    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                     U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ISIL AFTER TERROR
                         GROUP SEIZES RAMADI AND PALMYRA

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                        THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  JUNE 3, 2015

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 114-113

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
                                      or
                           http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

                                     ______

                            U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    94-835PDF                   WASHINGTON : 2015

    ________________________________________________________________________________________
    For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
    http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
    U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
    E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    PAUL COOK, California                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            GRACE MENG, New York
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
    DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
    TOM EMMER, MinnesotaUntil 5/18/
        15 deg.
    DANIEL DONOVAN, New YorkAs
        of 5/19/15 deg.

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

                Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa

                     ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         GRACE MENG, New York
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Michael Rubin, Ph.D., resident scholar, American Enterprise
      Institute......................................................     6
    Anthony H. Cordesman, Ph.D., Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy,
      Center for Strategic and International Studies.................    19
    Matthew Spence, Ph.D. (former Deputy Assistant Secretary for
      Middle East Policy, U.S. Department of Defense)................    34

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Michael Rubin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.........................     9
    Anthony H. Cordesman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement..................    21
    Matthew Spence, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................    37

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    60
    Hearing minutes..................................................    61

     U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ISIL AFTER TERROR GROUP SEIZES RAMADI AND PALMYRA

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JUNE 3, 2015

                         House of Representatives,

               Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12 o'clock p.m.,
    in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
    Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
    After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch, who came 7
    minutes before me today, for 5 minutes each for our opening
    statements, I will then move immediately to the witnesses for
    their opening statements.
        And without objection, the witnesses' prepared statements
    will be made a part of the record and members may have 5 days
    to insert statements and questions for the record subject to
    the length limitation of the rules.
        And the reason we are zooming right along is because--for
    the audience, thank you, and for our witnesses--at 1:30
    approximately we will have the first series of votes and there
    are 15 votes.
        So I don't think we want to keep you guys waiting for about
    3 hours. So thank you very much.
        The chair recognizes herself for 5 minutes. It is time that
    we dispense with the administration's charade that our anti-
    ISIL strategy is a success.
        In Iraq, ISIL holds almost a third of the country's
    territory and controls major strategic population centers in
    Mosul, Fallujah and Ramadi.
        While Secretary Carter may blame the Iraqi military for not
    having the will to fight in Ramadi, Prime Minister Abadi has
    strongly denied it and said yesterday that he is not receiving
    the arms and support necessary for him to take on ISIL.
        In Syria, ISIL controls half the country's territory,
    according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. ISIL's
    capture of Tadmur, adjacent to the ancient city of Palmyra,
    gives them control of a strategic crossroads and unrestricted
    access to Iraq's Anbar Province.
        There are some success stories where we have been able to
    push ISIL back from its positions. But ISIL continues to spread
    into other areas as well. ISIL is already in Libya, Egypt,
    Nigeria, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
        It is also creeping closer to Jordan and Lebanon, and
    Syrian foreign fighters have even reached our own hemisphere in
    the Caribbean. ISIL and its ideology are metastasizing across
    the region.
        Foreign fighters are pouring into Iraq, Syria and Libya.
    Billions of people have been displaced--millions of people have
    been displaced, putting strains on our allies, and there are
    humanitarian crises throughout the Middle East.
        Our train and equip program in Syria is now only just
    getting off the ground, and according to the latest reports
    only 2,000 fighters have been identified and 400 have been
    vetted. Only 90 have begun training.
        On top of that, this past weekend one of the Syrian
    commanders participating in the U.S. train and equip program
    threatened to withdraw 1,000 of his fighters from the program
    because a DoD official said he would have to promise not to
    attack Assad.
        Incredibly, this is the same Assad who, according to press
    reports and the Twitter account of the U.S. Embassy in Syria
    yesterday, is providing advanced air support for ISIL and is
    actively seeking to bolster ISIL's position against the Syrian
    population in the moderate stronghold of Aleppo. The same Assad
    whose brutality the Embassy is now admitting is ISIL's best
    recruiting tool and who is being propped up by an Iranian
    regime using the Iranian Revolutionary Guard corps, its proxy
    Hezbollah and thousands of foreign fighters to fight on Assad's
    behalf. The same Assad who failed to disclose his entire
    chemical weapons arsenal and is using barrel bombs and chemical
    weapons to kill hundreds of thousands of his own people--almost
    a quarter of a million by last count.
        And yet, we are going to make our small number of trained
    Syrian fighters promise not to fight this monster? Iran is also
    funneling Assad billions of dollars to ensure his survival and
    since money is fungible, these are the same billions that were
    unfrozen as part of the disastrous nuclear negotiations.
        Our strategy in Iraq cannot and must not be separated from
    a strategy in Syria--one that removes Assad--and a strategy
    that takes on Iran. Iran will not work in the interest of the
    United States, no matter what dreams the administration might
    have.
        You cannot heal sectarian tensions in Iraq while allowing
    Iran to exacerbate them, including through its Shi'ite militias
    that are said to have committed horrific human rights
    violations.
        You cannot stop the flow of foreign fighters without
    getting tough on Turkey, and you cannot expect to have success
    with a minimal air strike campaign that refuses to deploy
    forward spotters to improve targeting.
        Our train and equip program in Iraq is scheduled to bring
    together approximately 5 to 10,000 people while ISIL is gaining
    1,000 recruits per month. We cannot wait a year for this
    program to be up and ready.
        The administration has laid out some lines of effort as
    part of its anti-ISIL strategy, including military and
    humanitarian support and counter finance and counter narrative
    efforts that we must continue with greater energy and better
    efficiency.
        But they do not address the fundamental miscalculations
    that this administration continues to make with regard to Assad
    and with regard to Iran, and they do not inspire confidence
    that this administration has much of a strategy at all.
        Beyond these basic contradictions of strategy, here are a
    few suggestions that I hope the administration, Congress and
    others consider immediately.
        Destroy or neutralize Assad's air capabilities. Sanction
    Assad and his military officials to hasten the collapse of his
    regime. Sanction any entity, including the Russians and
    Iranians, that are propping up Assad. Listen to our military
    commanders who say we should at least discuss the possibility
    of boots on the ground, including U.S. special forces in Iraqi
    military units.
        Also, stop telegraphing to our enemies what we are not
    willing to do and urge the Gulf Cooperation Council, the GCC,
    countries to put their boots on the ground.
        Consider the best way to equip anti-ISIL forces in Iraq
    whether that is by directly arming the Kurds, the Sunni tribes
    or integrated units. And finally, the United States Congress
    should approve an authorization for the use of military force
    that goes a lot further than what the President has requested
    and appropriately characterizes the scale, goals, capabilities
    and identity of the enemy.
