[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-30]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 25, 2015
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RICK LARSEN, Washington
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
ROB BISHOP, Utah PETE AGUILAR, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana
Steve Kitay, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Eric Smith, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Cardillo, Robert, Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency......................................................... 7
Hyten, Gen John E., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command..... 3
Loverro, Douglas L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Space Policy, Department of Defense............................ 4
Raymond, Lt Gen John W. ``Jay,'' USAF, Commander, Joint
Functional Component Command for Space......................... 6
Sapp, Betty, Director, National Reconnaissance Office............ 103
Weatherington, Dyke, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Space, Strategic, and Intelligence Systems, Department of
Defense........................................................ 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cardillo, Robert............................................. 96
Hyten, Gen John E............................................ 31
Loverro, Douglas L........................................... 52
Raymond, Lt Gen John W. ``Jay''.............................. 78
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 29
Sapp, Betty.................................................. 107
Weatherington, Dyke.......................................... 68
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 127
Mr. Rogers................................................... 121
FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 25, 2015.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:58 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. I want to welcome everyone to
the Strategic Forces Subcommittee's hearing on the fiscal year
2016 national security space activities of the Department of
Defense.
We are honored to have a panel of expert witnesses who lead
multiple areas of national security space enterprise. They are
General John Hyten, Commander, Air Force Space Command; Mr.
Douglas Loverro, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Space Policy; Mr. Dyke Weatherington, Acting Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Space, Strategic, and Intelligence
Systems; Lieutenant General John ``Jay'' Raymond, Commander,
Joint Functional Component Command for Space; Mr. Robert
Cardillo, Director of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
[NGA]. And we are awaiting Ms. Betty Sapp, Director of the
National Reconnaissance Office. She still hasn't been able to--
we haven't been able to reach her since we moved the hearing
back from 6 o'clock, but we have her opening statement.
This is a big panel. We will work to give every member a
chance to ask questions in this open hearing, at which point,
we will adjourn to a closed session to continue our oversight
in an appropriately secure fashion.
I would like to take note that this is the first time we
are having the Director of NGA testify at the Strategic Forces
annual space posture hearing. This is important both literally
and symbolically.
From a literal point of view, NGA has a critical role
within the national security space community and, as a combat
support agency, NGA provides tremendous support to our
warfighters. From a symbolic point of view, the six of you on
this panel, along with the other armed services and members of
the space community, need to be working extremely closely
together.
While each of you has your own missions with different
roles and responsibilities, it is essential that national
security space is integrated across the Department of Defense,
both unclassified and classified programs. In the end, all of
your jobs are to support and defend our country.
Regarding the posture of national security space, we
currently face many serious challenges. On January 28 of this
fiscal year, the Armed Services Committee held a hearing with
Mr. Frank Kendall, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as a witness.
Chairman Mac Thornberry opened up the hearing with a
question regarding the U.S. technological superiority and asked
Mr. Kendall to provide his greatest concern. Mr. Kendall
responded, ``We are at risk, and this situation is getting
worse.''
He further went on to state, ``The U.S. is being challenged
at an unprecedented rate. It is not just missiles. It is other
things, such as electronic warfare capabilities, anti-satellite
capabilities, and a spectrum of things to defeat our space
system. It is a number of things which I think are being
developed very consciously to defeat the American way of
projecting power, and we need to respond to that.''
Mr. Kendall could not talk specifics in an open session.
But when the most senior acquisition and technology leader of
the Department of Defense [DOD] says we are at risk of losing
our technological superiority, he must have our attention. We
want to understand how you will be addressing that threat.
Aside from the growing foreign threat, we have also heard
from our senior DOD and Air Force leaders about their concern
about our assured access to space posture going forward. We
held a hearing on this last week, and we will have a few more
questions on that topic today.
Separately, we have heard risks of not maintaining the
appropriate space-based weather-collection capabilities for top
Department of Defense requirements. I am concerned we are not
taking a strategic long-term view and are headed down a path
with significant risk. We will not allow critical capabilities
our warfighters rely on to be based out of Moscow or Beijing.
Additionally, we have systems on orbit that we have
invested billions of taxpayer dollars in that we are still not
fully using because of delays in ground systems and user
terminals. We must do better for the taxpayer and the
warfighters.
And, lastly, we are all aware of the current budget
pressure. This means we need to do business smarter without
sacrificing capability. As I have said multiple times in the
past, I believe we can save money in wideband satellite
communications, as one example. It will take strategic
planning, better partnerships with commercial industry, and new
contracting approaches.
Regarding the budget request, I support technology
development and evolutionary acquisition, but remain concerned
with efforts to create new programs, such as in missile warning
and protected communications, and will conduct close oversight
of such activities. I will need to be convinced that this is
the right time to make billions of dollars in investments in
new programs when our current programs are working better than
expected.
I know the great men and women of the Department of
Defense, including military, civilian, and industry partners,
will not shy away from these challenges. It will take work, and
I believe that we need to strengthen national security space
through capabilities development, organization, management,
policy, and funding.
Thank you again for your leadership and for being with us
today regarding these important topics. I look forward to your
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
Mr. Rogers. I now recognize my friend and colleague from
Tennessee, the ranking member, Mr. Cooper, for any opening
statement.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to
work with you.
And I, too, welcome the distinguished witnesses.
We have a crowd of witnesses to hear from today. So I will
forego an opening statement and look forward to the testimony
of the witnesses.
Mr. Rogers. Now you know why I like him so much.
Roll Tide.
General Hyten, you are recognized for your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
SPACE COMMAND
General Hyten. Thank you, Congressman. And Roll Tide.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be here today
to represent the 38,000 men and women in the Air Force Space
Command and tell our story. It is also a privilege to be here
with my distinguished colleagues and friends to discuss some
very important issues with you.
Everyone here has been fortunate enough to witness our
Nation's evolution in space power. Our combatant and theater
commanders have fully realized how fundamental space-based
effects have become, but our potential adversaries have been
watching and working to challenge these very capabilities.
So to prepare for tomorrow's fight, we have to be ready to
respond to any threat. That response starts with command and
control. And so we have to assure that our Space Operations
Center is prepared to meet the challenges of daily operations
and demands of war, and that starts with the Joint Space
Operations Center [JSpOC] mission system [JMS] at Vandenberg
Air Force Base. This is the key to everything.
Winning tomorrow's war also includes countering adversarial
actions, and we are working to increase our overall resiliency
by investigating desegregation, hosted payloads, onboard
satellite protection, and defensive operations, as well as
leveraging commercial capabilities. But we can build resilient
architectures all day and, without assured access to space, it
means nothing.
With today's national reliance on space capabilities,
assured access has gone from important to imperative. It is our
highest priority. So, in case you missed it just a couple hours
ago, this afternoon we had another successful launch from Cape
Canaveral. Delta IV with GPS [Global Positioning System] IIF-9
onboard was successfully launched, and that makes 82 successes
in a row for the EELV [Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle]
program and ULA [United Launch Alliance].
But we also support competition in a healthy space launch
industrial base and must move as fast as we can towards rocket
engines that are built in the United States. So the Air Force
and SpaceX are aggressively working together to close all the
remaining criteria that we have to meet a June 2015
certification, and we are collaborating with private partners
to invest in industry solutions for U.S.-made rocket propulsion
systems.
Finally, returning to funding levels as directed by the
Budget Control Act of 2011, the Air Force Space Command is
going to have a difficult time meeting operational
requirements. Compromises will be made. Risks would increase in
any scenario. But we know that we have to continue to provide
the Nation with necessary capabilities and not lose ground in
the space arena.
So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your support, and I look
forward to working with Congress to provide resilient, capable,
and affordable space capabilities for the joint force and the
Nation.
Thank you very much, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Hyten can be found in
the Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General.
Mr. Loverro, you are recognized for 3 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS L. LOVERRO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Loverro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to
discuss the DOD's national security space program and, in
concert with my fellow panelists, report to you on the shared
progress we have all made to respond to the growing threats in
that domain. Those threats continue to mature, and our
adversaries are not sitting still. Let me assure you, neither
are we.
In order to address these threats, the Department has
increased its budget for space security by $5 billion. This
substantial increase is intended to make certain that U.S.
space forces are as dependable as the terrestrial forces which
depend upon them. These investments, as well as other
nonmaterial changes, will make clear to all that attacks in
space are not only strategically ill-advised, but militarily
ineffective.
Notwithstanding our increased focus on the national
security dimensions of space, we remain absolutely committed to
assuring the peaceful use of space for all. Space is a global
good and has been a driver for economic growth, environmental
monitoring, verification of treaties, and an enabler for
everyday citizens at home and abroad. Several of the
initiatives I will discuss today are intended to extend that
commitment, deter conflict in space, and enhance the economic
benefit we all derive.
But let me be clear. We can no longer view space as a
sanctuary. Potential adversaries understand our reliance on
space and want to take it away from us. We won't let them. The
U.S. leads the world in space on the commercial side, the civil
side, and the national security side. We will not cede that
leadership.
Together with allies and commercial partners, we will
continue to defend the right of all nations to access space for
peaceful purposes. But where that access is threatened, where
others would seek to remove the national security or economic
benefits we derive from that access, we will defend our use
just as we would in any other domain.
My written remarks include additional detail. But in the
interest of time, I would like to go ahead and thank you for
the opportunity to discuss these policies and programs with you
today. I look forward to working closely with Congress on these
issues, and I stand ready to answer your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Loverro can be found in the
Appendix on page 52.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Loverro.
And now we will go to Mr. Weatherington for 3 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DYKE WEATHERINGTON, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE, STRATEGIC, AND INTELLIGENCE
SYSTEMS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Weatherington. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking
Member Cooper, and distinguished members of this subcommittee.
It is my pleasure to be part of this esteemed panel, which
together represents the full spectrum of the United States
national security space enterprise.
With your permission, I would like to submit my written
statement for the record and just offer a very short oral
statement so we can get to your questions more quickly and have
a meaningful discussion.
Mr. Rogers. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Weatherington. I am pleased to report to you that the
Program Executive Officers for Space have been able to leverage
that which has been provided by Better Buying Power initiatives
undertaken by my boss, Under Secretary for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, to generate significantly improved
prices and real savings as the government negotiates production
contracts for several space systems. We look forward to seeing
how these latest iterations of Better Buying Power 3.0 will
continue this trend and save the taxpayers real dollars.
