[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL CAMP DAVID
SUMMIT: ANY RESULTS?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 9, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-68
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
TOM EMMER, MinnesotaUntil 5/18/
15 deg.
DANIEL DONOVAN, New YorkAs
of 5/19/15 deg.
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina GRACE MENG, New York
TED S. YOHO, Florida LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Michael Eisenstadt, Kahn Fellow, Director, Military and
Security Studies Program, The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy.................................................... 6
Mr. J. Matthew McInnis, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise
Institute...................................................... 13
David Andrew Weinberg, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Foundation for
Defense of Democracies......................................... 23
Kenneth Katzman, Ph.D., Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs,
Congressional Research Service................................. 62
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Michael Eisenstadt: Prepared statement....................... 9
Mr. J. Matthew McInnis: Prepared statement....................... 15
David Andrew Weinberg, Ph.D.: Prepared statement................. 25
Kenneth Katzman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 64
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 92
Hearing minutes.................................................. 93
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 94
THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL CAMP DAVID SUMMIT: ANY RESULTS?
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THURSDAY, JULY 9, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:19 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. This subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and ranking member, my good friend,
Ted Deutch, for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I
will then recognize any other members seeking recognition for 1
minute. We will then hear from our witnesses. Thank you for
your patience. We had unscheduled votes come up, and we were
there for 45 minutes, so we thank you for that.
Without objection, your prepared statements will be made a
part of the record, and members may have 5 days to insert
statements and questions for the record subject to the length
and limitations in the rules.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
As we continue to analyze the impact of a weak nuclear deal
with Iran, it is important to examine how the Gulf Cooperation
Council, the GCC, will be directly impacted by these policy
decisions. There is no question that our relationships with the
Gulf countries have been severely strained in recent years. It
should be no surprise that our Gulf allies believe that the
United States has turned its back on them, and that we are not
committed to seeking stability in the Middle East.
First, by signaling a preference to focus attention outside
of the Middle East with the so-called ``Asia pivot''; second,
by initiating naive rapprochement with Iran; and third, by not
following through on the President's red lines in Syria. So
that was the backdrop of the Camp David Summit that occurred
with the GCC just 2 months ago. GCC countries see the desire to
legitimize Iran as a power and counterweight in the region as
the motivation for current U.S. policy, a policy that
destabilizes the region as we see Iranian influence expand in
Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon, in Yemen, and elsewhere. They see
the failure to take a strong stance against Iran's ally, Assad,
or to enforce the red line against the use of chemical weapons
as evidence of the desire not to upset Iran.
And let's not be fooled, any signing bonus or currency
injection going to Iran from sanctions relief will be spent on
Iran fomenting hegemonic ambitions in the region, which is
another cause for concern for the GCC countries. At a time when
we need as many partners as possible in the fight against ISIL
and in the fight against Iran's support for terror, now is not
the time for the administration to be alienating some of the
GCC members, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who have been
part of the coalition against ISIL and have helped launch
strikes against the terror group in Syria.
The GCC countries have also led the coalition against the
Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen, while we continue to ignore
Iran's meddling in regional issues. So how does the
administration respond to these countries that we need as
partners, that we need to trust in the fight against ISIL and
other terror groups? By trying continuously to pursue a nuclear
deal with Iran that they will never accept, only to try to buy
the GCC countries off with sales of advanced military systems.
For years, many of us have said that a nuclear Iran would
lead to a nuclear arms race in the region, and that can still
happen. But now a nuclear deal with Iran is also leading to a
conventional arms race in the region. So while on one hand the
U.S. was partially responsible for giving legitimacy to Iran
and letting it become a larger menace in the region, on the
other hand the U.S. is trying to sell these military systems to
act as a deterrent against Iran. Instead of just trying to
prevent the problem in the first place, the administration has
chosen to treat the symptoms without addressing the underlying
disease.
I also recognize that not all of the GCC countries have
been ideal partners, and some haven't taken the necessary steps
to stop terror financing and the undermining of U.S. national
security interests. I am concerned that while some GCC
countries will use our additional weapons for good and as
partners in the fight against ISIL, others are only using this
as an excuse to get arms for their own purposes.
In addition, human rights and the rule of law concerns
continue in some GCC countries, but they have figured out our
playbook. As long as they provide the U.S. with bases and are
willing to host our troops, they know that the U.S. will look
the other way when it comes to their many transgressions.
The other concern I have is with the objective of the most
recent Camp David Summit and how it relates to Israel's
qualitative military edge. We must be mindful that upholding
Israel's qualitative military edge is the law of the land. Yet,
many in the public did not notice that when the President
signed the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act in December
2014, which was sponsored by Congressman Deutch and me, the
President issued a signing statement saying that his
administration would not implement the section that pertains to
Israel's qualitative military edge. That is very concerning.
What kind of message are we sending to our greatest major
strategic partner in the Middle East, the democratic Jewish
state of Israel. We need to take these military sales requests
on a case-by-case basis.
Some GCC countries have been at the forefront of leading
the fight against ISIL, which is a positive step forward. With
ongoing military operations in Yemen, Libya and throughout the
region, some GCC countries have shown that they have the
political will and they have the dedication to take this fight
head on, and these countries should be supported.
We should be renewing our commitment to the Middle East and
our GCC allies and combating Iranian aggression, not pulling
back from this critical region of the world. And with that, I
turn to my friend, the ranking member, Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Thank you
for calling today's hearing.
The announcement that President Obama would be convening
GCC leaders at Camp David came on the heels of the April
nuclear framework agreement with Iran. There was, in no
uncertain terms, meant to reassure our allies that any
impending deal would not result in greater Iranian interference
or destabilization in the Middle East. I know that when this
hearing was first noticed, we expected to be examining U.S.-
Gulf relations in the wake of a final Iran nuclear deal. We are
still waiting to hear whether P5+1 negotiators will reach a
deal, and whether or not that deal would be acceptable, not
just to Members of this Congress, but to our allies in the
region.
However, Camp David Summit didn't just focus on Iran, and
today's hearing provides us with an opportunity to assess the
ways in which we can bolster cooperation with the GCC countries
to enhance our mutual security concerns and strategic
objectives on a range of issues. There has been--there is no
doubt that there have been growing pains in our relations with
the GCC in recent years, and there has been frustrations on
both sides. The United States was deeply troubled by the early
financing of extremist elements on the fight against Assad by
some Gulf actors. The GCC countries, in turn, have been
frustrated with what they perceive as a lack of action by the
U.S. against Assad.
The GCC has been wary of American engagement with Iran. The
U.S. has struggled to strengthen and reassure our partners,
while also balancing what are legitimate human rights concerns.
But as with any relationship, we have got to be able to air
these grievances while also looking for ways to move forward
together to confront our shared challenges.
The question is, did Camp David do enough to put us back on
the right path. Current U.S.-GCC relations have been dominated
by the Iranian nuclear threat in the fight against ISIS. Gulf
states are allied in the coalition to fight ISIS, but it
appears some countries have not fully lived up to their
commitments to coalition. Nonetheless, continued GCC support in
terms of intelligence sharing, stopping ISIS financing, and
preventing foreign fighters from joining ISIS are critical to
our efforts.
We continue to cooperate against Iran's terror proxy,
Hezbollah, and our efforts to keep it from propping up the
Assad regime and expanding its regional influence. These
concerns are also shared by our ally, Israel. The unique
alignment of security concerns for the Gulf and Israel have
presented U.S. with an opportunity to foster greater regional
cooperation. It was revealed in June that an unprecedented five
bilateral meetings had been held between Israelis and Saudis to
address the Iran threat.
So how do we move forward together to serve our mutual
interests? Camp David Summit resulted in agreement to bolster
defense sales. Some argue that increased sales to the GCC
countries are beneficial because they not only increase our
interoperability, but because these are foreign military sales,
meaning that they are not paid for with U.S.-provided security
assistance. So they are a boon to the American economy.
