[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
REGIONAL IMPACT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ AND SYRIA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 30, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-33
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
TOM EMMER, Minnesota
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina GRACE MENG, New York
TED S. YOHO, Florida LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Seth G. Jones, Ph.D., director, International Security and
Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation........................ 6
General Jack Keane, USA, Retired, chairman of the board,
Institute for the Study of War................................. 24
Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D., director, Center for Middle East
Policy at Brookings............................................ 38
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Seth G. Jones, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 9
General Jack Keane, USA, Retired: Prepared statement............. 27
Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................. 40
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 66
Hearing minutes.................................................. 67
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 68
REGIONAL IMPACT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ AND SYRIA
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THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 o'clock a.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
I will first recognize Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes
each for our opening statements. I will then recognize other
members seeking recognition for 1 minute and thank you for my
Cuban coffee.
And there are so many subcommittees and full committees
taking place right now because tomorrow, Friday, we will be on
a district work period, so everybody is cramming their work in.
So Ted Deutch is in an actual voting marathon in Judiciary
but will come over here in a minute, and then Lois Frankel has
Transportation--a committee that she has to go to.
But we will then hear from our witnesses and without
objection, the witnesses' prepared statements will be made a
part of the record. Members may have 5 days to insert
statements and questions for the record subject to the length
limitation in the rules.
And I am going to take this a little bit out of order today
because I know Congressman Deutch has to get back to votes in
Judiciary.
I would like to recognize him first so that you can get on
with your business, Congressman Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
I apologize to the panel. We have votes and close votes at
that. So I am going to be running back and forth.
Thanks very much for providing us the opportunity to
examine how current U.S. strategy in Iraq and Syria is
impacting the rest of this vulnerable region and thanks to our
distinguished witnesses for being here today.
This is one of a dozen or so hearings that we have had on
Syria, Iraq or ISIS in the past couple of years and each time
we convene to address the conflict as a whole or specific
aspects I am struck by what I am concerned is a general lack of
strategy when it comes to ending the Syrian civil war.
I applaud the President's willingness to take action
against ISIS and we are seeing some successes from that air
campaign in Iraq, and I support our efforts to train and equip
the moderate Syrian opposition.
But I do believe that we waited too long to get that
program off the ground in a meaningful way. The opposition has
fractured over and over again and the Syrian people are being
forced to choose to align with those who can simply provide
them the greatest protection.
With most of our efforts focused on ISIS' brutality, we
seem to have left out a very critical piece of the puzzle. This
conflict will not end unless Assad is no longer in power.
The suggestion that Assad is part of any solution or that
he is a protector against ISIS is, quite frankly, ridiculous.
This is a regime that has been responsible for the deaths of
thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of Syrians.
This is a regime that has abandoned its people, trapping
them in besieged areas without access to food and basic
humanitarian needs. This is a regime that has resorted to the
most barbaric torture, dropped barrel bombs on its people and
used chemical weapons against its own citizens.
And frankly, when we talk to our allies in the region, we
are often met with confusion and frustration over, some
believe, a lack of strategy for Syria. The chaos that has spun
out from the Syrian conflict is having a devastating impact on
the region.
The humanitarian crisis alone is threatening the stability
of critical states like Jordan and Lebanon. This conflict will
change the makeup of the region for decades to come.
Even if Syria was solved tomorrow it would take years
before refugees and displaced persons could return to their
homes and we have to make sure that the people of Syria know
that the United States stands with them and that they do not
believe that the coalition is acting on behalf of Assad or as
Assad's air force.
And we can do that by continuing to support the opposition
including the consideration of buffer zones. The United States
must think holistically about what the impact of Assad
remaining in power could have on the region. A direct
consequence would be the emboldening of Iran.
Assad in power preserves Iran's lifeline to Hezbollah, and
a report just this week estimated that Iran is spending $1
billion to $2 billion a month supporting Assad and Hezbollah in
Syria.
Our efforts to combat ISIS in Iraq have resulted in
moderate gains. The Abadi government seems to be willing to
correct the years of weak and exclusive governance left--that
left western Iraq susceptible to ISIS. Do our allies fear the
U.S. will cooperate with Iran against ISIS in Iraq?
Expanded Iranian influence in Iraq could have a devastating
effect on our efforts to support the Abadi government and
encourage inclusive governing.
If Shi'ite militias are seen as receiving the backing of
the Government of the United States, that could alienate Sunni
tribes. And as we deal directly with Iraq and Syria we need to
support our regional partners to defend their own countries
against ISIS growth.
There are extremist groups in nearly every Middle Eastern
nation who have declared allegiance to ISIS. That is why I was
pleased to join the chairman in co-sponsoring legislation that
would ensure the Kingdom of Jordan receive the assistance that
it needs to maintain security and stability. We must also push
to strengthen efforts to stem the flow of foreign fighters into
Syria and Iraq.
ISIS' spread into North Africa, particularly in lawless
Libya, has given the group new territory in which to train,
recruit and attack as we, unfortunately, saw with the brutal
attacks on Egyptian Christians.
How long can coalition strikes against ISIS continue? Will
our Arab partners, who are vital to efforts to send a message
that this is not just an American fight, continue to support
our efforts if they feel that we are jeopardizing regional
security on other fronts?
Because, not surprisingly, our allies are not just
concerned about the spread of ISIS' influence. Perhaps most
concerning at this particular moment in time to our partners is
the potential for expanded Iranian influence.
What security guarantees can the United States provide to
the Gulf States and to Israel? What do Iranian proxies like
Hezbollah or even Hamas, which appears to have mended its
relationship with the Ayatollah, look like with even greater
Iranian financial support?
Or what do groups that are simply in Iran's orbit like the
Houthis in Yemen look like with greater financial support and
what continued action does this spur from the Saudis and other
G-16 nations to counteract this threat?
Madam Chairman, we have been talking about ending the
Syrian for 4 years. If there is no military solution to this
conflict, how can we move a political solution forward,
particularly without the Russians or Iranians?
I look to our panel today to help us understand how these
conflicts might play out in the coming months and years and
what effect U.S. policy can have on reaching a positive
outcome.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. Thank
you and we look forward to seeing you scoot in and out. And
thank you, Mr. Higgins, for joining us as well.
The Chair now recognizes herself for her opening statement.
In the Middle East, many times events in one country have a
profound impact in other countries in the region.
In 2009, President Obama failed to support the protests
that had erupted throughout Iran, an opportunity that could
have turned the tide in Iran and the entire landscape of the
Middle East.
In late December 2010, a Tunisian street vendor set himself
on fire to protest abuse by State officials. This act
ultimately sparked the Arab Spring with similar large-scale
protests spreading to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria in
early 2011.
In Libya and Syria, both Ghadafi and Assad resisted any
calls for democracy or reform and in fact responded to the
protest with violence and bloodshed. However, the U.S.
responses in Syria and Libya were markedly different from each
other.
Whereas in Libya the U.S. responded with cutting ties with
Ghadafi, sanctioning members of his regime and led the push for
the U.N. to authorize military intervention in the conflict,
that was not the case with Syria.
Then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called Assad ``a
reformer,'' and that was rather ludicrous. The death toll is
now over 220,000 in Syria. But if this guy is who we thought
would be a reformer, well, we did not really assess that
situation correctly.
The U.S. refused to take any action against Assad and even
after Assad crossed President Obama's chemical weapons red
line, and has done so repeatedly, the United States did not
respond with military force in Syria like we had done in Libya.
The decision to not act on the red line caused a large
ripple effect throughout the Middle East and beyond, as our
adversaries saw that we don't have the courage of our
convictions to act and our allies saw that we can't be trusted
to act and question our resolve.
Even in Libya where we did initially act, the
administration failed to ensure stability and now Libya is
fractured and has become a breeding ground for radicalism as
extremists from Libya flock to join ISIL, al-Nusra and other
terror groups.
This mirrors the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal of our
troops from Iraq in 2011, leaving a void that Iran was more
than happy to fill, allowing the regime to gain more and more
influence over Baghdad and Maliki.
So the United States' decision to not get involved in Syria
immediately and to withdraw our troops from Iraq in 2011 played
a large role in facilitating the rise of ISIL and the spread
from Syria to Iraq.
But I am not part of what Jeane Kirkpatrick called the
``blame America first'' crowd. The responsibility is with ISIL
and all of these terror groups and not of the United States.
But the rise of ISIL has exacerbated the humanitarian
crisis that we have seen in Iraq and Syria. Millions have left.
