    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

             REGIONAL IMPACT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ AND SYRIA

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                        THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 30, 2015

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 114-33

                                   __________

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    PAUL COOK, California                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            GRACE MENG, New York
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
    DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
    TOM EMMER, Minnesota

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

                Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa

                     ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         GRACE MENG, New York
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Seth G. Jones, Ph.D., director, International Security and
      Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation........................     6
    General Jack Keane, USA, Retired, chairman of the board,
      Institute for the Study of War.................................    24
    Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D., director, Center for Middle East
      Policy at Brookings............................................    38

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Seth G. Jones, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.........................     9
    General Jack Keane, USA, Retired: Prepared statement.............    27
    Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D.: Prepared statement..................    40

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    66
    Hearing minutes..................................................    67
    The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
      from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement..........    68

             REGIONAL IMPACT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ AND SYRIA

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2015

                         House of Representatives,

               Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 o'clock a.m.,
    in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
    Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
        I will first recognize Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes
    each for our opening statements. I will then recognize other
    members seeking recognition for 1 minute and thank you for my
    Cuban coffee.
        And there are so many subcommittees and full committees
    taking place right now because tomorrow, Friday, we will be on
    a district work period, so everybody is cramming their work in.
        So Ted Deutch is in an actual voting marathon in Judiciary
    but will come over here in a minute, and then Lois Frankel has
    Transportation--a committee that she has to go to.
        But we will then hear from our witnesses and without
    objection, the witnesses' prepared statements will be made a
    part of the record. Members may have 5 days to insert
    statements and questions for the record subject to the length
    limitation in the rules.
        And I am going to take this a little bit out of order today
    because I know Congressman Deutch has to get back to votes in
    Judiciary.
        I would like to recognize him first so that you can get on
    with your business, Congressman Deutch.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
        I apologize to the panel. We have votes and close votes at
    that. So I am going to be running back and forth.
        Thanks very much for providing us the opportunity to
    examine how current U.S. strategy in Iraq and Syria is
    impacting the rest of this vulnerable region and thanks to our
    distinguished witnesses for being here today.
        This is one of a dozen or so hearings that we have had on
    Syria, Iraq or ISIS in the past couple of years and each time
    we convene to address the conflict as a whole or specific
    aspects I am struck by what I am concerned is a general lack of
    strategy when it comes to ending the Syrian civil war.
        I applaud the President's willingness to take action
    against ISIS and we are seeing some successes from that air
    campaign in Iraq, and I support our efforts to train and equip
    the moderate Syrian opposition.
        But I do believe that we waited too long to get that
    program off the ground in a meaningful way. The opposition has
    fractured over and over again and the Syrian people are being
    forced to choose to align with those who can simply provide
    them the greatest protection.
        With most of our efforts focused on ISIS' brutality, we
    seem to have left out a very critical piece of the puzzle. This
    conflict will not end unless Assad is no longer in power.
        The suggestion that Assad is part of any solution or that
    he is a protector against ISIS is, quite frankly, ridiculous.
    This is a regime that has been responsible for the deaths of
    thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of Syrians.
        This is a regime that has abandoned its people, trapping
    them in besieged areas without access to food and basic
    humanitarian needs. This is a regime that has resorted to the
    most barbaric torture, dropped barrel bombs on its people and
    used chemical weapons against its own citizens.
        And frankly, when we talk to our allies in the region, we
    are often met with confusion and frustration over, some
    believe, a lack of strategy for Syria. The chaos that has spun
    out from the Syrian conflict is having a devastating impact on
    the region.
        The humanitarian crisis alone is threatening the stability
    of critical states like Jordan and Lebanon. This conflict will
    change the makeup of the region for decades to come.
        Even if Syria was solved tomorrow it would take years
    before refugees and displaced persons could return to their
    homes and we have to make sure that the people of Syria know
    that the United States stands with them and that they do not
    believe that the coalition is acting on behalf of Assad or as
    Assad's air force.
        And we can do that by continuing to support the opposition
    including the consideration of buffer zones. The United States
    must think holistically about what the impact of Assad
    remaining in power could have on the region. A direct
    consequence would be the emboldening of Iran.
        Assad in power preserves Iran's lifeline to Hezbollah, and
    a report just this week estimated that Iran is spending $1
    billion to $2 billion a month supporting Assad and Hezbollah in
    Syria.
        Our efforts to combat ISIS in Iraq have resulted in
    moderate gains. The Abadi government seems to be willing to
    correct the years of weak and exclusive governance left--that
    left western Iraq susceptible to ISIS. Do our allies fear the
    U.S. will cooperate with Iran against ISIS in Iraq?
        Expanded Iranian influence in Iraq could have a devastating
    effect on our efforts to support the Abadi government and
    encourage inclusive governing.
        If Shi'ite militias are seen as receiving the backing of
    the Government of the United States, that could alienate Sunni
    tribes. And as we deal directly with Iraq and Syria we need to
    support our regional partners to defend their own countries
    against ISIS growth.
        There are extremist groups in nearly every Middle Eastern
    nation who have declared allegiance to ISIS. That is why I was
    pleased to join the chairman in co-sponsoring legislation that
    would ensure the Kingdom of Jordan receive the assistance that
    it needs to maintain security and stability. We must also push
    to strengthen efforts to stem the flow of foreign fighters into
    Syria and Iraq.
        ISIS' spread into North Africa, particularly in lawless
    Libya, has given the group new territory in which to train,
    recruit and attack as we, unfortunately, saw with the brutal
    attacks on Egyptian Christians.
        How long can coalition strikes against ISIS continue? Will
    our Arab partners, who are vital to efforts to send a message
    that this is not just an American fight, continue to support
    our efforts if they feel that we are jeopardizing regional
    security on other fronts?
        Because, not surprisingly, our allies are not just
    concerned about the spread of ISIS' influence. Perhaps most
    concerning at this particular moment in time to our partners is
    the potential for expanded Iranian influence.
        What security guarantees can the United States provide to
    the Gulf States and to Israel? What do Iranian proxies like
    Hezbollah or even Hamas, which appears to have mended its
    relationship with the Ayatollah, look like with even greater
    Iranian financial support?
        Or what do groups that are simply in Iran's orbit like the
    Houthis in Yemen look like with greater financial support and
    what continued action does this spur from the Saudis and other
    G-16 nations to counteract this threat?
        Madam Chairman, we have been talking about ending the
    Syrian for 4 years. If there is no military solution to this
    conflict, how can we move a political solution forward,
    particularly without the Russians or Iranians?
        I look to our panel today to help us understand how these
    conflicts might play out in the coming months and years and
    what effect U.S. policy can have on reaching a positive
    outcome.
        Thank you, and I yield back.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. Thank
    you and we look forward to seeing you scoot in and out. And
    thank you, Mr. Higgins, for joining us as well.
        The Chair now recognizes herself for her opening statement.
    In the Middle East, many times events in one country have a
    profound impact in other countries in the region.
        In 2009, President Obama failed to support the protests
    that had erupted throughout Iran, an opportunity that could
    have turned the tide in Iran and the entire landscape of the
    Middle East.
        In late December 2010, a Tunisian street vendor set himself
    on fire to protest abuse by State officials. This act
    ultimately sparked the Arab Spring with similar large-scale
    protests spreading to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria in
    early 2011.
        In Libya and Syria, both Ghadafi and Assad resisted any
    calls for democracy or reform and in fact responded to the
    protest with violence and bloodshed. However, the U.S.
    responses in Syria and Libya were markedly different from each
    other.
        Whereas in Libya the U.S. responded with cutting ties with
    Ghadafi, sanctioning members of his regime and led the push for
    the U.N. to authorize military intervention in the conflict,
    that was not the case with Syria.
        Then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called Assad ``a
    reformer,'' and that was rather ludicrous. The death toll is
    now over 220,000 in Syria. But if this guy is who we thought
    would be a reformer, well, we did not really assess that
    situation correctly.
        The U.S. refused to take any action against Assad and even
    after Assad crossed President Obama's chemical weapons red
    line, and has done so repeatedly, the United States did not
    respond with military force in Syria like we had done in Libya.
        The decision to not act on the red line caused a large
    ripple effect throughout the Middle East and beyond, as our
    adversaries saw that we don't have the courage of our
    convictions to act and our allies saw that we can't be trusted
    to act and question our resolve.
        Even in Libya where we did initially act, the
    administration failed to ensure stability and now Libya is
    fractured and has become a breeding ground for radicalism as
    extremists from Libya flock to join ISIL, al-Nusra and other
    terror groups.
        This mirrors the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal of our
    troops from Iraq in 2011, leaving a void that Iran was more
    than happy to fill, allowing the regime to gain more and more
    influence over Baghdad and Maliki.
        So the United States' decision to not get involved in Syria
    immediately and to withdraw our troops from Iraq in 2011 played
    a large role in facilitating the rise of ISIL and the spread
    from Syria to Iraq.
        But I am not part of what Jeane Kirkpatrick called the
    ``blame America first'' crowd. The responsibility is with ISIL
    and all of these terror groups and not of the United States.
        But the rise of ISIL has exacerbated the humanitarian
    crisis that we have seen in Iraq and Syria. Millions have left.
    Hundreds of thousands have been murdered.
        Religious minorities have been targeted for extinction and
    nearly every country in the region has felt the impact of the
    terror of ISIL.
        The crisis in Iraq and Syria is a cancer and it is quickly
    metastasizing and spreading throughout the region. In Jordan,
    the Kingdom is feeling the burden to try and take care of the
    Syrian refugees and to protect its own borders.
        In Lebanon, there are over 1 million registered Syrian
    refugees and the fighting between Hezbollah and the Lebanese
    Armed Forces has caused instability in the Golan Heights, which
    poses a security threat to the democratic Jewish State of
    Israel.
        In Saudi Arabia, an attack against our embassy in Riyadh
    was foiled when nearly 100 individuals were arrested this week,
    all alleged affiliates of ISIL.
        This is why the administration needs a drastic reassessment
    of our policies. We have got an Iran that remains unchecked in
    Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon and in Yemen.
        We have ISIL and al-Qaeda resurgent. Assad remains in Syria
    and the sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shi'a is as bad
    now as any time in recent history. Many questions remain about
    the Syrian train and equip program, the size and the scope of
    the mission.
        The program isn't even up and running yet. By the time the
    program finishes, it could be too late and the situation in the
    region could be worse.
        Many issues remain regarding the proposed authorization for
    use of military force, the AUMF, that the administration has
    sent to Congress, not least of which is the failure to address
    Assad, al-Nusra and other terror groups in Iraq and Syria.
        The administration has failed to develop a comprehensive
    strategy to address all of the threats in Iraq and Syria. But
    until we do, the situation is only going to get worse and we
    will be faced with even tougher decisions down the road.
        And at this time I would like to recognize our members for
    any opening statements they would like to make. Ms. Frankel, my
    Florida colleague.
        Ms. Frankel. Thank you, and Madam Chair, I just want to say
    you so enjoy--you have the--sort of the most diplomatic and
    kindest way of putting some things that I may not agree with.
    But we should learn from you.
        Look, I just--and I enjoyed listening to your remarks. I
    think that this is a very complicated situation and I think
    from my own--my constituents the big concern is just even if we
    just look at recent history is somehow we take action--our
    country takes action--military action.
        We are well intended but the action seems to fail. And I
    will go a little bit further back, Madam Chair, to 2003 when we
    sent troops into Iraq and we toppled Saddam Hussein and I think
    there are some who would argue that that actually helped give
    rise to Iran increasing its power in the region and perhaps the
    fighting or the new government not being inclusive may have
    something to do with giving rise to ISIL.
        I think there are factors that are a lot more complicated.
    So I actually will listen very intently to what you all have to
    say and I thank you for being here.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, and I think I should say thank
    you--I am not quite sure. Thank you, Lois.
        Mr. Higgins of New York.
        Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair. I will be brief.
        I just, you know, talk about this region of the world, it
    is marked by instability for a long time and U.S. intervention
    in that part of the world is complicated because where there is
    no political center there are only sides, and taking sides or
    being perceived to take a side has major political consequences
    as well.
        So when we talk about this part of the region, you know,
    revisionist history is not helpful because there is a lot of
    gray area. There is a lot of nuance.
        It is not black and white and to be strategic and to be
    smart and to use your resources as best you can but to also
    require that regional players also participate fully and don't
    play the United States as they historically have in Iraq and in
    other places.
        Syria, clearly, is a mess--clearly, is a mess. And, you
    know, some people wanted us to believe that if we just
    supported the free Syrian army that we would be supporting the
    good guys against the bad guys.
        But, again, when you look beyond the surface it is so much
    more complicated than that with so many militias and Islamic
    extremists that even as bad as Bashir al-Assad is, the
    alternatives, you know, throughout that continuum could in fact
    be worse, given the history of those groups as well.
        So with that, we have a distinguished group of panelists
    and I look forward to the testimony. I will yield back.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Higgins and Ms.
    Frankel.
        And so now I am pleased to introduce our distinguished
    panel. We welcome back Dr. Seth Jones. He is a director of the
    International Security and Defense Policy at the RAND
    Corporation.
        He is an adjunct professor at the School of Advanced
    International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and has
    served in an advisory capacity to several operational commands
    in the Department of Defense.
        Second, we welcome back General Jack Keane, who is chairman
    of the Institute for the Study of War. The general has served
    in the United States Army for 37 years, rising to the post of
    Army vice chief of staff.
        He has served as a combat veteran in Vietnam, as has my
    husband. Also has served in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo
    and has commanded the prestigious 18th Airborne Corps and the
    decorated 101st Airborne Division.
        Thank you, General, for being with us this morning and
    thank you for your distinguished service to our country. You
    are a true hero.
        And last but certainly not least, I would like to welcome
    Dr. Tamara Cofman Wittes. Help me out. Wittes. Wittes. Just as
    it--yes, Wittes. She is a senior fellow and the director of the
    Saban Center for Middle East policy at Brookings.
        Dr. Wittes served as deputy assistant secretary of state
    for Near Eastern affairs from November 2009 to January 2012 and
    we welcome you back. Thank you.
        We will begin with you, Dr. Jones.

      STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, PH.D., DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
          SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND CORPORATION

        Mr. Jones. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking
    Member Deutch and distinguished members of the committee, and
    thanks to the other members here. We have got a distinguished
    group.
        I am going to divide my comments into two sections. The
    first will provide an overview of Iraq and Syrian and the
    broader regional context, and the second will get into some
    recommendations--some preliminary recommendations.
        Let me begin with the wars as they stand right now. I think
    one of the--one of the challenges right now is both the media
    and some administration and other officials try to deal with
    them almost separately and in fact they are quite intertwined.
    And we will see in my comments, it is generally a mistake to
    treat them even sequentially.
        In Iraq right now, the United States remains engaged in a
    counter insurgency campaign against Da'ish, also referred to as
    ISIL or ISIS, and its allies.
        It has lost some ground recently, including in Tikrit, but
    it does still have substantial territory, particularly in the
    predominantly Sunni areas of Anbar, Salahadin and Nineveh. It
    also continues to fund itself through activities like smuggling
    oil, selling stolen goods, kidnapping, seizing bank accounts
    and the smuggling of antiquities.
        In Syria, the U.S. is somewhat involved in the insurgency
    campaign. It has provided limited support to rebels, which I
    will come back to in a little bit through the train and equip
    program.
        But U.S. air strikes have been insufficient to seriously
    degrade Da'ish in Syria. More recently, there has been a surge
    of rebel activity and I wanted to highlight with our focus so
    much on Da'ish or ISIL in Syria.
        One of the groups that has clearly benefited from the gains
    in rebel activity is the al-Qaeda affiliated Nusra Front. It
    probably has more fighters, more money and more territory than
    at any time since its creation.
        In 2011, it retains a stronghold in northwestern Syrian
    areas like in Idlib. So I want to highlight my concerns with
    the al-Qaeda affiliate now in Syria and the gains that it has
    made.
        There, obviously, are differences between Syria and Iraq
    but I think as you look at the way the wars have transpired, we
    have a range of issues. The movement of extremist groups and
    criminal networks operating on both sides of the border are
    moving back and forth.
        The role of or the use of Turkey as a--Turkish territory as
    a pipeline for groups coming into the region and then,
    obviously, Irani involvement in both wars as being just three
    examples of how intertwined those wars are.
        U.S. and allied efforts, obviously, need to consider a
    range of issues including efforts to undermine the ideology of
    extremist groups, to target key leaders, to build partner
    capacity, to engage in political dialogue including Iraq and
    other steps.
        But I am going to focus my remaining comments on three
    issues. The first is interdiction efforts in Turkey and other
    neighboring states. Turkey, in particular, has taken some steps
    to crack down on foreign fighter flows.
        It has added, for example, thousands of names to its banned
    from entry list into Turkey. But, in my view, these steps are
    still not sufficient. Turkey remains the most important
    pipeline for foreign extremists coming into both Iraq and Syria
    contexts.
        As I--as I provide more material in the written testimony,
    there are a number of useful examples since World War II of
    successful efforts to crack down on border interdiction.
        So I think there are useful lessons, again for aerial-
    ground maritime surveillance, strengthening capacity and
    resources of border security personnel, et cetera that are
    still worth pursuing in Turkey.
        The second issue is the train and equip program. In my
    view, the U.S., including Congress, should put a pause on this
    program. I am concerned for several reasons.
        First, it seems to me it makes little sense to expend U.S.
    financial, diplomatic, military and other resources without a
    long-term strategy and a desire to end-state in Syria. The U.S.
    needs to first agree on a long-term strategy and then design a
    train and equip program to achieve that end state.
        In addition, I think it is also problematic to train Syrian
    rebels to counter Da'ish, or the Islamic State, and not what
    virtually all rebels are trying to do, which is--which is to
    end the Assad regime that has used chemical weapons on its own
    population.
        And then, finally, it strikes me also as problematic that
    the train and equip program, the way it is set up right now, at
    least as I understand it is to train, advise and assist local
    security forces outside of Syria and then to not have on the
    ground training in Syria itself.
        Virtually every successful effort that I have seen or have
    been involved in myself--Philippines, Colombia, a number of
    other places--have required on the ground training. It provides
    a way of giving them hands-on capacity as well as understanding
    how they are actually being used.
        So for those reasons and many others, I would--I would
    strongly urge taking a pause to this program until some of
    these issues get settled out.
        And then finally, let me just say on the AUMF, in my view,
    Congress should most likely pass an AUMF that is an omnibus,
    and we can talk about the details. I lay it out in the
    testimony.
        No geographical limitations, in a sense, but that get into
    issues of threat, a fairly broad definition of groups--happy to
    give you more specifics--specified purposes for which military
    forces for which military forces may be used, a requirement to
    report to Congress and then, finally, a renewal clause.
        So let me just conclude by saying the biggest issue and the
    biggest challenge we have in Iraq and Syria is this war is
    spreading. It is spreading into West Africa, East Africa, North
    Africa.
        We see Da'ish and the Islamic State rising in South Asia.
    We have seen arrests now in the Pacific Rim. If we do not begin
    to get more of a handle on it, we are going to see this spread
    across multiple regions, including outside of this committee's
    jurisdictions.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        General Keane.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL JACK KEANE, USA, RETIRED, CHAIRMAN OF THE
                 BOARD, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR

        General Keane. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member
    Deutch, distinguished members of the committee for inviting me
    back to testify. I am honored to be with such a distinguished
    panel today.
        Attached to my written testimony are three maps that are
    prepared by ISW for your reference, and let me just correct
    something in your statement, Madam Chairman. I am a Vietnam but
    I did--my troops served in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia.
        In my judgements, it is indisputable that U.S. policy
    failures in Iraq and Syria enabled Iranian expansion in the
    Middle East, enabled ISIS to reemerge, establish a sanctuary in
    Syria, expand into Iraq, Egyptian Sinai, North Africa and South
    Asia while conducting daily acts of barbarism against humanity
    and civilization, enabled the al-Qaeda, particularly Jabhat al-
    Nusra, to expand significantly in Syria to include the Khorasan
    Group, which has committed to out-of-region attacks against the
    United States and Europe while expanding in north and northeast
    Africa, enabled Assad to kill over 220,000 Syrians while
    forcing the displacement of over 7 million people from their
    homes, a humanitarian catastrophe, as the Syrian nation is
    systematically destroyed, which is an accelerant for jihadist
    groups regionally and globally.
        One cannot simply blame the underlying factors that exist
    in the region and absolve the United States of specific policy
    decisions that have unintended adverse consequences. The facts
    are the following on Iraq.
        By 2009, the Sunni insurgency supported by al-Qaeda and
    Iranian-backed Shi'a militias and others were defeated.
    However, beginning in 2009,the new administration begins to
    pull away from Iraq politically. Iran regains influence.
        In 2010, Maliki loses the election by one vote. But instead
    of helping his preferred opponent, Allawi, to form a new
    government, the United States inexplicably backs Maliki.
        In 2011, the U.S. pulls out all troops. The al-Qaeda in
    Iraq reemerges as ISIS. In Syria, the Arab Spring reaches Syria
    in 2011. Despite Assad's obvious military advantage, the
    opposition is succeeding. Many predict the regime will fall as
    the opposition seeks additional ammunition and weapons to fight
    the regime.
        While the President calls for Assad to go, he surprisingly
    refuses the opposition request. Iran begins daily flights of
    supplies and ammunition plus the commitment of Quds Force
    advisors to include Qasem Soleimani.
        Iran deploys its proxies, 5,000 Hezbollah from Lebanon and
    at its peak 20,000 Iraqi Shi'a militia. The momentum shifts to
    Assad's favor. The al-Qaeda recognizes the opportunity and
    moves in, and ISIS in 2012 deploys from Iraq to northeastern
    Syria to establish a sanctuary.
        To avoid a regional spillover war, which we certainly have
    now, Clinton, Panetta, Dempsey, CIA Director Petraeus make a
    formal recommendation to arm the opposition in the summer of
    2012.
        The President refuses again. The killing continues. Assad,
    in 2013, as you pointed out, Madam Chairman, uses CW--chemical
    weapons--and cross the U.S. red line. But still the President
    does not act.
        ISIS invades Iraq in 2014. The Maliki government requests
    assistance. The President refuses. Iran begins immediate
    assistance--Quds Force advisors, Qasem Soleimani, daily flights
    of supplies and ammunition.
        In 2014 Mosul falls. The Maliki government, again, requests
    air power and the President refuses. Not until August, some 8
    months after the ISIS invasion, does the United States respond.
        Despite ISIS' recent setbacks in Iraq, as you can see on
    the ISIS sanctuary map, it still holds considerable territory
    and influence in Iraq and remains on offense today while it has
    expanded its territorial control and influence in Syria.
        Moreover, it has expanded its influence in what is called
    the near abroad, as you can see on the global rings map. Its
    affiliates, or wilayats, are expanding as ISIS is rapidly
    becoming the new face of radical Islam and competing with al-
    Qaeda for control and influence. Those are the black stars on
    that map.
        What about the U.S. strategy? In Iraq, we are taking less
    than half measures to assist the Iraqi security forces, the
    Kurds and the Sunni tribes, which stretches out the time to
    defeat ISIS as casualties mount.
        In Syrian, there are no plans to defeat ISIS. To do so
    requires an effective ground forces supported by air power.
    There is none. U.S. policy is fundamentally inadequate to
    defeat ISIS.
        As to Assad, he must go. Allowing Assad to continue his
    genocide sows the seeds for generational regional disorder and
    empowers expansionist Iran. As to Iran, the United States has
    no strategy to stop the regional hegemonic aspirations of the
    Iranian regime. On the contrary, the U.S. is desperately and
    naively, in my judgment, moving to accommodate Iran on a
    nuclear deal that Iran's aggressive behavior will change as it
    supposedly joins the community of nations.
        In conclusion, the appalling lack of a comprehensive and
    coherent strategy to defeat radical Islam 22 years after the
    first attack on the World Trade center and almost 14 years
    after 9/11 is a generational policy failure.
        To date, we don't define radical Islam. We don't explain
    it. We don't try to understand its appeal. We don't counter and
    undermine the ideology, which is grounded in a religious belief
    system.
        This is a regional problem become a global problem and the
    countries who have a vested interest in defeating radical Islam
    should join together in an alliance to develop a comprehensive
    strategy.
        The balance of power in the Middle East is shifting against
    the United States' regional interest and against the United
    States' security.
        There is much that can be accomplished with our allies to
    include a Syrian strategy but the reality is American power is
    considered and our credibility is at an all-time low.
        There are no simple answers or solutions. But without
    strong U.S. leadership, our adversaries will continue to be
    emboldened. Our friends, out of fear, are susceptible to poor
    decisions while the Middle East region and the world becomes a
    more dangerous place.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]

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        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, General.
        Dr. Wittes.

    STATEMENT OF TAMARA COFMAN WITTES, PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
                    MIDDLE EAST POLICY AT BROOKINGS

