[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TUNISIA'S FRAGILE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 14, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-69
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
TOM EMMER, MinnesotaUntil 5/18/
15 deg.
DANIEL DONOVAN, New YorkAs
of 5/19/15 deg.
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina GRACE MENG, New York
TED S. YOHO, Florida LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Mark Green, president, International Republican
Institute...................................................... 5
Mr. Leslie Campbell, senior associate and regional director,
National Democratic Institute.................................. 14
Mr. Aaron Zelin, Richard Borow Fellow, The Washington Institute
for Near East Policy........................................... 15
Mr. William Sweeney, president and chief executive officer,
International Foundation for Electoral Systems................. 27
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Mark Green: Prepared statement..................... 8
Mr. Aaron Zelin: Prepared statement.............................. 19
Mr. William Sweeney: Prepared statement.......................... 29
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 54
Hearing minutes.................................................. 55
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 56
TUNISIA'S FRAGILE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
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TUESDAY, JULY 14, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5
minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize
any member seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear
from our witnesses. Thank you to our witnesses for being here.
I apologize that we did not get a chance to shake your hand and
say thank you beforehand.
The witnesses' prepared statements will be made a part of
the record. Members may have 5 days to insert statements and
questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in
the rules.
Before we begin, I would like to recognize the Tunisian
Ambassador to the United States, who is in attendance today. We
welcome the Ambassador when he comes, and look forward to
continuing to work with Tunisia to help its people realize
their goal of a democratic future. The Chair now recognizes
herself for 5 minutes.
Perhaps it is fitting that Tunisia, the nation that started
the Arab Spring, is the only country in the Middle East and
North Africa that has made any significant progress toward
democracy. But that future success is still very far from
certain. Despite all of the positive gains that Tunisia has
made over the past 1\1/2\ years-plus, from adopting a new
constitution to electing a new Parliament and the first real
free and fair Presidential elections since its independence, it
has been two high profile terror attacks in Tunisia that has
really, sadly, captured the world's attention in this North
African country. And with greater scrutiny over Tunisia's
security situation, the international community has also
highlighted some of the other struggles the current government
is facing as it strives toward democracy.
One of the major stumbling blocks for the new Tunisian
Government is turning its economy around. As the recent terror
attacks at the hotels on the east coast of the country reminded
us, Tunisia is largely dependent on the tourism industry.
Tourism is responsible, in fact, for some 15 percent of the
total GDP. Tunisia's tourism industry is already taking a hit
from the economic troubles in Europe. They might just not be
able to recover if there is any lasting damage to its tourism
economy. In fact, Tunisia's President stated that another
terror attack like the one last month could cause the collapse
of his government. But cracks in the country's economic outlook
were already there. The government needs to do more to
fundamentally address the economic challenges as well as the
security challenges if it is to continue to have the support of
the people of Tunisia.
And that is why programs like the Tunisian-American
Enterprise Fund, which invests in small and medium businesses
to spur economic growth and employment, are steps in the right
direction. Democracies aren't formed overnight, but it becomes
difficult for people who have been through so much and who have
come so far to be patient and to understand that this is a long
process, and that there will be ups and downs along the way.
The nascent government needs some major accomplishments
that it can point to in order to really solidify its support
for Tunisia's democracy project. And that is where the United
States could play a very important role. The stability of
Tunisia and the viability of its democratic transition are not
only strategically important to the United States and the
region, but it is important to all of us who believe in
democracy and what the people of Tunisia are trying to
accomplish for themselves.
It would reaffirm the significance of the demonstrations
that millions of Tunisians participated in to get this started.
And it could still prove to be the spark for change across the
entire region--the example for others to emulate. That is why
it is critical that the U.S. invests our assistance in Tunisia
wisely, and that our policy puts the people of Tunisia in the
best place to achieve their goals.
We need to ensure that our security assistance is going to
building up Tunisia's capability to protect its citizens, to
enforce its laws, to defend its borders from the terrorist
threats coming from Libya and Algeria or returning from
fighting with the terror groups in Iraq and Syria.
Last week's designation of Tunisia as a major non-NATO ally
was a very positive step forward. We are going to need not only
a partner willing to cooperate with us in the fight against
ISIL, al-Qaeda, and any other terror group, but an able partner
as well, because make no mistake, Tunisia is home to the most
foreign fighters that have flocked to Iraq and Syria.
Once these guys return and put into practice what they have
learned on the battlefield, Tunisia will have its hands full.
We must also ensure that we are helping Tunisia build the
foundation for democracy by supporting the rule of law, civil
society, and respect for human rights. We need to help the
Tunisian Government strengthen its institutions and consolidate
the political gains that they have made in these past 4 years.
In short, we need to invest in Tunisia's future if we want to
ensure that the future will be a democratic one.
I commend the people of Tunisia for not letting the recent
terror attacks disrupt their progress toward democracy, and for
their commitment to this transition that they began in 2010 and
have paid a very high price for. They deserve our support. And
with that support, they could one day be the model for other
countries in the region. With that, I would like to turn to my
good friend, the ranking member, Ted Deutch, for his opening
statement.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for calling this
very timely and important hearing. And thanks for our witnesses
for the great work that your institutions do around the world
to support democracy.
Tunisia has been hailed as the success story of the Arab
Spring. It has by any measure been the most promising
transition from autocracy to democracy. Constitutional reforms
have progressed, parliamentary elections have now been held
twice. Political parties have proven that they can not only
peacefully transfer power, but they can govern together in a
coalition. But transitions are not without bumps. As is the
case with every democracy, whether a few years old or a fewer
centuries old, there are internal tensions within society. But
the success of a democracy is in part based on foundations
established within a country that allow and encourage debate
and freedom of expression from all parts of society.
For example, the parliamentary elections of 2014 showed an
electorate that wanted its government to go in a different
direction. The election of the Nidaa Tounes party over the
Islamist Ennahda party could have been a disastrous change of
power, but the Parliament committed to a transition that, even
if challenging, would nevertheless remain peaceful. I have to
say this was very much noticed and respected here in Congress.
With the expansion of civil society groups, political parties,
and media outlets in Tunisia, more voices are contributing to
the national dialogue about the current state of the country
and the best decisions for moving forward.
The government should pay heed to the discourse and act in
the best interests of the Tunisian people and the stability of
the state. Since the revolution, Tunisia has struggled to
regain economic prosperity. There is great concern that Tunisia
cannot fully stabilize and complete its democratic transition
if the economy doesn't grow. Tunisia is currently facing an
unemployment rate of 15 percent, and that rate nearly triples
among working class youth. But Tunisia is a sophisticated
society with an educated and professional workforce, and the
government must implement reforms to open and expand the
economy. Achieving success and political reforms, which
includes receiving popular legitimacy, must go hand in hand
with improving the people's economic opportunities.
Tourism, long a key revenue stream for the country, has
struggled, particularly amid the recent terrorist attacks that
have caused countries such as Great Britain to discourage
travel, and foreign investment and trade have suffered as well.
