    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 114-30]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                       ON

          FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                                 MARCH 25, 2015

     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                         MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair   LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
    MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               RICK LARSEN, Washington
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
    J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia            BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
    ROB BISHOP, Utah                     PETE AGUILAR, California
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana
                     Steve Kitay, Professional Staff Member
                             Leonor Tomero, Counsel
                               Eric Smith, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Cardillo, Robert, Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence
      Agency.........................................................     7
    Hyten, Gen John E., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command.....     3
    Loverro, Douglas L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      Space Policy, Department of Defense............................     4
    Raymond, Lt Gen John W. ``Jay,'' USAF, Commander, Joint
      Functional Component Command for Space.........................     6
    Sapp, Betty, Director, National Reconnaissance Office............   103
    Weatherington, Dyke, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
      for Space, Strategic, and Intelligence Systems, Department of
      Defense........................................................     5

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Cardillo, Robert.............................................    96
        Hyten, Gen John E............................................    31
        Loverro, Douglas L...........................................    52
        Raymond, Lt Gen John W. ``Jay''..............................    78
        Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................    29
        Sapp, Betty..................................................   107
        Weatherington, Dyke..........................................    68

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Lamborn..................................................   127
        Mr. Rogers...................................................   121

          FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                              Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                             Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 25, 2015.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:58 p.m., in
    room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
          ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. I want to welcome everyone to
    the Strategic Forces Subcommittee's hearing on the fiscal year
    2016 national security space activities of the Department of
    Defense.
        We are honored to have a panel of expert witnesses who lead
    multiple areas of national security space enterprise. They are
    General John Hyten, Commander, Air Force Space Command; Mr.
    Douglas Loverro, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Space Policy; Mr. Dyke Weatherington, Acting Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Space, Strategic, and Intelligence
    Systems; Lieutenant General John ``Jay'' Raymond, Commander,
    Joint Functional Component Command for Space; Mr. Robert
    Cardillo, Director of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
    [NGA]. And we are awaiting Ms. Betty Sapp, Director of the
    National Reconnaissance Office. She still hasn't been able to--
    we haven't been able to reach her since we moved the hearing
    back from 6 o'clock, but we have her opening statement.
        This is a big panel. We will work to give every member a
    chance to ask questions in this open hearing, at which point,
    we will adjourn to a closed session to continue our oversight
    in an appropriately secure fashion.
        I would like to take note that this is the first time we
    are having the Director of NGA testify at the Strategic Forces
    annual space posture hearing. This is important both literally
    and symbolically.
        From a literal point of view, NGA has a critical role
    within the national security space community and, as a combat
    support agency, NGA provides tremendous support to our
    warfighters. From a symbolic point of view, the six of you on
    this panel, along with the other armed services and members of
    the space community, need to be working extremely closely
    together.
        While each of you has your own missions with different
    roles and responsibilities, it is essential that national
    security space is integrated across the Department of Defense,
    both unclassified and classified programs. In the end, all of
    your jobs are to support and defend our country.
        Regarding the posture of national security space, we
    currently face many serious challenges. On January 28 of this
    fiscal year, the Armed Services Committee held a hearing with
    Mr. Frank Kendall, the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as a witness.
        Chairman Mac Thornberry opened up the hearing with a
    question regarding the U.S. technological superiority and asked
    Mr. Kendall to provide his greatest concern. Mr. Kendall
    responded, ``We are at risk, and this situation is getting
    worse.''
        He further went on to state, ``The U.S. is being challenged
    at an unprecedented rate. It is not just missiles. It is other
    things, such as electronic warfare capabilities, anti-satellite
    capabilities, and a spectrum of things to defeat our space
    system. It is a number of things which I think are being
    developed very consciously to defeat the American way of
    projecting power, and we need to respond to that.''
        Mr. Kendall could not talk specifics in an open session.
    But when the most senior acquisition and technology leader of
    the Department of Defense [DOD] says we are at risk of losing
    our technological superiority, he must have our attention. We
    want to understand how you will be addressing that threat.
        Aside from the growing foreign threat, we have also heard
    from our senior DOD and Air Force leaders about their concern
    about our assured access to space posture going forward. We
    held a hearing on this last week, and we will have a few more
    questions on that topic today.
        Separately, we have heard risks of not maintaining the
    appropriate space-based weather-collection capabilities for top
    Department of Defense requirements. I am concerned we are not
    taking a strategic long-term view and are headed down a path
    with significant risk. We will not allow critical capabilities
    our warfighters rely on to be based out of Moscow or Beijing.
        Additionally, we have systems on orbit that we have
    invested billions of taxpayer dollars in that we are still not
    fully using because of delays in ground systems and user
    terminals. We must do better for the taxpayer and the
    warfighters.
        And, lastly, we are all aware of the current budget
    pressure. This means we need to do business smarter without
    sacrificing capability. As I have said multiple times in the
    past, I believe we can save money in wideband satellite
    communications, as one example. It will take strategic
    planning, better partnerships with commercial industry, and new
    contracting approaches.
        Regarding the budget request, I support technology
    development and evolutionary acquisition, but remain concerned
    with efforts to create new programs, such as in missile warning
    and protected communications, and will conduct close oversight
    of such activities. I will need to be convinced that this is
    the right time to make billions of dollars in investments in
    new programs when our current programs are working better than
    expected.
        I know the great men and women of the Department of
    Defense, including military, civilian, and industry partners,
    will not shy away from these challenges. It will take work, and
    I believe that we need to strengthen national security space
    through capabilities development, organization, management,
    policy, and funding.
        Thank you again for your leadership and for being with us
    today regarding these important topics. I look forward to your
    testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
    Appendix on page 29.]
        Mr. Rogers. I now recognize my friend and colleague from
    Tennessee, the ranking member, Mr. Cooper, for any opening
    statement.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to
    work with you.
        And I, too, welcome the distinguished witnesses.
        We have a crowd of witnesses to hear from today. So I will
    forego an opening statement and look forward to the testimony
    of the witnesses.
        Mr. Rogers. Now you know why I like him so much.
        Roll Tide.
        General Hyten, you are recognized for your opening
    statement.

      STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
                             SPACE COMMAND

        General Hyten. Thank you, Congressman. And Roll Tide.
        Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, distinguished
    members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be here today
    to represent the 38,000 men and women in the Air Force Space
    Command and tell our story. It is also a privilege to be here
    with my distinguished colleagues and friends to discuss some
    very important issues with you.
        Everyone here has been fortunate enough to witness our
    Nation's evolution in space power. Our combatant and theater
    commanders have fully realized how fundamental space-based
    effects have become, but our potential adversaries have been
    watching and working to challenge these very capabilities.
        So to prepare for tomorrow's fight, we have to be ready to
    respond to any threat. That response starts with command and
    control. And so we have to assure that our Space Operations
    Center is prepared to meet the challenges of daily operations
    and demands of war, and that starts with the Joint Space
    Operations Center [JSpOC] mission system [JMS] at Vandenberg
    Air Force Base. This is the key to everything.
        Winning tomorrow's war also includes countering adversarial
    actions, and we are working to increase our overall resiliency
    by investigating desegregation, hosted payloads, onboard
    satellite protection, and defensive operations, as well as
    leveraging commercial capabilities. But we can build resilient
    architectures all day and, without assured access to space, it
    means nothing.
        With today's national reliance on space capabilities,
    assured access has gone from important to imperative. It is our
    highest priority. So, in case you missed it just a couple hours
    ago, this afternoon we had another successful launch from Cape
    Canaveral. Delta IV with GPS [Global Positioning System] IIF-9
    onboard was successfully launched, and that makes 82 successes
    in a row for the EELV [Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle]
    program and ULA [United Launch Alliance].
        But we also support competition in a healthy space launch
    industrial base and must move as fast as we can towards rocket
    engines that are built in the United States. So the Air Force
    and SpaceX are aggressively working together to close all the
    remaining criteria that we have to meet a June 2015
    certification, and we are collaborating with private partners
    to invest in industry solutions for U.S.-made rocket propulsion
    systems.
        Finally, returning to funding levels as directed by the
    Budget Control Act of 2011, the Air Force Space Command is
    going to have a difficult time meeting operational
    requirements. Compromises will be made. Risks would increase in
    any scenario. But we know that we have to continue to provide
    the Nation with necessary capabilities and not lose ground in
    the space arena.
        So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your support, and I look
    forward to working with Congress to provide resilient, capable,
    and affordable space capabilities for the joint force and the
    Nation.
        Thank you very much, sir.
        [The prepared statement of General Hyten can be found in
    the Appendix on page 31.]
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General.
        Mr. Loverro, you are recognized for 3 minutes.

    STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS L. LOVERRO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
            DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Loverro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, members of the
    subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to
    discuss the DOD's national security space program and, in
    concert with my fellow panelists, report to you on the shared
    progress we have all made to respond to the growing threats in
    that domain. Those threats continue to mature, and our
    adversaries are not sitting still. Let me assure you, neither
    are we.
        In order to address these threats, the Department has
    increased its budget for space security by $5 billion. This
    substantial increase is intended to make certain that U.S.
    space forces are as dependable as the terrestrial forces which
    depend upon them. These investments, as well as other
    nonmaterial changes, will make clear to all that attacks in
    space are not only strategically ill-advised, but militarily
    ineffective.
        Notwithstanding our increased focus on the national
    security dimensions of space, we remain absolutely committed to
    assuring the peaceful use of space for all. Space is a global
    good and has been a driver for economic growth, environmental
    monitoring, verification of treaties, and an enabler for
    everyday citizens at home and abroad. Several of the
    initiatives I will discuss today are intended to extend that
    commitment, deter conflict in space, and enhance the economic
    benefit we all derive.
        But let me be clear. We can no longer view space as a
    sanctuary. Potential adversaries understand our reliance on
    space and want to take it away from us. We won't let them. The
    U.S. leads the world in space on the commercial side, the civil
    side, and the national security side. We will not cede that
    leadership.
        Together with allies and commercial partners, we will
    continue to defend the right of all nations to access space for
    peaceful purposes. But where that access is threatened, where
    others would seek to remove the national security or economic
    benefits we derive from that access, we will defend our use
    just as we would in any other domain.
        My written remarks include additional detail. But in the
    interest of time, I would like to go ahead and thank you for
    the opportunity to discuss these policies and programs with you
    today. I look forward to working closely with Congress on these
    issues, and I stand ready to answer your questions.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Loverro can be found in the
    Appendix on page 52.]
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Loverro.
        And now we will go to Mr. Weatherington for 3 minutes.

       STATEMENT OF DYKE WEATHERINGTON, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT
      SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE, STRATEGIC, AND INTELLIGENCE
                     SYSTEMS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Weatherington. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking
    Member Cooper, and distinguished members of this subcommittee.
        It is my pleasure to be part of this esteemed panel, which
    together represents the full spectrum of the United States
    national security space enterprise.
        With your permission, I would like to submit my written
    statement for the record and just offer a very short oral
    statement so we can get to your questions more quickly and have
    a meaningful discussion.
        Mr. Rogers. Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Weatherington. I am pleased to report to you that the
    Program Executive Officers for Space have been able to leverage
    that which has been provided by Better Buying Power initiatives
    undertaken by my boss, Under Secretary for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics, to generate significantly improved
    prices and real savings as the government negotiates production
    contracts for several space systems. We look forward to seeing
    how these latest iterations of Better Buying Power 3.0 will
    continue this trend and save the taxpayers real dollars.
        I am also happy to report--and this is in no small part due
    to the diligence of my distinguished colleagues, General Hyten
    and Ms. Sapp--that, with a few exceptions, our defense and
    intelligence satellite constellations are currently in a
    relatively stable, healthy, and well-populated situation to
    support both the Nation and our warfighters.
        That said, we also need to recognize that many of these
    constellations will be entering a window of recapitalization in
    the coming years. How we approach these recaps will be a
    primary concern of the Department and will hinge on many
    ongoing analysis and study efforts, chief among those being the
    Secretary's strategic portfolio review and several key analysis
    of alternative studies. And, of course, those plans and
    programs will be drastically and harmfully impacted should the
    Department be hampered by another sequestration.
        Moreover, I believe you will certainly take away a common
    theme from this panel today, a theme that no uncertain term
    portrays the rapidly emerging additional vulnerability. And, of
    course, I am speaking to the point that space is no longer a
    sanctuary. Would-be adversaries are developing formidable
    capabilities, capabilities designed to operate for the express
    intent of denying our intelligence professionals and uniformed
    warfighters the asymmetric advantages derived from our space
    capabilities.
        You will hear from all my colleagues on this point, each
    from their own unique vantage point. From where I sit, it is my
    job to ensure the Department acquisitions for new capabilities
    stay abreast of this rapidly evolving challenge and that our
    warfighters have the capability they need, but not at the price
    that is untenable to Congress and the American people.
        The President's fiscal year 2016 budget offers just these
    solutions, with a mix of sustainment of current capabilities,
    refreshing and upgrading other capabilities, and offering new
    starts for some very unique capabilities.
        Let me wrap up, as I promised to be short. Thank you for
    working with us to provide space capabilities that address a
    warfighter's needs, prepares for future challenges, and looks
    at the broad range of our national security interests and
    protects the U.S. taxpayers.
        I look forward to your questions, Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Weatherington can be found
    in the Appendix on page 68.]
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Weatherington.
        Now General Raymond is recognized.

     STATEMENT OF LT GEN JOHN W. ``JAY'' RAYMOND, USAF, COMMANDER,
              JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR SPACE

        General Raymond. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper,
    and members of the subcommittee, it is indeed an honor to
    appear before you again with my distinguished colleagues as the
    Commander of the United States Strategic Command's Joint
    Functional Component Command for Space [JFCC Space]. In doing
    so, I am representing the 3,200 soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, civilians, and allied exchanges officers that make up
    the command.
        Last year, I testified just shortly after my change of
    command that the space environment had changed. It was no
    longer the relative sanctuary it once was. Over this past year,
    the pace of change has accelerated and today the domain is even
    more congested, contested, and competitive than it was before
    with no signs of slowing down. We are quickly approaching the
    point where every satellite and every orbit can be threatened
    and the strategic, operational, and tactical advantages derived
    from space are no longer a given.
        Now, more than ever, our responsive and flexible global
    space force is critical to our ability to continue to exploit
    the advantages of space. We are transforming our Joint Space
    Operations Center from an organization focused largely on
    cataloging objects in space to a command and control capability
    with the space domain awareness needed to meet those current
    and future challenges. With the help of the United States
    Strategic Command and the services, this transformation is
    being fueled through innovation, experimentation, and
    partnerships.
        As U.S. Strategic Command's Functional Component Commander
    responsible for conducting space operations in the domain, I am
    concerned that, if we do not receive relief from the Budget
    Control Act, our ability to provide our Nation assured access
    to these critical space capabilities will be at risk.
        We are absolutely committed to assuring global access to
    space and peaceful operations in and through the space domain.
    Credible, reliable, and assured space capabilities are vital to
    our Nation's strategic deterrence. I look forward to continuing
    to work with you and your staffs as we advance and protect our
    Nation's space capabilities.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Raymond can be found in
    the Appendix on page 78.]
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Cardillo for 3 minutes.

