[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-42]
THE COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY
AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ
AND THE LEVANT: ARE WE ON THE RIGHT PATH?
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 24, 2015
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Chairman
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOHN GARAMENDI, California
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Vice Chair DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
MO BROOKS, Alabama PETE AGUILAR, California
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
Peter Villano, Professional Staff Member
Lindsay Kavanaugh, Professional Staff Member
Neve Schadler, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 2
Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.............. 1
WITNESSES
Eisenstadt, Michael, Director, Military and Security Studies
Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy......... 5
Fishman, Brian, Counterterrorism Research Fellow, International
Studies Program, New America Foundation........................ 9
Kagan, Dr. Frederick W., Christopher Demuth Chair and Director,
Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute........ 7
Robinson, Linda, Senior International Policy Analyst, RAND
Corporation.................................................... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Eisenstadt, Michael.......................................... 50
Fishman, Brian............................................... 70
Kagan, Dr. Frederick W....................................... 59
Robinson, Linda.............................................. 31
Wilson, Hon. Joe............................................. 29
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Langevin................................................. 77
Mr. Wilson................................................... 77
THE COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AGAINST THE
ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT:
ARE WE ON THE RIGHT PATH?
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 24, 2015.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:33 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES
Mr. Wilson. Ladies and gentleman, I call this hearing of
the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee to order.
I'm pleased to welcome everyone here today for this very
important hearing on the counterterrorism strategy against the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [ISIL] also known in the
region as ``Daesh.'' ISIL or Daesh continues to spread and
create instability throughout the Middle East, northern Africa,
and Asia. Their propaganda insidious campaign of influence
extends globally, manipulating or recruiting young men and
women who are willing to die for Daesh. The trajectory we are
on is not promising.
The President himself has acknowledged that we do not have
a complete strategy to combat the threat. Defense Secretary
Carter has acknowledged that the military is reviewing how to
increase the effectiveness of our campaign and that an
additional 450 troops would deploy to Iraq to expand the advise
and assist mission. When I last visited Iraq in February of
this year along with Representative Seth Moulton of
Massachusetts, Elise Stefanik of New York, and Brad Ashford of
Nebraska, there was talk that the Iraqi Army would begin taking
back Mosul by the summer which now is leaving nearly 1 million
people subjugated.
Today, sadly, we see this is not the case. While often
characterized as a terrorist organization, ISIL/Daesh fights
and behaves like an army. They remain well-funded and
resourced, and we saw recently in Ramadi that they do not
necessarily need overwhelming numbers to win on the
battlefield, only an ability to strike fear in the hearts of
those they encounter. Today we will seek answers to very simple
but serious issues of national importance.
First, are we on the right path to defeat ISIL/Daesh?
Second, what problems exist with our current counterterrorism
strategy? And lastly, what other actions could be taken to
counter this evolving national security threat? We will not
answer all of the questions today, but what will be certain is
the fact that it will take years to render ISIL/Daesh
ineffective. Because of that, we cannot ignore the pressure of
the declining defense budgets and the looming shadow of defense
sequestration. As we examine our strategy against ISIL/Daesh,
we must remind ourselves that if the defense sequestration
continues, we will truly be fighting this threat with one hand
tied behind our back.
We are fortunate today to have before us a panel of expert
witnesses. They are, Ms. Linda Robinson, a Senior International
Policy Analyst with the RAND Corporation; Mr. Michael
Eisenstadt, the Director of the Military and Security Studies
Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr.
Fred Kagan, the Director of the Critical Threats Project at the
American Enterprise Institute; and Mr. Brian Fishman, a
Counterterrorism Research Fellow with the International Studies
Program at the New America Foundation.
I would like now to turn to my friend, the ranking member
from Rhode Island, Mr. Jim Langevin, for any comments he would
like to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
our witnesses for providing us the benefit of your experience
and your insight. I know what you are going to have to say is
going to be invaluable to the committee. And I look forward to
today's discussion, certainly.
As we all know, we find ourselves in a very difficult
circumstance when it comes to the interests of the United
States and our allies and partners in the Middle East in the
fight against ISIL. Our interests and objectives and those of
our partners are not necessarily aligned. The ambitious U.S.
strategy does not appear to be able to achieve the end state,
but we are dealing with a serious enemy. And recent ISIL gains
in Iraq and Syria demonstrate the need for a comprehensive,
cohesive whole-of-government U.S. strategy as well as the
cooperation of regional partners which has been challenged, at
best, to enlist more support from our regional partners.
Now, while I share the frustrations of many about the
seeming lack of a visible strategy, I'm not unsympathetic
regarding the immense complexity of interlinked and sometimes
contradictory challenges that the administration faces. We face
a morass of gray when it comes to our menu of options, a ground
commitment to the region seems to be a win the battle, lose the
war option, but we also simply cannot walk away.
Similarly, swatting bad guys without a larger strategy in
place really threatens to be another recruiting tool for our
adversaries. So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
about what they think an effective U.S. strategy to counter
ISIL should look like, and the situation fueling it across Iraq
and Syria should encompass to achieve both near-term and long-
term success.
Now, specifically, I would like to know what concrete
actions you would recommend? What countervailing forces prevent
these actions from being taken, and can those forces be
mitigated? Are existing policies counterproductive? Can we have
a coherent Syria and Iraq policy while negotiations with Iran
are ongoing? What should postwar Syria look like? Are we able
to align our objectives with those of our allies? And how do we
engage more regions, nations in the region to be more proactive
and involved in this strategy?
Are we able to align our objectives again with those of our
allies? And how do we regain the initiative to make ISIL
reactive rather than proactive? And how do we fight their
narrative? What assumptions and desires will we have to
jettison in order to achieve a workable outcome? And are we
sufficiently leveraging the power of the non-military means,
including financial, at our disposal?
So we have heard a variety of answers to these questions
from the administration already, in testimony and otherwise,
but I hope we can expand on our thinking here today. I am under
no illusions that if we only change a few things about the
United States approach to the region, peace will somehow
instantly break out tomorrow.
We must recognize that we are in a highly complex
generational struggle against those who would pervert one of
the world's great religions into a justification for the murder
of thousands of innocents, including women and children, and
the wanton destruction of an incredible piece of a shared human
heritage in a region already gripped by a terrible humanitarian
crisis born from years of strife and conflict.
With today's discussion, I hope we can explore what a more
peaceful region would look like and require, and ensure that
our actions today and tomorrow are aligned in working towards a
sustainable solution.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding
this hearing, and the witnesses you have arranged to testify
today, and with that, I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Langevin. And I agree
with you that we are in a generational conflict. And I look
forward to working with you in a bipartisan manner on these
issues.
We are joined today at some time with Representative Martha
McSally of Arizona, and Representative Mike Coffman of
Colorado, who is here. They are members of the House Armed
Services Committee, but not part of this subcommittee. So I ask
unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be allowed to
participate in today's hearing after all subcommittee members
have had the opportunity to ask questions. Is there any
objection?
Without objection, non-subcommittee members will be
recognized at the appropriate time with each member here under
the 5-minute constraint.
Ms. Robinson, thank you again for being here today, and we
look forward beginning with your testimony, and for the benefit
of persons who are attending today, and I'm just grateful to
see the number of people who are interested.
It's a 5-minute section for each one of you. Then each
member of the subcommittee will have the opportunity for 5
minutes. And all of us are going to be a person beyond any
characterization of inappropriate, and that is Pete Villano is
going to keep the time, so as professional staff of the Armed
Services Committee. So we are very fortunate to have such a
capable person. Ms. Robinson.
STATEMENT OF LINDA ROBINSON, SENIOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY
ANALYST, RAND CORPORATION
Ms. Robinson. Thank you, Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member
Langevin, and members. Thank you for inviting me to speak on
these important topics. I returned from Iraq 10 days--3 weeks
ago from 10 days in Iraq and Jordan. This was my second
research trip to the region this year. I will first address the
military line of operations, then recommendations for improving
the strategy that is currently in place, and finally, comment
on the alternatives.
My bottom line: The best option is the partnered approach
because indigenous ground forces are required to defeat this
formidable hybrid enemy in a lasting way. However, the ways and
means currently applied are inadequate on both the U.S. and the
Iraqi side. Syria is a much harder case, but there the alliance
of the People's Protection Units and Free Syria Army may have
potential.
My prepared remarks include a detailed assessment of the
five forces fighting ISIL in Iraq. I conclude that separately,
they cannot defeat ISIL. But together, they might. Currently,
however, they are stovepiped and inadequately coordinated and
supported. The following suite of measures, if implemented
quickly and in tandem, might achieve significant effect in the
short term.
U.S. advisors should be pushed out to all area commands in
ISIL-threatened territory. They should also be allowed to embed
with capable and trusted brigades such as the Counter-Terrorism
Service and to move forward as needed to their command posts.
Sending 450 advisors to Anbar was a first step, but belated. It
had been urged months ago. Advisors cannot be effective if
pushed out on the eve of battle. It takes time to gain enemy
and friendly situational awareness, plan and conduct
operations, conduct tribal engagement, coordinate artillery and
air support, and gain influence to restrain abuses.
My second recommendation is that U.S. Special Operations
Forces [SOF] have their request granted immediately. They have
requested Exelis satellite radios that are in U.S. Army stocks
in Kuwait, and they want to give these to Iraqi units. These
radios instantly and accurately mark the unit's location, and
together with U.S. joint terminal air controllers [JTAC] at the
brigade and area commands, this could have a transformative
effect. The people I talked to in Iraq, however, did not argue
for putting the joint terminal air controllers at the battalion
and below level.
One reason is that this would entail a much larger
footprint for quick reaction forces, medevac [medical
evacuation], air support, and logistic support, and the
certainty of U.S. troops being in contact with the enemy. Many
SOF officers also have come to believe that this ultimately
increases dependency.
My third recommendation is that the Baghdad combined
operations center, the current nerve center of our effort in
Baghdad, needs to focus more on coordination and planning at
the national level rather than act primarily as a strike cell.
My fourth recommendation is that the needed vehicles and
heavy weapons be expedited to Iraq. The depots are full of
small arms and ammunition, and in particular, I would urge that
the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service needs be met immediately.
They have been carrying the load of the fighting as some of you
may know, they have been heavily attrited with over 2,600
casualties although they are now in the process of rebuilding.
They will reach their assigned level of 11,000 by next January.
Finally, the air campaign could be made more effective
within the current ROE [rules of engagement] by certain
measures including increased ISR [intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance], more deliberate targeting, and additional
target engagement authorities. For Iraq's part, it must
incorporate more Sunnis into both the popular mobilization
forces and the army. Sunnis, thousands of Sunnis want to fight.
I met with a number of Tikritis who fought spontaneously to
liberate Tikrit, but they now have no support. Passage of the
National Guard legislation would be extremely helpful if it
gives provincial governors a role. This would also regularize
command and control of local Shia and Sunni forces for the
long-term.
Third, Iraq must commit to recruiting those forces or
others into the Iraqi Army, put good leaders into key posts,
and shift the current disposition which is heavily arrayed
around Baghdad and in Shia areas. In return I believe the U.S.
should support a long-term rebuilding of the ISF, the Iraqi
Security Forces, because the alternative is Lebanonization, the
entrenchment of militias.
Iraq may dissolve, or it may find its way to a
decentralized state. But taking actions that hasten that
dissolution, such as unilaterally creating a large army of
tribal forces could fuel further conflict. We have been down
that road. The partnered approach may not work. We may be
forced to fall back to containment. Though I believe that may
be no more effective. I would not give up on the current
partnered approach without aggressively implementing it and
staying that course for some time. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you, Ms. Robinson, very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Robinson can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Eisenstadt.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL EISENSTADT, DIRECTOR, MILITARY AND
SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR
EAST POLICY
Mr. Eisenstadt. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for giving
me this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
counter-ISIL campaign.