        These are all ideas that could change our approach to ISIL
    from one of the bare minimum, which is what we have now, to one
    that is actually having a positive impact that the President
    claims he desires.
        With that, I turn to my friend, the ranking member, Mr.
    Deutch.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Thanks to our witnesses for appearing here today to help us
    understand what happened in Ramadi and how it affects the
    international effort to combat ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
        ISIS fighters have been on the outskirts of Ramadi for
    nearly 1\1/2\ years. While Iraqi security forces have
    maintained fragile control over most of the city, there have
    been new heavy fighting in areas under ISIS control for months.
        In the midst of a sandstorm, ISIS fighter detonated a
    series of bombs that, as the New York Times described it,
    allowed it to take advantage of a pause in air strikes and
    overwhelm Iraqi forces.
        While it would be a mistake to compare the fall of Ramadi
    to the swift fall of Fallujah or Mosul, nonetheless it was a
    serious setback with devastating consequences for the innocent
    civilians of Ramadi, the morale of Iraqi troops and for U.S.
    and coalition strategy.
        The capture of Ramadi was further compounded by ISIS'
    seizure of the ancient Syrian city of Palmyra the following
    day. The fall of Ramadi, unfortunately, gave ISIS a public
    relations win.
        It now holds the capital of Anbar Province, the largest
    Sunni province in Iraq. This is why now more than ever it is
    critical that the Iraqi Government ramps up its outreach to
    Sunni tribal areas and pushes ahead with Prime Minister Abadi's
    stated goals of an inclusive government and society.
        The United States should be actively engaged in advising
    and supporting Prime Minister Abadi in these efforts, and while
    the popular mobilization forces and other Shi'ite militias have
    been effective on the battlefield, the Abadi government must
    have an active strategy in place to ensure that these militias
    do not exploit the areas they help defend or liberate.
        In the days after Ramadi fell, Secretary of Defense Carter
    made the bold assessment on national television that Iraqi
    troops have no will to fight. For years the U.S. has invested
    heavily in the training of Iraqi forces.
        So why does it continue to appear at least that Iraqi
    forces are dropping their weapons and running? Is this an
    accurate portrayal of what occurred in Ramadi despite months of
    reinforced U.S. training? I hope our witnesses will speak to
    that.
        The administration does have a strategy to combat ISIS but
    I have to question how it can be effective against a group that
    seems to constantly adapt.
        This conflict needs a comprehensive strategy that doesn't
    just defeat ISIS on the battlefield but also cuts off its
    funding and its propaganda machine, and I am unsure as to
    whether we are being successful in those areas and I hope our
    witnesses will speak to that as well.
        The victories in Ramadi and Palmyra just weeks ago gave
    ISIS the appearance of having momentum on its side. Now, in
    Syria yesterday ISIS advanced on opposition-held territory
    north of Aleppo.
        Reports from opposition leaders claim there seem to have
    been coordination with the regime with Assad's air force
    striking in what seemed to be a supportive ISIS ground
    campaign, and I would welcome our witnesses' assessment of
    these claims and, if true, what that means going forward.
        Now, I have admittedly been frustrated by what seems to be
    a lack of attention to the Syrian front of this conflict and we
    will never effectively degrade and destroy ISIS if we don't
    simultaneously deal with the problem of the heinous Assad
    regime, which opened the space for ISIS' rise to begin with.
        Part of this conflict is a result of sheer lack of
    governance. In many areas, ISIS is filling a void in terms of
    services and security.
        We have heard time and time again that in many parts of
    Syria people have aligned with ISIS not because of ideological
    agreement but because it was the only group offering them
    protection.
        The international community needs to focus greater
    attention on a long-term solution, and I was pleased to hear
    General Allen's comments yesterday that there is no place for
    Assad in a long-term Syria solution.
        I am concerned with the growing chorus of frustration with
    the U.S. that we hear from the Syrian opposition, and while our
    train and equip programs are now slowly advancing, the question
    is are we being as effective as possible in supporting the
    Syrian opposition.
        And finally, I would like to take just a remaining moment
    or two to remind everyone, the American people and the
    international community, of the devastating--the devastating
    humanitarian crisis in Iraq and Syria. The people of Syria
    continue to suffer under Assad's barbarity--barrel bombs,
    chlorine gas attacks, ongoing brutal repression.
        In Iraq, the number of displaced people grows daily as ISIS
    moves in on new territory. Women and children are at extreme
    risk of violence and we continue to hear reports of hundreds of
    people slaughtered in days.
        We have to remember that real--that the real and grave
    consequences that this conflict is having on innocent
    civilians.
        Madam Chairman, I know that you share these concerns. I
    thank you for your continued commitment--your continued
    commitment to drawing attention to the humanitarian aspect of
    this devastating conflict.
        It is one that must continue to be at the forefront of all
    of our discussions and I would thank--offer thanks again to our
    witnesses for appearing here today.
        I look forward to your insights and I yield back the
    balance of my time.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. I will
    recognize members for 1 minute for their opening statement,
    starting with Mr. Issa of California.
        Mr. Issa. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks for bringing
    this distinguished panel before us today.
        I am going to be particularly interested in hearing from
    Dr. Spence. Fact is, we are dealing today with a policy that he
    was at the center of and is intimately familiar with.
        This is not some sort of hypothetical. We have been
    fighting a war--we have been fighting a war that is in fact
    fighting against a tide.
        We have continuously found ourselves siding with
    organizations like the Maliki government, one in which the
    Shi'a are perfectly happy to repress the Sunni but not willing
    to fight to protect the Sunni from extremism.
        The Sunnis, on the other hand, are perfectly willing to
    allow others to fight for them but they certainly are not in a
    position to remove a Sunni extremist group only to be, again,
    held hostage to a government that still has former Prime
    Minister Maliki in many ways as the puppeteer of that regime.
        The fact is that when Ash Carter, rightfully so, said that
    we do have an inherent problem, I began looking and saying when
    did we have that problem last.
        And answer was the last time we had this problem we were
    backing Chiang Kai-shek over Mao Zedong, and the reality is we
    are not picking the sides at this time in Syria or Iraq in a
    way in which we can find a path with active support to a
    solution that the American people can believe in.
        And I look forward to asking each of the witnesses a series
    of questions. I thank the chairwoman for her indulgence.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Issa. Ms. Frankel.
        Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madame Chair.
        I, really, have one significant question that I would like
    each of you to address, if you could, and what I would like to
    know is is this fight or struggle against ISIL--in your
    opinion, is it going to require the United States to put more
    troops in harm's way.
        That is my question. I yield back.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Ms. Frankel.
        I now would like to introduce our expert witnesses. First,
    we are pleased to welcome back Dr. Michael Rubin, who is a
    resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
        Dr. Rubin is a former DoD advisor on international security
    affairs and a senior editor of the Middle East Quarterly. Dr.
    Rubin was also a lecturer at Johns Hopkins University as well
    as a senior lecturer at the Naval Post-Graduate School.
    Welcome, Dr. Rubin.
        Second, we welcome Dr. Anthony Cordesman, the Arleigh Burke
    chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International
    Studies.
        Previously, he has served as the director of intelligence
    assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as
    director of policy and planning at the Department of Energy.
    Welcome, Dr. Cordesman.
        And last but certainly not least, we also want to welcome
    back Dr. Matthew Spence. Dr. Spence is a senior fellow at Yale
    University's Jackson Institute for International Affairs.
        Formerly, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for the Middle East and has served in the White House
    as special assistant to the President and director of
    international economics at the National Security Council.
        Welcome, gentlemen, and we will start with Dr. Rubin.