      STATEMENT OF ROBERT CARDILLO, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-
                          INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

        Mr. Cardillo. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for
    the invitation to join my colleagues here to testify before you
    today.
        The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is the Nation's
    primary provider of geospatial intelligence [GEOINT] for both
    the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community. Every
    local, regional, and global conflict has geolocation at its
    heart.
        In a complex world of accelerating change, GEOINT delivers
    spatial awareness, temporal context, and insight that enables
    understanding and reveals unknown activities. NGA produces
    GEOINT with content from an array of platforms. As the GEOINT
    functional manager, I oversee current and future GEOINT
    requirements, evaluate sensor system performance to meet those
    needs, and we continue to require high-resolution imagery and
    have an increasing need to image targets frequently to maintain
    persistent awareness.
        The sensors we use are not exclusively spaceborne. However,
    defense space programs are critical to accomplishing our
    diverse and worldwide mission. For spaceborne reconnaissance,
    NGA relies heavily upon platforms and services provided by the
    National Reconnaissance Office. NRO spaceborne assets continue
    to meet national security requirements that only its program
    could accomplish.
        The fiscal year 2016 budget request also funds acquisition
    of commercial satellite imagery. This imagery enables NGA to
    provide GEOINT in current, high-interest and rarely imaged
    areas of the world. It also allows us to develop products that
    support air and sea navigation and humanitarian assistance
    missions.
        The commercial satellite imagery market is expanding at an
    extraordinary rate, darkening the skies with small satellites
    that present a remarkable opportunity for NGA and our
    customers. If we can embrace the explosion in commercial
    sources and leverage the exquisite capabilities of our national
    technical space architecture, we have the opportunity to
    realize the persistent GEOINT coverage that NGA and our
    customers have sought for so many years.
        In closing, the President's budget for fiscal year 2016
    supports NGA's requirements for space and space-based systems
    and services, provides us the resources and the capabilities we
    need to support our warning, targeting, mission planning,
    navigation, and flight safety missions.
        So on behalf of the men and women of NGA, thank you for
    this opportunity to appear before the committee. I look forward
    to addressing your questions, and I look forward to earning a
    second invitation to testify before this committee.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cardillo can be found in the
    Appendix on page 96.]
        Mr. Rogers. I thank you for that comment and for being
    here.
        And I recognize myself now for the first set of questions.
        General Hyten and Mr. Loverro and General Raymond, this
    will be targeted toward you.
        The Department's requested a pretty significant increase in
    investment over the next several years for the protection and
    security of space systems.
        Could you tell us about those investments and why you think
    they are important.
        Let's start with you, General Hyten.
        General Hyten. So, yes, sir. As we look at the threat--and
    you have heard each of us in a different way talk about the
    threat being significant. And when we get into a closed hearing
    later, we will go into more detail about what that threat is.
        But as you look at that, it is clear that the United States
    must increase our ability to respond to that threat. So in that
    increased investment that Mr. Loverro referred to, you will see
    increased efforts in space situational awareness as well as
    response options that will allow us to respond to threats that
    we see coming in the future.
        And I think, as far as an open hearing, that is probably as
    far as I could go, but we can address that in more detail in
    the closed hearings.
        Mr. Rogers. Would you say the increased investments are
    proportionate to the need?
        General Hyten. I would say they are proportionate to need
    and they start us down a path. It would be nice to take more
    resources and begin. But, as you start programs, it is
    important to begin them in a prudent way so you understand what
    the initial investments are going to be and then grow from
    there. And that is what you will see in the fiscal year 2016
    President's budget, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. Mr. Loverro.
        Mr. Loverro. Yes, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I couldn't
    agree more with what General Hyten has already said. I think he
    is spot on.
        Let me just add a couple of remarks. As I alluded to in my
    opening statement, we have to recognize that space is not a
    sanctuary. And several of us have said it up there. That means
    a lot. That is not the way we designed and operated systems for
    many years.
        We designed and operated them as if it were. We did not lay
    out our space architectures. We did not build them with the
    notion in mind that they would be attacked by conventional
    means. That requires us to go ahead and make a change.
        I am very pleased that we have aggressively pursued that
    change in the President's budget. I think that we made many,
    many good investments. As General Hyten said, we can't do
    everything at once. To do so would be foolhardy. We would
    probably fail.
        But we have absolutely made a significant turn towards the
    space capability that we need to defend against adversaries,
    and we think that this will start us in the correct direction.
    There may be more in the future, but right now we think that we
    have got a very good balance within the fiscal year 2016
    budget.
        Mr. Rogers. Okay.
        General Raymond.
        General Raymond. Thank you, Chairman.
        I concur with what General Hyten and Mr. Loverro said. You
    know, for the last 20 years, we have worked hard to integrate
    space capabilities into the fight, and we have done so and it
    has fueled our way of war. We must protect those capabilities.
        Our capabilities were really designed at a time when the
    domain was a sanctuary. Today, if you look at our space
    capabilities with the lens of the contested threat that we see
    emerging, then challenges materialize and we need this
    investment to keep pace with those challenges.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Rogers. All right. Thank you.
        General Hyten, in the launch hearing last week, we didn't
    get an opportunity to hear your perspective on the EELV launch
    capability [ELC] contract.
        Can you provide your perspectives on the importance and how
    you can have fair competition with this contract in place.
        General Hyten. So, to be honest, Congressman, I don't think
    you can have fair competition with that contract in place.
    There will have to be a change. We are working with the
    acquisition community to figure out what that change is going
    to be. You may want to ask Mr. Weatherington about some of
    those issues.
        But let me just give a little bit of history of why we have
    the EELV launch capabilities, the ELC contract in place. It was
    really put in place to preserve a very fragile industrial base
    because, in the mid part of the last decade, the mid-2000s, we
    were facing an era where the satellites we were building for
    the national security were not being delivered and the
    commercial marketplace that we thought was going to boom did
    not materialize either. And, therefore, the industry was in a
    very fragile perspective because there was not launches there
    available to support that industry.
        So we created the ELC contract as a way to make sure that,
    even if we didn't launch--and there were years that we launched
    very small number of satellites--there would still be a healthy
    industrial base at the end of that period.
        It was also put in place that, God forbid, we ever had a
    launch failure, that there would be a means to preserve that
    industry as we worked through the issue of that launch failure
    as well. So it is really an industrial-based concern.
        As you build into a competitive environment, those reasons
    become much different. And so the competition and the existence
    of multiple capabilities really provide the resilience that you
    need to get through those kind of issues.
        And we believe that the launch manifest will be increased.
    It will still be a significant challenge for our acquisition
    community to figure out how to transition from the current
    structure into the future, and they are working that issue now,
    sir.
        Mr. Rogers. Great.
        Mr. Weatherington, the general wanted to put you on the
    spot. So I will do what the general ordered me to do.
        Mr. Weatherington. Mr. Chairman, General Hyten is
    absolutely correct. There were and are very valid reasons for
    the ECL construct as it exists today.
        But clearly there is an understanding that, with increased
    competition with the potential inclusion of new entrants into
    the launch capability family, that that capability, that
    function, has to be changed.
        And so we are working very diligently with the Air Force to
    adjust, and we have that flexibility in Phase 1A, the
    competitive activity that is currently undergoing. Phase 2,
    fundamentally, that function will be likely wrapped into the
    rates that we pay on a per-launch basis.
        And so the Department is committed to modifying and
    continuing to evolve its space launch capability to take
    advantage of the competitive launch environment that we see