Hundreds of thousands have been murdered.
Religious minorities have been targeted for extinction and
nearly every country in the region has felt the impact of the
terror of ISIL.
The crisis in Iraq and Syria is a cancer and it is quickly
metastasizing and spreading throughout the region. In Jordan,
the Kingdom is feeling the burden to try and take care of the
Syrian refugees and to protect its own borders.
In Lebanon, there are over 1 million registered Syrian
refugees and the fighting between Hezbollah and the Lebanese
Armed Forces has caused instability in the Golan Heights, which
poses a security threat to the democratic Jewish State of
Israel.
In Saudi Arabia, an attack against our embassy in Riyadh
was foiled when nearly 100 individuals were arrested this week,
all alleged affiliates of ISIL.
This is why the administration needs a drastic reassessment
of our policies. We have got an Iran that remains unchecked in
Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon and in Yemen.
We have ISIL and al-Qaeda resurgent. Assad remains in Syria
and the sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shi'a is as bad
now as any time in recent history. Many questions remain about
the Syrian train and equip program, the size and the scope of
the mission.
The program isn't even up and running yet. By the time the
program finishes, it could be too late and the situation in the
region could be worse.
Many issues remain regarding the proposed authorization for
use of military force, the AUMF, that the administration has
sent to Congress, not least of which is the failure to address
Assad, al-Nusra and other terror groups in Iraq and Syria.
The administration has failed to develop a comprehensive
strategy to address all of the threats in Iraq and Syria. But
until we do, the situation is only going to get worse and we
will be faced with even tougher decisions down the road.
And at this time I would like to recognize our members for
any opening statements they would like to make. Ms. Frankel, my
Florida colleague.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, and Madam Chair, I just want to say
you so enjoy--you have the--sort of the most diplomatic and
kindest way of putting some things that I may not agree with.
But we should learn from you.
Look, I just--and I enjoyed listening to your remarks. I
think that this is a very complicated situation and I think
from my own--my constituents the big concern is just even if we
just look at recent history is somehow we take action--our
country takes action--military action.
We are well intended but the action seems to fail. And I
will go a little bit further back, Madam Chair, to 2003 when we
sent troops into Iraq and we toppled Saddam Hussein and I think
there are some who would argue that that actually helped give
rise to Iran increasing its power in the region and perhaps the
fighting or the new government not being inclusive may have
something to do with giving rise to ISIL.
I think there are factors that are a lot more complicated.
So I actually will listen very intently to what you all have to
say and I thank you for being here.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, and I think I should say thank
you--I am not quite sure. Thank you, Lois.
Mr. Higgins of New York.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair. I will be brief.
I just, you know, talk about this region of the world, it
is marked by instability for a long time and U.S. intervention
in that part of the world is complicated because where there is
no political center there are only sides, and taking sides or
being perceived to take a side has major political consequences
as well.
So when we talk about this part of the region, you know,
revisionist history is not helpful because there is a lot of
gray area. There is a lot of nuance.
It is not black and white and to be strategic and to be
smart and to use your resources as best you can but to also
require that regional players also participate fully and don't
play the United States as they historically have in Iraq and in
other places.
Syria, clearly, is a mess--clearly, is a mess. And, you
know, some people wanted us to believe that if we just
supported the free Syrian army that we would be supporting the
good guys against the bad guys.
But, again, when you look beyond the surface it is so much
more complicated than that with so many militias and Islamic
extremists that even as bad as Bashir al-Assad is, the
alternatives, you know, throughout that continuum could in fact
be worse, given the history of those groups as well.
So with that, we have a distinguished group of panelists
and I look forward to the testimony. I will yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Higgins and Ms.
Frankel.
And so now I am pleased to introduce our distinguished
panel. We welcome back Dr. Seth Jones. He is a director of the
International Security and Defense Policy at the RAND
Corporation.
He is an adjunct professor at the School of Advanced
International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and has
served in an advisory capacity to several operational commands
in the Department of Defense.
Second, we welcome back General Jack Keane, who is chairman
of the Institute for the Study of War. The general has served
in the United States Army for 37 years, rising to the post of
Army vice chief of staff.
He has served as a combat veteran in Vietnam, as has my
husband. Also has served in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo
and has commanded the prestigious 18th Airborne Corps and the
decorated 101st Airborne Division.
Thank you, General, for being with us this morning and
thank you for your distinguished service to our country. You
are a true hero.
And last but certainly not least, I would like to welcome
Dr. Tamara Cofman Wittes. Help me out. Wittes. Wittes. Just as
it--yes, Wittes. She is a senior fellow and the director of the
Saban Center for Middle East policy at Brookings.
Dr. Wittes served as deputy assistant secretary of state
for Near Eastern affairs from November 2009 to January 2012 and
we welcome you back. Thank you.
We will begin with you, Dr. Jones.
STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, PH.D., DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Jones. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking
Member Deutch and distinguished members of the committee, and
thanks to the other members here. We have got a distinguished
group.
I am going to divide my comments into two sections. The
first will provide an overview of Iraq and Syrian and the
broader regional context, and the second will get into some
recommendations--some preliminary recommendations.
Let me begin with the wars as they stand right now. I think
one of the--one of the challenges right now is both the media
and some administration and other officials try to deal with
them almost separately and in fact they are quite intertwined.
And we will see in my comments, it is generally a mistake to
treat them even sequentially.
In Iraq right now, the United States remains engaged in a
counter insurgency campaign against Da'ish, also referred to as
ISIL or ISIS, and its allies.
It has lost some ground recently, including in Tikrit, but
it does still have substantial territory, particularly in the
predominantly Sunni areas of Anbar, Salahadin and Nineveh. It
also continues to fund itself through activities like smuggling
oil, selling stolen goods, kidnapping, seizing bank accounts
and the smuggling of antiquities.
In Syria, the U.S. is somewhat involved in the insurgency
campaign. It has provided limited support to rebels, which I
will come back to in a little bit through the train and equip
program.
But U.S. air strikes have been insufficient to seriously
degrade Da'ish in Syria. More recently, there has been a surge
of rebel activity and I wanted to highlight with our focus so
much on Da'ish or ISIL in Syria.
One of the groups that has clearly benefited from the gains
in rebel activity is the al-Qaeda affiliated Nusra Front. It
probably has more fighters, more money and more territory than
at any time since its creation.
In 2011, it retains a stronghold in northwestern Syrian
areas like in Idlib. So I want to highlight my concerns with
the al-Qaeda affiliate now in Syria and the gains that it has
made.
There, obviously, are differences between Syria and Iraq
but I think as you look at the way the wars have transpired, we
have a range of issues. The movement of extremist groups and
criminal networks operating on both sides of the border are
moving back and forth.
The role of or the use of Turkey as a--Turkish territory as
a pipeline for groups coming into the region and then,
obviously, Irani involvement in both wars as being just three
examples of how intertwined those wars are.
U.S. and allied efforts, obviously, need to consider a
range of issues including efforts to undermine the ideology of
extremist groups, to target key leaders, to build partner
capacity, to engage in political dialogue including Iraq and
other steps.
But I am going to focus my remaining comments on three
issues. The first is interdiction efforts in Turkey and other
neighboring states. Turkey, in particular, has taken some steps
to crack down on foreign fighter flows.
It has added, for example, thousands of names to its banned
from entry list into Turkey. But, in my view, these steps are
still not sufficient. Turkey remains the most important
pipeline for foreign extremists coming into both Iraq and Syria
contexts.
As I--as I provide more material in the written testimony,
there are a number of useful examples since World War II of
successful efforts to crack down on border interdiction.
So I think there are useful lessons, again for aerial-
ground maritime surveillance, strengthening capacity and
resources of border security personnel, et cetera that are
still worth pursuing in Turkey.
The second issue is the train and equip program. In my
view, the U.S., including Congress, should put a pause on this
program. I am concerned for several reasons.
First, it seems to me it makes little sense to expend U.S.
financial, diplomatic, military and other resources without a
long-term strategy and a desire to end-state in Syria. The U.S.
needs to first agree on a long-term strategy and then design a
train and equip program to achieve that end state.
In addition, I think it is also problematic to train Syrian
rebels to counter Da'ish, or the Islamic State, and not what
virtually all rebels are trying to do, which is--which is to
end the Assad regime that has used chemical weapons on its own
population.
And then, finally, it strikes me also as problematic that
the train and equip program, the way it is set up right now, at
least as I understand it is to train, advise and assist local
security forces outside of Syria and then to not have on the
ground training in Syria itself.