I am also happy to report--and this is in no small part due
to the diligence of my distinguished colleagues, General Hyten
and Ms. Sapp--that, with a few exceptions, our defense and
intelligence satellite constellations are currently in a
relatively stable, healthy, and well-populated situation to
support both the Nation and our warfighters.
That said, we also need to recognize that many of these
constellations will be entering a window of recapitalization in
the coming years. How we approach these recaps will be a
primary concern of the Department and will hinge on many
ongoing analysis and study efforts, chief among those being the
Secretary's strategic portfolio review and several key analysis
of alternative studies. And, of course, those plans and
programs will be drastically and harmfully impacted should the
Department be hampered by another sequestration.
Moreover, I believe you will certainly take away a common
theme from this panel today, a theme that no uncertain term
portrays the rapidly emerging additional vulnerability. And, of
course, I am speaking to the point that space is no longer a
sanctuary. Would-be adversaries are developing formidable
capabilities, capabilities designed to operate for the express
intent of denying our intelligence professionals and uniformed
warfighters the asymmetric advantages derived from our space
capabilities.
You will hear from all my colleagues on this point, each
from their own unique vantage point. From where I sit, it is my
job to ensure the Department acquisitions for new capabilities
stay abreast of this rapidly evolving challenge and that our
warfighters have the capability they need, but not at the price
that is untenable to Congress and the American people.
The President's fiscal year 2016 budget offers just these
solutions, with a mix of sustainment of current capabilities,
refreshing and upgrading other capabilities, and offering new
starts for some very unique capabilities.
Let me wrap up, as I promised to be short. Thank you for
working with us to provide space capabilities that address a
warfighter's needs, prepares for future challenges, and looks
at the broad range of our national security interests and
protects the U.S. taxpayers.
I look forward to your questions, Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weatherington can be found
in the Appendix on page 68.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Weatherington.
Now General Raymond is recognized.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN JOHN W. ``JAY'' RAYMOND, USAF, COMMANDER,
JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR SPACE
General Raymond. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper,
and members of the subcommittee, it is indeed an honor to
appear before you again with my distinguished colleagues as the
Commander of the United States Strategic Command's Joint
Functional Component Command for Space [JFCC Space]. In doing
so, I am representing the 3,200 soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, civilians, and allied exchanges officers that make up
the command.
Last year, I testified just shortly after my change of
command that the space environment had changed. It was no
longer the relative sanctuary it once was. Over this past year,
the pace of change has accelerated and today the domain is even
more congested, contested, and competitive than it was before
with no signs of slowing down. We are quickly approaching the
point where every satellite and every orbit can be threatened
and the strategic, operational, and tactical advantages derived
from space are no longer a given.
Now, more than ever, our responsive and flexible global
space force is critical to our ability to continue to exploit
the advantages of space. We are transforming our Joint Space
Operations Center from an organization focused largely on
cataloging objects in space to a command and control capability
with the space domain awareness needed to meet those current
and future challenges. With the help of the United States
Strategic Command and the services, this transformation is
being fueled through innovation, experimentation, and
partnerships.
As U.S. Strategic Command's Functional Component Commander
responsible for conducting space operations in the domain, I am
concerned that, if we do not receive relief from the Budget
Control Act, our ability to provide our Nation assured access
to these critical space capabilities will be at risk.
We are absolutely committed to assuring global access to
space and peaceful operations in and through the space domain.
Credible, reliable, and assured space capabilities are vital to
our Nation's strategic deterrence. I look forward to continuing
to work with you and your staffs as we advance and protect our
Nation's space capabilities.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Raymond can be found in
the Appendix on page 78.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Cardillo for 3 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT CARDILLO, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Cardillo. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for
the invitation to join my colleagues here to testify before you
today.
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is the Nation's
primary provider of geospatial intelligence [GEOINT] for both
the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community. Every
local, regional, and global conflict has geolocation at its
heart.
In a complex world of accelerating change, GEOINT delivers
spatial awareness, temporal context, and insight that enables
understanding and reveals unknown activities. NGA produces
GEOINT with content from an array of platforms. As the GEOINT
functional manager, I oversee current and future GEOINT
requirements, evaluate sensor system performance to meet those
needs, and we continue to require high-resolution imagery and
have an increasing need to image targets frequently to maintain
persistent awareness.
The sensors we use are not exclusively spaceborne. However,
defense space programs are critical to accomplishing our
diverse and worldwide mission. For spaceborne reconnaissance,
NGA relies heavily upon platforms and services provided by the
National Reconnaissance Office. NRO spaceborne assets continue
to meet national security requirements that only its program
could accomplish.
The fiscal year 2016 budget request also funds acquisition
of commercial satellite imagery. This imagery enables NGA to
provide GEOINT in current, high-interest and rarely imaged
areas of the world. It also allows us to develop products that
support air and sea navigation and humanitarian assistance
missions.
The commercial satellite imagery market is expanding at an
extraordinary rate, darkening the skies with small satellites
that present a remarkable opportunity for NGA and our
customers. If we can embrace the explosion in commercial
sources and leverage the exquisite capabilities of our national
technical space architecture, we have the opportunity to
realize the persistent GEOINT coverage that NGA and our
customers have sought for so many years.
In closing, the President's budget for fiscal year 2016
supports NGA's requirements for space and space-based systems
and services, provides us the resources and the capabilities we
need to support our warning, targeting, mission planning,
navigation, and flight safety missions.
So on behalf of the men and women of NGA, thank you for
this opportunity to appear before the committee. I look forward
to addressing your questions, and I look forward to earning a
second invitation to testify before this committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cardillo can be found in the
Appendix on page 96.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank you for that comment and for being
here.
And I recognize myself now for the first set of questions.
General Hyten and Mr. Loverro and General Raymond, this
will be targeted toward you.
The Department's requested a pretty significant increase in
investment over the next several years for the protection and
security of space systems.
Could you tell us about those investments and why you think
they are important.
Let's start with you, General Hyten.
General Hyten. So, yes, sir. As we look at the threat--and
you have heard each of us in a different way talk about the
threat being significant. And when we get into a closed hearing
later, we will go into more detail about what that threat is.
But as you look at that, it is clear that the United States
must increase our ability to respond to that threat. So in that
increased investment that Mr. Loverro referred to, you will see
increased efforts in space situational awareness as well as
response options that will allow us to respond to threats that
we see coming in the future.
And I think, as far as an open hearing, that is probably as
far as I could go, but we can address that in more detail in
the closed hearings.
Mr. Rogers. Would you say the increased investments are
proportionate to the need?
General Hyten. I would say they are proportionate to need
and they start us down a path. It would be nice to take more
resources and begin. But, as you start programs, it is
important to begin them in a prudent way so you understand what
the initial investments are going to be and then grow from
there. And that is what you will see in the fiscal year 2016
President's budget, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Loverro.
Mr. Loverro. Yes, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I couldn't
agree more with what General Hyten has already said. I think he
is spot on.
Let me just add a couple of remarks. As I alluded to in my
opening statement, we have to recognize that space is not a
sanctuary. And several of us have said it up there. That means
a lot. That is not the way we designed and operated systems for
many years.
We designed and operated them as if it were. We did not lay
out our space architectures. We did not build them with the
notion in mind that they would be attacked by conventional
means. That requires us to go ahead and make a change.
I am very pleased that we have aggressively pursued that
change in the President's budget. I think that we made many,
many good investments. As General Hyten said, we can't do
everything at once. To do so would be foolhardy. We would
probably fail.
But we have absolutely made a significant turn towards the
space capability that we need to defend against adversaries,
and we think that this will start us in the correct direction.
There may be more in the future, but right now we think that we
have got a very good balance within the fiscal year 2016
budget.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
General Raymond.
General Raymond. Thank you, Chairman.
I concur with what General Hyten and Mr. Loverro said. You
know, for the last 20 years, we have worked hard to integrate
space capabilities into the fight, and we have done so and it
has fueled our way of war. We must protect those capabilities.
Our capabilities were really designed at a time when the
domain was a sanctuary. Today, if you look at our space
capabilities with the lens of the contested threat that we see
emerging, then challenges materialize and we need this
investment to keep pace with those challenges.
Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. All right. Thank you.
General Hyten, in the launch hearing last week, we didn't
get an opportunity to hear your perspective on the EELV launch
capability [ELC] contract.
Can you provide your perspectives on the importance and how
you can have fair competition with this contract in place.
General Hyten. So, to be honest, Congressman, I don't think
you can have fair competition with that contract in place.
There will have to be a change. We are working with the
acquisition community to figure out what that change is going
to be. You may want to ask Mr. Weatherington about some of
those issues.
But let me just give a little bit of history of why we have
the EELV launch capabilities, the ELC contract in place. It was
really put in place to preserve a very fragile industrial base
because, in the mid part of the last decade, the mid-2000s, we
were facing an era where the satellites we were building for
the national security were not being delivered and the
commercial marketplace that we thought was going to boom did
not materialize either. And, therefore, the industry was in a
very fragile perspective because there was not launches there
available to support that industry.
So we created the ELC contract as a way to make sure that,
even if we didn't launch--and there were years that we launched
very small number of satellites--there would still be a healthy
industrial base at the end of that period.
It was also put in place that, God forbid, we ever had a
launch failure, that there would be a means to preserve that
industry as we worked through the issue of that launch failure
as well. So it is really an industrial-based concern.
As you build into a competitive environment, those reasons
become much different. And so the competition and the existence
of multiple capabilities really provide the resilience that you
need to get through those kind of issues.
And we believe that the launch manifest will be increased.
It will still be a significant challenge for our acquisition
community to figure out how to transition from the current
structure into the future, and they are working that issue now,
sir.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
Mr. Weatherington, the general wanted to put you on the
spot. So I will do what the general ordered me to do.
Mr. Weatherington. Mr. Chairman, General Hyten is
absolutely correct. There were and are very valid reasons for
the ECL construct as it exists today.
But clearly there is an understanding that, with increased
competition with the potential inclusion of new entrants into
the launch capability family, that that capability, that
function, has to be changed.