I support our country's aid efforts to support the Tunisian
economy, such as the establishment of the Tunisian-American
Enterprise Fund and sovereign loan guarantees. We all fear that
the recent spate of terror attacks threaten to undermine
Tunisia's success. I offer my condolences to the victims and
their families of the deadly terrorist attacks this year on the
Bardo Museum in Tunis and in Sousse, many of whom were foreign
nationals. Tunisia is struggling with homegrown terror cells,
the proliferation of terrorist groups such as AQIM, Ansar al-
Sharia, and the Islamic State within its borders, as well as
external threats coming from Libya and Algeria.
Tunisians have traveled at an alarming rate to train with
ISIS. And the threat of their return home looms. And with
reportedly one of the largest foreign contingents in Iraq and
in Syria, the country must address ways to improve security
conditions. The government's decision to issue a state of
emergency certainly speaks to the high level of threats facing
the country, but it must be careful to provide for the security
of its citizens without restricting basic civil liberties
guaranteed by the Tunisian constitution.
I support President Obama's decision to designate Tunisia a
major non-NATO ally and the decision to enter into a memorandum
of understanding with Tunisia. These are clear signs that this
administration recognizes the country's post-2011 achievements,
its commitment to cooperating on mutual security threats, and
the national security interests for our country, and bolstering
the capabilities of a North African ally in a very tumultuous
neighborhood. It is also important to acknowledge the great
work that each of your organizations have done and continue to
do every day.
I often speak about the role of our foreign assistance
program. And I believe that it is within our national security
interests to offer not only military assistance, but also
political, social, and economic aid to our overseas partners.
The programs run by your organizations and the successes they
have achieved offer strong evidence for the incredible return
on these investments.
Tunisia has taken great steps toward democracy, and the
progress achieved since 2011 should be lauded. To sustain
success, sustain success and to push forward, the government
must continue to work across political parties to address the
priorities of today's Tunisia. And it is my great hope that it
does not sacrifice this progress in the name of security.
I look forward to discussing with our witnesses today how
U.S. policy can support Tunisia's path forward to democracy,
economic prosperity, and greater security. And I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch.
I now would like to yield to Mr. Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for calling this
important hearing. Tunisia could be a model in many ways to its
neighbors in the region for having forged a democratic
government following the revolutionary overthrow of its
authoritarian regime in 2011. And as we all know, it had a
dramatic impact because it essentially set off the Arab Spring
throughout the area. And we have seen tumultuous both positive
and negative outcomes of that.
But it did start really in Tunisia. At the same time, the
growing terrorist threat in Tunisia is worrisome as terrorist
networks have gained influence and ground. The recent mass
disappearance of 33 people is a sign of radicalization among
some young Tunisians along the border with Libya. And it is
clear that Tunisia now faces another challenge of impeding,
stopping this recruitment, and preventing further attacks
against its citizens and the effect that that will have on the
tourist industry, which is absolutely critical to the country.
And so we look forward to the hearing, and I want to
especially thank Ambassador Green, who is a friend and
colleague of many of us, who served about 8 years here in
Congress together. And he was a leader on a whole range of
issues. And it is good to have him back. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I echo that sentiment. Thank you so much,
Mr. Chabot.
And now I would like to introduce our witnesses. First, we
are pleased to welcome Ambassador Mark Green, who is the
president of the International Republican Institute. He is a
former U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania, and served as a Member of
Congress, as Mr. Chabot just pointed out, representing
Wisconsin's 8th District from 1999 to 2007. It is always a
delight to see you, Ambassador.
Second, we welcome back Mr. Leslie Campbell, who is the
senior associate and regional director of the National
Democratic Institute. Previously, he was the chief of staff to
the leader of the New Democratic Party in the Canadian House of
Commons, and has served as a guest lecturer at Georgetown
University. Welcome back.
Third, we also welcome back Mr. Aaron Zelin, who is the
Richard Borow fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy. He has conducted extensive research on jihadi groups,
with a focus on North Africa and Syria, and is writing his
dissertation for Kings College in London on the Tunisian jihadi
movement. As a recipient of that final degree, my condolences
to you. Good luck with that.
And last, but certainly not least, we welcome back Mr.
William Sweeney, who serves as the president and CEO of the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Formerly, he
served in the board of directors of IFES, conducting several
high profile elections across the world, and served as vice
president of Global Government Affairs for EDS.
And I would like to commend our panelists today, and I hope
that you have all had the opportunity to see the newspaper The
Hill this morning. Our panelists wrote a great op-ed, which was
published in The Hill, on Tunisia. So thank all of you for your
commitment to the people of Tunisia and for promoting U.S.
values to a key ally in the region. Great job. And Mr.
Ambassador, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK GREEN, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE
Ambassador Green. Great. Thank you. Thanks, Chairwoman Ros-
Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and Mr. Chabot. I am honored
to be here and to have this opportunity to speak on the
brightest hope for democracy in Middle East and North Africa,
Tunisia.
At IRI, we believe that Tunisia's remarkable journey toward
democracy can serve both as an inspiration for those hoping to
shape their own democratic path, and also a rejoinder to those
who claim that democracy has little chance outside the Western
world. Tunisia's story should also serve as a symbol to
policymakers of what nonprofit organizations like IRI, NDI, and
IFES can do with U.S. Government support when we work as one
team. I had the privilege of observing the parliamentary round
of voting in last year's elections. Like others, I was struck
by how Tunisia's political stakeholders showed a truly
unwavering commitment to democratic principles throughout the
process.
Both in victory and in defeat, Tunisia's political
competitors accepted the voters' will. That is particularly
striking in a region too often haunted by polarization,
sectarianism, and extremist violence. In my view, the Tunisian
people have shown their mettle. And as the country faces its
new challenges, we must show our mettle and our willingness to
help.
The administration should be commended for joining with
Congress to expand U.S. security assistance to Tunisia through
foreign military financing, military training, and security
sector reform efforts. We must also be smart about the kind of
security assistance we provide. We want to help the country
reform security services that were created under an
authoritarian President's reign to ensure that they are now
ethical, citizen-centered, and just. The administration and
Congress should also be commended for the considerable economic
assistance being provided.
Tunisia's economy, as noted, has floundered largely since
2011, and the terrible June 26 terrorist attack will only
create even greater economic pressure on a country still
grappling with the effects of previous mistakes and bad
policies. IRI's most recent polling in Tunisia shows that
unemployment and the economy are the issues weighing most
heavily on the minds of Tunisians, particularly young
Tunisians, surpassing even security.
Tunisia needs to carry out reforms that will remove
stifling bureaucracy, encourage small and medium enterprise
growth, attract foreign direct investment, and produce a
skilled workforce. As they take on those reforms, we should all
be there to help. Since the elections, IRI has focused its
attention on helping the new government identify and meet key
policy priorities by strengthening inter-ministerial planning,
coordination, and communications. We are supporting the
Tunisian-led process of decentralization to ensure that all of
Tunisia's regions are listened to.