        Ms. Wittes. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking
    Member Deutch, members of the committee. I appreciate the
    invitation. I must emphasize, as always, that I represent only
    myself. Brookings does not take any institutional positions on
    policy issues.
        The Middle East is disordered more today than in perhaps a
    half century and ISIS is only a symptom of this underlying
    breakdown in regional order.
        The upheaval in the region has likewise generated newly
    assertive regional powers like Turkey, new opportunities for
    longstanding troublemakers like Iran and Hezbollah, and
    sometimes bitter disputes between Arab States.
        Of course, this disorder is itself the product, the same
    long-building pressures that generated the Arab Spring. Iraq
    and Syria may be our focus today, but marginalizing extremist
    movements like ISIS demands attention to other weak and fragile
    states in the region.
        It is no accident that Syria and Libya are the most
    disordered and violent parts of the region today because these
    are the places where leaders, having failed to govern in a
    manner that could have prevented mass dissent, then sought to
    repress their people through the use of force.
        These brutal power-hungry shortsighted men broke their
    crumbling states to bits and drove their societies to civil war
    and it is the terrible choices of these terrible leaders more
    than anything else that created the openings that al-Qaeda,
    ISIS and other sectarian killers across the region now exploit.
        The roots of the region's upending in this fraying and
    broken social contract remind us that ISIS is not the cause of
    today's disorder and it is not the disease.
        The broken state-society relationship is what must be
    addressed if the region is to return to some form of stability.
    This means that whatever the United States does militarily in
    Iraq and Syria we must focus our strategy on the politics.
        In Iraq, the government has given non-state militias, some
    under Iranian influence, a large role in the fight in ways that
    have exacerbated Sunni anxieties and made the fight against
    ISIS harder.
        That said, the operation in Tikrit last month in which
    Iranian-supported militias failed and the Iraqi Government
    relied on American air support for victory, showed the limits
    of Iranian influence.
        The U.S. strategy rightly has the Iraqi Government own
    responsibility for its own choices in this battle for its
    territory and the hearts and minds of its people.
        This strategy ultimately stands or falls on Iraqi Prime
    Minister Abadi's ability to move forward with the kind of
    political and security steps that will build the confidence of
    Iraq Sunnis in the Iraqi state.
        In Syria, as we have been discussing, U.S. efforts to equip
    and train cooperative Syrian opposition forces will take more
    than a year, perhaps more than two, to have any meaningful
    battlefield impact, and meanwhile a coalition of more extremist
    Islamist groups is successfully routing Syrian military forces
    in Idlib Province.
        So the question is what will follow the withdrawal of
    Assad's forces--extremist rule or civil administration?
        The U.S. must urgently focus on working with its allies and
    with Syrian opposition forces on the ground to shape the
    situation so as to advance the latter.
        Let me talk about our partners in the region. The fall of
    Mosul last June brought a momentary unity between American
    priorities and those of our traditional regional partners and
    allowed the establishment of this anti-ISIS coalition. But it
    is a thin coalition and it has been from the start.
        Today, Saudi Arabia and others seem to prioritize the
    Iranian threat over the threat from ISIS and the military
    operation in Yemen is evidence for this.
        The reassurance that our partners are looking for is to see
    the United States demonstrate its recognition and its readiness
    to push back against Iran's destabilizing activities around the
    region, and the primary arena in which Arab states wish to see
    that from the U.S. is in Syria.
        So efforts to help expose and push back against those
    Iranian behaviors should be a key element of America's policies
    in the coming months, and I would say that is true regardless
    of the outcome of the nuclear talks because I think that
    Iranian behavior will continue regardless of the outcome of the
    nuclear talks.
        In addition, the United States must attend to the political
    components of its policy in Iraq and Syria to ensure that
    territory and people liberated from ISIS or from Assad find
    reliable security from a responsible civil administration, not
    rough justice from extremist militias whether Sunni or Shi'a.
        Finally, the United States must address the underlying
    vulnerabilities that produced this upheaval and gave space for
    ISIS across the region.
        We must devote greater attention to supporting governments
    like Tunisia, who are using political compromise instead of
    violence to resolve disputes.
        We should help local partners forge meaningful governance,
    not just a security presence, in ungoverned spaces like the
    Sinai.
        Ultimately, building resilient societies that can
    marginalize extremists requires governments that can win
    citizens' trust and loyalty and it requires systems that can
    offer young people meaningful opportunities to fulfill their
    long-denied dreams so that they don't place their hopes in a
    world after this one.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Wittes follows:]

