[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES: A
VITAL RESOURCE IN THE NATION'S HOMELAND
SECURITY MISSIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 10, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-20
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Martha McSally, Arizona, Chairman
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Mark Walker, North Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Kerry A. Kinirons, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Arizona, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey................................... 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Robert J. Fenton, Jr., Deputy Associate Administrator, Office
of Response and Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Robert G. Salesses, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Homeland
Defense Integration and Defense Support of Civil Authorities,
U.S. Department of Defense:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 14
Brigadier General Joseph E. Whitlock, Deputy Director, Western
Hemisphere, The Joint Staff, J-5, Strategic Plans and Policy
Directorate, U.S. Department of Defense:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 14
Mr. Joseph W. Kirschbaum, Ph.D., Director, Defense Capabilities
and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Panel II
Major General Michael T. McGuire, The Adjutant General,
Department of Emergency and Military Affairs, State of Arizona:
Oral Statement................................................. 42
Prepared Statement............................................. 44
Mr. Jimmy J. Gianato, Director, Division of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management, State of West Virginia, Testifying on
Behalf of the National Emergency Management Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 54
Prepared Statement............................................. 56
Mr. Peter T. Gaynor, Director, Emergency Management Office, State
of Rhode Island:
Oral Statement................................................. 59
Prepared Statement............................................. 61
APPENDIX
California Governor's Office of Emergency Services, National
Emergency Management Association:
Statement for the Record....................................... 77
DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES: A VITAL RESOURCE IN THE NATION'S
HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS
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Wednesday, June 10, 2015
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Martha McSally
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McSally, Loudermilk, Donovan,
Watson Coleman, and Rice.
Also present: Representative Langevin.
Ms. McSally. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting
today to examine the important role played by the military in
homeland security missions.
Before we begin, I would like to welcome the gentleman from
New York, Mr. Donovan, to the subcommittee. We look forward to
working with you on this committee.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
Ms. McSally. I will now recognize myself for an opening
statement.
Like politics, all disasters are local. Whether it is a
hurricane making landfall in a coastal State, a bomb exploding
in a mass gathering, or a wildfire threatening life and
property, State and local first responders and emergency
managers will be the first on scene to manage the response.
Sometimes, however, the magnitude of these emergencies will
exceed the capabilities of the local responders. Governors may
activate their National Guard forces, in addition to requesting
Federal Government support. Coordinated by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, this assistance may also include
assets from the Department of Defense.
Today's hearing will examine the vital role played by the
military in these homeland defense missions. So far this year
we have seen record snowfalls, destructive tornados, massive
flooding around the country. Last week marked the start of the
2015 hurricane season, and in areas out West, including my home
State of Arizona, we are gearing up for what is predicted to be
an above-average wildfire season as well.
In such emergencies, defense personnel and assets act as
flexible force multipliers to the response. When activated by a
Governor, a State's National Guard can provide, on short
notice, search and rescue, logistics, firefighting, and law
enforcement support. Federal military forces may also
supplement State capabilities.
We have seen this in action. National Guard forces
responded to the massive flooding in Texas and Oklahoma by
rescuing stranded citizens, transporting supplies, and
providing equipment that assisted in accessing areas isolated
by the floodwaters. Arizona National Guard personnel and
resources have contained and suppressed wildfires, protecting
the life and property of Arizona citizens. National Guard and
Federal military forces deployed in response to Hurricane
Sandy, which tested the use of the dual-status command
structure. I am interested to hear more from our witnesses
about the coordination and integration of defense capabilities
during these and other responses.
The National Guard also executes an important law
enforcement support function. More than 400 Massachusetts
National Guardsmen were on site during the 2013 Boston Marathon
to supplement local law enforcement. These personnel were
quickly able to pivot their mission to assist victims and
secure the crime scene after the bombs detonated.
As the threats to our Nation have evolved, so too have the
military's homeland defense capabilities. DOD and the National
Guard have units dedicated to responding to incidents involving
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear--CBRN--agents or
explosives.
This subcommittee has held two hearings so far this year on
the threat of chemical and biological terrorism. We know that
the terrorists have long had an interest in using CBRN agents
in their attacks. The resources and expertise provided by these
specialized military teams are essential capabilities to meet
this threat.
We have two distinguished panels of witnesses before us
today to discuss the importance of defense support to State and
local emergency response providers and the lessons that have
been identified in previous response collaborations. I
mentioned lessons have been identified. We were just talking
earlier, often in the military we call them lessons learned,
but they are not learned until they have actually been learned.
So I call them lessons identified until they are actually
lessons learned.
I look forward to learning more about the coordination of
local, State, Federal, and military response capabilities,
along with the areas that could be improved to make this vital
response capability even more nimble.
[The statement of Ms. McSally follows:]
Statement of Chairman Martha McSally
Like politics, all disasters are local. Whether it is a hurricane
making landfall in a coastal State, a bomb exploding at a mass
gathering, or a wildfire threatening life and property, State and local
first responders and emergency managers will be the first on the scene
to manage the response.
Sometimes, however, the magnitude of these emergencies will exceed
the capabilities of these responders. Governors may activate their
National Guard Forces, in addition to requesting Federal Government
support. Coordinated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, this
assistance may also include assets from the Department of Defense.
Today's hearing will examine the vital role played by the military
in these homeland defense missions.
So far this year, we have seen record snowfalls, destructive
tornados, and massive flooding around the country. Last week marked the
start of the 2015 hurricane season and areas out west, including in my
home State of Arizona, are gearing up for what is predicted to be an
above average wildfire season.
In such emergencies, defense personnel and assets act as flexible
force multipliers to the response.
When activated by a Governor, a State's National Guard can provide,
on short notice, search and rescue, logistics, firefighting, and law
enforcement support. Federal military forces may also supplement State
capabilities.
We've seen this in action. National Guard forces responded to the
massive flooding in Texas and Oklahoma by rescuing stranded citizens,
transporting supplies, and providing equipment that assisted in
accessing areas isolated by floodwaters.
Arizona National Guard personnel and resources have contained and
suppressed wildfires, protecting the life and property of Arizona's
citizens.
National Guard and Federal military forces were deployed in
response to Hurricane Sandy, which tested the use of the dual-status
command structure. I'm interested to hear more from our witnesses about
the coordination and integration of defense capabilities during this,
and other, responses.
The National Guard also executes an important law enforcement
support function. More than 400 Massachusetts National Guardsmen were
on site during the 2013 Boston Marathon to supplement local law
enforcement. These personnel were quickly able to pivot their mission
to assist victims and secure the crime scene after the bombs detonated.
As the threats to our Nation have evolved, so too have the
military's homeland defense capabilities. DOD and the National Guard
have units dedicated to responding to incidents involving chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agents or explosives.
This subcommittee held two hearings on the threat of chemical and
biological terrorism earlier this year. We know that terrorists have
long had an interest in using CBRN agents in their attacks. The
resources and expertise provided by these specialized military teams is
an essential capability to meet this threat.
We have two distinguished panels of witnesses before us today to
discuss the importance of defense support to State and local emergency
response providers and the lessons that have been identified in
previous response collaborations.
I look forward to learning more about the coordination of local,
State, Federal, and military response capabilities, along with areas
that could be improved to make this vital response capability even more
nimble.
Ms. McSally. The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady,
Mrs. Watson Coleman, for an opening statement.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Good morning. I would like to thank Chairman McSally for
holding this important hearing on the role of defense resources
in disaster response.
The capabilities of our defense resources are vast and
diverse. Though ordinarily jurisdictions may not look to
partnering with National Guard or the Defense Department, the
boots on the ground and the capacity that they can supply are a
great multiplier. Just last month, units from the Texas and
Oklahoma National Guards provided surge capacity to State and
local responders during and after massive floods pummeled the
region. With the upcoming 10-year anniversary of Hurricane
Katrina and 3-year anniversary of Superstorm Sandy, we are
reminded once again of the important role that defense
resources play in response to recovery.
Although many important reforms to facilitate improved
integration of defense assets into civil response plans were
implemented between Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy,
every after-action report identified improvements that must be
made. From clarifying the role of the dual-status commander, to
improving training to ensure that command-and-control
structures are well-exercised, there is more work to be done to
drive efforts for better coordination on the ground,
particularly during complex multi-State catastrophes.
The testimony prepared by Mr. Kirschbaum underscores my
point. Madam Chair, today's hearing could not come at a more
appropriate time. As a subcommittee we have expended
significant time when exploring response challenges associated
with chemical and biological threats. In the event of a
catastrophic chemical or biological incident, we know that
defense resources are an integral part of an effective
response. Today's hearing affords the subcommittee the
opportunity to deepen our understanding of how defense
resources support our Nation's chem-bio response capabilities.
Another area of great interest to Members on both sides of
the aisle is the Nation's response capability when it comes to
another emerging threat area, and that is cybersecurity. The
disclosure last week by the Department of Homeland Security and
the Office of Personnel Management that the personnel files for
possibly 4 million current and former Federal employees were
hacked brings threat into real focus.
The challenge of securing our Nation's cyber infrastructure
and networks demands an all-hands approach. DHS has a dual
cyber role. It is responsible for helping to protect Federal
networks and partnering with critical infrastructure owners and
others in the private sector to bolster cybersecurity. In the
event of a major cyber incident which results in cascading
failures of multiple independent, critical, life-sustaining
infrastructure sectors, an effective and timely civilian
response will necessarily depend on coordination with defense
resources.
Recent announcements by the National Guard Bureau of the
creation of cyber protection teams is a welcome development and
reflects an awareness of the likelihood that civilian
authorities will look to the Guard for such support. These
cyber protection teams will train and operate on a traditional
part-time basis in support of their respective State National
Guards. But when activated for Federal Active Duty, the teams
will provide surge support to Army Cyber Command and support
defense cyber space operations. I will be interested in
learning more about how this capability will coordinate with
and complement the civilian response capability.
Along these lines, I would like to thank Mr. Gaynor, the
director of Rhode Island Emergency Management, for being here
today to talk to us about how the State leverages defense
assets in its cyber response plans.
Although I am encouraged to learn that cyber response
coordination is underway, I was concerned to learn in GAO's
written testimony that the Department of Defense has not yet
adequately aligned its guidance on preparing for and responding
to domestic cyber incidents with National-level guidance. I
hope we can learn more about DOD's progress in that regard
today.
Once again, I thank the Chair for holding this timely
hearing. I thank the witnesses for being here today, and I look
forward to their testimony. With that I yield back my time.
Ms. McSally. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Madam Chair, I ask unanimous consent
that Mr. Langevin be permitted to participate in today's
subcommittee meeting.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Without objection.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Ms. McSally. Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded
that opening statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
June 10, 2015
Good morning. I would like to thank Ms. McSally and Mr. Payne, Jr.
for holding this important hearing.
Nearly 10 years ago, Hurricane Katrina slammed into the Gulf Coast
and devastated the communities in its path.
During the response and recovery efforts, we learned painful
lessons about planning and training gaps that undermined successful
response efforts.
One of the most important lessons that emerged after Hurricane
Katrina was the failure to coordinate Federal, State, and local assets
to allow for rapid deployment of much-needed resources.
In Mississippi, for example, household goods supplied by the
Federal Government never made it into the hands of disaster survivors,
and were given instead to State agencies.
In the storm's aftermath, I worked with my colleagues in Congress
to enact the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, which
provided a mechanism for the FEMA administrator to be elevated to the
President's Cabinet during a disaster and directed FEMA to develop pre-
scripted mission assignments for Federal agencies, including the
Department of Defense.
Although Hurricane Katrina triggered many reforms to improve the
ability to leverage defense support of civil authorities during
emergencies, it is important to note that Hurricane Katrina was not the
first time that defense resources were not effectively leveraged during
a disaster response.
Following the September 11 attacks, Federal Reservists tried to
respond to Ground Zero, but there was no legal authority to put them to
work--so an on-the-fly approach was employed.
In the weeks and months that followed, Congress and the Executive
branch began to reassess the Department of Defense's role in domestic
responses to terrorist attacks and major disasters.
While some progress was made to bolster DOD's role in certain civil
response activities, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that critical gaps
remained.
For example, our National Response Plan did not distinguish the
type of defense support that might be required during a small disaster
versus a catastrophic disaster.
The Plan did not include detail about how defense support would be
provided, whether resources would be supplied by Federal forces or the
National Guard, nor how long it would take to deliver defense assets.
Most notably, we did not conduct training exercises for
catastrophic disasters in which DOD assets were fully deployed.
Accordingly, Military, Federal, State, and local responders were
determining what defense assets could be supplied and who would supply
them while response efforts were underway.
For example, in Mississippi, Governor Barbour initially called up
about 1,000 National Guard troops, and put an additional 600 on stand-
by--which was consistent with the State's response to Hurricane Camille
but did not account for the population increase.
The military deserves credit for its response to Hurricane
Katrina--50,000 National Guard Troops and 20,000 Federal troops were
ultimately deployed, which undoubtedly saved lives.
That said, the response would have been more effective had
appropriate plans been in place before the Hurricane.
Nearly 3 years ago, Hurricane Sandy pummeled the northeast, and it
was the first time many of the post-Katrina reforms were utilized.
Although efforts to bolster and clarify the role of the dual-status
commander after Hurricane Katrina did appear to improve coordination
between National Guard troops and Federal forces during Hurricane Sandy
relief efforts, many involved in the response did not fully understand
the chain-of-command.
Additionally, Hurricane Sandy revealed challenges presented by
multi-State disasters, in which more than one dual-status commander is
appointed but no coordinating process exists.
I will be interested in learning what training is underway to help
those in the chain-of-command better understand the role of the dual-
status commander and how DOD and FEMA are working together to improve
response capabilities for multi-State disasters.
I will also be interested in learning how FEMA is working with DOD
to identify capability needs and develop pre-scripted mission
assignments at the regional level to ensure that defense assets can be
deployed in a timely manner.
Finally, I will be interested to understanding how defense
resources have supported the response to the horrific flooding in Texas
and Oklahoma.
I look forward to the witness' testimony, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Ms. McSally. We are pleased to have two panels of very
distinguished witnesses before us today on this important
topic. I will now introduce our first panel.
Mr. Robert Fenton currently serves as the deputy associate
administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's
Office of Response and Recovery. He previously served as the
assistant administrator for response and was responsible for
coordinating the Federal response in support of States during
major disasters.
Since joining FEMA in 1996, Mr. Fenton has held a number of
positions at both headquarters and in Region IX. I understand
Mr. Fenton will be soon departing headquarters to assume the
role of regional administrator for Region IX. My home State is
in Region IX, and I look forward to working with you in this
capacity.
Mr. Robert Salesses serves as the deputy assistant
secretary of defense for homeland defense integration and
defense support of civil authorities. Okay, these are long
titles here. Mr. Salesses previously served as the deputy
special assistant for the Homeland Security Task Force, a
position he assumed shortly after the September 11 terrorist
attacks. Mr. Salesses is a retired United States Marine Corps
officer.
Brigadier General Joseph Whitlock is the deputy director
for political-military affairs, western hemisphere, strategic
plans and policy directorate, at the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In
this capacity his portfolio includes issues associated with
homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities.
Mr. Joseph Kirschbaum is the director in the defense
capabilities and management team of the Government
Accountability Office, the GAO. In this capacity he oversees
evaluation of the Department of Defense programs in the
homeland defense and emerging threats and capabilities
portfolio. In 2013, Mr. Kirschbaum served as acting director in
GAO's Homeland Security and Justice Team, overseeing
evaluations of Federal emergency preparedness and homeland
security programs.
The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Fenton for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. FENTON, JR., DEPUTY ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF RESPONSE AND RECOVERY, FEDERAL
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Fenton. Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and
Members of this distinguished subcommittee, I am Robert Fenton,
deputy associate administrator of the Office of Response and
Recovery for FEMA. It is my pleasure to be here today to
discuss how the Department of Defense and FEMA coordinate to
ensure efficient, effective, and well-orchestrated response and
recovery activities in support of States and local governments
in response to all hazards.
In my testimony I will highlight four areas today. First,
integration, personnel, and collaboration. A clear example of
the collaboration is with regard to the exchange of subject-
matter expertise between FEMA and the Department of Defense. We
have liaison officers in FEMA from OSD Policy, Joint Staff, and
NORTHCOM, and in each of our 10 regions we have defense
coordinating officers assigned there. FEMA has embedded also
FEMA officials who serve in NORTHCOM as the Deputy Plans and
Integration for the J-5.
The defense coordinating officer is a key position who are
members in disasters of the Unified Coordination Group to
ensure unity of effort in helping provide support to State and
local governments. They participate in developing Federal-State
plans and maintain well-established relationships with DOD
installations of the National Guard through the region.
Additionally, DOD has provided individuals to support our
National IMATs. Then lastly, the employment of the dual-status
commander during large-scale incidents improves unity of effort
by establishing standardized procedures for the command and
integration of State and Federal military forces for the
contingency operations of no-notice operations.
The second area is catastrophic preparedness and planning.
Since the implementation of Presidential Policy Directive 8,
FEMA has facilitated the development of the National Planning
System and a National response Federal interagency operational
plan for all 10 regions, as well as specific annexes for unique
catastrophic hazards based on National and regional threat
assessments. DOD engages as a member of the core planning team
for every National and regional planning initiative.
Additionally, NORTHCOM is in the process of developing
incident-specific playbooks to execute defense roles and
fulfill supporting capability requirements identified in the
FEMA regional plans. NORTHCOM playbooks have already been
developed based on FEMA plans for a southern California
earthquake, Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake, Alaska
earthquake. Playbooks are in the process of being developed for
the nuclear effort, improvised nuclear device events, in the
Atlantic hurricane and New Madrid Seismic Zone events.
Lastly, the National Guard is key as they assist in
planning at the State and multi-State level and also help
connect whole community integration, civilian and military
emergency management concepts.
The third area I would like to talk about is the progress
we have made in mission assignments. Following the Post-Katrina
Reform Act, FEMA was directed to develop prescripted mission
assignments for all Federal departments and agencies. With
regard to Department of Defense, we developed 28 prescripted
mission assignments for DOD, specifically, 48 for the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, and 6 for the National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency. These allow us to further expedite the
response.
In addition, FEMA has recently placed the whole prescripted
mission assignment library in our Crisis Management System,
WebEOC, which allows Federal agencies, State, local, Tribal
agencies to access those mission assignments during events.
We further tested a new concept by bundling those mission
assignments in response to a catastrophic event. What we were
able to do is, previously it would take us about an hour to
process a mission assignment, by bundling together in nine big
bundles based on the plans developed for southern California,
we were able to process about 70 prescripted mission
assignments in 2 hours, which allows us to expedite the process
for providing resources to State and local governments for
life-saving measures.
The fourth area I would like to talk about is exercise
activities and testing capabilities. The National Exercise
Program is the principal exercise mechanism for National
preparedness and measuring readiness. FEMA and DOD have
collaborated and participated in various activities, most
recently a southern California exercise in 2015. FEMA and DOD
have begun to synchronize these exercise schedules and aligning
those with FEMA and NORTHCOM operational planning. FEMA and DOD
also are joint participants in the National Exercise Capstone
Program that allows us to better test our capabilities.
In conclusion, as I present my testimony today we are
collaborating, integrating, and sharing resources and
capabilities with DOD via embedded liaisons, comprehensive
planning, flexible mission assignment procedures, and
overarching exercise activities. Ultimately, FEMA and DOD
continue to take all necessary actions to maximize the utility
and effectiveness of DSCA.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look
forward to and am prepared to respond to any questions you
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fenton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert J. Fenton, Jr.
June 10, 2015
introduction
Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of this
distinguished subcommittee, I am Robert J. Fenton, deputy associate
administrator for the Office of Response and Recovery of the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA). I am grateful for the opportunity to be here today.
In this testimony, I will discuss how the Department of Defense
(DOD) supports FEMA under Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).
FEMA and DOD work closely together to ensure that our efforts are well-
orchestrated and that DOD capabilities are available to support States
and Tribes as they respond to and recover from disasters. DOD is always
in support of a lead Federal agency in providing DSCA.
collaboration between fema and the department of defense
Past incidents highlighted specific limitations under Federal law
and Federal response doctrine that resulted in the slow application of
resources during initial phases of disaster response. Over the last
decade, FEMA has made significant strides to mitigate these limitations
and enhance operational preparedness for future catastrophic events.
DOD policies, processes, and procedures have evolved to incorporate
these changes.
By leveraging the authorities of the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) and the mandates set forth in
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8 on National Preparedness, FEMA
improved planning and coordination among State, local, Tribal, and
Federal stakeholders to include the DOD. Moreover, both FEMA and DOD
have been heavily involved in the exchange of subject-matter expertise
through the use of liaison officers (LNOs) and through DOD's Defense
Coordinating Officer (DCO) program that maintains a presence in each of
the ten FEMA regions.
In order to compress DOD response time lines and expedite the
mission assignment request and approval process, FEMA and DOD developed
28 Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMAs) that remain working drafts
based on lessons learned from previous disasters. Although not pre-
approved, PSMAs facilitate a more rapid response by standardizing the
process of developing Mission Assignments. They specify what type of
assistance is required (personnel and equipment), identify a statement
of work, and provide projected costs.
Through PKEMRA, these mission assignments can be authorized in
advance of known events such as hurricanes.
fema mission assignment authorities
Stafford Act
The Stafford Act constitutes the statutory authority for most
Federal disaster response activities, especially as they pertain to
FEMA programs in support of State and Tribal governments. It vests
responsibility for emergency preparedness jointly in the Federal
Government, State, Tribal, and territorial governments and their
political subdivisions. It also gives FEMA responsibility for
coordinating Federal Government response to support State, local,
Tribal, and territorial efforts.
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006
PKEMRA gives FEMA the authority needed to lean forward and leverage
the entire emergency management team in response and recovery efforts.
This team includes not only Government, but also private, non-profit,
and citizen partners to successfully prevent, protect against, respond
to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.
PKEMRA also requires that each Federal agency with responsibilities
under the National Response Framework (NRF) develop operational plans
to ensure a coordinated Federal response.
Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness
After the policy changes ushered in following PKEMRA, PPD-8 was
released with the goal of strengthening the security and resilience of
the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that
pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation.
PPD-8 defines five mission areas, including: Prevention,
protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. It mandates the
development of policy and planning documents to guide the Nation's
approach for ensuring and enhancing National preparedness.
National Preparedness Goal
While PPD-8 describes the Nation's approach to preparing for
threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the security of the
United States, the National Preparedness Goal defines success by
increased security and resilience through the use of core capabilities.
The National Planning Frameworks, which are part of the National
Preparedness System, set the strategy and doctrine for building,
sustaining, and delivering the core capabilities identified in the
National Preparedness Goal.
National Response Framework
The NRF is a guide to how the Nation responds to all types of
disasters and emergencies. It is built on scalable, flexible, and
adaptable concepts identified in the National Incident Management
System (NIMS) to align key roles and responsibilities across the
Nation.
This Framework describes specific authorities and best practices
for managing incidents that range from the serious, but purely local to
large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. The
NRF describes the principles, roles and responsibilities, and
coordinating structures for delivering the core capabilities required
to respond to an incident and further describes how response efforts
integrate with those of the other mission areas.
The objectives of the response mission area define the capabilities
necessary to save lives, protect property and the environment, meet
basic human needs, stabilize the incident, restore basic services and
community functionality, and establish a safe and secure environment
moving toward recovery.
Under the NRF, Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes describe
the Federal coordinating structures that group resources and
capabilities into functional areas that are most frequently needed in a
National response. The Federal Government organizes response resources
and capabilities under the ESF construct. ESFs have proven to be an
effective way to manage resources to deliver core capabilities. The
Federal ESFs bring together the capabilities of Federal departments and
agencies and other National-level assets. ESFs are not based on the
capabilities of a single department or agency, and the functions for
which they are responsible cannot be accomplished by any single
department or agency. Instead, Federal ESFs are groups of organizations
that work together to deliver core capabilities and support an
effective response.
DOD, through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is a lead and
coordinating agency for ESF No. 3--Public Works and Engineering and is
a support agency for every ESF. The ESFs are vital structures for
responding to Stafford Act incidents; however, they may also be used
for other incidents.
Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan
In addition to the National Planning Frameworks, FEMA completed the
Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs) as part of the National
Planning System. This includes one for each mission area to provide
further detail regarding roles and responsibilities, specify the
critical tasks, and identify resourcing and sourcing requirements for
delivering core capabilities.
The Response FIOP builds upon the NRF, which sets the strategy and
doctrine for how the whole community builds, sustains, and delivers the
response core capabilities identified in the National Preparedness
Goal.
This plan describes how the Federal Government delivers core
capabilities for the response mission area. Specifically, the response
FIOP is an all-hazards plan that describes how the Federal Government,
pursuant to the Stafford Act, supports State, local, Tribal,
territorial, and insular area efforts to save lives, protect property
and the environment, and meet basic human needs following an emergency
or disaster.
defense support of civil authorities
Like any lead or supporting agency under the NRF/ESF construct, the
DOD is mission assigned when their assets or capabilities would best
meet FEMA requirements in support of State-requested assistance. This
process pertains to DSCA as it is defined by DOD Directive 3025.18 as
``Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD
contract personnel, DOD Component assets, and National Guard forces
(when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of
the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title
32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil
authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and
other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special
events. Also known as civil support.''
Process
The Defense Coordination Element (DCE) is an integral part of a
region's all-hazards preparedness and response. The DCE participates in
the development of regional plans, familiarizes regional staff with
DSCA capabilities and maintains well-established relationships with DOD
installations and National Guard leadership throughout the region.
These relationships are critical since they allow the region to rapidly
identify potential facilities to serve as Federal Staging Areas or
Incident Support Bases.
During disasters, the response process begins when the President
issues either an Emergency Declaration or a Major Disaster Declaration
under the Stafford Act. After a declaration, the DCO and the DCE are
activated in response to a FEMA Mission Assignment (MA), which are used
by FEMA to request assistance from the DOD, to task other Federal
agencies, and to provide reimbursement for direct assistance during
emergencies and disaster.
The DCO is a member of the Unified Coordination Group and works
alongside the State/Tribal and Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO),
State and regional partners, including ESFs, to identify capability
gaps and either known or anticipated DOD requirements. FEMA Mission
Assignments are generated by the FCO at the FEMA Joint Field Office.
Those Mission Assignments requesting DOD assistance are validated by
the DCO and then sent by the FCO through FEMA to the Secretary of
Defense. PSMAs for the most commonly-requested assistance from DOD are
available to significantly reduce processing delays.