    coming in the future.
        Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
        The Chair now recognizes the ranking member for any
    questions he may have.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Hyten, I noticed in your testimony that you have
    made some organizational changes. In fact, you lead your
    testimony with it. And I am just curious.
        By combining the A2, A3 and A6, is that something unique to
    your organization or is this something that is going to spread
    throughout the military?
        General Hyten. Right now it is unique to our organization,
    Congressman. But I think it is going to spread. And let me
    explain the fundamental reasons why.
        If you look at the capabilities that we have integrated,
    the -2, the -3, the -6, which is intelligence, operations, and
    cyber, you put those three things together and you think about
    what we do as a command, those are three operational missions
    that we do.
        If you go to an intelligence organization, whether it is
    the 18th Intelligence Squadron that is related to Space Command
    or another squadron in another command, and you look at the
    business that they do and you look at how we do space
    operations and then you go to San Antonio and you look at how
    we do cyber operations, it is very much the same.
        So I believe that, in the future, the power of the military
    is the ability to integrate all information. And in our
    command, there is three elements of that: space, intel, and
    cyber. And so it is a logical step to take those three pieces
    and integrate them together because the integration of
    information is going to be the power of military in the future.
        Mr. Cooper. So is it too much to say that, by breaking down
    these silos, that you have created a new best practice in the
    military?
        General Hyten. We have not created a new best practice yet
    because we are still going through it. It is a significant
    challenge because it is a change of culture as well.
        But our command is committed to changing that culture. We
    are committed to looking at each of those three areas as equal
    partners in the operations. And that is why we will have one
    flag officer on top of that pyramid that is responsible for
    integrating all those operations. We have had success so far,
    but we still have a long way to go.
        Thank you for the question.
        Mr. Cooper. Mr. Cardillo, in his testimony, makes the point
    very forcefully that one of his main problems is information
    overload, this vast array of data that comes in, how do you
    make sense of it.
        And I hope that we have good answers to those questions
    because understanding an infinite number of visual images,
    which you say are increasing exponentially, that is a big
    problem to get your arms around.
        How are we faring in that regard?
        Mr. Cardillo. Congressman, I couldn't agree with you more
    about the challenge. I have to tell you I am equally excited
    about the opportunity.
        What I mean is that, if we are successful in managing the
    data in a way that we haven't before, I think it is going to
    elicit signatures, patterns, indicators we haven't seen before.
    But I won't argue with you that this challenge isn't large. And
    we are taking it head on.
        Mr. Cooper. General Raymond's testimony was particularly
    interesting because I am not sure that the average constituent
    understands how crowded space is, with some 500,000 pieces of
    space junk up there. That is quite a lot to keep up with.
        And I forget whether it was your testimony or another
    person who said, basically, we are going to have the first 24/7
    traffic cop to warn people of collisions because there is some
    23 announcements a day of potential collisions between, you
    know, satellites and space junk.
        General Raymond. Yes, sir. The Joint Space Operations
    Center at Vandenberg actively tracks about 23,000 objects.
    Those are about 10 centimeters or greater. That is the size
    that we can track.
        As you mentioned, 500,000 are below that level that we
    can't track. The JSpOC, by its nature, serves as that traffic
    cop. We provide space traffic control, if you will, for the
    world, providing warning of potential conjunction to keep the
    domain safe for all.
        Last year, in 2014, alone, 121 times we recommended that a
    satellite move and it moved, including the International Space
    Station 3 times.
        Mr. Cooper. It worried me a little bit that the number of
    warnings is increasing so much regarding possible missile
    launches from the ground. You said there were 588 of those and
    some 9,648 infrared events. That is a lot to keep up with.
        General Raymond. It is a lot to keep up with.
        Mr. Cooper. How do we separate the wheat from the chaff
    here?
        General Raymond. It is a lot to keep up with. We have the
    world's greatest capabilities with SBIRS [Space-Based Infrared
    System] and DSP [Defense Support Program]. We have got the
    world's best airmen that are operating that. And one of the
    keys is that, when you are dealing with warning of potential
    missile attack to theater or potential attack on the homeland,
    you take that very, very seriously and put a lot of emphasis on
    it to make sure we do it perfectly.
        Mr. Cooper. Mr. Loverro, I would be interested--you made a
    pretty forceful statement about domain and protecting our
    domain.
        I would be curious, in the rhetoric of this and other
    administrations, is yours the most forceful statement or are
    you mirroring other rhetoric?
        Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. I don't know if I want to call mine
    the most forceful, but it is certainly what I believe strongly.
    And I don't necessarily want to call it just pure rhetoric
    either. It is absolutely our intent.
        You know, it probably has been an evolving state of affairs
    because the threat has evolved. Quite frankly, it is one thing
    to anticipate an imaginary threat. It is another thing to see
    that threat develop, watch it be exercised, as we have on the
    Chinese on several occasions, recognize what it can do to our
    capability, and react to that.
        And that is what we are doing right now, is reacting to it
    and making it very clear. We have no desire to have a conflict
    extend to space. That is not in our interest. We don't believe
    it is in the interest of anybody on the face of the planet.
        We want our potential adversaries to understand that, if it
    does, the U.S. will be prepared to defend our space assets.
    Attacking our space assets is not a way to get the United
    States to back off of a fight.
        We are going to make sure that space assets are there to
    support the men and women that General Hyten and General
    Raymond have talked about so we can do the job that you have
    asked us to do.
        Mr. Cooper. Finally, Mr. Weatherington, you mentioned the
    terrific recapitalization problem that we are about to face. A
    generation or two earlier we had huge nuclear investments that
    we are struggling to be able to recapitalize right now.
        And it would be great to have some sort of early warning
    system for how many years we need to be planning recap for our
    space assets. So I hope you can help us with that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
        And I want to recognize Ms. Sapp, who has made it. I want
    to apologize to her for the moving target of start time, but we
    are at the mercy of the leadership and when they call votes.
    But I do appreciate you being here. We did accept your opening
    statement for the record already.
        [The opening and prepared statements of Ms. Sapp can be
    found in the Appendix beginning on page 103.]
        Mr. Rogers. Now I will recognize the gentleman from
    Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you all for being here and for your service to
    our country in various ways.
        General Hyten, we talked earlier today about an issue I
    would like to ask you a little bit more about, the Air Force
    space-based weather collection program. And I am concerned
    about the future planning.
        In October 2014, in response to a congressional-directed
    report, there was a briefing by the Air Force that stated,
    ``DOD does not currently rely on nonallied international
    sources for environmental data, but may be required to do so as
    early as 2017 due to EUMETSAT's recent decision not to replace
    Meteosat-7.''
        I have another memo on this topic that was written just
    last month by the Air Force. It states, ``New information has
    come to light that demonstrates an unacceptably high risk for
    relying on civil and international sources.''
        And the memo further states, ``While China and Russia have
    mature technical systems, recent events indicate they present
    unacceptable security and operational risk. This dependency,
    particularly over the USCENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] area of
    responsibility, provides an unnecessary risk to U.S. operations
    and American lives.''
        So, actually, my first question will be to Mr. Loverro. But
    thank you for the discussion that we had earlier, General
    Hyten.
        Mr. Loverro, should we be creating new reliances on China
    and Russia for weather data for our warfighters?
        Mr. Loverro. Mr. Congressman, I like the fact that you
    started off with General Hyten first, so----
        No. This is a very complex issue. But let me make one thing
    very clear before I answer in detail. The DOD has no intent, no
    plans, and has no current reliance on Chinese or Russian
    weather satellites. We do not have it today. We will not have
    it in the future. That is not where we are heading.
        We had a conversation with this committee 2 years ago on a
    problem with satellite communications in that regard. We fixed
    that. And thank you very much for helping us do that. We are
