[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-45]
ASSURING NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE:
INVESTING IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY
TO END RELIANCE ON RUSSIAN
ROCKET ENGINES
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 26, 2015
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
95-320 WASHINGTON : 2016
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RICK LARSEN, Washington
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
ROB BISHOP, Utah PETE AGUILAR, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana
Steve Kitay, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Eric Smith, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Bruno, Salvatore T. ``Tory,'' President and Chief Executive
Officer, United Launch Alliance................................ 3
Culbertson, Frank, Jr., President of Space Systems Group, Orbital
ATK............................................................ 6
Greaves, Lt Gen Samuel A., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space and
Missile Systems Center......................................... 34
Griffin, Dr. Michael D., Deputy Chair, RD-180 Availability Risk
Mitigation Study............................................... 36
Hyten, Gen John E., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command..... 33
McFarland, Hon. Katrina G., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Department of Defense............................. 32
Meyerson, Robert, President, Blue Origin......................... 4
Thornburg, Jeffery, Senior Director of Propulsion Engineering,
SpaceX......................................................... 8
Van Kleeck, Julie A., Vice President, Advanced Space and Launch
Systems, Aerojet Rocketdyne.................................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Bruno, Salvatore T. ``Tory''................................. 63
Culbertson, Frank, Jr........................................ 103
Greaves, Lt Gen Samuel A..................................... 143
Griffin, Dr. Michael D....................................... 154
Hyten, Gen John E............................................ 135
McFarland, Hon. Katrina G.................................... 128
Meyerson, Robert............................................. 79
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 61
Thornburg, Jeffery........................................... 113
Van Kleeck, Julie A.......................................... 86
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Section 1604, from ``Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015,
Legislative Text and Joint Explanatory Statement to
Accompany H.R. 3979, Public Law 113-291''.................. 163
Liquid Rocket Engine--Multi Program Applicability............ 164
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 168
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 167
Mr. Rogers................................................... 167
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bridenstine.............................................. 177
Mr. Brooks................................................... 178
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 176
Mr. Cooper................................................... 172
Mr. Rogers................................................... 171
Mr. Turner................................................... 180
ASSURING NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE: INVESTING IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY TO END
RELIANCE ON RUSSIAN ROCKET ENGINES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Friday, June 26, 2015.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:03 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. Good morning. I want to welcome everybody to
our Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing on ``Assuring
National Security Space: Investing in American Industry to End
Reliance on the Russian Rocket Engines.''
Before I get started, I think we all ought to take note
today that this is the day of the funeral, those nine families
in South Carolina. And it is a real tragedy. And I know our
hearts and thoughts are with them and our condolences to their
family and friends. As for today's business, we will be
conducting two panels. In this first panel, we have five expert
witnesses from the industry who represent current and potential
providers of the space launch and rocket propulsion for the
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle [EELV] program.
In our second panel, we have three senior government
officials who have responsibilities in managing and overseeing
the EELV program. And we also have an expert adviser to the
government on recent launch study.
On panel one, we have Tory Bruno, president and CEO [chief
executive officer] of United Launch Alliance [ULA]; Mr. Rob
Meyerson, president of Blue Origin; Ms. Julie Van Kleeck, vice
president, advanced space and launch programs at Aerojet
Rocketdyne; Mr. Frank Culbertson, president of space systems,
Orbital ATK; and Mr. Jeff Thornburg, senior director of
propulsion engineering at SpaceX. I thank all of you for
participating in this hearing, providing your perspective on
national security. I know it takes time and energy to prepare
for these things. And it is really an inconvenience to come up
here, but it really helps us a lot in developing public policy.
So I really appreciate your service. This is our second
hearing we recently conducted on space. We are dedicating the
time to this topic because of its significance to our national
security. Without an effective space launch program, we lose
all the advantages we gain from space capabilities. Losing
space for our warfighters is not an option. There are key
policy and acquisition questions regarding the future of
national security space that need to be addressed. As we have
said before, I am committed to ending our reliance on Russian
rocket engines for national security space launch.
I believe we must end our reliance in a manner that
protects our military's assured access to space and protects
the taxpayers by ensuring we don't trade one monopoly for
another. The House bill accomplishes this. And I look forward
to perspectives of our witnesses on the current legislation
under consideration for fiscal year 2016 NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act], both the Senate version and the House
version.
Because we are committed to ending our reliance on Russian
engines, we must invest in the United States rocket propulsion
industrial base. Investment in our industry for advanced rocket
engines is overdue. While we may lead in some areas of rocket
propulsion, we are clearly not leading in all. This is a
painfully obvious fact considering that two of the three U.S.
launch providers we have here today rely on Russian engines.
And it is not just the Russians leading the way. According
to online press reports, the Chinese may be flying a new launch
vehicle on a maiden flight this summer with similar
technologies as the Russians, using advanced kerosene engine.
The time has come to resume U.S. leadership in space. And I
believe the companies before us today can help us do that.
However, I am concerned with the Air Force's recent
approach in what may amount to a very expensive and risky
endeavor in development of new engines, new launch vehicles,
and new infrastructure. Congress has only authorized funding
for the development of a rocket propulsion system. Launch
vehicles are not the problem. The problem is the engine.
Thank you for being with us this morning. I look forward to
your testimony and discussion of these important topics. I now
recognize my friend and colleague from Tennessee, the ranking
member, Mr. Cooper, for any opening statement he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 61.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think we should approach this hearing as all others with
a great deal of humility. Because I think the bottom line is if
we had gotten last year's NDAA right, we wouldn't even be
having this hearing. So we are correcting a self-inflicted
wound here. Now, there are many self-inflicted wounds depending
on how far back you want to go in history. It is a little
embarrassing for America that we haven't been able to duplicate
or exceed the Russian technology already, given the billions of
dollars we have expended. But, actually, there are tremendous
signs of hope because if we had this hearing a few years ago,
that is when we really should have been worried, but we weren't
smart enough to be worried back then. Now due to the
investment, sometimes of our own billionaires and their love of
space, there are some amazingly exciting things happening. So
we are really just managing this transition.
I am confident we can do it. I wish, and I don't know
whether the Chinese with their Long March missile have, in
fact, bought the RD-180 or at least copied it successfully,
something we apparently have been unable to do. But we don't
want to just be held to the past standard. There are new
generation technologies that are even more exciting, more
capable. So how do we effectively transition to that. Company
competition can be contentious sometimes, but it is also
exciting. And sometimes it brings out the best in us no matter
how painful it is. So I am glad we are having this hearing. I
hope that the net result will be superior congressional
performance, as well as superior company performance so that we
can have assured access to space.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of
the witnesses.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
And the Chair would inform the other members if they have
opening statements, they can submit them for the record.
Now we will move to our first panel. The witnesses are
asked to summarize their opening statements. Your full opening
statements will be accepted into the record.
And we will start with Mr. Bruno. You are recognized for 5
minutes to summarize your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF SALVATORE T. ``TORY'' BRUNO, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, UNITED LAUNCH ALLIANCE
Mr. Bruno. Thank you.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, members of the
committee, I appreciate the opportunity to come here today and
talk about our ongoing transformation of ULA and our journey to
replace the Russian RD-180 with an all-American solution for
our rocket engine. As you know, we partnered with Blue Origin
last year for the development of the BE-4 engine. It is a
methane engine. It was 3\1/2\ years into its development. And
the engine portion of that effort was fully funded, allowing us
to move out smartly on that activity.
Rocket science is hard. And rocket engines are the hardest
part. So prudence required that I also enter into a partnership
with Aerojet Rocketdyne for the AR1 rocket engine as a backup.
That is a kerosene engine. It is at present 16 months behind
the Blue Origin 4 engine simply because it started later. And
it does require significant government funding in order to
continue. Both engines are currently on plan. They are meeting
their project and technical milestones. And, most importantly
for our Nation, both will bring the advanced engine cycle
technology that is present on the RD-180 to American shores and
allow us to regain our leadership in this key technical area.
Now, as we do all of this, ULA's focus will remain laser
sharp on mission success and schedule certainty. We are very
proud of our perfect, on-time successful record of now 96
consecutive launches, many of which were critical national
security assets. Now, in order to do all of this and avoid an
assured access gap and generate the commercial funds necessary
for this investment in this new engine, it is necessary that we
be allowed to continue competing with the Atlas launch vehicle
in order to support those missions and provide the funds that
are required to do this. And so I am grateful to the House and
especially for this committee and the work that you have done
to correct the situation that Ranking Member Cooper referred to
that will allow us to have true and proper competition going
forward while we protect our own national security.
Now, as we stand here today, the industry has matured to
admit a second provider for national security launch. I think
that is a good thing. Competition is healthy for the taxpayer,
and it is healthy for the industry. I look forward to competing
in this new environment. And I am confident that when there is
a fair and even playing field, that ULA can come to that field,
and we can win. So I am optimistic about the future of space
launch. I am inspired by the missions that I have the privilege
to be entrusted with. And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bruno can be found in the
Appendix on page 63.]
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you, Mr. Bruno.
Mr. Meyerson, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT MEYERSON, PRESIDENT, BLUE ORIGIN
Mr. Meyerson. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
speak before you today. Assured access to space is a national
priority and a challenge that we must meet domestically. Blue
Origin is working to deliver the American engine to maintain
U.S. leadership in space and deliver critical national security
capabilities.
Our partnership with ULA is fully funded and offers the
fastest path to a domestic alternative to the Russian RD-180
without requiring taxpayer dollars. For more than a decade, we
have steadily advanced our capabilities, flying five different
rocket vehicles and developing multiple liquid rocket engines.
We are spending our own money rather than taxpayer funds. And
we are taking a clean sheet approach to development. As a
result, we are able to outcompete the Russians, building modern
American engines to serve multiple launch vehicles.
Our recent successes demonstrate that. In April of this
year, our BE-3 engine performed flawlessly, powering our New
Shepard space vehicle to the edge of space. The BE-3 is the
first new American hydrogen engine to fly to space in more than
a decade. United Launch Alliance recognized the merits of our
approach when they selected our BE-4 for their Vulcan rocket.
The BE-4 improves performance at a lower cost and is already
more than 3 years into development. Most importantly, it is on
schedule to be qualified in 2017 and ready for first flight on
the Vulcan in 2019, 2 years ahead of any alternative.
Being available 2 years earlier means that there is 2 years
less reliance on the Russians. As with any ox-rich [oxygen-
rich] staged-combustion development, there are many technical
challenges. Blue has made conscious decisions, design choices
to mitigate risk. And we also have an extensive testing program
underway, completing more than 60 staged-combustion tests and
multiple hotfire tests on our powerpack to date. Full BE-4
engine testing is on track, on schedule to be completed or
being conducted by the end of next year. And because we own our
own test facilities, we can do this much faster. Blue is well
capitalized, and significant private investment has been made
in the facilities, equipment, and personnel needed to make the
BE-4 a success.
The engine is fully funded primarily by Blue with support
from ULA and does not require government funding to be
successful. Instead of duplicating private efforts, the U.S.
Government should focus its resources on developing the next
generation of launch vehicles to meet national security
requirements.
In conclusion, no new engine can simply be dropped into an
existing launch vehicle. Launch vehicles have to be designed
around their engines. And launch vehicle providers are the ones
who are best able to decide what type of engine they need.
Thank you.
And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Meyerson can be found in the
Appendix on page 79.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Meyerson.
Ms. Van Kleeck, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JULIE A. VAN KLEECK, VICE PRESIDENT, ADVANCED
SPACE AND LAUNCH SYSTEMS, AEROJET ROCKETDYNE
Ms. Van Kleeck. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and
members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to be here today
to discuss this important national security issue.
Simply stated, we have an engine problem on the Atlas V
rocket, the Nation's best and most versatile national security
launch vehicle. It uses a Russian-made RD-180 booster engine.
On behalf of Aerojet Rocketdyne and its 5,000 employees
nationwide, I want to thank this committee for recognizing the
problem and taking action.
It continues to be our position that the fastest, least
risky, and lowest cost way to fix this problem is to develop an
advanced American rocket booster engine to replace the Russian
RD-180. With a focused competitive acquisition based on a
robust public-private partnership, we firmly believe this can
be accomplished by 2019. In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, this
committee took a leadership role by authorizing funding and
direction for the Air Force to competitively develop this
engine by 2019.
Aerojet Rocketdyne welcomes the opportunity to compete for
this effort for an engine that we call the AR1. Unfortunately,
more than 6 months have passed since fiscal year 2015 funds
were authorized and appropriated for the engine development
program that this committee mandated. And virtually no money
has been spent. It appears that this engine development is
being subsumed into a lengthy new launch vehicle development
and subsequent launch service acquisition.
Mr. Chairman, earlier this week, you stated in the press,
and I quote, ``It is not time to fund new launch vehicles or
new infrastructure or rely on unproven technologies. It is time
for the Pentagon to harness the power of the American
industrial base and move with purpose and clarity in order to
swiftly develop an American rocket propulsion system that ends
our reliance on Russia as soon as possible,'' end quote.
You are exactly right. And we wholeheartedly agree with
you. This is a national security imperative and should be
treated as such. We have the technology to fix this problem,
but we must get moving. For the focused public-private
partnership, Aerojet Rocketdyne has the proven capability to
develop a state-of-the-art, advanced-technology kerosene-fueled
booster engine that can be certified by 2019 and be a near
drop-in replacement for the Russian RD-180 on the existing
Atlas V.
Aerojet Rocketdyne is able to say this with confidence
based on more than 60 years of experience developing and
producing launch vehicle propulsion. We have at hand these
technologies as we have worked on them for the last 20 years.
We have active state-of-the-art liquid rocket engine factories
that are currently delivering engines supporting upcoming
national security launches. We are the only domestic company
that has designed, developed, produced, and flown rocket
engines with thrust greater than 150,000 pounds thrust.
Replacing the RD-180 requires nearly a million pounds of
thrust. We have experience developing large liquid rocket
engines on short timelines such as our Nation now faces. The R-
68, the first-stage engine on the Delta 4 launch vehicle, which
produces 700,000 pounds of thrust, was developed and produced
on a 5-year schedule. AR1 will not be a copy of the RD-180. It
will be a superior all-American engine and will leapfrog
Russian technology. AR1 will be available to any U.S. launch
booster propulsion user and configurable to any launch vehicle.
The engine's intellectual property will be retained by the
government. To reiterate, our Nation has an engine problem on
its premiere launch vehicle, the Atlas V. We must get rid of
the Russian rocket engine. At Aerojet Rocketdyne, we believe
the fastest, least risky, lowest cost manner to do this is to
develop an advanced American engine to replace the RD-180 on
Atlas V. This can only be done by 2019 with a focused and
robust engine development program and a public-private
partnership. Doing so will preserve access to space and
reinvigorate the U.S. rocket propulsion industrial base.
Chairman Rogers, I want to thank you again for holding this
important hearing. These are difficult issues. And each of us
at the table has competing equities at stake. On behalf of
Aerojet Rocketdyne, I appreciate you allowing our voice to be a
part of this conversation. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Van Kleeck can be found in
the Appendix on page 86.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Ms. Van Kleeck.
Mr. Culbertson, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF FRANK CULBERTSON, JR., PRESIDENT OF SPACE SYSTEMS
GROUP, ORBITAL ATK
Mr. Culbertson. Good morning, Chairman Rogers, Ranking
Member Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
the opportunity to appear today. I have submitted my full
statement for the record, of course. And, in the interest of
time, I will briefly describe for the committee how Orbital ATK
is working to support the United States national security space
systems and launch vehicle programs. As a global leader in
aerospace and defense technologies, Orbital ATK designs,
builds, and delivers affordable space, defense, and aviation-
related systems to support our Nation's warfighters, as well as
civil, government, and commercial customers in the U.S. and
abroad.
Our company is the leading provider of small- and medium-
class space launch vehicles for civil, military, and commercial
missions, having conducted more than 80 launches of such
vehicles for NASA [National Aeronautics and Space
Administration], the U.S. Air Force, the Missile Defense
Agency, and other government, commercial, and international
customers in the last 25 years, including delivering
approximately 4 tons of cargo to the International Space
Station.
As the committee is aware, earlier this year, the U.S. Air
Force announced its EELV Phase 2 development and launch
services acquisition plan. One of the key components of this
plan, beginning in fiscal year 2015, centers on the rocket
propulsion [system] or RPS prototype program. We believe the
Air Force's acquisition plan for RPS is well conceived and, if
supported by Congress, will be successful in providing new
space launch capabilities that are affordable, reliable, and
available by the end of this decade. As both a launch vehicle
builder and a propulsion system supplier, Orbital ATK is
prepared to support the Air Force's RPS prototype program.
Orbital ATK has proposed both solid and liquid propulsion
system developments that will support a new, all-American
launch vehicle family that meets all the specified national
security launch requirements, as well as civil, government,
commercial, and international launch needs.
It is true that we are currently using the Russian engine
on one of our launch systems. That is because it was the only
one available to us at the time. We had to meet our commitment
to the International Space Station and deliver cargo. Our new
systems, however, will be developed in a public-private
partnership with significant private investment. And we are
confident that our alternatives will be ready to support first
flights by early 2019. Orbital ATK is committed to supporting
our Nation's assured access to space policy. Reliable,
affordable, and capable space launch systems are critical to
ensuring our country is prepared to maintain access to space.
Through the program outlined by the Air Force, we believe
that U.S. industry is able and poised to respond to this need
and will provide the best possible combinations of systems for
the future of U.S. access to space. We appreciate the efforts
of this committee and this Congress to correct the situation we
find ourselves in propulsion development in this country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Culbertson can be found in
the Appendix on page 103.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Culbertson.
Mr. Thornburg, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JEFFERY THORNBURG, SENIOR DIRECTOR OF PROPULSION
ENGINEERING, SPACEX
Mr. Thornburg. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before this committee. In addition to my opening statement, I
have prepared a detailed written statement, which I have
submitted for the record.
Mr. Chairman, this country's ability to launch rockets
without using Russian engines should not be in question.
America right now has talented rocket scientists, engineers,
and technicians currently flying or developing innovative,
American-made solutions to end U.S. reliance on Russia today.
It bears noting that there has been a concerted movement
towards national consolidation of the Russian space industry
and a series of recent failures with Russian rockets, engines,
and spacecraft.
Having worked in this business for 20 years for both
government and private industry, including the Air Force and
NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, I can tell you that more
is happening now in propulsion development in the United States
than at any time in my career.
What is SpaceX doing? SpaceX today is the largest private
producer of liquid-fuel rocket engines in the world. The first
stage Merlin engine has flown 162 times to space, more than any
other domestic boost-phase rocket engine flying, including the
RD-180 and the RS-68 combined. In the past 13 years, SpaceX has
developed nine different rocket engines. Merlin is the first
new American hydrocarbon rocket engine to be successfully
developed and flown in the past 40 years, all while offering
the highest thrust-to-weight ratio ever achieved.
We are investing in a next-generation rocket engine called
Raptor, which will be a fundamental advancement in propulsion
technology and serve a number of applications for the national
security space market. And we have captured more than 50
percent of the global space launch market, unilaterally
increasing U.S. market share from zero percent in 2012.
With respect to a national engine program, the Air Force is
undertaking a strategy to result in not just a rocket engine
but in launch systems. We believe this approach will, if done
correctly, benefit the entire U.S. industrial base, properly
require private industry co-investment, and meet requirements
for U.S. Government launches. Most importantly, the Air Force
is seeking to ensure that any new system is commercially viable
in order to end the current practice of costly and
unsustainable government subsidization.
SpaceX stands ready and able to provide access to space for
the United States with our launch systems today, as well as
next-generation propulsion launch systems. In May, the Air
Force certified the Falcon 9 launch system to launch the most
critical national security space payloads. We appreciate the
Air Force's confidence. Powered by SpaceX's Merlin rocket
engine, the Falcon 9 can perform 60 percent of the DOD
[Department of Defense] launch requirements to date. We are
also building, qualifying, and certifying the Falcon Heavy,
which also uses the Merlin rocket engine. Between these two
launch vehicle systems, SpaceX will be able to execute 100
percent of the DOD launch requirements and provide heavy-lift
redundancy for the first time to the government. We anticipate
Falcon Heavy certification in mid-2017. At the same time,
SpaceX is developing Raptor. This staged-combustion reusable
system will not only be extremely powerful but also versatile,
efficient, and reliable while achieving commercial viability
through notable risk and cost-reducing improvements. Raptor
will advance the state of the art, ensure the U.S. remains the
global leader in rocket propulsion technology, and serve
important applications for national security space launch.
Importantly, meaningful competition is reentering the EELV
program. With this, we have seen the incumbent make promises to
reduce its costs, innovate, and fund new development efforts
with private capital. These are good things. Much has been made
of a so-called impending capability gap in assured access to
space. The only gap that currently exists relates to heavy-lift
capability. This is because the Russian-powered Atlas V does
not have a heavy-lift variant. Otherwise, there is no credible
risk of any capability gap for national security launch now or
in the future. Existing vehicles, including the Falcon 9 and
the Delta 4, are both made in America, certified for DOD
launch.
The Atlas will continue to fly through 2020 under current
law. Even if no engine or launch vehicle is flying by the
congressionally mandated deadline of 2019, there will be no
gap. Soon, however, the Falcon Heavy Launch System will close
the preexisting gap in heavy-lift through internal funding by
SpaceX. Falcon Heavy will be certified years before any
proposed national engine program is set to fly. I want to close
my testimony with some constructive solutions to truly achieve
assured access.
First, the United States doesn't need more Russian engines
to get national security space payloads to orbit. Second,
continue working to achieve assured access through genuine
competition between multiple qualified providers with
redundant, truly dissimilar launch vehicle systems. Third,
Congress must properly structure its engine development effort
to maximize smart investment. Any government money should be
matched at 50 percent by private capital to ensure meaningful
co-investment. And commercial viability must be a key component
of the future system.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. SpaceX, with our U.S.-built Falcon
9 and Falcon Heavy, as well as our investments in homegrown,
next-generation propulsion systems like Raptor, looks forward
to contributing to the Nation's space enterprise. I am pleased
to address any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornburg can be found in
the Appendix on page 113.]
Mr. Rogers. Great. Great job. I thank all of you.
