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THE RISK OF LOSING MILITARY TECHNOLOGY SUPERIORITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY, STRATEGY, AND POSTURE IN THE ASIA–PACIFIC

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

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THE RISK OF LOSING MILITARY TECHNOLOGY SUPERIORITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY, STRATEGY, AND POSTURE IN THE ASIA–PACIFIC

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 15, 2015.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. "Mac" Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. "MAC" THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Let me thank our members, witnesses, and guests for being here today.

Before we start on the topic of today's hearing, let me just take a moment to welcome formally the newest member of the House Armed Services Committee. Steve Russell represents Oklahoma's Fifth District. A retired lieutenant colonel in the Army, Steve has deployed to Kosovo, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and commanded the 1st Battalion's 22nd Infantry in Tikrit. His unit played a key role in the capture of Saddam Hussein. So he has already, in our briefings and so forth, made an important contribution to the committee. We are very glad to have Steve join our numbers.

Today, we hold a hearing on the risk of losing military technological superiority and its implications for U.S. policy, strategy, and posture in the Asia-Pacific. We probably need to get a little better about succinct titles for our hearings, but it does bring together a lot of what we have been examining over the past couple, 3 months.

And I appreciate the senior-level attention within the Department on the Asia-Pacific region, as well as technological superiority. I realize that there are a number of serious security issues around the world all happening at the same time, the reason that we have had some people testify that it is unprecedented in our country's history to have so many serious security issues all happening at the same time. But we cannot, either on this committee, the Department of Defense, or the country in general, cannot allow limited bandwidth to have us ignore what is happening in the Asia-Pacific.

Among the issues that come to the fore, I think, in the region for which you all have responsibility is the technological superiority issue, which has been a key focus of this committee. We have had Under Secretary Kendall, for example, testify about our eroding

technological superiority, especially in light of some of the key investments that China is making.

It also brings together some individual unconventional warfare tactics. We focused a lot on what Russia has been doing with little green men, but it wasn't that long ago I read a paper about the three warfares of China, including psychological, media, and legal warfare. They have their own unconventional tactics.

And of course we have in the region North Korea and its asymmetric attempts both with its cyber, its missile and nuclear programs, just to keep everyone off balance.

So this region brings together a lot of what we have talked about so far this year. And, again, we appreciate everybody being here.

Mr. Smith is not able to be with us this week, but I would yield to the distinguished gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez, in his place for any comments she would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, again, to our panel, thank you for being before us.

Obviously, the Indo-Asia-Pacific arena is an incredibly important one to our United States and to security in our world. I am always a little amused with the fact that everybody talks about pivoting towards that direction. I am a Californian. We have always been on the Pacific.

So, to a large extent we have had the opportunity to look across that Pacific and work with the nations and accept a lot of people who are originally from those countries to our California. So I think that we are well-positioned, in particular, as Californians, with respect to understanding and having ties to those regions.

The collective security of our world is not only one of defense and high-tech solutions to some of that, but it is also about culture and the economy. And so I believe that we should continue to work in the many myriad of ways to—as we look towards that region. Maintaining a significant U.S. military capability advantage is clearly a top priority for us from a national security perspective. And it is entirely appropriate to take a look at the capabilities, especially with high technology that these countries in that region are doing.

Again, we should not presuppose, I think, that there is malice involved when somebody is beefing up their military or working towards higher military capabilities. And we shouldn't, I think, presume that conflict is inevitable. Rather, we should be geared toward working together in good faith of preservation of our international order.

And I think that the most significant thing that Congress can do to help bolster the U.S. military's technological edge and to help advance strategic objectives in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region is to eliminate sequestration. And I am talking not just here in the defense committee, but across the Federal board. As I remember Secretary Gates once said, if we don't educate our people, if our economy is not good—and I am paraphrasing, I am not saying directly—then we don't have to worry about our military because it is about our economy and about our people.

So I am looking forward to hearing the testimony today. And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit Mr. Smith's statement for the record. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

The CHAIRMAN. And without objection, the witnesses' complete written statements will be made part of the record.

We are pleased to have with us today the Honorable Christine Wormuth, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command; and General Curtis Scaparrotti, the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea.

Again, thank you all for being with us. As I said, your complete statements will be made part of the record. And we would appreciate you summarizing in your opening comments before we turn to questions.

Ms. Wormuth.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTINE WORMUTH, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you very much, Chairman Thornberry and distinguished members of the committee, for having us here today. We are looking forward to the conversation. And I am sending my best wishes to Ranking Member Smith for a speedy recovery. I know he is not enjoying that process.

The CHAIRMAN. Madam, excuse me. Would you mind getting that microphone right in front of you?

Secretary WORMUTH. Sure. That better?

The CHAIRMAN. That is better. The only way it works is talking right into it. So thank you.

Secretary WORMUTH. It is a pleasure to be here to talk with you about certainly a top priority for Secretary Carter and myself, which is our rebalance to Asia-Pacific.

I am also very pleased to be here alongside Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti. We work closely together on a lot of different issues. They are doing a tremendous job, and the men and women who are out there working in Pacific Command and at U.S. Forces Korea are really the day-to-day face of our rebalance for a lot of countries in the region. So we really appreciate the work that they do.

Both Secretary Carter and I have recently come back from Asia, different parts of the region, but I think we both heard in a very resounding way a lot of support from the countries out there for the rebalance that we have undertaken, and also a lot of desire to have even greater U.S. leadership and engagement with the countries that are there.

In the past 70 years it has obviously been a time of tremendous change and opportunity for the Asia-Pacific region. As nations there rise and become more prosperous it has created a lot of opportunity. At the same time, the dynamism in the region has also created a much more complex security environment in which we are now operating.

In particular, China's very rapid military modernization, its opaque defense budget, the—its actions in space and cyberspace, and its behavior in places like the East and South China Seas raise a number of serious questions for us. Though China's expanding interests are a natural part of its rise, it does continue to pursue activities and to make investments that lead many countries in the region, including the United States, to have some serious questions about its long-term intentions.

China's behavior in the maritime domain, I think, in particular, has created significant friction for its neighbors. The government's efforts to incrementally advance its claims in the East and South China Sea, and its extensive land reclamation activities, particularly the prospect of further militarizing those outposts, are very concerning to us. We have urged China to show restraint and to refrain from further activities that undermine regional trust.

We also have continued to urge China to clarify the meaning of its ambiguous "nine-dash line" claim as a starting point as a way to start reducing tensions and provide greater transparency to countries in the region.

While the United States and China are not allies, we also don't have to be adversaries. I think both of us, both the United States and China recognize that a constructive U.S.-China relationship is essential for global peace and prosperity. We are therefore not only talking to China about actions they undertake that concern us, but we are also talking to them and undertaking activities to build transparency and to improve understanding, particularly through our military-to-military engagement with the PLA [People's Liberation Army].

We also face a number of other challenges, obviously, in the region. Particularly I think of greatest concern to us in DOD [Department of Defense] is North Korea's dangerous pursuit of ballistic missiles and its weapons of mass destruction program. North Korea, as you all know, has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use provocations as a means to achieve its ends. And just in the last year, we saw a very significant cyber attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment.

There are also other challenges in the region that are magnified by a growing range of nontraditional threats, such as the increased flow of foreign fighters both to and from Asia, the trafficking of illegal goods and people, and devastating natural disasters such as the cyclone we saw last month in Vanuatu.

So in response to these shifting dynamics, DOD has consistently worked to implement President Obama's whole-of-government strategy towards rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific. One of the most important pieces of the administration's work in the area of the rebalance is to finalize the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP]. Our military strength ultimately rests on the foundation of our vibrant and growing economy, so we believe strongly that TPP is not just part of our economic agenda, but is also a very important part of our national security agenda. And I would urge Congress to pass Trade Promotion Authority and allow negotiators to conclude this very important agreement.

In DOD, we are really focused in terms of the rebalance on a couple of key lines of effort. First is strengthening our security rela-

tionships with allies and partners in the region. In Japan, for example, we are very close to completing a historic update of the defense guidelines, which really wouldn't have been possible a decade ago. We are also working with the Republic of Korea to develop a comprehensive set of alliance capabilities to counter the North Korean threat. And in Australia and the Philippines, last year we signed important, groundbreaking posture agreements that will give us enhanced access for our forces and also allow us a lot of new, combined training opportunities for our partners in Australia and the Philippines.

Our strong friendships in the region also go beyond traditional alliances to some of our new relationships, particularly in South and Southeast Asia. In addition to our very strong partnership with Singapore, where I just visited a couple weeks ago, we also are strengthening our relationships with countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. And finally, we are investing, of course, in our partnership with ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations], which is really leading the way in terms of trying to build a more robust security architecture in the region.

And lastly, in terms of relationships, the U.S.-India relationship is a very important and very exciting partnership. As you all know, just this January, President Obama and Prime Minister Modi signed a Joint Vision Statement. We also completed the first update in 10 years to our Defense Framework with India, and we concluded four "pathfinder" projects for technology development with India under the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative.

In tandem with our efforts to modernize relationships in the Pacific, the Department is also updating our forward presence. And this isn't just about putting more assets into the region. It is also about using those assets in new ways. For example, we have developed a more distributed model for our Marine Corps that is reducing our concentrated presence in Okinawa through relocating marines to Australia, Guam, Hawaii, and mainland Japan.

The Navy is also working more on its rotational presence concept to include being on track to have our goal of having four Littoral Combat Ships [LCS] rotating through Singapore by 2017. We have had two of our LCS ships go to Singapore already. And the Army will be initiating its first rotational deployment of a brigade combat team to the Korean Peninsula later this spring.

Finally, and I think going very much to the issue of the technology concerns that the committee is interested in, we are also bringing our best capabilities to the Asia-Pacific region. We are making significant investments to sustain our American technological edge into the future in the air, land, sea, and undersea domains. We are investing in precision munitions that will increase our ability to strike adversaries from greater standoff distances and we are working on new capabilities to allow us to continue to operate freely in space and cyberspace.

All of these efforts demonstrate the seriousness of our Department's commitment to protecting U.S. military primacy in the Asia-Pacific theater. And our focus on technology is really the impetus for our Defense Innovation Initiative, which is a long-term, comprehensive effort to make sure that we enhance our military competitive edge even as we face budget constraints.

The Department's rebalance efforts, as well those of our interagency colleagues, are part of a long-term project that reflect, I think, the enduring interest the United States has in the Asia-Pacific region. We look forward to continuing to work with Congress on the rebalance. And I look forward to questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Wormuth can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today with Secretary Wormuth and General Scaparrotti, who I work very closely with both of them. Before we begin I would like to ask that my written testimony be submitted for the record.

For more than 3 years I have had the honor and the privilege of leading the exceptional men and women, military and civilian, of the United States Pacific Command [USPACOM]. These volunteers are skilled professionals dedicated to defense of our Nation. They are serving as superb ambassadors to represent the values and strengths that make our Nation what it is: great. I want to go on record to formally thank our service members, civilians, and their families for their sacrifices.

USPACOM continues to strengthen alliances and partnerships, maintain an assured presence in the region, and demonstrate U.S. intent and resolve to safeguard our U.S. national interest. When I spoke to you last year I highlighted my concern for several issues that could challenge the security environment across the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Those challenges included responding to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief events; dealing with an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable North Korea, a challenge that General Scaparrotti and I remain aligned in addressing; a continued escalation of complex territorial disputes; increasing regional transnational threats; and the complexity associated with China's continuous rise.

In the past years these challenges have not eased. They will not go away soon. But the Asia rebalance strategy is and has taken hold. It is achieving its intended goals.

However, the greatest challenge remains the continued physical uncertainty resulting from sequestration. If the Budget Control Act remains in force, the greatest challenge in the Indo-Asia-Pacific will be dealing with the consequences to the security of our national interest as we respond to a rapidly changing world. I echo the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the service chiefs' testimony before Congress. Our Nation is being forced into a resource-driven national security strategy instead of one properly resourced and driven by our enduring national interest.

In the Indo-Asia-Pacific we are accepting more risk, not less. Sequestration will force harmful reductions in force size, structure, and readiness that will reduce my ability to manage crisis space

and provide options to the President and the Congress, and diminishes United States prestige and credibility in the region and around the globe.

In the last year, at great expense to the readiness of the surge forces' position in the continental United States, USPACOM has maintained its forward forces, focused on protecting the homeland, deterring aggressors, such as North Korea, strengthening alliances and partnerships, and developing the concepts and capabilities required for us to remain dominant in a world that is growing in complexity with threats that continually increase against a seemingly unending stream of constraints.

Without adequate resources, we will be forced to make difficult choices today that will have strategic consequences to our future.

I would like to thank the committee for your continued interest and support. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Locklear can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

General.

STATEMENT OF GEN CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

General SCAPARROTTI. Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to testify today as the Commander of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea, and also alongside Admiral Locklear and Under Secretary Wormuth. On behalf of the service members, civilians, contractors, and their families who serve our great Nation in the Republic of Korea, one of our most important allies, thank you for your support. I have prepared some brief opening remarks and I thank you for submitting them to the record.

Last year, I testified that the combined and joint forces of the United States and the Republic of Korea were capable and ready to deter, and if necessary, respond to North Korean threats and actions. Due to our accomplishments in 2014, I report to you that our strong alliance is more capable of addressing the rapidly evolving and increasingly asymmetric North Korean threat.

In recent years, North Korea has aggressively developed and utilized asymmetric capabilities, such as cyber warfare, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles to advance its interests. To put this in perspective over time, in 2012, my predecessor noted North Korea's advancements in cyber and nuclear capabilities during his opening statement to this committee. A year later, North Korea conducted cyber attacks on South Korea's banks and broadcasting stations. And in 2014, they boldly projected their cyber capabilities against Sony Pictures in the United States, in an effort to inflict economic damage and suppress free speech.

This example represents a trend that is persistent across several North Korean asymmetric capabilities. My top concern is that we will have little to no warning of a North Korean asymmetric provocation, which could start a cycle of action and counteraction, lead-

ing to unintended escalation. This underscores the need for the alliance to maintain a high level of readiness and vigilance.

Last year, the alliance took significant steps in improving its capabilities and capacities that deter aggression and to reduce its operational risk. But our work is not done. In 2015, we will maintain this momentum by focusing on my top priority, sustaining and strengthening the alliance, with an emphasis on our combined readiness. This includes ensuring the rapid flow of ready forces into Korea in the early phases of hostilities and improving our ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capabilities and critical munitions.

Based on the national security strategies of both our nations, the United States will continue to be a steadfast strategic partner to South Korea, and South Korea is poised to be a long-lasting and important ally to America. Our enduring military partnership in South Korea is the preeminent example of bilateral security cooperation and a visible element of American leadership and our Nation's commitment to the Asia-Pacific region.

The men and women serving on freedom's frontier, defending the Republic of Korea remain thankful for this committee's unwavering support in prioritizing resources that enable us to defend our national interests in Asia, while advancing universal values and international order.

I am extremely proud of our service members, civilians, and their families serving in the Republic of Korea, who never lose sight of the fact that they are at freedom's frontier, defending one of our most important allies and vital American interests.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti can be found in the Appendix on page 81.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I want to ask, Admiral and General, each of you, about this issue of technological superiority. I mentioned Under Secretary Kendall has testified that our technological superiority that we have enjoyed for years is eroding, and we have had many other witnesses support that. There are a variety of factors that have played into it, what we have done to ourselves with budget cuts, a procurement process that cannot keep up with changes in technology, the fact that some of our competitors have stolen incredible amounts of information from us and benefitted from it. I mean, all of these things, and probably others, contribute to it.

But, each of you are responsible for dealing with the world today as we find it and being prepared with plans and contingencies and using the forces that we have today. So I would be interested, as a combatant commander, as a commander responsible for a key area of the world, are you concerned about these trends in technology and our ability to keep up? Are there some areas that concern you more than others given your area of responsibility? And are there suggestions you have about how we, the United States, could and should adjust to meet these changes? Kind of a broad picture of what it is like from your end, as warfighting commanders.

Admiral.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, thank you, sir.

Over my career, my observation is that when we were dealing with the Soviet Union in the Cold War, that we had a concerted effort as a military to have that technological edge that really provided a great, a tremendous amount of benefit and allowed us to prevail, I think, during that time.

As we entered the last part of this past century and we started efforts in the Middle East, we predominantly were dealing with wars and events that—where we had such a large technological superiority, that it didn't—we had air dominance, we had undersea dominance, we had dominance in every area. And that was good, I think, and we used that dominance.

But during that time I think that our priorities for watching what the rest of the world was doing as countries came along that had the ability and the desire to want to improve their militaries and improve their technological capabilities, that we kind of took a little bit of a break and didn't make the types of investments that we needed to make. So during that time our relative superiority, I think, has declined, and continues to decline.

Some of the reasons for that I think are because countries have more money to spend. There is a greater proliferation of technology. Some of it has been stolen through intellectual property. Some of it has been sold around the world in different venues that you are all aware of.

The other thing that makes it challenging for us is our general vulnerability. I mean, when it comes to the Asia-Pacific, we are a Pacific nation, but we are also an island nation. So we rely very heavily on power projection, which means we have to be able to get forces forward, to sustain them forward, and we rely heavily on systems that several decades ago weren't even known about or thought about too much, and that really exists now in the cyber world and the space world, which unveils, if we are not careful, will unveil vulnerabilities that we have to pace with technological advancements.

To the degree of how we address these, what is important for me is making sure that the forces we have, number one, can—are dominant. You never want to go into any crisis or even in deterrence to try to manage a situation where the force is not dominant. It needs to be technologically superior across multiple domains. So if you start at the top and you go from space, to cyber, to air, to integrated air and missile defense, to sea, maritime, to subsurface maritime, there is technological challenges as all of the militaries in the world get better in these domains, that we must continue to pace for us to be able to be relevant in the domains that allow us to project U.S. power in defense of U.S. interests.

Now, in the buildup to this Presidential budget submission, I made it clear through a series of processes in the Pentagon, the types of key areas where we need to maintain our focus on technological advancement, and I think most of those were adequately—accurately—represented in Secretary Kendall's testimony. And I think that if the President's budget is supported in those areas, that it will continue to get at the types of technological advances that are critical for us to stay forward and to protect U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific.

General SCAPARROTTI. Mr. Chairman, I would echo what Admiral Locklear had to say, particularly on the peninsula. You discussed earlier the asymmetric capabilities that are being developed by North Korea. Really, as they develop those asymmetric capabilities, they are specifically orienting on what they consider to be some of our vulnerabilities, and through their development they are trying to close our dominance, basically. And so we have to continue to develop our capabilities, to change our posture, our concepts, our employment in order to ensure that we maintain dominance.

The last thing I would say in a peninsula is because we are operating on a peninsula, it is a relatively small theater. Air and naval dominance is very important to the agility that I have on the peninsula itself if we have a crisis. So all of those things are things that I think about quite often.

And finally, the specific asymmetric capabilities that I think about the most is the ballistic missile capability North Korea possesses and our continued ability to be able to counter that.

And then finally, on ISR. Many of our adversaries are becoming more proficient in determining how to work inside of our capabilities, our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and also how to use deception and other means in order to limit that advantage that we have today.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me in no area of the world is it more true that a loss of technological superiority means increased risk to American lives than on the Korean Peninsula. So I think that is another way to keep in mind.

Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you again for your testimonies.

I represent the largest Vietnamese population outside of Vietnam in the world sitting right there in Orange County, California. As I said, we have always had our view to what is going out in the Asian countries and the Pacific region. And last year, Vietnam and the United States agreed to ease its lethal weapons embargo on Vietnam in order to improve the maritime security and to address the ongoing conflicts in regards to the islands in the East Sea.

You know, but on the other hand, I have worked enough on the Vietnamese issues to understand that Vietnam still is lacking so much with respect to its human rights issues. In particular, in 2000, when I went with President Clinton for the bilateral trade agreement, and then later when we took the, took Vietnam off of the Countries of Particular Concern list with respect to religious infractions, in order for them to be able to go into the World Trade Organization. So we continue to see that things don't get better with respect to the human rights issues, or marginally at times, and then worse.

So can you address for me the roadmap for weapon sales to Vietnam and what types of lethal weapons your—would be precluded if Vietnam continues on its road of not changing its human rights record. Even with respect, for example, for Human Rights Watch and our own State Department. They are consistently marked very, very low with respect to human rights.

So what do you see, or what can we expect from this administration and this Pentagon with respect to weapons sales to Vietnam? And are we going to tie any conditions to lifting that embargo?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congresswoman Sanchez, thank you very much for that question.

We are still in the process now of working with the Department of State, our colleagues there, to work through how best to leverage the partial lifting of the lethal weapons ban. But certainly a part of those consultations is looking at the human rights picture in Vietnam. And we are very much, even as we in the Department of Defense are very interested in deepening our relationship with Vietnam, we also are committed to pushing for greater progress on the human rights front. So that is something that we are very much taking into account as we look at how best to work with Vietnam.

I think it is fair to say that, broadly speaking, the kinds of capabilities that we think that would be most useful for Vietnam in terms of its security needs are those that are—that would be helpful to them in terms of maritime security, in terms of maritime domain awareness, in terms of helping them strengthen their ability to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

So those are the kinds of areas that we are focused on with them and looking at what kinds of arms might be relevant to that. But we are still in the process of figuring out how best to approach specific items they might be interested in.

Ms. SANCHEZ. And, Madam Secretary, we have also seen, obviously, a pretty aggressive stance by China with respect to territorial rights or claimed territorial rights in the East Sea. What types of help could we give to Vietnam to ensure its sovereignty over the islands that it believes are part of their integral country?

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, I think, first, as you know, we don't take a position on the territorial claims, but we are very much committed to wanting to see countries in the region work through diplomacy to try to resolve those territorial disputes. So we are focused on encouraging all of the countries to seek peaceful means for resolution and to use diplomacy and use available mechanisms.