As many of you know, the disconnect between Tunisia's
coastal and interior regions was a key factor prompting the
2011 revolution. We are also supporting a national
accountability network that is strengthening the involvement of
Tunisian youth. As we noted in our election statements last
year, the lack of youth voter participation is a serious
concern that Tunisian leaders must address. Our polling shows
great interest on the part of youth in building a more
democratic and entrepreneurial Tunisia. At the same time,
however, many youth apparently don't carry that interest over
to participating in key democratic institutions. That obviously
must change.
Madam Chair, we have been asked to offer some
recommendations for Tunisia going forward, and we are honored
to do so. For Fiscal Year 2016, the administration is seeking
to more than double last year's level of assistance. We agree
with that plan. However, according to one analysis, only 16
percent of that assistance will fall into the category of
governing justly and democratically. We respectfully suggest
that much more needs to be done.
We need to see in this new strategy real support for
continued political party development. If Tunisians don't
believe that political parties effectively represent their
interests, especially at the local level, it can worsen
regional tensions and undermine confidence in the national
democratic process. Furthermore, if political parties aren't
seen as issue-based, there is much greater potential for
renewed polarization, especially with respect to secular and
Islamist political groups.
Tunisia will hold elections, probably, in 2016. The time to
foster genuine democratic competition is right now. It is to go
to work especially to bring in young Tunisians. We think it is
very, very important. We also need to continue to support the
work of civil society groups, in many ways the first and most
immediate way that young people could become involved in the
process. And again, if it is a broken record in our testimony,
we think it is crucial that young people be connected to
constructive democratic institutions so that they have a stake
in the survival of democracy.
To wrap up, Madam Chair, Ranking Member Deutch, we have all
seen remarkable things take place in Tunisia in these last
several years. Much has been accomplished. Again, we are proud
at IRI, working with our sister organizations NDI and IFES, to
have played a role in that effort, but we know that the
transition is fragile, and it needs all of us and our help.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Green follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Campbell.
STATEMENT OF MR. LESLIE CAMPBELL, SENIOR ASSOCIATE AND REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
Mr. Campbell. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member
Deutch, members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be
here again to talk about Tunisia. Nearly 5 years after the
protests toppled Ben Ali, Tunisia has adopted a modern
constitution, and for the first time democratically elected a
new legislature and President. The process of getting to those
elections was not without its challenges, with a prolonged
constitution drafting process that was tested by occasional
political deadlock, and twice rocked by political
assassinations.
The road forward toward consolidating democratic gains,
building the capacity and sustainability of governing
institutions, ensuring the protection of freedoms achieved
through the revolution, and enacting much needed economic and
security sector reforms has not and will not be easy. Tunisia's
fragile polity today seems more vulnerable than at any other
point to date. But on a hopeful note, I have to say that
several factors have differentiated Tunisia from regional
neighbors which have struggled with their process's
transitions, either succumbing to a return to authoritarianism
or slipping into violent chaos.
What makes Tunisia or what has made Tunisia different?
Number one, Tunisia took time to develop a constitution,
undertaking a deliberative and representative process rather
than rushing into snap elections that could have exacerbated
regional differences and partisan polarization. As it has
historically, the Tunisian military stayed out of politics and
refrained from interfering with economic policy. It remained a
neutral institution focused on defending the country's borders,
and it did not enter the political fray. Civil society was
allowed to flourish, and secured a role in the transitional
process, demanding dialogue, compromise, and inclusivity. Civil
society organizations, trade unions, women's groups, community
development associations were treated as important partners in
the democratic transition.
And finally, number four, Tunisia's political leadership
generally avoided hyperbole and polarization, seeking
compromise, and embracing the concept of no victor, no
vanquished. These factors manifested in the highly competitive,
but ultimately peaceful and credible elections, of 2014. Beyond
voting in significant numbers, tens of thousands of people
participated as candidates, poll workers, candidate
representatives, and citizen monitors.
Notably, Tunisia defied the oft repeated warnings of
naysayers that Islamists would never give up power once elected
to office, the notion of one vote, one time--one vote--one
person, one vote, one time, and the majority Ennahda party
conceded defeat in the legislative elections and joined its
opponents in a national unity government.
Throughout this transition, NDI and IRI and IFES, working
together, as was said, we provided Tunisia's democratic
leadership with advice and information on comparative
democratic experiences. Through the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), the State Department's
Middle East Partnership Initiative, the group that is
represented here received funding to establish programs within
weeks of Ben Ali's departure. Ahead of the 2014 elections,
NDI's U.S. Government-supported activities helped create a
space for inclusive political debate that would inform citizens
and expose them to various political options.
We worked to keep parties, political parties focused on
building lasting structures and creating platforms that
incorporate citizen concerns. The parties' investments in their
internal structures, recruitment of party activists, and
platform development have already contributed to democratic
stabilization. The calls from the United States and the
international community during the uprising of 2011 demanding
that the Tunisian Government listen to pleas for dignity lent
important legitimacy to citizen aspirations throughout the Arab
world. Despite Tunisia's numerous challenges, there are reasons
for great hope.
Tunisia's transition, symbolized by the adoption of its new
constitution, remains on track, setting it apart. But in terms
of recommendations, Tunisia is in need, still in need of
assistance to democracy, to its economy and to security reform,
and the United States should continue to support popular
demands for transparency, accountability, and freedom.
One of the themes for today I think is going to be how to
find that balance between freedom and security. And I look
forward to questions on that exact topic. But this means as a
hopeful exception in the Arab world, which is managing and
inspiring a fragile transition, Tunisia wants, needs, in fact
demands Western solidarity and investment. And I hope that we
can respond adequately to that.
The administration and U.S. Congress should be steadfast at
supporting an enabling environment for parties and civil
society to continue to build a democratic Tunisia, and support
the aspirations of both Tunisian citizens and those around the
world who look to Tunisia for inspiration. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Campbell, very much.
[Mr. Campbell did not submit a prepared statement.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Zelin.
STATEMENT OF MR. AARON ZELIN, RICHARD BOROW FELLOW, THE
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Zelin. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, members of the
committee, for giving me the opportunity to testify today on
Tunisia's transition, in particular focusing on recommendations
related to the jihadi threat.
Currently, there are two main groups that are attacking the
Tunisian state, an al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb cutout
called Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi, and the Islamic State, which has
a safe haven in Libya as well as cells inside of Tunisia. Since
the elections late last year, there have been 11 known
terrorist attacks claimed or believed to be conducted by AQIM
or the Islamic State. In response, there have been 21 arrests
of those suspected of planning attacks or being connected to
attacks that have already occurred.
The Tunisian military has also been involved in operations
against insurgents 10 times in this time span. This illustrates
that the threat from jihadis is very real, but also that the
Tunisian State has been quite proactive in attempting to stem
any more attacks, whether in the form of terrorism or insurgent
activity. You can get more specifics on the background of both
AQIM and the Islamic State's activities in Tunisia in my
written testimony, as well as what policies the Tunisian
Government and the U.S. have already implemented over the past
\1/2\ year, which has largely been military focused, or we can
talk more about it in the Q and A.