My first question was going to be to the companies, do you
think you are capable of providing us a rocket propulsion
system, an advanced rocket propulsion system that can replace
the RD-180 by 2019? Mr. Meyerson and Ms. Van Kleeck both
answered that in their opening statement.
Mr. Culbertson, I was interested in your opening statement,
you implied that you all are going to get into competition for
this replacement engine. Was that an accurate interpretation of
your opening statement?
Mr. Culbertson. Yes, sir. We certainly are working towards
that end.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
Mr. Thornburg, are you all planning on getting in that
competition for a replacement engine for the RD-180? And can
you have it done by 2019?
Mr. Thornburg. Through our existing launch vehicles with
Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy, we can provide 100 percent of the
Nation's needs for national security space missions. In
addition, we will continue our investment in next-generation
propulsion systems and capability to further increase the
U.S.'s position in propulsion development.
Mr. Rogers. My understanding is you are talking about you
can use your Falcon 9 1.1 and Falcon Heavy when it is certified
to compete for this mission, but you are not planning to get in
the competition to develop a propulsion system to fit on the
Atlas V?
Mr. Thornburg. We are investing internally in next-
generation propulsion systems like Raptor. And we are happy to
have the conversation about how we can support the U.S.
Government. And any time the Congress and the U.S. Government
asks, ``what can industry provide to service the needs of the
country,'' we are ready to participate in that conversation.
Mr. Rogers. I heard you make reference to both the Merlin
and the Raptor. If those, in fact, would work in some way with
a launch system, would you be willing to sell those to other
U.S. companies, launch companies?
Mr. Thornburg. From an engineering standpoint, yes, that is
something that we would entertain at SpaceX.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Culbertson, you wanted to be recognized?
Mr. Culbertson. Yes, sir. I am not sure I totally
understood your question correctly. We are not proposing a
replacement engine for Atlas. We are proposing a launch system
that would meet the needs of the country in response to the Air
Force----
Mr. Rogers. Okay. That's what I thought. You had me excited
for a minute there. I want a new engine. I don't want a new
rocket. We want something to replace the RD-180 and if not be a
drop-in fit on the Atlas V, something that doesn't require a
whole lot of modifications to work on the Atlas V. I understand
all of you all like what you have got. And I know Mr. Bruno
wants a new rocket and a launch system. That is awesome, as
long as we are not paying for it. We want an engine to be able
to get our critical missions into space in a timely fashion.
And 2019, as you know, is a critical time for us. I will now go
back to the two people I know are going to compete for it, Mr.
Meyerson and Ms. Van Kleeck. And we will start with Mr.
Meyerson. Will the cost of your engine be comparable to what we
are currently paying for the RD-180?
Mr. Meyerson. According to our customer at ULA, we
understand it is. It is comparable or better than what is
being, the RD-180.
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Van Kleeck.
Ms. Van Kleeck. Yes, sir, we have designed the AR1 to be at
or below the price point of the RD-180.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. I want to stay with you, Ms. Van Kleeck,
for a minute. Mr. Bruno, in his opening statement, made
reference to the fact that you were 16 months behind Blue
Origin in your development of your engine. Could you address
that observation? And what does he mean by that?
Ms. Van Kleeck. Well, I don't have my competitor's
schedule, so I can't say for certain where the 16 months comes
from. What I can say is we will be certified by 2019. We are
very confident about that. We have spent 20 years developing
this technology from the Russians, that was pioneered by the
Russians. We have the factories. We have a schedule. We will be
testing full-scale engines in the beginning of 2017. We will
provide a full engine set to ULA in 2018. And we will complete
certification in 2019.
Mr. Rogers. 2018 or 2019?
Ms. Van Kleeck. We will complete certification of the
engine in 2019.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Meyerson, tell us what your schedule is.
When do you think you will complete certification?
Mr. Meyerson. We believe the engine will be qualified in
2017 and certified for flight on the Vulcan in 2019 or ready
for the first flight on the Vulcan in 2019, with certification
of the system coming after. We have been working at this for
more than 3 years. And we have the facilities and the people
and processes and equipment in place to do so. So we have high
confidence in our schedule. We are testing hardware now. We are
testing today. So the confidence, the level of data is well
ahead of any alternative. So that is what gives us the
confidence in our schedule.
Mr. Rogers. Now, you made reference to the Vulcan in your
opening statement. And I know Mr. Bruno really wants to have a
Vulcan launch system.
Mr. Meyerson. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. We are interested in the Atlas or I am in my
questioning. Will your engine work on the Atlas with
modifications? And how significant a modification would it
take?
Mr. Meyerson. So our engine runs in liquid oxygen and
liquified natural gas. So, no, as it is, as the Atlas is
designed, it will not integrate with the Atlas.
Mr. Rogers. We would have to have a new launch system?
Mr. Meyerson. That is right.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Mr. Bruno, let's talk about this Vulcan system. Tell me
where that came from and when you see that happening and how
does that play into what we are doing right now. Given, you
know, our previous testimony and my comments publicly and our
conversations privately, I feel very strongly, I just want a
replacement for the RD-180. Why are we talking about the
Vulcan?
Mr. Bruno. Certainly. Well Vulcan really refers to a series
of evolutions to the Atlas that takes several years to
accomplish. The first step in that evolution is simply
replacing the engine that is on the Atlas. So whether it is an
AR1 or a BE-4, that Atlas with that new engine would be called
Vulcan and it would still have the Atlas upper stage, Atlas
fairings, Atlas strap-ons. It is essentially an Atlas with a
new engine. If I might take a moment, I would like to expand on
my colleagues' answers, I think they were far too modest when
they responded to your question relative to the cost of their
engines.
First, understanding that there is no such thing as an RD-
180 drop-in replacement, we are not at this time capable of
replicating the performance and the thrust level of the RD-180.
What they are talking about is providing a pair of engines that
would replace the single RD-180. That pair of engines we expect
to be upwards of 35 percent less expensive than a single RD-
180. So while the performance of the engine is only first
generation and lagging what the RD-180 has, the manufacturing
technology is a giant leap ahead.
Mr. Rogers. I will get back to you all on my next round of
questions. I want to turn to my friend now from Tennessee, the
ranking member, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you. I appreciate the expertise on this
panel. And I appreciate my friendship with the chairman. I am a
little worried that we are pursuing a unicorn here because I
think Mr. Bruno just said there is no such thing as a
replacement for the RD-180 engine, there is no drop-in
equivalent. And we are kind of fooling ourselves if we think
there could be, at least in the reasonable future.
Now, there are some, you know, workarounds, replacements.
And there is certainly new launch systems. So continuing the
theme of my opening statement, I think our first role should
be, ``first, do no harm,'' because we wouldn't even be here if
we had gotten the language right in last year's NDAA. So I am
not a technical expert. I am certainly not a rocket scientist.
But it seems to be that in this testimony there are some
remarkable differences.
First of all, I regret, it is a little bit unfair, the
witnesses are at least three to one against SpaceX. And I am
not sure that is fair. Perhaps we should have given Mr.
Thornburg three times the time. It may be three and a half to
one against, but he more than held his own. And it should be
exciting for all Americans that we have billionaires and
entrepreneurs who are willing to devote so much of their
resources to coming up with new and apparently more efficient
solutions.
But the factual question, is there a gap? It seems to me
that we need at least 9 RD-180s. We may need 29. We may need
more than 29. And, meanwhile, a lot of what you hear on the
Hill is a lot of bad-mouthing of the Russians. And there is
plenty of reason to bad-mouth at least their leaders. But while
we are dependent on the RD-180, it may not be the smartest
thing strategically to bad-mouth the source.
Hopefully, we can overcome this gap. And Mr. Thornburg's
testimony is that the real gap is the premature decision to
retire the Delta Medium. So there you don't blame the Russians,
you blame us. Or the gap could be the Air Force dragging their
feet to certify the new Falcon Heavy. And certainly there are a
lot of worthy and important requirements and certification,
three required successful launches, lots of things. I loved Mr.
Culbertson's quote of Wernher von Braun when he said: We can
lick gravity, but sometimes the paperwork is overwhelming. What
Congress is really good at is paperwork and putting in
artificial requirements that oftentimes impede the private
sector's ability to innovate.
I get worried that when it comes to a drop-in engine, you
are talking about my beloved old Chevrolet Impala and trying to
find a new V-8 to put in the old vehicle. I want a car that
will work, not just an engine that will perform. And when we
talk about assured access to space, we want a vehicle that can
get our payloads up into the appropriate orbit. And it may be
that we haven't had enough discussion on this panel of
appropriate orbits, and maybe we can't do that in an open
setting. But we have to serve all of our national security
needs. And some of those are harder to achieve than others.
So I hope that this hearing, and it may take the second
panel to do it, will be able to resolve the question of whether
there is a gap and, if so, how large, and how best to bridge
that gap. And to a certain extent, all of the witnesses are
asking us to buy some vaporware because nobody can predict,
nobody has a perfect crystal ball. One tends to believe in Mr.
Bruno when he says really, getting realistic, ain't going to
happen before 2021, 2023, maybe because it takes time, at least
the American way of doing it. I hope it is not that long. And
we should all be encouraged with the new methane engine, the
Blue Origin is completely amazing. But also the idea of the
Raptor is totally amazing. But some existing accomplishments
are things we should be deeply proud of.
I am a little bit worried about Mr. Thornburg's methodology
because the Falcon uses 9 or 10 engines. And you claim an
engine heritage that is able to be multiplied due to the number
of engines. It makes me think that if the Falcon 9 were
composed of 100 engines, then you would have a track record 10
times or 100 times more successful than all the RD-180s. That
is, perhaps, a specious methodology for coming up with a track
record. But still you can't deny the accomplishments because
you have exceeded what most people would have expected. But,
again, our job here is to not stand in the way of progress. And
I think the statement of administration policy was pretty on
point when it said so often the congressional language,
especially last year's section 1608, gets in the way.
So how do we resolve this in a sensible way? We want
commercial competition. We want assured access to space. But,
above all, we have to have assured access to space. So I am
hopeful that the witnesses can help us resolve these questions.
And, as I say, it make take the second panel, but there seems
to be general consensus that no one is talking about a drop-in
engine. Because it is my understanding that even the proposed
solutions are either 18 inches too long or 4 inches too long or
there are really two engines instead of one engine. So the
chairman's goal, as worthy as it may be, is really not
available from any of the witnesses on this panel. Now, the
chairman's goal of cost savings is extremely important. But I
don't need to remind members of the Armed Services Committee
how much money we are wasting on various things here or there.
And in the scheme of things, the money we are talking about
here is relatively small and manageable. The key is assured
access to space.
So if any of the witnesses want to correct my impressions,
I spent much of last night reading your testimony. It was very
helpful. But it also is so conflicting, it is hard to find
where the truth lies. So I hope--Ms. Van Kleeck, you seem
poised.
Ms. Van Kleeck. Yes, yes, sir, thank you for the
opportunity. Rockets have been re-engined in the past, okay, on
numerous occasions both in this country and others. There is,
you can replace rocket engines. The AR1 is a near drop-in
replacement. It uses----
Mr. Cooper. The AR1 is----
Ms. Van Kleeck. Yes. And I will explain the differences.
And they are minor. There is, we can reproduce an RD-180 in
this country. It would cost, in my opinion, more money than it
would to develop a new engine. It is a very complex engine. It
would also cost a lot from a recurring standpoint. And I think
it is time for the U.S. to leapfrog that technology anyway.
The AR1 uses the same propellant. It has the same engine
cycle, so it has a very similar environment. It would use the
same tankage, would have the same attach points, has the same
performance, not lower performance, the same performance. It is
two engines. We did look at making it a single engine. But two
engines is probably a better long-term solution for the U.S.
because it can be used in multiple other applications in the
future. And you can have the exact same physical attach points
with the two-engine solution, so really where the propellant
feeds the engines and how it attaches. It is 11 inches longer.
But we have been told by ULA engineers that the length is not
an issue; there is length to work with. That will affect minor
ground support equipment but it is very minor. We are talking
modest modifications, things that we have done in the past. So
it is as near to a drop-in replacement as can be made.
Mr. Cooper. But there are many other issues, acoustics. You
know, and Mr. Bruno was saying just because you started late,
you are 16 months behind. So we don't know what they will
choose in the down select a year or two from now.
Ms. Van Kleeck. Yes, sir. That is a fact. The acoustics,
every rocket engine has a specific signature. The fact that it
is the same cycle, runs at a very similar operating point, we
would anticipate that would be similar.
Mr. Cooper. But there have been lots of anticipations that
didn't necessarily pan out. And for assured access to space, we
need something that will work.
Ms. Van Kleeck. Yes, sir. But we have been a part of re-
engining numerous launch vehicles over time. And we have been
successful with those re-enginings. This engine has been
designed from the beginning to be a replacement to Atlas V.
Because we saw this problem coming 10 years ago. And we have
focused on that. We understand the Atlas V very well. This
engine was designed to interface with the Atlas V.
Mr. Cooper. Well, you may have seen the problem 10 years
ago, but you are 16 months behind right now, even Blue Origin
and some of these other things. So what, that puts us in a
tough spot. We have to measure the gap and figure out how to
fill the gap.
Ms. Van Kleeck. You know, whether we are, again, we feel we
can meet 2019, whether we are 16 months behind or not, we
would, one would have to look at the details of these schedules
and the different milestones to really come to that. I have not
seen that.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Chairman, I think my time has more than
expired. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr.
Bridenstine, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One of the concerns I have is when you consider the House's
position and the Senate's position on RD-180s, our positions
are different. And I have heard that ULA is interested in
developing the Vulcan to the extent that they have a certain
number of RD-180s available for the future. And if we don't
have that certain number, then they are not interested in
developing the Vulcan.
My question for you, Mr. Bruno, is what happens if the
Senate doesn't come the direction of the House? In that case,
what happens to the Vulcan and what is your backup plan?
Mr. Bruno. So either engine path that has just been
discussed requires significant investment on the part of ULA.
Without the continued revenue generation of the Atlas, until
that new American engine is available, we will lack the funds
to be able to accomplish that activity. Without that, we are
entering into a marketplace where the Air Force market has
declined and is incapable of supporting two providers.
Now, the good news is the overall lift market is large
enough to support both of us, both the new entrant and us and
the other traditional suppliers. But in order to be a viable
economic entity in that environment, we need to be able to
effectively compete for civil and commercial missions in
addition to competing for national security space missions.
Without that lower-cost rocket and without the investment
required to get there, we are simply not economically viable in
that window.
Mr. Bridenstine. You indicated that with the commercial
launches in addition to the military launches that there would
be economic viability for multiple providers. And it looks like
even, you know, we might get a third provider with Orbital ATK
potentially participating. That being the case, is there a
reason ULA couldn't get private capital to support the
investment?
Mr. Bruno. It is unlikely that the capital markets would
look at this uncertain investment environment any more
favorably than our parents do. So investment really dislikes
and avoids uncertainty. And as we sit here today, it is very
uncertain whether the Atlas will even be available to fly
during the period between the end of its current contracts and
the availability of the new rocket engine. So that leaves a
multiyear period of time when we have no product to bring to
the marketplace. Not very likely I could attract money from
capital markets for that.
Mr. Bridenstine. Mr. Culbertson, does Orbital ATK agree
with that position, that it is not worth the investment if
there is not more RD-180 engines? Obviously, you guys are doing
it without the RD-180 engine.
Mr. Culbertson. I can't really comment on ULA's position on
this. We do see a market out there, but it is still pretty slim
in the classes we are discussing here. We actually are working
with ULA to continue to supply cargo to the International Space
Station. After we had the accident, they, SpaceX, and a couple
other companies stepped forward and said: We can give you a
ride.
And we have contracted with them on a commercial basis to
do that. So we are sort of the beginning of their commercial
market to continue to fly. But we also are continuing to
develop our own systems to fly not only to the space station,
but to fly national security missions.
Mr. Bridenstine. Mr. Thornburg, when you think about the
commercial market with the EELV program, is the market big
enough? And for how many providers? And, clearly, you guys are
already making the investment privately.
Mr. Thornburg. Correct. And I would also say, you know,
that as an engineer, I am not necessarily studying the markets.
But I can say that SpaceX believes there is, that we can be
very competitive across the market. As I mentioned in my
opening statement, we have recaptured for the United States 50
percent of the launch market share. So certainly with more
cost-effective launch solutions, the market does open up.
Mr. Bridenstine. And for Mr. Bruno, you would know that the
United States and we, as Members of Congress, we want to make
sure we have assured access to space which means we need
multiple launch service providers for the EELV program. That
being the case, your investors have got to understand that it
is not in our interest as a Nation to have two providers and
one of them go out of business and end up with a monopoly,
which means there is going to be some level of security, would
you agree with that? And are your investors, your parents,
aware of that?
Mr. Bruno. The only data I have to operate on at the moment
is the forecasts that the government has provided for the space
lift that occurs in that window of time. And it is important to
remember that we are the ride for national security assets.
They are recapitalized in waves. So we are currently
recapitalizing a set of national security satellites that are
well past their design life. That is going to complete in a
short number of years. There will be a long trough until the
new assets run out of life, and then they will be
recapitalized. So it is very cyclic. What has been forecasted
to us by the government--and it is a pretty sound forecast
because we can see the satellites in the pipeline being
designed and built--is that that marketplace drops from about 8
to 10 a year to 5. And then that will be divided between at
least two providers, so two or three. And that is not a
sustainable economic model if you do not also have access to
civil and commercial markets.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Coffman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Mr. Bruno, congratulations for an outstanding record
of success. Jeff Bezos, founder of Blue Origin and Amazon,
said, quote, ``ULA has put a satellite into orbit almost every
month for the past 8 years. They are the most reliable launch
provider in history. And their record of success is
astonishing,'' unquote. I am proud that ULA is headquartered in
Colorado. I am fully confident ULA will remain very competitive
in the future. You enjoyed an exclusive contract because of
your competence. But I want to ask you what exactly can
Congress do to ensure that across the board we have created an
environment that promotes innovation while not unfairly tipping
the playing field towards or away from any potential provider.
Mr. Bruno. Certainly. But, first, I have to observe that
that comment reveals that Mr. Bezos is obviously a very
intelligent man. So in order to have a fair and even
competitive playing field that is healthy and in the interest
of the government and good for industry, it is important, of
course, that the participants in that competition are able to
bring competitive products to the marketplace. That is why we
need continued access to Atlas.
In addition to that, the competition itself needs to be
fair and even. So we must be held to the same technical
standards in terms of the performance and the missions that we
are able to fly, as well as the contracting requirements. So,
today, the ULA is required to perform to what is called FAR
[Federal Acquisition Regulation] Part 15, which are a set of
very complex and sophisticated acquisition regulations. They
require for us to provide elaborate, extensive, and expensive
financial recording, tracking, and reporting systems.
Our competitor in a commercial marketplace does not. So all
of these elements have to be leveled. And then I would also
advise the government that for national security missions, for
which our Nation's safety depends and warfighters' lives are at
risk, that a low-price, technically acceptable, type of priced
shootout is not an appropriate methodology. You wouldn't buy
your car that way. You wouldn't buy your home that way. And our
soldiers' lives should not be dependent upon it. So when
competing and when making selections, they should consider cost
equally balanced with technical performance, reliability, and
schedule certainty. Remember, I mentioned that the assets being
recapitalized are generally beyond their design life. There is
an urgency to replacing them as soon as possible. That, too,
should be considered.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornburg, congratulations on the successful
certification of Falcon 9. In March, Ms. Shotwell testified in
this committee that you have DCAA [Defense Contract Audit
Agency] auditors doing manufacturing audits right now, and your
cost and your rates have been audited. Was that testimony
correct? And can you briefly describe the frequency and extent
of the DCAA audits that SpaceX undergoes and the number of DCAA
personnel resident at SpaceX facilities?
Mr. Thornburg. To your first question, was her testimony
correct, yes, the answer to that is yes. With regard to the
questions about DCAA audit and frequency, in my position within
engineering and working engine and vehicle development, I am
not familiar with the frequency of the visits. I can tell you
that we are working very closely with the Air Force and the
DOD. I would be happy to go collect that information and return
it for the record.
Mr. Coffman. I would really appreciate if you could get
that back to us for the record.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 168.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this very
important hearing. And thank you for the timeliness of this
hearing.
Mr. Thornburg, I would like to ask you about the current
version of the Merlin engine that you are using. Is it the new,
is the new baseline, is the full thrust Merlin engine the new
baseline for the Falcon version 1.1 going forward? And does
SpaceX intend to bid that system for upcoming EELV launches?
Mr. Thornburg. The current engine we are flying is the
Merlin 1D boost engine. Your reference to the full thrust is a
minor upgrade to that engine that basically takes the full
potential of that engine system for future missions on the
Falcon 9 1.1.
Mr. Lamborn. Now, what are the differences between the two
systems, both hardware and software? I heard there are hundreds
of differences. Is that correct?
Mr. Thornburg. I can't recall the exact number of
differences. I can say that from a technical standpoint
engineering-wise, the differences are very minor in terms of
the changes in the upgrades to the engine. It is all in line
with our continual improvement of our propulsion systems and
overall vehicle systems. But, essentially, we are taking the
existing Merlin 1D with its present design and performance and
taking the additional performance that we have available there
and offering it to our customers to enhance the performance of
the Falcon 9 1.1 system.
Mr. Lamborn. But what I am trying to get at is with the
changes that you have incorporated, does the previous
certification cover the new, what amounts to what I would
consider a new version once you have started making a lot of
changes?
Mr. Thornburg. As far as the certification effort to date,
the recent certification of the Falcon 9, the Merlin 1D engine
now and going forward, the bulk of that is identical. So we are
talking about minor changes and upgrades to the system that
will be reviewed through ongoing and future Engineering Review
Board activity with the Air Force.
Mr. Lamborn. So even though there are an undetermined
number of changes, indeterminate number of changes, you can't
give a number, you don't think that amounts to anything worth
recertifying?
Mr. Thornburg. No.
Mr. Lamborn. Or reopening the----
Mr. Thornburg. No. And I can comment that the ongoing
dialogue with the Air Force through the certification process
has been fantastic. We are working very closely with the Air
Force as well as the Aerospace Corporation. The type of
improvements and modifications that the Falcon 9 launch vehicle
is going through now is no different than improvements that
Atlas and Delta have taken on over the years. So we are in line
with that in terms of the initial certification and then
ongoing certification activities as these improvements come
online.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I just wish there was a little more
certainty in this. Because you can't even tell me how many
changes there are. I guess that is a concern I think we should
get to the bottom of.