Virtually every successful effort that I have seen or have
been involved in myself--Philippines, Colombia, a number of
other places--have required on the ground training. It provides
a way of giving them hands-on capacity as well as understanding
how they are actually being used.
So for those reasons and many others, I would--I would
strongly urge taking a pause to this program until some of
these issues get settled out.
And then finally, let me just say on the AUMF, in my view,
Congress should most likely pass an AUMF that is an omnibus,
and we can talk about the details. I lay it out in the
testimony.
No geographical limitations, in a sense, but that get into
issues of threat, a fairly broad definition of groups--happy to
give you more specifics--specified purposes for which military
forces for which military forces may be used, a requirement to
report to Congress and then, finally, a renewal clause.
So let me just conclude by saying the biggest issue and the
biggest challenge we have in Iraq and Syria is this war is
spreading. It is spreading into West Africa, East Africa, North
Africa.
We see Da'ish and the Islamic State rising in South Asia.
We have seen arrests now in the Pacific Rim. If we do not begin
to get more of a handle on it, we are going to see this spread
across multiple regions, including outside of this committee's
jurisdictions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
General Keane.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JACK KEANE, USA, RETIRED, CHAIRMAN OF THE
BOARD, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR
General Keane. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member
Deutch, distinguished members of the committee for inviting me
back to testify. I am honored to be with such a distinguished
panel today.
Attached to my written testimony are three maps that are
prepared by ISW for your reference, and let me just correct
something in your statement, Madam Chairman. I am a Vietnam but
I did--my troops served in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia.
In my judgements, it is indisputable that U.S. policy
failures in Iraq and Syria enabled Iranian expansion in the
Middle East, enabled ISIS to reemerge, establish a sanctuary in
Syria, expand into Iraq, Egyptian Sinai, North Africa and South
Asia while conducting daily acts of barbarism against humanity
and civilization, enabled the al-Qaeda, particularly Jabhat al-
Nusra, to expand significantly in Syria to include the Khorasan
Group, which has committed to out-of-region attacks against the
United States and Europe while expanding in north and northeast
Africa, enabled Assad to kill over 220,000 Syrians while
forcing the displacement of over 7 million people from their
homes, a humanitarian catastrophe, as the Syrian nation is
systematically destroyed, which is an accelerant for jihadist
groups regionally and globally.
One cannot simply blame the underlying factors that exist
in the region and absolve the United States of specific policy
decisions that have unintended adverse consequences. The facts
are the following on Iraq.
By 2009, the Sunni insurgency supported by al-Qaeda and
Iranian-backed Shi'a militias and others were defeated.
However, beginning in 2009,the new administration begins to
pull away from Iraq politically. Iran regains influence.
In 2010, Maliki loses the election by one vote. But instead
of helping his preferred opponent, Allawi, to form a new
government, the United States inexplicably backs Maliki.
In 2011, the U.S. pulls out all troops. The al-Qaeda in
Iraq reemerges as ISIS. In Syria, the Arab Spring reaches Syria
in 2011. Despite Assad's obvious military advantage, the
opposition is succeeding. Many predict the regime will fall as
the opposition seeks additional ammunition and weapons to fight
the regime.
While the President calls for Assad to go, he surprisingly
refuses the opposition request. Iran begins daily flights of
supplies and ammunition plus the commitment of Quds Force
advisors to include Qasem Soleimani.
Iran deploys its proxies, 5,000 Hezbollah from Lebanon and
at its peak 20,000 Iraqi Shi'a militia. The momentum shifts to
Assad's favor. The al-Qaeda recognizes the opportunity and
moves in, and ISIS in 2012 deploys from Iraq to northeastern
Syria to establish a sanctuary.
To avoid a regional spillover war, which we certainly have
now, Clinton, Panetta, Dempsey, CIA Director Petraeus make a
formal recommendation to arm the opposition in the summer of
2012.
The President refuses again. The killing continues. Assad,
in 2013, as you pointed out, Madam Chairman, uses CW--chemical
weapons--and cross the U.S. red line. But still the President
does not act.
ISIS invades Iraq in 2014. The Maliki government requests
assistance. The President refuses. Iran begins immediate
assistance--Quds Force advisors, Qasem Soleimani, daily flights
of supplies and ammunition.
In 2014 Mosul falls. The Maliki government, again, requests
air power and the President refuses. Not until August, some 8
months after the ISIS invasion, does the United States respond.
Despite ISIS' recent setbacks in Iraq, as you can see on
the ISIS sanctuary map, it still holds considerable territory
and influence in Iraq and remains on offense today while it has
expanded its territorial control and influence in Syria.
Moreover, it has expanded its influence in what is called
the near abroad, as you can see on the global rings map. Its
affiliates, or wilayats, are expanding as ISIS is rapidly
becoming the new face of radical Islam and competing with al-
Qaeda for control and influence. Those are the black stars on
that map.
What about the U.S. strategy? In Iraq, we are taking less
than half measures to assist the Iraqi security forces, the
Kurds and the Sunni tribes, which stretches out the time to
defeat ISIS as casualties mount.
In Syrian, there are no plans to defeat ISIS. To do so
requires an effective ground forces supported by air power.
There is none. U.S. policy is fundamentally inadequate to
defeat ISIS.
As to Assad, he must go. Allowing Assad to continue his
genocide sows the seeds for generational regional disorder and
empowers expansionist Iran. As to Iran, the United States has
no strategy to stop the regional hegemonic aspirations of the
Iranian regime. On the contrary, the U.S. is desperately and
naively, in my judgment, moving to accommodate Iran on a
nuclear deal that Iran's aggressive behavior will change as it
supposedly joins the community of nations.
In conclusion, the appalling lack of a comprehensive and
coherent strategy to defeat radical Islam 22 years after the
first attack on the World Trade center and almost 14 years
after 9/11 is a generational policy failure.
To date, we don't define radical Islam. We don't explain
it. We don't try to understand its appeal. We don't counter and
undermine the ideology, which is grounded in a religious belief
system.
This is a regional problem become a global problem and the
countries who have a vested interest in defeating radical Islam
should join together in an alliance to develop a comprehensive
strategy.
The balance of power in the Middle East is shifting against
the United States' regional interest and against the United
States' security.
There is much that can be accomplished with our allies to
include a Syrian strategy but the reality is American power is
considered and our credibility is at an all-time low.
There are no simple answers or solutions. But without
strong U.S. leadership, our adversaries will continue to be
emboldened. Our friends, out of fear, are susceptible to poor
decisions while the Middle East region and the world becomes a
more dangerous place.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, General.
Dr. Wittes.
STATEMENT OF TAMARA COFMAN WITTES, PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
MIDDLE EAST POLICY AT BROOKINGS
Ms. Wittes. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking
Member Deutch, members of the committee. I appreciate the
invitation. I must emphasize, as always, that I represent only
myself. Brookings does not take any institutional positions on
policy issues.
The Middle East is disordered more today than in perhaps a
half century and ISIS is only a symptom of this underlying
breakdown in regional order.
The upheaval in the region has likewise generated newly
assertive regional powers like Turkey, new opportunities for
longstanding troublemakers like Iran and Hezbollah, and
sometimes bitter disputes between Arab States.
Of course, this disorder is itself the product, the same
long-building pressures that generated the Arab Spring. Iraq
and Syria may be our focus today, but marginalizing extremist
movements like ISIS demands attention to other weak and fragile
states in the region.
It is no accident that Syria and Libya are the most
disordered and violent parts of the region today because these
are the places where leaders, having failed to govern in a
manner that could have prevented mass dissent, then sought to
repress their people through the use of force.
These brutal power-hungry shortsighted men broke their
crumbling states to bits and drove their societies to civil war
and it is the terrible choices of these terrible leaders more
than anything else that created the openings that al-Qaeda,
ISIS and other sectarian killers across the region now exploit.
The roots of the region's upending in this fraying and
broken social contract remind us that ISIS is not the cause of
today's disorder and it is not the disease.
The broken state-society relationship is what must be
addressed if the region is to return to some form of stability.
This means that whatever the United States does militarily in
Iraq and Syria we must focus our strategy on the politics.
In Iraq, the government has given non-state militias, some
under Iranian influence, a large role in the fight in ways that
have exacerbated Sunni anxieties and made the fight against
ISIS harder.
That said, the operation in Tikrit last month in which
Iranian-supported militias failed and the Iraqi Government
relied on American air support for victory, showed the limits
of Iranian influence.