This process ensures that resources are coordinated and arrive at
the disaster site as quickly and efficiently as possible.
hurricane sandy successes and lesson learned
FEMA deployed significant numbers of personnel, both before and
after Hurricane Sandy made landfall, to support response and recovery
efforts. At the peak of response and initial recovery efforts, more
than 17,000 Federal personnel--including more than 7,500 FEMA staff--
were deployed. In addition, States deployed over 11,000 National Guard
personnel in the impacted areas.
FEMA successfully used its mission assignment authority to provide
coordinated, efficient response to survivors after the storm, issuing
over $6.3 million in mission assignments to Federal partners the day
Hurricane Sandy made landfall, directing them to provide assets and
services to support State, local, and Tribal efforts. Federal assets
and services included communications system restoration, debris
removal, aerial imaging and surveillance, as well as health and medical
care.
Despite these successes, the significant response to Sandy also
revealed notable challenges in how FEMA coordinates with its Federal
partners, supports State, local, and Tribal officials and disaster
survivors, integrates with the whole community, and prepares and
deploys its workforce. FEMA's Sandy After-Action Report identified
issuing timely mission assignments as an area for improvement.
Specific to DOD mission assignments, FEMA continues to work with
DOD to develop PSMAs which enable FEMA to expedite resources to the
affected communities during a disaster. These mission assignments were
directed by law in PKEMRA and while they are not pre-approved, they
instead provide a basis for language that is agreed to prior to an
incident--promoting common understanding and reducing processing time.
FEMA currently has a total of 251 approved PSMAs for 31 departments
and agencies. FEMA has a close partnership with the DOD as evidenced by
the 28 PSMAs for DOD support, along with an additional 48 for the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, and 6 for the National Geospatial Intelligence
Agency. The PSMA catalogue will be continually updated based on
experiences and lessons learned from disasters and simulation
exercises.
FEMA recently revamped its PSMA review process and transferred the
PSMA process to FEMA's WebEOC Crisis Management System to make tracking
draft PSMAs, and accessing approved PSMAs, more visible to departments
and agencies and to streamline their coordination within FEMA. A PSMA
Technical Review Team was also created, made up of representatives from
FEMA headquarters and the regions, to conduct a comprehensive review of
each draft PSMA, ensuring eligibility, clarity, completeness, proper
format, legality, and cost efficiency. In addition, FEMA developed a
new comprehensive Mission Assignment Guide to help clarify the mission
assignment process, effectively managing the time required for issuing,
executing, and financially closing out mission assignments.
enhanced partnerships, integrated planning, and exercises
DOD and FEMA enjoy a very close relationship in deliberate planning
and exercising for catastrophic incidents.
Doctrine, Guidance, and Plans Guide Integration at the State, Regional,
and National Level
A new ``All-Hazards'' planning construct is in place to execute
PPD-8 and ensure that all ten FEMA regions are synchronized and using a
single all-hazards FIOP. FEMA also develops incident-specific annexes
to plan for unique situations or requirements that would not otherwise
be addressed in the all-hazard plan. A single 5-year planning schedule
enables FEMA to synchronize its planning efforts with other departments
and agencies, including DOD, to ensure planning addresses regional
Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRAs), as well
as the Strategic National Risk Assessment.
We are proud of substantial improvements in the integration of
planning assumptions, concepts of operations, and support requirements
with the DOD represented in intergovernmental planning for catastrophic
incidents.
Through the leadership of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, NORTHCOM, the Joint
Staff, National Guard Bureau, and other organizations, the NORTHCOM
CONPLAN 3500, DSCA Response plan has been developed, which represents
NORTHCOM's plan for executing its supporting roles and responsibilities
set forth by the NRF and the FIOP-Response.
Similarly, NORTHCOM is beginning to develop incident-specific
playbooks to execute DOD roles and responsibilities identified in
Regional All-Hazard Plans and their incident-specific annexes. National
Guard planning at the State and multi-State level help to close the
loop on whole community integration of civilian and military emergency
management concepts.
To illustrate our success in integration, new NORTHCOM Playbooks
are under development now to specifically support the tasks and
requirements set forth in the FEMA Region IX Southern California
Earthquake Plan and the FEMA Region X Alaska and Cascadia Subduction
Zone Annexes. The NORTHCOM Playbooks will function as annexes to the
NORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500 (DSCA Response).
Embedded Partners
To maintain momentum with the planning integration, FEMA and
NORTHCOM are in the process of embedding officials to serve in each
other's Plans Divisions. A FEMA official was detailed to NORTHCOM last
summer and currently serves as a deputy plans chief to support the
development of NORTHCOM playbooks.
DOD also supplies a number of personnel within FEMA headquarters
and its regional offices to coordinate and synchronize its operations.
Liaison officers from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, the Joint Staff, and NORTHCOM permanently reside within the
FEMA Response Directorate to coordinate and ensure situational
awareness on a broad array of program efforts. These liaisons also
serve in positions in the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC)
to coordinate operational support missions to the States and survivors
during disasters. NORTHCOM also supplies permanent DCOs in each FEMA
region and an operational planner within the FEMA Headquarters Response
Directorate Planning Division. These personnel are engaged as part of
the core planning team for each regional and National planning
initiative. Routine coordination meetings, a NORTHCOM National Planning
Integration Team, and other forums provide opportunities for our
organizations to raise awareness of new and on-going planning
initiatives, to solicit formal feedback on planning products and to
synchronize our collective planning efforts.
Additionally, FEMA is looking to enhance the capabilities of its
Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs) by including some of our
key interagency partners as members of the IMATs. This will enable the
IMATs to more quickly establish an effective unified response with our
State and local partners. DOD has provided two full-time personnel to
two of the National IMATs, (an Noncommissioned Officer and an Officer
in the rank of Colonel). Their primary role will be as planners working
closely to ensure that all DOD resources are properly integrated in the
response and recovery efforts in support of the State objectives. When
not engaged in a response, these individuals will also be engaged with
FEMA's on-going deliberative planning efforts. This will further
enhance our abilities to fully understand the full capabilities of DOD
in support of response operations.
Exercising: National Exercise Program Capstone Event
FEMA doctrine reflects that the planning process is not complete
until after it has been validated through an actual event or exercise.
Exercises are also the means to test Federal department and agency
policies, procedures, and capabilities. For instance, the National
Exercise Program Capstone 14 exercise that was held March 27 through
April 3 tested capabilities of the broad homeland security enterprise,
as well as the specific capabilities of FEMA and DOD. Key DOD
components participated in the event which served to validate and
improve upon the recent joint planning efforts conducted by FEMA, the
State of Alaska, DOD components, and other departments and agencies.
Senior Leader Engagement
FEMA engages senior leaders throughout the military community
through:
Quarterly senior leader video teleconferences, which include
participation from the deputy commander of NORTHCOM and FEMA's
associate administrator for the Office of Response and Recovery
Quarterly dual-status commander courses
Monthly ESF Leadership Group
Periodic senior executive DSCA course, which features FEMA
instruction
Participation in Capstone, which is a DOD General Officer
senior leader development course.
conclusion
FEMA's mission is to support our citizens and first responders to
ensure that as a Nation we work together to build, sustain, and improve
our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover
from, and mitigate all hazards. FEMA coordinates with other departments
and agencies, such as the DOD, which enables FEMA to better serve the
Nation. This supports FEMA's broad strategic goals as an agency,
including its strategic priority of posturing and building capability
for catastrophic disasters. DOD is a key partner for FEMA and through
liaisons, senior leadership engagement, and planning efforts, this
relationship is strengthening.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important authority.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Fenton.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Salesses for a 5-minute
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. SALESSES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
HOMELAND DEFENSE INTEGRATION AND DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL
AUTHORITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Salesses. Chairwoman McSally, Congresswoman Watson
Coleman, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you
for the opportunity to address you today on the Department of
Defense's defense support to civil authorities mission,
affectionately known as DSCA.
I want to emphasize four key points today. DOD plays a
supporting and important role in the National response system.
DOD relies on a broad range of defense capabilities to provide
that support. DOD has made significant improvements to our
preparedness to support civil authorities. Last, DOD is better
prepared to support civil authorities at this time than any
other time in history.
A fundamental tenet of the National response system is that
DOD is always in support of domestic civil authorities. DOD
understands this and is well prepared to assist our Federal
partners in sustaining and saving lives in the aftermath of
man-made or natural disasters.
DOD supports FEMA as the primary Federal agency and is
prepared to support each of the 14 emergency support functions,
the ESFs. Working closely with our ESF partners, DOD has
identified critical capabilities to assist them.
DOD has made significant investments in equipping and
readiness of the National Guard. The National Guard is a
critical State-level resource, providing needed capabilities to
State Governors quickly in response to disasters and
emergencies. In addition, through pooling of National Guard
resources under emergency management assistance compacts, State
Governors may draw upon additional National Guard capabilities
from other States.
DOD supports disaster response with a broad range of
defense capabilities, much more than just our military. DOD's
approach to the DSCA mission starts at the installation level.
DOD encourages installations to enter into mutual aid
agreements providing reciprocal capabilities between the local
community and the military installations. Under immediate
response authority, installation commanders may make the
resources under their control immediately available to save and
sustain life in the local community.
When providing assistance, DOD leverages the total military
force, Active, Reserve, and National Guard. DOD also relies on
its defense agencies, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
Defense Logistics Agency, and the National Geospatial Agency.
USTRANSCOM's strategic air, maritime, and intermodal lift
capabilities enable DOD to provide responsive transportation
capabilities to our Federal partners.
The third point, DOD has made significant improvements in
its preparedness. DOD has a strong, direct, day-to-day
relationship with the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA,
and all of our ESF partners. That relationship is enabled from
full-time DOD advisers at the DHS headquarters, DOD liaisons at
the FEMA headquarters, and coordinating offices at each of the
10 FEMA regions.
DOD works closely with FEMA to integrate planning efforts
at both the State, regional, and Federal levels. DOD and FEMA
have developed many prescripted mission assignments and are
continually improving upon those to expedite the request for
assistance process. DOD's standing defense support to civil
authorities, EXORD, identifies critical capabilities that are
postured military forces to respond rapidly in support of our
Federal partners.
DOD has also developed a wide range of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear--CBRN--response
capabilities and has trained a force of 18,000 personnel
postured to respond rapidly in support of civil authorities in
the aftermath of a CBRN event.
DOD supports the FEMA-led National Exercise Program, and
DOD also hosts numerous exercises at the Federal, State, and
local partner level, most recently out in Colorado Springs,
Ardent Sentry, which is a major West Coast earthquake scenario,
working very closely with the State of California and Arizona.
DOD has leveraged the dual-status commander concept to improve
the unity of effort between State National Guard and military
forces.
As a result of these advances and others, DOD is well
prepared to maximize its capabilities and forces to act quickly
to save and sustain lives in the aftermath of catastrophic
disasters.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear. I appreciate your
leadership, Chairwoman McSally and distinguished Members of the
committee, and I appreciate your support of the Department of
Defense. I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Salesses and General
Whitlock follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Robert G. Salesses and Joseph E. Whitlock
June 10, 2015
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, distinguished Members of
the subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to address you today on
the Department of Defense's (DOD's) role in responding to man-made and
natural disasters in the United States.
We would like to emphasize four key points for you today: (1) DOD
plays a supporting but important role in the National response system;
(2) DOD relies on a broad range of defense capabilities to provide
support; (3) DOD has made significant improvements in its preparedness
to support civil authorities; and (4) DOD is now better prepared to
support civil authorities than at any other time in our Nation's
history.
dod's role in the national response system
DOD is prepared to assist civil authorities in saving and
sustaining lives after man-made and natural disasters, including
extreme weather events, pandemics, and industrial accidents. DOD
understands this and is well-prepared to meet this expectation.
As stated in the National Defense Strategy, while defending the
homeland, the Department must also maintain the capacity to support
civil authorities in times of National emergency such as in the wake of
catastrophic man-made and natural disasters.\1\ DOD refers to this
support as ``Defense Support of Civil Authorities'' (or ``DSCA''):
Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD
contract personnel, and DOD component assets in response to requests
for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law
enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying
entities for special events.
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\1\ Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, June 2008,
page 7.
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DOD plays a supporting but important role in the National response
system. As provided in the National Response Framework, the National
response system and its protocols provide tiered levels of support when
additional resources or capabilities are needed. Most incidents begin
and end locally and are managed at the local level. Some may require
additional support from neighboring jurisdictions or State governments.
The Federal Government and many State governments organize their
response resources and capabilities under the Emergency Support
Function (ESF) construct. The 14 Federal ESFs bring together the
capabilities of Federal departments and agencies and other National-
level assets to perform such functions as transportation, public works
and engineering, mass care and temporary housing, logistics, public
health and medical services, and search and rescue. DOD is available to
support all 14 Federal ESFs when requested.
A fundamental tenet of the National response system is that DOD is
always in support of domestic civil authorities. It is also important
to note that the chain of command always runs from the President to the
Secretary of Defense to the combatant commander concerned. DOD fully
supports the Incident Command System of the National Incident
Management System. However, at no time does the supported agency
exercise any formal command and control over DOD forces.
In this National response system, the National Guard serves as a
critical State resource in disaster responses and can provide much-
needed capabilities to State Governors very quickly. The majority of
National Guard support in disaster responses is performed at the
direction of a State Governor and in a State Active-Duty status as a
State militia.
Normally, DOD provides DSCA in support of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) or another lead Federal agency, when directed
by the President or when the Secretary of Defense has approved a
request for assistance pursuant to the Stafford Act \2\ or the Economy
Act.\3\ This arrangement helps DOD ensure that its resources are used--
lawfully--to satisfy prioritized Federal Government requirements as
outlined by the President and the lead Federal agency. This arrangement
is absolutely critical when DOD is supporting a Federal multi-State
response so that lead Federal agency requirements are appropriately
prioritized and personnel and resources are deployed/employed in the
affected region effectively.
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\2\ The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act (Public Law 93-288), as amended.
\3\ 31 U.S.C. 1535.
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There are, however, exceptions, including support provided under
the immediate response authority or pursuant to a mutual and automatic
aid agreement, as well as DOD organizations with independent
authorities.
Immediate Response Authority.--Under immediate response authority,
Federal military commanders, heads of DOD components, and responsible
DOD civilian officials may, in response to a request for assistance
from a civil authority, under imminently serious conditions and if time
does not permit approval from higher authority, may provide an
immediate response by temporarily employing the resources under their
control, subject to any supplemental direction provided by higher
headquarters, to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great
property damage within the United States. Support provided under the
immediate response authority should be provided on a reimbursable
basis, where appropriate or legally required, but will not be delayed
or denied based on the inability or unwillingness of the requester to
make a commitment to reimburse DOD.
Mutual and Automatic Aid.\4\--Installation commanders may provide
DSCA to local jurisdictions under mutual and automatic aid agreements
(also known as reciprocal fire protection agreements), when requested.
Support provided pursuant to a mutual and automatic aid agreement is
not reimbursed with funding, but instead is reimbursed in-kind by
reciprocal support.
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\4\ Sections 300hh-ll and 5121 et. seq. and Chapter 15A of Title
42, U.S. Code.
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Organizations with Independent Authorities and Agreements.--Many
DOD organizations possess independent authorities to provide DSCA. For
example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has independent
statutory authorities regarding emergency management, such as section 5
of the Flood Control Act of 1941 (Public Law 84-99) (e.g., providing
technical assistance; direct assistance such as providing sandbags,
pumps, and other types of flood fight materials, emergency contracting;
and emergency water assistance due to contaminated water source). Under
the National Response Framework, USACE is assigned as the primary
agency for Emergency Support Function No. 3--Public Works and
Engineering. USACE assists FEMA by coordinating Federal public works
and engineering-related support, as well as providing technical
assistance, engineering expertise, and construction management to
prevent, prepare for, respond to, and/or recover from domestic
incidents. Likewise, the National Geospatial--Intelligence Agency
(NGA), in accordance 50 U.S.C. 3045, is authorized to provide
geospatial intelligence support to other Federal departments and
agencies, including FEMA.
Other DOD organizations have unique agreements for support. For
instance, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has an interagency
agreement with FEMA to provide commodities including fuel to civil
authorities responding to disasters.
dod relies on a broad range of defense capabilities to provide dsca
(support to superstorm sandy as an example)
DOD supports disaster response with a broad range of defense
capabilities, including the Total Force (Active and Reserve Components,
including the National Guard), DOD civilians, and the significant
capabilities of the Defense Agencies.
During the response to Superstorm Sandy in 2012, for example, USACE
unwatered the longest tunnel in North America--the Brooklyn-Battery
tunnel--and did the same for other vital tunnel and subway lines, at a
scale and on a pace never before seen in a disaster. USACE also
installed 198 generators in critical locations (e.g., hospitals,
shelters, and other facilities at the Hoboken Ferry Terminal, Long
Island, and Indiantown Gap, as well as first responder operating
locations) and sent power experts and generators to support New York
Public Housing. At peak capacity, USACE generated 55 megawatts of
power, enough to support the power needs of 50,000 families.
During the Superstorm Sandy response, DLA, under its interagency
agreement with FEMA, provided 9.3 million gallons of fuel to over 300
gas stations and emergency vehicle fueling depots, and, together with
USACE and the U.S. Transportation Command, provided essential support
for restoring the electric grid, the gasoline distribution system, and
other critical infrastructure. DLA also used 500 trucks to distribute
6.2 million meals, 92,000 Meals-Ready-to-Eat, 72,000 bottles of water,
172,500 blankets, 4,000 cots, 18,734 mats, 6 portable X-ray machines,
51 generators (with a 71,250-kilowatt capacity), and 107 unwatering
pumps (providing a 1 million gallons per minute capacity).
Prior to Sandy's landfall, NGA reviewed more than 21,000 square
miles of satellite data to produce pre-strike hurricane products that
included images of 24 coastal cities whose critical infrastructures and
key resources would be susceptible to damage if a hurricane landed in
their vicinity. NGA also deployed teams of analysts to support FEMA in
Boston, New York City, and Philadelphia. After landfall, NGA worked
closely with FEMA and the U.S. Coast Guard to provide mission-essential
support by enabling access to and supplying analyzed images to improve
situational awareness, including flooding and damage assessments,
monitoring energy distribution centers, and evaluating airfields for
possible evacuation and relief missions.
dod has made significant improvements in its preparedness to provide
dsca
DOD continually pursues improvements in its ability to provide DSCA
when needed, and to work closely with its domestic agency partners.
Strategic Guidance.--DOD's strategic guidance recognizes DSCA as a
priority mission.\5\ One of the three pillars emphasized by the Defense
Strategy is protecting the homeland--deterring and defeating attacks
and supporting civil authorities in mitigating the effects of potential
attacks and natural disasters.
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\5\ The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance designated DSCA as a
primary DOD mission. The Unified Command Plan assigned DSCA as a core
mission of two geographic combatant commands: U.S. Northern Command
(responsible for DSCA in the 48 contiguous States, Alaska, the District
of Columbia, and the territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands) and U.S. Pacific Command (responsible for DSCA in Hawaii and
the territory of Guam). The Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years
2017-2021 prioritizes the capabilities, capacities, and readiness of
the Joint Force to perform the DSCA mission.
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Integrated Regional Planning.--Consistent with the Presidential
Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) on National Preparedness, FEMA initiated a
deliberate planning process to ensure integrated regional plans are in
place for each FEMA region. The purpose of these plans is to speed
disaster responses by enabling quick decisions based on pre-determined
plans. DOD has worked closely with FEMA to integrate planning efforts
and identify both response requirements and coordination challenges
during major disasters.
Complex Catastrophe Initiative.--DOD has taken steps to improve its
preparedness to help civilian authorities save and protect lives during
a complex catastrophe. The Complex Catastrophe Initiative directed
improvements in DSCA for regional planning and plans integration, force
sourcing, training and exercises, and the role of military
installations and Defense Agencies in emergency response operations.
Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments.--DOD continues to work closely
with FEMA to develop all-hazard, pre-scripted mission assignments
(PSMAs). FEMA PSMAs translate civilian support requirements into
military tasks to expedite the request for assistance process. Although
more are in development, there are 28 all-hazards, PSMAs for DOD
support, more than 30 PSMAs for USACE support, and 6 PSMAs for NGA
support. These all-hazards PSMAs include:
Heavy and medium rotary-wing lift;
Tactical transportation;
Strategic transportation;
Communications support;
Emergency route clearance;
Damage assessment;
Mobilization centers and operational staging areas;
Airspace control;
Deployable temporary medical facilities; and
Rotary-wing medical evacuation.
DSCA Execute Order.--DOD published a standing DSCA Execute Order
(EXORD) that provided the commanders of U.S. Northern Command and U.S.
Pacific Command--the two combatant commanders responsible for DSCA--
more delegated authority to provide critical life-saving and life-
sustaining capabilities faster, including:
Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense Coordinating
Elements;
DOD installations that could have been used for FEMA
mobilization centers;
Medium- and heavy-lift helicopters;
Search aircraft for disaster area reconnaissance;
Robust, deployable communications support packages;
Joint task forces to command and control Federal military
forces;
Combatant Commander Assessment Elements;
Aeromedical patient evacuation/transportation;
Forward Surgical Teams; and
The DLA Deployment Distribution Center.
Access to the Total Force.--The Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine
Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve--more than 365,000 men and women
living in thousands of communities across our Nation, who are ready on
short notice to put on a uniform and serve when called--are an
invaluable resource to our Nation.
For example, the Army Reserve provides a significant portion of the
Army's disaster response capabilities, including mortuary affairs (75
percent), quartermaster (65 percent), medical (59 percent),
transportation (44 percent), and engineer (31 percent) capabilities. In
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Congress
approved the administration's request to grant the Secretary of Defense
the authority to order to active duty this invaluable resource to
provide assistance in responses to major disasters and emergencies in
the United States. To maximize the value of this authority to mitigate
human suffering and save lives, DOD established policies to expedite
the sourcing of these invaluable forces, including consideration of
proximity to the region affected and time to employment.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response
Enterprise.--DOD has developed a wide range of CBRN response
capabilities, and has trained to employ these capabilities rapidly in
support to civil authorities to help save lives in the aftermath of a
CBRN incident.
The CBRN Response Enterprise--almost 17,000 military personnel
strong--currently consists of 57 National Guard Weapons of Mass
Destruction Civil Support Teams (one in each State and territory and
two in California, Florida, and New York), 17 National Guard CBRN
Enhanced Response Force Packages (stationed in Alabama, Colorado,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin), 10 National Guard Homeland Response Forces
(one stationed in each of the 10 FEMA regions), one Defense CBRN
Response Force, and two Command-and-Control CBRN Response Elements.
The CBRN Response Enterprise provides such critical capabilities as
detection and assessment of CBRN hazards; casualty search and
extraction; casualty decontamination; emergency medical, patient
triage, trauma care, and surgical and intensive medical care; fatality
recovery; ground and rotary-wing air patient movement; security;
command and control; engineering; logistics; transportation; and
aviation lift.
DOD published a standing domestic CBRN Response EXORD that
establishes a response posture system for the Federal components of the
CBRN Response Enterprise, and provides the Commanders of U.S. Northern
Command and U.S. Pacific Command with authorities to conduct Federal
CBRN response operations in support of a lead Federal agency, such as
FEMA.
Defense Coordination and Liaison.--In addition to interagency
planning and other initiatives, DOD has forged strong, direct, day-to-
day relations with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA,
including full-time DOD advisers in DHS headquarters, Defense
Coordinating Officers and Defense Coordinating Elements at each of the
10 FEMA regional headquarters, and DOD liaisons at FEMA's deployed
joint field offices.
DOD also established a National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-
State in all 54 States, territories, and the District of Columbia.
These Joint Force Headquarters provide expertise and situational
awareness to DOD authorities to facilitate integration of Federal and
State-level activities. They also develop plans to support civil
authorities in response to man-made or natural disasters, and
coordinate these plans, through the National Guard Bureau and the Joint
Staff, with U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command.
Exercises.--Exercises are critical to ensuring readiness and
identifying gaps and potential weaknesses within and across agencies in
responding to man-made or natural disasters. DOD has fully supported
the FEMA-led National Exercise Program. For years, DOD has also hosted
numerous exercises involving Federal, State, and local partners,
including annual DSCA exercises such as Ardent Sentry 2014 (Alaska
earthquake) and Ardent Sentry 2015 (California earthquake). In April of
this year, the Commander of U.S. Northern Command hosted a Senior
Leader Seminar with Federal, State, and local partners. This seminar
used a large-scale California earthquake with a cascading effects
scenario as a framework to integrate key State, interagency, and DOD
perspectives on how best U.S. Northern Command can provide support.
Dual-Status Commanders.--In 2010, DOD and the States agreed to
utilize dual-status commanders in disaster responses. Until 2010, dual-
status commanders had only been used in deliberately-planned special
events.
A dual-status commander is a military commander who may, in
accordance with the law, serve in two statuses, State and Federal,
simultaneously, while performing the duties of those statuses
separately and distinctly. In State status, the dual-status commander
is subject to the orders of the State Governor and Adjutant General,
and, on their behalf, exercises command or control of State National
Guard forces to execute State missions. In Federal status, the dual-
status commander is subject to the orders of the President, the
Secretary of Defense, and the supported Combatant Commander, and, on
their behalf, exercises command and control of Federal military forces
for the purpose of executing DSCA missions. The appointment of a dual-
status commander does not grant the President (or other Federal
officials) command of non-Federalized State National Guard forces or a
State Governor (or other State officials) command of Federal military
forces.
The intended benefit of appointing a dual-status commander is to
facilitate unity of effort within our National response system between
State National Guard forces, operating on behalf of a State Governor,
and Federal military forces, operating on behalf of the President, the
Secretary of Defense, and the supported Combatant Commander in
achieving common objectives in a disaster response or in securing a
special event.
To expedite appointment of dual-status commanders, DOD has
established standing memorandums of agreement with 52 of the 53 States
and territories.
dod is better-prepared to provide dsca
As a result of these advances, DOD is better-prepared to defend the
United States and assist civil authorities in the aftermath of a
catastrophic incident than at any other time in our Nation's history.
DOD is prepared, when directed by the President or the Secretary of
Defense, to provide, as part of the Federal Government's support of
State and local emergency assistance efforts, capabilities and
resources to save lives, sustain lives, and protect property and public
health and safety, including search and rescue, emergency medical care,
emergency mass care, emergency shelter, and provision of food, water,
and other essential needs, including movement of supplies or
persons.\6\ DOD is well-prepared and has capabilities and forces
postured to act, with a sense of urgency, when needed, to maximize the
saving and sustaining of lives in the aftermath of a catastrophic
disaster.
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\6\ 42 U.S.C. 5170a, 5170b, 5192.