Changing gears here, Ms. Van Kleeck, what advanced
technology does the RD-180 use? And why isn't it important that
we bring that technology to the U.S.?
Ms. Van Kleeck. Well, the RD-180 is what is called an ox-
rich [oxygen-rich] staged-combustion engine. It is a closed-
cycle engine which, closed-cycle engines are the most efficient
engines that can be, chemical rockets that can be produced. The
RS-25 that powered the space shuttle was also one of these
engines. The Russians pioneered and perfected the ox-rich
staged-combustion engine during the Cold War. And the U.S.
didn't. The U.S. perfected solids and hydrogen systems. It is a
very high-performing, hydrocarbon engine. It provided a lot of
advantage to the original Atlas vehicle. Some of the things
that are in it are advanced coatings, advanced materials. It is
very compact, very high pressure. Those are things,
particularly the materials, were things that this country did
not choose to pursue and didn't develop. And so that is where
the--there is a technology gap in this particular variant of
rocket engines in this country.
Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Meyerson, do you agree with that
assessment?
Mr. Meyerson. In terms of the RD-180 and the importance and
the efficiency of the cycle, yes, I agree. I think, you know,
if you look back to the time that Lockheed Martin, ULA's
parent, and the choice of the RD-180 was an enabler for the
Atlas V. That Atlas V rocket would not have worked without the
RD-180. Today, I think it is time to take a fresh look and look
at a new engine. The ox-rich staged-combustion cycle is
critical. And that is what Blue Origin has chosen for the BE-4.
But the BE-4 is the enabler for the next generation of American
launch vehicles. And it is--the choice of methane, liquified
natural gas, as the propellant is one of those enablers.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
And thank you all for being here.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. I will start our second
round of questions. I was listening to my buddy from Tennessee
when he was talking about his Chevy and dropping a new engine
in and how sometimes that wasn't all that easy because, you
know, I made it very clear, my priority is to re-engine the
Atlas V. And it just reminded me as he was talking, he and I
had the true privilege to meet with an American treasure
earlier this week, retired General Tom Stafford, also an Apollo
astronaut. And we both visited this topic with him, you know,
how big a deal is this to re-engine this rocket? And he
basically said: It is nothing. We re-engined fighter jets for
generations. And that is much more complicated than what we are
talking about here.
And so, with that backdrop, Mr. Culbertson, your company is
in the process of changing the engine in the Antares launch
vehicle from the NK-33 to the RD-181 Russian engine, is that
correct?
Mr. Culbertson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Considering your current experience, how
reasonable is it to change an engine to an existing launch
vehicle?
Mr. Culbertson. It depends on the background of the engine
and what it was originally designed for and the maturity of it
at the time that you move forward with it.
The engine that we are using in the future generation of
Antares launch vehicles, which we intend to start flying next
year, was specifically designed as a replacement for the NK-33,
which the AJ-26 was based on. So the arrangement of the thrust
vector, the piping, if you will, for the fuel systems, the
connections, the size of the engine, and the thrust levels were
all very comparable to the NK-33 because it had been in
development for almost 10 years now to replace that engine on a
couple of different Russian rockets. So when we started talking
to them over 3 years ago, they were pretty far along on that
path already. We did a lot of analysis to make sure that it
would, in fact, be compatible. And when we reached the point
where we needed to move forward with another engine, it was the
one that was most likely to succeed in our application and the
one that was available to ensure we could continue to deliver
cargo.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Ms. Van Kleeck, you have already heard
some reference to it today in the interchange with the ranking
member, and in the next panel, we are going to hear that it is
going to cost a significant amount of money to re-engine the
Atlas V with the AR1. Can you address where 200--and as I
understand it, you are going to hear it is going to cost at
least $200 million to modify the Atlas V for the AR1. Can you
address that?
Ms. Van Kleeck. Yes, I can. We have been working closely
with ULA for several years now on replacing an RD-180 in
various forms. Like I said, we have looked at this problem over
the past 10 years. We have an active contract right now
identifying the specific changes that need to be made, assuming
this goes into an Atlas V vehicle. We are also looking at a
Vulcan configuration. That configuration requires a different
launch vehicle. Relative to the Atlas, I have summarized the
changes that need to be made, and I will submit those for the
record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 167.]
Ms. Van Kleeck. In terms of the estimate for those costs, I
have heard a variety of numbers. I have never heard a $200
million number. A number I have heard for the changes
associated with an AR1 going into an Atlas V, are low tens of
millions of dollars. I think that cost estimate is--still needs
to be refined, but the type of modifications that are required
are very minor.
Mr. Rogers. For the AR1?
Ms. Van Kleeck. For the AR1 to fit on the Atlas V vehicle.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Mr. Meyerson, same question.
Mr. Meyerson. Well, can I add to Mr. Culbertson's comment,
his response? The key word was that 10 years of investment by
the Russian government to develop a replacement for the NK-33,
which was developed into the AJ-26, that is the key point. Ten
years, and we don't know how much money was invested. The BE-4
is being developed. It is fully funded. We are more than 3
years into development. So this engine is real. There is real
hardware to see. It is not a paper engine.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Tell me, Mr. Bruno has stated that both
the BE-4 and the AR1 would work on the Atlas V with
modifications. One with more modifications than the other. Can
you describe the extent to which we would have to modify the
Atlas V for your engine to work?
Mr. Meyerson. I think that is a better question for Mr.
Bruno. But the engine, when you are developing a new engine,
you start with requirements, and the details really matter.
Because the BE-4 is so far along in its development, those
details are much more well understood so that Mr. Bruno's team
at ULA can look at that and design the right system to meet the
national security need.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Bruno, I would love for you to visit this
topic.
Mr. Bruno. Well, this is an excellent sort of example of
the difference between an engine provider and a launch vehicle
service provider. It will not cost tens of millions of dollars
to incorporate any version of an AR1. Recall that we started
with an understanding that the performance level coming out of
either of these two engines will not match the RD-180, and we
will be using a pair of engines to do that. The thrust level--
--
Mr. Rogers. Let me stop you there. Will the combined thrust
of the two engines be comparable to the RD-180?
Mr. Bruno. Yes, it will. In fact, it will be larger than
the two.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Mr. Bruno. In addition to that, the RD-180 uses a very
novel thrust vector control system to move the nozzle and steer
the rocket based on fluidics that tap off the engine fuel
system. That is also a technology that does not exist in the
United States, and, by the way, one that we do not have an
interest in developing. So there will be a new thrust vector
control system to go along with that. So when we do all of
that, with the new performance point that is required and the
new thrust levels that will be delivered, there will be
software changes; there will be structure changes; there will
be alterations to the pad to accomplish even the AR1. The
number that was quoted was not unreasonable, but I think you
will hear from----
Mr. Rogers. $200 million, I think, we are going to hear
from the Air Force later.
Mr. Bruno. Right.
Mr. Rogers. Do you think that's an accurate?
Mr. Bruno. I do think that's an accurate.
Mr. Rogers. That is for the AR1?
Mr. Bruno. That is for the AR1. I can drive that number
down if I am willing to leave the tank exactly the same size
that I have on Atlas. But if I do that, because of the lower
efficiency of that engine and its first generation as a launch
system for several missions, I will be adding one or more solid
rocket boosters to the launch vehicle. And so the cost
competitiveness, the affordability of that system, will be less
than the Atlas today.
Mr. Rogers. So getting you those modifications moves you
towards the new rocket system you want, but is not necessary
for the replacement engine that we are pursuing, or that I am
pursuing?
Mr. Bruno. It will not lift the same missions. So I think
you are asking me, could I keep the tank size the same, take
the engine that I am--that is made available to me, strap on
the extra strap-ons and just deal with the additional cost. I
could do that for the first set within the fleet. So remember
that the Atlas is a fleet of rockets, the least capable of
which is equivalent to a Falcon. There are much more difficult
orbits that we go to. Eventually, there is a limit to how many
strap-ons I can physically attach to the rocket because of the
way the rocket is configured. Those most difficult missions
would suddenly become out of reach of an Atlas in this
configuration without a longer tank to carry more fuel.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Now that is the AR1 we are talking about.
Let us talk about the BE-4.
Mr. Bruno. Yes. So the BE-4 requires more extensive changes
to our infrastructure and to our rocket.
Mr. Rogers. So what the does $200 million figure turn into
with the BE-4 as the down-selected engine?
Mr. Bruno. It would not be unreasonable to triple or
quadruple that number.
Mr. Rogers. So $600 to $800 million?
Mr. Bruno. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Let's talk about the other infrastructure
involved when we change--let's say we do change to a new
rocket. And I am not saying I am ready to go there, but what
else is required for the launch? I mean, modifications other
than just the rocket. Don't you have to change the
infrastructure that you use for the launch process?
Mr. Bruno. Yes. So, you know, you can think of it in these
pieces: there is the rocket; there is the pad; factory, of
course, with its tooling; and then the equipment that we use
actually at the launch site to integrate the rocket with the
satellite and roll it out.
So those things, you know, are more dependent upon the
physical size and configuration of what changes we have to make
to accommodate the engine. So my colleague is correct, there
are far fewer changes with the AR1, because it is the same
propellant, and so the diameter and the length of the rocket
will be much more similar, much more of the tooling in the
factory can be the same. The equipment at the launch pad can be
only slightly modified and the pad will have smaller
modifications.
For the methane engine, because methane is less dense, the
tank will be much larger. I will have to replace much more
tooling in the factory. I will have to redo what is called the
mobile launch platform that moves the rocket to the pad, and
then the changes to the pad are more extensive.
Mr. Rogers. Are those costs a part of the tripling or
quadrupling?
Mr. Bruno. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. So that was a comprehensive figure.
Maybe I missed it, but were you able to explain the
difference in the 16 months of lead that you assert the Blue
Origin has over Aerojet in their development?
Mr. Bruno. Yes. So both companies are under contract with
us. We have, you know, sort of weekly engagements, monthly
formal program reviews. We are tracking both schedules side by
side. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, Aerojet Rocketdyne
started several years later than Blue Origin, and that is
essentially the nature of the 16 months.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you. This would be for all the
witnesses. Do you agree that the government should own the
intellectual property of any investment it makes in a new
propulsion system?
Mr. Meyerson, I know you are talking about your private
money. But if we are going to invest money in it, do you
believe that we should own some of the intellectual value?
Mr. Meyerson. I think if the government fully invested in
the system, they should own the IP, yes.
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Van Kleeck.
Ms. Van Kleeck. Yes, sir. I do agree.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Culbertson.
Mr. Culbertson. Yes, sir. If the government has invested a
majority of the money, then they should, as the law allows, own
the IP for it. But the companies also investing should own
their IP that they develop to enable the systems.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Thornburg.
Mr. Thornburg. I agree with my colleagues in that if the
government fully invests, then they would own and retain the IP
rights. But for systems that are privately developed, they
would not.
Mr. Rogers. Now, I am a recovering attorney, so two of you
used the term fully invest, Mr. Meyerson and Mr. Thornburg.
What if we paid for 60 percent of the development cost, is
that something that you believe should inhibit our owning a
percentage of the intellectual property's value? Let's start
with Mr. Thornburg.
Mr. Thornburg. I think it would depend on what type of
development we were talking about in terms of the technology.
If the technology was an offshoot of something that had been
completely developed and invested by the private corporation,
maybe not. But I think it would be case dependent.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Meyerson.
Mr. Meyerson. I think the contracting methods, there is
public-private partnerships, and there are mechanisms that can
be in place to allow industry to invest and account for shared
ownership.
Mr. Rogers. That is one of my concerns. We have already set
aside a little over $400 million for this, and we project that
by the time it is all said and done, $1.3- to $1.5 billion is
going to be spent in pursuit of this new engine, and as much as
$800 million or more may be paid for by the Federal Government.
So it just seems to me that there should be some interest that
we have in the intellectual property that arises out of that.
I want to ask the witnesses this, and this is for all the
witnesses: Are there clear requirements from the Air Force as
we go into this process about what they are expecting, and do
you think they are not only clear, but fair and reasonable?
Mr. Meyerson.
Mr. Meyerson. I think--yeah, I think that the requirements
are clear. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Van Kleeck.
Ms. Van Kleeck. I assume you are referencing the current
acquisition process that is underway?
Mr. Rogers. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Van Kleeck. Yeah. And there is a--there is a process
that is well spelled out in that. It does focus more on an
ultimate launch service as opposed to an engine, but it is
spelled out. I think there is a lot of different paths that
that particular process can go.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Culbertson. I am sorry.
Mr. Culbertson. Yes, sir. We do feel like, based on our
experience in both the commercial and the government market, we
understand the requirements of the Air Force and what they are
looking for, and we do think it is focused on a system that
could be developed in a public-private partnership that would
give the government the most options for competition as well as
success.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Thornburg.
Mr. Thornburg. With regards to the ongoing source selection
activity, I don't think it is appropriate for me to comment on
that right now, because I wouldn't want to say anything that
would undo--unduly influence that ongoing source selection.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Bruno, do you have any comment on this? You
are not building an engine, but you are going to be buying it.
Mr. Bruno. I believe the requirements in the RPS activity
that you are referring to are very clear from the government.
Mr. Rogers. Are they fair and reasonable?
Mr. Bruno. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. Great. A couple of cleanup questions. This is
for Ms. Van Kleeck. Your history is partnering with launch
service providers or being a launch service prime when
developing a new engine. Why do you believe that this approach
is not appropriate in this situation?
Ms. Van Kleeck. I think the issue at hand that we are
talking about is replacing an engine. And right now we are
looking at an acquisition process that is looking at replacing
a service or looking at an evolution of that service. I believe
with that acquisition you can get to an engine through that
process, but it isn't the most efficient way to do that.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. And then finally, Mr. Bruno. As ULA moves
forward with a new Vulcan launch vehicle, can you tell the
committee if you intend to mitigate your risk by carrying
forward both the AR1 and BE-4 as design options? If not, why
not? And if yes, when will you be able to require--be able to
down select a new single option?
Mr. Bruno. I will not carry them all the way until
completion. We will carry both until it is clear that the major
technical risk with either path has been retired and we are in
a position to make a down selection based on their technical
feasibility, their schedule, and their forecast of recurring
cost. I expect that to happen at the end of 2016. The reason we
will down select and not carry both forward is simply because I
cannot afford to carry both all the way.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you very much.
The ranking member is recognized for any additional
questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There are 5 areas I would like to pursue. Some are just
context and peripheral, but I think it is going to be important
for this committee to understand.
In the Air Force RPS, is there a prediction in the out-
years of payload size? Because I think the assumption is they
are going to get--stay about the same size as they are today,
some large and some small. There is some trends--if we're going
to Mars, probably need to be on the big side. If we are going
to do CUBESATs [miniaturized satellites], maybe we don't need
the lift capability. So all this talk about launch systems and
lift capacity, the question is, what are we lifting? And as
electronics get smaller and smaller, it could be that lighter
lift capacity is sufficient to do the job. I don't know the
answer to that question. Anybody have any answers on this
panel?
Mr. Bruno. The standard reference for technical performance
remains what the Air Force calls the 8 reference missions. And
so they provide us with a set of orbits and payload weight to
be lifted to that orbit. Those have not changed as of this
date. The most challenging of those orbits require our complete
capability all the way to the Atlas V with its 5 strap-ons and
its largest payload fairing.
Mr. Cooper. Part of it is orbit, part of it is weight?
Mr. Bruno. Yes. And it is probably important to understand
the subtlety within that as well, which is the time required in
space to reach the highest orbits, and that dictates some of
the technical characteristics of the upper stage. So when we go
to, for example, geosynchronous orbit, if you wish to directly
inject, which the government generally does to preserve the
life of the satellite, it takes 8 hours flying in space
operating in upper stage in order to circularize that orbit,
something not possible with conventional fuels like kerosene,
for example, without elaborate systems to keep them from simply
freezing up.
Mr. Cooper. Yeah. We haven't given much attention at all to
the second-stage problems. And what you point out are very,
very important. On the intellectual property issue, it is the
greatest source of wealth on the planet, but we have increasing
difficulty understanding ownership and relationships like that.
I guess it gives us some comfort that an American citizen might
be owning all this IP, but sometimes citizens move. Sometimes
they make private sale decisions that could endanger a national
security. So this is something that we need to figure out
better. And in terms of payback to the taxpayers, if we could
get one or two pharmaceutical companies to pay back all the
benefits of their blockbuster drugs from basic research done at
NIH, it would return many more than a few billion dollars. So
perhaps we need to work with our colleagues on other committees
on that.
On the question of paperwork, Mr. Bruno mentioned FAR 15, I
think you called it. And that is a requirement that you have to
endure, but some others might not. But I am not sure, is all of
FAR 15 really good paperwork? Is that necessary paperwork? Can
we streamline FAR 15 so that we can reduce the burden for
anybody who might have to be subjected to all that paperwork
burden? It is not the 10 Commandments. It is not written in
stone.
Mr. Bruno. The Federal Acquisition Regulations actually
provide for different models; 15 is one set. There is another
set referred to as 12, and there are others that do exactly
that and provide guidance when it is appropriate to use the
less-elaborate systems.
Mr. Cooper. So there is some flexibility within that. Is
FAR 15 the biggest and scariest monster out there?
Mr. Bruno. Yes.
Mr. Cooper. But there are lesser monsters? Okay. So you
just mentioned that to scare us.
Mr. Bruno. It happens to be the world that we live in at
ULA.
Mr. Cooper. A question Mr. Bridenstine mentioned, monopoly.
Nobody likes monopoly, but I think in the best case situation
we would have a duopoly or maybe an oligopoly. We need to find
another billionaire to back Ms. Van Kleeck here. Where is
Richard Branson when we need him? Or maybe there are others
with sufficient egos. Because when you correctly said the
business case isn't very exciting about this. Diminishing
number of payloads, substantial risk. It takes an investor's
ego to kind of propel this sort of speculative investment, the
glory of spacefaring. So I think as we fear a monopoly we
should bear in mind that even in the best case we are going to
have an oligopoly, and that is not a whole lot better. We love
the retail model where we can get Amazon pricing for
everything. It is not likely to be available here, despite Mr.
Bezos's involvement. So we don't want to be too idealistic in
this pursuit.
And, finally, there is this touchy issue of recruiting
brilliant personnel. And we in America relied heavily on
Wernher von Braun and lots of other folks who were imported
from Germany. And I think the last one just died in the last
year or so down in Huntsville, Alabama. So, unquestionably,
there are some brilliant scientists who make a difference.
I couldn't help but note on the first page of Mr.
Meyerson's testimony, he has recruited lots of folks from lots
of places, including someone with Merlin experience. That is
interesting. It makes me think, regarding the RD-180, that our
failure is not to have recruited a Russian who actually knew
how that worked. Where is that person?
And maybe the Chinese did that when they have integrated
that into their Long March, or maybe they just stole the
blueprints. But you kind of wonder, you hope that a team of
scientists can do great things, and, in many cases, they have.
But in some cases, at least, there are these brilliant
individuals who come up with the secret sauce. And that leads
us to the very interesting feature of SpaceX, where they do not
rely on the patent system to protect their IP, preferring,
instead, the trade secret system, which is basically thumbing
their nose at the entire Western system of protecting
intellectual property.
And I am not defending the inefficiencies of the Patent
Office or--you know. But, this is kind of an interesting
challenge here. You just keep it locked up in a safe like maybe
the Coca Cola formula as opposed to publishing and
disseminating and then protecting legally. So there are many
challenges we face as we get into this issue to make sure that
we have assured access to space, that we have a perhaps unique
national security capability to lift whatever is required on
the timetable that we need to serve the warfighter, and, yet,
we are increasingly relying on commercial models, global
models, international models that may or may not service this
unique national capability.
So these are some of the challenges the subcommittee faces
as we try to come up with some sort of fair solution that,
above all, puts America first. So that is how I see it.
If you all publicly or privately have corrections,
amendments to that, modifications, I would appreciate hearing
from you, because we are trying to do the right thing and not
have Congress mess up yet again like we did last year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
I would note, when Congress messed up last year, it was
with language the private sector gave us to put in that bill.
We didn't dream up that language.
Let's go to the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine,
for any additional questions he may have.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bruno, you mentioned earlier to close the business
case, ULA will need to be able to compete in the commercial
sector for space launch; is that correct?
Mr. Bruno. Yes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Mr. Meyerson, does Blue Origin intend to
also compete in the commercial space launch industry with its
own system?
Mr. Meyerson. In the very long term, yes, we do. Our first
iteration we are working on is our suborbital New Shepard
vehicle, which we flew last month, and our focus on our rocket
engines as a merchant supplier to ULA and other companies and
making those engines available.
Mr. Bridenstine. So if--and just for you, Mr. Bruno, if
Blue Origin enters a space, and they are competing directly
against you in the commercial market, and you are entirely
dependent on them for your rocket engine, does that pose a risk
to the costs of government launches?
Mr. Bruno. In the foreseeable future, I see our activities
in the marketplace as complementary. And what my colleague Rob
is referring to is in the far future, when we will have ample
opportunity to work out arrangements.
Mr. Bridenstine. If the AR1 engine ultimately is not what
is down-selected, what is the future for the AR1?
Ms. Van Kleeck.
Ms. Van Kleeck. Currently, the AR1 is relevant to this
particular change in launch vehicles in this particular point
in time. We don't re-engine launch vehicles. You know, but
every 10 years we have different opportunities to do that. We
would maintain the technology. We would probably put it at a
technology level. But if there isn't a launch vehicle provider
that will use it, the development will not be completed at this
point in time.
Mr. Bridenstine. Is there a chance that that launch vehicle
provider might materialize and the AR1 would find itself
relevant in both commercial and the EELV program?
Ms. Van Kleeck. It is possible. There are--it clearly
depends on what some of the launch vehicle providers, what
their paths going forward are. But, as you know, there are
multiple providers here on this panel, and we have talked about
a limited market. So in the near term, it is not a high
probability.
Mr. Bridenstine. One of the--one of the challenges we have
is--certainly, it seems like there are two different directions
that the panel is trying to accommodate. One direction is the
Air Force's position, which is we need to purchase launch as a
service. And, of course, that has been the going mindset for
everyone for quite a while. Then we ended up in this position
where the Russians got aggressive. And, boy, I will tell you, I
share Chairman Rogers' position. We don't want to send one more
dollar to Russia that we don't absolutely have to send to them.
