    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                            IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT:
                           THE ADMINISTRATION'S CASE

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JULY 28, 2015

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 114-93

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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    Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    PAUL COOK, California                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            GRACE MENG, New York
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
    DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
    TOM EMMER, MinnesotaUntil 5/18/
        15 deg.
    DANIEL DONOVAN, New YorkAs
        of 5/19/15 deg.

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director

                                 C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    The Honorable John Kerry, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of
      State..........................................................     4
    The Honorable Ernest Moniz, Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department
      of Energy......................................................    12
    The Honorable Jacob Lew, Secretary of the Treasury, U.S.
      Department of the Treasury.....................................    18

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    The Honorable John Kerry: Prepared statement.....................     9
    The Honorable Ernest Moniz: Prepared statement...................    14
    The Honorable Jacob Lew: Prepared statement......................    21

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    90
    Hearing minutes..................................................    91
    The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
      from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement..........    93
    Written responses from the Honorable John Kerry to questions
      submitted for the record by:
      The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress
        from the State of California, and chairman, Committee on
        Foreign Affairs..............................................    95
      The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from
        the State of New York........................................   102
      The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
        from the State of Florida....................................   104
      The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
        State of Texas...............................................   109
    Questions submitted for the record to the Honorable Ernest Moniz
      by:
      The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen..............................   111
      The Honorable Joe Wilson.......................................   112

                            IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT:
                           THE ADMINISTRATION'S CASE

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JULY 28, 2015

                           House of Representatives,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Chairman Royce. This hearing will come to order.
        Today, we continue our review of the nuclear agreement the
    Obama administration reached with Iran. This is a critical
    hearing on one of the most sweeping diplomatic initiatives in
    years, some say decades, demanding the committee's thorough
    review.
        The global threat from Iran has been a focus of this
    committee for as long as I can remember. Last Congress, we
    passed comprehensive sanctions legislation by a vote of 400 to
    20. It would have given Iran's Supreme Leader a choice between
    its nuclear program or economic collapse, but the
    administration was successful in blocking that legislation.
        So, instead of us considering a verifiable, enforceable,
    and accountable agreement, we are being asked to consider an
    agreement that gives Iran permanent sanctions relief for
    temporary nuclear restrictions. Should Iran be given this
    special deal?
        In September, committee members will face the important
    decision of approving or disapproving this agreement. We will
    have that vote only because of the Iran Nuclear Agreement
    Review Act, passed in May, which the administration did not
    want. To be frank, the administration's preference has been to
    sideline America's representatives. So I was not entirely
    surprised when the administration went against bipartisan calls
    and gave Russia and China and others at the U.N. Security
    Council a vote on this agreement before the American public.
    That is backwards--and wrong.
        We have heard serious concerns from experts about the
    substance of this agreement. First, Iran is not required to
    dismantle key bomb-making technology. Does that make the world
    safer? Second, it is permitted a vast enrichment capacity,
    reversing decades of bipartisan nonproliferation policy. Does
    that make the region more stable? And, third, Iran is allowed
    to continue its research and development to gain an industrial-
    scale nuclear program once this agreement begins to expire in
    as little as 10 years. Ten years. That is a flash in time, and
    then Iranian obligations start unwinding. Does that make the
    world more secure?
        We appreciate President Obama's efforts to secure the most
    intrusive inspections in history, but it came up short.
    Instead, there is ``managed access,'' with Iran, Russia, and
    China having a say in where international inspectors can and
    can't go. The deal's 24-day process is a far cry from
    ``anywhere, anytime''--and this provision expires too. While
    the administration has professed absolute knowledge about
    Iran's program, it is a fact that we have been surprised by
    most every major nuclear development in Iran's history. And
    Iran has cheated on every agreement they have signed. So I ask,
    Mr. Secretary, has Iran earned the right to be trusted?
        This deal guts the sanctions web that is putting intense
    pressure on Iran. Virtually all economic, financial, and energy
    sanctions disappear. And where does all that money go? To the
    largest terror network on Earth. Gone are the sanctions on
    Iran's nuclear program, but also on the bad banks that have
    supported Iran's terrorism and ballistic missile development.
    And, to our dismay, Iran won a late concession to remove
    international restrictions on its ballistic missile program and
    conventional arms, imperiling the security of the region and
    our homeland.
        If this agreement goes through, Iran gets a cash bonanza, a
    boost to its international standing, and a lighted path toward
    nuclear weapons. With sweeping sanctions relief, we have
    lessened our ability to challenge Iran's conduct across the
    board. As Iran grows stronger, we will be weaker to respond.
        Yes, the U.S. would roil the diplomatic waters if Congress
    rejects this deal, but the U.S. still wields the most powerful
    economic sanctions in the world--sanctions Iran desperately
    needs relief from--sanctions that would continue to deter
    countries and companies from investing in Iran. I understand
    the effort the administration has put into this agreement, but
    these are about as high stakes as it gets. So the committee
    must ask if we made the most of our pretty strong hand, or are
    we willing to bet, as the administration has, that this is the
    beginning of a changed Iran?
        These are complex issues, and I look forward to what should
    be an extremely informative hearing.
        And I now turn to the ranking member.
        Mr. Engel. Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this
    hearing.
        Secretary Kerry, Secretary Lew, Secretary Moniz, welcome to
    the Foreign Affairs Committee. Thank you all for your dedicated
    service. No matter what side of the issue anybody is on, I
    don't think anyone here doubts your commitment to the United
    States and your good intentions on this deal. Thank you for the
    time you have taken over the last week to engage with Members
    of Congress on the proposed deal, and thank you for your
    testimony today.
        Congress gave itself 60 days to renew this deal, and I
    sincerely hope my colleagues take full advantage of this time
    to study this agreement, to ask questions, and to make an
    informed decision when the time comes. We have had many months
    and many hearings to discuss the different aspects of a nuclear
    agreement with Iran, but, at this point, we no longer are
    dealing with hypotheticals. We have a specific deal on the
    table, and we have to decide if that deal advances the national
    security interests of the United States and our allies.
        To answer that question, to be fair, we also need to ask
    ourselves what is the alternative. Absent this deal, would the
    international sanctions regime and the P5+1 coalition hold
    together? If this deal fails, how would we get the Iranians
    back to the table? Would new sanctions have to be coupled with
    military action?
        As I continue to review the deal, though, there are a
    number of issues that I find troublesome. I hope the three of
    you will address them in your testimony and as you answer the
    committee's questions.
        First, I continue to have concerns that international
    inspectors will not have immediate access to undeclared sites.
    Under the agreement, Iran has 14 days to grant access. If Iran
    refuses access after that time, then members of the Joint
    Commission could take another week to resolve the IAEA's
    concerns. After that, Iran has 3 more days to provide access.
        So we are already nearly a month after inspectors first
    wanted access, but if Iran continues to say no, another month
    could go by while this dispute is resolved. That potential
    length of time gives me pause. I would like to know how we can
    be sure Iran cannot use these delays to sanitize sites and get
    away with breaking the rules.
        Already, we are seeing Iran's leadership declare that
    military sites will be off limits to inspectors. If this is
    Iran's version of transparency during the implementation of the
    agreement, we are getting off to a bad start.
        I am also troubled by reports about how the arrangement
    reached between Iran and the IAEA on how Parchin will be
    inspected.
        Secondly, I have concerns about the sunset of the
    international sanctions on ballistic missiles and advanced
    conventional weapons. Now, my understanding was these weren't
    on the table during the talks. So I was disappointed to learn
    that after a maximum of 5 and 8 years, respectively, they will
    be terminated. I would like to understand why we allowed this
    to happen and what we can do to ensure that this doesn't make a
    terrible situation in the region get even worse.
        I am also concerned about what Iran's leaders will do when
    sanctions are phased out and new resources come flowing in. We
    are talking about tens of billions of dollars. Of course, I
    would like to see Iran's leaders use this money to help the
    Iranian people, but, even with tough international sanctions in
    place, Iran has bolstered Hezbollah, Shia militias, Hamas, and
    the Assad regime. If this deal goes through, how would you
    propose to keep this newfound wealth out of the hands of
    terrorists and tyrants?
        Next, while I am glad that Iran will be limited in its
    development of advanced centrifuges for 8 years, I worry what
    happens down the road. After the research and development ban
    expires, Iran could quickly move toward the next stage of its
    enrichment activities. I would like to know what other
    provisions in the deal, if any, will mitigate this risk.
        Finally, I have a fundamental concern that 15 years from
    now Iran will essentially be off the hook. If they choose,
    Iran's leaders could produce weapons-grade highly enriched
    uranium without any limitation. They could use advanced
    centrifuges to speed this progress even further. This amounts
    to Iran being a legitimized nuclear threshold state in the year
    2030. My big question is this: What happens then? Are we back
    to square one? Is this deal just pushing the pause button for
    15 years?
        I must also say that I have trepidation; barely a week
    after the Iranians sign the deal with us, there was the Supreme
    Leader, the Ayatollah, chanting, ``Death to America, death to
    Israel.'' You would think that after the agreement was signed
    with us there might be a modicum of goodwill, that perhaps they
    would keep quiet for a week or 2 or a month, but it went back
    to business as usual. How can we trust Iran when this type of
    thing happens? It is very disconcerting.
        So I am looking forward to hearing from our distinguished
    witnesses on these issues. Again, I thank you for your service
    and hard work.
        And I yield back to the chairman.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
        This morning, we are pleased to be joined by John Kerry,
    the Secretary of State; Ernie Moniz, the Secretary of Energy;
    and Jack Lew, the Secretary of the Treasury.
        Prior to his appointment, Secretary Kerry served as a
    United States Senator from Massachusetts for 28 years. Before
    being appointed Secretary of Energy, Dr. Moniz was professor of
    physics and engineering at MIT, where he was a faculty member
    since 1973. From Director of the Office of Management and
    Budget to White House Chief of Staff, Secretary Lew now serves
    as the 76th Secretary of the Treasury.
        Gentlemen, welcome.
        And, without objection, the witnesses' full prepared
    statements will be made part of the record.
        Members here will have 5 days to submit statements and
    questions and extraneous materials for the record.
        And, before turning to the testimony, we have most of the
    members present here. I know we all recognize the gravity of
    this issue. We want everyone to have a chance to question the
    Secretaries. To accomplish that, I would ask everyone, members
    and witnesses, respect the time limit. And that means leaving
    an adequate amount of time for witnesses to answer your
    questions. And nothing requires full use of your time.
        So we will begin with a summary of Secretary Kerry's
    testimony.
        Mr. Secretary?

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S.
                          DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Secretary Kerry. Well, Chairman Royce, Ranking Member
    Engel, and all the members of the committee, thank you very,
    very much.
        We genuinely appreciate the opportunity to be here to,
    frankly, clear up a lot of misinterpretation, some element of
    public distortion that exists out there. I know there is one ad
    I have seen on TV, has at least three or four major absolutely,
    totally incorrect facts on which it bases the ad. And, with all
    respect to both the chairman and the ranking member, there are
    conclusions that have been drawn that just don't, in fact,
    match with the reality of what this deal sets forth. And we
    happily--happily--look forward to clarifying that during the
    course of this hearing. That is what it is all about. And we
    welcome the opportunity.
        We are convinced that the plan that we have developed with
    five other nations accomplishes the task that President Obama
    set out, which is to close off the four pathways to a bomb. And
    I think, as you listen to Ernie Moniz, particularly on the
    technical components, and see the whole deal, I really believe
    that that is a conclusion that everybody can come to. I am not
    saying they will, but can.
        I am joined by, obviously, two Cabinet Secretaries. Both
    Ernie and Jack were absolutely critical to our ability to do
    this. The Treasury Department's knowledge of the sanctions and
    application of the sanctions has been exemplary, and they
    helped us understand the implications of all of these
    sanctions.
        And, as Jack will let you know, we are not talking about
    $150 billion. We are not talking about $100 billion. We are
    actually talking about $55 billion that will go to Iran. And we
    will go into that later.
        But from the day that our negotiations began, Mr. Chairman,
    we were crystal-clear that we would not accept anything less
    than a good deal, one that would shut off all of those pathways
    toward fissile material for a nuclear weapon. And after 18
    months of very intensive talks, the facts are pretty clear that
    the plan announced this month by six nations, in fact,
    accomplishes that.
        I might remind everybody, all of those other nations have
    nuclear power or nuclear weapons, and all of them are extremely
    knowledgeable in this challenge of proliferation.
        So, under the terms of this agreement, Iran has agreed to
    remove 98 percent of its stockpile of enriched uranium;
    dismantle two-thirds of its installed centrifuges; and destroy,
    by filling it with concrete, the existing core of its heavy-
    water plutonium reactor. Iran has agreed to refrain from
    producing or acquiring highly enriched uranium and weapons-
    grade plutonium for nuclear weapons forever.
        Now, how do we enforce or verify so that that is more than
    words? And, particularly, to speak to the ranking member's
    question, what happens after 15 years, what happens is:
    Forever, we have an extremely rigorous inspection/verification
    regime, because Iran has agreed to accept and will ratify prior
    to the conclusion of the agreement--and, if they don't, it is a
    material breach of the agreement--to ratify the additional
    protocol, which requires extensive access as well as
    significant additional transparency measures, including cradle-
    to-grave accountability for the country's uranium, from mining
    to milling, through the centrifuge production, to the waste,
    for 25 years.
        Bottom line, if Iran fails to comply with the terms of our
    agreement, our intel community, our Energy Department, which is
    responsible for nuclear weaponry, are absolutely clear that we
    will quickly know it, and we will be able to respond
    accordingly with every option available to us today.
        And when it comes to verification and monitoring, there is
    absolutely no sunset in this agreement--not in 10 years, not in
    15 years, not in 20 years, not in 25 years. No sunset ever.
        Now, remember, 2 years ago, when we began these
    negotiations--and a lot of people are kind of forgetting
    conveniently, sort of, where we are today. People are sitting
    there saying, oh, my gosh, in 15 years, this is going to
    happen, or whatever; Iran is going to have the ability to be,
    you know, a capable nuclear power.
        Folks, when we began our negotiations, we faced an Iran
    that was already enriching uranium up to 20 percent. They
    already had a facility, built in secret, underground in a
    mountain, that was rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium. When
    we began negotiations, they had enough enriched uranium for 10
    to 12 bombs already. Already, they had installed as many as
    19,000 nuclear centrifuges. And they had nearly finished
    building a heavy-water reactor that could produce weapons-grade
    plutonium as a rate of one to two bombs per year.
        Experts put Iran's breakout time, when we began--which,
    remember, is not the old breakout time that we used to refer to
    in the context of arms control, which is the time to go have a
    weapon and be able to deploy it. Breakout time, as we have
    applied it, is extraordinarily conservative. It is the time it
    takes to have enough fissile material for one bomb, but for one
    potential bomb. It is not the amount of time to the bomb.
        So, when we say they will have 1 year to a certain amount
    of fissile material, they still have to go design the bomb,
    test, do a whole bunch of other things. And I think you would
    agree, no nation is going to consider itself nuclear-capable
    with one bomb.
        So, if this deal is rejected, folks--by the way, when we
    started negotiations, the existing breakout time was about 2
    months. We are going to take it to 1 year, and then it tails
    down slowly. And I will explain how that provides us with
    guarantees.
        But if this deal is rejected, we immediately go back to the
    reality I just described without any viable alternative, except
    that the unified diplomatic support that produced this
    agreement will disappear overnight.
        Let me underscore: The alternative to the deal that we have
    reached is not some kind of unicorn fantasy that contemplate's
    Iran's complete capitulation. I have heard people talk about
    dismantling their program. That didn't happen under President
    Bush, when they had a policy of no enrichment and they had 163
    centrifuges. They went up to the 19,000. Our intelligence
    community confirms--and I ask you all to sit with them. They
    will tell you that is not going to happen.
        So, in the real world, we have two options. Either we move
    ahead with this agreement to ensure that Iran's nuclear program
    is limited, rigorously scrutinized, and wholly peaceful; or we
    have no agreement at all--no inspections, no restraints, no
    sanctions, no knowledge of what they are doing--and they start
    to enrich.
        Now, to be clear, if Congress rejects what was agreed to in
    Vienna, you will not only be rejecting every one of the
    restrictions that we put in place--and, by the way, nobody is
    counting the 2 years that Iran has already complied with the
    Interim Agreement--and, by the way, complied completely and
    totally, so that we have already rolled their program back. We
    have reduced their 20-percent enriched uranium to zero. That
    has already been accomplished.
        But if this is rejected, we go back to their ability to
    move down that road. You will not only be giving Iran a free
    pass to double the pace of its uranium enrichment, to build a
    heavy-water reactor, to install new and more efficient
    centrifuges, but they will do it all without the unprecedented
    inspection and transparency measures that we have secured.
    Everything that we have tried to prevent will now happen.
        Now, what is worse? If we walk away, we walk away alone.
    Our partners are not going to be with us. Instead, they will
    walk away from the tough multilateral sanctions that brought
    Iran to the negotiating table in the first place, and we will
    have squandered the best chance that we have to solve this
    problem through peaceful means.
        Now, make no mistake: From the very first day in office,
    President Obama has made it clear that he will never accept a
    nuclear-armed Iran. And he is the only President who has asked
    for and commissioned the design of a weapon that has the
    ability to take out the facilities and who has actually
    deployed that weapon.
        But the fact is, Iran has already mastered the fuel cycle.
    They have mastered the ability to produce significant
    stockpiles of fissile material. And you have to have that to
    make a nuclear weapon. You can't bomb away that knowledge any
    more than you can sanction it away.
        Now, I was chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
    when a lot of us joined together and put most of the Iran
    sanctions in place. And I know well, as you do, that the whole
    point was to bring Iran to the negotiating table. Even the
    toughest sanctions, previously, did not stop Iran's program
    from growing from, what, 163 to 300 to 5,000 to more than
    19,000 now, and it didn't stop Iran from accumulating a
    stockpile of enriched uranium.
        Now, sanctions are not an end to themselves. They are a
    diplomatic tool that has enabled us to actually do what
    sanctions could not without the negotiation; and that is to
    rein in a nuclear program that was headed in a very dangerous
    direction and to put limits on it, to shine a spotlight on it,
    to watch it like no other nuclear program has ever been watched
    before. We have secured the ability to do things that exist in
    no other agreement.
        Now, to those who are thinking about opposing this deal
    because of what might happen in year 15 or year 20, I ask you
    to simply focus on this: If you walk away, year 15 or 20 starts
    tomorrow and without any of the long-term access and
    verification safeguards that we have put in place.
        What is the alternative? What are you going to do when Iran
    does start to enrich, which they will feel they have a right to
    if we walk away from the deal? What are you going to do when
    the sanctions aren't in place and can't be reconstituted
    because we walked away from a deal that our five fellow nations
    accepted?
        Now, I have heard critics suggest that the Vienna agreement
    would somehow legitimize Iran's nuclear program. That is
    nonsense. Under the agreement, Iran's leaders are permanently
    barred from pursuing a nuclear weapon, and there are permanent
    restraints and access provisions and inspection provisions to
    guarantee that.
        And I underscore: If they try to evade that obligation, we
    will know it, because a civil nuclear program requires full
    access 24/7, requires full documentation, and we will have the
    ability to track that as no other program before. The IAEA will
    be continuously monitoring their centrifuge production, so
    those centrifuges cannot be diverted to a covert facility. For
    the next 25 years, the IAEA will be continuously monitoring
    uranium from the point that it is produced all the way through
    production so that it cannot be diverted to another facility.
        For the life of this agreement, however long Iran stays in
    the NPT and is living up to its obligations, they must live up
    to the Additional Protocol. And that Additional Protocol, as we
    can get into today, greatly expands the IAEA's capacity to have
    accountability.
        So this agreement--and I will close by saying this
    agreement gives us a far stronger detection capability, more
    time to respond to any attempt to break out toward a bomb, and
    much more international support in stopping it than we would
    have without the deal.
        If we walk away from this deal and then we decide to use
    military force, we are not going to have the United Nations or
    the other five nations that negotiated with us, because they
    will feel we walked away. And make no mistake, President Obama
    is committed to staying with the policy of stopping this bomb.
        So, in the 28 years, a little more, that I was privileged
    to represent Massachusetts, I had a 100-percent voting record
    on every issue for Israel. I first traveled there in 1986; I
    have great friends there, members of my family, others who care
    enormously about Israel. I understand the fear. I understand
    the concerns that our friends in Israel have. But we believe
    that what we have laid out here is a way of making Israel and
    the region, in fact, safer.
        And I emphasize, we do not lose any option in 15 years, 10
    years, 20 years, 5 years that we have available to us today.
        We will push back against Iran's other activities. We have
    laid out a very detailed policy for working with the Gulf
    states and others, and we look forward to working with Israel
    in the effort to do that. Our current security cooperation with
    Israel is at an unprecedented level, and it is why we have a
    robust military presence in the region, and it is why we are
    working so closely with the Gulf states.
        So, Mr. Chairman, we will continue to push back against
    Iran on every front available, but the fact is, it is a lot
    easier to push back against an Iran that doesn't have a nuclear
    weapon rather than one that does. That has been our principal
    strategic objective: Deal with a nuclear weapon, and then you
    have an easier time dealing with the other issues too.
        The outcome here is critical. We believe this deal makes
    our country and our allies safer. It will guarantee that Iran's
    program is under intense scrutiny. It will ensure that the
    world community is unified in backing this up. And, in the end,
    it will guarantee Iran's program has to be peaceful and,
    therefore, is a good deal for the world, a good deal for
    America, a good deal for our allies and our friends, and we
    believe it richly deserves your support.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Kerry follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Chairman Royce. Dr. Moniz?
        Thank you, Secretary Kerry.
        Secretary Kerry has been very thorough. Dr. Moniz, if you
    could be brief, and we will get back on time. And we will
    recognize you at this point.

     STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ERNEST MONIZ, SECRETARY OF ENERGY,
                       U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Secretary Moniz. Thank you, Chairman Royce, Ranking Member
    Engel, and members of the committee. Thanks for the opportunity
    to discuss the nuclear dimensions of the Iran agreement, JCPOA,
    reached between the E3/EU+3.
        The JCPOA prevents Iran from getting a nuclear weapon,
    provides strong verification measures to give us time to
    respond if they violate its terms, and takes none of our
    options off the table.
        I want to stress that I was backed up in the negotiations
    by the nuclear competency built up over decades at DOE and
    supported by this Congress. America's leading nuclear experts
    at DOE labs and sites were engaged throughout the negotiations.
    Nine labs and sites in seven States took part in supporting our
    negotiating position. These experts, again, were essential,
    and, as a result of their work, I am very confident that the
    technical underpinnings of this deal are solid and that the
    Department of Energy stands ready to assist in its
    implementation.
        The JCPOA will extend, for at least 10 years, the time it
    would take for Iran to produce enough fissile material for a
    first explosive device to at least 1 year. That is the fissile
    material being reduced from 12,000 to 300 kilograms; stringent
    constraints on Iran's enriched uranium stockpile, as I said,
    for 15 years; strong containment and surveillance measures on
    all centrifuge manufacturing and the uranium supply chain for
    20 and 25 years.
        Verification that Iran is following the agreement is
    forever stronger than it would be without the agreement. The
    Arak reactor will be redesigned so it is not a plutonium
    factory; and, furthermore, its plutonium-bearing irradiated
    fuel sent out of the country for the entire life of the
    reactor.
        Thus, the Lausanne parameters are maintained, and all paths
    to a bomb's worth of nuclear weapons material are addressed. In
    fact, Lausanne is materially strengthened in the P5+1 Vienna
    agreement.
        One important area, and only one, of that strengthening is
    that Iran will not engage in several activities that could
    contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device,
    including explosively driven neutron sources and multiple-point
    detonation systems. These commitments are indefinite. In
    addition, Iran will not pursue plutonium or uranium or uranium
    alloy metallurgy for 15 years.
        Weaponization requirements, especially for missile launch,
    add to the breakout timeline.
        Mr. Chairman, I cannot agree that the agreement does not
    dismantle Iran's technology efforts of relevance to nuclear
    weapons. In fact, every aspect is rolled back.
        Returning to verification, the IAEA will be permitted to
    use advanced technologies such as enrichment monitoring and
    electronic seals--technologies that DOE National Laboratories
    have, in fact, developed.
        Much has been made about a 24-day process for ensuring IAEA
    inspectors getting access to undeclared sites. In fact, the
    IAEA can request access to any suspicious location with 24
    hours' notice under the Additional Protocol, which Iran will
    implement under this deal. The deal does not change that
    baseline.
        The JCPOA goes beyond that baseline, recognizing that
    disputes could arise regarding IAEA access, and provides a
    crucial new tool for resolving such disputes within a
    reasonably short period of time. So the IAEA gets the access it
    needs within 24 days. Again, this is the first time that there
    actually is a cutoff in time.
        But, of course, most importantly, to complement that,
    environmental sampling provides extremely sensitive
    measurements of microscopic traces of nuclear materials even
    after attempts are made to remove the material. And the 2003
    example found undeclared nuclear material even after Iran
    delayed access for 6 months.
        The combination of the agreements, technical measures, and
    the coherence of the P5+1 dramatically increase the risk to
    Iran for any attempt to move to nuclear weapons capability. For
    example, any attempt to enrich to HEU, to high-enriched
    uranium, at any time must earn a sharp response by all
    necessary means. In fact, a steep response must be clear from
    the start for any violation of the agreement.
        Blocking the covert path, I should emphasize, will always
    rely, of course, on the work of the American intelligence
    community and those of our friends and allies.
        The deal is based on science and analysis because of its
    deep grounding in exhaustive technical analysis, carried out
    largely, again, by our highly capable DOE scientists and
    engineers.
        I am confident that this is a good deal for America, for
    our allies, and for our global security. This is nicely
    summarized in the recent letter to congressional leadership by
    seven former U.S. Ambassadors to Israel and Under Secretaries
    of State--individuals dedicated to strengthening the bonds
    between Israel and the United States.
        And I quote, briefly,

            ``This landmark agreement removed a threat that a
            nuclear-armed Iran would pose to the region and to
            Israel specifically. We see no fatal flaws that should
            call for the rejection of this agreement and have not
            heard any viable alternatives from those who oppose the
            implementation of the JCPOA.''

