    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                       THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL CAMP DAVID
                                  SUMMIT: ANY RESULTS?

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                        THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  JULY 9, 2015

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 114-68

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    PAUL COOK, California                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            GRACE MENG, New York
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
    DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
    TOM EMMER, MinnesotaUntil 5/18/
        15 deg.
    DANIEL DONOVAN, New YorkAs
        of 5/19/15 deg.

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

                Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa

                     ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         GRACE MENG, New York
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Michael Eisenstadt, Kahn Fellow, Director, Military and
      Security Studies Program, The Washington Institute for Near
      East Policy....................................................     6
    Mr. J. Matthew McInnis, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise
      Institute......................................................    13
    David Andrew Weinberg, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Foundation for
      Defense of Democracies.........................................    23
    Kenneth Katzman, Ph.D., Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs,
      Congressional Research Service.................................    62

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Mr. Michael Eisenstadt: Prepared statement.......................     9
    Mr. J. Matthew McInnis: Prepared statement.......................    15
    David Andrew Weinberg, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................    25
    Kenneth Katzman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.......................    64

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    92
    Hearing minutes..................................................    93
    The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
      from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement..........    94

          THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL CAMP DAVID SUMMIT: ANY RESULTS?

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, JULY 9, 2015

                         House of Representatives,

               Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:19 p.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
    Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. This subcommittee will come to order.
    After recognizing myself and ranking member, my good friend,
    Ted Deutch, for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I
    will then recognize any other members seeking recognition for 1
    minute. We will then hear from our witnesses. Thank you for
    your patience. We had unscheduled votes come up, and we were
    there for 45 minutes, so we thank you for that.
        Without objection, your prepared statements will be made a
    part of the record, and members may have 5 days to insert
    statements and questions for the record subject to the length
    and limitations in the rules.
        The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
        As we continue to analyze the impact of a weak nuclear deal
    with Iran, it is important to examine how the Gulf Cooperation
    Council, the GCC, will be directly impacted by these policy
    decisions. There is no question that our relationships with the
    Gulf countries have been severely strained in recent years. It
    should be no surprise that our Gulf allies believe that the
    United States has turned its back on them, and that we are not
    committed to seeking stability in the Middle East.
        First, by signaling a preference to focus attention outside
    of the Middle East with the so-called ``Asia pivot''; second,
    by initiating naive rapprochement with Iran; and third, by not
    following through on the President's red lines in Syria. So
    that was the backdrop of the Camp David Summit that occurred
    with the GCC just 2 months ago. GCC countries see the desire to
    legitimize Iran as a power and counterweight in the region as
    the motivation for current U.S. policy, a policy that
    destabilizes the region as we see Iranian influence expand in
    Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon, in Yemen, and elsewhere. They see
    the failure to take a strong stance against Iran's ally, Assad,
    or to enforce the red line against the use of chemical weapons
    as evidence of the desire not to upset Iran.
        And let's not be fooled, any signing bonus or currency
    injection going to Iran from sanctions relief will be spent on
    Iran fomenting hegemonic ambitions in the region, which is
    another cause for concern for the GCC countries. At a time when
    we need as many partners as possible in the fight against ISIL
    and in the fight against Iran's support for terror, now is not
    the time for the administration to be alienating some of the
    GCC members, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who have been
    part of the coalition against ISIL and have helped launch
    strikes against the terror group in Syria.
        The GCC countries have also led the coalition against the
    Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen, while we continue to ignore
    Iran's meddling in regional issues. So how does the
    administration respond to these countries that we need as
    partners, that we need to trust in the fight against ISIL and
    other terror groups? By trying continuously to pursue a nuclear
    deal with Iran that they will never accept, only to try to buy
    the GCC countries off with sales of advanced military systems.
        For years, many of us have said that a nuclear Iran would
    lead to a nuclear arms race in the region, and that can still
    happen. But now a nuclear deal with Iran is also leading to a
    conventional arms race in the region. So while on one hand the
    U.S. was partially responsible for giving legitimacy to Iran
    and letting it become a larger menace in the region, on the
    other hand the U.S. is trying to sell these military systems to
    act as a deterrent against Iran. Instead of just trying to
    prevent the problem in the first place, the administration has
    chosen to treat the symptoms without addressing the underlying
    disease.
        I also recognize that not all of the GCC countries have
    been ideal partners, and some haven't taken the necessary steps
    to stop terror financing and the undermining of U.S. national
    security interests. I am concerned that while some GCC
    countries will use our additional weapons for good and as
    partners in the fight against ISIL, others are only using this
    as an excuse to get arms for their own purposes.
        In addition, human rights and the rule of law concerns
    continue in some GCC countries, but they have figured out our
    playbook. As long as they provide the U.S. with bases and are
    willing to host our troops, they know that the U.S. will look
    the other way when it comes to their many transgressions.
        The other concern I have is with the objective of the most
    recent Camp David Summit and how it relates to Israel's
    qualitative military edge. We must be mindful that upholding
    Israel's qualitative military edge is the law of the land. Yet,
    many in the public did not notice that when the President
    signed the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act in December
    2014, which was sponsored by Congressman Deutch and me, the
    President issued a signing statement saying that his
    administration would not implement the section that pertains to
    Israel's qualitative military edge. That is very concerning.
    What kind of message are we sending to our greatest major
    strategic partner in the Middle East, the democratic Jewish
    state of Israel. We need to take these military sales requests
    on a case-by-case basis.
        Some GCC countries have been at the forefront of leading
    the fight against ISIL, which is a positive step forward. With
    ongoing military operations in Yemen, Libya and throughout the
    region, some GCC countries have shown that they have the
    political will and they have the dedication to take this fight
    head on, and these countries should be supported.
        We should be renewing our commitment to the Middle East and
    our GCC allies and combating Iranian aggression, not pulling
    back from this critical region of the world. And with that, I
    turn to my friend, the ranking member, Mr. Deutch.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Thank you
    for calling today's hearing.
        The announcement that President Obama would be convening
    GCC leaders at Camp David came on the heels of the April
    nuclear framework agreement with Iran. There was, in no
    uncertain terms, meant to reassure our allies that any
    impending deal would not result in greater Iranian interference
    or destabilization in the Middle East. I know that when this
    hearing was first noticed, we expected to be examining U.S.-
    Gulf relations in the wake of a final Iran nuclear deal. We are
    still waiting to hear whether P5+1 negotiators will reach a
    deal, and whether or not that deal would be acceptable, not
    just to Members of this Congress, but to our allies in the
    region.
        However, Camp David Summit didn't just focus on Iran, and
    today's hearing provides us with an opportunity to assess the
    ways in which we can bolster cooperation with the GCC countries