Since we only have short amount of time, I wanted to focus
more on recommendations that can complement the military
options already taken. They might seem less sexy, but they are
just as important. Regarding the strengthening of the rule of
law, Tunisia's draft security bill is highly controversial and
has major critics, which could lead to a repeat of the 2003
terrorism law passed by Ben Ali that was regarded as against
human rights. It had many loose definitions, and unjustly led
to many arrests that had nothing do with terrorism.
From 2003 to 2011, a number of individuals that were
arrested were not terrorists, but while they were in prison
they became radicalized. As we saw following the March 2011
prisoner amnesty, many of the individuals that had been
radicalized in prison then were involved with Ansar al-Sharia
in Tunisia. Therefore, if the security bill is passed, it will
only lead to a repeat of what has already occurred, which would
suggest the Essebsi-led Government has not learned from the
past. The U.S. should provide advice on a security bill that is
more in line with the rule of law and best practices in other
democratic states.
Regarding security sector reform, many Tunisians think that
nothing drastic will change unless major steps are taken to
address the corruption in the ministry of interior. There have
been very little reforms made in the past 4 years.
Further, the new minister, Najem Gharsalli, was a judge
under Ben Ali, who has been accused of deep corruption by many
within civil society. Many of the old practices of the former
regime are creeping back too, including within the prison
system. For example, the Tunisian Organization Against Torture
is currently investigating almost 70 torture cases in 2015.
Torture is an easy way to radicalize anyone. This must end,
and the United States should not stand idly by and ignore this
wretched trend. As a result, prison reforms need to take place
as well. Moreover, there are many arbitrary arrests that are
once again occurring, even if they have no connections to
jihadi networks or attacks that have occurred. This could be a
source of radicalization as well. It is imperative that the
United States works with the Tunisian MOI and its police forces
to professionalize what it does. They need to better learn the
art of intelligence gathering, and then once a case starts,
doing the proper paperwork for preparing it to go to court.
A major retraining and reeducation could be something the
United States helps with in terms of capacity building. This
type of effort needs patience, though, since Tunisia is coming
out of 45 years of authoritarian rule. Therefore, it is crucial
for there to be a sense of duty and discipline instilled within
the police force. The key is to transform the body into a force
that is seen as a protector, not a force that takes away
individuals' rights or are involved in abuses of power. Related
to this, during the uprisings many courts, police stations, and
police equipment were destroyed. Therefore, instead of
providing only money, it would be worthwhile if the United
States funded specific rebuilding projects. That way it would
cut down on potential corruption from the government, but also
provide new jobs for locals since the economy remains the most
important issue for the average Tunisian. Therefore, it will
provide tangible benefits that the local populace can see
instead of monetary promises that might seem distant.
And finally, related to public relations and transparency,
since the uprising the Tunisian Government has had difficulty
with its ability to properly communicate after attacks have
occurred. In all high profile cases, the government has been
slow at articulating transparently what occurred and what the
government is doing about it. If it wants to solidify its
democratic bona fides it needs to leave the more shadowy and
murky as well as secretive aspects of investigations in the
past. The public has a right to know.
There are two recent examples in the aftermath of the
Sousse beach attack that highlight some of these deficiencies.
First, when Essebsi announced the reimplementation of the state
of emergency, he stated, ``If similar attacks occur again, the
state will collapse.'' Not only was this comment irresponsible,
it was also quite amateurish. He should have been reassuring
the public. Moreover, on the same day, the MOI spokesman
explained that it did not want to blame the attack in Sousse on
the Islamic State because advertising their involvement would
radicalize the public. This illustrates a lack of trust by the
government in the public to remain vigilant and resilient. This
is something the United States can provide advice on how to
more professionalize the government's public persona and
ability to articulate properly to the public.
Beyond reforming issues related to the security front, as
everyone is well aware, there needs to be serious economic
reforms that affect the entire country, and not just those on
the coast. At the end of the day, Tunisians just want to
support their families, live a good life, and be able to travel
within their country without feeling insecure.
Not all is lost, and the Tunisian Government can right the
ship, but it needs to do more and not fall back on old habits
from the Ben Ali era, which have already proven failures. It
needs to also have a vision which goes beyond rhetoric. It
needs to inspire the younger generation, otherwise individuals
that have connections or are well off will move to Germany or
France, while those that might not have those opportunities
could be swayed easier into joining up with jihadis who could
provide guidance and a vision, even if the individual does not
necessarily agree with the ideology from the beginning.
The United States should be there to lend a helping hand
based off our own experiences and best practices with
transitioning countries in Asia, South America, and eastern
Europe. The Tunisian people deserve an honest and good ally,
and the United States can be that.
Let's help the Tunisian people complete their dream that
started more than 4 years ago. America can provide that
guidance and assistance. Thank you very much for your time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Zelin follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Sweeney.
STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM SWEENEY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
Mr. Sweeney. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. If you could push that little button
there to amplify your remarks.
Mr. Sweeney. Thank you. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member
Deutch, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, on
behalf of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems,
better known as IFES, I deeply appreciate this opportunity to
discuss Tunisia's fragile democratic transition.
Before I begin, I would like to echo my colleagues'
statements on the Sousse tragedy. Our thoughts are with our
partners in Tunisia and those around the world who lost loved
ones.
Madam Chairman, it is not the first election that
establishes a democracy, but those that take place years or
even decades later. Tunisia's planned 2016 municipal and
regional elections will be the country's next democratic test.
Continued support by the U.S. Government and its allies in the
international community is imperative to the success of the
municipal and regional elections.
To briefly summarize our written statement, there are
several key electoral issues the Tunisians and their
international partners must address prior to the local
elections planned for 2016.
The first priority should be the drafting of a legal
framework for municipal and regional elections. None currently
exists. IFES recommends the adoption of a unified consolidated
electoral law that will regulate all types of elections and
referendums in Tunisia. One national process and standard will
build trust and prevent confusion.
Second, the ISIE, the Tunisian Election Commission, should
be made a permanent entity, with the protections of civil
service, and be further developed to provide professional,
efficient, and sustainable election administration. As an
independent agency, the ISIE must build the capacity and
professionalism of its regional offices to undertake the
organizational burden of the local elections.
A third priority is to confront and implement lessons
learned from the 2014 elections. For example, campaign finance
regulations were overly strict, while enforcement measures were
lax. The ISIE should also seek to improve its voter and civic
outreach strategies. Media, particularly radio outlets, should
improve standards on election coverage. Finally, demographics
demand a focus on youth. Over a third of Tunisians between 15
and 29 remain jobless. To this group, a dictatorship and a
democracy are still much the same.
Madam Chairman and Ranking Member Deutch, I conclude by
reiterating that while Tunisia is a job well done, it is also a
job not finished. American assistance, particularly for
democracy and governance activities, will continue to play a
critical role in strengthening Tunisia's fledgling democracy.
IFES commends the people of Tunisia for their hard work,
sacrifice, and continued dedication even in the face of
unspeakable violence and intimidation. We are proud to partner
with ISIE to ensure there is a vote for every Tunisian voice.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sweeney follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And thank you to all of our panelists.
And to start our question and answer period, we will begin with
Mr. Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I appreciate
you giving me the time.