At the same time, I think helping countries in the region like Vietnam, but other countries as well, strengthen, again, their own maritime security capabilities and their own maritime domain awareness capabilities is helpful to them in terms of them being able to, again, maintain some visibility over their territorial waters, for example. And I don't know whether Admiral Locklear would want to add on that.

Ms. SANCHEZ. And might you also explain to me the timeline or how we could work together to ensure that this partial release of the weapons ban is not detrimental with respect, in particular, to our, I believe what should be, and it is for me at least, a requirement that we see better human rights from Vietnam? What is the process in which you are going through to take a look and figure out how we will help militarily?

Secretary WORMUTH. First and foremost, we are working with the State Department, again, I think, to try to make sure that we have agreement on what are the basic policy parameters for how we would approach how best to leverage the partial lifting of the

ban. We are then in consultations with Vietnam about what their needs are.

So the State Department really has the lead on the—on talking with them about human rights and the importance of making progress in that area. We reinforce that message. But we have a process internal to our government to sort of lay out our basic parameters, and then we have an ongoing dialogue with Vietnam about what their needs are.

And that is a very active dialogue. My Assistant Secretary for Asia-Pacific Affairs is actually a former ambassador to Vietnam, so we have a very active conversation with them.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And, I want to—Madam Secretary, I took down some notes, what you had said in your prepared remarks, and also what you said today: We urge the Chinese, actions that concern us, we bring this to the Chinese's attention. I am one of the individuals in the Congress that for years have been speaking out publicly back in my district, the Third District of North Carolina, about the growing debt of our Nation because I believe sincerely that that is the biggest threat to our national security, is the growing debt.

Admiral, that is why we passed the bill—I did not vote for it, to be honest about it—the sequestration.

And then I see we continue to play a shell game with the budget and with the American people's money and find ways to continue to pump up the needs for our military.

I believe in honesty in budgeting. I don't believe in dishonesty, but, anyway, in budgeting. But I am for honesty in budgeting.

This is my question to you. I have long thought, maybe it is because I was raised in eastern North Carolina, that if you owe someone money and you can't pay them back, they just don't have the same respect for you. And I look at the fact that President Bush raised the debt ceiling 7 out of 8 years that he was the President. Mr. Obama has raised the debt ceiling 7 out of 6 years that he has been the President. And you know, when we raise the debt ceiling what we are saying to the world is we can't pay our bills; that we have to sell our financial instruments and somehow finance our debt. Okay.

The Chinese buy a lot of our debt. So I really would like to know, when our representatives of our government, whether it be military or non-military, are sitting there facing the Chinese, if it is a respect, because we continue to have to borrow money from the Chinese to pay our bills. And they see all of the news articles of how we are spending billions and billions in Afghanistan, that much of it, according to John Sopko, is wasted. And yet, we are taking the billions and billions that we are spending overseas that is wasted, taken away from rebuild—from building our military, which needs to be rebuilt.

And I get to a point that I just don't understand an administration—and I would say this if it was a Republican administration—how in the world can we continue to play this game of spending, spending, spending, and borrow, borrow, borrow, and then we think

we have got equal placement to talk to the Chinese about we are concerned about this and we urge you to do that. Do they really listen to us?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I certainly agree that, as I said in my opening remarks, the foundation of our vitality as a country is a strong economy, and that underpins our ability to have a strong military. And, again, I think that is one of the reasons why we in the Defense Department have been expressing our support for important agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, for example.

I think China, again, you know we have a very independent global—interdependent global economy at this point, and we are very important customers for China, as are many other countries around the world. So I think having a robust and growing economy in the United States is important and the Chinese see the value of that for them. We have—and I also think they recognize very much that even as they modernize their military, the United States military remains the premier military force in the world.

And then, in addition to our very strong technological track record, we also have an operational track record that is unmatched. I mean, our military's combat experience is unmatched by almost any country in the world, and it has been honed over the last more than 10 years. And I think China very much respects that as we, as we talk to them about our concerns.

Mr. JONES. Well, I also found it very interesting that you mentioned Trade Promotion Authority in your comments. There are many of us who believe sincerely that any President, Democrat or Republican, if you give them Trade Promotion Authority, then you are damaging our constitutional ability to maintain fairness in trade, so.

But thank you for your testimony.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today. In particular, Admiral Locklear, I want to thank you for your leadership at PACOM [Pacific Command] for the last 3 years. I thank you for your service and I wish you all the best of luck in your future endeavors.

If I could start with you, Admiral. You mentioned China's aggressive shipbuilding program in addition to their significant advances in electronic warfare capabilities, Admiral. How do our forces in PACOM compare in those aspects? And where do you believe improvements need to be made, besides continued and sustained investment in the U.S. nuclear submarine force, as you mentioned?

I am particularly concerned and interested. I think that the Chinese at this point are—have confidence that they could potentially turn the lights off on our use of cyber capabilities on our fleet and our ability to respond, both figuratively and literally.

So I want to know where you—what your views are and how we stand.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, thank you, sir. It is my assessment that we remain the most dominant military power in the world from all aspects. And I think that there is hardly a country—there

is not a country in the world that would disagree with that today, even though I think they would recognize that the relative parity of our relative gap between how good we are versus how some of the other forces may be developing is shrinking.

In the case of the maritime forces that you have talked about with the PRC [People's Republic of China], they are on an aggressive strategy, an aggressive shipbuilding campaign. They seem to have limited restrictions on how fast they can produce systems, how fast they can produce ships, submarines. And they are producing what I would consider to be pretty good ships and submarines.

But I still believe that we remain and we have the best ships. We have clearly the best ships, the best submarines, the best aircraft carriers, and the best people running them in the world. So I am generally pretty good in that case.

But when it comes to dealing day to day in the Asia-Pacific, what I require, first of all, we have a forward-deployed force that operates with our host nations—Japan, Korea—operates extensively in that region. And that force needs to be ready, because it is not only ready for day to day to maintaining the deterrent oversight security of the region, but it is also critical to ensure that we are prepared for a quick reaction if we have to do something in North Korea.

So those forces need to be ready. They need to be the best that we have. They need to be of the highest technical capability that we have. And to the degree that we can get host—continue to get good host nation support, which I think we have today, we need to pursue that.

Mr. LANGEVIN. But I want to speak specifically to electronic warfare capabilities if you could, Admiral.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yeah. In the electronic warfare arena, I think that we are, because we have operated in environments, as I have said in earlier statements, around the globe that—where we have limited denied area through electronic means, I think our electronic warfare capability has diminished, has not kept pace with where we need to be in the future. And we are taking some steps to take a harder look at how we get at electronic warfare.

Of course, as you talk about electronic warfare then it starts to get into the whole cyber issues, which are now being—we are working hard to try to determine how we best defend our cyber assets, how we organize ourselves to do that, how we train a workforce to be able to do that. And that is all part of the President's budget that has come forward that gets at those particular issues.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good. Well, I share your concern there, Admiral.

With regards to North Korea, both you and General Scaparrotti mentioned in your testimonies that their cyber actors continue to conduct cyber actions against South Korean military and civilian networks. How confident are you that this isn't happening to our U.S. Forces Korea infrastructure as well? And additionally, how are we defending ourselves, as you mentioned in your testimony, China generating insights into our U.S. security policies, defense networks, logistics and military capabilities through their cyber program?

General SCAPARROTTI. Thank you.

In regards to Korea and the threat from North Korea, I am confident of our ability to defend our military networks. We work very closely with the Republic of Korea, our partners and allies, to ensure that, because we have a combined command and control system, that we close any vulnerabilities there. And we have been working in the past year very hard to develop our cyber capabilities as a team.

However, you know, that is an ongoing challenge that we have to stay on top of. North Korea is getting better every day.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Madam Secretary, General, Admiral, thank you so much for your service to our country. Thank you for being here today.

We have had a couple of milestones in the last few weeks. One, the Japanese have now exceeded the number of planes they have had to scramble against Chinese and Russian planes since the Cold War, as I understand it. We also had the Office of Naval Intelligence print this report, first time they have done it since 2009, talking about a compelling concern about Chinese activity in the disputed waters off the East and South China Sea.

I also concur with your comments about sequestration as it relates to national defense, although I really question anyone on this committee or the administration that would suggest that we shouldn't remove defense sequestration unless we can also give the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency], the IRS [Internal Revenue Service], and the GSA [General Services Administration] all the money they want or unless we can quench the thirst of every other agency that drinks from every Federal trough. To hold defense sequestration hostage against that would be unconscionable.

My concern today as we talked about it, Admiral Locklear, in this committee, we talked about the high-end technological superiority. But I am also concerned about what we are seeing happen at the lower end. You mentioned, I think correctly, China launched more naval ships than any other country in 2013 and 2014, and they expect the same for 2014 and 2015. But I am also concerned about what they are doing with their Coast Guard. They now have 95 large cutters, 110 small cutters. That is a total of 205. That is 68 ships less than the entire U.S. Navy, and they have more ships in their Coast Guard than Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have combined.

We don't always rate those as naval ships, but you have seen this picture, I am sure. This picture is of a Chinese Coast Guard vessel. They have labeled on here Tugboat number 25. It is painted white. This is one of their amphibious naval ships. It is number 908. It is painted gray. Other than being painted gray and the number on there, there is virtually no difference, I don't think, between these two ships. And that is something that is really concerning me, because we don't always measure those.

[The pictures referred to were not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. So my question for you today is not the high-end technological superiority, but when we are seeing Iranians in Yemen, we are seeing Russians in the Ukraine, we are seeing Chi-

nese on the Senkakus and the artificial islands they are building up, what strategies, concepts, forces, and capabilities do you think we need to counter this kind of gray-zone aggression we are seeing in Asia?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, thank you, sir. Your—the two pictures you showed I think were accurate, the way I understand it. The Chinese are engaging in a comprehensive military modernization program that wants to transform not only the PLA into a high-end kind of network-centric military capable of large-scale operations—we have talked about that—but they are also working on the lower end to ensure that they have a maritime security force, which we would equate to a Coast Guard or a fisheries patrol, that by numbers, you add up all their numbers and everybody else's in Asia, in that category they exceed everybody else's put together.

And I think that they went down that path after they saw what was happening in the Senkakus. They took some of the gray hulls, and we observed them, shipped those over to be what they would call noncombatants or maritime patrol ships by maybe just changing the color of them.

They show no slowdown in the pace of their military modernization, particularly in their Navy, even though their economy has dropped a little bit. They are still on about a 10 percent increase in 2014; 2015, it will be a little bit more. That is the fifth straight year we have seen them do double-digit increases.

Of course, their military is, on the high end prepares for issues around Taiwan and what they would call their near seas. Their maritime security are put in a position to be able to gain influence, particularly in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea, to further their, what they consider their national interests there.

Now, they are doing this in combination with what we have seen to be a fairly massive land reclamation in the Spratly Islands and upgrades to facilities in the Paracel Islands, which are the two regions in the South China Sea.

Now, the implications of that for us are that it provides an ability for them to deploy more of these lower-end ships down there, provides ability to base them down there, to resupply them. It allows them to exert basically greater influence over what is now a contested area. Its expanded land features down there also could eventually lead to the deployment of things such as long-range radars, military and advanced missile systems, and it might be a platform for them if they ever wanted to establish an air defense, an ADIZ [Air Defense Identification Zone], an air defense zone down there for them to be able to enforce that from.

Up to this point in time, the nations around them, the Southeast Asian claimants have really had little success in formulating an effective response to the PRC actions down there. None of their efforts have slowed the PRC in the South China Sea. And they recognize that stopping the PRC would require a change in the strategic environment down there.

So what are the types of things that we need to do down there? First, the forces we need to stay forward. We need to have the types of intelligence and search, ISR assets that allow us to maintain our knowledge of what is going on. These are globally stressed because of the things that we are doing in Afghanistan and in Iraq

and in Yemen, and those—many of those assets are similar in type to ones we would use in that arena. So we need to ensure that we can sense and see what is going on because it allows me to optimally use the forces that we have.

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, my time has expired, but would you mind submitting that to us for the record? It is important that we have it as a committee.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Absolutely, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 103.]

Mr. FORBES. And I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I appreciate it.

Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Wormuth and Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, I want to thank you for coming today.

And as the representative from Guam, I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your calling the committee together, for taking time to further examine our posture in the Asia-Pacific region.

Admiral Locklear, I have a question for you. As the ranking member of the Readiness Subcommittee, I would like to focus on training capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. Our Marines in Okinawa have degraded training capabilities, and the Army and the Air Force have significant degradation of training capabilities elsewhere in the region.

Can you comment on how the Department is looking at improving these capabilities? We are moving forward with a live-fire training range on Guam, but what about larger training exercises and the need for improving training capabilities in the Northern Marianas Islands? I think that the committee has questions about the cost, and I understand PACOM has a handle on many of these matters. So could you answer that for me?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, thanks for the question.

It is clear that for us to be as far forward as we are, that we need to have adequate facilities to be able to train and keep our forces ready at the high end. So it requires, I think, a multipronged strategy. One is, you mentioned first, is your home, is in Guam, is ensuring that the Guam plan that we have for the relocation of the Marines there stays on track, and we really appreciate the support of this committee in doing that as we go forward. And it is on track.

As we look at the entire Guam complex and bringing those Marines there, we envision, with the support of the Marianas Islands, the Northern Marianas Islands' governments up there to be able to put in place a range up there that allows not only us to keep our marines that are there ready, but also could bring other nations into play in that strategic part of the world for us to be able to learn together and train together and maximize the opportunity for interoperability between our militaries.

It is also very important that in Alaska, that we get the range systems in Alaska correct and we maintain those, because that is where we get much of our high-end training, in those ranges in Alaska.

As you know, we are also working very closely with our allies in Australia, and in Northern Australia for having access to those really magnificent, broad ranges that are there so that we can work together with them.

So I think that we have a good plan if we can bring it all together.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Admiral, I have another question for you. Can you comment on the progress of the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, and what do you envision occurring to implement these guidelines in the near term?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, the guidelines process is ongoing, and we anticipate that later this year that the guidelines will be completed and signed.

Ms. BORDALLO. I was going to ask, yes, the Secretary as well.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. And what we—the real key to the guidelines is making sure that, first of all, that we militarily, both countries recognize the importance the alliance. This is one of the most important alliances in the world, for not only Japan, but for the United States, but also for the region, and ensuring that we get this right and that we are able to go forward in a military way that provides the peace and security and prosperity for the region for both countries is important. And it starts to get at more specifics of how we are going to do that. And it also forces, I think in this case, or encourages the Japanese to kind of look at how they view the alliance and how they are going to participate as we go forward.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

Madam Secretary.

Secretary WORMUTH. Just to add on that, I think we anticipate finishing up the defense guidelines right around the time that Prime Minister Abe comes to Washington later this month.

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good.

Secretary WORMUTH. And a couple of things I think that are really notable and important about the defense guidelines are, first of all, that there will be a whole section that really speaks to the collective self-defense vision that Japan has for the role of its Self-Defense Forces. But it also will have a new alliance coordination mechanism which will again further our ability to work with Japan, to help Japan with its security needs, but also to look at our security needs.

There will be a section on peacetime cooperation in the areas of ISR, maritime domain awareness, missile defense. We will also have a whole section that looks at international activities, as well as additional cooperation in space and cyber.

So I think it will be, you know, a really important document to bring the alliance to the next level.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I have just one quick question.

Admiral Locklear, what will be the impact of our rebalance strategy if sequestration remains in place?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. If it remains in place, in general, in short, you will have less force, that are less ready, that are less technologically capable in an increasingly technological environment.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much.

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES [presiding]. The gentlelady's time has expired.

The chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for 5 minutes.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank each of you for being here today.

I just really have been impressed, Ms. Wormuth, your comments.

And, Admiral, I am just grateful that I have a son who is currently serving in the Navy, and I have got three in the Army.

And my visits, General, to the DMZ [demilitarized zone], again, such extraordinary people that you serve with, and making such a difference, indeed, for the Republic of Korea and their protection. And that is why, as I am thinking about the cyber offensive of North Korea, General, how is that being countered, and, with the efforts that they have made to disrupt the banks of South Korea and other activities? How is this being addressed?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, sir, I think, first of all, we are working very closely with our allies as a multinational community in this regard. And we have a very good cyber capability in the United States that is growing as well. This is a domain that we don't necessarily have superiority in. I think there is a lot—there is a lot of simultaneity out there in this domain.

So we are working very hard. I think we stayed ahead of it well, but it will take that kind of effort and resourcing in order to continue to develop our capability. That is about what I would say here. It is difficult to get into that much without, you know, in an open hearing.

Mr. WILSON. Well, again, we just appreciate your efforts so much.

Additionally, Ms. Wormuth, I am really grateful to be the chairman of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. The unconventional warfare tactics are a great concern to the entire committee and to myself.

Could you please characterize your assessment of the unconventional strategy and tactics being used by China and the challenge these pose to the DOD's ability to counter them?

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you, Congressman.

I think, as Congressman Forbes talked about in terms of the Coast Guard capabilities, for example, or the maritime law enforcement capabilities that China has, China has been—China uses those assets to assert, to try to assert additional control over what it sees as its territorial claims. And I think that is a way where they are sort of using assets in an unconventional way.

We are really focused, I think, on the building partner capacity side in trying to help partners in the region. Some of the smaller countries in Southeast Asia, for example, work on their own maritime security capabilities to try to counter that kind of unconventional use of assets.

We also, though, are looking at, on the more technology side, we are looking at certainly our intelligence capabilities and are trying to strengthen our information operation capabilities, for example. And those capabilities are relevant, obviously, not just in the Asia-Pacific theater, but in many theaters around the world. I think, you know, we have seen a considerable use of unconventional tech-

niques in Europe recently, given Russia's activities in Ukraine, for example.

Mr. WILSON. And certainly that is to me such a tragedy, the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. I know that I had just so hoped for a modern European-inclined Russian Federation and that doesn't seem to be developing.

Additionally, I am very concerned about North Korea's nuclear weapons policy. And, Ms. Wormuth, what does North Korea, the regime, what is their, what do you see as their capability of enhancing nuclear weapons delivery capabilities?

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, Congressman, we are certainly concerned, obviously, about North Korea's weapons of mass destruction capability, and its nuclear program in particular. You know, we—North Korea has not tested some of its capabilities, and we don't yet fully know what they are able to do in terms of their ability to miniaturize, for example, a nuclear weapon. But it is our assessment that it is prudent to plan for the worst-case scenario, which is why we are so focused on our national missile defense program, for example, and why we have made the investments to expand the number of Ground-Based Interceptors from 30 to 44, to try to make sure that we are keeping track with that, with that threat.

I think fundamentally the North Korean regime believes that having a nuclear capability under—basically guarantees their regime survival, which is why they see it as so important. I would ask, I think, General Scaparrotti to elaborate.

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman's time has expired, so would ask the General if he could do that for the record.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. FORBES. And the chair recognizes Ms. Gabbard from Hawaii for 5 minutes.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I will continue along the same topic here, and I think it is important for us to recognize that North Korea remains the most immediate military threat, not to only our interests within the region, but really to the U.S. directly, and important for us to focus on this immediate threat, especially within the context of the greater conversation that is taking place now and seeing how we can prevent Iran from getting to the point of having this nuclear capability.

General Scaparrotti, I am wondering if you can speak to Mr. Wilson's question, but also specifically to the status of ballistic missile defense policy within the region and the level of cooperation that you are getting from our partners there, within the Republic of Korea and Japan specifically.

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, thank you.

First of all, to the North Korean nuclear capability, I would state it this way, that they claim to have a capability to deliver a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile. They have paraded it, they have shown it to us. But they haven't tested it, as the Under Secretary mentioned, and that is very important in something that is as complex as this. But as a commander, I have to be prudent and assume that they can deliver one and act on that basis.

Secondly, in terms of ballistic missile defense, we bring our best systems to the peninsula. We work very closely with the Republic of Korea. This year, just this funding year, they committed in the last couple of months to upgrade their PAC–2 systems to PAC–3, and they will be doing that over the next couple of years, And we are working closely with them over the next year or so to increase our interoperability and the ability to have a common operating picture.

So I think we are moving in the right direction, given the threat. We have to keep pace with that, we have to continue to keep our focus on that.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you.

Admiral Locklear, in your written statement you stated that currently there are roughly 1,300 ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] foreign fighters who are coming from the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Can you speak to specifically which countries predominantly they are coming from? What is drawing them to ISIS specifically? And how do you characterize the threat of these foreign fighters coming back and returning to their home countries in the region and continuing these activities there?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, thank you, Congresswoman.

We are working closely with our fellow COCOM [combatant command] in CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] to actually have a, try to get a better sense of this phenomenon of foreign fighters that would be moving out of predominantly Asia, Southeast Asia.

They come from a broad range of countries. It wouldn't—you know if you took a look at the list, it would surprise you, it wouldn't be what you thought. They come from a number of different places. We are not sure how many of them are dedicated fighters that go forward or are they just kind of wannabes that kind of trundle over there and decide they want to sign up for a new cause.

And the numbers that are coming back, we don't have good fidelity on that at this point in time. But what it has done, it has opened up our information-sharing with all the countries in the region that are concerned about this problem, which all of them are. And this isn't just a mil to mil [military to military], this is a whole of government, agency, FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], those types of agencies are working hard on the problem.

So the implications for Asia, in this, is if you just kind of just add up the number of Islam that is in Asia, it greatly overwhelms the number that are in the Middle East. So there is probably 400 million-plus, I would just say, just kind of making an estimate off it.

Now, the difference is that they are generally moderate and they are less, I think, susceptible to violent extremism. And they have good governments, most of them do. They have better security environments that can monitor what is going on in the countries. So I think these are advantages that the Asia-Pacific has that might not be available in all countries in the Middle East.