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DOD maintains this high level of preparedness by continually
investing in its preparedness, including through integrated planning,
training, and exercises.
conclusion
DOD plays a supporting, but important role in the National response
system.
DOD relies upon a broad range of defense capabilities to provide
support. DOD has made significant advances in its ability to provide
DSCA, when needed, by: (1) Recognizing DSCA as a priority mission in
DOD's strategic guidance; (2) working closely with FEMA to support the
deliberate planning process to develop integrated regional plans for
each FEMA region; (3) enhancing DSCA for regional planning and plans
integration, force sourcing, training, and exercises, and the roles of
installations and Defense Agencies through the Complex Catastrophe
Initiative; (4) expediting the request for assistance process by
establishing FEMA PSMAs; (5) empowering Combatant Commanders to provide
DSCA via a standing DSCA EXORD; (6) incorporating the extensive
capabilities and outstanding personnel of the Army Reserve, Navy
Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve; (7) fielding the
best-funded, best-equipped, and best-trained CBRN response force in the
world; (8) forging strong, direct, day-to-day relations with DHS and
other partners; and (9) promoting unity of effort through such concepts
as the use of dual-status commanders.
As a result, DOD--Active, Reserve, National Guard, and civilians
and contractors--is better prepared to defend the United States and
assist civil authorities in the aftermath of a catastrophic incident
than at any other time in our Nation's history. DOD's men and women--
both military and civilian--are well-prepared to act, with a sense of
urgency, when needed.
To continue to meet interagency preparedness requirements, DOD will
work with its partners to: (1) Build and sustain partnerships; (2)
establish well-developed networks for sharing information and setting
joint priorities; (3) forge pre-arranged agreements; (4) continually
improve on integrated planning; (5) train and exercise to execute
integrated plans; and (6) rapidly integrate National efforts. As then-
Deputy Secretary Carter stated in DOD's 2013 after-action report for
Superstorm Sandy, ``[t]his is a new frontier for the Department as
counter-insurgency was . . . and we continue to learn and adapt.''
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. We
appreciate your leadership, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Payne,
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, and your support for the
Department of Defense. We look forward to your questions.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Salesses. The Chair now
recognizes Brigadier General Whitlock.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH E. WHITLOCK, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, WESTERN
HEMISPHERE, THE JOINT STAFF, J-5, STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY
DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
General Whitlock. Chairwoman McSally, Representative Watson
Coleman, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, I am
Brigadier General Joe Whitlock, the deputy director for western
hemisphere of strategic plans and policy, what we call J-5, in
the Joint Staff. Thanks for the opportunity to address you
today on the role the Department of Defense plays in supporting
civil authorities during disasters.
In this testimony, we will discuss the progress DOD has
made with regard to in-depth planning with the geographic
combatant commands, that is U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific
Command, our two combatant commands responsible for DSCA.
In 2013, the Department of Defense published a standing
DSCA execute order, or EXORD, that provided commanders of
NORTHCOM and PACOM more delegated authority to provide critical
life-saving and life-sustaining capabilities faster, including
defense coordinating officers and the defense coordinating
elements they bring, aircraft for disaster area search and
rescue, joint task forces to command and control Federal
military forces, and aeromedical patient evacuation and
transportation.
DOD has also developed a wide range of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear--CBRN--response
capabilities, and has trained to employ these capabilities
rapidly to support civil authorities to help save lives in the
aftermath of a CBRN incident.
DOD has also published a standing domestic CBRN response
execute order in 2011 that establishes a response posture
system for the Federal components of the CBRN response
enterprise and provides the commanders of NORTHCOM and PACOM
with authorities to conduct Federal CBRN response operation in
support of a lead Federal agency, such as FEMA.
DOD has also worked closely with our interagency partners
to exercise their support capabilities during disasters.
Exercises are critical to ensuring readiness and identifying
gaps and potential weaknesses within and across agencies in
responding to man-made or natural disasters.
DOD fully supports the FEMA-led National Exercise Program.
For years DOD has also hosted numerous exercises involving
Federal, State, and local partners, to include our annual DSCA
exercise, such as Ardent Sentry 2014 that focused on a major
Alaska earthquake and Ardent Sentry 2015 that focused on a
southern California earthquake. And in April this year, as you
heard the earlier witnesses, the commander of U.S. NORTHCOM
also hosted a senior leader seminar with Federal, State, and
local partners. Again, that helps us get better left with an
incident.
As the DOD objective is to ensure unity of the effort
between Federal and State forces, the DOD and States have
procedures in place to utilize the dual-status commander in
disaster response if warranted. In 2010 dual-status commanders
had only been used in delivery plan special events. We have
used them in other cases since them. A dual-status commander is
a military commander who may, in accordance with the law, serve
in two statuses, State and Federal simultaneously, while
performing the duties of those statuses separately and
distinctly.
The intended benefit of appointing a dual-status commander
is to facilitate unity of effort within our National response
system between the State National Guard forces operating on
behalf the State Governor and Federal military forces operating
on behalf of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the
supported combatant commander in achieving common objectives in
a disaster response or in securing a special event.
Chairwoman McSally, Representative Watson Coleman, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, that you again for
the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to
taking your questions.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, General Whitlock.
The Chair now recognizes Dr. Kirschbaum.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. KIRSCHBAUM, PH.D., DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Mr. Kirschbaum. Chairman McSally, Mrs. Watson Coleman, and
Members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to
discuss the progress the Department of Defense has made
addressing our recommendations in its defense support of civil
authorities mission.
The National response framework highlights the
understanding that incidents, disasters, and other emergencies
are managed at the lowest jurisdictional level and are then
supported by additional response capabilities as needed. In a
sense, direct support from the Department of Defense is meant
as a last resort.
However, the Department recognizes, as Mr. Salesses said,
the Department is often expected to play a prominent role, and
early on, in supporting civil authorities and must be prepared
to provide rapid response when called upon. This in turn
highlights the importance of vigilance in planning,
coordinating, and assessing the ability of the Department to
provide these capabilities.
My statement is based on reports we have issued from March
2010 through December 2014 and discusses the Department's
progress in addressing our recommendations on strategy, plans,
and guidance, interagency coordination, and sustaining
capabilities to support civil authorities.
Despite the rapidly-developing relationships between the
Department of Defense and its domestic Federal and State
partners in the years after 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, we
consistently found that key defense strategy, plans, and
guidance were outdated and incomplete, did not reflect new
common terms or such National guidance as the National response
framework.
We found during this time that the Department of Defense,
and particularly the new U.S. Northern Command, were not
consistently applying to domestic planning the same rigorous
strategic operational and tactical planning the Department has
been using for decades for more traditional military operations
abroad. For example, we found gaps in guidance on command-and-
control structures for Federal military forces during complex
catastrophes and for the aforementioned dual-status commander
concept, which is intended to be a regular Army or Air Force or
National Guard officer who would command both State and Federal
military forces in a domestic setting.
In response to our recommendations, the Department has made
critical progress. In 2013, the Department issued an updated
strategy for homeland defense and defense support of civil
authorities and a critical revised joint doctrine publication.
More recently, Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command
reported that they have updated their civil support concept
plans to address command-and-control issues, and DOD is now
currently updating an instruction on the dual-status commander
concept. DOD also agreed to address gaps we found in guidance
and plans for domestic cyber incidents, but has not yet fully
addressed these recommendations.
With respect to interagency coordination, we identified
gaps in DOD's guidance related to who does what, translating
for interagency partners DOD's terms and prophesies, and
management of DOD's interagency liaisons. An example of the
latter was that for a time early on DOD was not aware of how
many of its personnel were assigned to DHS as liaisons or in
some other capacity.
To address our recommendations, the Department updated key
guidance, issued an interagency partner guide, and signed a
memorandum of understanding with DHS that includes key
personnel management practices for interagency liaisons.
With respect to sustaining capabilities to support civil
authorities, DOD has taken steps to evaluate existing
capabilities and identify gaps. One of the specific gaps we
identified was in planning for complex catastrophes. In 2014,
DOD reported that this planning had been completed and covered
such areas as complex catastrophes, wildland firefighting, and
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear responses.
DOD continues to work on this and told us that future
efforts will also include revised planning for pandemic
influenza and infectious diseases and civil disturbance
operations.
In conclusion, DOD has made significant progress in
improving strategy, plans, and guidance, interagency
coordination, and capabilities needed to support civil
authorities. Our work also shows that DOD recognizes that there
remains room for improvement. The gaps we identified, as well
the Department's efforts to close those gaps, are also a
cautionary tale about the sustained effort required by DOD and
its Federal and State partners to plan in advance and
coordinate constantly and closely to ensure that DOD is
positioned to support civil authorities in responding to the
myriad threats we face.
Looking ahead, we are beginning additional work in the area
of defense support of civil authorities. These reviews will
include DOD's cyber civil support, the status of the homeland
response forces, DOD's preparedness for civil support in the
event of a pandemic, and coordination with Federal agencies to
counter improvised explosive devices in the United States.
Chairman McSally, Mrs. Watson Coleman, Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before
you today, and I am happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kirschbaum follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph W. Kirschbaum
June 10, 2015
Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss progress and
challenges in the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to serve the
American people through its defense support of civil authorities (DSCA)
mission.\1\ The United States continues to face an uncertain, complex
security environment with the potential for major disasters and
emergencies, such as Hurricane Sandy in 2012. The 2013 Strategy for
Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities recognizes
DOD is often expected to play a prominent role supporting civil
authorities and must be prepared to provide rapid response when called
upon.\2\ DOD must coordinate with a number of other agencies on its
civil support mission, which include providing support during disasters
and declared emergencies (both natural and man-made); providing support
for restoring public health and services and civil order; providing
support for National special security events; and periodic planned
support. Examples of such DOD coordination with civil authorities
include aiding the identification and interdiction of suspected
transnational criminal organizations' activities conducted within and
along the approaches to the continental United States; assisting the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) during the annual hurricane
season; assisting the Department of Transportation after the I-35
bridge collapse in Minnesota in 2007; and supporting the U.S. Secret
Service regarding Presidential inaugurations. In these and other
events, DOD offered a broad array of resources that were developed for
its warfighting mission but were brought to bear when civilian-response
capabilities were overwhelmed or exhausted--or in instances where DOD
offered unique capabilities.
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\1\ Defense support of civil authorities is support provided by
Federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD
component assets, and, in certain circumstances, National Guard forces
in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for
domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic
activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.
\2\ DOD, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil
Authorities (February 2013).
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In an effort to facilitate defense support of civil authorities
across the Nation and at all organizational levels, DOD has assigned
responsibilities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (such as
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Global Security),\3\ the Joint Chiefs of Staff, various combatant
commands (such as Northern Command and Pacific Command), the National
Guard Bureau, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Defense Logistics
Agency, joint task forces (such as Joint Task Force-North),\4\ the
intelligence agencies (such as the National Geospatial--Intelligence
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency), and regional interagency
liaisons (such as the Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officers).\5\
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\3\ In January 2015, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy reorganized its missions and renamed the assistant secretary
of defense for homeland defense and America's security affairs as the
assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and global
security. For the purpose of consistency, we will refer to the position
in this report as the assistant secretary of defense for homeland
defense.
\4\ Joint Task Force-North, formerly referred to as Joint Task
Force-6, was created in 1989 to serve as the planning and coordinating
operational headquarters to support local, State, and Federal law
enforcement agencies within the Southwest Border region to counter the
flow of illegal drugs into the United States. In the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the command
was officially renamed Joint Task Force-North and its mission was
expanded to include providing homeland security support to the Nation's
Federal law enforcement agencies.
\5\ A Defense Coordinating Officer is a DOD single point of contact
for domestic emergencies who is assigned to a joint field office to
validate requests for assistance, forward mission assignments through
proper channels to the appropriate military organizations, and assign
military liaisons, as appropriate, to activated emergency support
functions. An Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer is a senior
reserve officer who represents their service at the appropriate joint
field office conducting planning and coordination responsibilities in
support of civil authorities. See Joint Publication 3-28, Defense
Support to Civil Authorities (Jul. 31, 2013).
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My testimony is based on reports we issued from March 2010 through
December 2014 that examined DOD's DSCA mission, and discusses DOD's
progress in implementing recommendations that we made to strengthen:
(1) DOD's strategy, plans, and guidance documents; (2) interagency
coordination; and, (3) capabilities to support civil authorities.\6\
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\6\ This statement is based on the following reports that are cited
throughout and include GAO, Emergency Preparedness: Opportunities Exist
to Strengthen Interagency Assessments and Accountability for Closing
Capability Gaps, GAO-15-20 (Washington, DC: Dec. 4, 2014); Civil
Support: Actions Are Needed to Improve DOD's Planning for a Complex
Catastrophe, GAO-13-763 (Washington, DC: Sep. 30, 2013); Homeland
Defense: DOD Needs to Address Gaps in Homeland Defense and Civil
Support Guidance, GAO-13-128 (Washington, DC: Oct. 24, 2012); Homeland
Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to Support
Civil Authorities During Disasters, GAO-10-386 (Washington, DC: Mar.
30, 2010); and, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance
Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support
Missions, GAO-10-364 (Washington, DC: Mar. 30, 2010).
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This statement includes selected updates that we conducted in June
2015 on DOD's DSCA mission. Our reports contained information that we
obtained from reviewing and analyzing relevant DOD documents, including
the 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil
Authorities; The DOD Cyber Strategy from 2015; Northern Command and
Pacific Command planning documents; DOD directives, instructions, and
doctrine; and Northern Command capability assessments. We also
conducted interviews with DOD officials within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant commands, military
services, defense agencies, and Reserve officials. We also conducted
interviews with other Federal officials from organizations such as the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FEMA, Customs and Border
Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and officials
located in the El Paso Intelligence Center. More detailed information
about our scope and methodology can be found in our reports. For the
updates, we collected information from DOD officials on actions the
Department has taken to address findings and recommendations made in
our prior reports. The work upon which this testimony is based was
conducted in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
dod continues to take action to strengthen its dsca strategy, plans,
and guidance
DOD has and continues to take action to address our prior
recommendations to strengthen its DSCA strategy, plans, and guidance.
As we have previously reported, clear, current, and complete
strategies, plans, and guidance documents are important for reflecting
the direction of the Departments' civilian and military leadership,
defining DOD and its components' policies and responsibilities, and
sharing practices that could facilitate effective support of civil
authorities. In 2005, DOD issued its first Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Civil Support.\7\ In four reports we issued in 2010 through
2013, we found that DOD's DSCA strategies and guidance were outdated,
not fully integrated, or were not comprehensive.\8\ Since 2010, DOD has
taken action to address many of our findings and recommendations. For
example:
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\7\ DOD, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (June
2005).
\8\ GAO-13-763, GAO-13-128, GAO-10-364, and GAO-10-386.
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DOD updated its strategy and doctrine for civil support.--In
2010, and then again in 2012, we found that DOD's 2005 Strategy
for Homeland Defense and Civil Support had not been updated to
reflect the current environment in which DOD supports civil
authorities. For example, while the strategy primarily
discusses DOD's DSCA mission in the context of the Department's
response to a weapon of mass destruction--DOD's primary focus
after the 2001 terrorist attacks--it did not address the
breadth of DSCA missions that DOD must be prepared to support
subsequent to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Based on our
recommendation that DOD should update its strategy, in February
2013 DOD issued an updated Strategy for Homeland Defense and
Defense Support of Civil Authorities. In this update, DOD
acknowledged that National security threats, hazards,
vulnerabilities, strategic guidance, and political and economic
factors had evolved since the 2005 strategy, and recognized
that its support to civil authorities included a broader set of
missions--to include catastrophic natural or man-made
disasters, pre-planned National Special Security Events (like
summits and high-profile sports events), cyber attacks, and the
Southwest Border counterdrug efforts. We also reported in 2012
that DOD had not updated its joint publication for DSCA and
recommended that the Department needed to do so. DOD agreed
with our recommendation and in July 2013, DOD updated its joint
publication for Defense Support for Civil Authorities.\9\ In
this update, among other things, DOD described more fully the
National Response Framework, which is a framework based on a
tiered, graduated response to major disasters and emergencies
where incidents are managed at the lowest jurisdictional level
and are supported by additional response capabilities, as
needed.\10\
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\9\ Joint Publication 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities,
(July 31, 2013).
\10\ The National Response Framework is a guide to how the Nation
responds to all types of disasters and emergencies. It is built on
scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts identified in the National
Incident Management System to align key roles and responsibilities
across the Nation. This framework describes specific authorities and
best practices for managing incidents that range from the serious but
purely local to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural
disasters. The National Response Framework describes the principles,
roles, and responsibilities, and coordinating structures for delivering
the core capabilities required to respond to an incident and further
describes how response efforts integrate with those of the other
mission areas.
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DOD has reported that it has updated its DSCA plans.--In
September 2013,\11\ we found that DOD did not have a clear
command-and-control structure for Federal military services
during complex catastrophes.\12\ We found that DOD had not
identified the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among
command elements that may be involved in responding to such
incidents across multiple States. This issue was illustrated by
events such as National Level Exercise 2011 that examined DOD's
response to a complex catastrophe. Similarly, DOD's after-
action reports on Hurricane Sandy in 2012 found that the
command-and-control structure for Federal military forces was
not clearly defined, resulting in the degradation of
situational awareness and unity of effort, and the execution of
missions without proper approval. Northern Command officials
agreed with our findings and stated that they would address
this issue and the associated recommendation we made in our
report by updating their DSCA plans. As of June 2015, DOD
reported that Northern Command and Pacific Command had updated
their DSCA plans to address our recommendation.
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\11\ GAO-13-763.
\12\ DOD has defined a complex catastrophe as a natural or man-made
incident, including cyber space attack, power grid failure, and
terrorism, which results in cascading failures of multiple
interdependent, critical, life-sustaining infrastructure sectors and
causes extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption
severely affecting the population, environment, economy, public health,
National morale, response efforts, and/or Government functions.
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DOD implementation guidance on the use of dual-status
commanders is in development.--DOD established the dual-status
commander structure--active-duty military or National Guard
officers who command State and Federal responses to civil-
support incidents and events--and has used this structure for
certain events.\13\ For example, DOD used the dual-status
commander structure for the 2012 Colorado wildfire response and
the Hurricane Sandy response. In October 2012, we reported that
DOD had not developed guidance for the use of dual-status
commanders for incidents affecting multiple States and
territories.\14\ For example, DOD had not developed specific
criteria and conditions for when and how State Governors and
the Secretary of Defense would mutually appoint a commander.
Consequently, we recommended and DOD concurred that the
department develop implementation guidance on the use of dual-
status commanders. In June 2015, Northern Command officials
reported that an instruction about dual-status commanders was
being drafted in coordination with DOD, Northern Command, and
the National Guard Bureau.
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\13\ Dual-status commanders are military commanders who serve as an
intermediate link between the separate chains of command for State and
Federal forces.
\14\ GAO-13-128.
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DOD has agreed to take steps to align cyber support roles
and responsibilities.--In October 2012, we found that DOD had
not updated its DSCA guidance, such as joint doctrine, to
ensure that it was consistent with National plans and
preparations for domestic cyber incidents.\15\ We recommended
that DOD align guidance on preparing for and responding to
domestic cyber incidents with National-level guidance to
include roles and responsibilities. DOD partially concurred
with this recommendation. However, the Department has not yet
taken action that meets the intent of the recommendation.
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\15\ GAO-13-128.
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dod has taken action to strengthen interagency coordination for support
of civil authorities
DOD has and continues to take action to address our prior
recommendations to strengthen the Department's interagency coordination
for support of civil authorities. As numerous events within the
homeland in the last decade have pointed out, it is critical that DOD
coordinate, integrate, and synchronize its DSCA mission with a broad
range of interagency partners that the Department may need to support.
Such partners can include FEMA, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Customs and Border Protection, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. As we have
previously reported, there are three key areas that DOD needs to focus
on to enhance and institutionalize its interagency coordination
efforts. DOD has since taken action to address these areas:
DOD Has Better Defined Interagency Roles and
Responsibilities.--Previous GAO work, the National Response
Framework, and DOD strategic guidance identify the need for
clearly-defined roles and responsibilities to enhance
interagency coordination.\16\ In our 2010 review of DOD's
interagency coordination efforts, we found that the key
documents used to define roles and responsibilities were
outdated, not fully integrated, or were not comprehensive.\17\
We found that DOD's series of civil-support policies and
guidance, such as a 1997 DOD directive on military assistance
to civil authorities,\18\ were outdated and did not reflect
changes that occurred subsequent to their issuance. For
example, the guidance documents did not refer to DHS, the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense, Northern Command, or roles and responsibilities under
the National Response Framework. Similarly, we found that roles
and responsibilities for support to law enforcement--including
Joint Task Force-North, which provides defense support of
civilian law enforcement agencies along U.S. borders--were
unclear as were the roles and responsibilities between the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
Consequently, we recommended and DOD concurred that the
Department should update key documents that outline roles and
responsibilities. Subsequently, DOD has, for the most part,
issued new guidance documents or updated older guidance to
better define roles and responsibilities within the Department
for interagency coordination.
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\16\ DHS, National Response Framework, Second Edition (May 2013);
DOD, Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During
Joint Operations (June 24, 2011); GAO-10-364; DOD, National Defense
Strategy (June 2008); and GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices
That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration Among Federal Agencies,
GAO-06-15 (Washington, DC: Oct. 21, 2005).
\17\ GAO-10-364.
\18\ DOD Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil
Authorities (Feb. 18, 1997).
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DOD has issued an interagency partner guide.--DOD's joint
doctrine on interagency coordination and support of civil
authorities notes that a unified ``whole-of-Government''
approach to National security issues requires Federal partner
agencies to understand core competencies, roles, and missions
and that sharing information is critical for the success of
interagency coordination between Federal agencies.\19\ To
support interagency coordination on DSCA, DOD has taken action
to communicate with its Federal partners through conferences
and other forums and multiple documents. In our 2010 review of
DOD's interagency coordination efforts, we found that DOD's
approach to communicating with Federal partners could be
improved, and the Department had not clearly identified the
roles and responsibilities and day-to-day coordination
processes with its Federal partners through a single, readily
accessible source.\20\ Specifically, DOD, DHS, and the
Department of Justice officials told us that the benefits
gained through interagency forums, such as Homeland Security
Council meetings and annual National Interagency Fire Center
conferences, are transient because they depend on personnel who
rotate out of their positions frequently. The National
Interagency Fire Center had addressed this challenge by
creating a partner handbook that identified key information.
DOD had not developed a similar vehicle for institutionalizing
its information-sharing efforts so that Federal partners could
maintain knowledge and have readily accessible information
about key issues, such as the different DOD entities that have
DSCA missions. For those cases where DOD internally documented
its missions, roles, and responsibilities, we found the
information was dispersed among multiple sources; also, the
documents may not have always been readily accessible to
Federal partners, and they may have been written in a manner
that led to unclear expectations. Therefore, we recommended
that DOD develop and issue a partner guide that identifies the
roles and responsibilities of DOD entities, processes, and
agreed-upon approaches for interagency coordination for
homeland defense and civil-support efforts. DOD concurred with
our recommendation and, in November 2011, issued its Defense
Support of Civil Authorities Interagency Partner Guide.
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\19\ Joint Publication 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(July 31, 2013); and Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational
Coordination During Joint Operations (June 24, 2011).
\20\ GAO-10-364.
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DOD has taken action to implement key practices for managing
some liaisons the Department exchanges with its Federal
partners.--Prior GAO reports and DOD guidance recognize that
leading organizations employ key practices for effective and
efficient workforce planning, such as situational awareness,
staffing-needs assessments, position descriptions, training,
and performance assessments.\21\ However, in our 2010 report,
we found that DOD had not implemented such key practices.\22\
For example, DOD did not have complete situational awareness of
all the liaisons detailed to its interagency partners.
According to DOD records, in 2009, there were only 2 DOD
personnel at DHS headquarters--yet an informal survey by the
representative for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense to DHS found that more than 110
DOD personnel, from a variety of DOD entities, were working at
DHS as liaisons, subject-matter experts, or in other
capacities.\23\ Therefore, we recommended and DOD agreed that
DOD develop and issue additional workforce management policy
and guidance regarding DOD liaisons to other Federal agencies,
as well as other Federal agencies' liaisons to DOD. In October
2013, the deputy secretary of defense and the acting deputy
secretary of homeland security signed an updated memorandum of
agreement that outlines ways in which DOD and DHS will
incorporate key practices for managing liaisons in the National
capital region.
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\21\ DOD Instruction 1315.18, Procedures for Military Personnel
Assignments (Jan. 12, 2005); DOD Instruction 1400.25, DOD Civilian
Personnel Management System (Nov. 18, 2008); DOD Instruction 1000.17,
Detail of DOD Personnel to Duty Outside the Department of Defense (Apr.
16, 2008); GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic
Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, DC: Dec. 11, 2003; and GAO,
A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP
(Washington, DC: Mar. 15, 2002).
\22\ GAO-10-364.
\23\ In responding to a draft of this statement, DOD stated that,
according to a 2004 DOD-DHS memorandum of agreement on personnel
exchange, there were at least 38 DOD personnel detailed to (or assigned
as liaisons at) DHS headquarters and 86 DOD personnel to DHS, in
general. However, during the audit, DOD documents and officials reflect
that DOD's numbers were inaccurate and that the officials did not have
an exact count on the number of DOD personnel located at DHS
headquarters or throughout the DHS organization.
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dod has taken action to identify needs and address capability gaps
regarding its support of civil authorities
In response to our prior recommendations, DOD has taken action to
identify needs and address capability gaps for its DSCA mission. In the
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD notes that the key pillar of
protecting the homeland includes sustaining capabilities to assist U.S.
civil authorities in protecting U.S. airspace, shores, and borders, and
in responding effectively to domestic man-made and natural
disasters.\24\ In 2008, DOD conducted a capabilities-based assessment
of its homeland defense and civil support missions to enable
improvements for DOD homeland defense and civil-support policy,
evaluate existing DOD capabilities and identify capability gaps,
improve DOD's integration with interagency mission partners, and
recommend further action to promote future capability development. In
2010, we found that DOD and DHS had undertaken initiatives to address
gaps in strategic planning that should assist DOD in identifying its
capability requirements for the DSCA mission.\25\ For example, DOD and
DHS issued catastrophic plans for responding to and recovering from a
category 4 hurricane in Hawaii. In addition, DHS had established a
pilot initiative entitled Task Force for Emergency Readiness pilot
initiative that sought to integrate Federal and State planning efforts
for catastrophic events, which in turn would assist DOD in determining
the capabilities it may be asked to provide. However, we found that
DOD's DSCA policy and guidance was outdated, which limited DOD's
ability to address capability gaps. We therefore made a recommendation
and DOD concurred that the Department should update its DSCA guidance.