And certainly I agree with Chairman Rogers that we need to do
everything possible to mitigate the risk to our own assured
access to space. That is kind of what drove us to this position
today where we have got language in the NDAA that ultimately
might not be compatible with language that says, we need to
purchase launch as a service.
So this is a challenge we are going to continue to have.
Unfortunately, the panelists today find themselves in a
challenge where they are trying to basically go two different
directions at the same time, given what has happened in the
world. And, of course, we as Congress, need to figure out a way
to make this the best for our country, the best for the
taxpayers, the best in the national security interest of the
United States. I know Chairman Rogers has that in his heart.
The goal here is to get off any Russian engines and to make
sure we have assured access to space. And we have got to make
that happen. And I just appreciate you guys being here and
working through this with us as we try to make it happen for
our country.
Thank you guys very much.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. And I concur with that
completely.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Coffman, for any additional questions he may have.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, I have one question.
Mr. Meyerson from Blue Origin and Mr. Thornburg from
SpaceX, has a large methane rocket engine ever been built and
flown in space? And why is this? And what are the advantages
and the challenges of building this type of engine?
Mr. Meyerson. By and large, I will say no. Engines that are
greater than 250,000 pounds in thrust, there has been no large
methane engine that has been built and flown to space that I
know of. We have been busily working on the BE-4, and we have
made some specific design choices to mitigate any risk with
that development, design choices in our chamber pressure,
design choices in our injector, and design choices in our
materials that will give us confidence that we can develop this
engine by the end of next year, get into testing, and meet the
Vulcan launch vehicle requirements.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Thornburg.
Mr. Thornburg. To your first question about have we flown a
large methane rocket engine, no, we have not done that. But the
one thing I did want to point out is that the one aspect of, as
you hear a lot about this novel technology in some of the new
engine power plants that are being discussed today, I wanted to
point out to the committee that the one common thread across,
whether it is Raptor, whether it is AR1, or whether it is BE-4,
is really the ox-rich staged-combustion technology. All three
engines that the three companies are working on incorporate
that. And that really does represent the technology coming to
the table.
So whether you are trying to replace something with Atlas
in terms of an AR1, you still have to finish the development of
ox-rich staged-combustion technology. And it is the same for
BE-4; it would be the same for a Raptor engine.
And I wanted to also comment that the talented engineers in
the United States have been working on these types of
technologies since the late 1990s. Through programmatic
investments of the Air Force Research Laboratory and NASA,
these technologies have been available, but have yet to be
fully funded and brought to the table until these conversations
are happening now. So that is kind of where we stand on the
methane engine development.
Mr. Coffman. Would anyone else like to comment on that?
Ms. Van Kleeck. Yes, sir, I would. I agree that the common
thread through these things is the ox-rich staged technology.
However, I would say there has been--I mean, we have worked on
methane as a company, Aerojet Rocketdyne has worked on methane
since the 1960s, and we have built a number of different
devices, none of which have flown yet. Methane is probably
going to be an important technology for Mars missions when you
are dealing with landers and things like that where you want to
make your propellant in space.
In terms of the difference, though, between a methane and a
kerosene engine for a booster, the ox-rich side is the same,
but the fuels, kerosene is characterized. The ability to run
kerosene in an ox-rich environment is also characterized. The
Russians have perfected this technology over decades.
I am confident we can also do that with methane, but it is
going to take time. It took the Russians a long time to get
where they are. I think we understand what they have done. We
will be building off of that technology. We have studied that
technology for 20 years. I believe this can also be done for
methane, but I think the timeframe is going to be quite a bit
longer.
Mr. Coffman. Anyone else comment? Yes.
Mr. Culbertson. Not about methane, sir, but I would like to
point out that there are other technologies involved here that
involve propulsion systems, and they have been mentioned
several times, and that is the solid rocket motors that
contribute to our access to space, whether they are strap-ons
or main stages.
That is a part of our heritage as a country and Orbital ATK
is very much involved with that and working with several people
here on the panel on making sure that that is a part of their
systems. Any system going forward is going to have to have
either newly developed or perfected solid rocket motors as a
part of it, whether it is the main engine or additional
propulsion or second stages. And I think that that needs to be
a part of the discussion too, is how to maintain the lead that
we have in this country in solid rocket motors and solid rocket
propellants over the rest of the world to help with national
defense, as well as our access to space for these big payloads.
Mr. Coffman. Yes, Mr. Thornburg.
Mr. Thornburg. Just a comment back on the methane side. I
think the research and development and the testing that has
been performed by SpaceX's private investment, as well as
activities we have been having with Blue Origin, are proving
out the viability of methane as a fuel, whether it is ox-rich
or a full-flow staged-combustion cycle.
I would also like to say that we have been operating
hydrogen propulsion systems in this country since the dawn of
the space age. Hydrogen, obviously, offers a lot more
complexities in the design, et cetera. Methane typically falls
somewhere between hydrogen and kerosene in terms of handling
due to the nature of its cryogenic properties.
But I did want to point out that there has been a lot of
research and development in methane ongoing in the private
sector, independent of government investment over the last
several years.
Mr. Meyerson. Can I just add one comment to that? We talked
about methane, but the choice of fuel for the BE-4 is liquefied
natural gas, which is commercially available methane. It is the
commodity that you can buy, and the infrastructure in the U.S.
is growing rapidly in the last decade. So we have chosen LNG
because it is cheap. It is four times cheaper than kerosene,
RP-1, the rocket propellant grade. It is available, and it is
clean. So it supports reusability applications, which we are
interested in, in the long term. And those are very important
points that I want to add.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornburg, I would like to drill down just a little bit
more on a line of questions I was pursuing earlier to hopefully
get a little more clarity. In response to a question for the
record from the last hearing, General Hyten stated that, quote,
``SpaceX has not formally submitted the changes desired to be
accepted under certification for the full thrust system to the
Air Force,'' unquote.
If SpaceX hasn't formally submitted the changes, then how
is it that your system should be certified for launch or
eligible for competition on EELV?
Mr. Thornburg. Sir, I would have to get back to you on the
specifics of what has been transferred. But I can tell you that
to my knowledge presently, since the last hearing, there have
been numerous conversations between the Air Force and SpaceX
specifically to address this information. I believe the bulk of
all that has been provided and is being discussed between the
Air Force and SpaceX. But I am happy to take that and provide
it back for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 167.]
Mr. Lamborn. Well, that doesn't really satisfy me. Let me
approach this from a little different angle. And I am going to
refer to an article from March 17 of this year, Aviation Week
article entitled ``SpaceX Sees U.S. Air Force Certification of
Falcon 9 By Midsummer.'' Okay. And here is a quote out of that
article. And it is a lengthy quote, so bear with me a minute.
``This year, SpaceX expects to debut another Falcon 9
upgrade, one that will see at least a 15 percent increase in
thrust for the Falcon 9's Merlin 1D core-stage engines and a 10
percent increase in the upper stage tank volume. NASA has said
such an increase in thrust is likely to require significant
design modifications to the engine and rocket, which could
necessitate additional certification work, including a series
of successful flights to prove the vehicle.''
So how is it that NASA can say that these are significant
modifications and that they require additional certification
and possibly test flights, and yet you don't seem to think that
there is a need for more certification?
Mr. Thornburg. The language you use, no need for more
certification, just to clarify, I guess my comments earlier
were mainly with regards to resetting the clock on
certification. There has been ongoing certification work to
upgrades of launch vehicles long before SpaceX was in
existence. So my comments there were mainly focused on the fact
that SpaceX is not doing anything different than ULA has done
over the years with Atlas and Delta in terms of bringing on new
improvements to systems that improve performance and costs.
I can also say that we are working very closely with NASA
and the Air Force, who have both certified us for their
launches, for their own payloads this year, and we have ongoing
conversations with them with regards to the status of the
vehicle. They are fully read into all of the changes, all of
the modifications that are planned and are ongoing, and are
fully supportive of what we are doing in terms of gaining the
certification for upcoming launches.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, let me change gears and ask my
last question. You stated in your opening statement that there
should be a 50-50 investment in a new engine. Did SpaceX follow
that guideline for Falcon 9 investment?
Mr. Thornburg. With Falcon 9 investment, SpaceX 100 percent
invested in development of that launch of that vehicle. So,
yes.
Mr. Lamborn. You said 100 percent. It is my understanding
that the bulk of SpaceX's capital is actually forward-funded
NASA contracts totaling around $3.5 billion. Is that correct?
Mr. Thornburg. I can't speak to the total. But if you are
referring to the COTS [Commercial Orbital Transportation
Services] program itself, the NASA money under the COTS program
to supply the space station was focused on the Dragon space
capsule versus the Falcon 9 launch vehicle, which SpaceX funded
the development of.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Really, I appreciate all of you all.
Mr. Thornburg, you made a great point when you emphasized
we got ourselves into this situation, and the ranking member
did, when the U.S. stopped investing heavily enough in this
technology and developing where we need to be and where we
should have been before now. But our full attention is focused
on the matter now, and we appreciate you being here.
I would remind all the witnesses, we are going to keep the
record open for at least 10 days in case any members have any
additional questions they would like to ask you to respond to
for the record, and I would appreciate a timely response to
those.
We are about to have another panel of government witnesses.
I very much hope you will listen to them and let us know what
you think about what they say, because it will continue to help
us as we continue to grow and develop in trying to move this
policy in the right direction.
And with that, we stand in recess for this panel to adjourn
and then bring the new panel in.
[Recess.]
Mr. Rogers. I would now like to welcome the experts for our
second panel. I want to thank you all for coming here today and
preparing for it. We have the Honorable Katrina McFarland,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition; General John
Hyten, Commander, Air Force Space Command.
And, General Hyten and Ms. McFarland, it is great to have
you back to testify on this topic. We truly appreciate your
opinions.
And we also look forward to hearing from Lieutenant General
Sam Greaves, Commander, Air Force Space and Missile Command
Center. And we also have Dr. Mike Griffin, who is representing
himself today, but he was deputy chair of the SecDef's
[Secretary of Defense's] RD-180 Availability Risk Mitigation
Study, and he is also a former NASA Administrator.
Ms. McFarland, I will turn it over to you to start with.
You are recognized for 5 minutes to summarize your opening
statement.
I will tell all the witnesses, your opening statements in
full will be submitted for the record. If you would just like
to summarize with your time, we will get right to questions.
Ms. McFarland.
STATEMENT OF HON. KATRINA G. McFARLAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary McFarland. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking
Member Cooper, and distinguished members of the committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to speak and appear before this
committee, particularly since you are supposed to be at recess.
And I ask that my written testimony, as you state, be taken for
the record.
Mr. Rogers. Without objection, so ordered.
Secretary McFarland. Thank you.
Assured access to space continues to be critical to our
defense space capabilities and national security, especially as
our world has changed over the last decade into a nonpermissive
environment.
During our March 17 hearing on assured access to space we
touched on many topics concerning the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle program. Amongst those were the Department's plans for
reintroducing competition on how we procure our launch services
for national security space, or NSS, satellites and our plan
for transitioning away from the use of the RD-180 engine, the
Russian engine, onto domestically sourced propulsions
capabilities.
And while I am pleased to state that we are making progress
on both of these, competition and transition is intrinsically
and fundamentally intertwined. This interdependency can't be
ignored. It must be managed. And as you heard with the members
from before us, it is a complex issue. And with SpaceX Falcon
9v1.1 launch system now certified for NSS launches, we have for
the first time since ULA's joint venture formation enabled
competition for NSS launch contract services.
However, section 1608 of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA
prohibits any use beyond the Block 1 contract with ULA for our
most cost-effective launch capability, ULA Atlas V, which
relies on that Russian RD-180 engine. As enacted, section 1608
creates a multiyear gap without at least two price-competitive
launch providers and trades ULA for SpaceX as the sole
providers on medium and some intermediate NSS launches. It also
impacts ULA's viability to compete in the future, as discussed,
as an estimate to replace and certify this capability is
optimistically about 7 years. And, yes, I am a recovering
engineer, and it is a complex issue, sir.
To avoid this unacceptable situation, the Department
submitted Legislative Proposal Number 192 requesting section
1608 be amended. The Department believes this legislative
proposal, combined with the addition of the newly certified
SpaceX Falcon 9v1.1, enables the Department to minimize impacts
to its assured access to space-based capabilities while
industry completes its transition using domestically designed
and produced propulsion systems. The Department greatly
appreciates this subcommittee's support of the legislative
proposal and looks forward to working with Congress and the
defense committees as the fiscal year 2016 budget
authorizations and appropriation languages are debated.
The Air Force released a request for information, RFI, you
have heard some of it earlier, to industry around August 2014
soliciting feedback on approaches for transitioning away from
the RD-180. Responses supported the Department's strategy to
co-invest with industry to transition off the RD-180 and
provide launch capabilities able to support NSS requirements,
but markedly broader approaches than anticipated, as you heard.
As a result of the RFI and in order to comply with the
commercial space trade transportation services and assured
access to space mandates, the Air Force developed a four-step
incremental strategy to fully transition onto domestic
propulsion capabilities as being discussed. The Department
remains committed to working with Congress and industry to
transition off this RD-180 engine in the most efficient,
expeditious, and affordable manner possible while ensuring
continued compliance with the assured access to space and
commercial trade space transportation service laws.
Again, thank you for your support to our critical missions,
and I look forward to our discussion.
[The prepared statement of Secretary McFarland can be found
in the Appendix on page 128.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Ms. McFarland.
General Hyten, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
SPACE COMMAND
General Hyten. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Cooper, distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is an
honor to appear before you again to talk about this important
issue with my distinguished colleagues. Thank you all for your
continued efforts to work this hard topic, because, as Ms.
McFarland said, it is a very difficult topic to try to work
through.
So I believe everybody has been fortunate enough to witness
our Nation's evolution in space power, while our combatant
theater commanders have fully realized how fundamental space-
based effects are to every military operation that takes place
on the globe today. However, these capabilities are merely an
illusion without assured access to space. With today's national
reliance on space capabilities, assured access has gone from
important to imperative and remains one of our highest
priorities.
The launch industry has fundamentally changed over the last
few decades. The Air Force no longer owns the vehicles we
launch. We purchase access to space as a service. And industry
is now investing large amounts of private capital in developing
new engines and rockets, and we are collaborating closely with
them to determine how best to invest in public-private
partnerships and U.S.-made rocket propulsion system.
So within context of assured access to space, it is
absolutely critical that we move as fast as we can to eliminate
reliance on the Russian RD-180 rocket engine. The United States
should not remain dependent on another nation to assure access
to space, and we need an American hydrocarbon engine. That will
be a significant challenge, but we think, with the efforts and
ingenuity of our government and industry teams, it is possible
to develop an American engine by 2019.
However, the engine still has to be made into a rocket. It
still has to be made into a complete space launch system. And
even if that system looks similar to the Atlas V, we still need
to integrate that new engine, test it, certify it, and that is
going to take another year or two once the engine is developed.
We do not want to be in a position where significant resources
have been expended on a rocket engine and no commercial
provider has built or modified the necessary rocket.
This subcommittee can be assured of our commitment toward
competition and a healthy space launch industrial base as we
move as fast as we can towards U.S.-built rocket engines. Thank
you for your support. I look forward to continuing in
partnership, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Hyten can be found in
the Appendix on page 135.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General Hyten.
General Greaves, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN SAMUEL A. GREAVES, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
FORCE SPACE AND MISSILE SYSTEMS CENTER
General Greaves. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today.
Space capabilities are essential to the American way of
life, and they multiply the effectiveness of our warfighters.
Thanks to the efforts of the men and women of the Space and
Missile Systems Center, our many contractors, and many mission
partners, we continue to deliver worldwide precision
navigation, threat warning, protected strategic and tactical
communications, and many other capabilities from space.
As we have all come to know, space launch is a key to
providing all of that capability. We address the critical
nature of space launch through a policy of assured access to
space. Maintaining at least two reliable launch systems is a
credible method for continued access to space should one suffer
a grounding event. As part of this approach, we purchase launch
services on a commercial basis, leveraging America's most
important source of innovation and national economic strength,
our free market.
These two concepts, assured access to space and
competition, are the cornerstones of our national launch
policy. They guide our implementation as we execute the 2015
National Defense Authorization Act, which outlines the use of
the RD-180 and mandates that we develop a next-generation
rocket propulsion system.
In response, I will emphasize that the Air Force is 100
percent committed to transitioning off of the RD-180 for
national security space launch as quickly and as prudently as
possible to a domestically produced liquid- or solids-based
rocket propulsion system.
From our perspective, solely replacing the RD-180 with a
new engine is not the complete solution, since rockets are
heavily influenced by engine design. Even a drop-in replacement
which closely matches the RD-180 physical interfaces and
performance would require modifications to launch vehicle
structures, the fuel and oxydizer feedlines, and the heat
shields to accommodate even minor differences in performance.
As was mentioned by the previous panel, the thrust vector
control and throttling of the RD-180 engine is a critical
characteristic of the Atlas V. The new engine's thrust
vectoring and throttling will require changes to the electronic
control systems and significant engineering analysis to develop
new flight profiles to launch the various satellites.
So, in other words, a rocket engine specifically engineered
to replace the RD-180 on the Atlas would most likely be usable
only for ULA's Atlas and not by any other launch service
provider without significant modifications to the engine and/or
the launch vehicle. We also do not believe this would meet the
intent of open competition.
Additionally, as a product of our market research, we found
that if we procured an engine not designed for a specific
launch vehicle, commercial providers would be unlikely to build
a rocket around it without the government also funding the
redesign of their launch vehicles, adding time, cost, and risk
we cannot afford.
So the Air Force is pursuing a strategy of shared
investment with industry using public-private partnerships at
the launch service level. The goal of this plan is to produce
at least two domestic, commercially viable launch systems,
including the accompanying liquid-fuel engines or solid rocket
motors.
In our research, we assess that industry timelines
predicting complete rocket propulsion systems by 2019 are
aggressive. History has consistently shown that developing,
testing, and maturing an engine takes 6 to 7 years, with
another year or two beyond that to be able to integrate into
the launch vehicle.
Now, with all that said, we are moving fast, very fast on
this. To execute this plan, we have developed an aggressive
four-step acquisition strategy to reach this end state as
quickly as possible. Step one pursues technical maturation and
risk-reduction efforts, building our expertise within the U.S.
Step two targets shared investments in rocket propulsion system
development. Step three guides the transition of our shared
investments into the provider's launch system. And finally,
step four directs the acquisition of launch services to meet
national security space requirements.
As we move forward, our overall goal is to preserve assured
access to space by maintaining our laser focus on mission
success. Our approach will accomplish this by supporting
competition where it credibly exists and by acquiring space
launch as a service from certified, commercially viable
providers using domestically produced rocket propulsion
systems. If we do this, we will be on a path to transitioning
off of the RD-180 and having at least two domestically
produced, commercially viable launch providers that are
certified to meet national security space requirements by the
end of fiscal year 2022.
Thank you for your support in helping us get here, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Greaves can be found in
the Appendix on page 143.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General Greaves.
Dr. Griffin, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN, DEPUTY CHAIR, RD-180
AVAILABILITY RISK MITIGATION STUDY
Dr. Griffin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and distinguished
members of the committee, I am honored to be asked to appear
before your subcommittee to testify on the matter before us
today. However, before beginning any substantive discussion, I
think I should note for the record that I am here as an
independent witness and a private individual. I have received
no consideration of any kind in connection with the topic of
today's hearing from anyone. I am here on personal leave and at
personal expense and do not represent any company, agency, or
committee on which I have served in the past or presently
serve.
So with that said, we are here to discuss the RD-180 and
its replacement. The RD-180 has been used for two decades on
various versions of Atlas. And without that engine or a
functionally equivalent replacement, today's Atlas V launch
vehicle will be grounded and with it two-thirds of our national
security payloads as we presently have the manifest.
And so while I completely agree that we should not continue
to be dependent upon a foreign power, much less an adversary,
for any element of our national space launch capability, I do
believe that the legislative action which has been taken in
this regard is a bit too abrupt. It might be that we should
wean ourselves of this dependence a bit more gently.
But if the Atlas is grounded, then what? Well, U.S. policy
and law require two independent systems for national security
space launch capability. This requirement is met, but only
partially so, with the Delta 4 family. The previous panel said
that payloads could be shifted from Atlas to Delta 4. That is
so, but many critical payloads are not immediately
interchangeable between these vehicles and would require
considerable rework at considerable cost to shift from Atlas to
Delta.
Moreover, the Delta is, in general, more expensive than the
equivalent Atlas, and the top-end Delta performance of Delta 4
Medium is less than that of the top-end Atlas. So some Atlas
payloads will not be transferable to Delta.
Finally, the Delta production limitations are such that
without a massive increase in manufacturing and launch
infrastructure, very limited surge capacity is even possible.
So the net effect of shifting national security space
systems from Atlas to Delta, should we have to do so, will be
several years of delay for the average payload and many
billions of dollars of increased cost.
Now, some have said that the best forward path is to
discard decades of government investment in and experience with
the Atlas and develop a whole new system. This does nothing to
solve today's problems. And even if it did, it is irrational to
suppose that an entirely new launch vehicle can be obtained
more quickly or at less cost than a new engine alone.
Others would have us believe that the U.S. Government can
merely purchase launch services from among multiple competitors
as if one were selecting a particular airline for a desired
trip based on airfare and schedule. Purveyors of this launch-
as-a-service view would have us believe that if we have an
engine supply problem, the U.S. Government should stay on the
sidelines while the market solves the problem.
But in reality, the U.S. national security launch
architecture is a strategic capability having far more in
common with other strategic assets such as fighters, bombers,
aircraft carriers, and submarines than it does with airlines
and cruise ships. The vagaries of the market cannot be allowed
to determine whether or not critical payloads make it to space.
Accordingly, the U.S. Government must be prepared to ensure
that the supply chain required to maintain this critical asset
remains intact. That supply chain is currently quite fragile,
because while we have been supporting the Russian rocket engine
industrial base, our own has withered.