Recent gains by ISIL in Iraq and Syria mark major setbacks
in the 10-month-old campaign against the group and highlight
fundamental flaws in the administration's strategy that need to
be rectified if the coalition is to succeed. To ensure success
in what will inevitably be a long struggle, the U.S. needs to
first, address the means-ends mismatch in its strategy; second,
bring its own policies and those of its allies into alignment
with the strategy. And third, undermine the appeal of ISIL by
ensuring the defeat of its military forces and the dismantling
of its state.
Now, first with regard to the means-ends mismatch. The U.S.
has devoted inadequate resources in pursuit of what is for now
an unrealistic goal, destroying ISIL. The U.S. needs to ramp up
its efforts while lowering its sights, at least in the near
term, regarding an organization that has demonstrated
impressive regenerative powers. Its resilience is rooted in
ideological and organizational factors and the characteristics
of the Middle Eastern operational environment. Ideologically,
ISIL supporters are unbothered by the criticism of
establishment Muslim clerics whom they regard as servants of an
illegitimate state system. Thus, efforts to delegitimize ISIL
on religious grounds are likely to succeed only on the margins.
Organizationally, ISIL can draw on manpower reserves from
around the world and it has recently started establishing
overseas affiliates, ensuring the survival of the ISIL brand,
even if its flagship operation in Iraq and Syria is defeated.
As for the operational environment, the proliferation of
weak and failing states and the region's zero-sum politics
ensure the survival of groups like ISIL. Thus, while coalition
military operations may be attriting and in places rolling back
ISIL forces, the coalition has not degraded the overall
capabilities of an organization that remains on the offensive
in a number of critical fronts. In terms of aligning policies
and strategy, the United States and its partners have often
pursued policies that have strengthened Salafi-jihadist groups
such as ISIL, thereby undermining the U.S.-led campaign.
First of all, American inaction in the face of the Syrian
civil war, the Maliki regime's sectarian politics in Iraq, the
widespread perception in the region that the United States is
tacitly aligned with Iran, and the fact that America's first
military strikes in Iraq were to save Yazidis, Turkmen, and
Kurds, anybody but Sunni Arabs--all of these were a recruiting
boon for Salafi-jihadist groups such as ISIL.
Secondly, the United States insists that it is training and
equipping the moderate Syrian opposition to fight ISIL while
the opposition as well as America's partners to this effort
want to fight the al-Assad regime. And this is a recipe for
disaster.
Third, the success of America's counter-ISIL strategy is
hostage to its regional partners whose politics created the
conditions for the rise of violent jihadist groups such as ISIL
and Jabhat al-Nusra.
Fourth, the United States will not succeed in its fight
against ISIL in Iraq if it does not succeed in its fight
against ISIL in Syria, where it enjoys a safe haven that it
will use to threaten and undermine the state of Iraq.
But it is not too late to correct course. So what is to be
done? The solution is not another major U.S. ground operation
that, absent changes in the region's politics would likely have
to be repeated several years hence, but neither can we afford
to walk away from the problem. The answer is rebalancing the
administration's light footprint approach.
Thus, the U.S. should close the means-ends gap by ramping
up its advise-and-assist mission in Iraq and its train-and-
equip effort in Syria, rethinking its approach to training
Iraqis and Syrians, intensifying its air campaign and
preventing additional reverses as recently occurred in Ramadi
and Palmyra. New victories for ISIL, even if ephemeral, will be
fatal to the efforts convincing the Arabs sitting on the fence
in Iraq to join the coalition against ISIL.
The goal should be to overextend ISIL by pressuring it
simultaneously in Iraq and Syria, thereby rendering it
vulnerable to internal uprisings and external attack. However,
closing the means-ends gap is not sufficient for success. The
United States also needs to alter its policies and those of its
partners that have undermined the military effort. The
dependence of the U.S. strategy on its allies' willingness to
alter their politics and policies is our strategy's Achilles
heel.
And finally, with regard to undermining ISIL's appeal,
because so much of ISIL's appeal derives from its aura of
military invincibility, its defeat would show that ISIL is just
another failed ideological movement that brought only ruin to
its supporters. Its defeat would mean no caliphate, no Islamic
utopia, no glory and adventure, and none of the other things
that have drawn so many to embrace it. The defeat of ISIL is,
thus, key to undermining its appeal, discrediting its ideology,
and demolishing its brand. And this, ultimately, is the most
important goal of the counter-ISIL military campaign. But the
administration's current light footprint approach permits ISIL
to continue to accrue victories that undercut this effort.
Now one final thought. The U.S. and its partners need to
figure out how Al Qaeda and its affiliates as well as Iran fit
into all of this. For if the coalition enfeebles or defeats
ISIL, which is still a long way away, only to clear the way for
the primacy of Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria and expansion of
Iranian regional influence, the United States will have only
succeeded in further fueling the region's ranging sectarian and
geopolitical conflicts. The sooner Washington realizes this,
the sooner it can work to avert an even greater disaster that
it may be inadvertently abetting. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Eisenstadt.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Eisenstadt can be found in
the Appendix on page 50.]
Mr. Wilson. And Dr. Fred Kagan.
STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERICK W. KAGAN, CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH CHAIR
AND DIRECTOR, CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE
Dr. Kagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for
calling this hearing. And thank you to all of the members for
attending and for giving this important issue your thought when
there's so many other things going on.
I agree with the ranking member, this is very hard. And I
also have a lot of sympathy with anyone, including the
administration, struggling to come up with a strategy to deal
with this problem. And I do think there is a lot of room for
reasonable people to disagree.
I have offered in my testimony a fair amount of detail
about what I think should be done in Iraq and what we might
hope to achieve. I would like for the few minutes that I have
here, to address what I think is a conceptual problem in the
way that we have been discussing this matter, or one of
several. And that is the continued refrain that there is no
military solution to this problem. Of course there is no
military solution to this problem. War is an extension of
politics. There is never a purely military solution, or almost
never, to a military conflict.
However, this is a war, and any solution has to have a
military component. And I think that we are too often
conflating these two issues and not paying enough heed to what
is required of the military component of any strategy that
might be successful while telling ourselves that there is not a
military solution. And I'm not offering a military solution.
But I think that we are generally underestimating what is
required of the military component of any strategy and although
I would associate myself with almost everything that my
previous two colleagues have said, I disagree with the notion
that a larger footprint would create dependency or would be
unwise. And I very much disagree with the notion that it is
desirable to keep U.S. forces from engaging in combat with the
enemy if our objective is to defeat this enemy and maintain and
establish a solid alliance with Iraqis.
It is extraordinarily hard to establish your bona fides as
an ally if your position is, hey, we are going to watch you
guys go out and fight. Let us know how that goes. And at the
end of the day, we really need to think hard about this. Are we
in this or not? Is this our war, or isn't it? If it is, then we
need to be prepared to have our people serve alongside of
Iraqis, not as they did in 2007, 2008, 2009. I'm not advocating
putting combat brigades in and taking the fight away from the
Iraqis.
I entirely agree that partnership is the correct model. I
think we probably need to partner down to lower levels. But
that is something that I would be reasonably comfortable
leaving up to commanders in the field, if they were given the
discretion to make those calls. I think that having a black and
white national level decision that says we are not going to do
that, I think it's the wrong decision, and I think it handicaps
our forces too much.
I also think that we have a problem when we say there is no
military solution, what's the political solution? In that we
break in our minds what is in fact a real close relationship
between those two things on the ground. The political situation
in Iraq isn't just whatever the political situation in Iraq is.
It is affected by what we do. It is affected by the military
situation. It is affected by the actions we take. It is
affected by what we actually offer.
We don't like the fact that the Iraqis are too dependent on
Iran. I don't like that. I understand why they are. We are not
offering them enough to make it a reasonable bet to turn down
what the Iranians are offering them and anger the Iranians to
some extent and rely instead on us. Now, it may be that they
wouldn't anyway, and it may be that we can't offer them enough,
and so on, and so on.
But as Linda Robinson said very eloquently, we have
continually failed to try to do a number of things that where
there was a reasonable expectation that they might succeed, and
as long as we continue to fail to try to do things that have
worked before, in admittedly different circumstances, we are
going to continue to chase this.
And so I think we need to understand that we need to see
the military component of any solution as an element of the
larger solution that interacts with the entire solution and
understand that we have the potential to change the situation
in ways that can also change the political discourse.
And lastly, I would like to just make a brief comment on
the subject of minimalism and the belief that we really should
send in only as many forces, precisely try to titrate exactly
how many forces we need on the ground and not have a single
soldier there more than is necessary, which is, I recognize,
not what my colleagues are advocating.
It is a mistake to take that approach. Unexpected things
happen. Ramadi comes under attack. Ramadi falls. You have
setbacks in war. The truth of the matter is that if you do
believe this is a war and if you do believe that we are in it,
then you should also--you also have to believe that we need to
make available the forces that are required and forces that
might be required in dire circumstances should they arise.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Dr. Kagan.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kagan can be found in the
Appendix on page 59.]
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Fishman.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN FISHMAN, COUNTERTERRORISM RESEARCH FELLOW,
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PROGRAM, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION
Mr. Fishman. Thank you, Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member
Langevin, members of the committee. Thank you for having me
here.
The Islamic State is a hybrid organization that aims to
establish an extremely harsh form of Islamic law across much of
the world. And to advance that goal it has five essential lines
of effort. It is establishing a proto-state at the moment in
Iraq and Syria. It is waging military campaigns to advance that
in those two places. It is encouraging followers to
independently attack hostile governments in the West, in the
U.S. and Western Europe. It is building a network of
affiliates, working to establish similar government structures
around the world, and critically, as Mike Eisenstadt said, it
is inspiring jihadis around the world to enter this
organization, or to at least endorse its vision of a caliphate.
We have to fight against all of these lines of effort if we are
going to succeed against this organization.
Critically, ISIS' [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]
fundamental goal and its basic operational vectors, with the
exception of building an affiliate network and expanding its
core operations to Syria, have been relatively consistent since
October of 2006. In Washington we have continued to fail to
recognize the persistence of this organization going back to
the declaration of what was then called the Islamic State of
Iraq.
We don't often recognize our long history fighting ISIS,
but we have effectively been fighting this organization for a
decade already. And it is because of our sustained fight to
this date that I, unfortunately, believe that our fight in the
future is going to take at least another decade. And we need to
be thinking about whatever policy we pursue it needs to be
sustainable. It needs to be something that doesn't just stop.
The worst mistakes we can make are to make a commitment and
then pull away.
From 2006 to 2008 we fought ISIS effectively, but we failed
to destroy it. The ``surge'' of 150,000 American troops into
Iraq is a top line number, including crucial special operators
and a concerted effort to inspire the Awakening of Sunni tribes
against the Islamic State of Iraq eliminated its ability to
control territory and forced it to abandon large-scale
insurgent and conventional military operations.
Nonetheless, the group was not defeated. It remained one of
the deadliest terrorist organizations in the world. It was
continually from that period forward viewed by jihadis globally
as the kernel of a future caliphate. It maintained a strong
presence near Mosul, Iraq, throughout the period and in Syrian
border areas. It established the bureaucratic structure for
future governance and it sustained the ability to play spoiler
in Iraqi politics by assassinating Sunnis and using terrorist
attacks to encourage the Shia-dominated Maliki government into
embracing its sectarian demons.
There are some key lessons from that era that we should
remember today as we think about our future strategy. One is
that ISIS is vulnerable to military pressure. Despite its
growth, the group's convention military power is limited and it
can be disrupted with military power.