So what we have is an opportunity here. We have an opportunity to assist them, to assist each other, to improve our information-sharing networks to see where this type is going, and then to be

more predictable rather than reactive should it occur in the theater, and we are making good inroads in that.

Ms. GABBARD. Do the governments of some of these countries recognize this threat? And are they reaching out to work with us in partnership to make sure that it doesn't grow?

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady's time has expired.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you.

Mr. FORBES. So, Admiral, if you could answer that for the record, we would appreciate it.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 103.]

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Scaparrotti, I know that we are in discussions with South Korea's government about the deployment of a THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] battery on the peninsula. Can you tell us why that would be important for the protection of our deployed forces in South Korea to have put on that peninsula?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, the employment of a THAAD would give us a high-tier defense. And so, therefore rather—we would have a layered defense and those systems would enhance the capability of our present Patriot systems that are on the peninsula today.

Mr. ROGERS. Okay.

Admiral, how many Chinese land-based cruise and ballistic missiles are located in your area of responsibility? And can you give me an estimate in the dozens or hundreds to keep it unclassified? And how many of these are between 500 and 5,500 kilometers in range?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. If you let me take that for the record, I would, and I will provide you a complete answer.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 103.]

Mr. ROGERS. Okay.

Ms. Wormuth, when will the administration make a decision on INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty] violation responses? And has the Principals Committee even met on this issue?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, we are again, I think, at this point in time of the view that it would be beneficial to remain in the INF Treaty if possible if Russia comes back into compliance, and we continue to have conversations with Russia about that.

There will come a point in time where, if Russia continues to be noncompliant, I think we will have to take action to deal with the military capabilities that they are potentially putting in place that are not compliant with the treaty. This is something that is discussed at very senior levels. You know, there are any number of Principals Committee meetings where this type of conversation may come up.

Mr. ROGERS. They have been noncompliant for years. How much longer is this going to go on?

Secretary WORMUTH. I think, Congressman, again, this is something that we are looking at very carefully. I think, you know, our view is it would be beneficial to keep them in the treaty if possible.

So we have not yet made that decision, but we recognize that we cannot let the current situation go on for an indeterminate period.

Mr. ROGERS. Yeah, in order to keep them into compliance, we have to get them in compliance, and they haven't been for years and they are not going to be. I hope that you all will start talking more seriously about some consequences.

Admiral, with China increasing its capability in nuclear attack submarines, ballistic missile submarines, and even aircraft carriers, how do those developments and deployments affect U.S. force structure and planning?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, certainly any increase of military forces by the PRC require us to think through: Are the forces we have adequate to be able to understand what is going on day to day?

In the case of their SSBN [ballistic missile nuclear submarine] forces, it becomes a homeland security, homeland defense issue, that will require resources for us to try to understand it and try to ensure that our country remains safe under all scenarios.

In the case of aircraft carriers, I believe primarily they will use aircraft carriers for—just like we do, to project power. That is one of the deficiencies I think they are trying to overcome now, is the projection of power, and that may have, down the road could have global implications, and it will just put further stress on the ISR assets we have and it will change the calculus on how we might deal with any contingencies down the road.

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe that the U.S. Government should be making it a priority to ensure that China is not able to obtain U.S. technology in our defense capabilities?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I do.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you.

That is all I have got, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back.

The gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Takai, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. TAKAI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you also for focusing today's hearing on the Asia-Pacific as you know, that is very important for people from Hawaii.

I wanted to welcome our witnesses. Under Secretary, Admiral, and General, thank you very much for coming.

Admiral Locklear, it is my understanding that the Pacific Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet are funded through separate budget offices. Can you speak to what advantages that has and how it supports the geographical combatant commander?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I would refer specific questions of that back to the Navy, because it is their internal workings. But my observation, it is of a historical nature. It was put that way because of the way that our fleets are laid down globally, and the significant influence that the Pacific Fleet has in the power projection of U.S. interest into what is over half the world. And I believe that there have been historic benefits to having that divide be there.

Mr. TAKAI. Great. I appreciate that answer.

And then are there any efforts underway to expand the use of training areas in the Pacific to support engagements of our regional partners and allies and more broadly connect ranges throughout the AOR [area of responsibility]? And can you speak specifically to

the Pohakuloa Training Area on the Big Island and the Pacific Missile Range on Kauai, some of the infrastructure needs there, and more importantly, how resources are being allocated to support upgrades at training ranges in the PACOM AOR?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Thank you.

As I previously laid out, you know we have a series of ranges that we need to support our forward forces. During that dialogue I did not mention Hawaii and I should have because that is where I live and where I breathe and where we have tremendous requirements.

So in the case of the ranges on the Big Island, I am a supporter of moving forward with those ranges. We are in need of those if we intend to maintain a forward footprint of Marines and Army personnel in Hawaii, which I very fully support a robust presence there.

The PMRF [Pacific Missile Range Facility] missile facility or missile range out there is a premier facility in the world as far as I am concerned, and that the investments will need to be made to keep it such. It has access to open space and open airways and open sea space that allow us to do, from Missile Defense Agency to all the other services, to be able do the right testing and evaluation of those systems that allow us to be relevant in the 21st century.

Mr. TAKAI. Thank you.

And, you know, this last question is something very important for people, especially on Oahu, and it is in regards to our groundwater supply.

So it is my understanding that recently meetings were conducted between PACOM and the DLA [Defense Logistics Agency] Energy regarding the Red Hill underground fuel facility. And though we know that fuel storage is necessary and important to support strategy and posture of your AOR, what is the plan to upgrade the aging infrastructure to ensure that communities that surround Red Hill, in addition the Halawa Aquifer that supplies about half the island with their water, are safe from contamination of, are safe regarding the water supply?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes, sir. This is a high priority for me because we very much respect the opportunity to be in Hawaii and to have these facilities there.

The need for fuel—I mean, the PACOM commander and the forces that are under me, I think, are the largest user of petroleum products probably in the world on any given day, and they have to be distributed throughout a vast area on only a very small number of nodes to be able to get at it.

And, historically, the Red Hill facility has provided a huge strategic reserve in case something happens out here. And I anticipate we are going to need that strategic reserve for a number of decades. I can't put an end state on it, but it will be a number of decades before we have visibility on how we might address that with different types of fuels or different types of forces.

So what we have done is, once we discovered that there was a potential leak in a couple of the tanks, we took immediate action to ensure there wasn't any damage to the water systems, and we have a comprehensive plan that both DLA and my staff have

brought back to the legislature in Hawaii. I am happy to have somebody come brief you on that if you desire.

But I think at this point in time we are in general agreement on the way forward that it is a good sound plan and it does what you indicated, it protects the environment of such a beautiful State.

Mr. TAKAI. Thank you.

And, thank you Mr. Speaker. I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Wormuth, my question is for the admiral and general, but I would like to say I am interested in any language suggestions that would cut this ridiculous appeals process that I think is one of the problems with us fielding the equipment. And some of these games that get played, if you will, from the people who are purchasing the equipment from—that slow down our ability to field the equipment I think is one of the reasons that the other countries are able to catch us, if you will. They don't have to deal with that bureaucratic process. And that is a pretty simple thing I think we could put an end to that would help national security.

Gentlemen, I represent Robins Air Force Base and the airmen and the women that fly and operate the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] aircraft. Last year we had worked with the Air Force, there was a proposal to retire six of the E–8, since you know they are old aircraft, with old technology, and to begin the recapitalization of a new plane with a more modern radar that would give you more information.

There was a proposal for a business class jet. I understand there has been a new analysis, a demand from the combat commanders, a decision is made to keep the entire fleet operational at this point. I would like for you to speak to the value of the JSTARS, how it benefits each of your missions.

And then the Air Force's analysis of the alternatives for the JSTARS and the recapitalization concluded that a manned aircraft was necessary and absolutely essential. And the Korea Command and Pacific Command both have benefitted from this manned platform and the on-board battle management provided by the JSTARS. And can you discuss the extent to which your command's ISRs or requirements are being met?

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question.

My top priority in terms of my requirements and requests through Department of Defense has been ISR. And specifically that aircraft, the JSTARS, is one that I need greater capability in terms of JSTARS, primarily because it provides us the MTI, Movement Target Indicator, and it allows us to queue, my other assets. So it doesn't work alone, it works in tandem with the other assets that are airborne. And I could use more than I have today.

I appreciate the fact that the Air Force, because of the budgeting, needs to get a newer aircraft, but I appreciate the fact that they are retaining what we have, because even the loss of hours of the one that I have today would make a difference in my indicators and warnings on the peninsula.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. It is a critically important capability in the ISR world, also in the battle management world, particularly when you operate in potentially contested environments, where other parts of your command and control may be under cyber attack or space attack. Having an aircraft that is manned that has that ability to have that functionality and thinking work is good.

I understand the Air Force's need to recap [recapitalize], and so we have to manage the risk on how they bring the new systems forward. Manned versus unmanned. I think there—my concern right now is that we don't have the technology able to put everything we need to in an unmanned system. I think that is what the Air Force is probably grappling with. So what would not be beneficial to me or to General Scaparrotti would be a replacement system that didn't replace it.

Mr. SCOTT. One of my concerns is, as you are forced to make, through all of the DOD and the agencies, as you are forced to make decisions based on the sequester instead of based on what the national security needs are, is that we end up with Army standing up for Army, and Navy standing up for Navy, and Air Force for Air Force. And we just need to make sure that those platforms, those ISR platforms that we use that operate across those what should be imaginary lines, if you will, don't get sacrificed.

And, I just, I appreciate all of you and what you do for our country and look forward to continuing to work with you to provide those JSTARS and that ISR platform.

And, ma'am, if you have suggestions on language that will stop that bureaucratic problem, we would happy to work with you in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] to put it in there.

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you. I will take that back and we will get back to you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 103.]

Mr. SCOTT. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back the balance of time.

Mr. Ashford, you are recognized for 5 minutes. No questions.

Mr. Nugent from Florida is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank our panel for being here today.

And, General, having been to South Korea, I think I was there in 2005 or 2006, not—I was not in this job, but I visiting my son who was stationed there, that is a special area. And you certainly are at great risk there, all of our service men and women and civilians that are there are certainly at great risk, particularly close in Seoul and on up. So I certainly do appreciate that.

I had the opportunity here just recently to go out. I did not get back out that far, nor did I get to Guam, but I got out to Hawaii and San Diego in regards to visiting our naval forces and some of our Marines that are stationed out there. And I was impressed with, I guess, the leadership.

And, Admiral, I met with you in Hawaii. I was impressed, though, not only with your leadership, but the leadership of those that are in your command, from a destroyer skipper, to an LCS–4 skipper, and others, in regards to how they take their mission and how they accomplish it, and also at the BUD/S [Basic Under-

water Demolition/SEAL] training facility in Coronado with our SEALs [Sea, Air, Land]. We have, and we talk about this all the time about equipment, but it is the personnel that man that equipment that makes the difference, I think.

But what I am concerned about as we move forward, and you have talked about it, that we have had to accept more risks and we are concerned about having adequate resources. Could you explain to us, and maybe we can do a better job of explaining this to the American people, first of all, why is the Asia-Pacific area so important to us? And (b), what are the additional risks that we are accepting because of the lack of providing the proper resources?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, thank you, sir, and thanks for your visit to PACOM. It was good for us.

If you take a look at the Asia-Pacific today, my AOR is about 52 percent of the world, 36 nations. Of those nations, there's—seven of them are key allies. I mean five of them are key allies. We only have seven defense treaties and five of them are there, and they—we believe that they are historic and they will go forward and be important for the future.

Today, about 6 out of 10 people alive live in the Asia-Pacific. My AOR, if you just characterize it as 83 percent water, 17 percent land, and on that 17 percent of the land, 6 out of every 10 people alive live there. Eventually, if the population goes to 10 billion like we expect it to, roughly, before it caps out, it will go to about 7 out of every 10 people. That is going to be the economic engine of the world. I think Secretary Carter in his speech to, the other day in Arizona pointed out, I think there is about half a billion middle-class consumers in the Asia-Pacific. And by 2030, he predicted in his speech, it would go to 3 billion.

So this is where the people who are going to have money are going to be spending it in a global economy, and that global economy is where I want my four grandsons to be able to compete in. And I want American systems over there, systems that are similar to the value systems we have, systems of law and order, systems of economic, economic systems that they understand and then they can compete in.

So what we have to do I think is to ensure that, number one, that we, to the degree we can, that we maintain a security environment that is similar to what we have enjoyed for the last 70 years, one that reflects the security of this country and the values of this country.

To do that, you have to be there. You have to be there in many ways. It is not just about the military, but the military is a big component of it. Military forces have to be there, they have to be part of those nations there, they have to be in there working with them. They have to be shaping the day-to-day environment and the landscape.

And so as the world changes, and as the military capabilities in this AOR over the countries change, we have to ensure that we have the right relevance there to ensure that we can compete in the Asia-Pacific for the next century.

Mr. NUGENT. One of the things that we really haven't touched on is Russia is playing in that area also. And I know we have

talked about China and we talk about all those things. But is Russia not playing in that area or starting to exert more?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, Russia in the last few months has returned to, I would say, nearly a Cold War level of activity that goes towards our homeland, with long-range attacks, you know, exercises, and those types of things. We also know that Russia will improve their strategic nuclear deterrent on what is their East Coast, which is in the Northern Pacific.

They also are improving their submarine force that operates in that area and are exerting increased influence not only in the Arctic, which they will tend in that direction from my AOR in, but also in Northeast Asia. And we see a greater presence of them in, just this year in Southeast Asia as well.

So it just adds to the amount of interesting things that a PACOM commander has to think about every day, and the amount of ISR that I need to track them, the sophistication of the systems I have to be able to deal with them. I mean, the key is for us to manage the security environment on our terms, not have to respond to someone else's.

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. NUGENT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the indulgence, but, and the Chairman mentioned this about the INF Treaty. I think that is an important issue for us as we move forward, particularly as it results to Russia now playing again in a Cold War atmosphere in the Pacific.

Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you.

And the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a question for Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti. When you think about the assessment of the technological imbalance between specifically us and China, and us and North Korea, can you share what your assessment is right now as it concerns cyber and space, those two elements, for each one of you as it relates to China and North Korea?

Admiral Locklear.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, my observation is I am a firm believer that anything we choose to be dominant in we can be. So we just have to make that decision.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Are we currently dominant?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes. That is my assessment.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Is the trajectory going to sustain that dominance, the trajectory that is going on right now?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. No.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Now, in the case of cyber, clearly PRC is a big actor, Russia is a big actor. I would say they are probably at the top tier. You drop down it would probably be North Korea and Iran. And then certainly we are in the top tier of cyber capabilities and probably lead the way in cyber defense capabilities, cyber understanding. But it is, as General Scaparrotti pointed out earlier, it is an interesting environment, it is an interesting domain that is changing rapidly.

In the case of space, I think what we have seen with the PRC that concerns us the most is their willingness to do offensive things in space, counter-space activity with the ASAT [anti-satellite] missile they fired a while back and some of the other programs I think they are developing that to, that would limit our ability to use those space assets in our favor, which we do need to stay forward globally.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. General Scaparrotti, will you address cyber as it relates to North Korea?

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes. In terms of cyber, as I said, I agree with Admiral Locklear, I think they are probably the B team right now. But they, since 2009, have said they are going to develop that capability, and we have seen even in the past year that capability improve.

So as I said, it is a dynamic domain. We are building teams. We are using our intelligence to develop our skills, the types of skills we need every day, and we are going to have to stay on that. And that has to be resourced. As you know, in DOD we are resourcing CYBERCOM [Cyber Command]. They train those teams that come out and help in PACOM's headquarters and mine. And that would be difficult to do under sequestration, I think.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you for that.

One of my concerns is that, and I have heard General Hyten talk about this, that, you know, satellites and networks, they don't have mothers. And so when we think about defending our forces, those satellites and those networks directly affect the people, those of us who serve in our country's uniform. We do have mothers. And so from my perspective, we need to maybe think about space a little differently.

Ms. Wormuth, would you like to address this?

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, if I may. I think, a, you are absolutely right, and both the admiral and general are right, that China in particular I think has identified space as a potential vulnerability area. They see that—they see being able to hit us in space as an important way to try to come after us if that were ever to come to pass.

Given the importance of space to all of our joint force, that is one of the areas in the PB16 budget [President's budget for fiscal year 2016] where we made some very specific and significant targeted investments to try to make sure that we stay ahead of that curve. And I think it was very much coming from the place of recognizing that that is an important capability that sort of underpins all of our ability to be effective.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So as a Navy pilot we have rules of engagement and we have hostile intent and then hostile act. And depending on where you are in the world and what is happening you can respond different ways.

When it comes to our space communication architecture, when it comes to our GPS [Global Positioning System] architecture, when these come under attack, whether it is jamming or kinetic, this directly impacts those of us who fight war. And to the extent that we are not fighting a war, it directly impacts the safety of those of us who happen to be on the other side of the world where there are hostile countries.

From a policy perspective, can you share with us, what is the position of the administration on how we treat, say, dazzling of an intelligence satellite or potentially, what is our, can we do kinetic affects if they jam GPS or if they jam our communication architecture in space? Can you share with us kind of the policy on that?

Secretary WORMUTH. I think, Congressman, what I would say here is that, again, we very much recognize that one of the key advantages we have is the networked space-enabled force that our military has. And we want to make sure that we protect that capability and that we continue to have the ability to keep our forces able to operate in that networked environment, and we know that there are potential adversaries that are trying to break that capability.

If it is all right with you, I would be happy to have a team come up and brief you about our space policy in a classified setting. I think that would be able to address your concerns.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Absolutely.

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman's time has expired.

The chair recognizes the other gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Russell, for 5 minutes.

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Madam Secretary, Admiral, General.

Part of the concerns that I hear, Madam Secretary, about a policy push on the trade Pacific authority, the trade partnership authority and the move to the Pacific is that if you look at history, when Commodore Perry went in and said we are going to open up Tokyo, and did, they immediately adopted our ways. We saw within two generations incredible industrial capability, military doctrine, to the point where they even defeated a world power.

John Hay at the turn of the century then developed an open-door policy with China as a hedge on Japan, almost using the same terms, hegemony. And now we see this push into the Pacific, and while we have had briefings here in the last couple of years with the same talks of how we are going to expand or change our posture or do different things, now it does not seem that the diplomatic or military advances are keeping pace with the trade advances.

Unfortunately, in 15 years we went from ally, making ships, signing naval treaties, to having to melt Japanese out of pillboxes and drop atomic bombs on their cities. I would hope that as we make an advance and a pivot into the Pacific, that we would not make those same policy errors.

My question would really be to the admiral or to the general. Missile defense seems to be the greatest short-term threat that we could possibly face. You have limited AN/TPY–2 [Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance] radars. The funding for those and the building of those does not seem to be a priority, and yet they may be the very things that stand between us and this incredible threat. How is that being addressed?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, Congressman, I would refer the specific timelines to the Missile Defense Agency and the services who buy them. But let me just talk about missile defense in general.

I am faced with two problems, and General Scaparrotti is part of the second one. One is I have a homeland defense support re-

quirement where not only do I have to defend Guam and Hawaii from potential missile attacks, but also have to support NORTHCOM [Northern Command] as NORTHCOM were to transition to where we would have to defend the homeland from maybe a rogue attack from North Korea. And so we moved rapidly to put things in position in the last decade that I think give us a relative assurance on our homeland defense.

We have guided missile destroyers that operate in the north. We put a—the THAAD radar, we put that in there in about less than a month into Guam when we knew that there was a potential for a launch from North Korea, which was really fabulous that the Army could move that fast and make it happen. We fast-tracked the TPY–2 radar that was put in Shariki in Japan, so now we have two of those going, and we are having dialogues about where a third THAAD may go.

The second part of our problem is defending forces in the theater and defending forces in an ever-increasing environment of ballistic missiles. And these can be short range, they can be directed at aircraft carriers, directed at ships, they can be directed at land bases. And you can't defend against all of them. There are just too many of them. You can't buy enough interceptors. So what you do do is you buy enough to give you confidence that you can deter and that when conflict were to start, to give you enough time to be able to get the rest of your war plan going.

Mr. RUSSELL. And I appreciate that, Admiral, and thank you. I—In fact, it brings up the larger concerns of power projection and even long logistical lines for reinforcement even if we can project power. This month in history over 100,000 Americans had to surrender at Bataan, not for a lack of fight, not for lack of leadership, but for lack of capacity to get to them. And with a lot of these things, I realize the constraints that each of you live under. And the policy has shifted, but we don't necessarily see the resources coming your way.

How would you—what counsel or what advice would you give to Members of the Congress of how we correct that as we look at a complete pivot in changing the economies globally and the friction points that that will create, and yet not have a Bataan-like future or an inability to project power and to also sustain it? Either one.

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir, thank you.

I think, in terms of the projection of power, I am probably the best example of that requirement. I have 28,500 service members on the peninsula, sufficient for today, but certainly if we begin to escalate, specifically to BMD [ballistic missile defense], I will ask for additional ballistic missile defense assets very quickly in order to safeguard not only our military installations, but the American civilians we have there and along with our ROK [Republic of Korea] allies.

So when we look at resourcing, the impact of sequestration in 2013, et cetera, it reduces the readiness of the force. And what I will need on the peninsula are forces that arrive ready to fight in a high-intensity conflict. And then also the impact of sequestration or reduction of resources, as you mentioned, I will need them on a pretty specific timeline, because I have a large adversary in close proximity to the capital of South Korea.

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman's time has expired.

Ms. McSally is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for your time and your testimony.

General Scaparrotti, I want to talk about the potential impact of divesting in the A–10 and the impact that that is going to have on our capabilities with your mission. And then also, Admiral Locklear, in general in the theater.