And so we are working very diligently with the Air Force to
adjust, and we have that flexibility in Phase 1A, the
competitive activity that is currently undergoing. Phase 2,
fundamentally, that function will be likely wrapped into the
rates that we pay on a per-launch basis.
And so the Department is committed to modifying and
continuing to evolve its space launch capability to take
advantage of the competitive launch environment that we see
coming in the future.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking member for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Hyten, I noticed in your testimony that you have
made some organizational changes. In fact, you lead your
testimony with it. And I am just curious.
By combining the A2, A3 and A6, is that something unique to
your organization or is this something that is going to spread
throughout the military?
General Hyten. Right now it is unique to our organization,
Congressman. But I think it is going to spread. And let me
explain the fundamental reasons why.
If you look at the capabilities that we have integrated,
the -2, the -3, the -6, which is intelligence, operations, and
cyber, you put those three things together and you think about
what we do as a command, those are three operational missions
that we do.
If you go to an intelligence organization, whether it is
the 18th Intelligence Squadron that is related to Space Command
or another squadron in another command, and you look at the
business that they do and you look at how we do space
operations and then you go to San Antonio and you look at how
we do cyber operations, it is very much the same.
So I believe that, in the future, the power of the military
is the ability to integrate all information. And in our
command, there is three elements of that: space, intel, and
cyber. And so it is a logical step to take those three pieces
and integrate them together because the integration of
information is going to be the power of military in the future.
Mr. Cooper. So is it too much to say that, by breaking down
these silos, that you have created a new best practice in the
military?
General Hyten. We have not created a new best practice yet
because we are still going through it. It is a significant
challenge because it is a change of culture as well.
But our command is committed to changing that culture. We
are committed to looking at each of those three areas as equal
partners in the operations. And that is why we will have one
flag officer on top of that pyramid that is responsible for
integrating all those operations. We have had success so far,
but we still have a long way to go.
Thank you for the question.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Cardillo, in his testimony, makes the point
very forcefully that one of his main problems is information
overload, this vast array of data that comes in, how do you
make sense of it.
And I hope that we have good answers to those questions
because understanding an infinite number of visual images,
which you say are increasing exponentially, that is a big
problem to get your arms around.
How are we faring in that regard?
Mr. Cardillo. Congressman, I couldn't agree with you more
about the challenge. I have to tell you I am equally excited
about the opportunity.
What I mean is that, if we are successful in managing the
data in a way that we haven't before, I think it is going to
elicit signatures, patterns, indicators we haven't seen before.
But I won't argue with you that this challenge isn't large. And
we are taking it head on.
Mr. Cooper. General Raymond's testimony was particularly
interesting because I am not sure that the average constituent
understands how crowded space is, with some 500,000 pieces of
space junk up there. That is quite a lot to keep up with.
And I forget whether it was your testimony or another
person who said, basically, we are going to have the first 24/7
traffic cop to warn people of collisions because there is some
23 announcements a day of potential collisions between, you
know, satellites and space junk.
General Raymond. Yes, sir. The Joint Space Operations
Center at Vandenberg actively tracks about 23,000 objects.
Those are about 10 centimeters or greater. That is the size
that we can track.
As you mentioned, 500,000 are below that level that we
can't track. The JSpOC, by its nature, serves as that traffic
cop. We provide space traffic control, if you will, for the
world, providing warning of potential conjunction to keep the
domain safe for all.
Last year, in 2014, alone, 121 times we recommended that a
satellite move and it moved, including the International Space
Station 3 times.
Mr. Cooper. It worried me a little bit that the number of
warnings is increasing so much regarding possible missile
launches from the ground. You said there were 588 of those and
some 9,648 infrared events. That is a lot to keep up with.
General Raymond. It is a lot to keep up with.
Mr. Cooper. How do we separate the wheat from the chaff
here?
General Raymond. It is a lot to keep up with. We have the
world's greatest capabilities with SBIRS [Space-Based Infrared
System] and DSP [Defense Support Program]. We have got the
world's best airmen that are operating that. And one of the
keys is that, when you are dealing with warning of potential
missile attack to theater or potential attack on the homeland,
you take that very, very seriously and put a lot of emphasis on
it to make sure we do it perfectly.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Loverro, I would be interested--you made a
pretty forceful statement about domain and protecting our
domain.
I would be curious, in the rhetoric of this and other
administrations, is yours the most forceful statement or are
you mirroring other rhetoric?
Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. I don't know if I want to call mine
the most forceful, but it is certainly what I believe strongly.
And I don't necessarily want to call it just pure rhetoric
either. It is absolutely our intent.
You know, it probably has been an evolving state of affairs
because the threat has evolved. Quite frankly, it is one thing
to anticipate an imaginary threat. It is another thing to see
that threat develop, watch it be exercised, as we have on the
Chinese on several occasions, recognize what it can do to our
capability, and react to that.
And that is what we are doing right now, is reacting to it
and making it very clear. We have no desire to have a conflict
extend to space. That is not in our interest. We don't believe
it is in the interest of anybody on the face of the planet.
We want our potential adversaries to understand that, if it
does, the U.S. will be prepared to defend our space assets.
Attacking our space assets is not a way to get the United
States to back off of a fight.
We are going to make sure that space assets are there to
support the men and women that General Hyten and General
Raymond have talked about so we can do the job that you have
asked us to do.
Mr. Cooper. Finally, Mr. Weatherington, you mentioned the
terrific recapitalization problem that we are about to face. A
generation or two earlier we had huge nuclear investments that
we are struggling to be able to recapitalize right now.
And it would be great to have some sort of early warning
system for how many years we need to be planning recap for our
space assets. So I hope you can help us with that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
And I want to recognize Ms. Sapp, who has made it. I want
to apologize to her for the moving target of start time, but we
are at the mercy of the leadership and when they call votes.
But I do appreciate you being here. We did accept your opening
statement for the record already.
[The opening and prepared statements of Ms. Sapp can be
found in the Appendix beginning on page 103.]
Mr. Rogers. Now I will recognize the gentleman from
Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being here and for your service to
our country in various ways.
General Hyten, we talked earlier today about an issue I
would like to ask you a little bit more about, the Air Force
space-based weather collection program. And I am concerned
about the future planning.
In October 2014, in response to a congressional-directed
report, there was a briefing by the Air Force that stated,
``DOD does not currently rely on nonallied international
sources for environmental data, but may be required to do so as
early as 2017 due to EUMETSAT's recent decision not to replace
Meteosat-7.''
I have another memo on this topic that was written just
last month by the Air Force. It states, ``New information has
come to light that demonstrates an unacceptably high risk for
relying on civil and international sources.''
And the memo further states, ``While China and Russia have
mature technical systems, recent events indicate they present
unacceptable security and operational risk. This dependency,
particularly over the USCENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] area of
responsibility, provides an unnecessary risk to U.S. operations
and American lives.''
So, actually, my first question will be to Mr. Loverro. But
thank you for the discussion that we had earlier, General
Hyten.
Mr. Loverro, should we be creating new reliances on China
and Russia for weather data for our warfighters?
Mr. Loverro. Mr. Congressman, I like the fact that you
started off with General Hyten first, so----
No. This is a very complex issue. But let me make one thing
very clear before I answer in detail. The DOD has no intent, no
plans, and has no current reliance on Chinese or Russian
weather satellites. We do not have it today. We will not have
it in the future. That is not where we are heading.
We had a conversation with this committee 2 years ago on a
problem with satellite communications in that regard. We fixed
that. And thank you very much for helping us do that. We are
not going to go ahead and repeat that error with the weather
satellites.
Now, we do have an issue. What we are talking about is
geosynchronous weather prediction and monitoring. That is not
primarily a DOD mission. That is a NOAA [National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration] mission for which the DOD uses
their capabilities.
And NOAA makes arrangements with other international
capabilities around the world. The one you mentioned, EUMETSAT,
has been our partner in the Indian Ocean for many years.
Because of the kind of budget problems the Europeans have
been having, they are having a hard time trying to fill that
gap. And they in the World Meteorological Organization have
decided that, for civilian purposes, that organization would
like to use indigenous capabilities, which includes Chinese and
Russian and Indian satellites.
We right now do not--I cannot tell you today how we will go
ahead and address this gap. We are working with NOAA. I met
with them just last week along with the folks from Air Force
A3, who wrote the letter that you quoted from, to figure out
how we can move forward.
NOAA has several alternative plans that they are examining.
Some of them are to move another European satellite, EUMETSAT-
8, over to the region. There are other capabilities that we
might look at. And I also visited India 2 weeks ago to start
the conversation with them about Indian satellites.
So there are several alternatives that we are looking at. I
cannot tell you what the answer is today. But let me make it
clear, once again, we do not intend to, we have no plans to, we
will not rely on Chinese and Russian satellites.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, that is a concern. Also, cost is a
concern. With constrained budgets, we have to make every dollar
count. I understand that. But getting the maximum capability
out of our existing constellation is also a concern.
Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. No. Absolutely. And, you
know, today that is not a mission that the DOD flies. So as we
look at that gap and we examine how we need to fill that, we
will have to assess whether or not there is something the DOD
needs to invest in or simply get NOAA to invest in. It is one
of those issues that is developing as we speak. I wish I had an
answer for you today. We know it is an issue.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay.
Mr. Loverro. We are following it.
Mr. Lamborn. All right. Thank you.
And let me--General Hyten, let me try to work in one--well,
I am going to have to wait for a second round, I am afraid.
I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now goes to Mr. Garamendi from California for 5
minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen and ma'am, thank you very much for being
here.
I guess this goes to Mr. Loverro and probably Mr.
Weatherington and Mr. Cardillo.
What are the opportunities to leverage the growing
commercial capabilities, services, for example, Skybox and
Planet Labs? And how long will it take for the U.S. Government
to replicate those assets or to use them?
So start at the right or the left. Let's start over here.
Mr. Loverro. Why don't I deal with the general, and then I
think Mr. Cardillo is better suited to answer the specific
questions.
So, sir, you are absolutely right. We have a great
opportunity here. As the DOD budget shrinks and as we focus
more on the security of space, we need to figure out how to do
things smarter. One of the smarter things we can do is to
leverage the commercial field far better.