The high profile attacks at Tunis and Sousse have certainly
exacerbated Tunisia's economic challenges. Tourism, after all,
is a significant percentage of Tunisia's GDP. And those attacks
probably, they certainly appear to have been aimed at the
tourism industry, which would then in turn probably spur
dissension amongst the Tunisian people against the government.
Let me ask you this. What steps are the Tunisians taking to
prevent additional attacks in the future? And what would you
think would be the impact should there be another terrorist
attack of this sort on the political environment, on the
economy of Tunisia? And I would welcome anybody who might like
to address that.
Ambassador Green, if you wanted to take it first, that
would be fine.
Ambassador Green. Sure. Thank you. Thanks for the question.
Well, first off, obviously if, and let's hope it never
occurs, but if there were another attack, it certainly would
continue to increase anxiety, put pressure on the government,
and rattle the nerves of the principal audience for tourism,
which is just miles away in Europe.
So I think several things are important here. First off,
again, to recognize the current impact on the economy. Tourism
is awfully important to Tunisia, as you mentioned in your
question. And this has certainly rattled tourism. The Tunisians
have taken a number of steps to provide immediate security in
some of the tourism areas. And while the images may be
unsettling of having armed guards along the beaches and in some
of those sites, they are certainly understandable. I think
everyone recognizes how difficult they can be.
But I think the more important steps that need to be taken
are addressing the underlying problems in the economy. This is
an economy built by an authoritarian regime at a different
time, an overwhelming bureaucracy that stifles entrepreneurship
and adds not only tremendous burdens to entrepreneurs inside
the country, but openly discourages foreign direct investment.
And while the government obviously needs to take on security
challenges and to worry about tourism, it cannot put off much
longer some of these fundamental reforms that are the key to
creating opportunity down the line.
As was mentioned by my colleagues, we have very high youth
unemployment, some of the highest youth unemployment anywhere.
As long as young people believe that there is future hope for
opportunity, I think they are prepared for some of the hard
choices that will need to be made.
However, if they don't see opportunity, if they don't
believe that they have a government committed to taking on some
of these tough choices and underlying reforms, then when you
see security rattled by terrorist strikes it only raises the
anxiety, increases the frustration, and sadly, I fear, also
causes young people to disengage more and more from democratic
institutions that are so essential to the country's future.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Let me turn to another question
rather than go down the line or I won't get another question
out. Is the U.S. doing enough by way of security assistance in
cooperation with Tunisia? How do we help Tunisia solidify its
democratic gains made thus far?
And briefly, maybe I will start with you, Mr. Sweeney, if
we can just go down the line this way, what are your
organizations doing to assist them in democratic foundation?
Mr. Sweeney?
Mr. Sweeney. Thank you, sir. First of all, our organization
is not involved with security issues except insofar as how they
affect an election process. I would say that the United States
is stepping up in response to the requests of the Tunisian
Government.
The NATO designation, a number of other steps that have
been taken in the last few weeks are all very positive. But I
would also go back to your last question, sir. The attack by
terrorists is not just at the tourist industry. The tourist
industry is 15 percent of the economy.
The attack is at the legitimacy of the democratic progress
and the remaining 85 percent of the economy that Ambassador
Green very pointedly made the comment that this 85 percent was
built up under an authoritarian period, and now there are so
many efforts to open that economy and bring it into the 21st
century. And all of that progress is under threat by terrorism
as well.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Mr. Zelin, briefly.
Mr. Zelin. The U.S. has been doing a lot over the past 6
months in terms of providing different types of assistance,
whether it is more Blackhawks, whether it is in terms of the
NATO designation, as well as helping out in other types of
military equipment.
One of the key issues here is that Tunisia has had this
jihadi problem bubbling up under the surface for a good 20
years. The issue is, is that many different realize it because
most of the Tunisians involved in it had been involved in it
outside of Tunisia because of the authoritarian system of Ben
Ali. So after the uprising in 2011, a lot of it started coming
back into the country. And now because of some of the policies
that occurred post-2011 in the early years in terms of not
necessarily taking the threat as very serious, we are now
seeing some of the backlash as a result of this.
So it didn't come out of nowhere necessarily. It is more a
process that is coming into the fore moreso because of things
that have already occurred.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Mr. Campbell--Madam Chair, can he
respond briefly? Okay. You can respond very briefly, Mr.
Campbell.
Mr. Campbell. I will defer to Mr. Zelin on the security.
But just to amplify Ambassador Green's point and add to that
quickly, that in terms of structural changes that are needed in
Tunisia that may help address the security, it is a top-down
country, very centralized, with great regional disparities. And
they have an opportunity coming up this year and next year to
decentralize, to put decisionmaking more at the local level,
and to engage citizens in helping to control the decisions that
affect their lives at the local level.
It won't have the same immediate impact as the security
sector reform, but I think it is a part of the longer term
solution.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. And Mr. Green, very
briefly.
Ambassador Green. Yeah, if I might, I think it is important
to remember that many of the militaries in this part of the
world were created to protect the government from its people.
This is a military that is transitioning to being what we
would refer to a military that protects the country from its
threats. That is a difficult transition, A.
And B, we have talked a bit about I think what Les has
referred to is a non-sexy issue, and he is right, improving the
ability of ministries to communicate, to work together, to
control expectations in the public, and to encourage the public
to buy into the solutions. If you don't have those
communications, when the military moves, people will run in the
opposite direction.
Fostering that investment, that personal investment in that
capacity is crucial for a country that is trying to make the
transition they are.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. My time has expired.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot. Excellent
questions. Mr. Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I just had
a couple questions about the perception of the people and the
way they view government.
First, the decision by Ennahda to join a secular-led
government, I would like our witnesses to offer your thoughts
on whether that was a decision that was a top-down decision or
does it reflect the will of the people? And ultimately, what
does it mean long term for a party like that to have made that
decision to enter a secular government? Ambassador?
Ambassador Green. It is interesting. And the organizations
represented here, many of us held our meetings together with
the ministries in advance of the elections. And they were
talking even back then of trying to foster what is enshrined in
the constitution. And that is the separation of church and
state, and to enshrining freedom of worship.
The fact that you saw the Islamist party move so quickly to
condemn the Charlie Hebdo attack, that you saw it move so
quickly to concede defeat and congratulate the winner after the
election, I think that shows that there is really buy in and
momentum around this idea of a uniquely Tunisian Government and
structure of government that respects faith.
I think it is great in the wake of an election in which
everyone feels very good about what has happened, it is great
in the wake of the success of the constitution. What I think we
are saying is it is vitally important we stand with them to
build the capacity of the government to be effective, to be
able to meet the needs of average Tunisians so that that
important sense and philosophy can continue.
Mr. Deutch. All right. Mr. Campbell?
Mr. Campbell. It is a great question. And I wondered that
myself. I remember sitting in the Ennahda office, you know, not
long after they made the decision, before they stepped down but
when they were making the decision to step aside. And I too
wondered about motivations. But I think in the Middle East
generally, but especially in Tunisia, looking for moderation, I
don't think we have to question motivations too much.