There are those who argue that if American made equipment
is not for sale, our friends will turn elsewhere. In this
increasingly volatile region, we do need to ensure our allies
can both be active participants in combating shared threats,
and also maintain their own defenses. Of course, any serious
increase in these sales must carefully be vetted to ensure that
Israel retains its qualitative military edge.
However, while defense sales have been a pillar of our
relationship with the GCC countries, it cannot be the only leg
on which these relationships stand. I was pleased to see the
GCC summit include commitments to also increase maritime
security, cyber security, and counterterrorism cooperation.
These, too, are critical pieces of the security puzzle.
The Iranian navy is well-funded and active. The U.S., in
conjunction with our partners, must be able to patrol the Gulf,
particularly in Strait of Hormuz. Just a few months ago, we saw
Iran illegally detain and board a commercial vessel passing
through the Strait. And as Mr. Katzman notes, one-third of the
internationally traded oil flows through that Strait. In
addition, we share with the GCC a serious and real concern
about Iran's regional meddling. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, in
particular, have accused Iran of stirring dissent among their
populations.
In Yemen, Iran has long backed the Houthi rebels. And as
the Houthis move to depose the U.S.-backed Hadi Government,
Saudi Arabia intervened. Many saw this move by Saudi Arabia as
a reaction to years of U.S. prodding to take a greater
leadership role in regional security.
Outside of the security realm, there are additional steps
that can be taken to strengthen the GCC. If the price of oil
remains low, the GCC countries could lose over $200 billion,
according to recent reports. Strengthening U.S. Gulf economic
ties outside of the oil trade could help offset the deepened
oil prices. As many GCC countries look to diversify their
economies, there are numerous opportunities for cooperation on
science and technology. In fact, many U.S. universities have
built campuses in recent years in cities like Abu Dhabi and
Doha.
Finally, we have to have constructive dialogue with our
partners. While some saw the absence of several heads of state
from the Camp David Summit as a blow to the administration, the
opportunity for the President of the United States to speak
directly with GCC top leadership was tremendously important. As
I said before, as important as it is to present a united front
with our allies, we won't agree on everything. So for the Gulf
states, they must be able to share concerns about the
implications of a potential Iran deal on regional
proliferation, or the impact sanctions relief could have on
Iran's ability to export terror.
Equally, we must have avenues to address our concerns about
human rights violations. I believe in the importance of our
relationships with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Oman, and
Kuwait. I want to see these relationships stabilize and
strengthen both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis, and I
believe Camp David was a good first step. But to sustain this
progress, we have to make a real commitment on both sides to
continue cooperation and consultation. I look forward to
discussing with our panel the ways in which we can help to
encourage that process. And I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch, for your
statement. Mr. Weber of Texas is recognized.
Mr. Weber. Madam Chair, I am ready to listen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. That is very charming of you. Thank you.
Mr. Boyle, we are ready to listen to you.
Mr. Boyle. Well, now that really makes me look bad for
wanting to say something.
Mr. Weber. I am reclaiming my time--no.
Mr. Boyle. I will just briefly say, I want to associate
myself with the very thoughtful comments of Mr. Deutch, and I
am very interested in this topic, especially the fact that this
was when they were at Camp David, and for a fairly significant
amount of time, this was much in the news and now has largely
been forgotten. Certainly, whatever comes about in this part of
the world and whatever resolution we may or may not reach with
Iran will affect our partners and Saudi Arabia, and in the
broader Arabian peninsula and what actions they may take in
response. So making sure that we maintain a close relationship
with them is of vital U.S. importance, and with that, I will
yield 6 seconds back. So I almost didn't speak, but----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, after your critical Oreo speech on
the floor----
Mr. Boyle. Thank you. Say no to Oreo.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. That was riveting. We all were attuned to
that. That is an inside joke. We will explain later.
We are so pleased to introduce our witnesses. First, we
would like to welcome Mr. Michael Eisenstadt, who is the Kahn
fellow and director of the Washington Institute, Military and
Security Studies Program.
Mr. Eisenstadt is a specialist in Persian Gulf security
affairs. And, previously, he served as an officer in the U.S.
Army Reserves and as a military analyst with the U.S.
Government.
Thank you for your service, Mr. Eisenstadt.
Second, we welcome back Mr. Matthew McInnis, who is a
resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute where he
focuses on regional security issues of the Persian Gulf. Prior
to this, Mr. McInnis served as a senior analyst at the U.S.
Central Command and on leadership and advisory positions for
the multi-national force in Iraq.
Thank you.
Next, we welcome Dr. David Andrew Weinberg, who is a senior
fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies where his
primary research is on Saudi Arabia and Gulf affairs. He was a
professional staffer for this committee and survived that, and
he was a visiting fellow at the UCLA Center for Middle East
Development.
Welcome back, Dr. Weinberg.
And last, but certainly not least, we really welcome back
Dr. Kenneth Katzman, who serves as a senior Middle East analyst
for the Congressional Research Service. Formally, Mr. Katzman
was an analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency and also
worked as a consultant for the defense industry for 2 years.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. And we would love to
hear from you. Feel free to summarize.
Let me just ask 1 second, if Mr. Connolly would like to
make an opening statement. We would be honored to hear from
you, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I think in order
to get on with the hearing, I will dispense with an opening
statement. Obviously, we are quite interested in the reaction
of the GCC. We have heard lots of speculation this morning
about what the reaction might be in the event of a successful
negotiated agreement, but would be delighted to hear from this
panel in terms of their points of view.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
So, Mr. Eisenstadt, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL EISENSTADT, KAHN FELLOW, DIRECTOR,
MILITARY AND SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE
FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Eisenstadt. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member
Deutch, distinguished subcommittee members, thank you for
inviting me to testify on the state of U.S.-GCC relations. It
is an honor for me to be here. The high-level summit in Camp
David last May with leaders of the six GCC states focused on
assuring them that the U.S. remains committed to their
security, while winning their support for the nuclear deal
being negotiated with Iran. A joint statement released at the
Summit included U.S. security assurances to the GCC and
described the outlines of ``a new U.S.-GCC strategic
partnership,'' that committed the United States and the GCC to
enhance cooperation in a number of areas.
While many of the announced measures would mark a step
forward in U.S.-GCC relations, much will depend on follow-
through in the months and years to come. Particularly with
regard to countering Iran's destabilizing activities in the
region. This is a central concern of Gulf leaders who are
already deeply concerned about Iran's growing regional
influence, and who are worried that in the event of a long-term
nuclear accord between the P5+1 and Iran, the latter would use
funds obtained through sanctions relief and its status as a
nuclear threshold state to further advance its regional agenda.
Absent action on this front, many of the announced steps
are unlikely to have significant impact on the broader fabric
of U.S.-GCC relations. The roots of the growing distrust
between the two sides can be traced to the 2003 invasion of
Iraq and the perception that much of the region that the United
States had to either incompetence or design turned over Iraq to
the Shiites and Iran. This was reinforced by the widespread
perception in the GCC and among other regional allies that when
it entered office, the Obama administration too eagerly courted
traditional enemies, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran at
the expense of its traditional allies, and too quickly
abandoned traditional allies, such as Hosni Mubarak during the
initial phases of what was then called the Arab Spring.
So to be fair, there was really not all that much, I think,
that the U.S. could have done differently with regard to
Mubarak. This destructive dynamic was further strengthened by
the Obama administration's tendency to frame and implement
measures to assure the GCC states in ways that tended to
exacerbate rather than allay their fears. This is best
illustrated by the following examples: First, in recent years,
the United States has sold tens of billions of dollars in arms
to its Gulf Arab allies. The intent has been to assure them by
enhancing their ability to deter and counter external
aggression.
Yet Tehran is then likely to engage in the conduct of
conventional aggression that would provide its neighbors and
the United States with reason to respond by conventional means.
It is much more likely to engage in subversion and proxy
warfare as it has done in the past and continue to do today.