Second is, ISIS is extremely resilient. It can shift its
geographic base of operations and mode of organization
relatively quickly. Operational setbacks will impact ISIS'
global appeal, but the group will remain a viable caliphate to
its supporters so long as it controls territory and continues
to fight. And that means really any territory. It was
continually viewed as a future caliphate even in 2009 and 2010
and 2011 at its weakest moment.
And even a diminished ISIS can operate as a political
spoiler in Iraq and Syria. So what should we do in the future?
ISIS will not be defeated so long as the Syrian civil war
continues and Sunnis in Iraq live in mortal fear of their own
government. Military action can contain ISIS and limit its
ability to control territory and people, but such gains will be
inadequate and fleeting without political resolutions in Syria
and Iraq. The ugly reality is that the United States does not
have policy levers to defeat the Islamic State in the near term
without massive, and in my opinion, politically untenable
intervention in both Iraq and Syria.
This is going to be a long fight and our strategy has to be
calibrated such that it is sustainable. So rather than scope an
entire strategy, I'm going to just point to a couple of present
issues. One, should the United States support Syrian rebels
focused on deposing Assad, in addition to those focused on
destroying ISIS? The answer is yes. And this is something that
I have not believed continually, but I have come to this
opinion. Although this approach carries significant risks such
as increased Iranian troublemaking and weapons falling into
jihadi hands, it will bolster relationships with our allies in
the region including and especially Turkey, and increase
pressure on the Assad regime to accept political compromise.
That said we should not under any circumstances legitimize
Al Qaeda-linked jihadi groups like Jabhat al-Nusra. Should the
United States continue to funnel weapons through Baghdad to
Kurdish and Sunni factions as opposed to arming them
separately? I think yes for now. We have to reinforce
governance where it exists, and the governance where it exists
today still is centered in Baghdad.
Should the United States increase the number of U.S. troops
on the ground in Iraq, and this is where I disagree with my
colleague Fred. Moderately increasing the number of troops may
improve our operational outcomes, but it will not lead to the
destruction of ISIS. We put 150,000 Americans on the ground
before. We are talking about a tenth of that now. And I don't
believe that this is going to have a decisive outcome because I
don't believe that it is sustainable. A mini-surge can push
ISIS into a box, a smaller box, but it will still have a box.
And having that box is what matters.
Our decade of war against ISIS has not produced a decisive
outcome in large measure because our strategy and commitment
has been inconsistent. To be successful in the next decade, we
must have a clear, consistent, and sustainable strategy. The
only good news is that jihadi organizations have a long track
record of self-destruction and ISIS is laying the seeds of
insurgency against it as we speak with its attacks on Sunnis,
its fighting against other Syrian rebel groups. Over time they
will collapse, but in order to produce that, we need to have a
sustainable strategy rather than an intermittent one that
reduces our credibility further in the region.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Fishman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fishman can be found in the
Appendix on page 70.]
Mr. Wilson. And I thank each of you. And Mr. Eisenstadt,
you referenced it, and for each person I would be interested in
your response beginning with Ms. Robinson about ISIL/Daesh
being successful in building a global propaganda campaign to
recruit foreign supporters from around the world, reinforcing
its battlefield successes and creating an aura of military
invincibility.
Why has this global campaign been so effective, appealing
to such a broad target audience worldwide, and what approaches
should the Pentagon consider to counteract this campaign and
reduce the appeal of potential recruits and supporters who can
be trained overseas to return home and attack American
families? Ms. Robinson.
Ms. Robinson. Chairman Wilson, thank you. The brand of ISIL
I think is so potent because they have been so enormously
successful on the battlefield. They are tactically proficient
and far more formidable than what U.S. forces faced when we
were there. It is just an order of magnitude different. They
are very adept at shifting between maneuvering guerilla
warfare, launching new and diversionary attacks, evolving new
tactics, and as you know, they trumpet their successes
globally, which has drawn new recruits and affiliates.
So that engine, I wish I could agree with Brian, but I
think that it doesn't, as I see it, contain the seeds of its
own demise. It is going to have to be stopped. And the
information warfare I think has to be conducted with Muslim
voices indigenous and worldwide. I just do not see the U.S.
being effective in the lead.
Now, General Terry, who is the Combined Joint Task Force
commander, had been trying for months to get an Arab spokesman
for that coalition. I think that is one of those unfortunate
things. You wonder, why aren't people stepping up? There is
now, I think the co-lead by UAE [United Arab Emirates] for the
counter-messaging bin of activities, but I think that the
actual content of the message needs to be looked at. And to me,
there is no more effective message than one delivered by a
disaffected former ISIL fighter.
And I think we have got to get those voices, and those of
the families of the ISIL fighters who have died, and what they
have been lost to this way of life. And I just think we are far
less adept at energizing that kind of messaging, although I
would like to note, that the incoming two-star in Baghdad,
General Richard Clark, is very key. He has honed in on the
media and information aspect of this. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
Mr. Eisenstadt. Yeah, I would agree with what Ms. Robinson
said. And I would just kind of reinforce the point that nothing
succeeds like success. And that is a major factor for their
appeal. And conversely, I think the most important way to
discredit the appeal of their ideology is by military defeat,
as Brian said also. You know, if they are not holding terrain,
if there is no caliphate, there is no Islamic utopia, it is a
lot less appealing as an idea.
I would also, you know, mention, and this is a topic which
I'm actually starting to do a lot of thought about, so I don't
have a comprehensive, you know, answer to you, but it seems to
me that a lot of at least in the public, a lot of the
government's--the administration's emphasis has been on
countering their religious ideology, and trying to get Muslim
voices to discredit it. And as I pointed out in my, you know,
remarks, by and large, most supporters of ISIS don't really
care what mainstream clerics think about them. They have their
own clerics, and they believe that all of these other
mainstream clerics are part of the problem.
So I think, I get the sense that perhaps we are pushing,
you know, on a locked door. That's not the way to go, by--you
know, we can affect things around the edges by trying to
counter their ideology and trying to discredit it, but I'm not
sure that's the right way to go.
In addition we have to recognize that in this fight, the
government is not the most flexible and effective actor. And
what we need is to partner with the private sector. We need a
troll army of people online who we could provide information
to, what the, you know, Combatting Terrorism Center at West
Point used to do, publishing captured documents which provide
insights into how ISIS functions and the way of how it is to
live under ISIS control. So that millions of people online who
are Muslims and who object to their message can use the
information to fight them.
And then the final point I would just say, we also need a
counter narrative because you can't fight something with
nothing. And people are flocking to ISIS because it fills a
role in terms of their identity, in terms of providing them
with meaning in life, and we need to be able to provide, or our
allies probably more to the point, need to be able to provide a
counter narrative which maybe speaks about inclusiveness, and
tolerance, and the like.
Again, these are half-formed ideas, but I think this gives
us some vectors for, you know, how to think about this so----
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. Dr. Kagan.
Dr. Kagan. I will be very brief. We don't have a narrative
problem. We have a reality problem. And we can talk narrative
from hell to breakfast, but the reality is that we are losing
and they are winning. And as long as that's the case, there is
no narrative that's going to affect the situation very much.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Mr. Fishman.
Mr. Fishman. I agree very much with that. It is not the--we
talk too much about their proficiency with social media, the
issue is that their message right now is one of victory. And
that's one that people can get behind. The one thing that I
would say about what is a credible voice, I agree very much
with what Linda said about former fighters.
One of the distinguishing factors at an ideological level
of ISIS from Al Qaeda, is that for them authority, ideological
and messaging authority, comes from your proximity to a fight,
to being in battle. Where Al Qaeda used to point to scholars
that would sit around and write things, those of us in think
tanks might like that but, you know, but for ISIS, the only
thing that gives you ideological authority is being on the
battlefield. And so if you are going to push back on them at an
ideological level it is going to have to come from somebody
with experience in the field.
Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you very much. And I share your
concerns that we need to have, Dr. Kagan, an example of
success, to--but at the same time, I'm grateful that the House
did pass in the Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization
Act [NDAA] authority for the Department to carry out a pilot
program to counteract the propaganda campaigns. And I
appreciate the concept of a former ISIL supporter and/or family
members of deceased ISIL supporters to carry out a campaign to
counteract propaganda.
And this provision we hope to be carrying through
conference so the Pentagon has the ability to counter Daesh. It
is my view that in a bipartisan manner here, that we understand
the threat of jihadists who proclaim death to America, death to
Israel. And I now proceed to Mr. Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I think I have a
question that any of the panelists here can answer. And I know
we have talked before about how ISIL is very in tune to what is
going on here culturally, you know, from the media,
particularly social media.
And they also have, I'm sure have seen news reports on the
question about what to do about ISIL. What do you think that
the ISIL leadership is thinking as far as their biggest fear is
concerned? Do you think it's, you know, more air strikes from
America? That we would eventually put troops on the ground?
That we would arm factions within their so-called caliphate?
What is the thing that makes ISIL fear the most?
Dr. Kagan. I think that it's been very clear that the thing
they fear the most is what happened to them that defeated them
before, which is the Awakening. And they most fear that the
populations that they live amongst will turn against them and
will be supported against them. And I think they feared to some
extent that we will assist that, but they have been carrying
out a ruthless campaign of assassinations, as Brian pointed
out, for many, many years now, precisely to forestall that
option. Because I think that is the one that they regard as
most permanently damaging and threatening to them.
Mr. Veasey. In regards to that, you know, when they come
into an area and they want to set up this caliphate, they want
to do it, obviously, with Sunni Muslims. With so many Sunni
Muslims being very distrustful of Shia Muslims, particularly in
Iraq, how do you build the support for the people that they are
in control of if you were to try to form some sort of a
coalition, or arm them, or what have you, how can you--with
that Sunni versus Shia element going on there, how can you make
something like that real and sustainable?
Dr. Kagan. Congressman, I think you really put your finger
on what is in many respects the most important issue here,
which is that we have, as Brian and my other colleagues have
said, we have a sectarian war throughout the region and it is
actually going global. And that sectarian war is in my opinion
the largest, most powerful, long-term driver of mobilization
and radicalization in both of these communities.
As long as that sectarian war continues to rage, it is
going to be very, very difficult to defeat ISIS, or Al Qaeda,
or get Iranian-backed militias in the box or anything like
that. And so that's one of the reasons why the notion of
containment fails completely because containment retains this
escalating sectarian civil war which has exactly the
consequences that you described.
Mr. Eisenstadt. I would just jump in one other thing that
we just have to remember. That we were, as you intimated, part
of the last effort to foment an uprising against ISIL's
predecessor. And we, as a result of the past experience where
we promised them, if you fight with us, and eventually the
Iraqi Government against Al Qaeda, we will look after you, and
we didn't.
So we have--there's a problem with the credibility of the
Iraqi Government and there is a problem with our credibility
which will make it much harder to replicate the past success.
In addition, there are various other factors that, you know,
kind of play into the mix now that we just don't have a large
presence on the ground the way we did in 2007 and after in
order to actually change the psychological dynamic in the way
that we need to in order to get the people, you know, people to
rise up against an adversary or right now the Islamic State who
is so vicious and cruel.
Ms. Robinson. May I just add briefly, I think that it is
important to recognize that Prime Minister Abadi has made more
overtures to the Sunni community, certainly, than his
predecessor did. And I think that there is room for, in Iraq,
diplomatic outreach to try to support that and try to build
links with the Shia majority with the idea of helping to
encourage them that ultimately their interests can be served by
these non-military pathways to resolution. For example, really
laying out a roadmap for the decentralization of Iraq because I
think that is ultimately the only way the country is going to
hold together.