The depleted uranium on the 30 millimeter, specifically the antitank capabilities, I know you have shared in your testimony about how North Korea is going more towards asymmetric capabilities, but there is still a very real conventional threat, as you know. And should we have to deal with that, having been a part of units that were supposed to be heading your way to be reinforcements to those that are stationed right there, it is a pretty tight timeline to be able to react in a very short geographic area, as you know.

So gaining and maintaining air superiority and then making sure that we have the anti-armor capability against North Korean capabilities is really important.

So if the President's budget were to be fulfilled and the A–10 would be divested in, you would lose the capability of the depleted uranium, and the A–10 squadron is right there at Osan. What capability gap does that provide for you and what are the plans to fill that gap in order to address this particular threat?

General SCAPARROTTI. I thank you. As you said, the A–10 was designed for a specific capability and it is very good at that. Being an infantryman, I have high regard for its ability to support ground troops. And in the region that I am in, particularly in mountainous region, it also can get low and it can turn in tight spots.

Having said that, I recognize too the Air Force's difficulty in terms of the funding and the need with an aging aircraft, with reduced funds, to perhaps move away from that and go to a multirole ship. And I have been assured that if the A–10 were to come out there would be a multirole aircraft that would replace that squadron on the peninsula. And I would need that. I would need additional air.

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. But the F–16 doesn't have the depleted uranium or the antitank. I want to focus specifically on antitank. We are often talking about close air support in Iraq and Afghanistan and other areas where the A–10 brings unique capabilities. But if we are talking about piercing armor and the antitank capability that the 30-millimeter with depleted uranium brings, and the F–16s, F–15s, they don't have that capability. So what gap does that create for you and what do you think is going to be replacing that?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I don't know from the Air Force. I mean, frankly, I would use air in different ways, the multirole aircraft, and then use the systems that I have on the ground primarily against their armor threat. And, so it would open a gap in terms of having that aircraft for that specific capability.

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. And I think the last thing that we want to be doing is be relying on having to have a tank battle, right, in a day and age where we have the capabilities to, and we have the plans, to be able to take out those capabilities from the air. We cer-

tainly wouldn't want to roll back that capability and have our guys on the ground having to fight that when we do actually possess the capability in the air to be doing that with the A–10.

So you agree that it would create a gap.

General SCAPARROTTI. It would, yes.

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay.

And, Admiral Locklear, do you agree just in the larger plans, we have been very much focusing on near-peer, conventional, potential scenarios in the future. So the close air support and the antitank capabilities that you would be lacking without the A–10, is that something that you think is also a gap for the greater mission that you have?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, it is certainly nice to have everything you could have when you need it. I would say that in general in the Asia-Pacific, other than the Korean Peninsula, that the close air support mission is of a lesser concern to me in general. But as the Air Force moves forward with the systems they have to move forward in the future, I think you are going towards a close air support model with airplanes that have improved precision-guided missile weapons that can go against tanks and can deal with a broader array of them.

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Thank you.

Again, we talked about the F–35 yesterday in a separate hearing, but the munitions capabilities on the F–35 actually are not an armor-penetrating capability, and survivability is in question, especially when you do get into that close fight. I mean, I agree, you have got a high-end challenge that you have to deal with for sure, and we have got to be able to meet that both with air and naval forces. But if we do have men and women on the ground in harm's way in any potential scenario, we do want to make sure that obviously we can protect them with the best capability that we have.

So I appreciate your responses. Thanks for your service as always.

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady yields back.

And Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Forbes.

And thank you to the witnesses for being here today.

Yesterday morning Under Secretary Kendall was sort of a featured speaker at the sea, air, and space gathering over in Virginia, you know, packed room. Talked about a lot of the same issues that are being discussed here, that narrowing gap that, Admiral Locklear, you referred to earlier this morning.

But what is interesting is at the end of his remarks he actually pretty passionately used a pretty good chunk of his time talking about STEM [science, technology, engineering, and mathematics] education in this country as really a critical component of our national security long term, and particularly with the narrowing gap that Admiral Locklear mentioned.

The STEM Education Council, which is a pretty extraordinary coalition of Microsoft, National Association of Manufacturers, you know, all the hard-science professional educators, American Farm Bureau, released a report recently where they talked about 23 percent of the graduate degrees in STEM in the world today are China

and 10 percent are the U.S. And that kind of, I think, particularly when we talk about Asia-Pacific and the challenges, and again looking beyond just today's budget year, that point that I think Under Secretary Kendall was making is pretty powerful.

And we talk about sequestration and trying to balance defense and nondefense. I mean the fact is that education is one of those that could "pay the price," quote, unquote, if we just had a sort of lopsided approach to dealing with sequestration. But long term, in terms of our defense, that is just adding to that disparity that is pretty disturbing right now.

So, Ms. Wormuth, then just wonder if you maybe wanted to comment on that, anyone else, about what you see out there in terms of where China's investment in education and the increase in capabilities that we are seeing emerging domestically from their country.

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you, Congressman.

I think that Under Secretary Kendall, as he often does, was making a very good point. And we are very much looking at the strides that countries in the Asia-Pacific region are making in terms of science and technology and mathematics. And it is clear that in our country we don't—have a harder time, for any number of reasons, convincing our young people to go into those areas, but it is critical. And making sure that we have the educational policy and funding for those types of skills is what we are going to need very much to be able to remain competitive in those fields in the future.

And I think Secretary Carter has talked about this issue as well. And not only do we need to find ways to get more folks into those areas as they pursue their higher education, but also we are looking at how in the Department of Defense do we find ways to bring more people with those types of skills into our system, because part of what we need to do to be able to remain competitive and to be innovative and to get after some of these technology challenges is to be able to bring in those sort of fresh people with new, fresh ideas. And that is something that our Department probably needs to be a little more agile about.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I would agree. I mean, how we recruit the force of the future has to be part of a national dialogue. I mean, 1 percent of the American people day to day defend it. Some of them are the most highly technical people that this country can produce. And if we don't have a system underpinning it that produces enough for us to lead the world, we will not be as successful. I know the service chiefs are all engaged on this thought process. Where does that future force come from?

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. I mean, this is the 60th anniversary of the launching of the *Nautilus*. And Admiral Rickover in his final days actually almost stopped talking about the nuclear Navy and was really focused on U.S. education policy for precisely those reasons.

And, again, the threat in Asia is where I think this imbalance is really the most acute. And, again, I think as we, this committee should look at the big picture here in terms of just what is national defense really, what are the building blocks of it. And having an educational system that is prepared to provide the workforce for both the military and obviously the people who develop our weapon

systems and weapons platforms has really got to be part of that discussion.

So thank you for your testimony today.

I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back.

And the chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio for 5 minutes.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have talked a lot about the region today, and I want to focus a little bit on our allies in the region. And maybe touch on a little bit, if you would, about their efforts of increasing their capabilities, not only in traditional warfare aspects, but, say, cyber and space and how we are coordinating with them, if you would.

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, if you would, I will go first with the Republic of Korea. First, overall within their defense budget over the past 4 years or so they have been averaging about 4 to 5 percent increase in their defense budget. This past year it was 2.5 percent of their GDP [gross domestic product], which is very good compared to, say, our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, et cetera.

And so they have been focused on meeting the capabilities that they need, given the evolving threat in North Korea, but also in order to meet the commitments that we made together as an alliance. An example being the funding of the PAC–3 upgrade and the missiles for those, this year Global Hawk, last year to assist in ISR, an improvement in their C4 systems, command control communications, computers, to enable them as we go to OPCON [operational control] transition, to ensure that they can lead a combined force in a high-intensity conflict.

So overall I think they are focused on that. Within their budget they have the same challenges that we do in terms of the social demand and the competition with defense and the expense of the systems that they have to put in place in order to increase their military's capability and to deal with the threat that is evolving in the north.

Dr. WENSTRUP. And what about Japan?

Secretary WORMUTH. I am happy to speak a little bit to Japan. Again, I think we have an incredibly strong relationship and alliance with Japan, and that will be renewed and I think brought to the next level with the completion of the defense guidelines that are going to be completed by the end of this month.

They, as you know, are buying a large number of F–35s. They have expressed an intent to buy the V–22. They also are working on upgrading their Aegis platforms. They are working with us on Global Hawk. So they are also, I think, doing a tremendous amount to upgrade their capabilities. And then we also have a very significant cooperative production project with them for the SM–3 II missile. That is a $3.2 billion cooperative program with Japan.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Admiral.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, in addition I would say that the Philippines, who is another key ally of ours, we have in negotiation for an Enhanced Cooperative Defense Agreement. That is currently being debated inside the Philippines on the political side. But that has an opportunity to help them improve to get them to a better minimum credible defense. It also has the opportunity for us to

strengthen that alliance and strengthen our position in Southeast Asia.

Our other ally, Australia, making good strides. I mean, it is a great alliance. As far as I can tell, they are increasing defense spending. They are having a good dialogue about how they will partner with us. They are thinking about extending their capabilities in submarine warfare and some other areas, amphibious warfare.

So in general I would say the trend of our allies across the board is that they are investing more in their defense and in their security rather than less, and they are investing more in directions that are complementary to our capabilities, so that we all enjoy the same mutual benefits of that security architecture.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you very much.

I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back.

And with that, Madam Secretary, General, Admiral, thank you so much for being with us today. We are getting you out right on time. And we appreciate, as you heard all of our members express, their appreciation to you for your service to our country, but thank you for being willing today to educate, advise, and consult with us as we try to be a component part of the national defense of this country.

And with that, we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

April 15, 2015

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

April 15, 2015

Statement of Ranking Member Adam Smith

HEARING ON

The Risk of Losing Military Technology Superiority and Its Implications for U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Posture in the Asia-Pacific

April 15, 2015

The Indo-Asia-Pacific region is vital to our national interests, and it includes many essential allies and partners. Our government has consistently relied on the U.S. military to support a variety of diplomatic, economic, and developmental priorities and objectives in the region, and that will not change. The United States will continue to be a leader and to promote growth and prosperity through its committed presence in the region.

As the Administration's rebalancing efforts gain momentum, the United States should contribute to collective security; help to peaceably address concerns and mitigate disputes; promote shared interests and objectives; and facilitate productive multi-lateral exchanges. We should: work to cultivate a stable and mutually beneficial relationship with China; continue to contain and marginalize the dangerous and unpredictable North Korean regime; strengthen our security relationship with India; encourage regional democratization efforts; and reinforce enduring ties with our allies in the region.

Maintaining a significant U.S. military capability advantage is clearly a top national security priority, and it is entirely appropriate that we assess the capabilities of other countries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and the challenges that those capabilities may pose. However, our efforts to guard against any concerning capabilities should not presuppose malice. Nor, should they presume that conflict is inevitable. Rather, they should be geared toward ensuring good faith preservation of the international order.

The most significant thing that Congress can do to help bolster the U.S. military's technological edge and to help advance strategic objectives in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region is eliminate sequestration. Sequestration wreaked havoc on the federal budget in fiscal year 2013, and it threatens to do so again in fiscal year 2016 and beyond. This year's House budget resolution attempts to partially compensate for the expected impact of sequestration by adding $38 billion in funding for overseas contingency operations. However, a short-term overseas contingency allocation may not provide enough fiscal security to support the long-term technological research and development efforts and the programmatic investments that the military needs to maintain its advantages.

Shielding the defense budget from sequestration, while leaving the remainder of the federal government exposed to its ravages, would also undermine regional priorities. As Secretary Carter has emphasized, national security involves much more than defense. In fact, the rebalance itself is based on a whole-of-government approach. Eliminating sequestration across the board would greatly enhance our ability to engage in the region.

As our involvement in the vitally important Indo-Asia-Pacific region continues to develop, I will work to help optimize efforts for imparting a positive and lasting effect.

Testimony of
Under Secretary of Defense Christine Wormuth
U.S. Department of Defense

House Armed Services Committee
"The Risk of Losing Military Technology Superiority
and its Implications for U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Posture
in the Asia-Pacific"
April 15, 2015

Introduction

Thank you very much, Chairman Thornberry. Thank you also to Ranking Member Smith and members of the committee for having me here today.

It's a pleasure to be here with you to discuss one of my top priorities as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy – implementing the President's rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. I'm also pleased to be here alongside ADM Locklear and GEN Scaparrotti. Our men and women in uniform at US Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea serve as the day-to-day face of DoD's rebalance for many partners in the region, and we greatly appreciate their tireless work.

Although this is the first time I've had the opportunity to address this topic with you, Secretary Carter, Deputy Secretary Work, and I all spend a great deal of our time focused on this important region of the world.

In fact, both Secretary Carter and I recently returned from Asia, where we were able to see first-hand some of the exciting efforts the Department has underway to enhance our defense posture in Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and Singapore. We also had the opportunity to sit down with our close allies and partners to discuss a shared vision for the future of the region and our partnerships. The resounding message we heard on these trips is that our allies and partners support the U.S. rebalance and continue to seek greater U.S. leadership and engagement in the region.

Overview of Security Environment

This year is an important one in the Pacific region, as it marks the 70th anniversary of the end of the War in the Pacific. The past seventy years have been a time of tremendous change and opportunity for the Asia-Pacific region. As Asia-Pacific nations rise and become more prosperous, it creates enormous opportunities for the United States. At the same time, Asia's dynamism has also created a much more complex security environment, with challenges ranging from rapidly advancing military technologies to widespread humanitarian disasters.

In particular, China's rapid military modernization, its opaque defense budget, its actions in space and cyber space, and its behavior in places like the East China Sea and South China Sea raise a number of serious questions. Though China's expanding interests are a natural part of its growing power, China continues to pursue activities and investments that lead many in the region, including the United States, to question its long-term intentions. Of note, China is

engaging in a comprehensive military modernization program that includes investments in capabilities such as ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and counter-space weapons that seem designed to counter U.S. power projection capabilities.

China's behavior in the maritime domain has also created significant friction with its neighbors. The Chinese government's efforts to incrementally advance its East and South China Sea claims and to block access to disputed fishing zones suggest a willingness to assert control over contested areas through coercion or the use of force. Moreover, its extensive land reclamation activities, especially the prospect to militarize these outposts, are deeply concerning to us. We would therefore urge China to show restraint and refrain from further activities that undermine regional trust. We also continue to urge China to clarify the meaning of its ambiguous Nine Dash line claim as a starting point to reducing tensions and creating greater transparency.

The U.S. and China are not allies, but we don't have to be adversaries. A strong, constructive U.S.-China relationship is essential for global security and prosperity. Our efforts to reduce the risk of miscalculation and unintentional conflict in the South China Sea and the region more broadly are a critical element of our regional engagement. We are therefore not only raising our concerns with China, we are also taking steps to build transparency and improve understanding through our military-to-military ties. Over the past year, through initiatives like the two Confidence-Building Measures we signed last fall, we have made significant strides in our bilateral defense relationship, while still adhering to the strict limitations guiding our defense contacts with China.

We face a number of other challenges in the region, however, beyond China's current activities. Of greatest concern to the Department is North Korea's dangerous pursuit of its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. North Korea's actions present a serious threat to the United States and the international community. North Korea has repeatedly demonstrated the willingness to use provocative means to achieve its ends. Just over the past year, this included a cyber-attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment in November 2014 and multiple short-range missile tests—most recently occurring in the past month, some of which immediately preceded Secretary Carter's arrival in Seoul.

These challenges are magnified by the growing range of non-traditional threats the U.S. and our allies grapple with in the Asia-Pacific region, including increased flows of foreign fighters to and from the Middle East, trafficking of illegal goods and people, and devastating natural disasters such as the cyclone that hit Vanuatu just last month.

Even in the face of these challenges, the overall trajectory of the Asia-Pacific region is very positive. Indeed, the complexity of Asia's security environment has helped propel closer cooperation between the United States and our allies, and a greater demand for U.S. leadership and presence. It has also led numerous partners across the region to step up into leading roles in providing security in the region and across the globe.

DoD Rebalance Strategy

In response to these shifting dynamics, the Department of Defense has consistently worked to implement President Obama's strategy of rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region.

Over the past six years, we have made our engagement and investments in the Pacific a top priority, even in the face of budget constraints. But the rebalance is first and foremost a whole-of-government approach, and we view our efforts as working hand-in-hand with the many political, economic, and development initiatives underway across the region.

One of the most important of these efforts is the administration's work to finalize the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an agreement that would knit together twelve of the region's largest economies and would increase U.S. exports by over $123.5 billion in the next decade. As Secretary Carter noted last week in Arizona, the Department believes this agreement not only has economic importance, but also has strategic significance.

TPP holds enormous promise for jobs and growth across our nation's economy – and our military strength ultimately rests on the foundation of our vibrant and growing economy. By increasing trade among our allies and partners, TPP will provide nations with greater economic choices. It will establish landmark protections for labor and the environment, making it the greenest trade agreement ever. And it will help ensure all nations play by the same open and transparent rules. So we believe very strongly that TPP is not just a critical piece of the President's economic agenda, it also is an important piece of his security agenda. U.S. leadership in global trade will enable broad-based prosperity, protect our strategic interests, and promote our core values. I urge the Congress to pass Trade Promotion Authority and allow the negotiators to conclude this critical agreement.

Modernizing Alliances and Partnerships

In the Department of Defense, our efforts to implement the rebalance are focused on a few key areas. First, strengthening our security relationships with our friends and allies. For over seventy years, our security alliances have been the bedrock of our presence in the Asia-Pacific region. And they will continue to be the foundation of our engagement in the future. Over the past few years, the Department has engaged in a concerted effort to modernize our alliances and develop the right capabilities and missions for today's security environment. We are seeing these efforts come to fruition on a number of fronts.

In Japan, we are very close to completing a historic update of our Defense Guidelines, which would simply not have been possible a decade ago. This update leverages Japan's expanded capacity to contribute in the region, and will allow us to build cooperation in new areas such as space and cyberspace. Equally important, it will allow the U.S-Japan alliance to play an even larger role on the global stage, where Japan is already contributing to important efforts like countering ISIL and responding to Ebola.

Likewise, we are working with the Republic of Korea (ROK) to develop a comprehensive set of Alliance capabilities to counter the range of growing North Korean threats, while expanding our ability to tackle global challenges together. And in Australia and the Philippines, we signed ground-breaking posture agreements in 2014 that will provide enhanced access for U.S. forces while greatly expanding the combined training opportunities for our alliances. These agreements will also improve our interoperability, allowing us to build on global cooperation with Australia in places like Iraq and to pursue high-end engagements such as Exercise Balikitan with the Philippines, which will kick off next week as the largest and most complex military exercise we've ever held together.

Our strong friendships in the region stretch beyond our traditional alliances to new and growing partners. In line with President Obama's recognition that South and Southeast Asia is a region of growing strategic, economic, and political importance, the Department has made a deliberate decision to strengthen our defense partnerships in this critical region. This is one reason why every Secretary of Defense under the Obama Administration has made it a priority to attend the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and why Secretary Carter will continue this tradition when he travels to Singapore in May.

In addition to our strong strategic partnership with Singapore, we are strengthening key partnerships with nations such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, where we are working together to help them lead in areas ranging from maritime security to supporting peace-keeping operations around the globe. We are also investing in our partnership with ASEAN, which is leading the way in building a more robust security architecture in the region. Regional institutions such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) are fostering concrete multilateral defense cooperation through exercises and training that will promote trust and transparency and build our collective capacity to respond to emerging crises.

The U.S.-India relationship is another one of our most exciting and dynamic partnerships. Just this past January, President Obama and Prime Minister Modi signed a new Joint Vision Statement. We also signed the first update in a decade to our bilateral Defense Framework, which will allow us to expand our relationship into exciting new areas, such as maritime security cooperation. Through the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), we are also pursuing cutting-edge collaborations in research and development and in defense technology. During President Obama's visit in January, we agreed to our first four "pathfinder" co-development and co-production projects. This is the type of work we undertake with few other countries, and it demonstrates the seriousness we attach to the U.S.-India defense relationship.

Posture and Presence

In tandem with our efforts to modernize our relationships in the Pacific, the Department is also updating our forward presence by developing a more distributed, resilient, and sustainable posture—one that allows us to operate more flexibly and respond to a wider range of challenges. This is not simply about increasing the number of assets we have in the region. It's about using our existing assets in new ways, across the entire region, with an emphasis on operational flexibility and showcasing our ability to project power across and within the Pacific - activities that maximize the value of our assets despite the tyranny of distance we face.

For example, we've developed a more distributed model for our Marine Corps that reduces our concentrated steady-state presence on Okinawa through locations to Australia, Hawaii, Guam, and mainland Japan. As a result, DoD concluded our first battalion-sized rotation of more than 1,100 Marines to Australia in 2014, including the rotational deployment of four helicopters. These efforts, along with rotations already beginning for 2015, help enable us to conduct complex and comprehensive training scenarios. Our posture agreement with Australia also enables the U.S. Air Force to increase the frequency and duration of training opportunities they are able to conduct together with the Royal Australian Air Force. They will

eventually scale up to an enduring two-month rotational presence and sophisticated training exercises that will capitalize on gains in interoperability made over the past decade of working side-by-side in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The U.S. Navy also continues to implement a rotational presence concept. We are currently completing the second proof-of-concept deployment of a Littoral Combat Ship, (LCS), to Singapore, and are on track to achieve our stated goal of simultaneous rotation of four LCS through Singapore from 2017. This year, Singapore will also host the introduction of a rotational Joint High-Speed Vessel, (JHSV), to the region, which will expand to rotational stops in other locations in the future.

Our Services' effort to update their presence likewise extends to the Army, which will be initiating the first rotational deployment of an Army Brigade Combat Team to the Korean Peninsula later this spring. Similarly, it has established a new exercise engagement model, Pacific Pathways, which allows our soldiers to spend more time on the ground training side-by-side with counterparts like Indonesia and Malaysia. Both of these efforts are enabling the Army to rotate increasingly ready and capable forces through the Pacific region, ensuring our forces, and those of our regional partners, will be able to respond to the region's most complex challenges.