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                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much to all of our
    panelists and I will recognize myself for the first round of
    questions.
        Despite the clear and vocal calls for a comprehensive
    strategy, a U.S. policy in Iraq and in Syria, the
    administration continues to treat the conflicts as separate or
    at least as situations that should be dealt with one at a time,
    and this is either a fundamental misunderstanding of the issues
    at hand or willful ignorance due to a political calculation,
    namely, the administration's misguided and naive nuclear
    negotiations with Iran.
        It must acknowledge that air strikes alone will not be
    sufficient to defeat ISIL in either Iraq or in Syria, that
    Assad must be removed from power and that Iran, even if it is
    the enemy of our enemy, is still an enemy.
        In a hearing yesterday, former Ambassador to Syria Robert
    Ford testified that if the United States allies with Iran, we
    are playing into ISIL's narrative and helping in its
    recruitment.
        So I ask the panelists do you believe that we are
    cooperating with Iran directly or indirectly against ISIL and,
    if so, is this helpful to our national security interests?
        Dr. Jones, then General Keane--whoever wants to tackle
    this.
        Mr. Jones. Sure. I will start.
        Look, I think in particular in Iraq there is and there are
    areas where the U.S. has worked with Iranian-backed militia
    organizations in various areas. The campaign has involved a
    complex set of state governments including Iraq as well as sub-
    state actors, Kurds, but also Iranian-backed Shi'a militias.
        So I think the answer to your question is yes, the U.S. has
    cooperated somewhat with Iran, particular at the substrate
    level. There have been discussions as well about the political
    issues, Sunni-Shi'a issues with the--with the Iraqi Government
    that Iran has been involved in.
        I think, ultimately, the U.S. is in a very complicated
    position here but I do agree with your comments that a strong
    allied relationship with Iran, if that is the direction we go
    in, would be very counterproductive and would certainly walk
    into an anti--would certainly help with the ISIL narrative.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Jones. It is exactly what they are saying.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. General?
        General Keane. I agree with the doctor about Iraq's level
    and repeat it. But in Syria, I think, really, the elephant in
    the room in Syria with the administration's reluctance to
    provide assistance to the Free Syrian Army despite a very
    credible and experienced national security team that
    recommended that, as I pointed out in my testimony, I think is
    Iran.
        It is the elephant in the room in the sense that we have
    been, because the nuclear talks and establishing a deal, I
    think, is the unstated foreign policy major objective of the
    administration.
        It has handcuffed our ability to do what we should have
    done in Syria because of a potential setback from the Iranians.
    So de facto our policy decisions in Syria have certainly helped
    Iran bona fide establish a client state with Syria, contributes
    to their expansionist policies and certainly encourages them to
    do what they are doing right now in Yemen, which if they are
    able to achieve what they want to achieve in Yemen--political
    and military control in Yemen--then they change the strategic
    balance of power in the region by gaining control of a
    strategic waterway at the Gulf of Aden at the straits of Bab-
    el-Mandeb and affect and control and leverage shipping that
    comes in and out of the Suez Canal--a major objective for the
    Iranians that they would not have thought of without the
    progress that they have made in Syria.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Doctor?
        Ms. Wittes. Thank you.
        You know, I think part of the challenge is that our
    regional partners who are absolutely necessary to any
    successful outcome in Syria have until very recently been
    pretty divided themselves on the question of what should follow
    Assad and what kind of political order they would see as a
    desirable end state, and in many ways their elevation of the
    Iranian threat above the threat of ISIS, above the threat of
    political Islam, is a product of just the last year or so.
        But up until recently, different Arab states were
    supporting different factions in the Syrian opposition and I
    think that vastly complicated any ability we had to forge unity
    among them.
        Now, there might well have been a time early in the Syrian
    conflict when a more forward-leaning American policy would have
    created that unified front. But I think we are long past that
    now, unfortunately.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        I have other questions but I will wait for the next round.
    Mr. Deutch, our ranking member.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        The Iranian foreign minister was on American television
    last night and was talking--when asked about Iranian influence
    in the region and the way that it is perceived pushed back
    against the argument that anyone could perceive what is
    happening now in any part of the region as a Shi'a-Sunni
    conflict--that there is absolutely nothing to that.
        I would like to hear from our panelists a response to that
    and if you disagree with that assertion what role, ultimately,
    can the United States play if his assertion is wrong and it is
    indeed perceived that way among our allies and those who are
    not?
        Mr. Jones. Chair, I will start.
        I think we are often prone to gross generalizations about
    the state of sectarianism. Being recently, for example, in
    Djibouti and looking closely at the situation in Yemen, one can
    easily gravitate to an argument that this is a Saudi--because
    they have been involved--Iran proxy war.
        But the reality when you get onto the ground into Yemen and
    look at it is there are a range of tribal politics involved.
        The Houthis have been battling Saudi Arabia for a long
    time. They are not an arm of the Iranian Government. They do
    get some assistance.
        So I would say the answer to your question is there is,
    clearly, an Iranian grand strategy for the Middle East, for
    North and East Africa and other locations that as caused them
    to provide assistance to some groups and not others--some
    governments and not others.
        But when you actually look on the ground, whether it is
    Syria or Iraq or Yemen or take your pick, I mean, I think we do
    have to understand that we are also bringing in the very
    localized elements of the dispute.
        So I would say that there is a combination of both local
    and these grand strategic issues that is going on in all the
    conflicts we are talking about here.
        General Keane. I agree. I mean, one of the things that
    happens when you look at this region, because of the
    sectarianism that has been there historically, that we have a
    tendency to throw that out as the underlying cause for all the
    problems we are having.
        It certainly is a contributor but there has been a lot of
    peace between these sectarian groups as well. Iranians--I mean,
    I, clearly, think this is a geopolitical strategy of theirs to
    dominate the region, to influence and dominate Shi'a countries
    as well as Sunni countries and I believe that is what is
    driving them.
        Like other radical Islamists, they will take advantage and
    manipulate this sectarian divide as much as they can to their
    own geopolitical ends.
        Mr. Deutch. Ms. Wittes.
        Ms. Wittes. I think both sides of this regional power
    struggle, and I would agree it is a regional power struggle,
    have found a sectarian narrative useful.
        It helps them rally around the flag, it helps them mobilize
    allies and, unfortunately, they have fed off of one another
    repeatedly whether it is Bahrain or in Yemen or in Syria.
        Once that narrative takes hold and is advanced by one side
    the other side ups the ante, and we have seen this in the
    regional media. It has been quite vicious and nasty.
        But I think that the problem with just looking at it
    through that lens is that it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy
    at a certain point, just as we saw in the Balkans in the 1990s.
        At a certain point, when people have lost the ability to
    find security through the state or through the government, they
    are going to fall back on community identifies and if everybody
    around them is choosing friend or foe according to sectarian
    identity they will be forced to do that, too.
        So the reality for Syrians, sadly, today I think is a
    reality of sectarian conflict. It didn't have to be that way
    but that is where we are.
        Mr. Deutch. And so then where should it go and,
    specifically, to your--the point you made about young people
    who, particularly those in their teens, early 20s, who have now
    endured 4 years of this, many of them displaced or refugees,
    what is the message from the United States, going forward?
        What do they need to see to counter their understandable--
    as you put it, their understandable decision in many instances
    to just fall back into tribal affiliation?
        Ms. Wittes. Yes, I think in the Iraqi case there is a
    fierce debate going on and an effort to try and demonstrate
    that there is space within Iraqi politics and the Iraqi state
    for all of Iraq's people.
        I don't know whether the angels will win that argument. I
    certainly hope so, and I think, by the way, that both Iran and
    our Sunni Arab partners, have important roles to play in
    helping to stabilize Iraq by making sure those decisions on
    behalf of political inclusion, like establishing a national
    guard, move forward.
        Syria, I think, is much harder because the conflict is so
    severe because half the population has been displaced.
        But as part of what we need to do, whatever the political
    architecture, we need to generate within society over the long
    term the ability to build dialogue, to build intercommunal
    dialogue, to build mechanisms for conflict resolution so that
    while those tensions will always be there, they don't erupt
    into violence.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch.
        And now another Florida colleague, Mr. Clawson, of a great
    state.
        Mr. Clawson. Thank you to the gentlelady for doing this
    committee hearing. I think it is great to have knowledgeable
    folks and let us shed some sunlight on complicated topics, and
    that takes time and too often up here we don't have enough
    time. So thank you, Congresswoman, for doing this.
        It seems to me that our objectives out to be--if they are
    not they ought to be, number one, protect Israel in this
    region, number two, to counterbalance I think what you call
    this grand--I don't remember the exact rhetoric you just used--
    grand Iranian strategies.
        Is that right? And so, at least from my seat, it seems like
    those are the two things that we ought to be trying to do.
        Having said that then, I have the following observations
    then you all could react to. Number one, it feels like we are
    talking too much to the wrong people and not enough to the
    right people and not enough allegiance is going on--you know,
    alliances going on with good friends that might be able to band
    together and do something about this instead of talking to the
    bad guy.
        It just feels like strategically I don't know who I am
    doing a joint venture with here--what is going on, number one.
    Number two, it feels like as the region gets more dangerous,
    that you all point out, why are we not giving more military
    assistance to Israel. It feels like an obvious question.
        Number three, why do we want more nukes in the region as it
    becomes less volatile, and number four, you know, I voted no on
    the Syrian involvement last year.
        It felt like if we didn't have a grand strategy to
    counterbalance this Iranian grand strategy, as you all call it,
    the isolated pinpricks just throw gasoline on the fire. It is
    hard to manage from halfway around the world with people we
    don't trust and don't really know very well and it just makes
    the situation worse.
        So while I am all for spending more military dollars to get
    ready for a coming crisis, I don't consider myself an
    isolationist because I don't like, you know, these isolated
    actions that aren't linked together and seem to take us
    nowhere.
        So I have given you four observations there. There is three
    of you. If each one of you take one, we might, you know, might
    get somewhere here.
        General Keane. Well, I will start. It is a fact that, and I
    agree with you, we spend a lot of time talking to our enemies
    and not our friends.
        When you travel in the region and talk to our allies in the
    region, I mean, it is unmistakable that over the last several
    years they have lost confidence in us.
        We do have a credibility issue with them and it is because
    of our policy decisions that I enumerated in the oral statement
    as well as the written statement that are driving those
    conclusions.
        Those are very real, and in a sense it handicaps putting
    together the kind of comprehensive strategy that we do need,
    one, to deal with the Sunni-based radical Islam, which is a
    generational challenge we are facing, and number two, to
    counter the Iranians effectively.