What seems important to me is that Ennahda, whether because
of, you know, I don't know if it was, you know, genuine
commitment to the principles that they espoused or not, but
because of what happened in Egypt they wanted to avoid that,
which I think was important. Because they felt constrained by
public opinion, especially after the political assassinations,
there was lot of blowback when secular politicians were
assassinated. Because of international expectations. There was
pressure from the international community saying, you know, we
want you to behave democratically. I think for those sort of
outside reasons they decide to step aside.
And I think what is important in a democratic transition is
not necessarily that the actors are motivated by, sort of, you
know, thoughts that we would prefer, but that they feel somehow
constrained both by domestic opinion but also by international
pressure. And they certainly felt constrained, and they acted
in a way that we would I think applaud. And I think if we would
continue to reward that behavior we would gt more of the same
behavior.
Mr. Deutch. Okay. You are nodding, Mr. Zelin?
Mr. Zelin. I agree pretty much with what everybody says.
But on the other hand, I also think that it also is a sign of
the fragileness of the system as it is, where a winner can't
take all just yet, otherwise people might feel that things
could really get bad.
So I do believe that in terms of the next national
election, if a party wins and takes all and then becomes truly
ruling party instead of in this broader national collection,
that is when I think we could really see signs that this
democracy is really solidifying in many respects.
Mr. Deutch. Mr. Sweeney?
Mr. Sweeney. I concur with just about everything that has
been said by my three colleagues. And the question is really
can the consensus toward shared values and tolerant society and
a belief in democratic values and an acceptance of the results
of the ballot process continue to be accepted?
And Tunisia had a very, very rocky, difficult time. And the
two assassinations forced a great many Tunisian leaders to have
long conversations with themselves and their colleagues about
how they wanted their society to evolve. And that is why the
2014 election was so important to all of us, particularly the
Tunisians, about how they wanted their society to move forward.
And I think that is the challenge ahead.
Mr. Deutch. Mr. Sweeney, how much of the decision do you
think is made because of their views of what is best for
Tunisia or their views based on dealing with or avoiding
certain externalities, as Mr. Campbell touched on?
Mr. Sweeney. All of the above, sir. I mean you have a
variety of motivations that came into play, as with any
political decision. And that political decision resulted in a
desire to go forward through an electoral process and then live
with the results of that electoral process.
And I think those of us who were in Tunisia and saw the
reaction to the assassinations in particular knew that this
society and the political leaders in the society and the
religious and business leaders in the society knew that they
had the challenge to come together or else they would lose
their country.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Before yielding
back, I just would like to note that while we have enjoyed two
hearings together today, I do not believe we will have a
hearing tomorrow together, which makes this the most opportune
time to wish you a happy early birthday. And I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thirty-nine again. Do you believe it, Mr.
Deutch?
Mr. Deutch. Another anniversary.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. You don't believe it, I know. Thank you,
Ted. And now I will yield my time to Mr. Wilson, who is not
here. Mr. Trott.
Mr. Trott. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I want to thank the
ranking member as well for holding this hearing. And I
apologize I came late and did not hear some of your statements,
gentlemen. So if I ask questions that you covered, it is a
scheduling issue here in Congress.
And my question is to any member of the panel. How big of a
problem is corruption in Tunisia? Obviously, we have never
successfully solved the problem in Afghanistan. I am just
curious how big of a hurdle, an obstacle that will be going
forward?
Ambassador Green. I think corruption is a very significant
problem in the country. Again, it dates back quite some ways,
but certainly rose to its peak under Ben Ali and the
authoritarian regime that he led. And it has stifled
individuality, entrepreneurship, and touched nearly every
aspect of Tunisian life.
That is why organizations like those represented here
believe so strongly in the need to work on democracy and
governance and build government capacity. It really gives them
the tools and the ability to take on these issues. It is hard
to see them succeeding if they don't.
Mr. Campbell. You know, I agree, although I would say that,
you know, having traveled the world a lot, Tunisia doesn't feel
immediately as corrupt as you might find say in Afghanistan,
just as an example, in terms of the day to day feeling.
What I view as the bigger issue, and I think many Tunisians
will express this maybe in slightly different terms than I do,
is the economy is run on the basis of cartels, franchises,
concessions. You know, it is crony capitalism. So certain
families. If you are in the right family and you get the right
conferred by the government to have a, you know, monopoly over
cement production or something like that, you are filthy rich,
and everyone associated with you is filthy rich.
And I think the prevailing feeling in Tunisia is if you
aren't in those circles, then you are really in deep trouble
and you are, you know, scraping and so on. And if you are not
in the right region, so you are not in the right family, the
right neighborhood, the right region, you feel like you are
shut out and there is no opportunity to get ahead.
So this may sound like Pollyanna-ish sort of thinking, but
the idea of equal opportunity of a meritocracy, for example
government jobs being awarded on the basis of qualifications
rather than some kind of, you know, hand me down, these are
important things. And this is the hard and very unsexy work of
democracy assistance is trying to work on government reforms
that don't simply allow people to give out, you know,
franchises that allow certain people to become billionaires.
So that is the kind of corruption I think is probably more
relevant to this discussion in Tunisia. And it exists there.
Mr. Trott. And is there a desire, Mr. Campbell, by the
business community to try and move away from crony capitalism
and create some equal opportunity?
Mr. Campbell. I actually accompanied Raj Shah when he was
the head of USAID on a trip to Tunisia. And he met with a lot
of business leaders, not something I normally do. But it was
interesting to be a fly on the wall. They talk that way in the
sense that business leaders were looking for modernization. So
for example they were looking for access to capital. You know,
capital is all kind of tied up and hard to get.
They are looking for modern approaches to real estate and
to property ownership and so on. So I think in that sense they
want access to money, they want the modern systems, I think
they would like to join the clubs, the economic clubs around
the world.
But having said that, when you are in those circles you get
a real sense that this is an elite. And you see even with the,
you know, with the now ruling party, I support what they have
done, I think they are doing a good job, but there is a kind of
an unsettling undercurrent within the ruling party of the crony
capitalists having again circled the wagons.
So I think the answer is 50-50. Sure, they would like to
have a modern economy, but I don't think they are going to give
up the monopoly power they have.
Mr. Trott. Does the new constitution make inroads toward
protecting, you know, and addressing some of those issues?
Hopefully, it addresses civil liberties and gender equality,
but how about business concerns?
Mr. Campbell. That is a good question. I don't think I can
answer that accurately. I believe it does, but I haven't looked
at that specifically.
Mr. Sweeney. If I might go back to my prior experience
heading global policy for a Fortune 100 company, it is
hopefully not in the constitution, but in the series of
economic reforms that can be more easily changed in response to
developments within the marketplace.
Constitutional change, as we know in this country, tends to
be very, very difficult. The question becomes around terms of
foreign direct investment. International companies will not
invest in Tunisia's economy as long as it is maintained by
crony capitalists who are circles and families and cartels,
which is an appropriate description.
I think, as, going back to Ambassador Green's statement,
there are a number of important reforms underway in the
Tunisian process, which hopefully will attract foreign
investment. Foreign investment is as much under attack as the
tourist industry, because you are not going to invest where you
don't think there is security to set up an organization and
your people are safe. That is as much a threat of the
terrorism.