Capabilities and Investments

Finally, one of the most important efforts the Department of Defense has underway is our effort to bring our finest capabilities forward to the Asia-Pacific region, underwriting our contribution to regional stability, crisis response efforts, and alliance obligations. As part of the rebalance, the Department is basing a fourth Virginia-class attack submarine in Guam to strengthen our advantage in survivable undersea capabilities, stationing two additional Aegis missile defense-equipped destroyers in Japan to counter the region's growing missile threat, and deploying our most modern Zumwalt class destroyers to the Pacific region. The Department maintains a continuous bomber presence of B-2s and B-52s in the region for deterrence purposes, and a range of cutting-edge manned and unmanned surveillance aircraft, such as the Navy's P-8 and the Air Force's RQ-4 Global Hawk, to enhance our operational awareness of regional developments.

But more than simply deploying existing technologies, the Department is making significant investments in the types of innovative technologies that will sustain America's technological edge into the future and ensure that we can operate in any and all regions, regardless of the technological developments of other nations. We face a security environment in Asia in which potential adversaries are designing systems to directly challenge U.S. technological superiority. Maintaining our technological edge therefore requires that we continue to make key investments in future systems that can succeed in a highly contested environment.

We're investing in technologies that will protect the strength of the U.S. military not only on the sea but also underneath it – including the Virginia Payload Module, a compartment added to our attack submarines that will increase their weapons-carrying capacity by more than 75%, a new nuclear ballistic missile submarine, and unmanned undersea vehicles. We're also investing

in the technologies we need to maintain U.S. dominance in the air - including the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, long-range surveillance aircraft, the KC-46A advanced refueling platform, and a new stealth bomber. Our investments in the future also encompass precision munitions that increase our ability to strike adversaries from greater stand-off distances, like the extended range Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM-ER) and a new long-range anti-ship cruise missile (LRASM), which was just successfully tested last month.

But as we were all reminded recently during the cyber-attack on Sony Pictures, the challenges we face extend far beyond threats to the air and sea. Therefore, we're also working on new capabilities that can protect our ability to operate freely in space and cyberspace. Finally, we are not just developing new technologies to employ in a crisis, but focusing on the ability of U.S. forces to survive in a crisis. While seemingly small-scale in comparison to our modernization efforts, investments in rapid runway repair and the hardening and dispersal of facilities are essential to ensure the joint force can operate successfully in a high-threat environment, particularly in light of the growing risk posed by ballistic and cruise missile programs. The Department is also examining concepts for dispersing our forces in the region to decrease our vulnerability to attack while preserving our ability to conduct joint operations.

All of these efforts demonstrate the seriousness of the Department's efforts to protect U.S. military primacy in the Asia-Pacific theater. This is the impetus for the Department's ongoing Defense Innovation Initiative (DII), which represents a long-term, comprehensive effort to enhance our military's competitive edge, even in light of budget constraints. Through the DII, the Department will "offset" global advances in military technologies by identifying new breakthroughs in cutting-edge systems from the world of robotics, autonomous weapons, and big data. Additionally, the DII will look beyond the systems we deploy to explore how we can use these systems in innovative ways. So we are also exploring new operational concepts, new approaches to professional military education, and new wargaming activities.

Conclusion

The Department's rebalance initiatives, as well as those of our inter-agency colleagues, will not be achieved overnight. They are long-term, comprehensive endeavors that reflect the enduring interests and commitment we have to the Asia-Pacific region. I am confident that the Department is making significant progress to modernize our relationships, enhance our posture and presence, and ensure we have the necessary capabilities to deter conflict and maintain stability, as we have for the past seventy years. I look forward to continuing to work together with Congress to achieve these goals in the years ahead.

Thank you.

Ms. Christine Wormuth
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Ms. Christine Wormuth was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on June 19, 2014. Ms. Wormuth serves as the Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

Ms. Wormuth was appointed as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Force Development in August, 2012. In this role, Ms. Wormuth was responsible for advising the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on the development of U.S. national security and defense strategy. She oversaw the strategic guidance development, review, and assessment for military contingency plans and the plans for the day-to-day military activities of Combatant Commanders. In addition, Ms. Wormuth led Policy's efforts to provide strategic guidance and implementation oversight to the Department's planning, programming, and budgeting process as well as various force development, force management, and corporate support processes. As DUSD(SPF), Ms. Wormuth led the Department's 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.

Prior to serving as DUSD(SPF), Ms. Wormuth was a Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Strategy on the National Security Staff (NSS). As the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Strategy, Ms. Wormuth oversaw the Defense directorate and was responsible for providing NSS expertise on global, functional, and regional defense, military and political-military issues.

Before her assignment to the NSS, Ms. Wormuth was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. As Principal Deputy, she advised the Assistant Secretary of Defense on the homeland defense activities of the Department and regional security matters for the countries of the Western Hemisphere. In addition, she was responsible for management of the Department's participation in interagency activities concerning homeland security and relations with the Department of Homeland Security.

Before returning to the Department of Defense as a political appointee in early 2009, Ms. Wormuth was a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ms. Wormuth worked on defense and homeland security issues, including emergency response and preparedness matters, homeland security policy development, defense strategy and resources, and the capabilities and readiness of the U.S. military. In 2007, she served as the Staff Director for the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, also known as "The Jones Commission." As Staff Director, she traveled with the Commission to Iraq, focusing on the readiness of Iraqi police forces.

Prior to joining CSIS, Ms. Wormuth was a Principal at DFI Government Services, a defense consulting firm, where she developed and managed a wide range of projects for government clients within the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.

Ms. Wormuth began her public service career in the Policy Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1996 through 2002. She served as the French desk officer during and after the September 11 attacks and, from 2000-2001, was the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Policy, focusing on defense program and legislative issues. Ms. Wormuth spent more than two years in the Strategy office, where she focused on defense strategy, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review process and a range of European issues. She entered government as a Presidential Management Intern and received a Masters of Public Policy from the University of Maryland. She holds a Bachelor of Arts in political science and fine art from Williams College.

STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR, U.S. NAVY
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE
15 APRIL 2015

Chairman Thornberry, Congressman Smith, and distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to address the committee. This will be my fourth and final opportunity to provide an Indo-Asia-Pacific assessment since taking command of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) in March 2012. For over three years, I have had the extraordinary privilege to lead Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians selflessly serving our nation. These dedicated men and women and their families are doing an amazing job and I am proud to serve alongside them.

In concert with allies and partners, USPACOM balances historical and cultural factors against modern day political and economic events in an ever-evolving effort to manage friction and conflict in the most militarized region in the world. These actions are designed to defend the homeland, strengthen and modernize our alliances and partnerships, maintain access to areas of common interest, counter aggression, prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and defeat violent extremism.

What follows is my assessment of the region's security environment, including the current and future challenges and opportunities for USPACOM forces. My testimony includes an update on major areas of concern in the security environment, allies and partners in the region, building and strengthening relationships, and maintaining an effective and assured presence.

Security Environment

The Indo-Asia-Pacific remains one of the most dynamic regions on earth. It is vital to U.S. economic and security interests, and activities in the region will shape much of our nation's future. The region encompasses 52% of the earth's surface and is composed of 83% water and 17% land. Over half of the people on the planet reside on that 17% of land, and by the middle of the century, the Indo-Asia-Pacific will potentially contain 70% of the world's population. This high population density coupled with destabilizing factors such as natural disasters, climate change, ideological radicalism, and population migration will continue to put immense pressure on regional governments. Contained in the thirty-six nations in USPACOM's area of responsibility are the world's two largest economies after the U.S. (China and Japan), and five

smallest economies. The region also contains the world's most populous nation (China), the largest democracy (India), the largest Muslim-majority (Indonesia), and the smallest republic (Nauru). It contains seven of the ten largest standing militaries, five nuclear nations, and five of the U.S.'s seven mutual defense treaty alliances. The socioeconomic diversity and population density throughout the USPACOM area of responsibility (AOR) create strategic long-term challenges. These challenges include: political instability, social inequality, poverty, increased sensitivity to climate change and natural disasters, risk of pandemic disease, and epidemic drug use and distribution.

In addition to these challenges, the U.S. must continue to deter North Korean provocation, ensure access to air and sea lanes, encourage peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas, respond to natural disasters and theater health issues, check the flow of violent extremists from the Middle East to violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, address transnational crimes, monitor an increasingly active Russia, and constructively engage a rising China. Despite all of the challenges, the theater possesses opportunities for the U.S., its allies, and its partners. In order to capitalize on these opportunities, foster the region's economic potential, and provide the security and stability necessary to protect areas of common interest, USPACOM remains engaged.

The Indo-Asia-Pacific requires stable political institutions to effectively govern and prosper. Overall, but with notable exceptions, the countries of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region are more politically stable than in previous years. The general health of democratic institutions across the region is evidenced by several critical leadership transitions which occurred last year. Successful, peaceful participatory elections occurred in India and Indonesia. Sri Lanka achieved a peaceful transition of power following its January election. Fiji took a major step toward moving past its 2006 military coup by holding elections last September. Citizens in many countries were able to peacefully protest without fear of oppressive action. While these activities are reassuring, challenges remain. For example, Thailand's military coup removed a democratically elected administration, and interim leaders have yet to restore a democratic government.

North Korea: North Korea remains the most dangerous and unpredictable security challenge. The regime continues its aggressive attitude while advancing its nuclear capability and ballistic missile programs. While the international community continues to urge North Korea to live up to its international obligations and return to authentic credible negotiations under the Six-Party Talks framework, North Korea has unfortunately shown no willingness to seriously discuss its denuclearization commitments and obligations, and additional nuclear tests remain possible. It is expected that North Korea will continue to showcase ballistic missile development (to include mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate range Musudan missiles) and conduct launches in direct violation of several United Nations Security Council Resolutions (such as the short-range ballistic missile launches in March 2015). North Korea already announced its intent to conduct "annual and regular" drills to advance this prohibited capability.

Additionally, North Korea demonstrated the will to employ cyber techniques to impose costly damage to civilian companies, as was demonstrated in the high-profile attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment. North Korean cyber actors continue to conduct cyber actions against South Korean military and civilian networks. USPACOM remains concerned about the destructive nature of this state sponsored cyber-attack targeting a commercial entity and its employees in the United States. These actions demonstrate North Korea's disregard for international norms. North Korea's actions are beyond the bounds of acceptable state behavior in cyberspace.

Territorial and Maritime Issues: Territorial and maritime issues in the East and South China Seas, if not handled properly, may negatively impact stability in the regional and the security environment. The claimants' use of maritime law enforcement vessels to enforce their claims has largely kept these issues out of the military sphere, despite a steady increase in military air and sea patrols. While no country appears to desire military conflict, an escalation due to a tactical miscalculation cannot be ruled out.

In the East China Sea, Japan and China both claim sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. While the United States does not take a position on ultimate sovereignty over the islands, it has long recognized Japanese administration of them. China's behavior in the area has resulted in close encounters at sea, aggressive Chinese air intercepts of Japanese reconnaissance flights,

inflammatory strategic messaging, and the no-notice declaration of a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea.

The South China Sea issues are complex. Six claimants (China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and the Philippines) have overlapping claims in the South China Sea. As the South China Sea claimants' populations and economies continue to grow, access to the oil, gas, minerals, and fisheries within the South China Sea becomes more important. Claimants appear to be asserting their claims through increased maritime patrols, outpost and facility construction, and land reclamation.

China has the broadest claim with its self-proclaimed "Nine-Dash line" that covers almost the entire South China Sea. China's lack of clarity with regard to its South China Sea claims, and China's attempts to unilaterally enforce its ambiguous claims, has created uncertainty in the region. Any use of the nine-dash line by China to claim maritime rights not based on claimed land features would not align with international law. The international community would welcome China to clarify or adjust its nine-dash line claim and bring it into accordance with the international law of the sea, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.

To achieve its long-term goals in the region, China is executing a strategy that includes expanding outposts in contested areas through land reclamation on South China Sea features, taking actions to prevent other nations from establishing / maintaining outposts, exploring for natural resources in disputed waters, and increasing its naval and air forces' presence through exercises and patrols. China's aggressive land reclamation and construction projects at eight South China Sea military outposts include new buildings, more capable berthing space for ships, and presumably an airfield on the Fiery Cross Reef (China's largest reclamation project). Although land reclamation cannot, for example, change a submerged feature into a natural island that generates any legal entitlements to maritime zones, the completion of these projects will give China the ability for greater presence, increase dwell time for military and coast guard assets, and expand the areas covered by surveillance and area-denial systems. Examples of activities supporting China's long-term strategy include attempts to block resupply missions to the small Philippine garrison at Second Thomas Shoal and exclude Philippine and other

fishermen from the disputed Scarborough Reef. Last year, China also moved a China National Offshore Oil Corporation drilling platform into Vietnam's claimed Exclusive Economic Zone resulting in a tense standoff between Vietnamese and Chinese maritime assets substantially increasing the possibility of miscalculation between the two countries.

The U.S. does not take a position on issues of sovereignty with respect to territorial claims in the East and South China Sea, but we do insist that all maritime claims must be derived from land features in accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. The U.S. also continues to emphasize the importance that maritime and territorial disagreements be resolved peacefully in accordance with international law and opposes the use of intimidation, coercion, or force to assert claims. An example of such an attempt at peaceful resolution is the Philippines' arbitration against China under the Law of the Sea Convention that is being heard by a tribunal in The Hague. Of note, China has refused to participate in this arbitration to date.

Natural Disasters: The Indo-Asia-Pacific accounted for over 40% (1,690 incidences) of the world's reported natural disasters during the period between 2004 and 2013, and, because of the region's coastal population density, these disasters were particularly deadly, claiming more than 700,000 lives. The Pacific Rim's tectonic plate structure produces its well-known Ring of Fire, which regularly triggers earthquakes, volcanoes, and tsunamis. Weather extremes and anomalies continue to plague the region. Understanding the scope and severity of long-term climate change, unexpected climate shocks, and climate variability events such as El Nino are shared global challenges.

In addition to seismic and climate challenges, areas of large populations, dense living conditions, and poor sanitary conditions in the region create optimal conditions for the rapid spread of human- or animal-borne diseases. To address these challenges, USPACOM focuses on pre-crisis preparedness with training and exercises. For example, many of the lessons learned and preparedness measures implemented after Typhoon Haiyan (Operation Damayan, November 2013) resulted in less damage and loss of life when Typhoon Hagupit passed over the Philippines last December. U.S. forces regularly train with allies and partners on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and stand ready to respond in support of interagency partners to a

natural disaster or the frequent vectors of disease that plague the region. Regional information sharing and rapid response to health crises are improving, but the danger remains high. USPACOM will continue to focus on improving pre-crisis preparedness and working with allies and partners in the region to ensure an effective response when an event occurs.

Violent Extremism: The ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq attracts foreign fighters from countries throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Current assessments indicate approximately 1,300 foreign personnel fighting alongside the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant are from the Indo-Asia-Pacific. A small number of these combat-experienced fighters who return home could enhance the capability of regional extremist networks within the most densely populated areas of the world. In South Asia, partner nations maintain pressure on extremist networks but face a persistent threat from transnational groups that continue adapting to shifting geopolitical factors, competition among global extremist groups, and counterterrorism actions by the U.S. and its regional allies. Al-Qa'ida's increased rhetoric focused on South Asia and the announcement of a new affiliate, "Al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent," suggest Al-Qai'da will focus resources on uniting established terrorist groups to engage in jihad in South Asia. Lashkar-e Tayyiba and other Pakistan-based groups continue fighting in Afghanistan, but they will likely shift some of their operational focus to the Indian Subcontinent in the next one to three years as Coalition forces drawdown. In Southeast Asia, regional partners maintain persistent pressure on extremist networks; however, competing security priorities in the region, coupled with the sensationalism of developments in the Middle East, have pressurized counter-terrorism attention. Extremist groups are increasingly interconnected and the region remains a potential safe haven, facilitation hub, and area of operations for extremists.

Proliferation Issues: Rapidly developing technology manufacturing sectors in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region have in many states outpaced the concurrent development of those states' effective export controls. The region includes some of the busiest maritime and air ports in the world with shipments of proliferation concern likely passing through these ports almost daily. These shipments include dual-use items—commercial items controlled by the nuclear, ballistic missile, and chemical/biological weapons control regimes, others covered by associated catch all controls—manufactured in or re-exported from states with spotty export control enforcement.

Iran built its robust nuclear infrastructure and advanced its ballistic missile systems with materials that passed through the USPACOM AOR; North Korea continues to procure for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs—and proliferate conventional arms for revenue generation—using a network of individuals and entities throughout the region. PACOM engages regional partners in capacity-building activities designed to improve export controls and interdiction capabilities in the region. In August 2014 PACOM hosted personnel from 31 nations as part of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise Fortune Guard, which marked the beginning of a six-year series of exercises that various "expert" nations in the region will host. (New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Japan, South Korea and the United States) Exercises such as Fortune Guard provide nations a forum to demonstrate the intention to act and share the best tactics against proliferators, emphasizing a whole-of-government approach to confront this complex challenge.

Transnational Crime: There is a growing trend for regional human and drug trafficking organizations to operate as global enterprises. In addition to the devastating impact widespread drug use has on a society, the revenue generated from these illicit activities fund terrorists and Violent Extremist Organizations. Methamphetamine and amphetamine-type stimulants continue to be the primary drug threat in the USPACOM AOR. The majority of Methamphetamine available in the United States comes from Mexico, primarily across the South West Border Region, and an estimated 90% of the precursor chemicals used to produce Mexican Methamphetamine comes from China. Further, the annual volume of Methamphetamine seizures made along the United States South West Border Region has exceeded Cocaine seizures in the past three years.

Nearly 21 million victims of human trafficking are estimated worldwide and nearly two-thirds are from Asia, with India, China, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Thailand among the countries with the highest number of victims. Women and children – especially those from the lowest socioeconomic sectors – are the most vulnerable demographics. Roughly a quarter end up in the commercial sex trade, while others are forced into difficult and dangerous positions in factories, farms, or as child soldiers. Still others are bound to families as domestic servants. Human trafficking victims often suffer physical and emotional abuse and social stigmatization while

being denied their basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. While awareness is rising, much remains to be done to combat this particularly heinous crime. USPACOM forces build partnership capacity and share intelligence in order to combat these transnational threats.

Russian Intent: Russia is reasserting itself politically and militarily in the Pacific. In the USPACOM AOR, Russian Navy and Long Range Aviation operational tempo have recently increased significantly, but not above Cold War levels. Though challenged by maintenance and logistical issues, Russian Navy cruisers, destroyers and frigates have increased their operations and reach. The Russian Pacific Fleet sent ships to support operations in the Middle East and Europe, while Russian ships from the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets deployed into the Asia-Pacific. Russian BEAR bombers and reconnaissance aircraft regularly fly missions in the Sea of Japan and continue operations as far east as Alaska and the west coast of the continental U.S. The anticipated fielding later this year of Russia's newest class of nuclear ballistic missile submarine (Borei-class SSBN) and upgrades to Russia's land-based ballistic missiles will modernize Moscow's nuclear capability in the Asia-Pacific. Russian ballistic missile and attack submarines remain active in our region. Russia aims to demonstrate military capabilities commensurate with its Pacific interests: ensuring Russian sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the Asia-Pacific, strengthening its sphere of influence, and projecting a credible deterrent force.

Chinese Military Modernization and Strategic Intent: Recent statements by senior PRC leaders, such as PRC President Xi Jinping, suggest that the PRC may be attempting to advance a vision for an alternative security architecture in Asia that affords Beijing increased influence in the region and diminishes the role of the United States. This Chinese view was highlighted in Shanghai last summer at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. At the conference, President Xi Jinping called on all of Asia to support the development of a new security order centered on China. The proposed new order also requires a curtailment of alliance-strengthening diplomacy, of which the "U.S. Rebalance to Asia" is noted as the greatest offender. China is proposing an alternative strategy to regional security issues where the U.S. plays, at best, a deferential role.

China is engaged in a comprehensive military modernization program to transform its forces into a high-tech military capable of conducting complex operations. Many of China's initiatives are intended to develop capabilities to deter or counter third-party intervention in regional contingencies. These anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities are focused on controlling access and freedom of operations in vast portions of the air and maritime domains, as well as space and cyberspace. These include a series of sophisticated and increasingly long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, and kinetic and non-kinetic counter-space systems. China is also making significant advances in electronic warfare capabilities, which are contributing to the A2AD challenge.

China continues an aggressive ship building program to produce and field advanced frigates, destroyers, and the first in-class cruiser-sized warship. Chinese shipyards are also producing newer, more capable submarines as they inactivate older submarines, resulting in a fleet that is not growing substantially in number but is significantly more capable. Advances in China's strategic capabilities remain significant. China now has three operational JIN-class ballistic missile submarines (Type 094), and up to five more may enter service by the end of the decade. The JIN-class submarine carries the JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile with a range capable of reaching the U.S. and will give China its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. Nuclear deterrence patrols will likely commence this year. Lastly, we expect China to soon begin constructing an indigenous aircraft carrier.

China is using computer network exploitation capabilities to support intelligence collection to advance its defense and high-tech industries. Through a sophisticated cyber program, China is generating insights on U.S. security policies, defense networks, logistics, and military capabilities.

As the Chinese military modernizes its capabilities and expands its presence in Asia, U.S. forces are drawn into closer and more frequent contact and the risk of an accident or miscalculation increases. This places a premium on efforts to increase mutual understanding and trust in order to reduce risk. The Chinese Navy is more frequently operating in the Indian Ocean, expanding the area and duration of operations and exercises in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, and

periodically venturing into other non-traditional areas, as exemplified by recent port visits to Europe. The complexity of the regional and global security environment, as well as China's military advancements, necessitates a continuous dialogue between the U.S. and Chinese militaries to expand practical cooperation where national interests converge and discuss areas where goals diverge, especially during periods of friction.