There are certainly two areas where the commercial field is
burgeoning, mostly the U.S. commercial field, which is great
for us and our Nation's industry. You mentioned one of them,
commercial imagery, Skybox, Planet Labs. There are about 20
names out there, all of which will try their hand at trying to
figure out how to revolutionize this field, as well as our
tried and true providers, like Digital Globe.
The commercial SATCOM [satellite communications] world is
just as exciting. While we still have the legacy of 40 or 50
years of commercial SATCOM, we have a whole bunch of new
entrants, from the likes of Elon Musk to many others. We are
looking at new constellations and new configurations. All of
these can provide capability. We need to figure out how to
leverage them better.
Let me turn over the specifics, maybe, to Mr. Weatherington
or Mr. Cardillo.
Mr. Cardillo. First, I couldn't agree more with the
opportunity that is before us. I can't answer your specific
question about exactly when. I can just tell you we are fully
engaging with each.
And I should also say, too, I am a huge commercial imagery
consumer today. I just use it for what we call our foundation
mission. This is mapping, charting, geodesy, so the baseline
products upon which we then apply NRO's capabilities to provide
that exquisite level of intelligence and information. And I can
give you more examples about that in closed.
But we are fully engaged with the companies that you just
mentioned to explore. We are looking to do pilots and test beds
to be able to answer your question, and we will keep you fully
informed.
Mr. Garamendi. Good. I am going to go to another series of
questions. I know my colleague to my right here has this issue,
and he will pick it up, I am sure, in just a moment.
I want to go to the vulnerability of the GPS system and
should we have a backup system available to us, specifically
the eLoran program. And it is maybe $50 million to put it in
place, another $10 million a year to keep it going.
Should we move forward with such a backup system?
I will start--you are nodding your head, Mr. Loverro.
Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. So we have had a lot of discussion
of this within the DOD. Our fiscal year 2016 budget includes an
initial investment into eLoran, as you are aware. We do believe
that is a good idea.
However, it is not a panacea. It is great for backing up
the use within the continental United States. For civilian use,
however, eLoran, as currently configured, is not nonspoofable.
It doesn't extend around the world. It doesn't meet the needs
of our warfighters. So, absolutely, for civil concerns, it is a
good solution.
But from DOD concerns, we need to do more. We are doing
more. We are investing significantly in anti-jam capabilities
both on the satellites, in our user equipment. We, in fact,
accelerated--part of that $5 billion investment that I talked
about was a large acceleration of nonspoofable, nonjammable
user equipment that the Air Force will be building for the new
GPS signals.
We are also in talks with our allies. Galileo, Japan and
their Quasi-Zenith satellite systems, these are other systems
that perform the same functions, are separate from GPS, yet
perform a capability. We are looking very strongly at how do we
leverage those as a backup as well.
Because for military use, we do need that worldwide or at
least regional overhead system that we can't get from the
eLoran system which basically provides two-dimensional timing
and navigation, but doesn't really help us in the three-
dimensional overseas world that we fight in.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I appreciate all of that.
Also, the Coast Guard is interested because it does go
about 1,000 miles off the coast. And so it is useful in many
different ways.
Mr. Loverro. Absolutely agree.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
I yield back my remaining time.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr.
Bridenstine, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our distinguished panel for being here.
General Hyten, I have heard you comment in the past that we
need to get past the days when we think about military
satellite communications and commercial satellite
communications. Just start talking SATCOM.
One of the parts of the last NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] that we did, we had section 1603, and it
specifically asked the Department to look at the idea of having
SMC [Space and Missile Systems Center] as the single
acquisition agent for space.
My question for you is: In your best professional military
judgment, is having a single acquisition agent for space
necessary to get the architecture to include both mil
[military] and commercial satellite communications
capabilities?
General Hyten. Well, thanks very much for the question,
Congressman.
So, in my judgment, it is essential that there is a single
point in the Department of Defense, a single agency in the
Department of Defense, that is responsible for integrating how
we provide SATCOM. If we have multiple agencies that are
looking at buying and leasing capabilities, we will never have
a fully integrated, most cost-effective, most military-useful
capability to do that.
And so you asked me about SMC. I think the Department is in
agreement that we need to have a single place that does that.
From my judgment, the best place to do that is in Los Angeles
at SMC because that is where the bulk of military satellite
communications is procured. So if you have the bulk of a single
procurement agency in one place, it makes sense to look at how
you integrate those.
Now, the Department as a whole is still looking at that. We
owe you an answer to that 1603 language. We will work that. But
you asked my opinion, and I am glad to give it. Thank you.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, General.
Mr. Loverro, section 1603 of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA also
requires the DOD to revise the Executive Agent for Space's
directives and guidance with respect to SATCOM strategies,
architectures, and programs and, also, a report on reforming
the SATCOM organizational structure.
Can you briefly describe where you are in that process and
when we might be able to see that report.
Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. I would be glad to.
So both the CIO's office, our chief intelligence officer's
office, and our acquisition, technology, logistics office--
excuse me--chief information--thank you--and our acquisition,
technology, and logistics organization--not Mr. Weatherington's
office, but another sector of that--have been given the lead to
answer that question.
They have been convening a series of working groups in
order to go ahead and look at it. I believe they have scheduled
an interim brief to this committee on the 19th of April. I
cannot tell you what the results are yet. I have not been
personally part of that. But they are working on that.
It comes at an opportune time. We are rewriting right now
our DOD instruction on SATCOM management. In fact, I have a
copy of it in front of me here as the draft. And so we will
integrate that into the rewrite of this instruction as well as
what Congress has directed us to do, which is to look at how we
rewrite the EA [Executive Agent] for Space charter.
Mr. Bridenstine. General Hyten, have you been part of those
discussions or the planning process?
General Hyten. We have not been part of those planning
processes yet. Congressman, I fully expect to----
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay.
General Hyten. As you have said earlier, I have some strong
opinions on that. I think the Department knows what those
opinions are. Certainly Mr. Loverro does.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay.
General Hyten. And so I fully expect to be brought in, as
does the Executive Agent for Space, who happens to be the
Secretary of the Air Force.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. Mr. Loverro, I have got a minute and
23 seconds left.
Section 1605 of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA authorized a
SATCOM pilot program using working capital funds.
Can you share with us the status of that program, if there
is anything we can do here on this committee to help assist
with that.
Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. So we very much appreciate the help
Congress gave us in authorizing those funds.
Unfortunately, because of the way the pilots are
constructed and the way working capital funds work, the match
isn't 100 percent perfect. We are trying to work through it.
But as I have shared with you previously, that is a very
difficult match to make.
I am not the financial wizard within the Department to be
able to tell you how to modify that today. I am happy to go
ahead and take that for the record and come back on a better
way to do that.
But we absolutely want to move forward on the Pathfinders
that that was intended to fund. Those Pathfinders have been
laid out. I think we are anxious to get started.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you for that. I have 33 seconds
remaining.
General Hyten, speaking of the Pathfinders, if you could,
for this committee--I think it is critically important that we
get those Pathfinders funded. It doesn't appear that the
President's budget request funded Pathfinder 2 or any of the
other Pathfinders.
Can you share with this committee with why the Pathfinders
are so important.
General Hyten. The Pathfinders are important for a number
of reasons. The quick answer is that, if we are going to walk
down the path where we leverage the commercial sector in the
right way, we need to figure out the business models to do
that. The Pathfinders are structured in order to do that.
The Pathfinders also have the opportunity for us to test
different capabilities. It is possible that we can work the
protected tactical waveform inside a Pathfinder program and
explore the operational utility of that before we actually have
to make an operational decision.
Those are the fundamental issues that make the Pathfinder
so important.
Mr. Bridenstine. Roger that.
I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
Franks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all of you for being here, for your commitment to
freedom.
Lieutenant General Raymond, let me, if I could, direct a
question to you, sir.
As you may be aware, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Stewart, at a House
Armed Services Committee hearing on worldwide threats earlier
this year said that ``China and Russia are developing
capabilities to deny the U.S. use of space in the event of a
conflict.'' And that is a quote.
I mean, I find that pretty sobering and having implications
of a pretty profound nature. And it seems to me the United
States is facing the most challenging environment we have ever
seen in space.
And I would like to ask you directly: Would you agree that
this is the most challenging space environment we have seen?
General Raymond. Yes, I would. I would agree. I think the
threats are real. I think they are technologically advanced and
they are concerning.
Mr. Franks. All right. Well, if I could, then, turn to Mr.
Loverro and Mr. Weatherington.
As you also very likely know, previous congressionally
mandated commissions have reported on the value of setting up a
major force program [MFP] in the budget structure itself for
space. And I am aware that a virtual MFP was set up, but I am
not sure that it truly provides the benefits the commissions
were originally seeking.
What is your position on the benefits and challenges of
establishing a true MFP with centralized authority for space?
And, beyond an MFP, do you think that it is important that we
evaluate all aspects of the national security space, not just
the capabilities and development, but, also, organization,
management, policy, doctrine, training, to strengthen national
security space within the Department of Defense? And, if so,
what are we doing about that?
Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. As Secretary Carter testified during
his confirmation hearing, we do intend to go ahead and look at
the organization of space within the DOD.
An MFP, a major force program, may or may not be an
important step, but I think that is putting the cart before the
horse, quite frankly.
I think we need to figure out what, if any, organizational
changes do we need to make and then find out if an MFP is
necessary to have that organization function in much the same
way we stood up SOCOM [Special Operations Command] and then
decided we need an MFP-11, not vice versa.
So I would say we need to do our study first. Secretary
Carter has committed to doing that. We intend to do that. And
then we can come back to you and tell you whether an MFP is
necessary in order to go ahead and enhance the capability of
that structure.
Mr. Franks. Mr. Weatherington, could I ask you to address
the same question.
Mr. Weatherington. Congressman, I really can't add anything
more than Mr. Loverro just commented on. I mean, it is really--
you know, the acquisition organization supports the warfighter,
and we align with the policy decisions.
So once we have made this decision on the organizational
structure, then we can align the resources to whatever that
organizational structure is, assuming there are any changes.
Mr. Franks. And so, therefore, it is your perspective and
testimony that the original congressionally mandated
commissions--do you think that the MFP that was set up on sort
of a--do you think that that is actually what they were looking
for? I mean, in other words, just a virtual MFP, is that what
they were looking for?
