[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FLYING UNDER THE RADAR: SECURING WASHINGTON, D.C., AIRSPACE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 29, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-25
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
http://www.house.gov/reform
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
JIM JORDAN, Ohio ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
TIM WALBERG, Michigan Columbia
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania
CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TED LIEU, California
MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey
KEN BUCK, Colorado STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands
MARK WALKER, North Carolina MARK DeSAULNIER, California
ROD BLUM, Iowa BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
JODY B. HICE, Georgia PETER WELCH, Vermont
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin
WILL HURD, Texas
GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
Sean McLaughlin, Staff Director
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
James Robertson, Staff Director for Transportation and Public Assets
Subcommittee
Michael Kiko, Professional Staff Member
Melissa Beaumont, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 29, 2015................................... 1
WITNESSES
The Hon. Paul D. Irving, Sergeant at Arms, U.S. House of
Representatives
Oral Statement............................................... 2
Written Statement............................................ 4
Admiral William E. Gortney Commander, NORAD/USNORTHCOM
Oral Statement............................................... 6
Written Statement............................................ 7
Mr. Robert G. Salesses, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Homeland Defense Integration and Defense Support of Civil
Authorities, U.S. Department of Defense
Oral Statement............................................... 11
Written Statement............................................ 13
The Hon. Michael P. Huerta, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 17
Written Statement............................................ 19
The Hon. Joseph P. Clancy, Director, U.S. Secret Service
Oral Statement............................................... 23
Written Statement............................................ 25
Mr. Robert D. MacLean, Chief, U.S. Park Police
Oral Statement............................................... 30
Written Statement............................................ 32
Ms. Kim C. Dine, Chief of Police, U.S. Capitol Police
Oral Statement............................................... 33
Written Statement............................................ 35
APPENDIX
Letter from Rep. Mica to Chief Dine, USCP, submitted by Rep. Mica 80
House Sergeant at Arms email alerts the day of the incident,
submitted by Rep. Mica......................................... 82
Statement for the record, submitted by Rep. Connolly............. 84
FLYING UNDER THE RADAR: SECURING WASHINGTON, D.C., AIRSPACE
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Wednesday, April 29, 2015
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz
(chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Jordan, Walberg,
Amash, Farenthold, Lummis, Massie, Meadows, Mulvaney, Walker,
Hice, Carter, Grothman, Palmer, Cummings, Maloney, Norton,
Lynch, Connolly, Cartwright, Kelly, Watson Coleman, DeSaulnier,
and Lujan Grisham.
Chairman Chaffetz. The Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform will come to order. And, without objection,
the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time.
As we get going, I need to first express my thoughts and
prayers to my colleague, Elijah Cummings, and what the people
of Baltimore are going through. Our hearts and prayers and
thoughts are with you and your neighbors and your friends and
your community, the police officers.
We are proud of you and the way you are conducting this and
getting through it, and you are a true leader. I would hope the
people of Baltimore, Maryland, would listen to your message,
but know that our thoughts and prayers are with you.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, I want to take this moment to
not only thank you, but thank the members of our Committee, who
have expressed their concern about Baltimore. And you, Mr.
Chairman, have a kind of unique perspective because you had a
chance to visit Baltimore with me before you even became
chairman. And so you had a chance to see what the issues are in
our city.
So I am looking forward to working with you and others to
try to heal some of that pain. And I do appreciate you. And I
will never forget your visit, and the people in my city will
not forget your visit. Thank you for your comments.
Chairman Chaffetz. Well, thank you. We will be conducting
this hearing a little differently today. I am going to ask
unanimous consent that we are going to change the order here,
that we will recognize our panel, allow them to give their
opening Statements, and then we will go into recess. We will
reconvene. We will give our opening Statements and then we will
get into questions.
But given that we have the very historic presence of the
Japanese Prime Minister here to address a joint session of
Congress, we are particularly sensitive that, for instance, one
of our witnesses, the House Sergeant at Arms, Mr. Paul Irving,
has to leave us early in order to fulfill his duties. And to
accommodate his schedule, I would ask unanimous consent to
forego opening Statements. For us, we will come back and give
them later and swear in the witnesses and begin their
testimony.
Without objection, so ordered.
We will get as far as we can and recess so Members can join
the joint session. We will reconvene 30 minutes after the
conclusion of the joint session to continue our hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
So we will now recognize our panel of witnesses.
First we have the Honorable Paul Irving, Sergeant at Arms
at the U.S. House of Representatives. Mr. Irving is accompanied
by Mr. Tim Blodgett, Deputy Sergeant at Arms, whose expertise
may be needed during questioning.
We also have Admiral William Gortney, Commander of NORAD/
USNORTHCOM; Mr. Robert--help me with the pronunciation----
Mr. Salesses. ``Salesses.''
Chairman Chaffetz [continuing]. Salesses, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense Integration and Defense
Support of Civil Authorities at the United States Department of
Defense; the Honorable Michael Huerta, Administrator of the
FAA, the Federal Aviation Administration; the Honorable Joseph
Clancy, Director of the United States Secret Service; Mr.
Robert MacLean, Chief of the United States Park Police; and Mr.
Kim Dine, Chief of the United States Capitol Police.
We welcome you all.
Pursuant to Committee rules, all witnesses are to be sworn
before they testify.
Mr. Blodgett you are included as well.
We would ask that all the panel please rise and raise your
right hand.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are
about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth?
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. You may be seated.
Let the record reflect that all the witnesses answered in
the affirmative.
All of your written Statements will be entered into the
record. We would ask that you would limit your verbal comments
to 5 minutes. We are going to recognize Mr. Irving first.
At the conclusion of those remarks, we are going to excuse
him so that he can tend to the duties of escorting the Prime
Minister into the House of Representatives.
Mr. Irving, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
WITNESS STATEMENTS
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL D. IRVING
Mr. Irving. Thank you.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cummings, and members of
the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today.
As Sergeant at Arms and Chief Law Enforcement Officer of
the House of Representatives, I'm fully dedicated to ensuring
the safety of the entire Capitol Complex, a mission performed
in close partnership and cooperation with the U.S. Capitol
Police Board and the men and women of the United States Capitol
Police.
Before I begin, though, I would like to extend my thanks to
all the men and women of the U.S. Capitol Police for their
capable and professional response to the indicant on April 15.
U.S. Capitol Police officers and officials promptly responded
to the west front and arrested the individual and ensured the
craft was harmless.
We are currently working closely with our partners in
Federal law enforcement, the Departments of Defense,
Transportation, and Homeland Security to maintain robust
airspace security within the challenging confines of the urban
environment of the national capital region, in particular,
working with our partners to ensure the most efficient and
robust early detection, tracking and warning systems, ensuring
there is consistent and constant interagency communication and
early warning communicated in realtime, improving and ensuring
immediate and ongoing communications and alerts to members and
staff during a security incident, and honing the
countermeasures and policies consistent with those
countermeasures.
Since the event, I've ordered the Chief of the Capitol
Police to utilize the House notification system to alert
members, staff and, to the extent possible, visitors in as
timely a manner as possible to alert regarding all life,
safety, and potentially threatening events that affect the
Capitol community.
The incident on April 15 reminds us all the greatest asset
of the Capitol, its very openness and accessibility, can, at
times, be one of our greatest challenges. However, every
incident allows us to refine our capabilities, enhance our
training, and be better prepared for every eventuality.
I am happy to answer questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[prepared Statement of Mr. Irving follows:]
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Chairman Chaffetz. I thank you. Please be excused and tend
to your duties. We thank you and we look forward to seeing you
at the conclusion of that event.
Mr. Irving. Thank you.
Chairman Chaffetz. Admiral, you are now recognized for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM E. GORTNEY
Admiral Gortney. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member
Cummings, and distinguished members of the Committee, I'm
honored to be here today. From a national security perspective,
I want to emphasize the sensitivity of these discussions in an
unclassified environment.
An open discussion of even unclassified information could
be pieced together to pose a risk to our national security.
Therefore, I cannot go into many of the specific details I deem
sensitive in an unclassified environment. However, in a closed
session, I'm ready and able to talk to you in much detail as
you need.
NORAD's role is to provide aerospace warning and control to
defend the United States and Canada, including the national
capital region, from all potential air threats. The airspace
surrounding the national capital region, known as the
Washington, DC, special flight rules area, is monitored by a
sophisticated integrated air defense system, which is a vast
network of radars, cameras, and other detection warning
devices. Each system is designed to detect, track, and monitor
specific parameters.
The integrated air defense system was implemented following
and in direct response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 has
continued to evolve with the threat over time. We are extremely
capable of identifying and tracking potential threats to the
national capital region, anything from commercial aviation down
to small single-propeller-sized aircraft like Cessnas.
However, a small manned gyrocopter or a similar low-
altitude, low-speed aerial vehicle, despite its assessed low
threat, presents a technical challenge.
This is an interagency effort that collectively understands
the technical challenges associated with these types of threats
and vehicles, and with our partners here at the table, we will
continue to implement technical and procedural solutions to
close any seams.
I know the Committee has questions, and I look forward to
talking with you today.
[Prepared Statement of Admiral Gortney follows:]
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Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. Appreciate it.
Mr. Salesses.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. SALESSES
Mr. Salesses. Thank you, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member
Cummings, and distinguished members of the Committee. I'd like
to thank you for the opportunity to address the Department of
Defense's role in securing the airspace of Washington, DC. I'd
like to acknowledge that aspects of this issue are very
sensitive for the Department of Defense from a national
security standpoint.
I look forward to continuing this discussion in a
classified setting. Because I know there's much to discuss, I
will be brief. To this end, there are four points I would like
to emphasize today.
No. 1, defending the United States is the Department of
Defense's highest priority. No. 2, the Department of Defense is
well postured to defend the United States. No. 3, the
Department works very closely with its Federal partners and law
enforcement to protect the national capital airspace. And,
last, the Department continually pursues opportunities to
enhance our homeland defense capabilities.
The national security strategy makes it clear that the U.S.
Government has no greater responsibility than protecting the
American people. Our national defense strategy make protecting
and defending the homeland the Department's first priority.
To the men and women of the Department of Defense, military
and civilian, these specific words are the reason they serve in
the very core of their professional lives. Every day these fine
men and women, whether serving here at home or some far-off
location across the globe, dedicate themselves to protecting
the American people and defending the United States.
Due to the leadership of the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Congress' steadfast support, DOD is well
postured with the authorities and capabilities necessary to
defend the homeland. Under Admiral Gortney's leadership and
command, the men and women of NORAD execute Operation Noble
Eagle, monitoring the U.S. Airspace, conducting military
operations to dissuade, deter, and, if necessary, defeat
airborne threats.
In this effort to secure the skies over our Nation's
Capital, the men and women of the Department of Defense do not
serve alone. They are joined by the counterparts at the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Transportation, the Department of Justice and our law
enforcement partners in a whole-of-government approach to
protecting the national airspace.
Working together, we have built a network of barriers to
protect the national airspace system against any and all
threats. We have improved our threat detection capabilities,
integrated our threat responses, and refined our procedures to
optimize response effectiveness.
We continually look for opportunities to improve our
defenses. We understand that, no matter how good we are, the
adversary remains committed and we can always be better.
To this end, we're dedicated to continual improvement over
our policies, procedures, and operational capabilities. Working
with our Federal partners, we test, we plan, we exercise to
improve our effectiveness. This is what the Nation expects.
We're committed to meeting this expectation, and this is our
obligation.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
We appreciate your leadership, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Committee, and your support of the men and women of the
Department of Defense. I look forward to your questions.
[Prepared Statement of Mr. Salesses follows:]
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Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
Mr. Huerta.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL P. HUERTA
Mr. Huerta. Thank you, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member
Cummings, members of the Committee, for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
I'd like to address your questions about the recent
gyrocopter incident by explaining the FAA's role in airspace
security and how we coordinate with other agencies.
First and foremost, the FAA's mission is aircraft and
airspace safety. We operate the Nation's air traffic control
system in order to separate aircraft. Our primary focus is on
getting aircraft safely to their destinations and managing the
flow of thousands of aircraft and their passengers around the
country every day.
In addition to the FAA's safety mission, we also work very
closely with the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security
on a daily basis to support their aviation security missions,
particularly here in the capital region. As part of that
support, we provide them a raw air traffic radar feed so they
have situational awareness of what is happening in our national
airspace system.
To enable our controllers to safely control air traffic,
the first thing we have to do is distinguish the aircraft that
are communicating with controllers from all other objects in
the air that are not aircraft. These other objects that the
radar detects could be things like vehicles on nearby roadways,
flocks of birds, weather events, or occasional kites and
balloons.