Allies and Partners

The U.S.' five treaty allies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific are: Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Philippines, and Thailand. In addition to U.S. treaty alliances, the U.S. continues to strengthen existing partnerships and build new relationships to advance common interests and address shared concerns. U.S. allies and key partners in the theater play a fundamental role in addressing the security challenges. Strengthening and modernizing alliances and partnerships is a top USPACOM priority.

Australia: Australia continues to be a close, steadfast, and effective ally in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The alliance anchors peace and stability in the region, and Australia has taken a leading role in addressing regional security and capacity-building issues, including lead roles in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief events. Australia is also a key contributor to global security, including counter-ISIL efforts in Iraq and the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. With the ongoing implementation of the Force Posture Initiatives, which provide expanded opportunities for bilateral and multilateral engagement, the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin successfully completed its third rotation while increasing its presence from 250 to 1,177 U.S. Marines. The U.S. Air Force is increasing its rotation of aircraft to Australia. In addition to the Force Posture Initiatives, the U.S. and Australia are identifying additional opportunities to increase collaboration in counter-terrorism, space, cyber, and integrated air missile defense and regional capacity building. Australia is procuring a number of high-tech platforms that will increase interoperability such as the F-35 Lightning II, P-8 Poseidon, C-17 Globemaster III, and EA-18G Growler aircraft as well as Global Hawk UAVs and MH-60R helicopters. To ensure greater synchronization and integration, the Australian Government provides a General Officer and a Senior Executive to USPACOM, as well as another General Officer to U.S. Army Pacific, as tangible examples of a mutual commitment to the alliance.

Japan: The U.S.-Japan alliance remains strong and productive through both countries' shared commitment to a full range of military capabilities with expanding responsibility for training, exercises, interoperability, and bilateral planning. Japan's 2013 National Security Strategy and the 1 July 2014 cabinet decision on collective self-defense are positive developments and indicators of Japan's ability and willingness to assume a greater role in the regional security architecture. The Abe administration will submit implementing legislation to the National Diet during its spring session, and debate is expected to conclude in summer 2015. The US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation are being revised, and that process will conclude with public presentation of the Guidelines in the near future. We are hopeful that Japan's upcoming legislative changes support new and expanded forms of cooperation.

U.S. Forces Japan continues to build its close relationship with the Japanese Joint Staff to enhance interoperability and information sharing through realistic training, exercises, and bilateral planning. USPACOM will continue to maintain a robust military presence in Japan to meet future security challenges and encourage greater trilateral military engagements with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia.

Efforts continue toward improving US-Japan-ROK trilateral coordination in response to North Korean provocative behavior. The December 2014 signature of the US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement is a positive first step toward greater information sharing on North Korean missile and nuclear threats.

As Japan increases its defense spending, it is procuring a number of high-tech platforms that will increase interoperability such as the F-35 Lightning II aircraft, MV-22 Ospreys, and the Global Hawk UAV, as well as upgrading existing AEGIS destroyers with the latest BMD capability and constructing two additional AEGIS destroyers (for a total of eight BMD capable platforms). Each North Korean ballistic missile provocation validates the investment of the AN/TPY-2 radars in Japan to provide ISR against missile threats. Last year's addition of the second radar in Japan and forward deploying two additional BMD capable ships will enhance our ability to defend our ally and the region, as well as provide early warning of missile threats to the U.S.

homeland. Lastly, Japan continues to make significant infrastructure investments in country that complement the realignment of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam including expanding the airfield and associated facilities at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni and construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility. It is important that these initiatives remain on track.

Philippines: The U.S.-Philippine alliance remains a positive source of strength and regional stability. Building upon the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the U.S. and the Government of the Philippines was signed last April. Through enhanced U.S. rotational presence, the EDCA provides expanded opportunities to conduct theater security cooperation activities and supports the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as it shifts focus from internal security to external defense. Full EDCA implementation awaits the outcome of a case before the Philippine Supreme Court, where deliberations could last into this summer.

After more than a decade, the Joint Special Operations Task Force created to counter Violent Extremist Organizations in the Philippines will stand down and the AFP will sustain that mission. Training and advising objectives that were set to address organizations such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah have been met. Although the Task Force is standing down, a small USPACOM footprint will remain embedded in the Philippines to continue working with the AFP leadership and planning staffs. The AFP has demonstrated an increased capacity and capability to handle domestic threats inside their country, but USPACOM will remain committed to supporting and advising the AFP at the operational level.

Competing claims in the South China Sea continue to be a source of friction and instability. China continues large-scale land reclamation around disputed features. Furthermore, periodic resupply and troop rotations to the small Philippine outpost at Second Thomas Shoal (also known as Ayungin Shoal) are well-known points of contention with the Chinese government.

Republic of Korea: The U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance remains strong and vital, and enduring for over six decades. Our militaries integrate complementary capabilities and enhance the relationship with honest and frank dialogue. During the most recent annual discussions, the

U.S. and ROK made arrangements to delay wartime operational control transfer and adopt a conditions-based approach, rather than a calendar-based deadline. The U.S. and ROK intend to modernize the alliance to better inform the development or acquisition of Alliance capabilities required to address future threats from North Korea.

USPACOM will continue to work with the ROK to address the North Korean threat. North Korea continues to be a challenge due to provocations and uncertainty, which are viewed as a threat to peace and stability in the region. The ability to rapidly respond to aggression with combined U.S.-ROK-Japan capabilities is the best way to ensure deterrence and maintain regional stability. Trilateral cooperation will improve each participant's understanding of the mutual challenges and shared opportunities that exist in and around the Korean Peninsula.

Thailand: As Thailand is the oldest U.S. treaty partner (182 years), the U.S. values its friendship with the people of Thailand. The Thai military's decision to suspend its constitution and assume control of the civilian government has impacted that relationship. Military engagements and exercises have been appropriately adjusted in a whole of government response to the coup, pending a return to a democratically-elected government. USPACOM will continue to demonstrate commitment to the U.S.' ally while reinforcing democratic values and ideals. The annual COBRA GOLD exercise co-sponsored with the Royal Thai Armed Forces is an important multi-lateral warfighting training event. This year's exercise was significantly limited in scope and scale in response to the Thai coup, and heavily focused on humanitarian assistance activities.

India: Last year, India held the largest election in its history. With new leadership in place, India is energizing the U.S.-India strategic partnership. Prime Minister Modi has focused India's foreign policy on building strong regional cohesion in South Asia. India's two decade-long "Look East Policy" has resulted in growing partnerships with Southeast Asian countries.

The U.S. military remains heavily engaged with New Delhi's military, having conducted 69 major exercises in the past five years. The Indian Navy continues its strong participation in multilateral exercises including INDRA with Russia, MALABAR with the U.S. and Japan, and

RIMPAC with 23 navies from across the Indo-Asia-Pacific. India's participation in these exercises signals their commitment as a regional security provider. Additionally, over the past three years the U.S. has been India's largest defense trading partner. Through military modernization, robust defense trade (C-17s, C-130Js, and P-8Is, among other items), and a growing network of defense partnerships, India is asserting its role as an important regional actor determined to protect common interests and ensure free access to economically vital sea lanes, although with respect to military activities, India still asserts a security interest in its EEZ that does not conform to the law of the sea.

Indonesia: Indonesia is a capable security partner in Southeast Asia, and is increasingly focused on its role as a regional power, which USPACOM continues to support as a main pillar of mil-mil engagement. Presidential elections last July demonstrated a commitment to democratic principles, and the August opening of Indonesia's new Peace and Security Center to train regional partners on peacekeeping operations reinforces its position as a leader in security assistance. A growing area of cooperation with Indonesia is defense trade, which includes the sale of AH-64E Apache helicopters and initial delivery of F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft. Indonesia remains concerned about maintaining security and stability in the South China Sea. While their Chief of Defense has articulated a zero-war policy in the South China Sea, there are signs they are increasingly concerned over China's so-called nine dash line overlapping with part of their claimed EEZ. While Indonesia continues a foreign policy rooted in the Non Aligned Movement, USPACOM has seen significant gains in security cooperation activities. Indonesia will continue to balance its partnership with the U.S. with other nations such as Russia and China, but security cooperation with the U.S. remains a top priority.

New Zealand: New Zealand is a respected voice in international politics and a recognized leader in Oceania that shares common security concerns with the U.S., such as terrorism, transnational crime, and maritime security. Military-to-military relations and defense engagements with New Zealand continue to improve, and the U.S. and New Zealand executed the second series of annual bilateral defense dialogues last year. New Zealand's establishment of a Consulate General in Honolulu has also provided additional opportunities for USPACOM and New Zealand to engage on issues of mutual interest. This new Consulate General addition to

Hawaii is timely as the U.S. celebrates the 100th Anniversary of ANZAC with New Zealand and the Australians this year.

Oceania: Maintaining our close partnerships in Oceania is important to national security. The Compacts of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau are important agreements that guide the relationships. The U.S. defense obligations to these nations are reflected in our defense planning and preparation. In return, these compact agreements provide assured access to the three Compact Nations and their associated 5.5 million square kilometers of Pacific in a contingency situation. They also give the U.S. authority to grant or deny access to another nation's military forces, which allows the maintenance of a clear strategic line of communication across the Pacific. The U.S.'s continued commitment to defend the Compact Nations and to partner with other Pacific island countries sends a strong message throughout the region and reinforces its commitment to the Pacific Rebalance.

Fiji currently has its first democratically elected government since its military coup in 2006. In 2015, Fiji will re-enter into regional forums (e.g., Pacific Island Forum) and have new opportunities for engagement with the U.S. Several other countries (Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu) may face government reorganizations over the next year. These events may set back specific projects but will not likely impact stability or affect overall U.S. engagement.

Climate change will continue to be an important issue across the Oceania region. This year's forecasted El Nino event will likely result in drought and increased tropical cyclone activity. The Republic of Marshall Islands will almost certainly face water shortage resulting in requests for aid or disaster declarations under a subsidiary agreement to the Amended Compact of Free Association. Fiji, Kiribati, the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Tonga will likely face similar situations. The December 2014 United Nations Climate Change Conference addressed the impact of rising sea levels - a keen interest to Pacific Island Nations.

Singapore: Singapore continues its important role in regional security initiatives. Singapore's role as a 'Major Security Cooperation Partner' is underscored by longstanding support of U.S. naval forces. For example, USS Freedom completed a ten month deployment in 2013, and USS Fort Worth is currently on a 16 month deployment. These forward forces contribute to naval readiness and partner capacity building and enable rapid response to many crises, including Operation Damayan in the Philippines and Air Asia recovery efforts. Additionally, Singapore's Changi Naval Base remains a key enabler to providing critical support to the USS Fort Worth and other forward operating forces.

U.S. – China: In light of an increasingly complex regional and global security environment, including advances in China's military capabilities and its expanding military operations and missions, the overall U.S. approach to China calls for a continuous dialogue between the armed forces of both countries to expand practical cooperation where national interests converge and to constructively manage differences through sustained and substantive dialogue. As a key element, the U.S.'s military engagement with China, within the guidelines of the 2000 NDAA, benefits the region, improves transparency, and reduces risk of unintended incidents, contributing to overall regional stability. The U.S. military has increased the depth of engagement with China in recent years and executed over 50 bilateral and numerous multilateral engagements last year. While these engagements are critical to improving transparency and reducing risk, the U.S. military must continue to take a pragmatic approach as the U.S. attempts to help integrate China into the existing security architecture. China's military investments, including A2AD capabilities, focused on the ability to control access and deny freedom of operations in vast portions of the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains raise concerns. The U.S. will need more transparency and understanding of Chinese intentions in order to minimize friction and avoid miscalculation or conflict in the future. Absent greater transparency from China, its ambiguous dashed-line claim, military modernization efforts and aggressive land reclamation in the South China Sea have significant implications for regional stability and the current security architecture.

Over the past year, the U.S. and China have agreed to mechanisms such as the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) on Notification of Major Military Activities and Rules of Behavior

(RoB) for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters, designed to underscore and reinforce existing international law and standards while improving transparency, building trust, and reducing risk of unintended incidents. The surface-to-surface encounters annex of the RoB CBM was signed last year and the air-to-air annex is scheduled to be completed by the end of this year. These new Rules of Behavior are non-binding and capture existing legal rules and standards. Additionally, the U.S. and China continue to use the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings to discuss safety in the maritime domain and avoid crises. As China continues to grow its military capacity and capability and operate further from its territory, these mechanisms become more important.

Both militaries have had success addressing areas of common interest, such as counter piracy, military medicine, and HA/DR. Some of the most successful engagements were focused on military medical cooperation and shared health concerns. For example, the USPACOM surgeon hosted Chinese counterparts in Hawaii and Washington, DC, which resulted in concrete opportunities for continued military medical cooperation focused on Disaster Response, Pandemic and Emerging Infectious Diseases, and Soldier Care. In January 2015, the PLA hosted the USPACOM Surgeon and component surgeons for a highly successful reciprocal visit. Demonstrating China's increasing ability to operate beyond the Western Pacific and a successful engagement on an area of common concern, last December, U.S. and Chinese ships conducted counter piracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. China's participation in international efforts to address these problems and to operate and exercise with the U.S. and its allies and partners in a manner consistent with international law and standards is welcomed.

Building and Strengthening Relationships

The future security and prosperity of the Indo-Asia-Pacific depends upon building bilateral and multilateral relationships. Strong relationships, facilitated by a U.S. forward presence, advance common interests and address shared threats. USPACOM strengthens relationships with U.S. allies and partners through security cooperation and capacity building, bilateral and multilateral approaches, and senior leader engagement.

Security Cooperation and Capacity Building: USPACOM enhances interoperability and information sharing with allies and partners in order to cooperatively address regional challenges. USPACOM's Security Cooperation approach is focused on building partner readiness, assisting with partner capability gaps, identifying partner shortfalls, and addressing the most critical capacity shortfalls. Last year, USPACOM identified C4ISR as a top priority for Security Cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and contributed to the U.S. supporting the ROK purchase of Global Hawk – a High Altitude UAV platform that will help close the gap in some of the security challenges on the Korean Peninsula. Supporting USPACOM's approach to addressing partner capability and capacity shortfalls will reduce risk, effectively use Security Cooperation and Assistance resources, and maintain the momentum to bring the right capabilities into the AOR.

As mentioned earlier, the progress the Republic of the Philippines continues to make in addressing violent extremists groups inside their country is a testament to building capacity in USPACOM's foreign internal defense efforts. USPACOM is also building capacity to counter drug trafficking in the AOR through Joint Interagency Task Force – West (JIATF-W) engagements with China. Through a partnership with the Internal Revenue Service, JIATF-W has leveraged Department of Defense counternarcotic authorities to open up an additional avenue of cooperation with Chinese officials by providing anti-money laundering training linked to counterdrug efforts. These efforts are only just beginning, but show promise in improving communication, cooperation, and information sharing on significant criminal enterprises operating in both the U.S. and China.

Lastly, increasing international representation at the USPACOM headquarters has improved collaboration with allies and partners and created a more agile and effective command and control architecture. The new USPACOM model integrates sixteen foreign exchange officers and liaison officers from six countries and facilitates a seamless transition from routine business to crisis. Included in these numbers are three foreign exchange Flag Officers and Senior Executives in key billets on the USPACOM staff.

Bilateral and Multilateral Approaches: With the exception of North Korea, USPACOM continues to build and strengthen bilateral relationships with all of the nations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. USPACOM maintains a close link with the five U.S. treaty allies and other partners in the region through a series of formal bilateral mechanisms. In Australia, key engagements stem from the ANZUS treaty obligations, guided by USPACOM's premier bilateral event with Australia, the Military Representatives Meeting. Similarly, USPACOM's military to military relationship with Japan is guided annually by the Japan Senior Leader Seminar, which USPACOM utilizes to ensure the bond with Japan remains strong. USPACOM continues to rely on the alliance with the Republic of Korea to maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and the annual Military Committee and Security Consultative Meetings are the preeminent bilateral mechanism to guide this alliance forward. Each year, USPACOM co-hosts the Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to discuss ways this critical alliance can modernize to meet 21st-century challenges. Lastly, USPACOM depends on annual Senior Staff Talks with Thailand to address shared regional security concerns while reinforcing U.S. commitment to democratic principles.

Similar bilateral mechanisms exist with partners throughout the USPACOM AOR, including Bilateral Defense Discussions with Indonesia, Vietnam, and others, as USPACOM continues to foster bilateral ties to enhance regional stability. Bilateral mechanisms with allies and partners form the strategic foundation of the security architecture that ensures peace and stability while defending U.S. interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

While bilateral mechanisms remain important, USPACOM continues to emphasize multilateral approaches. USPACOM works with regional forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to encourage multilateral relationships that build trust, prevent misperceptions that can lead to conflict, and reinforce international standards of conduct. For example, USPACOM arranges an annual Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Conference as its premier multilateral engagement tool for candid discussions with 20-plus Chiefs of Defense in the region. Each year the CHOD Conference alternates between USPACOM and a co-host country; Brunei hosted last year's successful conference. The 2015 CHOD Conference will be held in Hawaii and is designed to promote multilateral cooperation and provide a forum for the theater's military

leaders to share regional and global perspectives on common challenges. USPACOM also participated in other multilateral events in the region, such as the Fullerton Forum and Shangri-La Dialogue, to encourage multilateral solutions to shared challenges, as well as provide a venue for continued dialogue and strengthening security partnerships in the region.

One of the most important multilateral forums in the theater is ASEAN. The ten member states in ASEAN, under the chairmanship of Burma last year and Malaysia this year, seek to improve multilateral security activities and advance stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Approximately $5.3 trillion of global trade ($1.2 trillion is U.S.) passes through ASEAN waterways each year. The ten member states of ASEAN form the fourth largest U.S. export market and fifth major trade partner. ASEAN continues to address common threats in the region including Maritime Security, Terrorism, Transnational Crimes, Cyber Security, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response. ASEAN demonstrated during past disasters, such as Typhoon Haiyan and the Malaysian Flight 370 search operations, that practical cooperation among member states can enable civilian and military agencies to be more effective and efficient.

Last April, Defense Secretary Hagel hosted the ten ASEAN Defense Ministers, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA), and other non-government organizations in Hawaii to discuss disaster response and maritime security. UNOCHA hosted an Integrated Civil-Military Regional Response Planning Workshop for Large-Scale International Disaster Relief last October and the USPACOM staff will continue the maritime security dialogue by hosting a Maritime Domain Awareness discussion this May. USPACOM will continue supporting ASEAN as it builds regional tools and forums such as the ASEAN Economic Community by the end of 2015. Additionally, there is hope that the ASEAN members and China can conclude a binding and enforceable Code of Conduct mechanism for the South China Sea.

The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) also contributes to multilateral engagements and rules-based security governance. Through its executive education courses, workshops, and sustained alumni engagement activities, the Center contributes to the USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan by building U.S. and partner nation capacities. Success

stories include the APCSS-facilitated development of Papua New Guinea's first-ever national security policy, a framework for an Indonesian defense white paper, and Bangladesh's first comprehensive maritime security strategy proposal. Additionally, APCSS helped with the successful completion of Nepal's disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program for dealing with Maoist ex-combatants, and the signing of an inter-party agreement to overcome political crisis—both led by a core group of APCSS alumni.

Senior Leader Engagement: USPACOM and its components leverage senior leader visits to increase dialogue on issues of shared concern, build and strengthen relationships, and convey U.S. commitment to the region. Each year, hundreds of senior military and government leaders address security challenges through counterpart visits which greatly enhance understanding, interoperability, and trust. Examples of senior leadership engagements in the Indo-Asia-Pacific over the past year include:

- The President attended the G-20 Summit in Australia, the Republic Day ceremony in India, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum in China, and the East Asia Summit in Burma.
- The President also increased engagements in the theater to strengthen alliances in the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, and to deepen ties with Malaysia.
- The Secretary of State visited the Republic of Korea; China; and Indonesia. He also traveled to India for the 5th Strategic Dialogue Conference; to Burma for a series of ASEAN discussions; Australia for annual Ministerial Consultations; and the Solomon Islands.
- The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense held a 2+2 meeting with their ROK counterparts in Washington.
- The Secretary of Defense traveled to Japan for bilateral security discussions; Mongolia and Singapore for key leadership meetings; India for defense consultations; Australia for AUSMINs and to sign the Force Posture Agreement; and China for Confidence Building Measure discussions.
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs toured the Changi facilities in Singapore; participated in security and military discussions in Vietnam (first CJCS to visit since 1971); Australia for the Defense Chiefs Strategic Dialogue conference and bilateral events; and both Japan and the Republic of Korea for key counterpart visits.

These senior leader engagements are critical to identifying opportunities and addressing security challenges in the region. Additionally, Congressional delegations to the theater are of significant benefit.

Effective and Assured Presence

Effective and assured presence of USPACOM forces is required to meet the challenges and opportunities within USPACOM's AOR. As strategic warning timelines decrease, early identification of potential crises is key to rapidly assessing and shaping events. It also places a premium on robust, modern, agile, forward-deployed forces, maintained at high levels of readiness. Assured presence is supported by posturing forward-deployed forces, fielding new capabilities and concepts, addressing critical gaps, and maintaining readiness in order to defend the homeland, strengthen and modernize our alliances and partnerships, maintain access in the air and maritime domains, counter aggression, and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and violent extremism.

Posture: Sustaining effective and forward presence begins with having the necessary military infrastructure and access to support forward-stationed and rotational forces. USPACOM's posture effectively communicates U.S. intent and resolve to safeguard U.S. national interests, strengthen alliances and partnerships, maintain an assured presence in the region, prevent conflict, and if necessary, respond rapidly and effectively across the full range of military operations.