I think also regionally, I would like to note Saudi Arabia
finally opened its embassy in Baghdad that could provide a
first step to build upon building relations between and
contacts between Iraq and the Gulf States. But I think it's
very important that Abadi do that outreach because, obviously,
the Gulf States are quite concerned about the reality of Iraq's
closeness to Iran.
Mr. Veasey. Very briefly, with the last few seconds that I
have, the White House's new hostage policy. How do you think
that ISIL will view that?
Mr. Fishman. I don't think it's going to impact their
decision making very much at all, to be honest. I don't think
they see that as their primary fundraising mechanism. Those
people, as we know too well, are more valuable to ISIS as sort
of propaganda tools than anything else.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Veasey. And as you
cited, a sectarian war and conflict, I had the opportunity this
year to meet with a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad who
explained to me that the sectarian war has been ongoing for
1,400 years.
We now proceed to Sheriff Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I think that's the
biggest problem that you hit on is that sectarian portion of
it. But let's talk about the Kurds for a moment. They have had
some great success. And you talked about, you know, the arms
that we are supplying the Iraqis that have to flow through the
central government to the Kurds and we saw that that was not
actually working very well. But supposedly, it is working
better today.
And I understand the reason for that, but aren't we sort of
chasing our tail on this because we think that, you know, we
are going to build some rapport with the Kurds to the central
government in Iraq, and they don't feel any allegiance to it,
you know, just because to give them some weapons, do you really
think that narrative is going to change the outcome as it
relates to the Kurds and Iraqi state itself?
Dr. Kagan. Congressman, I think that it's--what would
really change the dynamic is if we started treating Kurdistan
as an independent state, and sending weapons directly to
Kurdistan. I think the notion--we are not binding them to
Baghdad by sending weapons through Baghdad, but we would be
making a positive statement that we are effectively treating
them as independent if we started sending weapons directly to
Kurdistan.
And I think that we really need to be careful of
overestimating what the Kurds' capabilities actually are. And
geography is a problem here because the Kurds are not going to
clear Anbar. They are just not. And in point of fact, I
actually believe that if you saw Kurdish forces push into Mosul
and push into Al Diwaniyah province, you would start and we are
beginning to see little indicators of this, an ethnic war as
the Arabs in those regions push back against what they would
perceive to be Kurdish encroachment on their territory and that
would be overlaid on a sectarian war.
So I think we really need to be careful. I'm all about
helping the Kurds defend Kurdistan----
Mr. Nugent. Right.
Dr. Kagan [continuing]. I think we can do that, but I think
we need to avoid as some people are trying--seeing Kurds as the
solution to this problem.
Mr. Nugent. Yeah. I don't think they are either. The Deputy
Secretary of State recently was spouting numbers almost, you
know, like in Vietnam, where we had 10,000 casualties, we have,
you know, eliminated 6,000 pieces of equipment. What does that
mean? I mean, is there any value in stating that, because
that's not an indicator of winning. It's just an indicator that
we killed people, and we demolished stuff.
Mr. Eisenstadt. Yeah, I, you know, body counts are, as we
know from our Vietnam experience, very deceiving and very
dangerous. I will just say two points: First, it only matters
if they have a finite manpower pool, and we need to know are
they able to replace the people being killed or are they
recruiting people faster than you are losing them. And I will
leave it at that. That's, I think, the----
Mr. Nugent. Well, let me ask you this, your opinion. Has
ISIL been degraded since August of last year since we started
this campaign or have they gotten stronger?
Mr. Eisenstadt. Well, yeah, let me just complete my thought
on that one. Attrition matters to the degree that they are
overextended, and further overextending them might make them
vulnerable to internal uprisings or further attacks along the
borders of the areas they control. So I think attrition is not
irrelevant, but it's dangerous as a metric that stands alone.
In terms of their capabilities, look, there have been areas
they have been rolled back, and there are areas that they have
pushed back successfully. So I think--and they have shown an
ability to move their forces from Syria to Iraq, and back
again.
So they overall, they have been attrited, but their
capabilities remain overall relatively robust to the degree
that they are able to maintain offensives and continue to gain
ground in areas that are important for them. I don't think you
could say that they have lost ground except for Tikrit which
was I think important on a certain level symbolically, that
they have lost ground in any areas that were critical for them.
And they gained the provincial capital of Anbar which was an
important psychological gain for them. And Palmyra is, too,
important--in the context of Syria is very important.
Mr. Fishman. I think one of the things to keep in mind
about ISIS, or ISIL, is that it, to maintain function, to be a
functional organization it needs to stay on offense. It needs
to have that message of fighting to get recruits, to keep
people motivated. It is not going to do a good job hunkering
down and defending a specific territory. And I think that you
see that in some of the ways it has exposed itself and I would
argue that, you know, they are probably sitting around in a
room saying, look, we have expanded in some places. We have
lost in others. You know, does our geographic footprint need to
fundamentally change? Did we try to take the right places? You
know, where can we hunker down? Where can we actually be more
secure? And I don't think they know that.
My expectation is that they will be, the territory they
control will contract by the end of 2015. It will still be a
very viable organization, and one that is extremely resilient
going forward, but I expect they will contract more this year.
Mr. Nugent. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it and I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Nugent. We now proceed to Mr.
Zinke.
Mr. Zinke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with your
assessment of the Kurds, having followed the Kurds. I don't
think they are going to look at Mosul primarily because you
have about 500,000 refugees. If they attempted, the refugees
can't go north, they can't go south. The only way they could go
is in Kurd-held territory. I don't think they want that or
could afford that.
I also agree with your assessment on Syria; until we figure
out what we are going to do with Syria, whether we are going to
arm the Syrian Free Army, having the desert as an area of
sanctuary to a degree with ISIS is problematic.
But what I'm not hearing is Iran, Persia. And the influence
in now eastern Iraq. Reports I think are validated that you
have the Badr Army now moving to what is, in my experience was
never more than about 7,000, the Shia militia seems to be
operating at now 30 to 40,000 at full strength, seem to be
either closely coordinated or directly controlled by Iran. You
have senior military leadership embedded.
And so my question is, and this has been a change of sea
for me, because I looked at Iraq and thought there are multiple
opportunities for us to check ISIS. And we have passed many of
those. And now if we enter and we cede territory from ISIS, and
if the result is simply for a Shia militia, which is to a
degree controlled by Iran, to now if we are ceding territory
from ISIS and simply having that territory being filled by
Iran, and their continuing influence in Iraq, then what's the
point? Do you share a concern, Dr. Kagan, about Iran's seem to
be expanding influence particularly in eastern Iraq and the
effects it has with disenfranchising further the Sunni
population?
Dr. Kagan. Absolutely. And it is not just eastern Iraq, it
is Baghdad, and it is Anbar, and it is throughout Iraq. I think
that there is a lot of complexity among the Shia militias that
we're seeing on the ground and I think it is important not to
lump them all together, not that you did.
By the way, Badr just basically seized the governorship of
Diyala Province which is going to be problematic from the
standpoint of National Guard law, among many other things. But
you have Badr, and you have Kata'ib Hezbollah [KH], which are
basically arms of the Quds Force in my assessment and are
basically commanded by Soleimani.
You have Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq [AAH], which is not quite there,
but close, but then you have popular mobilization forces that
actually responded to Grand Ayatollah Sistani's call, and I
don't believe that all of those are controlled by Badr, or KH,
or AAH. And I do believe that there is a possibility that those
forces, some of those forces could be integrated into the ISF,
and are less under the Iranian control. I think the issue is,
if we assess and I do agree with Linda Robinson that Prime
Minister Abadi is much better than his predecessor, who was a
major driver of sectarian conflict. And I think that the Prime
Minister really actually has the right goals in mind.
Mr. Zinke. We agree on that.
Dr. Kagan. But I think he is being pushed hard by radical
Shia militias and by Iranian advisors in a sectarian direction.
And I think that it is very important that we offer him enough
of an alternative, and that we overcome or try to overcome the
military gap that Mike Eisenstadt pointed out, to let him--to
give him an opportunity to try to unwind these militias from
control of his state because he is not really sovereign in even
what he controls, as long as Soleimani is commanding armed
forces in his territory.
Mr. Zinke. And Ms. Robinson, I agree with much of your
assessment as well. How do you see the Iranian influence being
checked and pushed out of the territory of Iraq? Because I
think that's a core issue that as you continue the Iranian
influence, how is it that we are going to push them back across
in Iranian territory rather than territory of Iraq? Is it
possible?
Ms. Robinson. Well, I would like to start by quoting my
esteemed friend Ambassador Ryan Crocker who said, Iran is not
going to leave the borders of Iraq. It is always going to be a
neighbor of Iraq. So it is a long-term issue, and I don't think
we can wave a wand and make Iran or Iranian influence go away.
But I think the critical question for the U.S. is, are we
going to cede Iraq to Iranian influence or are we going to get
in there and play the influence game? And I think that includes
a much more robust outreach to a whole range of Shia forces.
And I appreciate what Fred said, and also your comment, the
Shia mosaic is quite complex. There are the standing,
longstanding Shia militias we have already mentioned, but also
new splinter groups that are supposedly less anti-American.
They might be more receptive to outreach, and then these
volunteers that came forward because Ayatollah Sistani said,
come and defend your country.
And he, of course, is, I think, a main critical figure so
long as he is still alive to try to weave that, find that path
between Iranian dominance and Shia-Iraqi nationalism, which is
not dead, but much mitigated. So I think it is a long-term
project, but really, we have to be, and it is part of a
political line of effort that I think we have to open up and
encourage our diplomats to be part of. Again, citing my friend
Ryan Crocker who was fully engaged in that. Thank you.
Mr. Zinke. Thank you. And thank you all for being here.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Zinke. Thank you for
your service here and thank you for your service as a Navy
SEAL.
I will now proceed to the vice chairman of the
subcommittee, Trent Franks of Arizona.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of
you for being here. I have to suggest I am going to try to
probably piggyback off of a couple of comments that have
already been made, starting with the Kurdish issue. Last week
during the HASC [House Armed Services Committee] hearing, I
questioned Secretary of Defense Carter on the administration's
strategy on ISIS, and, of course, you know, many of us know
that even though that Dr. Kagan is correct about the Kurdish
not being able to do--they are certainly limited, but they have
been a bright spot in this situation, and we did pass an
amendment in the full committee here to give direct support to
the Kurds for that reason alone.
But after the Secretary himself responded in steadfast
agreement that the Kurds were making progress, then the State
Department, the Defense Department, and the U.S. Ambassador to
Iraq have derailed Senator Joni Ernst's efforts to do the same
on the Senate floor last week with a very intense lobbying
effort. And to quote a senior administration official, this--
this is the quote, it says, ``the U.S. gives weapons directly
only to the Iraqi Government and to the Iraqi Security Forces,
but the lines between them and the militias are blurry. U.S.
weapons often fall into the hands of militias like Iraqi
Hezbollah. There is no real command and control from the
central government.''
And that seems to underscore what I am saying here, this
bank shot that the administration tries to do. Using the Iraqi
central government as the distribution mechanism doesn't seem
to be working very well.
Do you think--and then, Dr. Kagan, I will ask for a quick
answer, because I am hoping to get one more question in. Do you
think that it is sound policy to just kind of hope for the best
and hope some of the money will get to the Kurds, or do you
think that we need to be more direct in our effort to assist
the Kurds and the Peshmerga in doing at least some of the good
work that they are doing?
Dr. Kagan. Sir, I don't think hope is ever a good method--
--
Mr. Franks. Yeah.
Dr. Kagan [continuing]. But I think this goes beyond hope.
And I think that as far as I have been able to hear and follow
up on this, the Kurds are largely getting what they need, and I
don't think it is a good idea to be providing support directly
to Kurdistan.
Mr. Franks. Help me understand that. Why not?