        As has been stated by many thoughtful analysts, the big
    gamble would come in turning away from the agreement rather
    than in implementing the agreement.
        So thank you for this opportunity to be here. I look
    forward to our discussion.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Moniz follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Chairman Royce. Thank you.
        We go to Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary Lew.

        STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JACOB LEW, SECRETARY OF THE
               TREASURY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

        Secretary Lew. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Engel, members of the committee, for the opportunity to be
    here. This is an important issue, one where I think the full
    discussion that we are having will make it clear that this will
    strengthen our national security and that of our allies.
        The powerful array of U.S. and international sanctions on
    Iran constitutes the most effective sanctions regime in
    history. These measures have clearly demonstrated to Iran's
    leaders the costs of flouting international law, cutting them
    off from world markets and crippling their economy. Today,
    Iran's economy is about 20 percent smaller than it would have
    been had it remained on its pre-2012 growth path.
        The United States Government stood at the forefront of this
    effort across two administrations and with the bipartisan
    support of Congress. Together, we established a web of far-
    reaching U.S. and international sanctions that ultimately
    persuaded Iran's leadership, after years of intransigence, to
    come to the table prepared to roll back its international
    program.
        International consensus and cooperation to achieve this
    pressure was vital. The world's major powers have been and
    remain united in preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. That unity of
    purpose produced four tough U.N. Security Council resolutions
    and national-level sanctions in many countries and secured
    adherence to U.S. sanctions by countries around the world.
        The point of these sanctions was always to change Iran's
    nuclear behavior, while holding out the prospect of relief if
    the world's concerns were addressed. Accordingly, once the IAEA
    verifies that Iran has completed key steps to roll back its
    nuclear program and extend its breakout time to at least 1
    year, phased sanctions relief will come into effect.
        There is no signing bonus in this agreement. To be clear,
    there will be no immediate changes to U.N., EU, or U.S.
    sanctions. Only if Iran fulfills the necessary nuclear
    conditions will the U.S. begin suspending nuclear-related
    secondary sanctions on a phased-in basis--sanctions that target
    third-country parties doing business with Iran.
        Of course, we must guard against the possibility that Iran
    does not uphold its side of the deal. That is why, if Iran
    violates its commitments once we have suspended sanctions, we
    will be able to promptly snap back both U.S. and U.N.
    sanctions. And since preventing the U.N. snapback requires an
    affirmative vote from the U.N. Security Council, the United
    States has the ability to effectively force the reimposition of
    those sanctions.
        Even as we phase in nuclear-related sanctions relief, we
    will maintain significant sanctions that fall outside the scope
    of the deal, including our primary U.S. trade embargo and other
    measures. With very little exception, Iran will continue to be
    denied access to the world's largest market, and we will
    maintain powerful sanctions targeting Iran's support for
    terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, its destabilizing role in
    Yemen, its backing of the Assad regime, its missile program,
    and its human rights abuses at home. Just this week, Treasury
    sanctioned several Hezbollah leaders, building on designations
    last month targeting the group's front companies and
    facilitators. And we will not be relieving sanctions on Iran's
    Revolutionary Guard Corps, its Quds Force, any of their
    subsidiaries, or their senior officials.
        Some argue the sanctions relief is premature until Iran
    ceases these activities and that funds Iran recovers could be
    diverted for malign purposes, and I understand that concern.
    But Iran's ties to terrorist groups are exactly why we must
    keep it from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon. The combination
    of those two threats would raise a nightmare scenario. A
    nuclear-armed Iran would be far more menacing.
        If we cannot solve both concerns at once, we need to
    address them in turn. JCPOA will address the nuclear danger,
    freeing us and our allies to check Iran's regional activities
    more aggressively. By contrast, walking away from this deal
    would leave the world's leading sponsor of terrorism with a
    short and decreasing nuclear breakout time.
        We must also be measured and realistic in understanding
    what sanctions relief will really mean to Iran. Iran's $100
    billion in restricted reserves, which many fear will be
    directed for nefarious purposes, constitute the country's long-
    term savings, not its annual budget. We estimate that after
    sanctions relief Iran will only be able to freely access around
    half of these resources, or just over $50 billion. That is
    because over $20 billion is committed to projects with China,
    where it cannot be spent. And tens of billions in additional
    funds are in nonperforming loans to Iran's energy and banking
    sector.
        As a matter of financial reality, Iran can't simply spend
    the usable resources, as they will likely be needed to meet
    international payment obligations such as financing for imports
    and external debt. Moreover, President Rouhani was elected on a
    platform of economic revitalization and faces a political
    imperative to start meeting those unfulfilled promises. He
    faces over $\1/2\ trillion in pressing investment requirements
    and government obligations. Iran is in a massive economic hole
    from which it will take years to climb out.
        Meanwhile, we will aggressively target any attempts by Iran
    to finance Hezbollah or use funds gained from sanctions relief
    to support militant proxies, including by enhancing our
    cooperation with Israel and our partners in the Gulf.
        Backing away from this deal to escalate the economic
    pressure and try to obtain a broader capitulation from Iran
    would be a mistake. Even if one believed that extending
    sanctions pressure was a better course than resolving the
    threat of Iran's nuclear program, that choice is simply not
    available. Our partners agreed to impose costly sanctions on
    Iran for one reason: To put a stop on its illicit nuclear
    program. If we change our terms now and insist that these
    countries now escalate those sanctions and apply them to all of
    Iran's objectionable activities, they just wouldn't do it. They
    would balk, and we would be left with neither a nuclear deal
    nor effective sanctions.
        So it is unrealistic to think that additional sanctions
    pressure would force Iran to totally capitulate and impractical
    to believe we could marshal a global coalition of partners to
    impose such pressure after turning down a deal our partners
    believe is a good one.
        The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is a strong deal.
    With phased relief after Iran fulfills its commitments to roll
    back its nuclear program and a powerful snapback built in if
    later on they break the deal, its terms achieve the objective
    they were meant to achieve: Blocking Iran's paths to a nuclear
    bomb. That is the overriding national security priority, and it
    should not be put at risk, not when the prospect of an
    unconstrained Iranian nuclear program presents such a threat to
    America and the world.
        Thank you again, and we look forward to answering your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Lew follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Secretary Lew.
        To get back to a point that was made, as I read it, the 24-
    day suspect site process does expire in 15 years. The IAEA
    Additional Protocol alone wouldn't deter Iran, based on our
    past experience with their noncompliance with the IAEA. So I
    think that point stands.
        The other question I just would like to ask Secretary Kerry
    relates to what the Secretary of Defense said. In his testimony
    about the ``I'' in ``ICBM,'' he said it stands for
    ``intercontinental,'' which means going from Iran to the United
    States. Simply, countries develop ICBMs to deliver a nuclear
    warhead. And these will be aimed at us, not at Moscow.
        And at the same time that these missile restrictions are
    coming off, sanctions on the Iranian scientists involved in
    their bomb work are also coming off.
        So how is that making us safer? It seems to me the winner
    here is Russia, which demanded and won on the lifting, on
    Iran's behalf, of these ICBM sanctions. Why did we concede on
    that?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, we didn't concede on that, Mr.
    Chairman.
        In fact, we won a victory because the--we have seven
    nations negotiating. Three of the seven thought that the
    sanctions ought to be lifted immediately--Iran, Russia, and
    China. Four of them--Germany, France, Britain, the United
    States--thought they shouldn't.
        And what we succeeded in doing was keeping both the arms
    embargo and the missile component--the missiles for 8 years,
    the arms for 5 years--notwithstanding the fact that Iran has a
    very legitimate argument, which they were making, that the U.N.
    Resolution 1929, which is what created the sanctions and the
    structure we were negotiating under, said that if Iran comes to
    the table and negotiates all the sanctions would be lifted.
        Now, they didn't just come to the table to negotiate; they
    made a deal. They signed an agreement. They came to an overall
    agreement. So they felt that they were in compliance with the
    U.N. resolution. And we felt, on the other hand, that their
    behavior in the region was such that it would be
    unconscionable, notwithstanding, to lift. So the compromise was
    the 5 and 8.
        But we don't feel we lost anything whatsoever in that, Mr.
    Chairman, for the following reasons: The UNSCR, U.N. Resolution
    1929, is a nuclear resolution. Susan Rice put the--she was then
    at the U.N.--she put the arms piece in at the last minute. It
    was a sort of throw-in at the last moment into this nuclear
    resolution.
        And the nuclear resolution always contemplated that if the
    IAEA came to what is known as its broad conclusion that Iran
    was not engaged in any illicit activities in its declared or
    undeclared activities, then all the sanctions are lifted.
        So, no matter what was going to happen here, we were going
    to lose both the missile and the arms under the U.N. component.
    But here is what we have done in the meantime that we believe
    actually takes care of this issue:
        First of all----
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Secretary, I have followed the
    arguments that you have made about the laws that we have to
    defend against Iran's missile program, and I understand the
    steps that you took here.
        I am just saying, big picture, big picture, when we end up
    with a bottom line where in 8 years they get the missile, it
    doesn't look like a victory to me. It looks like----
        Secretary Kerry. But they don't.
        Chairman Royce. They may not get the missile at the time,
    but they can buy the technology at that time. The embargo is
    lifted at that time.
        Secretary Kerry. No. Actually, they can't, Mr. Chairman,
    because we have, happily--we have several other protocols which
    prevent that from happening. Specifically, the missile control
    technology regime prevents that from taking place. We have an
    Executive order by the President of the United States that, in
    fact, prevents the transfer of----
        Chairman Royce. I would just point out there is a reason
    why Russia pushed it. There is a reason we did not want----
        Secretary Kerry. Because Russia they didn't want the U.N.
    component of this. But they know that we have separate
    capacities and we will apply them.
        Chairman Royce. I would hope that we could strengthen our
    hand in this as we go along, but the bottom line is Iran is
    getting a financial windfall. It increases its support for
    terrorist proxies. They have announced that recently. It
    reintegrates into the global economy. It upgrades its
    conventional weapons. I think it upgrades its ballistic missile
    program in this, over the time of this agreement. It has an
    industrial-size nuclear program in 10 years. And that is the
    timeframe only if they don't cheat.
        So, when I look at this and I see that Iran's neighbors,
    who know it the best, trust it the least, I just ask--we are
    presuming Iran is going to change its behavior----
        Secretary Kerry. No, we are not.
        Chairman Royce [continuing]. And that behavior did not
    change last weekend, when they were chanting, again, ``Death to
    America.''
        Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman, please, with all due
    respect, we are not presuming any such thing. There is no
    presumption in here about what Iran will or will not do. There
    is one objective: Make sure they can't get a nuclear weapon.
    And on the back side of that, we have a very robust initiative
    that will push back against Iran's other activities.
        But let me be very specific. Executive----
        Chairman Royce. Well, my time has expired.
        Secretary Kerry [continuing]. Order 12938 authorizes U.S.
    Sanctions on foreign persons that materially contribute to the
    proliferation of missiles, including efforts to manufacture,
    acquire, develop, and transfer them, by any person or foreign
    country of proliferation concern.
        That is just one----
        Chairman Royce. Okay.
        Secretary Kerry [continuing]. Of about four or five----
        Chairman Royce. My time has expired, Mr. Secretary. I am
    going to go to Mr. Engel, but thank you very much.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank all of you for testifying.
        I still want to get back to 15 years, because, frankly, it
    is the thing that disturbs me the most. The truth is that after
    15 years Iran is a nuclear threshold state. They are
    legitimized in this agreement as being a nuclear threshold
    state, which means they can produce weapons-grade highly
    enriched uranium without limitation.
        I know you can make the argument and say, well, they are
    already at that point now. But why would we not try to
    negotiate a deal where they couldn't have those things in 15
    years?
        I also want to mention that a nuclear agreement doesn't
    whitewash the fact that Iran continues to remain a
    destabilizing actor in the region and continues to fuel
    terrorism around the globe.
        Our friends in Israel, rightfully, are concerned that
    Iranian funding of terrorism would continue to affect them in
    an existential way. One of the issues I have had with this
    agreement is that from day one it only focused on--it limits to
    Iran's nuclear program. With this agreement, the way I look at
    it, Iran's financing of terrorism will continue and could
    become much worse. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps would
    take advantage of any sanctions relief that results from an
    agreement between P5+1 and Iran because, simply put, money is
    fungible.
        So I would like to know how, specifically, will we work
    with our allies to minimize the potential windfall to terrorist
    organizations and protect our allies like Israel.
        And the other issue I want to raise is that the lifting of
    the arms embargo and the sanctions--the chairman mentioned some
    of this--and the sanctions around Iran's ballistic missile
    program further destabilizes the region.
        I was very disappointed that these sanctions will
    eventually be lifted. We had been told that Iranian weapons
    transfers and their ballistic missile program were outside of
    the scope of the negotiation. So, in my opinion, the changes to
    these sanctions should have been outside the scope, as well.
        So that means, when the arms embargo expires, Iran will be
    able to legally ship weapons to President Assad so he can
    continue to torture and kill his own people.
        So how will U.S. sanctions work to address this issue?
    Would the administration be open to further congressional
    consideration of new sanctions on Iran's arms activity and
    ballistic missile program?
        And, finally, because the arms embargo and ballistic
    missile sanctions are not specifically mentioned in the JCPOA,
    only the U.N. Security Council resolution governing the JCPOA,
    would violations of the arms embargo be considered violations
    of the JCPOA? Does the snapback of sanctions apply to
    violations of the arms and missile embargoes? If Iran were to
    continue to ship weapons to Hezbollah before the arms embargo
    expires, would they be in violation of the JCPOA?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, Congressman, there are so many
    questions in there. Obviously, we are very happy to come back
    to you on the record. I want to answer every single one of
    them. But let me try to take on the biggest ones first of all.
        Let me just call to everybody's attention here, the IRGC
    opposes this agreement. So they are not sitting there thinking
    they are going to get the whole world and be able to go and do
    what they want to do. And one of the reasons they oppose this
    agreement--and I invite you to talk to the intel community
    about that, they will document it--is that they see themselves
    losing the cover of the nuclear umbrella that they had hoped to
    have for their nefarious activities.
        Now, there is nothing here to prevent us from pushing back
    against the IRGC and others going forward, Congressman.
    Congress and others, we are all free to work together to build
    the pushback against the destabilizing activities.
        But let me ask you a simple question: Is Iran empowered
    more destabilizing the region with a nuclear weapon or stripped
    of that ability with an international agreement it has to live
    up to and then us coming in underneath with a whole set of
    other security arrangements and pushback? I think the answer to
    that is crystal clear.
        Now, you asked the question of what happens with respect to
    year 15. Folks, under the additional protocol and the Modified
    3.1 Code, please focus on what happens. There is not some
    sudden break-off at the end of 15 years. They are under
    remarkable restraint.
        Specifically, the comprehensive safeguards agreement that
    they have to negotiate with the IAEA, which goes on forever,
    provides the IAEA with the right and obligation to provide
    safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in
    Iran to ensure the material is not diverted to nuclear weapons.
    All non-nuclear-weapon states parties under the
    Nonproliferation Treaty have to bring this into agreement.
        The comprehensive safeguard agreement requires Iran to
    maintain detailed accounting records on all material that is
    subject to the safeguards, operating records on all facilities
    subject to the safeguards. All public facilities in their
    program are subject to the safeguards.
        It provides for a range of IAEA inspections, including
    verifying the location, the identity, the quantity, the
    composition of all nuclear materials subject to the safeguards,
    the design of nuclear facilities. It requires the Board of
    Governors to ``take action without delay''--that is a quote--in
    a situation where it is essential and urgent and provides
    consequences for a finding of noncompliance.
        That is just on the side of the declared facilities. There
    are a whole set of requirements for access and inspection and
    accountability on the undeclared facilities.
        So, Congressman, they are forever under enormous
    constraints here with respect to inspections and
    accountability. They have to provide accountability for all the
    nuclear research and development activities not involving
    nuclear material, manufacturing and production of sensitive
    technology, centrifuge rotor components, construction of hot
    cells usable for plutonium separation, uranium mines,
    concentration plants, nuclear waste, all kinds of things.
        Now, let me let Ernie----
        Chairman Royce. Well, may I suggest this, Mr. Secretary? We
    can respond for the record, Mr. Secretary, to the ranking
    member's questions. But if we could go now to Ileana Ros-
    Lehtinen. The time has expired here. And we will just get that
    for the record later.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Last week, the LA Times reported that Iran's Foreign
    Minister told the Iranian Parliament that under the deal Iran
    can deny inspectors access to military sites. Iran's Defense
    Minister has also stated that he would not allow international
    inspectors to enter Iran's military sites. Yet President Obama
    stated:

            ``Inspectors will also be able to access any suspicious
            location. Put simply, the organization responsible for
            the inspection, the IAEA, will have access where
            necessary, when necessary.''