    to enhance our mutual security concerns and strategic
    objectives on a range of issues. There has been--there is no
    doubt that there have been growing pains in our relations with
    the GCC in recent years, and there has been frustrations on
    both sides. The United States was deeply troubled by the early
    financing of extremist elements on the fight against Assad by
    some Gulf actors. The GCC countries, in turn, have been
    frustrated with what they perceive as a lack of action by the
    U.S. against Assad.
        The GCC has been wary of American engagement with Iran. The
    U.S. has struggled to strengthen and reassure our partners,
    while also balancing what are legitimate human rights concerns.
    But as with any relationship, we have got to be able to air
    these grievances while also looking for ways to move forward
    together to confront our shared challenges.
        The question is, did Camp David do enough to put us back on
    the right path. Current U.S.-GCC relations have been dominated
    by the Iranian nuclear threat in the fight against ISIS. Gulf
    states are allied in the coalition to fight ISIS, but it
    appears some countries have not fully lived up to their
    commitments to coalition. Nonetheless, continued GCC support in
    terms of intelligence sharing, stopping ISIS financing, and
    preventing foreign fighters from joining ISIS are critical to
    our efforts.
        We continue to cooperate against Iran's terror proxy,
    Hezbollah, and our efforts to keep it from propping up the
    Assad regime and expanding its regional influence. These
    concerns are also shared by our ally, Israel. The unique
    alignment of security concerns for the Gulf and Israel have
    presented U.S. with an opportunity to foster greater regional
    cooperation. It was revealed in June that an unprecedented five
    bilateral meetings had been held between Israelis and Saudis to
    address the Iran threat.
        So how do we move forward together to serve our mutual
    interests? Camp David Summit resulted in agreement to bolster
    defense sales. Some argue that increased sales to the GCC
    countries are beneficial because they not only increase our
    interoperability, but because these are foreign military sales,
    meaning that they are not paid for with U.S.-provided security
    assistance. So they are a boon to the American economy.
        There are those who argue that if American made equipment
    is not for sale, our friends will turn elsewhere. In this
    increasingly volatile region, we do need to ensure our allies
    can both be active participants in combating shared threats,
    and also maintain their own defenses. Of course, any serious
    increase in these sales must carefully be vetted to ensure that
    Israel retains its qualitative military edge.
        However, while defense sales have been a pillar of our
    relationship with the GCC countries, it cannot be the only leg
    on which these relationships stand. I was pleased to see the
    GCC summit include commitments to also increase maritime
    security, cyber security, and counterterrorism cooperation.
    These, too, are critical pieces of the security puzzle.
        The Iranian navy is well-funded and active. The U.S., in
    conjunction with our partners, must be able to patrol the Gulf,
    particularly in Strait of Hormuz. Just a few months ago, we saw
    Iran illegally detain and board a commercial vessel passing
    through the Strait. And as Mr. Katzman notes, one-third of the
    internationally traded oil flows through that Strait. In
    addition, we share with the GCC a serious and real concern
    about Iran's regional meddling. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, in
    particular, have accused Iran of stirring dissent among their
    populations.
        In Yemen, Iran has long backed the Houthi rebels. And as
    the Houthis move to depose the U.S.-backed Hadi Government,
    Saudi Arabia intervened. Many saw this move by Saudi Arabia as
    a reaction to years of U.S. prodding to take a greater
    leadership role in regional security.
        Outside of the security realm, there are additional steps
    that can be taken to strengthen the GCC. If the price of oil
    remains low, the GCC countries could lose over $200 billion,
    according to recent reports. Strengthening U.S. Gulf economic
    ties outside of the oil trade could help offset the deepened
    oil prices. As many GCC countries look to diversify their
    economies, there are numerous opportunities for cooperation on
    science and technology. In fact, many U.S. universities have
    built campuses in recent years in cities like Abu Dhabi and
    Doha.
        Finally, we have to have constructive dialogue with our
    partners. While some saw the absence of several heads of state
    from the Camp David Summit as a blow to the administration, the
    opportunity for the President of the United States to speak
    directly with GCC top leadership was tremendously important. As
    I said before, as important as it is to present a united front
    with our allies, we won't agree on everything. So for the Gulf
    states, they must be able to share concerns about the
    implications of a potential Iran deal on regional
    proliferation, or the impact sanctions relief could have on
    Iran's ability to export terror.
        Equally, we must have avenues to address our concerns about
    human rights violations. I believe in the importance of our
    relationships with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Oman, and
    Kuwait. I want to see these relationships stabilize and
    strengthen both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis, and I
    believe Camp David was a good first step. But to sustain this
    progress, we have to make a real commitment on both sides to
    continue cooperation and consultation. I look forward to
    discussing with our panel the ways in which we can help to
    encourage that process. And I yield back.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch, for your
    statement. Mr. Weber of Texas is recognized.
        Mr. Weber. Madam Chair, I am ready to listen.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. That is very charming of you. Thank you.
        Mr. Boyle, we are ready to listen to you.
        Mr. Boyle. Well, now that really makes me look bad for
    wanting to say something.
        Mr. Weber. I am reclaiming my time--no.
        Mr. Boyle. I will just briefly say, I want to associate
    myself with the very thoughtful comments of Mr. Deutch, and I
    am very interested in this topic, especially the fact that this
    was when they were at Camp David, and for a fairly significant
    amount of time, this was much in the news and now has largely
    been forgotten. Certainly, whatever comes about in this part of
    the world and whatever resolution we may or may not reach with
    Iran will affect our partners and Saudi Arabia, and in the
    broader Arabian peninsula and what actions they may take in
    response. So making sure that we maintain a close relationship
    with them is of vital U.S. importance, and with that, I will
    yield 6 seconds back. So I almost didn't speak, but----
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, after your critical Oreo speech on
    the floor----
        Mr. Boyle. Thank you. Say no to Oreo.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. That was riveting. We all were attuned to
    that. That is an inside joke. We will explain later.
        We are so pleased to introduce our witnesses. First, we
    would like to welcome Mr. Michael Eisenstadt, who is the Kahn
    fellow and director of the Washington Institute, Military and
    Security Studies Program.
        Mr. Eisenstadt is a specialist in Persian Gulf security
    affairs. And, previously, he served as an officer in the U.S.
    Army Reserves and as a military analyst with the U.S.
    Government.
        Thank you for your service, Mr. Eisenstadt.
        Second, we welcome back Mr. Matthew McInnis, who is a
    resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute where he
    focuses on regional security issues of the Persian Gulf. Prior
    to this, Mr. McInnis served as a senior analyst at the U.S.
    Central Command and on leadership and advisory positions for
    the multi-national force in Iraq.
        Thank you.
        Next, we welcome Dr. David Andrew Weinberg, who is a senior
    fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies where his
    primary research is on Saudi Arabia and Gulf affairs. He was a
    professional staffer for this committee and survived that, and
    he was a visiting fellow at the UCLA Center for Middle East
    Development.
        Welcome back, Dr. Weinberg.
        And last, but certainly not least, we really welcome back
    Dr. Kenneth Katzman, who serves as a senior Middle East analyst
    for the Congressional Research Service. Formally, Mr. Katzman
    was an analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency and also
    worked as a consultant for the defense industry for 2 years.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. And we would love to
    hear from you. Feel free to summarize.
        Let me just ask 1 second, if Mr. Connolly would like to
    make an opening statement. We would be honored to hear from
    you, Mr. Connolly.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I think in order
    to get on with the hearing, I will dispense with an opening
    statement. Obviously, we are quite interested in the reaction
    of the GCC. We have heard lots of speculation this morning
    about what the reaction might be in the event of a successful
    negotiated agreement, but would be delighted to hear from this
    panel in terms of their points of view.
        Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
        So, Mr. Eisenstadt, we will begin with you.

      STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL EISENSTADT, KAHN FELLOW, DIRECTOR,
    MILITARY AND SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE
                          FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

        Mr. Eisenstadt. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member
    Deutch, distinguished subcommittee members, thank you for
    inviting me to testify on the state of U.S.-GCC relations. It
    is an honor for me to be here. The high-level summit in Camp
    David last May with leaders of the six GCC states focused on
    assuring them that the U.S. remains committed to their
    security, while winning their support for the nuclear deal
    being negotiated with Iran. A joint statement released at the
    Summit included U.S. security assurances to the GCC and
    described the outlines of ``a new U.S.-GCC strategic
    partnership,'' that committed the United States and the GCC to
    enhance cooperation in a number of areas.
        While many of the announced measures would mark a step
    forward in U.S.-GCC relations, much will depend on follow-
    through in the months and years to come. Particularly with
    regard to countering Iran's destabilizing activities in the
    region. This is a central concern of Gulf leaders who are
    already deeply concerned about Iran's growing regional
    influence, and who are worried that in the event of a long-term
    nuclear accord between the P5+1 and Iran, the latter would use
    funds obtained through sanctions relief and its status as a
    nuclear threshold state to further advance its regional agenda.
        Absent action on this front, many of the announced steps
    are unlikely to have significant impact on the broader fabric
    of U.S.-GCC relations. The roots of the growing distrust
    between the two sides can be traced to the 2003 invasion of
    Iraq and the perception that much of the region that the United
    States had to either incompetence or design turned over Iraq to
    the Shiites and Iran. This was reinforced by the widespread
    perception in the GCC and among other regional allies that when
    it entered office, the Obama administration too eagerly courted
    traditional enemies, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran at
    the expense of its traditional allies, and too quickly
    abandoned traditional allies, such as Hosni Mubarak during the
    initial phases of what was then called the Arab Spring.
        So to be fair, there was really not all that much, I think,
    that the U.S. could have done differently with regard to
    Mubarak. This destructive dynamic was further strengthened by
    the Obama administration's tendency to frame and implement
    measures to assure the GCC states in ways that tended to
    exacerbate rather than allay their fears. This is best
    illustrated by the following examples: First, in recent years,
    the United States has sold tens of billions of dollars in arms
    to its Gulf Arab allies. The intent has been to assure them by
    enhancing their ability to deter and counter external
    aggression.
        Yet Tehran is then likely to engage in the conduct of
    conventional aggression that would provide its neighbors and
    the United States with reason to respond by conventional means.
    It is much more likely to engage in subversion and proxy
    warfare as it has done in the past and continue to do today.
    And in light of the administration's announced rebalance to
    Asia and the President's statement in an interview with Thomas
    Friedman in April, that ``The U.S.'s core interests in the
    region are not oil,'' GCC leaders may view large U.S. arms
    sales less as a tangible expression of enduring commitment than
    a sign that Americais providing its friends with the means to
    fend for themselves as it prepares to leave the region.
        Second, while the United States has drawn down its presence
    in Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years, it has increased other
    aspects of its presence around the Gulf as part of its efforts
    to assure allies and deter Iran. Yet, there is no sign that the
    large post-1991 U.S. military presence in the Gulf deterred
    Iran from using proxies to target U.S. interests in the region
    and elsewhere. Furthermore, our GCC allies are frequently
    reminded by U.S. officials that America continues to maintain
    some 35,000 servicemembers in the region, but this has led them
    to question the purpose of such a large show of presence at a
    time when Iran and Hezbollah's intervention has contributed to
    the death of more than 200,000 Syrians, mostly Sunni civilians,
    amid U.S. inaction.
        And even when Washington finally did act against ISIL, it
    did so at least initially on behalf of beleaguered Iraqi
    minorities, the Yazidis in Sinjar, Turkmens at Amerli, and
    Kurds in Erbil, rather than Sunni Arabs.
        Third, while President Obama declared in January 2012 that
    if Tehran tried to build a nuclear weapon, the U.S. would use
    all its means at its disposal to prevent it from doing so.
    Since then, he has tended to couch his threats in passive
    language that conveys more ambivalence than resolve. Thus, in a
    March 2012 interview with Jeffrey Goldberg he stated, when the
    U.S. says it is unacceptable for Iran to have nuclear weapons,
    we mean what we say.
        In sum, the U.S. has a credibility deficit with its GCC
    partners that threatens its interests and endangers its allies
    in the region. The steps it has taken in the past to assure its
    GCC allies, arms transfers, forward presence, and red lines,
    often fail to allay their doubts and frequently compounded
    their fears. In this light, the steps promised at a Camp David
    Summit do not constitute a game changer in U.S.-GCC relations,
    because the joint statement is so vague regarding specific
    steps to counter Iran's destabilizing activities. Only by
    pushing back against Iran's efforts to expand its regional
    influence can Washington hope to restore its credibility.
        There is no reason that such a policy cannot go hand and in
    with engaging Iran, just as the U.S. pushed back against Soviet
    aggression while engaging Moscow during the Cold War. For as
    much it may be in the American interest to conclude a long-term
    nuclear accord with Tehran, it is also U.S. interest to curb
    Iranian activities that fuel sectarian violence, contribute to
    the appeal of groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS and
    ultimately threaten the stability and security and of the U.S.
    allies in the region. Such a policy would also go a long way
    toward repairing ties with traditional allies in the part of
    the world that still very much matters to U.S. security. I
    apologize for going over.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Eisenstadt follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. It was fine. Thank you so much.
        Mr. McInnis.

    STATEMENT OF MR. J. MATTHEW MCINNIS, RESIDENT FELLOW, AMERICAN
                          ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

        Mr. McInnis. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch,
    and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
    inviting me to testify here today on the impact of the
    potential nuclear deal on our allies from the Gulf Cooperation
    Council. And let me begin with how Iran perceives this changing
    strategic environment and their contest with the Gulf states.
    Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has sought to spread its
    concepts of Islamic governance and to assert its regional
    hegemony by displacing the United States as the dominant power.
    Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, countering the Kingdom
    of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states has dominated Iran's
    regional calculations. Saudi Arabia poses a unique ideological
    challenge to Tehran's attempts to assert its leadership in the
    Muslim world. The GCC states are increasingly alarmed about
    expanding Iranian influence in the Middle East, but seem unable
    to develop an effective means to push back against Tehran's
    growing influence and power.
        For the past 36 years, Tehran has pursued its objectives
    against the GCC primarily through clandestine operations. In
    particular, Iran has utilized its resistance network of
    partners, proxies, and terrorist groups, including Lebanese's
    Hezbollah and others, while employing a suite of deterrence
    capabilities, including ballistic missiles and asymmetric naval
    platforms. With the new Saudi leadership under King Salman,
    Tehran is recalculating its threat perceptions and response.
    Iranian leaders worry that the GCC's expanded interventions in
    Yemen and Syria come as a result of U.S. encouragement perhaps
    at the Camp David Summit for the Gulf states to take a more
    leading role in countering Iran's destabilizing activities. A
    more active Saudi Arabia poses a risk to Iran's long-term
    objectives. Tehran may even be worried that Saudi Arabia,
    underwritten by its own financial holdings and U.S. military
    support, will begin using the IRGC's own playbook of regional
    proxy warfare against Iran. Considering these fears, it is
    important for us to look at how a nuclear deal will impact
    Iran's strategy toward the GCC and the rest of the region.
        Supreme Leader Khamenei has not shown any indication that a
    nuclear deal will fundamentally alter Iran's regional policies
    toward the United States, our allies in the Gulf, and even
    Israel. The IRGC may initially become even more assertive
    against the GCC, the United States or Israel, as the Iranian
    leadership tries to establish its anti-Western and an anti-
    Zionist credentials following a nuclear deal. Tehran, however,
    will likely try to limit any resulting conflict escalation that
    could credibly endanger the world power's support for the
    agreement, especially with a new U.S. President entering office
    in 2017.
        The bulk of Iran's estimated $150 billion windfall from a
    nuclear deal will likely go to internal economic investment as
    the U.S. administration argues. This does not mean that the
    Iranian leadership will not have access to billions more to
    allocate to the IRGC's efforts in Iraq, Syria, and around the
    region. We should not underestimate how far Iran will go to
    defend its interests in Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad, as well
    as to attempt to expand its activities in Yemen, Bahrain, the
    Palestinian territories, and elsewhere.
        More critically, if the IRGC decides to send actual combat
    forces into Syria to fight the GCC or Turkish-backed opposition
    groups, or into Iraq to fight ISIL, we risk potential serious
    miscalculations by Turkey, the GCC, or Israel. The United
    States must be prepared for and try to prevent, if possible,
    escalation by these regional powers in response to a direct
    Iranian intervention. With this in mind, here are four
    recommendations that the United States should consider to best
    support our allies in the region: First, prevent the
    conventional forces' balance of power in the Gulf from eroding
    in Iran's favor, which a removal of the conventional arms
    embargo would do, which is being discussed potentially in
    Vienna. Congress should carefully scrutinize the Iranian
    nuclear deal to mitigate any weakening of the arms embargo or
    missile technology import restrictions that are currently in
    place. Second, reinforce the U.S. commitment to the region's
    security through enhanced defense agreements with the GCC,
    mindful to maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge. We
    may want to consider elevating the relationship by signing
    security treaties, but should avoid pursuing concepts such as a
    nuclear umbrella. Third, help the GCC develop better asymmetric
    warfare capabilities for both defensive and potentially
    offensive capabilities.
        President Obama's comments at the Camp David Summit implied
    that the Gulf states already have sufficient resources to push
    back against Iran's destabilizing activities in the region. We
    need to go further. The United States and the GCC have a shared
    interest in contesting the IRGC, and formation of an Arab rapid
    reaction force would be a step forward in that directs.
        Finally, we should focus diplomatic, legislative,
    intelligence, and military strategies for shaping the post-2025
    environment, once Iranian uranium enrichment and nuclear
    research and development restrictions expire under a potential
    deal, to ensure Iran remains deterred from achieving a nuclear
    weapon. This should include ensuring that the United States
    maintains a robust military option to degrade or destroy
    Iranian infrastructure.
        Taking these steps will help assure our Gulf partners at a
    time of increasing doubt about U.S. commitment to their
    security as well as mitigate the impact the Iran nuclear deal
    will have on our position in the region. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. McInnis follows:]

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                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. McInnis.
        Dr. Weinberg.