Air traffic controllers could not do their jobs if they had
to work with an unfiltered radar feed. They would not be able
to distinguish the aircraft they are charged with safely
handling from other elements on their radar scopes.
We require aircraft that fly in the airspace around
Washington, DC, and other large cities across the country to
use transponders that broadcast basic information, such as the
type of aircraft, its speed, direction, and altitude. When
radar detects those aircraft, it picks up the transponder
information and it displays it on the air traffic controller's
radar scene.
Controllers can see all the flights in the specific area
along with the identifying information from each aircraft.
Anything that doesn't have a transponder shows up as an image
representing a simple small dot on the radar screen, and there
are typically many of them across the controller's radar
screen.
To assist controllers in focusing on safely managing air
traffic, we apply filters to the controller's radar to
eliminate the vast majority of those small dots. Safely
managing air traffic is a controller's mission, and they must
be able to do that without distraction.
Now, to support national and Homeland Security, the FAA
shares a realtime unfiltered radar feed with our partners at
the Department of Defense and several other agencies. We do
that so they have the same information that we have and so they
can apply the appropriate filters for their own mission to
protect the airspace.
We also embed technical air traffic staff at a number of
North American Aerospace Defense Command facilities around the
country to provide additional operating expertise and support.
On April 15, Mr. Hughes' gyrocopter appeared on our radar
as one of those small unidentified elements, indistinguishable
from all other non-aircraft radar tracks. The National Capital
Region Coordination Center called the FAA at 1:24 p.m. that
afternoon to alert us to the flight based on information they
received from the U.S. Capitol Police.
After the incident, we conducted a forensic radar analysis
and looked for an image that might match Mr. Hughes'
gyrocopter. We understood he had taken off from a small airport
in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and we had an approximate time.
So we looked at unfiltered radar data. A trained radar
analyst identified a slow-moving image that traveled from
Gettysburg toward the capital and vanished from radar at about
the time Mr. Hughes landed on the west lawn. We now believe
that unidentified radar element was Mr. Hughes' gyrocopter. But
the dot appeared only intermittently throughout that flight.
When we got the call from the Capitol Police, we
immediately notified our interagency partners on the Domestic
Events Network, or DEN, a 24-hour, 7-days-a-week communication
line we operate to support a shared situational awareness among
our agency partners.
We initiated the DEN more than a decade ago to quickly
share information about activity in the airspace with multiple
agencies. It now includes more than 130 Federal and local
agencies as well as major FAA air traffic facilities around the
country. The DEN has played a critical role in disseminating
important operational information to other agencies as quickly
as possible.
Each agency has a responsibility to announce an airspace
incident on the DEN as soon as they know about it. We're
committed to our safety mission at the FAA, and we're dedicated
to working closely with all of our airspace security partners
to support protection of our airspace.
We're assisting the Department of Homeland Security in its
ongoing interagency review, and this is in addition to our own
internal review to ensure that FAA employees followed all the
proper procedures and protocols during the event. If we need to
make changes as a result of these efforts, we will. And I will
keep the Committee informed.
I would be happy to take your questions.
[Prepared Statement of Mr. Huerta follows:]
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Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
Director Clancy.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH P. CLANCY
Mr. Clancy. Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member
Cummings, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to be here to discuss the Secret Service's
role within the broader effort to secure the airspace of the
national capital region, or the NCR.
The longstanding relationships between interagency
partners, many of which are represented here today, are
critical to ensuring the security of people in places given
protection by the Secret Service and others.
The Secret Service must be prepared to confront and defeat
evolving threats, including those from small manned and
unmanned aircraft systems. As these technologies become both
more advanced and more widely available, the Secret Service
will continue to work aggressively with our partners to address
existing threats and anticipate those to come.
Existing FAA flight restrictions in the NCR were enhanced
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The FAA implemented the
special rights--I'm sorry--the special flight rules area, which
includes within its boundaries the flight restricted zone and
prohibited area, P-56, or Area 56. The White House, the Vice
President's residence, and the U.S. Capitol are located within
the P-56.
The Secret Service's role in the administration of the
restricted airspace is limited to issuing waivers for access to
the P-56 in consultation with the Capitol Police and the Park
Police.
Airspace security for the NCR is coordinated by the
interagency National Capital Region Coordination Center. The
Center was created after the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks to provide realtime information-sharing and tactical
coordination to address potential airborne threats in and
around the Washington, DC, area.
It is staffed at all times with specially trained personnel
assigned to the Secret Service Airspace Security Branch in
addition to representatives from the military, the FAA, and
selected Federal civilian law enforcement agencies.
The mission of the Secret Service Airspace Security Branch
is to give early notification to the protective details and
uniform division and provide realtime information to allow
appropriate time to make informed decisions about actions to
take to ensure the security of our protectees and protect its
sites.
Given the pace at which events can unfold in an air
incursion, maximizing the time to react is critical. Presently
the Airspace Security Branch combines radar feeds from a number
of sources to create an image of the airspace. This image is
monitored by the detection system specialists who have military
or civilian radar backgrounds.
With respect to the history between the Secret Service and
Douglas Mark Hughes, the pilot from the April 15 incident,
Hughes first came to the attention of the Secret Service on
October 4, 2013. At that time, the Secret Service obtained
information that Hughes intended to fly a single-seat aircraft
onto the grounds of the Capitol or the White House with no
specific timeframe provided.
That same day the Secret Service relayed the information to
our law enforcement partners at the Capitol Police. The
following day special agents from the Secret Service
interviewed Hughes, who denied owning an aircraft or having
plans to fly one to Washington, DC. However, subsequent
corroborative interviews revealed differently.
Further, the investigation revealed no evidence of an
interest in persons or places protected by the Secret Service,
and information regarding Hughes was made available to other
interested law enforcement agencies in the national capital
region.
Regarding events leading up to the April 15 incident--I
went to be clear--at no time did the Secret Service receive
actionable advanced notice or any information that this event
was taking place.
While the Secret Service received telephone calls on the
date of the incident, at no time was information provided in
the calls that would have alerted our personnel to the fact
that Hughes was piloting his aircraft to the Capitol.
As the gyrocopter flew in the direction of the Capitol, it
was observed by Secret Service personnel in the area of the
White House complex. These individuals subsequently relayed
that information through their chain of command. While in the
process of making the appropriate notifications, the aircraft
landed and the incident was acknowledged on the FAA Domestic
Events Network, effectively notifying all relevant parties.
That day and the days to follow, the Secret Service field
offices gathered information regarding Hughes and his
activities leading up to the event. While the Capitol Police
are the lead investigative agency in this matter, the Secret
Service stands ready to continue to contribute any resources
necessary and to work collectively with our partners.
Protection of the President, his family, and the White
House is paramount to this agency. The partnerships represented
here today are critical to the success of our mission as it
relates to effectively addressing airborne threats. Continued
interagency coordination is vital to ensuring safety and
security in the airspace of the NCR.
Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and members of
the committee, this concludes my testimony. I welcome any
questions you may have.
[Prepared Statement of Mr. Clancy follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the Director.
Chief MacLean.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT D. MacLEAN
Chief MacLean. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, and
members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the United States Park Police involvement in the April
15, 2015, gyrocopter incident in Washington, DC. My name is
Robert MacLean. I am the Chief of the United States Park
Police.
United States Park Police, established in 1791, is the
oldest uniformed Federal law enforcement agency in the United
States. The Park Police, which is primarily responsible for
safety and crime prevention in parkland administered by the
National Park Service, has enjoyed a long history of
partnership and coordination with the numerous public safety
protection, aviation, and defense agencies within the national
capital region.
In the District of Columbia, the Park Police has primary
jurisdiction over Federal parkland, which comprises
approximately 22 percent of the District of Columbia, including
the National Mall, East and West Potomac Parks, Rock Creek
Park, Anacostia Park, McPherson Square, and many of the small
triangle parks in the District.
The Park Police officers who proudly and diligently patrol
Federal parkland every day are trained to identify, report, and
investigate violations of law and suspicious or unusual
activity. Although the Park Police has an aviation unit that
flies law enforcement, MedeVac, and search-and-rescue missions
within the national capital region, the Park Police does not
have primary responsibility of airspace defense over the
Federal parklands.
As such, the Park Police does not have radar detection
capability to monitor that airspace, nor does it have the
appropriate tools to engage or defend against an aircraft in
the airspace above these parks. Those primary responsibilities
and capabilities rest with other Federal agencies.
On Wednesday, April 15, 2015, at approximately 1:20 p.m., a
Park Police officer observed and reported an aircraft later
identified as the gyrocopter operated by Mr. Doug Hughes. It
was operating near the Lincoln Memorial and estimated to be
approximately 100 feet off the ground and traveling eastbound
toward the United States Capitol.
The officer made a request to the Park Police Dispatch
Center to contact the United States Capitol Police. The patrol
supervisor confirmed the observation and requested the Park
Police Dispatch Center notify the Park Police Aviation Unit,
which, in turn, contacted the National Capital Region
Coordination Center to report an aircraft in a restricted
airspace.
Another Park Police officer observed and followed the
aircraft eastbound in his patrol vehicle to where the aircraft
landed on the west grounds of the United States Capitol. The
Park Police officer arrived at the Capitol Grounds and observed
the U.S. Capitol Police arresting Mr. Hughes. At that point,
the Park Police became an assisting agency to the United States
Capitol Police on the scene and at their command post.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my Statement. I would be
pleased to respond to any questions you and other members may
have.
[Prepared Statement of Chief MacLean follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
Chief Dine, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF KIM C. DINE
Chief Dine. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, members
of the Committee, good morning. And thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the event that occurred on Wednesday,
April 15, and the actions taken by the United States Capitol
Police.
I will begin by providing a time line of the events and
will gladly answer any questions that you may have. It is
important to note that this is an ongoing criminal
investigation.
On Wednesday, April 15, at 12:59 p.m., an individual from
the Tampa Bay Times sent an email to the U.S. Capitol Police
public information officer, stating that a local man was
planning on flying a gyrocopter as part of a protest and will
be attempting to land on the west front. This individual
inquired if the USCP was aware of the flight and if permission
had been obtained. No time or date information was provided
regarding this flight.
At 1 p.m., the same individual called the USCP Command
Center and Stated to an officer that he had information about a
man who was planning to fly a drone onto the Mall and onto the
west front of the Capitol. He Stated that he had called the
U.S. Secret Service and they advised him to call the United
States Capitol Police.
He also Stated that this man, who he identified as Douglas
Hughes, had received permission from the U.S. Secret Service
and the USCP and he was calling to confirm that permission was
granted. No time or date or actual information was provided
regarding the flight during this telephone phone call either.
The officer advised this individual she was not aware of
any approvals to land a drone. They were then transferred to a
sergeant in the Command Center, and this individual repeated
what he had told the officer, except now he referred to the
aircraft as gyrocopter. The sergeant advised that no approval
existed for a gyrocopter to land on the Capitol Grounds.
The caller advised the sergeant that Hughes' live feed
could be seen on Hughes' Website, which he provided. At this
point in the conversation, the conversation concluded, and
during the conversation no mention was made that the landing
was imminent.
At 1:07 p.m., the U.S. Capitol Police public information
officer responded to this email by immediately forwarding it to
the Investigations Division and currently the Command Center
personnel went into the provided Website, but did not find the
live feed noted by the individual from the Tampa Bay Times.
The Command Center notified the Investigations Division and
the public information officer. As the Command Center was
attempting to validate any air flight information with the USCP
staff at the National Capital Region Coordination Center, the
gyrocopter landed at approximately 1:23 p.m.
At 1:21 p.m., just prior to the landing, an officer posted
on the Pennsylvania Avenue walkway on the west front was
approached by a reporter, who asked if he had seen a helicopter
yet. The officer Stated he had not seen a helicopter and then
consulted with another officer to determine if they were aware
of any prohibited airspace overflights.
During this discussion, the officers observed the inbound
gyrocopter over Union Square, nearly atop the Grant Memorial.
The officers immediately notified the Communications Center and
subsequently reported the landing of the gyrocopter. This
information was immediately broadcast over the radio for
situational awareness and response.
The USCP officers immediately assessed the threat in
accordance with Department policy and training. USCP personnel
quickly facilitated the movement of the public on the west
front away from the gyrocopter.
Once the gyrocopter rotor stopped, USCP officers quickly
approached the subject and took him into custody. The subject
did not resist and was compliant with police direction.
A K-9 unit immediately approached and swept the gyrocopter
and showed interest in the area of the engine and fuel
compartment, which was expected. Incident Command was
established at 1:26 p.m., the west front was closed, and
vehicular traffic was restricted on First Street between
Constitution and Independence Avenues, along with Maryland and
Pennsylvania Avenues to Third Street.