Mr. Weatherington. Sir, you are asking me to interpret the
intent. I can tell you from the Department's perspective that
we can provide the oversight responsibilities of your committee
with where every dollar in the space enterprise is going.
Now, whether that was the original intent, I mean, that--as
Mr. Loverro said, Secretary Carter took this on. We are working
this very hard, and we will have a response back this summer.
Mr. Franks. All right. And, Mr. Loverro, not to belabor the
subject, but you think that this--you know, again,
congressionally mandated commission, do you think that you have
satisfied that requirement?
Mr. Loverro. Sir, I think both the Rumsfeld Commission and
the Allard Commission, as we call them, both had many
recommendations about how to go ahead and improve space
organization management.
Many of those recommendations were implemented. MFP-12 that
they recommended was part of some of those recommendations. We
certainly did not execute all of the recommendations for those
commissions, and a lot has changed since then.
While I think those were both valuable studies, I really do
think in today's world, where we see a different threat than
was present in 2000 or 2006, we really need to look at the
question again.
Mr. Franks. All right. Well, thank you.
Quickly, Ms. Sapp and Mr. Cardillo, as you know, previously
the director of the NRO was also the Under Secretary of the Air
Force, and those days are gone.
But do you believe it is important to have appropriate
integration in this warfighting domain between this so-called
white and black space or unclassified and classified space
committees? And what is being done to strengthen this
integration? And are there opportunities for improvement?
Ms. Sapp. I think we have a great relationship. As you
said, we think the threats in space are very real, and that is
across white and black space. We have a great relationship with
General Raymond and General Hyten. We do joint exercises, joint
games. We have linked our op [operations] centers. So there is
a very, very close relationship there.
Mr. Franks. All right. And, Mr. Cardillo, would you like to
take a shot at it?
Mr. Cardillo. No. I am a customer of that relationship. So
I am good.
Mr. Franks. All right. All right. Thank you all very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlemen from Colorado, Mr.
Coffman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Well, first of all, I think the GPS system is incredible.
As somebody who served on the ground when it was first
introduced at least to us on the conventional level during the
first gulf war, it was an extraordinary asset.
What are the challenges right now? I know synchronization
is one of them with other systems. But what are some of the
challenges we have in terms of upgrading and updating the GPS
system?
General Hyten. So, Congressman, I will go ahead and answer
first, and then we will open it up across the board.
But I think there is two big challenges we really face now
with GPS--actually, three. One is the satellite piece of it.
The other is the ground command and control piece. And the
final one is the user equipment piece. Those three elements
have to be synchronized.
We are actually very close to having those in line right
now. But on the ground segment, we have a program called OCX,
the new operational control segment for GPS, that we are moving
into the future with. The challenge there is that that
capability is required to provide us the information assurance
capabilities that we need to defend our system against the
cyber threat.
The GPS system today has external interfaces into 35
different organizations in the world. Each of those interfaces
go out into the world. We have to tighten those down and
protect them. That is one of the biggest concerns I have with
GPS, in general.
And then, as we go forward in the user equipment, we need
to figure out how to take advantage of the anti-jam
capabilities, the various capabilities that Mr. Loverro talked
about earlier, and the new satellite systems have to be able to
provide the signal structure that will allow that.
So if you put those three things together, it is a
complicated problem, but one that we are making good progress
on.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you. Anything else?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman--oh. Sorry. Go ahead. Yeah.
Mr. Weatherington. Congressman, the only thing I would add
to General Hyten's remarks are last month Mr. Kendall
personally led a deep dive on the OCX activities, that it has
got significant attention at both the Air Force and the AT&L
[Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics] level. We are tracking
that progress very, very closely because OCX is really critical
to the next capability set that GPS is going to provide. And,
for now, we believe we have a plan to execute that program and
deliver that capability.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
General Raymond. Could I jump in and say one thing?
Mr. Coffman. Please.
General Raymond. I just wanted to say thanks for that
question. The GPS constellation is a national treasure. General
Hyten talked about the launch occurring.
I will tell you that on that we have made first contact
with the satellite that was launched today. That will continue
to provide 24/7 navigation with the other satellites that are
up there. And we are completely integrated with those forces in
theater to make sure that they have the precision navigation
timing that they need.
Thank you.
Mr. Coffman. Well, thank you.
I was just a simple infantry guy for the Marine Corps. But,
you know, to go from having a map and trying to figure out
where you are in order to call in air support or artillery
with, you know, sand dunes that are shifting, roads that don't
exist, and all of a sudden, you know, to be able to, you know,
get a grid coordinate, you know, within, at that time, probably
100 meters was extraordinary.
Thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentlemen.
We have been called for votes. But before we head out, Mr.
Lamborn had something else he wanted to revisit. So he is
recognized.
Mr. Lamborn. Yeah. Thank you. And I will try to make this
quick for everyone, although some, I am sure, will have to
leave in a minute to vote before I finish, perhaps.
General Hyten, last year we were briefed that the JMS
program would be integrating and delivering advanced SSA [Space
Situational Awareness] commercial capabilities in Increment 2
of the program by the end of the calendar year 2016 to help
detect and track these threats.
Is the Air Force's JMS program still on track with this
Increment 2 delivery schedule?
General Hyten. So the JMS program is making good progress.
If you go to Vandenberg today--and General Raymond sees it
every day, at least every day he is at Vandenberg. He sees the
capabilities coming in.
And the commercial elements of that are a very important
element. In fact, the commercial element really is the visual
display capability and the user interface into that system.
And so we have taken tremendous advantage of commercial
capabilities in Increment 2. We plan to take even further
advantage of those capabilities in Increment 3. But we are
making great progress with the Joint Space Operation Center's
mission system.
Mr. Lamborn. Do you believe it is on schedule?
General Hyten. Right now those capabilities are on
schedule. Right now we are getting ready to deliver--Service
Pack 9 is the element that is being delivered.
And the reason that is an important element is because that
is the delivery that will eliminate--or develop the new catalog
that eliminates the reliance on the old SPADOC [Space Defense
Operations Center] system that was built in the mid-1990s, and
we need that to move forward in the future.
General Raymond. Sir, I would just add I agree. It is on
the operations floor today in increments. It is delivering
real-time capability today that is very useful.
And like any other commander in any other domain, if you
are going to conduct operations, you have to have the ability
to command and control, and this is the key to that for me.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you very much.
And, lastly, Mr. Loverro, I wrote section 913 of the fiscal
year 2013 NDAA.
And on the European code of conduct, will the Department of
Defense issue any manner of guidance or instruction to the
military, to our military, if the President were to sign this
or a similar code of conduct?
Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
So we have been--my office is the lead for the Department
of Defense on the code of conduct, working very closely with
the Joint Staff, and we have worked very closely with the
Department of State as well.
We would indeed issue implementing guidance if we decide to
go ahead and subscribe to the code of conduct. We are working
very vigorously to make sure that what gets signed is something
that we absolutely can live with.
We will not sign a code we cannot live with, and we will
issue implementing guidance so it is very clear what the
responsibilities of the United States DOD is with regard to
that agreement.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, I am really concerned because, on the
surface, a code of conduct would be nonbinding. Isn't that
correct?
Mr. Loverro. It is absolutely correct. Not legally binding.
We have many such agreements between nations.
What the code of conduct does is it sets out rules of
behavior that good citizens in the domain follow. It really
helps us to distinguish who are good citizens and who are not.
Mr. Lamborn. Yeah.
Mr. Loverro. You know, sometimes it seems like that doesn't
mean much. But I can tell you, for example, as you are well
aware, in 2007, the Chinese, of course, demonstrated their ASAT
[anti-satellite weapon] capability and blew apart a satellite,
which now----
Mr. Lamborn. Oh.
Mr. Loverro [continuing]. General Raymond used to do.
But in the latest one they didn't mostly because of the
condemnation of the world, not because there was anything that
prevented them from doing it legally.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, my concern is something on the surface
would be nonbinding, but through you issuing a guidance for the
employment of force instruction, a GEF instruction, it becomes
binding upon the military.
And so, as a Congressman, I am concerned about the
interaction between the executive branch and Congress, and this
is something that would not be submitted to the Senate for
treaty ratification and could be viewed as kind of an end run
around Congress.
Mr. Loverro. Mr. Congressman, if I could take that for a
closed session, I can, I think, provide you a more nuanced
answer on how this will work.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
We have been called for votes. And we are going to recess
until approximately 6:50, when we will reconvene in the closed
session next door in 2216.
[Whereupon, at 5:58 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 25, 2015
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 25, 2015
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 25, 2015
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. What are the major acquisition challenges regarding the
development, deployment, and sustainment of space systems?
What plans are in development and/or in place for addressing these
challenges?
General Hyten. We continue to improve in addressing affordability
in the acquisition of space systems. We are actively pursuing revisions
to our processes on how we acquire the space enterprise to include our
satellites, ground systems, and launch services.
To improve our satellite acquisitions, we are implementing the
Better Buying Power 3.0 (BBP 3.0) initiatives instituted by USD/AT&L.
BBP 3.0 represents the Department's new increment of process
improvement efforts intended to increase the buying power across all
weapon systems. In satellite acquisition, we are adapting contracting
strategies, such as the use of fixed priced contracts to not only
control costs, but to also reduce the requirements creep common to cost
reimbursable contracts. To that end, we are also pursuing initiatives
to better define the government's role in owning the technical baseline
of our contracts, such as identifying critical interfaces and required
data rights.
Space ground systems will continue to provide the information
pathway to and from orbit for our systems. A major ongoing effort is to
create a common ground architecture that can communicate with multiple
satellite systems. Such a ground system would leverage modular and open
architectures to increase resiliency, and will significantly reduce the
lifecycle cost by providing common operations across multiple mission
areas.
In the launch enterprise, we are encouraging competition to
invigorate the industrial base and eliminate sole source procurements.
As a part of this effort, we are streamlining the certification process
for potential new entrants. We are also taking a competitive approach
to mitigating reliance on foreign entities with regard to our launch
capability to maintain the United States' assured access to space.