And in light of the administration's announced rebalance to
Asia and the President's statement in an interview with Thomas
Friedman in April, that ``The U.S.'s core interests in the
region are not oil,'' GCC leaders may view large U.S. arms
sales less as a tangible expression of enduring commitment than
a sign that Americais providing its friends with the means to
fend for themselves as it prepares to leave the region.
Second, while the United States has drawn down its presence
in Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years, it has increased other
aspects of its presence around the Gulf as part of its efforts
to assure allies and deter Iran. Yet, there is no sign that the
large post-1991 U.S. military presence in the Gulf deterred
Iran from using proxies to target U.S. interests in the region
and elsewhere. Furthermore, our GCC allies are frequently
reminded by U.S. officials that America continues to maintain
some 35,000 servicemembers in the region, but this has led them
to question the purpose of such a large show of presence at a
time when Iran and Hezbollah's intervention has contributed to
the death of more than 200,000 Syrians, mostly Sunni civilians,
amid U.S. inaction.
And even when Washington finally did act against ISIL, it
did so at least initially on behalf of beleaguered Iraqi
minorities, the Yazidis in Sinjar, Turkmens at Amerli, and
Kurds in Erbil, rather than Sunni Arabs.
Third, while President Obama declared in January 2012 that
if Tehran tried to build a nuclear weapon, the U.S. would use
all its means at its disposal to prevent it from doing so.
Since then, he has tended to couch his threats in passive
language that conveys more ambivalence than resolve. Thus, in a
March 2012 interview with Jeffrey Goldberg he stated, when the
U.S. says it is unacceptable for Iran to have nuclear weapons,
we mean what we say.
In sum, the U.S. has a credibility deficit with its GCC
partners that threatens its interests and endangers its allies
in the region. The steps it has taken in the past to assure its
GCC allies, arms transfers, forward presence, and red lines,
often fail to allay their doubts and frequently compounded
their fears. In this light, the steps promised at a Camp David
Summit do not constitute a game changer in U.S.-GCC relations,
because the joint statement is so vague regarding specific
steps to counter Iran's destabilizing activities. Only by
pushing back against Iran's efforts to expand its regional
influence can Washington hope to restore its credibility.
There is no reason that such a policy cannot go hand and in
with engaging Iran, just as the U.S. pushed back against Soviet
aggression while engaging Moscow during the Cold War. For as
much it may be in the American interest to conclude a long-term
nuclear accord with Tehran, it is also U.S. interest to curb
Iranian activities that fuel sectarian violence, contribute to
the appeal of groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS and
ultimately threaten the stability and security and of the U.S.
allies in the region. Such a policy would also go a long way
toward repairing ties with traditional allies in the part of
the world that still very much matters to U.S. security. I
apologize for going over.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Eisenstadt follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. It was fine. Thank you so much.
Mr. McInnis.
STATEMENT OF MR. J. MATTHEW MCINNIS, RESIDENT FELLOW, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. McInnis. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to testify here today on the impact of the
potential nuclear deal on our allies from the Gulf Cooperation
Council. And let me begin with how Iran perceives this changing
strategic environment and their contest with the Gulf states.
Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has sought to spread its
concepts of Islamic governance and to assert its regional
hegemony by displacing the United States as the dominant power.
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, countering the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states has dominated Iran's
regional calculations. Saudi Arabia poses a unique ideological
challenge to Tehran's attempts to assert its leadership in the
Muslim world. The GCC states are increasingly alarmed about
expanding Iranian influence in the Middle East, but seem unable
to develop an effective means to push back against Tehran's
growing influence and power.
For the past 36 years, Tehran has pursued its objectives
against the GCC primarily through clandestine operations. In
particular, Iran has utilized its resistance network of
partners, proxies, and terrorist groups, including Lebanese's
Hezbollah and others, while employing a suite of deterrence
capabilities, including ballistic missiles and asymmetric naval
platforms. With the new Saudi leadership under King Salman,
Tehran is recalculating its threat perceptions and response.
Iranian leaders worry that the GCC's expanded interventions in
Yemen and Syria come as a result of U.S. encouragement perhaps
at the Camp David Summit for the Gulf states to take a more
leading role in countering Iran's destabilizing activities. A
more active Saudi Arabia poses a risk to Iran's long-term
objectives. Tehran may even be worried that Saudi Arabia,
underwritten by its own financial holdings and U.S. military
support, will begin using the IRGC's own playbook of regional
proxy warfare against Iran. Considering these fears, it is
important for us to look at how a nuclear deal will impact
Iran's strategy toward the GCC and the rest of the region.
Supreme Leader Khamenei has not shown any indication that a
nuclear deal will fundamentally alter Iran's regional policies
toward the United States, our allies in the Gulf, and even
Israel. The IRGC may initially become even more assertive
against the GCC, the United States or Israel, as the Iranian
leadership tries to establish its anti-Western and an anti-
Zionist credentials following a nuclear deal. Tehran, however,
will likely try to limit any resulting conflict escalation that
could credibly endanger the world power's support for the
agreement, especially with a new U.S. President entering office
in 2017.
The bulk of Iran's estimated $150 billion windfall from a
nuclear deal will likely go to internal economic investment as
the U.S. administration argues. This does not mean that the
Iranian leadership will not have access to billions more to
allocate to the IRGC's efforts in Iraq, Syria, and around the
region. We should not underestimate how far Iran will go to
defend its interests in Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad, as well
as to attempt to expand its activities in Yemen, Bahrain, the
Palestinian territories, and elsewhere.
More critically, if the IRGC decides to send actual combat
forces into Syria to fight the GCC or Turkish-backed opposition
groups, or into Iraq to fight ISIL, we risk potential serious
miscalculations by Turkey, the GCC, or Israel. The United
States must be prepared for and try to prevent, if possible,
escalation by these regional powers in response to a direct
Iranian intervention. With this in mind, here are four
recommendations that the United States should consider to best
support our allies in the region: First, prevent the
conventional forces' balance of power in the Gulf from eroding
in Iran's favor, which a removal of the conventional arms
embargo would do, which is being discussed potentially in
Vienna. Congress should carefully scrutinize the Iranian
nuclear deal to mitigate any weakening of the arms embargo or
missile technology import restrictions that are currently in
place. Second, reinforce the U.S. commitment to the region's
security through enhanced defense agreements with the GCC,
mindful to maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge. We
may want to consider elevating the relationship by signing
security treaties, but should avoid pursuing concepts such as a
nuclear umbrella. Third, help the GCC develop better asymmetric
warfare capabilities for both defensive and potentially
offensive capabilities.
President Obama's comments at the Camp David Summit implied
that the Gulf states already have sufficient resources to push
back against Iran's destabilizing activities in the region. We
need to go further. The United States and the GCC have a shared
interest in contesting the IRGC, and formation of an Arab rapid
reaction force would be a step forward in that directs.
Finally, we should focus diplomatic, legislative,
intelligence, and military strategies for shaping the post-2025
environment, once Iranian uranium enrichment and nuclear
research and development restrictions expire under a potential
deal, to ensure Iran remains deterred from achieving a nuclear
weapon. This should include ensuring that the United States
maintains a robust military option to degrade or destroy
Iranian infrastructure.
Taking these steps will help assure our Gulf partners at a
time of increasing doubt about U.S. commitment to their
security as well as mitigate the impact the Iran nuclear deal
will have on our position in the region. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McInnis follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. McInnis.
Dr. Weinberg.
STATEMENT OF DAVID ANDREW WEINBERG, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW,
FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Weinberg. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
this opportunity to testify before you today.
America's relations with the GCC states are on the wrong
track. Each side offers the others some benefits, yet our main
interests continue to go unfulfilled. Today I will cover four
main topics on this regard: Threats from Iran, negligence on
terror finance, religious incitement, and abuses of basic
rights.
On Iran, our Sunni-ruled Gulf allies see the pursuit of a
nuclear bargain with their main enemy and Washington's
disengaged approach to the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen,
and they wonder if they are on the fast track to abandonment.