To conclude, we have an engine problem, not a rocket
problem. I believe we should solve it by building a government-
funded, government-owned, American equivalent to the RD-180 as
quickly as we can possible do so. We should not allow the many
obfuscating issues which have been raised in connection with
this problem to cloud our view of what must be done.
Thank you. My full statement, I hope, will be entered for
the record.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Griffin can be found in the
Appendix on page 154.]
Mr. Rogers. It certainly will.
Well, listen, before I get into my questions that I
prepared, you heard the previous panel. Is anybody just
chomping at the bit to take on something that came out in that
previous panel that you think the committee needs to hear for
sure?
Dr. Griffin.
Dr. Griffin. Sir, I need to comment on one of the last
statements of the SpaceX representative, that the development
of Falcon 9 was done on private funds and that NASA money spent
went on Dragon.
I personally am the originator of the COTS program, and
that program was intended to provide seed money--and I
emphasize seed money, not majority funding--for the development
of a new launch vehicle and a delivery system for cargo to
space station.
After I left the agency with the inauguration of President
Obama, considerably more money was supplied to SpaceX. I think
from public sources it is easily possible to show that SpaceX
has received about $3.5 billion or so, possibly more, in open
source funding. Seeing as how they have conducted seven
launches for NASA, counting the one upcoming this week, that is
either an extraordinarily high price per launch of about a half
a billion dollars per launch, which I don't believe is the
case, or a considerable amount of that money has gone into
capitalizing the company.
The money was not segregated out, according to Dragon or
Falcon 9, so I very strongly believe that the government money
which has been provided to SpaceX has in fact gone for the
development of Falcon 9.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Anybody else? Anything that just jumps out at you?
You know, you all heard me hope optimistically that more
than two companies are going to be competing for this engine,
and I hope that we wind up with three or four or more getting
into this competition when it really gets going.
All right. In last year's 2014 space hearing, I asked the
witnesses if they think developing a competitively acquired
next-generation engine available to all U.S. providers that
could effectively replace the RD-180 was important. General
Shelton, the predecessor of General Hyten, stated, quote, ``I
would be a strong supporter of that if we can find the money to
do it,'' close quote. Mr. Gil Clinger, who used to work for Ms.
McFarland, stated, quote, ``I think in the long run it is in
the interest of the United States Government to develop a next-
generation rocket, U.S.-produced rocket engine,'' close quote.
We took their advice and directed the Department to build a
domestic propulsion system that ends our reliance on the
engines by 2019, and we provided $220 million just to get
started.
But, now, when I read your plan, it is not clear to me that
we are focused on developing a domestic engine. What has
changed since that testimony?
And I would like to ask all the witnesses: In your
professional judgment, if we have two options--one, to replace
an engine with a proven technology or, two, to build a new
engine with an unproven technology, new launch vehicle, and new
infrastructure--what is the low risk, most expedient, and the
least cost to the taxpayers?
Anybody that wants to take it on.
General Hyten.
General Hyten. So, Mr. Chairman, I will make two comments,
and then I will turn it over to my fellow members on the panel.
So the first comment is that the United States leads the
world in two elements of the rocket engine business. We lead
the world in solids, and we lead the world in liquid oxygen/
hydrogen engines. I think we should lead the world in every
category of engine development. The one we don't lead in is
hydrocarbon development.
I believe the United States, no matter what the rest of
this discussion goes on, the United States should develop a
technology program that builds hydrocarbon technology for the
United States across the board. I think it is essential to what
we do as a country. We have avoided that for about 20 years,
and we ought to take that on and go forward to that, however
this turns out.
The second issue is what has changed. What has changed
since the last time we talked is we actually have a bill, we
have a National Defense Authorization Act, that gave us very
specific guidance. And the guidance said that we need to pursue
engines that grow to a domestic alternative for national
security space launches. It tells us they have to be made in
the United States; I think all the previous panel did that.
They said they have to meet the requirements of the national
security space community; I think they did that. Developed not
later than 2019; that is a challenge, but we heard that. And
then be developed using full and open competition.
That full and open competition is exactly the structure we
put in place. We were specifically told by the law not to go to
a specific vendor, not to go build a specific engine, but to go
look at full and open competition across the industry. And when
you look at the previous panel, the thing that struck me about
the previous panel that was very impressive is how much they
had embraced that across the board, from Blue Origin to ULA to
Aerojet Rocketdyne to Orbital ATK to SpaceX, to embrace that,
to look at that place.
So the competition was very important, but when you do full
and open competition, you have to go through the process to
make sure it is full and open and fair across industry. That
does not happen overnight.
So I would just make those two comments for the record,
sir.
Mr. Rogers. General Greaves.
General Greaves. Mr. Chairman, you asked whether or not we
should replace the RD-180 with technology. As the previous
panel did express, we do not have the capability within the
United States today to replace that engine. So whatever we come
up with will be a new engine. And the AR1, BE-4, they were both
mentioned.
Now, from our point of view, replacing an engine has
effects on the overall capability that we plan to deliver. So
we must verify the impacts of any changes to any component in
the system, especially engine, on the rocket itself and our
ability to deliver that capability to orbit.
So, combined with what General Hyten just mentioned, our
approach is to look at the total capability, the total system,
that will result from any changes to any component, to include
the engine. And that is why we start from the launch service
ultimate capability, assess what the impacts are, and then
decide whether or not, as you will see through the four-step
process that we have in place, whether or not any of the
providers--and, by the way, we did have what we are referencing
as a broad response from industry to the RPS proposal that we
put out there that arrived a couple days ago that we are
assessing right now. So there is interest. But we must look at
the impacts from any changes to the rocket, to the system, on
that system.
Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Ms. McFarland.
Secretary McFarland. Chairman, I think it was very clear
that one thing came out from each of the previous industry
comments: There isn't a drop-in replacement for an RD-180 on
the table. Form, fit, and function, maybe, but not a drop-in
exact replacement.
So really what we are focused on is risks. How do we
leverage our funds and risks? Is it going to be leveraging
funds from the government and the risk is to the government and
we pass that risk back to industry? Or do we take and work
together with industry and funding and share the risks? I call
it the ``pay me now or pay me later.''
Each of these industries have already stated there is a
limited industrial base for commercialization immediately. I
shared with you earlier the Satellite Industry Association
study that says there is a modest growth, somewhere between 4
and 9 percent. They, in commercial world, don't use the size as
you are familiar with that we have for payloads.
So we carry, no matter what, an underwriting of whatever
comes out of here. And because we don't have the IP to the RD-
180 and we haven't developed, as has been stated repeatedly
here, the engineering expertise that understands the metallurgy
and necessarily the methodology to do the propulsions in exact
form, we have to assess that we are going to have some modicum
of risk.
The Air Force proposal, as it stands, and with their RFP,
are pursuing getting the government and industry smart together
to the point where they can make a logical decision to the next
step. Can we purvey going forward with a launch system? Shall
we look at just propulsion system? Shall we look at just
engine? And what is the most cost-effective and, by the way,
timely--we are racing against time--proposal?
The advancements from industry is reassuring. The question
is now where do we place that risk and how can we afford it.
Particularly, as I mentioned to you also earlier and with the
ranking member, we are concerned with sequestration right in
the midst of trying to rush to moving forward on this
replacement. It hits us right at our weakest joint, fiscal year
2016.
Mr. Rogers. You heard the witnesses in the previous panel
talk about the degree of modifications that would be required
to take one of the new proposed rocket engines and put it on
the rocket itself. And they didn't disagree with the numbers I
have heard from you earlier, General Hyten, of $200 million for
not just the rocket but all the infrastructure changes, and
that was the floor.
Do you still believe that is at a minimum what we are going
to be looking at, no matter which alternative we select?
General Hyten. Mr. Chairman, I won't disagree with what Mr.
Bruno said--what his numbers are. The numbers I shared with you
are the numbers I heard from Mr. Bruno.
We will know more as we actually get into the contract
activities with them. General Greaves will be going down that
path with him directly. But I think those are ballpark numbers
that are fair to look at. But they are not tens of millions of
dollars. I think $200 million is the floor.
Mr. Rogers. Is the floor.
One big change from the last assured access hearing to this
hearing that has been striking to me is the idea of hitting
2019 for completion of testing and providing your system for
Air Force certification seemed ambitious but realistic. Now,
you have heard from the previous panel, with high degrees of
confidence, they believe they are going to have not only
completed testing of their systems but have completed
certification easily by 2019.
General Greaves, you seem to have some real concerns about
that. Do you think that is just optimism or silly?
General Greaves. Sir, I believe they are discussing
certification of the engine. When we talk certification, we are
talking certification of the system. So the engine, plus
everything--any modification to the engine brings with it
software, structures, loads, flight dynamics, processing,
manufacturing. And that is what we refer to as certification.
So I do believe it is aggressive, but, then, that is only
part of the answer.
Mr. Rogers. So you just created a new question for the
record for all of our industry panelists, is we are going to
find out if they were talking about--what certification
process.
General Hyten. So, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Rogers. Yes, General Hyten.
General Hyten. I was listening real close, and the BE-4
answer from Blue Origin, the quote was ``ready to integrate and
fly in 2019,'' and the Aerojet Rocketdyne was ``certification
of the engine in 2019.''
So I think that is a great question for the record, but I
was listening very close to that, as well, to hear what they
said about certification.
Mr. Rogers. Yeah.
Dr. Griffin. May I add a comment, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Rogers. Dr. Griffin, yes, I would love to hear your
thoughts on this.
Dr. Griffin. I first want to say that I very strongly agree
with General Hyten that large hydrocarbon engine technology is
one which we let go at our peril, our national peril. I would
point out we have never actually agreed not to have it. We just
did a make-or-buy decision back in 1995, and we decided to buy
it. That option doesn't look so smart right now, and so I think
we need to relearn how to make it. I am not interested in
replicating RD-180 technology; I am interested in going beyond
it. And that is what I believe we will and should do.
Secondly, I believe that there is considerable self-
interest on the part of a number of different parties in
estimating the difficulty of integrating a new engine on a
launch vehicle. I don't think it is a $10 million problem, but
I am not sure that I agree that it is a multi-hundred-million-
dollar problem.
I actually compiled an incomplete list of 14 different
engines which have been used on a plethora of different launch
vehicles and stages and 8 different rocket engine stages which
have been re-engined over the course of, you know, 50-some
years of American space history. I would be happy to submit
that for the record.
But I simply--the history of this matter does not show it
to be so horribly difficult to re-engine a vehicle, as some of
our earlier witnesses were saying. I just----
Mr. Rogers. And if you would submit that for the record, I
would appreciate it.
Dr. Griffin. I will submit that for the record. I just
simply don't believe it to be so difficult.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 167.]
Mr. Rogers. Before I go to the ranking member, General
Hyten, I want to go back to the specific language you wrote
down that Blue Origin and Aerojet offered.
When Blue Origin said they would be ready to fly by 2019,
how did you interpret that? Did that mean they had completed
the certification process?
General Hyten. For their engine. I interpreted that as the
engine would be ready for us to start into a certification
flight test program in 2019.
The certification flight test program takes a year or two,
usually about 2 years, to go through from a very first flight
of an engine. So that was interesting to me because----
Mr. Rogers. And what does the Aerojet language mean to you?
General Hyten. What the Aerojet language means to me was a
similar thing, except they said by the end of 2019 the engine
would be ready. And they didn't say ready to fly on a rocket;
they said it would be ready by the end of 2019.
Mr. Rogers. Which you interpreted as meaning having
completed the certification process?
General Hyten. The engine, not the system.
Mr. Rogers. So, in either case, you are talking about just
the engine, not the system.
General Hyten. And that is what I heard from both of them.
I heard the engine would be ready in 2019 at best.
But I think it is important to point out that both of those
technologies have significant challenges that they are going to
have to work through. Now, I believe that industry on both
sides, especially on the competitive environment, can
aggressively pursue those and get through those.
But methane, as I think a number of the members of
committee talked about, is a new endeavor when you get above
250,000 pounds of thrust. And this lox-rich [liquid oxygen-
rich] staged combustion across the board has not been done yet.
So there are still technical risks to pursue in either activity
that we need to remember.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
The ranking member is recognized for any questions that he
may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am a budget hawk, and I hate to bring up the issue of
sequestration, but that probably is, as Ms. McFarland pointed
out, the most important issue we face, not only for this issue
but for all the military issues. And this committee has ducked
it yet again.
So, to put a fine point on it, under this NDAA, we will be
borrowing $30 billion, we say from the OCO [overseas
contingency operations] account, but it is not budgeted;
increase the deficit. We will probably be borrowing it from
China. And yet none of us has thought of or proposed, oh, we
would buy the Long March missile from China to meet our gap.
But we are taking the money from them. But we wouldn't consider
buying their missile based on RD-180 technology.
So I hope the members of this committee and of this
Congress will solve the sequestration problem, something that
repeated Congresses have failed to do, which dramatically
injures our national defense capability. So that is the big
issue. So, within that giant issue, we are focusing on this.
I need to ask the witnesses and the chairman this question.
General Greaves indicated there has been broad interest in the
latest RFP. Great. But that is for more than re-engining. So I
am interested to find out and get clarity in this hearing
whether the chairman would be interested in a new RFP just for
a new engine. Are we buying missile systems, or are we buying
new engines?
General Greaves.
General Greaves. Congressman Cooper, the broad response
from industry includes initial proposals from both engine
providers as well as launch service providers. So we are
assessing that combination as we speak. We received it 3 days
ago. We are on a timeline to select the best and get detailed
proposals from the remainder.
Mr. Cooper. But any new RFP would delay the whole process--
--
General Greaves. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. Terribly.
General Greaves. But we believe that----
Mr. Cooper. And you have already expressed, or at least
General Hyten has, extreme skepticism about the possibility of
getting a certified engine replacement by 2019.
General Greaves. Yes, sir. We believe a new RFP would delay
the process. But we also believe that the current process we
have, the RPS we had, encompasses both opportunities for inputs
from engine providers and launch service providers themselves.
So, within that sum total of inputs we have today, we believe
it is highly likely we will find a way through this.
Mr. Rogers. And I would respond to the ranking member's
question with last year's NDAA specific language on this.
``The agreement includes the House provision with an
amendment that would direct the Secretary of Defense to develop
a rocket propulsion system that is made in the United States,
is developed no later than 2019 using full and open
competition, meets the requirements of the national security
space community, and is available for purchase by all space
launch providers of the United States.''
We note that this provision is, quote, ``not an
authorization for funds for development of a new launch
vehicle,'' period.
And I will submit that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 163.]
Mr. Cooper. But this Congress, this committee, can say
2019. That doesn't mean it is going to happen. And we have
heard from our Air Force experts extreme skepticism that that
could happen.
General Hyten. Well, you may have heard skepticism, but I
hope you also heard optimism. Because when you get into a
competitive environment and you actually engage the best
scientists and engineers that we have, I think it is possible
to get there in 2019.
The skepticism that I think you are referring to is talking
about the significant technical challenges in a couple of
areas. And then we also have the thrust vector control issue
that was talked about by the previous committee, too, that we
have to work through. We are not going to go down that
technology path. I think in the long term that would be a good
technology program for the United States to go down, as well.
Mr. Cooper. Well, we keep on using this word
``competition,'' at least from the previous panel. There are
really only two competitors, if you get down to it. You know,
there is the ULA group, and then there is SpaceX. And Orbital
wants to get in, maybe, sometime. But this isn't retail
environment. There are not lots of folks vying for this lumpy
business.
Now, there are more folks interested in commercial, but
that is not what we are talking about here. You know, this
basically, at least due to market interest, is not an
interesting business space unless you are a multibillionaire
with a big ego.
And, by the way, the missing billionaire for the
hydrocarbon engine? Maybe we could find a Texas oilman who
would be interested in funding a hydrocarbon research platform.
Because Dr. Griffin is probably right; we need world-class
research in this area. Well, where has it been for decades? You
know, we haven't had the backing for it somehow. So we are in
this fix right now.
Dr. Griffin. We were buying it from Russia because it was,
in Ms. McFarland's earlier words, pay me now or pay me later.
And we chose to take the route of buying a relatively
inexpensive recurring engine rather than preserving our own
industrial base. At this point, that does not look like it was
the smart alternative then, and I would suggest that we do not
repeat it.
Mr. Cooper. Well, I don't want to put words in your mouth,
Dr. Griffin, but there are some advantages sometimes to big
government. And you proposed a government-funded and
government-owned solution. Many of my colleagues across the
aisle call that big government, and they resist that. They want
to turn over virtually everything to the private sector.
Dr. Griffin. Well, sir, I am a free-market conservative.
And if I thought that the market were such as to supply this
item, as it does for airline transportation or computers, then
I would want the government to buy it off the market.
My observation is that--well, I will just put it like this:
Last year, ULA conducted one commercial launch and something
like a dozen national security or other government launches.
That is the ratio here of free market to national requirements.
So I am urging the committee to consider regarding this
item as a national security item first, with some possibility
of dual use.
But for the national security side, if we believe it to be
so, then we must ensure our supply chain. And that is
everything from thrust vector control systems and guidance
systems to ground infrastructure to airframes to engines. We
must ensure that, cradle to grave, we in the national security
community have taken care that we can get every item we need.
Mr. Cooper. I like your argument, because we do need
assured access to space. I think you went a little bit too far
if you used the ULA ratio last year as the appropriate mix. It
could be that ULA is the higher-cost provider for commercial,
and that is why so much of the business has been taken by
SpaceX.
But, regardless of that, there are certain needs that only
the government can perform, and we should step up and do that
and fully pay for those, unlike we are doing with our overall
defense budget. Because we are still relying on sequestration
and borrowing the money, essentially from the Chinese. So we
have to get real about this, and this committee has failed in
that regard.
I am a little worried about the aspect of the Air Force
demanding, you know, competition and performance and everything
like that, and then you are the gatekeeper. So you could slow-
walk or prevent an otherwise-qualified vendor from achieving
success. This assumed horizon of 6 to 7 years is worrisome
because we won World War II in that timeframe, but now
everything is slower in the modern age.
So I am a little bit worried, and we saw this a little bit
with the last SpaceX certification. It was 6 months, at least,
longer than expected. And I want to make sure all the i's are
dotted and t's are crossed, but sometimes we are not quite sure
where it is lost in the bureaucracy.
General Greaves.
General Greaves. Congressman Cooper, just let me restate
that we are 100 percent focused on expediting our transition
off the RD-180, as well as ensuring that we have a level
playing field between all applicants for that work effort. And
we have not, to date, excluded any of the proposed options, to
include solids.
We have the four-step process, which will drive us to a
conclusion expeditiously. And we do have the opportunity, if we
find that for one or more reasons that one or more of the
proposals that we are reviewing now will not close from a
business-case perspective, won't meet requirements, someone
can't meet what we need, to essentially go back to step one,
which is the technical maturation activity, to pursue an engine
development if needed.
Mr. Cooper. See, that sounds like such a great answer. And
you said ``expeditiously,'' and that sounds great. But the
definition of ``expeditiously'' in the modern age is 6 to 7
years.
General Greaves. Sir, I am talking for step two, which is
the RFP that we are currently assessing, awards between
September and December of this year. It is a two-step process.
Does the set of initial proposals that we have now even meet or
not meet the requirement? Narrowing it down and moving on.
Because, as you heard from the previous panel, sir, these
providers have been working on this issue for quite some time
on their own, and we do not believe it will take an exorbitant
amount of time to get to a decision.
Mr. Cooper. Well, we all hope it won't be an exorbitant
amount of time, but, you know, we heard the FAR 15 problems,
and no one has ever proposed to us reforming FAR 15.
Ms. McFarland.
Secretary McFarland. If I could, I think that was one of
the things that is underlying your question. What the Air Force
used was an other-than transaction. They aren't using FAR 15.
That is similar to what you see in DARPA [Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency], I am sure. That is a very important
tool that they are using to expedite not only the speed but the
innovation. It is not as proscriptive as we discussed in that
earlier one.
Mr. Cooper. So it is not as scary as FAR 15, the big
monster, but this is a little monster.
Secretary McFarland. This is like boo-boo.
Mr. Cooper. Well, I am sure they will be comforted by that.
Essential question of fact here. SpaceX testifies that they
can handle 60 percent of national security loads--60 percent.
Okay. Ms. McFarland, in her testimony, said that they can do
four of eight, which sounds like 50 percent. And then Dr.
Griffin, in his testimony, said two-thirds of the payloads
would be grounded. You know, so what is it?
Dr. Griffin. Well, I will answer first.
I was privileged to be asked to serve on the Mitchell
Committee last year as deputy chair to look at RD-180
alternatives, and we surveyed the manifest at that time. And
two-thirds of the individual flights in the manifest were on
Atlas V, one version of it or another. That is just a fact.
When SpaceX talks about ``can lift 60 percent of the
payloads,'' I am not arguing that that is not the case, but
many of those payloads will be repeat versions of the same
thing. It doesn't mean that they can lift 60 percent of all
possible spacecraft that the national security community has to
be launched.
Mr. Cooper. Uh-huh.
Do we have the legal ability here to force the continuation
of the Delta Medium? Because that is what SpaceX claims would
eliminate any gap even today.
Dr. Griffin. Sir, I am not a lawyer.
Mr. Cooper. Uh-huh.
General Greaves, you are a lawyer, aren't you?
General Greaves. Yes, sir.
I believe the entire discussion of the Delta IV revolves
around the ability of United Launch Alliance to remain
competitive with something like a Falcon 9. And, as Mr. Bruno
mentioned before, they are asking for the time to transition
between where we are today and whatever their new system, the
new--the Vulcan is. And, to do that, they need a steady stream
of revenue to maintain the capability to get there.
So, from what they have briefed us, they have briefed me,
if the Delta IV was forced to compete with the Falcon 9, it
would not be cost-competitive and most likely would not win.
So, without that--and Mr. Bruno mentioned it in the previous
hearing--without that assurance of that steady stream of
revenue, it would be hard to receive the capital investment
they need to make that transition.
So it is not, in our opinion, a matter of whether or not
the Delta IV can meet our requirements or we can force them to
stay. I believe it is a matter of whether or not ULA can remain
in business during the transition with the Delta IV as the
competitive item.
Mr. Cooper. So we could make it happen if we paid them to
make it happen.
General Greaves. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cooper. Okay.