The U.S. strategy rightly has the Iraqi Government own
responsibility for its own choices in this battle for its
territory and the hearts and minds of its people.
This strategy ultimately stands or falls on Iraqi Prime
Minister Abadi's ability to move forward with the kind of
political and security steps that will build the confidence of
Iraq Sunnis in the Iraqi state.
In Syria, as we have been discussing, U.S. efforts to equip
and train cooperative Syrian opposition forces will take more
than a year, perhaps more than two, to have any meaningful
battlefield impact, and meanwhile a coalition of more extremist
Islamist groups is successfully routing Syrian military forces
in Idlib Province.
So the question is what will follow the withdrawal of
Assad's forces--extremist rule or civil administration?
The U.S. must urgently focus on working with its allies and
with Syrian opposition forces on the ground to shape the
situation so as to advance the latter.
Let me talk about our partners in the region. The fall of
Mosul last June brought a momentary unity between American
priorities and those of our traditional regional partners and
allowed the establishment of this anti-ISIS coalition. But it
is a thin coalition and it has been from the start.
Today, Saudi Arabia and others seem to prioritize the
Iranian threat over the threat from ISIS and the military
operation in Yemen is evidence for this.
The reassurance that our partners are looking for is to see
the United States demonstrate its recognition and its readiness
to push back against Iran's destabilizing activities around the
region, and the primary arena in which Arab states wish to see
that from the U.S. is in Syria.
So efforts to help expose and push back against those
Iranian behaviors should be a key element of America's policies
in the coming months, and I would say that is true regardless
of the outcome of the nuclear talks because I think that
Iranian behavior will continue regardless of the outcome of the
nuclear talks.
In addition, the United States must attend to the political
components of its policy in Iraq and Syria to ensure that
territory and people liberated from ISIS or from Assad find
reliable security from a responsible civil administration, not
rough justice from extremist militias whether Sunni or Shi'a.
Finally, the United States must address the underlying
vulnerabilities that produced this upheaval and gave space for
ISIS across the region.
We must devote greater attention to supporting governments
like Tunisia, who are using political compromise instead of
violence to resolve disputes.
We should help local partners forge meaningful governance,
not just a security presence, in ungoverned spaces like the
Sinai.
Ultimately, building resilient societies that can
marginalize extremists requires governments that can win
citizens' trust and loyalty and it requires systems that can
offer young people meaningful opportunities to fulfill their
long-denied dreams so that they don't place their hopes in a
world after this one.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Wittes follows:]
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----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much to all of our
panelists and I will recognize myself for the first round of
questions.
Despite the clear and vocal calls for a comprehensive
strategy, a U.S. policy in Iraq and in Syria, the
administration continues to treat the conflicts as separate or
at least as situations that should be dealt with one at a time,
and this is either a fundamental misunderstanding of the issues
at hand or willful ignorance due to a political calculation,
namely, the administration's misguided and naive nuclear
negotiations with Iran.
It must acknowledge that air strikes alone will not be
sufficient to defeat ISIL in either Iraq or in Syria, that
Assad must be removed from power and that Iran, even if it is
the enemy of our enemy, is still an enemy.
In a hearing yesterday, former Ambassador to Syria Robert
Ford testified that if the United States allies with Iran, we
are playing into ISIL's narrative and helping in its
recruitment.
So I ask the panelists do you believe that we are
cooperating with Iran directly or indirectly against ISIL and,
if so, is this helpful to our national security interests?
Dr. Jones, then General Keane--whoever wants to tackle
this.
Mr. Jones. Sure. I will start.
Look, I think in particular in Iraq there is and there are
areas where the U.S. has worked with Iranian-backed militia
organizations in various areas. The campaign has involved a
complex set of state governments including Iraq as well as sub-
state actors, Kurds, but also Iranian-backed Shi'a militias.
So I think the answer to your question is yes, the U.S. has
cooperated somewhat with Iran, particular at the substrate
level. There have been discussions as well about the political
issues, Sunni-Shi'a issues with the--with the Iraqi Government
that Iran has been involved in.
I think, ultimately, the U.S. is in a very complicated
position here but I do agree with your comments that a strong
allied relationship with Iran, if that is the direction we go
in, would be very counterproductive and would certainly walk
into an anti--would certainly help with the ISIL narrative.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Jones. It is exactly what they are saying.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. General?
General Keane. I agree with the doctor about Iraq's level
and repeat it. But in Syria, I think, really, the elephant in
the room in Syria with the administration's reluctance to
provide assistance to the Free Syrian Army despite a very
credible and experienced national security team that
recommended that, as I pointed out in my testimony, I think is
Iran.
It is the elephant in the room in the sense that we have
been, because the nuclear talks and establishing a deal, I
think, is the unstated foreign policy major objective of the
administration.
It has handcuffed our ability to do what we should have
done in Syria because of a potential setback from the Iranians.
So de facto our policy decisions in Syria have certainly helped
Iran bona fide establish a client state with Syria, contributes
to their expansionist policies and certainly encourages them to
do what they are doing right now in Yemen, which if they are
able to achieve what they want to achieve in Yemen--political
and military control in Yemen--then they change the strategic
balance of power in the region by gaining control of a
strategic waterway at the Gulf of Aden at the straits of Bab-
el-Mandeb and affect and control and leverage shipping that
comes in and out of the Suez Canal--a major objective for the
Iranians that they would not have thought of without the
progress that they have made in Syria.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Doctor?
Ms. Wittes. Thank you.
You know, I think part of the challenge is that our
regional partners who are absolutely necessary to any
successful outcome in Syria have until very recently been
pretty divided themselves on the question of what should follow
Assad and what kind of political order they would see as a
desirable end state, and in many ways their elevation of the
Iranian threat above the threat of ISIS, above the threat of
political Islam, is a product of just the last year or so.
But up until recently, different Arab states were
supporting different factions in the Syrian opposition and I
think that vastly complicated any ability we had to forge unity
among them.
Now, there might well have been a time early in the Syrian
conflict when a more forward-leaning American policy would have
created that unified front. But I think we are long past that
now, unfortunately.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
I have other questions but I will wait for the next round.
Mr. Deutch, our ranking member.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
The Iranian foreign minister was on American television
last night and was talking--when asked about Iranian influence
in the region and the way that it is perceived pushed back
against the argument that anyone could perceive what is
happening now in any part of the region as a Shi'a-Sunni
conflict--that there is absolutely nothing to that.
I would like to hear from our panelists a response to that
and if you disagree with that assertion what role, ultimately,
can the United States play if his assertion is wrong and it is
indeed perceived that way among our allies and those who are
not?
Mr. Jones. Chair, I will start.
I think we are often prone to gross generalizations about
the state of sectarianism. Being recently, for example, in
Djibouti and looking closely at the situation in Yemen, one can
easily gravitate to an argument that this is a Saudi--because
they have been involved--Iran proxy war.
But the reality when you get onto the ground into Yemen and
look at it is there are a range of tribal politics involved.
The Houthis have been battling Saudi Arabia for a long
time. They are not an arm of the Iranian Government. They do
get some assistance.
So I would say the answer to your question is there is,
clearly, an Iranian grand strategy for the Middle East, for
North and East Africa and other locations that as caused them
to provide assistance to some groups and not others--some
governments and not others.
But when you actually look on the ground, whether it is
Syria or Iraq or Yemen or take your pick, I mean, I think we do
have to understand that we are also bringing in the very
localized elements of the dispute.
So I would say that there is a combination of both local
and these grand strategic issues that is going on in all the
conflicts we are talking about here.
General Keane. I agree. I mean, one of the things that
happens when you look at this region, because of the
sectarianism that has been there historically, that we have a
tendency to throw that out as the underlying cause for all the
problems we are having.
It certainly is a contributor but there has been a lot of
peace between these sectarian groups as well. Iranians--I mean,
I, clearly, think this is a geopolitical strategy of theirs to
dominate the region, to influence and dominate Shi'a countries
as well as Sunni countries and I believe that is what is
driving them.
Like other radical Islamists, they will take advantage and
manipulate this sectarian divide as much as they can to their
own geopolitical ends.
Mr. Deutch. Ms. Wittes.
Ms. Wittes. I think both sides of this regional power
struggle, and I would agree it is a regional power struggle,
have found a sectarian narrative useful.
It helps them rally around the flag, it helps them mobilize
allies and, unfortunately, they have fed off of one another
repeatedly whether it is Bahrain or in Yemen or in Syria.