These states perceive an imminent threat from Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, which, as Mr. McInnis indicated,
will inevitably share in any windfall from sanctions relief.
The U.S. should offer the GCC states explicit commitments
about how we will respond to cheating on a nuclear deal, and
how we will prevent Iran from obtaining the bomb after the deal
begins to sunset. That said, we should also press Riyadh to
take its own confidence-building steps to prove their own
nuclear program will also stay peaceful.
With regard to regional conflicts and Iran's destabilizing
activities, we should strive to get Iran-backed militias in
Iraq off of the front lines in Sunni majority areas of the
country, such as in the effort to retake Ramadi. In Yemen, we
should help make the Saudi-backed arms embargo more
sustainable, specifically by finding ways to mitigate its
significant humanitarian impact.
In Syria we should boost support for the moderate
opposition, including providing air cover where appropriate,
but impose sanctions on groups like Ahrar al-Sham, Jund al-
Aqsa, and the Army of Conquest, urging Gulf states to similarly
choke off support. Unfortunately, in the fight against ISIL and
al-Qaeda, our GCC allies have broken their word in two critical
regards that they pledged on the last anniversary of 9/11: To
end the impunity of terror financiers and to halt the religious
incitement that feeds extremist recruitment.
They agreed to take these steps when they joined the anti-
ISIL coalition, yet still today, little has changed. Last year
America's czar for combating terror finance revealed that the
majority of private support reaching al-Qaeda's core leadership
in Pakistan came from the Gulf. The worst offenders were Qatar
and Kuwait. Yet neither country has taken noteworthy legal
action against individuals on U.S. or U.N. terror lists.
For example, it appears that Muthanna al-Dhari, whom the
U.S. and U.N. charged with providing over $1 million to the
group we now know as ISIL, was let into Qatar yet again last
month since the Camp David Summit, in violation of his U.N.
travel ban, and earlier this year he was hugged and kissed by
the Qatari Emir's father. Kuwait released two men sanctioned by
the U.S. as al-Qaeda financiers several hours after detaining
them. For the fourth time last week, Israel accused another
Hamas operative in Doha of directing a West Bank terror cell,
and I believe Congress can take some constructive steps to
address this challenge. We should not let the Gulf states'
lucrative arms purchases or desire to invest in U.S. assets
crowd terror finance off the agenda, and we should not wait to
insulate our economy from Gulf energy disruptions via a
national strategy for transportation fuel choice.
As for incitement, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have recklessly
supported religious leaders who propagate hatred. To highlight
one example, Representative Deutch, you mentioned U.S. campuses
in Doha, for instance. Yet, we found that the mosque that
serves the U.S. universities in Doha's Education City, campuses
like Northwestern University and Texas A&M, when the mosque was
inaugurated earlier this year, the ceremony was sponsored by
the Emir of Qatar's mother. The preacher who was invited to
give the sermon has memorably called on Qatar TV saying that
Osama bin Laden died with more dignity and honor than any
infidel, such as any Christian, any Jew, any apostate, any
atheist, any Zoroastrians. This is very discouraging rhetoric,
and unfortunately these sorts of clerics have continued to
receive state perks especially from the Saudi and Qatari
Governments, but also from the Governments of Dubai, Kuwait,
and Bahrain as well.
Finally, while President Obama claims that it is important
to have tough conversations with our allies in the Gulf, and
said this in advance of the Camp David Summit, there wasn't
really clear indication in the public view that this sort of
conversation has actually been had. Unfortunately, this is all
too typical for U.S. administrations, both Democrat and
Republican, when it comes to the Gulf. All six GCC states are
systematically demolishing the constituencies needed to move
their countries in a more moderate direction. Washington needs
to get tougher with Gulf security chiefs, whom we treat as
partners against al-Qaeda, yet also preside over the sorts of
egregious rights abuses that we know feeds extremism long term.
Thank you. And with that, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weinberg follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Dr. Weinberg.
Dr. Katzman.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH KATZMAN, PH.D., SPECIALIST IN MIDDLE
EASTERN AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Katzman. Thank you, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking
Member Deutch, distinguished subcommittee members for asking me
to appear on behalf of CRS (Congressional Research Service) on
this important topic. I will summarize my remarks and ask that
my remarks be submitted for the record.
The United States has been a major actor and basically the
guarantor of Gulf security for over 30 years. The United States
still imports more than 15 percent of its oil from the GCC
states. Containing a potential threat for Iran requires
substantial cooperation with the GCC states. The GCC states
express concern about how a final nuclear agreement with Iran
might affect the region. They assert that broad sanctions
relief will enable Iran to increase its assistance to regional
factions in governments, such as President Assad of Syria, the
Houthi rebels in Yemen, Shiite militia forces in Iraq, Lebanese
Hezbollah, and hard line opposition factions in Bahrain.
Sanctions relief could enable Iran to potentially enable Iran
to modernize its armed forces, possibly to the point where Iran
could deploy a large ground force across the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran, too, now has been hampered by the lack of sea lift and
ability to move across waterways.
The GCC leaders are concerned that a nuclear deal could
lead to a broader improvement in U.S.-Iran relations, but gives
Iran's views in the region increase weight on the U.S.
decision-making apparatus. There is a perception in the Gulf
that the United States, as a consequence of a nuclear deal,
could come to view the Gulf region as secure and walk away and
or reduce--substantially reduce its military presence in the
Gulf. That is a huge concern that the Gulf leaders have.
There are, however, some possible benefits of a nuclear
deal to the GCC. The GCC states conduct extensive trade with
Iran, particularly the UAE. And economic growth in Iran would
enhance, obviously, the economic--this trade and help the GCC
economies. A nuclear agreement could, depending on what
direction Iran goes after a deal, provide some movement,
perhaps, on a political solution in Yemen and some regional
energy projects that have been long discussed but have not
moved forward because of sanctions, such as energy pipeline
linkages between Iran and Kuwait, Iran and Oman, and Iran and
Bahrain.
Iran and the UAE could potentially resolve their
territorial dispute over the three Gulf islands, Abu Musa and
the Tunb islands, which the Shah seized, and the Islamic
Republic completed that seizure by taking Abu Musa in 1992,
putting its forces, IRGC forces, on Abu Musa. The
administration has sought to reassure the GCC leaders. We have
talked about the GCC summit, which came out with the strategic
partnerships stipulating five areas facilitating arms sales to
the Gulf, increasing U.S.-GCC cooperation on maritime security,
cyber security, counterterrorism, military exercises, U.S.
training, and a renewed commitment to building a Gulf-wide
holistic missile defense against Iran's missile capabilities.
Gulf diplomats indicate to me and others that working
groups on these stipulated areas have now been established in
the foreign and defense ministries of the GCC states, and that
U.S.-GCC discussions on these areas are becoming more
systematic and structured. Previously, the U.S.-GCC strategic
dialogue was only at the level of U.S. Defense--Defense
Secretary and Secretary of State, and now it has moved into
down the bureaucracy, more institutionalized.
Again, armed sales are a key to this relationship. Two of
the countries, Kuwait and Bahrain are major non NATO allies.
There have been substantial weapon sales to the Gulf states,
obviously. And these armed sales have not only made the GCC
states able partners, but in some way, they have emboldened the
Gulf states. The Gulf states are flexing their muscles, so to
speak, on regional issues. We have seen it in Libya, where the
UAE conducted an air strike last year on a terrorist training
camp without necessarily consulting the United States; Saudi
Arabia has taken the lead in putting together this coalition
that is intervening in Yemen with very minimal support from the
United States, and perhaps the U.S. didn't think maybe this
type of intervention was going to succeed.
So we have that against the Houthis. Obviously, the GCC
states were helping the military Government of CC and Egypt at
the same time the U.S. was, you know, denying some weaponry to
Egypt. So the Gulf states are emboldened and are acting,
perhaps, because they feel the U.S. is not acting on some of
these key interests that they have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Katzman follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Excellent testimony.