        Can the IAEA really have access to any and all military
    sites suspected of housing nuclear activity? Does the agency
    need preapproval from Iran to access these sites?
        And the whole point of sanctions, Mr. Secretary, was not to
    bring Iran to the negotiation table, and dismantling Iran's
    nuclear infrastructure used to be the administration's goal.
    The administration repeatedly told us that it would focus
    sanctions only on its nuclear portfolio. Yet, in the deal we
    have over 60 pages of individuals, companies, vessels that will
    be delisted, specifically mentioned. Many of these sanctions
    are not nuclear-related.
        The administration has always stated that all provisions
    within this agreement have to be agreed upon by all parties,
    which includes allowing the EU to list sanctions on the Quds
    Force, including its leader Soleimani. What do you say, Mr.
    Secretary, to the families of Americans who were killed or
    wounded as a result of Soleimani's actions in Iraq? And please
    explain to them why as part of the nuclear negotiations the
    U.S. agreed that the IRGC Quds Force that is responsible for
    countless deaths around the globe are going to get their
    designations lifted and will be getting billions of dollars to
    support their acts of terror throughout Europe. And I am glad
    that it is only $50 billion. I feel better already.
        Secretary Kerry, you will be in Cuba soon. I remain
    extremely worried about allowing Cuba to open an Embassy here
    in DC, giving the regime a license to spy against our Nation.
    Will U.S. law enforcement vet every Cuban official, so-called
    diplomat, who wants to come to Washington, and will we reject
    any Cuban official who wishes to be posted in DC if our law
    enforcement officials have information related to their
    espionage apparatus?
        And finally, Secretary Kerry, when announcing the deal,
    President Obama said--the Iranian deal: ``We will continue our
    unprecedented efforts to strengthen Israel's security.'' Will
    you guarantee that the U.S. will veto any measure at the U.N.
    Security Council on Palestinian statehood that calls for
    anything but a two-state solution through direct bilateral
    negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and nothing
    else?
        Secretary Kerry. So, Madam Chair, let me come back to you
    on the record on a bunch of those, because, again, they are
    more than we can answer in the time we have. And I appreciate
    your effort to get a lot of questions, and we will answer them
    all.
        Let me just clarify a couple of important things. I want
    Ernie and Jack to get in here on two things, one on the money
    and the other on the highly enriched uranium.
        But just very quickly, there is a confusion here between
    the dismantling of the nuclear weapons program versus the
    nuclear program. It was never the goal of this administration--
    and by the way, not even the Bush administration. The Bush
    administration in 2008 offered----
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect,
    perhaps if you could answer about the Soleimani, the lifting of
    sanctions of the EU, which we agreed to.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, I just want to be very clear,
    though, I want to be very clear that we are achieving what we
    set out to do, which is dismantling their capacity to make a
    nuclear weapon.
        With respect to the military sites, yes, they will have,
    providing that is part of the inspection of an undeclared
    suspicious facility. And if it is, we will have access.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We will have access to the military
    sites?
        Secretary Kerry. If they don't provide it, they will be in
    material breach of this agreement and the sanctions will snap
    back.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And we consult with Iran before we get
    access?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, there is a process, there is a
    procedure in place, but it doesn't rely on Iran or Russia or
    China saying yes.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. So Iran is wrong when they say that we
    won't have access to military sites?
        Secretary Kerry. No. They are taking care of a domestic
    constituency in the way that they feel they need to. They
    understand that under this agreement----
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Secretary Kerry [continuing]. What they say is not as
    important as what they do.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. My time is up.
        Chairman Royce. I am going to remind the members we have 5
    minutes. So ask the question. Give enough time for response.
    Then with a second question. And what we are going to do is we
    are going to have the response for the record. But I am going
    to encourage the members.
        We are going to go now to Mr. Brad Sherman of California.
        Mr. Sherman. We have got to remember that this is not a
    binding deal. This is not a treaty. This is not binding on
    Iran. This is not binding on the United States. It is not even
    an Executive legislative agreement. And these gentlemen here
    aren't even asking for Congress to approve the deal. I think
    they would appreciate it if we didn't pass a formal resolution
    of disapproval. It might be at most morally binding on this
    administration.
        So what may be important for us is to look to see whether
    it is a good deal in the next couple of years, because I think
    the administration has plans to follow it, unless we prohibit
    that, and also try to see whether we will have Congresses and
    administrations in the future that will take the actions in the
    future necessitated by our national interest.
        One quick observation. The IRGC may publicly oppose this
    deal because that is the best thing the Iranian Government can
    do to persuade us here in Congress to support the deal, or
    maybe they genuinely oppose it.
        But I want to focus, Secretary Kerry, on your remarks about
    dealing with Iran's non-nuclear behavior. And you say we will
    be in a stronger position to deal with that, and we have to
    deal with it. They are holding four American hostages. Assad is
    killing 5,000 people a month at least, and the blood is on the
    hands of men in Tehran. And they are supporting Hamas,
    Hezbollah, and the Houthi, and those are just the organizations
    that begin with the letter H.
        You are not going to be able to persuade them to change
    just by charm, although you bring a considerable amount of
    that. You are going to need to threaten them with new
    sanctions, unless they change their behavior. And we have seen,
    sanctions cause Iran to change its behavior even on things very
    important to Iran.
        Now, I am not asking you whether you think new sanctions
    are a good idea, bad idea, whether Europe will follow, whether
    they won't follow. I am only going to focus on what is legal
    under this agreement.
        You were asked about this in the Senate, and you said, ``We
    will not violate the agreement if we use our authorities to
    impose sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights, missiles,
    or other non-nuclear reasons.'' But you then also noted that
    there is this provision in paragraph 26 that commits the United
    States to refrain from reintroducing or reimposing the
    sanctions specified in annex 2, which of course are the very
    best sanctions we have got, although we can probably come up
    with new ones if you tell us that the old ones are forbidden.
        So you were also asked: If we reimpose sanctions on the
    Central Bank of Iran to deter terrorism, would that violate the
    agreement? And you said no. But I would like you to clarify, is
    Congress and the United States free under this agreement to
    adopt new sanctions legislation that will remain in force as
    long as Iran holds our hostages and supports Assad?
        Secretary Kerry. We are free to adopt additional sanctions
    as long as they are not a phony excuse for just taking the
    whole pot of the past ones and putting them back. We can put
    them in place.
        Let me let Jack----
        Mr. Sherman. Secretary Kerry, it is my time, and I have got
    a lot of other questions.
        Now, we have got a number of entities listed for their
    nuclear activities that deserve to be listed for their
    terrorist activities. It is just you haven't had time to put
    them on that second list. Will you be putting entities who are
    on the list of sanctions for their nuclear activity on the
    terrorist list if they deserve it, and can you get that job
    done before this agreement becomes effective?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, we have terrorism sanctions in place
    right now.
        Mr. Sherman. But we have got to list additional entities.
        Secretary Kerry. We are free to add, and we have added.
        Mr. Sherman. And we are free to add those who----
        Secretary Kerry. By the way, we added some 60 entities
    during the course of these negotiations.
        Mr. Sherman. Let me get to one other question. You strongly
    do not want us to override a Presidential veto, but if we do,
    that triggers certain American laws. I would like to give you
    an opportunity. You don't want us to do it. You think it is
    terrible policy. You think the rest of the world would be
    against us.
        But let's say Congress doesn't take your advice. We
    override a veto. And the law that is triggered then imposes
    certain sanctions. Will you follow the law even though you
    think it violates this agreement clearly and even if you think
    it is absolutely terrible policy?
        Secretary Kerry. I can't begin to answer that at this point
    without consulting with the President and determining what the
    circumstances are----
        Mr. Sherman. So you are not committed to following the law
    if you think it is a bad law?
        Secretary Kerry. No, I said I am not going to deal with a
    hypothetical, that is all. I would like the Secretary of the
    Treasury to respond on the sanctions.
        Chairman Royce. We are out of time. We are going to have to
    go to Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey. But for the record, Mr.
    Secretary, please put it in the record and we will have it.
        Secretary Lew. Mr. Chairman, on the financial issues and on
    the sanctions issues, there is a lot of responses to the
    questions that are being asked, and if we got a minute or 2 to
    respond, it might actually be helpful to those who want to
    understand the agreement.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Smith.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome to the committee, gentleman.
        Numerous reports of Iranian collaboration with North Korea,
    including articles written by Assistant Secretary of State
    Douglas Frantz way back in 2003, make it clear that North Korea
    is collaborating with Iran. One first question, what happens
    under the agreement if North Korea conveys nuclear weapons to
    Iran and other capabilities that they certainly have at their
    disposal?
        The issue of the arms race is real. I think this
    incentivizes Saudi Arabia and others, Egypt, to acquire a bomb.
    That means the Middle East becomes even more of a powder keg.
        Saeed Abedini, Hekmati, Rezaian, Levinson, when are they
    going to be free, if you can speak to that, Mr. Secretary?
        In your opening you said even if they break out, they still
    have to go design the bomb. But that is the problem with this
    agreement. It once again kicks the issue of the past military
    dimensions of Iran's program down the road.
        Iran has been stonewalling the IAEA on this point for
    years. Inspectors have long been denied access to the Parchin
    military site, where it is believed that Iran tested detonators
    for nuclear warheads. Iran has refused inspectors access to the
    Parchin site for years. In 2013, there were even images showing
    bulldozing of buildings and removing of roads.
        Is the IAEA being pressured to accept terms that fail to
    provide inspectors full access and disclosure?
        And the last point, Mr. Secretary, yesterday at the TIP
    Report release you spoke eloquently and boldly about combating
    modern day slavery. I deeply respect your personal commitment
    to ending sex and labor trafficking. But while the report is
    accurate, I am concerned that the designations for several
    countries miss the mark, and a number of countries got
    absolutely unmerited upgrades, including Malaysia, Cuba and
    Uzbekistan.
        I went back and read the reports from last year and the
    year before. In China, there were 35 convictions of
    trafficking, and that is now a Watch List country. Cuba, 13
    convictions for sex trafficking. The narrative gets it right.
    None for labor trafficking. They say there is no labor
    trafficking, it doesn't exist, which is nuts. A year ago there
    were 10 convictions. So we are talking about absolutely
    minimal.
        Thailand, by contrast, had 151 convictions. They are still
    Tier 3. And Malaysia had three convictions for sex and labor
    trafficking, a decrease from nine from last year, and they were
    Tier 3.
        The narratives get it right. The designations miss it by a
    mile.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, I am going to deal with the TIP. I
    would be happy to sit down with you and talk that through.
    Since time is so precious here, I want to stay on Iran, and I
    want my colleague to be able to address a couple key issues.
        Secretary Lew. Mr. Chairman, if I could just respond to a
    couple of the issues that have been raised. Congressman Engel
    asked about the money----
        Mr. Smith. If the gentleman would yield. This is my time. I
    would really like to know about the questions.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Smith, we will get answers here to
    everything. Let's let the witness.
        Secretary Lew. On the question of the flow of money to
    Iran, there have been a range of estimates as to how much money
    Iran has locked up. Let's remember why the money is locked up.
    It is locked up because our international partners worked with
    us to take Iran's money and not let Iran get it.
        At the highest number that we see, there is $115 billion
    that is theoretically available. In reality, $58 billion to $59
    billion of that is unavailable, roughly $20 billion is tied up
    in contracts like China, and the balance is things like
    nonperforming loans.
        Now, I am not going to say that $56 billion is not a lot of
    money, but it is not $150 billion, and it cannot all be used
    because they need to keep some foreign reserves just to run
    their economy. If you look at the demands in Iran's economy for
    the use of that money, we see at least $500 billion of
    competing demands for that $50 billion.
        So in any kind of an allocation of that resource, you look
    at what they have done under sanctions, they have managed with
    sanctions in place to put several million dollars a year toward
    malign purposes. We can't say that there won't be any more
    money going to malign purposes.
        But I think the order of magnitude is way, way smaller, and
    it is in line with the kinds of spending they have been doing
    anyway. You compare that to an Iran with a nuclear weapon, the
    bigger threat to us and our friends in the region is Iran with
    a nuclear weapon having the same kinds of objectives.
        On Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen's questions about the IRGC
    and Soleimani, Soleimani is not delisted. We have not delisted
    the major entities of the IRGC. There are a few entities whose
    identity has changed over time, whose leadership has changed
    over time. Privately, we are happy to go through the individual
    cases. But we have kept in place our sanctions regime on
    terrorism.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Now, we have got three questions that were asked by the
    gentleman from New Jersey. If we can just have a succinct
    answer to those.
        Secretary Kerry. Congressman, the greatest incentive for an
    arms race in the region, for Egypt or Saudi Arabia or one of
    the other countries to try to get a bomb, will be if this
    agreement is rejected. And the reason will be that Iran will go
    back to enriching, we will not have inspection, we will not
    have insight, and they will say: Oh, my God, now they are going
    for a bomb, now we have a reason to have to get one. They have,
    in fact, told us, these countries, that they are not going to
    chase a bomb providing the implementation of this agreement
    continues and providing that we are working with them on the
    other pushback issues for the region.
        With respect to the issue of Parchin, yes, there will be
    access as appropriate under the agreement between the IAEA and
    Iran, and that is an agreement which is normally entered into
    confidentially between those countries.
        Mr. Smith. Again, that is the problem.
        Americans held captive and North Korea gets the bomb, or
    conveys a bomb to Iran, what happens there?
        Secretary Moniz. May I comment? I believe I heard you say,
    Congressman, that Iran set off a nuclear explosive at Parchin.
    That is incorrect.
        Mr. Smith. I didn't say that. I didn't say that at all.
        Chairman Royce. Those weren't his remarks, if I could just
    interject.
        Mr. Smith. Really, at least get that right.
        Secretary Kerry. But there will be appropriate access.
        Mr. Smith. But appropriate, how is that defined?
        But, again, on the Americans held captive and on the issue
    of North Korea conveying bombs to Iran, what happens under the
    agreement?
        Secretary Kerry. My last conversation with Foreign Minister
    Zarif and with the brother of the President was regarding the
    four people being held, the four American citizens. And we have
    followed up on that conversation since then. We are in direct
    conversations. That is all I am going to say here today. But I
    hope that they will be returned to be with their families.
        Mr. Smith. North Korea and a bomb, they convey bombs to
    Iran, what happens under the agreement, anything?
        Secretary Kerry. If North Korea what?
        Mr. Smith. If North Korea were to provide weapons, nuclear
    weapons to Iran, what happens?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, they can't do that, and both Iran
    and North Korea would be in gross violation of the
    Nonproliferation Treaty, and we would take action.
        Mr. Smith. North Korea seems not to care.
        Secretary Kerry. And Iran would be in violation of this
    agreement.
        Chairman Royce. All right. So we have Albio Sires from New
    Jersey.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for being here.
        There are deep divisions in Iran, evidenced by the comments
    made by the hardliners and the Prime Minister and the Foreign
    Minister and the Supreme Leader. Are these divisions likely to
    resurface during the implementation of this agreement? And what
    are the consequences of these divisions for the implementation?
    Because I keep reading that they are constantly going back and
    forth. And I am concerned that we get an agreement and the
    hardliners----
        Secretary Kerry. So, Congressman, it is a very, very good
    question and appropriate to understanding the dynamic here.
        We saw the exact same divisions of things that were being
    said regarding the interim agreement, if you recall. And what
    we have learned is it is not as important what they say, it is
    important what they do, and make sure that their actions are
    held accountable. Every aspect of the interim agreement has
    been lived up to, notwithstanding denials that came out
    publicly from certain politicians or from certain leaders.
        We have seen the same thing here. We heard that X or Y or Z
    was a red line, it wouldn't be able to do it, et cetera. But
    the agreement is the agreement. That is why we have been so
    clear, Mr. Chairman, that nothing in this agreement is based on
    trust. Nothing is based on an expectation of some change of
    behavior. This agreement is 100 and whatever pages, 9 pages,
    because it is specific with its annexes in declaring what is
    expected of whom and when. And that precision is what gives us
    confidence we will be able to hold them accountable.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you. And, Secretary, you said there is
    only $56 billion for them to really----
        Secretary Lew. That is accessible.
        Mr. Sires. Accessible. But really, they do not need a lot
    of money for some of these groups to start up again. I mean,
    they don't need billions, they can't absorb billions, some of
    these groups. So, I mean, there is enough money there to stir a
    lot of problems.
        Secretary Lew. I mean, the problem is that even with all of
    the sanctions in place, they are finding the relatively small
    sums of money that it takes to do terrible acts of regional
    destabilization and support of terrorism. So they are doing
    that now with the sanctions in place. And what I am saying is I
    don't think you are going to see the shape of that support
    change. Though there will be some more resources available, it
    will on the margin, and it will be along the lines of what they
    are already doing, which puts the burden on us and our allies
    in the region to shut down the flow of money and the flow of
    materiel to malign forces.
        Frankly, one of the issues we discussed with our Gulf
    allies when we met with them at Camp David was how to work more
    effectively together to shut down some of those flows of money,
    things that are happening today, with the sanctions in place.
    So I think the problem exists today, with or without an
    agreement.
        And the challenge on this money that is Iran's money locked
    up overseas is it is not in the United States. A lot of the
    money is in China. A lot of the money is in India. It is in
    other places. If the P5+1 agreement is rejected by the United
    States, I don't think we can rely on those other countries
    keeping that money locked up. So you could end up with Iran
    getting access to that money without the benefit of an
    agreement, which would be a very bad outcome.
        So I think that we have to keep it in perspective. It is a
    serious issue. We have made the commitment to continue
    designating, like we did last week, additional Hezbollah
    actors. We will continue to do that. We have sanctions and
    secondary sanctions in place. We will double and redouble our
    efforts on that. We need to get our allies to be part of it.
    But that is not a reason not to have an agreement to make sure
    that Iran doesn't get a nuclear weapon.
        Secretary Kerry. Also, Congressman, I would just
    underscore, if you look at their activities, they are not
    capital intensive, what they have been doing with the Houthi,
    what they have done over the years.
        So I think that our objective here was to make sure they
    can't have a nuclear weapon, and, secondly, to work with our
    allies and friends in the region in order to do a greater job,
    a much better job of pushing back against those activities. And
    I am going, at the end of this week, I will be meeting in Doha
    with the Gulf states. We are laying out with them the very
    specific steps with respect to that pushback and what we will
    be engaged in, in order to increase the security and push back
    against these activities you are talking about.
        But it is impossible to do them all in one pot at one time.
    First step nuclear weapon. Now we have the opportunity to press
    for the changes that we want.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you.
        We go to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And,
    again, thank you and Ranking Member Engel for providing such
    leadership on this issue. We have had many hearings about it.
        And, Mr. Secretary, let me note that while you are
    receiving quite a grueling today, let us note that we
    appreciate the hard work that you and others in the
    administration are making. We know that you sincerely are
    looking to make this a more peaceful world. But some of us
    realize that in the past we have seen people who are very
    sincere in seeking peace creating a--unfortunately, setting
    things off in a direction that led to war and led to more
    repression and didn't create a more peaceful world.
        One of the efforts that I noted when I was part of this is
    how Ronald Reagan succeeded in ending the Cold War, and during
    that time period we reached weapons agreements with the Soviet
    Union.
        But let me note, while we were making those agreements with
    the Soviet Union to put a lid on nuclear weapons in Europe, et
    cetera, we ratcheted up our support for the democratic elements
    who were struggling against Soviet domination in various parts
    of the world. Whether it was in the Soviet Union or in
    Nicaragua or Afghanistan, we were actually increasing our
    efforts to support those people. We also denied them hard
    currency, much less had any agreement that would have bolstered
    the Soviet economy. And because we had that approach, the
    Soviet Union fell apart, and in the long run that is what made
    a more peaceful world, the elimination of that regime.
        And I am afraid that--without fighting, by the way, we
    eliminated it--I am afraid that this treaty that you are
    talking about today and you are promoting will do just the
    opposite then what we saw succeeded, and that it is it will
    actually empower the mullahs. Rather than making it a more
    peaceful regime and make peace more likely, empowering the
    mullahs in the long run will create more chaos, more likelihood
    of war, because they are the main proponents and supporters of
    terrorism and, of course, hatred toward the West that we have
    seen coming from their regime.
        Now, what I would like to ask you is that we all know in
    this body, we have been aware, for example, of the repression
    and the brutal treatment of people within Iran, like the MEK,
    who are suffering, and you have noted this in the past
    yourself, the brutality that these people who oppose the regime
    have had to face.
        Did you confer in any way with the people, the democratic
    elements in Iran, or these other people who are struggling for
    a free Iran and how this agreement will affect their long-term
    goal for a democratic Iran and thus a more peaceful world?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, as you know, this was a nuclear
    negotiation. But I have on many occasions met with and had
    discussions with folks representing different interests and
    aspirations within Iran.
        What I would say to you, Congressman, and you have to make
    sort of a hard judgment here about where Iran is, President
    Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif are both individuals who
    have expressed a very different point of view from the past
    leadership of Iran.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. I have a limited amount of time. So your
    answer is, no, that you did not confer with the democratic
    elements----
        Secretary Kerry. No, that is not what I said. I said I have
    had plenty----
        Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. But you have been
    conferring--but you are conferring with their oppressors
    instead. The fact is that----
        Secretary Kerry. No, I didn't say that. I don't think I
    said that at all, Congressman.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. And during the Reagan years, Mr.
    Secretary, during the Reagan years--we talk about only $55
    billion. Well, okay, we will figure out whether it is $150
    billion that the mullahs are going to have or whether it is $50
    billion. But the fact is, part of the effort that worked under
    Reagan was supporting the democratic element and undermining
    the economy of the Soviet Union.
        In the long run what will bring peace to this part of the
    world is not for us to have short-term arms deals with the
    mullah regimes and the other people who hate the West and are
    supporting terrorism, but to try to support those elements in
    those societies that want peace with the West and aren't
    preparing some sort of holy war against us.
        I am sorry, Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your sincerity and
    what you guys are trying to do, but I believe this treaty will
    empower the mullahs and make conflict more likely.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Gerry Connolly of Virginia.
        Mr. Connolly. I thank the chairman.
        And I find, my friend from California, I find his words
    ironic, because Ronald Reagan was nothing if not a pragmatist
    and was quite capable of compartmentalizing relationships for
    the sake of a greater good. His relations with the Soviet Union
    were the quintessence of that kind of pragmatism, exactly what
    is in front of us today. Something is overriding: Nuclear
    capability in the region. Shall we deal with it or not?
        Samuel Taylor Coleridge described fiction as the willing
    suspension of disbelief. I must say I find a lot of fiction
    involved, the willing suspension of disbelief, in some of the
    criticism of this agreement. It is not perfect. It will hurt
    Israel. It will give them a nuclear capability some day. It
    doesn't do enough. It doesn't deal with ancillary and
    horrendous behavior. Well, who said it would?
        And here is the bottom line. Valid though many of those
    criticisms may be, imperfections we can find by the score, what
    is your program? And you know what I have heard in a series of
    hearings here? Let's just go back to the P5+1 and Iran and say
    we just couldn't sell it, let's start over. That is one of the
    most monumentally naive statements I have ever heard, and it
    came from a former Member of Congress who knows better. It is
    not true. It won't happen.
        At least let's stick to the facts. But, no, the willing
    suspension of disbelief is at work, it is alive and well here,
    including the issue of the existential threat to Israel.
    Walking away from this agreement, you need to take
    responsibility for the consequences to Israel, whether you are
    Bibi Netanyahu or you are a Member of Congress, and you have
    got to weigh it really carefully. What will happen? What risks
    am I willing to take before I cast that vote on behalf of our
    country and our allies like Israel?
        Mr. Secretary, I think it is an extraordinary job you have
    done, and I would like to give you the opportunity to talk
    about two problems. And you, too, Mr. Secretary, Secretary
    Moniz. If we walk away from this agreement, what in your
    analysis is likely to happen?
        And secondly, Secretary Moniz, to me one of the real
    vulnerabilities in this agreement is that 24-day problem. All
    of us have reason to be concerned about that. That is not quite
    the robust inspection we had hoped for.
        Secretary Kerry. So I am going to be very quick, because I
    want Ernie to get in here.
        But it is not speculation, it is clear, if Congress rejects
    this, Iran goes back to its enrichment, the Ayatollah will not
    come back to the table. Anybody who makes that judgment has not
    talked to the intel community. And there is no way, given his
    feelings already about the West and his mistrust of us and his
    reluctance to even have engaged in this discussion, that he is
    suddenly going to reenter if we reject this.
        Moreover, the sanctions regime completely falls apart. The
    folks we relied on to provide a united front here, France,
    Germany, Britain, China, Russia, go off, and we will have set
    ourselves back, folks. I don't know how I would go out to
    another country if that happens and say: Hey, you ought to
    negotiate with us, or you ought to talk to us about any issue,
    whatever it is, with the reliance that we can actually deliver.
    Because they will sit there and say: Well, you have got 535
    Secretaries of State in the United States, we don't know who we
    are negotiating with, and whatever deal we make always risks
    being overturned.
        That is not the traditional relationship that has existed
    between the Executive and the Congress.
        And finally, Iran will say: We are free. We can go back to
    our program. And what I said earlier about bringing year 15 to
    today, it happens, year 20, whatever it is. They will take
    their 19,000 centrifuges, they have the ability to enrich, and
    they will feel we have backed off.
        Ernie, would you address the----
        Secretary Moniz. Yeah.
        First, let me just add that from my 5 months at the
    negotiating table, I doubt our P5+1 partners would be any more
    interested in going back to the table than Iran.
        On the 24 days, again, let me emphasize that all the
    regular access--well, for declared sites--is constant. The 24
    days is a new tool in the sense that there has never been any
    limit at all. And so the key is in getting enough of a
    compressed process where we feel confident in being able to
    detect any use of nuclear materials, number one, over that time
    period. And in a classified environment we could provide even
    more evidence than I have already discussed today.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        We go to Steve Chabot of Ohio.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for being here, Mr. Secretary.
        This administration, the President specifically called
    ISIS, famously, the JV team. That clearly wasn't true. This
    administration cited Yemen as the model approach to U.S.
    counterterrorism, and that was shortly before Yemen's near
    total collapse into chaos. So that wasn't true either.
    President Obama declared al-Qaeda to be ``decimated,'' ``on the
    run,'' ``broken apart,'' ``on their heels,'' ``very weak,'' and
    those are all quotes, by the way. Now, that may be wishful
    thinking, but it certainly wasn't true and isn't true.
        Why should the American people trust the administration now
    on this deal?
        Secretary Kerry. We are not asking them to trust. We are
    asking them to read the deal and look at the components. As I
    have said many times, nothing in this deal is built on trust.
    Nothing. It is on very specific steps that have to be taken.
    For instance, Iran gets zero relief from the sanctions until
    Iran has implemented the 1-year breakout time by destroying the
    calandria, taking out their centrifuges, undoing their
    electrical, undoing the piping. They have to do all of that----
        Mr. Chabot. As you know, I have got limited time, so I am
    going to move on to my next question.
        Secretary Kerry. All I am saying is they have to take
    specific steps.
        Mr. Chabot. But when you say that that doesn't depend on
    trust, that just strains credibility, I think, to say there
    isn't trust on both sides involved in this. There has to be or
    there is no deal.
        Sticking with this theme on trust, let me ask you this:
    Relative to anywhere, anytime inspections, you said, and I
    quote:

            ``This is a term that, honestly, I never heard in the 4
            years that we were negotiating.''

        Now, in fact, in April this year Deputy Secretary Advisor
    Ben Rhodes had said that the International Atomic Energy Agency
    would have immediate access--immediate access--to any site that
    the agency wanted to inspect. Now, immediate access sure sounds
    like anytime to me.
        And also, in April, Energy Secretary Moniz, who is the
    gentleman sitting next to you there, he said, and I quote:

            ``We expect to have anywhere, anytime access to places
            that are suspected of out-of-bounds activities.''