Once that narrative takes hold and is advanced by one side
the other side ups the ante, and we have seen this in the
regional media. It has been quite vicious and nasty.
But I think that the problem with just looking at it
through that lens is that it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy
at a certain point, just as we saw in the Balkans in the 1990s.
At a certain point, when people have lost the ability to
find security through the state or through the government, they
are going to fall back on community identifies and if everybody
around them is choosing friend or foe according to sectarian
identity they will be forced to do that, too.
So the reality for Syrians, sadly, today I think is a
reality of sectarian conflict. It didn't have to be that way
but that is where we are.
Mr. Deutch. And so then where should it go and,
specifically, to your--the point you made about young people
who, particularly those in their teens, early 20s, who have now
endured 4 years of this, many of them displaced or refugees,
what is the message from the United States, going forward?
What do they need to see to counter their understandable--
as you put it, their understandable decision in many instances
to just fall back into tribal affiliation?
Ms. Wittes. Yes, I think in the Iraqi case there is a
fierce debate going on and an effort to try and demonstrate
that there is space within Iraqi politics and the Iraqi state
for all of Iraq's people.
I don't know whether the angels will win that argument. I
certainly hope so, and I think, by the way, that both Iran and
our Sunni Arab partners, have important roles to play in
helping to stabilize Iraq by making sure those decisions on
behalf of political inclusion, like establishing a national
guard, move forward.
Syria, I think, is much harder because the conflict is so
severe because half the population has been displaced.
But as part of what we need to do, whatever the political
architecture, we need to generate within society over the long
term the ability to build dialogue, to build intercommunal
dialogue, to build mechanisms for conflict resolution so that
while those tensions will always be there, they don't erupt
into violence.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch.
And now another Florida colleague, Mr. Clawson, of a great
state.
Mr. Clawson. Thank you to the gentlelady for doing this
committee hearing. I think it is great to have knowledgeable
folks and let us shed some sunlight on complicated topics, and
that takes time and too often up here we don't have enough
time. So thank you, Congresswoman, for doing this.
It seems to me that our objectives out to be--if they are
not they ought to be, number one, protect Israel in this
region, number two, to counterbalance I think what you call
this grand--I don't remember the exact rhetoric you just used--
grand Iranian strategies.
Is that right? And so, at least from my seat, it seems like
those are the two things that we ought to be trying to do.
Having said that then, I have the following observations
then you all could react to. Number one, it feels like we are
talking too much to the wrong people and not enough to the
right people and not enough allegiance is going on--you know,
alliances going on with good friends that might be able to band
together and do something about this instead of talking to the
bad guy.
It just feels like strategically I don't know who I am
doing a joint venture with here--what is going on, number one.
Number two, it feels like as the region gets more dangerous,
that you all point out, why are we not giving more military
assistance to Israel. It feels like an obvious question.
Number three, why do we want more nukes in the region as it
becomes less volatile, and number four, you know, I voted no on
the Syrian involvement last year.
It felt like if we didn't have a grand strategy to
counterbalance this Iranian grand strategy, as you all call it,
the isolated pinpricks just throw gasoline on the fire. It is
hard to manage from halfway around the world with people we
don't trust and don't really know very well and it just makes
the situation worse.
So while I am all for spending more military dollars to get
ready for a coming crisis, I don't consider myself an
isolationist because I don't like, you know, these isolated
actions that aren't linked together and seem to take us
nowhere.
So I have given you four observations there. There is three
of you. If each one of you take one, we might, you know, might
get somewhere here.
General Keane. Well, I will start. It is a fact that, and I
agree with you, we spend a lot of time talking to our enemies
and not our friends.
When you travel in the region and talk to our allies in the
region, I mean, it is unmistakable that over the last several
years they have lost confidence in us.
We do have a credibility issue with them and it is because
of our policy decisions that I enumerated in the oral statement
as well as the written statement that are driving those
conclusions.
Those are very real, and in a sense it handicaps putting
together the kind of comprehensive strategy that we do need,
one, to deal with the Sunni-based radical Islam, which is a
generational challenge we are facing, and number two, to
counter the Iranians effectively.
I am of the mind that the administration has this thought--
that Iran, being the country it is, a powerful country itself,
has a right to a sphere of influence in the region and as such
we must work with that country to achieve common objectives in
terms of regional objectives.
It does not embrace the 30-plus year history of Iran's
barbarism and proxy wars that it has fought and the killing of
Americans from 1983 all the way to 2008 and puts that aside and
chooses to treat Iran as a country that aspires to be in the
community of nations and therefore tries to influence in moving
in that direction.
I think that naiveness and sophomoric approach to a serious
problem, to be quite frank about it, has so antagonized our
allies in the region that it becomes their number-one issue
with us because they had always believed that the United States
strategically was a counterbalance to Iranian influence in the
region.
Mr. Jones. If I could just pick up on your first point, I
would add one other major U.S. interest and that is to protect
the homeland, and the concern I have, particularly on the
Syrian side, is that, as U.S. intelligence officials have said
publically, that we have two groups--Khorasan out of looser
territory and the Islamic State more kind of inspired but are
plotting or encouraging attacks against the homeland coming
from Syria.
And second, we have the highest percentage of foreign
fighters in the history of jihadist battlefields--the recent
history--coming in particular to Syria to fight, and we don't
have a long-term strategy right now.
We have got a bit of a half measure with the train and
equip program but in my view that is not tied to a long-term
regional--certainly, not a Syrian strategy.
Mr. Clawson. So you would--I think the general and I, you,
then the three of us would be in agreement to go big or don't
go. If the problem is that serious, then either let us not mess
around with it or let us go big and get something done with our
allies.
Mr. Jones. Just to be clear, when you say go big you mean--
--
Mr. Clawson. Big enough to make a difference--to make us
safer.
Ms. Wittes. Perhaps I can weigh in on that component
because I think that--I think it is important to understand the
military tool as one tool in the toolbox but a strategy looks
at how all the tools fit together, right.
And so a good strategy uses military force directly or
indirectly as a means to an end. I think one of the hard
lessons that we have learned over the last decade and a half is
about the limitations of military force.
It can achieve a lot but there are limits on what it can
achieve, especially if it is not in the context of a broader
political strategy.
So as we think about how to push back on Iranian influence
around the region, we can certainly increase--you know, talk
about increasing assistance to our friends and partners in the
region.
I am sure that when the GCC partners come to Washington
later this month some of them--maybe all of them--will have a
shopping list. But I would argue that that is not the most
important thing they are looking for in terms of reassurance
and support from us.
What they are looking for is our willingness to use all of
our policy tools to push back on Iran around the region and I
think in some ways the most important tools we have are
intelligence to expose what we see and what we know about
Iran's activities and cooperation with our regional partners on
the politics and diplomacy.
If we can work diplomatically to resolve some of these
conflicts and grievances, that gives the Iranians much less
room to operate. The upheaval of the last 4 years has given the
Iranians far more opportunities in far more places and we need
to try to shrink that down.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Clawson.
Another Florida colleague, Ms. Frankel.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to thank all the panelists for being here and, of
course, General, for your service to our country. I deeply
appreciate that.
So with that said, I just wanted to say that, General, I
am--I will try to say this as kindly as possible. I am
perplexed of you laying the blame on this administration, first
of all, for what is going on in the Middle East--first of all,
without even commenting on the fact that another administration
took us--military action into Iraq in the first place.
But I want to get past that because I think to blame the
United States of America on what is going on in Iraq, Syria,
Libya, Iran, Yemen and every other place in this world is
ridiculous. I think it is unfair.
And I do have a question, though, and my question is what
role does a corruption of these governments, the oppressiveness
of these governments, the poverty in the country and the lack
of human infrastructure to replace these governments.
How does that affect what is going on? And this is for all
of you.
General Keane. Well, first of all, I didn't blame the
United States for everything that is wrong in the Middle East.
I quite frankly said that our policy decisions enabled these
activities and I think that is an important distinction to
make.
We are--we are contributors to our problem. I mean, it is
conventional wisdom to say that the underlying factors in the
Middle East are the real cause of all of these problems and we
should absolve the United States of any accountability or
responsibility and those underlying factors are the ones that
you are reaching out to, and I certainly understand that.
The region, by and large, is run by repressive regimes.
Almost every one of them has some degree of repression in it.
The fact is the Arab Spring was about people seeking political
and social injustice--reform of political and social injustice
and economic opportunity.
There is political incompetence in the region and a lack of
moral courage to make change. There is historical sectarianism
that is in the region.