And I will begin the question-and-answer period.
This morning our full committee held a hearing on Iran, and
some of the witnesses pointed out that the U.S. is no longer
seen in the region as upholding our commitments to protect our
partners from foreign aggression. So my first question to you,
gentlemen, is even if the U.S. signs some sort of security
cooperation agreement with the GCC countries, do they believe
that we will uphold that commitment or have we lost trust with
the GCC? You can keep the answers short, because I have
several.
Mr. Eisenstadt. I think the important point is I think they
don't know. And I think the fact of the matter is that in light
of U.S. behavior in recent years, the red line with regard to
the Syrian CW and the initial U.S. red lines with regard to
Iran's nuclear program and how those red lines have kind of
moved in the course of negotiations, I think they probably have
questions about the validity of any commitments that the United
States provides.
Plus I would just point, in terms of the joint statement
that was made at the Camp David Summit, it was--as these kind
of commitments go, it was a very kind of bland and--kind of
statement that I think from the point--you know, that kind of
reference U.N. Charter as kind of the grounds for U.S. support
for its allies. And you know, it wasn't the treaty that was
passed by Congress, although I am not sure that would--that is
the way to go either. So I think they probably have a lot of
questions. But the problem is, from their point of view, they
don't really have anywhere else to go at this point.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. I know that some of you might
want to participate in this. Let me ask you some other
questions, and you can still answer it that way.
At Camp David, the GCC needed to hear that the United
States is committed to the Middle East region and committed to
stopping Iranian expansionism. But instead, they received
assurances about arms deals and general defense cooperation, as
important as they may be. But we must ensure that sales of
advanced weapon systems to the GCC are consistent with our
larger goals, objectives and policies, including human rights
concerns, maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge and
also addressing the underlying problems that the GCC has beyond
the surface level.
And should a deal be finalized, we all know that Iran is
not going to stop its destabilizing activities against the U.S.
and against the GCC interests in the region. So what credible
actions are the GCC countries asking from us in order to ease
their anxieties about developments in the region, and what
alternatives do you suggest in order to combat Iranian
aggression and repair this difficult and already harmed GCC
relationship?
Mr. McInnis. Thank you. What I would add, and following up
in the context of your previous question, Chairwoman, is that
the GCC countries in conversations I have had with leaders
there, indicate that it is more the issue that the United
States is not one to understand the personal relationship
issue. I think that we tend to underestimate how much they
value personal commitments. When they see the President
breaking red lines or, you know, even if there are rational
policy reasons for it, with personal relationships, it is
really hard for the Gulf leaders to rebuild those. And I think
we tend to be too callous about that.
The second thing is I think that the GCC leadership does
not think that we understand the Iranian threat adequately, and
that we do not understand the existential problems that the GCC
feels it faces. It thinks that the United States underestimates
the destabilizing internal threat that Iran poses to them. I
think this is a real key problem. I think the President was
very dismissive of that issue at Camp David. And I think
because of that, bearing in mind the human rights concerns, we
do need to increase our capacity to work on counterterrorism
issues with the GCC countries, because their fears of internal
instability, frankly, trump all decision-making. We have to be
sensitive to that in making them feel reassured that we are
there to strengthen overall security in the region, while at
the same time, we do want them to change certain policies.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. And let me continue,
and you can answer whichever ones you like.
I am concerned, as you have heard me say, that the sale of
advanced weapon systems to GCC countries is contributing to a
conventional arms race in the region, and that we are running
into the risk of diminishing Israel's qualitative military
edge, which is still a U.S. law whether the administration
wants to enforce it or not. What kind of weapons can we expect
to see the U.S. offer GCC countries in the months ahead beyond
those deals that are already pending, and how would this impact
Israel's qualitative military edge, and will GCC countries look
toward Russia or China to fulfill their military needs? And if
so, what kind of threat does this pose to our security
interests in the region?
Mr. Weinberg. So I think at the Camp David Summit, one of
the measures that was a constructive U.S. proposal for
addressing some of these concerns, both QME--rather, that
doesn't undercut QME, but is still a constructive thing we can
do for our Gulf allies, is the creation of a Foreign Military
Sales office specifically devoted to GCC-wide sales.
So this is something that could decrease bureaucratic
hurdles while not necessarily providing new weapon systems that
would be problematic. The U.S. did not provide promises to give
the Gulf states the F-35 joint strike fighter. It did not
provide, as far as I am aware, commitments for improved bunker
busters. These are two things that the Israelis would be very
uncomfortable about.
I think it is important to recognize that, indeed, the Gulf
states are not going to be reassured by forward U.S.
deployments or arms sales alone. They need to know that the
U.S. has their back when it comes to Iran's destabilizing
regional activities or else otherwise they are basically on
their own when it comes to using those American weapons.
One area where the Russians have been turning to--the
Saudis have been turning to the Russians, have been reports
that they are seeking the S-400 missile system. They also
likely are seeking from the United States countermeasures
against the S-300 that the Iranians recently acquired. And that
is going to be a real challenge going forward without that
undermining QME.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I agree. And, Dr. Katzman, I am going to
ask one more question, but you can answer whichever one I have
already posed. While we contemplate additional GCC arms sales,
we must ensure that we aren't losing sight of our commitment to
human rights in the region. How can the U.S. continue to
promote human rights in the Gulf, where the political, social,
and religious repression is some of the worst in the world,
while maintaining our strategic partnership? This a difficult
dance for us, isn't it?
Mr. Katzman. Well, actually, I would say a lot of the human
rights groups were somewhat upset a few weeks ago when the U.S.
announced it was going to proceed with an armed sale to Bahrain
that had been held up on human rights grounds in 2011. This was
a September 2011 sale of basically Humvees, tow missiles, anti
tank weaponry. And the administration stated that Bahrain had
been improving its human rights record.
I think what I have heard, many in the region saw it,
really, as a way of implementing the Camp David commitments to
release certain armed sales that the GCC states wanted and to
show that the U.S. is implementing Camp David. So the human
rights question in the Gulf is a very difficult question. You
know, the Summit, human rights were barely mentioned at the
Camp David Summit. And this almost didn't come up at all. We
have had several leaders visit in the past 2 years. The Emir of
Kuwait has been here. Sheikh Mohammad bin Zayed, who is the
defacto leader of UAE has been here, Sheikh Emir Tamim of Qatar
has been here, and the communiques based on the meetings that
have gone on, barely have mentioned human rights at all. So
these are some issues that some of the human rights groups are
raising.
Now, I just--I wanted to just comment on the QME issue. You
know, again, Israel and the GCC states have the very same
position on a lot of regional issues right now. So I think--and
the Israelis and the GCC states are talking about a broad range
of security issues that they never even talked with each other
about at all previously. So, you know, to some extent that,
perhaps, puts context to the QME discussion.
I would also say in terms of the Iran deal, let's--for 35
years the United States has not talked to Iran at all. So the
only message the U.S. was getting about Gulf security, the
region, was from the Gulf states. Now, the United States is
getting Iran's point of view. The U.S. does not always
necessarily put much weight on it, but at least the U.S. is
hearing Iran's point of view. And what I am understanding from
Gulf officials, is that has caused a problem because now they
know that the U.S. is at least hearing Iran's point of view,
which is mainly to complain about them, the GCC states.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you for
excellent answers to my rambling questions.
And Mr. Deutch is recognized for his question and answers.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. We discussed earlier
today in an Iran hearing an issue that I would like to get this
panel's thoughts on. We have--as these talks in Vienna move on,
and as we move forward to see whether there is a deal that can
be made, one of the big--the biggest issues is what sanctions
relief would mean to Iran, what they would do with the $150
billion that they would then have access to. And the argument
has been made that it would more likely be used for domestic
purposes, that it would not be, despite our concerns, that it
wouldn't be used, that sanctions wouldn't be used to fuel
regional mischief to fund terror, to do all the things that we
worry so much about the Iranian regime for. What--how do the
Gulf states view this? What is their--how do they view this?