     STATEMENT OF MICHAEL RUBIN, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN
                          ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

        Mr. Rubin. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch,
    honorable members, thank you for the opportunity to testify.
        I have submitted in my written testimony detailed analysis
    and recommendations, but as time is short, please allow me only
    to highlight a few key points.
        Suffice to say the U.S. strategy to degrade and ultimately
    destroy the Islamic State has not succeeded. Any comprehensive
    strategy will combine the diplomatic with the military.
        There is a correlation between Turkey's visa policies and
    those nationalities which travel to the Islamic State.
    Moroccans and Tunisians either do not need visas to enter
    Turkey or can get them on demand.
        Algerians, however need visas. While several thousand
    Moroccans and Tunisians have traveled to Syria, only a handful
    of Algerians have, though Algerians fight for the Islamic State
    elsewhere.
        A low-cost high-value reform would be for Turkey to end
    visa waivers or visas on demand for those under the age of 40
    from countries which provide the bulk of Islamic State
    recruits. Drying up the flow of recruits across the Turkish-
    Syrian frontier is essential.
        The Iraqi army does fight. They fought in Ramadi for months
    before losing. They regained control in Baoji. That the Islamic
    State can deploy hundreds and even whole parades shows a lack
    of U.S. intelligence and/or unwillingness to use air power to
    maximum advantage.
        The Iraqi military must maintain its qualitative military
    edge. If U.S. authorities do not believe it wise to provide
    weaponry to the Iraqi army, then they must substitute air
    power, special forces and trainers to assist Iraqi forces.
        While it is essential our allies be armed, some seek
    advantage from the crisis to strengthen their own political
    hand vis-a-vis rivals.
        Under Prime Minister Abadi, Baghdad has supplied both light
    and medium weaponry to the Kurdistan regional government
    including MRAPs.
        The Kurds have also imported weaponry directly from Iran,
    Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. According to the State
    Department, the Kurds have anti-tank missiles that Baghdad does
    not have but needed in Ramadi.
        Alas, the Kurds still distribute weapons to peshmerga based
    on political loyalty to the Kurdistan Democratic Party rather
    than to areas of greatest need. This puts Kirkuk at risk.
        The United States must coordinate deliveries through
    Baghdad but monitor their distribution both from Baghdad to
    Kurdistan and then from Kurdish authorities to the front where
    needed.
        Rather than exacerbate divisions by providing weaponry on
    an ethnic or sectarian basis, U.S. equipment should be
    designated for Iraqi army units which incorporate Iraqi
    diversity.
        Providing weaponry directly to Iraqi, Kurdistan or Sunni
    tribes empowers hardline pro-Iranian factions and undercuts
    Abadi and his more moderate allies across the Shi'ite spectrum.
        We cannot look a gift horse in the mouth. The group with
    the greatest success against the Islamic State have been the
    Syrian Kurds.
        They are not perfect but they are secular, tolerant
    religiously and generally ethnically as well and a relative
    haven for women's freedom. Washington should not treat Syrian
    Kurds as pariahs simply out of deference to Turkey, which has
    proven itself an unreliable ally at best.
        The long-term cost of Iranian military presence in Iraq is
    greater than the gain derived from Iranian personnel battling
    the Islamic State. Iranian units exacerbate sectarianism.
        Still, the United States must differentiate between
    Iranian-backed militias and Shi'ite volunteers. Not every
    Shi'ite is an Iranian puppet. But painting them all with the
    same brush risks creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.
        U.S. diplomats should work with the Iraqi Government to
    create the bureaucratic reforms necessary to implement bottom-
    up administrative federalism in liberated districts. This
    involves changes in administrative law and procedure rather
    than constitutional amendments.
        U.S. officials must not incentivize sectarian violence by
    rewarding it even as they try to bolster the central
    government's delivery of services across ethnic and sectarian
    lines.
        We must recognize that the motivation for the Islamic State
    is ideological and not based in petty political grievances.
    That recruitment and residence of the Islamic State reaches
    from Malaysia to Morocco illustrates this.
        It is not all about Baghdad. Unless and until there is
    bipartisan consensus to do what is necessary to defeat the
    Islamic State before it targets the American homeland and until
    there is an authorization for the use of military force that
    empowers rather than restricts American forces combating the
    Islamic State, then it would be unfair to American servicemen
    to put them in harm's way.
        Likewise, it would be dangerous to conflate the mission to
    defeat the Islamic State with a very different peacekeeping
    mission afterwards. That is a mission about which we seldom
    talk.
        And with that, I conclude my remarks. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rubin follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                      ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Dr. Rubin.
        Dr. Cordesman.

      STATEMENT OF ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, PH.D., ARLEIGH A. BURKE
       CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
                                STUDIES

        Mr. Cordesman. Thank you, and thank you for the opportunity
    to testify.
        It is possible to focus on the immediate issue----
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Move your microphone a little bit closer.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Cordesman. It is possible to focus on the immediate
    issue in Ramadi, and yet when I look at Tikrit I am not sure
    that it was any more of a victory.
        If you lose the population, if you lose the city as a
    functioning area, if essentially you have liberate a desert
    that simply has buildings in it, you have not achieved a goal
    and I think both are a warning of--or you used, Madam Chairman,
    repetitively the need for a strategy and for a recognition that
    no one defeat or issue here is critical. The problem is to have
    some consistent way of dealing with this over a period of
    years.
        Yes, I think we need to look beyond ISIL and al-Nusra and
    focus on the broader problems and tensions in both Iraq and
    Syria. I think it is clear you can't have a successful strategy
    in western Iraq that doesn't deal with the problems in eastern
    Syria.
        We cannot ignore Iran and focus on the nuclear issue to the
    exclusion of the other threats that are affected here. Frankly,
    the train and assist mission, to me, has been too limited,
    badly focused and too distant from the front and the need to
    actually work with combat forces from the start, repeats
    mistakes I have seen in other wars and it is an area where we
    do need change.
        The air campaign is one where at least publically we have
    not been able to explain either what we are doing or what its
    focus is and it certainly seems to be too limited to achieve a
    key level of effectiveness.
        We don't seem to be able to explain the weapons flow that
    actually reaches Iraqi troops or the problems that our train
    and assist group has in working with them.
        But having said all of that which affects the short-term
    goal, what bothers me on the basis of what happened in our
    previous war in Iraq and in Afghanistan is if you do not have a
    strategy which is public and a real strategy, if you do not
    have requirements to report on the progress you have in meeting
    that strategy--whether it works, what it costs and whether it
    is successful--you go on from incident to incident without ever
    really being able to assess what you are doing or demonstrating
    you have a coherent plan to deal with it.
        We don't have the equivalent of a 1230 report coming out of
    the Department of Defense. We have no meaningful reporting
    coming out of the Department of State.
        After some 50 years in the United States Government, I have
    never seen a more meaningless report on the structure of a war
    than came out of the so-called lead inspector general on
    Inherent Resolve.
        It is, as a public relations exercise, inept. And what I am
    suggesting is that as you react to this defeat, there are some
    concrete steps you can take. You can't legislate strategy but
    you can insist that one be reported on.
        You can demand that that strategy be explained in terms of
    some form of net assessment. You can call for milestones,
    estimates of resources, progress reporting and real measures of
    effectiveness.
        You can create the equivalent of a special inspector
    general, as you did in terms of Iraq and the Afghan war. You
    can force regular outside and independent reporting on where we
    are going and you can have that assess the costs and the
    measures of effectiveness.
        These are measures which, I think, may be longer term than
    the more immediate suggestions I made in my written testimony.
        But, quite frankly, if we go on with even less
    understanding, transparency and responsibility than we managed
    to have in reporting on the Iraq war and the Afghan war, I
    don't think that any reaction to one defeat or one set of
    problems is going to be relevant.
        We simply have to establish a basis for a strategy,
    transparency and credibility.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cordesman follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Dr. Cordesman.
        Dr. Spence.

      STATEMENT OF MATTHEW SPENCE, PH.D. (FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT
     SECRETARY FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE)