As this was occurring, the Investigations Division provided
the commanders in the Command Center with information about the
subject from the Internet video publicizing the subject's
ownership of the gyrocopter, his intention to deliver a box of
letters to Congress in reference to campaign finance reform,
and his investigative history with both the USCP and the U.S.
Secret Service. The Command Center notified the NCRCC of the
situation.
While the K-9 sweep was occurring, a Capitol Division
commander directed a brief lockdown of the Capitol and of the
CVC. When the lockdown was announced via the radio, the
Uniformed Services Bureau commander, who was in the Command
Center, consulted with the incident commander.
The USB commander then decided to lift the lockdown of the
Capitol based on the following facts: The K-9 had not alerted
to the body of the gyrocopter, but had shown interest only in
the area of the engine and fuel compartment; the subject was in
custody and compliant with directions; the size of the small
package area of the gyrocopter was limited to two backpack-size
boxes; information provided by the Investigations Division that
the intent of the pilot was clearly expressed in his video; and
the USCP had established a strong perimeter from the gyrocopter
with distance from the Capitol.
The exterior perimeters stayed in effect. Due to the
extremely short timeframe between the lockdown order and the
direction to lift the lockdown, no messages were sent to the
congressional community advising of the lockdown.
The USCP Hazardous Devices Section responded to this
incident and at 1:36 p.m. utilized a robot to investigate the
gyrocopter. Since the robot could not access the two boxes in
the gyrocopter, at 2:11 p.m., the ACS section personnel donned
protective gear and took x-rays of the boxes.
The gyrocopter was determined to be clear of any hazards at
2:57 p.m. Traffic cuts were subsequently released and the west
front remained closed until the crime scene could be processed
and the gyrocopter removed.
It is important to note that, while the USCP does not
control prohibited airspace over Washington, DC, we do monitor
this airspace 24/7 and we are directly linked to other Federal
agencies related in this controlled airspace. On April 15, this
gyrocopter did not register on radar as a threat and,
therefore, was not raised as a concern among our Federal
partners.
We take the monitoring of prohibited airspace very
seriously, which is why we have a designated airspace
coordinator and have assigned liaisons at the NCRCC to provide
immediate linkage to critical information regarding identified
airspace threats.
Information about identified airspace threats allows us to
make informed decisions regarding the safety of our
stakeholders, the congressional community, and Capitol Complex.
Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss this event
that occurred on Wednesday, April 15, 2015. I am very proud of
the professional and immediate actions taken by members of the
United States Capitol Police in addressing this incident. I
would be happy to answer any questions that you may have at
this time.
[Prepared Statement of Chief Dine follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
As previously announced, the committee is going to recess
so that Members will be allowed to hear the Prime Minister of
Japan as he addresses the joint session of Congress. We will
reconvene approximately 30 minutes after the conclusion of
that. We appreciate your patience.
The committee is in recess.
[Recess.]
Chairman Chaffetz. The Committee will come to order.
I thank you for your patience. I know you are all very
busy.
The chair would like to notify members, remind members,
that no subcommittee will start until the full committee is
finished. So we do have two subcommittees that plan to meet at
2. We also have votes that will happen on the floor in about 45
minutes.
We will try to do this as swiftly as possible, but I wanted
to note that for members and those that might be showing up for
the 2 hearing. That is going to occur in this meeting.
But let's address why we are here today, the gyrocopter
incident that happened 2 weeks ago. The 9/11 Commission after
that terrible, horrific terrorist attack wrote, ``The most
important failure was one of imagination. We do not believe
leaders understood the gravity of the threat.''
We are here today because we need to understand who saw
what and when, who communicated what, did it work, did we learn
those lessons of tragedies of past. On April 15 a man in a
gyrocopter was able to fly through the highly restricted
airspace of the national capital region and land on the west
lawn of the Capitol. He started off in the north, came, went
over the Lincoln Memorial, right past into the airspace
surrounding the White House, right past the Washington
Memorial, and landed on the lawn of the Capitol. Unbelievable.
He first told the Federal authorities about this--it came
on the radar about 2 years ago. And the national capital region
is unique in that the Department of Defense, Transportation and
Homeland Security, along with the Capitol Police, National Park
Police, and the congressional Sergeant at Arms all have roles
to play in protecting the airspace.
As best I can tell, in this region there are roughly 32 law
enforcement agencies that have some form of jurisdiction in the
safety and security of the Washington, DC, area. But it is
still unclear who on this panel was ultimately responsible for
first identifying this object entering restricted airspace and
then for responding to it.
At this point ignorance is no longer an excuse when it
comes to drones and small aircraft. In January, a drone crash
landed on the White House lawn. It is becoming very common
throughout the world. After the gyrocopter incident, a drone
with radioactive material landed on the Japanese Prime
Minister's residence. Dozens of unaccounted drones have flown
over the streets of Paris since last October. And a drone
crashed in front of the German Chancellor Merkel at a rally in
2013.
There have been several instances involving the White
House, including helicopters and small aircraft, and this is a
pervasive threat. It has been there for a long time. It isn't
going anywhere. And when we show this type of vulnerability, I
worry that the shine that it will inevitably be taken down and
taken down hard has gone away.
Someone should have identified that this type of threat we
aren't prepared to meet or that our enemies would exploit. Our
defensive technology must be able to prevent and respond to
unconventional and emerging threats.
We need to have that creativity to understand that the
would-be terrorists and those people who want to see harm to
the United States of America will likely be creative.
But in this gyrocopter incident, he was loud and clear what
he was going to do. In fact, he was live-streaming it. And yet
nobody seemed to pick that up. News outlets did. They sent
staff. They sent reporters down on the lawn to watch it.
The United States military has researched drones since
World War I and for the last 13 years used them to fight
against terrorists. Yet, the primary drone detection technology
currently used by the FAA, NORAD, the Secret Service, and the
Capitol Police is roughly 70 years old.
This antiquated technology can't even tell the difference
between a bird, a drone, a gyrocopter, or just plain old
weather. Even a mylar balloon sets things off where people are
hesitant to do anything because it might just be a good old-
fashioned balloon.
I understand we will hear today about the Pentagon's effort
to improve our capability to identify and intercept small
aerial threats. This is the same technology Customs and Border
Patrol has used on the border for years, long periods of time.
They have been dealing with this type of gyrocopters and
hang gliders and all sorts of these types of small aircraft on
the borders for decades. They have been dealing with this for a
long time. Did we ever learn any of those lessons? Do we need
to bring CBP in here to help protect the capital region? They
seemed to figure it out.
The stakes are higher, and our agency intelligence-sharing
and communications coordination can never ever fail us. We must
make sure all agencies with a role in the National security
effectively communicate with each other. So, hopefully, we will
hear today how the agencies represented here have effectively
communicated about threats in their counterparts.
Quite frankly, I didn't learn much in your opening
Statements. That was as bland as we could possibly have been.
We are here to address a serious topic. We are not going to
just stand here and say, ``Well, it is classified. We can't
talk about it.'' Because, evidently, when you have been talking
about it, it hasn't gotten done.
I, like other Members of Congress and congressional staff
and visitors to the Capitol, also have concerns about the
communication breakdown in alerting the Capitol community about
this incident. The first Capitol-wide alert came at 5:03 p.m.,
several hours after the incident was over.
While I look forward to hearing about how the Sergeant at
Arms and the Capitol Hill Police have updated their policies to
prevent a breakdown like this from ever happening again, it
certainly shouldn't have ever happened in the first place.
It is very disappointing that three of the agencies here--
the FAA; the Department of Defense, NORAD; and the Park
Police--chose not to brief Members of Congress last week. Now,
I do appreciate the Capitol Hill Police, the Sergeant at Arms,
and the Secret Service for making themselves available.
We had four agents, four committees, four committee
chairmen, four ranking members, ask for your presence to have a
behind-the-scenes, closed-door briefing on this topic. And for
whatever reason, the FAA, Department of Defense, and the Park
Police refused to brief Members of Congress.
That doesn't give us a whole lot of confidence, folks. And
we will yank you up here time and time again until we get
answers in the public. We are different than the rest of the
world. We are different. We are self-critical. Don't take it so
personally.
Understand this is how we make America the greatest country
on the face of the planet. We do this in an open and
transparent way. But when you won't even talk to members in a
closed-door meeting, that is not acceptable. It is a waste of
our time. It is a waste of the other people's time.
We need results because we had some yahoo in a gyrocopter
land right over there, and it didn't work. And I got these
opening Statements from you that shed no light other than a
time line and how big a space the Park Police protects. It
didn't work. We need candor.
I want to again thank Director Clancy, Chief Dine, and Mr.
Irving for their responsiveness to the requests. I can tell we
have had a lot of interactions with the Secret Service that
haven't been the most pleasant, but I will thank that agency
for being so accessible in their communications.
And particularly Mr. Clancy has made himself available on
the mobile phone and calling us and making sure that he is
available here, and I want to publicly thank him for that, even
though we have had our differences.
We understand that the mission is difficult to fulfill, but
you are here today because you have been entrusted to
accomplish it. We want to help that. We are in the middle of
our appropriations season. We can't ever have this mission
fail. So we look forward to hearing more about that.
Chairman Chaffetz. With that, I will now recognize the
Ranking Member, Mr. Cummings, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Unlike previous hearings our committee has held with the
Secret Service and the DEA which involve misconduct by
individual agents, today's hearing presents a different
question: How should our Nation deal with the relatively new
and evolving threat of unmanned or small manned aerial vehicles
entering the airspace over our Nation's Capital?
This is a question of technology and policy, both of which
are rapidly evolving. In this case, I do not personally believe
the answer is to condemn the Capitol Police for not shooting
down the gyrocopter. I also do not believe we should rush to
criticize Federal agencies charged with responding to this
threat.
Instead, I believe the best course of action is to work
collaboratively with both the Capitol Police and these Federal
agencies to understand the threat, understand it, and to
strongly support their ongoing efforts to enhance current
technologies, many of which are classified.
So I thank the chairman for calling today's hearing on this
very critical issue. I completely understand the frustration
expressed by the chairman and others about this incident. And
let me be clear. I share the frustration.
I said in a meeting the other day so often what happens is
that we have a tendency to tell each other that everything will
be fine when the rubber meets the road and then, when it comes
time for the rubber to meet the road, we discover there is no
road.
The airspace around our Nation's Capital is supposed to be
the most restricted in the world, yet a postal worker--hello, a
postal worker--from Florida was able to fly his gyrocopter
through 30 miles of restricted airspace before finally landing
on Capitol lawn.
In this case, the individual was only trying to make a
peaceful demonstration, but we might not be so fortunate in the
future. It takes almost no effort to imagine what could have
been. What if he had weapons? What if he were carrying a bomb.
On the flip side, it is also my understanding, based, in
part, on classified briefings we have received, that this
individual is incredibly lucky to be alive today. The next
person who tries something this stupid--and it was stupid--may
not be so lucky.
I would like to thank all of the witnesses for testifying
here today on such short notice. I also want to thank you for
providing briefings last week, both classified and
unclassified. Your missions are extremely difficult, and the
lives of people throughout the District depend on your success.
I look forward to hearing from each of you in an effort to
address this very pressing situation.
We all agree that our paramount interest is in the
continued security of the airspace over the capital and
addressing any possible breaches as effectively and efficiently
as possible. That is what we are aiming at.
This is a critical moment, gentlemen, a very critical
moment. By the way, it is wake-up-call time. We live in a
dangerous world with complex, constantly evolving threats. So
it is imperative that we are prepared to counter them.
In addressing these questions today, however, the last
thing we want to do, the last thing, is give a road map to
those who want to harm us. I hope that you all agree on that.
Don't want to do anything that counters what you do every day,
and that is trying to protect us.
So, obviously, we need to treat this information
responsibly, and we do not want to highlight security
vulnerabilities to would-be attackers because you can guarantee
your bottom dollar they are watching.
Out of an abundance of caution, I want to make 100 percent
sure that all of our witnesses understand that we do not, we do
not, want you to discuss any sensitive information in this
public forum.
I think all of you know what I mean by ``sensitive.'' And
if you don't know, raise your hand now and let me know, and we
will try to make sure you are clear on what we are talking
about. And I am not trying to be smart either.
Many of you have raised concerns about holding a public
hearing on this topic, and I understand your concerns. The
chairman understands your concerns. Our committee understands.
After discussions with the chairman and his staff--and I
want to thank him for this--we have agreed to set up a separate
cleared room to address any sensitive issues that may arise.
The bottom line is that you are the experts and we will defer
to you on what can be discussed in this public setting.