But I am also suggesting that something has fundamentally
changed about the United States' role in that region in the
last several years compared to what it has historically been,
and I tried to point out to you those mistakes--those policy
mistakes----
Ms. Frankel. Excuse me. How about the--how about going into
Iraq in the first place? Do you think that was a good decision?
General Keane. I think the decision to go into Iraq based
on the information that was provided this Congress, the U.N.
thought it was the right decision.
Ms. Frankel. Was that a good decision?
General Keane. Yes, at the time----
Ms. Frankel. Oh, it was? Okay.
General Keane [continuing]. Based on what we did.
Ms. Frankel. All right. Well----
General Keane. Now--no, wait a second. Let me--let me--let
me finish the answer. If, given what we know now--we justified
going into Iraq based on WMD. Given what we know now, would I
make that same decision? No.
Ms. Frankel. Okay. So--okay. Let me ask Dr. Wittes. Could
you comment on my question?
Ms. Wittes. I think that we have to look at all the sides
of the equation here. There is no question in my mind that some
American decisions have exacerbated the anxieties of our
partners in the region.
There is no question in my mind that the invasion of Iraq
did help to crack up this regional order. But as I said, it was
breaking down anyway. It definitely gave it a push.
But I think the most important point I would make is that
our regional partners are anxious anyway because the region
that they knew, the status quo they counted on and befitted
from is gone and it is never coming back, and they don't know
what is going to replace it.
They don't have a vision themselves for what they want to
replace it and so right now they are mistrustful of one
another's motives.
They are anxious about the balance of power, which they do
perceive as turning against them because of Iran's activities
around the region and because of the rise of political Islam.
They are deeply worried about the degree of violence and
the spillover and the refugees and the implications for their
stability. And yes, they have some anxieties about the U.S.
role.
But in that context, our role is going to be incredibly
complicated and incredibly controversial almost no matter what
we do. And so hewing to our own interests and being very
transparent with our partners about what we are doing, what we
are not going to do and why seems to me that would--that would
be the best way to address the problem.
Mr. Jones. Can I briefly answer or are we over time? I will
be brief.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Please go ahead.
Mr. Jones. I think when you look at, particularly since the
rise--the Arab uprisings, when you look, for example, at World
Bank data, in the region--in the region this subcommittee deals
with, you see a categorical decline across all major governance
indicators.
One factor that has contributed to what you have outlined
is weakening governance across the region--across North Africa,
East Africa and the Middle East.
In that vacuum, from Libya through Yemen up into the Middle
East, in that vacuum we now have a range of actors that have
pushed into that vacuum sub-state actors--the Islamic State,
al-Qaeda in a few locations.
We have state actors like Iran. I think because of that
situation this then puts the United States in a very important
position. With the collapse--weakening of governance in a range
of these cases and actors filling in, whether they are sub-
state or state, what role does and should the United States
play in filling in? That is diplomatically, economically and
militarily.
I think that is where--and that is really the question to
ask based on the events over the last several years. But I
think the data on this is actually pretty clear. We have got
weakened--severely weakened governments.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. Frankel.
Mr. Meadows of North Carolina.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is refreshing to
not only hear a diversity of answers but I can honestly say I
followed each one of you, reading comments and work that you
have done and continue to do in this particular issue.
So my request of you is the balance of diplomacy versus
more military intervention versus credibility because I think
that the balance of those three elements I see a lack of
credibility within the region right now in terms of if we say
something do we really mean it.
Are we going to be there like we have historically or is
this a new era? How do we start to restore that, and I will
start with you, Doctor.
Ms. Wittes. Thank you. It is--it is a challenging question.
I think that in many ways the anxieties right now in the region
are about intentions and objectives, not about means, and I
think that if we had a stronger dialogue and clearer common
ground with our partners on what we together are trying to
achieve then we can debate the means.
Mr. Meadows. Do you think we know that? I mean, because
here I am sitting in Congress and I am not sure what we are
trying to achieve, if we really look at it. I know we want
peace and everybody wants peace and it is really easy to say
that.
But if we look at it from a strateg or a tactical point of
view, I am confused on what our objectives are, specifically
with Syria--you know, where our intel is less than it is in
other parts of the region. Let us put it that way.
So, I mean, can you clearly define what our objective or do
you know at Brookings what our objective is or should be?
Ms. Wittes. Well, I think what we have heard from the
administration is a dual objective, which is to push back ISIS
in Iraq and Syria and at the same time to build up a stronger
opposition force that can get to at least a hurting stalemate
in the conflict with Assad so that he then is willing to
negotiate. At the end of the day, civil wars, you know, only
end in a couple of ways--either one side vanquishes and
exterminates or expels the other or they fight to the point
where an external power can help, sometimes impose, sometimes
negotiate a political solution and that is guaranteed by
outside powers. That is how civil wars typically end.
We wouldn't want the first outcome so we should be driving
for the second and I think that--you know, to the extent the
administration has articulated a long-term vision that is its
vision.
The question is how do we get there. And one of the reasons
I highlighted in my testimony the importance of ensuring that
where we push back ISIS or where the rebels push back Assad we
have something in place to replace it that is not extremist
rule is because it helps us drive toward that solution.
For example, a number of our partners have talked about the
idea of establishing safe zones in northern Syria and areas
where the rebels have liberated territory.
What is happening in Idlib right now is that the rebels
pushed, Assad's forces fell back and now the regime is bombing
from the air.
So the remaining guys who were working for the Syrian
Government and could be the kernel of a civil administration
are fleeing like every other civilian in the area and that
leaves these towns to the rebels--the extremists. So that is
what we need to try and fix.
Mr. Meadows. So let me--let me go back, because Dr. Jones
mentioned we are having more foreign, and I believe it was you,
Dr. Jones, that was talking about we have more foreign
fighters' intervention. And so when they are expelled from
Syria they come back to the United States, to Europe, to
wherever because part of the problem we have in Syria is that
we had trained fighters that were in a neighboring country that
actually came here.
And so we call it ISIS today. It was actually known by a
different name just a few months ago. And so if we expel them
without really having some meaningful military intervention, do
we not just transport the extremist problem to other parts of
the world?
Mr. Jones. I think the pattern of jihadist activity we have
seen in Iraq and Libya, in Afghanistan and Pakistan is they
will either go back home or they will go somewhere else and
bring instability, unless they die on the battlefield.
The issue then on the military tools is I think I would
support Clausewitz on this--that they--the military and the
political goals need to be intertwined, which is where I think
with programs like Syrian train and equip they are not exactly
meshed. If we are going to train Syrian rebels, Syrian rebels
are predominantly focused on the Assad regime. So trying to get
them then to focus on the Islamic State, in my view, means that
the military and the political goals are not intertwined
directly.
And so I think that is where I would say we have got to
focus on bringing those two together.
But, look, there is a war going on so the military tool is
a necessity. They are fighting. We can try to work the
political establishment and we should work for deals in both
countries.
But there is a war going on.
Mr. Meadows. I am out of time and I am going to yield back
to the chairman. General Keane, can you explain to me why we
had more missiles that were launched into Israel from Gaza than
sorties that we have actually conducted within Syria at this
point and expect a different result?
I call it Operation Powder Puff with what we have done so
far in Syria. Do we need to have more meaningful military
intervention? And I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Very good. We will allow General Keane to
answer, if he would like.
General Keane. Well, the Syrian strategy, from a military
perspective, is a complicated one, to say the least. I mean,
just thinking through it makes your head hurt.
But, frankly, arming 5,000 Free Syrian Army each year--new
recruits, not an organization--where are they going to go? The
Free Syrian Army is down to several brigades.
At one time it did make sense to strengthen that
organization when it really had some robustness to it but we
passed that opportunity.
ISIS recruits on average, according to our intelligence
services, 1,000 a month and steady--still doing that. That is
12,000 new recruits that they are getting a year. So this is a
fig leaf operation that has no connection to anything
consequential.
I think we should listen to our allies, which have been
telling us that, look, we are all for dealing with ISIS but we
cannot deal with ISIS while the Assad regime is still in power
and it is using its military force throughout that country.
Turkey tells us that. Saudi Arabia tells us that. All the
bordering countries tell us that. So what do they want us to
do? They would--in conjunction with them they would like us to
establish no-fly zones, shut down the air power and free
zones--stop the killing.
What is the reason for that? To pursue a political
solution. You are using military force, which is always
intended to do to get a political solution. What is the
political solution? Assad is undermined.