What evidence do they use to draw their conclusions? Any of our
panelists.
Dr. Weinberg, you seem anxious to answer.
Mr. Weinberg. So I think there is an interesting comparison
with how our Israeli allies view the Iranian threat that they
face and how our Gulf allies view it. I think for our Israeli
allies, the existential question is the nuclear one, and the
IRGC issue is another major concern. I think for the Gulf
states, the nuclear issue is a very major concern, and the
nuclear component is the existential question for them. They
basically see it as a core threat to their rule. And so when
they see that Iran, in the last calendar year, increased its
public budget allotment for the IRGC by 48 percent when Iran is
under crippling sanctions----
Mr. Deutch. I am sorry, Dr. Weinberg, to what amount?
Mr. Weinberg. I don't have the numbers offhand, but you we
can submit that for the record.
Understandably, when they see that the IRGC is undoubtedly
going to share in some portion of the windfall, I mean, even
supporters of the Iran nuclear deal acknowledge that. It would
be folly to say that they are not going to get any of the
money. The question is how aggressive will they be with that
money, and nobody in the Gulf is putting money on more
moderate.
Mr. Deutch. Right. So let me be more specific.
Mr. Weinberg. Sure.
Mr. Deutch. There are those who have argued that, in
response to what I believe are valid concerns in line with your
response to my question, that we don't really believe that more
of their--that they would use much of this money to fund the
IRGC to engage in the nefarious activities that they do around
the world, because they have been able to do it already with a
small amount of money, which I have a hard time really wrapping
my head around. Because if they have been successful with a
small amount of money, then why wouldn't they--Dr. Katzman, why
wouldn't we expect that some part of that $150 billion, whether
1 billion or 5 or 20, would be used? And if so, what could all
of that additional money be used for?
Mr. Katzman. Congressman, I agree with that question and
the way you framed it. The issue--I would take some, perhaps,
difference on the--Iran is having trouble. Iran is not having
success universally. Yes, they have had some success in places.
They are having tremendous trouble in Syria right now. I am not
convinced in my analysis that more money would necessarily
bring them to success in Syria where they seem to be having
grave difficulty in Syria. Hezbollah is taking very large
casualties in Syria. I am not convinced that there was--I was
at a discussion the other day about Iran might give Hezbollah
$1 billion, theoretically, of this money they are going to get.
What would Hezbollah do with the billion--that is the thing.
They are losing a lot of men; very tough to recruit; Hezbollah
doesn't necessarily believe in fighting all over Syria, just on
the border.
So, yes, they would have more resources, but I think Iran
is having a lot of problems in the region. They are having
success in places, but they are also having problems.
Mr. Deutch. My question isn't whether--I am not asking you
to anticipate whether they would be successful in how they
spent the money. My question is, is it realistic to believe
that if they have access to $150 billion, that given this
regime, some significant amount of money would go to fund
terrorists, and that some significant amount of money would go
to wreak havoc in the region? Mr. Eisenstadt.
Mr. Eisenstadt. If I could just piggy back on Ken's
comments. I agree with what he is saying, that Iran's allies in
Syria are overstretched. We have seen them. They have been
using recently Afghani Shiites and Pakistani Shiites. I think
that is the answer. In the past, their preference has always
been to fight to the last Arab proxy. Having money enables them
to hire on additional people. They are now expanding their
recruitment base to Afghan and Pakistanis. And more money means
greater ability to recruit people. Now, whether they will be
effective or not is another question. But I think, given the
fact that they have committed their own people to combat for
the first time in Iraq and Syria, and they prefer not to do
that, they prefer to fight the proxies, money gives them
additional resources to gain additional proxies.
Again, I don't know if it will translate into greater
effectiveness, but I think you can say that given the situation
they are in, that that provides them potentially a new lease on
life, at least in the short run.
Mr. Deutch. Mr. McInnis, do you agree?
Mr. McInnis. I would agree with that. And what I would add
is that the strain that we are discussing on the Iranians'
expeditionary activities right now is very significant. And
when you think about what they are having to give to Assad to
kind of keep him afloat, the amount of money that is coming in
that can help offset some of those negative things on their
budget right now allows them to kind of do what they want to
do. Frankly, especially what I consider to be the more
expansionist activities in Yemen, for example, that is
something that makes me worried. If they can kind of hold the
fort better in Syria and Iraq, the additional money coming in
allows them to expand what they are trying to do in very,
sometimes, odd ways inside Yemen to really pressure the Saudis.
And I think what the Iranians have been looking for just as
the Iranians always fear that we are surrounding them or trying
to surround them--the Iranians are trying to surround Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf states. That is the reason why you saw the
recent exposure of the plot in Jordan that just came to light
recently. When you look at their activity in Iraq, Jordan,
Yemen, Bahrain, and potentially other places, the Iranians have
kind of a latent capacity surrounding Saudi Arabia and the
Emirates. And I think that is the concern. If they can hold the
fort better in Iraq and Syria with additional money, it allows
them to put greater pressure on the Saudis.
Mr. Deutch. Thanks.
Madam Chairman, I just--I appreciate the input from our
panelists. And as we move forward in these talks, this is very
helpful, because a sober analysis of the potential outcome of
this negotiation, I think, requires us to acknowledge that in
all likelihood, sanctions relief, if and when it comes, is
going to result in more money. However it is spent, it is going
to result in more money creating more problems in the region. I
just think that, perhaps, has not been part of the discussion
as much as it should have, and I hope that with this from our
panelist, we will have an opportunity to inject into it today.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. We turn to
Mr. Boyle of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Boyle. Thank you. I wanted to, just a quick follow-up
on the last point that Ranking Member Deutch was making.
Unfortunately, we have a terrible history in this part of the
world of funding and of sending armaments for one purpose, and
then suddenly seeing those armaments used by a different group
in a completely different purpose and reminded of that each and
every day by the activities of ISIS. But the two questions I
wanted to ask, though, weren't really on this point.
The first, though, I think it was Dr. Katzman, you raised
it in your opening statement. One of the unintended
consequences, positive unintended consequences of this
protracted negotiation that P5+1 has had with Iran is that we
finally found something that would bring the Gulf--the GCC
states and Israel a little closer together and cooperating. I
am just wondering if you see this--this is--you know, it is not
completely possible to accurately predict this, but I am
interested in your sense of whether or not this is a temporary
phenomenon, or this actually could be the beginning of a
permanent improving of relations and actually working together?
Mr. Katzman. I will address it further. Thank you.
The way I would frame it is the GCC and Israel still have a
huge difference of opinion on certain regional issues, mainly
the Palestinians, Arab-Israeli dispute. But I think they see
that as sort of an emotional and political dispute. On Iran,
they have a strategic agreement. Israel and the GCC have an
exact same strategic analysis, and they have a strategic
alignment that Iran is the key threat to the region; Iran
cannot have a nuclear weapon; Iran must be contained and
deterred, and so that has brought a level of strategic
dialogue, as quiet as it is, between Israel and the GCC, as has
ever been witnessed really, since Israel was formed.
Mr. Boyle. Right. So the follow-up, I am more on--if we can
project, and once, let's say, whether an agreement is reached
or not, the Iranian nuclear negotiations are now, one way or
the other, no more, we are into the fall, we are into next
year, I am interested in your view to project forward, whether
or not you think this could be the beginning of a longer shift,
or this is simply a one-time, all about Iran, and then go back
to business as usual?
Mr. Katzman. It depends. I think if Iran goes back in the
direction that I think most of us think, which is they will use
the resources to continue to try to expand their influence in
the region, then I think that basis of strategic cooperation
would continue.
Mr. Weinberg. If I may offer a different perspective on
this. I am much more pessimistic in this regard. I went on to
the Saudi state news channel's Web site recently, and there was
an article in which they talk about alleged Israeli overflights
in Lebanon. But the way in which they talk about these are the
``enemy'' Israeli Air Force. When you look at these sorts of
preachers whom the Saudi king has surrounded himself with, on
the official state Ulema council, some of the other preachers
whom he hugs and kisses, these people have a long record of
inciting against Christians and also inciting against Jews.