If our questions call for sensitive information, please let
us know, and we can reconvene in the closed setting to address
those issues. Our sole purpose today is to help you counter the
threats we face, not to expose our Nation's Capital to greater
danger by exposing operational details or security
vulnerabilities.
Now, let me go back to something that the chairman said.
And I wholeheartedly agree with him on this. Gentlemen, time is
of the essence. Time is of the essence. And I have not come
here to ask you. I have come here to beg you to do whatever you
have to do to get the technology if we don't have it, to speed
up the technology if it is in the process, to more effectively
and efficiently allow you to do the jobs that you are sworn to
do.
And I want to take this moment again to thank all the
people who work with you. They are people who have come out
there every day trying to make sure that we are safe. And I
want to publicly thank them on behalf of all of us for what
they do every day.
And I want them to understand--and I know that the chairman
agrees with me on this--although there may be criticism, it is
about moving to a more effective and efficient system of
protection for all of us. And so one of the best ways to do
that, of course, is to make sure we have effective oversight.
And, again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for calling
the hearing. And, with that, I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes. And it starts
with a simple question of who is in charge. You have got a dude
in a gyrocopter 100 feet in the air, crossing 30-plus miles of
restricted airspace.
Whose job is it to detect him? And whose job is it to take
him down?
Admiral Gortney. Sir, as the commander of NORAD, that's my
responsibility, and I'maccountable for that.
Chairman Chaffetz. Why didn't it happen?
Admiral Gortney. Because we're working against physics,
sir. Our system is designed to detect, track, identify. We have
a decisionmaking process to decide what to do, and then we
engage.
And that system is netted sensors, radars, cameras, and
other capabilities that are out there. And we employ that
system to the best of our ability, mitigate the risk to the
best of our ability.
But it's only capable down to a particular set of
characteristics that the platform that we want to track and
defend against is emitting, based on speed and based on size.
And I can go into further details in the classified
session.
Chairman Chaffetz. You are a spokesperson for Michael
Cuchara in an article dated April 16 in the Baltimore Sun. You
had launched some balloons at the Aberdeen Proving Ground
called the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated
Netted Sensor System, otherwise known as JLENS. It was designed
to help officials, ``spot low-flying, slow-moving targets.''
Was it working? Was it operational?
Admiral Gortney. It's not operational, sir. We put it up in
Aberdeen to test it. It's in testing today. It's not netted
into our system. And in the investigation we're going to find
out, while it's in its test mode, was it able to detect that
particular traffic.
Chairman Chaffetz. It wasn't operational on that day? You
weren't testing at that time?
Admiral Gortney. It's not operational. It's in a test
process right now. We're using it as a test platform. And it is
not integrated into our system. Should it prove to be
effective, our choice is to put it into our system and make it
operational, but it's not operational today.
Chairman Chaffetz. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol uses the
tethered aerostat radar system, or TARS.
Why aren't you using that?
Admiral Gortney. That's why we're putting--we think JLENS
has more promise. And the reason we think JLENS has more
promise than that is--I'll have to defer to the next session,
sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. Once you detect something, whose job and
role and responsibility is it to take it down?
Admiral Gortney. Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of
Defense. And if they're not there, it's my decision or to my
deputies.
Chairman Chaffetz. Whose decision is it if they see
something visually, the Capitol Police, Chief Dine?
Chief Dine. Mr. Chairman, as officers do every day, if they
see something that is a threat to them or anyone else----
Chairman Chaffetz. When did they see it?
Chief Dine. They saw it seconds before it landed, as it was
above the statue at Grant Circle.
Chairman Chaffetz. And what was the decisionmaking tree at
that point?
Chief Dine. They go through their training in terms of
threat and use-of-force training. And I believe they, in this
instance, made the appropriate decision based on the manner in
which it landed, the compliance of the pilot, and the distance
from the building.
Chairman Chaffetz. So we did have guns trained on it? They
decided not to fire?
Chief Dine. They made an instantaneous decision to do what
they did and quickly arrest him, apprehend him----
Chairman Chaffetz. As opposed to shooting it out?
Chief Dine. Yes, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. You say in your written Statement that
the caller from the Tampa Bay Times, presumably here, advised
the Sergeant that Hughes' live feed could be seen on Hughes'
Website, which he provided. You later said but it did not find
the live feed noted by the individuals from the Tampa Bay
Times.
Why weren't you able to see it when so many others were? I
mean, we had news organizations who were sending their
reporters down there because they were watching it.
Chief Dine. Yes, sir. Clearly, the media knew about this
ahead of time. When we got that call and that one email, we
immediately began to investigate. And minutes later he landed.
Chairman Chaffetz. You told me last week personally that
you would provide to me that email. Yet, we have not been
provided that email.
Will you provide this committee that email?
Chief Dine. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. We have also asked to meet with the
individuals who--I would like this committee, certainly myself,
the ranking member, the House Administration, Candice Miller
and her ranking member, to meet with the people who had their
guns up ready to fire.
Will you make those people available to us?
Chief Dine. Absolutely. We can work through the United
States Attorney's Office. Obviously, as you know, this case is
under prosecution.
Mr. Cummings. Will the chairman yield just for a second?
Chairman Chaffetz. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. When will we get the email that the chairman
just asked you about? When will we get that? I thought we would
have this by now.
Chief Dine. I can provide it to you immediately.
Mr. Cummings. That means right after this hearing?
Chief Dine. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
Chairman Chaffetz. Last question before I turn it over to
the ranking member.
You say in your written Statement, Chief Dine, that due to
the extremely short timeframe between the lockdown order and
the direction to lift the lockdown, no messages were sent to
the congressional community advising the lockdown.
The gyrocopter landed at 1:23 p.m. You say later in your
testimony the gyrocopter was determined to be clear of any
hazards at 2:57 p.m. And, yet, it was 5:03 p.m. Before any
notice went out.
Why did it take so long?
Chief Dine. You're absolutely correct, Mr. Chairman. We
immediately fixed that. The next day I gave a directive to our
people to put out messages to the entire community that affect
the community.
What no one got was a lockdown message. We did send some
messages out to the Senate community based on their direction.
But that matter has been fixed. We had an overly complex
notification system, and we have immediately fixed that. And
that will not happen again.
Chairman Chaffetz. To the Sergeant at Arms, Mr. Irving,
welcome back. I know you have had some duties there with the
Prime Minister.
But why didn't we get notification that there was a
potential threat?
Mr. Irving. Mr. Chairman, frankly, there was a mix-up in
the Command Center, lack of communication between my staff and
the Capitol Police command staff. That will not happen again,
as the Chief said. We have fixed that. So we vow that that
won't happen again.
Chairman Chaffetz. I mean, they are the same people. They
are in the same room. Correct?
Mr. Irving. It is correct. They are all in the same room.
And the notification should have gone out. It was an error. In
most cases, the notifications do go out.
We had had an incident the prior weekend. They were
flawless. In this case, they were not. And we assure you that
it will not happen again.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
I will now recognize the ranking member, the gentleman from
Maryland, Mr. Cummings, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chief Dine, I wanted to ask you about the Capitol Police
and your current policies on when to use lethal force. The
chairman and others have suggested that you should have shot
down the gyrocopter. But others disagree, and you seem to
disagree.
This incident was not the first time the Capitol Police
have had to make a life-or-death judgment call in a matter of
seconds.
In 1998, a deranged individual burst through the doors of
the Capitol and shot and killed two Capitol Police officers.
That was a tragic event, and I am certain that it is on the
minds of every single Capitol Police officer who stands guard
outside these doors.
Chief Dine, do you believe that the shooting in 1998
influenced how the Capitol Police handle threats of this nature
today and when this incident happened?
Chief Dine. Yes, sir. In fact, every threat that this
agency and other agencies face ends up influencing the history
of that agency and the policies that they put in place.
Mr. Cummings. Well, can you please tell us what impact, if
any, does that shooting in 1998 have on the policies used by
the Capitol Police today? I mean, how did that affect it?
Chief Dine. Well, we changed our security posture. And, of
course, I would be glad to discuss that more in closed session.
But we drastically changed our security posture throughout the
Capitol in terms of methods and staffing.
In this instance that we're talking about today, obviously,
as in any instance where an officer has to make a split-second
decision to use force or not to save their lives or others'
lives, that's what officers are up against every day.
In this particular instance, given all of the
ramifications, some of which we discussed in closed session
last week, I think they made the appropriate decision.
But that's a challenge that officers face every single day,
whether it's on one of their checkpoints, during a traffic
stop, when they're stopping people around the campus, et
cetera.
Mr. Cummings. Without going into any classified
information, tell me this.
This incident that we are talking about today, has that
caused you all to change anything about your policies with
regard to shoot-downs or lethal force?
Chief Dine. We have not changed anything yet, but it has
caused us, like those other seminal moments that you
referenced, to reexamine how we do business.
Mr. Cummings. Now, about 2 years ago, in 2013, there was
another incident. A woman drove onto the Capitol Grounds,
fleeing law enforcement, and the Capitol Police shot and killed
her. We learned later that the woman was mentally ill and that
she was not armed and that she had a 1-year-old baby in the
backseat of the car.
Is that right, Chief Dine?
Chief Dine. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Now, while some praised the response of the
Capitol Police, others criticized.
Chief Dine, what impact, if any, did this incident, that
is, this incident that I just talked about, have on your
policies for using lethal force?
Chief Dine. Ranking Member Cummings, as you know, that
matter is under litigation. But I can tell you every time we
face one of these instances it causes us to examine and re-
examine how we do business.
And the fact of the matter is, during every one of these
instances, it's that police officer on the street that has
literally seconds to make a decision about whether their life
is in danger or someone else's is in danger, and they do their
best to make the best judgment at that time.
Mr. Cummings. Now, it seems clear that, in both cases, the
officers had to respond almost instantly, as you said, life-or-
death decisions.
With respect to the gyrocopter incident earlier this month,
some have suggested that the Capitol Police made a mistake by
not shooting him out of the air.
Keeping in mind that this is a public session, can you tell
us generally what steps the Capitol Police took with respect to
using lethal force against the gyrocopter pilot.
Chief Dine. Yes, sir. Based on the circumstances of that
day, literally seconds, having seen it, having observed it
land, the manner in which it landed, the geography from the
United States Capitol, the compliance of the pilot, and all of
those kinds of things, as well as we discussed in closed
session the ramifications which officers have to take into
consideration as well when they're considering using lethal
force, and the ramifications of that force and the impact it
may have on others--all of those decisions are processed
literally in a matter of seconds.
And that is what happened in this case. And I believe their
actions were heroic. They quickly approached, arrested the
individual. We screened the vehicle as well K-9-wise and then
used additional capabilities after that to make sure everybody
was safe.
Mr. Cummings. Just out of curiosity, is there simulation
for these types of incidents in the training?
Chief Dine. Well, frankly, that's something that we're all
examining because, when airborne vehicles reach the point where
they become a law enforcement issue versus a DOD issue--that's
a phenomenon that we're all examining.
Mr. Cummings. So you are saying--you didn't answer my
question.
That is not a part of simulation right now. Is that what
you are trying to tell me?
Chief Dine. Well, we have the capability to do what we need
to do and take any vehicle down. I don't know that historically
police agencies have practiced shooting at aircrafts.
But that's something that is clearly under--but I want to
make it clear we have the capabilities to do what we need to
do. I do want to make that clear to the committee.
Mr. Cummings. Just two more questions.
There seems to be a suggestion that the Capitol Police
should have just shot him down.
Without disclosing any sensitive information, can you tell
us whether the Capitol Police had an opportunity to take down
the gyrocopter and, if so, why they didn't.
Chief Dine. I would say in this instance the answer is no
based on, again, the manner in which it landed.
Mr. Cummings. You are saying no to what?
Chief Dine. No, sir. They did not literally have the
ability to do it based on height and its proximity to other
people and all of the ramifications and how quickly it landed
and then based on the whole decisionmaking matrix that I
mentioned. But there's often a split second or so where an
officer has to make that decision.
Mr. Cummings. And last, but not least: Why do you say that
the Capitol Police officers made the right decision? You have
reiterated that over and over and over again, and I just want
to know why you feel so sure about that.
Chief Dine. Because they, in this instance--and each
instance is unique when a police officer faces those kinds of
challenges. Each and every one is totally unique with a unique
set of circumstances.
But in this one, given the timing, given the lack of
information about any credible threat, given all of the
ramifications that may have taken place had shots been fired, I
believe they acted quickly, bravely, and heroically.
Chairman Chaffetz. Before the gentleman yields back, I have
to ask you a question.
I have asked you directly in closed doors and in here
whether or not you had somebody with a gun trained on these
people that could take him out of the air. And, yet, when Mr.