Dr. Kagan. Because the--when you provide direct support to
Kurdistan, and I understand and sympathize with the motivations
of the committee and the members supporting that.
Mr. Franks. Because they are the only ones kicking ISIS'
rear.
Dr. Kagan. Right. But they can only do that up to a point,
and the problem is that by supporting the Kurds directly, you
are making a statement unintentionally about Kurdish
independence and the Kurdish role in----
Mr. Franks. Well, I know we wouldn't want to hurt anybody's
feelings here, but I guess I am just concerned about that, you
know, somebody's got to fight ISIS, and this administration is
not doing that.
Dr. Kagan. I can't disagree with that enough, but the Kurds
are not going to be able to do it either, and so we are going
to have to find partners in Arab Iraq, and that means that
there is a limit to how much we can afford to side with the
Kurds and what is after all a----
Mr. Franks. Who is a better partner than the Kurds right
now?
Dr. Kagan. Right now we--well, the partner that we need is
in the Sunni Arab community, that is the partner that we most
need. And the problem is that the more that you support the
Kurds in Ninawa and along the disputed areas and the Kurds push
into those areas, the more that we put ourselves against the
Sunni Arab community that might otherwise join us in fighting
ISIS.
Now, we don't have a strategy that is going to get them to
join us fighting ISIS right now and we need to address that,
but I am afraid that the Kurdish arming--arming the Kurds
directly could be counterproductive.
Mr. Franks. Let me switch gears. I would just suggest to
you that the Sunnis weren't fighting the ISIS very effectively
before, where the Kurdish at least were trying.
We know that the deadline for the P5+1 [United States,
Russia, China, France, United Kingdom, plus Germany] nuclear
negotiations with Iran is about a week away and this
administration seems hellbent on doing a deal no matter what it
is, and the only thing it seems to be willing--is possible to
get in their way is the intransigence of the Tehran government
themselves, that they can't--you know.
So this concern midterm could have implications across the
Middle East that is hard to fathom right now, and I--what
effects do you see happening of the injection into the Iranian
economy of billions of dollars, under such a potential
agreement, to sponsor additional terrorism in the region? Do
you think that them getting a great deal more money is going to
somehow to make this all better?
Dr. Kagan. The Iranian regime has been extremely clear that
it has no intention whatsoever of altering any of its policies
in the region or toward the United States, regardless of
whether there is a deal. They regard us as an enemy and they
intend to continue to pursue efforts to drive us from the
region and destroy our allies.
If they receive a significant influx of additional
resources, they will put it, among other things, to the purpose
of increasing their military and paramilitary capabilities
throughout the region and throughout the world.
Mr. Franks. Well, I couldn't agree with you more, Dr.
Kagan.
And I would just say, Mr. Chairman, that as dangerous as
ISIS is, we need to fight them, but we cannot take our eye off
of the Iranian nuclear threat. And I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Franks.
And we now proceed to Mr. Lamborn of Colorado.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
hearing. Thank you all for being here. And I would like to ask
you about our targeting of ISIS assets. The New York Times
reported on May 26 that, quote, ``American officials say that
they are not striking significant and obvious Islamic State
targets, out of fear that the attacks will accidentally kill
civilians, but many Iraqi commanders and some American officers
say that exercising such prudence with air strikes is a major
reason ISIS has been able to seize vast territory in recent
months in Iraq and Syria.''
Dr. Kagan, would you agree with that assessment? And is it
possible to step up air strikes while still, to the degree
possible, preserving civilian lives?
Dr. Kagan. I think that there is a trade-off between
deciding that you are going to have a more effective air
campaign and accepting a higher risk of civilian casualties.
I think if your standard for civilian casualties is low,
you are probably going to have a very hard time increasing the
intensity of the air campaign, especially as long as you are
not prepared to put forward air controllers on the ground,
which would be something that would mitigate that, but I think
that we have too high a standard from the standpoint of
collateral damage and civilian casualties. I think that the
truth is this is a war. And we always try to minimize
collateral damage and civilian casualties, but a standard of
effectively zero has, I think, done enormous harm to our
ability to prosecute this war with the tools that we have at
our disposal.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And then for any one of you, I am
really concerned about Jordan's welfare. They have the direct
threat of ISIS wanting to overcome them, and they have the
indirect threat of floods of refugees from Syria especially
overwhelming their infrastructure and their budget.
What can we do to better help Jordan? What should Jordan be
doing to help itself?
Ms. Robinson. I am glad you raised that, because I did
include mention of Jordan in my written remarks, and I think it
is critical. Jordan, of course, does have a very effective and
efficient military, police, and intelligence service, but that
said, I think the waves of refugees pose a long-term threat,
not just a humanitarian issue, but to the political and
economic fabric of that country, as well as the surrounding
region.
And I think that trying to get more involved with those
refugee populations, possibly through international
organizations, but to deepen the understanding of what is going
on there and help to ensure that they don't become subject to
concerted radicalization campaigns or support networks, and to
eventually find a disposition for these people, I doubt they
are going to go--most of them will go back home, so this poses
a very critical long-term threat.
Mr. Fishman. Just one thing to add to that. I absolutely
agree that we shouldn't expect that they are going to go home,
and we should plan that this is--these are not just refugees,
these are--many of these people are going to be new citizens
essentially of Jordan, but this is a place where many of our
Arab allies, I think, also have a responsibility, and we should
be leading politically to pull them along. It is a place where
they can contribute. Even if they are not going to contribute
militarily, this is something where they can contribute, where
money matters, and they can offer that.
Mr. Lamborn. And either Mr. Eisenstadt or Dr. Kagan,
anything to add to that?
Dr. Kagan. I think it is--you are making an excellent
point, and I am also very worried about Jordan and the strain
that is being put on it. And I would just turn it in a slightly
different way, because there are a lot of people in town who
are talking about the need to raise an Arab army to fight in
Syria and Iraq and the Jordanians should fight and the Saudis
should fight and so forth, and you have highlighted one of the
reasons why that is not really feasible. The Jordanians, I
would not be enthusiastic about calling on the Jordanians to
deploy large numbers of their own forces abroad, for a whole
bunch of reasons.
Mr. Eisenstadt. And I will just add, you can't worry too
much about Jordan, because of its importance vis-a-vis our
allies, Saudi, Israel, but that said, keep in mind they have
been dealing with the problem of refugees for well over a
decade now, or actually even longer, and their resilience and
their ability to do so is remarkable, but that said, we can't
take them for granted, they are absolutely a critical ally of
ours. And we are doing things. They get financial aid, they get
military assistance. I can't say whether we should be doing
more or not, but I think we are focused on that issue.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, and you probably know in the NDAA, which
is going to be going to conference, we just voted on with the
Senate, I think we put in 300-plus million dollars of very good
military aid for Jordan.
Thank you for being here.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Lamborn.
And we now--we have been joined by Congresswoman Martha
McSally, of Arizona, the very first female air combat pilot to
serve in Congress.
Congresswoman McSally.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you. I am
not on this committee, but I wanted to join this. I appreciate
the testimony and your perspectives. I know there is a lot of
talk about specifically the strategy about ISIS and I know you
have--in the discussions on Iran talked a little bit more about
the regional dynamic. A big concern that I have is the
incoherence of a strategy in the region especially vis-a-vis
Iran, the elephant in the room.
We have got--we are focusing a lot on ISIS, which is
important, but we are kind of looking through a soda straw
without realizing some of the dynamics with our Sunni allies
are related to the incoherence and the inconsistencies in how
we are dealing with Iran, on the one hand doing everything we
can to get to a nuclear weapon, on the other hand allowing
them--you know, Soleimani to be the ground force commander
while we are providing the air forces in Tikrit, and vis-a-vis
what we are doing in Yemen.
I mean, it is totally incoherent. So I would like to get
your perspectives on that incoherence and what we could be
doing better regionally to address not just ISIS, but also this
larger state sponsor of terror on the globe, which is Iran, and
then I want to follow up with some discussion on the air
campaign.
Mr. Eisenstadt. Yeah. If I could just start off by saying,
first of all, we will never be able to iron out all the
contradictions in our policies. There are just way too many
moving pieces in this part of the world, and we will never be
able to square the circle. But that said, I would argue that
just as during the Cold War, while negotiating arms control
deals with the Soviet Union, we pushed back against Soviet
aggression and proxy activities around the world. We should be
doing more in that regard with Iran.
I am fully supportive of trying to put the relationship
between the United States and Iran on a more normal basis while
still acting to advance our interests and to defend the
interests of our allies, which means doing more things in Syria
with regard to the opposition there, doing things like we are
doing, we are doing, to the credit of the administration, with
regard to interdicting arms shipments to the Houthis in Yemen
and some of the things we are doing in Iraq, but we needed to
have been a lot more forceful than we have.
And some of the things that the spokesperson of the
administration has stated in public have sent the wrong signal
in terms of acquiescing to what is seen in the region as Iran's
attempts to establish a modern-day empire.
So we need to--it is a matter of finessing or striking the
right balance in our policy, and we have not hit the right
balance. There is more we could do.
Ms. McSally. All right. Dr. Kagan, any thoughts on that
or----
Dr. Kagan. I really want to second what Mike said and also
what Brian said earlier. Absolutely, once you talk to one's
enemies, you can negotiate with your enemy, you don't have to
surrender every other interest that you have while negotiating
with your enemy, and we should be pushing back.
And what Brian said earlier was really, really important.
We have to support opposition in Syria against Assad,
otherwise, we have no meaningful opposition in Syria to
support.
Ms. McSally. Exactly. Thank you. Now, turning to the
military strategy against ISIS, I was critical last week to the
Secretary of Defense and to the chairman related to our air
campaign. And I think we have got this false choice, really,
narrative in the media: it is either an air campaign that seems
to not be working or it is hundreds of thousands of boots on
the ground.
And the reality is it seems like we are stuck in a
counterinsurgency mind-set that we have been mired in over the
last 14 years, and we are forgetting that we have vital
national interests in stopping ISIS that are separate and
distinct from Iraq's interests in the region and what we are
trying to get them to do.
And so I feel very frustrated that we are not using
airpower, as an airman, to the extent that we can use it, where
we minimize civilian casualties, but we hit the targets that
are legitimate in order to take out the command and control,
the logistics, the leadership, everything it takes for ISIS to
be able to be continuing to have the momentum.
So it is very frustrating. And I have heard and read your
testimony. I believe we need more intelligence, more JTACs, we
need to be using airpower in a stronger way, we need to raise
the bar. To save one civilian casualty, but then allow ISIS to
murder thousands of people on the ground is absolutely
contradictory. We have got to be able to gain the momentum and
use airpower, and I just want your perspectives on that.
Dr. Kagan. Well, I couldn't agree with you more. And I find
it baffling that ISIS has been able to maneuver mechanized
forces around this battlefield in airspace--while we control
the airspace.
Ms. McSally. Exactly.
Dr. Kagan. We have an entire military designed to prevent
people from doing that----
Ms. McSally. Exactly.
Dr. Kagan [continuing]. So we certainly can, and we--as you
say, we certainly can do it with minimum casualties and we can
do it without putting 150,000 thousand troops on the ground
also, and we should do it.
Ms. McSally. Exactly. Thank you.
Mr. Eisenstadt. If I could just add, my understanding is
that we have until recently perhaps had most of our ISR in
Afghanistan to support the drawdown there, and now I guess--and
if you look at the trend lines of ISR sorties in Iraq and
Syria, they are trending up.
So there is a--I suspect there is--some of that assets are
being now redeployed to the fight there to support it, but that
said, probably need more and we probably need to be more
aggressive with our air strikes, and as Fred and others have
said, strike a different balance with regard to the trade-offs
with regard to our concern to collateral damage and the need to
consistently be pushing ISIS back, and show that momentum has
changed.