    There is that anywhere, anytime once again.
        So, again, why should the American people trust what they
    are being told by this administration about this deal?
        Secretary Moniz. May I say, my quotes have anytime,
    anywhere in the sense of a well-defined process and a well-
    defined timescale, and that is what we have.
        Mr. Chabot. Okay.
        Secretary Kerry. But let me go further than that. I have
    been negotiating----
        Mr. Chabot. That really clears things up, Mr. Secretary. So
    thank you.
        Go ahead, Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Kerry. We never had a discussion in the context
    of these negotiations that talked about anywhere, anytime.
    Nowhere on the planet Earth does any country anywhere under the
    NPT have anything called anywhere, anytime. What we have is
    called managed access, and it is a process by which we get in.
        Mr. Chabot. With this 24 days, okay, I mean, that came out
    to 24 days.
        Secretary Kerry. Please let me answer, let me answer the
    question.
        Mr. Chabot. And we know that that is longer. That is months
    actually.
        Secretary Kerry. Twenty-four days is an outside period of
    time during which time, and for 24 years or longer, 2,400
    years, they would not be able to hide the remnants of nuclear
    activity, of fissile material, and Ernie Moniz will tell you
    that.
        But leaving that aside, the 24 days----
        Mr. Chabot. Mr. Secretary, as you know, I have only got 5
    minutes, and I have got several more questions. Let me ask you
    this.
        Secretary Kerry. Congressman, you love asking questions and
    having no answers.
        Mr. Chabot. If this is such a good deal, why is Israel so
    opposed to it?
        Secretary Kerry. First of all, I understand when you say
    Israel, there are people in Israel who support it.
        Mr. Chabot. And the Prime Minister, okay, he is the
    representative, just like President Obama is the representative
    of our country on these types of things.
        Secretary Kerry. I understand, and you will agree that
    President Obama always talks for everybody in the country,
    right?
        Mr. Chabot. Well, he is sure speaking for us in this
    agreement, and he seems bound and determined to go forward with
    this thing whether the elected representatives of the American
    people, the majority of us at least, are for it or not.
        Secretary Kerry. Let me speak to your question, because it
    is a serious question and it is important. As I said earlier,
    we fully understand, every Israeli has concerns, has fears.
    There are concerns about the region they live in, about the
    nature of the rhetoric that is used, death to Israel, death to
    America. Everybody is concerned. Which is why this is not based
    on some element of a dream they are going to change or some
    element of trust.
        But I will tell you there are people in Israel who----
        Mr. Chabot. You are going to name a couple of people. The
    Prime Minister is against it. And I am almost out of time.
        This is one of the main reasons, as a representative of the
    American people, I am so concerned, because Israel could be
    directly affected, but with these ICBMs and the technology that
    could be coming, it could make American cities at risk.
        Chairman Royce. Excuse me, Mr. Chabot. We have got to go to
    Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks
    to our witnesses for being here.
        Secretary Kerry, thank you as well on behalf of my
    constituent's family, Robert Levinson, for continuing to raise
    his plight and that of the three other Americans who are held.
    And I agree with you that it is time for them to come home.
        I want to talk specifically about PMD, because if we don't
    address PMD, the military dimensions of the program, then it is
    impossible for us to believe that the IAEA will have the
    credibility it needs going forward.
        Under the terms of the agreement, the nuclear-related
    activities that are set forth that need to be satisfied in
    order for there to be sanctions relief refer to the road map,
    the IAEA-Iran road map, except they leave out the most
    important point, which is the one that the IAEA has to have
    final resolution of PMD.
        So I have two questions. The first question is, will we
    have access, will the IAEA have access to Parchin? The second
    question is, am I right, because I don't see any other way to
    read the agreement, that satisfaction of PMD will not be a
    prerequisite to Iran getting sanctions relief?
        Secretary Kerry. It is. It is a prerequisite. If they
    haven't complied with the IAEA and lived up to the dates that
    are laid out in the program, August and October, they will not
    get relief.
        Mr. Deutch. Mr. Secretary, I acknowledge that. But by
    October 15, they have to have activities, they need to set out
    what they are going to do. But it is December 15 by which the
    Director General and the Board of Governors will assess whether
    or not they have complied, and that is not a condition under
    the deal.
        Secretary Kerry. Actually it is. They would be in material
    breach if they don't do this. We have told them that and they
    understand that. Moreover----
        Mr. Deutch. I understand. I would just point out it is
    specifically omitted in the list of past and present concerns.
    It is not a requirement.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, the outcome. If you are talking
    about the outcome, it is not dependent on the outcome because
    the outcome, we have no way of knowing which way obviously that
    goes.
        Mr. Deutch. But that is the issue, Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Kerry. No, it is whether they comply or not. We
    know what they were doing. We have already drawn our conclusion
    about 2003. We know they were engaged in trying to make a
    weapon.
        Mr. Deutch. So that is my point.
        Secretary Kerry. So it is not the outcome that determines--
    --
        Mr. Deutch. This is important. So you are saying that
    even----
        Secretary Kerry. It is compliance.
        Mr. Deutch. Right. So if they comply with the IAEA, but the
    IAEA ultimately concludes that they are not satisfied on PMD,
    either because they don't have access, because they didn't get
    access to the site----
        Secretary Kerry. Then they are not in compliance.
        Mr. Deutch [continuing]. Because they didn't get access to
    the scientists?
        Secretary Kerry. That would be a breach. We would not do
    sanctions relief. They know that.
        Mr. Deutch. Then I would respectfully suggest that it is
    not at all clear in the agreement. We could talk about that.
        I would like to move on to the issue of specifically the
    sanctions. This has been brought up by a number of my
    colleagues. The annex 2 that lists lots and lots of individuals
    and entities that are getting sanctions relief under this deal,
    many of them are listed, are involved in not just proliferation
    activities, but they are also involved in terrorism, support
    for terrorism. They are involved in human rights abuses. They
    went on this list because it was easier to get our European
    allies to go along with the proliferation sanctions.
        And I have a very specific question. Secretary Lew, I
    appreciate that we are going to continue to sanction Hezbollah.
    But what I really want to know is, will we be able to and are
    we going through the process now of scouring this list, not
    just for individuals, but for banks and shipping lines and
    state-owned companies, to reimpose sanctions if they are
    subject to sanctions for terrorism?
        Secretary Lew. Well, Congressman, first, we have not listed
    for relief many entities. The IRGC----
        Mr. Deutch. I understand. But I am asking about this----
        Secretary Lew. There are institutions that were designated
    for their acts of terrorism or regional destabilization that
    have not been relieved.
        Mr. Deutch. Mr. Secretary, I understand that. I have a very
    specific question. Will we be able under this agreement to
    reimpose sanctions on all of these individuals and entities if
    we find they should be because of their terrorism?
        Secretary Lew. Congressman, we have retained all of our
    rights to designate firms and individuals under terrorism
    sanctions----
        Mr. Deutch. Including everyone listed in this annex?
        Secretary Lew--including entities who are on the list. What
    we cannot do--and this is what Secretary Kerry was saying a few
    minutes ago--we cannot just put in place the nuclear
    sanctions----
        Mr. Deutch. I understand. No, no, I understand.
        Secretary Lew. We have given up no ability to target
    individuals or entities.
        Mr. Deutch. Including, I hope we are going through the list
    and scouring it right now. I only have a few seconds left. And
    I would just ask for some acknowledgement that when we say that
    Iran is engaged in all these terrible activities now and it
    doesn't cost much money, I would suggest that it has been
    reported that $200 million a year is the amount that they use
    to fund Hezbollah. So if only $1 billion of the $56 billion
    were to go to Hezbollah, we would double the amount of support
    for 5 years, at which time the arms embargo comes off and they
    are considerably more dangerous. We have to at least
    acknowledge that that could occur.
        Secretary Kerry. Congressman, we can put the arms--there
    are plenty of opportunities to deal with the arms.
        Chairman Royce. Joe Wilson of South Carolina.
        Secretary Kerry. There is a U.N. resolution preventing them
    from taking weapons to Hezbollah. There is a resolution
    preventing them from sending weapons to Iraq, preventing them
    from sending weapons to----
        Chairman Royce. At this time we have got to go to Joe
    Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Ed Royce and Ranking Member
    Eliot Engel, for hosting this hearing, and I appreciate the
    panel being here today.
        Secretary Kerry, I share the concerns of an op-ed by David
    Horovitz of The Times of Israel where he presents 16 reasons
    the nuke deal is a catastrophe for the Western world. I will
    present these as questions for the record for you to answer
    during the coming month. We need this as a response for the
    American people so that as we vote in September, the American
    people will know, as you stated a few minutes ago, the correct
    facts.
        One, was the Iranian regime required to disclose the
    previous military dimensions of its nuclear program in order
    both to ensure effective inspections of all relevant
    facilities? No.
        Two, has the Iranian regime been required to halt all
    uranium enrichment, including thousands of centrifuges spinning
    at the main Natanz enrichment facility? No.
        Has the Iranian regime been required to shut down and
    dismantle the Arak heavy water reactor and plutonium production
    plant? No.
        Four, has the Iranian regime been required to shut down and
    dismantle the underground uranium enrichment facility it is
    building at Fordow? No.
        Five, has the Iranian regime been required to halt its
    ongoing missile development? No.
        Six, has the Iranian regime been required to halt research
    and development of the faster centrifuges, which will enable it
    to break out the bomb far more rapidly than is currently the
    case? No.
        Seven, has the Iranian regime been required to submit to
    anywhere, anytime inspections of any and all facilities
    suspected of engaging in rogue nuclear-related activity? No.
        Eight, has the international community established
    procedures setting out how it will respond to different classes
    of Iranian violations to ensure that the international
    community can act with sufficient speed and efficiency to
    thwart a breakout of the bomb? No.
        Eight, has the Iranian regime been required to halt its
    arming, financing, and training of Hezbollah terrorist army in
    south Lebanon? No.
        Ten, has the Iranian regime been required to surrender for
    trial the members of the leadership placed on an Interpol watch
    list for the alleged involvement in the bombing by the
    Hezbollah suicide bomber of the AMIA Jewish Community Center in
    Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1994, and resulting in the deaths
    of 835 people? No.
        Eleven, has the Iranian regime undertaken to close its 80
    estimated cultural centers in South America from which it
    allegedly fosters terrorist networks? No.
        Twelve, has the Iranian leadership agreed to stop inciting
    hatred among its people against Israel and the United States
    and stop its relentless calls for the annihilation of Israel?
    No.
        Thirteen, has the Iranian regime agreed to halt executions
    currently running at an average of some three a day, the
    highest rate in 20 years? No.
        Fourteen, does the nuclear deal shatter the painstakingly
    constructed sanctions regime that forced Iran to the
    negotiating table? Yes.
        Fifteen, will the deal usher in a new era of global
    commercial interaction with Iran, reviving the Iranian economy
    and releasing financial resources that Iran will use to bolster
    its military forces in terrorist networks? Yes.
        Sixteen, does the nuclear deal further cement Iran's
    repressive and ideologically rapacious regime in power? Yes.
        I am going to be submitting these for the record, and I
    look forward to receiving them during the next month. In the
    meantime, the American people need to know there is bipartisan
    opposition to this deal. I was really grateful, 2 weeks ago we
    had Senator Joe Lieberman here who addressed my concern, and
    that is that the Secretary of State designated Iran a state
    sponsor of terrorism over 30 years ago in response to the
    hundreds of Marines who were killed at the Marine barracks. And
    I asked Senator Lieberman, has there been a change in course?
    His quote directly:

            ``This regime, the Iranian Government, the Islamic
            Republic of Iran, has the blood of a lot of Americans
            on its hands, the Marines at the barracks in Beirut,
            the soldiers of Khobar Tower, and I would go on.
            Incidentally, hundreds of American soldiers were killed
            in Iraq by Shia militias that were trained and run by
            the IRGC. Sir, your question is a good one: Has the
            government changed? There is no evidence of change.''

        Mr. Secretary, has there been evidence of change?
        Secretary Kerry. Yes, in that the President of Iran sent
    his Foreign Minister to negotiate an agreement to which I could
    pose you a lot of questions that I can give you the answer to
    that are ``yes'' too. Does Iran have to give up two-thirds of
    its centrifuges for 10 years? Yes. Does Iran have to annihilate
    its----
        Mr. Wilson. And, Mr. Secretary, those are words----
        Chairman Royce. If the gentleman will suspend. Your time
    has expired. I have suggested to the members, ask the questions
    and leave time for a response.
        We are going to Brian Higgins of New York.
        Mr. Higgins.
        Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The snap-back provisions in this agreement are real and
    powerful, and I think are born out of a deep distrust of Iran.
    The snap-back provisions, as I understand them, allow for any
    of the six powers to the deal to flag what it considers a
    violation. That concern would be submitted to a dispute
    resolution panel. If those concerns remain unresolved, the
    sanctions would resume or snap back after 30 days. Preventing a
    resumption of sanctions would require a vote of the Security
    Council, from which the United States and its Western allies
    would have veto power. It is unprecedented and I think very,
    very powerful and speaks volumes to this deal.
        Under this deal, uranium would be cut by 98 percent. The
    level of enrichment for what remains is 3.67 percent, a long
    way from the 90 percent enrichment that would need to occur to
    achieve a weapons-grade or fissile material. Centrifuges would
    be reduced from 19,000 to a little over 6,100 for 10 years.
    There would be no enrichment at Fordow, and the only
    centrifuges permitted for use would be older, first-generation
    centrifuges. Plutonium. The Arak facility would be
    reconstituted so it cannot make weapons-grade material, and
    materials that do exist there today would be sent out of the
    country entirely.
        Number four, Iran may try to build a nuclear weapon in
    secret. Mr. Secretary of Energy, I would ask you, through
    robust monitoring and verification and inspection, the deal
    would allow inspectors access and to inspect any suspicious
    site. I heard critics of this plan say that, well, that is
    like, because of this 24-day period, it is like a police
    officer calling a drug dealer to say that we are going to raid
    your apartment in 24 days so that they can clear all the
    evidence.
        Would you speak to this within the context of physics and
    talk about the half life of both uranium and plutonium?
        Secretary Moniz. I will start with the last question then,
    if I may. Well, first of all, technically on the half life, the
    half life of the dominant uranium isotope is roughly the age of
    the Earth, which is why it still exists in the Earth. And that
    of uranium 235, which is the isotope that you would want to
    enrich for a nuclear weapon, is somewhat shorter and therefore
    is more rare in nature.
        However, first of all, the analogy to putting the drugs
    down the toilet is not very applicable to the use of nuclear
    materials. And as I have said, in the both unclassified and
    classified regimes, we have extraordinarily sensitive ways of
    finding miniscule amounts that are left over from using nuclear
    materials, whether it is enrichment or whether it is in an
    explosive environment to understand this nuclear weapons
    behavior. So on that we are very, very clear.
        And in addition, we have other constraints on them, some of
    them forever, in terms of other parts of weaponization, like
    neutron sources, where we also would have some interesting
    signatures should there be suspicious activity.
        Mr. Higgins. Secretary Lew, you had dealt with the issue of
    the projected amount of money that would be available to Iran
    once the sanctions are lifted. My understanding is that most of
    that money is Iranian money in foreign accounts, frozen in
    foreign accounts. In that Iran's currency has lost about half
    its value over the past 3 years, was that factored into your
    estimate about the amount of money which will be available to
    Iran once it comes back to them?
        Secretary Lew. Congressman, I was addressing the specific
    issue of their reserves that are tied up overseas because of
    sanctions.
        We have done enormous damage to their economy. It will take
    them years to get back to where they would have been if
    sanctions had not been put in place, even if they got that
    money back. So they are not looking at breaking out into a
    period of great growth.
        And I think the challenge here is we have a pretty good
    understanding of what the pressures in Iran are right now. We
    can't know with certainty what decisions they will make. We
    know that, for example, just to get their oil fields up and
    running properly would require an investment of $100 billion to
    $200 billion.
        So I can't tell you how much of the $50 billion they will
    apply to their oil fields, but you have to assume that one of
    the things they are going to want to do is get their economy
    moving. So that money will quickly be used for a lot of
    purposes.
        I wish I could say that zero, not a nickle, would not go to
    malign purposes. But even with the current sanctions regime,
    they are finding the money to put into malign purposes. The
    question is, do they do it with or without a nuclear weapon?
        Chairman Royce. Mike McCaul of Texas.
        Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Kerry, the countries that know Iran the best fear
    this agreement the most. And the reasons why are for the
    following reasons: It lacks the necessary verification measures
    to ensure Iran does not cheat. It lifts the restrictions on
    Iran's intercontinental ballistic missiles, which the Ayatollah
    himself said they will mass-produce.
        The international sanctions on Iran's Revolution Guard
    Corps, its terror arm, will be relieved, and the European
    sanctions. This still could also, in my judgment, spark a
    nuclear arms race in the Middle East, as the Saudis told me
    when I recently visited there.
        And, as chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, what
    concerns me the most is this deal frees up hundreds of billions
    of dollars to the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism.
    Susan Rice, the President's National Security Advisor, said,

            ``We should expect that some portion of that money will
            go to the Iranian military and could potentially be
            used for the kinds of bad behavior that we have seen in
            the region.''

        And now you are asking this Congress to endorse an
    agreement that the President's own National Security Advisor
    admits will spread terror in the region.
        Finally, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister confirmed,

            ``We will provide weapons to whomever and whenever we
            consider appropriate, and we will buy weapons from
            wherever we can.''

        Chairman Royce and I sent a letter, sir, to you and the
    President of the United States, asking you to first submit this
    deal for consideration by the American people through their
    representatives, first, before this deal was submitted to the
    United Nations. But, instead, you went around the Congress and
    the American people, submitted this to the United Nations, and
    then China, Russia, and Venezuela got a chance to vote on this
    and approved this agreement before we have had a chance to
    deliberate.
        My question is this: If the Congress overrides the
    President's veto, what effect would that have on this deal? In
    other words, would it kill the deal?
        Secretary Kerry. Yes. We have said that many times.
        But let me come back to your earlier comment----
        Mr. McCaul. But this is a very important point. Will the
    U.N. and EU sanctions be lifted and that will relieve Iran of
    these burdens, or would it--if we override the President's
    veto, would it collapse the entire international deal?
        Secretary Kerry. The sanctions rely on the international
    community's participation to be able to enforce them. Our
    sanctions alone did not do the job alone. It wasn't until we
    went out and worked with other countries diligently--China, for
    instance, in order to persuade them not to buy X amount of oil;
    countries in the Middle East, to not be trading underneath the
    table or otherwise. There were a lot of different things
    necessary to make these sanctions work.
        If the United States unilaterally, through congressional
    decision, pulls away from this deal, they are not going to
    continue to apply those sanctions. They have no reason to. They
    are gone. They have already said they are gone.
        And, with respect to Saudi Arabia, there was an AP article
    the other day when Ash Carter visited Saudi Arabia. Saudi
    Arabia's Foreign Minister said Iran's nuclear deal appears to
    have the provisions needed to curtail Iran's ability to obtain
    a nuclear weapon, and----
        Mr. McCaul. Well, my time is limited. I have heard
    otherwise from the Saudis. But let me just--that is very
    important for us----
        Secretary Kerry. Well, that is a very public comment----
        Mr. McCaul. For us in the Congress to understand that if we
    override the President's veto it will stop this entire
    agreement, I think that is important for us, as Members of
    Congress, to know.
        Secretary Kerry. But what I am hearing here is that----
        Mr. McCaul. I have one more question. It has been debated
    by Secretary Lew and yourself that you did not approve the
    delisting of the Quds Force commander, the Iranian terror arm,
    from the European sanctions list. I am looking at the agreement
    right here. They are taken off the list, the European list,
    which is an agreement that was approved by you.
        The Quds Force, they killed Americans in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. What do I tell my Gold Star Mothers back home,
    whose children were killed by these Iranian forces, and tell
    them that this agreement will take them off the list?
        Secretary Kerry. Tell them that the United States of
    America will continue to keep the sanctions on him,
    specifically. He remains designated by our country, and we will
    not ever lift them and that that the United States will be
    pushing back on them.
        But, look, here is what I am hearing----
        Mr. McCaul. My final question is this, too.
        Secretary Kerry. Let me----
        Mr. McCaul. This secret deal between the IAEA and Iran----
        Secretary Kerry. There is no secret deal.
        Mr. McCaul [continuing]. We have never seen this. Are you
    going to present that to the Congress?
        Secretary Kerry. There is no secret deal. There is an
    agreement, which is the normal process of the IAEA, where they
    negotiate a confidential agreement, as they do with all
    countries, between them and the country. And that exists. We
    have briefed on it, we know it exists----
        Mr. McCaul. Are you going to present that to the Congress,
    sir?
        Secretary Kerry. We don't have it. It is not in our
    possession.
        Mr. McCaul. Have you seen it?
        Secretary Kerry. We have been briefed on it. I have not
    personally seen it.
        But can I just say something?You know, we hear these
    complaints. We hear, well, this agreement doesn't do this, it
    doesn't stop their terror, this agreement is going to give them
    some money, this agreement is going to do this. What this
    agreement is supposed to do is stop them from having a nuclear
    weapon. Now, I want to hear somebody tell me how they are going
    to do that----
        Chairman Royce. We are going to go to----
        Secretary Kerry [continuing]. Without this agreement. I
    would like to know----
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Secretary----
        Secretary Kerry [continuing]. How you are----
        Chairman Royce. We are going to go to Mr. William Keating
    of Massachusetts.
        The gentleman's time has expired.
        Secretary Kerry. They have an ability to go enrich again.
    What is the next step for the United States? Nobody is
    answering that question.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Keating.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank our witnesses for being here and their hard work.
        Three threads I am going to throw out there, and one of
    them--there have been reports in the media that have surfaced
    that among our European partners in this there was reluctance.
    And those reports centered on France, in particular.
        I am curious--and you can answer all three at the end--I am
    curious what issues that you can detail that they might have
    had qualms about, issues that weren't addressed. And I wanted
    you to comment on those reports.
        Number two, if you could generally comment about the
    cooperative actions of North Korea and Iran and how this might
    be impacted.
        Number three, we have had witnesses before on this issue,
    and they really were forceful, including Ambassador Burns, they
    were forceful in saying it is important that we send a strong
    military message, should any agreement go forward.
        And when it comes to, you know, sales and transfer of arms
    and other things--you began to speak to this, and I want to
    give you the time to address what military options, what are
    our strongest options that we still have as a country and how
    we can act on this.
        And I am going to give all three of you the remainder of my
    time so that you can answer some questions. And I won't be
    interrupting you.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, thank you, Congressman.
        Let me just say very quickly, because I want my colleagues
    to have a chance to catch up here, but on the European
    partners, France, in the final comments, when they signed on to
    the agreement, it was Bastille Day, July 14, and the Foreign
    Minister said that he thought this agreement was not only a
    strong agreement but he hoped it would be remembered in the
    same way, as having a positive impact for the world, the way
    Bastille Day was remembered as having the impact for the
    development of France. And they supported this agreement and
    voted for it.
        With respect to North Korea and Iran, this is a very
    different agreement from anything that ever existed with North
    Korea. There are about seven or eight different major
    differences between the North Korea agreement, not the least of
    which is North Korea pulled out of the NPT. And North Korea had
    already exploded a nuclear weapon, and Iran has not. There are
    many differences, and I would rather lay them out on the
    record, if we can. But this covers all possible nuclear-related
    activities. The agreement with North Korea did not. And we also
    have consent to the process of inspections. North Korea--I
    mean, there are a whole series of things.
        Finally, on the military option, I have said it again and
    again, everybody has, Ash Carter has reiterated it: President
    Obama is the only President who has actually commissioned the
    development of a weapon that can do what is necessary to deal
    with the facilities that are at risk. And he has not only
    commissioned its design, he has deployed it.
        And he has made it clear that Iran will not get a weapon,
    and he is prepared to use any option necessary in order to
    achieve that. But his preferred option is the one he is
    pursuing here, which is a diplomatic solution and which
    resolves this issue in a way that avoids the conflict that some
    people seem to be not even addressing, which would be almost
    inevitable as a consequence of not accepting this deal.
        Ernie?
        Secretary Moniz. Well, in terms of the first question about
    the dynamics with the EU or the other partners in general,
    first of all, on the nuclear dimension side, I should emphasize
    that I have talked about our team, but every one of the six
    countries had technical experts involved. And they had very
    robust discussions. We did not share our own classified
    calculations but made sure we were coming out in the same
    place. And, to be honest, in many areas, we pushed the
    envelope; in some areas, they pushed the envelope.
        And the good news is I think we all came out of this very
    satisfied that the technical dimensions accomplished the job of
    blocking nuclear-weapons pathways. There are some specific
    examples one could give, in terms of additional infrastructure
    removal from centrifuge places in both Natanz and Fordow, in
    terms of 20-percent uranium issues. But these were very robust,
    and I think all six countries feel very, very confident in our
    conclusions.
        Secretary Lew. Congressman, I think that, on the sanctions
    side, we have very different systems here in the United States
    than the EU. And the questions that we are getting on IRGC kind
    of underscore the fact that we need to look at our system and
    their system and understand that they are different.
        They are not delisting the IRGC for terrorist activities.
    If they do, at the end of phase 2, delist for nuclear, the
    terrorist sanctions still stays in place. So I think people
    looking at the document ought to understand what is actually
    going to be in place after it is in effect. And I think
    cooperation with the Europeans on this requires that we not
    distort what they are doing. They are not taking the IRGC off
    of their terrorist list.
        Chairman Royce. Judge Ted Poe of Texas.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you, gentlemen.
        I have received numerous questions from people in Texas,
    and I will submit those for the record. They are pretty simple
    questions, but I will submit those for you to answer.
        Secretary Kerry, this question is for you. Following up on
    Chairman McCaul's comments about the secret deal, Secretary
    Rice said that she has seen this deal with the IAEA and that it
    will be shared with Congress. So if she has seen it, have you
    seen it?
        Secretary Kerry. I don't believe that Susan Rice, the
    National Security Advisor, has seen it. I think she----
        Mr. Poe. She said she did 6 days ago. She said 6 days ago
    she seen it and reviewed it----
        Secretary Kerry. Well, I don't know that she----
        Mr. Poe [continuing]. And that Congress will get to see it
    in a classified session. My question is, have you seen it?
        Secretary Kerry. No, I haven't seen it. I have been briefed
    on it, and----
        Mr. Poe. But you haven't read it. You haven't seen it.
        Secretary Kerry. No.
        Mr. Poe. Let me ask you this----
        Secretary Kerry. We don't discuss it. It is in the
    possession of the IAEA.
        Mr. Poe. [continuing]. Are you going to read it?
        Secretary Kerry. We don't have access to the actual
    agreement. Or, at least, I don't.
        Mr. Poe. But Secretary Rice has access to it, but you don't
    have access to it.
        Secretary Kerry. I don't know about that.
        Mr. Poe. Well, that is just what she said. I am just going
    on what she said.
        Is the policy of the United States still that Iran will
    never have nuclear weapons?
        Secretary Kerry. Yes.
        Mr. Poe. Is it the policy of the Ayatollah, if you can
    answer for him, that Iran wants to destroy the United States?
    Is that still their policy, as far as you know?
        Secretary Kerry. I don't believe they have said that. I
    think they have said ``Death to America'' in their chants, but
    I have not seen a specific----
        Mr. Poe. Well, I kind of take that to mean that they want
    us dead. That would seem like that would be their policy. He
    has said that.
        You don't think that is their policy? I am not mincing
    words. Do you think it is their policy to destroy us?
        Secretary Kerry. I think they have a policy of opposition
    to us and of great enmity. But I have no specific knowledge of
    a plan by Iran to actually destroy us.
        I do know that the rhetoric is beyond objectionable. I know
    that we, you know, are deeply concerned with Iran's behavior in
    the region, deeply concerned with their past activities, which
    is why President Obama felt----
        Mr. Poe. Reclaiming my time. I got your answer. I am going
    to ask another question.
        Secretary Kerry [continuing]. That it is----
        Mr. Poe. I am reclaiming my time, Senator. Thank you--
    Secretary.
        We have heard a lot of comments about----
        Secretary Kerry. But if they did want to destroy us, they
    would have a much better shot of doing it if they had a nuclear
    weapon.
        Mr. Poe. But you don't know if it is their policy or not.
    That is the question, and that is your answer.
        Next question: Is it our policy or belief that, after the
    deal, whether the deal is approved or not, do we have a policy
    in the United States that we want, expect, desire a regime
    change by the people of Iran to have their own say, free
    elections? Weigh in on our policy toward a regime change in
    Iran.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, as you know, Congressman, President
    Obama was very outspoken with respect to support for
    transformation in Iran around the time of the elections.
        Our policy today is specifically focused on pushing back on
    their activities within the region that destabilize the region,
    threaten Israel, threaten our friends and allies. And that is
    specifically where we are gearing up to take a specific set of
    steps that will define a new security alliance for the region.
        Mr. Poe. Okay. So we want to push back. We want them to
    stop their naughty ways. But regime change--I mean, I
    personally think the best hope for the world for safety,
    including in Iran, is for the people of Iran to have free
    elections and to let the people of Iran really decide who their
    government should be in a free setting.
        Let me ask you another question, Secretary Moniz. This
    might be my last question. If I understand the agreement, the
    oil sanctions, which is prohibiting Iran from exporting oil,
    that is going to be lifted. Is that correct?
        Secretary Moniz. Well, if sanctions are relieved, that
    would be among those relieved, correct.
        Mr. Poe. Under this deal, that is one of the ones that will
    be relieved.
        Secretary Moniz. If the sanctions are relieved, yes, and
    then----
        Mr. Poe. Okay.
        Secretary Moniz [continuing]. Then oil export.
        Mr. Poe. Now, being the Secretary of Energy, let me ask you
    this: Why is the United States lifting the sanctions on the
    exporting of oil on Iran, but we are not lifting the sanctions
    on America exporting crude oil, like Texas sweet crude?
        Secretary Moniz. We don't have sanctions on oil exports. We
    have a congressional law that in the 1970s restricted exports.
        Mr. Poe. But do you support----
        Secretary Moniz. Secondly----
        Mr. Poe. Do you support that law being changed?
        Secretary Moniz. Secondly----
        Mr. Poe. Do you support that law being changed?
        Secretary Moniz. Secondly----
        Mr. Poe.You know that is the question. Do you support the
    law being changed?
        Chairman Royce. The gentleman's time has expired, and we
    can get that for the record.
        Mr. Poe. Okay. I will put that in writing. Thank you.
        Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman, point of----
        Chairman Royce. We need to go to David Cicilline of Rhode
    Island.
        Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman, just a point of personal
    privilege here.
        I wanted to make sure that we knew what we were talking
    about and the record properly reflects this. Susan Rice's quote
    is:

            ``We know their contents, and we are satisfied with
            them. We will share the contents of those briefings in
            full and classified sessions with Congress.''

        She has not seen them. She has been briefed on them.
        Mr. Poe. And that question----
        Chairman Royce. And we will, of course--reclaiming my time,
    we are still looking forward to that briefing.
        But now we must go to David Cicilline of Rhode Island.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to the witnesses not only for being here today
    but for the ongoing conversations.
        And I want to particularly thank the administration for
    really making sure that Members have all the information that
    we need as we navigate through a very sober decisionmaking
    process with enormous consequences.
        And I thank all three of the Secretaries for their service.
        I have a series of questions that I am not asking to
    support a conclusion that I have already made but actually to
    help me in arriving at the right conclusion. So I would like to
    set forth the questions, recognizing you can answer some, and,
    on the others, if you would submit in writing, I would
    appreciate it.
        The first is on Parchin. The agreement says that the IAEA
    will provide progress reports by October 15 and then the final
    assessment by December 15. We know, obviously, that this is a
    site where there was nuclear testing of some kind.
        My first question is, is it at all concerning that this
    final conclusion, or the set of final conclusions, might inform
    in a substantive way whether we should go forward? And is there
    any concern that there will be something revealed in this
    report that would impact whether or not Iran is in compliance
    from the outset?
        That is the first question. Because we will be asked to
    vote on and the first round of sanctions relief will be
    provided before, obviously, that December 15 date.
        My second question is, it has been argued that we are in
    the same position in 15 years, with no options off the table,
    except some have argued the economy of Iran will be fortified,
    that they will be able to withstand sanctions in an enhanced
    way, and that the ability to reassemble this international
    coalition will be very difficult as countries will be doing
    business and reengaging with Iran.
        Do you agree with that assessment? And do you just conclude
    that that is a sensible tradeoff, as some have suggested?
        Third, you concluded, Mr. Secretary, that this agreement
    makes the world, our allies, including Israel, and the region
    safer. And I have no doubt that you have concluded that that is
    correct based on your best assessment. If you would just
    provide for us, kind of, some thinking of why it is that the
    current Israeli leadership does not see it that way, you know,
    as they, obviously, sort of, have come to a different
    conclusion. Why do you think that is?
        Four, after 15 years, Iran, most have suggested, is a
    nuclear threshold state but that they must negotiate
    comprehensive safeguards again with the IAEA, whether or not, I
    know there has been some discussion, have you seen those. But
    do we have some ability to influence what that agreement is? Do
    we have any ability to influence its content or to monitor
    their compliance going forward--that is, between Iran and the
    IAEA?
        Fifth, what is the likelihood of an international consensus
    remaining if the deal is rejected? What happens if the deal is
    rejected?
        Some have suggested, actually, some top-level Israeli
    officials have suggested Iran will comply with the terms of the
    agreement, will get relief from our other partners, and the
    U.S. will be isolated. Others have suggested that Iran will
    rush toward the development of a nuclear weapon with no
    constraints.
        Is there any reason to believe that Iran would comply with
    the terms of the deal if it is rejected, as some have
    suggested, and not proceed quickly to a nuclear weapon?
        Sixth, if weapons are transferred to Hezbollah during the
    5-year period, which is a violation of the U.N. resolution but
    also a violation of the Interim Agreement, would that
    constitute a violation and cause snapback in these intervening
    5 years, if arms are sold to Hezbollah?
        And, finally, what will happen to the U.N. Security
    Resolution, specifically the lifting of the arms embargo and
    the ICBM provisions, if Congress does not approve the
    agreement? Do those remain intact?
        And the last question, Secretary Lew, is for you. The JCPOA
    describes a process in which noncompliance with the agreement
    might result in sanctions snapping back at the U.N., but this
    process will likely only work in the case of major violations
    of the agreement. How will the administration treat minor
    violations?
        And I would invite you to--maybe we will start with you,
    Secretary Lew. But the ones that you obviously can't get to, I
    would very much appreciate your answers. And thank you for the
    work that you have done, gentlemen.
        Secretary Lew. Well, thanks, Congressman. I will start with
    the snapback question.
        We have reserved the right to snap back in whole or in
    part. Obviously, if there is some small technical violation,
    that will not bring back the whole sanctions regime.
        I think that the goal would be to get them back into
    compliance. If there is a need to make it clear that violations
    that are small will get a response, we have the option of
    putting some of the smaller sanctions back into place.
        If there is a major violation, we have the option of
    putting in force all of our unilateral sanctions and ultimately
    going back to the U.N. for the international sanctions, as
    well. We have all the authority we need to do that.
        Chairman Royce. Matt Salmon of Arizona.
        Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, you have said no country would accept
    anytime, anywhere inspections. But I would submit that Iran is
    not a normal country. In fact, Iran is a terrorist state under
    heavy international sanctions. It neither is the moral nor the
    geopolitical equal of the United States or our negotiating
    partners, and I think we have to stop treating it like one. It
    aspires to be a regional power.
        The U.S. right now is the only world superpower. And my
    question: Is this really the best deal that we could get, given
    the fact that we seem to have most of the cards and we have had
    most of the cards since these sanctions were imposed?
        Secretary Moniz, you say the deal includes anytime,
    anywhere, in the sense of a well-defined process and a well-
    defined end date. But all of that depends on Iran acting in
    good faith. We shouldn't make that assumption, because Iran has
    been stonewalling the IAEA on the military dimensions while
    claiming to cooperate for years. They are doing that as we
    speak.
        First, the process is not just 24 days. If Iran balks, it
    is a minimum of 24 days. Before the clock even starts, the IAEA
    has to tell Iran its concerns about a particular site, and Iran
    then is supposed to provide an explanation. But there is no
    time limit. Does anyone believe that Iran will respond
    immediately or the back-and-forth discussions or negotiations
    won't take place?
        Only after these delays and the high barriers are taken
    care of, at best maybe, can the IAEA make a formal request and
    start the 24-day clock. But at the end of the 24 days, there is
    no punishment if Iran says no. Instead, the matter goes to the
    dispute resolution mechanism, which has lots of opportunity for
    delay and more barriers.
        Does anybody believe that the P5+1, not this administration
    and certainly not the Europeans, will derail the entire
    agreement by imposing sanctions and restarting Iran's nuclear
    program just because Iran is denying access to one sensitive
    site?
        More likely, there will be overwhelming pressure for a
    compromise, one that is no more substantive than what is in the
    final agreement. Kicking the can down the road is always one
    option. It has worked in Iran for years.
        I think all of this led CIA former Director Michael Hayden
    to warn in front of this committee that the deal has taken
    inspections from the technical level and put it at the
    political level. And I just think that is a formula for chaos,
    obfuscation, ambiguity, and doubt.
        My question, besides the fact that I think that, on the 24
    days, we are kidding ourselves if we think that the 24 days is
    the total length of the deal--I think that it could be much,
    much longer. And I would like to know how, ultimately, we are
    going to deal once we do find infractions.
        My second question is, of all the sanctions to be lifted in
    the Iran nuclear agreement, few are more significant than those
    against a shadowy $100 billion network of foundations belonging
    to the Islamic Republic's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.
        The U.S. delisting the headquarters for the Execution of
    Imam Khomeini's Order, also known as EIKO, will pump tens of
    billions of dollars into the Supreme Leader's personal coffers,
    helping him secure his grip on the Iranian people and
    bolstering Iran's ability to promote its agenda abroad. In
    fact, it is estimated he will gain access to as much as $95
    billion.
        The U.S. Treasury designated EIKO and 37 subsidiaries in
    June 2013, noting its purpose is to generate and control
    massive off-the-books investments, shielded from the view of
    the Iranian people and international regulators.
        Secretary Kerry, please explain why EIKO will be de-
    designated.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, Congressman, I am going to turn to
    Ernie for the first part of that because it is important to
    understand these 24 days. You are, I say respectfully,
    misreading how the 24 days--by the way, the 24 days is an
    outside period of time. It could be less than that. It is very
    possible it could be in 18 days or something.
        But, Ernie, why don't you discuss that.
        Secretary Moniz. Well, first, you started out with this
    question of Iran being unique in terms of verification. That is
    exactly why we have a verification system in this agreement
    that is unparalleled. This goes beyond what anyone else has
    accepted exactly because of the distrust of Iran built up from
    previous behavior.
        With regard to the 24 days, first of all, the IAEA can cut
    that off anytime by declaring their request for access, and
    then the 24-day clock runs. It is not the beginning of dispute
    resolution; it is the end of dispute resolution. And, in fact,
    at that point, they are in material breach.
        Now, you asked about, would there be a response if it was
    ``only one site''? Well, I want to turn it over now to my
    colleagues, but I want to emphasize that, in the snapback, it
    says ``in whole or in part.'' So a graded response is possible.
        Chairman Royce. We are going to go to Mr. Alan Grayson of
    Florida.
        Mr. Grayson. Mr. Secretary, I have 5 minutes. I have 10
    short questions. I am hoping for 10 short answers.
        Will implementation of the agreement increase Iran's
    support for terrorism?
        Secretary Kerry. You want these sequentially?
        Mr. Grayson. Yes.
        Secretary Kerry. We have no way to know. I presume in some
    places, possibly. Only in the sense that they are committed to
    certain things that we interpret as terrorism, they don't, and
    we are going to continue to conflict on those issues.
        Mr. Grayson. All right.
        If the agreement is implemented, will Iran, in fact, allow
    inspections at all of its military sites?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, they have to. If they don't, they
    are in material breach of the agreement, and we will snap back
    the sanctions or take other action if necessary.
        Mr. Grayson. If the agreement is implemented, do you
    suspect or do you think that there is a significant risk that
    Iran will cheat on the agreement and develop a nuclear weapon
    secretly?
        Secretary Kerry. I don't think they are able to develop a
    nuclear weapon secretly because our intelligence community
    tells us, with the regime that we have established here, it is
    physically impossible for them to create an entirely covert
    secondary fuel cycle.
        And we have a sufficient, intrusive inspection mechanism
    and capacity on their fuel cycle that they can't do it. You
    can't make a bomb at 3.67-percent enrichment for 15 years. You
    can't make a bomb with 300 kilograms of the stockpile for 15
    years.
        You can't make a bomb if you can't go enrich and move
    forward without our knowing it. And we have submitted and we
    believe with clarity that we will know what they are doing
    before they can do that.
        Mr. Grayson. If an agreement is implemented, is there a
    significant risk that Iran will adhere to it for a year, let's
    say, then pocket the $50 billion and then violate the agreement
    and go ahead and build a bomb?
        Secretary Kerry. Again, they can't do that, because the red
    flags that would go off, the bells and whistles that would
    start chiming as a result of any movement away from what they
    have to do.
        They have to live for 15 years under this extraordinary
    constraint of a limitation on the number of centrifuges that
    can spin; on a limitation in their R&D; on 24/7 inspections; on
    day-to-day accountability, with live television, with respect
    to their centrifuge production; and so forth. So it is not
    possible for them during that period, in 1 year, 2 years, 5
    years, to sort of make this decision and stiff us.
        And if they did in some way, if they just radically said,
    you know, we are going to change this whole deal and we are
    breaking out of here, then we have snapback of all the
    sanctions with the full support of the international community,
    which would then be absolutely in agreement that they have to
    do it. And we have the military option if that was necessary.
        Mr. Grayson. But, briefly, to follow up, isn't it true in
    that scenario that they would then have $50 billion in their
    pocket that they wouldn't otherwise have?
        Secretary Kerry. No. I doubt that after 1 or 2 years they
    would. They would have investments in their economy, and they
    would be moving, but, I mean, you have to look at this in the
    real world.
        Here they are, trying to attract investment from France,
    Germany, China, Russia, Britain, all kinds of countries. Is it
    your presumption that a country that has destroyed its
    stockpile, reduced its centrifuges by two-thirds, put concrete
    in its calandria, totally stripped the ability to do fissile
    material at Fordow, and is now seeking investment and trying to
    build its economy, with a population of 50 percent of the
    country under the age of 30, who want jobs in the future, is it
    your presumption that they are just going to throw this all to
    the wind and go create a nuclear weapon after saying, ``We will
    strip our program down,'' and won't? I don't think it is going
    to happen.
        Mr. Grayson. What about after 15 years? If the agreement is
    implemented, is Iran, in fact, likely to build a nuclear weapon
    after 15 years, at the end of the deal?
        Secretary Kerry. All I can say to you is that they can't do
    it without our knowing what they are doing. Because, after 15
    years, they have to live by the Additional Protocol, they have
    to live by the modified Code 3.1, they have to live with
    inspectors. One hundred and fifty additional inspectors are
    going to be going into Iran as a consequence of this agreement.
    And those inspectors are going to be given 24/7 access to
    declared facilities.
        So, if Iran suddenly starts to enrich more, which we will
    know, all the bells and whistles go off. The international
    community would be all over that with questions and restraints.
        Mr. Grayson. All right.
        My time is almost up, and I want to ask you this----
        Secretary Moniz. May I just add that this is the agreement
    that codifies a permanent ban on nuclear weapons in Iran, and
    we have to take----
        Mr. Grayson. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Moniz. Okay.
        Mr. Grayson. I do want to ask this one additional question.
    And I had four more, but that is the way it goes.
        Tell me exactly what you expect will happen if the
    agreement is rejected. Specifically, there has been some
    suggestion that Iran will adhere to it anyway and that----
        Secretary Kerry. Iran can't adhere to it anyway.
        Mr. Grayson [continuing]. Sanctions will remain in place
    anyway.
        Secretary Kerry. I have heard that.
        Mr. Grayson [continuing]. If the agreement is rejected.
    Explain to me what you expect to----
        Secretary Kerry. I actually heard that for the first time
    last night when I met with an Israeli friend who suggested that
    might be possible. It is physically impossible.
        Mr. Grayson. Explain why, please.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, I will tell you why. Because in the
    legislation that you have passed, in which you have given
    yourself the ability to vote, you have also put in an inability
    for the President to waive the sanctions. So there will be no
    waiving of the sanctions.
        So there is no way for the deal to work, because our
    lifting of sanctions is critical to the ability of other
    countries to invest and work and critical, obviously, for Iran
    to get any money. So nothing works for them unless this deal is
    accepted.
        Chairman Royce. We have a lot of members who still want to
    ask questions. We need to go to Tom Marino of Pennsylvania.
        Mr. Marino. Mr. Secretary of State, we all know what Iran
    has done as far as giving weapons to terrorists to do Iran's
    dirty work. And what will stop Iran from giving nuclear
    material or even more weapons to terrorist organizations?
        And how is a nuclear Iran going to make the world and the
    United States a safer place? And, more particular, how is a
    nuclear Iran going to make American citizens feel safer?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, the opposite of your question is to
    suggest that somehow you or we can prevent them from having any
    nuclear program at all.
        Mr. Marino. Okay.
        Secretary Kerry. Now, you all have a responsibility to show
    us how that is going to happen.
        Mr. Marino. I am going to show you how that is going to
    happen.
        Secretary Kerry. President George Bush----
        Mr. Marino. I am going to show you right now how that is
    going----
        Secretary Kerry. President George Bush----
        Mr. Marino [continuing]. To happen, Mr. Secretary. You have
    answered my question. I am going to show you how that is going
    to happen.
        I am going to take Secretary Lew's words. The sanctions
    have crippled Iran. If we ratchet them up and get our allies to
    ratchet those sanctions up, you can bring Iran to its knees,
    where it cannot financially function. That is how to do it,
    because it----
        Secretary Kerry. Congressman, let me----
        Mr. Marino [continuing]. Is proved that it has been done.
        Secretary Kerry. Congressman, let me just tell you----
        Mr. Marino. Please.
        Secretary Kerry [continuing]. I suggest--I really suggest,
    very respectfully, that you go spend some time with the intel
    community. Ask the people who have spent a lifetime following
    Iran very closely whether or not they agree with your judgment
    that an increase in sanctions will, in fact, bring Iran to its
    knees. They do not. They do not believe there is a capitulation
    theory here.
        And you will not sanction Iran out of its commitment to
    what it has a right to. Iran is an NPT country. There are 189
    of them----
        Mr. Marino. And we have a right to protect the American
    citizens from this disaster of this country having nuclear
    power.
        Secretary Kerry. That is exactly--Congressman----
        Mr. Marino. Sanctions have worked. Are you going to retract
    these----
        Secretary Kerry. Congressman----
        Mr. Marino [continuing]. Statements made by Secretary Lew
    and anyone else that says it has crippled them, it will take
    years for them to get servicing again?
        Secretary Lew. Congressman, if you are going to quote me,
    let me speak for myself.
        Mr. Marino. No. I quoted exactly what----
        Secretary Lew. No.
        Mr. Marino [continuing]. You said.
        Secretary Lew. No.
        Mr. Marino. Yeah, it----
        Secretary Lew. Congressman----
        Mr. Marino [continuing]. Crippled Iran, and it will take
    them years to recover.
        So if we upped----
        Secretary Lew. But the other part of what I said,
    Congressman, is that the reason it was crippling is that we had
    international cooperation.
        We have worked very hard to get that international
    cooperation. The parties that we worked with reached an
    agreement here. If we walk away from it----
        Mr. Marino. Look who we worked with. We worked with China,
    and we worked with Russia, the people who want Iran to be in
    that position because it jeopardizes the United States.
        Secretary Lew. But, Congressman, the power of our sanctions
    is not going to have the effect----
        Mr. Marino. I disagree with you.
        Secretary Lew [continuing]. You want or that we want.
        Mr. Marino. Economists disagree with you. Individuals that
    I have read article after article on disagree with you.
        Secretary Kerry. But, Congressman, as we have said again
    and again, and I want to repeat it now, we are absolutely
    committed that Iran will never get the material for one bomb--
    not for one bomb.
        Mr. Marino. Okay, but you didn't answer my original
    question, Mr. Secretary. My original question is, how is that
    going to make the United States citizens safer?
        Secretary Kerry. Let me tell you. I will tell you exactly
    how it makes United States citizens safer. Because if Iran
    fully implements the agreement that we have come to, Iran will
    not be able to make a nuclear weapon.
        And we have created an agreement which has sufficient level
    of intrusive inspection and verification that we are confident
    in our ability to be able to deliver on preventing them from
    having enough fissile material for the one bomb.
        Now, mind you, we started in a place where they already had
    enough fissile material for 10 to 12 bombs. We have already
    rolled that back, and that made America safer. By the way, it
    also made Israel and our friends and allies in the region
    safer. Everything that we have done thus far in the Interim
    Agreement, which has been in force for 2 years, has made the
    world safer.
        Mr. Marino. Okay, sir, I am going to reclaim my time----
        Secretary Kerry. But the alternative----
        Mr. Marino [continuing]. Because you are repeating----
        Secretary Kerry. No, I am----
        Mr. Marino [continuing]. Statements that you have made. I
    understand, but I have 40 seconds left.
        Secretary Kerry. If you kill this deal----
        Mr. Marino. I hope that you are right.
        Secretary Kerry [continuing]. That is not making Americans
    safer.
        Mr. Marino. I hope you are right. Because, if not, you, the
    executive branch, and Congress is going to have a disaster on
    our hands. And we need to be accountable to the American
    people.
        Thirty-two seconds. I want to ask an important question.
    Secretary Kerry, this is an extremely important topic for the
    future of this country's security and the safety of the
    American people as well as our allies in the Middle East.
        I first want to ask you a simple yes-or-no question. In
    accordance with the Office of Management and Budget as well as
    the National Archives and Records Administration directives,
    along with State Department policy, have you ever used a
    nongovernment and personal email account to conduct official
    business?
        Secretary Kerry. No. I conduct my business on a government
    account.
        Chairman Royce. We need to go to Dr. Ami Bera of
    California.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I want to thank the witnesses.
        I am going to go through a series of questions as I try to
    make my decision with regards to this deal.
        Secretary Kerry, multiple times you have said this
    negotiation had one objective, to make sure they cannot get a
    nuclear weapon.
        Secretary Moniz, you are the expert here. In your opinion,
    do you believe this deal makes it less likely within the next
    decade, next 15 years, over a lifetime, for Iran to obtain a
    nuclear weapon?
        Secretary Moniz. Far less likely.
        Mr. Bera. Okay. Great.
        I don't trust Iran. Secretary Kerry, you have said multiple
    times there is nothing in this agreement that is based on
    trust.
        Secretary Lew, you have said there will be no immediate
    sanctions relief. Is that an accurate statement?
        Secretary Lew. Sanctions relief will only come after Iran
    complies with all the measures to stop their nuclear program.
        Mr. Bera. And, in your estimation, is there enough in the
    verification regime in this deal that will allow us to----
        Secretary Lew. I would defer to Secretary Moniz, but I have
    been persuaded by everything I have read and seen that it is
    the toughest verification regime we have ever had.
        Mr. Bera. Is that correct?
        Secretary Moniz. Yes.
        Mr. Bera. And, Secretary Lew, there is no signing bonus.
        Secretary Lew. There is no signing bonus.
        Mr. Bera. Okay. Great.
        Moving on, then, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter is not
    here, but I will direct this to Secretary Kerry.
        In your opinion, would you say that Secretary Carter as
    well as our Joint Chiefs are satisfied with the ICBM provision
    of no missiles for 8 years, as well as the arms embargo for 5
    years, as the best--that they would be okay with that
    provision?
        Secretary Kerry. Yes.
        Mr. Bera. Okay.
        Moving on, Secretary Kerry, you have pointed out, in your
    time and history in the Senate, you were a very strong defender
    of Israel and had a strong record of support of Israel. In your
    opinion, do you believe this deal makes Israel safer or less
    safe?
        Secretary Kerry. I am absolutely convinced beyond any doubt
    this deal makes Israel safer, and the region and the world.
        Mr. Bera. And would you say that President Obama shares
    that opinion?
        Secretary Kerry. Yes.
        Mr. Bera. Okay.
        Secretary Moniz, we have talked a lot about the 24-hour
    framework. Is it accurate that you believe, as an expert here,
    that within that 24-hour framework we will be able to detect
    any activities, nuclear activities, et cetera?
        Secretary Moniz. Well, the 24----
        Mr. Bera. I am sorry. Twenty-four days.
        Secretary Moniz. For the 24-day access to undeclared sites
    that work with nuclear material, I feel quite confident that we
    can detect, yes.
        Mr. Bera. That there will be no cheating, that we will be
    able to detect it within that 24-day period.
        Secretary Moniz. I want to emphasize ``work with nuclear
    materials.'' Other work, non-nuclear work, might be a little
    more difficult.
        Mr. Bera. Okay. Great.
        Secretary Lew, if, in fact, you know, there is no nuclear
    activity going on and Iran is complying with the terms of this
    deal, I do have serious reservations that they will continue to
    fund terror groups, fund organizations that destabilize the
    region. And that is worrisome, obviously.
        In your opinion, do you believe that if we acted in a
    unilateral manner to impose new sanctions or reimpose existing
    sanctions, not based on breaking the nuclear deal but based on
    other activities, that we would be able to impose sanctions
    strong enough that they are felt in Iran?
        Secretary Lew. Congressman, we totally agree that their
    actions on terrorism and regional destabilization are and
    continue to be an area of concern. We have been putting
    sanctions in place. We have reserved the right to put even
    parties who were delisted on the list again if, in fact, they
    are violating terrorism or regional destabilization provisions.
        I think that we have powerful tools. I think that the world
    knows we mean to use them. And I believe that our credibility
    in doing it has to be for real. It has to be that we are
    listing people for reasons of terrorism and regional
    destabilization.
        Mr. Bera. And you feel we have the tools, if we have to
    do----
        Secretary Lew. Yes.
        Mr. Bera [continuing]. This unilaterally, to make it----
        Secretary Lew. We definitely have powerful tools.
        Mr. Bera. Okay. Great.
        I will actually yield back the remainder of any time.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you.
        We will go to Jeff Duncan of South Carolina.
        Mr. Duncan. Thank you.
        Secretary Kerry, there are still three or four Americans in
    prison in Iran. I put their pictures here to remind you of them
    today.
        I understand not using them as pawns in negotiations, but
    what should have happened is they should have been released as
    a precondition before ever sitting down with Iran for anything.
        And, with that, I will yield to Mr. DeSantis from Florida.
        Mr. DeSantis. Well, I thank the gentleman from South
    Carolina.
        Secretary Kerry, for these side agreements between the IAEA
    and Iran, can you at least confirm that one of the agreements
    is about the Parchin military site, the other one is about the
    possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program?
        Secretary Kerry. I believe there is just one basic
    agreement, which contains the approach to the PMD.
        Mr. DeSantis. So can you confirm that the Congress will
    not----
        Secretary Kerry. I am advised that--I think he has been
    more briefed than I have, but the two appendices, apparently.
        Mr. DeSantis. Two appendices. And is it your testimony that
    the Congress will not get to review those agreements before
    voting on----
        Secretary Kerry. No. Congress will be briefed on the
    contents of those agreements per what we know.
        Mr. DeSantis. But we will not be given the actual
    agreements to review, correct?
        Secretary Kerry. I don't believe you will get the actual
    agreement, Congressman.
        Mr. DeSantis. The problem with that, though, is that the
    Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act that the Congress passed and
    that President Obama signed required the executive branch to
    provide Congress with all documents and specifically defined
    ``all documents'' to include any side agreements. So the
    executive branch has a binding legal obligation under the Iran
    Nuclear Review Act to provide all documents----
        Secretary Kerry. Well, actually, we don't have a side
    agreement, so we are in compliance.
        Mr. DeSantis. It doesn't matter. The agreement----
        Secretary Kerry. The IAEA is an independent U.N. agency,
    and it makes an independent agreement under standard procedures
    with----
        Mr. DeSantis. And the Nuclear Review Act, with all due
    respect, applies to any agreement that Iran may have with any
    other parties, any related agreements, whether entered into or
    implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or
    implemented in the future. So if there is an agreement between
    Iran and the IAEA, under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Act, that
    needs to be provided to Congress.
        And so, if you are not in compliance with that act, how has
    the clock even started to run for the 60-day review period?
        Secretary Kerry. Congressman, I am not sure, legally, that
    the Congress of the United States has the power, powerful as it
    is, to be able to dictate to the IAEA a change in its
    procedures.
        Mr. DeSantis. That is not what we are doing. We passed a
    bill; the President signed it.
        Secretary Kerry. We don't have----
        Mr. DeSantis. It lays out the conditions before we would
    then have----
        Secretary Kerry. We don't have the agreement. We don't have
    the agreement.
        Mr. DeSantis. You are not going to request the agreement
    and bring it so that we can review it?
        Secretary Kerry. Congressman, we don't possess the
    agreement.
        Secretary Moniz. These are protocols worked out to satisfy
    the IAEA-Iran agreement on resolving the PMD----
        Mr. DeSantis. Which are very important issues, because we
    need to know the PMD, we need to know more about Parchin. We
    want to be able to evaluate the efficacy of the agreement that
    you guys have negotiated.
        Secretary Moniz. The IAEA will then be providing its report
    on December the 15th, which summarizes all that they have
    found.
        Mr. DeSantis. Which is after the window that Congress has
    to review the agreement, so we are not going to be privy to
    that information, and we are going to be asked to cast a vote
    on this.
        Let me ask you this, Secretary Kerry. You had alluded to in
    previous questioning about the ability that if Iran cheats we
    can snap back the sanctions. The problem, though, that I see is
    that, in the agreement itself, it says, Iran has stated that if
    sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat
    that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under the
    JCPOA in whole or in part.
        So if you have a situation where Iran is doing incremental
    cheating and then there is a movement to then have the
    sanctions reimposed, if you do that, Iran is saying, well,
    okay, it is going to walk away from its commitments.
        And so, for me, it is structured in a way to allow Iran to
    get away with small violations, because the cost of going to
    actually impose the sanctions would be to blow up the deal that
    you guys have spent so much time negotiating.
        Secretary Kerry. Congressman, with all respect, that is a
    misread of the paragraph and a misread of what we have here.
        The paragraph was requested by Iran because they were
    afraid because Congress kept rattling its sabre about more
    sanctions. And so they said, well, what guarantee do we have,
    if we agree to this, that Congress isn't going to pass more
    sanctions on the same thing--or, excuse me, not ``more''--just
    take the sanctions they had and bring them back after we made
    an agreement?
        So that paragraph merely says that we are not going to--we
    agree that we are not just going to reimpose the same sanctions
    and put them back. It does not, as Secretary Lew has said,
    prevent us from bringing any other additional or appropriate
    sanctions for other things.
        And the sanctions language also says ``in whole or in
    part.'' So we are allowed, for any minor infraction--we are not
    facing this draconian choice of bringing the whole thing and
    risking the whole deal. We could bring a small amount.
        Also, remember, the reason Iran is coming to the table to
    make this agreement is they want the relief from the sanctions.
    And if, indeed, they were in flagrant violation, all of our
    friends who helped negotiate this are going to be standing with
    us, all in agreement that we have to put the sanctions back.
    And that is what----
        Chairman Royce. We must go to Grace Meng of New York.
        Secretary Kerry [continuing]. Generates the behavior from
    Iran.
        Chairman Royce. Grace.
        Ms. Meng. Thank you to all of you for being here, for your
    time and dedication to this important issue, and for spending
    so much time with us here in Congress, on the Hill, to discuss
    so many of our concerns.
        I want to ask, during the negotiations, did this law of the
    land, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, signed by
    President Obama and known to all parties of the negotiation,
    was it known to all the parties?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, obviously, the other parties became
    very aware of the fact that Congress was requiring a review
    period, and they were very concerned about it.
        Ms. Meng. And so I want to bring up one example of, during
    the Cold War, Congress played a very important role in the
    development of nonproliferation agreements dealing with nuclear
    weapons, specifically the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which I
    know was a treaty, but we also have our law here.
        This treaty was initially blocked by the Senate because of
    concerns over Soviet compliance. The treaty was not submitted
    to the Senate for approval for 2 years after signing and wasn't