Since then, DOD has updated or replaced several DSCA guidance
documents, such as DOD Directive 3025.18.\26\ By updating this
guidance, DOD addressed our recommendation and DOD is in a better
position to address remaining capability gaps.
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\24\ DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Mar. 4, 2014).
\25\ GAO-10-386.
\26\ DOD Directive 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(DSCA) (Dec. 29, 2010, incorporating change 1, Sep. 21, 2012).
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Additionally, we found in 2013 that DOD had not taken all of the
necessary steps to identify capabilities for DSCA. Additionally, we
found in 2013 that DOD had not taken all of the necessary steps to
identify capabilities for DSCA.\27\ Specifically, we found that
Northern Command and Pacific Command were updating their DSCA plans to
include a scenario for a complex catastrophe; however, the commands
delayed identification of capabilities that could be provided to
execute the plans in light of FEMA's plan to complete its regional
planning efforts in 2018. We recommended that the commanders work
through the defense coordinating officers to develop an interim set of
specific capabilities that could be provided to prepare for and respond
to complex catastrophes while FEMA completes its plans. DOD concurred
with our recommendation and, in May 2014, according to DOD officials,
Northern Command and Pacific Command had updated their plans to
incorporate complex catastrophes, including identifying capabilities
that would be available to the lead Federal agency during such an
event. Specifically, DOD officials told us, in June 2015, that planning
had been completed, covering issues such as complex catastrophes;
wildland firefighting; and chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear response. Additionally, DOD officials told us that future
planning efforts will include additional branch plans addressing issues
such as pandemic influenza and infectious diseases and civil
disturbance operations.
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\27\ GAO-13-763.
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Under the National Response Framework, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers serves as the coordinator for the ``Public Works and
Engineering'' emergency support function--1 of 14 emergency support
functions that serve as the Federal Government's primary coordinating
structure for building, sustaining, and delivering response
capabilities.\28\ The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in its emergency
support function coordinator role, is responsible for engaging in
appropriate planning and preparedness activities, which could include
establishing capability requirements, cataloguing current capabilities,
and conducting capability gap analyses that might be needed if the
Federal Government is asked to support local, State, Tribal,
territorial, and insular area Government response operations during a
disaster. In a recent assessment of the Federal preparedness to respond
to no-notice catastrophic disasters, such as improvised nuclear device
attacks and major earthquakes, we found that the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers had taken an insular approach to identifying, cataloguing,
and analyzing gaps for public works and engineering capabilities.\29\
Since we concluded that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' actions--as
well as actions by other non-DOD agencies that serve as coordinators
for different emergency support functions--were attributable to unclear
guidance, and recommended that FEMA issue supplemental guidance to the
agencies that serve as coordinators for the different emergency support
functions.\30\ FEMA concurred with this recommendation and estimated
that it would complete this supplemental guidance by June 30, 2015.
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\28\ The National Response Framework states that the Secretary of
Homeland Security is to ensure that overall Federal preparedness
actions are unified, complete, and synchronized to prevent unfilled
gaps or seams in the Federal Government's efforts to respond to all
hazards. The emergency support functions are organized by specific
functional areas for the most frequently needed capabilities during an
emergency--including communications, medical services, and search and
rescue--and are designed to coordinate the provision of related assets
and services by Federal departments and agencies. See DHS, National
Response Framework, Second Edition (May 2013).
\29\ GAO-15-20.
\30\ FEMA serves as the chair of the Emergency Support Function
Leadership Group.
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In conclusion, threats to the homeland and major disasters and
emergencies, such as cyber attacks and earthquakes, frequently are
unpredictable or occur with little or no notice. DOD's 2014 Quadrennial
Defense Review emphasizes protecting the homeland, including deterring
and defeating attacks on the United States and supporting civil
authorities in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural
disasters, as the first of the defense strategy's three pillars. DOD
has made significant progress in improving strategy, plans, and
guidance; interagency coordination; and capabilities needed for DSCA.
Our work also shows that there remains room for improvement and that
DOD recognizes this and intends to fully address the remaining
recommendations from our prior reports. We continue to believe that
their implementation will buttress the advanced planning and
interagency coordination effort DOD requires to support civil
authorities in responding to the myriad threats and challenges we face.
On that note, looking ahead, we will continue to monitor and evaluate:
(1) DOD's cyber civil support, (2) the status of the homeland response
forces, (3) DOD's preparedness for civil support in the event of a
pandemic, and (4) coordination with Federal agencies to counter
improvised explosive devices in the United States.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Dr. Kirschbaum.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
I will first say, in my 26 years in the military I had zero
dealing with this issue, defense support to civil authorities,
zero experience dealing with this issue, which I think probably
is the preponderance of military personnel, just as a framing
mechanism there, unless you are in a specific job that has to
deal with it. But my views on it are formed and shaped by my
experiences at Africa Command working with military support to
USAID OFDA overseas, and we were dealing with overseas response
to disasters.
What I saw was oftentimes basically the military, we would
show up, beyond the sort-of inherent danger, and we would be
like we are in charge because we are very action-oriented and
then we are just going to figure it all out. We don't even
realize there is another lead Federal agency there. We have
just got colonels and lieutenant colonels, they want to do the
Lord's work out there and save people's lives, and so they just
get going. There is often very confusing, cumbersome, and in a
very chaotic environment to start with, there are turf battles,
there is misunderstanding, there is not a unity of effort.
So I have got a lot of experience with that overseas. So I
would imagine in looking at this and preparing for this hearing
we have similar dynamics that could happen here at home in
response to an emergency, especially when you are dealing with
getting Active-Duty Forces involved with many individuals in
the chain of command not necessarily understanding what the
roles and responsibilities are, what the legal authorities are.
Again, aside from that, the imminent danger, and then doing
life-saving response, it seems we have got some examples of
that even as recently as Hurricane Sandy, right, where we had
Marines showing up like we are going to start doing a bunch of
stuff that maybe they don't even have the legal authority to
do.
So my question really, Mr. Salesses and General Whitlock,
is: What are we doing to make sure that the military
understands, especially the chain of command understands, their
role and responsibility? It is too late to be teaching them
about that when you are in the middle of responding to
something up and down the chain of command?
Mr. Fenton, or anybody want to give some after-action
lessons identified from Sandy and any responses since Sandy
related to, again, maybe turf battles or misunderstandings of
roles and responsibilities and what we can do to fix that in
the DSCA mission?
Mr. Salesses. Chairman McSally, I will start if you don't
mind.
You are absolutely right. Having had the opportunity to
work overseas in humanitarian disaster relief events, it is
very chaotic. Although we have great partners in the
international area too, with Department of State, USAID, and
OFDA, I can tell you from my experience that the way we are
organized domestically far exceeds the way that we are
organized to do overseas humanitarian disaster relief.
That really starts with the National response system, the
National response framework. The work that FEMA has done to
organize the Federal Government in particular, and the ESF
structure, and the way that they manage things under
Administrator Fugate's leadership really makes a difference
here at home, first of all, in bringing together the Federal
departments and agencies and the way that we do this.
Your point about education, training, exercising, planning,
I think all of those things are critical to this issue of
making sure that people understand their roles and
responsibilities. Everything, of course, starts with
authorities. I think in my statement recognizing right up front
we play a supporting role, we recognize the environment that we
are in here, and the Defense Department is prepared to support
our Federal partners in their efforts.
But we do spend a lot of time educating and training.
Northern Command, which you are familiar with out in Colorado
Springs, actually runs five different education courses. They
run the DSCA executive course, which is a 2-day course, and
they bring in State emergency management, local emergency
management, other Federal partners, and military members,
Active, Reserve, and Guard. They have a regular week-long
course. They run the dual-status commander force, along with
the National Guard Bureau. So there is a lot of work underway
to continue to educate people.
I would also say very quickly that there has been a
tremendous evolution in the Defense Department in understanding
its responsibilities for defense support to civil authorities,
and I can talk more about that. I don't want to overuse my
time. I will give somebody else an opportunity.
General Whitlock. Chairwoman McSally, I agree with
everything Mr. Salesses has said. Just one kind of top-level
thing. NORTHCOM was formed in 2002 in response to the terrorist
acts of September 11, 2001, and I think we have made
significant progress. I served at NORTHCOM as the Deputy J-5,
and I was there for Hurricane Sandy response.
A key is training, exercises, and education, and oftentimes
you won't have officers that have done that if they were just
on the Federal side. But we have a great civilian workforce out
there. Those officers get up to speed quickly. As you might
know in your AFRICOM experience, the supporting and supported
commander relationship, we understand that. We have
operationalized that across the Department of Defense, with
NORTHCOM being the supporting command for DSCA or PACOM if
there is an incident in the PACOM area.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks.
There is a lot of discussion about support to FEMA, but
there is a great potential that the military will be called to
support other agencies as well, even within DHS, whether it is
Customs and Border Protection, HHS for some sort of health
crisis, DOJ. So it seems like a lot of work has been done
related to integration with FEMA, but could you speak to
integration with those other agencies that you might be called
to support as well?
Mr. Salesses. We actually do a lot of work with the other
departments and agencies. I will pick HHS as an example.
Assistant Secretary Nicki Lurie and her staff, we spend a lot
of time working with them, just like we do with Mr. Fenton and
his team, but specifically focused on the public health
response kinds of activities. The Department of Defense in
particular is responsible, along with HHS and VA, to support
natural disaster medical system. That is where we provide
transportation of critical care patients, and in particular
USTRANSCOM has the responsibility to air lift critical care
patients, and we have done that in a number of disasters.
We also work with HHS on their Federal medical staging
stations. They are responsible for standing up these. We work
very closely with them on planning and looking at the kinds of
capabilities that the Department of Defense could provide
beyond the Public Health Service capabilities that would be
available in a disaster.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks. My time is well expired. I hope
we get a second round of questions here, but I appreciate your
responses so far.
So the Chair now recognizes Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thank you very much. I really have a respect for the work
that you do and how difficult and complicated the issues that
you confront are. In fact, I was reading through the material
last night, and I was absolutely struck by all the different
protocols and touch points and responsibilities. So I have got
a couple of questions regarding how that is actually working.
The Chairman spoke for a moment about the issue of the
Marines deploying under Sandy in New Jersey before being asked
to and before having the authority to do that. Specifically,
what is done to avoid that happening again? I don't even know
who answers that. I am sorry. Staten Island. Just right across
the bridge.
General Whitlock. Ma'am, I will take that question. We have
done extensive after-action reviews, and we have lessons
identified, and I think we are learning them now.
In my military career, Hurricane Sandy was the most
extensively after-action-reviewed event I have done. NORTHCOM
did a really complex and thorough one with its components and
partners with the National Guard Bureau and OSD and even FEMA
there, and I saw that go up through the Department of Defense.
So I think we continue to learn and understand, and we will
constantly have the training and education challenges, new
Members come in, or Marines that are operating off the coast in
the area or in proximity to respond, how they respond, but also
the Defense Coordinating Officer is key and integral there,
each one of those in FEMA region, his or her team. Then
NORTHCOM has what the command calls a Title 10 deputy, and
there is a Title 10-06 colonel or Navy captain that goes out
and helps that dual-status commander or that adjutant general.
So those are key players in making sure that we have the right
command and control.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. That kind of leads me to
Dr. Kirschbaum, because I did notice that there are a lot of
offices, there are a lot of protocols, there are a lot of
memorandums of understanding, there is a lot of positioning of
one Department's staff in another Department's office for
certain issues.
So from a Government accountability perspective, are we
doing all that we need to be doing in the leanest, most
effective way, cost-effective and efficient way, or have we
overresponded to the things that we haven't done well that we
are creating layers and layers and potential contradictions and
confusion? Dr. Kirschbaum.
Mr. Kirschbaum. Thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman.
One of the things that we noticed over time in particular,
when we look at the kind of planning necessary to do this kind
of response to major disasters and what-not, it requires, as we
talked about, fast levels of planning, and particularly in the
case of the Department of Defense, where the focus for decades
has not been on that kind of planning here in the homeland.
There is extra effort involved. We saw a lot early on,
especially when U.S. Northern Command was establishing, where
there was a lot of effort, but the outcomes weren't as
satisfactory because of those things. Lots of activity that
wasn't necessarily coordinated and planned.
Fortunately that has gotten better. General Whitlock
mentioned the after-action reviews. We love after-action
reviews, for two reasons. No. 1, because it helps us identify
those things that tend to be recurring problems. So that is
obviously the indicator that things like the ever-present
interoperability issues with communications. They are in the
Sandy AAR. So you pay attention to those.
We also love them because it shows materially how seriously
the Department takes looking at exercises. The way the
Department exercises, they exercise to break things, figure out
where the problems are, and fix them. So they are very good in
that score.
The overarching issue for us is when it comes to planning
for these kind of things, is that it is a plant that needs to
be watered all the time. You have to have a plan, know the
plan, test the plan, and that has to happen every single day.
So the level of effort that applies to that often is a very
high level of effort. So it is up to the departments to
determine in doing that over time you become more efficient
because you have done it and you recognize where the pain
points are, where you are doubling up effort, and where you can
afford to make the risk-management decision so you don't end up
double-counting.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. It just seems very confusing the way
some of the protocols were identified, who does what, when,
under what circumstances, who is in the FEMA office that
doesn't work for FEMA but brings an expertise from someplace
else. So just for someone from the outside looking in,
particularly for the first time, it just seemed like there were
a lot of steps and touchstones and protocols and memorandums of
understanding and whatever. I am just wondering how long does
it take to execute from the time that you know that you are
needed to the time that you actually get some resources into
that area, if there is an answer to that?
Mr. Salesses. I think there is. It is a fascinating system,
our National response system, a Federalist system built on a
transactional process with systems within systems. You are
right, there is a tremendous amount of activity and
organizations involved in this. But the way that I think that
we have collectively tried to deal with that is by
understanding what the State needs are and translating those
State needs into prescripted mission assignments, identifying
capabilities that are needed.
FEMA manages that process. We in DOD have 28 prescripted
mission assignments. Those are essential for translating the
task that needs to be done into military-speak and the kinds of
capabilities that are needed.
Then we mentioned, General Whitlock and I both mentioned
the DSCA EXORD. That is actually a document where we have gone
through and identified military capabilities and postured them
on time lines so that those capabilities will be made available
rapidly to support our Federal partners in that regard. That is
just the beginning part of the discussion.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I know there were lots of lessons
learned in Katrina, and I know that there are still lessons
being learned from Sandy. Is Sandy the event that you employed
this sort-of new system of checks and balances and
accountabilities and identification? Is that the only event
that we can tell whether or not you are responding more
quickly, more effectively, more efficiently, or is there
something that I am missing, some other incident? Thank you.
Mr. Salesses. I would say probably Sandy, but we also
learned a lot from a number of events around the world, Haiti
in particular, the Fukushima earthquake and tsunami. When those
events happen, we collectively get together and plan to look at
what was needed in those cases, and we refine our processes.
But to employ the DSCA EXORD, we did use that in Sandy to
provide capabilities.
Then the other thing is, I spoke in my opening statement,
the Department of Defense does more than provide military
capabilities, when you think about the Corps of Engineers and
what they did in Sandy, pumping out the tunnels, helping the
city and the State in regards to dewatering and the kinds of
things that were necessary, the Defense Logistics Agency, which
provided over 9 million gallons of fuel for the 2,500 gas
stations that were out up there.
When you start to look at the cascading effects of
infrastructure and what happened, the ability to rely on the
Defense Department initially is very, very important. So
maximizing our capabilities with the Corps of Engineers, using
DLA, using USTRANSCOM, which airlifted utility vehicles from
the West Coast to the East Coast to help out the power
companies, again working with the Department of Energy. So
understanding this and pulling this all together is a pretty
significant task.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Thank you, Chairman, for your indulgence.
Ms. McSally. Absolutely.
The Chair will now recognize other Members of the
subcommittee for questions they may wish to ask the witnesses.
In accordance with the committee rules and practice, I plan to
recognize Members who were present at the start of the hearing
by seniority on the subcommittee. Those coming in later will be
recognized in the order of arrival.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Loudermilk from Georgia.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I appreciate
everyone being here.
September 11 was a wake-up call for our Nation. During my
time in the military during the Cold War most of our emphasis
was defending the homeland, but it was abroad. September 11
showed how vulnerable we were. Since 9/11, we have seen a
growing emphasis on local and State, the needs of local and
State, for support with the increase of natural disasters and
the impact of those disasters, terrorist attacks, civil unrest,
riots, violent protests, and those continue.
I have worked on both sides of that, from the purely
Federal side, as well as in the last several years working with
our State and local as boots on the ground and in the air and
search and rescue and disaster response. One of the things that
I have seen from working both with the purely Federal side and
our State is the National Guard has unique capabilities for
working in those local disasters for several reasons.
Of course, our purely Federal Department of Defense has
constraints on them such as the Posse Comitatus that the
National Guard doesn't have. The National Guard also has been
working with local law enforcement. They usually know the local
law enforcement, the local emergency management agency heads.
They are from those communities, and they are continually doing
joint exercises.
From working on that side, I have seen that the response,
the coordination, and the flexibility to transition, especially
if it is under Title 32, to transition from purely just
disaster response to assisting law enforcement is there that we
don't have on the Federal side. Also, and rightly so, purely on
the DOD, there is a constraint that it cannot degradate our
National security posture.
With that, Mr. Salesses, a question for you is, I
understand that the DOD has made some changes to DOD
Instruction 3025.22 recently as it regards to the National
Guard and the response. Can you describe what those changes
were and what effect that is having?
Mr. Salesses. Absolutely, Congressman. First of all, you
are absolutely right too, the National Guard is a tremendous
capability and available to the Governors, and as I spoke to,
with EMAC it is able to pull resources together and be a very,
very effective organization in supporting the Governors in
those responsibilities.
But as we look at the National response system, and I am
going to defer to my partner here, Bob Fenton, part of that
National response system is, as you opened, is State
responsibilities. Clearly when there is an event in the State,
the State will deal with it or use the EMAC.
When it goes beyond that, the Governor obviously has the
opportunity to declare the Stafford Act. The Stafford Act, as
we all know, provides Federal resources. It also provides the
capability for the State to be reimbursed through the DERF
fund, and there is almost $8 billion, I understand, in the DERF
fund today. That fund is there to fund the National Guard and
State response, and so clearly that is the most effective way
to do that.
The challenge going forward in Title 32 is when we want,
the Defense Department, the Defense Department has determined
that we have a requirement from FEMA that we are going to
employ the National Guard in. When we do that and we determine
through the sourcing process that the National Guard as opposed
to the Marine Corps or the Army or the Air Force has the best
capability to support that, we can ask the Governor consent to
put National Guardsmen in Title 32. That is what that directive
is all about, and that is what it is designed to do.
Mr. Loudermilk. Well, my question was: What changes have
been made recently to the standing procedures?
Mr. Salesses. No changes. It was just the policy was
codified. That is what the directive does. It codifies the
policy that has been in long existence.
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. So you are saying there were no
changes recently to DOD Instruction 3025.22?
Mr. Salesses. It was published. It was published a couple
years ago. The process and the way that the Department operates
and supports the use of Title 32 has been employed that way,
and the policy codified that.
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. I will reserve other questions for
the next panel. Thank you.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin from Rhode Island.
Mr. Langevin. First of all, I want to thank our panel of
witnesses here today. Madam Chair, thank you for letting me sit
in on this first panel.
If I could, let me begin with Mr. Salesses. I am pleased to
hear that all of the witnesses touched on cybersecurity in
their testimony. Some of them spent quite a bit of time on it.
I would like to dig a little deeper into DSCA's role with
respect to a cyber incident.
So, Mr. Salesses--who, for the record, I want to mention
hails from my own alma mater, Rhode Island College, so it is
good to see a Rhode Island College alum here--per JP 3-28,
DSCA's operations, DOD forces may be required to assist and
local networks to operate in a disrupted or degraded
environment.
With that in mind--and I would like to ask all of our
witnesses in your answers to be brief because I have a slew of
questions--in the event of a cyber attack, how would
determination be made that DOD forces would assist civil
authorities, and what is the threshold for involving them? Have
those things been worked through yet?
Mr. Salesses. Congressman Langevin, I apologize, but cyber
is not an area under my purview. But my understanding obviously
is if there is support needed at the State level, that the DHS
and DOJ would request DOD support, which would be the normal
course. But, again, this is out of my purview, so I am glad to
take questions related to cyber.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Would we turn to FEMA then? Would that
be something that has been worked out under your jurisdiction?
Mr. Fenton. Sure. The part that would fall into FEMA's
responsibility is the consequences of a cyber event. So if
there were physical consequences of that event, we would look
at it as the same as with regard to those consequences of any
other type of event and look at the authorities within the
Stafford Act to be able to provide support to State and local
governments in support of requirements.
One of the things that we have recently done is looking at
the cyber threat and look at areas of critical infrastructure
that may be most threatened from that is power and utilities.
So what we are doing this year is developing a long-range power
outage plan and how we respond and support the private sector
with regard to assisting them and getting systems back up and
operational and those kind of things.
From a crisis perspective, you are really looking over at
FBI, the NCCIC within the Department of Homeland Security where
those authorities sit, to respond to the crisis, and FEMA's
responsibility would really be the consequences of such an
event.
Mr. Langevin. Maybe I would go back to Mr. Salesses. Who
within DOD or DSCA would be responsible for a cyber-related
event where DOD would be involved?
Mr. Salesses. Congressman, we have an office, deputy
assistant secretary for cyber, that oversees the policy for
that. Of course we have Cyber Command, the operational command
that would oversee the kinds of support that the Defense
Department would provide.
Mr. Langevin. But how would the assistant secretary of
cyber interact with civil authorities? Has that been worked out
yet?
Mr. Salesses. Sir, again, a little out of my purview. I
will do the best I can. Normally it would be very similar to
what we do here in defense support to civil authorities as it
relates to disasters. Normally if the State and local need
support, they go to the Federal department, in this case the
Department of Homeland Security and DOJ and the FBI. Then in
turn, if one of those Federal agencies didn't have the
capability to assist in that regard and they needed DOD
resources, they would come to us and we would support that
Federal agency down to the State and local level.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Would GAO have something to say
about that?
Mr. Kirschbaum. Mr. Langevin, thank you for the question.
We are actually currently starting work to look specifically at
that issue, and our most recent work was from 2013. My
understanding is there are still a lot of questions about just
the things you are asking. We ask mostly, like at U.S. Northern
Command, they understand that they are responsible for command
and control of Federal forces that are applied to civil
support, and this would be one of those cases.
I think what the Department is working on is how that chain
would work, where the request would go from Northern Command
and others, who would it go to, what is the right scope of the
operations in terms of what they would do. Those are all still
under consideration.
Mr. Langevin. I think these are obviously vitally important
to get answered now since it is in the cyber domain, where
milliseconds matter. How quickly we can work things out would
be essential.
Mr. Salesses. Congressman, if I could add, in this case,
Cyber Command would be the supported combatant command, not
NORTHCOM. So the bottom line is any request for cyber support
from the Defense Department would come through the OSD element
into the combatant command, in this case, Cyber Command, not
NORTHCOM.
Mr. Langevin. Very good.
Well, my time has expired. I have a bunch of other
questions. Maybe we will get to a second round. But thank you.
I yield back.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Donovan from New York.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
First of all, gentlemen, I would like to thank you. I
represent Staten Island. For the people of my community who you
came to help during our time of disaster--one of the things
Government should do for their citizens is come to their aid in
the time of disaster, and you did. So thank you on behalf of
all the people of Staten Island and southern Brooklyn.
I saw first-hand, sir, what you are talking about, pumping
out those tunnels in my city. So I just wanted to take a moment
to thank you.
A lot of the questions I had were already asked, but I
understand, when you were saying that you learned lessons from
Katrina, that you applied to your methods in dealing with
Superstorm Sandy and the aftermath there.
Are there any things that you, now looking back--you said
you would do an assessment afterward. Are there things, looking
back now in the response to Sandy, that you wish you had known
then to help back then 2\1/2\ years ago? Anyone.
Mr. Salesses. Congressman, thank you for those comments.
I think in disasters there is a common set of issues that
we continually improve upon. The first is gaining situational
awareness. Because of the Federalist system that we operate in,
you can imagine how complex that is, the five boroughs of New
York City and the ability to provide the insight from those
boroughs to the mayor of New York City and then from the city
to the State government in Albany and through that process. It
is a very challenging process. So the ability to gain
situational awareness for what is needed rapidly is a real
challenge.
The way that I believe--and I will let my friend Bob talk
more about this. One of the things that FEMA has done is
expanded their IMAT capability to include additional expertise.
So when we send out an IMAT, which is basically an assessment
team that FEMA has that works with the State and locals to
determine that, I think it begins to gain that.
But I think there is other improvements that can be made. I
think the requirements generation process, for lack of a better
term, the ability to generate the requests for assistance from
the local to the State level and then from the State level to
the Federal level, is quite a process. By using pre-scripted
mission assignments, I think that is helping. But that can
always be done better, in my view.
I think the other thing that is key is the investment that
we make in our partnerships on a daily basis. I think that is a
key aspect of what we all do at the Federal, State, local
level, private industry, volunteer organizations. I think it is
critical to being successful in this area.
Then the leadership. I can tell you, from my vantage point
at the Defense Department, during that whole period of Sandy--
and Joe was there--the Secretary of Defense, the chairman of
the joint chiefs, the service chiefs, the combatant commands--
NORTHCOM, TRANSCOM--all the most senior officials in the
Defense Department met once, sometimes twice, a day to figure
out how the Defense Department could be more effective.
I think with FEMA providing the requests directly to the
Defense Department for things that haven't even been asked for
yet is very, very effective. Chief of the National Guard Bureau
was in that meeting. Every day we would work together to figure
out what we could do to be more effective.
Mr. Fenton. I would just add, you know, as someone that has
been at FEMA for 20 years and has been the operations chief for
9/11 in New York at Ground Zero and Katrina in Mississippi and
then was helping with Superstorm Sandy for the first week and a
half there, in these events, in the early hours, there is a fog
of war that happens.
Our administrator all the way up to the President, you
know, is--you know, we are going to preposition resources. In
fact, our administrator says, ``Think big. Go big. Go fast. But
be smart'' in what we do. So we are going to move to make sure
we have the right resources from the Federal Government
prepositioned, anticipating requirements.
So, as this fog of war happens--and I think, you know, good
Americans wanting to help other Americans in need respond to
those. I think what we are trying to do now is do more
deliberate planning--and I touched on that--not only doing it
at the National level, but doing it really at the whole
community level with States, local governments, private sector,
nonprofits being part of that, to understand really what is the
true capability, what are the gaps, so we can better determine,
to Bob's point, what are the resource requirements, how do we
better identify where they are coming from and logistics time
frames and get them there to make a difference.