Right now, his Alawite and Druze power is not what it used
to be. There is no guarantee that this would happen but it is
so far better than the status quo and the genocide that is
taking place that it is worth a try. And then you get to some
kind of coalition sharing.
Are we concerned about post-Assad? Of course. Are we
concerned about, as the doctor mentioned, Jabhat al-Nusra and
the strength that it has gained in the last year? Of course, we
are.
All of that in some kind of political compromise and
coalition sharing is a far better political answer than what we
have now and you use limited military power or, in this case,
the threat of it to get you moving in that direction.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Meadows.
Mr. Higgins of New York is recognized.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Just a couple of things. You know, General Keane, you had
talked about--you clearly made a distinction that was
administration policy that has resulted in some of the
instability that exist in Iraq and Syria.
But it is not just exclusive to this administration. I
think if you look back in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the de-
Ba'athification order and the dissolution of the Iraqi army
basically said to 100,000 Sunni Iraqis that there is no place
for you in Iraqi society and that formed the basis for the
insurgency that we dealt with for most of the time that we were
there, and I would argue that it was also the genesis of ISIS.
The second issue is the panel seemed to be somewhat
dismissive of the sectarian nature of the conflict in Iraq and
in Syria, and I don't think it can be dismissed at all. I mean,
it amazes me and, General, you had made reference to Qasem
Soleimani, who heads to Quds Forces in Iraq.
I mean, he is not only a tangential player in what is going
on in Iraq today and Syria--he is there physically. He is on
the ground directing Shi'a militias to prop up the Shi'a
government in Iraq and they are not doing that, you know, as a
good will measure.
They are doing that to impose their influence to ensure
that in the aftermath of ISIS that Iraq remains Shi'a. And one
could argue that ISIS basically wants their country back. They
want to reestablish Sunni dominance in Iraq.
And, you know, someone had said here, you know, it is a
fair assertion that we should talk less to our enemies and more
to our friends. We don't really have friends in that part of
the world.
You know, there is the discussion when Americans are in the
room and the discussion when Americans are not in the room. And
typically, we count our friends as people whose interests are
aligned with ours at any given time.
But they are not really helping us, and it just seems that
given everything that Americans have invested toward peace in
Iraq--$25 billion to build up--to help them build up an Iraqi
army, a security force--$25 billion--in their first test they
ran.
They ran from a fighting force of less than 31,000. The
Iraqi army at that time was estimated to be anywhere between
180,000 and 240,000 fighters. And then we depend on our allies
who have proven to be helpful to us, the peshmerga--good
fighters, experienced fighters, pro-Western, helped us on the
early stages of the Iraq war, 190 fighters--and Shi'a militias,
who are controlled directly by Qasem Soleimani, an Iraqi.
And, you know, we tried to do one thing and I think we
could only expect to do one thing in Iraq and that is through
our military involvement to create a place, a breathing space,
within which Sunni, Shi'a and Kurds could develop a political
contract, and they failed miserably.
And the guy that we put in there, Nouri al-Maliki, we put
him in there first--Iran put him in there the second time--you
know, basically created another sectarian divide. So, you know,
at least when Saddam Hussein was in there, there was an 8-year
war between Iraq and Iran and they fought to a standstill.
Khomeini had said that when the Revolutionary Guard came to
him and said--and Mousavi came to him and said, we can't win
this thing, he basically stopped the war.
But he said it was like drinking poison from a chalice. At
least they were preoccupied with each other and expending the
resources so that they weren't directed toward us.
Look, a lot of questions there. I apologize for it, but a
lot of things have been said here. So I throw that out to you--
all of you.
General Keane. Briefly, you know, I agree with a lot of
what you just said. I would go further. This isn't about
politics for me--a Democratic administration, Republican
administration. I am interested in policy.
The White House policy dealing with Afghanistan and not
building an effective security force after we deposed the
regime was a policy mistake that led to the reemergence of the
Taliban.
As you pointed out, the decision to disband the army and
not pull it back and use it as security and stability when
looting led to general lawlessness was a mistake. However,
having Saddam Hussein in our jail houses, and other generals,
we know now that the regime began that insurgency.
They planned it 6 months before execution and they
conceptualized it actually 2 years prior. So they were going to
do that regardless of what we did with the military. But
nonetheless, it still was a policy mistake.
The sectarian nature of the conflict, yes. I am not
dismissive of it but this much I know. ISIS' own stated
objectives in their 400-page document in color designs a
caliphate in the region and they intend to dominate those
countries.
Most of those countries are in fact Sunnis, as they are. So
they intend to dominate the countries in the region to
establish their caliphate, not only Shi'a countries where they
have begun but also Sunni countries, which means they would
depose governments and kill people in support of those
governments.
I am not--and they take huge advantage of the sectarian
conflict and manipulate it, you know, to their ends. And Qasem
Soleimani, certainly an instrument of the Supreme Leader.
Doesn't work for anybody else but the Supreme Leader. He is
carrying out his regional objectives, which are largely
geopolitical.
What they want in Iraq, in my judgment, is a weak
government but stable, aligned with Iran and not aligned with
the United States.
That is their objective and I think they are working toward
that end, and I know we are sort of out of time here. Thank
you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.
I am just going to ask a few more questions, if I might.
Mr. Jones, in your testimony both written and oral you said
that we should consider pausing the Syria and Iran train
program until we get a clear explanation of our strategy and
long-term goals.
The administration has said that it wants the program to
only be for defensive purposes against ISIL. Yet, these forces
consider Assad to be their number-one enemy, and I will ask the
panelists or just Dr. Jones, what do you believe should be the
mission of the train and equip and program both in Syria and in
Iraq?
Should they be offensive? Should they be defensive? How can
we use these programs to help bring stability to the region?
Mr. Jones. That is an excellent question, or excellent
series of questions. My own experience in being involved in
training programs overseas is that one can't train only for
offensive or defensive purposes.
You can't control, like joysticks, fighters when they go
into the field. So if they are trained for primarily defensive
purposes, when they actually go into combat they are going to
use both skill set--the skill sets for offensive and defensive
purposes.
I think that is the general reality. My primary focus on
the train and equip program, though, is to meld together a
training program with a political end state in Syria and so if
we are going to train Syrian rebels, if that is--if that makes
political sense and then they have to be designed toward
dealing with the biggest political problem in Syria right now,
which is the Assad regime.
But if you are going to train then they have to be trained
sufficiently, integrated with other states in the region
including the Jordanians to pursue operations on the ground
in--with the long-term goal of a political end goal and I think
that is the end of the Assad regime.
So what I would like to see is the matching of those and,
again, I would just highlight, you know, there are at least two
other challenges I think there are with the program.
One is there is no follow-on force once these people hit
the ground. It makes it very difficult to see what they are
doing, to impact what they are doing on the ground.
The second issue is that in general they--that it makes it
very difficult--if you are not there it makes it difficult to
assess what they are doing, how they are doing. You really need
people on the ground to be about to assess that and, again,
this really is special operations skill set or an intelligence
one with organizations like the CIA.
So I think if we are to do this, those are the kinds of
forces I would strongly consider.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. General Keane.
General Keane. The training program in Syria makes no sense
to me whatsoever and I don't think we should be doing it. It is
a fig leaf because 5,000 new recruits this year are not
consequential to dealing with ISIS and that is the stated
purpose of doing it.
They are supposed to join a Free Syrian Army, which is in
fact fighting the regime and not fighting ISIS. The only time
the training program will make any sense is when we have a
political solution in Syria and ISIS is still there and we have
to deal with it.
Then it makes some sense now to put together a training
force. Now we would train not--and we would put--I think it
would be advisable to put some advisors on the ground as well.
That makes sense because now you have got a stable political
situation. The regime is not pounding its people anymore or the
opposition force.
In Iraq, the problem with the train and assist mission it
is just--Madam Chairman, it is just so extraordinarily
inadequate.
We have an 18-division force in Iraq that we began with. We
are training nine Iraqi brigades and three peshmerga brigades.
No advisors will go forward with those units to fight, no
forward air controllers forward with those units. We need a few
thousand advisors training considerably more people, compress
the time frame and then let some of those trainers as advisors
go forward and follow with the unit.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And that was going to be general----
General Keane. So it is inadequate.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. My follow-up question, which was what is
your assessment of the Iraqi security forces capability. But
you just answered that.
But you had testified that we are taking less than half
measures to assist the Iraqi security forces, that we are
providing insufficient arms to the Kurds and we have no
credible plan to defeat ISIL.