        Mr. Spence. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking
    Member Deutch and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
    Thank you for inviting me to speak with you today about the
    situation in Iraq and our strategy to combat ISIL.
        I value talking regularly with you in my role in the
    Department of Defense and I appreciate to continue to have that
    candid dialogue in my personal capacity now.
        The ISIL threat is complex and the situation is rapidly
    evolving. I will summarize my statement with the following
    three areas. First, let me briefly outline how I view the
    current strategy to counter ISIL.
        Second, I will offer some reflections about what happened
    in Ramadi and what we can learn from it. And third, I will
    share a few thoughts about how we can adjust the current
    strategy, given the rapidly changing battlefield environment.
        Quite frankly, the enemy is adapting and learning and we
    must as well. The events in Ramadi in the past weeks have
    created an extremely serious situation. We must learn from
    ISIL's successes in Ramadi and adapt to new conditions on the
    battlefield.
        But we also cannot view Ramadi as the sole referendum on a
    long-term strategy to combat ISIL. The causes of ISIL's rise
    are deep and complex. It is a tenacious and adaptive enemy. It
    operates in a joint battlefield between Iraq and Syria.
        Combatting ISIL, therefore, requires a joint strategy
    toward Iraq and Syria. Taking on ISIL and Iraq alone will not
    accomplish our objectives.
        We need to think regionally as well as strategically, and
    Iran plays a complex role both fighting ISIL on its own while
    also pursuing a broader destabilizing agenda in the region.
        That is why combatting ISIL requires a long-term campaign
    that will take several years and we are in the first year of
    what was designed as a multi-year campaign.
        Now, let me offer some context, if I may. Last June, ISIL
    moved across Iraq with unprecedented speed and stunned the
    world with its military victories. The underlining causes of
    ISIL's success, however, were more than weapons and battlefield
    tactics.
        Assad's brutality and the conflict in Syria created chaos
    that allowed ISIL to seize territory. The border between Iraq
    and Syria became, effectively, meaningless.
        The Iraqi Government alienated large segments of the Sunni
    population and was not governing effectively and lacked the
    required senior professional military leaders to direct Iraqi
    security forces.
        These political conditions will not change overnight and
    they cannot be changed with military force alone. That said,
    recognizing that military force alone cannot effectively
    address ISIL does not mean that military power does not have a
    significant role. It does.
        There are many elements to the United States strategy--
    trying to work on the terrorist foreign fighters, the ideology
    and the terrorist funding. I will just focus briefly on what I
    see are three elements of the military aspect of the strategy.
        The first part of the strategy is political. As I said,
    ISIL thrives on corruption, alienation, weak governance and the
    ensuing political chaos. No amount of soldiers we could deploy,
    even the best trained Americans and Iraqis, can fill the vacuum
    of poor governance.
        The Iraqi governance must take the lead in designing,
    executing and maintaining military operations. America cannot
    be more committed to Iraq's success than Iraq is.
        Second, however, a key part of our military efforts must be
    the use of unique and powerful American and coalition military
    capabilities.
        We must use unique U.S. and coalition military capabilities
    to gain an advantage over ISIL. We should not be fighting a
    fair fight against ISIL and we should use our unique
    capabilities from the air.
        The accommodation of U.S. and coalition and partner air
    power with Iraqi and peshmerga ground operations has pushed
    back Iraq and has made a difference. We need to be doing more
    with our air power, however.
        And then finally, because air power alone cannot create the
    conditions on the ground to combat ISIL, a third and key
    element of our strategy must be focusing on building the
    capacity of the Iraqi security forces, peshmerga ground forces
    as well as local fighters in Syria.
        Now, that said, I want to briefly recommend a few
    adjustments to our strategy, and in recommending those
    adjustments I briefly want to recommend four principles to keep
    in mind.
        First, our effort should be built around sustainability.
    Will additional U.S. support create the incentives for the
    Iraqi forces to own the fight?
        Second, we must balance any support the United States
    provides against the risk to American service members. Third,
    we cannot view Iraq--view ISIL in isolation in Iraq. Coalition
    forces cannot fight Iraq--ISIL in Iraq only to allow them
    sanctuary in Syria. And fourth, the United States must support
    and maintain the international coalition.
        Given that, if I may, I both recommend adjustments in each
    of the areas I mentioned before. First, in training, forward-
    deployed U.S. special forces, advisors within Iraqi units
    should be used more.
        Such forces have been deployed in al-Assad airbase in
    western Anbar. U.S. special forces can be deployed in eastern
    Anbar as a platform for working with Sunni tribes in the east.
    Embedding U.S. forces can help inject energy into leadership
    development of new and weaker Iraqi commanders and help stand
    them up more quickly.
        It was the failure of unit leadership in Iraq, the failure
    of that type of leadership, which is necessary for good
    organization and good morale, which I think explains some of
    what we saw in the recent weeks.
        Second, in U.S. unique military assets we must make better
    use of air power, expanded target sets for U.S. and coalition
    aircraft, should we need it. Now, this must be done carefully
    to minimize civilian casualties.
        However, we should consider deploying forward American and
    coalition air controllers to targeting and expediting air
    strikes. We must surge in better weapons to take on the large
    suicide truck bombs which caused such devastation that we saw
    in the past weeks.
        And then finally, politically, the United States and
    coalition forces must press the Iraqi Government harder to more
    actively enlist Sunni fighters in this campaign.
        In conclusion, Madam Chairman, what I would say is Iraq and
    Syria show us what a tremendous adversary ISIL is. They are
    adapting quickly. They are learning.
        We must be more nimble with them. This is what I recommend
    now. But as the situation evolves, we should not fail to look
    at more bold options as things have adjusted to adjust to the
    realities of what the enemy is doing on the battlefield.
        Thank you for the opportunity.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Spence follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Excellent recommendations. Thank you to
    all of our panelists. I will begin the question and answer
    period.
        I wanted to ask our panelists to comment on today's New
    York Times article that says Assad's forces may be aiding the
    new ISIS surge:

              ``Building on recent gains in Iraq and Syria, Islamic
            State militants are marching across northern Syria
            toward Aleppo, Syria's largest city, helped along,
            their opponents say, by the forces of President Bashar
            al-Assad. . .
              ``The rebels complain that the United States has
            refrained from contributing air support to help them
            fend off simultaneous attacks by the government and the
            Islamic State.''

        And the article continues:

              ``The Twitter account of the long-closed United
            States Embassy in Syria made its strongest statement
            yet about Mr. Assad's tactics.
              `` `Reports indicate that the regime is making air
            strikes in support of ISIL's advance on Aleppo, aiding
            extremists against Syrian populations,' the Embassy
            said in a series of Twitter posts.
              ``In another post, it added that the government war
            planes were `not only avoiding ISIL lines but actively
            seeking to bolster their position.'
              ``Neither American officials nor Syrian insurgents
            have provided proof of such direct coordination, though
            it has long been alleged by the insurgents.''