        I am of the mind that the administration has this thought--
    that Iran, being the country it is, a powerful country itself,
    has a right to a sphere of influence in the region and as such
    we must work with that country to achieve common objectives in
    terms of regional objectives.
        It does not embrace the 30-plus year history of Iran's
    barbarism and proxy wars that it has fought and the killing of
    Americans from 1983 all the way to 2008 and puts that aside and
    chooses to treat Iran as a country that aspires to be in the
    community of nations and therefore tries to influence in moving
    in that direction.
        I think that naiveness and sophomoric approach to a serious
    problem, to be quite frank about it, has so antagonized our
    allies in the region that it becomes their number-one issue
    with us because they had always believed that the United States
    strategically was a counterbalance to Iranian influence in the
    region.
        Mr. Jones. If I could just pick up on your first point, I
    would add one other major U.S. interest and that is to protect
    the homeland, and the concern I have, particularly on the
    Syrian side, is that, as U.S. intelligence officials have said
    publically, that we have two groups--Khorasan out of looser
    territory and the Islamic State more kind of inspired but are
    plotting or encouraging attacks against the homeland coming
    from Syria.
        And second, we have the highest percentage of foreign
    fighters in the history of jihadist battlefields--the recent
    history--coming in particular to Syria to fight, and we don't
    have a long-term strategy right now.
        We have got a bit of a half measure with the train and
    equip program but in my view that is not tied to a long-term
    regional--certainly, not a Syrian strategy.
        Mr. Clawson. So you would--I think the general and I, you,
    then the three of us would be in agreement to go big or don't
    go. If the problem is that serious, then either let us not mess
    around with it or let us go big and get something done with our
    allies.
        Mr. Jones. Just to be clear, when you say go big you mean--
    --
        Mr. Clawson. Big enough to make a difference--to make us
    safer.
        Ms. Wittes. Perhaps I can weigh in on that component
    because I think that--I think it is important to understand the
    military tool as one tool in the toolbox but a strategy looks
    at how all the tools fit together, right.
        And so a good strategy uses military force directly or
    indirectly as a means to an end. I think one of the hard
    lessons that we have learned over the last decade and a half is
    about the limitations of military force.
        It can achieve a lot but there are limits on what it can
    achieve, especially if it is not in the context of a broader
    political strategy.
        So as we think about how to push back on Iranian influence
    around the region, we can certainly increase--you know, talk
    about increasing assistance to our friends and partners in the
    region.
        I am sure that when the GCC partners come to Washington
    later this month some of them--maybe all of them--will have a
    shopping list. But I would argue that that is not the most
    important thing they are looking for in terms of reassurance
    and support from us.
        What they are looking for is our willingness to use all of
    our policy tools to push back on Iran around the region and I
    think in some ways the most important tools we have are
    intelligence to expose what we see and what we know about
    Iran's activities and cooperation with our regional partners on
    the politics and diplomacy.
        If we can work diplomatically to resolve some of these
    conflicts and grievances, that gives the Iranians much less
    room to operate. The upheaval of the last 4 years has given the
    Iranians far more opportunities in far more places and we need
    to try to shrink that down.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Clawson.
        Another Florida colleague, Ms. Frankel.
        Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I want to thank all the panelists for being here and, of
    course, General, for your service to our country. I deeply
    appreciate that.
        So with that said, I just wanted to say that, General, I
    am--I will try to say this as kindly as possible. I am
    perplexed of you laying the blame on this administration, first
    of all, for what is going on in the Middle East--first of all,
    without even commenting on the fact that another administration
    took us--military action into Iraq in the first place.
        But I want to get past that because I think to blame the
    United States of America on what is going on in Iraq, Syria,
    Libya, Iran, Yemen and every other place in this world is
    ridiculous. I think it is unfair.
        And I do have a question, though, and my question is what
    role does a corruption of these governments, the oppressiveness
    of these governments, the poverty in the country and the lack
    of human infrastructure to replace these governments.
        How does that affect what is going on? And this is for all
    of you.
        General Keane. Well, first of all, I didn't blame the
    United States for everything that is wrong in the Middle East.
    I quite frankly said that our policy decisions enabled these
    activities and I think that is an important distinction to
    make.
        We are--we are contributors to our problem. I mean, it is
    conventional wisdom to say that the underlying factors in the
    Middle East are the real cause of all of these problems and we
    should absolve the United States of any accountability or
    responsibility and those underlying factors are the ones that
    you are reaching out to, and I certainly understand that.
        The region, by and large, is run by repressive regimes.
    Almost every one of them has some degree of repression in it.
    The fact is the Arab Spring was about people seeking political
    and social injustice--reform of political and social injustice
    and economic opportunity.
        There is political incompetence in the region and a lack of
    moral courage to make change. There is historical sectarianism
    that is in the region.
        But I am also suggesting that something has fundamentally
    changed about the United States' role in that region in the
    last several years compared to what it has historically been,
    and I tried to point out to you those mistakes--those policy
    mistakes----
        Ms. Frankel. Excuse me. How about the--how about going into
    Iraq in the first place? Do you think that was a good decision?
        General Keane. I think the decision to go into Iraq based
    on the information that was provided this Congress, the U.N.
    thought it was the right decision.
        Ms. Frankel. Was that a good decision?
        General Keane. Yes, at the time----
        Ms. Frankel. Oh, it was? Okay.
        General Keane [continuing]. Based on what we did.
        Ms. Frankel. All right. Well----
        General Keane. Now--no, wait a second. Let me--let me--let
    me finish the answer. If, given what we know now--we justified
    going into Iraq based on WMD. Given what we know now, would I
    make that same decision? No.
        Ms. Frankel. Okay. So--okay. Let me ask Dr. Wittes. Could
    you comment on my question?
        Ms. Wittes. I think that we have to look at all the sides
    of the equation here. There is no question in my mind that some
    American decisions have exacerbated the anxieties of our
    partners in the region.
        There is no question in my mind that the invasion of Iraq
    did help to crack up this regional order. But as I said, it was
    breaking down anyway. It definitely gave it a push.
        But I think the most important point I would make is that
    our regional partners are anxious anyway because the region
    that they knew, the status quo they counted on and befitted
    from is gone and it is never coming back, and they don't know
    what is going to replace it.
        They don't have a vision themselves for what they want to
    replace it and so right now they are mistrustful of one
    another's motives.
        They are anxious about the balance of power, which they do
    perceive as turning against them because of Iran's activities
    around the region and because of the rise of political Islam.
        They are deeply worried about the degree of violence and
    the spillover and the refugees and the implications for their
    stability. And yes, they have some anxieties about the U.S.
    role.
        But in that context, our role is going to be incredibly
    complicated and incredibly controversial almost no matter what
    we do. And so hewing to our own interests and being very
    transparent with our partners about what we are doing, what we
    are not going to do and why seems to me that would--that would
    be the best way to address the problem.
        Mr. Jones. Can I briefly answer or are we over time? I will
    be brief.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Please go ahead.
        Mr. Jones. I think when you look at, particularly since the
    rise--the Arab uprisings, when you look, for example, at World
    Bank data, in the region--in the region this subcommittee deals
    with, you see a categorical decline across all major governance
    indicators.
        One factor that has contributed to what you have outlined
    is weakening governance across the region--across North Africa,
    East Africa and the Middle East.
        In that vacuum, from Libya through Yemen up into the Middle
    East, in that vacuum we now have a range of actors that have
    pushed into that vacuum sub-state actors--the Islamic State,
    al-Qaeda in a few locations.
        We have state actors like Iran. I think because of that
    situation this then puts the United States in a very important
    position. With the collapse--weakening of governance in a range
    of these cases and actors filling in, whether they are sub-
    state or state, what role does and should the United States
    play in filling in? That is diplomatically, economically and
    militarily.
        I think that is where--and that is really the question to
    ask based on the events over the last several years. But I
    think the data on this is actually pretty clear. We have got
    weakened--severely weakened governments.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. Frankel.
        Mr. Meadows of North Carolina.
        Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is refreshing to
    not only hear a diversity of answers but I can honestly say I
    followed each one of you, reading comments and work that you
    have done and continue to do in this particular issue.
        So my request of you is the balance of diplomacy versus
    more military intervention versus credibility because I think
    that the balance of those three elements I see a lack of
    credibility within the region right now in terms of if we say
    something do we really mean it.
        Are we going to be there like we have historically or is
    this a new era? How do we start to restore that, and I will
    start with you, Doctor.
        Ms. Wittes. Thank you. It is--it is a challenging question.
    I think that in many ways the anxieties right now in the region
    are about intentions and objectives, not about means, and I
    think that if we had a stronger dialogue and clearer common
    ground with our partners on what we together are trying to
    achieve then we can debate the means.
        Mr. Meadows. Do you think we know that? I mean, because
    here I am sitting in Congress and I am not sure what we are
    trying to achieve, if we really look at it. I know we want
    peace and everybody wants peace and it is really easy to say
    that.
        But if we look at it from a strateg or a tactical point of
    view, I am confused on what our objectives are, specifically
    with Syria--you know, where our intel is less than it is in
    other parts of the region. Let us put it that way.
        So, I mean, can you clearly define what our objective or do
    you know at Brookings what our objective is or should be?
        Ms. Wittes. Well, I think what we have heard from the
    administration is a dual objective, which is to push back ISIS
    in Iraq and Syria and at the same time to build up a stronger
    opposition force that can get to at least a hurting stalemate
    in the conflict with Assad so that he then is willing to
    negotiate. At the end of the day, civil wars, you know, only
    end in a couple of ways--either one side vanquishes and
    exterminates or expels the other or they fight to the point
    where an external power can help, sometimes impose, sometimes
    negotiate a political solution and that is guaranteed by
    outside powers. That is how civil wars typically end.
        We wouldn't want the first outcome so we should be driving
    for the second and I think that--you know, to the extent the
    administration has articulated a long-term vision that is its
    vision.
        The question is how do we get there. And one of the reasons
    I highlighted in my testimony the importance of ensuring that
    where we push back ISIS or where the rebels push back Assad we
    have something in place to replace it that is not extremist
    rule is because it helps us drive toward that solution.
        For example, a number of our partners have talked about the
    idea of establishing safe zones in northern Syria and areas
    where the rebels have liberated territory.
        What is happening in Idlib right now is that the rebels
    pushed, Assad's forces fell back and now the regime is bombing
    from the air.
        So the remaining guys who were working for the Syrian