       STATEMENT OF DAVID ANDREW WEINBERG, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW,
                 FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES

        Mr. Weinberg. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch,
    and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
    this opportunity to testify before you today.
        America's relations with the GCC states are on the wrong
    track. Each side offers the others some benefits, yet our main
    interests continue to go unfulfilled. Today I will cover four
    main topics on this regard: Threats from Iran, negligence on
    terror finance, religious incitement, and abuses of basic
    rights.
        On Iran, our Sunni-ruled Gulf allies see the pursuit of a
    nuclear bargain with their main enemy and Washington's
    disengaged approach to the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen,
    and they wonder if they are on the fast track to abandonment.
    These states perceive an imminent threat from Iran's Islamic
    Revolutionary Guard Corps, which, as Mr. McInnis indicated,
    will inevitably share in any windfall from sanctions relief.
        The U.S. should offer the GCC states explicit commitments
    about how we will respond to cheating on a nuclear deal, and
    how we will prevent Iran from obtaining the bomb after the deal
    begins to sunset. That said, we should also press Riyadh to
    take its own confidence-building steps to prove their own
    nuclear program will also stay peaceful.
        With regard to regional conflicts and Iran's destabilizing
    activities, we should strive to get Iran-backed militias in
    Iraq off of the front lines in Sunni majority areas of the
    country, such as in the effort to retake Ramadi. In Yemen, we
    should help make the Saudi-backed arms embargo more
    sustainable, specifically by finding ways to mitigate its
    significant humanitarian impact.
        In Syria we should boost support for the moderate
    opposition, including providing air cover where appropriate,
    but impose sanctions on groups like Ahrar al-Sham, Jund al-
    Aqsa, and the Army of Conquest, urging Gulf states to similarly
    choke off support. Unfortunately, in the fight against ISIL and
    al-Qaeda, our GCC allies have broken their word in two critical
    regards that they pledged on the last anniversary of 9/11: To
    end the impunity of terror financiers and to halt the religious
    incitement that feeds extremist recruitment.
        They agreed to take these steps when they joined the anti-
    ISIL coalition, yet still today, little has changed. Last year
    America's czar for combating terror finance revealed that the
    majority of private support reaching al-Qaeda's core leadership
    in Pakistan came from the Gulf. The worst offenders were Qatar
    and Kuwait. Yet neither country has taken noteworthy legal
    action against individuals on U.S. or U.N. terror lists.
        For example, it appears that Muthanna al-Dhari, whom the
    U.S. and U.N. charged with providing over $1 million to the
    group we now know as ISIL, was let into Qatar yet again last
    month since the Camp David Summit, in violation of his U.N.
    travel ban, and earlier this year he was hugged and kissed by
    the Qatari Emir's father. Kuwait released two men sanctioned by
    the U.S. as al-Qaeda financiers several hours after detaining
    them. For the fourth time last week, Israel accused another
    Hamas operative in Doha of directing a West Bank terror cell,
    and I believe Congress can take some constructive steps to
    address this challenge. We should not let the Gulf states'
    lucrative arms purchases or desire to invest in U.S. assets
    crowd terror finance off the agenda, and we should not wait to
    insulate our economy from Gulf energy disruptions via a
    national strategy for transportation fuel choice.
        As for incitement, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have recklessly
    supported religious leaders who propagate hatred. To highlight
    one example, Representative Deutch, you mentioned U.S. campuses
    in Doha, for instance. Yet, we found that the mosque that
    serves the U.S. universities in Doha's Education City, campuses
    like Northwestern University and Texas A&M, when the mosque was
    inaugurated earlier this year, the ceremony was sponsored by
    the Emir of Qatar's mother. The preacher who was invited to
    give the sermon has memorably called on Qatar TV saying that
    Osama bin Laden died with more dignity and honor than any
    infidel, such as any Christian, any Jew, any apostate, any
    atheist, any Zoroastrians. This is very discouraging rhetoric,
    and unfortunately these sorts of clerics have continued to
    receive state perks especially from the Saudi and Qatari
    Governments, but also from the Governments of Dubai, Kuwait,
    and Bahrain as well.
        Finally, while President Obama claims that it is important
    to have tough conversations with our allies in the Gulf, and
    said this in advance of the Camp David Summit, there wasn't
    really clear indication in the public view that this sort of
    conversation has actually been had. Unfortunately, this is all
    too typical for U.S. administrations, both Democrat and
    Republican, when it comes to the Gulf. All six GCC states are
    systematically demolishing the constituencies needed to move
    their countries in a more moderate direction. Washington needs
    to get tougher with Gulf security chiefs, whom we treat as
    partners against al-Qaeda, yet also preside over the sorts of
    egregious rights abuses that we know feeds extremism long term.
        Thank you. And with that, I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Weinberg follows:]
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                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Dr. Weinberg.
        Dr. Katzman.

       STATEMENT OF KENNETH KATZMAN, PH.D., SPECIALIST IN MIDDLE
            EASTERN AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

        Mr. Katzman. Thank you, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking
    Member Deutch, distinguished subcommittee members for asking me
    to appear on behalf of CRS (Congressional Research Service) on
    this important topic. I will summarize my remarks and ask that
    my remarks be submitted for the record.
        The United States has been a major actor and basically the
    guarantor of Gulf security for over 30 years. The United States
    still imports more than 15 percent of its oil from the GCC
    states. Containing a potential threat for Iran requires
    substantial cooperation with the GCC states. The GCC states
    express concern about how a final nuclear agreement with Iran
    might affect the region. They assert that broad sanctions
    relief will enable Iran to increase its assistance to regional
    factions in governments, such as President Assad of Syria, the
    Houthi rebels in Yemen, Shiite militia forces in Iraq, Lebanese
    Hezbollah, and hard line opposition factions in Bahrain.
    Sanctions relief could enable Iran to potentially enable Iran
    to modernize its armed forces, possibly to the point where Iran
    could deploy a large ground force across the Strait of Hormuz.
    Iran, too, now has been hampered by the lack of sea lift and
    ability to move across waterways.
        The GCC leaders are concerned that a nuclear deal could
    lead to a broader improvement in U.S.-Iran relations, but gives
    Iran's views in the region increase weight on the U.S.
    decision-making apparatus. There is a perception in the Gulf
    that the United States, as a consequence of a nuclear deal,
    could come to view the Gulf region as secure and walk away and
    or reduce--substantially reduce its military presence in the
    Gulf. That is a huge concern that the Gulf leaders have.
        There are, however, some possible benefits of a nuclear
    deal to the GCC. The GCC states conduct extensive trade with
    Iran, particularly the UAE. And economic growth in Iran would
    enhance, obviously, the economic--this trade and help the GCC
    economies. A nuclear agreement could, depending on what
    direction Iran goes after a deal, provide some movement,
    perhaps, on a political solution in Yemen and some regional
    energy projects that have been long discussed but have not
    moved forward because of sanctions, such as energy pipeline
    linkages between Iran and Kuwait, Iran and Oman, and Iran and
    Bahrain.
        Iran and the UAE could potentially resolve their
    territorial dispute over the three Gulf islands, Abu Musa and
    the Tunb islands, which the Shah seized, and the Islamic
    Republic completed that seizure by taking Abu Musa in 1992,
    putting its forces, IRGC forces, on Abu Musa. The
    administration has sought to reassure the GCC leaders. We have
    talked about the GCC summit, which came out with the strategic
    partnerships stipulating five areas facilitating arms sales to
    the Gulf, increasing U.S.-GCC cooperation on maritime security,
    cyber security, counterterrorism, military exercises, U.S.
    training, and a renewed commitment to building a Gulf-wide
    holistic missile defense against Iran's missile capabilities.
        Gulf diplomats indicate to me and others that working
    groups on these stipulated areas have now been established in
    the foreign and defense ministries of the GCC states, and that
    U.S.-GCC discussions on these areas are becoming more
    systematic and structured. Previously, the U.S.-GCC strategic
    dialogue was only at the level of U.S. Defense--Defense
    Secretary and Secretary of State, and now it has moved into
    down the bureaucracy, more institutionalized.
        Again, armed sales are a key to this relationship. Two of
    the countries, Kuwait and Bahrain are major non NATO allies.
    There have been substantial weapon sales to the Gulf states,
    obviously. And these armed sales have not only made the GCC
    states able partners, but in some way, they have emboldened the
    Gulf states. The Gulf states are flexing their muscles, so to
    speak, on regional issues. We have seen it in Libya, where the
    UAE conducted an air strike last year on a terrorist training
    camp without necessarily consulting the United States; Saudi
    Arabia has taken the lead in putting together this coalition
    that is intervening in Yemen with very minimal support from the
    United States, and perhaps the U.S. didn't think maybe this
    type of intervention was going to succeed.
        So we have that against the Houthis. Obviously, the GCC
    states were helping the military Government of CC and Egypt at
    the same time the U.S. was, you know, denying some weaponry to
    Egypt. So the Gulf states are emboldened and are acting,
    perhaps, because they feel the U.S. is not acting on some of
    these key interests that they have. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Katzman follows:]