    not going to go ahead and repeat that error with the weather
    satellites.
        Now, we do have an issue. What we are talking about is
    geosynchronous weather prediction and monitoring. That is not
    primarily a DOD mission. That is a NOAA [National Oceanic and
    Atmospheric Administration] mission for which the DOD uses
    their capabilities.
        And NOAA makes arrangements with other international
    capabilities around the world. The one you mentioned, EUMETSAT,
    has been our partner in the Indian Ocean for many years.
        Because of the kind of budget problems the Europeans have
    been having, they are having a hard time trying to fill that
    gap. And they in the World Meteorological Organization have
    decided that, for civilian purposes, that organization would
    like to use indigenous capabilities, which includes Chinese and
    Russian and Indian satellites.
        We right now do not--I cannot tell you today how we will go
    ahead and address this gap. We are working with NOAA. I met
    with them just last week along with the folks from Air Force
    A3, who wrote the letter that you quoted from, to figure out
    how we can move forward.
        NOAA has several alternative plans that they are examining.
    Some of them are to move another European satellite, EUMETSAT-
    8, over to the region. There are other capabilities that we
    might look at. And I also visited India 2 weeks ago to start
    the conversation with them about Indian satellites.
        So there are several alternatives that we are looking at. I
    cannot tell you what the answer is today. But let me make it
    clear, once again, we do not intend to, we have no plans to, we
    will not rely on Chinese and Russian satellites.
        Mr. Lamborn. Well, that is a concern. Also, cost is a
    concern. With constrained budgets, we have to make every dollar
    count. I understand that. But getting the maximum capability
    out of our existing constellation is also a concern.
        Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. No. Absolutely. And, you
    know, today that is not a mission that the DOD flies. So as we
    look at that gap and we examine how we need to fill that, we
    will have to assess whether or not there is something the DOD
    needs to invest in or simply get NOAA to invest in. It is one
    of those issues that is developing as we speak. I wish I had an
    answer for you today. We know it is an issue.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay.
        Mr. Loverro. We are following it.
        Mr. Lamborn. All right. Thank you.
        And let me--General Hyten, let me try to work in one--well,
    I am going to have to wait for a second round, I am afraid.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now goes to Mr. Garamendi from California for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Garamendi. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, gentlemen and ma'am, thank you very much for being
    here.
        I guess this goes to Mr. Loverro and probably Mr.
    Weatherington and Mr. Cardillo.
        What are the opportunities to leverage the growing
    commercial capabilities, services, for example, Skybox and
    Planet Labs? And how long will it take for the U.S. Government
    to replicate those assets or to use them?
        So start at the right or the left. Let's start over here.
        Mr. Loverro. Why don't I deal with the general, and then I
    think Mr. Cardillo is better suited to answer the specific
    questions.
        So, sir, you are absolutely right. We have a great
    opportunity here. As the DOD budget shrinks and as we focus
    more on the security of space, we need to figure out how to do
    things smarter. One of the smarter things we can do is to
    leverage the commercial field far better.
        There are certainly two areas where the commercial field is
    burgeoning, mostly the U.S. commercial field, which is great
    for us and our Nation's industry. You mentioned one of them,
    commercial imagery, Skybox, Planet Labs. There are about 20
    names out there, all of which will try their hand at trying to
    figure out how to revolutionize this field, as well as our
    tried and true providers, like Digital Globe.
        The commercial SATCOM [satellite communications] world is
    just as exciting. While we still have the legacy of 40 or 50
    years of commercial SATCOM, we have a whole bunch of new
    entrants, from the likes of Elon Musk to many others. We are
    looking at new constellations and new configurations. All of
    these can provide capability. We need to figure out how to
    leverage them better.
        Let me turn over the specifics, maybe, to Mr. Weatherington
    or Mr. Cardillo.
        Mr. Cardillo. First, I couldn't agree more with the
    opportunity that is before us. I can't answer your specific
    question about exactly when. I can just tell you we are fully
    engaging with each.
        And I should also say, too, I am a huge commercial imagery
    consumer today. I just use it for what we call our foundation
    mission. This is mapping, charting, geodesy, so the baseline
    products upon which we then apply NRO's capabilities to provide
    that exquisite level of intelligence and information. And I can
    give you more examples about that in closed.
        But we are fully engaged with the companies that you just
    mentioned to explore. We are looking to do pilots and test beds
    to be able to answer your question, and we will keep you fully
    informed.
        Mr. Garamendi. Good. I am going to go to another series of
    questions. I know my colleague to my right here has this issue,
    and he will pick it up, I am sure, in just a moment.
        I want to go to the vulnerability of the GPS system and
    should we have a backup system available to us, specifically
    the eLoran program. And it is maybe $50 million to put it in
    place, another $10 million a year to keep it going.
        Should we move forward with such a backup system?
        I will start--you are nodding your head, Mr. Loverro.
        Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. So we have had a lot of discussion
    of this within the DOD. Our fiscal year 2016 budget includes an
    initial investment into eLoran, as you are aware. We do believe
    that is a good idea.
        However, it is not a panacea. It is great for backing up
    the use within the continental United States. For civilian use,
    however, eLoran, as currently configured, is not nonspoofable.
    It doesn't extend around the world. It doesn't meet the needs
    of our warfighters. So, absolutely, for civil concerns, it is a
    good solution.
        But from DOD concerns, we need to do more. We are doing
    more. We are investing significantly in anti-jam capabilities
    both on the satellites, in our user equipment. We, in fact,
    accelerated--part of that $5 billion investment that I talked
    about was a large acceleration of nonspoofable, nonjammable
    user equipment that the Air Force will be building for the new
    GPS signals.
        We are also in talks with our allies. Galileo, Japan and
    their Quasi-Zenith satellite systems, these are other systems
    that perform the same functions, are separate from GPS, yet
    perform a capability. We are looking very strongly at how do we
    leverage those as a backup as well.
        Because for military use, we do need that worldwide or at
    least regional overhead system that we can't get from the
    eLoran system which basically provides two-dimensional timing
    and navigation, but doesn't really help us in the three-
    dimensional overseas world that we fight in.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I appreciate all of that.
        Also, the Coast Guard is interested because it does go
    about 1,000 miles off the coast. And so it is useful in many
    different ways.
        Mr. Loverro. Absolutely agree.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
        I yield back my remaining time.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr.
    Bridenstine, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you to our distinguished panel for being here.
        General Hyten, I have heard you comment in the past that we
    need to get past the days when we think about military
    satellite communications and commercial satellite
    communications. Just start talking SATCOM.
        One of the parts of the last NDAA [National Defense
    Authorization Act] that we did, we had section 1603, and it
    specifically asked the Department to look at the idea of having
    SMC [Space and Missile Systems Center] as the single
    acquisition agent for space.
        My question for you is: In your best professional military
    judgment, is having a single acquisition agent for space
    necessary to get the architecture to include both mil
    [military] and commercial satellite communications
    capabilities?
        General Hyten. Well, thanks very much for the question,
    Congressman.
        So, in my judgment, it is essential that there is a single
    point in the Department of Defense, a single agency in the
    Department of Defense, that is responsible for integrating how
    we provide SATCOM. If we have multiple agencies that are
    looking at buying and leasing capabilities, we will never have
    a fully integrated, most cost-effective, most military-useful
    capability to do that.
        And so you asked me about SMC. I think the Department is in
    agreement that we need to have a single place that does that.
    From my judgment, the best place to do that is in Los Angeles
    at SMC because that is where the bulk of military satellite
    communications is procured. So if you have the bulk of a single
    procurement agency in one place, it makes sense to look at how
    you integrate those.
        Now, the Department as a whole is still looking at that. We
    owe you an answer to that 1603 language. We will work that. But
    you asked my opinion, and I am glad to give it. Thank you.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, General.
        Mr. Loverro, section 1603 of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA also