    Government and could be the kernel of a civil administration
    are fleeing like every other civilian in the area and that
    leaves these towns to the rebels--the extremists. So that is
    what we need to try and fix.
        Mr. Meadows. So let me--let me go back, because Dr. Jones
    mentioned we are having more foreign, and I believe it was you,
    Dr. Jones, that was talking about we have more foreign
    fighters' intervention. And so when they are expelled from
    Syria they come back to the United States, to Europe, to
    wherever because part of the problem we have in Syria is that
    we had trained fighters that were in a neighboring country that
    actually came here.
        And so we call it ISIS today. It was actually known by a
    different name just a few months ago. And so if we expel them
    without really having some meaningful military intervention, do
    we not just transport the extremist problem to other parts of
    the world?
        Mr. Jones. I think the pattern of jihadist activity we have
    seen in Iraq and Libya, in Afghanistan and Pakistan is they
    will either go back home or they will go somewhere else and
    bring instability, unless they die on the battlefield.
        The issue then on the military tools is I think I would
    support Clausewitz on this--that they--the military and the
    political goals need to be intertwined, which is where I think
    with programs like Syrian train and equip they are not exactly
    meshed. If we are going to train Syrian rebels, Syrian rebels
    are predominantly focused on the Assad regime. So trying to get
    them then to focus on the Islamic State, in my view, means that
    the military and the political goals are not intertwined
    directly.
        And so I think that is where I would say we have got to
    focus on bringing those two together.
        But, look, there is a war going on so the military tool is
    a necessity. They are fighting. We can try to work the
    political establishment and we should work for deals in both
    countries.
        But there is a war going on.
        Mr. Meadows. I am out of time and I am going to yield back
    to the chairman. General Keane, can you explain to me why we
    had more missiles that were launched into Israel from Gaza than
    sorties that we have actually conducted within Syria at this
    point and expect a different result?
        I call it Operation Powder Puff with what we have done so
    far in Syria. Do we need to have more meaningful military
    intervention? And I yield back.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Very good. We will allow General Keane to
    answer, if he would like.
        General Keane. Well, the Syrian strategy, from a military
    perspective, is a complicated one, to say the least. I mean,
    just thinking through it makes your head hurt.
        But, frankly, arming 5,000 Free Syrian Army each year--new
    recruits, not an organization--where are they going to go? The
    Free Syrian Army is down to several brigades.
        At one time it did make sense to strengthen that
    organization when it really had some robustness to it but we
    passed that opportunity.
        ISIS recruits on average, according to our intelligence
    services, 1,000 a month and steady--still doing that. That is
    12,000 new recruits that they are getting a year. So this is a
    fig leaf operation that has no connection to anything
    consequential.
        I think we should listen to our allies, which have been
    telling us that, look, we are all for dealing with ISIS but we
    cannot deal with ISIS while the Assad regime is still in power
    and it is using its military force throughout that country.
        Turkey tells us that. Saudi Arabia tells us that. All the
    bordering countries tell us that. So what do they want us to
    do? They would--in conjunction with them they would like us to
    establish no-fly zones, shut down the air power and free
    zones--stop the killing.
        What is the reason for that? To pursue a political
    solution. You are using military force, which is always
    intended to do to get a political solution. What is the
    political solution? Assad is undermined.
        Right now, his Alawite and Druze power is not what it used
    to be. There is no guarantee that this would happen but it is
    so far better than the status quo and the genocide that is
    taking place that it is worth a try. And then you get to some
    kind of coalition sharing.
        Are we concerned about post-Assad? Of course. Are we
    concerned about, as the doctor mentioned, Jabhat al-Nusra and
    the strength that it has gained in the last year? Of course, we
    are.
        All of that in some kind of political compromise and
    coalition sharing is a far better political answer than what we
    have now and you use limited military power or, in this case,
    the threat of it to get you moving in that direction.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Meadows.
        Mr. Higgins of New York is recognized.
        Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Just a couple of things. You know, General Keane, you had
    talked about--you clearly made a distinction that was
    administration policy that has resulted in some of the
    instability that exist in Iraq and Syria.
        But it is not just exclusive to this administration. I
    think if you look back in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the de-
    Ba'athification order and the dissolution of the Iraqi army
    basically said to 100,000 Sunni Iraqis that there is no place
    for you in Iraqi society and that formed the basis for the
    insurgency that we dealt with for most of the time that we were
    there, and I would argue that it was also the genesis of ISIS.
        The second issue is the panel seemed to be somewhat
    dismissive of the sectarian nature of the conflict in Iraq and
    in Syria, and I don't think it can be dismissed at all. I mean,
    it amazes me and, General, you had made reference to Qasem
    Soleimani, who heads to Quds Forces in Iraq.
        I mean, he is not only a tangential player in what is going
    on in Iraq today and Syria--he is there physically. He is on
    the ground directing Shi'a militias to prop up the Shi'a
    government in Iraq and they are not doing that, you know, as a
    good will measure.
        They are doing that to impose their influence to ensure
    that in the aftermath of ISIS that Iraq remains Shi'a. And one
    could argue that ISIS basically wants their country back. They
    want to reestablish Sunni dominance in Iraq.
        And, you know, someone had said here, you know, it is a
    fair assertion that we should talk less to our enemies and more
    to our friends. We don't really have friends in that part of
    the world.
        You know, there is the discussion when Americans are in the
    room and the discussion when Americans are not in the room. And
    typically, we count our friends as people whose interests are
    aligned with ours at any given time.
        But they are not really helping us, and it just seems that
    given everything that Americans have invested toward peace in
    Iraq--$25 billion to build up--to help them build up an Iraqi
    army, a security force--$25 billion--in their first test they
    ran.
        They ran from a fighting force of less than 31,000. The
    Iraqi army at that time was estimated to be anywhere between
    180,000 and 240,000 fighters. And then we depend on our allies
    who have proven to be helpful to us, the peshmerga--good
    fighters, experienced fighters, pro-Western, helped us on the
    early stages of the Iraq war, 190 fighters--and Shi'a militias,
    who are controlled directly by Qasem Soleimani, an Iraqi.
        And, you know, we tried to do one thing and I think we
    could only expect to do one thing in Iraq and that is through
    our military involvement to create a place, a breathing space,
    within which Sunni, Shi'a and Kurds could develop a political
    contract, and they failed miserably.
        And the guy that we put in there, Nouri al-Maliki, we put
    him in there first--Iran put him in there the second time--you
    know, basically created another sectarian divide. So, you know,
    at least when Saddam Hussein was in there, there was an 8-year
    war between Iraq and Iran and they fought to a standstill.
        Khomeini had said that when the Revolutionary Guard came to
    him and said--and Mousavi came to him and said, we can't win
    this thing, he basically stopped the war.
        But he said it was like drinking poison from a chalice. At
    least they were preoccupied with each other and expending the
    resources so that they weren't directed toward us.
        Look, a lot of questions there. I apologize for it, but a
    lot of things have been said here. So I throw that out to you--
    all of you.
        General Keane. Briefly, you know, I agree with a lot of
    what you just said. I would go further. This isn't about
    politics for me--a Democratic administration, Republican
    administration. I am interested in policy.
        The White House policy dealing with Afghanistan and not
    building an effective security force after we deposed the
    regime was a policy mistake that led to the reemergence of the
    Taliban.
        As you pointed out, the decision to disband the army and
    not pull it back and use it as security and stability when
    looting led to general lawlessness was a mistake. However,
    having Saddam Hussein in our jail houses, and other generals,
    we know now that the regime began that insurgency.
        They planned it 6 months before execution and they
    conceptualized it actually 2 years prior. So they were going to
    do that regardless of what we did with the military. But
    nonetheless, it still was a policy mistake.
        The sectarian nature of the conflict, yes. I am not
    dismissive of it but this much I know. ISIS' own stated
    objectives in their 400-page document in color designs a
    caliphate in the region and they intend to dominate those
    countries.
        Most of those countries are in fact Sunnis, as they are. So
    they intend to dominate the countries in the region to
    establish their caliphate, not only Shi'a countries where they
    have begun but also Sunni countries, which means they would
    depose governments and kill people in support of those
    governments.
        I am not--and they take huge advantage of the sectarian
    conflict and manipulate it, you know, to their ends. And Qasem
    Soleimani, certainly an instrument of the Supreme Leader.
    Doesn't work for anybody else but the Supreme Leader. He is
    carrying out his regional objectives, which are largely
    geopolitical.
        What they want in Iraq, in my judgment, is a weak
    government but stable, aligned with Iran and not aligned with
    the United States.
        That is their objective and I think they are working toward
    that end, and I know we are sort of out of time here. Thank
    you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.
        I am just going to ask a few more questions, if I might.
    Mr. Jones, in your testimony both written and oral you said
    that we should consider pausing the Syria and Iran train
    program until we get a clear explanation of our strategy and
    long-term goals.
        The administration has said that it wants the program to
    only be for defensive purposes against ISIL. Yet, these forces
    consider Assad to be their number-one enemy, and I will ask the
    panelists or just Dr. Jones, what do you believe should be the
    mission of the train and equip and program both in Syria and in
    Iraq?
        Should they be offensive? Should they be defensive? How can
    we use these programs to help bring stability to the region?
        Mr. Jones. That is an excellent question, or excellent
    series of questions. My own experience in being involved in
    training programs overseas is that one can't train only for
    offensive or defensive purposes.
        You can't control, like joysticks, fighters when they go
    into the field. So if they are trained for primarily defensive
    purposes, when they actually go into combat they are going to
    use both skill set--the skill sets for offensive and defensive
    purposes.
        I think that is the general reality. My primary focus on
    the train and equip program, though, is to meld together a
    training program with a political end state in Syria and so if
    we are going to train Syrian rebels, if that is--if that makes
    political sense and then they have to be designed toward
    dealing with the biggest political problem in Syria right now,
    which is the Assad regime.
        But if you are going to train then they have to be trained
    sufficiently, integrated with other states in the region
    including the Jordanians to pursue operations on the ground
    in--with the long-term goal of a political end goal and I think
    that is the end of the Assad regime.
        So what I would like to see is the matching of those and,
    again, I would just highlight, you know, there are at least two
    other challenges I think there are with the program.
        One is there is no follow-on force once these people hit
    the ground. It makes it very difficult to see what they are
    doing, to impact what they are doing on the ground.
        The second issue is that in general they--that it makes it
    very difficult--if you are not there it makes it difficult to
    assess what they are doing, how they are doing. You really need
    people on the ground to be about to assess that and, again,
    this really is special operations skill set or an intelligence
    one with organizations like the CIA.
        So I think if we are to do this, those are the kinds of
    forces I would strongly consider.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. General Keane.