        Dr. Rubin, what do you make of that?
        Mr. Rubin. I would say that President Assad makes
    Machiavelli look like Mother Teresa. You know, when I am in the
    region often times I hear the conspiracy theory which is
    pervasive that the Americans are behind the Islamic State, and
    this is a conspiracy theory which has been pushed forward by
    Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei of Iran on numerous occasions.
        The way I counter this is to remind people that before the
    United States began air operations in Syria the Islamic State
    was still centered at Raqqah. The Syrian air force, under the
    command of Bashar al-Assad, had dominance over the skies of
    Syria, and rather than take on the Islamic State he preferred
    to drop barrel bombs on Syrian civilians.
        So I fully concur that we may have a situation in which
    Bashar al-Assad is acting in a way that might not appear at
    first glance logical or that Bashar al-Assad may not be as
    committed to defeating the Islamic State as some people would
    like to argue.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        And to our other witnesses, I wanted to ask you what are
    the dangers of--if the administration again relies on Russia or
    Iran in the fight against ISIL this time. Because just
    yesterday, Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken held a press
    availability with Prime Minister Abadi and the French Foreign
    Minister following a meeting of some of the coalition partners
    in the fight against ISIL.
        He was asked a question by a reporter about how the U.S.
    may have told Iraq that Baghdad will be able to buy weapons
    from Russia and Iran, and it just seems like--is that the right
    message we should be sending or what should we be doing in
    respect to relying on Russia and telling Baghdad it is okay to
    rely on Russia and Iran? Dr. Cordesman.
        Mr. Cordesman. Let me begin by saying first Iran has
    provided weapons and aircraft to Iraq. Russia has provided
    weapons, and Iraq is a sovereign country and if it chooses to
    use its own money to buy weapons from other countries these are
    not some things where we can do more than attempt to influence
    the situation.
        What would bother me much more seriously is exactly what is
    the strategy we are using to arm and develop the Iraqi forces,
    how well does the train and assist mission actually work in
    ensuring the arms get there or even to the training base
    because there have been major problems simply in getting low-
    level training ammunition into rear area training activities.
        We are not going to be able to limit all of these things by
    asking them not to go to other suppliers. The real issue, I
    think, is are we going to provide an effective timely flow and
    one that gives us the kind of influence and leverage that can
    help push them both toward unity and military effectiveness. I
    think that is the key issue.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Dr. Cordesman.
        Dr. Spence.
        Mr. Spence. Madam Chairman, I think sound strategy requires
    looking two steps ahead. In the near term, Iran is fighting
    ISIL and we have a shared enemy.
        In the longer term, Iran has a more destabilizing agenda
    both in Iraq to have control of large parts of the Iraqi state,
    and in Syria as well, and we should be under no illusions of
    what a long-term partnership with Iran would do.
        So in the near term, as Dr. Cordesman said, there is a
    reality of the funding that Iran and weaponizing that Iran is
    conducting.
        However, as we do this we need to look at the steps ahead
    would be--what the consequences will be if we knowingly allowed
    Iran to get a type of foothold in these places with its larger
    destabilizing region has.
        Ultimately, what we need to do is make sure we have more
    stable and effective governance not just when ISIL is driven
    out but there is something strong to put in place in the vacuum
    that will be left when ISIL is gone.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, gentlemen. Mr. Deutch
    is recognized.
        Mr. Deutch. Hardly. Hardly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Dr. Spence, let me follow up on that last point, which is
    what is going to be there when ISIL is gone. Can you--in your,
    I think, rightful efforts to look two steps ahead what should
    that look like?
        Mr. Spence. You know, Congressman, I think it is enormously
    difficult and it is different in Iraq and in Syria. I mean, the
    basic principle is there needs to be an inclusive government
    that both Sunnis as well as Shi'a or Alawites feel a stake in
    the central government that they don't need to turn to some
    other non-state actor.
        Executing that is very hard. I think in Iraq what it looks
    like in large parts is trying to enlist local fighters to fight
    against ISIL in the areas where they are.
        They have an incentive, they know the area better and we
    need to have these types of Sunni fighters who have an
    incentive to stop ISIL from murdering their families but also
    be brought into some larger structure in the Iraqi Government.
        So I think it is largely recruiting local fighters. In
    Syria, it is much, much harder because as imperfect a partner
    as Abadi is, even though he is taking good steps, we have the
    opposite of that in Syria.
        Of course, we have an enemy in Assad, and I think that is
    why as slow as the train and equip program in Syria is moving
    that is why trying to recruit and train and find some Syrian
    fighters to get some victories in villages in Syria that we
    have been trying to work with and create some good government
    can also provide the military muscle to provide both governance
    as well as some stable sense of state authority so there is a
    real alternative between the devil of Assad and the other devil
    that is ISIL.
        Mr. Deutch. Can we really be successful in our train and
    equip in Syria if the focus--if we are training and equipping
    only to take on ISIS when Assad continues to drop barrel bombs
    and chlorine on his own people?
        Mr. Spence. You know, it is hard. I mean, I think in any
    event the most immediate threat to American interests still are
    ISIL. But the longer cause that allowed ISIL to take place is,
    of course, Assad.
        Now, part of the issue that we face is, you know, the
    program that is authorized by Congress is not authorized to
    take on Assad.
        You know, one of the purposes of the program is to create
    the conditions to create a political settlement to do that. The
    issue we face right now, I think--before we were to openly take
    on Assad in a military way we need to be very clear about what
    happens on day two and the years that would follow.
        And right now I think we need to do more work to strengthen
    the opposition to do that before we would have a concerted
    effort right now to go after Assad. I think it is an issue of
    timing and sequencing.
        Mr. Deutch. Right. Dr. Rubin, in--as we assess what to do
    in Syria we don't want to be in a position, do we, where we
    succeed in pushing back ISIS only to be left with an al-Qaeda-
    backed government there?
        Mr. Rubin. That is correct. And within--you can't allow a
    safe haven to develop anywhere. Terrorists love a vacuum and
    ungoverned spaces are a chief problem both in Iraq and in areas
    under ISIS control and in Syria.
        One of the problems in Iraq post-liberation of territories
    seized by ISIS is going to be the leadership of the Sunni
    community and the problem is the Kurds have a definite
    leadership.
        The Shi'ites have a definite leadership. Saddam Hussein cut
    off the Sunni leadership at its knees and it never really has
    redeveloped. Some in the Sunni leadership have tried to gamble
    with the Islamic State, assuming they could use it as a wedge
    against Prime Minister Maliki. They failed. They have lost
    support.
        The question is what strategy do we have to build this up,
    because at this point when the Sunnis go to Prime Minister
    Abadi their chief demand is not to listen to any of the other
    Sunni groups who are going to Prime Minister Abadi.
        Mr. Deutch. Dr. Cordesman, in Iraq do you--can you comment
    on Secretary Carter's assessment of Iraqi forces and whether it
    is an accurate assessment to suggest that perhaps they don't
    have the will to defend themselves?
        Where does the truth lie? If there is any truth to that
    then what is it ultimately that we can hope to accomplish, if
    that is the case?
        Mr. Cordesman. First, I think there is a will to fight,
    depending on the unit. Part of the problem is that under Maliki
    you used the military forces essentially as a political weapon
    to suppress opposition and against the Sunni population.
        The legacy is what happened that virtually destroyed a good
    part of the Iraqi army. Rebuilding that, we have said, will
    take several years.
        Now, one of the units in Ramadi actually held together
    quite well for a long amount of time. It eventually simply was
    worn out and one of the problems you have when you talk about
    the will to fight is you need to look at the order of battle.
        Remember, they are on the scene--that is, the Islamic State
    or ISIL's forces. They know the weaknesses in the local Iraqi
    forces. If they can smash through or in, go around the better
    units, take advantage of the weaker units or the police, they
    can disrupt and shatter a defense over time, and they have done
    that.
        But it is also true if you want the will to fight you need
    a government that can get ammunition and reinforcements there
    on time. The problems are not simply forward.
        They are just as serious throughout the entire structure of
    Iraqi defense and if we don't really find a way to advise and
    assist to deal with the broad operations you are going to have
    unit after unit, unless this changes, which runs out of
    ammunition, isn't reinforced in time, isn't pulled out and is
    exhausted, and you are going to find this repeated.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch.
        Votes have been moved up from the scheduled time so I will
    ask our--the rest of our members to limit their question and
    answer period to 4 minutes so everyone can get a shot at it.
        Mr. Issa.
        Mr. Issa. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I have 32 prepared questions. Would you all agree to
    receive them and respond for the record?
        Mr. Rubin. Yes.
        Mr. Spence. Yes.
        Mr. Issa. Let the record reflect that all witnesses
    answered in the affirmative.
        Dr. Spence, with my remaining time, what I would like to do
    is I would like to go through a couple of items that are not in
    that long list and one of them is you were both in two
    different major roles in the administration at a time in which
    the administration rejected safe havens in Syria either to deal