And there was recently much talk about an unofficial
dialogue between a former Israeli official and a former Saudi
official. So what? I mean, this was, as I understand it, a very
unofficial level, and it was covered in a much lesser level in
Saudi press as it was than it was in the Israeli press. I don't
think the Saudi Government is really in a position to do
anything beyond the security--the quiet security and strategic
intelligence coordination which was already going on a decade
ago.
Mr. Boyle. Thank you. I would just add, Dr. Weinberg, your
opening remarks, I was very much listening. And I think it is
worth repeating the reminder that a number of these states that
we can cooperate with on a number of strategic areas still are
pretty large funders of anti-American and anti-Semitic rhetoric
and hate. And that is something that we had better always keep
in both the back and the front of our minds. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Boyle. And Mr.
Clawson is going to take over for me. Meanwhile, I will
recognize Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman. You are so kind.
Thank you, Mr. Clawson. Mr. Clawson, if you wish to go, I, of
course, would defer to you. Okay. Thank you very much. Welcome
to our panel. Fascinating discussion. If I understood what Dr.
Weinberg just said to Mr. Boyle, Mr. Katzman, he was saying,
let's not overstate this, you know, level of cooperation, that
the enemy of my enemy is my friend kind of status that has
descended on the GCC and its relations with Israel. Did I get
that right, Mr. Weinberg? I did?
Mr. Weinberg. You did.
Mr. Connolly. So, Dr. Katzman, you disagree, you think
actually it is of a different elevation than in the past and
worthy of some note?
Mr. Katzman. Yes. I mean, I am not disputing what Dr.
Weinberg is observing. But I think a lot of it is the basic
culture and approach of the population and people way below the
leadership level in the GCC. And I tend, perhaps, because of my
background or whatever, to give more weight to what is going on
at the government-to-government level and to not necessarily
look at each cleric. These clerics have been around, Youssef
al-Qaradawi is in Qatar. He is one of the most inflammatory
clerics in the Islamic world. He is in Qatar. There were 9/11,
there were al-Qaeda activists who transited through Qatar
before 9/11. These things go on.
Mr. Connolly. Right. But, I mean, take Qatar, for one
example. I mean, there is all kinds of behavior we could decry
and call out and not like. On the other hand, they have
actually been useful interlocutors in some other situations,
including on behalf, well, de facto on behalf of Israel. Is
that not correct?
Mr. Katzman. Qatar has also been very helpful in
Afghanistan. Without Qatar, we probably would not have gotten
Mr. Bergdahl back. They are interlocutors on any number of
issues absolutely.
Mr. Connolly. Okay. So we have a mixed record of behavior.
We would like everyone to be perfect and do what we think is in
everybody's best interest. But it is a problematic area at
best, the Gulf. I want to go back to sort of the origins of
this hearing. So, Dr. Katzman, the GCC reps were invited to
Camp David to meet with the President and his team, is that
correct? And what was your understanding of the purpose of that
summit or that meeting, set of meetings?
Mr. Katzman. Well, the summit was announced simultaneously
when President Obama briefed the Nation on the April 2
tentative nuclear accord with Iran, the framework accord. So it
was in connection to that certainly.
Mr. Connolly. As a longtime analyst and observer of the
region, were those productive meetings from your point of view?
Mr. Katzman. From everything I have heard, the Camp David
summit was more productive than was anticipated. There were
very low expectations. Only two of the heads of state attended.
King Salman and then King Hamad of Bahrain pulled out, you
know, about a day before. So there were very low expectations.
And my understanding is the summit far exceeded the
expectations.
Mr. Connolly. In far exceeding the expectations, is an
element of that a sense of reassurance by the GCC that the
United States was actually quite serious about what it was
trying to achieve in the Iran nuclear negotiations? Because I
assume that was the big elephant in the room.
Mr. Katzman. Yes. I mean, I think the GCC statements on the
nuclear deal have evolved. And I think it has been somewhat
more positive, not outright positive, but more positive than
they were before the Camp David summit on the nuclear deal.
Yes, they have become more positive on it, yes.
Mr. Connolly. Do you feel that the United States was
successful in providing reassurances, both in terms of their
collective security and in terms of where we are headed in this
relationship with Iran?
Mr. Katzman. That is my understanding, yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. You know what? My first trip to the Gulf was
in the early 1980s to mid 1980s. I was there right after the
revolution in Iran and when we reflagged the Kuwaiti oil
tankers. And what struck me and surprised us when we went, we
were expecting all the Gulf, the GCC nations, I keep on wanting
to say G7, forgive me, GCC nations to be really as preoccupied
as we were with the Ayatollah Khomeini and the revolution in
Iran and the threat that posed to the region and so forth. They
weren't particularly focused on that. In the 1980s, they were
focused on Iraq and Saddam Hussein. I might just observe that
the preoccupation with Iran today is logical. They are the big
menace now that Iraq has been defenestrate, and Saddam Hussein
is no more. And it is perfectly understandable, and it has to
be dealt with, but it is not a unique--I mean, depending on who
is strong at any given moment in the region, that is who GCC
members are going to be concerned about, given size and
proximity and the nature of the military threat.
So it has to be dealt with. It can't be minimized. But I
think some of the rhetoric we have heard about broken
relationship and lacking credibility and fractured this and
fractured that, I don't think so. And I would agree with your
characterization, Dr. Katzman. Actually, the meeting at Camp
David turned out, press expectations notwithstanding, more
successfully than one might have expected. And I think
reassurances apparently were made that were well received. I
don't want to overstate it, but I would hardly call that a
fractured relationship in the Gulf between them and the United
States. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Clawson [presiding]. Thank you. Sorry for coming late,
gentlemen. We appreciate you coming in today. I was in a
subcommittee on Africa. So we get double booked here. So it
certainly wasn't meant to be any kind of disrespect. So if any
of my questions or comments are repetitive, I ask your
forgiveness for my absence. When we voted last year and again
this year on our country's, my country's, your country's
involvement in the Syrian conflict, I voted no, because it felt
like, to me, another bad war with very limited chances of any
meaningful success, with the possibility of acceleration of our
involvement, and one more kind of no-win situation in that part
of the world.
And I don't like sending my own sons and daughters of my
constituents to die in faraway places without a meaningful
payback. And as the son of my oldest sister prepares for his
second tour in Afghanistan, in a face-to-face war with the
enemy, I just have a hard time getting there unless I see
victory in the cards, which I would love to see. Then when I
think about the backdrop of this Iranian deal, I say to myself
sanctions go away, these guys get more money to fight us in
places like Afghanistan and Syria and other places. The Gulf
states, by and large, are going to sit it out. And a big mess
just got messier.
Am I being overly pessimistic here? I look now at the money
we have spent in Syria and where we are, what, a year, almost a
year later, $1 billion, 60 people trained or whatever, and this
feels like a sinkhole of money, lives, and confidence that will
only be made worse if this deal goes through.
So I know you are going to tell me why I am mistaken. So I
turn it over to you all to give the counterpoint here.
Remember, we are going to come back in 6 months and we are
going to do a business review and see if it really has gotten
any better here. With that, I yield to whoever would like to
answer first.
Mr. Eisenstadt. Mr. Chairman, actually I share a lot of
your concerns. I think one of the challenges we face in dealing
with the challenge posed by ISIL in Iraq and Syria is basically
our strategy is contingent on our allies' policies, and what I
am talking about with regard to the Iraqi Government and their
willingness to engage in Sunni outreach and create an inclusive
political system, which flies in the face of the zero-sum
politics which tend to dominate Iraqi politics and the politics
not all the countries in the region, but many of the countries
in the region.