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                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Excellent testimony.
    And I will begin the question-and-answer period.
        This morning our full committee held a hearing on Iran, and
    some of the witnesses pointed out that the U.S. is no longer
    seen in the region as upholding our commitments to protect our
    partners from foreign aggression. So my first question to you,
    gentlemen, is even if the U.S. signs some sort of security
    cooperation agreement with the GCC countries, do they believe
    that we will uphold that commitment or have we lost trust with
    the GCC? You can keep the answers short, because I have
    several.
        Mr. Eisenstadt. I think the important point is I think they
    don't know. And I think the fact of the matter is that in light
    of U.S. behavior in recent years, the red line with regard to
    the Syrian CW and the initial U.S. red lines with regard to
    Iran's nuclear program and how those red lines have kind of
    moved in the course of negotiations, I think they probably have
    questions about the validity of any commitments that the United
    States provides.
        Plus I would just point, in terms of the joint statement
    that was made at the Camp David Summit, it was--as these kind
    of commitments go, it was a very kind of bland and--kind of
    statement that I think from the point--you know, that kind of
    reference U.N. Charter as kind of the grounds for U.S. support
    for its allies. And you know, it wasn't the treaty that was
    passed by Congress, although I am not sure that would--that is
    the way to go either. So I think they probably have a lot of
    questions. But the problem is, from their point of view, they
    don't really have anywhere else to go at this point.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. I know that some of you might
    want to participate in this. Let me ask you some other
    questions, and you can still answer it that way.
        At Camp David, the GCC needed to hear that the United
    States is committed to the Middle East region and committed to
    stopping Iranian expansionism. But instead, they received
    assurances about arms deals and general defense cooperation, as
    important as they may be. But we must ensure that sales of
    advanced weapon systems to the GCC are consistent with our
    larger goals, objectives and policies, including human rights
    concerns, maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge and
    also addressing the underlying problems that the GCC has beyond
    the surface level.
        And should a deal be finalized, we all know that Iran is
    not going to stop its destabilizing activities against the U.S.
    and against the GCC interests in the region. So what credible
    actions are the GCC countries asking from us in order to ease
    their anxieties about developments in the region, and what
    alternatives do you suggest in order to combat Iranian
    aggression and repair this difficult and already harmed GCC
    relationship?
        Mr. McInnis. Thank you. What I would add, and following up
    in the context of your previous question, Chairwoman, is that
    the GCC countries in conversations I have had with leaders
    there, indicate that it is more the issue that the United
    States is not one to understand the personal relationship
    issue. I think that we tend to underestimate how much they
    value personal commitments. When they see the President
    breaking red lines or, you know, even if there are rational
    policy reasons for it, with personal relationships, it is
    really hard for the Gulf leaders to rebuild those. And I think
    we tend to be too callous about that.
        The second thing is I think that the GCC leadership does
    not think that we understand the Iranian threat adequately, and
    that we do not understand the existential problems that the GCC
    feels it faces. It thinks that the United States underestimates
    the destabilizing internal threat that Iran poses to them. I
    think this is a real key problem. I think the President was
    very dismissive of that issue at Camp David. And I think
    because of that, bearing in mind the human rights concerns, we
    do need to increase our capacity to work on counterterrorism
    issues with the GCC countries, because their fears of internal
    instability, frankly, trump all decision-making. We have to be
    sensitive to that in making them feel reassured that we are
    there to strengthen overall security in the region, while at
    the same time, we do want them to change certain policies.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. And let me continue,
    and you can answer whichever ones you like.
        I am concerned, as you have heard me say, that the sale of
    advanced weapon systems to GCC countries is contributing to a
    conventional arms race in the region, and that we are running
    into the risk of diminishing Israel's qualitative military
    edge, which is still a U.S. law whether the administration
    wants to enforce it or not. What kind of weapons can we expect
    to see the U.S. offer GCC countries in the months ahead beyond
    those deals that are already pending, and how would this impact
    Israel's qualitative military edge, and will GCC countries look
    toward Russia or China to fulfill their military needs? And if
    so, what kind of threat does this pose to our security
    interests in the region?
        Mr. Weinberg. So I think at the Camp David Summit, one of
    the measures that was a constructive U.S. proposal for
    addressing some of these concerns, both QME--rather, that
    doesn't undercut QME, but is still a constructive thing we can
    do for our Gulf allies, is the creation of a Foreign Military
    Sales office specifically devoted to GCC-wide sales.
        So this is something that could decrease bureaucratic
    hurdles while not necessarily providing new weapon systems that
    would be problematic. The U.S. did not provide promises to give
    the Gulf states the F-35 joint strike fighter. It did not
    provide, as far as I am aware, commitments for improved bunker
    busters. These are two things that the Israelis would be very
    uncomfortable about.
        I think it is important to recognize that, indeed, the Gulf
    states are not going to be reassured by forward U.S.
    deployments or arms sales alone. They need to know that the
    U.S. has their back when it comes to Iran's destabilizing
    regional activities or else otherwise they are basically on
    their own when it comes to using those American weapons.
        One area where the Russians have been turning to--the
    Saudis have been turning to the Russians, have been reports
    that they are seeking the S-400 missile system. They also
    likely are seeking from the United States countermeasures
    against the S-300 that the Iranians recently acquired. And that
    is going to be a real challenge going forward without that
    undermining QME.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I agree. And, Dr. Katzman, I am going to
    ask one more question, but you can answer whichever one I have
    already posed. While we contemplate additional GCC arms sales,
    we must ensure that we aren't losing sight of our commitment to
    human rights in the region. How can the U.S. continue to
    promote human rights in the Gulf, where the political, social,
    and religious repression is some of the worst in the world,
    while maintaining our strategic partnership? This a difficult
    dance for us, isn't it?
        Mr. Katzman. Well, actually, I would say a lot of the human
    rights groups were somewhat upset a few weeks ago when the U.S.
    announced it was going to proceed with an armed sale to Bahrain
    that had been held up on human rights grounds in 2011. This was
    a September 2011 sale of basically Humvees, tow missiles, anti
    tank weaponry. And the administration stated that Bahrain had
    been improving its human rights record.
        I think what I have heard, many in the region saw it,
    really, as a way of implementing the Camp David commitments to
    release certain armed sales that the GCC states wanted and to
    show that the U.S. is implementing Camp David. So the human
    rights question in the Gulf is a very difficult question. You
    know, the Summit, human rights were barely mentioned at the
    Camp David Summit. And this almost didn't come up at all. We
    have had several leaders visit in the past 2 years. The Emir of
    Kuwait has been here. Sheikh Mohammad bin Zayed, who is the
    defacto leader of UAE has been here, Sheikh Emir Tamim of Qatar
    has been here, and the communiques based on the meetings that
    have gone on, barely have mentioned human rights at all. So
    these are some issues that some of the human rights groups are
    raising.
        Now, I just--I wanted to just comment on the QME issue. You
    know, again, Israel and the GCC states have the very same
    position on a lot of regional issues right now. So I think--and
    the Israelis and the GCC states are talking about a broad range
    of security issues that they never even talked with each other
    about at all previously. So, you know, to some extent that,
    perhaps, puts context to the QME discussion.
        I would also say in terms of the Iran deal, let's--for 35
    years the United States has not talked to Iran at all. So the
    only message the U.S. was getting about Gulf security, the
    region, was from the Gulf states. Now, the United States is
    getting Iran's point of view. The U.S. does not always
    necessarily put much weight on it, but at least the U.S. is
    hearing Iran's point of view. And what I am understanding from
    Gulf officials, is that has caused a problem because now they
    know that the U.S. is at least hearing Iran's point of view,
    which is mainly to complain about them, the GCC states.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you for
    excellent answers to my rambling questions.
        And Mr. Deutch is recognized for his question and answers.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. We discussed earlier
    today in an Iran hearing an issue that I would like to get this
    panel's thoughts on. We have--as these talks in Vienna move on,
    and as we move forward to see whether there is a deal that can
    be made, one of the big--the biggest issues is what sanctions