        General Keane. The training program in Syria makes no sense
    to me whatsoever and I don't think we should be doing it. It is
    a fig leaf because 5,000 new recruits this year are not
    consequential to dealing with ISIS and that is the stated
    purpose of doing it.
        They are supposed to join a Free Syrian Army, which is in
    fact fighting the regime and not fighting ISIS. The only time
    the training program will make any sense is when we have a
    political solution in Syria and ISIS is still there and we have
    to deal with it.
        Then it makes some sense now to put together a training
    force. Now we would train not--and we would put--I think it
    would be advisable to put some advisors on the ground as well.
    That makes sense because now you have got a stable political
    situation. The regime is not pounding its people anymore or the
    opposition force.
        In Iraq, the problem with the train and assist mission it
    is just--Madam Chairman, it is just so extraordinarily
    inadequate.
        We have an 18-division force in Iraq that we began with. We
    are training nine Iraqi brigades and three peshmerga brigades.
    No advisors will go forward with those units to fight, no
    forward air controllers forward with those units. We need a few
    thousand advisors training considerably more people, compress
    the time frame and then let some of those trainers as advisors
    go forward and follow with the unit.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And that was going to be general----
        General Keane. So it is inadequate.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. My follow-up question, which was what is
    your assessment of the Iraqi security forces capability. But
    you just answered that.
        But you had testified that we are taking less than half
    measures to assist the Iraqi security forces, that we are
    providing insufficient arms to the Kurds and we have no
    credible plan to defeat ISIL.
        I will ask you, do you believe that the current government
    in Baghdad, that is certainly a breath of fresh air compared to
    the previous one, can work cooperatively with the Kurds and
    provide them military hardware?
        General Keane. Yes, and that is a great question and you--I
    think you probably know the answer here. It is pretty
    frustrating what is unfolding. We want to assist the Sunni
    tribes, we want to assist the Kurds and the Iraqi Government is
    constipating that process. And I know there is a thought that
    we should find a mechanism to go around the government.
        Look, this government is an improvement and much of the
    success in Iraq is dependent on their ability to politically be
    inclusive, particularly with the Sunni tribes and with the
    Kurds.
        The advisors and the training program and the Sunni tribes
    is inadequate. It is not going to get us there. The arms
    program is inadequate because they are not reaching them.
        The same thing with the Kurds. The Kurds have skill and
    they have will, but they need better weapons and that is not
    getting there either.
        More pressure needs to be put on--I would rather go through
    the government and make that happen than go around the
    government and find another program to do it. We have got to
    move the government in the right direction to do that.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you, General.
        Mr. Deutch.
        Mr. Deutch. Thanks. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        General Keane, if the train and equip mission is just a fig
    leaf, if it is not going to accomplish what needs to be done in
    Syria, which is, I think what you just said--you just described
    the problems in Iraq--so what is--how do we--how do we
    accomplish it?
        It would start with Syria, and if in Syria ultimately the
    real solution involves Assad's departure then, for you and Dr.
    Wittes, how do we--how does that happen?
        Who can put pressure on Assad if at this point it is not us
    and, obviously, it is not--it appears that it is not the
    Russians?
        General Keane. Well, what I have suggested is that,
    clearly, we can use the military instrument here to try to get
    a political solution.
        We should take the counsel of our allies in the region--
    Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan--and what their objective is,
    clearly, they recognize ISIS as a major threat to them.
        But they understand that to pursue ISIS while the Assad
    regime has all of its military power and is pounding opposition
    forces and killing its own people makes no sense. We have got
    to get Assad out of there.
        The way to do that--and there is no perfect solution here.
    But the status quo, I think, is unacceptable, given the
    genocide that is taking place.
        So what you do is you put in, and this is what our allies
    would like to do and I agree with them, no-fly zones--if Assad
    contested then we would shut his air power down and we have the
    capability to do that, I don't think he would--and buffer zones
    to stop the genocide.
        The Alawites and the Druze right now have less support for
    Assad than they have had through these 4 years. I think some
    kind of political solution with Assad gone is in the offing.
        The opposition will not entertain anything with Assad
    there. So I would focus on that political solution and modest
    introduction of military threat and possible capability to do
    that. That allows you then to focus on ISIS.
        ISIS cannot be driven out of Syria, Congressman Deutch,
    without an effective ground force. Where is that going to come
    from? It is not going to be the 5,000 recruits that we are
    training.
        It has to be largely provided by the nations in the region.
    They have to step up and do that. They will not do that with
    Assad there.
        So once we get a political solution then we can put
    together some kind of an effective ground force to deal with
    ISIS. Otherwise, the policy we have now is ISIS just continues.
        Mr. Deutch. All right. Great.
        So, Dr. Wittes, how do we get that political solution?
        Ms. Wittes. Thank you. Well, I think what General Keane is
    suggesting is that, in essence, we need to reverse the
    sequencing that the administration has put forward.
        They have said ISIS is the first priority and Assad is the
    second, and the General would have it the other way around. I
    actually think that the problem right now on the ground is that
    those who are gaining influence and power are gaining it
    because of battlefield success.
        They are not gaining it because they are protecting people.
    They are not gaining it because they are providing services.
    They are not gaining it because they are providing justice.
        And ISIS is saying that it is offering a governing model
    but what it is really offering is, we can win, and the
    extremist rebels on the ground that are doing the business in
    Idlib right now are gaining strength because they are showing
    that they can win.
        What we want to do is reverse that dynamic. We want to show
    that if you can demonstrate the ability to hold territory, to
    govern people, to provide security and justice that that brings
    benefits.
        And in order to do that, I think safe zones are a piece of
    the puzzle definitely worth considering, and our allies are
    pushing that, but it would require a commitment that we so far
    have been unwilling to make.
        Now, our allies have just been conducting air operations
    over Yemen and they have, you know, been part of the anti-ISIS
    campaign in there as well.
        So I think it is worth asking the question whether policing
    those safe zones is something they might be willing to take on
    or at least be the lead on in terms of threatened use of force.
        But we have also got to ensure that resources flow to these
    rebel-held areas in a way that keeps civilians there instead of
    having them flee and worsen the refugee problem and allows
    rebel forces who actually want to help govern Syria to begin to
    govern and protect Syrian people.
        Mr. Deutch. Madam Chair, can I ask one last question?
        So we know--we know that the American people will be
    supportive of efforts to push back ISIS. The horrific
    beheadings, I think, shine a light on the awful brutality of
    what they do and the killing of Americans is, I think, a moment
    of awakening for Americans. We understand that.
        I think there is broad awareness of the threats that--the
    concerns that we have about Iran and the Iranian threat and
    their support of not just propping up Assad but the way that
    they meddle and disrupt in the region and their support of
    terror.
        But I would just like--before we go I would just like to
    ask this question. With now a quarter of a million or so
    Syrians having died, do we--is there a place in our foreign
    policy for human rights anymore? Do we care? Do you think the
    American people care?
        General Keane. I definitely think so. I mean, I think the
    problem we have had here--you know, over at the Institute for
    the Study of War we get--we keep track of the genocide. We have
    got just these unbelievably graphic pictures of the results of
    starvation campaigns, attacking bakeries, 62 percent of the
    hospitals being destroyed, close to 70 percent of the
    ambulances--a systematic methodology that the Assad regime has
    used on killing his people.
        It is just--it is outrageous. But very little of that is in
    the domain of the American people. I will tell you that--and I
    have to protect confidentiality here--I have dealt with some
    relatively senior people in the administration who had no level
    of detail of what this really was until I put photographs in
    front of them and showed them this systematic methodological
    campaign to do this.
        It is much more than just barrel bombing. And so I think
    that is part of it. I mean, there is--I think the American
    people in general have the sense something bad is going on in
    Syria and people are being killed but they don't have a sense
    of what that really is.
        I will--I always believe fundamentally that this country
    has and will continue to have an interest in human suffering in
    the world. Doesn't mean we can solve all of it. I am not
    suggesting that.
        But I do believe that that is--and it is part of the
    President's policy dealing with ISIS--it is one of his tenets
    of it is humanitarian assistance.
        Mr. Deutch. General Keane, I believe you are right. And
    Madam Chairman, we had a witness here at one of our previous
    hearings, if you recall, who was a physician--a Syrian-American
    physician--who came--went to provide medical assistance in
    Syria and came here and told us about not--he didn't have the
    evidence of systematic killing.
        All he could tell us about was standing out in a school
    yard and looking up and seeing a black dot in the sky and
    knowing that it was a helicopter, and then seeing two more
    black dots come out and knowing that they were barrel bombs and
    knowing that they were being dropped and having no idea where
    they were going to land but the sole purpose of those dots as
    they fell and grew larger and ultimately hit the ground was to
    kill as many people as possible.
        General Keane, I believe you. I believe that we still think
    that human rights matter and that a regime that brutally kills
    over 200,000 people cannot be allowed to stand, and I think it
    is an important reminder. I am heartened by what you said.
        And I hate to end this hearing on that note. Your testimony
    has been--the three of you--has been really helpful to us. But
    I was at a meeting with our U.N. ambassador, who raised a
    term--this was a while ago, actually--who raised the term, a
    professional term, that I never heard before called psychic
    numbing.
        We can't afford, as a country, to allow psychic numbing to
    overcome the way we view the tragic deaths of thousands and
    thousands of people at the hands of a brutal dictator. We can't
    allow it. It is not who we are and I appreciate speaking here.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Amen. Thank you. Yes, I remember the use
    of that phrase tragic numbing and it is a tragedy.
        Mr. Connolly, thank you so much for being kind enough to
    give up your time. But I wanted to recognize you so that you
    could say a few words before we break, and I know that we have
    votes on the floor.
        Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Forgive me for being late--been a harried morning.
    Obviously, a lot more to go into in terms of this subject area.
    I was informed that General Keane perhaps made the suggestion
    that we were deliberately holding back in support of Syria
    freedom fighters or insurgents somehow to perhaps please Iran.
        I have never seen any evidence of that. I think we are
    holding back because we are not entirely sure which side to
    support and there isn't a great secular middle that is out
    there fighting the Assad regime.
        But that is worthy of further examination and, certainly, I
    will study your testimony very closely.
        Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr.
    Deutch.
        I thank the panelists for your excellent testimony. You
    have given us a lot to chew on, a lot to ponder on, a lot to
    worry about.
        Thank you so much, and with that the subcommittee is
    adjourned. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 12:51 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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