In support of all of these initiatives, we are reevaluating how we
manage risk. As we move forward and prepare for tomorrow's threat
environment, we must focus on modernizing our constellations. In the
past, we focused on minimizing the cost and schedule risks to our large
programs by producing near copies of our development assets. Moving
forward, we must continue to minimize the cost and schedule risks, but
modernize our systems by smartly planning for incremental upgrades/
improvements to our systems. Within the space enterprise, we are
preparing for the future through the Space Modernization Initiative or
SMI. SMI is a disciplined approach to planning for the system
modernization of our largest programs by investing early in technology
maturation to minimize future obsolescence and maximizing the
warfighting utility of our existing systems. SMI is critical to the
future of our weapon systems in order to ensure our systems are
resilient against future threats. However, SMI is constantly in the
cross hairs in a constrained fiscal environment. Our biggest challenge
going forward will be being able to smartly prepare for tomorrow
through SMI while simultaneously ensuring the capabilities we deliver
today remain world class.
Mr. Rogers. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Space
Based Infrared System (SBIRS) programs are in the process of assessing
options for future systems through Analyses of Alternatives (AOAs).
Both programs face the reality of making acquisition decisions for
future systems within the next several years. However, the AOA efforts
have experienced delays.
a. To what extent will the AOA delays affect the DOD's ability to
make informed acquisition decisions?
b. When do decisions need to be made for how to proceed with
satellite systems, such as AEHF and SBIRS?
General Hyten. Answer for AEHF: a. Service and acquisition
authority representatives have participated extensively in the
Protected Satellite Communication Services (PSCS) AOA, and are familiar
with the findings. This knowledge has been factored into the Air Force
FY16 President's Budget (PB) request planning efforts to ensure we
remain consistent with the likely outcome of the AOA. MILSATCOM
acquisition plans and schedules allow time for results of the PSCS AOA
to inform decisions for input to the FY17 PB.
b. Protected MILSATCOM capability need dates are driven by the need
to sustain current capabilities (EPS, MILSTAR and AEHF services), and
to satisfy new mission needs for which existing capabilities are
inapplicable or insufficient.
c. Acquiring a new military satellite system with a traditional
approach normally takes about 10-12 years from initial program
directive, including satellite development and launch, and even 6-8
years for systems only involving ground assets. We need to explore
alternative approaches otherwise decisions are needed by early 2016 for
the Polar SATCOM Follow-on and to enable timely fielding of protected
tactical SATCOM capabilities.
Answer for SBIRS: a. The AoA is nearing completion and will be
undergoing Departmental deliberations this summer. This timing has no
negative effects on the DOD's ability to make an informed acquisition
decision for the SBIRS Follow-on program. In fact, this completion date
is ahead of the need date in the first quarter of FY16 (shown on page
9, Figure 1 of the Air Force Congressional Report Space Modernization
Initiative (SMI) Strategy and Goals, dated April 2014). While the AoA
team's final report submission was delayed from the originally planned
December 2014 goal, the delay allowed completion of comprehensive and
accurate analysis of the architectural alternatives. The DOD and the
Air Force are poised with the necessary analysis to support the SBIRS
Follow-on decision and planned program start in FY18.
b. As described in the April 2014 SMI Congressional Report, the
SBIRS Follow-on program must be started in FY18 to allow timely
replenishment of the SBIRS constellation. Allowing for appropriate
acquisition planning lead time, the final architectural decision for
the SBIRS Follow-on program is required by the end of FY16, at the
latest. The AoA completion earlier than the first quarter of FY16
allows the DOD to make the SBIRS Follow-on decision earlier and allows
more time for deliberate planning of the acquisition strategy.
Mr. Rogers. What are the plans for the Operationally Responsive
Space program office?
General Hyten. Consistent with the FY14 ORS Report to Congress the
ORS Office will be maintained to execute critical Urgent Needs as
identified by USSTRATCOM and approved by the Executive Committee. In
FY15, the ORS Office will test the ORS-4 Super Strypi experimental
launch vehicle and will continue the development of the ORS-5, Space
Situational Awareness operational demonstration satellite, in
conjunction with SMC/SY. The 22 April 2015 EXCOM approved the ORS
office to mitigate gaps in space based environmental monitoring. The
ORS Office and SMC/RS will jointly execute the program. Funding will go
to the AFSPC Weather Mission program element. The program will address
two JROC validated capability gaps: the 2015 gap for ``Ocean Surface
Vector Winds'' and the 2021 gap for ``Tropical Cyclone Intensity.''
SMC/RS will pursue the most responsive option to minimize the impending
gaps which is expected to be a passive space-based microwave solution
as the operational gap filler. The program team will also work with
USSTRATCOM and Joint Staff to prioritize the requirements for the
program by June 2015. Lifecycle Sustainment will be addressed by SMC/
RS. These programs are consistent with the stated AFSPC goal of
integrating the principles of operationally responsive space into AFPSC
missions.
Mr. Rogers. Several systems continue to experience synchronization
problems (such as Global Positioning System [GPS] III, GPS Next
Generation Operational Control System, and Military GPS User Equipment;
Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites and Family of Advanced
Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals; Mobile User Objective System and the
user terminals; and the Space Based Infrared System and its supporting
ground system). What is being done to avoid these alignment issues in
the future? What have the opportunity costs been as a result of these
delays?
General Hyten. Answer for Global Positioning System [GPS] III, GPS
Next Generation Operational Control System, and Military GPS User
Equipment:
Through the GPS Enterprise Integrator, the Air Force executes
rigorous systems engineering and integration, synchronizing GPS
capabilities to ensure programs meet warfighter requirements and
identifying mitigation steps when synchronization fails. Delays to the
delivery of the GPS III satellites and the GPS Next-Generation
Operational Control Segment (OCX) have challenged synchronization, but
mitigation efforts are being executed. For example, incremental
deliveries such as the OCX program's Launch and Early Checkout System
(LCS) will support the first GPS III satellite launch and its checkout
expected in FY17. Furthermore, battery life extension on the GPS IIR
satellites extended the health of the current constellation and has so
far avoided any opportunity cost from the OCX/GPS III delay.
An additional effort to synchronize the GPS Enterprise is the
acceleration of the Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) program to
ensure new anti-jam capabilities offered by the M-Code signal can be
used at the earliest possible time. The M-Code signal is currently
transmitted by 7 GPS IIR-M and 9 GPS IIF satellites (for a total of 16
M-Code transmitting satellites), nearing the necessary 18 satellites
for 24-hour coverage. Today, the GPS system is broadcasting a
modernized GPS test message that supports this MGUE acceleration by
enabling early risk reduction events and operational demonstrations.
The live-sky test signals also support critical space, ground, and user
equipment development, integration and testing for the new civilian
signals, L2C and L5. Since MGUE is ahead of schedule, there has been no
opportunity costs associated with the user equipment.
Answer for Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites and Family
of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals:
The Family of Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminal (FAB-T) is the planned
command and control terminal for the Milstar and Advanced Extremely
High Frequency (AEHF) satellite constellation. FAB-T development
experienced technical difficulties leading the Department to open the
production contract to competition. The competition led to lower cost
terminal, however the fielding date was delayed. The AEHF Program
currently delivers EHF capability to the warfighter through the Navy
Multiband Terminal and the Army's Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable
Tactical Terminal and all legacy Milstar terminals. The National
Security Satellite Communications Systems Synchronization Roadmap
indicates that the AEHF terminal fielding is synchronized with AEHF
Initial Operational Capability (IOC). 20% of Extended Data Rate (XDR)
capable terminals were fielded in FY13 (2 years before IOC) and 49% of
AEHF XDR capable terminals will be fielded by the AEHF IOC date this
summer.
The opportunity costs associated with the delay of FAB-T fielding
are difficult to accurately quantify. A FAB-T delay forces a risk due
to reliance on current, hard to maintain, and poor performing systems,
which increases operational risk. However, the delay did require the
AEHF Program to develop an interim constellation command and control
terminal. The program modified the planned design for AEHF Calibration
Facility test terminals to meet nuclear hardening and operational
suitability requirements. The AEHF Program produced and delivered six
Interim Command and Control (IC2) terminals, which cost $50M to develop
and $6M/year more to maintain than a FAB-T terminal.
Answer for SBIRS:
After overcoming early satellite and ground development delays,
SBIRS has established a stable ground baseline and stable production
delivery schedules for GEO satellites 3 and 4 which has allowed for
improved synchronization of the space and ground segments. The current
SBIRS program is synchronized with final space and ground systems being
delivered in FY18. Three of the five mobile survivable/endurable ground
systems will also be operational by 2018. The two remaining are
programmed in FY16 for delivery in 2020. Moving forward, the space and
ground segments will remain synchronized as the future GEO 5/6
production effort focuses on replenishment of the existing
architecture.
The opportunity costs related to ground development delays are
difficult to accurately quantify. A portion of the planned ground
capability had to be accelerated to provide interim operations to
support the GEO 1 launch in 2011. This development was approximately
17% ($334M) of the total contractual effort between 2008-2011
($1,936M), the actual opportunity cost of the acceleration cannot be
discretely identified from the development cost. Additionally, the
interim on-orbit sustainment efforts have successfully extended the
life of the DSP constellation which enabled avoidance of opportunity
costs from the SBIRS delays. In addition, starter data has been
provided to Battlespace Awareness (BA)/Technical Intelligence (TI)
users since FY2014 and will be certified as an independent source for
BA/TI by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in July
2015.
Mr. Rogers. When does the Air Force plan to finalize its
acquisition strategy for the next phase, phase 2 starting in fiscal
year 2018, of the EELV program? Please describe the options being
considered for that strategy.
General Hyten. During phase 2, the Air Force plans to transition
off the Russian RD-180 by investing in launch systems that enable
assured access to space by allowing the Air Force to acquire launch
services from two or more domestic, commercially viable launch
providers. The Air Force plans to use a four step plan that both
invests in industry's emerging launch system development and procures
the phase 2 launch services starting in FY2018. Step 1, the Technical
Maturation and Risk Reduction addressing the highest technical risks
associated with transitioning off the RD-180, is underway. The
acquisition strategy for steps 2 and 3, which is the Government
investment in industry's Rocket Propulsion Systems (Step 2) and the
associated Launch Systems (Step 3), was signed by the Air Force Service
Acquisition Executive on 5 June 2015. The development of the
acquisition strategy for step 4, procuring the launch services starting
in FY2018, will begin later this year. Therefore the final acquisition
strategy for step 4 will likely not be approved in late FY2016 or early
FY2017. Regardless, the goal of the strategy will be to assure access
to space with two or more launch systems available at all times, while
leveraging competition to the maximum extent possible.