    relief would mean to Iran, what they would do with the $150
    billion that they would then have access to. And the argument
    has been made that it would more likely be used for domestic
    purposes, that it would not be, despite our concerns, that it
    wouldn't be used, that sanctions wouldn't be used to fuel
    regional mischief to fund terror, to do all the things that we
    worry so much about the Iranian regime for. What--how do the
    Gulf states view this? What is their--how do they view this?
    What evidence do they use to draw their conclusions? Any of our
    panelists.
        Dr. Weinberg, you seem anxious to answer.
        Mr. Weinberg. So I think there is an interesting comparison
    with how our Israeli allies view the Iranian threat that they
    face and how our Gulf allies view it. I think for our Israeli
    allies, the existential question is the nuclear one, and the
    IRGC issue is another major concern. I think for the Gulf
    states, the nuclear issue is a very major concern, and the
    nuclear component is the existential question for them. They
    basically see it as a core threat to their rule. And so when
    they see that Iran, in the last calendar year, increased its
    public budget allotment for the IRGC by 48 percent when Iran is
    under crippling sanctions----
        Mr. Deutch. I am sorry, Dr. Weinberg, to what amount?
        Mr. Weinberg. I don't have the numbers offhand, but you we
    can submit that for the record.
        Understandably, when they see that the IRGC is undoubtedly
    going to share in some portion of the windfall, I mean, even
    supporters of the Iran nuclear deal acknowledge that. It would
    be folly to say that they are not going to get any of the
    money. The question is how aggressive will they be with that
    money, and nobody in the Gulf is putting money on more
    moderate.
        Mr. Deutch. Right. So let me be more specific.
        Mr. Weinberg. Sure.
        Mr. Deutch. There are those who have argued that, in
    response to what I believe are valid concerns in line with your
    response to my question, that we don't really believe that more
    of their--that they would use much of this money to fund the
    IRGC to engage in the nefarious activities that they do around
    the world, because they have been able to do it already with a
    small amount of money, which I have a hard time really wrapping
    my head around. Because if they have been successful with a
    small amount of money, then why wouldn't they--Dr. Katzman, why
    wouldn't we expect that some part of that $150 billion, whether
    1 billion or 5 or 20, would be used? And if so, what could all
    of that additional money be used for?
        Mr. Katzman. Congressman, I agree with that question and
    the way you framed it. The issue--I would take some, perhaps,
    difference on the--Iran is having trouble. Iran is not having
    success universally. Yes, they have had some success in places.
    They are having tremendous trouble in Syria right now. I am not
    convinced in my analysis that more money would necessarily
    bring them to success in Syria where they seem to be having
    grave difficulty in Syria. Hezbollah is taking very large
    casualties in Syria. I am not convinced that there was--I was
    at a discussion the other day about Iran might give Hezbollah
    $1 billion, theoretically, of this money they are going to get.
    What would Hezbollah do with the billion--that is the thing.
    They are losing a lot of men; very tough to recruit; Hezbollah
    doesn't necessarily believe in fighting all over Syria, just on
    the border.
        So, yes, they would have more resources, but I think Iran
    is having a lot of problems in the region. They are having
    success in places, but they are also having problems.
        Mr. Deutch. My question isn't whether--I am not asking you
    to anticipate whether they would be successful in how they
    spent the money. My question is, is it realistic to believe
    that if they have access to $150 billion, that given this
    regime, some significant amount of money would go to fund
    terrorists, and that some significant amount of money would go
    to wreak havoc in the region? Mr. Eisenstadt.
        Mr. Eisenstadt. If I could just piggy back on Ken's
    comments. I agree with what he is saying, that Iran's allies in
    Syria are overstretched. We have seen them. They have been
    using recently Afghani Shiites and Pakistani Shiites. I think
    that is the answer. In the past, their preference has always
    been to fight to the last Arab proxy. Having money enables them
    to hire on additional people. They are now expanding their
    recruitment base to Afghan and Pakistanis. And more money means
    greater ability to recruit people. Now, whether they will be
    effective or not is another question. But I think, given the
    fact that they have committed their own people to combat for
    the first time in Iraq and Syria, and they prefer not to do
    that, they prefer to fight the proxies, money gives them
    additional resources to gain additional proxies.
        Again, I don't know if it will translate into greater
    effectiveness, but I think you can say that given the situation
    they are in, that that provides them potentially a new lease on
    life, at least in the short run.
        Mr. Deutch. Mr. McInnis, do you agree?
        Mr. McInnis. I would agree with that. And what I would add
    is that the strain that we are discussing on the Iranians'
    expeditionary activities right now is very significant. And
    when you think about what they are having to give to Assad to
    kind of keep him afloat, the amount of money that is coming in
    that can help offset some of those negative things on their
    budget right now allows them to kind of do what they want to
    do. Frankly, especially what I consider to be the more
    expansionist activities in Yemen, for example, that is
    something that makes me worried. If they can kind of hold the
    fort better in Syria and Iraq, the additional money coming in
    allows them to expand what they are trying to do in very,
    sometimes, odd ways inside Yemen to really pressure the Saudis.
        And I think what the Iranians have been looking for just as
    the Iranians always fear that we are surrounding them or trying
    to surround them--the Iranians are trying to surround Saudi
    Arabia and the Gulf states. That is the reason why you saw the
    recent exposure of the plot in Jordan that just came to light
    recently. When you look at their activity in Iraq, Jordan,
    Yemen, Bahrain, and potentially other places, the Iranians have
    kind of a latent capacity surrounding Saudi Arabia and the
    Emirates. And I think that is the concern. If they can hold the
    fort better in Iraq and Syria with additional money, it allows
    them to put greater pressure on the Saudis.
        Mr. Deutch. Thanks.
        Madam Chairman, I just--I appreciate the input from our
    panelists. And as we move forward in these talks, this is very
    helpful, because a sober analysis of the potential outcome of
    this negotiation, I think, requires us to acknowledge that in
    all likelihood, sanctions relief, if and when it comes, is
    going to result in more money. However it is spent, it is going
    to result in more money creating more problems in the region. I
    just think that, perhaps, has not been part of the discussion
    as much as it should have, and I hope that with this from our
    panelist, we will have an opportunity to inject into it today.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. We turn to
    Mr. Boyle of Pennsylvania.
        Mr. Boyle. Thank you. I wanted to, just a quick follow-up
    on the last point that Ranking Member Deutch was making.
    Unfortunately, we have a terrible history in this part of the
    world of funding and of sending armaments for one purpose, and
    then suddenly seeing those armaments used by a different group
    in a completely different purpose and reminded of that each and
    every day by the activities of ISIS. But the two questions I
    wanted to ask, though, weren't really on this point.
        The first, though, I think it was Dr. Katzman, you raised
    it in your opening statement. One of the unintended
    consequences, positive unintended consequences of this
    protracted negotiation that P5+1 has had with Iran is that we
    finally found something that would bring the Gulf--the GCC
    states and Israel a little closer together and cooperating. I
    am just wondering if you see this--this is--you know, it is not
    completely possible to accurately predict this, but I am
    interested in your sense of whether or not this is a temporary
    phenomenon, or this actually could be the beginning of a
    permanent improving of relations and actually working together?
        Mr. Katzman. I will address it further. Thank you.
        The way I would frame it is the GCC and Israel still have a
    huge difference of opinion on certain regional issues, mainly
    the Palestinians, Arab-Israeli dispute. But I think they see
    that as sort of an emotional and political dispute. On Iran,
    they have a strategic agreement. Israel and the GCC have an
    exact same strategic analysis, and they have a strategic
    alignment that Iran is the key threat to the region; Iran
    cannot have a nuclear weapon; Iran must be contained and
    deterred, and so that has brought a level of strategic
    dialogue, as quiet as it is, between Israel and the GCC, as has
    ever been witnessed really, since Israel was formed.
        Mr. Boyle. Right. So the follow-up, I am more on--if we can
    project, and once, let's say, whether an agreement is reached
    or not, the Iranian nuclear negotiations are now, one way or
    the other, no more, we are into the fall, we are into next
    year, I am interested in your view to project forward, whether
    or not you think this could be the beginning of a longer shift,
    or this is simply a one-time, all about Iran, and then go back
    to business as usual?
        Mr. Katzman. It depends. I think if Iran goes back in the
    direction that I think most of us think, which is they will use
    the resources to continue to try to expand their influence in
    the region, then I think that basis of strategic cooperation
    would continue.
        Mr. Weinberg. If I may offer a different perspective on