    ratified until after the U.S. and Soviet Union reached
    agreement 14 years later on additional provisions to enhance
    America's ability to verify Soviet compliance.
        So this all leads me to believe that Congress should be,
    and we are, and we have the ability and authority to compel a
    better deal, should it choose to disapprove of this one.
        What are the key differences between the JCPOA here and the
    Cold War examples, other than the fact that it was a treaty and
    there were multiple parties?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, one of the principal differences is
    that we have not had any engagement or any dialogue with Iran
    since 1979. And the lack of diplomatic relations, even, which
    is different from what we had with the Soviet Union, makes this
    a very, very complicated situation.
        So you have to take and analyze what is achievable here in
    the context of the threat, the nuclear program. And I believe,
    given the nature of the political system in Iran, the
    challenges with respect to their own politics, the notion that
    we are going to be able to go back to the table is just a
    fantasy. There is no latitude here.
        Because Iran came to this table with enormous suspicions
    about even engaging with the United States. There was a huge
    debate in the country about whether or not they should, whether
    or not we could be trusted, whether or not they thought this
    was worth the risk. And many people in the country suggested
    that we would not act in good faith.
        If, indeed, all of a sudden, we stand up in Vienna, seven-
    nations-strong, embrace an agreement, the United Nations has
    supported the agreement, and we turn around and say, ``We are
    not going to perform,'' I think the intelligence community will
    confirm to you resoundingly we will not be back at the table,
    certainly in the near future, and I would think certainly not
    with this Iranian Government or leadership.
        Ms. Meng. One final question. You have also, obviously,
    asserted that, if Congress does disapprove, the international
    sanctions regime will fall apart, and Iran goes back to 2-
    months breakout time.
        I understand that Russia and China's top priority and
    interests may not be the views of Congress here in the U.S.,
    but if you can help me understand, what is the basis for the
    view that these two countries would also just allow Iran to
    fully violate the deal? Why wouldn't they hold Iran to the
    nuclear commitments set forth in the agreement?
        And if they allow them to do that, then why do we also
    believe that they will be there with us in any sort of snapback
    scenario?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, I think that Russia and China are
    very, very serious about the nonproliferation component of
    this, as serious as we are. Russia has agreed to export the
    spent fuel and process it in Russia in order to help make this
    work. China has accepted major responsibility to be the lead
    entity, with our co-chairmanship, on a committee that will work
    to redesign the Arak reactor in a way that is acceptable to all
    of us. And they have taken on major responsibility.
        So they both have a huge interest in the nonproliferation
    piece of this. But they both believe that the other components
    of the resolution, with respect to the arms and missiles, was
    thrown in as an add-on, as punishment, in effect, not because
    it referred directly to the nuclear part of the resolution or
    agreement. The resolution of the U.N. was a nuclear agreement.
    And, in that regard, I think they would have serious
    reservations--they did express serious reservations about
    continuing.
        Chairman Royce. We will go to Darrell Issa of California.
        Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I guess I have to be careful when I say ``Mr. Secretary,''
    but, Secretary Lew, let's start with you.
        Were the sanctions, or are the sanctions that are in place
    as of today effectively curtailing both the money flow and the
    economy of Iran in a way that has brought them to the table?
        Secretary Lew. Congressman, I think that the sanctions have
    been very effective at slowing the rate of growth in Iran's
    economy, at making inflation high, unemployment high, and the
    exchange rate on their currency very unfavorable.
        I don't think it has stopped them from doing a lot of other
    bad things around the world. And they have maintained, even in
    a very difficult set of fiscal challenges, malign activities,
    which we have to stay focused on stopping even if we have a
    nuclear agreement.
        Mr. Issa. Okay. The question, though, Mr. Secretary, was,
    did it bring them to the table, or did they come out of just
    goodwill?
        Secretary Lew. No, I believe that the sanctions brought
    them to the table. And the sanctions were, in fact, designed to
    bring them to the table.
        Mr. Issa. Secretary Kerry, you would agree with that?
        Secretary Kerry. I do agree. I think the sanctions and
    other strategic designs. But I think, essentially, the
    sanctions are what crystalized their timing.
        Mr. Issa. And when I look at the sanctions that will be
    lifted under this agreement, I looked at--in the classified
    annex, but it wasn't the classified portion of it--a long list
    of ships and aircraft and banks that will receive the relief
    under this. I am sure you are both familiar with those 20, 30
    pages.
        The question I really have here--because I think we are all
    focusing on the nuclear deal, but I want to focus on Iran--an
    exporter of terrorism; a killer, directly and indirectly, of
    Americans; a kidnapper, indirectly and directly, of Americans
    since 1979.
        All of those sanctions that we are agreeing to lift, is
    there anyone that doesn't think that those sanctions and more
    are appropriate as long as they continue to export terrorism,
    kill Americans and others, and destabilize not one, not two,
    not three, but at least five countries throughout the Middle
    East?
        I will start with Secretary Lew, from a standpoint of those
    tools that we are lifting, those 40 pages or whatever, single-
    spaced, a huge amount of things that will now be able to carry
    oil, move money, and so on, those are, most of them, equally
    effective in deterring or slowing their ability to export
    terrorism, aren't they?
        Secretary Lew. Congressman, as a class, we are lifting for
    relief from sanctions entities and individuals who were
    violating the nuclear provisions.
        Mr. Issa. Right, but those entities are banks, in many
    cases.
        Secretary Lew. Well, so a bank that was designated as a
    nuclear violator stays on. So Bank Saderat stays on the list.
        If there are institutions that are delisted that are
    relisted subsequently under other authorities that deal with
    terrorism, we have every right to do that. But I think that the
    delisting of nuclear parties is what you would expect if there
    is a nuclear agreement. The nuclear sanctions would go away,
    but other sanctions stay in place.
        Secretary Kerry. And they can be--again, Congressman, I
    want to emphasize that we share with everybody the concern
    about Iran's behavior within the region, and we have the
    ability to bring sanctions with respect to that behavior as we
    go forward.
        Mr. Issa. Well, let me just give you a hypothetical, and it
    is not a hypothetical without some thought. What if, at the
    same time as we don't reject this plan, we bring you a package
    of new sanctions? What if, in fact, Congress determines that
    the only way we can accept this risk is if we can truly,
    essentially, snap back now relative to their promise?
        Just the day after you signed this, they promised to
    destabilize Bahrain, to continue what they are doing in Yemen;
    obviously, their support for Hezbollah and Hamas, their support
    for the Assad regime, and the taking of both Lebanon and Syria.
        So, with that real threat, with that goal, with that
    continued activity, is there any reason that we should not
    either reject this agreement and/or include further sanctions
    in order to keep them from expanding their support for the
    murder of Americans and our allies around the world and the
    destabilizing of the Middle East, one that is leading to an
    arms race?
        Secretary Lew. Congressman, we have powerful tools to snap
    back sanctions----
        Mr. Issa. No, not snapback. I am saying today. Today, they
    are, in fact, doing all of this. What would you say about the
    fact that----
        Chairman Royce. We need to----
        Mr. Issa. Well----
        Chairman Royce. If the gentleman would suspend, we need to
    go to Lois Frankel of Florida----
        Mr. Issa. I just wanted him to answer the question I asked.
        Chairman Royce [continuing]. Simply because these junior
    members do not have sufficient time. And so, Lois.
        Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, gentlemen. Some quick followup questions and
    then some new ones.
        If new enrichment sites are detected under that 24-day
    rule, will those sites then become under a constant inspection?
        Secretary Kerry. If a new site emerges in this?
        Ms. Frankel. Yes.
        Secretary Kerry. Absolutely.
        Ms. Frankel. Okay. And could you tell me how many
    countries, other than the P5+1, are currently engaged in
    sanctions? And how long would you say that it takes to have all
    these sanctions in place to get Iran to the table?
        Secretary Lew. Congresswoman, I would have to go and check
    the number, but our sanctions and international sanctions are
    being honored around the world, so it is many, many countries.
    And it has taken us years to put that regime in place.
        And I would have to underscore really two points. One is,
    our unilateral sanctions are powerful, but the ability for them
    to really have an effect still requires cooperation. And the
    international sanctions wouldn't exist without cooperation. We
    have spent a lot of effort with countries for whom it is at
    substantial economic cost they have cooperated to try and stop
    Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.
        Ms. Frankel. How would a snap-back effect all those
    countries? It concerns me how you could actually get the snap-
    back----
        Secretary Lew. I think, as Secretary Kerry said earlier,
    there is enormous unity in the goal of keeping Iran from
    getting nuclear weapons. If they violate the agreement, if, in
    fact, a snap-back is warranted because of nuclear issues, I
    think that both the international and the U.S. unilateral
    sanctions would, in fact, snap back.
        We are going to continue to prosecute our unilateral
    sanctions on things like terrorism, on things like regional
    destabilization and human rights, but they are obviously
    different regimes.
        Ms. Frankel. Once Congress, if we don't disapprove this
    agreement, if it goes forward, will the Congress, U.S. Congress
    have any role, any further role in this agreement, number one?
    Number two, can any President alter this agreement or refuse to
    abide by it in the future?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, Congress will always have a role,
    obviously, and you have made that crystal clear in a context of
    what we are doing here now. So, yes, I mean, there will be an
    ongoing role with respect to the enforcement, the
    implementation, our----
        Ms. Frankel. Will we have to vote on anything?
        Secretary Kerry. Afterwards?
        Ms. Frankel. To repeal sanctions.
        Secretary Kerry. Ultimately, yes. Ultimately, there is the
    Iran Sanctions Act itself. There is the lifting of sanctions.
    Ultimately, you would have to vote.
        Ms. Frankel. And if we don't do that pursuant to the
    agreement, are there any penalties on our part?
        Secretary Kerry. Actually then Iran is free to break the
    agreement because we will have broken it, and then all bets are
    off in terms of compliance.
        Ms. Frankel. Can a future President refuse to abide by the
    agreement?
        Secretary Kerry. Absolutely. A future President can. But it
    is our judgment that if this agreement is fully implemented and
    is working well, no future President is going to choose to do
    that because of the implications. If this is working, it is
    achieving our goal of not having a nuclear weapon in Iran.
        Secretary Lew. And just to be clear, the actual repeal of
    sanctions will be way down the road. It is not something that
    happens in the next year or 2. It is many, many years in the
    future, probably 8 or more years.
        Ms. Frankel. I want to get again to the troubling issue of
    the inspections. Are you saying that there is no limit to
    inspections by the IAEA, that it will go on forever? Did you
    say that?
        Secretary Kerry. Yes. What I am saying is there is a
    process, Congresswoman----
        Ms. Frankel. Excuse me. And who pays for that?
        Secretary Kerry. We pay a certain element of the budget. It
    is a U.N. agency. We represent a certain percentage of that
    budget, about 25 percent, and others contribute to it. We
    actually train all the inspectors. That is one thing that we do
    and do very effectively. But it is an independent entity other
    than that.
        Ms. Frankel. Excuse me. Is it this separate secret
    agreement that we don't see that is going to allow this
    continuation of inspections? That is what is not clear.
        Secretary Kerry. No. The continuation of inspections is
    under what is called the Additional Protocol. And the
    Additional Protocol is exactly that. It is an add-on----
        Ms. Frankel. That is what we don't get to see?
        Secretary Kerry. Yes. No, you can see, absolutely. You can
    see that. You can read every component of it. And I was sharing
    some thoughts with the committee earlier about the things that
    it empowers the IAEA to do. The kind of accountability is very
    in-depth and significant. That is what I was trying to point
    out. This is not some light set of requirements.
        Chairman Royce. We will go to Mr. Mo Brooks of Alabama.
        Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Kerry, my questions require brief answers to
    comply with my 5-minute time limitation, and I hope you will
    cooperate in that context.
        Three months ago, Iranian Brigadier General Mohammad Reza
    Naqdi stated that erasing Israel off the map is non-negotiable.
    Do you believe his comments accurately reflect Iranian
    Government goals? Yes, no, or I don't know.
        Secretary Kerry. I think it accurately reflects some
    people's rhetoric and some people's attitude. But I don't think
    it is possible----
        Mr. Brooks. In the Iranian Government?
        Secretary Kerry [continuing]. I don't think it is possible
    for Iran to do that. And I think Israel has enormous capacity,
    obviously----
        Mr. Brooks. Okay. I didn't ask for all that other. I am
    just asking if you have a judgment as to whether his comment
    accurately reflects Iran's Government goals.
        Secretary Kerry. My judgment is it is not an implementable
    policy by Iran.
        Mr. Brooks. Okay. Well, less than 2 weeks ago Iranian
    Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei led a rally that was
    frequently punctuated by chants of death to America and death
    to Israel. Do you believe his comments accurately reflect
    Iranian Government goals? Again, yes, no, or I don't know.
        Secretary Kerry. I think they reflect an attitude and a
    rhetorical excess, but I see no evidence that they have a
    policy that is implementing that against us at this point in
    time.
        Mr. Brooks. Well, do you believe that Iran is the world's
    foremost sponsor of terrorism?
        Secretary Kerry. Yes.
        Mr. Brooks. And that they will use the conventional weapons
    made available by the Iran nuclear treaty to kill Americans or
    Israelis?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, they may. They may. And we have, as
    you know, responded to that from 1979, when they took over our
    Embassy, forward. We have put sanctions in place specifically
    because of their support for terror, because of their abuse of
    human rights----
        Mr. Brooks. Okay, I understand that. You have answered my
    question when you said, yes, they may.
        Next, is the Obama administration willing to use military
    force to prevent Iran from obtaining, building, testing, or
    using nuclear weapons?
        Secretary Kerry. Yes.
        Mr. Brooks. And what has Iran done in the past couple of
    years that causes you to believe Iran will abide by the Iran
    nuclear treaty or that Iran wants to become a responsible
    member of the international community?
        Secretary Kerry. The only thing that indicates to us a
    willingness to try to comply with this agreement is the fact
    that they have complied fully with the interim agreement for
    the last 2 years and that we have put in place such a strict
    set of consequences that it is deeply in their interest to
    comply if they have reduced two-thirds of their centrifuges,
    stripped their stockpile, put concrete in the calandria of
    Arak, emptied out Fordow. There is a lot of incentive therefore
    to fully comply with this agreement.
        Mr. Brooks. Okay. That focuses to a large degree on the
    nuclear side. What about the use of the conventional weapons
    and whether they will maintain their status as the world's
    foremost sponsor of terrorism?
        Secretary Kerry. We have serious concerns, which is
    precisely why we are engaged with our friends in the region. It
    is why I will be in Doha in a few days to meet with them. As we
    lay out the plans for pushing back against those activities, we
    will be engaging in Special Forces training, counterterrorism,
    counterinsurgency, counterfinance, a whole series of steps in
    order to empower all of us to do a better job of reducing those
    activities.
        Mr. Brooks. September 11, 14 years ago, proves Muslim
    fundamentalists are very willing to sacrifice their own lives
    in furtherance if their desire to kill non-Muslims and other
    foes. Given the religious zealotry of the Iranian Government,
    how confident are you that Iran will not use nuclear weapons to
    further death to America or death to Israel if Iran obtains
    nuclear weapons?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, they won't obtain a nuclear weapon.
    And I am confident that under this agreement and with President
    Obama's commitment, they are not going to secure a nuclear
    weapon.
        Mr. Brooks. And is that in part because of your statement
    that this administration is willing to use whatever means are
    necessary of a military nature to prevent Iran from having
    nuclear weapons?
        Secretary Kerry. That is certainly the final backup to it,
    but I believe all of the elements of this agreement will, if it
    is implemented fully--again, if it is implemented--will prevent
    them from even getting near that possibility.
        Mr. Brooks. On occasion you have used the phrase ``all
    options are on the table.'' Do those options to prevent Iran
    from having nuclear weapons include the use of nuclear weapons
    by the United States?
        Secretary Kerry. I have never asked--I have never asked--I
    mean, I know of no President of the United States who have ever
    taken all military options available to them off the table, but
    I also don't know of any realistic situation in which that
    would present a very feasible strategy given the proximity of
    great friends of ours to Iran and the consequences of that. But
    I don't think the President has taken any--there is no option
    that has ever been discussed that has been taken off the table.
        Mr. Brooks. So when you talk about the use of military
    force, is it fair to infer that we are really talking solely
    about conventional weaponry?
        Secretary Kerry. What the President has laid out and what
    the military has designed is an approach--and I am not going to
    discuss that plan in open session here--but a plan that
    sufficiently meets the task of preventing them from having a
    nuclear weapon. That is the goal. That is the objective. And
    our current set of options accomplished that.
        Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you.
        Joaquin Castro of Texas.
        Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.
        And thank you, gentlemen, for your work and diplomacy on
    behalf of the Nation.
        I want to imagine for a moment another scenario, a scenario
    where we don't take a deal, we walk away from it, and there is
    military action against Iran. Can you imagine for me for a
    moment what would the fallout be from a destabilized Iran? We
    have seen other nations, Libya, Iraq, Egypt, where there have
    been destabilized regimes, secular leaders who have been
    replaced by fundamentalists, and terrorism that has now been
    franchised almost across the world. What would happen if Iran
    was destabilized in the same way?
        Secretary Kerry. You know, Congressman, it is very hard for
    me to get into the speculative game here, and there is too much
    talk about the military option and this and that.
        When we have in front of us a plan that accomplishes the
    task of preventing Iran from achieving a nuclear weapon, which
    they say they don't want to do anyway and have made very strong
    averments about their commitment not to do, it seems that to be
    focused on the destabilized side of it and the military side of
    it is not the right focus. The right focus is on this agreement
    that accomplishes the goal of preventing them from having a
    weapon.
        Now, the region is obviously destabilized and in flames,
    and that is another reason why I think we should think really
    carefully about the consequences of turning away from this
    deal.
        Mr. Castro. And I guess, let me point out, Secretary Kerry,
    so that I am not coy here, I am inclined to support the deal.
    One of the questions I have, though, is I think a concern is
    that we find out that they are cheating, and at that point a
    decision has to be made if we are going to hold true to our
    position, which is we are not going to let them have a nuclear
    weapon.
        Secretary Kerry. But that is, frankly, Congressman, that is
    the easiest decision in the world for this President and for
    all of us here.
        Mr. Castro. But here is my question, Secretary. What is the
    tipping point where sanctions will no longer work and you have
    to take military action if, in fact, you are going to keep them
    from not having that weapon?
        Secretary Kerry. The tipping point is a clarity with
    respect to what effort is being put into breaking out, if that
    is the choice they have made, and where they are in that
    process. The tipping point is how much time you make a judgment
    that you have with respect to where they are starting and where
    they can wind up.
        But we are convinced that with the depth of accountability
    and verification that is built into this agreement, we will
    have enormous tipoff to that. That is why a year was built into
    this agreement for the first 10 years and even after that.
    There is a lengthy enough period of time that our interests,
    the interests of the region, our friends, Israel, others, is
    protected. And we are confident about our ability to have
    accountability in that process going forward.
        But I would say to everybody, if this is rejected, then you
    have no inspections, you don't have a regime in place, you
    don't have the sanctions, Iran may undertake, not immediately,
    but they have certainly indicated they would consider
    themselves free to do so. And as they do it, what are the
    options that are then available to us? It seems to me when you
    compare those two scenarios, this becomes not that complicated
    a choice.
        Mr. Castro. And then my final question is, to put this in
    context, can you go over again--I missed some of the
    discussion--but can you go over again the deal that was offered
    in 2003 by the Bush administration?
        Secretary Kerry. In 2008 is when it was offered.
        Mr. Castro. 2008, I am sorry.
        Secretary Kerry. In 2003 there was discussion. There were
    about 163 centrifuges. But the P5+1, the same P5+1, made an
    offer to Iran for their suspension of enrichment and
    reprocessing that the United States and the P5+1, excuse me,
    would then recognize Iran's right to nuclear energy for
    peaceful purposes, treat Iran's nuclear program in the same
    manner as that of any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT
    once confidence had been built, provide technical and financial
    assistance for peaceful nuclear energy, including state-of-the-
    art power reactors, support for R&D and legally binding fuel
    supply guarantees, improve relations with Iran and support Iran
    in playing an important and constructive role in international
    affairs, work with Iran and others in the region on confidence-
    building measures and regional security, reaffirmation of the
    obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force,
    cooperation on Afghanistan, steps toward normalization of trade
    and economic relations, and it goes on. All of these things
    were offered in exchange for suspending enrichment and so
    forth.
        Now, they didn't suspend. They went up to 19,000
    centrifuges. And that fact is one of the driving factors in our
    coming to the conclusion, the President coming to the
    conclusion that we needed to arrive at an agreement which
    recognized their ability to have nuclear power under a
    safeguards agreement, under the NPT, with our ability to know
    what they are doing.
        Chairman Royce. Randy Weber of Texas.
        Mr. Weber. Thank you.
        Mr. Kerry, I appreciate you being here. You said that we
    are going to briefed on that side agreement that the IAEA has
    with Iran. Is that correct?
        Secretary Kerry. Yes, that is correct.
        Mr. Weber. Well, I want to implore you to use your power to
    make sure that we are not briefed by the same staff that
    briefed Susan Rice and Hillary Clinton on Benghazi or Sergeant
    Bowe Bergdahl. Okay? Make sure that we get a decent briefing
    there.
        Mr. Kerry, you say frequently that this is the strongest
    negotiation that you could get, you feel like it was. The
    President said he would walk away from a bad deal. And I would
    submit this. Now, you come to us and you say there is not 535
    Secretaries of State and that other countries don't appreciate
    that Congress is weighing in. But if you are going to get a
    strong deal, I have said from the get-go, I think there is a
    lot stronger position you should have taken. So I am going to
    lay out some preclusions, and you tell me if you operated from
    that basis.
        Number one, I agree with Jeff Duncan over here when he said
    American hostages should have been released first and foremost.
    Number two, the demand should have been for Iran to dismantle
    all of its centrifuges. Number three, give the IAEA unfettered
    24/7, 365-day access. Number four, stop the exporting of terror
    to Syria, to Iraq, and everywhere else. Number five, denounce
    terrorism and prosecute those who perpetrate it. Restore civil
    rights in their own country, number six. Stop the death chant
    to America and Israel, and they need to recognize Israel's
    right to exist--even as a Jewish state, I might add. And,
    number seven, Secretary Kerry, they have been a bad actor for
    36 years, going back to 1979.
        So if this is not based on trust, if this is based on
    actions, shouldn't we have required them to show by their own
    actions, I don't know, say for half of the time since 1979, say
    18 years, or a fourth of the time, 9 years, how about just 2
    years, shouldn't we have required them to show with their
    actions?
        You said in your exchange with Grace Meng earlier that Iran
    came to the table with enormous suspicions about the United
    States. And me and my colleague up here are thinking, who
    cares? We are not the bad actors here. They are the ones
    exporting terrorism.
        Did you start from that basis of strength? And then if you
    did, how did we get here, you consider this to be a good deal?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, Congressman, plain and simple, all
    the things that you just listed, there never would have been a
    negotiation.
        Mr. Weber. My heart pains for them. These are bad actors.
    My heart pains for Iran. These are bad actors in the area.
        Secretary Kerry. Congressman, what you need to think about
    is our security. We are better off with Iran not having a
    nuclear weapon.
        Mr. Weber. No question.
        Secretary Kerry. Our primary objective here was to have a
    negotiation, because they were already at 19,000 centrifuges,
    already with enough material for 10 to 12 bombs, already
    enriching at 20 percent, and they were a step away from a
    plutonium reactor that could produce enough material for one to
    two bombs a year.
        Mr. Weber. How long was----
        Secretary Kerry. So we stepped into that----
        Mr. Weber. I get that.
        Secretary Kerry [continuing]. And we have rolled it back.
        Mr. Weber. You said that earlier. How long before we knew
    about Fordow?
        Secretary Kerry. I beg your pardon? We knew about Fordow--
    we discovered Fordow. We blew the whistle.
        Mr. Weber. How long was it there before we knew about it?
        Secretary Kerry. I don't know the precise amount of time.
        Mr. Weber. Ten years?
        Secretary Kerry. I know, but, Congressman, we discovered
    that and we also discovered----
        Mr. Weber. I am sorry----
        Secretary Kerry. Let me just tell you. In 2003, we
    discovered that they were actually trying to make a bomb, and
    we did it without inspectors, without this regime.
        Mr. Weber. You have said all that. I get that. But it is
    about the trust that you keep saying that we are going to have.
        Secretary Kerry. No, there is no trust.
        Mr. Weber. Well, you are implying that we can catch them at
    what they are doing, yet Fordow went uncovered for about 10 or
    12 years.
        Secretary Kerry. That is not trust. That is verification.
        Secretary Moniz. We can supply that information----
        Mr. Weber. All right. Let me do this.
        Secretary Moniz. Sir, in a classified environment we will
    be happy to----
        Mr. Weber. We will talk about that. I am running out of
    time.
        Are you aware of the fact that today--today--``Iran to
    United Nations: New Sanctions Could Kill the Nuclear Deal.''
    They are still uttering threats against us, I may remind us. We
    are not the bad actors here.
        In a letter to a 15-member body, Iran's U.N. envoy,
    Gholamali Khoshroo, said Tehran ``may reconsider its
    commitments'' under the nuclear pact if U.S., European, and
    U.N. sanctions lifted under the deal are ``impaired by
    continued application or the imposition of new sanctions with a
    nature and scope identical or similar to those that were in
    place prior to the implementation date, irrespective of whether
    such new sanctions are introduced on nuclear-related or other
    grounds, unless the issues are remedied within a reasonably
    short time.''
        Today they are threatening to walk away from this deal if
    we implement other sanctions on even other grounds, and you are
    saying the hostages are different?
        The Chairman. We have got to go to Tulsi Gabbard of Hawaii.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        With the U.N. Security Council voting unanimously to
    support this nuclear deal with Iran, the toughest global
    sanctions will be dismantled in exchange for Iran's compliance.
    Practically speaking, what is the status of this U.N.
    resolution and the implications if Congress disapproves this
    deal and overrides a Presidential veto?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, Congresswoman, we built into this
    agreement a process that was kind of compromised because our
    friends, our allies, thought they should go immediately to the
    U.N. and implement immediately. But because Congress had
    already voted to have a review period, we persuaded them to
    have a 90-day period during which time it could not be
    implemented.
        So they had their vote, but there is this grace period in
    order to protect the rights of Congress. And that was a balance
    between the desire of our friends to exercise their own
    sovereignty and do what they wanted under the U.N., versus our
    desire to try to protect Congress' right to review.
        Ms. Gabbard. So if Congress does go through the review
    process and disapprove of the deal, at that point what happens
    with the resolution?
        Secretary Kerry. If Congress were to override a veto and
    disapprove the deal there would be no deal.
        Ms. Gabbard. That U.N. resolution that was passed
    unanimously would no longer stand?
        Secretary Kerry. It dies. The entire deal dies because we
    can't lift the sanctions without the ability to waive, and that
    has been taken away, and that would be part of the vote. So we
    would see this deal die.
        Ms. Gabbard. Okay. Thank you.
        Secretary Kerry. Die without any other option, no
    alternative whatsoever.
        Ms. Gabbard. Secretary Moniz, what evidence or materials
    could potentially be cleaned up or hidden within the 24-day
    period listed in the inspections regime?
        Secretary Moniz. Well, there would be an attempt,
    presumably, to replace flooring, do all kinds of cleanup. And,
    as I said, we have experience in both the unclassified and
    classified arenas in terms of being able to detect very, very
    small amounts of uranium. So, using nuclear materials, there
    would typically be a strong signature.
        Ms. Gabbard. And if Iran fails to allow inspectors entry
    within that 24-day period, what consequences would they face
    and under what time line?
        Secretary Kerry. If they fail to do it, they are in
    material breach of the agreement. We can snap back all the
    sanctions. And obviously all options are available to us that
    are available today.
        Ms. Gabbard. So immediately after that 24-day period, if
    they have still not allowed inspection----
        Secretary Kerry. If they fail to live up to the 24-day
    period and provide the access, they are in material breach of
    this agreement. And if we had cause to have gone and asked for
    access to an undisclosed facility about which we have deep
    concerns, everybody will join with us in ratifying that concern
    and we will be operating with the consent, if you will, of the
    international community because of Iran's noncompliance, which
    is one of the reasons why I believe we have huge leverage for
    compliance.
        Ms. Gabbard. And after termination day when the snap-back
    mechanism will no longer apply, Iran will still be subject to
    the Additional Protocol. What are the consequences if they
    violate that Additional Protocol after termination day?
        Secretary Kerry. We still have the power of bringing
    unilateral sanctions. Congress and all of us can join together.
    We can go right back to where we were at square one. Or we have
    obviously other options available to us.
        Ms. Gabbard. I think the concern is that the time that it
    takes for those kinds of unilateral sanctions to apply, whether
    they be from the United States or from the global community, as
    you have seen from the past, what other immediate consequences
    would there be at that point?
        Secretary Kerry. If they are in material noncompliance in a
    way that is threatening, obviously, we are in a much more
    serious kind of situation and confrontation with the potential,
    needless to say, of the President taking the most dramatic
    options.
        Secretary Moniz. I would just add, yes, exactly as Senator
    Kerry said, that it would depend upon their motivation, what
    they were doing. Certainly in my view anything that shows
    movement toward a nuclear weapon would have to be responded to
    quite forcefully.
        I would also add, going back to something Congresswoman
    Meng asked, and I think it is relevant to your statements as
    well, is that the P5 by definition have a special role in the
    NPT and a very, very strong interest in seeing its integrity
    maintained.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Scott Perry of Pennsylvania.
        Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen. We certainly appreciate your
    indulgence. We know it has been a long time.
        In the context of these statements is how I would like to
    ask my questions. From 1994--so not too long ago, right, we are
    talk about an 11-, 15-year context of this deal for the most
    strict portions of it--so from 1994:

            ``The entire world will be safer as we slow the spread
            of nuclear weapons,''

    is one statement. And also:

            ``The United States and international inspectors will
            carefully monitor North Korea to make sure it keeps its
            commitments.''

    And we all know those are, of course, quotes from President
    Clinton.
        None of that happened. I mean, North Korea is what it is,
    and we are where we are.
        In that context, Secretary Kerry, reading your quote
    recently with a reporter from Al Arabiya:

            ``I don't know how to interpret it at this point in
            time, except to take it at face value,''

    in relation to chants of death to America, death to Israel, we
    are going to continue our policy. And then:

            ``It is very disturbing, it is very troubling, and we
            will have to wait and see.''

    What will we have to wait and see, Secretary Kerry?
        And before you answer, 1979, 52 U.S. hostages, 444 days;
    1983, the U.S. Marine barracks, 241 Americans killed; 1992, the
    Israeli Embassy in Argentina bombed; 2011, the attempted
    assassination of the Saudi Ambassador in DC; the killings and
    maimings of hundreds in Iraq and Afghanistan; not to mention
    support of Assad, Hezbollah, Hamas, and activities in Iraq,
    Syria, and Yemen.
        What will we have to wait and see? What was your----
        Secretary Kerry. To see the implementation of the plan,
    Congressman.
        Look, you and I can have a speech-off if you want----
        Mr. Perry. I don't want to have a speech-off. I am just
    trying to understand your comments.
        Secretary Kerry. No, no, no, but I am just saying, we could
    have a competition for who is angrier about some of the things
    Iran has done historically. We understand they have killed
    Americans. We understand what they did in Khobar Towers. We
    understand all of this. But they were marching toward a nuclear
    weapon.
        Mr. Perry. Mr. Secretary, you must understand, I appreciate
    it, this is my time.
        Secretary Kerry. No, no, no, no, let me, Congressman, let
    me----
        Mr. Perry. You must understand the American people see Iran
    as like a crocodile or a shark that does what it does. And we
    are saying: Well, we are going to give the crocodile or the
    shark a few more teeth, and let's see if it does something
    different.
        Secretary Kerry. That is just not accurate. That is not
    accurate in the least.
        Mr. Perry. But that is what we see.
        Let me say this too. You have said that we don't have a
    better option. You keep on saying, well, you haven't provided a
    better option.
        Secretary Kerry. Congressman, we have----
        Mr. Perry. First of all, Mr. Secretary, with all due
    respect, it is not Congress' job. This is the administration.
    And if you would use the treaty process as provided by the
    Constitution, maybe we wouldn't be in this situation.
        Furthermore, you say: Well, this is the only deal we can
    get, that there is no better deal. Congress has a long history
    of instituting better deals. Examples are 200 treaties,
    including 80 multilateral accords modified by Congress,
    including the arms control agreement, SALT II, and the
    Threshold Test Ban Treaty that failed to reach a vote and were
    modified. So there is a history for that of getting a better
    deal.
        And if the Ayatollah doesn't like it and doesn't want to
    negotiate it, oh, boo hoo. We are here for America. We stand
    for America. You represent America.
        With that having been said, in another interview: ``If you
    don't get a majority in Congress to support this deal, doesn't
    that undermine the deal?'' And your statement, it is
    abbreviated: ``They don't care over there''--and I am assuming
    you mean Iraq--``as long as the deal is implemented. And that
    is what we care about, that this deal be implemented.''
        So do you care more about this deal or the U.N.'s approval
    or American sovereignty and the approval of the American people
    through their duly elected representatives, Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Kerry. Congressman, I don't need any lessons from
    you about who I represent. I have represented and fought for
    our country since I was out of college.
        Mr. Perry. And God bless you for your service.
        Secretary Kerry. So don't give me any lessons about that,
    okay?
        Now, let me just make it crystal clear to you: This is
    America's interest, because America is the principal guarantor
    of security in the region, and particularly with respect to
    some of our closest friends. Now, we believe that Iran was
    marching toward a weapon or the capacity to have a weapon, and
    we have rolled that back, Congressman. That is indisputable.
        Mr. Perry. Okay, that is your opinion, and I understand
    that is your belief.
        Secretary Kerry. No, that is a fact. That is a fact.
        Mr. Perry. Let me ask you this, let me ask you this, Mr.
    Secretary. Is it possible that Iran will acquire Russian air
    defense missiles in relation to the arms embargo lifting to
    protect nuclear sites, possible or not possible?
        Secretary Kerry. Say that again?
        Mr. Perry. Is it possible that Iran will acquire Russian
    air defense missiles to protect nuclear sites?
        Secretary Kerry. Those are not in the agreement. They have
    A300s----
        Mr. Perry. In relation to the arms embargo lifting.
        Secretary Kerry. No, they are not banned by the arms
    embargo. They are outside of it.
        Chairman Royce. We are going to Mr. Brendan Boyle of
    Pennsylvania, and my intention is to keep going to give our
    junior members an opportunity to ask their questions.
        Mr. Boyle. Thank you.
        I actually want to direct my question to Secretary Moniz.
    And I am probably going to be a little boring, here but a very
    technical question that when I ask the White House and the
    President specifically, he directed us to you saying that you
    are one of the top 10 experts in the world on this.
        So with that buildup, there was a report about 6 days ago
    in The New York Times that really questioned this issue of the
    24 days, and there are some, such as you have said earlier,
    that say, look, 24 days, it is not exactly like you are
    flushing a whole program down the toilet, that certainly
    wouldn't be enough time in which to hide illicit behavior.
        The former deputy director of the IAEA contradicted that
    and said that while it is true with some of the larger scale
    operations, some things such as manufacturing uranium
    components, as well as triggers, actually could be covered up
    in the 24 days.
        So I am really trying to get a clear answer on this issue
    because I actually think it is one of the key components when
    trying to look at this in an intellectually honest way to see
    if we really have a verifiable deal here.
        Secretary Moniz. Yes. And I have spoken with Mr. Heinonen,
    of course, he is up the river from MIT, at Harvard these days.
        But the issue I really want to emphasize, what I have
    always said is that work with nuclear materials, we have very,
    very high confidence in terms of finding microscopic amounts
    there. When you go to things like triggers, things that do not
    involve nuclear materials but are important for a nuclear
    explosive, then that gets into a higher stage of requirement,
    as I have said. And in a classified environment we could talk a
    little bit more about it.
        Even there, there can be some signals, some signals that
    are quite interesting and certainly may be quite detectable.
    But certainly one gets farther away from the nuclear materials,
    then there are more possibilities of both coverup and for at
    least maybe semi-credible explanations for pursuing other
    activities. For example, any military does work with
    conventional explosives in chambers, so the question is, was
    that work around certain hemispherical shapes, for example,
    with multipoint detonation, and that requires more and more
    investigation. But nuclear materials leave quite significant
    signatures typically.
        Mr. Boyle. I wanted to, just with only a couple minutes,
    let me switch, because this something that the Israeli
    Ambassador raised in my office and has been raised a couple
    times and, again, I think is a legitimate--I realize that some
    of this is bash the administration and that is part of
    politics, but there are those of us on the Democratic side who
    do have real, genuine concerns. The 24-day is one of them.
        The other is the question of how exactly we bring forward
    and what we have to reveal in terms of our intelligence to
    demand or request that a site is being inspected. It has been
    pointed out that we would have to reveal why exactly we suspect
    a site, meaning we would have to compromise where we got
    intelligence and why we suspect it.
        Can you talk about how that process would work and how much
    we would have to reveal to the Iranians just in order to
    inspect the site?
        Secretary Moniz. Well, that is something that ultimately
    you really should pick up with the intelligence community,
    obviously. And certainly protecting sources and methods is
    particularly important.
        Now, having said that, clearly in the past intelligence
    agencies from many countries have been able to share
    information. And I also note that, of course, four out of the
    seven countries involved in the talks work together quite
    closely, namely the Europeans and the United States, and I
    think we would do all that we could to provide the IAEA with
    relevant information that would point to a suspicious site no
    matter where it was.
        But clearly, again, in terms of sources and methods, I
    think you have to go to the intelligence----
        Mr. Boyle. Could I ask Secretary Kerry to weigh in on that
    point?
        Secretary Kerry. Yeah, Congressman, I have been through
    this kind of thing a little bit on occasion, and we are very
    careful not to disclose sources and methods, and we have ways
    of providing information and making it available in ways that
    don't compromise that. I can assure you that will not happen.
    It is not something that our community feels prevented or
    stopped by.
        But let me just point out, because you mentioned the
    Israeli Ambassador was in there talking to you about these
    concerns, Sandy Levin is the longest serving Jewish Member of
    the United States Congress, and he came out today in favor.
        Mr. Boyle. I read his statement.
        Secretary Kerry. He was asked about it and he said:

            ``Israel's security has and always will be of critical
            importance to me and our country. I believe that
            Israel, the region, and the world are far more secure
            if Iran does not move toward the possession of a
            nuclear weapon. I believe the agreement is the best way
            to achieve that.''