Cummings asked that same question in a different way, you say
no. You told me yes.
What is it?
Chief Dine. We clearly have officers out there with
weaponry that are----
Chairman Chaffetz. In this instance, with the gyrocopter
coming at the Capitol, did you--and it may have been brief.
Believe me, I understand you didn't get much advance warning.
Chief Dine. Right.
Chairman Chaffetz. But did you or did you not have guns
trained on this gyrocopter to take him out of the air if he had
continued to fly on?
Chief Dine. They trained guns on him----
Chairman Chaffetz. No. No. No.
Did they have guns on him in this instance? Yes or no.
Chief Dine. As he was landing.
Chairman Chaffetz. So he was in the air?
Chief Dine. As he landed. I would say as he landed.
Chairman Chaffetz. This is why we have got to talk to the
people who are actually----
Mr. Cummings. Yes.
Reclaiming my time just very quickly, how far was he from
the ground? Picking up on where the chairman left off, how far
was he from the ground, if you know, when the Capitol Police
had an opportunity to shoot him down?
Chief Dine. I believe the officer first saw him when he was
right above Grant statue, which was literally right atop Grant
statue, which is seconds from when he landed.
Mr. Cummings. Very well.
I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. We need further clarification of that.
I now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, for
holding this meeting.
What we have experienced with this incident is, again,
another horrible communications failure of the system, and this
isn't new.
The ranking member just cited back in October 2013 we had
the deranged individual, a woman, who actually backed into
someone at the White House, came across the entire distance of
downtown, metropolitan D.C., went through the barriers, and the
communications failed.
Chief Dine, I wrote you on October 8, right after that. I
said, ``We all appreciate and commend your actions. I am
contacting you to request your response about concerns that
were highlighted in this tragic act.''
No. 1, it is my understanding the Secret Service, Capitol
Police, Park Service, and District of Columbia Police, and
other agencies have interoperable communications.
You know, when I raise this, there are other things here.
We spent a quarter of a billion when we did the Capitol Visitor
Center in redoing bollards and all of the things after 9/11,
and that failed. Those communication systems failed. Now, they
failed again.
I am stunned. I am still--this is how we get a warning. OK?
This device still has not gone off to this instance. My office
is right down the hall here. My desk faces out. So I could look
at the Capitol lawn.
I am sitting there at 1:20 watching what is coming down.
And I am on the phone, and I look and there is a police vehicle
not on the road, not on the path, but coming up the grass.
There is another officer with, I mean, a pretty powerful
weapon.
I have got pictures of it. We snapped some of the pictures
of it. I said to the staff, ``I don't know what is going on,
but something's coming down.'' Well, we never heard a thing.
This is the first communication that I got. Let me get the
exact communication. What is the date here? Well, actually, it
wasn't until 5:02. There was no notification. This is a message
from the Sergeant at Arms. ``The Capitol have cleared the
police activity.'' We never knew what was coming down.
Now, granted, a week before, on Saturday, the 11th, we had
incredible notice. It was Saturday. Were you here, Mr.
Chairman? No. Was anyone here? No one was here.
It was a serious situation. Someone ended up, we found out,
committing suicide. It worked very well. This thing went crazy.
My annunciator went crazy. I got lots of notice.
But it is working some of the time, not all of the time.
Isn't that right, Chief Dine?
Chief Dine. It now will work all the time, sir. And your
point is well taken.
Mr. Mica. Well, again, I don't think I got a response from
you. I asked the staff, ``Where is my letter to Dine from the
last incident?''
You know, a lot of people around here wanted to sweep this
under the table. It was an embarrassing situation. But it can't
happen again.
Mr. Huerta, FAA, a gyrocopter can lift how many pounds?
Mr. Huerta. A small gyrocopter of this----
Mr. Mica. 254 pounds. Right?
Mr. Huerta. Its weight is about 250 pounds.
Mr. Mica. But it can lift, I think, that much. It falls
into a category.
So you can have a 200-pound individual, right, flying it,
we will say?
Mr. Huerta. Yes.
Mr. Mica. So what capacity does that leave? 50 pounds?
Mr. Huerta. It is a very small capacity.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Clancy, no one knew what was on that
helicopter. You guys didn't know, did you? Did anyone know what
was on the helicopter?
We were told some time ago, but nobody connects the dots.
But we didn't know whether it was letters to the Congressmen or
we didn't know whether it was, in fact, 50 pounds of plastic
explosive.
Mr. Clancy, what would 50 pounds of plastic explosive do to
the Capitol building? It would be pretty----
Mr. Clancy. It would be devastating.
Mr. Mica. Devastating.
Nobody knew--wait a second, too. I just heard today you
said the FAA domestic network was notified. What time? It went
up on the FAA domestic network. Who knows when that was? Huerta
or Clancy?
Mr. Huerta. About 1:34 in the afternoon.
Mr. Mica. That was afterwards?
Mr. Huerta. After it landed.
Mr. Mica. After it landed.
So there is something wrong there on the domestic FAA
notice. There is something wrong with the notice with the
Capitol Police.
At 1:23 you had the guy under arrest. We never knew. I
mean, I am not afraid. I have been here through 9/11. If they
want to take me out, take me out. Give me a chance. Give our
staff a chance. Give us notice. Make this thing work. OK?
Again, I don't think it is too much to ask that we get this
thing right. And there is a lot at stake, not just saving
Members of Congress.
We have got new threats. And I brought up the drone before
the drone landed on the White House, the White House. They
still don't have--we had another jumper, didn't we, Mr. Clancy,
just recently?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir, we did.
Mr. Mica. How long before we get the fence increased? I
told you I got the name of a great welder. He has welded my
fence in Florida. I will get him up here. I've got the name of
ADT. We can get them in here to put in systems.
But we still don't have the fence secure there, do we? It
is not heightened. You can still jump over the fence. How long?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, in the summer. The attachment will be
attached this summer.
Mr. Mica. OK.
Yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentleman.
I will now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Lynch, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Chairman, before you do that, this letter has
to be in the record at some point. This is my letter to Chief
Dine from some time ago.
Chairman Chaffetz. Ask unanimous consent to do that.
Without objection, it is ordered.
Mr. Mica. It is the only email I got at 5, after it was all
over.
And one more thing. Would you yield for just a second for
the benefit of members.
I sent you back--and I was told afterwards the staff said
you didn't get it. ``I have searched my messages to see if an
alert was sent out on this incident. Was one sent? Congressman
John Mica.'' The staff told me we can't respond to you, that
you only send these alerts out.
So I sent this out the same day after the--well, the day
after the incident, finding out if anything had been sent, and
I missed it. But there is no way for us to contact you. We need
a way to contact you.
Thank you.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentleman.
We are going to recognize, I guess, the gentlewoman from
the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton, first for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
This is an important hearing. You can't have an incident
like this and not have a hearing. And I know that witnesses
understand this. I certainly appreciate the work they do.
And I think, essentially, gentlemen, the problem you are
facing is getting ahead of risks and threats that may be
unbelievable, but that is what the Congress and, for that
matter, the public expects you to do.
I mean, we are fortunate that that gyrocopter didn't have a
chemical or an explosive in it. And, of course, we know that
you knew it did not. And we know--and this is why I have
question first for Mr. Huerta.
I believe we know that it was not possible for existing
technology that keeps the violation of an airspace--that we can
go, we can catch a helicopter, we can catch a small plane.
But, technically, do we have the technology to capture
``wigamadoos'' that fly below that airspace that is more
typical?
Mr. Huerta. Congresswoman Norton, what the FAA provides to
the surveillance capability is radar feeds. And radar that the
FAA uses for our purposes to separate air traffic is filtered
to ensure that a controller is able to safely separate traffic
transiting the region's airports and the region's airspace.
This very small aircraft flying through is not something
that a controller would ordinarily pick up in the course of
carrying out their aircraft separation activities.
Ms. Norton. So, you see, I am not going to ask law
enforcement on the ground to do the impossible, but I am going
to ask law enforcement on the ground to tell us ahead of time
what the impossible is.
I mean, we are asking you to do Star Wars-type thinking
about who could fly like you fly a kite. And if we don't think
about it, we know who will be thinking about it. So I am
interested in separating out what is technically possible and
what is technically not possible.
And I want to know, Mr. Huerta, why Congress hasn't been
asked for the capability to fly below that usual airspace
where, by the way, if anybody gets into that airspace, we send
National Guard planes up in the air right way, instantly.
If we don't have the ability to do something tantamount to
that, then the only people who really know it, who can get
ahead of the game for us, are those of you who are on the
ground who don't have that capability.
And we, therefore, have to think about risks that only law
enforcement, frankly, has the capability to envision. And I
want to know why the Congress hasn't been asked for the means
to provide that capability.
Mr. Huerta. Congresswoman Norton, what I was referring to
is the FAA's surveillance capability that is provided to this
whole government effort. But the entire government surveillance
network is not limited to that, and I would defer to my
colleagues from DOD.
Admiral Gortney. Ma'am, I'm prepared to answer that
question for you, the investments that Congress has made, but I
need to do that in a closed session.
Ms. Norton. Thank you.
It would be very important for Congress to know can we do
it. To say to people on the ground to do it, as Chief Dine
says, you see it in a few seconds, take it down, that is not
what happens if I try to fly a helicopter into the airspace.
So I want to give you the same capability the same time
that those who have tried to pierce our airspace have found
they just can't do it so we don't see you having to shoot down
much up there because you have the technology to do it. And in
closed session, we need to know that, and we need to know it
now.
And one of the reasons we need to know it now is the first
thing I find that officials do when they don't have the
capability is they keep the public out. They say, ``We know how
to make sure nobody gets hurt. Nobody gets in.'' And I am not
accusing you of doing that, but I have to tell you it has been
often the first reflex.
We seem to work on a case-by-case basis. Now we know
probably that Chief Dine, that our police officers--because he
said they saw it only a few seconds and then they had to get
themselves together. But the case-by-case way to go at security
assures us that there will be a terrible thing to happen and
then we will take care of it.
So what I am trying to find out is if we can get the
capabilities before you have the obligation even to do
something about it because it hasn't occurred yet. And I will
be interested in that in closed session.
But I am interested in closing down the Capitol. When
anthrax occurred, I had to go on the House floor and literally
embarrass the police to get the Capitol open. It was closed for
months because the Capitol Police couldn't think of a way to
keep it open.
It was terrible to have the Capitol itself closed. And I
want to make sure--I have seen no evidence that the Capitol is
being closed, that those grounds are being closed, and I want
assurance that that is not taking place.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentlewoman.
Does anybody care to comment on that?
Ms. Norton. Could I have an answer at least?
Chairman Chaffetz. Sure.
Ms. Norton. Can people still go where they were able to go
before, Chief Dine?
Chief Dine. Yes, ma'am. The Capitol is open right now.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much.
Chairman Chaffetz. Recognize the gentleman from Michigan,
Mr. Walberg, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks to the panel for being here. I think we all
understand you have to be right all of the time. They have to
be right once. And so we appreciate the fact of what you deal
with. I just have relatively few questions that could be asked
without going into some closed session.
But, first of all, to Director Clancy, I am having a hard
time wrapping my mind around the fact that Secret Service had
the recognition of this gentleman and his intentions to fly
here and to land, as I understand it, on the Capitol sometime
before, in 2014, in fact, early 2014, and that Secret Service
interviewed Mr. Hughes based on some information he was putting
out back in August, September, and October 2013.
So with that in mind, with that lead up to it, plus the day
of the flight there was also phone calls made from the Tampa
newspaper to Secret Service, my question is: Did the Secret
Service share all the information that it should have with
other relevant law enforcement agencies with responsibility for
the D.C. Airspace?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, Congressman. On October 4, our Denver
field office did get a call from an individual who knew of Mr.
Hughes' plan. This is October 2013.
We relayed that information to our partners at Capitol
Police, and that day we also--that following day we went and
interviewed that individual to get more details. As we got more
details, we realized that Mr. Hughes, the subject here, lived
in Tampa Bay.
We sent our Tampa Bay office agents down there to interview
him. He denied any interest in any of our protectees, denied
any interest in the White House, and he had no indication that
he would be flying up into the Washington, DC, area.
We did do additional interviews with additional associates
who corroborated the first call that we received in Denver that
he did have some aspirations to do this. But, again, there was
no indication that any of our protectees or any of our
protected facilities were--that he had the intent to do this.
But we did share the information.
Mr. Walberg. But you shared it with them.
So, Chief Dine, you had that information back in early
2014, that there was an individual of interest, at least, that
had some idea to fly and bring letters to Congress in a very
unusual way?