However, going to your question, there is hope for Tunisia
because making a great deal of progress, and one of the
national conversations they have been having at the legislative
and political level is how do we make Tunisia attractive for
foreign investment so that other companies and other countries
can invest and create jobs here?
Mr. Trott. Madam Chairwoman, I see my time has expired, but
I just have one other question. You know, the border security
issue is particularly acute given the threats from Libya. Is
the U.S. doing enough?
And how can Tunisia improve its border security, which I
think is a key part of the success going forward? Particularly
if the U.S. is doing enough. That is the question I want to
hear answered.
Mr. Zelin. Yeah, the Tunisian Government has been doing a
lot more related to the border security with Libya, in
particular in the past 6 months or so, starting in February
when they sent more reenforcements from various parts of the
security apparatus, and now they have announced only last week
that they are trying to put up a border fence as well as in
some areas sort of a moat between the borders.
But the reality is, is that, it is not just necessarily an
issue of people that are going to Libya and getting training
going back. You have individuals who are already in the country
that have access to weapons or people that are coming from
Algeria, so it is not just a Libya issue here.
It is sort of a wholistic approach that needs to be taken,
and, you know, obviously helping out with the border security
is definitely something the U.S. has already been doing with
drones, aerial surveillance, I believe, already. And I know
that the Algerians have been assisting with the Tunisian
Government a lot on these issues as well, since they do share a
border.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Trott. Thank you gentlemen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Trott. Mr. Connolly of
Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And welcome to
our panel. To pick up on the sort of the Libya aspect here, if
you look at Tunisia and Libya, they are both overwhelmingly
Sunni Muslim population, 97 and 98 percent. Libya's GDP per
capita is actually higher. It is 6623 with a literacy rate of
91 percent. Tunisia is 4,415 and 80 percent respectively. And
the female literacy gap is actually less severe in Libya.
So there are a lot of commonalities here. What is the
nature of the divergence? Is it the violent history? Is it
Qadhafi? Why are we seeing two very different paths with these
two neighboring nations? Mr. Zelin.
Mr. Zelin. I think one of biggest ones is that, unlike Ben
Ali, who actually abdicated his power and went to Saudi Arabia,
and the military didn't intervene but allowed sort of a
transitional process to begin, in Libya of course as we know,
Qadhafi wasn't interested at all in losing any power, and he
went all the way until he got killed. I think that that is one
of the biggest differences.
And then as a result of that you have seen trends add on
top of there exponentially from there in part because then
there became a huge weapons bazaar in Libya and therefore a
proliferation of different militias.
And part of it, too, is that historically Libya or Qadhafi
the way he ruled, sort of ruled different tribes as well as
regions of the countries against each other, and that is why
you are sort of seeing these different battles between
different parts of Libya.
Whereas in Tunisia, obviously there has been issues between
sort of the coastal and interior, but it is just different
historically.
Mr. Campbell. If I can jump in, I mean, I think there is an
obvious answer and then a couple less obvious answers. I the
obvious difference is the French Colonial history. And one of
the, you know, leftovers of that or leave-behinds, as well as
enlightened Tunisian leadership in the 1950s and 1960s was a
series of institutions, including civil Saudi institutions like
trade unions. And so there was some sort of glue that held the
country together. So that is kind of an obvious one. But I
think it is important. We could tease it out, but it is very
important.
The second big difference is the tribal makeup of Libya.
Traditionally territories that were very, very separate, ruled
as fiefdoms by tribes, kind of artificially stitched together.
And I think if you take the tribal nature versus Tunisia, which
was much more urban, much, much more urban, much less tribal,
so if you take the existing institutions which came in part
because of Colonialism, but also because of a very a, you know,
very strong national structure, and then look at the tribalism
of Tunisia with absolutely no institutions, those are the two
big things that explain the differences.
Mr. Connolly. Yeah. Ambassador Green.
Ambassador Green. Thank you. I was struck by, in the days
leading up to the election, we asked the acting President
whether Tunisia could serve as a model for the region, and he
said no, not a model; maybe an inspiration. And I thought that
was right.
Tunisia in a number of ways is unique. The process that
they undertook after Ben Ali fled, was a remarkable one. I
think for all of us as observers watching the long process of
the forums, the public forums they held around the country, I
or I and NDI partnered in most of those forums. They listened
patiently and took input, and they seemed to sincerely process
that input. They were very cognizant of those youthful crowds
that took to the streets in 2011.
So I think there were a number of steps that they took
early on that created a unique mix. I think they are right. I
am not sure we would ever say, okay, let's take this model and
transplant it next-door. But I think the spirit and the ethos
that has been brought to bear is something hopefully that can
be fostered elsewhere.
And again, I think what you are hearing from us over and
over again is we all look at this as a place where something
good has happened through patient, persistent Tunisian-led
work. We should never impose anything upon them, but where they
are reaching out for help, as they are, we have a tremendous
opportunity to help foster this and to reenforce it so that as
the difficult challenges come up--and they are facing them
right now--this special model that they have created can
survive.
Mr. Connolly. My time is up, but I think the point you make
is a very good one, Mr. Ambassador, your two organizations, NDI
and IRI, working around the world, I think you are right. It is
not necessarily a model, but within the Tunisian experience,
there are things that can be replicated or at least benchmarked
against.
And that is what we, I hope, can identify as the evolution
continues so that others can benefit from the experience
without slavishly saying it ought to be like Tunisia. Thank
you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly, very much. Dr.
Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I appreciate you all
being here. This is a good hearing because we see this as a
fledgling democracy growing in an area that they are not very
well welcomed. And I see the biggest threat is, you know, the
surrounding countries see Tunisia as an example of, you know,
freedom, liberty, starting to develop, and it scares them; and
so they are going to do everything they can to erode that.
What can we do? And I know this question was asked earlier.
Is there more that we can do or the Tunisian Government asking
us, what would be probably the most significant benefit that we
can afford them to help them keep their democracy going? Mr.
Sweeney, if you want to start.
Mr. Sweeney. Thank you, sir. The quick answer is there is
always more, and particularly in the area of economic
assistance, both in terms of direct grants, as well as helping
with the Tunisia investment funds and a number of other areas.
In terms of security, I will defer to my colleague in terms
of democracy and governance. Ambassador Green noted in his
testimony that only 16 percent of programming is right now
directed toward democracy and governance activities. And if we
are to help keep Tunisians on the path toward democracy and
full engagement in their society, we suggest there is more that
can be done there as well.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. Ambassador Green, let me ask you, because
you were talking about--I lost my train of thought--you were
talking about how the democracy was coming up, and there was a
lot of corruption in the government--I think it was you--and
that a lot of the people at the top were wealthy and they were,
you know, crony capitalism.
How do you change that dynamic to where the people on the
lower income scales seize opportunity? Because without
opportunity, it is hard to support a government like that. What
are we doing to change that--not we because I think the more we
meddle, the more it gets messed up. What are they doing to
change that internally?