        Chairman Royce. We are going to Mr. Ron DeSantis of
    Florida. There is a vote on. There are 2 minutes remaining.
        Mr. DeSantis. Secretary Moniz, with respect to the
    agreement between Iran and the IAEA for Parchin and a possible
    military dimension, have you read those documents or
    agreements?
        Secretary Moniz. No, sir, I have not seen them.
        Mr. DeSantis. Okay. And to your knowledge, nobody in the
    U.S. Government has a copy of the agreements?
        Secretary Moniz. To my knowledge, we do not have a copy.
    Again, in Vienna we had very broad oral--I had at least a broad
    oral briefing, but I never saw any paper.
        Mr. DeSantis. So you were briefed in Vienna before the
    JCPOA was announced?
        Secretary Kerry. Yes.
        Secretary Moniz. Shortly before, yes.
        Mr. DeSantis. Who briefed you?
        Secretary Moniz. DG Amano.
        Mr. DeSantis. Okay. And do you have any plans to request
    that those documents be provided to Congress consistent with
    the Iran Nuclear Review Act?
        Secretary Kerry. I don't know if it is consistent, so I
    will check with our folks and make a determination. I don't
    think we judge that it is consistent, but as we have said, we
    will certainly brief the contents in an appropriate classified
    session.
        Mr. DeSantis. Well, if you don't, if you could provide us
    the rationale for why you don't think the definition of
    agreement would encompass----
        Secretary Kerry. Well, I said I don't know. Congressman, I
    just said I don't know.
        Mr. DeSantis. No, I know. But I am saying, if you would
    make that determination, if you could provide us the kind of
    the legal justification so that we can look at it.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, of course we would have to, of
    course we would do that.
        Mr. DeSantis. Okay. Very good.
        There was a report on the Associated Press today that the
    agreement between Iran and the IAEA may not even be completed.
    There was something about maybe Iran would be the one to take
    the soil samples. Can you guys comment? Is it, in fact, still
    being negotiated between Iran and the IAEA?
        Secretary Kerry. We can't, in session here, we can't
    discuss what the methodology is. We will be happy to take this
    on in classified session.
        Mr. DeSantis. Can you confirm the AP story? Have you seen
    it?
        Secretary Kerry. Absolutely not. I can't.
        Mr. DeSantis. You cannot in open session?
        Secretary Kerry. I cannot confirm it.
        Mr. DeSantis. Okay.
        Secretary Kerry. I haven't seen it, among other things.
        Mr. DeSantis. Secretary Moniz, obviously it is a very
    complex agreement. We get into a lot of different things.
    Obviously very important, and I know you guys worked hard on
    it. But sometimes I would just like to take a step back, and
    just a few years ago it had been pretty much the general policy
    of the United States that an agreement would be simply Iran
    gives up its nuclear program, no enrichment. The U.N. had
    always said no enrichment. The President, when he was debating
    Governor Romney in 2012, said: ``The deal we will accept is
    that they end their nuclear program. It is very
    straightforward.''
        Secretary Moniz, do you acknowledge that this agreement--I
    know you guys think it is good, and let's put that aside--but
    do you acknowledge that this agreement doesn't meet that
    standard of where they are ending their nuclear program, that
    they are allowed to maintain a significant nuclear program? The
    international community is going to be helping them develop
    nuclear technology? I know you guys are going to say that you
    are confident you will be able to detect if that is used in a
    military capacity. But that does represent a change, does it
    not, from where we were just a few years ago?
        Secretary Kerry. Congressman, I have had conversations with
    members of the prior administration, and I am not going to--it
    is inappropriate for me to tell you who or speak for them. But
    I think if you talk to them, you will learn that they had come
    to a conclusion by the end of that administration that that
    policy wasn't working and that they were going to need to, in
    fact, have some structure of enrichment and some structure of a
    program.
        There is a distinction here between Iran's nuclear weapons
    capacity and a peaceful nuclear program. Unlike North Korea,
    which pulled out of the NPT, Iran is still a signatory to the
    NPT. Iran has not exploded an ordnance. Iran has not yet gone
    forward to make a weapon, even though they had enough material
    for 10 to 12 bombs.
        So Iran is stating in this agreement its willingness to
    comply with and live within the Nonproliferation Treaty. Under
    the Nonproliferation Treaty, countries have a right to a
    peaceful nuclear program.
        Mr. DeSantis. Just so I get clear with the question, you
    are acknowledging that there has been a reappraisal in kind of
    the goal posts, and it is one that has been shared by both
    people in the Bush administration and the Obama administration?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, I don't think they shared it
    publicly, but they shared it with us privately, and it is----
        Secretary Moniz. May I just add that the construct going in
    then, and this was among the P5+1, that our basic construct
    would be to get the 1-year breakout time to fissile material.
        Mr. DeSantis. I am almost out of time. Secretary Kerry,
    just real quickly, because this is not going to be ratified as
    a treaty, there are a lot of States, and Florida particularly,
    where State legislatures have enacted sanctions against Iran in
    various capacities. Do you acknowledge that this deal will not
    affect states' ability to do it since it is not going to be
    approved as a treaty, it is not going to be considered the
    supreme law of the land, it will be more of an Executive-to-an-
    Executive agreement?
        Secretary Kerry. That is accurate, but we would urge those
    States, if Iran is fully complying with this agreement, we will
    take steps to urge them not to interfere with that.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Ted Yoho of Florida. And don't feel
    compelled to use all your time.
        Mr. Yoho. Yes, sir, I understand. I appreciate it.
        I appreciate you all being here.
        Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you a simple yes-or-no
    question. The Iran Sanctions Act expires on December 31, 2016.
    Will this administration support legislation simply extending
    the Iran Sanctions Act so that the nuclear-related sanctions it
    provides for can be snapped back if Iran is caught cheating?
        Secretary Kerry. Yeah----
        Mr. Yoho. It is a yes-or-no.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, we obviously are committed to the
    ISA, but I don't think any decision has been made on timing or
    what steps the President will take with respect----
        Mr. Yoho. Well, can we do the snap-backs without this?
        Secretary Kerry. Yes, we can.
        Mr. Yoho. According to this, we can't because the Iran
    Sanctions Act expires, and those are necessary to have the
    snap-backs.
        Secretary Lew. No, we have other existing authorities where
    we could snap back both financial and----
        Mr. Yoho. Can you guarantee this body that those acts or
    facilities are going to be in place so that snap-back does work
    without an act of Congress?
        Secretary Kerry. Yes.
        Mr. Yoho. And I have a problem with the secret deals that
    are going on, and you are asking us to support this deal
    without being able to read it. It kind of reminds me of the
    healthcare law. I don't want to be in that situation. You are
    asking us to vote on something. We don't know what is in that
    deal. And I think it is very disingenuous to ask us as Members
    of the--Representatives of United States' citizens to vote on a
    deal without knowing what is in it.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, we are not. I have said to three or
    four Congressmen that they will be briefed.
        Mr. Yoho. I heard that. But it is not clear that the
    information is going to be forthright. We are going to get
    briefings, but briefings is not the same as being able to read
    the actual agreement. And I realize it is the IAEA with Iran,
    but, you know, we are paying 25 percent of the budget of that
    place, I think we as the representatives of the American
    people, we deserve that, and I wouldn't support this without
    that.
        Secretary Lew. Congressman, on the Iran Sanctions Act, can
    I just add two things? First, it doesn't expire until the end
    of 2016, and now would not be the appropriate time, it is
    premature to take action. And I think, respectfully, we know
    that if there is a problem in 2016, it won't take very long for
    Congress to act.
        Mr. Yoho. You say it is premature to take action, and this
    will be my last question, or statement, I think. You say this
    is the best deal we get, and if we walk away from the table, we
    walk away alone. I feel that you, this negotiating team, put
    America in that situation because of the way you negotiated
    this from the very beginning.
        If we go back to the very beginning, Iran will not be
    allowed to have a nuclear weapon. And, you said, Mr. Secretary,
    I heard it come out of your mouth, anywhere, anytime, anyplace.
    That has been passed on. We are beyond that point. And it is
    beyond the point of trying to prevent Iran from having a
    nuclear weapon. We are trying to prevent something that we
    can't, instead of preparing for that which we will have.
        And we have been boxed into a bad corner because you guys
    negotiated from weakness instead of as the superpower, and you
    go into the U.N. to get their approval first so that we look
    like the bad guys. This is a bad deal, and I think if we
    operate from a level of strength Iran will come back to the
    negotiating table. To think that they are going to come back to
    the negotiating table a year or 2 from now, I think that is a
    fallacy, and I think it is disingenuous to America.
        Secretary Kerry. So, Congressman, I urge you, I urge you,
    Congressman, with all respect, to spend time with the intel
    community. I think you will hear a very different judgment from
    them about----
        Mr. Yoho. No disrespect, but we get those people in here
    all the time. We sit in intelligence briefings and we hear from
    them.
        Secretary Kerry. And secondly----
        Mr. Yoho. And they are telling us this is a bad deal. And
    if you say and President Obama says this is going to make
    America safer----
        Secretary Kerry. Congressman, the intelligence community--
    --
        Mr. Yoho. Wait a minute. And the Middle East safer, but yet
    the intelligence community is telling us to build missile
    defense systems on the East Coast, bolster the ones on the West
    Coast and Alaska, because this is a great deal? I think we
    should run away.
        I am going to yield back. Thank you.
        Secretary Kerry. The intelligence community is not saying
    this is a bad deal. The intelligence community supports this
    deal, Congressman. And what is more, they were an integral part
    of helping to shape it.
        And furthermore, the reason we are able to get the good
    deal we got is because we did operate out of a position of
    strength, which is why they are dismantling two-thirds of their
    program, undoing their stockpile, living by restraints on their
    enrichment, and have accepted the Additional Protocol, as well
    as 25-year restraints on their uranium and so forth.
        Chairman Royce. So we will go to Mr. Reid Ribble of
    Wisconsin.
        Secretary Moniz. Just to add, Mr. Congressman, that the
    agreement is that IAEA and Iran, the IAEA will complete its
    PMD. That is the agreement. That is the protocol.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Ribble.
        Mr. Ribble. Thank you.
        Secretary Kerry, earlier in the hearing today you said that
    countries in the future, if the Congress rejects the deal,
    countries in the future will not trust negotiating with the
    U.S. State Department because they are now negotiating with 535
    individual Members of Congress. For 228 years the Constitution
    provided a way out of that mess by allowing treaties to be with
    the advise and consent of 67 U.S. Senators. Why is this not
    considered a treaty?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, Congressman, I spent quite a few
    years trying to get a lot of treaties through the United States
    Senate, and, frankly, it has become physically impossible. That
    is why. Because you can't pass a treaty anymore. It has become
    impossible to, you know, schedule. It has become impossible to
    pass. And I sat there leading the charge on the Disabilities
    Treaty, which fell to basically ideology and politics. So I
    think that is the reason why.
        Mr. Ribble. Yeah, okay. I may not disagree with that. I
    mean, the political world around here is pretty challenging for
    both political parties and certainly for the Congress and the
    President.
        I would say this, that one of the concerns that has been
    voiced to me by my constituents is the fact that in the
    President's press conference about this agreement he threatened
    to veto the Congress' action if we didn't agree with him
    anyway. And so there was this arbitrary poke in the nose of the
    Congress when it was unnecessary. So my folks back home are
    saying: I want to have some say in this and my only say is
    through you. So I think that maybe could have been handled a
    little bit different.
        Secretary Moniz----
        Secretary Kerry. I understand.
        Mr. Ribble. Go ahead, Secretary.
        Secretary Kerry. No, I understand.
        Mr. Ribble. Yeah, okay.
        Secretary Moniz, is it not billions of dollars cheaper to
    build a natural gas power plant rather than a nuclear power
    plant? Why do you suppose the Iranians have gone down the
    nuclear road when they are so carbon rich? I mean, they have
    got a trillion gallons of reserves in natural gas. Wouldn't it
    have been much cheaper for them, if the idea was just peaceful
    electricity, to have gone that route?
        Secretary Moniz. Well, a natural gas power plant has lower
    capital cost, but typically a nuclear plant has lower operating
    costs. That is one point.
        Mr. Ribble. But in this case the natural gas would be free
    to them. It is their primary energy source.
        Secretary Moniz. I am not sure it is free. Certainly in the
    sense--again, I am not arguing one way or the other, but just
    what the argument is, is that it is more valuable than as an
    export product, where, of course, with LNG prices for example,
    in parts of the world, there is quite a bit of rent to be
    captured.
        Mr. Ribble. Yeah, sure.
        Secretary Lew, I appreciate your patience today. You
    haven't been called on that much. But in light of how
    penalizing the economic sanctions have been on this economy it
    still strikes me odd that Iran would continue to move toward
    this very, very expensive construction project as opposed to
    other alternatives. Does this seem odd to you? I mean, it is
    billions and billions of dollars to build a nuclear power
    plant.
        Secretary Lew. Which expense?
        Mr. Ribble. The expense of actually constructing nuclear
    power plants. They have been under great stress economically.
        Secretary Lew. I think that they have been under enormous
    stress. Like any government, they make decisions based on their
    short and their long-term needs. I can't question why they have
    chosen one form of a power plant over another.
        What I do know is their infrastructure, including their
    power infrastructure, is highly inadequate. In order to have a
    foundation for economic growth they do need more power, and
    that is going to require investment. It is one of the reasons
    that I believe they have domestic needs that far exceed any
    relief they are going to get. Their domestic infrastructure is
    in a pretty bad condition right now.
        Mr. Ribble. Well, it seemed to me that one of the possible
    solutions of this whole deal would have been for the P5+1
    countries to assist them in building alternative sources of
    electrical power to meet that need as opposed to setting this
    canard up where now in 15 years if they choose they can go
    ahead and nuclearize from a weaponry standpoint.
        And with that, I will go ahead and yield back.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you.
        Mr. Trott and Mr. Zeldin, if you can keep these comments
    brief, there are votes going on the floor.
        Mr. Trott.
        Mr. Trott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank the witnesses for being here and for your
    service.
        Secretary Kerry, you said in your opening statement that
    there have been major distortions, and President Obama actually
    said yesterday that there have been no factual arguments on the
    other side that are worth scrutiny.
        So a simple yes or no. These the facts that we are basing
    the negotiations off of at the outset: They are holding
    American hostages, they are sponsoring terrorism, calling for
    death to America, want Israel wiped from the face of the Earth,
    guilty of egregious human rights violations, and generally
    creating instability around the world. Are those facts true,
    yes or no?
        Secretary Kerry. Yeah, they are. But----
        Mr. Trott. So would you say those facts looked at
    collectively would suggest that Iran is guilty of bad behavior?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, I think it is more than just bad
    behavior. Destabilizing countries and blowing people up
    somewhere is beyond bad behavior.
        Mr. Trott. I will take that as a yes.
        So how would a deal, let's say I wanted to sell my business
    to Lee. Back when I was in the business world, we were doing an
    acquisition, I would say to my team: You can't do a good deal
    with a bad guy. So can you sort of understand our concern about
    this deal? Because it sure looks like, if you are doing a good
    deal as you suggest, it is with a bad guy.
        Secretary Kerry. I understand exactly what you are saying.
    We confronted questions about what could be achieved or not
    achieved in the course of these negotiations ourselves and came
    to the conclusion, therefore, that nothing is based on trust,
    that we are going to set up something that you can read, we can
    read, that everybody can understand what the expectations are.
        And that is one of the reasons why, from a position of
    strength, we believe we achieved something that really helps
    establish some level of confidence over the years, and that is
    the level to which they will reduce their current program,
    reduce their stockpile, live by limitations on enrichment,
    which are absolutely ascertainable, and so forth.
        So we have created, we think, a dynamic here where you get
    over the hurdle of the things you don't like and are bad
    behavior because you have created something that is verifiable
    and has certainty in it.
        Mr. Trott. Is there any chance that Iran's strategy is to
    get the deal signed, get the $50 billion, and then a year or so
    down the road start to violate the agreement, knowing that----
        Secretary Kerry. That is what was said earlier.
        Mr. Trott. Yeah. And I know that is the challenge of going
    last or next to last, but I appreciate you staying. But isn't
    there a chance that a year from now it is going to be a whole
    lot more difficult for us to get the band back together and be
    able to put in place some of the protections that led to----
        Secretary Kerry. Not if they are breaking the agreement.
        Mr. Trott. So Russia and China are just going to go along
    and say: Gosh, United States, we understand your concern, and
    what can we do to get back in----
        Secretary Kerry. We are convinced about the seriousness of
    purpose of all of our five other partners in this effort.
        Mr. Trott. Hindsight is 20/20, and I am not asking you to
    necessarily evaluate how we got to this point. But is there any
    credibility to the concern that I think someone earlier
    mentioned that maybe decisions by Ambassador Rice or the
    administration or your negotiating team really put us in a
    position now where if we don't sign this deal we are really
    left without any good options? Any concern in hindsight we
    could have done things a little differently, maybe U.N.
    Resolution 1929, other decisions that were made along the way,
    that put us in this box in terms of having no great options?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, we think we have a great option. The
    great option is the agreement that we came to. And we did not
    create the box, by the way. You know, you guys decided you
    wanted to review it, and now you are reviewing it. And I am
    sorry about the consequences of that review, but that is not
    our creation. The consequences of the review are the reality
    that this agreement cannot go forward, and there are
    consequences to that.
        Mr. Trott. I have no regrets, sir, about having the
    responsibility of reviewing this agreement.
        Secretary Kerry. No, and I am not arguing with you about
    your right to do it. But we are arguing that the consequences,
    when you weigh the benefit of this agreement going through
    versus the consequence of not doing it, are serious.
        Mr. Trott. One last question, sir, and I appreciate your
    time. You said earlier this was never about making sure Iran
    did not have a nuclear program but rather about making sure
    they did not have a nuclear weapon.
        Secretary Kerry. The capacity to build a nuclear weapon or
    to get one.
        Mr. Trott. So what did candidate Obama mean in the debate
    with Mitt Romney in 2012 when he said: ``The deal we will
    accept is they end their nuclear program. It is very
    straightforward.'' So he really was just talking about the
    capacity to create a nuclear weapon, not having a nuclear
    program?
        Secretary Kerry. Yeah, having played Mitt Romney for him in
    preparation for that debate, I can assure you that is what he
    meant.
        Mr. Trott. Thank you for your time again, sir. I hope you
    are doing all right on your crutches. I spent a lot of time
    over the years on crutches. They are not any fun. Thank you,
    sir.
        Secretary Kerry. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Lee Zeldin of New York.
        Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Kerry, just now in response to Mr. Ribble's question, I
    just want to understand, with regards to a treaty, you said
    this isn't a treaty because it was difficult to pass. Is that
    correct?
        Secretary Kerry. No. There are a lot of other reasons. We
    don't have diplomatic relations with Iran. It is very
    complicated with six other countries. It is just a very
    complicated process. So we thought that the easiest way to get
    something that had the leverage, had the accountability, could
    achieve our goal, was through a political agreement, and that
    is what we have.
        Mr. Zeldin. And, Mr. Secretary, if you would be able to
    submit for the record just a little more background as to why
    this is not treated as a treaty, I think it would be helpful
    for us.
        Secretary Kerry. Absolutely. Sure. Be happy to do it.
        Mr. Zeldin. Okay. And you said a little bit earlier the
    reason why Iran came to the table is because they wanted the
    relief from the sanctions. The Iranian Supreme Leader said:

            ``The Islamic Republic of Iran will not give up support
            of its friends in the region, the oppressed people of
            Palestine, of Yemen, the Syrian and Iraqi Governments,
            the oppressed people of Bahrain, and sincere resistance
            fighters in Lebanon and Palestine.''

    There is so much state sponsorship of terror in that list, Mr.
    Secretary.
        The Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, said this past
    weekend: ``The United States remains the 'Great Satan,' both
    before and after the nuclear accord.''
        The leverage, as you said, that brought the Iranians to the
    negotiating table was the sanctions relief. Let me just recap
    some of the stuff that wasn't even part of the negotiations:
    Iran developing ICBMs, overthrowing foreign governments,
    sponsoring terror, they are unjustly imprisoning United States
    citizens, including a marine and a pastor, a reporter, pledging
    to wipe Israel off the map, chanting death to America. None of
    that was even part of the negotiations.
        Iran's neighbors, who know them the best, trust them the
    least. It is just something for us to think about.
        I would also ask if you can submit for the record, just for
    the sake of time, a little bit more in the plan as for stopping
    all the other Iranian terror that wasn't part of the deal. I
    think it would be very helpful for Congress to have a better
    sense of what the plan is regarding everything that wasn't part
    of the deal.
        And, Mr. Secretary, if we remove the sanctions, we are
    removing the leverage that brought the Iranians to the table.
    Over 70 years ago, a leader of the free world held up a
    document, declared it ``peace for our time.'' I am afraid that
    many years from now if the American people, through their
    representatives in Congress, accept this bad deal, that just
    like the Munich Agreement of 1938, this Iranian agreement will
    prove to not be in the best interests of American security or
    the stability and safety of the free world.
        There is an alternative other than war. It is a better
    deal. Now, you said getting a better deal is Fantasyland. Some
    other stuff that I would consider Fantasyland is believing that
    you have access to military sites when the Iranian leadership
    tells us that we don't. Fantasyland is agreeing to a three-
    member advisory board where one of the members is declared an
    independent member, but there is no details in the agreement
    whatsoever as to how that independent member is selected.
    Fantasyland is saying that there is no secret deal with Iran
    and the IAEA even though we are acknowledging that there is an
    agreement and that it is secret. Fantasyland is saying that
    this deal provides 24/7 where necessary, when necessary
    inspections, which don't, in fact, exist. A Fantasyland is
    saying that Iran does not want to destroy the United States,
    dismissing their death to America pledge as just rhetoric.
        I don't believe that this is a great option, as you just
    said to the last person. I know it, the American public knows
    it, that there is an alternative other than war and it is a
    better deal. America got played like a five-string quartet.
        Mr. Secretary, a lot of Americans have fought and died to
    make our country the greatest Nation in the world. And you,
    sir, respectfully, you don't have the power to surrender our
    greatness.
        And I would strongly, with all these hypotheticals, that if
    Congress rejects this deal, that everything falls apart, you
    have not yet answered what you would do next. What would you
    three Secretaries do if Congress rejects the deal? Because the
    answer on the next day is no one shows up to work. No one is
    working with the international community to try to protect
    America and the free world. So if Congress rejects this deal,
    when you wake up the next morning, sir, what would you do?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, Congressman, you threw a lot out
    there all at once.
        All of us take affront at the comments that are made
    publicly by many people in Iran, whether it is a general or a
    leader of one kind or another or the Ayatollah's comments.
        What is important is what Iran does, not what it says, what
    it does. For 2 years now, Iran lived by a deal that many of
    your colleagues here called an historic mistake, but they lived
    by it. They have actually rolled their program back. And
    President Obama is the first President in the United States who
    has challenged this issue, who has actually rolled the Iranian
    program back significantly and stopped them from the path to
    get a weapon.
        Now, we have laid out----
        Mr. Zeldin. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, for the
    sake of time----
        Secretary Kerry. No, with all due respect, I think----
        Mr. Zeldin [continuing]. I am just asking what you would do
    the next morning, you have not answered the question of what
    the administration would do.
        Secretary Kerry. I am coming to that.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Zeldin, there is a vote on and your
    time has expired.
        Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        If you could submit that for the record, I think it is
    important for Congress to know what you would do next.
        Secretary Kerry. Sure.
        Chairman Royce. I want to thank our witnesses for being
    with us today. These are not easy issues. Congress will be
    taking a historical vote on this agreement in September. The
    committee will continue doing its job before that vote and
    after. And I thank each of our witnesses again for being with
    us today and staying through the process of having all of the
    members ask their questions.
        We stand adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 2:01 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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