Chief Dine. Yes, sir. The Secret Service shared that
information with us. Yes, sir.
Mr. Walberg. What did Capitol Police know about Mr. Hughes
and his intentions prior to him landing on the Capitol Grounds
subsequent to getting this information? What else came through
that should have highlighted something happening?
Chief Dine. Subsequent to that case being essentially
closed or suspended by us and the Secret Service, nothing up
until minutes before he landed. As I had mentioned earlier, we
got a fairly cryptic email and a phone call that was not date-
or time-specific, talking about whether or not--were we aware
of this and whether or not he had a permit. That was literally
minutes before he landed.
Mr. Walberg. But April 15, as I am seeing a time line here,
an individual made a call to Secret Service's Tampa field
office to warn of Hughes' plan.
Was that information shared with you?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, on October 15, we received a call from an
individual who did not give any time or date or specifics
regarding----
Mr. Walberg. This was April 15 that I have here.
Mr. Clancy. April 15. Yes, sir.
Just an individual had called our Tampa Bay office and
asked specifically for a specific agent, and we said the agent
is no longer assigned to the office. And this individual said,
``Well, just let him know I called.'' There was no specifics to
Mr. Hughes or to this flight.
Mr. Walberg. So the Tampa Bay Times, then, reporter called
Secret Service on April 15 at 1.
Mr. Clancy. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Walberg. He landed at 1:23. So we have got 23 minutes
still.
Let me ask Chief MacLean to join in here as well.
Was there any notification of all the entities that
someone, indeed, is starting this flight, is on his way, he is
live-streaming it, he may be coming over your territory? Is
there any action that can be taken even with the Park Service
in stopping someone flying low?
Chief MacLean. To answer the first part of your question,
the United States Park Police did not have any actionable
information--let me correct that--no information regarding Mr.
Hughes coming to this area prior to our officer patrolling
witnessing the aircraft.
Mr. Walberg. Well, Mr. Chairman, I guess it leaves me with
great concern that, when information is given, crackpot or
otherwise, and then the day that the event takes place we had
information that is given and still this person is able to make
it all those miles and, more importantly, across the restricted
airspace, coming across our monument area, leading up to our
Capitol itself and then lands, and nothing happens until this
person is on the ground.
I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Lynch, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank the ranking member.
This is not good. I mean, this is on top of a lot of other
incidents that we have been talking about at the White House as
well.
You know, I get the feeling that, just as before 9/11, if
you visited an airport in the United States, we had very little
security going on. Yet, if you visited Ben Gurion Airport or
Leonardo da Vinci Airport or Heathrow, those countries had
dealt with terrorism before us and they were all tooled up.
They were ready. They had heavy weapons. They had metal
detectors.
And, yet, we were lulled into a false sense of security. I
get the sense that we are behind the curve again. You know, you
visit any of these--the committee's involved in hardening our
facilities overseas. And you go into any major capital in
Europe or the Middle East or Africa and they are taking
precautions that we are not.
And I know there is a balance between public access and
security, but we have gotten to the point where I am worried
about the President. I am worried about his family. I am
worried about the security on the grounds here at the Capitol.
I am worried about the Supreme Court across the street.
And I just have to say that we had advanced notice, albeit
you had to connect the dots and you had to talk to each other.
This was not good, that a fellow was able to fly in here and
land a gyrocopter on the lawn. It is not good. And I know we
have got a bunch of reasons why it happened, and it seems like
we have got some excuses. But that is just not good enough.
And I have a lot of respect for the panel individually. And
I don't know if it is a lack of communication between
departments, but we have got to do better. Dear God, we have
got to do better.
Since this guy landed the gyrocopter on the lawn, is there
anything that we have done that we would do differently if that
were to happen today and someone with nefarious intent, a
terrorist, were to do the same damn thing? Anybody? OK.
So we are doing basically the same thing that we were doing
when this guy did his thing. We need change. We need change.
And I don't know--you know, Mr. Clancy, I have got enormous
respect for you and the job that you do. I really do.
But can you tell me what you need to make the White House
safe, the Capitol safe, the Supreme Court safe, with respect to
the airspace that you are charged to guard.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. Before I address that, I would just
like to say, in this particular incident, we believe--and this
is a team effort, certainly among the members here on the
panel, but certainly among the American people, too. And the
Department of Homeland Security has this initiative for see
something, say something. And we feel very strongly that
Americans need to----
Mr. Lynch. But people said something. People said
something. A few people said something. And we all saw
something. And some of your colleagues saw things or their
employees saw things. And this still went forward, right to the
door of the Capitol.
That is what gets me. And there were a lot of the public
that were, you know, exposed to potential danger, people
bringing their families here. So it is not just, you know,
self-preservation here among Members of Congress. We are
worried about the general public as well.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. And you're exactly right, sir.
I think if, for example, the Tampa Bay Times had informed
us prior to departure of this aircraft, we could have had a
response team at Gettysburg or law enforcement would have. Or
if we were notified a day in advance, days in advance, we could
have had law enforcement down in Florida. So I think that's
part of that team effort.
But in terms of your second question, sir--I'm sorry.
Mr. Lynch. Well, look, if your officers are on the ground
or your agents are on the ground and they see--what are the
orders--just at a very basic level, what are the orders for a
Capitol Police officer or a Secret Service agent that there is
an object flying toward the Capitol? Are we still stand and
watch? Are we still passive or are they under orders to do
something?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, for the Secret Service, I'll just say
that, first, it's communication and then we take a defensive
posture.
We rely on the radar that we see and the communication to
take a defensive posture if we need to move any of our
protectees or any of the guests by our protected facilities. So
that's our first move, cover and evacuate.
Mr. Lynch. That doesn't work very well with a suicide
bomber or something like that, though. I mean, obviously, you
shelter in place to the degree you can, but----
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lynch. I don't know. I just think maybe we have got to
talk about this more in a classified briefing. But this cannot
stand.
I yield back.
Mr. Cummings. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Lynch. Sure.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
I have got to ask you this. This is getting to be very
painful.
Mr. Clancy, you said that it is a team effort. I agree. But
the gentleman just asked a question, and the silence was
chilling.
He asked a question--and I am talking to all of you now--
are we doing--and I just--if it is classified information, tell
us, and we will deal with it. But I do need to know a yes or
no.
Have we done things now that put us in a better position
than where we were on the day of this offense? And I don't want
silence. It is not good enough.
Chief Dine. Sir, the answer is yes. And I would be glad to
discuss that in a closed session.
Mr. Cummings. And has that been a team effort?
Chief Dine. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Very well. Thank you.
Chairman Chaffetz. I now recognize the gentleman from North
Carolina, Mr. Meadows, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So let me pick up on this team environment. Prior to this
incident, how many times have all of you met as an agency to
discuss new technology that may be a threat to the Capitol or
the White House or to other assets? How many times have you all
met together prior to this incident to discuss that?
Mr. Salesses. Congressman, if I can take that,
individually, I can't say that we have all met frequently at
all. But there is a lot of working done among the Federal
departments.
Mr. Meadows. So it is not frequent. So how often? How many
times have you done it, where all of you have gotten together?
You are the team. You talk about the team. Now, we know a lot
about teams. The Bad News Bears were a team, too, and they
didn't do real well.
Mr. Salesses. But, Congressman, if I could, our staffs work
together.
Mr. Meadows. So have your staffs all been in a room to
discuss that prior to this incident? And, if so, how many
times?
Mr. Salesses. Sir, first of all----
Mr. Meadows. Do you know how many times?
Mr. Meadows. Do you know how many times?
Mr. Salesses. Yes, sir. That is twice-a-month meetings with
our staff.
Mr. Meadows. To discuss the technology and what is
different?
Mr. Salesses. Yes, sir. And, if I could, I'd like to just
take a little--what has been going on, Congressman, is there is
a national effort. The National Security Staff has been leading
an effort over the last year to look at UAVs in particular,
what we refer to as nontraditional aircraft, whether they are
gyrocopters, UAVs or----
Mr. Meadows. So you just haven't come up with an answer?
Mr. Salesses. No. No, sir. I want to----
Mr. Meadows. But we can put a man on the moon. We can fly a
rover to Mars.
Can't we figure out how to stop a postal worker with a
gyrocopter coming in to the grounds?
Mr. Salesses. Sir, the work that is being done between the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the
Department of Transportation, and recently the National Science
and Technology Council fast-track looking at technologies that
could help. Again----
Mr. Meadows. So when will we have a plan? Admiral, when
will we have a plan? You said you are the guy in charge. When
will we have a plan to make sure that this doesn't happen in
case there is 50 pounds of plastic explosives?
Admiral Gortney. Sir, when we go to closed session, I will
show you what we have, what we are testing, and when we will--
--
Mr. Meadows. I am not asking what the plan is. I said when
will we have it.
Admiral Gortney. Sir, I need to do that in a closed
session.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So let me ask you a different
question. Because the silence a deafening.
So if you get together twice a month, your staff, how many
times have most of you or all of you gotten together to discuss
your responses to this hearing? Did you meet as a group to
discuss your responses to this hearing?
Mr. Salesses. Yes, sir, we did. Yesterday. Yes, sir.
Mr. Meadows. So what you are saying is you all got together
to discuss your response to this hearing, but, yet, you all
don't get together necessarily individually, your staffs do, to
discuss the protection of assets here?
Mr. Salesses. Congressman, we also----
Mr. Meadows. Yes or no?
Mr. Salesses. No, sir. We do at the White House. We have
deputy-level meetings and----
Mr. Meadows. So all of you got together to discuss your
responses to this hearing? When did you do that?
Mr. Salesses. Yesterday, sir.
Mr. Meadows. Why would you do that? If you were just
wanting to be transparent, why would you try to coordinate your
answers to this hearing? Are you more afraid of the Government
oversight than you are of protecting the people?
Mr. Salesses. No, sir, we are not.
Mr. Meadows. So why would you have gotten together to
discuss you responses if they were individual responses there?
Mr. Salesses. To talk about some of the lessons we learned,
sir.
Mr. Meadows. Talk about the lessons before you testify? Is
that what you were doing----
Mr. Salesses. No, sir.
Mr. Meadows [continuing]. Preparing your testimony?
Mr. Salesses. No, sir. We were talking----
Mr. Meadows. So none of you prepared your testimony.
Mr. Clancy, is that your sworn testimony today, that you
didn't talk about how you would testify before this hearing?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, we did talk about what we could talk about
in the open hearing as opposed to a closed hearing, and we
wanted to make sure----
Mr. Meadows. So was there any strategy to those discussions
on what you would say and what you wouldn't say in terms of how
you would look, Mr. Clancy, before this hearing?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, the discussion was, again, what could be
talked about in the open hearing and what could not be talked
about in the open hearing.
Mr. Meadows. Well, my understanding is that it was a lot
more strategic than that.
Am I wrong, Mr. Huerta? You and I have a good relationship,
an honest relationship. Was that discussed in terms of what you
would say and what you would not say in terms of response to
the questions?
Mr. Huerta. No, it was not.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So what was discussed?
Mr. Huerta. I think, as you've heard from these other two
gentlemen, it was simply a discussion of what could be said in
open versus----
Mr. Meadows. What I find very concerning, Mr. Chairman--
what I find very concerning is all of you are willing to get
together to discuss your testimony before coming here to be
honest and, yet, the American people expect just honesty and,
yet, what we have is a coordinated effort to be a stone wall.
That is concerning, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
I need to add--and I said it in my opening--when we asked
you all to come privately brief four committees of Congress,
more than half of you said no. I don't understand that. I
really don't understand that.
You can sit here in public testimony and say, ``We are
doing everything we can.'' This is the way our system works. It
is inexcusable to me that you would refuse to come to Congress
a week after the attack and give us a brief. Three of you did,
but four of you didn't. And that is why you get questions like
that, because the time you did get together, nobody was in the
room.
Sounds like you all coordinated on how to message this and
you spent more time doing that than you did briefing Congress,
being candid with us.
I now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Cartwright, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cartwright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank also my colleague from Massachusetts, and I wish to
associate myself with his remarks.
He talked about that this is not a question of self-
preservation for Members of Congress. We think about not only
ourselves, but we think about the people who come to visit us
from our districts. We think about the young people who help
enable us to do the work that we do. We are talking about
thousands and thousands of young people, interns and fellows
and employees on Capitol Hill here, and we feel responsible to
them and their families and their parents to keep them safe.
All of these people are within the special flight rules
area, the SFRA, that you have discussed. They are all within
the national capital region flight area that you have been
talking about. And, more than that, the visitors who come and
visit our national memorials, the World War II Memorial, the
Jefferson Memorial.