Mr. Rogers. With the delays of both GPS III and OCX, when does the
Air Force plan to deploy Military code (M-code) signal capability?
General Hyten. M-Code test and user equipment integration
capability is available today, with 16 satellites broadcasting M-Code
messages provided by a test capability attached to the ground system.
The current estimate for the space segment to attain 18 satellites
broadcasting M-Code is 4QCY2015 with GPS IIF-11. The ground segment
full command and control capability (OCX Block 1) is scheduled for
delivery July 2019. The Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) is based on
service schedules, however the first platform scheduled to complete is
the B-2 in 2017.
Mr. Rogers. Given the GPS III and OCX delays, what is the risk of
not sustaining the current, as well as required, levels of GPS service,
and what is being done about this risk?
General Hyten. The required GPS level of service is at risk if
capability is not delivered by the constellation sustainment need date.
This date is currently driven by GPS III Space Vehicle 01 (SV01)
entering the operational constellation, which requires GPS III SV01 to
be ready to launch as well as having a ground system ready to launch,
checkout, and operationally command the satellite. The GPS Next
Generation Operational Control System (OCX) is under development to
provide the ground launch, checkout, and command and control
capability.
The current schedules for both OCX Block 1 and GPS III SV01 project
delivery in time to meet the constellation sustainment need date and
maintain the required levels of GPS service. In the event of future
schedule delays to the OCX Block 1 ground system, the program office
initiated development of a short-term GPS III Contingency Operations
capability that will enable interim on-orbit operation of GPS III
satellites and reduce risk of diminished levels of PNT services should
OCX Block 1 delivery be further delayed. Although the GPS III satellite
development has been delayed more than 2 years, we are seeing progress
and believe it will be delivered prior to the constellation sustainment
need date with margin.
Mr. Rogers. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Space
Based Infrared System (SBIRS) programs are in the process of assessing
options for future systems through Analyses of Alternatives (AOAs).
Both programs face the reality of making acquisition decisions for
future systems within the next several years. However, the AOA efforts
have experienced delays.
a. To what extent will the AOA delays affect the DOD's ability to
make informed acquisition decisions?
b. When do decisions need to be made for how to proceed with
satellite systems, such as AEHF and SBIRS?
Mr. Loverro. Both the Protected Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Space-Based Infrared
System (SBIRS) Analyses of Alternatives (AoAs) will conclude this
summer, and although this is later than originally planned, there has
been minimal effect on the Department's ability to make informed
acquisition decisions. Acquisition decisions for both follow-on
capabilities will benefit from the additional comprehensive analysis of
architectural alternatives. Military Department and capability
acquisition representatives have participated extensively in both AoA
processes, and they have used this knowledge to inform their Fiscal
Year 2016-2020 President's Budget request submissions.
Both AoAs will have concluded prior to the Department needing to
begin making decisions on future acquisitions. Initial acquisition
decisions are needed in early 2016 for a polar SATCOM follow-on
capability and to enable timely fielding of protected tactical SATCOM
capabilities. Based on constellation replenishment needs dates, the
Department will need to make a decision for both the AEHF follow-on
capability and the SBIRS follow-on decision to support program starts
by FY2018.
Mr. Rogers. What are the plans for the Operationally Responsive
Space program office?
Mr. Loverro. The Operationally Responsive Space Program Office will
continue to provide a transformational way by which DOD designs,
builds, and launches national security satellites. Specifically, the
Program Office is intended to ensure rapid development and deployment
capability for satellites in response to unanticipated needs and
persistent threats in space. The FY 2016 DOD Budget Request requests
$6.5M for the Program Office to continue its work on this mandate. The
Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center is working with the Program
Office to incorporate transformational concepts into its own
acquisition and development processes, and retains the possibility of
utilizing the Program Office to meet warfighter requirements on a rapid
timeline if the need arises.
Mr. Rogers. Several systems continue to experience synchronization
problems (such as Global Positioning System [GPS] III, GPS Next
Generation Operational Control System, and Military GPS User Equipment;
Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites and Family of Advanced
Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals; Mobile User Objective System and the
user terminals; and the Space Based Infrared System and its supporting
ground system). What is being done to avoid these alignment issues in
the future? What have the opportunity costs been as a result of these
delays?
Mr. Loverro. The Department takes seriously all program delays and
issues with systems synchronization. To address these issues and avoid
them in the future, in late 2014 the Department conducted a
comprehensive study to look at these programs and their associated
synchronization issues. The study found that many of the
synchronization issues are the result of insufficiently defined
measures and processes for system alignment. To address these issues,
the study provided standardized Department-wide metrics for whole-of-
system synchronization. DOD is now implementing a standard assessment
of integration and synchronization efforts across the space portfolio
to ensure that issues are addressed early in the development and
acquisition process and are successfully resolved.
Beyond the establishment of standard metrics of assessment,
tangible mitigating efforts are being implemented to ensure future
synchronization. For example, the Space-Based Infrared System is now
operating on a stable delivery schedule for its third and fourth
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit satellites, and the current program has
effectively synchronized space and ground system development for
delivery of additional capability in FY2018. Furthermore, a lack of
synchronization between the Global Positioning System (GPS)-III
constellation and its Next-Generation Operational Control Segment has
largely been mitigated by extending the battery life on current GPS IIR
satellites.
Mr. Rogers. What are the major acquisition challenges regarding the
development, deployment, and sustainment of space systems?
a. What plans are in development and/or in place for addressing
these challenges?
Mr. Weatherington. The major acquisition challenges to space
systems are driven by the increasingly contested space environment.
With the emergence of new threats to satellite systems from China and
Russia, resiliency has become a top requirement for our space
architectures to ensure those capabilities will be there when needed.
The need for resilience has driven the Department to examine a range of
alternate future architectures for our space capabilities. The major
challenge will be to transition to these more resilient architectures,
across several mission areas, while maintaining current capabilities
and services. Specifically, 1) our development and deployment timelines
must be aligned with need dates, 2) our new architecture must, in some
cases, be compatible with existing ground and user infrastructure, and
3) our architecture decisions must be coordinated and synchronized
across related mission areas. All of this must be accomplished against
the backdrop of a challenged industrial base and constantly evolving
threat environment.
At the same time, the increase in both private sector and
international activity in space provides opportunity. The Department
may be able to achieve more of its space-based capability needs through
agreements and collaboration with foreign strategic partners and
emerging private sector space-based services. Fully exploring and
leveraging these opportunities, however, will require increased
acquisition agility to keep pace with the private sector decision
timelines. We must also develop new approaches to risk management;
putting sufficient safeguards in place to ensure national security
objectives can be achieved even in the event of bankruptcy, strikes,
partner nation budget fluctuations and other uncertainties.
Mr. Rogers. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Space
Based Infrared System (SBIRS) programs are in the process of assessing
options for future systems through Analyses of Alternatives (AOAs).
Both programs face the reality of making acquisition decisions for
future systems within the next several years. However, the AOA efforts
have experienced delays.
a. To what extent will the AOA delays affect the DOD's ability to
make informed acquisition decisions?
b. When do decisions need to be made for how to proceed with
satellite systems, such as AEHF and SBIRS?
Mr. Weatherington. The delays will impact the DOD, but in a
positive manner. Our experience gained from the recent AoAs have
resulted in a higher level of collaboration and understanding across
the DOD for these informational needs and various perspectives, and
added attention to resiliency driven by increased threats. As part of
the Department's decision process, insights from AoAs complement other
important information derived from national security strategy and
future challenges, relationships to future plans and programs,
knowledge of current and projected capabilities and gaps, current and
projected intelligence and threat assessments. The results of these
AoAs should strengthen DOD's decision making process from the
perspective of capabilities/needs assessment, PPBE, and acquisition.
The SBIRS Follow-On AoA has completed the analysis phase and the
Air Force is synthesizing the insights including cost, schedule,
performance, and resiliency, to inform architectural deliberations
across the Department this summer. Similarly, the Department expects to
gain important insights from the Protected Satellite Communications AoA
when its analysis phase concludes later this summer.
The decisions for these systems need to be made by Fall 2015/early
in FY 2016. More specifically, the formal acquisition decisions for the
aforementioned systems depend on the selected architecture, functional
availability analysis of the existing SBIRS, AEHF and Enhanced Polar
System constellations, and the transition strategies from today's
architectures to the future architectures. The results of the
Department's deliberations this summer will inform decisions
potentially as early as FY2016 and guide pre-acquisition activities in
advance of formal program initiation.
Mr. Rogers. What are the plans for the Operationally Responsive
Space program office?
Mr. Weatherington. The Department of Defense included $6.5M in its
FY16 Budget Request for the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
Office. The program office has a unique mandate and acquisition
authorities to drive down cost and decrease delivery time for urgently
needed space capabilities, thus enabling a broad range of replenishment
and reconstitution options.
Two examples where the Air Force looks to integrate ORS concepts
are Weather System Follow-On (WSF) and Space Based Space Surveillance
Follow-On (SBSS-FO). These candidate programs have well defined funding
and requirements, good commercial small system concepts, and will
benefit from streamlined acquisition authorities.
The WSF program plans to use flight proven technologies and designs
for a low risk solution to satisfy weather capability gaps. It also
plans to utilize ORS contractual vehicles that allow for a responsive
procurement of a commercial satellite bus and responsive acquisition
practices to deliver the operational capability over two years sooner.
The SBSS-FO mission is a cost-constrained program using mature
``commercial-like'' technologies to meet a current space surveillance
system end-of-life capability gap. It is utilizing technology from the
prototype ORS-5 mission in order to provide reuse of government
reference designs.
Mr. Rogers. Several systems continue to experience synchronization
problems (such as Global Positioning System [GPS] III, GPS Next
Generation Operational Control System, and Military GPS User Equipment;
Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites and Family of Advanced
Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals; Mobile User Objective System and the
user terminals; and the Space Based Infrared System and its supporting
ground system). What is being done to avoid these alignment issues in
the future? What have the opportunity costs been as a result of these
delays?