So I think what we learned from Sandy, obviously, is the
huge requirements from water and some of the other missions
that we really didn't get into previously with better surge,
better situational awareness, those kinds of things, that over
the last 2 years we have improved tremendously.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
Ms. McSally. Thanks.
The Chair is now going to recognize myself for a second
round here. Just a couple of our Members, myself, and Mr.
Langevin have a few follow-up questions.
Mr. Salesses, I am equally as concerned as my colleague
here about that cybersecurity is in somebody else's area of
responsibility. Because when it comes to defense support to
civil authorities, that is your duty title.
So, if we have got rice bowls and stovepipes even within
the Pentagon, I mean, this is a domain. Cyber is just one
domain that we might be using the military to support other
agencies.
So I think we do need to follow up on that, even if it is
not here, on where our shortfalls are. Because if that is not
something squarely in your domain, then we are not thinking
about that in the DSCA mission. Then we have got to figure out
how to break down those stovepipes.
So any further comments on that?
You know, similarly, it is really important--look, I have
been in the military. So stovepipes, bureaucracies, lack of
nimbleness, turf battles, I mean, this is part of our tribal
culture, and it often inhibits our ability to be able to
respond quickly to do things well.
Certainly, as we have seen from all of you today, the tight
coordination with State, National Guard, and the Federal level
is really important in a situation like this.
Even in preparation for this hearing--I mean, one of the
reasons we have two panels is because, to my understanding, Mr.
Salesses, your office didn't even want to be on a panel with my
adjutant general because they are a State person with a Federal
person sitting next to them. God forbid. We have a State and a
Federal person sitting next to each other on a panel for a
hearing on a topic like this.
So that just makes me concerned about, you know, the
integration still not being where it needs to be for something
that is really important. So I just wonder if you could comment
on that.
Mr. Salesses. Absolutely. Again, it is a National response
system. I understand the value of not just the Federal
partners, the State partners, the local partners, private
industry. I actually sit on the National Advisory committee for
FEMA, and there is a cross-section of State, local, Federal,
private, volunteer organizations.
I have great appreciation for the fact that we need to
coordinate and integrate well, and I spend a lot of time doing
that. This past Wednesday I was in Minneapolis speaking to all
the new State emergency managers. Bryan Koon is the president
of NEMA, National Emergency Managers Association, is a good
friend and somebody I spent a lot of time with.
In fact, Bob and I in March, along with Don Boyce from HHS,
were on a panel. We spent a lot of time trying to educate and
inform and learn from those at the State and local level and at
private industry and how they can help. A couple weeks ago I
had the president of the International Association for
Emergency Managers in my office at the Pentagon.
Because, as you look at the municipalities and the major
cities, their emergency management community is different than
the State emergency NEMA. So it is the ability to bridge all
that together and to take the opportunity to explain what the
Defense Department can do greatly, more than just our military
capabilities.
I can't overemphasize our ability to bring other
capabilities to bear on these kinds of events. It is an
education. It is a training. It is a planning. We have done a
lot to integrate planning.
The Department invested heavily in the Joint Force
Headquarters-NCR, which is at the State level, and working on
an initiative with Secretary Panetta, Secretary Hagel, and now
Secretary Carter, the Complex Catastrophe Initiative. We
focused on integrative planning.
DOD is unique because of the Joint Force Headquarters-
State. We have folks at the State level. We have folks at the
regional level. We have folks at the Federal level with
NORTHCOM and PACOM. So the ability to integrate that kind of
planning is very unique, and we have done those kinds of
things.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks. I mean, I appreciate that
perspective. I am just trying to wrap up here quickly.
Just one final quick question is--you know, one of the
greatest abilities we need in a disaster is situational
awareness using surveillance capabilities, and manned and
unmanned aircraft can help with that. I know there has been
some challenges in the past domestically with the use of
unmanned aircraft because of the FAA restrictions.
Where are we on that right now? If we had a disaster, are
there quick emergency authorities so that we could use the
unmanned aircraft to be able to provide that situational
awareness where we currently can't because of the FAA
restrictions?
Mr. Salesses. As you may or may not know, we did UASs in
the fire season last year in California. But as we spoke about
the DSCA EXORD, we also have a military capability, manned
capability, available immediately to do the kind of wide-area
awareness that is needed in these kinds of disasters.
We also have NGA, the National Geospatial Intelligence
Agency, which has incredible capability and uses commercial
satellites and is able to do the kinds of things that we need
in that area.
Ms. McSally. But do we have procedures in place? I mean, it
is very restrictive right now as to where drones can fly. So do
we have procedures in place to break glass and allow them to
provide that unique capability?
Mr. Salesses. We actually published domestic use of UAS
guidelines. It talks specifically about how UASs can be used in
DSCA events. I would be glad to share that with you and your
staff.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
So my understanding is Mr. Langevin now has more questions.
Mr. Langevin. Sure. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Again to our panel, thank you for your testimony today.
I guess I will go back to this and just work this through.
You know, maybe it is because cyber--and, actually, use of
cyber tools in an attack that would cause physical damage
thankfully hasn't happened to any significant degree here in
the United States. It is kind of unchartered territory.
But, obviously, anticipating things ahead of time is
essential because I think it is just a matter of when and not
if something like that could happen, as we have seen on a
number of cases in other places around the world where these
things have happened.
But I would like to say, you know, if you are a State EMA
director, you know, you are used to dealing with, whether it is
FEMA or NORTHCOM, who then do they turn to in a related cyber
event like this where it may have multiple interactions, if you
will?
You may have physical damage to recover from, say, a
turbine or if a generator goes down, but then you also have to
ensure that the adversaries are not still on your network. So,
therefore, who do you recommend that a State EMA director would
turn to?
Mr. Fenton. So State emergency management I think has two
different avenues to go on this. One that affects is us, you
know, the consequences. With regard to the threat, they are
coordinating through DHS' Office of National Preparedness
Protection.
Specifically the NCIC, there is the cyber center within DHS
that coordinates the State emergency management, and also then
the FBI obviously would be involved in that. Those are the two.
They coordinate with the rest of the cyber centers within the
Federal Government to then coordinate and communicate those
threats.
Mr. Langevin. So, obviously, that goes to the fact that
they would go to people they have dealt with in the past. But I
don't know that--it seems like it hasn't yet been
institutionalized that an EMA director would know who to go to
in the event of a cyber-related incident.
Let me just ask this. Again, when things move very quickly,
what, if any, of this has been exercised? How is the DOD
adjusting its annual exercise program to account for this type
of a new eventuality?
Mr. Salesses. Again, Congressman, not an expert in the
cyber area. But we do have, obviously, CYBERCOM and the whole
office and the OSD staff that deals with cyber.
But right now, for example, there is an exercise on-going
called CYBERCOM and NSA--CYBERCOM, rather--it is called--Cyber
Guard is the exercise. Cyber Command and the National Guard
Bureau are running an exercise for the next 2 weeks focused on
cyber, specifically how to deal with the cyber threat, the
cyber intrusion, and those kinds of things.
It doesn't focus on the consequences of an event where
infrastructure may be impacted, but does focus on the issue
that you keep raising, is: How do State and local connect at
the Federal level to get support from the Federal Government?
As Bob mentioned, it would be through DHS and the NCIC and
DOJ. Then, if support was needed from DOD, DOD would make that
support available through CYBERCOM and DHS and DOJ, in
particular, FBI. But there is an on-going exercise. I would be
glad to provide that information to your staff.
Mr. Kirschbaum. Mr. Langevin, this is an excellent example
of what we have been talking about, the need to really continue
the diligence on the planning.
As Cyber Command gets the cyber mission teams established
and going, the command and control for them, the structure,
this is the kind of thing throughout the Department that they
need to determine--who does what, who is supposed to do what--
so, when that connection happens during a major disaster, when
forces are already deployed in the field to assist civil
authorities, when requests come to them, they know who to send
them to and when and how that goes.
So that is a lot of internal duties to work on, and then
that external piece is going to have to be a major priority.
Mr. Langevin. Sure. Sure. Well, that is part of what we are
going to ensure in our oversight responsibility, is to make
sure that we are working these things through.
I sit on the Armed Services Committee and am the Ranking
Member that oversees Cyber Command and NSA. I am going to be
sure that we press these issues there as well to work out these
things sooner rather than later so that, in the event that
something happens, the questions have already been answered.
Thank you to our panel.
Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. McSally. Thank you.
I want to thank these witnesses for their valuable
testimony on our first panel. This panel is dismissed.
The clerk will now prepare the witness table for our second
panel.
Ms. McSally. All right. I would like to welcome our second
panel to today's hearing. Thank you all for participating.
Major General Michael McGuire is Arizona's adjutant general
and currently serves as the director of the Arizona Department
of Emergency and Military Affairs. In this capacity, he is
responsible for managing the day-to-day activity of Arizona's
Army and Air National Guard's joint programs and the Division
of Emergency Management.
Mr. James Gianato serves as the homeland security advisor
for the State of West Virginia, a position he has held since
December 2010. In this capacity, he also serves as the chairman
of the State Emergency Response Commission.
Mr. Gianato has 35 years of experience in emergency
response, which includes service as the director of 9-1-1 and
emergency services in McDowell County and active membership in
the Kimball Volunteer Fire Department. Mr. Gianato is
testifying on behalf of the National Emergency Management
Association.
I now recognize the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.
Langevin, to introduce our final witness.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Welcome to our panel. I, in particular, just want to thank
you for the opportunity to say a few words of introduction
about Mr. Gaynor from my home State of Rhode Island.
Pete Gaynor has spent his career in public service, first
as a Marine, where he rose to the rank of colonel, and more
recently as an emergency manager. From 2008 to 2014, Pete
served as the director of the City of Providence's Emergency
Management Agency, where he was widely lauded for
professionalizing its operations.
Last December Pete was appointed by Governor Gina Raimondo
as the head of the Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency,
where he immediately helped lead the response to the January
blizzard and the many blizzards and significant storms after
that, as a matter of fact. I also want to add that Pete is also
an alumnus of our Rhode Island College. Good to see a fellow
alum here.
I welcome you, Mr. Gaynor, as well as our panel, and I look
forward to hearing your testimony as well as our other
witnesses.
With that, I yield back.
Ms. McSally. Thank you.
The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record.
The Chair now recognizes General McGuire for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL T. MCGUIRE, THE ADJUTANT
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, STATE OF
ARIZONA
General McGuire. Good morning, Madam Chairman. Thank you
for the opportunity.
Distinguished Members of the panel, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of Governor
Ducey, serving in his cabinet as the director of emergency
management and military affairs, serving also concurrently as
the adjutant general for the nearly 8,200 soldiers and airmen
of the Arizona Army and Air National Guard.
I want to take the opportunity to quickly just talk through
a couple of things. I did provide a visual aid up there today
that I will refer to at least once when we talk about why the
Guard is the first choice and put it in military parlance for
the Chairman's reference, as she talked about being forward-
deployed and rice bowls and stovepipes that exist in the
military.
Then I will take the last couple minutes of my time to try
to reference a couple of the questions about cyber and some of
the questions that have come up from the other Members in the
name of time and then, hopefully, get your questions.
On the historic perspective, I think it is important for us
to understand that the National Guard has been at this mission
for 379 years, dating back to the Pequot wars of 1634 and the
appointing of the first adjutant general in the Massachusetts
Bay Colony in 1636.
That is important to understand. You know, there is a lot
of confusion about why the Guard, what the existence of the
Guard is about, and, truly, it is the father of the modern
United States Army. As we have evolved in the Guard, we have
been involved and will continue to be involved in every major
conflict since 1634 to the current overseas contingency
operations.
We look at the Guard very clearly as an organization that
has to train for what we believe to be the most demanding and
complex mission, but can instantly pivot to respond to support
the States and the citizens under the command of the Governor
at a moment's notice. So, when you hear people say that the
Guard is the first choice, it is the first choice because of
that slide.
Now, that slide doesn't have every single armory
installation around the country. But you can see every one of
those stars represents an area where there is a prepositioning
of National Guard equipment and personnel that can be called at
a moment's notice to meet an emergent response in a State and
local community.
In a military sense, the Guard is prepositioned. They are
forward-deployed. In Arizona, for example, members of the
Arizona National Guard hail from all 15 counties in the State.
In my role as State emergency manager, I understand better
than anyone that those 15 county emergency managers work with
their local incident management system and their first
responders, police and fire, and that every single emergency is
a critical action and that, while we train for the most complex
mission, the most emergent really will be supporting our
citizens.
So that is why you hear that the Guard is the first choice.
They are just out there. They are out there in every community,
and they are able to respond. They have these relationships
with local community responders, as well as bringing their
civilian skills as citizen soldiers and airmen, to the fight.
Carpentry, plumbing, legal, contracting, whatever it might be,
the Guard is expertly designed to be able to do both missions.
The final thing is that, because we are prepositioned, we
have a huge base of tactical knowledge about at-risk areas,
understanding the local geography and lay of the land, areas
where flooding is most prone to occur, areas where we have had
issues with power grids and those types of things in the past.
So that is really why the Guard is critical.
As a preferred choice, the Guard has statutory reasons, as
has been mentioned, under Posse Comitatus that makes it very
clear under Title 10 we are very restricted when Federalized.
But operating under the Governor's authority under Title
32, where Federal resources are provided, or State Active-Duty
where State resources are provided, the Guard provides a huge
swing capability that we cannot tap into in our Title 10
forces.
Just some quick closing comments on two issues that were
touched on here, the CBRN enterprise. As we get ready in the
Armed Services Committee for the mark-ups, it is important for
all the Members to understand that 80 percent of the CBRN
capacity is currently resident in the National Guard Army or
Air. So any indiscriminate cuts to force structure need to be
reviewed by anybody that is working on the Homeland Security
side to make sure that that CBRN response capacity is not
affected.
When we look at future missions--cyber, RPA, firefighters
en masse--the use of Title 32 funding and the ability to
quickly respond is something that is yet to be clearly defined,
as we saw from the earlier testimony, first that I have heard
that Cyber Command will be taking the lead in the event of an
emergency response in the cyber domain in the States.
So I am more than happy to answer your questions, and I
yield the final 17 seconds of my time to my colleagues from
Rhode Island and West Virginia.
[The prepared statement of General McGuire follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael T. McGuire
June 10, 2015
introduction \1\
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\1\ Maj Gen McGuire submits this written testimony and
corresponding oral testimony in his State capacity as the director of
the Arizona Department of Emergency and Military Affairs and on behalf
of the Governor of the State of Arizona. Neither the written testimony
nor Maj Gen McGuire's oral statements to the subcommittee have been
reviewed by the Department of Defense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the number of overseas deployments of U.S. forces continues to
decline, the focus of military planners has begun to shift to domestic
operations to include disaster preparedness, emergency response, and
homeland security. But the military departments' renewed focus on
domestic operations merely highlights a mission that the National Guard
has capably executed for the past 379 years. The National Guard has
performed this critical domestic response duty while simultaneously
engaging in combat operations around the globe. From the Pequot War in
1634 to the current Overseas Contingency Operations, National Guard
troops have been involved in every major military campaign in this
Nation's history. Thus, the National Guard is uniquely trained and
situated as the first line of support to the Nation's communities if
first responders and local resources are overwhelmed.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See ADP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, July 2012
(``Most domestic disasters require no Federal military assistance.
State and Federal emergency management agencies receive the military
assistance needed from the National Guard in State active duty or Title
32 status.'').
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The National Guard is the modern-day militia, the formation of
which predates the founding of our country. The Massachusetts National
Guard traces its lineage to the first regiments established by the
General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636. Each of the
States, the U.S. territories and the District of Columbia (referred to
herein as ``the States'') have equally rich histories. Militia units
patterned after the English militia system were common throughout the
colonies and played a central role in our Nation's fight for
independence. They also assured the security of new States as the
Nation expanded westward. Because of the critical militia role in the
birth and expansion of our Nation, the right of the States to raise,
maintain, and employ their own military forces (known since 1824 as the
``National Guard'') is guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the
constitutions and statutes of the several States.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The majority of this paragraph taken by permission from Major
General (Retired) Timothy J. Lowenberg, The Role of the National Guard
in National Defense and Homeland Security, http://www.ngaus.org/sites/
default/files/pdf/primer%20fin.pdf (last visited June 6, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistent with the citizen-soldier model of the early militias,
the present-day National Guard is embedded in the local communities.
The Soldiers and Airmen that comprise the National Guard are members of
the communities--policemen and firemen, small business owners,
carpenters, civil engineers, plumbers, and mechanics. This fact
provides intangible benefits. First, response time during an emergency
is much shorter for National Guard troops than their Federal
counterparts because the majority of Guardsmen are already located in
and around the affected area. Second, relationships already exist
between Guardsmen and local officials, first responders and residents
because, again, the Guardsmen live and work in the community. Third,
affected communities benefit from a response force that can bring not
only military capabilities but also civilian skills such as carpentry,
mechanical, civil engineering, and business negotiation. And fourth,
National Guard troops have home-town familiarity with the geographic
layout of the affected community, combined with an understanding of the
most at-risk areas. Put another way, with nearly 3,300 installations in
2,700 communities around the country, the National Guard is America's
``forward-deployed'' homeland response force.\4\ Accordingly, any
proposal to impose ``proportionate'' cuts on the various military
branches must consider the effect an arbitrary cut would have on this
critical homeland response force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See Exhibit 1.
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the national guard as the preferred domestic response force
Disasters typically begin and end locally, and most are managed at
the local level. It is therefore the goal of any emergency response
plan to be able to resolve an event at the lowest possible level of
jurisdiction--our cities and counties. Local first responders are the
first line of defense during any emergency or disaster that strikes our
homeland. The Nation's local first responders are supported by the
``Whole Community,'' a concept that recognizes preparing for and
responding to emergencies is the collective responsibility of our
citizens, local governments, faith-based and non-profit organizations,
and the private sector in conjunction with State, Tribal, and Federal
government agencies. The Whole Community concept is essential to the
National Preparedness System. Developed in response to Presidential
Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness, the National Preparedness
System is based upon and driven by the National Preparedness Goal--``A
secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the
whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and
recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.'' The
existing National Incident Management System (NIMS) provides the
foundation on which the National Preparedness System is built, and has
developed over time to guide the Whole Community in the response and
management of a disaster or emergency, from local first responders and
across all levels of government, while recognizing the sovereignty and
responsibility of State.
The National Preparedness System is broken into five preparedness
frameworks: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Disaster
Recovery. The National Response Framework provides the structure to
enable the Whole Community response. Local first responders address
nearly 85% of the disasters and emergencies that impact our communities
on daily basis.\5\ Occasionally, disasters and emergencies occur that
exceed the resources and abilities of our local first responders; and
in those rare cases where our first responders are not sufficiently
able to respond and recover from a disaster or emergency the response
escalates to higher levels of government through the National Response
Framework--first the State, then multiple States, and finally Federal.
This scalability is the essential strength of the National Incident
Management System, and enables the Whole Community to meet and manage
incidents involving all threats and hazards--regardless of cause, size,
location, or complexity. Although the scalability includes the ability
to integrate national resources, the National Incident Management
System and National Response Framework respect the sovereignty of the
States and recognize that command and control of the disaster or
emergency response remains with the State(s) or lowest level of
jurisdiction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Lt Col Mike Domingue, New Hampshire National Guard, ``National
Guard Civil Support,'' National States Geographic Information Council,
http://www.nsgic.org/public_resources/Sun-Dominge-National-Guard-
Briefing-for-NSGIC.pdf (last visited June 6, 2015).
As an event grows in size or complexity, the National Response
Framework guides the incorporation of additional resources from the
Whole Community to respond, from city to county and then to the State
level. At the State level, the incident is managed through the State's
emergency manager and no matter how large or small the incident
becomes, the State remains in control of all response assets, Federal
or otherwise. There are three models for the State emergency manager
found among the States and territories. A majority of the States and
territories, 37, have a stand-alone emergency manager, five States
assign the Adjutant General of the National Guard the dual role of
State emergency manager, and 12 States assign the Adjutant General the
roles of State emergency manager and homeland security advisor.\6\ The
Governor ultimately exercises command and control of the response to an
emergency or disaster through his or her emergency manager. As a State
institution, one of the tools available to the Governor is his or her
National Guard, and the Governor can task the National Guard to provide
Military Support for Civil Authorities (MSCA) missions to help in the
response. In addition, the Governor can request assistance from
neighboring States through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC), which has been ratified by all States and territories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See Exhibit 2.
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If the event exceeds the resources and ability of the State to
respond, the Governor will then request assistance from the Federal
Government through FEMA. It is important to note that the resourcing
agent for all Federal resources, including requests for support from
the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) not related to the State's
National Guard MSCA mission, is FEMA. Despite the DOD's ``immediate
response'' authority, FEMA manages and assigns requests for Federal
assistance to the most capable organization.\7\
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\7\ DOD Directive 3025.18, also known as the ``Immediate Response
Authority,'' grants Federal military commanders and/or responsible DOD
civilian officials the ability to act from a request by a competent
civilian authority to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate
great property damage within the United States.
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Capability is more than force structure: It is the ability to
provide the most effective, versatile, scalable support to the local
community--the type of support only found in the National Guard. In the
5% of emergencies and disasters that require assistance beyond the
resources and capabilities provided by the National Guard, neighboring
States, and non-DOD Federal agencies, FEMA will task the DOD to
respond.\8\ The request for DOD resources, however, does not transfer
command and control of the incident to the DOD. Instead, in a properly-
executed response to an emergency or disaster, it brings those DOD
resources to the incident and works at the direction of the Governor
and State emergency manager through a Dual-Status Commander as part of
the National Response Framework. Despite the additional resources that
the DOD brings, its support to civil authorities is slow and mission
assignment cumbersome because providing those resources requires
Secretary of Defense authorization. The National Guard, because it is
locally based and responsive to the State, is the first line of support
to your constituents' first responders once local resources are
overwhelmed. Beyond being the first choice, it is also most appropriate
choice based on applicable legal authorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Domingue.
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the role of the national guard in dsca operations
National Guard (NG) units, under the control of their respective
State Governor and their ``The Adjutants General'' (TAGs), have
traditionally been the primary military responders in domestic
operations and emergencies. The use of Federal forces to support State
and local governments was, and remains, the exception rather than the
rule. Federal forces are generally used only after State resources are
exhausted or overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested by
State officials.\9\
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\9\ DR Dave Sherry and LCDR Robert Pirone, Domestic Operational Law
Handbook (CLAMO, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School,
U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, 2013), 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As detailed above, management of natural disasters and similar
incidents is based upon the principal of ``tiered response.'' Pursuant
to that concept, response and support to affected areas begin at the
lowest level of Government and escalate to the next tier based upon
requirements. Each successive level of Government maintains enough
capability to carry out the responsibilities imposed upon it by law.
Each has some reserve capability to address exceptional circumstances
that occur within its jurisdiction. When an incident overwhelms the
capacity of any level of Government, it calls upon the next higher
level of Government for support. The key players in the tiered response
framework are local, Tribal, State, and Federal governments.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ ADP 3-28, 3.
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To understand the role of the National Guard in National defense
and homeland security, one must understand the Constitutional and
statutory provisions governing use of military force by the Federal and
State governments. Governors and Federal officials must also have a
clear understanding of current and evolving National defense and
homeland security strategies and the organizational structure, funding
sources, and operational capabilities of today's Army and Air National
Guard.\11\
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\11\ Lowenberg, 1.
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Several statutes govern the use of military forces in response to a
natural or man-made disaster. The first is the Stafford Act.\12\ The
Stafford Act is the primary legal authority for Federal emergency and
disaster assistance to State and local governments. It authorizes the
President to issue major disaster declarations and authorizes Federal
agencies to provide assistance to States overwhelmed by disasters. Most
of the Stafford Act provisions come into play after an emergency
request from a State's Governor. The Stafford Act also sets the
guidelines for reimbursements from Federal funds to Federal agencies
and States. As is the case with many of the legal authorities governing
disaster relief, the Stafford Act ``is based on the premise that most
incidents begin and end locally and are managed on a daily basis at the
lowest possible geographical, organizational, and jurisdictional
level.''\13\
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\12\ The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121, et seq., as amended by the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-295
(2007), and the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, Pub. L. No.
113-2 (2013).
\13\ Sherry and Pirone, 25.
One of the oldest and most restrictive of the laws applicable to
Defense Support to Civilian Authorities is the Posse Comitatus Act
(PCA).\14\ The PCA prohibits the use of Federal troops for law
enforcement purposes, with some limited exceptions. But while the PCA
restricts the use of Federal troops in law enforcement roles, such as
traffic control points or patrolling in the aftermath of a disaster,
National Guard troops serving in their State capacities are exempt from
the restrictions of the PCA. The Federal versus State characteristics
of the National Guard are discussed in greater detail below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ 18 U.S.C. 1385.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the few exceptions to the PCA's prohibition on use of
Federal troops for law enforcement purposes is the Insurrection
Act,\15\ which permits the President to use the armed forces to enforce
the law when: (1) There is an insurrection within a State, and the
State legislature (or Governor if the legislature cannot be convened)
requests assistance from the President; (2) a rebellion makes it
impracticable to enforce the Federal law through ordinary judicial
proceedings; or (3) an insurrection or domestic violence opposes or
obstructs Federal law, or so hinders the enforcement of Federal or
State laws that residents of that State are deprived of their
Constitutional rights and the State is unable or unwilling to protect
these rights.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ 10 U.S.C. 331-334.
\16\ Sherry and Pirone, 82 (citing 10 U.S.C. 331-333).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a unique State-based military force (albeit largely funded by
the Federal Government and trained in accordance with Federal
standards), the National Guard is the only military force shared by the
States and the Federal Government. It is a ready operational force
accessible to the States for both State and combined State and Federal
purposes and to the Federal Government for Federal purposes.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ This paragraph taken in its entirety by permission from
Lowenberg, 1.