I will ask you, do you believe that the current government
in Baghdad, that is certainly a breath of fresh air compared to
the previous one, can work cooperatively with the Kurds and
provide them military hardware?
General Keane. Yes, and that is a great question and you--I
think you probably know the answer here. It is pretty
frustrating what is unfolding. We want to assist the Sunni
tribes, we want to assist the Kurds and the Iraqi Government is
constipating that process. And I know there is a thought that
we should find a mechanism to go around the government.
Look, this government is an improvement and much of the
success in Iraq is dependent on their ability to politically be
inclusive, particularly with the Sunni tribes and with the
Kurds.
The advisors and the training program and the Sunni tribes
is inadequate. It is not going to get us there. The arms
program is inadequate because they are not reaching them.
The same thing with the Kurds. The Kurds have skill and
they have will, but they need better weapons and that is not
getting there either.
More pressure needs to be put on--I would rather go through
the government and make that happen than go around the
government and find another program to do it. We have got to
move the government in the right direction to do that.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you, General.
Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thanks. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
General Keane, if the train and equip mission is just a fig
leaf, if it is not going to accomplish what needs to be done in
Syria, which is, I think what you just said--you just described
the problems in Iraq--so what is--how do we--how do we
accomplish it?
It would start with Syria, and if in Syria ultimately the
real solution involves Assad's departure then, for you and Dr.
Wittes, how do we--how does that happen?
Who can put pressure on Assad if at this point it is not us
and, obviously, it is not--it appears that it is not the
Russians?
General Keane. Well, what I have suggested is that,
clearly, we can use the military instrument here to try to get
a political solution.
We should take the counsel of our allies in the region--
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan--and what their objective is,
clearly, they recognize ISIS as a major threat to them.
But they understand that to pursue ISIS while the Assad
regime has all of its military power and is pounding opposition
forces and killing its own people makes no sense. We have got
to get Assad out of there.
The way to do that--and there is no perfect solution here.
But the status quo, I think, is unacceptable, given the
genocide that is taking place.
So what you do is you put in, and this is what our allies
would like to do and I agree with them, no-fly zones--if Assad
contested then we would shut his air power down and we have the
capability to do that, I don't think he would--and buffer zones
to stop the genocide.
The Alawites and the Druze right now have less support for
Assad than they have had through these 4 years. I think some
kind of political solution with Assad gone is in the offing.
The opposition will not entertain anything with Assad
there. So I would focus on that political solution and modest
introduction of military threat and possible capability to do
that. That allows you then to focus on ISIS.
ISIS cannot be driven out of Syria, Congressman Deutch,
without an effective ground force. Where is that going to come
from? It is not going to be the 5,000 recruits that we are
training.
It has to be largely provided by the nations in the region.
They have to step up and do that. They will not do that with
Assad there.
So once we get a political solution then we can put
together some kind of an effective ground force to deal with
ISIS. Otherwise, the policy we have now is ISIS just continues.
Mr. Deutch. All right. Great.
So, Dr. Wittes, how do we get that political solution?
Ms. Wittes. Thank you. Well, I think what General Keane is
suggesting is that, in essence, we need to reverse the
sequencing that the administration has put forward.
They have said ISIS is the first priority and Assad is the
second, and the General would have it the other way around. I
actually think that the problem right now on the ground is that
those who are gaining influence and power are gaining it
because of battlefield success.
They are not gaining it because they are protecting people.
They are not gaining it because they are providing services.
They are not gaining it because they are providing justice.
And ISIS is saying that it is offering a governing model
but what it is really offering is, we can win, and the
extremist rebels on the ground that are doing the business in
Idlib right now are gaining strength because they are showing
that they can win.
What we want to do is reverse that dynamic. We want to show
that if you can demonstrate the ability to hold territory, to
govern people, to provide security and justice that that brings
benefits.
And in order to do that, I think safe zones are a piece of
the puzzle definitely worth considering, and our allies are
pushing that, but it would require a commitment that we so far
have been unwilling to make.
Now, our allies have just been conducting air operations
over Yemen and they have, you know, been part of the anti-ISIS
campaign in there as well.
So I think it is worth asking the question whether policing
those safe zones is something they might be willing to take on
or at least be the lead on in terms of threatened use of force.
But we have also got to ensure that resources flow to these
rebel-held areas in a way that keeps civilians there instead of
having them flee and worsen the refugee problem and allows
rebel forces who actually want to help govern Syria to begin to
govern and protect Syrian people.
Mr. Deutch. Madam Chair, can I ask one last question?
So we know--we know that the American people will be
supportive of efforts to push back ISIS. The horrific
beheadings, I think, shine a light on the awful brutality of
what they do and the killing of Americans is, I think, a moment
of awakening for Americans. We understand that.
I think there is broad awareness of the threats that--the
concerns that we have about Iran and the Iranian threat and
their support of not just propping up Assad but the way that
they meddle and disrupt in the region and their support of
terror.
But I would just like--before we go I would just like to
ask this question. With now a quarter of a million or so
Syrians having died, do we--is there a place in our foreign
policy for human rights anymore? Do we care? Do you think the
American people care?
General Keane. I definitely think so. I mean, I think the
problem we have had here--you know, over at the Institute for
the Study of War we get--we keep track of the genocide. We have
got just these unbelievably graphic pictures of the results of
starvation campaigns, attacking bakeries, 62 percent of the
hospitals being destroyed, close to 70 percent of the
ambulances--a systematic methodology that the Assad regime has
used on killing his people.
It is just--it is outrageous. But very little of that is in
the domain of the American people. I will tell you that--and I
have to protect confidentiality here--I have dealt with some
relatively senior people in the administration who had no level
of detail of what this really was until I put photographs in
front of them and showed them this systematic methodological
campaign to do this.
It is much more than just barrel bombing. And so I think
that is part of it. I mean, there is--I think the American
people in general have the sense something bad is going on in
Syria and people are being killed but they don't have a sense
of what that really is.
I will--I always believe fundamentally that this country
has and will continue to have an interest in human suffering in
the world. Doesn't mean we can solve all of it. I am not
suggesting that.
But I do believe that that is--and it is part of the
President's policy dealing with ISIS--it is one of his tenets
of it is humanitarian assistance.
Mr. Deutch. General Keane, I believe you are right. And
Madam Chairman, we had a witness here at one of our previous
hearings, if you recall, who was a physician--a Syrian-American
physician--who came--went to provide medical assistance in
Syria and came here and told us about not--he didn't have the
evidence of systematic killing.
All he could tell us about was standing out in a school
yard and looking up and seeing a black dot in the sky and
knowing that it was a helicopter, and then seeing two more
black dots come out and knowing that they were barrel bombs and
knowing that they were being dropped and having no idea where
they were going to land but the sole purpose of those dots as
they fell and grew larger and ultimately hit the ground was to
kill as many people as possible.
General Keane, I believe you. I believe that we still think
that human rights matter and that a regime that brutally kills
over 200,000 people cannot be allowed to stand, and I think it
is an important reminder. I am heartened by what you said.
And I hate to end this hearing on that note. Your testimony
has been--the three of you--has been really helpful to us. But
I was at a meeting with our U.N. ambassador, who raised a
term--this was a while ago, actually--who raised the term, a
professional term, that I never heard before called psychic
numbing.
We can't afford, as a country, to allow psychic numbing to
overcome the way we view the tragic deaths of thousands and
thousands of people at the hands of a brutal dictator. We can't
allow it. It is not who we are and I appreciate speaking here.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Amen. Thank you. Yes, I remember the use
of that phrase tragic numbing and it is a tragedy.
Mr. Connolly, thank you so much for being kind enough to
give up your time. But I wanted to recognize you so that you
could say a few words before we break, and I know that we have
votes on the floor.
Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Forgive me for being late--been a harried morning.
Obviously, a lot more to go into in terms of this subject area.
I was informed that General Keane perhaps made the suggestion
that we were deliberately holding back in support of Syria
freedom fighters or insurgents somehow to perhaps please Iran.
I have never seen any evidence of that. I think we are
holding back because we are not entirely sure which side to
support and there isn't a great secular middle that is out
there fighting the Assad regime.
But that is worthy of further examination and, certainly, I
will study your testimony very closely.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr.
Deutch.
I thank the panelists for your excellent testimony. You
have given us a lot to chew on, a lot to ponder on, a lot to
worry about.
Thank you so much, and with that the subcommittee is
adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:51 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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