Mr. Weatherington. USD(AT&L) constantly strives to eliminate
synchronization issues in our acquisition efforts. The Department
determined the definition and metrics for ``synchronization'' across
space mission areas did not exist. The Department is implementing a
standard assessment of integration/synchronization across the space
portfolio more closely integrated with the budget formulation and
deliberation process. As Mr. Kendall indicated in his January 26, 2015
letter to the congressional defense committees, the Department will be
submitting an initial exemplar report covering a single representative
program (Space Based Infrared System) in June 2015, and a comprehensive
initial annual report with submission of the FY 2017 President's
Budget. Additionally, this approach can be applied for future programs
being approved at Milestone B in order to fulfill the statutory
requirements contained in the FY 2013 NDAA.
As Chairman Rogers noted, significant opportunity costs have
resulted from the lack of synchronization. An example of this problem
is the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) waveform capable user
terminals. The legacy transponder payload side of the MUOS satellite is
being used for operations, but the full operational use of the MUOS
satellites will not be possible until a significant number of terminals
of different types are fielded. Synchronization of MUOS and the user
terminals is highly complex and has significant challenges. Despite
these challenges, the Navy, in close coordination with the Army, has
successfully integrated the MUOS waveform with the Army's Handheld,
Manpack, Small Formfit (HMS) Manpack terminal. As much as the
Department has recognized the synchronization problems with MUOS, we
have also identified synchronization issues in other space mission
areas. In addition to the measures identified herein, the Department
will continue to work diligently to close these synchronization issues
across the space enterprise.
Mr. Rogers. What is your perspective on the importance of having a
capability to support urgent warfighter space requirements, as the
Operationally Responsive Space office was intended?
General Raymond. It is imperative that the warfighter has access to
responsive space-based capabilities in this increasingly contested,
congested and competitive space environment. The Operationally
Responsive Space Office is a great asset that anticipates, and responds
to, challenges within the space domain. The office also addresses
urgent warfighter requirements that can be met with space-based assets,
and helps us to extend our advantages in space and increase resiliency.
The importance of having this capability will increase as the trend
toward smaller operationally relevant CubeSats materializes.
Mr. Rogers. Are there any space capabilities that you currently
rely on from the Air Force, in order to most effectively and
efficiently perform your mission? Please describe these capabilities
and dependency relationships, the plan going forward, and the impact on
the warfighter.
Mr. Cardillo. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. What are the major acquisition challenges regarding the
development, deployment, and sustainment of space systems?
a. What plans are in development and/or in place for addressing
these challenges?
Ms. Sapp. The operating environment in which the NRO finds itself
continues to grow in complexity. Targets are becoming increasingly
vague and fleeting, and our adversaries are aggressively pursuing
denial and deception techniques. They are developing capabilities to
threaten our collection assets, and the pace of change is as rapid as
it has ever been. Therefore, we must continually seek increasingly
innovative approaches to keep pace and improve our capabilities. At
NRO, we are thinking outside the box to create unusual or unexpected
uses of existing sensor systems. Our adversaries continue to develop
new and improved means to destroy our freedom of action in space, so we
must develop collection systems with enhanced survivability built in
from the beginning. We must also factor in affordability; we are
designing architectures, systems, and technologies to increase
intelligence collection value, to improve efficiency, and to reduce
cost of ownership. Innovation enables us to meet these challenges and
lead the world in intelligence dominance. To ensure that we are always
on the leading edge with the newest technologies, the NRO has one
office, the Advanced Systems and Technology Directorate (AS&T), focused
on research and development. AS&T explores, tests, and develops, and
transitions revolutionary new capabilities to our current and future
architecture. AS&T hosts a variety of forums and collaborative research
programs with industry, government, and academia, always searching for
the most promising technologies. Another mechanism to address
acquisition challenges is having a strong acquisition workforce, which
applies best practices and maintains and close and enduring partnership
with our industry partners. A critical NRO organizational asset is the
Acquisition Center of Excellence (ACE). For the past 17 years, ACE has
provided targeted acquisition training; acquisition support services;
and helped to ensure open communications with industry. ACE provides
vital acquisition support services to the NRO workforce, particularly
for competitive acquisitions. It provides the facilities, tools, and
support for competitive source selection processes. In doing this, ACE
helps to ensure the NRO selects the best value solution to its mission
requirements. Additionally, ACE provides a communication capability
with our industry partners. Within the ACE is the Acquisition Research
Center, which provides classified and unclassified web sites as portals
for industry into NRO business opportunities, including upcoming
solicitations and on-going acquisitions. The ARC allows industry to
access data on upcoming NRO acquisitions and helps ACE reach a broader
industry base for NRO's mission requirements. The ARC capability
enables industry to communicate with the NRO early in the acquisition
planning phase. This is extremely important since early industry input
can help us revise our requirements to attract the widest industry
interest.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. We know that civil agencies can get OPIR data, such as
that from SBIRS, at a classified level. This is useful where those
civil agencies can declassify the data. However, there are agencies who
need the data, but who cannot declassify the data and/or who do not
have appropriate clearances. What is the Air Force doing to advance
policy and technical solutions that meet the civil needs for
declassified OPIR data, such as for use in fighting forest fires in
Colorado and other high-risk states?
General Hyten. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) is in the process of
completing a review and updating our security classification guidance
across all programs to ensure that we provided consistent guidance with
the appropriate classification risk levels. Specifically, we are
conducting a review and in the process of updating Space Based Infrared
System (SBIRS) security classification guide. Today, AFSPC units
provide OPIR data and reports to DOD and civil agencies where they are
able to interpret the data and provide the appropriate context in
conjunction with other data sources. In accordance with our current
security guidance, when SBIRS derived products are combined with data
from other sources, from areas where there is enough viable sources to
provide plausible deniability, the end products would be unclassified.
Mr. Lamborn. We have read the recent press about the Air Force's
desire to turn Wideband Global SATCOM operations over to industry. How
is the Air Force posturing itself to take advantage of this and other
opportunities, such as enabling AFSCN connectivity to commercial
antenna networks?
General Hyten. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) continues to explore
opportunities to partner with commercial industry to provide
uninterrupted space effects to the US warfighter. The initial space
operation effort focuses on transitioning from purely military
operations to a proper mixture of military and contractor personnel,
with Global Positioning System (GPS) as the pathfinder. Additional
potential manpower savings, either military or contractor can be gained
through enhanced automation opportunities of ground command and control
systems.
Concerning the Air Force's desire to transition Wideband Global
SATCOM (WGS) satellite vehicle operations from military operations to
industry operations, AFSPC has not determined a specific timeline to
potentially transition WGS Satellite operations from military to
commercial industry. Lessons learned from GPS effort will inform
decisions on future opportunities in other space capability areas.
Concerning the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN), AFSPC
conducted a preliminary study on AFSCN Commercial Provisioning, but
there is more work to do. There is an independent review underway to
explore broader options that could include AFSCN that should culminate
later this year.
Mr. Lamborn. The performance issues with Raytheon's OCX contract
have been well documented, particularly in recent weeks. How is Air
Force Space Command reducing risk and creating potential GPS III ground
control requirement off-ramps should Raytheon continue to perform
poorly?
General Hyten. The Space and Missile Systems Center, Global
Positioning Systems Directorate has initiated a short-term GPS III
Contingency Operations capability development to allow GPS III
satellites to support the constellation sustainment need date. This
provides risk reduction in the event of late GPS Next Generation
Command and Control System (OCX) delivery.
On 9 February 2015, a Federal Business Opportunities (FBO)
announcement was released for this activity. Anticipated contract award
is in 2QFY16. The program office is also studying a long-term solution
to provide executable options in the event an off-ramp is needed. The
Air Force will balance the affordability of the current strategy versus
the regrets of pursuing an off-ramp strategy.
Mr. Lamborn. We know that civil agencies can get OPIR data, such as
that from SBIRS, at a classified level. This is useful where those
civil agencies can declassify the data. However, there are agencies who
need the data, but who cannot declassify the data and/or who do not
have appropriate clearances. What is the Air Force doing to advance
policy and technical solutions that meet the civil needs for
declassified OPIR data, such as for use in fighting forest fires in
Colorado and other high-risk states?
Mr. Loverro. The Air Force, through Air Space Command, provides
Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) data throughout DOD and to civil
agencies for data interpretation and analysis. The Air Force
understands that there is an issue with the release of classified OPIR
data to U.S. departments and agencies without appropriate security
clearances. To address this issue, Air Force Space Command is
conducting a review of its security classification guidance, especially
for data from the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). Once this review
is complete, the Department expects to be able to release more
unclassified SBIRS data to U.S. departments and agencies that require
access to the data.
Mr. Lamborn. We have read the recent press about the Air Force's
desire to turn Wideband Global SATCOM operations over to industry. How
is the Air Force posturing itself to take advantage of this and other
opportunities, such as enabling AFSCN connectivity to commercial
antenna networks?
Mr. Weatherington. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and Space and
Missile Systems Center (SMC) are exploring ways to contract for
commercial services to operate Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) and AFSCN
Telemetry, Tracking, and Command (TT&C) to take advantage of industry
efficiencies. Currently, AFSPC and SMC are analyzing the results of a
recently completed Commercial Provisioning study that will be used to
develop future options based on mission requirements. This will also
require legal review of the options to ascertain if there are any
barriers to various approaches.
Mr. Lamborn. The performance issues with Raytheon's OCX contract
have been well documented, particularly in recent weeks. How is Air
Force Space Command reducing risk and creating potential GPS III ground
control requirement off-ramps should Raytheon continue to perform
poorly?
Mr. Weatherington. Air Force Space Command has initiated a short-
term GPS III Contingency Operations ground system capability
development to reduce the constellation sustainment risk associated
with any additional delays to OCX. Contingency Operations will allow
the Air Force, prior to the full OCX functionality, to launch and
checkout the initial GPS III satellites and make their signals
operationally available to GPS users. The Air Force is also studying a
potential long-term solution for meeting all validated OCX requirements
should intractable problems with the current acquisition program
require the Service to pursue an alternative strategy.
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