    with the plight of Syrians going to Lebanon or into Jordan or
    into Turkey.
        Do you regret that? A yes or no is fine.
        Mr. Spence. No, I don't right now. No.
        Mr. Issa. So you think it is fine that in fact Lebanon is
    essentially more than 25 percent Syrian refugees, Jordan is
    maintaining huge amounts of refugees and, in fact, our
    situation with Turkey is one in which we depend on a Turkish
    Government that is at best marginal in their real support for
    deterring ISIL while in fact they continue to insist that we
    overturn the Assad government as a precondition of full
    cooperation.
        Isn't it time that we begin looking at having territory
    within Syria in which we control it, he is denied ability to
    fly, even if it is not to overturn the Assad government but
    rather to have a safe haven in which we can prepare Syrian
    troops to take on ISIL?
        Mr. Spence. I think--you know, in response to your question
    I think a few things. I think, first, I am extremely concerned
    about the refugee situation, about the neighbors, and I think--
    --
        Mr. Issa. The Lebanese appreciate that. Send them a couple
    billion dollars. Answer the question because I am deeply
    concerned that a failed strategy continues to be used in Syria,
    one in which we say we are going to take out the Assad
    government but we don't, but we are perfectly willing to
    destabilize that government so that ISIL in fact can grow
    faster than any of the troops that we want to prepare to cause
    a regime change.
        Mr. Spence. Well, Congressman, I think the issue that we
    need to focus on is what is the best way of accomplishing this
    end goal that you are talking about and that is both minimizing
    the damage in refugees that comes to the countries in the
    region.
        In Lebanon, for example, it is not just 25 percent ISIL
    refugees. Over half of the country could be refugees. That is
    enormously concerning.
        The concern I have about safe havens and what would happen
    if Assad immediately fell is what would the results be if it
    happened right away and how do we sustain it.
        Mr. Issa. So it is your position, as someone who just left
    the administration, that Assad falling from government today
    would be adverse to our best interest?
        Mr. Spence. I am not saying that. But I am saying is before
    the United States were to take action to push Assad out we need
    to think very carefully about what comes in Assad's----
        Mr. Issa. So it is your--during your tenure at National
    Security and your tenure, obviously, at Defense do you believe
    we could have diminished or eliminated Assad's military
    supremacy over his own troops in his own country?
        Mr. Spence. I think we were doing a fair amount to do that.
    I think the goal needs to be it is not just the fall of Assad.
    It is what comes in Assad's place.
        Mr. Issa. So would you say--would you say that we used
    efforts to diminish and eliminate his air supremacy? From my
    reports, his helicopters, very easy targets for performance
    aircraft, are not in fact on a daily basis targets that we go
    after and certainly not his air bases. Isn't that correct?
        Mr. Spence. I think there are a number of things that we
    did to reduce the fighting power of Assad, both----
        Mr. Issa. No, that wasn't the question. Assad's ability, as
    the chairwoman said, Assad's ability to punish their own people
    and often their own people and not ISIL was never diminished.
        Assad's ability to rain down terror from the air continues
    today, a capability that I am sure you agree, Doctor, we had
    the capability to diminish and we did not and currently do not.
        Dr. Cordesman, perhaps you could weigh in on this. I don't
    think Dr. Spence is going to give me the answer I would like.
        Mr. Cordesman. I don't know if I can give you the answer
    you would like. But I think that we do have the ability to put
    far more pressure on Syria and its use of force than we have
    exercised.
        From the start, I think we exaggerated their capabilities
    and willingness to react to that pressure, and certainly it
    isn't just outside refugees. You have got 7 million displaced
    people in the country without homes or jobs.
        Mr. Issa. Or safe havens to live in.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Mr. Cordesman. More than half the population.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Dr. Cordesman.
        Mr. Issa. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We all strive to please Mr. Issa but it
    is an impossible task.
        Mr. Higgins of New York is recognized.
        Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you,
    gentlemen, for being here.
        You know, coalition forces met recently and the conclusion
    was that our strategy is going to continue as it is.
        You know, you look at Ramadi and Palmyra and the fact that
    ISIS troops are far outnumbered by coalition forces. You look
    at the chaos in Iraq with a fighting force that just doesn't
    seem to be up for the task.
        How does this strategy that is in place--how does it
    succeed? Dr. Rubin.
        Mr. Rubin. The strategy which is in place does not succeed
    and on September 10th, 2014, the President laid out a goal
    which was to degrade and destroy the Islamic State. It is clear
    that that strategy is not working.
        Mr. Higgins. Dr. Cordesman.
        Mr. Cordesman. In all fairness, we have said this would
    take two to 3 years and it would take us more than a year to
    train even 9 to 12 Iraqi brigades.
        But if this strategy is ever going to work, it is going to
    work far too slowly. It is far from clear that it is going to
    have anything like the political and civil effects that are
    necessary and it is a strategy for Iraq that doesn't seem to
    have any strategy for Syria, because if you are training 5,000
    people 90 people at a time, I, frankly, don't see the point.
        Mr. Higgins. Dr. Spence.
        Mr. Spence. I think--I think both the strategy will take
    time by the ways we are executing it. So, first, I think there,
    of course, is a role for American significant military power
    that must be used.
        But second, if you are going to be working through local
    partners, which I think is the sustainable way to do it,
    training local partners takes time.
        I mean, the genius of America's military is not the
    technology we deploy but it is the leadership, our tactics and
    how our men serve in combat, and training that leadership at
    the unit level takes time and is extremely difficult.
        Mr. Higgins. Late last year there was an announcement that
    Prime Minister Abadi had agreed to or came to an agreement with
    the Kurds that they would receive $1 billion for their
    peshmerga and they would receive 17 percent of national oil
    revenues in perpetuity.
        It seemed to be a good start to the new administration in
    that he appeared to be the Prime Minister developing a strategy
    for a coalition to defeat ISIS in Iraq. What happened there and
    where is the peshmerga in these fights?
        Mr. Spence. So I think the peshmerga in these fights have,
    I mean, a few things. I think, first, a key part of the
    strategy needs to continue to be encouraging Abadi to reach out
    both to the Kurds as well as Sunnis in the way that he takes
    steps to do it and push him to follow through on those
    commitments.
        I think on arming the peshmerga what the international
    coalition did in July was try to mobilize an enormous effort to
    provide large amounts of equipment and training and that has
    been flowing to Kurdish fighters and I think that is part of
    the reasons why we have seen Kurdish fighters able to be
    effective on the ground in some very, very difficult fights.
        Mr. Higgins. Dr. Rubin.
        Mr. Rubin. I want to reemphasize the point that the Kurdish
    regional government has not been fully truthful when they say
    that they have not received weaponry from the Iraqi Government.
        If they have not received enough weaponry it is simply
    because the Iraqi Government also has not received enough
    weaponry. The bigger problem that undercuts Kurdish peshmerga
    effectiveness is that the weaponry which the Kurds do have does
    not always make it to the place of greatest need.
        It is more distributed on the basis of political patronage.
    We certainly see this in and around Kirkuk, which seems to be
    the next target for the Islamic State.
        But because Kirkuk voted the wrong way in the Kurdish
    elections they are simply not getting the weaponry from the
    Kurdistan central government.
        Mr. Higgins. I yield back my time.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Higgins.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Madame Chair, and thank
    you for having this very important hearing and each of you we
    appreciate you being here today.
        I particularly appreciate, Dr. Rubin, the American
    Enterprise Institute. I well remember nearly 2 years ago right
    here, as our President was falsely claiming that radical Islam
    was on the run, that the threats to American families was being
    diminished, that Dr. Kagan was here with a map clearly showing
    that there was a spread of threats across North Africa, Middle
    East and Central Asia, and what he projected at that time,
    sadly, has come to effect. And so we really appreciate AEI
    presenting information to us.
        I am particularly interested in the Kurdish regional
    government that we have worked with for many years--the Kurdish
    regional government of Iraq.
        You are indicating that they have not been properly using
    the equipment received, but yet I was sincerely hoping that we
    could continue, obviously, to be working with them for the
    mutual interest that we have and that has been in place for
    decades and with the no-fly zone, on and on.
        So how can we work with them and encourage their active and
    very capable involvement?
        Mr. Rubin. Thank you, Congressman, for your kind words. I
    would say simply trust but verify, and we don't want to get
    into a situation anywhere in Iraq where we are used as a foil
    for unrelated political rivalries.
        So it is essential that we simply don't insist that the
    Kurds get the weaponry but we go the extra step and suggest
    that once they do get the weaponry they have to show that it is
    being distributed on the basis of military need and if that
    involves American advisors in the various war rooms to help
    second guess those decisions, so be it.
        Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you very much for that insight.
        Dr. Cordesman, my whole time being here--I was elected in
    2001 so I have not forgotten 9/11. It is on my mind all the
    time, that where there are safe havens for terrorists anywhere
    in the world that the American people and American families are