Final point would be this. I am worried overall that the
short tenure of generalships does not meet these multiyear
national security capabilities. Because so many of the
personnel and leaders of these companies are retired Air Force,
and, you know, when we have 3-year, 4-year tours of duties--and
I am not impugning anyone's integrity. It just seems like, when
we have a 20-year or 30-year time horizon on some of these
things and we are rotating in and out personnel, success is
sometimes defined as punching your ticket on your command. And,
if that is sufficient, you know, that--because we are on the
receiving end of a 20-year problem here, and I wonder where
those folks are.
General Hyten. So I understand the argument, Congressman. I
really do. And it may be an anomaly, but I will just point out
that I came back into this element of the business in February
of 2010. And I started coming over here to the Hill in February
of 2010, working this issue as the space acquisition person
under the acquisition chain for 2 years, then as the vice
commander of Space Command, now as the commander of Space
Command. So I have been in this area, focused on this area for
over 5 years now.
And this is essentially important to me, personally, to
make sure we get this done correctly, because I don't want to
leave a problem for the people that come after me. Because I
understand that I have a finite amount of time left in the
service now, and I want to make sure that we get it right so
that the folks that come after me don't have to worry about
this problem.
Mr. Cooper. Yeah. And you are a good man, and 5 years on a
problem is a very long time for the Air Force. But that pales
in comparison to Admiral Rickover's tenure with Navy Nuclear.
General Hyten. It does, sir. I understand the argument.
Mr. Cooper. Yeah.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. And the point the ranking member is making is
one I completely agree with. It is one of my frustrations in
this world that is so complex that we have these short tenures
of really sharp people like you. And it would be awful nice if
we could make those, instead of 3-year tenures, 6 years or
thereabouts.
Anyway, the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, is
recognized.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Since the issue of the sequester came up, I will take an
opportunity to share what I think a lot of us on this panel
worked on very hard. Every year, we reauthorize the Department
of Defense. Every year, we appropriate funds for the Department
of Defense. We have done that again this year, and we have
found a way to unwind the sequester on defense for a year and
meet the President's budget request.
Some people would argue that the color of money isn't
right. I would argue that they are correct. I would also argue
that the money spends the same way, and the money is all green,
and what we need to do is unwind this defense sequester
permanently. But, for now, we have funded the Department of
Defense at the President's budget request level. That is what
we have done. And we worked really hard on both sides of the
aisle to make this happen.
I would also let people know that, when the President
threatens to veto defense appropriations or to veto the NDAA
after we met his budget request, the world is listening to
that, and it doesn't help the situation at all.
This is an important issue. We need to unwind the defense
sequester permanently, and, certainly, I support that. But the
reality is, every year, we reauthorize the Department of
Defense. Every year, we appropriate funds for the Department of
Defense. This meets that same situation.
My question is, when I heard General Greaves talk about
technical maturation--that is step one--and risk reduction as
part of step one, rocket propulsion system investment as step
two, launch systems investment as step three, this sounds an
awful lot like the same process that Dr. Griffin went through
with COTS.
And my question for you, Dr. Griffin, is, why is it
inappropriate now but it was appropriate then? Was the COTS
program unsuccessful? Which--now we have commercial crew and
commercial resupply; it seems like it is at least working. Why
is this different?
Dr. Griffin. Well, a major difference, I think, is in the
amount of money involved. In the COTS program at NASA--now,
this is taking us back nearly 10 years--we allocated, as we
intended, a fairly small amount of money across two providers,
and the clear terms of the agreements were that there would be
a very significant majority of corporate investment. That was
our plan at that time.
The program did work. We got two new launch vehicles out of
it, domestic launch vehicles: the Falcon 9 and the Orbital ATK
Antares.
I think it is a very different thing for the national
security launch infrastructure to be told to purchase launch as
a service, implying that there is an open market of providers
from which the Department can buy a launch on a marginal cost
basis, as if it were an airline ticket----
Mr. Bridenstine. Real quick----
Dr. Griffin [continuing]. And then, oh, by the way, to be
told that they have to fund the development of that capability.
Mr. Bridenstine. Is that not what COTS was? COTS was the
funding of the development, ultimately, right, that led to----
Dr. Griffin. A small portion of the development.
Mr. Bridenstine. So the level of the investment was----
Dr. Griffin. Money matters. That is exactly right. The
level of the investment matters a lot. When we established the
COTS program, we wanted to see a major element of contractor
skin in the game. We did not want the skin in the game to be
entirely that of the government. If the government was going to
fund it as a new development, then we should just do it as a
prime contract.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay.
I just have a few seconds left. And I just want to
reiterate the point I made earlier, which is the Department of
Defense will be fully funded, and the President needs to sign
that into law.
And I think it is critically important that we not, you
know, take risk of, you know, shutting down the Department of
Defense because the President believes we don't have enough
money spent on the IRS [Internal Revenue Service] or enough
money spent on the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] or the
National Endowment for the Arts. That is not an appropriate
thing to do, especially given the threats that we face in the
world.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Coffman from Colorado.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General Hyten, everyone appears to be in unanimous
agreement on two points: first, that competition is good since
it provides cost savings and resiliency; and, two, that we need
to eventually transition off the Russian RD-180 engine.
I am very concerned we haven't rationally thought through
that process and the timelines. In other areas of national
defense, we would never consider phasing out a capability until
we had confidence in a follow-on--for example, F-35 will be
ready to fight before phasing out the F-16. You know, as a
combat veteran, I would never advocate for the phase-out of one
weapon system until I was confident the follow-on system is
operationally ready to support the mission. In this space
launch arena, we are anxious to phase out the RD-180 engine
without full confidence that a robust capability is ready to
replace it.
What is the Department doing to ensure there is no gap in
assured access to space between the time the Atlas and Deltas
are phased out and the follow-on Vulcan and Falcon Heavy become
operational?
General Hyten. So, Congressman, I agree with your overall
assessment. It is the first rule of wing-walking; you don't let
go with one hand until you got firm hold of the next hand. And
I am concerned we are about to let go of one before we have a
firm hold on the next. So I think it is very important that we
logically transition off these capabilities.
I think the efforts that General Greaves and the
acquisition community have come up with to reach out to
industry broadly to come up with a competitive strategy that
looks at that, to use different acquisition authorities to
allow them to go as fast as the acquisition process will allow
them to go has been exactly the right thing to do.
But I still am concerned, is that if he does everything
exactly according to plan and we get an engine by 2019, we
still can't let go of the wing. And that is why the Department
has come back to you and requested the ability to continue to
have RD-180s for that transition period, whatever that is. And
I agree with that request.
Mr. Coffman. General Hyten, if the supply of RD-180s were
cut to less than 14 engines, what would be the practical
result?
General Hyten. There are two possible practical results.
Practical result number one is that ULA can no longer be
competitive in a competitive market, and, therefore, they
decide that they can't compete and we move into another
monopoly.
The other is that the government, because of the assured
access to space requirement, decides that that can't be allowed
to stand, and, therefore, for the transition period we decide
to pay the premium and fly the Delta IV at a price point that
will be significantly higher and pay the difference with the
taxpayers' dollars.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
General Hyten, what is the Department doing--and,
Lieutenant General Greaves, you might want to comment on this
too--what is the Department doing to ensure you are not
replacing a, quote/unquote, sole source provider with a
different, quote/unquote, sole source provider?
General Hyten. Well, I think the whole approach that we are
taking is to figure out how to develop the rocket propulsion
system that will be available for the capabilities that we need
in the future. We are going down that path so we can have that
new rocket. Whether it is Vulcan with the Atlas V upper stage,
or whether it is the Atlas first stage with the other pieces,
we are going down that path.
And we have a much healthier industrial base now. SpaceX is
certified for an element of the capabilities now, so we have
SpaceX that is out there. So we have capabilities out there if
we can take advantage of all of those systems, and that is what
our approach is trying to do.
General Greaves. Congressman Coffman, we initiated this in
earnest last August with a request for information from
industry, and we have been working with them very, very
closely. And the rocket propulsion system effort that is
ongoing now, step two, as we refer to it, the goal is to, based
on what we gathered from industry on their capabilities across
the board, to end up with an initial four potential candidates
and then whittle it down to two.
So we are ensuring, based on the capability within the
Nation, that we will preserve assured access to space.
Mr. Coffman. Assistant Secretary McFarland, would you like
to comment further?
Secretary McFarland. Exactly what the two gentlemen here
said. The Department's look at this is that: Here we are. We
have not got the intellectual capital currently inside of our
government, let alone outside in industry, to do a one-for-one
replacement. The RFP that is out on the street is to grow that
knowledge immediately under a special type of an acquisition
tool, if you would, the OTA [other transaction authority]. It
has in there logical steps that would say, okay, we can now see
what is the quickest, clearest, most affordable way to get to
closure. And, at this time, that is, I think, the most prudent
approach to doing it.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lamborn of Colorado for any
additional questions he may have.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Chairman.
And I want to follow through on a question I was asking
earlier. And if I could just go down the line, starting with
you, Ms. McFarland. And it has to do with questions I was
asking to SpaceX.
If they haven't submitted changes for the upgrade Falcon 9,
then how can it be said that their system is certified for
launch or eligible for competition on the EELV?
Secretary McFarland. Well, post that hearing on March the
17th, they did come in with a statement of intent and, indeed,
are working with the Air Force for the heavy launch Falcon 9.
General Hyten. And the other point I will say, sir, is that
part of the transition phase of that is moving with the full-
thrust engines on their Merlin capability. Now, that is a very
similar process to what we went through on the Delta vehicle
when we went from an RS-68 to the RS-68A. They actually work
closely with us as they go through that. That is part of the
normal process that we work with both Atlas and Delta over the
years. We have done that on the upper stage, as well.
Once we go through and certify the system, it is basically
a baseline capability. And then, as industry learns and
develops new capabilities, they have to come back to us and
demonstrate their changes they go through. And the lucky part
is General Greaves is actually the certifier, so he can talk
about all the details of that. So I will pass it to General
Greaves.
General Greaves. Well, Congressman, as General Hyten said,
the Air Force has designated my position as the certification
official for new entrants. And, as part of that, in assessing
space access capability, we are working with them very closely.
In fact, I co-chair meetings every 2 weeks with the Glenn
Shotwell/Elon Musk level to assess the current status of what
they have proposed, any changes that they are envisioning or
have realized into their system to ensure it becomes certified
in time.
So, in the end, we are well aware of proposed changes to
the Falcon 9 1.1 system as part of the upgrade that was
discussed in the other panel. Daily, our teams are--our organic
government team, our FFRDC [Federally Funded Research and
Development Center] team--are working with SpaceX to fully
understand what it will take to accept those changes, whatever
they may be, as a certified system.
This is no different, sir, than we have done with ULA in
the past. In fact, last December, when we flew the RL10C, which
is an upgraded second-stage engine, we went through a
significant effort with ULA ahead of time to understand the
changes of that engine, what it would do to the system, and
then certify it for flight, which we did last December, and it
flew very successfully for the first time.
So, today, as we speak, SpaceX has provided what changes
they envision for the upgraded Falcon 9. We are, daily, in an
intense effort with them to understand and hopefully certify
that system.
Mr. Lamborn. And you mentioned test flights in the case of
ULA. Will test flights be part of the protocol with SpaceX?
General Greaves. As a basis, yes, sir. But I will use the
RL10C as an example. That engine was qualified as part of ULA's
design and delivery process, and we flew it for the first time
with an operational mission--it was a classified mission--back
in December.
So it depends on the level, degree, amount, impact of the
changes that we are looking at, to determine whether or not it
would require a re-flight or test flight. It is no different,
sir, than what we have done historically with our launch
providers.
Mr. Lamborn. And, Dr. Griffin, would you care to comment?
Dr. Griffin. I would agree with General Greaves with regard
to certification of new capability. In fact, I would say the
idea that we fly a large number of repeated copies of rockets
is something that may look true from the outside, but,
truthfully, it is rare to go very long in a string without
upgrading or changing something about the rocket. So you are in
this continual process of evolution.
And, certainly, we don't do a non-value-added test flight,
a whole separate test flight, with no payload merely because we
go from an RL10B to an RL10C. You just wouldn't want to spend
that kind of money. On the other hand, when you are fielding an
entirely new rocket, you will do a couple of test flights,
typically, before you put a valuable payload on it.
So there is an informed engineering and program management
judgment that has to be applied to determine when you are
willing to risk an upgrade without a test flight and when you
need a test flight because the upgrade is just so big that you
don't want to risk the payload.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay.
And for a couple of clarifications, Ms. McFarland, some
people have made unhelpful comments out in the public that the
money from the sale of the RD-180 engines goes to, quote,
``Vladimir Putin and his cronies.''
Can you clarify that, please?
Secretary McFarland. Congressman, I can't say where the
money goes. The government buys launch services from ULA. But I
can state that, on May the 6th of 2014, the U.S. Court of
Claims received the opinion of the United States Department of
the Treasury, the United States Department of Commerce, the
United States Department of State, that the payments to NPO
Energomash do not directly contravene Executive Order 13661 at
this time and would inform the court in the case of such
determination in the future had to be overturned.
So, from our perspective, we did exactly due diligence on
this to ensure that those statements were not factual.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, thank you for your background work and
for that clarification.
And, lastly, I would like to clarify with you or possibly
General Greaves, Reuters reported at one point that the
contracting approach used by ULA to purchase RD-180 engines via
RD Amross employed, quote/unquote, ``questionable contracting
practices.''
Is that true?
General Greaves. Congressman, no. It followed the standard
process where the Air Force procurement contracting officer,
with advice from such agencies as the DCMA [Defense Contract
Management Agency], DCAA [Defense Contract Audit Agency],
examined the contracting approach for both ULA and RD Amross,
and they did a couple of things.
They went through and essentially did a price analysis to
assess whether or not the proposed prices we were paying were
within historical bounds. They also took a look at, for
instance, the RS-68, what it cost to produce that engine versus
what we were paying for the Russian engines.
And they correlated all this information. And there was
also a cost study that was done. So, in the end, all the steps
were taken. The RD-180 was procured on a fixed-price basis. So
we followed all those rules, and we vehemently dispute the
accuracy of that information.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you for that clarification.
Thank you all for being here.
Thank you, General Hyten and General Greaves, for your
service to our country.
Dr. Griffin, Ms. McFarland, thank you for helping our
country, as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging those questions.
Mr. Rogers. Glad to. I appreciate the questions.
I mentioned this earlier--I think it was during our first
panel--that the House version of the NDAA for 2016 in this
subject matter area and the Senate language is different. So
this will be a question for all the witnesses.
Please comment on the impact of the current fiscal year
2016 NDAA Senate language regarding the prohibition of Russian
rocket engines. Are nine engines from the 2015 to 2017
timeframe enough to maintain assured access to space and keep
competition going? Why does this issue need to be addressed
now?
Ms. McFarland.
Secretary McFarland. No, it does not. We have in block 1-A
multiple launch, competitive launch opportunities that this
would not allow us to have two viable competitors for.
Mr. Rogers. General Hyten.
General Hyten. And then the follow-on to that is, as we go
to Phase 2----
Mr. Rogers. Well, first, do you concur with that?
General Hyten. I concur with what Ms. McFarland just said.
And it goes further than that, because my biggest concern is
really when we get into Phase 2, which is the period between 18
and 22, where we have approximately 28 launches that we are
going to manifest. There would be no Atlases available to
compete for those launches at that time. That brings the whole
discussion that we had a little while ago about the viability
of ULA to get through that period--that is an even bigger
concern for me as we get into Phase 2.
Mr. Rogers. So I want to make sure that for the record we
understand. Both Ms. McFarland and General Hyten are saying
that the nine engines are not enough to maintain assured access
to space?
General Hyten. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
General Greaves, you had something you wanted to say?
General Greaves. Chairman, I concur entirely. It gets back
to the entire discussion on whether or not ULA remains
commercially viable to make the transition between today and
2022.
Mr. Rogers. And that is important because?
General Greaves. Because they need the steady stream of
revenue to----
Mr. Rogers. I mean, in the big picture, we need to have two
people that can----
General Greaves. Yes, sir. Assured access to space, yes,
sir.
Mr. Rogers. So we would be falling down on our overall
goals of making sure we maintain assured access to space by
having two providers.
General Greaves. Yes, sir.
Dr. Griffin. May I come in on this?
Mr. Rogers. Dr. Griffin, absolutely.
Dr. Griffin. The requirement for two providers comes more
out of, if you will, my era. Back in 1986, we lost in sequence
a space shuttle, a Titan, an Atlas, and a Delta. And so, by the
second half of 1986, the United States had no access to space
capability at all.
From among the many recovery actions taken following the
loss of Challenger, it was determined that we would, in the
expendable vehicle arena, keep two independent paths to space
at all times for national security purposes. That is now--it is
Presidential policy for several past administrations, and it is
law. And I think, although the history is now 30 years old
almost, I think we depart from that at our peril.
Mr. Rogers. Great. You know, one of the things you will
hear from the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee
is: Well, you know, we can just rely on NASA to make sure we
maintain this assured access to space.
Do you concur with that interpretation of our circumstance,
Ms. McFarland?
Secretary McFarland. Sir, I do not. I am going to be
visiting with NASA to see what they have in their SLS [Space
Launch System] vehicle. From what I understand--and I am sure
General Greaves and Hyten can explain further--it is a very
costly way to send up an asset given what we have to do for our
mission manifest.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
General Hyten.
General Hyten. NASA uses Atlas and Delta for most of their
scientific missions today. They are working down a couple of
other paths. The Space Launch System, the SLS program, is a
giant rocket, a giant rocket that is built for interplanetary
exploration. It is not built to put satellites in low-earth,
medium-earth, or geosynchronous orbit. So the good news is we
meet with NASA, the Air Force, and the NRO [National
Reconnaissance Office] all the time to talk about the
partnerships. And we have great technology partnerships. But
they do not have a rocket system that would meet our
requirements.
Mr. Rogers. General Greaves.
General Greaves. Chairman Rogers, I concur with what has
been said before. One additional note is that my position also
functions as the flight worthiness certification official for
every national security space launch. And that set of criteria
that we use--in fact, I sign letters for every one of them,
that criteria that we use to certify missions that are ready to
support national security space, in most cases, are somewhat
different than what NASA uses because their risk tolerance is,
in most cases, a little higher than ours because ours are low
risk. So that would be a difference if we were told to go to
NASA for these engines.
Mr. Rogers. Dr. Griffin, you used to run NASA. Do you think
we ought to be relying on NASA for our assured access to space?
Dr. Griffin. I don't because, in actuality, as was said
earlier, NASA relies on the Department of Defense for the
procurement of Delta and Atlas launch vehicles for its own
robotic payloads. The larger rocket, the SLS, to which General
Hyten referred, is intended for human exploration of the solar
system, which I devoutly hope we will resume. But to use it for
unmanned national security launches is possibly somewhat
equivalent to using an aircraft carrier to transport cargo
across the ocean. It would be a bit of an overkill.
Mr. Rogers. General Greaves, what is the estimated cost of
your four-part plan, including all necessary investments in
engines, launch vehicles, and infrastructure? And what is the
basis of that estimate?
General Greaves. Chairman, we do not have a final estimate.
And a lot of it depends on the assessment that we are doing
right now. We do have funding in the 2016 PB [President's
budget] to address step two and step three of the four-step
process. But we are looking to see what estimates we get. And
we will work that in in future budgets.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Dr. Griffin, what are your thoughts on
the cost of the Air Force's four-part plan versus funding an
RD-180 replacement for existing launch vehicles and
infrastructure?
Dr. Griffin. As General Greaves just said, I can't know yet
what the cost of the four-part plan will be. I will offer the
opinion that I believe, I very strongly believe that the
cheapest way for the United States to regain its national
security launch independence is to re-engine the Atlas V. I
said that in my testimony for the record. So I can't prejudice
the outcome of a procurement process which is ongoing. Even
though I am not an attorney, I know that. But I do hope that
the outcome of that procurement process results in a decision
to re-engine the Atlas V.
Mr. Rogers. Ms. McFarland, what would it take to off-ramp
the current Air Force plan to a path that is focused on
developing an engine that complies with the law and without
government development of a new launch vehicle?
Secretary McFarland. I think that would be a good question
to ask us after we have a chance to review what has been
proposed from the Air Force's current solicitation. I think
that would be a good question for the record. And I think that
would be good product.
Mr. Rogers. Great. General Greaves, you stated in your
testimony that, quote, ``a rocket engine specifically
engineered to replace the RD-180 on the Atlas would most likely
be usable only for ULA's Atlas,'' closed quote. However,
according to press reports, Orbital ATK wanted the RD-180 so
much, they sued ULA to get access to it. That suit was settled
out of court. And Orbital went up with another Russian engine.
But isn't it reasonable to conclude that the RD-180 would be
flying on an Atlas and Antares today if Orbital had access to
the RD-180?
General Greaves. Chairman, the answer is yes. But I believe
what I also said is that without significant modification to
the receiving launch system, the launch vehicle--so, yes, the
RD-180 could be transitioned to another launch system, but it
would come with mods [modifications].
Mr. Rogers. General Hyten, there are claims that industry
doesn't need any money to get off the RD-180 or the solutions
are fully funded. In your judgment, can we just rely on
industry to provide us the capabilities we need for our
military? In the end, will the government need to pay for its
requirements?
General Hyten. No, we can't, Congressman, in my opinion,
and I think Dr. Griffin answered this well earlier when he
talked about the business case that is really out there. And if
you look at the business case, the business case is national
security space launches, which means this is national security
mission, which means we need to be able to fund the critical
elements of the industrial base to make sure that is there.
And, right now, that element of the industrial base is not
there to support where we need to go in the future. I think it
is the responsibility of the Department of Defense and the
government to make sure that industrial base is there for
national security.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent. I have many more questions. But I am
going to submit them to you all to get back to us for the
record because it is noon, and we have worn out our welcome
with you all, I am afraid. But, I very much appreciate your
time and effort. You have been enormously helpful to us. And I
look forward to our continuing efforts to get off this RD-180
and onto a new path of independence.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
June 26, 2015
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 26, 2015
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 26, 2015
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
June 26, 2015
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Ms. Van Kleeck. It is Aerojet Rocketdyne's position that major
modifications to the Atlas V launch vehicle are not required to
integrate the AR1 main propulsion system as a replacement for the RD-
180. Aerojet Rocketdyne engineers have been working directly with ULA
engineers under a cooperative agreement to ensure that AR1 will
interface with the existing Atlas vehicle and launch pad
infrastructure. For example, Aerojet Rocketdyne has taken specific
actions to ensure the length of the AR1 engine does not interfere with
the mobile launch platform. AR1 propellant interfaces meet the RD-
180's, ensuring major re-routing of vehicle feed lines is not required.