    requires the DOD to revise the Executive Agent for Space's
    directives and guidance with respect to SATCOM strategies,
    architectures, and programs and, also, a report on reforming
    the SATCOM organizational structure.
        Can you briefly describe where you are in that process and
    when we might be able to see that report.
        Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. I would be glad to.
        So both the CIO's office, our chief intelligence officer's
    office, and our acquisition, technology, logistics office--
    excuse me--chief information--thank you--and our acquisition,
    technology, and logistics organization--not Mr. Weatherington's
    office, but another sector of that--have been given the lead to
    answer that question.
        They have been convening a series of working groups in
    order to go ahead and look at it. I believe they have scheduled
    an interim brief to this committee on the 19th of April. I
    cannot tell you what the results are yet. I have not been
    personally part of that. But they are working on that.
        It comes at an opportune time. We are rewriting right now
    our DOD instruction on SATCOM management. In fact, I have a
    copy of it in front of me here as the draft. And so we will
    integrate that into the rewrite of this instruction as well as
    what Congress has directed us to do, which is to look at how we
    rewrite the EA [Executive Agent] for Space charter.
        Mr. Bridenstine. General Hyten, have you been part of those
    discussions or the planning process?
        General Hyten. We have not been part of those planning
    processes yet. Congressman, I fully expect to----
        Mr. Bridenstine. Okay.
        General Hyten. As you have said earlier, I have some strong
    opinions on that. I think the Department knows what those
    opinions are. Certainly Mr. Loverro does.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Okay.
        General Hyten. And so I fully expect to be brought in, as
    does the Executive Agent for Space, who happens to be the
    Secretary of the Air Force.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. Mr. Loverro, I have got a minute and
    23 seconds left.
        Section 1605 of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA authorized a
    SATCOM pilot program using working capital funds.
        Can you share with us the status of that program, if there
    is anything we can do here on this committee to help assist
    with that.
        Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. So we very much appreciate the help
    Congress gave us in authorizing those funds.
        Unfortunately, because of the way the pilots are
    constructed and the way working capital funds work, the match
    isn't 100 percent perfect. We are trying to work through it.
    But as I have shared with you previously, that is a very
    difficult match to make.
        I am not the financial wizard within the Department to be
    able to tell you how to modify that today. I am happy to go
    ahead and take that for the record and come back on a better
    way to do that.
        But we absolutely want to move forward on the Pathfinders
    that that was intended to fund. Those Pathfinders have been
    laid out. I think we are anxious to get started.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you for that. I have 33 seconds
    remaining.
        General Hyten, speaking of the Pathfinders, if you could,
    for this committee--I think it is critically important that we
    get those Pathfinders funded. It doesn't appear that the
    President's budget request funded Pathfinder 2 or any of the
    other Pathfinders.
        Can you share with this committee with why the Pathfinders
    are so important.
        General Hyten. The Pathfinders are important for a number
    of reasons. The quick answer is that, if we are going to walk
    down the path where we leverage the commercial sector in the
    right way, we need to figure out the business models to do
    that. The Pathfinders are structured in order to do that.
        The Pathfinders also have the opportunity for us to test
    different capabilities. It is possible that we can work the
    protected tactical waveform inside a Pathfinder program and
    explore the operational utility of that before we actually have
    to make an operational decision.
        Those are the fundamental issues that make the Pathfinder
    so important.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Roger that.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
    Franks, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank all of you for being here, for your commitment to
    freedom.
        Lieutenant General Raymond, let me, if I could, direct a
    question to you, sir.
        As you may be aware, the Director of the Defense
    Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Stewart, at a House
    Armed Services Committee hearing on worldwide threats earlier
    this year said that ``China and Russia are developing
    capabilities to deny the U.S. use of space in the event of a
    conflict.'' And that is a quote.
        I mean, I find that pretty sobering and having implications
    of a pretty profound nature. And it seems to me the United
    States is facing the most challenging environment we have ever
    seen in space.
        And I would like to ask you directly: Would you agree that
    this is the most challenging space environment we have seen?
        General Raymond. Yes, I would. I would agree. I think the
    threats are real. I think they are technologically advanced and
    they are concerning.
        Mr. Franks. All right. Well, if I could, then, turn to Mr.
    Loverro and Mr. Weatherington.
        As you also very likely know, previous congressionally
    mandated commissions have reported on the value of setting up a
    major force program [MFP] in the budget structure itself for
    space. And I am aware that a virtual MFP was set up, but I am
    not sure that it truly provides the benefits the commissions
    were originally seeking.
        What is your position on the benefits and challenges of
    establishing a true MFP with centralized authority for space?
    And, beyond an MFP, do you think that it is important that we
    evaluate all aspects of the national security space, not just
    the capabilities and development, but, also, organization,
    management, policy, doctrine, training, to strengthen national
    security space within the Department of Defense? And, if so,
    what are we doing about that?
        Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. As Secretary Carter testified during
    his confirmation hearing, we do intend to go ahead and look at
    the organization of space within the DOD.
        An MFP, a major force program, may or may not be an
    important step, but I think that is putting the cart before the
    horse, quite frankly.
        I think we need to figure out what, if any, organizational
    changes do we need to make and then find out if an MFP is
    necessary to have that organization function in much the same
    way we stood up SOCOM [Special Operations Command] and then
    decided we need an MFP-11, not vice versa.
        So I would say we need to do our study first. Secretary
    Carter has committed to doing that. We intend to do that. And
    then we can come back to you and tell you whether an MFP is
    necessary in order to go ahead and enhance the capability of
    that structure.
        Mr. Franks. Mr. Weatherington, could I ask you to address
    the same question.
        Mr. Weatherington. Congressman, I really can't add anything
    more than Mr. Loverro just commented on. I mean, it is really--
    you know, the acquisition organization supports the warfighter,
    and we align with the policy decisions.
        So once we have made this decision on the organizational
    structure, then we can align the resources to whatever that
    organizational structure is, assuming there are any changes.
        Mr. Franks. And so, therefore, it is your perspective and
    testimony that the original congressionally mandated
    commissions--do you think that the MFP that was set up on sort
    of a--do you think that that is actually what they were looking
    for? I mean, in other words, just a virtual MFP, is that what
    they were looking for?
        Mr. Weatherington. Sir, you are asking me to interpret the
    intent. I can tell you from the Department's perspective that
    we can provide the oversight responsibilities of your committee
    with where every dollar in the space enterprise is going.
        Now, whether that was the original intent, I mean, that--as
    Mr. Loverro said, Secretary Carter took this on. We are working
    this very hard, and we will have a response back this summer.
        Mr. Franks. All right. And, Mr. Loverro, not to belabor the
    subject, but you think that this--you know, again,
    congressionally mandated commission, do you think that you have
    satisfied that requirement?
        Mr. Loverro. Sir, I think both the Rumsfeld Commission and
    the Allard Commission, as we call them, both had many
    recommendations about how to go ahead and improve space
    organization management.
        Many of those recommendations were implemented. MFP-12 that
    they recommended was part of some of those recommendations. We
    certainly did not execute all of the recommendations for those
    commissions, and a lot has changed since then.
        While I think those were both valuable studies, I really do
    think in today's world, where we see a different threat than
    was present in 2000 or 2006, we really need to look at the
    question again.
        Mr. Franks. All right. Well, thank you.
        Quickly, Ms. Sapp and Mr. Cardillo, as you know, previously
    the director of the NRO was also the Under Secretary of the Air
    Force, and those days are gone.
        But do you believe it is important to have appropriate
    integration in this warfighting domain between this so-called
    white and black space or unclassified and classified space
    committees? And what is being done to strengthen this