But the challenge we face is that we have seen what
happened in Syria as a result of 3 or 4 years of non-
engagement, and that it creates a vacuum that is then filled by
extremists. And, in fact, the failure of the United States to
engage earlier in Syria created, and tried to create, tried to
create, we have to acknowledge there is no guarantee that our
efforts to create a moderate opposition will succeed. But our
efforts to try to create a third way could then perhaps suck
away resources and manpower that are now going to al-Qaeda
affiliates and ISIL. So the challenge is to find the right
balance.
I agree, I don't want Americans on the ground engaged in
combat again. But, on the other hand, walking away or
disengaging, we have seen what has happened. We still have
vital interests there. What happens in this part of the world
has implications for, first, our allies, but it is already we
are seeing that ISIL is influencing people here to act as lone
wolves and engage in attacks. So the challenge is finding the
right balance. And I actually share the administration's
concerns and I support a light-footprint approach, though I
would say that it would have to be, doing a light-footprint
approach that entails more than the administration is doing.
But, again, the challenge is finding the right balance because
we have seen what happens when we don't engage. But then our
allies also do things, act on their impulses which are not
always the healthiest ones and sometimes they have supported
groups that are either al-Qaeda affiliates, or very close to
being, you know, they are kind of extremist in their
orientation. And that is not good either.
Mr. Clawson. Do you think that lifting sanctions will put
more guns into the wrong hands in the region?
Mr. Eisenstadt. That is one of the dangers of that course
of action. And the problem is, we will never be able to square
the circle with all the, you know, there are so many moving
parts with regard to our policies in this part of the world,
that you are never going to be able to iron out all the
contradictions in U.S. policy. You can manage them.
So I am supportive of a deal with Iran that advances our
interests. It will remain to be seen if the deal we get
actually does that. But while doing that, and if that entails
sanctions relief, as it necessarily would have to, we have to
find ways to mitigate that by doing other things, like I said,
while extending a hand to Iran, we still also have to push back
against Iranian efforts to expand their influence and to engage
in proxy warfare in the region. That is also a driver of ISIS.
Iran's involvement in Syria and Iraq also empowers ISIS. So
I know it is like, you know, sometimes it makes my head explode
too when I try to think of all this stuff because it really is
almost impossible to iron out all the contradictions. But you
need to try to manage it. And walking away, we have seen what
happens when we are not engaged.
Mr. McInnis. I would just add on that point that, and we
have been talking about this in general, but there needs to be
recognition that what is happening in the region is, yes, their
role. The mistakes of U.S. strategy and policy have helped
create the problems we have there right now. But the real
issues are what the other regional states have done. And you
look at what Iran's strategies have been in the region. They
have been, aside from our own concern about what they are
trying to achieve, even for their own purposes what they are
trying to do has created enormous amounts of failure, at least
right now. And that what they are facing is the fact of what
they have done in Syria and what they are doing in Iraq is not
necessarily succeeding.
At the same time, our allies within the GCC, they are not
nearly as sophisticated on these types of asymmetric proxy
warfare efforts that Iran is able to do, which it is kind of
failing at right now. But they are also in a position where the
Saudis traditionally and the Emiratis and others, they throw
money at groups and they fund these types of efforts, but they
don't actually know how to build governance or build effective
fighting forces. We have to recognize the limits of the players
there. If we are going to leave, kind of withdraw and just kind
of let this play out, we have to recognize the limits of the
players there.
And the fact that if we are going to make this work, if
this is going to keep ISIL from becoming a worldwide problem
for us, we are going to have to find ways to work with our
allies in particular to learn how to fight these wars better.
And that is one of the reasons why the encouragement that we
saw, perhaps, from Camp David, that we need to start creating
these types of Arab rapid reaction forces or help them train
better how to build and work with fighting forces in other
countries. People talk about: Should Saudi Arabia create its
own version of the Quds force? I don't know. That is a really
tough question.
But this is something where we have to recognize the limits
of what we have there. The other issue when it comes to the
sanctions relief, and I hit this on my earlier points but
wanted to hit it again, on the conventional side is a huge
problem, especially if we start seeing a relaxation of the
conventional arms embargo or the missile technology control
regimes. Those are things that could happen in a deal. And if
that happens, we could see a real shifting of the conventional
balance of power in the Gulf in a direction that is dangerous
for the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, in addition to the pressure
it is going to put on our Gulf allies and accelerate the
conventional arms race that the chairwoman was mentioning
earlier. So I think on both the asymmetric fight, the proxy
fight, and the conventional fight, the potential nuclear deal
is a real disaster for us.
Mr. Weinberg. You had mentioned the fight in Afghanistan.
And I just want to note a terror finance case that relates.
There was an organization known as Revival of Islamic Heritage
Society in Kuwait which has branches all over the world,
including in Pakistan. The United States first sanctioned the
Pakistan branch and another regional branch, and several years
later, sanctioned the headquarters in Kuwait as well. And, yet,
indications suggest that the Kuwaitis have never taken
significant action against RIHS within their own territory,
even though we believe that it was functioning, including in
Pakistan, as a channel for funds to al-Qaeda in South and
Central Asia. The reported office director of the Pakistan
office, both before and immediately after it was under U.S.
sanctions at the time, was a Jordanian national named Khalil
al-Zeer, who then, for many years, went on to be the executive
director of a prominent charity in Qatar named the Eid Bin
Muhammad Al Thani Charitable Society. One of the founding board
members of the Eid Bin Muhammad Al Thani Charitable Society,
was recently sanctioned by the United States and the United
Nation on charges of providing up to $2 million a month to the
organization we now know as ISIS. Alzeer left the country in
2014. And the organization threw him a going-away party.
The most recent State Department counterterrorism country
report said that one of the positive steps that Qatar took
against terror finance was to deport an individual who was a
terror financier of Jordanian nationality who worked at a
Qatari charity. Could it be Khalil al-Zeer? It could. Could it
be somebody else? It could. Regardless of who that individual
is, the fact is that Qatar's supposedly positive step that the
administration is citing for fighting terror finance is to
deport somebody rather than arrest them and try them. That they
did the same with Hamas financiers according to the Christian
Science Monitor quite recently. And that Kuwait is doing the
same with alleged Nusra Front financiers as well.
Arresting them and releasing them is very worrisome. And
until we get at this problem of seed funding going to terror
groups throughout the world from primarily Gulf private
financiers in these early stages when we get these start-up
terror groups, it is going to be extremely hard to keep these
conflicts from getting to the point where we need to go in, or
our allies need to go in militarily and take on the problem
when they have conquered territory.
Mr. Clawson. You are making the point to me that, the way I
would put it, we are undermanaging our foes, in this case,
Iran, and we are undermanaging our so-called friends.
Mr. Weinberg. Yes.
Mr. Clawson. And my second conclusion on that is we are not
helping Israel enough because they are right over there. And,
you know, words like what you just said lead me to believe that
if I were them, I would want a few extra weapons if everybody
around me was arming like this. Dr. Katzman?
Mr. Katzman. Thank you. I mean, again, I wouldn't dispute
everything Dr. Weinberg is saying. But I would also note Kuwait
is hosting the headquarters for our anti-ISIS mission right
now. I would point out also that Qatar is hosting forward
headquarters for U.S. Central Command. Yes, there are these
actors in the Gulf states. We are not disputing that. There was
an minister in Kuwait for the Awazem tribe, Al Ajmi, who was
allegedly posting, making posts on Twitter and raising money
for al-Nusra I believe. And the Kuwaitis fired him. Now, they
didn't necessarily arrest him, they didn't punish him. But they
did take him away from his ministry.
So the issue is to get at some of this, what Dr. Weinberg
is talking about, would probably require a level of U.S.
intrusiveness into the internal dynamics, tribal dynamics,
political dynamics. It would require a level of intrusiveness
that might interfere with our broader strategic plan in the
Gulf.
Mr. Clawson. Okay. I really have to cut it off because we
have got to go. I thank all of you for your participation and
your patience as the committee comes and goes. But these are
obviously life-and-death kind of stuff. So I appreciate your
contributions today.
[Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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