Some modification to avionics, ancillary feed systems, thrust
structure, etc. will be required but are considered minor impacts. If
ULA chooses to take advantage of the AR1's increased performance over
the RD-180 by increasing the vehicle's propellant load, that would
require greater changes to the launch vehicle and pad; however, it is
Aerojet Rocketdyne position that those changes are not required to
address the immediate concern of maintaining the viability of Atlas and
could be reserved for future upgrades. In addition, it is Aerojet
Rocketdyne's position that none of these upgrades represent the level
of impact to all aspects of ULA's launch infrastructure that will be
required by a the proposed new methane/liquefied natural gas (LNG)
fueled ``Vulcan'' launch vehicle. [See page 20.]
Dr. Griffin. My list of re-engined stages and engines which have
been used on more than one launch platform is attached. [See page
42.]
[The list referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 164.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Thornburg. The Falcon 9 Launch System was certified on May 27,
2015. As General Hyten, General Greaves, Secretary McFarland, and Dr.
Griffin noted in response to your line of questions, the Air Force has
a standard procedure in place to validate upgrades to launch systems in
the EELV Program. These procedures have been used for both the Atlas V
and Delta IV systems for numerous upgrades, including to the RL10
upper-stage engine and the RS-68A first-stage engine, among other
upgrades for the incumbent provider's rockets.
In their testimony, Gen Hyten and Gen Greaves, explained this
process (emphasis added):
``HYTEN: And the other point I will say, sir, is that part of
the transition phase of that is moving to the full thrust
engines on their Merlin capability. Now that's a very similar
process to what we went through on the Delta vehicle when we
went from an RS-68 to the RS-68A. They actually work closely
with us as they go through that. That's part of the normal
process, that we work with both Atlas and Deltas over the
years. We've done that on the upper stage as well. Once we go
through and certify the system, it's basically a baseline
capability, and then as industry learns and develops new
capabilities, they have to come back to us and demonstrate
their changes that go through. And the lucky part is General
Greaves is actually the certifier. So he can talk about all the
details of that. So I will pass it to General Greaves.
GREAVES: Well, Congressman, as General Hyten said, the Air
Force has designated my position as the certification official
for new entrants. And as part of that in assessing SpaceX's
capability, we're working with them very closely. In fact, I
co-chair meetings every two weeks with Gwynne Shotwell, Elon
Musk level, to assess the current status of what they have
proposed, any changes that they are envisioning or have
realized into their system to ensure it becomes certified in
time. So in the end we are well aware of proposed changes to
the Falcon 9 1.1 system as part of the upgrade that was
discussed in the other panel. We are daily, our teams are
organic government team, our FRDC team, we are working with
SpaceX to fully understand what it will what it will take to
accept those changes, whatever they may be, as a certified
system. This is no different, sir, than we have done with ULA
in the past. In fact, last December, when we flew the RL10C,
which is an upgraded second stage engine, we went through a
significant effort with ULA ahead of time to understand the
changes of that system, what it of that engine, what it would
do to the system and then certify it for flight, which is which
we did last December and it flew very successfully for the
first time. So, today as we speak, SpaceX has provided what
changes they envision for the upgraded Falcon 9. We are daily
in an intense effort with them to understand and hopefully
certify that system.
LAMBORN: And you mentioned test flights in the case of ULA,
will test flights be part of the protocol with SpaceX?
GREAVES: As a as a basis, yes, sir, but I will use the RL10C
as an example. That engine was qualified as part of ULA's
design and delivery process. And we flew it for the first time
with an operational mission, it was a classified mission, back
in December. So it depends on the level, degree, amount, impact
of the changes that we're looking at to determine whether or
not it would require a reflight or test flight. It is no
different, sir, than what we've done historically with our
launch providers.
LAMBORN: And, Dr. Griffin, would you care to comment?
GRIFFIN: I would agree with General Greaves with regard to
certification of new capability. In fact, I would say the idea
that we fly a large number of repeated copies of rockets is
something that may look true from the outside but, truthfully,
it's rare to go very long in a string without upgrading or
changing something about the rocket. So you are in this
continual process of evolution and, certainly, certainly we
don't do a non-value-added test flight, a whole separate test
flight with no payload, merely because we go from an RL10B to
an RL10C. You just wouldn't want to spend that kind of money.
On the other hand, when you're fielding an entirely new rocket,
you will do a couple of test flights before typically before
you put a valuable payload on it. So there's an informed
engineering and program management judgment that has to be
applied to determine when you're willing to risk an upgrade
without a test flight and when you need when you need a test
flight because the upgrade is just so big that you don't want
to risk the payload.'' [See page 30.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Thornburg. SpaceX refers you to our response to Question #15
from Mr. Coffman [on page 176]. [See page 17.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
June 26, 2015
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. When there is a failure of a launch system, which is
the same system to be used national security space missions, should the
Department conduct an independent failure review board? Why or why not?
What is the historical precedent?
Secretary McFarland. If a launch system that carries, or intends to
carry, a National Security Space (NSS) payload has a flight failure, as
has recently occurred with the Space X Falcon 9, the Department expects
to be granted insight into the investigation and its findings. This
expectation remains true even if the launch failure did not involve an
NSS payload.
Failure investigations for NSS missions are typically handled by
the Air Force under Air Force Safety and Accident Board regulations.
For additional information on this process the Air Force can provide
you with details of historical precedents and current Failure Review
Board practices. This effort is performed under the direction of the
Air Force Space Command Commander and the Air Force Space and Missile
System Center Commander.
Mr. Rogers. Considering SpaceX's recent failure with a Falcon 9,
are you planning to revisit the certification decision? Why or why not?
If there is no root cause identified and final plan to address the
problem before the upcoming GPS launch competition, what is your plan?
Secretary McFarland. Air Force Space Command is charged with
determining the certification status of any launch system/launch
provider seeking to provide launch services for National Security Space
payloads. The Space and Missile Systems Center Commander (SMC/CC) is
the designated certification official and makes all certification
decisions.
If a root cause for the Space X Falcon 9 v1.1 flight failure is not
identified prior to the award of the GPSIII-2 launch service, the
certifying official will make a risk-based decision on the offered
launch systems certification status. The evaluation criterion for the
GPS III-2 mission, which has been released for industry review,
requires that the offered launch system must be certified. Unless the
launch system offered to the government is not certified, the
contractor proposals will be evaluated in accordance with the published
criteria.
Mr. Rogers. When there is a failure of a launch system, which is
the same system to be used national security space missions, should the
Department conduct an independent failure review board? Why or why not?
What is the historical precedent?
General Hyten and General Greaves. (1) The Air Force conducts
parallel, independent investigations or reviews of significant launch
anomalies and launch failures of launch systems used for NSS missions,
regardless of the nature of the mission.
(2) NSS missions are subject to the USAF mission assurance process,
resulting in a certification of spaceflight worthiness. Therefore, the
cause and corrective action of any failure of a launch system used for
NSS launches needs to be understood so that any residual risks can be
folded into the spaceflight worthiness assessment for future NSS
missions. Furthermore, in the event of the failure of a NSS mission, an
AFSPC-chartered Accident Investigation Board (AIB) or Independent
Review Team would need to ascertain whether the NSS mission assurance
process adequately addressed any elevated risk areas. The USAF would
conduct an independent failure review for any NSS launch failure.
For non-NSS missions (such as the SpaceX Falcon 9-20 CRS-7
mission), other agencies such as the FAA would have the responsibility
for mishap reviews; but AFSPC (to include SMC) have official
representation on those review teams and access to all data. AFSPC or
the Department could choose to begin an independent review at any time
if needed to support a future NSS mission.
The Air Force mission assurance process includes a post flight
analysis for all launches whether successful or not. The results of
these analyses are incorporated into the spaceflight worthiness
determination for future launches. This process includes independent
verification and validation activities.
(3) There was an in-flight anomaly on the GPS-IIF-3 mission in
2012. SMC and AFSPC convened Independent Review Teams, even though the
mission was successfully accomplished. The SMC team, which included
technical support by The Aerospace Corporation, worked in close
coordination with the contractor (United Launch Alliance, ULA) on the
investigation, conducting independent analyses and tests where
appropriate. The NASA and the NRO also participated in the ULA-led
investigation. The AFSPC Independent Review Team complemented the ULA-
led anomaly investigation team, provided an independent assessment of
the investigation processes and conclusions, and reported their
conclusions directly to the AFSPC Commander. The return to flight was
granted by the SMC Commander (the certifying official) after Launch
Systems Directorate and Delta IV Chief Engineer recommendations to do
so, and with concurrence of the AFSPC Commander.
Mr. Rogers. Considering SpaceX's recent failure with a Falcon 9,
are you planning to revisit the certification decision? Why or why not?
If there is no root cause identified and final plan to address the
problem before the upcoming GPS launch competition, what is your plan?
General Greaves. (1) Not at this time; SpaceX remains certified for
the Falcon 9 Launch System and can compete for and win award of NSS
missions.
(2) A failed mission does not automatically drive a revisit to a
certification decision or a revocation of a certification. A launch
system remains certified unless a significant process or design change,
or some other certification factor (such as manufacturing quality),
causes the certification authority (SMC/CC) to determined that the
launch system or provider is no longer certified.
The Falcon 9 Launch System has flown 18 successful missions prior
to the failure. Also, as part of the certification, the USAF assessed
and accepted the SpaceX anomaly resolution process, which they are
using to determine the root cause of the recent in-flight failure.
(3) Space X expects to arrive at initial root cause findings and
implement corrective actions by Fall 2015, which will support the GPS
launch competition timelines. If root cause determination and
corrective actions are not complete in this timeframe, then the USAF,
in support of the GPS launch competition, will evaluate Space X's plan
for completing the remaining open non-recurring work, to include work
to resolve open flight and qualification anomalies. Regardless of the
outcome of the GPS launch competition evaluation, the USAF will
continue to observe Space X's technical progress and stay engaged as we
do with all certified providers who are addressing technical issues
with their launch systems.
Mr. Rogers. When there is a failure of a launch system, which is
the same system to be used national security space missions, should the
Department conduct an independent failure review board? Why or why not?
What is the historical precedent?
Dr. Griffin. Historically, when a launch system failure has
occurred the DOD has always either conducted a failure review under its
own auspices, or required total visibility into any failure
investigation conducted by its contractors, or both.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. To clarify, how much do you estimate the adjustments to
Atlas will cost with respect to using an AR1 engine? Is it $100
million-$200 million?
Mr. Bruno. A U.S. developed engine will not be a pure ``drop-in''
replacement for the RD-180. Current U.S. technology is not capable of
replicating RD-180 performance, and the RD-180 fluid-mechanical thrust
vector control (TVC) technology does not exist outside of Russia. None
of the variants of the AR-1 under consideration would address these
differences.
The current U.S. state of the art allows two near drop-in design
options: 1) Almost the same physical interfaces, but lower system
performance as a result of reduced engine performance (higher weight,
lower efficiency). 2) Same or greater system performance through some
vehicle changes to offset lower engine performance.
The minimum set of vehicle/system changes as outlined above for the
lower performance option would cost approximately $100M. To enable
equivalent or greater Atlas performance the cost would be approximately
$200M.
Mr. Cooper. If you pursue the Atlas with the AR1, will you be able
to reach the more difficult orbits?
Mr. Bruno. No, we could not fly the missions that currently require
the most capable Atlas variant with 5 solid rocket boosters (Atlas
551). Other missions would require the addition of an SRB making Atlas
less competitive.
A less capable Atlas booster when coupled with our planned advanced
upper stage (ACES) could not fly the missions that currently require a
Delta IV Heavy launch vehicle. ULA would have to continue to offer the
more expensive Delta IV Heavy to meet the requirements for these
critical national security payloads.
More extensive modifications to the booster to offset the lower
engine performance could address these shortfalls, but would increase
the total booster development costs to approximately $200M.
Mr. Cooper. Would the BE-4 be available to other launch providers
other than ULA?
Mr. Meyerson. The blue Origin BE-4 engine will be available for
purchase by all space launch providers of the United States.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Griffin stated during the hearing that ``It is
easily possible to show that SpaceX has received about $3.5 billion or
so, possibly more, in open source funding. Seeing as how they have
conducted seven launches for NASA, counting the one upcoming this week,
that is either an extraordinarily high price per launch of about a half
a billion dollars per launch, which I don't believe is the case, or a
considerable amount of that money has gone into capitalizing the
company. The money was not segregated out, according to Dragon or
Falcon 9, so I very strongly believe that the government money which
has been provided to SpaceX has in fact gone for the development of
Falcon 9.'' Would you care to respond to this statement or clarify it
for the record?
Mr. Thornburg. Dr. Griffin's testimony merits clarification and
correction. To begin, under the Commercial Orbital Transportation
Services (COTS) Program, NASA contributed a total of $396M toward the
development of a capability to carry cargo to and from the
International Space Station (ISS), as well as demonstration missions of
that capability. The milestones associated with these payments are
publically available. SpaceX invested well more than $450M of private
funds toward the development of Falcon 9, including upgrades, and the
Dragon spacecraft. To date, beyond the COTS Program, NASA development
funds include $75M for CCDev2 and $460M for CCiCap.
SpaceX has operational launch services contracts with a host of
international and domestic commercial purchasers of launch services, as
well as operational contracts with NASA for cargo missions and
satellite delivery missions. Dr. Griffin misunderstands and conflates
milestone-based payments under operational launch services contracts
versus system development contracts. For instance, SpaceX's cargo
contract under NASA Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) is a services,
not a development, contract. This service includes the manufacture and
launch of a Dragon spacecraft on a Falcon 9 launch vehicle, plus the
operations, ISS berthing, reentry, and recovery of the Dragon
spacecraft. Pricing for these missions is approximately $130M per
mission, on a fixed price basis. SpaceX notes that NASA pays for all of
its launches, including those with other providers, under services-
based agreements.
Finally, SpaceX recently won a firm fixed price contract, as did
Boeing, for astronaut carriage capability development and demonstration
missions under the ``CCtCap, for a total possible value of $2.6B
depending on the number of missions that NASA exercises. Notably, the
SpaceX contract includes up to six missions--launches and returns from
the Space Station--as well as development. Further, this contract is
structured with performance, milestone-based payments. In other words,
SpaceX is only paid when it performs contractually agreed-upon
milestones (or work) under the contract. SpaceX would note that the
Boeing Company received a similar contract with a total value of $4.2B,
for performing the exact same requirements. If Dr. Griffin's reasoning
were true, which it is not, then the same arguments would apply to
Boeing, of course.
SpaceX Falcon 9 pricing for commercial customers is $60M; pricing
for U.S. Government missions for satellite carriage is well below
$100M.
Mr. Cooper. How will SpaceX plan to fulfill its national security,
civil, and commercial missions, and how will you prioritize the
missions if necessary, in response to potential disruption to its
manifest caused by the recent CRS-7 mission failure?
Mr. Thornburg. SpaceX currently anticipates returning to flight in
the fall of 2015. With respect to prioritization of missions, SpaceX
will work with all of our customers to satisfy their needs and meet
contractual requirements.
SpaceX maintains a clear manifest policy that is part of each of
our commercial contracts, which prioritizes critical U.S. Government
missions. Here, SpaceX's Air Force and NASA Commercial Resupply
Services (CRS) contracts are rated either DO, DX, or in support of the
International Space Station (ISS), meaning that SpaceX has a
contractual legal right to prioritize these launches ahead of
commercial missions, as necessary. Further, SpaceX has invested
internal funds in the development of additional launch infrastructure
(i.e. the South Texas launch site and LC-39A at NASA Kennedy Space
Center) to eliminate any manifest congestion and any schedule conflicts
at the Federal Ranges in the coming years.
Presently, SpaceX is not under contract for any EELV missions; the
first competitive opportunity in over a decade is set for release in
the coming weeks. The first launch of a competed EELV opportunity would
occur no earlier than 2017 based on acquisition and satellite
integration timelines.
Mr. Cooper. Can SpaceX describe how it plans to reach the more
difficult orbits?
Mr. Thornburg. The SpaceX Falcon 9 launch vehicle is currently
certified under the EELV Program for 4 of the 8 reference orbits for
the Program. The four reference orbits for which the Falcon 9 has been
certified correspond to upcoming competitive missions in Phase 1A.
SpaceX will certify the Falcon Heavy launch vehicle to all eight EELV
reference orbits.
Mr. Cooper. What is the right balance in a public/private
partnership in terms of funding a new engine? What are the incentives
for private industry to develop a new engine and what is the value of
planned expenditures by the Department of Defense that these companies
would compete for in the national security market once they have
developed an engine?
Secretary McFarland. The Department is very supportive of a public/
private partnership for the development of a new rocket propulsion
system. The actual funding balance between the Department and industry
will be based on the evaluation of industry proposals as the Air Force
implements its 4-step acquisition strategy. The 4-step strategy allows
for an incremental approach to develop new launch capabilities that
utilize domestically designed and manufactured rocket propulsion
systems and result in systems that meet all the Department's launch
service requirements. The Department's goal is to have industry fund
the public/private partnership to the maximum extent possible that
still supports a positive return on investment for industry. This
strategy will enable the Department to transition away from the use of
RD-180 engines for National Security Space (NSS) missions in the 2022
timeframe.
At present, the Department is confident that market forces support
a public/private investment strategy. Launch service providers will
likely be highly motivated to ensure their ability to participate in
the future NSS launch market due to the projected mission requirements
and the corresponding long-term revenue opportunities. The Department
estimates that between now and 2030, which is the currently projected
end of the EELV program of record, over $40B in NSS launch services
contracts may be awarded.
Mr. Cooper. What is your recommendation for getting best value for
the taxpayer money with regard to launch and development of a new
engine or launch system, as we seek to ensure access to space while
phasing out reliance on RD-180s?
Secretary McFarland. The Department supports the Air Force's
strategy for obtaining the best value to the government by implementing
their 4-step acquisition process to develop a new launch system
utilizing a domestically produced propulsion system. This process
allows industry to communicate all alternatives and government to
ensure we gain the information required to be a ``good customer.'' The
4-step process also allows for an incremental approach to develop new
launch capabilities that utilize domestically designed and manufactured
rocket propulsion systems and result in systems that meet all the
Department's launch service requirements. This process was also
designed to allow the Air Force and industry to optimize the ratio
between government/industry investment.
Mr. Cooper. What is the right balance in a public/private
partnership in terms of funding a new engine? What are the incentives
for private industry to develop a new engine and what is the value of
planned expenditures by the Department of Defense that these companies
would compete for in the national security market once they have
developed an engine?
General Hyten and General Greaves. 1) The balance between the
Government and private industry will be dependent on each industry
solution. Some industry solutions may be mature, but require additional
development to meet national security space requirements. In those
cases the Government may fund a higher share of the investment. Other
solutions may be less mature, but show great promise to both be
commercially viable and meet national security launch needs. In those
cases, the industry share may be larger. Industry has generally
responded favorably to public/private cost share.
2) The primary incentive for industry investment is the ability to
capture future market share in both the national security and
commercial launch markets. The EELV program plans to procure $36.6B of
launch services for National Security Space (NSS) missions from FY18-
FY30, and the commercial launch market appears to have a stable demand
during that same period. However, if either the Government or
commercial market weakens, it may be difficult for industry to achieve
their desired return on investment.
Private industry benefits from developing a new or upgraded engine
if it is quickly combined with investment to integrate the engine into
or develop a domestic commercially viable launch system that allows
them to compete for NSS missions. Industry participants will share
development costs with the Government, a fact that will help them
obtain favorable financing and increase their attractiveness to
commercial satellite providers. The goal is a robust U.S. industry for
future NSS launch services that is also competitive for the global
commercial launch market.
The exact amount of planned expenditures by the Department of
Defense for the shared investment portion of these programs depends
largely on the solutions proposed by industry, and ultimately, which
solutions are selected for Government investment.
Mr. Cooper. What is your recommendation for getting best value for
the taxpayer money with regard to launch and development of a new
engine or launch system, as we seek to ensure access to space while
phasing out reliance on RD-180s?
General Hyten and General Greaves. Investing in industry at the
launch service level is the best option to quickly and effectively
transition off the RD-180 while also meeting program cost, schedule,
and performance goals. Specifically, partnering with industry harnesses
industry's creative ideas to meet national security launch needs while
keeping the Government from bearing the full cost burden. Cost sharing
offers the best chance of solving technical challenges and meeting
schedule goals. Partnering with industry will also improve assured
access to space, because the commercial partners will develop domestic,
commercially viable launch systems that meet national security space
launch requirements, rather than just a domestic engine that would
still require complete launch system development.
The Air Force has developed a four step plan to partner with
industry and invest in domestic, commercially-viable launch services.
Step 1 is funding the up-front technical maturation and risk reduction.
Step 2 is shared investment in industry's proposed rocket propulsion
systems. Step 3 expands this shared investment to encompass the entire
launch system. Step 4 is to award launch services to certified
providers. These four components are not mutually exclusive, and
aspects of each may overlap or be conducted in parallel with the
others. The goal of this plan is to ensure two or more domestic,
commercially viable launch providers that also meet National Security
Space requirements and are available as soon as possible but no later
than the end of Phase 2 (FY22) or earlier.
Mr. Cooper. What is the right balance in a public/private
partnership in terms of funding a new engine? What are the incentives
for private industry to develop a new engine and what is the value of
planned expenditures by the Department of Defense that these companies
would compete for in the national security market once they have
developed an engine?
Dr. Griffin. I cannot say what the ``right balance'' of public/
private investment would be for a new engine, as the answer depends in
part upon a corporate business-case assessment. I am not privy to any
of the internal financial information that the relevant companies would
use to make this assessment. However, I will offer the opinion that
even if no corporate investment is made in developing a new engine to
replace the RD-180 presently employed on the Atlas V, we as a nation
should still proceed with this effort. This is a critical national
security item, and whether or not a corporate business case can be made
for private investment in such an engine, it is needed for U.S.
government purposes and should be developed. The projected cost of such
an engine, less that $1.5 billion, is considerably lower than even the
most optimistic cost estimates associated with grounding the Atlas and
moving its present manifest of national security payloads to the Delta
4 family. Replacing the Russian RD-180 with an equivalent American
engine is the lowest-cost forward path for the Department of Defense to
preserve its national security launch architecture, irrespective of
whether any private investment is brought to bear.