    this. I am much more pessimistic in this regard. I went on to
    the Saudi state news channel's Web site recently, and there was
    an article in which they talk about alleged Israeli overflights
    in Lebanon. But the way in which they talk about these are the
    ``enemy'' Israeli Air Force. When you look at these sorts of
    preachers whom the Saudi king has surrounded himself with, on
    the official state Ulema council, some of the other preachers
    whom he hugs and kisses, these people have a long record of
    inciting against Christians and also inciting against Jews.
        And there was recently much talk about an unofficial
    dialogue between a former Israeli official and a former Saudi
    official. So what? I mean, this was, as I understand it, a very
    unofficial level, and it was covered in a much lesser level in
    Saudi press as it was than it was in the Israeli press. I don't
    think the Saudi Government is really in a position to do
    anything beyond the security--the quiet security and strategic
    intelligence coordination which was already going on a decade
    ago.
        Mr. Boyle. Thank you. I would just add, Dr. Weinberg, your
    opening remarks, I was very much listening. And I think it is
    worth repeating the reminder that a number of these states that
    we can cooperate with on a number of strategic areas still are
    pretty large funders of anti-American and anti-Semitic rhetoric
    and hate. And that is something that we had better always keep
    in both the back and the front of our minds. Thank you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Boyle. And Mr.
    Clawson is going to take over for me. Meanwhile, I will
    recognize Mr. Connolly.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman. You are so kind.
    Thank you, Mr. Clawson. Mr. Clawson, if you wish to go, I, of
    course, would defer to you. Okay. Thank you very much. Welcome
    to our panel. Fascinating discussion. If I understood what Dr.
    Weinberg just said to Mr. Boyle, Mr. Katzman, he was saying,
    let's not overstate this, you know, level of cooperation, that
    the enemy of my enemy is my friend kind of status that has
    descended on the GCC and its relations with Israel. Did I get
    that right, Mr. Weinberg? I did?
        Mr. Weinberg. You did.
        Mr. Connolly. So, Dr. Katzman, you disagree, you think
    actually it is of a different elevation than in the past and
    worthy of some note?
        Mr. Katzman. Yes. I mean, I am not disputing what Dr.
    Weinberg is observing. But I think a lot of it is the basic
    culture and approach of the population and people way below the
    leadership level in the GCC. And I tend, perhaps, because of my
    background or whatever, to give more weight to what is going on
    at the government-to-government level and to not necessarily
    look at each cleric. These clerics have been around, Youssef
    al-Qaradawi is in Qatar. He is one of the most inflammatory
    clerics in the Islamic world. He is in Qatar. There were 9/11,
    there were al-Qaeda activists who transited through Qatar
    before 9/11. These things go on.
        Mr. Connolly. Right. But, I mean, take Qatar, for one
    example. I mean, there is all kinds of behavior we could decry
    and call out and not like. On the other hand, they have
    actually been useful interlocutors in some other situations,
    including on behalf, well, de facto on behalf of Israel. Is
    that not correct?
        Mr. Katzman. Qatar has also been very helpful in
    Afghanistan. Without Qatar, we probably would not have gotten
    Mr. Bergdahl back. They are interlocutors on any number of
    issues absolutely.
        Mr. Connolly. Okay. So we have a mixed record of behavior.
    We would like everyone to be perfect and do what we think is in
    everybody's best interest. But it is a problematic area at
    best, the Gulf. I want to go back to sort of the origins of
    this hearing. So, Dr. Katzman, the GCC reps were invited to
    Camp David to meet with the President and his team, is that
    correct? And what was your understanding of the purpose of that
    summit or that meeting, set of meetings?
        Mr. Katzman. Well, the summit was announced simultaneously
    when President Obama briefed the Nation on the April 2
    tentative nuclear accord with Iran, the framework accord. So it
    was in connection to that certainly.
        Mr. Connolly. As a longtime analyst and observer of the
    region, were those productive meetings from your point of view?
        Mr. Katzman. From everything I have heard, the Camp David
    summit was more productive than was anticipated. There were
    very low expectations. Only two of the heads of state attended.
    King Salman and then King Hamad of Bahrain pulled out, you
    know, about a day before. So there were very low expectations.
    And my understanding is the summit far exceeded the
    expectations.
        Mr. Connolly. In far exceeding the expectations, is an
    element of that a sense of reassurance by the GCC that the
    United States was actually quite serious about what it was
    trying to achieve in the Iran nuclear negotiations? Because I
    assume that was the big elephant in the room.
        Mr. Katzman. Yes. I mean, I think the GCC statements on the
    nuclear deal have evolved. And I think it has been somewhat
    more positive, not outright positive, but more positive than
    they were before the Camp David summit on the nuclear deal.
    Yes, they have become more positive on it, yes.
        Mr. Connolly. Do you feel that the United States was
    successful in providing reassurances, both in terms of their
    collective security and in terms of where we are headed in this
    relationship with Iran?
        Mr. Katzman. That is my understanding, yes, sir.
        Mr. Connolly. You know what? My first trip to the Gulf was
    in the early 1980s to mid 1980s. I was there right after the
    revolution in Iran and when we reflagged the Kuwaiti oil
    tankers. And what struck me and surprised us when we went, we
    were expecting all the Gulf, the GCC nations, I keep on wanting
    to say G7, forgive me, GCC nations to be really as preoccupied
    as we were with the Ayatollah Khomeini and the revolution in
    Iran and the threat that posed to the region and so forth. They
    weren't particularly focused on that. In the 1980s, they were
    focused on Iraq and Saddam Hussein. I might just observe that
    the preoccupation with Iran today is logical. They are the big
    menace now that Iraq has been defenestrate, and Saddam Hussein
    is no more. And it is perfectly understandable, and it has to
    be dealt with, but it is not a unique--I mean, depending on who
    is strong at any given moment in the region, that is who GCC
    members are going to be concerned about, given size and
    proximity and the nature of the military threat.
        So it has to be dealt with. It can't be minimized. But I
    think some of the rhetoric we have heard about broken
    relationship and lacking credibility and fractured this and
    fractured that, I don't think so. And I would agree with your
    characterization, Dr. Katzman. Actually, the meeting at Camp
    David turned out, press expectations notwithstanding, more
    successfully than one might have expected. And I think
    reassurances apparently were made that were well received. I
    don't want to overstate it, but I would hardly call that a
    fractured relationship in the Gulf between them and the United
    States. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Clawson [presiding]. Thank you. Sorry for coming late,
    gentlemen. We appreciate you coming in today. I was in a
    subcommittee on Africa. So we get double booked here. So it
    certainly wasn't meant to be any kind of disrespect. So if any
    of my questions or comments are repetitive, I ask your
    forgiveness for my absence. When we voted last year and again
    this year on our country's, my country's, your country's
    involvement in the Syrian conflict, I voted no, because it felt
    like, to me, another bad war with very limited chances of any
    meaningful success, with the possibility of acceleration of our
    involvement, and one more kind of no-win situation in that part
    of the world.
        And I don't like sending my own sons and daughters of my
    constituents to die in faraway places without a meaningful
    payback. And as the son of my oldest sister prepares for his
    second tour in Afghanistan, in a face-to-face war with the
    enemy, I just have a hard time getting there unless I see
    victory in the cards, which I would love to see. Then when I
    think about the backdrop of this Iranian deal, I say to myself
    sanctions go away, these guys get more money to fight us in
    places like Afghanistan and Syria and other places. The Gulf
    states, by and large, are going to sit it out. And a big mess
    just got messier.
        Am I being overly pessimistic here? I look now at the money
    we have spent in Syria and where we are, what, a year, almost a
    year later, $1 billion, 60 people trained or whatever, and this
    feels like a sinkhole of money, lives, and confidence that will
    only be made worse if this deal goes through.
        So I know you are going to tell me why I am mistaken. So I
    turn it over to you all to give the counterpoint here.
    Remember, we are going to come back in 6 months and we are
    going to do a business review and see if it really has gotten
    any better here. With that, I yield to whoever would like to
    answer first.
        Mr. Eisenstadt. Mr. Chairman, actually I share a lot of
    your concerns. I think one of the challenges we face in dealing
    with the challenge posed by ISIL in Iraq and Syria is basically
    our strategy is contingent on our allies' policies, and what I
    am talking about with regard to the Iraqi Government and their
    willingness to engage in Sunni outreach and create an inclusive
    political system, which flies in the face of the zero-sum
    politics which tend to dominate Iraqi politics and the politics
    not all the countries in the region, but many of the countries
    in the region.
        But the challenge we face is that we have seen what
    happened in Syria as a result of 3 or 4 years of non-
    engagement, and that it creates a vacuum that is then filled by
    extremists. And, in fact, the failure of the United States to