USPACOM faces three key challenges related to force posture. The first is operating in an AOR that covers 52% of the earth's surface. The vast distances complicate ISR, movement/maneuver, and sustainment, and require a geographically distributed force laydown to rapidly respond to crisis. The second challenge is the growth of military capabilities in the region. The Indo-Asia-Pacific is the most militarized region in the world. Maintaining the ability to defend strategic national security interests in an increasingly complex and lethal environment requires a force posture that is operationally resilient. Finally, expanding access to regions in South and Southeast Asia requires access and forward staging arrangements that are politically sustainable.

In support of USPACOM's objectives, the military services and our allies and partners are making investments to improve U.S. force posture. Examples of these investments are:

- Construction in Iwakuni, Japan to allow a carrier air wing to relocate from Atsugi
- Expanding base facilities and capabilities in Okinawa for Futenma replacement
- Operationalizing Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the Philippines
- Expanding future capabilities through construction at Camp Humphreys, ROK
- Reinforcing Guam's munitions and fuels piers at Apra Harbor
- Implementing Force Posture Initiatives through troop rotations and, ultimately, facility upgrades and construction in Darwin, Australia
- Building hardened C2 and aircraft shelters at Andersen AFB, Guam
- Installing and fortifying fuel nodes, manifolds, and lines in Guam and Japan
- Implementing rotational forces through USFK
- Developing divert options and training ranges in the Northern Marianas Islands
- Dredging port facilities to requisite depths to allow pier operations in Naha, Japan

These posture investments are part of USPACOM's holistic infrastructure investment strategy and are key to continued mission success.

Much of the supporting infrastructure in the Pacific and on the West Coast of the U.S. mainland was established during World War II and during the early years of the Cold War. The infrastructure now requires investment to extend its service life. The military services continue to invest in sustainment, restoration, and modernization (SRM) to provide quality facilities to support service members and their families; however, during times of austere budgets, the military services struggle to maintain infrastructure SRM funding levels. These forced decisions undermine the significant investment in facilities made by DoD and Host Nation Funded Construction programs over past decades.

Reduced SRM funding will negatively impact the ability to bring new forces and capabilities into the theater and maintain critical infrastructure. The U.S. and the theater benefit from the significant levels of investment made by allies and partners. For example, the Republic of Korea is significantly contributing to the cost of keeping U.S. Forces on the Korean Peninsula. The

Government of Japan has committed up to $3.1 billion to help realign U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam and other locations and $4.5 billion to expand the airfield and associated facilities at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni.

The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Joint Military Training initiative (CJMT) is an important posture undertaking. CNMI remains strategically important as a forward and sovereign U.S. location with lease rights until 2033 and extendable to 2083. When the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative moves approximately 4,700 U.S. Marines from Japan to Guam, the CJMT will enable this U.S. Marine force to train and maintain operational readiness. Specifically on the island of Tinian, the CJMT initiative will provide live-fire ranges and training areas. The CJMT will optimize future training ranges for joint and combined exercises with allies and foreign forces. As a part of aviation resiliency initiatives, divert and alternate air fields are also being explored on the islands of Saipan and Tinian along with other locations in the broader Western Pacific.

Forward Deployed Forces: The tyranny of distance, which defines the USPACOM AOR, requires forward deployed forces to engage with allies and partners, respond rapidly to crisis or contingencies, defend the homeland, and reinforce U.S. commitment to the region. To increase USPACOM's forward deployed forces and capabilities, the military services are:

- Rotationally deploying Navy Littoral Combat Ships into Singapore
- Forward deploying two additional ballistic missile defense-capable surface ships to Japan
- Increased deployments and rotations of E-8 JSTARS, E-3 AWACS, and E-2D Advanced Hawkeye in theater
- Replacing the USS George Washington with the more capable USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier in Japan
- Installing an advanced radar in Australia
- Continuing to deploy and operate F-22s in theater
- Completing a second ballistic missile defense radar in Japan
- Stationing additional submarines in Guam
- Improving rotational force presence in the Philippines, Singapore, and Australia

New Systems and Operating Concepts: Crafting new concepts and fielding new systems is fundamental to employing a credible force. For example, the military services are:

- Replacing P-3 maritime patrol aircraft with newer and more capable P-8s
- Deploying tilt rotor aircraft for Marines and Special Forces and new unmanned capabilities throughout the AOR
- Forward stationing High Speed Vessels and Mobile Landing Platforms in the USPACOM AOR
- Introducing Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air Aegis Destroyers
- Expanding the U.S. Army Pacific Pathways deployment concept
- Preparing for F-35 Joint Strike Fighters deployment with maintenance hubs in Japan and Australia

Addressing Critical Capability Gaps: The most technical, high-end military challenges are in the USPACOM AOR, and are growing. While many improvements to posture, forward deployed forces, capabilities, and concepts have been made to address these challenges, there are a number of mission sets and enablers that require continuous focus and attention. These include areas such as Undersea Warfare, Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance, space, battle management, command and control, cyber, munitions, Ballistic Missile Defense and Integrated Air and Missile Defense systems, and capacity shortfalls in theater enablers such as petroleum redistribution and lift.

Undersea Warfare is a mission set that requires constant attention to maintain a decisive advantage. Of the world's 300 foreign submarines, roughly 200 are in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region; of which, 150 belong to China, North Korea, and Russia. Countries operating these systems view the platforms as a mechanism to affect the balance of power in their favor. Even small navies that possess submarines hold a distinct advantage over a navy without the capability.

There is a significant leap underway in the Indo-Asia-Pacific in undersea capability as newer submarines replace older variants. In the past few years, Singapore, India, Vietnam and Malaysia have all received modern diesel submarines and China is on a modernization path to

improve the lethality and survivability of its attack submarines with the introduction of quiet, high-end, diesel-powered and nuclear-powered submarines. Russia is also modernizing its existing fleet of Oscar-class multi-purpose attack nuclear submarines (SSGNs) and producing their next generation Yasen-class SSGNs.

In addition to attack submarines, there are important developments underway that will increase Chinese and Russian strategic deterrent patrol capability and capacity. China has three operational JIN-class ballistic missile submarines and up to five more may enter service by the end of the decade. Additionally, Russia is planning to field its newest Borei-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific later this year. Submarine detection and tracking is a complex problem set and will continue to be one of the most important functions of naval forces. A continued and sustained investment in the U.S. nuclear submarine force, advanced Undersea Warfare technologies, capabilities and capacity, and readiness is necessary to outpace the growing challenges.

Persistent and deep-look ISR capabilities and supporting architecture are required to prevent strategic surprise, assess the security environment, and support actions that impose cost or defeat potential adversaries. Although ISR capacity and capabilities have increased, significant capacity issues remain. Efforts to mitigate ISR capacity issues, as well as develop new capabilities, are ongoing. Additionally, an ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination enterprise that is interoperable and shared with Allies and Partners is important. Without a concerted effort to continue advancing U.S. capabilities, the U.S. risks missing key indications and warnings in an environment where situational awareness affects decision space.

Satellite communications (SATCOM) is an essential enabler to exercise Command & Control (C2) and enabling ISR. Satellite space continues to grow increasingly congested and contested, and adversaries continue developing means to curtail access to space-enabled capabilities. A resilient space-based command, control, and ISR architecture remains a USPACOM priority.

There is a growing need to sustain and modernize airborne early warning systems to execute multi-mission, multi-domain integrated command and control. The cruise missile, air, and UAV

threats in the USPACOM AOR require robust, long range Battle Management, Command and Control (BMC2) and Wide-Area Surveillance (WAS) platforms capable of operating in a contested environment. Developing and modernizing the capabilities within the BMC2 and WAS platforms to track and operate in a communications contested or degraded environment is necessary to meet the challenges of future operational environments in the Pacific; these platforms must be interoperable with military services, partners, and allies.

Related, the Joint Information Environment (JIE) increments I and II have the potential for consolidation of each military services' command, control, communication, and computers programs. JIE II will further strengthen collective cyber security and defense posture in the region, improve staff efficiency and support, and strengthen interagency and international relationships. JIE II will require an information infrastructure adaptable enough to accommodate multiple security classification levels with the interoperability and sharing capability to maximize mission effectiveness. JIE II is a necessary next step to mitigate the risk posed by persistent cyber threats. These threats continue to grow.

Increased cyber capacity and use, especially by China, North Korea, and Russia, underscore the growing requirement to evolve our command, control, and operational structure authorities. In order to fully leverage the Cyber domain, Combatant Commanders require an enduring theater cyber operational command resourced to provide regional cyber planning, integration, synchronization, and direction of cyberspace forces. The theater cyber operational command will provide direction of operations against increasingly capable threats in coordination with USCYBERCOM, the interagency, and allies and partners. USPACOM sees a future where Joint Force Cyber Component Command (JFCCC) are aligned regionally under Combatant Commands. JFCCCs will provide staffing and expertise required to oversee persistent operations and defense of theater information networks, synchronization of cyber risk assessments and intelligence, and development of flexible cyber effects.

Munitions are a critical component of combat effectiveness and readiness. A number of munitions improvements in lethality, production, and precision are required. There is a growing need for ship-to-ship and air-to-ship munitions to allow U.S. forces to defeat an aggressor from

greater range. Specifically, there are troubling gaps in Anti-Surface Warfare capability and readiness that compel the accelerated fielding of a long range anti-ship missile. A long-range stand-off weapon, such as the Defense Advanced Research Programs Agency / Office of Naval Research developed Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, will meet the urgent need for an offensive anti-surface warfare capability against combatants in a contested environment. There is also a need for advancements in the air-to-air realm and for Hard Target Munitions capabilities to engage hardened targets that are growing in numbers and complexity. Area Effects Munitions are required to prevent open space aggression. Lastly, along with lethal munitions, non-lethal capabilities can prove equally valuable in supporting USPACOM's strategy and deterrence.

With North Korea continuing to advance its ballistic missile capabilities, USPACOM will continue its efforts in maintaining a credible, sustainable ballistic missile defense. The recent deployment of long range second TPY-2 radar to Japan (December 2014) along with THAAD on Guam achieving full Fully Operational Capability further enhanced U.S. homeland defense capabilities which are required to protect key regional nodes from aggressive action. In addition, over the last year the U.S., Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia have had better coordination and information sharing. USPACOM looks forward to continuing our work with our regional IAMD partners and expanding our ballistic missile defense cooperation and information sharing.

Equally important to having the right equipment and capabilities is the capacity of critical logistics. The time and distance required to move assets across the Pacific make it an imperative to preposition and secure munitions. Dedicated sealift must be adequately funded to posture munitions, fuel, and other supplies within theater. Agile, responsive, and sustained operations demand a resilient network of capabilities to deploy and sustain USPACOM forces. USTRANSCOM's prepositioning strategy has emphasized positioning equipment and materiel afloat to optimize flexibility, ensure rapid responses to crises, and provide force presence; however, USPACOM still does not have enough lift to satisfy all operational requirements.

Readiness: Fundamental to USPACOM's mission is the ability to deter aggression and prevail in crisis. USPACOM's readiness is evaluated against its ability to execute operational and

contingency plans, which places a premium on forward-deployed, ready forces that can exercise, train, and operate with our partner nations' militaries and follow-on forces able to respond to operational contingencies.

USPACOM maintains forward-deployed ready forces as credible deterrents, to support and defend national security interests, and to provide assurance and protection to allies and partners. Forward deployed forces, west of the International Date Line, remain responsive and relevant to mitigating risk in the event of escalating regional security events and greatly benefit from training with allies and partners in a complex environment. Ready, forward-deployed forces increase decision space and decrease response time, bolster allies' and partners' confidence, and reduce the chance of miscalculation by potential adversaries. However, redistribution of global forces that lead to moving forces out of the Indo-Asia-Pacific diminishes USPACOM's impact and effectiveness. Additionally, short-notice redeployment of USPACOM's ready, forward deployed forces to fill emergent requirements to other areas of operation increases risk to our nation's Indo-Asia-Pacific interests and objectives.

In addition to concerns with the forward deployed forces, there are troubling readiness trends associated with follow-on forces. The ability of the U.S. to surge and globally maneuver ready forces has historically been an asymmetric advantage that is now diminishing. Over the past year, the U.S. has been forced to prioritize the readiness of forward-deployed forces, at the expense of the readiness of follow-on-forces and critical investments needed to outpace emerging threats. A lack of ready surge forces resulting from high operational demands, delayed maintenance periods, and training limitations will limit responsiveness to emergent contingencies and greatly increases risk.

Budget reductions and uncertainty directly impact operations and combat readiness. Fiscal constraints disrupt the predictable, persistent funding needed to organize, train, and equip a ready force. Fiscal uncertainty degrades and disrupts long-term engagement opportunities with strategic consequences to U.S. relationships and prestige. Resource pressures have triggered deferrals in exercises, operations, and senior leader engagement opportunities; have introduced regional doubt; and compound the risk to U.S. interests in the region. As the Service Chiefs

recently testified, continuation of sequestration will further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of forces needed for contingency response, forego procurement of new platforms and weapon systems and further downsize weapons capacity…all of which are required for success in the USPACOM AOR. I am in full agreement with their assessments and remain deeply concerned about the growing risk to U.S. interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

Conclusion

It has been over three years since the President announced the U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. The Rebalance is focused on modernizing and strengthening treaty alliances and partnerships through cooperative agreements, building partner capacity, and increasing regional cooperation, interoperability, and security capabilities. From the military perspective, the U.S. is accomplishing what it set out to do and the Rebalance is working. However, fiscal uncertainty resulting from the Budget Control Act could arrest progress and place some initiatives at risk. Building on the positive momentum of the Rebalance to the Pacific is critical to protecting U.S. interests in the region. Thank you for your continued support to USPACOM and our men and women, and their families, who live and work in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, III
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

Admiral Samuel Locklear is a 1977 graduate of the United States Naval Academy.

His career as a surface warfare officer includes assignments aboard USS William V. Pratt (DDG 44), USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), USS Callaghan (DDG 994), and USS Truxtun (CG 35), culminating in command of USS Leftwich (DD 984). Subsequent command assignments include commander, Destroyer Squadron 2; commander, Nimitz Strike Group; commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet; and commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Naval Forces Africa, and Allied Joint Force Command Naples.

Ashore, he served as executive assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations; the 78th commandant of Midshipmen, United States Naval Academy; director, Assessment Division (OPNAV N81); director, Programming Division (OPNAV N80); and, as director, Navy Staff.

He is a 1992 graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and holds a master's degree in Public Administration from the George Washington University.

Locklear is the commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.

His personal decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal with one gold star, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit with four gold stars, Bronze Star Medal, and numerous individual, campaign and unit awards.

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI
COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND;
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA COMBINED FORCES COMMAND;
AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

April 15, 2015

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1. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, I am honored to testify as the Commander of the multinational United Nations Command (UNC), the combined United States–Republic of Korea (ROK) Combined Forces Command (CFC), and the joint United States Forces Korea (USFK). Thank you for your support of our Service Members, Civilians, Contractors, and their Families who serve our great nation and the U.S.-ROK Alliance. The Asia-Pacific region is critical to our nation's security and prosperity, and the U.S.-ROK Alliance is indispensable to the stability that enables the region to thrive despite serious threats and challenges. The men and women of this Command are committed every day to each other, our mission, and our nation's calling. We are very proud of our partnership with the Republic of Korea and of our contributions to stability and prosperity in Korea and the region. The U.S.-ROK Alliance is one of history's most successful alliances, and we are confident that we can further enhance it to serve both of our nations.

Last year, I testified that the Alliance is strong, but that we would not become complacent in our daily mission to deter and defend against the North Korean threat. I also stated that we would face challenges and opportunities in adapting the Alliance to that threat. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, I report to you that the Alliance is even stronger today due to our accomplishments in 2014. In 2015, we will build on that momentum based on four guiding Command priorities.

- Sustain and Strengthen the Alliance.
- Maintain the Armistice. Be Ready to "Fight Tonight" to Deter and Defeat Aggression.
- Transform the Alliance.
- Sustain the Force and Enhance the UNC/CFC/USFK Team.

2. ALLIANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN 2014

In 2014, the United States and the Republic of Korea took significant steps to improve our overall

readiness and the strength of the Alliance. We started the year with the annual KEY RESOLVE exercise in February-March, followed by the ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN exercise in August. These annual exercises, along with my personal visits to ROK and U.S. units throughout South Korea, helped me confirm our strengths and note some areas we must improve. The Command's greatest strength rests in the close, collaborative, and cooperative working relationship with not only our ROK ally, but with the larger United Nations Command team.

The strength and importance of the Alliance were highlighted last April by our two Presidents' first visit to CFC. President Park praised the close relationship of the Alliance in the steadfast defense of the Republic of Korea. President Obama called the Alliance "special, forged on the battlefield" and commented that we are "more than allies – we are friends." He also noted that it is "this foundation of trust … that allows both our nations to thrive economically and socially."

In 2014, we made progress on two initiatives against the growing North Korean missile threat. We further developed our comprehensive Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) to counter the North Korean missile and WMD threats. We also concluded the "Concepts and Principles for Comprehensive Alliance Counter-Missile Operations," with a "4D Strategy" to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy North Korean missiles. This important step will help us gain important synergies and efficiencies, not only in terms of the capabilities each nation develops, but how we use these capabilities operationally.

Over the past year, our drive to strengthen the Alliance has improved our combined readiness. For example, the U.S. Army began and the U.S. Air Force continued to deploy forces to Korea on a rotational basis. This added commitment complemented units based in Korea, improving overall readiness. Additionally, the ROK Army and Air Force participated in National Training Center and Red Flag exercises in the United States. These challenging exercises improved the Alliance's interoperability and transformed air crews into seasoned veterans.

South Korea made progress in enhancing future warfighting and interoperability capabilities by taking steps toward procuring Patriot Advanced Capability missiles, F35 Joint Strike Fighters, and RQ-4 Global Hawk Surveillance Aircraft. Once integrated into our Alliance force structure, these systems will enhance the capabilities of our Alliance.

We also agreed to establish a U.S.-ROK Combined Division in wartime with a functioning combined staff during Armistice. Once in place later this year, the division will enhance our combined combat posture at the tactical level.

We signed the five-year Special Measures Agreement which established the sharing of costs for stationing U.S. forces in South Korea. ROK contributions through the SMA help maintain the Alliance's readiness and infrastructure to support U.S. forces.

We ended the year with the signing of a much needed trilateral information-sharing arrangement between the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Under this arrangement, our two closest allies in the region can share classified information related to the nuclear and missile threats posed by North Korea. Our strategic and military initiatives in 2014 comprise what we call a "Quality Alliance." We continue to use this concept to focus on military qualities and capabilities, and to provide a framework and context to align senior leadership decision-making.

3. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Our accomplishments last year advanced U.S. security and prosperity, which are inextricably linked to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. In the 21st century, the Asia-Pacific region is expected to serve as an engine of the global economy, grow in political influence, and remain the focus of a variety of complex security challenges. The troubled history of the region, combined with the dynamic regional security situation, render strong alliances and partnerships critical to our nation's ability to defend our interests. In the face of strategic changes and security threats, and lacking regional security institutions,

the United States serves as the constant that provides presence, stability, and a framework for conflict avoidance and resolution. The United States has taken a vital role in Asia, as it has worldwide, in promoting international cooperation and the effectiveness of international rules and norms. This role is supported by America's enduring military presence, which serves as a foundational and visible element of U.S. leadership and commitment in Asia. In South Korea, forward-deployed American forces stand together with our ROK ally and demonstrate unwavering resolve in the face of the growing North Korean asymmetric threat.

A. CHINA, RUSSIA, AND JAPAN

China is continuing on a comprehensive military modernization program, at times acting assertively to press its interests in the region. China remains North Korea's most significant supporter, even though the relationship has been strained since Kim Jong-un assumed control of North Korea. Russia has increased its focus on the region, including military presence and engagement, in a reassertion of its strategic interests. Meanwhile, Japan is adapting its strategy to allow it to exercise collective self-defense. This change constitutes a natural evolution in Japan's defense policy, and its alliance with the U.S. should reassure the region that by accepting increased defense responsibilities it will contribute to regional and global security and enable a more effective defense of the Korean Peninsula.

B. NORTH KOREA

An unpredictable North Korea remains a significant threat to American interests, the security and prosperity of South Korea, and the stability of the international community. North Korea is willing to use coercion, continue development of nuclear weapons technology and long-range ballistic missile programs, engage in proliferation of arms, missiles and related materiel and technologies, and conduct cyber attacks, all while continuing to deny its citizens the most basic human rights. Due to the strength of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, North Korea lacks the ability to unify the Korean Peninsula by force with its

large but aging conventional military. Recognizing this, North Korea has opted for an asymmetric strategy capable of little to no notice provocations and limited attacks. North Korea's strategy is designed to ensure the survival of the Kim regime, with options to disrupt peninsular, regional, or global security. To achieve this, Kim Jong-un must maintain internal security and a strong military deterrent. North Korea's nuclear program serves both objectives by enhancing domestic regime legitimacy and threatening neighbors and the United States.

What's Changed Since Last Year? North Korea has placed significant emphasis and resources into its asymmetric capabilities, especially its missiles and cyber threats. In 2014, North Korea conducted a series of long-range artillery, rocket, and ballistic missile tests with very little to no notice. During the summer training period, North Korea military units conducted more realistic training and increased activities along the Demilitarized Zone and in the North West Islands region. The North West Islands region - where North and South Korea actively monitor fishing vessels operated by both countries and by China - remains the primary hotspot on the Korean Peninsula. In November, North Korea sought to intimidate and pressure the U.S. media and entertainment industries by projecting its cyber capabilities against Sony Pictures. This was a significant action that demonstrated North Korea's willingness to use cyber-attacks in defiance of international norms.