Mr. Cooper. What is your recommendation for getting best value for
the taxpayer money with regard to launch and development of a new
engine or launch system, as we seek to ensure access to space while
phasing out reliance on RD-180s?
Dr. Griffin. I believe that ``best value'' for the American
taxpayer would be attained by building, as expeditiously as possible,
an American replacement for the Russian RD-180 as it is used on Atlas
V. In the meantime, to avoid any gap in our national security space
access, we should procure as many RD-180 engines from Russia as that
nation is willing to sell.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Coffman informed SpaceX that Ms. Shotwell
testified in March that DCAA has been working in SpaceX facilities. Mr.
Coffman asked if this was a correct statement and SpaceX responded yes.
As a follow-up, can SpaceX please describe the audits that DCAA has
conducted with SpaceX and how many DCAA professionals are currently
working with SpaceX? [Question #15, for cross-reference.]
Mr. Thornburg. In her March 2015 appearance, Ms. Shotwell testified
that SpaceX presently had DCAA auditors doing manufacturing audits.
Here, a distinction should have been drawn between DCAA and DCMA. DCAA
does not do manufacturing audits; rather, ``DCMA'' was auditing SpaceX
at the time of the Shotwell testimony and has done so annually relative
to certain NASA and DOD contracts. Further, DCMA professionals worked
on SpaceX's EELV certification for more than a year. Further, SpaceX
has provided audited financials and rates to the Government for review.
For its part, in the context of the EELV Program, DCAA has performed
verification of SpaceX labor rates. SpaceX provides 10-15 in-facility
workspaces for U.S. Government officials engaged in contract management
oversight, with the division of these seats between NASA, Air Force,
DCMA and DCAA, as appropriate and at the discretion of our Government
customers with input from SpaceX.
Mr. Coffman. Prior to June 28th, During the CRS-1 missions there
have been numerous anomalies of both the launch vehicle and spacecraft
(Dragon). Out of 6 missions flown, 4 of the Dragon capsules have
experienced anomalous behavior, including thruster failure and salt
water leakage. Considering that the next evolution (Dragon 2) will be
utilized for Crew efforts, and that capsule is anticipated to be re-
usable, what is SpaceX doing to mitigate the anomalies that occurred
during CRS-1 missions (for missions 1-6)? What ``turnaround''
activities does SpaceX anticipate performing to ready a previously
flown Dragon capsule for a subsequent crewed mission? What specialized
readiness reviews will SpaceX and the USG conduct to ensure readiness
of the capsule?
Mr. Thornburg. It is important to understand that anomalies occur
on every space mission ever flown. As General Hyten noted in his recent
testimony before the committee when asked about launch anomalies:
``we've also had the same things with Atlas launches. We've had the
same thing with Delta launches. And we go back and look at that.''
Dragon has successfully performed missions to and from the ISS
seven times. Notably, Dragon is the only operational capsule in the
entire world at present capable of carrying significant down-mass from
space--all other capsules either burn up on reentry or have highly
limited cargo capability. Although Dragon was lost during the CRS-7
mishap, Dragon was not the cause of the failure--and in fact survived a
high energy event intact, demonstrating the spacecraft's inherent
robustness.
SpaceX's rockets and spacecraft were designed from the beginning to
carry crew with built-in redundancies throughout, including avionics
with triple-string computing, engine-out capabilities on both Falcon 9
and Dragon, and an integrated escape capability, which unlike past
abort tower systems, provides astronauts with escape capability all the
way to orbit. SpaceX and NASA conduct robust post-mission analyses with
a focus on continuous improvement of our systems and vigilance
regarding safety and mission assurance.
One of the best ways to validate safety systems is through actual
flight testing. With our cargo version of the Dragon spacecraft, SpaceX
is able to test the vast majority of systems designed to keep
astronauts safe well before any astronaut actually flies. This provides
a distinct advantage to not only meet NASA's safety requirements, but
ultimately, with NASA's support, build the safest and most reliable
human spacecraft ever flown.
There is no agreement in place with NASA to fly ``previously
flown'' Dragon capsules for subsequent crewed missions. SpaceX and
Boeing have contracts with NASA under the CCtCap program that dictate
the reviews necessary prior to crewed missions.
Mr. Coffman. Falcon Heavy is 3 years delayed on original
commitments. In 2011 Elon Musk stated that, ``Falcon Heavy will arrive
at our Vandenberg, California launch complex by the end of next year,
with liftoff to follow soon thereafter. First launch from our Cape
Canaveral launch complex is planned for late 2013 or 2014.'' In March
of 2015 SpaceX testified that Falcon Heavy would finally fly, ``later
this year.''
Considering the delayed schedule and the recent letter of intent
submitted regarding the certification process of Falcon Heavy, how does
SpaceX plan to mitigate the schedule gap? Why is Falcon Heavy 3 years
behind schedule?
Mr. Thornburg. SpaceX submitted its updated EELV certification
statement of intent (SOI) for the Falcon Heavy on April 14, 2015.
SpaceX has timed Falcon Heavy development and demonstration to precede
our contractual obligations for the operational launch of the vehicle.
Contractual commitments are the gaining factor here. The first launch
contract for Falcon Heavy--for STP-2, an Air Force mission--was pushed
back as a result of a delay with the Government's COSMIC-2 payload.
Accordingly, SpaceX was in a position to move back our self-funded
demonstration flight of the Falcon Heavy, while focusing on EELV
certification of the Falcon 9 launch vehicle and other matters.
SpaceX anticipates flying a Falcon Heavy demonstration flight in
the first half of 2016, well in advance of the vehicle's first
contracted missions. We have additional commercial Falcon Heavy flights
under contract in 2016. Falcon Heavy will be ready for any planned
Phase 2 EELV missions years ahead of their anticipated launch dates,
scheduled to begin no earlier than 2020, and will have numerous flights
in advance of any EELV mission that the vehicle might be used to
perform.
Mr. Coffman. The Mitchell Study recommended stockpiling RD-180
engines to smooth the transition to an American made system but current
legislation prohibits such a stockpile. Given the recent failure of
SpaceX's Falcon 9, do you believe Congress should relook at the
timelines and numerical restrictions imposed on the use of the RD-180?
General Hyten and General Greaves. This anomaly does not alter the
Air Force's position with respect to the RD-180 restrictions. The Air
Force maintains assured access to space via two launch vehicle families
per U.S. law and Presidential policy. This is currently provided by
United Launch Alliance's (ULA) Atlas V and Delta IV launch vehicles.
However, the Air Force is reintroducing competition into the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. ULA's Atlas V vehicle is
their lowest-cost offering when compared to the Delta IV vehicle,
thereby providing competitive prices until new launch vehicles are
available, likely no earlier than 2021. Additional RD-180s will be
required in order to maintain assured access to space at a reasonable
cost to the Government.
Excluding heavy lift missions in EELV Acquisition Phase 1A and
Phase 2, the Atlas V is capable of lifting approximately 9 and 25
missions, respectively, for a total of approximately 34 missions.
However, we believe authorization to use up to 18 RD-180 engines in the
competitive procurement and award of launch service contracts through
Fiscal Year 2022 is a reasonable starting point to mitigate risk
associated with assured access to space and to enable competition. As
the competitive environment develops and evolves, we will re-assess the
number of engines required to ensure we maintain assured access to
space.
Mr. Coffman. The Mitchell Study recommended stockpiling RD-180
engines to smooth the transition to an American made system but current
legislation prohibits such a stockpile. Given the recent failure of
SpaceX's Falcon 9, do you believe Congress should relook at the
timelines and numerical restrictions imposed on the use of the RD-180?
Dr. Griffin. I am absolutely of the opinion that our present
legislative quota on the import and stockpiling of the RD-180 engine is
far too low. While I strongly believe that we should end our dependence
upon Russia for this engine as soon as it is possible to do so, we
should not ``cut off our nose to spite our face'' in the attempt.
Continued use of the RD-180 until we have a domestic replacement is the
best course of action available to us at this point, and I offer that
opinion irrespective of the status of Falcon 9. Even if the recent
failure of that vehicle had not occurred, most payloads manifested on
Atlas could not be launched on Falcon 9, as its payload capacity is
relatively limited for the foreseeable future. Our national security
space launch requirements cannot be fully met without Atlas, and for
the next 5 years Atlas cannot launch without the RD-180.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE
Mr. Bridenstine. In a worst case scenario, the United States could
find itself reliant on a single provider for national security space
launches. If that sole U.S. provider failed, then America could lose
access to space for national security payloads. Given the possibility
of such a scenario, are there any launch vehicles currently provided by
close allies which can cover a broad range of EELV-class missions?
Secretary McFarland. A waiver to National Space Transportation
Policy and statute would be required to launch a National Security
Space (NSS) payload on a launch vehicle not manufactured in the United
States. Even if such a waiver was granted, significant engineering
analysis would be required to determine what, if any, NSS payloads
would be compatible with an allied nation's launch vehicle. At present,
no allied launch capability has a demonstrated capability that meets
all NSS requirements. While it is possible to evolve this capability,
NSS payloads would need to be assessed for compatibility.
Mr. Bridenstine. In a worst case scenario, the United States could
find itself reliant on a single provider for national security space
launches. If that sole U.S. provider failed, then America could lose
access to space for national security payloads. Given the possibility
of such a scenario, are there any launch vehicles currently provided by
close allies which can cover a broad range of EELV-class missions?
General Hyten and General Greaves. Public Law 111-314 (51 U.S.C.
50131) and National Space Transportation Policy require National
Security Space (NSS) systems be launched using United States commercial
providers. Currently, assured access to space for NSS missions is
provided by United Launch Alliance (ULA) with the Delta IV and Atlas V.
The SpaceX Falcon 9 recently completed certification to compete for NSS
launch services. While it is possible that other allied systems could
launch a subset of NSS missions, the detailed studies have not been
accomplished to ensure we can meet all NSS stressing requirements. If
all domestic paths to space are precluded, the Air Force would consider
all options, in consultation with the Congress, to regain access to
space as quickly as possible.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
Mr. Brooks. Both the U.S. Air Force and ULA have asserted to this
committee that it will require approximately $200 million to integrate
AR1 into the Atlas V. You, however, stated to the committee that the
cost to do so would be in the tens of millions. I am wondering why
there is such a large discrepancy.
Are we comparing apples to apples--or apples to oranges? How so? In
your view, what vehicle are the Air Force and ULA referring to when
they cite an AR1 integration cost of $200 million? What vehicle are you
referring to when you cite an AR1 integration cost of ``tens of
millions?''
Ms. Van Kleeck. The $200 million figure ULA refers to is the
estimated cost to develop a proposed ``Vulcan/AR1'' launch vehicle.
While Vulcan/AR1 would be a derivative of the current Atlas V, it is
envisioned by ULA that this new launch vehicle would have an
approximately 30% greater propellant load. Integration of an AR1 engine
main propulsion system is included in that value. Vulcan/AR1 is not to
be confused with Vulcan/BE-4, which represents a wholesale change of
the launch vehicle and infrastructure from kerosene propellant to
methane (Liquefied Natural Gas, or LNG) propellant. Mr. Bruno, in his
testimony, acknowledged that Vulcan/BE-4 would cost $600M-$800M.
Aerojet Rocketdyne's work with ULA on the AR1 engine and an AR1 main
propulsion system--comprised of two AR1 engines mated together--has
revealed that no major modifications to the Atlas V launch vehicle are
required to integrate the AR1 as a replacement for RD-180 booster
engine. Aerojet Rocketdyne estimates the non-recurring costs to
integrate the AR1 engine main propulsion system into the existing Atlas
V launch vehicle to be between $50 million and $75 million, including
launch vehicle integration and certification costs.
Mr. Brooks. Is there precedent for re-engining a launch vehicle,
particularly the Atlas? Please elaborate for the committee.
Ms. Van Kleeck. Yes, there is a strong precedent for re-engining
launch vehicles, including the Atlas. Most recently, as the Atlas
evolved from the Atlas IIAS to the Atlas III, the vehicle was re-
engined from the Rocketdyne MA5 engine to the Russian-made RD-180
engine. Throughout its history, the Atlas program has made incremental
changes rather than wholesale launch vehicle changes, to include
stretching the onboard tanks, avionics changes and engine changes. The
incremental evolution of the Atlas system maintains mission success
with far less risk than an entirely new launch vehicle and the required
accompanying infrastructure changes.
Similarly, in the civil space arena, the Antares launch vehicle is
currently undergoing a re-engining from the AJ26 (derived from the
Russian NK-33 engine) to the Russian-made RD-181 booster engine.
Mr. Brooks. What would be the cost to integrate AR1 into the
current existing version of Atlas V? Upon what do you base this cost
estimate? Has this estimate been shared with ULA?
Ms. Van Kleeck. Aerojet Rocketdyne estimates the non-recurring
costs to integrate an AR1 engine main propulsion system into the
existing Atlas V launch vehicle would be between $50 and $75 million.
This estimate includes launch vehicle integration, infrastructure mods
and certification. Our estimate is based on: 1) Aerojet Rocketdyne's
two decades of work on the oxygen rich staged combustion cycle,
previous internal company and U.S. government investment, and advances
in materials science and manufacturing techniques, 2) an engine
designed to integrate into the Atlas V with minimal changes required.
This estimate has been shared with ULA.
Mr. Brooks. What would be the range of payloads the current Atlas V
with an AR1 booster engine could launch to geosynchronous transfer
orbit (GTO)? What number and type of expected NSS payloads would such a
configuration be unable to launch?
Ms. Van Kleeck. The Atlas V featuring an AR1 engine main propulsion
system would provide similar performance to the existing Atlas V,
including coverage of all USAF EELV missions currently served by Atlas
V. The same Atlas V/AR1 combination however would not be able to launch
missions currently flown on the Delta IV Heavy.
Mr. Brooks. Would re-engining the Atlas V with AR1 allow for a
faster, less costly and lower risk transition off of the RD-180? If
yes, how so? If not, why not?
Ms. Van Kleeck. Yes, coupling the AR1 engine in a main propulsion
system comprised of two AR1 engines mated together onto the Atlas V
offers the fastest, lowest cost and lowest risk approach to the U.S.
government. The AR1 engine has been designed from the start to minimize
launch vehicle modifications to the current Atlas V. Building on
Aerojet Rocketdyne's long history of successfully developing rocket
engines for the Nation, the AR1 features advanced oxygen-rich staged
combustion technology, is an all U.S. design, provides a 500,000 lbf
thrust class that is configurable to multiple U.S. launch vehicles--
including the 1 million lbf thrust AR1 main propulsion system for the
current Atlas V--leverages the existing liquid oxygen-kerosene launch
infrastructure, operations and facilities and utilizes new materials
and advanced manufacturing techniques, like additive manufacturing.
Aerojet Rocketdyne developed the last major U.S. liquid rocket engine,
the RS-68 that powers the Delta IV launch vehicle, in five years.
Similarly, Aerojet Rocketdyne is on course to complete development,
undergo certification and bring the AR1 into production by the end of
2019--5 years after initiation of dedicated development.
Mr. Brooks. How has Aerojet Rocketdyne gained the knowledge and
experience to build an engine that will leapfrog the Russian technology
used in the RD-180 engine? Over what time period did you execute this
work?
Ms. Van Kleeck. Aerojet Rocketdyne's development of a new American
liquid rocket engine, the AR1, is not a new program in Fiscal Year
2015. Since the 1990s, Aerojet Rocketdyne has been working on Oxygen
Rich Staged Combustion (ORSC) technology. ORSC is the combustion cycle
that will be used in the AR1. More than two decades of technology
efforts support the rapid development of this advanced engine. AR1
leverages over $300 million in government and Aerojet Rocketdyne
company investments. AR1 will be a thoroughly modern rocket engine
using the latest engineering analysis, manufacturing techniques, and
advances in materials science. As an example, Aerojet Rocketdyne
materials science research and development has enabled us to develop an
oxygen resistant material to eliminate the need for the coatings that
the Russians used in earlier designs. Through the use of modern
electronics, AR1 will also forego the need for the hydraulic ``step
ladder'' actuation that is used in the RD-180. Aerojet Rocketdyne is
also employing additive manufacturing techniques to develop state of
the art, world class launch engine components at an affordable price
for the government customer.
Additionally, Aerojet Rocketdyne currently participates in two
existing competitively won contracts to perfect ORSC technology: NASA's
Advanced Booster Engineering Development and Risk Reduction Program
(ABEDRR) and the U.S. Air Force's Hydrocarbon Booster Technology
Program (HCBT).
Mr. Brooks. Dr. Griffin stated that as NASA Administrator he funded
development of the Falcon rocket. To SpaceX, how much money has NASA
invested in SpaceX development efforts since inception of the company?
If SpaceX is unable to answer, would DCAA be able to assist in the
evaluation of USG funds paid to SpaceX?
Mr. Thornburg. Dr. Griffin was referring to the Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services (COTS) program, which was initiated under his
tenure during the Bush Administration.
Under the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS)
Program, NASA contributed a total of $396M towards the development of a
capability to carry cargo to and from the International Space Station,
as well as demonstration missions of that capability. Your question
pertains to development alone. SpaceX went beyond this to both develop
and demonstrate. The milestones associated with these payments are
publically available. SpaceX invested well more than $450M of private
funds toward the development of Falcon 9, including upgrades, and the
Dragon spacecraft. To date, beyond the COTS Program, NASA development
funds include $75M for CCDev2; and $460M for CCiCap.
SpaceX recently won a firm fixed price contract, as did Boeing, for
astronaut carriage capability development and demonstration under
CCtCap, for a total possible value of $2.6B. Notably, the SpaceX
contract includes up to six missions--launches and returns from the
Space Station--as well as development. This contract is structured with
performance, milestone-based payments. In other words, SpaceX is only
paid when it performs contractually agreed-upon milestones (or work)
under the contract. SpaceX would note that the Boeing Company received
a similar contract with a total value of $4.2B, for performing the
exact same requirements.
SpaceX has operational launch services contracts with a host of
international and domestic commercial purchasers of launch services, as
well as operational contracts with NASA for cargo missions and
satellite delivery missions.
Mr. Brooks. Can SpaceX provide a technical description of how the
Falcon vehicle and propulsion system can meet all 8 of the EELV
reference missions to, as Representative Cooper described, the
appropriate orbits?
Mr. Thornburg. SpaceX would be pleased to brief the Congressman on
the technical aspects of the Falcon family of vehicles, in the
appropriate forum. In short, Falcon 9 is certified to execute missions
associated with 4 reference orbits, and Falcon Heavy will be certified
to all 8 reference orbits. The Air Force will validate that these
requirements will be met as part of the EELV certification process.
Mr. Brooks. SpaceX stated that any government funding should be
matched 50/50 by commercial investment. Can SpaceX verify that this 50/
50 split was the case for the development of Falcon and Dragon? If
SpaceX is not able to verify, would DCAA be able to assist in the
evaluation of the proper use of USG funds?
Mr. Thornburg. Under the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services
(COTS) Program, NASA contributed a total of $396M toward the
development of a capability to carry cargo to and from the
International Space Station, as well as operational demonstration
missions of that capability. As noted above, under the COTS program,
SpaceX contributed 53% of the development funds. The U.S. Government
contributed $396M under this program; SpaceX invested well more than
$450M of private funds toward the development of Falcon 9, including
upgrades, and the Dragon spacecraft.
Mr. Brooks. In the hearing, the term Low-Price Technically
Acceptable (LPTA) was mentioned. In light of the SpaceX accident and
considering the value of national security payloads, can you describe
the risk that is required to compete launches with a LPTA selection
criteria? In the long run and beyond current budget challenges, is LPTA
worth the risk to the tax payer and to the warfighter? What criteria
will the USG use in assessing a proper balance between price and
technical acceptability?
Mr. Thornburg. The Air Force and the Department of Defense are
responsible for development of source selection criteria associated
with Requests for Proposals. SpaceX cannot comment on the criteria that
the USG will use in assessing price and technical acceptability. SpaceX
notes that NASA and a number of other agencies, as well as the entire
commercial world, purchase launches services on a commercial fixed-
price basis. Further, DOD itself has purchased LPTA launch services in
the recent past. Launch should be treated as a commercial commodity
and, based on this, the appropriate FAR contracting models should
apply, as required by law.
Mr. Brooks. Can you please describe how the SpaceX accident on the
June 28th will impact the schedule and selection criteria for the
upcoming GPS III mission competition?
Mr. Thornburg. The Air Force and the Department of Defense are
responsible for the schedule and selection criteria for the upcoming
GPS III mission competition. According to public reports, the Air Force
has stated that it plans to issue the RFP for this mission in the
coming weeks. SpaceX looks forward to participating in this
competition--the first competition held in the EELV Program in the last
ten years.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. Knowing that Atlas V and Delta IV rockets are the two
systems currently capable of meeting the full gamut of national
security payload requirements, what is the Department's existing backup
plan should there be a catastrophic failure or disruption preventing
either system from being used?
At this year's Space Symposium in Colorado Springs, you mentioned
your concerns with using an unproven system to launch some of our
nation's most critical and costly satellites. If the United States is
faced with a scenario in which a backup system is immediately needed,
are there proven systems currently being used by NATO allies that could
serve as viable alternatives?
It's my understand that Europe's Ariane 5 rocket is a proven system
capable of heavy-lift launches and slated to be the launch vehicle for
the James Webb Space Telescope--the most sophisticated and costly
telescope ever built. Given its track record, could the Ariane 5 serve
as a viable backup to both the Atlas and Delta systems?
General Hyten. Public Law 111-314 (51 U.S.C. 50131) and National
Space Transportation Policy require National Security Space (NSS)
systems be launched using United States commercial providers. If all
United States commercial providers are precluded, the Air Force would
consider all options, in consultation with the Congress, to regain
access to space as quickly as possible. Preliminary studies based on
open source information indicate that the Ariane 5 launch vehicle is
capable of meeting the requirements for some NSS missions.
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