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State Active Duty
States are free to employ their National Guard forces under State
control for State purposes and at State expense as provided in the
State's Constitution and statutes. In doing so, Governors, as
commanders-in-chief, can directly access and utilize the Guard's
Federally-assigned aircraft, vehicles, and other equipment so long as
the Federal Government is reimbursed for the use of fungible equipment
and supplies such as fuel, food stocks, etc. This is the authority
under which Governors activate and deploy National Guard forces in
response to floods, earthquakes, wild fires and other natural
disasters. It is also the authority under which Governors deploy
National Guard forces in response to human-caused emergencies such
riots (e.g., World Trade Organization meeting, Seattle, 1999), civil
unrest (e.g., World Bank meeting, District of Columbia, 2000) and
terrorist attacks (e.g., World Trade Center attacks, New York City,
Washington DC and Pennsylvania, September 11, 2001). Unlike active-duty
and Federal military reserve forces such as the Army and Air Force
Reserves, all National Guard personnel and equipment (or so much
thereof as are not already ``Federalized'') are directly accessible to
the Governor in State or local emergencies and as otherwise provided by
State law. Such service is performed in accordance with State law;
National Guard members performing duty at the call of the Governor are
therefore said to be in ``State Active-Duty status'', meaning, among
other things, that command and control rests solely with the Governor
and the State or territorial government. Execution of State active-duty
missions is accomplished by delegation of authority from the Governor
to the adjutant general.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Ibid, 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 32 Duty
The Militia Clause found in Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution also authorizes use of the National Guard under continuing
State control but in the service of the Federal Government to ``execute
the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions''.
These provisions are unique to the National Guard and are the authority
by which Governors answered the President's request for deployment of
National Guard forces to our Nation's airports following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. State-controlled National Guard forces
were deployed by Governors at Federal expense and in compliance with
prescribed Federal operational standards to assure aerial port security
and compliance with Federal inter-State commerce and aviation laws.
Unlike subsequent border security missions (described below), National
Guard forces mobilized within hours and promptly deployed to airports
where they remained under State control for the duration of the 6-month
airport security mission. These arrangements preserved State-level
management of National Guard personnel and assured maximum flexibility
for responding to other unforeseen or emerging State and Federal
requirements.\19\
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\19\ Ibid.
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These and similar domestic military missions have been performed by
the National Guard at various times since September 11, 2001 under the
authority of Title 32, section 502(f) of the United States Code (USC);
National Guard members performing such duty are therefore commonly said
to be serving in ``Title 32 duty status'', meaning, among other things,
that command and control remains with the Governor and the State or
territorial government even though the Guard forces are being employed
``in the service of the United States'' for a primary Federal purpose
or a shared State-Federal purpose.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notwithstanding clear Constitutional authority for these
arrangements (State control of Guard operations having a primary
Federal purpose or a shared State-Federal purpose), DOD officials
frequently questioned the Guard's statutory authority for Title 32
domestic operations. Statutory authority for National Guard training at
Federal expense is clear. The argument, however, was that 32 USC
502(f), which authorizes use of the National Guard at Federal expense
but under continuing State control for ``training or other duty'' is
somehow intended to authorize training only, as opposed to duties such
as military support to civil authorities. Some of these DOD officials
therefore questioned President Bush's request for National Guard Title
32 operational assistance at the Nation's airports in 2001-2002,
subsequent support for Federal border security agencies and other
periodic National Guard assistance to Federal and State civil
authorities. Enactment of 32 USC 901 et. seq., resolved much of this
claimed ambiguity by authorizing the Secretary of Defense to ``provide
funds to a Governor to employ National Guard units or members to
conduct homeland defense activities that the Secretary determines to be
necessary and appropriate.'' See 32 USC 902.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The statute defines ``homeland defense activities'' as activities
``undertaken for the military protection of the territory or domestic
population of the United States, or of the infrastructure or other
assets of the United States determined by the Secretary of Defense as
being critical to National security, from a threat or aggression
against the United States.'' (32 USC 901(1)). The Secretary of Defense
may request domestic use of National Guard forces and fund such
operations (as was done with the Governors' support for airport
security in 2001-2002). ``A Governor of a State may [also] request
funding assistance for the homeland defense activities of the National
Guard of [their] State.'' (32 USC 906). 32 USC 901 et seq. explicitly
authorizes use of the National Guard under continuing State control but
at Federal expense, when approved by the Secretary of Defense, for a
wide variety of operations, including, when appropriate, protection of
oil refineries, nuclear power plants and other critical infrastructure
and responding to catastrophic natural disasters and adaptive human
threats.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Ibid.
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Title 10 Duty
The War Powers Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants the Federal
Government plenary authority to raise military forces and to employ
such forces, including mobilized (sometimes referred to as
``Federalized'') National Guard units, under Federal control and at
Federal expense for National defense purposes. This is the authority
under which the Federal Government mobilizes and deploys National Guard
units and personnel for combat, combat support, and combat service
support missions at home and throughout the world. Such service is
performed under the authority of Title 10 USC; service members
performing such duty are therefore commonly said to be in ``Title 10
duty status'', meaning, among other things, that command and control
rests solely with the President and the Federal Government.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Ibid, 3.
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Since the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Coast Guard Reserves,
like their active-duty counterparts, are Federal military forces wholly
controlled by the Federal Government, they are not directly accessible
by Governors and duty performed by such personnel is always in ``Title
10 status''. When performed within the United States, Title 10 duty
(including Title 10 duty performed by National Guard personnel) is
subject to a number of legal restrictions, including, as stated above,
provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385), which severely
limit the use of Federal military forces in support of domestic law
enforcement operations.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Ibid.
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When employed at home or abroad in Title 10 status, National Guard
forces are stripped of all State control and become indistinguishable
elements of the Federal military force. This was the authority used by
the Federal Government to mobilize and deploy National Guard forces to
augment Federal law enforcement agencies at the Canadian and Mexican
borders in the spring and summer of 2002. In stark contrast to the
speed and efficiency with which Governors deployed National Guard
Soldiers and Airmen to airports (more than 450 airports were secured
within a matter of hours or days), it took more than 6 months for the
DOD to agree to a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Border
Patrol and increased security at our Nation's borders was delayed until
these negotiations and legal arrangements had been finalized.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Ibid.
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Duty Statuses Summarized
Federal and State constitutions and statutes provide the primary
authority for use of military force by the Federal and State
governments. These provisions, in-so-far as they apply to the National
Guard, reflect the Constitutional balance of power between the
sovereign States and the central Federal Government. National Guard
forces are unique among all other military components in that they may
be used in one of three legally distinct ways:
(1) by the Governor for a State purpose authorized by State law
(State Active Duty); or
(2) by the Governor, with the concurrence of the President or the
President's designee (e.g., the Secretary of Defense), for
shared State/Federal purposes or for a primary Federal purpose
(Title 32 Duty); or
(3) by the President for a Federal purpose authorized by Federal
law (Title 10 duty).\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ See Exhibit 3.
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When in State Active-Duty or Title 32 status, National Guard forces
remain under the operational, tactical, and administrative control of
the Governor and the State government. This authority is reposed in the
Governor as commander-in-chief and executed by the adjutant general, as
the State's senior military commander. By contrast, Title 10 military
forces (active-duty, reserve, and ``Federalized'' National Guard
forces) are under the exclusive control of the President and the
Federal Government and are beyond the access, control, or supervision
of the Governor even when operating within his or her State.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the dual-status commander concept
In responding to a complex catastrophe, there is a potential for
confusion in the chain of command between the response initiated at the
State-level National Guard forces, and the Federal active-duty and
reserve forces provided by the DOD for DSCA operations. In reviewing
the responses to modern catastrophes, the first lesson learned to
preserve the respect for civil authorities is establishing a clear
chain of command. Second, coordination and operational unity of effort
between the State and Federal efforts must be maintained. Finally,
imposing multiple voices from different uniformed services on stressed
local, State, and Federal civilian agencies must be avoided.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Ryan Burke and Sue McNeil, Toward a Unified Military Response:
Hurricane Sandy and the Dual-Status Commander (Strategic Studies
Initiative, The U.S. Army War College Press, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania, April 2015), 53-78.
The 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, found in Public Law
112-81, fused earlier legislative efforts from both the Council of
Governors and the DOD to enable individual States and the DOD to
coordinate their efforts through a single commander. The Dual-Status
Commander concept involves a command arrangement that legally
authorizes one military officer, usually a National Guard officer, to
assume simultaneous but mutually exclusive command authority over both
National Guard forces and Title 10 Federal military forces. While State
and Federal military forces maintain separate and distinct chains of
command, the Dual-Status Commander is capable of leading all military
forces and directs their response efforts. This achieves a level of
unity of effort that was unachievable or difficult prior to
implementation of this construct. The unique command architecture of
the Dual-Status Commander respects the various Constitutional and legal
considerations governing the use of military forces in a domestic
capacity. It further alleviates the tension experienced in past
responses between States and the Federal Government during complex
disaster mitigation.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Schumacher, Ludwig J. ``Dual-Status Command for No-Notice
Events: Integrating the Military Response to Domestic Disasters.''
Homeland Security Affairs 7, Article 4 (February 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ultimately, nobody knows a State better than its Governor; the
individual elected by the people and accountable to them during their
time of greatest need. The Governor, working with his or her State
adjutant general, will continue to lead disaster response and recovery
efforts within their State. A dual-status commander allows them to do
it better by ensuring all types of DOD support work together within the
Governor's intent. It allows the President and Secretary of Defense to
bring the weight of unique DOD capabilities and National capacity to
bear when our citizens most need it, and when the interests of the
entire country are at stake. And, it allows U.S. Northern Command to
achieve its vision of working with partners to outpace threats and
support the American people in their times of greatest need.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Gen. Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., and Gen. Frank J. Grass ``Dual-
Status, Single Purpose: A Unified Military Response to Hurricane
Sandy'' http://www.ang.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123339975 (last visited
June 6, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dual-Status Commanders have successfully been employed for multiple
planned events since 2004 and multiple unplanned wildfires and
hurricanes. Most notably, Dual-Status Commanders were used during the
G8 Summit at Sea Island, GA in 2004; at the Republican and Democratic
National Conventions in both 2004 and 2008; and the G20 Summit in
Pittsburgh, PA in 2009. Dual-Status Commanders were also employed for
Hurricane Irene in 2011, the Colorado wildfires in 2012, the Colorado
floods of 2013, Tropical Storm Isaac in 2012, and Hurricane Sandy in
October of 2012.\31\ The Governor for the State of New Jersey, the
Title 10 Commander for US Northern Command, and the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau all heralded the successful use of Dual-Status
Commanders in the response to Hurricane Sandy.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Brig Gen Richard J. Hayes, Jr. ``DOD Response Under the
Stafford Act: A Call to Action.'' (Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 77,
2nd Quarter 2015, St. Louis, Missouri) 84-86.
\32\ Jacoby and Grass.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
considerations for the way forward
Since the deployment of Dual-Status Commanders to both pre-planned,
as well as no-notice/limited-notice incidents, improvements at both the
State and Federal levels can be made. Future modifications must
preserve the authority of a State Governor to manage incidents in the
State and mitigate the risk of failed State and Federal coordination
mechanisms.
Difficulties in Receiving 32 USC 502(f) Authority and Resourcing
The DOD receives--and often denies--requests from States for the
Secretary of Defense to approve 100% DOD-funded operations under 32 USC
502(f).\33\ The current articulated criteria for a 502(f) operation
from the DOD are: (1) Effects of event are catastrophic; (2) the event
is National in character; and/or (3) requires a significant multi-State
National Guard response.\34\ In April of 2012, The DOD's Reserve Forces
Policy Board published its report on New Policies and Clearer Funding
Flows for Reserve Component Operations in the homeland. In this report,
the Reserve Forces Policy Board discussed the denial of requests for
502(f) funding and recommended that the Office of the Secretary of
Defense should collaborate with the National Guard to develop clearer
guidelines and criteria.\35\ This recommendation would provide greater
predictability for State leaders regarding the likelihood of approval
by the Secretary of Defense for State-requested operations under
Section 502(f). Additionally, the Board recommended that the DOD should
work with Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, and the Office of
Management and Budget to clarify in writing the policy for the
reimbursement of the pay of both National Guard and Reserve forces when
assigned missions by the Secretary of Defense for purposes of
conducting disaster relief operations. Specifically, the dialogue
should cover possible revision of 44 CFR 206.8 or the creation of an
agreement in writing between DOD and FEMA regarding reimbursement for
the military pay of National Guard personnel employed for disaster
operations under 32 USC 502(f).\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Maj Gen Arnold L.
Punaro, USMCR (Ret), Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board, Re: Report
of Reserve Forces Policy Board on New Policies and Clearer Funding
Flows for Reserve Component Operations in the Homeland, April 9, 2012.
\34\ Ibid.
\35\ Ibid.
\36\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 10 Awareness of the Dual-Status Commander Construct
Of the noted areas needing improvement, perhaps none is more
important than DSCA education for senior military leaders.\37\ While
there are many subject-matter experts in all things related to defense
support of civil authorities, there appears to be a critical gap in
DSCA knowledge among some senior military commanders. As evidenced by
the failure to follow mission assignment processes and the notable
confusion over the role and authority of the dual-status commander. It
appears that some senior leaders, often with decision-making authority,
lack the required knowledge to ensure their decisions fall within
established legal, financial, and doctrinal barriers of DSCA
operations. The critical triad of DSCA considerations--the legal,
financial, and doctrinal guidelines--were abused during the Sandy
response in New York, in many cases due to a lack of DSCA knowledge
among commanders and their support staffs.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Ibid, 73-74.
\37\ Burke and McNeil, 106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some of the Title 10 active-duty officers who participated in
Hurricane Sandy suggested overturning the National Response Framework
and that prepositioning Title 10 forces was the preferred strategy,
rather than activating National Guard troops through Emergency
Management Assistance Compact and other sourcing mechanisms.\39\
Aggressive posturing of Title 10 forces risks complicating the incident
response framework on multiple levels, including command-and-control
confusion and functional interoperability. A Governor should be able to
enlist the aid of a local Title 10 engineer unit in a flood, but even
the unmatched capabilities found in active-duty units must be applied
in a coordinated fashion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Ibid, 80.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After-Action Reports indicate that U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
commanders were equally unfamiliar with the dual-status commander
construct.\40\ In this case, Title 10 forces attached to Task Force
Pump and in support of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as the lead
Federal agency for Emergency Support Function-3 were assigned missions
beyond the scope of any pre-approved mission assignments for Title 10
forces. Reports suggest that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers personnel
were unaware of certain Title 10 restrictions for Federal military
forces and did not have an effective process in place to facilitate
coordination with the dual-status commander.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Ibid, 74.
\41\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the Marine Corps' arrival on Staten Island resulted
from a series of conversations outside of the established chain of
command and perhaps without consideration for normal Title 10 request
for assistance procedures.\42\ A number of After-Action Reports support
the claim that the commandant of the Marine Corps, through the II
Marine Expeditionary Force commanding general directed the 26th Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) commander to deploy his unit to the USS Wasp
off the coast of New York. The guidance from the commandant instructed
the MEU to: ``Get to New York City, go ashore, do good, and relieve the
suffering that is occurring.''\43\ As a result, without a mission
assignment or notifying the dual-status commander, Marines carried out
their orders and began support efforts on November 4, 2012. Except for
justifying the Marine Corps' arrival on Staten Island as Immediate
Response Authority, the legal basis for the Marines' activity on Staten
Island during Hurricane Sandy remains questionable and ambiguous.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Ibid, 90.
\43\ Ibid, 64.
\44\ Ibid, 95.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impacts of Sequestration and a Reduction in Force on the CBRN Response
The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response
Enterprise is composed of both Title 10 Active-Duty and Title 32
National Guard forces which are divided into State-assigned/resourced
units and teams, and allocated Federal response forces. Forces assigned
to State National Guard command and control include 57 Weapons of Mass
Destruction--Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) with 22 personnel in each,
with one in every State (two in FL, CA, and NY), plus one in the
District of Columbia and each of the U.S. territories within U.S.
Northern Command's area of responsibility. There are also 17 CBRNE
Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs), and 10 Homeland Response
Forces (HRFs). The Federal response force includes the Defense CBRN
Response Force (DCRF) and the Command and Control CBRN Response Element
(C2CRE).\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ LCDR David M. Aliberti, ``Preparing for a Nightmare:
USNORTHCOM's Homeland Defense Mission Against Chemical and Biological
Attack.'' (U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, May 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A review of the different emergency concept plans through the lens
of the National Response Framework, indicates that a Nation's
comprehensive defense strategy and robust capability to manage chemical
and biological events resides primarily with the Title 32 National
Guard forces. In every State, National Guard WMD-CSTs, CERFP, and HRFs
stand ready to deploy at the direction of the Governor to integrate
under the on-scene incident commander in support of the civilian LFA.
Title 10 allocated forces would deploy on U.S. Northern Command's order
to further augment local teams.
Any reduction in force as a result of sequestration must ensure
that this CBRN capability is not diminished in any form. In fact, any
realistic application of sequestration must consider preservation of
the fundamental State ability to respond to CBRN incidents before
divesting Federal DOD capacities from the National Guard. The United
States is strengthened by having 54 individual States and territories
that can handle immediate needs and only seek Federal assistance when
it is truly required.
Future Missions for Homeland Response in Cybersecurity
For all of the same statutory reasons presented, the National Guard
is the most appropriate force to augment community, private business,
and State partners in the event of a cyber-incident affecting the
health and welfare of our citizens necessitating an emergency response.
We should respond in the same manner for these types of incidents
utilizing the existing National Response Framework with the established
protocols in the National Incident Management System. If the event
exceeds State capabilities and first responders are overwhelmed, the
same dual-status commander concept to integrate DOD capabilities into a
coordinated response should be utilized.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, General McGuire. You could join us
here. It sounds like you know the procedures really well.
So, anyway, the Chair will now recognize Mr. Gianato.
STATEMENT OF JIMMY J. GIANATO, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF HOMELAND
SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Gianato. Good morning, Chairman McSally, Ranking Member
Payne, Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for holding this
hearing this morning on the important topic of military
assistance and disaster response.
Today I am pleased to represent the National Emergency
Management Association as the legislative committee chairman
and Region III vice president. I am also the director of the
West Virginia Division of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management.
Effective collaboration between emergency management
agencies and the military is crucial if we want to see
successful responses to disasters. In West Virginia, we are
very fortunate to have had great success working with our
National Guard.
One of the most prominent examples of this has been our
collaboration on the National Boy Scout Jamboree, which is a
unique event held at the Summit Bechtel Reserve in rural
Fayette County, West Virginia. This gathering of approximately
45,000 Scouts, leaders, and staff over the course of 10 days in
the summer happens every 4 years.
Given the size of West Virginia, it is a monumental task to
handle the logistics, security, and operational support for
such a major event. One of our challenges with the Jamboree was
obtaining and managing resources for an event of that magnitude
while still sustaining the ability to respond to any other
disaster or emergency that occurred at that same time.
To accomplish the cooperation required to manage the
Jamboree and other events, West Virginia developed a Joint
Interagency Task Force, or JIATF, at the direction of Governor
Tomblin in 2010. The Governor appointed me as the lead for that
task force and the adjutant general of the National Guard to
serve as the co-lead. A senior leader from the Governor's also
office served as his liaison to the task force.
Not only did the task force work exceptionally well for the
Jamboree, it was also successfully implemented during responses
to a derecho that impacted our State and Hurricane Sandy, both
of which created major power outages and infrastructure
challenges for the State.
Within minutes of the derecho moving through West Virginia,
53 of our 55 counties were without power. The State had to
quickly make decisions on how it would handle power
restoration. After a discussion among the JIATF leadership,
FEMA, and consultation with the Governor, West Virginia elected
to use a capability developed by the West Virginia National
Guard to support this mission in a cost-effective and efficient
way. Such collaboration resulted with the State being able to
manage its own power restoration capabilities at a significant
cost savings.
Of course, West Virginia is not the only State to see such
successful collaboration. In North Carolina, the North Carolina
Department of Emergency Management was able to take advantage
of the National Guard cybersecurity team to evaluate its IT
architecture. They conducted a detailed study that identified
several areas of improvement. This mission was conducted
expertly and efficiently at a low cost.
The State of Washington has also built a successful
partnership, as was seen during the deployment of the National
Guard during flooding and the mudslides that occurred last
year. The National Guard assisted the State's donations manager
by supporting the movement of commodities, staffing warehouses,
and assisting with the distribution of food.
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact has played an
important role in facilitating collaboration among States and
enabling them to share National Guard assets. EMAC provides a
legal and procedural mechanism whereby emergency response
resources can quickly move throughout the country, which
lessens the need for Federal resources.
During Hurricane Sandy, for example, a helicopter crew was
sent to New Jersey and staging and warehouse operations
personnel were sent to New York. More recently, during the
historic snowstorms in Massachusetts this past winter, Maine
and Vermont provided Massachusetts with front-end loaders and
dump trucks for snow removal. Just a few weeks ago, Louisiana
provided helicopters and crews to Texas to assist with water
rescue activities after floods hit the State.
The use of dual-status command is another development that
has played an important role to strengthening the unity of
effort and overall coordination. As I mentioned earlier, the
use of the dual-status command at the National Boy Scout
Jamboree enabled effective coordination and integration and
kept the operational control of the military units at that
event under the control of the Governor, who consequently was
able to retain control over the response.
Colorado has also successfully used a dual-status commander
in several instances, including its 2013 floods, 2012
wildfires, and the 2014 Black Forest fires.
If we hope to see effective response to disasters, we must
involve the whole community. One of the key partnerships in the
whole community is between emergency management agencies and
the National Guard.
Going forward, States must continue to look for
opportunities to improve collaboration among emergency
managers, the National Guard, and Federal forces. One method
for doing this is the creation of formal mechanisms as we did
with the JIATF.
Further, we need to continue to support EMAC. It has been
invaluable in deploying National Guard assets throughout the
country. We also need to continue support for the dual-status
command, which has greatly promoted coordination in FEMA grant
programs such as the Emergency Management Performance Grants,
which have built and strengthened State capabilities.
I thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and look
forward to answering any of your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gianato follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jimmy J. Gianato
June 10, 2015
introduction
Thank you Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of
the subcommittee for holding this hearing today. As director of the
West Virginia Division of Homeland Security & Emergency Management and
a regional vice president of NEMA, which represents the State emergency
management directors of the 50 States, territories, and District of
Columbia, I am pleased to be here to discuss the role of the military
in disaster response and how emergency managers and the military work
together.
As you know, emergency management is a ``whole community''
endeavor. It involves the public sector, the private sector, voluntary
organizations, and individual citizens--all of whom are crucial to
preparing for disasters and responding to and recovering from them. The
National Guard and the military are an important part of the whole
community and play a key role in efforts to address disasters, largely
by supporting State and local responses. In my testimony this morning,
I will focus on key lessons learned concerning how emergency managers
and the military can work together effectively. Specifically, I will
discuss the importance of collaboration, the value of the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact, and the dual-status command.
lessons learned
Partnerships Have Been Effective in West Virginia
More than anything else, effective collaboration between emergency
management agencies and the military is crucial if we want to see
successful responses to disasters. In West Virginia, we are very
fortunate to have had great success working with the National Guard.
One of the most prominent examples of this has been our collaboration
on the National Boy Scout Jamboree, which is a unique event held at the
Summit Bechtel Reserve in rural Fayette County, West Virginia. This
gathering of approximately 45,000 scouts, leaders, and staff, over the
course of 10 days in the summer, happens every 4 years. Given the size
of West Virginia, it is a monumental task to handle the logistics,
security, and operational support of such a major event.
The Jamboree has posed some distinct challenges. Most
significantly, the State needed to develop the resources for the
Jamboree while also maintaining the capability to respond to and
recover from any other disaster or emergency that could occur at the
same time. It was obvious that coordination and collaboration with the
National Guard were going to be crucial to making this happen. In 2010,
Governor Earl Ray Tomblin brought together key members of his emergency
response team and directed them to develop a construct that could be
easily adapted to handle the Jamboree, as well as any major disaster
that could affect the State. We subsequently adopted the concept of a
Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) to develop the necessary planning
and response capabilities.
The Governor appointed me to lead the JIATF and the adjutant
general of the National Guard to serve as the co-leader. In addition, a
senior leader from the Governor's office served as the liaison for the
Governor to the JIATF. The JIATF included Department of Defense assets
from the active-duty, reserve, and National Guard. These military
elements served under a dual status, West Virginia National Guard
Brigadier General who reported to and supported the JIATF. Utilizing
the dual-status command kept the operational control of the military
units at the National Boy Scout Jamboree under the control of the
civilian leadership and allowed the Governor to retain control of the
response to the event.
We successfully implemented the JIATF in 2012 during responses to a
derecho and Hurricane Sandy. Both events created major power outages
and infrastructure challenges for the State. For example, within
minutes of the derecho moving through West Virginia, 53 of the 55
counties were without power. This included numerous water and sewer
systems, hospitals and nursing homes, as well as many other types of
critical infrastructure and retail facilities. Much of the power
infrastructure was significantly damaged, and repairs took weeks to
finish. This left the State with shortages of water, ill-functioning
sewer systems, off-line gas stations, and many big box retailers that
were unable to open. The State had to quickly make key decisions as to
how it would handle power restoration and provide supplemental power to
many of these facilities. After discussion among the JIATF leadership,
FEMA, and consultation with the Governor, West Virginia elected to use
a capability developed by the West Virginia National Guard to support
this mission in a cost-effective and efficient way. Such collaboration
resulted in the State being able to manage its own power restoration
capability.
Collaboration Has Been Invaluable in a Number of States
Of course, West Virginia is not the only State to see such
successful collaboration. Florida, for example, has seen a number of
instances over the years. These include the Republican National
Convention in 2012; the Annual All-Hazards Coordination Workshop; the
FEMA Region IV Defense Coordinating Officers Defense Support to Civil
Authorities Conference; State-wide annual hurricane conferences and
exercises; the Annual United States Army Corps of Engineer, South
Atlantic Division, Hurricane Rehearsal of Concept Drill; and Vigilant
Guard 2013, which included Title 32 Forces, Title 10 forces, and dual-
status commanders. Florida's efforts have not been without their
challenges, however. They have found that there are numerous ``common
operating pictures'' at the local, State, and Federal level that do not
communicate interchangeably. This frequently creates gaps in response
and recovery.
Similarly, North Carolina has also taken a number of steps to
promote collaboration. For example, the Department of Emergency
Management invites a North Carolina National Guard Domestic Operations
officer to attend the weekly staff meetings in an effort to enhance
coordination. Moreover, the Department of Emergency Management and
National Guard work together on the State's Helo-Aquatic Rescue Team.
The National Guard provides helicopters, along with pilots and
aircrews, while the Department of Emergency Management coordinates the
provision of local responders to serve as highly-skilled rescue
technicians. In order to maintain the team's abilities at a high level,
the Department of Emergency Management conducts monthly training. They
are called out frequently during the summer months to rescue climbers
in western North Carolina. Further, in April and May of this year, the
Department of Emergency Management was able to take advantage of the
National Guard Cybersecurity Team to evaluate its IT Architecture. They
conducted a detailed study that identified several areas of
improvement. This mission was conducted expertly and efficiently at a
low cost. The team provided the Department of Emergency Management with
a checklist to improve its IT infrastructure.
