutions.
Question Submitted by Hon. Jim Costa, a Representative in Congress from
California
Question. Please explain how the agency is engaging with our
trading partners to minimize trade disruptions and provide an update on
such discussions that have taken place or are scheduled to occur.
Answer. USDA has had regular discussions with our partners to
minimize the impacts of the HPAI outbreak on trade. In June, USDA
participated in the International Conference on Avian Influenza and
Poultry Trade in Baltimore, Maryland. There, USDA directly engaged
trading partners around the world to discuss how to minimize the risks
of the disease and to ensure continuity of safe trade. APHIS officials
have been continuing those conversations and met directly with key
trading partners to emphasize the safety of U.S. poultry products
throughout September.
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