We just had the National Cherry Blossom Festival a couple
of weeks ago. There had to be well over 100,000 Americans
visiting. All of those areas and the Tidal Basin are within the
special flight rules area; are they not? That is correct. An
area that was traversed by this knucklehead with a gyrocopter
who could easily have been a terrorist.
And so we take seriously a hearing like this. It isn't
about ourselves. It is about the huge number of Americans who
are in this special flight rules area and the national capital
region. And it is not just about gyrocopters either. It is
about drone as well. We have heard a lot in the past months
about drones and the threat they could cause to our national
security.
You know, Admiral Gortney, your testimony was--you said
this: What we now understand is that the gyrocopter was
detected by several of the integrated sensors as it approached
and transited through the SFRA, the special flight rules area.
However, the aircraft's flight parameters fell below the
threshold necessary to differentiate aircraft from weather,
terrain, birds, and other slow-flying objects so as to ensure
that the systems and those operating them focus on that which
poses the greatest threat.
You said: We are in the early stages of conducting a
thorough reconstruction and analysis of all aspects of this
incident, including time lines, communication, and sensor data.
And you said: Identifying low-altitude and slow-speed
aerial vehicles from other objects is a technical and
operational challenge.
Have I read that correctly, Admiral?
Admiral Gortney. That is correct, sir. And I can go into
greater detail in answering some of those questions in closed
session.
Mr. Cartwright. Well, here is my problem. Like my
colleagues up here on the dais and the public, I find the lack
of planning on how to respond to gyrocopters and drones
surprising and disappointing. These things are hardly new. The
British Army flew a drone as early as 1917. And here we are
nearly 100 years later and we are just starting to tackle the
problem.
I want to invite Mr. Huerta--your attention to this
question: When did the FAA first begin to think that drones may
be a security concern?
Mr. Huerta. Well, the FAA has specific direction from
Congress to swiftly integrate unmanned aircraft into the
national airspace system. That was included in the FAA
Authorization Act of 2012.
Since then, we have published a road map for their
integration and we have embarked upon a stage integration
process to find ways to integrate these into the national
airspace system.
But we do cooperate with our interagency partners on the
larger question of what they may pose as a security threat. Our
mandate and our direction is to find a way to integrate them so
that they don't pose a safety of flight issue.
Mr. Cartwright. Well, back to you, Admiral Gortney.
You said: Identifying these vehicles is a technical and
operational challenge. ``Challenge'' is a nice word for
``problem,'' something that we are really having a hard time
with.
So the question is: How long have you known this was a
challenge, Admiral?
Admiral Gortney. Sir, we've been working against the low-
radar cross-section target for probably over 25 years. I've
been in the aviation business for over 38. So we understand the
problem. We understand the technical challenges.
And if we go to closed session, we can show you the
solutions that we have in place and we are currently testing,
but I can't do it in an open session.
Mr. Cartwright. On a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the most
urgent, how urgent is this, gentlemen?
Mr. Salesses. Very.
Admiral Gortney. In the protection of the United States and
Canada and the homeland defense and my role as the NORAD
commander, it is my primary responsibility. On a scale of 1 to
10, it's on about a 50.
Mr. Cartwright. I look forward to the closed session. Thank
you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
I now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
Mulvaney, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mulvaney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to go about this a little bit differently, a
little bit more straightforward.
At any time did we have the ability to interdict and to
shoot this guy down? Mr. Gortney? Admiral?
Admiral Gortney. No, sir. We did not because we did not
have a detection, our ability to track it or positively
identify it to queue our sensors. If we had--I can't go any
farther.
Mr. Mulvaney. That is fine. That is fine. I obviously don't
want to know anything that we can't do in public session. I am
just curious.
Admiral Gortney. But I have that answer for you.
Mr. Mulvaney. We hear around here that we had the ability,
but chose not to.
But you telling me that is not accurate?
Admiral Gortney. I need to go to closed session.
Mr. Mulvaney. Thanks very much.
So, then, I guess the same answer regarding, if the
gentleman had wanted to, he could have crashed this into the
Capitol building. Correct?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mulvaney. And the same is true for the White House or
the museums?
Admiral Gortney. If there was an intent, yes, sir.
Mr. Mulvaney. Would it have been different if it was a
small single-seat airplane?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. A small single-seat airplane,
the size of a Cessna or smaller, we'd probably be able to track
that.
Mr. Mulvaney. Got you.
Admiral Gortney. We would--we do it every--we track them
and we have two incidents a month where we actually launch our
helicopters on those sorts of things.
Mr. Mulvaney. OK. A similar result had it been a drone or
something smaller than a gyrocopter?
Admiral Gortney. That's correct.
Mr. Mulvaney. Who saw it first?
Mr. MacLean. An officer with the United States Park Police
saw it first.
Mr. Mulvaney. And it is fair to say that you were the only
one at the table who didn't know about this guy in advance.
Right?
Admiral Gortney. We did not.
Mr. Clancy. The Secret Service did not.
Mr. Huerta. We did not.
Mr. Mulvaney. NORAD didn't?
Admiral Gortney. We did not.
Mr. Mulvaney. OK. So the Secret Service knew.
Who else knew about this guy in advance, then? Park,
Capitol Police. But the Park Police did know about the guy. OK.
Let me figure out why he left from Gettysburg. Given that
any thought? Why would a guy drive from Florida to Pennsylvania
to do this? Does anybody have any thoughts on that? Does that
make sense to anybody? There is a lot of private airports,
small airports, between Florida and Gettysburg.
Admiral Gortney. I think with an ongoing investigation,
both legal and technical, it is difficult for us to answer that
question.
Mr. Mulvaney. Fair enough. All right.
Here is my last question, then. Because it sounds like most
of the stuff I want to know we will have to deal with in closed
setting.
Admiral Gortney, were you advised not to come here today?
Did anybody suggest to you not to come here today?
Admiral Gortney. No, sir.
Mr. Mulvaney. Did anybody suggest that you not come to the
briefing a couple weeks ago?
Admiral Gortney. We were seeking permission and did not
receive the permission. Why that happened I'm not sure, sir.
Mr. Mulvaney. From whom do you seek permission for that,
sir?
Admiral Gortney. We go through the Department of Defense.
Mr. Mulvaney. And who would the next person up the ladder
from you be in that----
Admiral Gortney. My chain of command goes from myself to
the Secretary of Defense to the President.
Mr. Mulvaney. OK. Mr. Salesses, the same question.
Mr. Salesses. Sir, I don't have a good answer for why we
didn't show. And I apologize for not showing. Because that's
not something the Department normally does.
Mr. Mulvaney. Did you seek permission to show and just----
Mr. Salesses. I was not aware that you were trying to
have--me personally, I was not aware of it.
Mr. Mulvaney. OK. Mr. Huerta?
Mr. Huerta. We were--I understood it to be a scheduling
issue. We had offered an alternative time the following
afternoon, and we did not hear back.
Mr. Mulvaney. Mr. Clancy, I think you were one of the ones
who did agree to come. Right?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mulvaney. With that, I will yield my time to the
chairman.
I guess we ask Mr. MacLean and Chief Dine the same
question, but I assume I know the answer there.
So go ahead, sir.
Chief MacLean. Yes, sir. I'm an employee of the United
States Department of the Interior. And they were planning to
schedule a properly--a proper witness to come and attend, and I
did attend the following day.
Mr. Mulvaney. OK. Chief Dine?
Chief Dine. Yes, sir. I was here last week. And, of course,
I am glad to be here today.
Mr. Mulvaney. I yield the balance of my time to the
chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
I now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Walker, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to look at the time line again and make sure that I
am clear on it. But let me back up just for a second.
How many different agencies or departments were contacted
at some point past or during the week of by the Tampa Bay Times
reporter? Just by a show of hands, who did he reach out to at
any point? Secret Service? OK.
Chief Dine, when did you first get contacted by the Tampa
Bay Times?
Chief Dine. That same day, a few minutes before he landed.
Mr. Walker. When you say ``a few minutes before,'' is that
the 1 p.m. Timeframe again?
Chief Dine. Well, 12:59. Yes, sir. And then at 1 p.m.
Mr. Walker. 12:59. And he lands at 1:24, 1:22?
Chief Dine. 1:23-ish.
Mr. Walker. 1:23.
So can you walk me through what you did in those 22, 23
minutes. Can you sort of give me a time line. What is your
first call? Just for my own education here.
Chief Dine. Yes, sir. 12:59 was the email. That email was
quickly sent to our Investigative Division, who began to try to
pull up information. Then a minute later he called our Command
Center. They talked to him a little bit. And then that
information was provided to our investigators as well.
Mr. Walker. When you say provided to your investigators,
what--when you have somebody that is approaching the Capitol in
this unidentified flying object, for lack of a better
expression, what do you do when you hear that information, that
this is something that could be encroaching into the airspace?
What happens? What is your next step?
Chief Dine. Well, what happened in this case was there was
no information that this was happening as they spoke or that it
was imminent. There was no time or day provided.
What they did do was do some research into the individual
himself and, also, check to see--one of the questions was was
there a waiver provided. So we have a system to access that as
well.
Mr. Walker. So are any of these agencies that you contact
once you hear that this is a possible situation--is there any
communication between the different departments or agencies
that this is a concern?
Chief Dine. In this instance, we contacted the NCRCC once
it came to fruition.
Mr. Walker. Mr. Clancy, you said you got information on
this as well? Is that correct?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, Tampa Bay Times called our Tampa Bay
office on April 13, but there was no specification regarding
Mr. Hughes, the gyrocopter.
The question was simply would we be involved in civil
disobedience displays by individuals, and we said we would be
if it involved our protectee or one of our protected
facilities. There was nothing specific.
Mr. Walker. One of the opening remarks--and I am trying to
remember specifically who talked about this--talked about on
the radar, distinguishable versus undistinguishable.
Can someone speak to that as far as--help me understand
that.
Mr. Huerta. An unfiltered radar feed picks up everything.
It is cluttered with--in addition to aircraft, will include
things such as traffic on the streets. It will include birds,
anything that is moving around.
And so, for our purposes at the FAA, we filter it for what
our primary function is, which is to safely separate aircraft,
and that means we filter out small things that might be a
distraction to a controller.
Now, what our forensic analysis showed was that the radar
did indicate something after the fact that we were able to
piece together as most likely the flight of the gyrocopter.
Mr. Walker. But would you agree that after the fact may not
be a good scenario?
Mr. Huerta. No. I would agree with that. But the point
being an air traffic controller can't do his job with a very
cluttered screen. And so what we are very focused on is how can
we ensure that a controller is able to safely separate air
traffic in our case.
Admiral Gortney. Sir, if I could----
Mr. Walker. Yes. I will come to the Admiral in just a
second.
Can you answer your own question there? How can that be
more safety conscious as far as being able to get through the
clutter on his own screen?
Mr. Huerta. What we do is--because the things that we are
filtering out are things like birds or weather systems or small
things that do not pose a threat to aviation safety.
Now, we do provide the unfiltered radar to our partners
across the Government, and each of the individual participants
filters it for their own purposes.
Mr. Walker. And I want to have time for the Admiral here.
But help me understand this.
Is there not--and you would know this, being the expert. If
someone is flying a gyrocopter, isn't that a different pattern
than what birds or other things may be flying around on a radar
or an FAA system?
Mr. Huerta. As I testified to earlier, it appeared and
disappeared. It actually had much more in common with a weather
system.
Mr. Walker. OK. Admiral?
Admiral Gortney. Sir, the characteristics on radar of an
aircraft of this size, flying the speed and the altitude--it
has the same characteristics of birds--of flocks of birds. It
can appear the same way.
And so we adjust. We take the feeds from the FAA as well as
our own sensors, and then we adjust those filters based on the
environmentals that would give us the highest probability to
pick up the smallest possible target that's a real target.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Admiral. My time has expired.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. I recognize the gentleman from Georgia,
Mr. Carter, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of you for being here. We appreciate the work
that you do. I have just three very quick questions for you or
maybe comments.
First of all, Mr. Clancy, thank you for being here. I
believe you were hear a couple of weeks ago and I closed my
comments with saying that I hoped I didn't see you anytime
soon. Here we are again.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carter. Chief Dine, I want to ask you--we had an
incident in Cannon--I believe it was last week--where there was
a suspicious powder that was found. I know that my staff had
four emails sent to them during that time. Yet, in this
situation with the gyrocopter, we only had one email sent to
us, and that was after the fact.
Why the difference there? What different scenario lead us
to that situation?
Chief Dine. The answer is that the systems we had in place
failed and we immediately fixed them. And I certainly
understand your concern.
So messages will be sent immediately now. And I appreciate
the fact that you acknowledge that we sent them in those other
instances.