    at risk of a murderous attack again.
        We saw the attack of Osama bin Laden from a cave in
    Afghanistan but a greater threat over the last year it is
    inconceivable to me that the city of Mosul, a city of nearly 1
    million people, has been under the control of ISIL.
        How great a threat and as a launching place is it that such
    a city be under their control?
        Mr. Cordesman. I think the issue is much broader. As long
    as they are a growing proto state which extends into both Iraq
    and Syria they have the ability to attract foreign volunteers,
    to train them, potentially to use them.
        As people they can use in Europe or the United States to
    conduct acts of international terrorism. But right now, the odd
    aspect is they are so caught up in dealing with the al-Nusra
    front, Assad and the Iraqi Government that it is a threat which
    may well become far more serious in the future.
        The oddity, I would say, is as we look at Yemen, in spite
    of what has happened there, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
    is still a critical issue.
        If you look at al-Qaeda in that map which, as Dr. Kagan
    presented to you several years ago, and you combine it with the
    ISIL map, it has expanded into many other areas.
        Those don't have the same internal pressures for conflict
    and in many of those you may find the threat changes and
    becomes more serious to us or other states.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Cicilline.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madame Chair.
        Dr. Cordesman, in your written testimony you speak about or
    write about the need for a civil military and whole of
    government strategy for both Iraq and Syria, and you speak
    about it being largely the responsibility of these individual
    nations to determine their own destiny.
        And you, I think, accurately recite a whole series of
    challenges including deeply divided societies, inadequate
    governance, massive corruption, mismanaged economies,
    demographic pressures that make a challenging context even in
    times of peace.
        In light of that, is our reliance on a strategy that
    focuses on training and equipping the Iraqi army, the
    peshmerga, the Shi'ite militia--does that have a real
    possibility of success in any event or are there things we
    should be doing differently that might produce a better
    outcome?
        Mr. Cordesman. In the case of Iraq, I think the problem is
    we aren't doing either one particularly thoroughly. You can do
    serious damage to the Islamic State and to extremism using
    force.
        But I think that if you are going to deal with Iraq's civil
    problems you need to work very carefully with every element you
    can in Iraq to move them toward unity, to overcome the kind of
    problems and divisions that have grown between Sunni and
    Shi'ite and Arab and Kurd.
        One of the things that I think is very discouraging and one
    thing that you might want to conduct hearings on is the idea
    that what we need in Baghdad is a normal Embassy that does not
    put real pressure for this kind of unity on the Iraqi
    Government.
        I would want to see exactly what the strategy and the
    efforts are, whether there are things we could do to encourage
    federation or reform without attempting to dictate it, and I
    have not seen any indication of that, at least in public terms,
    and being reassured in broad terms doesn't help me.
        In the case of Syria, the issue is far more difficult. One
    way or another we have the al-Nusra Front, the Islamic State,
    Assad and perhaps some very small groups of Islamists which are
    more moderate.
        It has never been explained to me why training 5,000
    volunteers a year is going to have any impact on this
    situation, civil or military, and as was raised earlier, we are
    talking about essentially 11 million people, refugees or IDPs.
        So we either have some civil strategy for Syria and a
    military strategy or we have a nightmare where anything we do
    militarily does not bring stability or security.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. I just have 1 minute left so I
    want to ask Dr. Rubin. Thank you, Doctor. Dr. Rubin, can you
    just speak briefly about the Kurdistan-Iran relationship?
        You know, we kind of view the opportunities that exist with
    the Kurds to be a panacea. So I would like to hear, and also
    what more can we be doing to persuade Turkey to really take
    seriously their responsibility to stem the flow of foreign
    fighters and really close their border?
        Does that continue to be a resource or pathway for most of
    the foreign fighters into the region?
        Mr. Rubin. Thank you very much. Firstly, make no mistake,
    on the ground many Kurds are pro-American. For that matter,
    many Iraqis are--non-Kurdish Iraqis are also pro-American.
        However, the Kurds have a history of abandonment. While
    Americans tend not to have extensive historical memory, Kurds
    do remember 1975 and 1988, both periods in which they feel that
    they were betrayed by the United States.
        On top of that, Iran is their neighbor and a major Iranian
    influence operation is that you can like the Americans better
    but you are always going to have live next to us and that
    Iranians do tend to exert that pressure a great deal.
        When I go to both Iraq and Baghdad, Basra and Kurdistan,
    Gerbil and Sulaymaniyah I am told, jokingly, that Qasem
    Soleimani was there 2 weeks ahead of me in each of those cities
    including Kurdistan.
        The danger is that the Americans have let their card down
    when it comes to Iraqi Kurdistan and we don't recognize the--
    just how deeply they have been penetrated by the Islamic
    Revolutionary Guard corps and the Quds Force.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline.
        Mr. Meadows.
        Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Dr. Spence, let me come to you. You talked about this 3-
    year strategy, you know, that the success is going to take
    about 3 years and that is what the administration has said.
    This is going to be a longer-term strategy.
        So when originally we came up with this 3-year window of
    success in our fight, was it contemplated at that particular
    time that ISIL was going to expand their capabilities and
    acquire all this other new territory? Was that part of what we
    assumed was going to happen?
        Mr. Spence. Congressman, what I would say is that even
    though there is a longer-term strategy, we need to have interim
    report cards.
        You can't just wait to see what happens at the end of 3
    years and, of course, to answer your question directly two
    things that at the Defense Department we are particularly
    concerned about are, first, denying territory and safe haven to
    ISIL, meaning they should not be expanding territory.
        And then second, to what degree are we building the
    capacity to the partners doing the fighting.
        Mr. Meadows. Agreed.
        Mr. Spence. So the first question I am very, very concerned
    about----
        Mr. Meadows. So they are expanding territory. So I guess
    our strategy is not working is what I am saying. The American
    people believe it is not working. So do you have a different
    opinion?
        Mr. Spence. The way I would--the way I would put it, just
    very candidly, is there will be places where ISIL has expanded
    and there are places where ISIL is also in retreat. This is not
    a homogenous fight. Iraq is not homogenous where ISIL can have
    control.
        So to be very blunt, what happened in the last weeks was a
    significant setback. We should make no bones about it and we
    should be very honest about what happened.
        It was only a setback because this was an area where we had
    Americans fight and die before. It is in a hugely important
    part of Iraq. Also, it creates a sense of momentum. If more of
    that happens then it becomes very positive.
        Mr. Meadows. Well, and that is what I am seeing is
    momentum, but part of that is a direct response to our anemic
    air strikes, our anemic support and, I guess, when are we going
    to get serious about it.
        And I say that because under sworn testimony before the
    Senate Armed Services Committee we heard testimony that
    basically that 75 percent of our sorties that are going out are
    coming back without deploying, you know, their missiles or
    bombs and so they are coming back.
        The other troubling aspect for me is is during a 29-day
    conflict with Gaza and Israel they were able to put almost
    3,000 missiles into Israel and yet here we are, the most
    powerful nation in the world, and we, over a 4-month period,
    did less than 1,000 air strikes in a much larger geographic
    region.
        So how is that going to create the fear of the American
    military might if we are being anemic?
        Mr. Spence. So I think--I don't think we are being anemic
    now with American air power. That said----
        Mr. Meadows. Well, less than 15 flights a day. I mean, you
    get more flights coming in over the National Mall here than you
    do in Syria and Iraq. So how can you say that it is not anemic?
        Mr. Spence. Look, we have had--the sheer number of sorties
    and weapons dropped in the territory and the ISIL targets that
    have been taken out have been significant.
        Now, as I said earlier, I do think we should do whatever we
    can to make sure that we are expanding the target list and look
    very carefully to make sure that we are making the best use of
    air power.
        So as we think about forward-deployed air controllers,
    American as well as coalition forces, I think this is something
    we should seriously consider balanced against, of course, the
    risks to the U.S. services.
        Mr. Meadows. All right. Dr. Rubin, let me go very quickly
    to you because what we see is with Turkey contributing to the
    ISIL can you speak to that--our strategy with regards to
    foreign fighters coming in? And I will yield back and let you
    answer.
        Mr. Rubin. Yes, thank you, and thank you also to
    Representative Cicilline. I didn't get to this part of your
    question because of time.
        Basically, I would argue that Turkey has become Pakistan on
    the Mediterranean where they are willing to say one thing
    publicly and quite--and do quite another issue.
        I gave one item in my testimony both oral and written,
    which should be a no-brainer on the part of Turkey, to be a
    cost-free option to test whether Turkey is sincere or not.
        But look, Turkey, in the late 1990s, sealed their border
    with Syria. So the argument that they cannot seal their border
    with Syria is nonsense. They simply do not want to.
        And even if the June 7th election leads to a coalition
    government--and it is not clear that the election will be free
    and fair--over the past 10-plus years President Erdogan and his
    party have completely shifted the Syria policy, if you will, to