Provocation and Engagement. North Korea's strategy involves combining provocation and engagement in what is often characterized as coercive diplomacy to pursue objectives that enhance regime survivability. This includes initiatives to compel international acceptance of its nuclear program, play regional actors, including the U.S., against one another, and split alliances, particularly the ROK-U.S. Alliance. North Korea recognizes the strength of the ROK-U.S. Alliance as its greatest threat, so it tries to fracture the Alliance in order to deal with each nation separately on its terms. The North Korean People's Army (KPA) retains the capability to inflict heavy costs on South Korea. However, KPA

senior leaders likely understand it is not capable of defeating the Alliance, despite its propaganda to the contrary. North Korea's asymmetric strategy and capabilities enable limited objective military actions, which have the risk of miscalculation and escalation.

Asymmetric Capabilities. North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests -- in 2006, 2009, and 2013. It continues to prepare its test site and could conduct another test at any time. In recent years, North Korea has continued to develop its asymmetric capabilities including several hundred ballistic missiles, a sizeable long range artillery force, one of the world's largest chemical weapons stockpiles, a biological weapons research program, the world's largest special operations forces, and an active cyber warfare capability. These capabilities can be employed with minimal warning, and threaten South Korea and potentially the United States and Japan.

Since assuming power three years ago, Kim Jong-un has taken a number of confrontational steps to solidify his control over the North Korean people, military, and political apparatus. The regime conducted a satellite launch in December 2012 and conducted its third nuclear test in February 2013, in defiance of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and 2094 (2013). In 2014, North Korea continued to develop its ballistic missile program, conducting no-notice Scud and No Dong missile tests from several launch locations, all violations of UN Security Council resolutions.

These asymmetric capabilities, along with the fourth largest military in the world that is 70-75% forward deployed within 60 miles of the DMZ, challenges the Alliance to assess potential indications of a North Korean provocation or attack.

What Are We Doing to Address the Threat? The Alliance is constantly using readiness, vigilance, and cooperation to counter the North Korean threat. All three Commands – United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea – in close coordination with the ROK military train

and posture our forces and capabilities to deter and defend against North Korea. We continue to press ahead on tailored deterrence, counter-missile capabilities, improving plans, and adding rotational forces and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). We have also taken steps to enhance the United Nations Command to increase multinational influence. A strong Alliance and ready military posture continue to provide the opportunity for further diplomatic, political, and economic engagements. The military dimension of national power is fully integrated into larger national efforts to address the North Korean threat, and more broadly to meet U.S. national security objectives in the region.

C. REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The ROK is a dynamic nation of 50 million people in a region critical to U.S. interests, as well as regional and global stability. The ROK's success, the "Miracle on the Han River," is truly remarkable considering that less than 60 years ago it was one of the poorest nations in the world. Emerging from the destruction of the Korean War, the ROK is among the most vibrant democracies and economies in the world. The drive and spirit of the Korean people along with the security provided by our Alliance forces have helped the Korean people propel their country to become an increasingly important and prominent player in the international community and one of America's closest allies.

Politically and economically, the ROK provides an example for other nations seeking to improve the lives of their citizens. Today, South Korea boasts the world's 12th largest economy. With world-class universities and research and development centers, the ROK is also a leader in science and technology, with the world's fastest average internet connection speed. As a nation with growing influence, South Korea is increasing its role in setting the international agenda, to include establishing a series of free trade agreements and hosting international defense talks.

D. UNITED NATIONS COMMAND: THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION IN KOREA

In response to North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950, the United Nations Security Council

(UNSC) called for members to provide military forces to South Korea under the leadership of the United States. The UNSC chartered the United Nations Command (UNC) to repel the attack and restore peace and security. In 1953, the UNC, North Korea, and China agreed to an Armistice to halt hostilities. Today, the 18 nation UNC remains an international coalition that maintains the Armistice and contributes to deterrence. If hostilities resume, UNC provides a multinational enabler to ensure broad international support to defend the ROK.

The ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command is the powerful warfighting command that deters North Korean aggression and leads U.S.-ROK forces in the defense of South Korea. CFC enables us to organize, plan, and exercise U.S. and ROK forces so that the Alliance is ready to "Fight Tonight."

U.S. Forces Korea, as a sub-unified command of U.S. Pacific Command, is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping U.S. forces on the Peninsula to be agile, adaptable, and ready to support CFC and UNC.

4. ADVANCING SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: PRIORITIES FOR 2015

In the context of the strategic environment I described above, I have four priorities for the Command: first, to sustain and strengthen the Alliance; second, to maintain the Armistice, while remaining ready to "Fight Tonight" to deter and defeat aggression; third, to transform the Alliance; and, finally, to sustain the force and enhance the UNC/CFC/USFK Team. I would like to describe the progress we've made over the last year on each of these priorities, and then conclude by looking ahead to how we will continue to build on these successes.

A. Sustain and Strengthen the Alliance

Our national leaders have established the ROK-U.S. Alliance as the linchpin of our common defense of South Korea. Our efforts on this priority have borne much fruit in this last year. We are increasing activities and communications, so that we keep the Alliance at the center of the Command's actions. By

putting the Alliance first, we will be better able to address Alliance issues to find Alliance solutions.

Strong Relationships. The U.S.-ROK Alliance is based on common values and interests, as well as strong relationships. Taken together with the national security strategies of both of our nations, presidential statements, and legislation, the U.S. is set to continue to be an indispensable strategic partner to the ROK, and the ROK is well poised to be an enduring and increasingly important ally to the U.S. We have shared an uncommon level of trust that has been central to the defense of South Korea, and key to addressing the regional and global implications of North Korea's disruptive behavior. But the Alliance is about much more than North Korea. Together we are working to address a broad range of security challenges, and to also create new opportunities, mechanisms, and initiatives for an enduring peace, stability, and prosperity. Going forward together, we are poised for a shared future of growth and prosperity.

ROK National Security Strategy. The ROK recently promulgated a new national security strategy titled "A New Era of Hope." The strategy seeks to build on the foundation provided by the ROK-U.S Alliance to pave the way toward peaceful unification and an enhanced international leadership role. The strategy provides a framework for making substantive civil and economic preparations for unification, but keeps in sharp focus the necessity of maintaining a robust defense posture and developing future-oriented capabilities. The strategy also looks outward in terms of enhancing the ROK's relations with other nations and contributing to what the strategy calls "the co-prosperity of humankind."

Republic of Korea Military: A Formidable Force. The ROK military is a modern and capable force with superb leaders. Considering all that is at stake on the Korean Peninsula, we are fortunate to have such a capable ally to tackle challenges and pursue common objectives. In line with the ROK military's growing capabilities, it is proving to be an increasingly valuable partner that contributes to disaster relief, anti-piracy, and non-proliferation operations worldwide. Since South Korea joined the

United Nations in September 1991, it has deployed 40,000 troops all around the world in peacekeeping and assistance missions. In 2014, the ROK military deployed to more than 15 countries in various operations, including an Ebola relief team to West Africa.

• Military Strategy. The ROK military strategy continues to call for a rapid and firm response to North Korean provocations, believing such a response is essential to deterrence and self-defense. As I testified last year, I remain concerned about the potential for miscalculation and escalation, so an Alliance response based on timely consultation is the best way to maintain the Armistice and stability.

• Manning and Budget. The South Korean military has an active duty force of 639,000 personnel and 2.9 million reservists. South Korea plans to offset a force reduction to 517,000 in the 2020s with better and more high-tech capabilities. In December, the ROK Ministry of National Defense submitted a budget of $37.09 billion, a 4.9% increase from last year and representing about 2.5% of its GDP.

• Capabilities and Force Improvement. South Korea continues to prioritize capabilities and training based on the North Korean threat, but it is also considering other factors such as the defense of sea lines of communication and maritime exclusive economic zones, and building its domestic defense industries.

B. Maintain the Armistice. Be Ready To "Fight Tonight" To Deter and Defeat Aggression

To advance this priority, we must expedite the completion of our plans, enhance BMD posture, and maximize training and exercise opportunities. In order to do those things, we have to provide the combined and joint force in Korea with the best capabilities the Alliance can muster.

U.S. Rotational Forces: Delivering Better Capabilities in Korea. Rotational assets are modular, multi-functional, and operational across the full range of military operations. They enhance our ability to sustain a diverse mix of rapidly deployable capabilities and adapt to a broader range of requirements to defend the Republic of Korea.

The movement of U.S. Air Force fighters into the Pacific has been a routine and integral part of U.S.

Pacific Command's combat capable air forces and regional force posture since March 2004, as has the forward stationing of Air Force bomber assets in the Pacific under the Continuous Bomber Presence initiative. These have maintained a prudent deterrent against threats to regional security and stability.

Eighth Army was among the first units to receive an Attack Reconnaissance Squadron in October 2013, and it will continue to support routine rotational deployments as part of the U.S. rebalancing efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. The decision to rotate units to South Korea represents the Army's commitment to provide mission-ready and culturally attuned capabilities to the region. The rotational deployments to Eighth Army also expose more Army units to the Korean Peninsula, while providing the Alliance with an improved ability to conduct bilateral exercises and improve readiness. These rotations have already achieved results. The 4-6th Attack Reconnaissance Squadron, 16th Combat Aviation Brigade, rotated to Korea from Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA (October 2013 to June 2014). In nine months, they increased their combat readiness by exercising close combat attack, reconnaissance, and security operations as air and ground forces worked together in a combined arms live-fire environment.

The first brigade-sized unit to support Eighth Army will arrive in June 2015 when the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 1st Cavalry Division from Fort Hood, TX arrives to replace the 1st ABCT, 2nd Infantry Division. This brigade is scheduled to inactivate in July after 50 years of proud service on the Korean Peninsula.

Missile Defense: Countering Growing North Korean Capabilities. The ROK-U.S. Alliance endeavors to strengthen our ability to counter North Korea's growing ballistic missile threat. At the October 2014 Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), the ROK Minister of National Defense and U.S. Secretary of Defense endorsed "Concepts and Principles for Comprehensive Alliance Counter-Missile Operations" or the "4D Strategy." This strategy will posture the Alliance to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy North Korean ballistic missile threats. This will not only improve Alliance defenses, it will

bolster efforts to deter North Korean WMD and missile use. Further, it will guide operational decision-making, planning, exercises, capability development, and acquisitions. The capabilities include the ROK's "Kill Chain" and Korean Air and Missile Defense System (KAMD), as well as U.S. capabilities on and off Peninsula. The Alliance continues to pursue upgrades and improvements to existing ballistic missile defense capability to include increasing interoperability in systems and procedures.

Tailored Deterrence: Influencing North Korean Decision-Making. The bilateral Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) was created in 2013 to outline a range of Alliance options to influence the North Korean regime's decision making. The strategy focuses on options that raise the cost of North Korean WMD or ballistic missile use; deny the benefits of their use; and encourage restraint from using WMD or ballistic missiles. The strategy provides bilaterally agreed upon concepts and principles for deterring North Korean WMD use and countering North Korean coercion.

Exercises: Enhancing Readiness. Exercising our combined and multinational force is an important component of readiness and is fundamental to sustaining and strengthening the Alliance. Combined Forces Command and ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) conduct three annual joint and combined exercises: KEY RESOLVE (KR), FOAL EAGLE (FE), and ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN (UFG). KR and UFG are computer-simulated, theater-level command post exercises that ensure our readiness to respond to provocations, attacks, and instability. UNC routinely invites participation from its 18 Sending States to strengthen Coalition interoperability, while observers from the Swedish and Swiss Delegations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission promote an independent and internationally credible assessment of the defensive nature of these exercises.

C. Transform the Alliance

To achieve transformation, we must synchronize, transform, and re-station the force. We also need to advance theater C4I and cyber capabilities.

Conditions-based Wartime Operational Control Transition. At the 2014 SCM, in light of the evolving security environment in the region including the enduring North Korean nuclear and missile threat, the ROK Minister of National Defense and U.S. Secretary of Defense agreed to implement a conditions-based approach to the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the U.S.-led Combined Forces Command (CFC) to a new ROK-led combined defense command. This will ensure our combined defense remains strong while the ROK develops or acquires the critical military capabilities necessary to assume the lead in its defense.

As a result of this decision, CFC will retain its wartime leadership until the Alliance agrees conditions are met and are conducive for a stable OPCON transition. We will continue to refine our strategy to create adaptive, agile plans and field combined forces that deter and defeat an enemy's provocations, deter aggression, and if deterrence fails, to fight and win.

Additionally, the CFC headquarters will temporarily remain in its current location in Yongsan and maintain the personnel and infrastructure required to command and control the combined force until OPCON transition occurs. Similarly, USFK will keep the U.S. 210th Field Artillery Brigade north of the Han River until the ROK fields a comparable capability.

U.S. Force Relocation: Posturing to Enhance Readiness. To posture forces in support of U.S. and ROK national interests, both governments agreed to consolidate USFK into two enduring hubs south of Seoul near the cities of Pyeongtaek and Daegu. USFK will enhance readiness, improve efficiencies, and further augment Alliance capabilities through two major plans: the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and the Land Partnership Plan (LPP).

YRP is funded by the ROK government to relocate USFK and UNC from Seoul to U.S. Army Garrison-Humphreys (USAG-H) in Pyeongtaek. LPP consolidates forces from north of Seoul to USAG-H south of Seoul, while still providing access to northern training areas and ranges. The majority of

relocations involves U.S. Army units and supports the Army's Force Generation rotational plan.

The YRP/LPP's $10.7B transformation program, which includes over 600 facilities, is well underway with over $1B in construction. The construction at USAG-H has tripled the garrison size. Key construction projects include unit headquarters, motor pools, barracks, family housing, medical facilities, communication centers, a "Midtown Community" complex, schools, installation service facilities, and underground utilities systems. In 2013 and 2014, ROK and U.S. funded projects completed an elementary school, a high school, family housing towers, a child development center, the waste water treatment plant, an airfield operations building, and supporting land fill for garrison expansion. In these efforts, we are particularly attentive to housing needs – to meet our goal of 40% command-sponsored families living on post, so we can maintain readiness and ensure quality of life.

Along with Eighth Army, the Marine Corps Forces Korea (MARFORK) headquarters located in Yongsan will relocate to USAG-H. Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea (CNFK) will relocate its headquarters to co-locate with the ROK Fleet Headquarters at Busan in 2015. This will strengthen day-to-day cooperation in the combined naval component, while leveraging the capabilities of nearby Commander Fleet Activities Chinhae, the only U.S. Navy base on the Asian mainland.

For Seventh Air Force at Osan Air Base, USFK will return real estate hosting dilapidated munitions storage areas to the ROK, and in turn the ROK will grant a larger parcel of land to construct new storage facilities which will enhance safety. Also, while not a YRP/LPP initiative, planning has advanced for a new Combined Air and Space Operations Center at Osan, to be funded in large part with host-nation funds, which will ensure a survivable, capable command and control capability for Airpower.

D. Sustain the Force and Enhance the UNC/CFC/USFK Team

To sustain U.S. forces in Korea, we will continue to focus on proper command climates, enforcement of discipline, and comprehensive fitness and wellness. Particularly in the areas of

preventing crime, sexual harassment, and sexual assault, we have been taking proactive steps that have led to a downward trend in incidents. To prevent sexual harassment and sexual assault, the Command Sergeant Major and I conduct regular sensing sessions that provide insights on what leaders need to be more aware of for effective prevention strategies. We are committed to this priority, so we can build trust and readiness to prevail in armistice and the crucible of war.

To enhance the international team in Korea, we have also made important progress. We are expanding UNC participation in exercises. For example, participation during the annual exercise ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN increased from three countries and seven officers in 2009 to seven countries and 153 officers in 2014. Multinational officers also play a critical role on the UNC staff, to include shaping UNC strategy, strategic communication, and other critical functions. This increasingly impactful and visible multinational presence is a clear message from the international community of continued international support for the defense of South Korea and for stability in the region.

5. WHAT WE MUST ACHIEVE

With the progress I have described, there is still much work to do. I am proud to testify that, as a result of the progress we have achieved on the Command's four priorities, our defense is capable and better prepared to respond effectively to any provocation, instability, or aggression.

Our top concern is that we could have very little warning of a North Korean asymmetric provocation, which could start a cycle of action and counter-action, leading to unintended escalation. This underscores the need for the Alliance to maintain a high level of readiness and vigilance, and to do so together.

Critical Capabilities. During the recent SCM, our national leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the combined defense of South Korea. They also confirmed several critical capabilities the Alliance must improve to ensure continued readiness to respond. These are:

- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, or ISR.
- Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence, or C4I.
- Ballistic Missile Defense, or BMD.
- Critical Munitions.

We must continue to pursue ISR capabilities. The Alliance's ability to distinguish the indications and warnings associated with an impending North Korean asymmetric or conventional attack directly impacts the Alliance's decision space. Investments here can mitigate the risk of miscalculation and escalation by providing a more accurate and timely picture of North Korean actions.

During this past year, South Korea began to invest in new tactical equipment that will comprise a reliable C4I architecture. We must maintain this momentum in improving C4I capabilities and interoperability, so we can communicate from tactical to strategic levels and between units in the field.

Due to the nature of the evolving threat, particularly ballistic missiles, it is critical for the Alliance to build a layered and interoperable BMD capability. Each nation has unique contributions to make to missile defense. While the U.S. has an existing layered BMD capability, the ROK is moving forward in the development of its KAMD and "Kill Chain." It is essential that we work together to ensure interoperability of Alliance BMD capabilities.

In the early phases of hostilities, we will rely on a rapid flow of ready forces into the ROK. During this time, we will rely on U.S. and ROK Air Forces to establish air superiority to defeat North Korean threats which could inflict great damage on Seoul. In order to ensure maximum Alliance capability and interoperability, we will also work closely with the Republic of Korea to ensure it procures the appropriate types and numbers of critical munitions for the early phases of hostilities.

Force Relocation Plans. We will continue executing the Yongsan Relocation Plan and the Land Partnership Plan, and as required, we will work together to refine relocation plans to support the

conditions-based OPCON transition.

Operational Plans. Finally, with CFC retaining its wartime leadership role, we will expedite updating our operational plans. Executable plans will ensure an effective Alliance response to a crisis.

6. CLOSING

2014 was a positive year for the ROK-U.S. Alliance in many respects, even in the face of unpredictable North Korean asymmetric actions. We have been fortunate and thankful for the strong support of all our partners and the priority of resources that allow us to carry out what our Alliance demands of the Command. In 2015, I am looking forward to working with senior U.S. and ROK civilian and military leaders, Ambassador Mark Lippert, ADM Locklear, and the new PACOM Commander as we maintain stability in Korea and the region. The men and women of this multinational, combined, and joint warfighting Command are very thankful for the support from this Committee and the American people which is so crucial in maintaining our readiness against the North Korean threat. We will never lose sight of the fact that we are at "Freedom's Frontier" defending one of our most important allies and vital American interests. Thank you, and I look forward to our discussion.

GEN Curtis M. Scaparrotti
Commander
United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces Korea

General Curtis M. Scaparrotti is a native of Logan, Ohio, graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, in 1978, and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army.

A career infantry officer, General Scaparrotti is the Commander, United Nations Command / Combined Forces Command / United States Forces Korea. He most recently served as the Director, Joint Staff. Prior to his tour with the Joint Staff, General Scaparrotti served as Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces – Afghanistan, the Commanding General of I Corps and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division.

In addition, General Scaparrotti has served in key leadership positions at the tactical, operational, and strategic level of the United States military to include Director of Operations, United States Central Command and as the 69th Commandant of Cadets at the United States Military Academy. He has commanded forces during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan), SUPPORT HOPE (Zaire/Rwanda), JOINT ENDEAVOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina), and ASSURED RESPONSE (Liberia).

His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Command and General Staff College, and the United States Army War College. He holds a Master's Degree in Administrative Education from the University of South Carolina.

His awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, and the Army Meritorious Service Medal. He has earned the Combat Action Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, and Ranger Tab.

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

April 15, 2015

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Admiral LOCKLEAR. The solutions to many of the "grey zone" challenges in the region are not military in nature. As I stated during my testimony, the military needs enough persistent, deep-look ISR assets to better understand the activity in the region; however, the solutions to such challenges largely reside in other areas of government. Diplomacy, not aggression, is the regional trend and still the best course of action. PACOM, together with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State, are working with our allies and partners in the region to create multilateral mechanisms to maintain peace and security in the region. One positive example of a multilateral effort that deserves continuing U.S. support is ASEAN's role in addressing common security concerns and non-traditional threats. ASEAN is doing this through confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy, and its leadership on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the development of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. [See page 17.]

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Regional governments largely acknowledge the threat from ISIL and the potential return of Foreign Terrorist Fighters. In response, several countries have either passed new Counter-Terrorism (CT) legislation or reinterpreted existing legislation to hinder Foreign Terrorist Fighters activities. Some efforts are underway to impact on-line recruiting and radicalization activities. There are a variety of partnering opportunities in the region available to counter ISIL. Most have been built over the past decade as nations have worked diligently—individually and collectively—to address the problem of violent extremism. These have been strengthened and reinforced since the rise of the ISIL threat. Regional organizations like ASEAN recognize terrorism as a top concern, and counter-terrorism cooperation is a component of most of our bilateral relationships. [See page 22.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

Admiral LOCKLEAR. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has approximately 1,900 land-based cruise and ballistic missiles. Of these, about 1,540 have ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers in range. [See page 22.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

Secretary WORMUTH. Regarding specific NDAA language proposals on streamlining the acquisition process and on improving the handling of contract award bid protests, I defer to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Mr. Frank Kendall. From a policy standpoint however, I share your concern that DOD needs a faster, more efficient, and more responsive acquisition process in order to retain our competitive technological edge and bring critical capabilities to our forces. This is the goal of DOD's Better Buying Power 3.0 program, announced in 2015. This program is intended to implement best practices to strengthen DOD's buying power, achieve greater efficiencies, and eliminate unproductive processes and bureaucracy, while promoting competition. [See page 26.]

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