Ms. McSally. And we can gain the space then, therefore, for
the political solution, but if we are letting them get the
momentum because we are not using our elements of military
power that we have in the way that is best used, then we are
surrendering.
Mr. Eisenstadt. Well, that is a critical point, because
every day Sunnis are making life and death calculations about
which side do they throw their support behind. And if they see
that--if they believe that after rising up against ISIS, 6
months from now ISIL will be back----
Ms. McSally. Yes.
Mr. Eisenstadt [continuing]. Because of our fecklessness--
--
Ms. McSally. Exactly.
Mr. Eisenstadt [continuing]. They are not going to do that,
and therefore, we need--there needs to be a consistent
perception of progress being made, and we can't afford to allow
them to claw back--ISIL to claw back territory that has been
lost--or that was not under their control.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you. My time has long expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me join the committee
hearing today.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you, Ms. McSally, for your insight
and thank you for joining us today on the subcommittee.
And I want to thank each of you. This has really been very
helpful, and each one of you have had points that we need to be
concerned.
And I do have one request of Dr. Kagan. Two years ago you
provided an extraordinary map indicating the spread of Al Qaeda
and its affiliates across North Africa, Central Africa, and the
Middle East, Central Asia. And for the benefit of our
subcommittee members, if you could provide, if you do have, and
I hope you do, an update of that map, it was extraordinarily
helpful as I was explaining to my constituents the threats that
we are facing from that region.
If there is no further, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
June 24, 2015
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 24, 2015
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
June 24, 2015
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. In your testimony, you call the suggestion of
abandoning the central government in Baghdad and arming the Kurds and/
or Sunni tribes directly as ``superficially appealing.'' Can you
provide us with more detail on why arming and supporting the Kurds
directly to fight Daesh is bad for our overall strategy?
Dr. Kagan. The Kurds cannot and should not fight ISIS beyond their
ethnic boundaries. They have very little ability to project power
outside of their home areas--their military forces are primarily
designed for self-defense--and their military activities in Arab lands
have repeatedly called forth violent responses and fueled recruitment
for al Qaeda in Iraq and ISIS. Arabs in Ninewah, Kirkuk, and Diyala
Provinces traditionally view Kurdish incursions into what they regard
as ``Arab'' lands as provocations intended to annex those lands to a
greater Kurdistan and conduct ethnic cleansing to Kurdify them. The
Kurds fuel these fears somewhat by prominently displaying maps of
``Kurdistan'' that show it lapping over into disputed areas and through
various other activities and statements. I offer no opinion on how
control of the disputed territories along the KRG border should be
resolved, other than it should be resolved peacefully. I take no
position on the historical rights of any group to that land. Nor do I
accuse the Kurds of seeking to seize more land than might rightfully be
regarded as theirs, still less of intending to conduct ethnic
cleansing. But the perception among many Arab communities in these
areas is different, and, from the standpoint of strategy, only that
perception matters. Kurdish forces operating for an extended time in
Arab areas of Iraq will generate ethnic violence that, in turn, will
create conditions for the resilience of ISIS as a defender of the
Arabs. The Kurds cannot, then, help defeat ISIS other than by holding
their own boundaries, which they should be assisted to do.
Mr. Wilson. You also indicate the importance of an inclusive Iraqi
Army to counter the hollow force under previous Iraqi leader, yet the
Iraqi Army has been unable to advance against Mosul and were not
successful in maintaining control of Ramadi. What actions should the
U.S. take to ensure that the Iraqi government continues to strengthen
its central military for successful combat against ISIL?
Dr. Kagan. The U.S. should increase its direct advice and
assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces by embedding trainers,
advisers, and forward air controllers with Iraqi Security Forces units;
by deploying the full array of U.S. intelligence-gathering, analysis,
and dissemination capabilities into Iraq; by providing significantly
increased fixed- and rotary-wing aviation support, both attack and
transport, to the ISF; by providing artillery support as necessary; and
by deploying Quick Reaction Forces to protect the more dispersed U.S.
footprint in extremis. The U.S. should simultaneously insist that any
ISF units receiving such assistance reject and abjure assistance from
Iranian security forces and the militias they control (specifically KH,
AAH, and Badr). In a period of extremely low oil prices and, therefore,
budgetary crisis in Baghdad, the U.S. should consider providing
financial assistance to support the ISF as well.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. Our comprehensive strategy to combat ISIL includes
undercutting their flow of resources. Shutting down access to revenue,
and closing the means by which funds flow to and from ISIL is a
critical component of that strategy. The Department of Defense, the
Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of
Justice, and other intelligence and national security agencies all play
a role in identifying and restricting ISIL's access to revenue, and
revenue flows. I am interested to hear your thoughts on the
effectiveness of the actions we are taking with respect to counter-
threat financing, the role the DOD plays in identifying networks and
informing those decisions, the threshold for an organization to receive
our attention with respect to terrorist financing action, and given the
current environment, should that strategy and threshold being
revisited? Would you say that counter-threat financing efforts are a
primary, secondary or tertiary concern of our military and intel
community? Finally, how effective have our economic pressures been to
date and what is your assessment of the ISIL Counter-Financing Working
Group?
Ms. Robinson. I thank Ranking Member Langevin for this important
question. The short answer is that counter-threat financing efforts
have lagged other aspects of the counter-ISIL effort. One reason is
that the Counter-ISIL Financing Working Group has been formed
relatively recently. A mechanism for reporting progress on a periodic
basis, as well as assessments to ascertain whether the current approach
is effective, would be advisable. Another, more fundamental reason is a
shortage of ground-based intelligence due to our current mode of
operating and our shortage of intelligence assets. Generating robust
and reliable intelligence flows is essential for this line of effort to
yield results. There is a need for greater intelligence both inside the
Iraq-Syria main theater of operations for ISIL as well as
internationally. Since the largest sources of funding are internal,
increasing intelligence about funding activities inside Iraq and Syria
would be the logical priority. Most analysis currently suggests that
internal sources of revenue are more important to sustaining ISIL than
outside resources, such as donations from benefactors in other
countries. That is to say, revenues from extortion of the Iraqi and
Syrian population, illicit oil and gas smuggling, and sale of looted
antiquities are considered to be major sources of ISIL funding at this
time. Therefore, the priority for the counter-threat financing line of
operations should be to gain precise real-time information about how
the internal funding networks operate and to identify the node in that
network where resource generation can most efficiently and effectively
be disrupted and dismantled. The computers and communications devices
seized in the May 2015 raid by U.S. special operations forces in
eastern Syria that killed Abu Sayyaf, a senior member of ISIL's
leadership cadre, yielded highly useful information about the
organization's current illicit oil, gas, and financial organizations.
Furthermore, the analysis from the computers and communications devices
seized in that raid is ongoing, and that work will significantly
enhance the U.S. government's understanding of how ISIL is operating
today. Based on the research I have done on ISIL and on special
operations forces, the importance of capturing such data and ISIL
leaders and facilitators who can yield important current intelligence
cannot be overstated. Certainly, vital intelligence can be gathered
through remote technical means, but ISIL's (and other terrorist)
leaders have grown increasingly savvy about protecting their
communications and information. Therefore, when such targets present
themselves, the objective should be to capture them, if at all
possible, whether by U.S. or other forces, so that the intelligence can
be collected and analyzed. This ultimately contributes far more toward
achieving the strategic goal of degrading and defeating ISIL than
airstrikes that kill individual leaders and facilitators but yield no
intelligence dividend. Those leaders and facilitators can be replaced
with relative ease. ISIL will not be defeated unless the United States
and its partners shift to an intelligence-driven war. This is one
important change in priority in how the war is fought that I would
recommend. External resources also matter, of course. Two member states
of the counter-ISIL coalition, Italy and Saudi Arabia, have agreed to
lead a working group focused on this issue along with the United
States. Within the U.S. government, the Treasury Department and the
National Counterterrorism Center are the lead entities for pursuing
counter-threat finance efforts aimed at both internal and external
resources fueling ISIL. The coalition's Counter-ISIL Financing Working
Group was formed relatively recently, as noted, and a detailed report
card on its efforts would be extremely helpful. Finally, the role of
Turkey as a conduit for illicit trade has been widely reported. The
importance of stopping flows of goods and funds through that major
transit point cannot be overstated. Turkey's agreement to allow armed
airstrikes against ISIL from bases on its territory may be a hopeful
sign that further progress on cross-border flows can be made in the
remainder of the year. A final note regarding the understanding of ISIL
financing networks. Historical information is useful, and can serve to
identify previous networks, facilitators and financiers that might
still be active. RAND has conducted analysis of documents captured from
ISIL's predecessor organization, al Qaeda in Iraq, as well as research
on currently active networks.*
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* See testimony on this subject by RAND political scientists Seth
Jones (``Breaking the Bank: Testimony presented before the House
Financial Services Committee, Task Force to Investigate Terrorist
Financing,'' April 22, 2015) and Patrick B. Johnston (``Countering
ISIL's Financing: Testimony Presented Before the House Financial
Services Committee on November 13, 2014,'' Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND
Corporation, CT-419, November 2014).
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Mr. Langevin. Ms. Robinson, I believe an effective strategy must be
a coordinated, well thought out whole-of-government effort. You
recently returned from Jordan and Iraq and noted the lack of
coordination between the U.S. lines of effort, and even more
concerning, a lack of consensus on the number of lines of effort. In
your opinion, how can these disconnects be addressed to unify the U.S.
strategy?
Ms. Robinson. Inadequate unity of effort plagues every level of
this war, and it will cripple the coalition unless it is remedied. At
the highest level, no single synchronizer of U.S. government efforts
has been named. U.S. government departments or agencies are designated
the leads for one of the nine lines of effort, but there is no daily
orchestration of the campaign in a whole-of-government or whole-of-
coalition sense. The White House is coordinating policy deliberations
and decisions, but no entity has been charged with coordinating
operations across the lines of effort and conducting periodic
assessments. Possible models include an interagency task force or a
czar, such as the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
This coordination work could be done with a dedicated staff in the
White House, but it might distract the latter from its proper focus on
policy and strategy, as opposed to implementation. The U.S. military
describes the effort as having nine lines, while the White House and
the State Department have described it as having four or five; this is
indicative, at a very superficial but important level, of a government
that is not speaking or thinking with one voice. A great deal more
thought should be given to the nature of ISIL, now that we understand
it is not going to disappear quickly, and from that fashion the right
strategy and the right architecture. Given the complexity of the Iraq-
Syria theater and the emergence of a significant network of ISIL
affiliates, a division of labor between those two efforts might make
sense. Within the Iraq-Syria theater, greater effort could be made to
ensure that strategic, operational, and tactical actions across those
two countries are synchronized. The Department of Defense leads two of
the nine lines of effort, but the three-star command in charge of both
Iraq and Syria, the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent
Resolve, has not been fully staffed, according to the joint manning
document. That suggests a lack of commitment to enable this primary
warfighting command. I understand that that the Combined Joint
Interagency Task Force-Syria has struggled mightily to gain the
requested staff. Also, those two commands are not co-located--they are
based in two different countries in the region--which creates an
additional burden to foster a one-theater and one-team mentality. While
in Iraq, I detected frictions between the military commands and the
U.S. embassy, with the trainers and advisers clamoring for equipment
but the security-assistance office unable to make the U.S. system work
quickly enough to meet all of the needs. I also noted an unclear
division of labor on the critical tribal engagement effort and the
equally critical information operations effort. There is also an
unfortunate reversal in the unity of effort that was achieved within
the special operations community, which reached a high point in
Afghanistan. These examples illustrate the variety of areas where our
own command and control and unity of effort could be improved. Finally,
the most distressing phenomenon I have observed is a tendency to make
even tactical decisions at very high levels of the U.S. government,
rather than entrusting highly qualified officers and civilian officials
to make decisions at the speed the war demands. The delegation of
appropriate authority to lower echelons--what the U.S. military calls
``mission command''--should be closely examined to document what I
believe to be an enormous gap between doctrine and actual practice and
the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness that results. The reason
underlying this reluctance to delegate authority is presumably an
aversion to risk. Failure is part of war and casualties are part of
war; any well-trained officer and official will seek to minimize risk,
but at this juncture we may be minimizing risk to forces and maximizing
risk to mission.