The State of Washington has built a successful partnership as well,
as was seen during the deployment of the National Guard during flooding
and the mudslide that occurred last year. The National Guard assisted
the State's donations manager by supporting the movement of
commodities, staffing the warehouses, and assisting with the
distribution of food. In addition, personnel from the military
department provided transportation to and from school for children in
communities isolated by the landslide. This made it possible for the
children to stay on pace with the curriculum and to graduate on time.
The National Guard also provided helicopters that supported movement of
critical resources and movement of recovered human remains. Teams from
the Washington Homeland Response Force and Colorado National Guard
supported local responders as they uncovered the remains and delivered
them to the medical examiner.
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact Facilitates Working
Together
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) has played an
important role in facilitating collaboration among States and enabling
them to share National Guard assets. When States and the U.S.
territories joined together and Congress ratified EMAC (Pub. L. 104-
321) in 1996, it created a legal and procedural mechanism whereby
emergency response resources such as Urban Search and Rescue Teams
could quickly move throughout the country to meet disaster needs. All
50 States, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto
Rico, and Guam are members of EMAC and have committed their emergency
resources in helping one another during times of disaster or emergency.
Since its ratification by Congress, EMAC has grown significantly in
size, volume, and the types of resources States are able to deploy. For
example, over 67,000 personnel from a variety of disciplines deployed
through EMAC to the Gulf Coast in response to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, and 12,279 personnel deployed to Texas and Louisiana during
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. More recent uses of EMAC have included the
response for the manhunt in Pennsylvania, severe weather in
Mississippi, wildfires in Washington, tropical storms in Hawaii, and
the historic snowstorms in Massachusetts. National Guard assets are
often deployed through EMAC. During Hurricane Sandy, for example, a
helicopter and crew were sent to New Jersey, and staging and warehouse
operations personnel were sent to New York, among other things. During
its 2013 flooding, Colorado received search-and-rescue assistance, as
well as road work repair assistance. More recently, during the
snowstorms in Massachusetts mentioned earlier, Maine and Vermont
provided Massachusetts with front-end loaders and dump trucks for snow
removal, and just a few weeks ago, Louisiana provided helicopters and
crews to Texas to assist with water rescue activities after floods hit
the State. EMAC has made it easier for States to assist each other
effectively and share National Guard assets--with the added benefit of
lessening the need for Federal resources in the process.
In addition to deploying throughout the country through EMAC, the
National Guard works with EMAC members to improve the system. For
example, in an effort to better integrate mutual aid partners before a
disaster into the EMAC system, an EMAC Advisory Group was established.
The group includes representatives from State and local government
associations, the National Guard Bureau, emergency responder
associations, public utility associations, the private sector, DHS/
FEMA, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The
discussions and interactions of this group have assisted in
incorporating local government assets into the EMAC system for a
unified response.
The Dual-Status Command Has Been a Success
The creation of the dual-status command has been an important
development over the past few years. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina,
policymakers realized that the separate chains of command for State and
Federal military forces had made coordination difficult and contributed
to the shortcomings of the response. In the years that followed,
policymakers developed the dual-status command, which allows a single
National Guard officer, responsible to the Governor of the affected
State, to simultaneously direct both State (Title 32) and Federal
(Title 10) military forces to ensure coordination during emergency
response. This occurs with the consent of the Governor and
authorization of the President. Ideally, it greatly strengthens unity
of effort, a keystone of the National Incident Management System, and
reduces the kinds of coordination problems seen during the response to
Katrina.
The emergency management community has had great success with the
dual-status command and shown that it is an effective way to operate
and provide the appropriate command and control of all military forces
during a response. Significantly, these forces remain under the control
of the Governor--who has the ultimate responsibility for public safety
of the State's citizens. Since 2004, 25 dual-status commanders have
been appointed, and of those, 16 have had Title 10 forces assigned. In
2013, four States requested dual-status commanders for real-world
events. Two of those received Title 10 forces, including the National
Boy Scout Jamboree in West Virginia.
As I mentioned earlier, the use of the dual-status command at the
Jamboree enabled effective coordination and integration and kept the
operational control of the military units at the event under the
control of the Governor--who consequently was able to retain control
over the response to the event. Another successful use of the dual-
status command was seen at the 2012 Republican National Convention in
Florida. During this special National security event, Tropical Storm
Isaac wreaked havoc on the convention schedule and interrupted travel
plans of many of the estimated 50,000 delegates, media, and others
planning to attend. The use of dual-status command greatly facilitated
coordination and enabled the State to respond more effectively to a
very challenging incident.
Colorado has also successfully used a dual-status commander in
several instances--including its 2013 floods, 2012 wildfires, and the
2013 Black Forest fires--and its use promoted effective coordination
and response. Further, the outstanding relationships between the State,
FEMA Region VIII, the FEMA Region VIII Defense Coordinating Officer,
the Colorado National Guard, and the Department of Defense facility
commanders in the State facilitated the seamless initiation of disaster
requests, transition of command, and effective coordination. While each
of these disasters had severe consequences--such as fatalities, damaged
and destroyed infrastructure, and environmental damage--each would have
been worse without the missions completed by the Colorado National
Guard and Department of Defense assets. Training for State emergency
management and military personnel concerning defense support to civil
authorities has been invaluable, helping to familiarize them with
relevant capabilities and procedures, as well as strengthening
important relationships.
conclusion
If we hope to see effective responses to disasters, we must involve
the whole community, and one of the key partnerships in the whole
community is between emergency management agencies and the National
Guard. In West Virginia, we have had great success in strengthening
this partnership, and other States have as well. As a result, these
States are better prepared to respond to and recover from disasters.
Going forward, States must continue to look for opportunities to
improve collaboration among emergency managers, the National Guard, and
Federal forces. One method for doing this is the creation of formal
mechanisms, as we did with the JIATF in West Virginia. But as Florida,
North Carolina, Washington, and Colorado show, there are other ways as
well. Further, we need to continue to support EMAC. It has been
invaluable in deploying National Guard assets throughout the country
and enabling States to support each other more effectively,
consequently reducing the need for Federal resources. We also need to
continue to support the dual-status command, which has greatly promoted
coordination, and FEMA's grant programs, such as the Emergency
Management Performance Grant, which have built and strengthened State
capabilities.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify today and welcome any
questions you may have.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Gianato.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Gaynor for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF PETER T. GAYNOR, DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OFFICE, STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
Mr. Gaynor. Good morning, Chairman McSally, Ranking Member
Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is a
pleasure to be here today to discuss the State of Rhode
Island's long and on-going partnership with our National Guard.
Again, my name is Pete Gaynor. I am the director of the State
Emergency Management in the State of Rhode Island.
As the director and a professional emergency manager, I am
responsible for preparing for emergencies, coordinating the
activation and use of resources, ensuring an integrated and
unified response, and managing the recovery effort in order to
support our local, State governments, citizens, and businesses.
I am pleased to be testifying before the committee today
and have submitted my full statement to the committee, which I
ask be made part of the hearing record.
Today with this testimony I want to provide the
subcommittee with information on the long-standing history of
cooperation and partnership between our State government and
the Army and Air Guard forces based in our State. I hope to
give you a sense of how we in Rhode Island have coalesced to
make our State safer, more secure, and more resilient against a
host of natural and man-made hazards.
Additionally, I would like to highlight the challenges and
opportunities we face in addressing the growing cyber threat.
The Rhode Island National Guard consists of about 3,300
members. Most of its members are residents of Rhode Island and
neighboring States.
Under State law, the National Guard provides protection of
life and property, preserves the peace and order and public
safety. The Rhode Island National Guard has served and remains
engaged in the global war on terror and overseas contingency
operations with units that have deployed world-wide in direct
support of National security objectives.
Within the State of Rhode Island, the Guard is consistently
called upon in disasters by the Governor to provide military
support to civil authorities during local emergencies, National
disasters, and significant severe weather events. The Rhode
Island National Guard provides a unique role with a distinct
local response mission. They are our neighbors. They are our
citizen soldiers.
Since 2010, the Rhode Island National Guard has activated
over 1,750 citizen soldiers to respond to numerous natural
disasters and events while simultaneously deploying over 1,400
individuals to overseas assignments. Specific events at home
consist of the 2010 March floods, Hurricane Irene in 2011,
Hurricane Sandy in 2013, the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013,
and the winter blizzards of 2013 and 2015. They all required
National Guard personnel and equipment.
Compared to the previous 50 years, the Rhode Island
National Guard activation over the last 5 years for State
emergencies has increased over 200 percent. Emergency
management requires a team effort from all facets of our
community to assist with the response and recovery, from
citizens preparing to be on their own for the first 72 hours of
an emergency, to electrical and gas providers teaming up with
us in our State emergency operations center, State departments
such as the Department of Transportation providing sand and
salt to communities in need, and then our National Guardsmen
providing law enforcement support during special events. We
simply require the whole community to be successful to navigate
a crisis or one of these special events.
Again, the Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency is only
one part of the State's emergency management team. We must
leverage all the resources of our collective team in preparing
for, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from all
hazards. Collectively, we must all meet the needs of the entire
community in each of these areas.
The National Guard is a unique and indispensable force
multiplier in preparedness efforts and during times of need,
from providing expert training and exercise support or in the
movement of dispensing commodities to local communities or
providing technical assistance in our cyber initiative. The
National Guard is ready, reliable, and a diverse force,
accessible for State, multi-State, and Federal purposes.
Cybersecurity is an emerging role, requiring a synchronized
and holistic approach, not unlike the counter-drug mission or
the CBRN, or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
forces. Cyber and cyber defense are emerging roles for the
National Guard, in partnership with local, State, and Federal
agencies, and businesses, requiring updated and new laws to
mitigate and prevent network attacks from domestic and foreign
players.
This is a new paradigm in consequence management. Hacking
into infrastructure nodes such as power grids,
telecommunications sites, financial institutions can be as
devastating as a hurricane or a blizzard.
In conclusion, the cohesive partnership between the civil
authorities and the National Guard is instrumental in life
safety and the protection of our citizens. This partnership
enhances our ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover
from disasters and assists in defending the United States
against increasing cyber attacks and acts of terrorism.
We look forward to working with our partner and continuing
our mission to reduce loss of life and property in disasters,
to protect our State's critical infrastructure from all hazards
by means of comprehensive emergency management policies, and
legislative initiatives.
Chairwoman McSally and subcommittee Members, thank you for
the opportunity to be here today. I stand ready to answer any
questions you may have about our partnership with the Rhode
Island National Guard.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gaynor follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter T. Gaynor
June 10, 2015
Good morning Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear
before you today to discuss the State of Rhode Island's long and on-
going partnership with our National Guard. My name is Pete Gaynor and I
am the director of emergency management in the State of Rhode Island.
As the director and a professional emergency manager, I am responsible
for preparing for emergencies, coordinating the activation and use of
resources, ensuring an integrated and unified response, and managing
the recovery effort in support of our local and State governments,
citizens, and businesses.
I am pleased to be testifying before the subcommittee today. I have
submitted my full statement to the committee, which I ask be made part
of the hearing record.
Today, with this testimony, I want to provide the subcommittee with
information on the long-standing history of cooperation and partnership
between our State government and the Army and Air National Guard forces
based in our State. I hope to give you a sense of how we in Rhode
Island have coalesced to make our State safer, more secure, and more
resilient against a host of natural and man-made hazards. Additionally,
I would like to highlight the challenges and opportunities we face in
addressing the growing cyber threat.
The Rhode Island National Guard consists of more than 3,300
members. Most of its members are residents of Rhode Island and
neighboring States. Under State law, the National Guard provides
protection of life and property and preserves peace, order, and public
safety. The Rhode Island Guard has served and remains engaged in the
Global War on Terror and Overseas Contingency Operations, with units
that have deployed world-wide in direct support of National security
objectives.
Within the State of Rhode Island, the Guard is inconsistently
called upon in disasters by the Governor to provide military support to
civil authorities during local emergencies, natural disasters, and
significant severe weather events. The Rhode Island National Guard
provides a unique role with a distinct local response mission. They are
our neighbors, they are our citizen soldiers.
Since 2010, the Rhode Island National Guard has activated over
1,750 citizen soldiers to respond to numerous natural disasters and
events while simultaneously deploying over 1,400 individuals in four
company-sized units overseas. Specific events such as the 2010 March
floods, Hurricane Irene 2011, Hurricane Sandy 2013, the Boston Marathon
bombing in 2013 and the winter blizzards of 2013 and 2015 all required
Rhode Island National Guard personnel and equipment. Compared to the
previous 50 years, Rhode Island National Guard activation over last 5
years for State emergencies has increased over 200 percent.
Emergency Management requires a team effort from all facets of our
community to assist with response and recovery. From citizens preparing
to be on their own for the first 72 hours of an emergency, to
electrical and gas providers teaming up with us in the State Emergency
Operations Center, State departments, such as the Department of
Transportation providing sand and salt to local communities in need,
and our National Guardsman providing law enforcement support during
special events. We simply require the whole community to help
successfully navigate a crisis or special event.
The Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency is only one part of
our State's emergency management team; we must leverage all of the
resources of our collective team in preparing for, protecting against,
responding to, recovering from, and mitigating against all hazards;
collectively we must meet the needs of the entire community in each of
these areas. The U.S. Armed Forces and National Guard have a historic
precedent and enduring role in supporting civil authorities during
times of emergency, and this role is codified in the National defense
strategy.
The National Guard is a unique and indispensable force multiplier
in preparedness efforts and during times of need, from providing expert
training and exercise support in the movement and dispensing of
commodities to local communities to providing technical assistance to
our Cyber Initiative. The National Guard is a ready, reliable, and
diverse force accessible for State, multi-State, and Federal purposes.
Typical State active-duty missions include Security, Traffic
Control, Evacuation, Search and Rescue, Civil Disturbance Control, Fire
Protection & Fighting, Natural Disaster Relief, Debris Clearance and
Emergency Response & Recovery efforts.
Our Civil Support Team (CST), a high-tech hazardous response and
monitoring team works hand-in-hand with local, State, and Federal
agencies in all mass-gathering events such as the recently-concluded
2015 Volvo Ocean Race in Newport, Rhode Island. The Rhode Island
National Guard continues to be called upon during winter storms,
flooding, and hurricanes. The National Guard spectrum of support
includes a Cyber Defense Team that provided network security support
for the Presidential Inauguration in 2013.
Cybersecurity is an emerging role requiring a synchronized and
holistic approach. Not unlike the counter drug mission or the Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives (CBRNE) forces, the CBRNE
Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP), and the Homeland Response
Force (HRF); cybersecurity and cyber defense are emerging roles for the
National Guard in partnership with local, State, Federal agencies and
businesses requiring updated or new laws to mitigate and prevent
network attacks from domestic and foreign players. This is a new
paradigm in consequence management; hacking into critical
infrastructure nodes such as power grids, telecommunications sites, or
financial institutions can be as devastating to the public as a
hurricane or blizzard.
conclusion
The cohesive partnership between civilian authorities and the
National Guard is instrumental in life safety and the protection our
citizens. This partnership enhances our ability to prepare for, respond
to, and recover from disasters and assists in defending the United
States against increasing cyber attacks and acts of terrorism.
As challenges continue to evolve, we must continue to adjust and
shape our emergency management and homeland security strategy and
enhance our whole-community concept. In the State of Rhode Island, the
National Guard has proven its value time and time again. Its relentless
commitment and dedication to serve and protect is unmatched.
We look forward to working with our partner and continuing our
mission to reduce the loss of life and property in disasters, and to
protect our State's critical infrastructure from all hazards by means
of comprehensive emergency management policies and legislative
initiatives.
Thank you, Chairman McSally and subcommittee Members, for the
opportunity to appear before you today. I stand ready to answer any
questions you might have.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Gaynor.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes to ask questions.
General McGuire, with your experience and listening to the
other panel, I would like your unique perspective on any gaps
in structure and procedures in planning related to this mission
and specifically the role of the National Guard.
I am just thinking about it. It is all local. So I am
thinking a disaster or crisis happens in southern Arizona. My
assumption would be Governor Ducey would first be looking to
use the capabilities that you have in the Guard and then, if it
exceeds that capability, perhaps the disaster be declared and
then you would be under Title 32. Then the next level would be,
you know, Title 10 forces also supporting.
So my assumption is that Davis-Monthan and Fort Huachuca
forces would be the next ones that would be asked to
potentially support. Because, just like you, they live in the
community, they are familiar with the community, they
understand the dynamics there.
Is that a valid assumption? Are there table-top discussions
within sort-of geographic regions to be able to make sure that
the proper understanding of roles and responsibilities would
happen or is that all being done at kind of the FEMA regional
levels and, you know, Colonel Meger, the DM commander, and
General Ashley at Fort Huachuca would just sort of have to do a
pick-up game with their forces in the event of a disaster or a
response within southern Arizona?
General McGuire. So let me start with the etymology of a
disaster question, and I will go back to the gaps thing.
So as the State emergency manager, what would happen if we
had a major event in southern Arizona is that there would be an
incident command stood up under the National Incident
Management System and every asset delivered from the State
would be in support of that incident command.
When the resources were exhausted in southern Arizona, that
would go to the county level. Let's say it is in Pima County.
Once Pima County has been overwhelmed, they direct the resource
request to the State.
Coincident to that, the Governor is making, in consultation
with me, a decision about whether or not to declare a state of
emergency. If a state of emergency is declared in Arizona--and
I will talk specifically about our case--we have, by statute,
legislatively set aside $4 million for a State emergency fund.
Those funds could be used to call guardsmen immediately to
duty under State Active-Duty provisions. As the resource meter
begins to run--and it is not just for the Guard. It could be
for overtime for neighboring county sheriffs or whatever we
believe is the best resource to deliver.
As that is evolving, the Federal bases--Fort Huachuca,
Davis-Monthan, Luke Air Force Base, anybody in the affected
area--those are seen at the State level as community partners.
So in a State like Georgia, where you have Fort Benning and
Moody Air Force Base and all these installations, they are
community partners in our communities, and we look to them to
see if there is any mutual aid compacts.
But the answer to your question about--once we believe
there is going to be a Stafford Act invoked, we work through
the DCO at FEMA Region IX. We have very--what I would call
well-codified paths about how to respond or get response from
the Federal authorities.
I am not a NORTHCOM guy, but my observation is they don't
link back capabilities to a region. So if an engineering
battalion is not available at Fort Huachuca and the closest one
is at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, that is where they are going
to come from.
So, really, we look at the airmen and soldiers at that base
as citizens of Arizona in terms of providing life, limb,
protection of property. Unless they have a specific capacity
that is needed by the incident management system, they are not
necessarily part of the response unless the incident happens at
their installation. Then you get into a situation where you
could have a dual-status commander that is a Title 10 guy. So
that is how that works.
Do you want me to talk about the gaps?
Ms. McSally. Yeah. Absolutely. The gaps, if you could, from
your perspective and knowledge.
General McGuire. So the gaps I think goes a little bit to
the Representative from Rhode Island's question about--we just
had last week in Arizona a State-wide emergency exercise with a
focus on cyber.
This is the best way I can crystallize that 1-day exercise,
that a cyber attack or a cyber incident only becomes an
emergency when there is a kinetic impact on the citizens. So
you have lost power, wastewater. There is inability to support
continuity of Government. Police and fire is affected so we can
no longer respond. Hospitals are shut down.
Those types of events, invariably, we have found are a
result of some nefarious act, which goes to the idea of why the
Guard is uniquely situated to be what I call the defensive and
restorative force.
Because when we run those drills in Arizona, we can deal
with the National Cyber Incident Center, the NCIC and DHS, and
all the lead Federal law enforcement agents to help us with
that. But what we find in Arizona is we lack the manpower to
literally go out and do the restorative mission.
We have also found that, when we do these exercises,
invariably we are going to run into Posse Comitatus issues if
we use Title 10 forces to do that because there will be
exculpatory evidence discovered as a result of that action that
more than likely will make forensic discovery of who committed
this act inadmissible at least in our court system, where, if
we use a Guardsman under Title 32 or Title 10, we are, for lack
of a better term, a good manpower pool that is tied to the tech
industry in Arizona--Intel, Microsoft, whatever--Guardsmen are
there that can come in and do that, discover that, and then
turn it over to Federal, State, and local law enforcement
folks.
I have never heard before today that there is an
involvement of U.S. Cyber Command taking the lead for any kind
of a Federal disaster inside the continental United States. So
I think that DOD should come back and explain that.
Ms. McSally. Yeah. We need to follow up on that. That was
alarming as well. I am out of my time. Perhaps we can have
another round here. But I want to give everybody an opportunity
here.
So the Chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin--I am sorry--Mrs.
Watson Coleman. I am sorry. I was looking right past you. I
didn't mean to. So, please.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for
being here.
Major General McGuire, the unpredictable Federal budget
process of recent years, coupled with sequestration, has taken
a toll on important programs across the Federal Government.
Components even within Federal agencies are competing for
limited dollars, resulting in robbing Peter to pay Paul. This
approach is even evident in the Department of Defense.
Can you talk about how the lack of predictability and
uncertainty surrounding the Federal appropriations process,
coupled with the reduced budgets, has affected the National
Guard's readiness to fulfill its domestic response mission?
General McGuire. Yes, ma'am. The unpredictability and the
nature of the continuing resolutions and operating on sequester
budgets has made it difficult on all components of the DOD. In
my role as a State cabinet secretary receiving resources from
the State, we have seen cuts in those areas affect our ability
to get formations ready.
That said, when you talk about domestic response, I often
ask my Army subordinate commanders, ``What is the Army military
specialty for filling sandbags?'' There isn't one. Really, what
I look at is the unique capability of our soldiers, and this is
why I am so passionate about the idea of indiscriminate cuts to
end strength in the Guard.
In a resource-constrained environment, the most cost-
effective force, the most embedded force forward, to protect
our most valuable resource, our citizen--why in a resource-
constrained environment we wouldn't holistically look at how
can we best build a force in a resource-constrained environment
that can meet the expeditionary National security strategy to
fight wars, yet maintain a huge base of trained and ready M-Day
or drill-status Reserve-status Guardsmen in our States that can
be called forward?
So our military commanders are doing very well in terms of
maintaining the morale of the citizen soldiers and airmen. They
are excited about the missions that they do. I haven't yet seen
huge losses in attrition as a result of declining dollars.
But I do see that weapons system modernization and some of
the things that need to happen as a result of Federal
priorities--those things that aren't happening will eventually
take a toll. But in terms of our ability to meet citizens'
requirements right now, there has been no wavering in that.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Sort-of to drill down on a particular issue, could you
discuss the impact of this on CBRN capabilities specifically?
General McGuire. So my example in my written statement
about the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear response
force.
So post-9/11 there were similar, I think, type hearings. We
talked about the idea that we have prepositioned people that
could serve in State Active-Duty Title 32 or Title 10 statuses,
and wouldn't that be a convenient place for us to station those
response forces?
So there was deliberate decisions made to move 80 percent
of the 18,000 that Mr. Salesses referred to. Eighty percent of
that capacity is in the National Guard. So, of those 18,000
MOS-trained specialists that are resident in the Guard, my
comment to this subcommittee is to say that any cut to the
Guard needs to evaluate how that 18,000-man force is affected
in the force structure changes that they make.
While this subcommittee doesn't have the necessary purview
of HASC and HAC-D, it still affects everything we do with
homeland response. So that was the reason for those comments in
my written statement.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. McSally. The good news is both myself and Mr. Langevin
are on the Armed Services Committee as well. So we can bring
these perspectives to our work on that other committee.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Loudermilk from Georgia.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
General, I want to ask you the same question that I asked
the previous panel about DOD Instruction 2025.22. The gentleman
answered the question by saying there was no changes made to
that DOD instruction, only just codifying procedures that was
already there.
How would you answer that same question? What changes has
the Department of Defense made to pre-established procedures in
DODI 3025.22 and how do they affect the Governor's ability to
request authorization to use National Guard forces for Title 32
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) purposes?
Additionally, what changes to preestablished procedures have
been made, and what is the effect?
General McGuire. I am unfamiliar with pre-established
procedures. But my reading of it would indicate that it makes
it at least appear procedurally more difficult for a Governor
to request authorization for Title 32 resources in an event
where he believes there is going to be a Federal nexus, either
a Federal declaration or a multi-State or a Federal interest,
in our case, like the Southern Border with Mexico.
It doesn't prohibit the Governor from going directly to the
Secretary of Defense to request additional Title 32 dollars
under 502(f), a provision that was well scrutinized after 9/11
and one that I think is really critical.
As we mirror that against the comment that the Chairman
made about AFRICOM and the HADR, Humanitarian Assistance
Disaster Relief, it is my observation, having just finished up
CAPSTONE just a few weeks ago, this Goldwater-Nichols Act-
required course, that the comment would be that, of my 48
classmates, there is a huge dearth of knowledge that there is
even a Federal statute called Title 32 and an authorization
that exists in such a way where we can deliver Federal
resources to the State and maintain command and control under
the Governor as commander-in-chief.
The more we push that out of the equation and make it
either a Title 10 answer or a State Active-Duty solution, you
start to make the burden very arduous for the State to power up
jet aircraft to do surveillance or helicopter and rotary wing.
I wouldn't categorize it as that there was a change. But
when you read it to someone who is not familiar with it--there
was a comment made about it is very complex--it doesn't
specifically say in there, sure, the Governor can always go VFR
direct.
I think that was intentionally written in the language so
that it didn't say that. Does that make sense? That is my
opinion. But I wasn't part of that DOD panel that created it. I
can certainly look into it more and get back to you in more
detail.
[The information follows:]
Historically, Governors have communicated directly with the
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), the Chief of National Guard Bureau
(CNGB), and even the White House to request Title 32 authorization for
National Guard DSCA missions. As recognized by the National Response
Framework, Governors are the individuals that possess the greatest
situational awareness in a State-based disaster and the Constitutional
and statutory responsibility for public safety and welfare within their
sovereign States.\1\ Title 32 status has traditionally been used in
preparing for and responding to domestic emergencies, such as Hurricane
Katrina in 2005 and Hurricanes Ike & Gustav in 2008, and for National
Special Security Events such as the Democratic and Republican National
Conventions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework,
Second Edition (May 2013) 13, available at http://www.fema.gov/
national-response-framework.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The authors of DODI 3025.22, however, all but eliminated the
Governor from the process. For example, Paragraph 3(f) of DODI 3025.22
states: ``The use of the National Guard for DSCA will not be approved
to: (1) Perform DSCA operations or missions at the direct request to
DOD of a State or local civil authority . . . '' (emphasis added).