Mr. Carter. We sent them in those other instances, but we
didn't with the gyrocopter?
Chief Dine. We sent some out, but clearly it was not
comprehensive enough. Yes, sir. You're correct.
Mr. Carter. Gentlemen, it just appears to me that we are
not keeping up with the times. I have been sitting here and I
hear what you say, that this needs to be discussed in a
confidential hearing, and I get that. But I am still not
confident--and I think the people want to be confident--that we
are keeping up with the times.
Drones aren't anything new. They have been around. And,
yet, all of a sudden we are having all these incidents. We read
about the incident in Japan with the Prime Minister and the
radioactive material that was sent there. That is scary. It is
scary for me and scary for everyone.
Are you comfortable and confident--and I want you to assure
the American people that you are--that we have got this under
control?
Admiral Gortney. Sir, we can assure the American people
that all of us at this table and the whole of Government is
working their very best to protect this Nation and its citizens
against the many threats that happen to be out there. In closed
session, I'll tell you what we're doing about this particular
threat.
Mr. Carter. Does that mean it is not going to happen again?
Admiral Gortney. I can never say it is not going to happen
again, sir.
Mr. Carter. I understand, that.
The last thing is the communication particularly among all
of you. You know, look, I am a freshman rep. I have been up
here for 4 months. But I have been in business for many years,
and I know that communication is the key and you have to
surround yourself with good people and you have to make sure
everybody is talking to each other.
But I am just not getting that warm and fuzzy feeling here
today after listening to all of this that that is happening
with you all. And I just want you to assure me, if that has not
been the case up to this point, that it will be the case in the
future.
Admiral Gortney. Sir, on the morning of 9/11, a network, a
telephone line, went into effect, and it has never been hung up
since. And it includes--we call it the DEN--it includes over
200 mission partners that protect the American people for this
particular threat--for the air threat. It is called the DEN.
And it is exercised and it operates every single day. Twice
a day just for the national capital region every one of those
200 mission partners are dealing with a penetration to our
special flight--the SFR. Twice a day it occurs. And once a week
we actually launch the Coast Guard helicopters in order to do
it. So not only is it operating, it is exercised, it is
utilized, every single day.
Mr. Salesses. Congressman, if I could, too, there is an
effort underway by the White House and the National Security
Council to bring all the Federal departments together to look
at these issues, in particular, technologies that are currently
available, technologies that are being in development, and
looking at possible procedural changes when we encounter these
kinds of situations.
Mr. Carter. Again, gentlemen, I want to thank you for the
work that you do and encourage you. Please, this is extremely
important and we really need you. So thank you for being on top
of your game.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
I recognize the ranking member.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
I want to thank all of you for being here. But I just have
three issues that I want to raise, and Mr. Carter mentioned one
of them. You know, as I sit here, I cannot help but be
concerned about the communication situation here.
Mr. Salesses, you said that you didn't even know that the
ranking--the chairman and ranking member, four committees,
wanted you to be here the other day?
Mr. Salesses. Sir, I did not personally know.
Mr. Cummings. There is something wrong with that picture.
There is something wrong with that picture. And let me tell you
what I tell my staff. When something goes wrong and I find out
about it, I wonder what I don't know about. And so, if you
recall, at the beginning of the hearing, I said people talk
about when the rubber meets the road and then we discover there
is no road. So communication is basic stuff.
And then I want to just--and this is directly connected.
You know, one of the things that we have noticed in a lot of
committees--not just this committee, but other committees--is
that folks seem to operate and want to operate in silos, silos.
You are doing something over here. I am doing something over
here. I have got my turf. You have got your turf. And it works
against effectiveness and efficiency. And I just want to make
sure that you all assure us that you truly are working
together. I just think we--this is of such urgency.
And my final point. I know you said that your staffs get
together, top-level staff. I guess that is what you all are
saying. You all need to get together, and it should not be just
to prepare--to get your notes together for a hearing.
I mean, you all are--I mean, you are there. You are paid to
do a certain job. And, I mean, this is with all the respect
that I have for you, and it is tremendous respect. But it is
not about your deputy or whatever. It is you all. We look to
you all. You are the experts. You are the ones who give your
blood, sweat, and tears, and you all are the brilliant minds
that we rely on every day to keep us safe.
And I think you all need to be meeting. I know somebody
said that the White House is trying to put something together
where folks get together. I mean, that is just--I mean, that
just comes from you, you, particularly after we have an
incident like the one that happened here.
And so, you know, I am anxiously looking forward, Mr.
Chairman, to the closed session. And I know you are going to
talk about that in a minute so that we can get some answers.
And if there are things that you could not answer--I hope
you all took notes about the things that you said that we have
to discuss in closed session, and then we'll do that. But,
again, I want to thank you for being here today. And we are
going to press forward.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank you.
And this has been a good, productive hearing, but we will
go to a closed hearing at another date. We have two other
subcommittee hearings. We got backed up with the Prime
Minister. We appreciate your patience. You all have important
jobs to do as well. So we will work together at another time.
I do have a few more questions. The Tampa Bay Times
published stories prior to this incident. The guy in the
gyrocopter was live-feeding a stream. I have heard a story from
one of the major networks where they were watching it in New
York, called down to the Capitol, and had staff reporters and
producers go down on the grass to watch it happen.
Do you all not monitor social media? Is Twitter like a new
thing for you? I mean, this stuff is out there. Try Google
Alerts. It is there. If it is not showing up on the radar, it
was showing up on the media's radar. And I don't understand why
you aren't able to pick up that sort of signal.
Because if you say that there is never any exposure in
advance, we have got to become more technically savvy, if you
can truly have somebody read a story online, get it to the
appropriate person in New York, send a producer, she walks down
on the grass and watches this land, and you all have billions
of dollars, billions, and you don't see a dude in a gyrocopter
flying over.
We deal with this on the border every single day. If I get
Customs and Border Patrol up here, they would tell you about
how they are detecting these. They will tell you how the
incursions are working. They have got special things that I
can't talk about right here. I have been in them. I have seen
them. They are very candid and open.
And they are in the same Department. That is why we had
Homeland Security. After 9/11, we formed Homeland Security to
communicate, to coordinate. And the only time you all seven can
get together is when you get called to the Oversight and
Government Reform Committee. That is in excusable.
If the major networks can watch it live on television, I
expect you to watch it on live television and do something
about it. And I still have huge questions about what you would
actually do. I want the men and women who are out there on the
front line that have their hands on those triggers to know we
have got their back.
We don't know if the person has mental capacity. I am going
to assume they do. But you cannot come into the capital region.
You are not going to go on that Lincoln Memorial. You are not
coming to the White House. You are not coming into the United
States Capitol unimpeded. We are going to take you down. That
is the prevailing attitude.
We can get all these sob stories about how nice we want to
be. But until we project force, until we let people know that,
``If you come here, you are going to go down. Then we will
figure out your disposition,'' then we are sending all the
wrong signals. We are sending all the wrong signals.
And so every time we have an incursion and they are not
taken down fast and hard, some other-job is going to get an
idea and terrorists are going to get more ideas. Figure it out.
We pay you a lot of money, billions of dollars, and it has been
a long time since 9/11. Figure it out.
To the men and women who are doing this, God bless them. I
cannot thank them enough. They do amazing things.
Two more questions and then I will be done. I would like
after this hearing to get your comments or your reaction, if
you are allowed, on the charges that were brought against this.
One of the things I hope I can work with the ranking member
and others on--this gentleman was charged with a misdemeanor.
This is a misdemeanor offense. The more stringent offense was
his flying of a gyrocopter. But an incursion into the airspace,
we have to look at that as a Congress.
Finally, I have got to ask you, Mr. Clancy: Is A.T. Smith
still on the Secret Service payroll?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. He's a detailee to another Homeland
department.
Chairman Chaffetz. Where does he work? What is his title?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, I am not aware of his title, but he works
for the CBP.
Chairman Chaffetz. Is he your Chief of Staff?
Mr. Clancy. No, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. He doesn't hold the title of Chief of Staff?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, he's not--I don't know what his title is.
He has not been----
Mr. Chaffetz. Does he work in the Secret Service building?
Mr. Clancy. No, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. Does he have a Secret Service vehicle?
Mr. Clancy. Not that I am aware of. No, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. You will get back to me on that and
confirm that?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. Whose decision was it--yours or
Secretary Johnson's--to detail Smith rather than transfer him
out of the agency?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, it was my decision.
Chairman Chaffetz. So why do you keep him in the Secret
Service? You sent out a press release that says he accepted a
position within the Department of Homeland Security effective
Tuesday, February 10, 2015, but he still works for the Secret
Service.
Mr. Clancy. Sir, he's detailed to--he is on our payroll.
Yes, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. Why?
Mr. Clancy. Sir----
Chairman Chaffetz. You told me, you told the ranking
member, you told the world--you all sent out a press release
saying he was being transferred. But he still works for the
Secret Service, doesn't he? He still gets a Secret Service----
Mr. Clancy. He gets a Secret Service paycheck. Yes, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. How long is he detailed for?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, it has not been defined, the time limit.
Chairman Chaffetz. It has been since February.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. Ranking Member Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Does the chairman yield?
Mr. Clancy, just following up on that, so is he actually
working--I mean, I know he gets a Secret Service paycheck.
But is he actually working for the Secret Service in his
detailed type of position?
Mr. Clancy. No, sir. I have no contact with Mr. Smith.
Mr. Cummings. None?
Mr. Clancy. None, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And we have details up here, too. So they
have a limited time that they are with us.
Can you tell us what the limitations are, wherever he is,
and can you get that information to us?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, I'll have to get back to you on that. Yes,
sir.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. You have done, Mr. Clancy, a very good
job of building trust and confidence. It is flushed down the
toilet when I read and hear about these things.
You said to us, to me personally, multiple times, the White
House did, Homeland Security did, Secretary Johnson did, Mr.
Mayorkas did, that you are implementing fundamental changes.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. And this guy is still on the payroll.
You sent out a press release touting that he was going to
another department and agency and he does no work for the
Secret Service, and, yet, he is on your payroll.
Don't ever come back here to Congress and tell me that you
have a financial problem when you have got A.T. Smith on your
payroll and you say you don't have enough money. You shouldn't
have to pay for that out of your budget. He is a very, very
senior person.
You personally promised that he was being moved and
transferred out of the Department, and he hasn't. I am not
buying this unlimited detail thing. This is just classic
Homeland Security shuffling around, and every one of your
employees knows it. How do you think I know it? I don't go to
work there. Your employees know it. And you lose their trust
and confidence that you are actually implementing the change
that you say you are going to.
There was no consequence to all these things we have talked
about if he can keep his job, have a great title, get the same
paycheck, you know, get a detailee, when waters calm down, then
we will sort things out.
With that, the committee stands adjourned.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, 1 second. I just want to ask
one more question. Because the things you just said concern me,
and I just wanted Mr. Clancy to have an opportunity to respond
to that.
If you want to. You may not want to. Those were some strong
accusations, and I am just wondering, do you have a response?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, Mr. Chairman, all I can say is that I was
looking for a fresh perspective in our leadership team, and we
thought this was one opportunity to do that.
And I am very pleased with the team that we have in place
today. We have not gone back to those individuals who have
taken these detailee positions. So I didn't have any other
comment, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Is it unusual for you to detail people--I
mean, the Secret Service to detail people?
Mr. Clancy. No, sir. We have detailees certainly up here in
Congress. We are the beneficiary of detailees as well.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Chairman Chaffetz. Reclaiming my time, one more time, I
have got to tell you, you tried to tell the men and women of
the Secret Service, you tried to tell Congress, you tried to
tell the world, that you were making changes. And everybody can
look this up. It is public knowledge.
But here is $183,000 that comes out of your budget that
could have gone to somebody else. Hire a new, fresh person.
Promote somebody within the agency. Do whatever you might. But
then you are going to come crawling back to Congress, saying,
``I need more money. I need more money.''
The four assistant directors that you also released, that
were transferred away, are they also detailees or are they
still on the Secret Service payroll?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, there is one--one is a detailee on our
payroll. Yes, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. And where is he detailed to?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, he is also with--he is with ICE, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. What do they do at ICE?
Mr. Clancy. And they can correct me if I'm wrong here.
I believe he's in a training position.
Chairman Chaffetz. Will you provide to this committee by
the week's end the disposition of each of the people that you
supposedly--you know, you were cleaning house. You were making
changes. You were touting that. You were telling the committee
that.
Tell us exactly with each and every one of them where they
are, how long the detail it, how much they make, all the
relevant details that our staff asked for.
Is that fair enough? Can you do that by the end of the
week?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
We now stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:11 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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