    integration? And are there opportunities for improvement?
        Ms. Sapp. I think we have a great relationship. As you
    said, we think the threats in space are very real, and that is
    across white and black space. We have a great relationship with
    General Raymond and General Hyten. We do joint exercises, joint
    games. We have linked our op [operations] centers. So there is
    a very, very close relationship there.
        Mr. Franks. All right. And, Mr. Cardillo, would you like to
    take a shot at it?
        Mr. Cardillo. No. I am a customer of that relationship. So
    I am good.
        Mr. Franks. All right. All right. Thank you all very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentlemen from Colorado, Mr.
    Coffman, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Well, first of all, I think the GPS system is incredible.
    As somebody who served on the ground when it was first
    introduced at least to us on the conventional level during the
    first gulf war, it was an extraordinary asset.
        What are the challenges right now? I know synchronization
    is one of them with other systems. But what are some of the
    challenges we have in terms of upgrading and updating the GPS
    system?
        General Hyten. So, Congressman, I will go ahead and answer
    first, and then we will open it up across the board.
        But I think there is two big challenges we really face now
    with GPS--actually, three. One is the satellite piece of it.
    The other is the ground command and control piece. And the
    final one is the user equipment piece. Those three elements
    have to be synchronized.
        We are actually very close to having those in line right
    now. But on the ground segment, we have a program called OCX,
    the new operational control segment for GPS, that we are moving
    into the future with. The challenge there is that that
    capability is required to provide us the information assurance
    capabilities that we need to defend our system against the
    cyber threat.
        The GPS system today has external interfaces into 35
    different organizations in the world. Each of those interfaces
    go out into the world. We have to tighten those down and
    protect them. That is one of the biggest concerns I have with
    GPS, in general.
        And then, as we go forward in the user equipment, we need
    to figure out how to take advantage of the anti-jam
    capabilities, the various capabilities that Mr. Loverro talked
    about earlier, and the new satellite systems have to be able to
    provide the signal structure that will allow that.
        So if you put those three things together, it is a
    complicated problem, but one that we are making good progress
    on.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you. Anything else?
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman--oh. Sorry. Go ahead. Yeah.
        Mr. Weatherington. Congressman, the only thing I would add
    to General Hyten's remarks are last month Mr. Kendall
    personally led a deep dive on the OCX activities, that it has
    got significant attention at both the Air Force and the AT&L
    [Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics] level. We are tracking
    that progress very, very closely because OCX is really critical
    to the next capability set that GPS is going to provide. And,
    for now, we believe we have a plan to execute that program and
    deliver that capability.
        Mr. Coffman. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
        General Raymond. Could I jump in and say one thing?
        Mr. Coffman. Please.
        General Raymond. I just wanted to say thanks for that
    question. The GPS constellation is a national treasure. General
    Hyten talked about the launch occurring.
        I will tell you that on that we have made first contact
    with the satellite that was launched today. That will continue
    to provide 24/7 navigation with the other satellites that are
    up there. And we are completely integrated with those forces in
    theater to make sure that they have the precision navigation
    timing that they need.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Coffman. Well, thank you.
        I was just a simple infantry guy for the Marine Corps. But,
    you know, to go from having a map and trying to figure out
    where you are in order to call in air support or artillery
    with, you know, sand dunes that are shifting, roads that don't
    exist, and all of a sudden, you know, to be able to, you know,
    get a grid coordinate, you know, within, at that time, probably
    100 meters was extraordinary.
        Thank you very much. I yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentlemen.
        We have been called for votes. But before we head out, Mr.
    Lamborn had something else he wanted to revisit. So he is
    recognized.
        Mr. Lamborn. Yeah. Thank you. And I will try to make this
    quick for everyone, although some, I am sure, will have to
    leave in a minute to vote before I finish, perhaps.
        General Hyten, last year we were briefed that the JMS
    program would be integrating and delivering advanced SSA [Space
    Situational Awareness] commercial capabilities in Increment 2
    of the program by the end of the calendar year 2016 to help
    detect and track these threats.
        Is the Air Force's JMS program still on track with this
    Increment 2 delivery schedule?
        General Hyten. So the JMS program is making good progress.
    If you go to Vandenberg today--and General Raymond sees it
    every day, at least every day he is at Vandenberg. He sees the
    capabilities coming in.
        And the commercial elements of that are a very important
    element. In fact, the commercial element really is the visual
    display capability and the user interface into that system.
        And so we have taken tremendous advantage of commercial
    capabilities in Increment 2. We plan to take even further
    advantage of those capabilities in Increment 3. But we are
    making great progress with the Joint Space Operation Center's
    mission system.
        Mr. Lamborn. Do you believe it is on schedule?
        General Hyten. Right now those capabilities are on
    schedule. Right now we are getting ready to deliver--Service
    Pack 9 is the element that is being delivered.
        And the reason that is an important element is because that
    is the delivery that will eliminate--or develop the new catalog
    that eliminates the reliance on the old SPADOC [Space Defense
    Operations Center] system that was built in the mid-1990s, and
    we need that to move forward in the future.
        General Raymond. Sir, I would just add I agree. It is on
    the operations floor today in increments. It is delivering
    real-time capability today that is very useful.
        And like any other commander in any other domain, if you
    are going to conduct operations, you have to have the ability
    to command and control, and this is the key to that for me.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you very much.
        And, lastly, Mr. Loverro, I wrote section 913 of the fiscal
    year 2013 NDAA.
        And on the European code of conduct, will the Department of
    Defense issue any manner of guidance or instruction to the
    military, to our military, if the President were to sign this
    or a similar code of conduct?
        Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
        So we have been--my office is the lead for the Department
    of Defense on the code of conduct, working very closely with
    the Joint Staff, and we have worked very closely with the
    Department of State as well.
        We would indeed issue implementing guidance if we decide to
    go ahead and subscribe to the code of conduct. We are working
    very vigorously to make sure that what gets signed is something
    that we absolutely can live with.
        We will not sign a code we cannot live with, and we will
    issue implementing guidance so it is very clear what the
    responsibilities of the United States DOD is with regard to
    that agreement.
        Mr. Lamborn. Well, I am really concerned because, on the
    surface, a code of conduct would be nonbinding. Isn't that
    correct?
        Mr. Loverro. It is absolutely correct. Not legally binding.
    We have many such agreements between nations.
        What the code of conduct does is it sets out rules of
    behavior that good citizens in the domain follow. It really
    helps us to distinguish who are good citizens and who are not.
        Mr. Lamborn. Yeah.
        Mr. Loverro. You know, sometimes it seems like that doesn't
    mean much. But I can tell you, for example, as you are well
    aware, in 2007, the Chinese, of course, demonstrated their ASAT
    [anti-satellite weapon] capability and blew apart a satellite,
    which now----
        Mr. Lamborn. Oh.
        Mr. Loverro [continuing]. General Raymond used to do.
        But in the latest one they didn't mostly because of the
    condemnation of the world, not because there was anything that
    prevented them from doing it legally.
        Mr. Lamborn. Well, my concern is something on the surface
    would be nonbinding, but through you issuing a guidance for the
    employment of force instruction, a GEF instruction, it becomes
    binding upon the military.
        And so, as a Congressman, I am concerned about the
    interaction between the executive branch and Congress, and this
    is something that would not be submitted to the Senate for
    treaty ratification and could be viewed as kind of an end run
    around Congress.
        Mr. Loverro. Mr. Congressman, if I could take that for a
    closed session, I can, I think, provide you a more nuanced
    answer on how this will work.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        We have been called for votes. And we are going to recess
    until approximately 6:50, when we will reconvene in the closed
    session next door in 2216.
        [Whereupon, at 5:58 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
    closed session.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 March 25, 2015