Ambassador Green. Well, and I think my colleague, Les
Campbell, put it well. The type of corruption they have is a
crony capitalism and is a cartel-dominated system. So much of
the Arab Spring which began here was out of frustration for
lack of opportunity.
So I think what we can do is help to provide support for
the fundamental policy reforms in the economy that they need to
take and which they know they need to take. So we have to help
them undertake those reforms to get rid of this stifling
bureaucracy that is a holdover from the Ben Ali days so that
young people--they have a very high percentage of college
graduates. They have an exceptionally good education system in
that sense.
But they have got this large population of college
graduates, fairly well-educated, know there is something
better, and are on the outside because they aren't one of those
big families, as Les made reference to.
The government knows that we need to provide the technical
assistance and the training as well as the investment to stand
behind them as they get rid of this bureaucracy and create a
vibrancy that will create a hope for the future.
Mr. Yoho. And let me ask, with the war going on in Syria, I
just read an article that, I think, 33 Tunisians left to go to
Libya for training to join ISIS and that the recruiters are
being paid $3,000 to $10,000 per recruit; and when you are in a
country that has 33 percent unemployment in the youth, I mean,
that is attractive.
If the Syrian civil war, if we were to negotiate some type
of negotiation through the U.N. With other nations to bring
that to an end, would that help the situation in Tunisia? Mr.
Campbell, you want to weigh in on that.
Mr. Campbell. I think I would defer to Mr. Zelin on that
one since he studies this specifically but----
Mr. Yoho. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Zelin. You know, there are so many individuals involved
in this movement now, that even with the Syrian conflict
ending, which it doesn't seem like it is going to happen any
time soon, I still think it is going to be an issue. And I have
actually met Tunisians that have fought in Syria and returned
to Tunisia; and some of them went purely for economic reasons
because then they are able to provide remittances to their
parents.
So, while there definitely people that go for ideological
reasons, at least in the case of Tunisia, some go for economic
reasons, too.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. And this is kind of off the mark here, but
with the Iran nuclear negotiation and Iran going to gain more
power and hegemony in the Middle East, how do you see this
affecting the situation in Tunisia where fledgling democracy is
trying to rise up, promoting liberties and freedoms different
than what is normal in that situation, and do you think Iran
will stand by and allow that to happen?
Mr. Campbell. Maybe I will take a crack at this somewhat,
but just to mention something that we haven't brought up
because this is about Tunisia, but North Africa, or the
Maghreb, we think of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. They have
many things in common, including the French language, but the
big thing that they have in common is that they are all staunch
U.S. allies; so you do have a very strong series of three
countries together, very strong U.S. allies, very much anti-
Iran, no question. I mean I don't think you would find any
sympathy for Iran in any way, shape, or form, in any part of
society in Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia.
These are countries that want and choose to be close to the
U.S., to Western partners. They are countries that want and
accept all sorts of security assistance and so on. And the
countries, Morocco and Tunisia particularly, that have the
express desire and goal of transitioning to democracies.
So I think my answer is it is a little bit broad because
Iran is so far away from them, but my answer would be these are
bulwarks against the kind of extremism we are trying to fight.
They are U.S. Allies, and they are looking and asking for
assistance, so it is a wonderful opening.
And the three countries together, if they were to
economically integrate more, could become a powerful and
attractive force.
Mr. Yoho. Let's hope they do that and that democracy shows
and shines over there of what freedom does. And I appreciate
it. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Dr. Yoho. Mr. Clawson.
Mr. Clawson. What percent of the population would you all
estimate is sympathetic, supportive of extremists that have
violent goals? And if someone else has already asked that, I
apologize for coming in a little bit late, but that tells me
what kind of fertilizer is in the country. Right? So go ahead.
Mr. Zelin. I can try and answer this sort of by proxy. So
from about April 2011 until the end of August 2013, there is an
organization in the country called Ansar al-Sharia, and it was
openly able to proselytize its ideas without much government
intervention until they designated a group at the end of August
2013.
And during their second conference, which was the last
conference they were able to hold, there was about 40,000
individuals that attended it. They were going to have a third
conference in May 2013, but the government didn't allow it, and
they said that potentially up to 100,000 people were going to
attend. Of course, it is difficult to verify because it didn't
happen, but the country has about, I believe, 11 million
people; so that is maybe 1 percent at best, if you are doing
the most liberal estimate.
So it is really not that many individuals. And the thing to
remember about Ansar al-Sharia is some of these people got
involved just more for the proselytization aspects of it and
not necessarily for the violent aspects that happened
afterwards, because after the group was designated, many
individuals actually quit the organization because they didn't
want to be involved in the violent parts.
Mr. Clawson. Everybody agree with that?
Mr. Campbell. I would just add one thing to this.
Unfortunately it is hard to really quantify, but people are
always struggling to find reasons why young Tunisians go abroad
and join jihadist groups. I think there are many reasons, and
we have tried to address some of those today, and other
members, Representatives, have mentioned some of this as well.
But one of the reasons that is put forward by Tunisians
that Tunisians go abroad is that there is not a lot of support
for violent jihadi talk and behavior in Tunisia. Certainly it
happens. We have seen these attacks, but it is not embraced and
accepted. And there are a lot of other countries in the region
where you can join a group and be open about it and sort of
brag about being violent and killing people, and it is not a
problem.
In Tunisia that is not an acceptable thing. And so, again,
I don't know how that translates into numbers; but at least for
right now, Tunisia is not an enabling environment, and it is
exporting people because people that feel that way have to go
elsewhere. It is not the only reason they go elsewhere, but it
is part of the reason they go elsewhere.
Mr. Clawson. So there is not a certain portion of the
mosques or others where there was open celebration to what
occurred?
Mr. Campbell. I can't answer specifically. I am not aware
of that. I mean, I look at the Tunisian news. If it happened,
it wasn't very obvious.
Ambassador Green. If I can, I think it is very hard to get
specific numbers to think of it in those terms, but what I
think you can do is look at the outside objective indicators.
This is the country that is constructed by popular assent, the
most moderate constitution in the region. In the Arab world, a
constitution which protects freedom of religion, that is
remarkably progressive in so many ways, enshrined the role of
women.
So in the constitution, which they adopted by vote, it
would certainly push back and be contrary to the extremism that
we have seen in so many other places. And I found what Les said
intriguing. Maybe that is one of the reasons why it is such a
big source of foreign fighters in Syria. But the logical
conclusion of that is when one day that conflict in Syria ends
or winds down, we do have to think about what happens when they
come back, and that will be a threat to the institutions in
Tunisia because some of them will have been radicalized by
their involvement in Syria. Again, another, I think,
opportunity for the U.S. as a friend to offer assistance and to
help as we can.
Mr. Clawson. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Clawson.
And we are in the midst of votes. We have 5 minutes left,
so I will not be able to ask my questions, but I had the honor
of visiting Tunisia with Speaker Boehner in a CODEL he led just
a few months ago. It was after the museum attack and before
this latest attack, and it certainly is a land of great
promise; so we will pray and work for the people of Tunisia and
throughout the region.
Thank you gentlemen, for your time and for sharing your
wisdom with us. And with that the subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:17 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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