    the MIT--to Syria's intelligence unit.
        So even under a coalition government we are still going to
    have the problem continue unless there is some serious pressure
    on President Erdogan to stop the nonsense.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Meadows.
        Mr. DeSantis.
        Mr. DeSantis. Thank you. I thank the witnesses and I would
    just say that the Ramadi setback was something that does
    resonate with me because I know the number of people who fought
    and died and were injured driving al-Qaeda and Iraq out of
    Ramadi.
        That was one of the most dangerous places in the world in
    2005-2006. I was deployed in that area. By the time we left in
    2008 it was peaceful. And so to see it go back is something
    that hurts.
        Dr. Cordesman, to what extent is Iran supporting the Iraqi
    forces right now?
        Mr. Cordesman. Quite frankly, I think you would need to get
    that answer at a very sensitive level of intelligence. But
    several things are clear. The Quds Force is active. They have
    provided, for example, SU-25s.
        Now, they were Iraqi originally until Saddam flew them to
    Iran. They have provided significant numbers of weapons. They
    have certainly trained and equipped the militias, some of which
    are seen as more moderate than others. So you have a very
    active role and they are forward.
        So when you have Iraqi troops move forward there are often
    Iranians present in small numbers. It is not a matter of
    volunteers who are dominating any aspect of military
    operations.
        I think that they have a significant political influence
    and they certainly are tying their military actions to trying
    to give themselves visibility.
        In looking at what they have done and said, they also
    often, at least quietly, are saying our air power is
    ineffective--we are not really serious about training--you
    can't trust us, and they can split the message up between one
    focused on Shi'ites and other factions.
        They are also present in the Kurdish area and we should
    have no illusions that this is only something that affects the
    areas under the Iraqi Government control.
        Mr. DeSantis. Dr. Rubin, what do you--what is your view on
    the extent to which Iran is influencing and directing these
    anti-ISIL operations in Iraq?
        Mr. Rubin. Well, let me put it this way. Iran will take
    credit for any success that occurs. They are trying to
    infiltrate. I would respectfully disagree a bit with Dr. Spence
    that in the short term any benefit can be derived from Iranian
    actions inside Iraq.
        Iran is not an altruistic power and if the problem--if you
    are willing to accept that the problem is based in grievance
    and not simply ideology and if the grievance has to do with
    sectarianism, then the Iranian-backed forces are the most
    sectarian forces there.
        That said, there is a silver lining if we choose to take
    advantage of that. Under Prime Minister Maliki, there was a
    political purge to concert the more pro-Iranian members into
    Iraqi army units and they were the ones who fared particularly
    poorly in Mosul.
        So this idea that we can derive even military benefit from
    Iranian prowess, to me, is overstating in the extreme.
        Look, we have an interest in defeating the Islamic State.
    The Iranians have an interest also in the Islamic State. But
    arsonists and firefighters both have interests in fires. It
    doesn't mean we are on the same side of the issue.
        Mr. DeSantis. And what about the nuclear agreement or
    pending agreement? This has, obviously, unnerved a lot of Sunni
    gulf states to see the United States essentially tilting toward
    Iran.
        How does that play just kind of on the street and for the
    average Sunni Arab in al-Anbar province, I mean, if they see
    the forces as being infiltrated by Iran, they see the U.S.
    tilting perhaps toward Iran? It just seems like that we are
    driving them into the arms of ISIS.
        Mr. Rubin. Not only are we driving them into the arms of
    ISIS, but we are going to make the situation far worse down the
    line.
        The Khatam al-Anbia, which is the economic wing of the
    Islamic Revolutionary Guard corps, controls about 40 percent of
    the Iranian economy. When the Iranians derive this $50 billion
    to $100 billion in relief after any nuclear accord, that money
    isn't going to flow into ordinary Iranians' coffers.
        I used to live in the Islamic Republic. I can give you any
    number of anecdotes. But for the sake of brevity that is going
    to directly to the Iranians.
        Now, between 2000 and 2005 the price of oil doubled, the
    European Union trade with Iran almost tripled and under the
    reformists--the so-called reformists--that hard currency
    windfall went almost exclusively into Iran's nuclear and
    ballistic missile capability.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Dr. Rubin, and thank you,
    Mr.----
        Mr. DeSantis. Yeah. Sorry.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. But votes have started. So our wrap-up
    question and answer period will be led by Dr. Yoho.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I appreciate it.
        Dr. Spence, you were talking about an inclusive government
    in Iraq. Is that possible in Iraq?
        Mr. Spence. Yes, I believe so.
        Mr. Yoho. You know, what I see is when Saddam Hussein was
    there, there was a unified Iraq because he ruled it with an
    iron fist. But what I see today, and talking to the experts,
    you have the Sunnis loyal to the Sunnis, Shi'a loyal to the
    Shi'a, Kurds loyal to the Kurds.
        To be able to be under one unified government I am not
    seeing that work and I know that was one of the strategies of
    being able to build these forces that were going to, you know,
    all be loyal to the Iraqi flag the way we see unity and loyalty
    to the American flag.
        I don't see that happening. What do the people of Iraq
    want? I mean, the different tribal cultures--you know, the
    split up of the cultures there--what do they want?
        Mr. Spence. They want much of what most of us want. They
    want to be represented. They don't want to be pushed out. They
    don't want to have fear for their lives and their basic needs.
        Mr. Yoho. I mean, we all have the basic rights of we want
    better for our children, a better life, and we want certain
    basic freedoms.
        But yet, do they see that working together in a unified
    country made up of different factions or different cultures?
        Mr. Spence. I think there have been--it is hard to do but
    there have been some steps taken to your question exactly about
    what has been done to outreach more. So when Prime Minister
    Abadi came in he took some immediate steps to reach out to the
    Sunnis, which Maliki simply had not done.
        He appointed, for example, a Defense Minister who is a
    Sunni, which is a critical form--a critical post to have had.
    He fired some of the most political generals who really weren't
    leading at all.
        Even after what happened in Ramadi he called his full
    cabinet--his national security cabinet together where it was
    both Kurds and Sunnis and Shi'a to talk about what they need to
    do necessarily.
        Within the Iraqi Parliament a bill for a national guard,
    which would not just have Shi'as fighting, has passed a second
    reading. So steps have been taken to bring some of these
    fighters in. It is hard, but things have been done and I think
    we just need to push more to happen.
        Mr. Yoho. Well, I have seen that and you are talking about
    that national guard made up of different groups. We tried that
    with the Iraqi security forces and they folded like cheap
    suits.
        Dr. Cordesman, what is your opinion on that?
        Mr. Cordesman. I don't think that the security forces
    universally fold. I think some of them have been exhausted.
    Better units, for example, were sent in to Ramadi--not rotated,
    not supported and not reinforced.
        Mr. Yoho. Dr. Rubin, how about you?
        Mr. Rubin. I have talked to Iraqi insurgents and I have
    talked to Shi'ites. The one area of consensus in which they
    have is a support for administrative federalism and by that I
    mean while Baghdad would have control over foreign policy and
    defense, all other decisions would be based on the district or
    sub-district level, not based on ethnic divisions, although
    oftentimes those will coincide.
        Mr. Yoho. Is that long term or is that just to get through
    the crisis we are in now?
        Mr. Rubin. That is long term.
        Mr. Yoho. All right. Let me ask you this about Syria, if we
    can pivot to Syria.
        Where is the U.N.? Has there been a resolution from the
    U.N. that comes out and denounces Assad and denounces the civil
    war and Assad for having a civil war, for the hundreds of
    thousands of people that have been genocide there,
    destabilizing not just his country, the surrounding countries,
    the whole Middle East and basically the world?
        When you have 7 million refugees, where is the U.N. coming
    out and saying, we are done with this--we are doing an
    ultimatum--you need to get your country under control in a time
    period and the world--the nations of the world stand up? Has
    that been done, and why not if not?
        Mr. Rubin. When you ask the question where is the U.N. the
    answer is usually in a five-star hotel.
        Mr. Yoho. Right.
        Mr. Rubin. But the real problem with regard to the United
    Nations on this is it is infused with cultural and moral
    equivalency. It is not there to solve problems. It is there to
    avoid solutions.
        Mr. Yoho. Well, and I think they do very well at that. And,
    you know, and then I question why are we there--why are we with
    the U.N. and where is the rest of the world, because what Assad
    is doing is bad, you know, for everything I just mentioned and
    I think the biggest thing is the humanitarian crisis and the
    strife he has caused in that country to his own people.
        This has gone on long enough. I would wish the world
    community would come up and say, this is it--you are done and
    it needs to have a regime change.
        But then I worry about who is going to fill that void
    because as we all know, nature abhors a vacuum and I am out of
    time. Thank you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Dr. Yoho.
        Mr. Yoho. I got to go do my constitutional duty and vote.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you to our panelists, and before we
    adjourn I would like my wonderful congressional interns to
    stand up and take a bow. We are singlehandedly keeping all of
    these juvenile delinquents off the streets.
        Thank you, guys, and with that our subcommittee is
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 1:19 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

                                  ----------

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     [all]