Mr. Langevin. What should be the United States' role in fighting
Islamic extremism, and what should be the roles of regional actors?
Does the U.S. government possess the right tools to fight an
ideological war, including information operations authorities? What
more should our allies be doing to counter Islamic extremism?
Ms. Robinson. In my view, the most effective voices in the struggle
against Islamic extremism are Muslim voices. In addition, however, a
particular subset may have even greater sway over those youths that are
being attracted to ISIL's ranks. That subset is former ISIL fighters
who deserted once they came into contact with the reality of the
movement and its depravity. Family members and friends who have seen
the toll taken on their loved ones provide another source of immediate,
graphic testimony that can compete--in visceral, emotional terms--with
the terrorist recruiters. The sophistication of this recruitment effort
has been documented by an increasing number of enterprising journalists
and other enterprises. The U.S. Congress has shown a great interest in
this informational side of irregular warfare, which is the type of
warfare that is in fact most common, and which the United States must
make a commitment to understanding and grappling with. The United
States can play an important role in understanding, devising, and
funding effective information operations, even if the most effective
voices in the actual operations are likely to be non- U.S. voices. The
first step to effective information operations is achieving a deep
understanding of the phenomenon. Much of the relevant discourse is now
occurring on social media, and RAND has developed tools and methods to
analyze large volumes of social media messages and derive operational
insights from them. Understanding the conversation is only the first
step; engaging effectively in that conversation is the next step, which
is the current urgent need. We must also be able to understand what is
in fact effective or ineffective, and for that more rigorous and
meaningful impact measures are also sorely needed. The authorities
issue has been tendentious. I recall many battalion commanders who
lamented that they could call in a bomb strike but not issue a press
release. For many years the U.S. government has been engaged in an
internal bureaucratic and intellectual struggle over who within the
U.S. government should be in charge of what type of information
operations and how they should be conducted. This plays out in a given
country between U.S. embassies and military commands, and at the
Washington interdepartmental level. The easy default position is to
call for the re-creation of the U.S. Information Agency, but this may
not be the appropriate model for this era given social and
technological changes. An independent commission could study this
issue--without regard to bureaucratic equities--and propose policy
changes and, if necessary, legislative action to ensure that the United
States adequately grapples with this central front in today's irregular
conflicts. From a military perspective, military information support
operations units currently have the authority to support other
countries' MISO capacity-building and conduct their own activities in
the counter-terrorism realm, subject to the support of specific
geographic combatant commands and U.S. chiefs of mission. What they
most need is support to carry out those programs at a high-level of
quality (in both substantive and technical terms) and to develop
empirically-grounded measures of effectiveness. This is a vastly under-
resourced part of the special operations community. Among the specific
technical needs are cyber expertise, regional and historical expertise,
marketing and branding expertise, and a case study repository to create
a body of knowledge for this nascent field. The U.S. State Department
has been making a serious effort to develop an effective approach to
counter-messaging and online engagement, but this is just one aspect of
influence and information operations. As part of this work, other
countries' efforts at de-radicalization programs should be closely
studied to learn what has and has not worked and why, so that a body of
knowledge on best practices can be developed and shared. This
knowledge can be brought to bear in the Middle East through willing
states, nongovernmental organizations, and international institutions.
A particularly vulnerable population is the youth among the millions of
refugees and displaced people in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and
Turkey. The tragedy of today will only be compounded and extended if
the next generation of young people are lured into this way of life.
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See, for example, research conducted by RAND senior
political scientist Kim Cragin: ``Resisting Violent Extremism: A
Conceptual Model for Non-Radicalization,'' Terrorism and Political
Violence, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2014.
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Mr. Langevin. How should the United States define and approach the
threat of Islamic extremism?
Ms. Robinson. Purveyors of violent Islamic extremism employ a
distorted version of Islam to attract militants to a cause that seeks
to undermine established governments, strike Western targets, and
impose a draconian medieval type of rule backed by vicious, wanton
violence. There is a debate over the correct terminology to use to
define Islamic extremism. On one hand, some are wary to avoid
antagonizing adherents to a faith, Islam, and unintentionally
stimulating sympathy for or converts to violent forms of extreme
Salafism or Wahhabism. On the other hand, some object to the anodyne
term ``violent extremist organization,'' in that it does not
specifically call out the use made of Islam to sway individuals into
the path of violent jihad, senseless brutality, and, in the case of
ISIL, nearly limitless atrocities carried out against both Muslim and
non-Muslim alike. Not all violent extremists are Muslims, of course,
and it is important to note the many stimulants and rationales that can
be used in an effort to justify violent extremism and attract recruits.
It is likely that approaches to dealing with various forms of violent
extremism will differ. It is imperative, given the powerful attraction
that groups like ISIL appear to hold over young and disaffected people
in many countries, that specific measures be developed to address the
phenomenon of violent Islamic extremism. The terrorist tactics that
ISIL and other similar groups are using draw specifically, if
erroneously, upon elements of the Islamic faith, its teachings, and its
history to advance the organizations' ends, which are ultimately about
power, not religion. The need to combat the distortion of Islam and
attack the credibility of these organizations requires acknowledgement
of the use being made of Islam and a superior knowledge of its true
teachings. This is, to some degree, a struggle within Islam--
particularly Sunni Islam--and those members of that faith have every
reason to lead the effort to debunk, discredit, and defeat those who
would tarnish the name of a religion embraced by millions of
peaceloving people around the world.
Mr. Langevin. What are the risks and/or trade-offs in how U.S.
policy and strategy defines and addressed the nature of the Islamic
extremism threat?
Ms. Robinson. As noted in my previous answer, a key risk is taking
actions that prove counterproductive by actually stimulating greater
support for terrorism, including additional converts to the ranks of
fighters or self-radicalized individual attackers. A particular risk is
creating a large and long-term footprint of U.S. military forces that
terrorist groups can depict as invaders or occupiers. This can turn the
focus away from the reality that most victims of Islamic extremist
violence are, in fact, Muslims. One problem is that, within the U.S.
military, the art of supporting others in the fight against terrorism
is still insufficiently developed. Another problem is that many
potential partners are also very weak and lack reliable capabilities
that can be leveraged by the United States. Partnering cannot likely be
reduced to a science, as there are many complex factors that will
determine a good partner, the right conditions, and the degree and type
of U.S. assistance that will enable a given partner to combat the
terrorist threat in a credible and effective manner. But rigorous study
and refined methods can certainly improve upon ``U.S. partnering'' and
working ``by, with, and through'' other countries, as the U.S. Special
Forces like to say. This approach and preference to support and work
through other countries is now enshrined in U.S. National Security
Strategy, U.S. National Military Strategy, and funded initiatives such
as the Counter-Terrorism Partnership Fund. But not enough attention has
been devoted to refining our partnership approaches, especially in the
most common circumstances, where all available partners are flawed in
some way yet, at the end of the day, are most likely a preferable
primary actor to the U.S. soldier--at least in great numbers. This
approach to warfare has not yet been elevated to the central position
in U.S. military thinking, organization, doctrine, and personnel
training and development that will be necessary for the United States
to become truly adept in this realm. My own research for the special
operations community has focused on deep study of their experiences in
this realm, and on linking the tactical, operational, and strategic
aspects of partnering in both concept and practice. One study outlines
steps for improved interagency and special operations-conventional
competence, as well as continued funding for those coordinating and
training bodies developed over the past 13 years.=
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= Linda Robinson, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey Decker,
Michael Schwille, and Raphael S. Cohen, Improving Strategic Competence:
Lessons from 13 Years of War, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,
RR-816-A, 2014.
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Mr. Langevin. Our comprehensive strategy to combat ISIL includes
undercutting their flow of resources. Shutting down access to revenue,
and closing the means by which funds flow to and from ISIL is a
critical component of that strategy. The Department of Defense, the
Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of
Justice, and other intelligence and national security agencies all play
a role in identifying and restricting ISIL's access to revenue, and
revenue flows. I am interested to hear your thoughts on the
effectiveness of the actions we are taking with respect to counter-
threat financing, the role the DOD plays in identifying networks and
informing those decisions, the threshold for an organization to receive
our attention with respect to terrorist financing action, and given the
current environment, should that strategy and threshold being
revisited? Would you say that counter-threat financing efforts are a
primary, secondary or tertiary concern of our military and intel
community? Finally, how effective have our economic pressures been to
date and what is your assessment of the ISIL Counter-Financing Working
Group?
Mr. Eisenstadt. I do not know the answer to all of your questions,
but it is my understanding that counter threat financing is a primary
concern of our military and intelligence community, because ISIL can't
fight or govern without money, and because this is something that we
can get our arms around, to some extent, and effect in a tangible way
(unlike efforts to counter ISIL's appeal, which is a much more daunting
task). My understanding is that we have had substantial success in
diminishing ISIL's oil income, but ISIL's main sources of income are
from taxes and criminal activities such as extortion, kidnap for
ransom, and the sale of stolen goods (including archeological
treasures). Coalition activities have not affected these sources of
income.
Mr. Langevin. What should be the United States' role in fighting
Islamic extremism, and what should be the roles of regional actors?
Does the U.S. government possess the right tools to fight an
ideological war, including information operations authorities? What
more should our allies be doing to counter Islamic extremism? [Question
#7, for cross-reference.]
Mr. Eisenstadt. The U.S. should play the role of enabler of its
regional partners, as this is likely to be a decades-long struggle, and
the U.S. needs to husband its resources, and build capacity among its
regional partners so that any military victory is lasting. The U.S.
could send 50,000 troops into Iraq and defeat ISIL in relatively short
order and at some cost, but unless the politics of our allies change,
and they develop an autonomous capacity to ensure internal security,
ISIL will regenerate in 3-5 years and all this would be for naught. As
for the ability of the U.S. government to fight an ideological war, I
believe that we are neither framing the issue correctly, nor are we
fighting it correctly. Various U.S. government documents talk about
countering ISIL's ideology, countering its narrative, or exposing its
hypocrisy, true nature, or false claims of acting in the name of
religion. ISIL's appeal is only partly religious or ideological, and by
overemphasizing this component, the USG seems to be overlooking the
many other reasons that people join ISIL. And it is not clear how the
military campaign against ISIL is tied to this effort to undermine
ISIL's appeal. It seems that the two should be closely linked. So the
U.S. seems to lack a proper understanding of how to prosecute this
central element of the campaign against ISIL, and how all the elements
of its counter-ISIL campaign contribute to this effort. In my mind,
undermining ISIL's appeal should be the decisive line of operation of
our campaign. But it is consistently listed as number six of our nine
lines of effort.
Mr. Langevin. How should the United States define and approach the
threat of Islamic extremism?
Mr. Eisenstadt. I would defer to my colleagues who specialize in
this issue, though I would say that it depends on the context. In the
United States, the emphasis should probably be on education, focusing
on an individual's social connections, and preventing peer
radicalization and recruitment via face-to-face and social media
contacts. In the Middle East, the answer lies in defusing the conflicts
in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere that have driven the radicalization
process, though it will be very hard to deal with the radicalization
process in Europe and the U.S., without addressing its root causes in
the Middle East. So the two are linked.