Instead of the Governor of the affected State, DODI 3025.22 vests the
authority to recommend the use of National Guard forces in Title 32
status in ``the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
America's Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)), as the principal civilian
advisor for DSCA . . . ''. This constitutes an unprecedented doctrinal
shift of authority from the Governors, i.e. the commanders-in-chief of
the States to non-military DOD appointees. The Governors of the
sovereign States are now relegated to simply providing their
``concurrence'' to the use of their National Guard forces. Of course,
it is inconceivable that any Governor faced with a disaster in his or
her State would withhold his or her concurrence and the Governor's
authority to concur is, therefore, merely symbolic in practice. DODI
3025.22 improperly removes the well-established role of the State's
Governor in this critical dialogue with the Federal Government.
There are other areas of concern in DODI 3025.22. For example,
paragraph 3(a) should be amended to recognize the CNGB's role as the
principal military advisor for National Guard DSCA, instead of vesting
all advisory authority in the ASD(HD&ASA)--a Federal civilian
appointee. Paragraph 3(c) also suggests that Title 32 funding for
National Guard troops responding to an emergency or disaster must be
reimbursed by the State in all instances. This paragraph should include
a brief statement recognizing that non-reimbursable support may be
provided in certain situations, such as when required by law or when
authorized by law and approved by SECDEF.
Mr. Loudermilk. In effect, have there been some changes in
the way that Governors request Title 32?
General McGuire. I don't know that it was codified in a
DODI, a DOD instruction, previously. But it was informally
understood that the Governor always had the ability to go
through the adjutant general right to the Secretary of Defense
and say, ``We need additional Title 32 authorization.''
Mr. Loudermilk. Currently what are they proposing?
General McGuire. Currently that procedure still exists, but
the DODI says it needs to make sure that it is going to rise to
the level of the Stafford Act and that there is a clear Federal
nexus.
An example of 502(f) that is being executed right this
minute in Arizona is our Southwest Border mission, where we
have Guardsmen serving in 502(f) because of--Title 32 because
of the law enforcement piece and the counter-narcotics
incidents that occur down there and the collection of evidence.
It is the right status to use those National Guard forces
in. So it would be disingenuous to say that status isn't used.
It is used currently today on the Southwest Border and could be
used in an emergent response at any time.
Mr. Loudermilk. Now, do you know if Governors were
consulted with these changes?
General McGuire. I do not know what level of consultation
that Governors were on. We--I say Arizona--was previously a
member of the Council of Governors, working with the National
Governors Association on that collaboration.
When Governor Ducey was elected, the seat went with the
actual individual. So we have not been a member of that Council
since January. So I haven't been familiar with current
negotiations. I can follow up with more information after the
hearing.
[The information follows:]
As I mentioned during my oral testimony before the subcommittee,
the Governor of Arizona is no longer a member of the Council of
Governors and I therefore cannot speak on the Council's behalf. My
understanding after speaking with representatives of the Council of
Governors, however, is that the authors of DODI 3025.22 did not seek
input from the Council before implementing these unprecedented changes
to established policy and procedures. In fact, it appears that the
authors ignored repeated requests from the Council of Governors to
meet, confer, and exchange views and information regarding the DODI
3025.22 when it was still in draft form.
For further information and an official response from the Council
of Governors, I recommend the subcommittee contact the National
Governors Association.
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. I appreciate that. To the best of
your knowledge do the Nation's Governors still object to these
changes?
General McGuire. I can tell you the Council of Governors
advocates for all 50 Governors, the 3 territorial Governors,
and there has been no communication about concurrence or
nonconcurrence on that. Let me check on that more thoroughly
and get back to you.
[The information follows:]
It is my understanding from speaking with representatives of the
Council of Governors that the Nation's Governors are adamantly opposed
to these unilateral changes to long-standing policy; changes that
interfere with the Governors' right to engage in direct communications
with the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau,
and even the White House if necessary. Again, I respectfully refer the
subcommittee to the Council of Governors through the National Governors
Association.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. McSally. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin from
Rhode Island.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Again to our panel of witnesses, thank you for being here,
for being on the front lines, EMA, and all that you do to keep
our people safe.
If I could begin with our witness from Rhode Island, Mr.
Gaynor, again I want to thank you for coming down to testify
today, especially on short notice.
Continuing on the cyber domain, you know, clearly, when you
think of cyber, this is a new concept to really think of this
potentially as an EMA-related issue for emergency preparedness
and response.
But can you talk about Rhode Island EMA's role in convening
stakeholders to protect critical infrastructure in the State
from cyber attack and, at least as importantly, help ensure
that the State is able to quickly recover from a disaster.
Mr. Gaynor. Thank you, Congressman.
For a couple years now, the State, in partnership both
within the State, State government, and within the region of
New England, have been partnering on some planning efforts to
bolster our cybersecurity effort.
The first thing that we actually did, again, as a region,
was develop these teams called cyber disruption teams that
consist of emergency managers, law enforcement, private
industry, public industry, IT professionals, that can help both
State and local jurisdictions deal with a low-level cyber
incident.
As we have moved through the past couple years, we have
matured. We have written a cyber protection plan. We have
written a cyber incident action plan. Most recently, Governor
Raimondo of Rhode Island instituted an Executive order
establishing the Cybersecurity Commission to look at two basic
things to ensure that the State is ready should it be the
recipient of a significant cyber attack.
So, first, we want to make sure that we improve State
cybersecurity practices in order to protect both Government,
businesses, and citizens of Rhode Island. The second part of
that is, because there is a significant deficit of cyber
experts these days, to accelerate the growth of Rhode Island's
cybersecurity industry in order to bring jobs and opportunity
to Rhode Island.
So two phases: Let's get our house in order and then let's
kind-of build a home-grown cybersecurity expertise within the
State.
Parallel with all those efforts we have been exercising
with numerous critical infrastructure, key resource sectors, in
cyber table-tops, from the banking sector to the wastewater
sector, to the electrical sector, and trying to get everyone to
understand what is at stake and what the consequences could be
should Rhode Island have a cyber attack.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you for that update.
If I could follow up, the 102nd Information Warfare
Squadron of the Rhode Island Air National Guard based in North
Kingstown is obviously an important State resource.
As someone who is on the ground and the front lines as an
emergency manager, can you share some thoughts about the
specific opportunities that the presence of the National Guard
cyber capabilities provides both proactively and reactively in
the cyber domain?
Mr. Gaynor. So in my opening statement I talked about the
uniqueness of the Rhode Island National Guard and National
Guard in general. In Rhode Island, as you referenced, the 102nd
Network Warfare Squadron is a unique capability resident in
Rhode Island, made up, again, of our National Guardsmen. In
their uniform they are part of the squadron and in their
civilian attire they work for cybersecurity companies. It is a
resource that we have tapped for numerous training and
exercises.
If you ask some of my partner agencies within the State,
like the Rhode Island State Police Cyber Crimes Unit, there is
a daily need for cyber experts that we don't have, whether it
be in a local jurisdiction or even in the State.
So, again, just like you would call a guardsman to help
with a hurricane or a blizzard, those neighbors coming to help
you, some of the friction that we have had in, again, tapping
these unique neighbors, our cyber experts, to help locals and
State in a cyber attack has been difficult. Again, we are
pressing the envelope in every way. So for the most part the
102nd is helping us with training and assist and technical
support.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you.
Well, I have other questions, but my time has expired, so I
will yield back.
Ms. McSally. We could either do another round, or I could
give you a couple more minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. That would be great. Just one. Thank
you then.
On those particular issues, what limitations do you face
that prevent you from realizing the vision where you would like
to see it be more effective, and is it a problem of resources,
authorities, or lack of experience in working together through
exercises?
Mr. Gaynor. I think our gap is the legal justification to
use cyber forces, National Guard cyber forces, and again in a
State event, whether it be local or a State event, because the
cyber threat is unique, and it is much different than a
hurricane or a winter storm. In the hurricane season, you can
see that hurricane coming days and days ahead of time, and you
kind of know what is going to happen when the hurricane comes
by, you know the effects of that, and then it is gone. Most
communities, both local and State, are prepared for a
hurricane, so they have some resources.
When it comes to a cyber attack or a cyber incident, again,
it is happening right now. You don't see it. It is hard to
describe. You may not know it has happened even after it has
happened. Local and State for the most part does not have
enough bandwidth to deal with a cyber incident, cyber crime.
Again, being able to tap into that unique capability, again, is
one of those things that as the State emergency manager, I want
to use all resources at my disposal.
So whether it is from Department of Transportation, I am
looking for a plow, or it is from the National Guard, I am
looking for a cyber expert on a particular threat, I think it
is one of these, again, I will say emerging threat, but it has
been with us for a while, but it is a growing threat that will
only get worse. If we don't figure out how to instantaneously
deploy those guardsmen, again, in support of their home State,
then I think we are going to fall short.
Mr. Langevin. Sure. On those authorities in the National
Defense Authorization Act, I am actually asking for some more
clarification on those so that we are thinking these things
through more proactively and we will have some answers
hopefully within the year.
But, General McGuire, did you want to comment on anything?
I know that you obviously are on the front lines.
General McGuire. Well, I would say that the legal
authorities as they--so I am not very good at cyber, like I
turn on the computer and things are working.
Mr. Langevin. You are like most Americans.
General McGuire. But I understand this part of it, that
that is how all of our SCADA systems and critical
infrastructure is managed right now. So the kinetic effect that
it can have can be tremendous.
So I in some ways say let's just keep this simple. We have
a National response framework. That National response
framework, if you had listened to the previous panel, means
that it is a National requirement. No, the National response
framework is something that we all agree to Nationally that
would be how we would respond, and it would start at the local
level.
So in any incident there is a point of impact. In this case
it could be the banking industry or whatever it might be.
Typically we find with these incidents that our partners in
many of these areas are private industry or not Governmental
agencies that run some of these critical infrastructure
networks for us.
So they have to have a motive to come to the table, and we
have tried to make sure that we reach out to them and
understand that we are there, especially in the National Guard,
to be, as I mentioned, restorative--so that requires manpower--
and defensive. We are not outward-looking trying to
counterattack a nation-state, were that to be the responder.
That clearly I think falls in the domain of U.S. Cyber Command.
But the problem is we are having a hard time defining where
that line lies, which is why I believe that the National Guard
is the right force to be trained with the technical skills so
that they are more capable than I am at cyber, and that they
can deploy under legal authorities, either State Active-Duty or
Title 32, not unlike Southwest Border, where we don't run into
these evidentiary collection issues that would be evident under
Posse Comitatus.
So that is kind of how I view the National Guard's role in
cyber, is that we are always going to be defensive and
restorative and that we are the correct first choice for that
for the same reason I made in my opening statement. We are the
right first choice when local first responders are overwhelmed
because we are there, we are knowledgeable, we have tactical
understanding of even the local banks, and we have
relationships there in each of those organizations.
Mr. Langevin. Completely agree. As having had interaction
with our 102nd Network Warfare Squadron, I think that the
National Guard in some ways, in many ways, is an
underappreciated resource in that we have people that are in
the National Guard and that also in their private lives are
day-to-day at work in these fields developing and using this
expertise on a day-to-day basis. So we could make better use of
that, I think, and appreciate it more.
General McGuire. Yes, sir. The synergy gained between your
commercial industry point of employment--let's say you are a
software writer for Microsoft and you are also a drill status
guardsman--boy, while we train them at U.S. Cyber Command, many
of the skills that they have learned at Microsoft are going to
be just as valuable in these kind of responses, not unlike a
plumber or a carpenter or a law enforcement officer or a
contracting attorney when we have a big disaster.
Mr. Langevin. Without a doubt.
So, Madam Chair, thank you for the extra time.
I would just mention that on the preparedness side of it,
one of the things I am very proud of in what we are doing in
Rhode Island, and Mr. Gaynor mentioned it, is developing the
Cyber Disruption Team--this actually happened under the
previous administration, under Governor Chafee--and the Rhode
Island State Police taking the lead, along with the EMA, and
working with the private sector went out and identified our
elements of critical infrastructure that could be affected by a
cyber-related event.
Then they work to determine how they would both prepare
against it from happening in the first place, but then also
developing a recovery plan for resilience purposes as well. So
it is a good model, and I know we are going to continue to
learn a lot from it.
So thank you, and I yield back.
Ms. McSally. Thank you.
Okay. Last round for myself, I guess, for a couple more
questions.
Mr. Gianato, you have got vast experience in emergency
response, and a lot of these procedures and things, as we have
talked about in both panels, have been getting better over the
years. In your current position, have you recently had to use
the National Guard, or has the National Guard responded in
either of their capacities? Specifically, last year's chemical
spill that was impacting 30,000 residents. What is your
perspective on the benefits of using the National Guard in this
role?
Mr. Gianato. To answer your question on the chemical spill,
the National Guard was actively involved and played a major
role in the response to that. I think it coupled, to build upon
what General McGuire was saying, we utilized the CST teams. One
of those teams that was developed in each State is the primary
resource for doing a lot of the base chemical analysis on the
product that was in the river. That CST team then became the
focal point of the collection of all the samples that were done
throughout that entire water system.
That was just one aspect. They also were instrumental in
helping with the logistics. That was one of the largest water
logistics missions that not only has West Virginia run, but
that FEMA has run, when you had that many people without water
for that duration of time.
But another thing, and just a couple of points with the
Guard and the cyber piece, that we had concerns with is the
SCADA system that ran the water facility. So we had built the
capability during the Boy Scout Jamboree and the intelligence
unit of the Guard that did monitoring of social media. So we
utilized that capability to pay attention to what was being
said, where we were seeing issues, and also to see if there was
anybody out there that was planning to try to take advantage of
the situation to do further harm.
We were also concerned of making sure that the plant
systems were functional. But then as we started to recover from
this event, the water company used a GIS-based application to
let people know when the water was safe. As they cleared
different zones of the water system and turned the systems back
on for public use, we had a concern that someone could hack
into that system and change those, so you would have people in
zones that weren't safe drinking the water. So we used the
Guard for that capability, to monitor that, and to work with
the water company on monitoring their SCADA systems as well.
The second point, we had a phishing attack on the State
network in West Virginia, and it was what appeared to be a
fairly benign attack but turned into a little bit more. But we
used some of the capabilities that the Guard has developed to
help us go in and look at the systems, identify that, collect
some of the, again, the evidence that was used by the FBI to
try to track this down. Then in the recovery phase, to actually
come in, we had about 4,000 or so computers that were infected,
and help our State technology office go in and literally clean
those machines and get them back on-line.
One of our concerns with that is building the depth of the
pool of people that can maintain this capability going forward.
We are very fortunate, several years ago the West Virginia
Legislature passed a piece of legislation that provides college
tuition if you join the National Guard. So they will pay for a
4-year college education if you join the Guard, or if you
already have a college degree, they will pay for up to a
master's degree. So our Guard, working with some of the local
colleges, is building a cyber capability or a cyber program
with one of those colleges to help build that depth that they
are going to need moving forward.
So I think the Guard is an integral part of all of our
emergency response. It is directly under the control of the
Governor. It keeps that response local. But yet if that
response still needs to be broadened out to other States, we
are still maintaining that control by the Governor using the
EMAC process. I don't know what we would do in West Virginia
without those capabilities.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you. Were there any
interoperability issues in the response to the chemical spill
as far as just basic communication?
Mr. Gianato. In West Virginia we have a State-wide trunked
radio system that everybody shares, including the National
Guard, so we were all on the same system. We purposely provided
the Guard with those types of radios so that they can interact
with us.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
General McGuire, I have just a couple of wrap-up questions
here. The first is related to the dual-status commanders. In
Sandy, all the dual-status commanders were Guard and not Title
10, so a guardsman leader taking on responsibility of Title 10
is one model, right, so that they have got both of those, but
the other model is you bring in an Active-Duty leader who is
then responsible for Title 10 and Title 32.
Based on your comments of Capstone and just our experiences
of the Active-Duty and their understanding of these roles and
responsibilities, are you aware of any Title 10 generals that
have been trained for this role, and what are your thoughts and
concerns about that?
General McGuire. So the statute--I don't know if it is a
statute or a DOD regulation instruction--says that the dual-
status commander will be a guardsman by exception, so unless
there is a reason not to. So an example that I gave was if the
incident occurred on Davis-Monthan, the dual-status commander
in that case would be a Title 10 officer. The reason for that
legally was there is no way to revert a Title 10 officer and
put him under Title 32 or State Active-Duty. Where I currently
am serving as the Adjutant General, but I also hold a Major
General authorization in the Air Force Reserve where I could be
called to duty and go----
Ms. McSally. Right. It is easier to go that way than the
other way.
General McGuire. Right. So there is no revision clause. So
by and large, all your dual-status commanders. I have been
through that NORTHCOM course. We did have Title 10 deputies.
The purpose of that is that that Title 10 deputy is to be the
guy that really handles what I will call the block and the
tackle.
Should you have any kind of significant requirement for
legal, Article 15, judicial action, any of that kind of stuff,
that they all, ADCON, OPCON, TACON, during the time of that
event through this dual-status commander, but you have a Title
32 and a Title 10 deputy that are dealing with that.
But we are synching effort, unity of effort, so mission
assignments are going to the right places. We are not sending
two engineering battalions to one location and an area where we
need an engineering battalion is uncovered once the resources
are exhausted.
That said, I will go back to your comment about education
and the training piece in the previous hearing. I think there
is probably a need for at least some National discussion about
the idea that maybe we have, require some of our senior
officers to serve a Title 10 duty, not in a command element,
but as a 04, 05, 06, kind of like we do in the joint world, in
the National Guard so that when they arrive to be the J-5 or
the NORTHCOM commander or the NORTHCOM J-3, they are not
shocked and surprised by these crazy adjutants general they
have to deal with.
That is how Goldwater-Nichols evolved in 1986, and I think
some of these events like Katrina and Sandy have kind of led us
to the idea that maybe--and that would come from you as a
Federal body--to decide that maybe you want to modify statutory
language that says something to that effect.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks.
My last question is related to the mission you mentioned of
using our guardsmen on the Southwest Border. First of all, just
for the record, what is the current role that our guardsmen are
serving on the Southern Border, and your perspectives of the
best roles that they could and should be serving in related to
the Southern Border?
Obviously steady-state in a perfect world, DHS has got a
better strategy and is securing the Southern Border. We are
often calling up the Guard sort of in an emergency, but we seem
to have lots of emergencies. If we were just actually to fix
the problem, then maybe we wouldn't need to be continuing to
call you all to duty.
So what are the best roles, and is it the best use of our
guardsmen to be serving in that capacity, both from a
capabilities and talents, and then also resources?
General McGuire. Well, I don't know that I can quantify if
it is best use. So let me talk about the roles.
In the supported and supporting, we are supporting in this
case DHS is the lead Federal agent, not unlike we would support
FEMA as the lead Federal agent in a response if we were
providing forces.
We have two separate missions that are going in Arizona,
primarily focused geographically on the Southwest Border under
different authorities. One is the Joint Counter Narcotics Task
Force and very clearly-defined rules for use of force, as well
as authorities under Title 32, Federally-resourced, Posse
Comitatus. Those people are working with and support of the war
on drugs, the counternarcotics piece.
Separate and independent, we have a Southwest Border Task
Force that was an outgrowth of the 2007 Operation Jump Start
that continues today. Operation Guardian Eye is the name of
that. Those roles are unique and distinct, so there is no
commingling of your rules for use of force and the rest.
In the former you have guardsmen uniquely designed to help
with support of aviation, rotary wing assets, moving people
around, moving Customs and Border Enforcement agents around,
not really getting on the pointy end of doing the arresting,
but helping with logistic support, movement, administration,
all kind of things that they need.
But ultimately I think that once DHS says that they are on
their feet and ready to go, that is a mission that is very
clearly the purview of the Department of Justice and the
Department of Homeland Security.
Separately, the Southwest Border mission, big issues there
for us are issues like supporting engineering, supporting,
again, all of the things with movement of, in this case,
Customs and Border Patrol is the lead Federal agent, moving
their forces around, helping them with the logistical piece.
As you know, in Arizona we have nearly 400 miles of border.
Only 35 miles of it is private land. The balance of it is
Federal or State land. So we have a lot of public entities and
equities, it is a lot of ground to cover in relatively unpaved
terrain. So rotary wing assets is where we primarily focus in
the logistical piece. Because we have large rotary wing assets
in the Guard it is a great place to do that down in southern
Arizona.
Ms. McSally. Thanks. Just one quick follow-up. Do you see
is there any role for any ISR assets that are in the Air
National Guard as they are doing their training missions for
them to actually be communicating and just providing ad hoc
support?
General McGuire. I would say our greatest strength would be
to help Customs and Border Patrol put up more aircraft in the
launch and recovery element that we just stood up down in Fort
Huachuca as the National Guard. We could gain great training
benefit to our airmen, hand those aircraft off to trained and
qualified enforcement agents so we don't trespass the intel
oversight rules on citizens inside this country and let law
enforcement agents deal with that.
But that would relieve a huge amount of stress on them
because, truthfully, having been qualified as an MQ-1 guy, it
is much easier to just drive in a straight line than take off
and land. So we do all the take off and landings, and they go
out and send out. So we could increase capacity significantly
in that area.
That mission though, that mission set where we talk about
incident awareness, the IAA kind of thing, I think that is a
good example of even in emergency response, your question
earlier about the FAA, I think that that is going to be a huge
force multiplier and a seam that needs to be explored as to
where the statutory limitations are, because as we get ready
for wildfire season, I would much prefer to have one of our
crews, Guard or DHS, utilizing an overhead asset to prevent
something like what happened on Yarnell Hill, where we could
have greater situational awareness on changing weather
patterns, where the fire is at, those types of things.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks. I look forward to following up.
Maybe we can connect with CBP on the integration related to the
ISR assets. I think that is a great increased capacity as well,
so I look forward to following up with you on that.
Okay. Well, thank you, everybody, for your time and your
participation today. I really appreciate your valuable insights
and experience. I thank the Members for their questions.
The Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses. We just ask that you respond to
those in writing. Pursuant to Committee Rule VII(E), the
hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Statement of the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services,
National Emergency Management Association
california's standardized emergency management system (sems)
The breadth and magnitude of emergencies that face the State of
California are unique in scope and resulted in the development of the
Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS). SEMS is a systematic
approach that coordinates the resources of all Californian agencies and
departments, from the local level up to larger jurisdictions, to
prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the
effects of a disaster. SEMS has been tested, and proven to be effective
in response to disasters, regardless of cause, size, complexity, or
location and many of its tenets were included in the National Incident
Management System (NIMS).
SEMS and NIMS were designed to seamlessly integrate the
capabilities of local, State, and Federal Government entities as well
as non-Governmental and volunteer organizations, to provide a rapid and
effective response to a disaster. It is imperative that any entity that
provides resources in response to a disaster do so within the framework
of SEMS/NIMS in order to ensure unity of effort, synchronization, and
prioritization of resources.
defense support of civil authorities in california
In addition to the California National Guard (CNG) under Title 32,
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) under Title 10 is utilized
on a daily basis in coordination with the State, and has prescribed
roles within the State's regional catastrophic plans. The CNG is a key
partner in Wildland Search and Rescue (SAR) and provides capabilities
within SEMS that largely include aviation support when local assets are
unavailable or not capable of supporting the mission. Within the
State's catastrophic plans and in coordination with the Unified
Coordination Group (UCG), CNG provides assistance under the designation
of dual-status command.
The most widely-used CNG asset within Wildland SAR are the UH60
Blackhawk and CH47 Chinook airframes. Both of these platforms combine
high-altitude performance, heavy-lift capacity and hoist capabilities
that facilitate the insertion and extraction of SAR personnel and
equipment into remote areas. Fires in California are expected to
increase to an unprecedented number in 2015, due to the severity of
California's on-going drought. To meet the demands of this volatile
scenario, the CNG provides essential support for fire missions, with a
requirement to deploy and maintain over a dozen helicopters and be
prepared to surge beyond that for a short duration. The National Guard
also supports homeland security within the State by participating in
regional and State-wide exercises supporting cybersecurity efforts and
providing aviation support for local efforts to eradicate illicit
drugs.
The CNG and the Department of Defense (DOD) all play vital DSCA
roles to support the State's three catastrophic plans for Southern
California, the Bay Area, and the Cascadia Subduction Zone. These plans
identify the resources and capabilities needed during a catastrophic
incident within one construct, and facilitate integration across all
levels of government. In some of these scenarios, the shortfalls that
cannot be filled using the mutual aid system will be forwarded to the
UCG to be filled by Federal assets, which connects the State to DOD
resources. In the catastrophic plans, CNG and DOD support under the
dual-status commander, a CNG officer, includes supplying emergency
water and sanitation needs for response operations, establishing and
maintaining functional and interoperable communications for responders,
implementing and directing acute care medical response in support of
Operational Areas, and operating the DOD Mortuary Affairs Team.
dsca and dual-status command (dsc)
The California National Guard and other Title 32 Guard forces
available through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact are
integral components of California's disaster management capability set.
To meet the challenges of catastrophic scenarios, the DOD has developed
standing Joint Task Forces (JTFs) under U.S. Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) to roll up multiple capabilities under a single command
structure to provide mutual aid support during emergencies.
Historically, these JTFs have not effectively integrated into SEMS
without being placed under the responsibility of the dual-status
command (DSC), giving the Governor effective control over their
activities. In its current state, DSCA doctrine and procedures lack
connectivity to SEMS, resulting in disordered response trainings and
exercises in California.
The DOD's overly broad interpretation of ``Immediate Response''
during emergency scenarios effectively circumvents, and at times,
undermines the dual-status command structure. This runs counter to the
principles of unified command and hinders resource allocation,
protocols, and other vital elements of emergency response operations,
as well as processes already established and agreed to in our
catastrophic plans. In the absence of DSC control over T-10 assets
deployed in operational support to a catastrophic scenario, SEMS'
effectiveness in prioritizing response across a wide area and multiple
jurisdictions is jeopardized.
looking forward: dsca and sems/nims
DSCA must integrate into SEMS/NIMS if it is to effectively
contribute to catastrophic incidents in California. When DSCA's
policies contradict California law, or violate its civil authority
framework, the integrity of SEMS is compromised. There must be greater
DOD recognition of, and adherence to, SEMS prior to incidents, during
trainings, exercises, and other preparatory activities to ensure that
DOD's ``Immediate Response'' activities are consistent with SEMS. The
California Governor's Office of Emergency Services is committed to
working with the DOD to ensure there is clarity on the tactical and
legal guidelines that need to be factored into a response in
California, and it is critical that these issues are addressed before
California experiences its next large-scale catastrophe.
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