    engage earlier in Syria created, and tried to create, tried to
    create, we have to acknowledge there is no guarantee that our
    efforts to create a moderate opposition will succeed. But our
    efforts to try to create a third way could then perhaps suck
    away resources and manpower that are now going to al-Qaeda
    affiliates and ISIL. So the challenge is to find the right
    balance.
        I agree, I don't want Americans on the ground engaged in
    combat again. But, on the other hand, walking away or
    disengaging, we have seen what has happened. We still have
    vital interests there. What happens in this part of the world
    has implications for, first, our allies, but it is already we
    are seeing that ISIL is influencing people here to act as lone
    wolves and engage in attacks. So the challenge is finding the
    right balance. And I actually share the administration's
    concerns and I support a light-footprint approach, though I
    would say that it would have to be, doing a light-footprint
    approach that entails more than the administration is doing.
    But, again, the challenge is finding the right balance because
    we have seen what happens when we don't engage. But then our
    allies also do things, act on their impulses which are not
    always the healthiest ones and sometimes they have supported
    groups that are either al-Qaeda affiliates, or very close to
    being, you know, they are kind of extremist in their
    orientation. And that is not good either.
        Mr. Clawson. Do you think that lifting sanctions will put
    more guns into the wrong hands in the region?
        Mr. Eisenstadt. That is one of the dangers of that course
    of action. And the problem is, we will never be able to square
    the circle with all the, you know, there are so many moving
    parts with regard to our policies in this part of the world,
    that you are never going to be able to iron out all the
    contradictions in U.S. policy. You can manage them.
        So I am supportive of a deal with Iran that advances our
    interests. It will remain to be seen if the deal we get
    actually does that. But while doing that, and if that entails
    sanctions relief, as it necessarily would have to, we have to
    find ways to mitigate that by doing other things, like I said,
    while extending a hand to Iran, we still also have to push back
    against Iranian efforts to expand their influence and to engage
    in proxy warfare in the region. That is also a driver of ISIS.
        Iran's involvement in Syria and Iraq also empowers ISIS. So
    I know it is like, you know, sometimes it makes my head explode
    too when I try to think of all this stuff because it really is
    almost impossible to iron out all the contradictions. But you
    need to try to manage it. And walking away, we have seen what
    happens when we are not engaged.
        Mr. McInnis. I would just add on that point that, and we
    have been talking about this in general, but there needs to be
    recognition that what is happening in the region is, yes, their
    role. The mistakes of U.S. strategy and policy have helped
    create the problems we have there right now. But the real
    issues are what the other regional states have done. And you
    look at what Iran's strategies have been in the region. They
    have been, aside from our own concern about what they are
    trying to achieve, even for their own purposes what they are
    trying to do has created enormous amounts of failure, at least
    right now. And that what they are facing is the fact of what
    they have done in Syria and what they are doing in Iraq is not
    necessarily succeeding.
        At the same time, our allies within the GCC, they are not
    nearly as sophisticated on these types of asymmetric proxy
    warfare efforts that Iran is able to do, which it is kind of
    failing at right now. But they are also in a position where the
    Saudis traditionally and the Emiratis and others, they throw
    money at groups and they fund these types of efforts, but they
    don't actually know how to build governance or build effective
    fighting forces. We have to recognize the limits of the players
    there. If we are going to leave, kind of withdraw and just kind
    of let this play out, we have to recognize the limits of the
    players there.
        And the fact that if we are going to make this work, if
    this is going to keep ISIL from becoming a worldwide problem
    for us, we are going to have to find ways to work with our
    allies in particular to learn how to fight these wars better.
    And that is one of the reasons why the encouragement that we
    saw, perhaps, from Camp David, that we need to start creating
    these types of Arab rapid reaction forces or help them train
    better how to build and work with fighting forces in other
    countries. People talk about: Should Saudi Arabia create its
    own version of the Quds force? I don't know. That is a really
    tough question.
        But this is something where we have to recognize the limits
    of what we have there. The other issue when it comes to the
    sanctions relief, and I hit this on my earlier points but
    wanted to hit it again, on the conventional side is a huge
    problem, especially if we start seeing a relaxation of the
    conventional arms embargo or the missile technology control
    regimes. Those are things that could happen in a deal. And if
    that happens, we could see a real shifting of the conventional
    balance of power in the Gulf in a direction that is dangerous
    for the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, in addition to the pressure
    it is going to put on our Gulf allies and accelerate the
    conventional arms race that the chairwoman was mentioning
    earlier. So I think on both the asymmetric fight, the proxy
    fight, and the conventional fight, the potential nuclear deal
    is a real disaster for us.
        Mr. Weinberg. You had mentioned the fight in Afghanistan.
    And I just want to note a terror finance case that relates.
    There was an organization known as Revival of Islamic Heritage
    Society in Kuwait which has branches all over the world,
    including in Pakistan. The United States first sanctioned the
    Pakistan branch and another regional branch, and several years
    later, sanctioned the headquarters in Kuwait as well. And, yet,
    indications suggest that the Kuwaitis have never taken
    significant action against RIHS within their own territory,
    even though we believe that it was functioning, including in
    Pakistan, as a channel for funds to al-Qaeda in South and
    Central Asia. The reported office director of the Pakistan
    office, both before and immediately after it was under U.S.
    sanctions at the time, was a Jordanian national named Khalil
    al-Zeer, who then, for many years, went on to be the executive
    director of a prominent charity in Qatar named the Eid Bin
    Muhammad Al Thani Charitable Society. One of the founding board
    members of the Eid Bin Muhammad Al Thani Charitable Society,
    was recently sanctioned by the United States and the United
    Nation on charges of providing up to $2 million a month to the
    organization we now know as ISIS. Alzeer left the country in
    2014. And the organization threw him a going-away party.
        The most recent State Department counterterrorism country
    report said that one of the positive steps that Qatar took
    against terror finance was to deport an individual who was a
    terror financier of Jordanian nationality who worked at a
    Qatari charity. Could it be Khalil al-Zeer? It could. Could it
    be somebody else? It could. Regardless of who that individual
    is, the fact is that Qatar's supposedly positive step that the
    administration is citing for fighting terror finance is to
    deport somebody rather than arrest them and try them. That they
    did the same with Hamas financiers according to the Christian
    Science Monitor quite recently. And that Kuwait is doing the
    same with alleged Nusra Front financiers as well.
        Arresting them and releasing them is very worrisome. And
    until we get at this problem of seed funding going to terror
    groups throughout the world from primarily Gulf private
    financiers in these early stages when we get these start-up
    terror groups, it is going to be extremely hard to keep these
    conflicts from getting to the point where we need to go in, or
    our allies need to go in militarily and take on the problem
    when they have conquered territory.
        Mr. Clawson. You are making the point to me that, the way I
    would put it, we are undermanaging our foes, in this case,
    Iran, and we are undermanaging our so-called friends.
        Mr. Weinberg. Yes.
        Mr. Clawson. And my second conclusion on that is we are not
    helping Israel enough because they are right over there. And,
    you know, words like what you just said lead me to believe that
    if I were them, I would want a few extra weapons if everybody
    around me was arming like this. Dr. Katzman?
        Mr. Katzman. Thank you. I mean, again, I wouldn't dispute
    everything Dr. Weinberg is saying. But I would also note Kuwait
    is hosting the headquarters for our anti-ISIS mission right
    now. I would point out also that Qatar is hosting forward
    headquarters for U.S. Central Command. Yes, there are these
    actors in the Gulf states. We are not disputing that. There was
    an minister in Kuwait for the Awazem tribe, Al Ajmi, who was
    allegedly posting, making posts on Twitter and raising money
    for al-Nusra I believe. And the Kuwaitis fired him. Now, they
    didn't necessarily arrest him, they didn't punish him. But they
    did take him away from his ministry.
        So the issue is to get at some of this, what Dr. Weinberg
    is talking about, would probably require a level of U.S.
    intrusiveness into the internal dynamics, tribal dynamics,
    political dynamics. It would require a level of intrusiveness
    that might interfere with our broader strategic plan in the
    Gulf.
        Mr. Clawson. Okay. I really have to cut it off because we
    have got to go. I thank all of you for your participation and
    your patience as the committee comes and goes. But these are
    obviously life-and-death kind of stuff. So I appreciate your
    contributions today.
        [Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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