Mr. Langevin. What are the risks and/or trade-offs in how U.S.
policy and strategy defines and addressed the nature of the Islamic
extremism threat?
Mr. Eisenstadt. By pursuing a long-war strategy, as I recommended
in response to question 7 [see above], there is a risk that the
extremist threat will metastasize before the U.S. effort gains
momentum. Indeed, the longer that ISIL and groups like it survive
efforts to defeat them, the greater their appeal is likely to be. To
win, they simply have to avoid defeat, and they have been doing much
better than that. This is in effect what seems to be happening. And the
U.S. does not seem to have successfully linked its military operations
and its efforts to undermine ISIL's appeal. As a result, it has
accepted defeats in Ramadi and elsewhere with relatively equanimity,
stating that they are only tactical setbacks, whereas these battlefield
victories for ISIL only feed its myth of invincibility, and are seen by
ISIL and its supports as strategic victories.
Mr. Langevin. Our comprehensive strategy to combat ISIL includes
undercutting their flow of resources. Shutting down access to revenue,
and closing the means by which funds flow to and from ISIL is a
critical component of that strategy. The Department of Defense, the
Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of
Justice, and other intelligence and national security agencies all play
a role in identifying and restricting ISIL's access to revenue, and
revenue flows. I am interested to hear your thoughts on the
effectiveness of the actions we are taking with respect to counter-
threat financing, the role the DOD plays in identifying networks and
informing those decisions, the threshold for an organization to receive
our attention with respect to terrorist financing action, and given the
current environment, should that strategy and threshold being
revisited? Would you say that counter-threat financing efforts are a
primary, secondary or tertiary concern of our military and intel
community? Finally, how effective have our economic pressures been to
date and what is your assessment of the ISIL Counter-Financing Working
Group?
Dr. Kagan. I am not familiar with the specific threat-finance
activities in which the U.S. Government is currently engaged, and so
have no ability to respond directly to most of these questions. It is
important to keep in mind, however, that threat-finance activities are
extremely unlikely to have a major impact on ISIS as long as the group
retains control of a large and populated area with its own natural
resources. Threat finance activities have rarely been decisive against
any significant opponent, but they are particularly ill-suited to one
that can tax people and smuggle oil, as well as ancient artifacts--to
say nothing of the ISIS traffic in human beings. It is nevertheless
valuable to do everything we can to disrupt the global financial
networks that support ISIS, al Qaeda, and other affiliated movements,
and there is generally very little reason not to do so apart from the
scarcity of resources the U.S. government can allocate to this problem.
It is particularly valuable, I believe, to see threat finance
activities within the framework of nexus targeting--seeking targets
that cross over from terrorism to human trafficking, narco-trafficking,
or other illegal activities. It is often easier to persuade regional
partners or the international community to act against human
traffickers or drug kingpins than against people we accuse of financing
terrorism, and the overlap among these activities is often broad.
Mr. Langevin. What should be the United States' role in fighting
Islamic extremism, and what should be the roles of regional actors?
Does the U.S. government possess the right tools to fight an
ideological war, including information operations authorities? What
more should our allies be doing to counter Islamic extremism?
Dr. Kagan. The U.S. and its regional allies have common interests
in defeating Islamist extremism that threatens the legitimacy of all
states and has brought violence to all communities. The U.S. should
play the role of a reliable ally in this fight. We should provide
resources necessary to help our partners, including ground forces when
and where they are required and can operate effectively. We should also
provide the full panoply of our intelligence-gathering and analysis to
our own warfighters and, with the minimum necessary caveats and
restrictions, to our partners. The U.S. does not, in my view, possess
the right tools to fight an ideological war on the ideological plane.
To begin with, what agency would be responsible for fighting such a
war? How, moreover, can the U.S. fight an ideological war while denying
that the enemy has a religious-based (if, in my view, heretical)
ideology? I do not know whether or not the U.S. government has the
right legal authorities to fight such a war because we have not come
anywhere close to developing a strategy for such an effort, to my
knowledge, worth testing.
Mr. Langevin. How should the United States define and approach the
threat of Islamic extremism?
Dr. Kagan. The U.S. must recognize that violent Islamism is a
direct threat to Americans and to our way of life. We should define the
threat to include those groups and individuals that seek through
violent means to impose their vision of Islam upon unwilling
populations when those groups also identify the U.S. or its allies as
an enemy that must be attacked. We should be careful not to define this
particular threat too broadly. Political Islamism--the idea that
extreme versions of Islam can and should be imposed on populations
through participation in political processes rather than through
violence--is also a threat to us, our allies, and Muslims. But
responding to political Islamism requires a very different strategy
from the one required to combat violent Islamism. It is a mistake, in
my view, to make no distinction between the Muslim Brotherhood and al
Qaeda or ISIS. All three are threats, and the purely political groups
can and often do create conditions propitious for the development of
violent groups within their midst. But we should identify political
Islamist parties not as ``enemies'' to be ``defeated'' in a war, but
rather as political opponents against whom the U.S. and its partners
must operate through the effective use of soft power. The best strategy
seeks to drive a wedge between political and violent Islamist groups
rather than driving them together by targeting both the same.
Mr. Langevin. What are the risks and/or trade-offs in how U.S.
policy and strategy defines and addressed the nature of the Islamic
extremism threat?
Dr. Kagan. I believe I have answered this in the preceding
responses.
Mr. Langevin. Our comprehensive strategy to combat ISIL includes
undercutting their flow of resources. Shutting down access to revenue,
and closing the means by which funds flow to and from ISIL is a
critical component of that strategy. The Department of Defense, the
Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of
Justice, and other intelligence and national security agencies all play
a role in identifying and restricting ISIL's access to revenue, and
revenue flows. I am interested to hear your thoughts on the
effectiveness of the actions we are taking with respect to counter-
threat financing, the role the DOD plays in identifying networks and
informing those decisions, the threshold for an organization to receive
our attention with respect to terrorist financing action, and given the
current environment, should that strategy and threshold being
revisited? Would you say that counter-threat financing efforts are a
primary, secondary or tertiary concern of our military and intel
community? Finally, how effective have our economic pressures been to
date and what is your assessment of the ISIL Counter-Financing Working
Group?
Mr. Fishman. Finances are critical for an organization pursue and
achieve its goals. As we know from our policy process, appropriating
money is the final indicator that an organization values a particular
line of effort. Jihadi groups are no different and we have seen various
groups put their money where mouth is in different ways over the years.
ISIL is different, however, than jihadi groups like al-Qaeda. Because
the group controls so much territory, and such a large population, it
is able to fundraise via ``taxation'', the appropriation of businesses,
and seizing resources from its enemies. Unlike al-Qaeda, which depended
largely on donations from wealthy supporters abroad, ISIL generates
most of its money locally. ISIL does obviously have some connections to
external entities for raising money. For example, it trades oil and
antiquities with smugglers and operatives in both government-controlled
Syria, Iraq, and Turkey. While we must crackdown on these networks, it
is important to recognize that they represent political alliances as
well as economic ones. One reason the Awakening in Iraq was so
successful is that we were able to co-opt smugglers that were upset
about the Islamic State of Iraq (al-Qaeda in Iraq) stealing their
smuggling routes. Unfortunately, I do not think that we will be able to
effectively constrain ISIL's fundraising without a significant troops
presence on the ground. The incentives of ISIL's economic partners run
against collaboration with the United States so long as we are unable
to coerce them--and most of those networks operate in the black market.
Importantly, jihadis have actively tried to build economic networks
that are resistant to external pressure. After the failure of the 1980s
Muslim Brotherhood uprising against Hafez al-Assad--Bashar's father--
Abu Mus'ab al-Suri wrote a widely-read lessons-learned treatise. One of
the key elements was that jihadis must be able to fundraise locally and
not be dependent on either foreign governments or foreign supporters,
both of whom he considered unreliable partners.
Mr. Langevin. What should be the United States' role in fighting
Islamic extremism, and what should be the roles of regional actors?
Does the U.S. government possess the right tools to fight an
ideological war, including information operations authorities? What
more should our allies be doing to counter Islamic extremism?
Mr. Fishman. The United States does not have the right tools to
fight an ideological war, especially one that is framed as undermining
jihadi ideology. We ought to be focused on building an image of the
United States and democracy that is positive, open, and appealing to
people across the world, regardless of their religious or ethnic
background. This is not a matter of acumen with social media, as it is
often portrayed in the United States. If you review the Islamic State
of Iraq's earliest discussion of social media--Youtube, Facebook, etc--
in 2008 and 2009 they largely talk about how they need to learn from
the effective social media campaigns of American politicians. It's not
about how slick they are with social media. The real issue is that they
have a clear message--of violence, domination, and what they consider a
utopian vision of a better world. Our problem is that we do not have a
clear message; it's hesitant and bound by our larger lack of policy
clarity toward the challenges in Iraq and Syria. Of course, our allies
must do more on the ideological side as well. Saudi Arabia, which is
obviously key to U.S. interests for a range of reasons, is a deep cause
of the instability in the Mideast. The promotion of Wahhabi mosques
globally as undermined progenitors of more pluralistic visions of Islam
and fosters an environment that is easier for ISIL and others of its
ilk to exploit. Ultimately, we will not be able to solve this problem
without Saudi Arabia facing some of its own demons.
Mr. Langevin. How should the United States define and approach the
threat of Islamic extremism?
Mr. Fishman. It is important to understand that, historically, not
all jihadis have been salafis, but that most jihadis today are salafis.
In other words, a particular brand of religious ideology is not a good
way to define our enemies. That said, there is simply no denying that
the backward-looking version of Islam propagated by many in Saudi
Arabia (and elsewhere) implies certain political realities, including
sectarianism and antipathy to non-Muslims. The United States should be
waging war specifically against militant organizations that threaten
U.S. interests directly, but we should also be working with our allies
to stop their implicit soft power campaigns against us. The Saudi
government tolerates and capitalizes on religious extremism. Even as
they help us fight militant groups, they support the ideologues that
foster those groups. This is unsustainable and self-defeating.
Mr. Langevin. What are the risks and/or trade-offs in how U.S.
policy and strategy defines and addressed the nature of the Islamic
extremism threat?
Mr. Fishman. There are almost too many tradeoffs to list. Even
though religious ideology is central to how most jihadi groups define
themselves, the United States should not actively frame our
counterterrorism campaign in religious terms. We have to be able to
walk and chew gum at the same time. We must recognize the ideological
foundation of these movements, but our communication efforts are not
particularly nuanced. Walk softly (and do not mention Islam very often)
but carry a big stick (by empowering moderates who criticize jihadis
and cracking down on primarily Saudi efforts to promote destructive
ideology). It is important to remember that jihadis kill far more
Muslims than they do Americans. With that in mind, we might want to
look at terms like ``takfiris'' (a term that reflects their hatred
toward Muslims) or ``kharijites'' (a historical term for a despised
Muslim sect that attacked other Muslims). Throughout Muslim history,
the religion has been practiced and lived dynamically, by real people.
In many periods, the Muslim mainstream was more tolerant of minorities
than in European societies. That tradition is being destroyed today,
both by the jihadis and by states that fund narrow understandings of
one of the world's great religious traditions. One danger of defining
our enemies solely in ideological terms, rather than in how they
operationalize those ideas politically, is that it may prevent us from
working with certain allies. There ARE salafi groups that oppose al-
Qaeda; we worked with a number of them in Iraq during the vaunted
``Awakening''. At the end of the day; we are interested in ideas
because of what they inspire people to do; it's the actions that count.
With that in mind, lets not define our enemies so broadly that we
prevent areas of potential collaboration.
[all]