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 March 25, 2015

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      [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 March 25, 2015

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

        Mr. Rogers. What are the major acquisition challenges regarding the
    development, deployment, and sustainment of space systems?
        What plans are in development and/or in place for addressing these
    challenges?
        General Hyten. We continue to improve in addressing affordability
    in the acquisition of space systems. We are actively pursuing revisions
    to our processes on how we acquire the space enterprise to include our
    satellites, ground systems, and launch services.
        To improve our satellite acquisitions, we are implementing the
    Better Buying Power 3.0 (BBP 3.0) initiatives instituted by USD/AT&L.
    BBP 3.0 represents the Department's new increment of process
    improvement efforts intended to increase the buying power across all
    weapon systems. In satellite acquisition, we are adapting contracting
    strategies, such as the use of fixed priced contracts to not only
    control costs, but to also reduce the requirements creep common to cost
    reimbursable contracts. To that end, we are also pursuing initiatives
    to better define the government's role in owning the technical baseline
    of our contracts, such as identifying critical interfaces and required
    data rights.
        Space ground systems will continue to provide the information
    pathway to and from orbit for our systems. A major ongoing effort is to
    create a common ground architecture that can communicate with multiple
    satellite systems. Such a ground system would leverage modular and open
    architectures to increase resiliency, and will significantly reduce the
    lifecycle cost by providing common operations across multiple mission
    areas.
        In the launch enterprise, we are encouraging competition to
    invigorate the industrial base and eliminate sole source procurements.
    As a part of this effort, we are streamlining the certification process
    for potential new entrants. We are also taking a competitive approach
    to mitigating reliance on foreign entities with regard to our launch
    capability to maintain the United States' assured access to space.
        In support of all of these initiatives, we are reevaluating how we
    manage risk. As we move forward and prepare for tomorrow's threat
    environment, we must focus on modernizing our constellations. In the
    past, we focused on minimizing the cost and schedule risks to our large
    programs by producing near copies of our development assets. Moving
    forward, we must continue to minimize the cost and schedule risks, but
    modernize our systems by smartly planning for incremental upgrades/
    improvements to our systems. Within the space enterprise, we are
    preparing for the future through the Space Modernization Initiative or
    SMI. SMI is a disciplined approach to planning for the system
    modernization of our largest programs by investing early in technology
    maturation to minimize future obsolescence and maximizing the
    warfighting utility of our existing systems. SMI is critical to the
    future of our weapon systems in order to ensure our systems are
    resilient against future threats. However, SMI is constantly in the
    cross hairs in a constrained fiscal environment. Our biggest challenge
    going forward will be being able to smartly prepare for tomorrow
    through SMI while simultaneously ensuring the capabilities we deliver
    today remain world class.
        Mr. Rogers. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Space
    Based Infrared System (SBIRS) programs are in the process of assessing
    options for future systems through Analyses of Alternatives (AOAs).
    Both programs face the reality of making acquisition decisions for
    future systems within the next several years. However, the AOA efforts
    have experienced delays.
        a. To what extent will the AOA delays affect the DOD's ability to
    make informed acquisition decisions?
        b. When do decisions need to be made for how to proceed with
    satellite systems, such as AEHF and SBIRS?
        General Hyten. Answer for AEHF: a. Service and acquisition
    authority representatives have participated extensively in the
    Protected Satellite Communication Services (PSCS) AOA, and are familiar
    with the findings. This knowledge has been factored into the Air Force
    FY16 President's Budget (PB) request planning efforts to ensure we
    remain consistent with the likely outcome of the AOA. MILSATCOM
    acquisition plans and schedules allow time for results of the PSCS AOA
    to inform decisions for input to the FY17 PB.
        b. Protected MILSATCOM capability need dates are driven by the need
    to sustain current capabilities (EPS, MILSTAR and AEHF services), and
    to satisfy new mission needs for which existing capabilities are
    inapplicable or insufficient.
        c. Acquiring a new military satellite system with a traditional
    approach normally takes about 10-12 years from initial program
    directive, including satellite development and launch, and even 6-8
    years for systems only involving ground assets. We need to explore
    alternative approaches otherwise decisions are needed by early 2016 for
    the Polar SATCOM Follow-on and to enable timely fielding of protected
    tactical SATCOM capabilities.
        Answer for SBIRS: a. The AoA is nearing completion and will be
    undergoing Departmental deliberations this summer. This timing has no
    negative effects on the DOD's ability to make an informed acquisition
    decision for the SBIRS Follow-on program. In fact, this completion date
    is ahead of the need date in the first quarter of FY16 (shown on page
    9, Figure 1 of the Air Force Congressional Report Space Modernization
    Initiative (SMI) Strategy and Goals, dated April 2014). While the AoA
    team's final report submission was delayed from the originally planned
    December 2014 goal, the delay allowed completion of comprehensive and
    accurate analysis of the architectural alternatives. The DOD and the
    Air Force are poised with the necessary analysis to support the SBIRS
    Follow-on decision and planned program start in FY18.
        b. As described in the April 2014 SMI Congressional Report, the
    SBIRS Follow-on program must be started in FY18 to allow timely
    replenishment of the SBIRS constellation. Allowing for appropriate
    acquisition planning lead time, the final architectural decision for
    the SBIRS Follow-on program is required by the end of FY16, at the
    latest. The AoA completion earlier than the first quarter of FY16
    allows the DOD to make the SBIRS Follow-on decision earlier and allows
    more time for deliberate planning of the acquisition strategy.
        Mr. Rogers. What are the plans for the Operationally Responsive
    Space program office?
        General Hyten. Consistent with the FY14 ORS Report to Congress the
    ORS Office will be maintained to execute critical Urgent Needs as
    identified by USSTRATCOM and approved by the Executive Committee. In
    FY15, the ORS Office will test the ORS-4 Super Strypi experimental
    launch vehicle and will continue the development of the ORS-5, Space
    Situational Awareness operational demonstration satellite, in
    conjunction with SMC/SY. The 22 April 2015 EXCOM approved the ORS
    office to mitigate gaps in space based environmental monitoring. The
    ORS Office and SMC/RS will jointly execute the program. Funding will go
    to the AFSPC Weather Mission program element. The program will address
    two JROC validated capability gaps: the 2015 gap for ``Ocean Surface
    Vector Winds'' and the 2021 gap for ``Tropical Cyclone Intensity.''
    SMC/RS will pursue the most responsive option to minimize the impending
    gaps which is expected to be a passive space-based microwave solution
    as the operational gap filler. The program team will also work with
    USSTRATCOM and Joint Staff to prioritize the requirements for the
    program by June 2015. Lifecycle Sustainment will be addressed by SMC/
    RS. These programs are consistent with the stated AFSPC goal of
    integrating the principles of operationally responsive space into AFPSC
    missions.
        Mr. Rogers. Several systems continue to experience synchronization
    problems (such as Global Positioning System [GPS] III, GPS Next
    Generation Operational Control System, and Military GPS User Equipment;
    Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites and Family of Advanced
    Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals; Mobile User Objective System and the
    user terminals; and the Space Based Infrared System and its supporting
    ground system). What is being done to avoid these alignment issues in
    the future? What have the opportunity costs been as a result of these
    delays?
        General Hyten. Answer for Global Positioning System [GPS] III, GPS
    Next Generation Operational Control System, and Military GPS User
    Equipment:
        Through the GPS Enterprise Integrator, the Air Force executes
    rigorous systems engineering and integration, synchronizing GPS
    capabilities to ensure programs meet warfighter requirements and
    identifying mitigation steps when synchronization fails. Delays to the
    delivery of the GPS III satellites and the GPS Next-Generation
    Operational Control Segment (OCX) have challenged synchronization, but
    mitigation efforts are being executed. For example, incremental
    deliveries such as the OCX program's Launch and Early Checkout System
    (LCS) will support the first GPS III satellite launch and its checkout
    expected in FY17. Furthermore, battery life extension on the GPS IIR
    satellites extended the health of the current constellation and has so
    far avoided any opportunity cost from the OCX/GPS III delay.
        An additional effort to synchronize the GPS Enterprise is the
    acceleration of the Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) program to
    ensure new anti-jam capabilities offered by the M-Code signal can be
    used at the earliest possible time. The M-Code signal is currently
    transmitted by 7 GPS IIR-M and 9 GPS IIF satellites (for a total of 16
    M-Code transmitting satellites), nearing the necessary 18 satellites
    for 24-hour coverage. Today, the GPS system is broadcasting a
    modernized GPS test message that supports this MGUE acceleration by
    enabling early risk reduction events and operational demonstrations.
    The live-sky test signals also support critical space, ground, and user
    equipment development, integration and testing for the new civilian
    signals, L2C and L5. Since MGUE is ahead of schedule, there has been no
    opportunity costs associated with the user equipment.
        Answer for Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites and Family
    of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals:
        The Family of Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminal (FAB-T) is the planned
    command and control terminal for the Milstar and Advanced Extremely
    High Frequency (AEHF) satellite constellation. FAB-T development
    experienced technical difficulties leading the Department to open the
    production contract to competition. The competition led to lower cost
    terminal, however the fielding date was delayed. The AEHF Program
    currently delivers EHF capability to the warfighter through the Navy
    Multiband Terminal and the Army's Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable
    Tactical Terminal and all legacy Milstar terminals. The National
    Security Satellite Communications Systems Synchronization Roadmap
    indicates that the AEHF terminal fielding is synchronized with AEHF
    Initial Operational Capability (IOC). 20% of Extended Data Rate (XDR)
    capable terminals were fielded in FY13 (2 years before IOC) and 49% of
    AEHF XDR capable terminals will be fielded by the AEHF IOC date this
    summer.
        The opportunity costs associated with the delay of FAB-T fielding
    are difficult to accurately quantify. A FAB-T delay forces a risk due
    to reliance on current, hard to maintain, and poor performing systems,
    which increases operational risk. However, the delay did require the
    AEHF Program to develop an interim constellation command and control
    terminal. The program modified the planned design for AEHF Calibration
    Facility test terminals to meet nuclear hardening and operational
    suitability requirements. The AEHF Program produced and delivered six
    Interim Command and Control (IC2) terminals, which cost $50M to develop
    and $6M/year more to maintain than a FAB-T terminal.
        Answer for SBIRS:
        After overcoming early satellite and ground development delays,
    SBIRS has established a stable ground baseline and stable production
    delivery schedules for GEO satellites 3 and 4 which has allowed for
    improved synchronization of the space and ground segments. The current
    SBIRS program is synchronized with final space and ground systems being
    delivered in FY18. Three of the five mobile survivable/endurable ground
    systems will also be operational by 2018. The two remaining are
    programmed in FY16 for delivery in 2020. Moving forward, the space and
    ground segments will remain synchronized as the future GEO 5/6
    production effort focuses on replenishment of the existing
    architecture.
        The opportunity costs related to ground development delays are
    difficult to accurately quantify. A portion of the planned ground
    capability had to be accelerated to provide interim operations to
    support the GEO 1 launch in 2011. This development was approximately
    17% ($334M) of the total contractual effort between 2008-2011
    ($1,936M), the actual opportunity cost of the acceleration cannot be
    discretely identified from the development cost. Additionally, the
    interim on-orbit sustainment efforts have successfully extended the
    life of the DSP constellation which enabled avoidance of opportunity
    costs from the SBIRS delays. In addition, starter data has been
    provided to Battlespace Awareness (BA)/Technical Intelligence (TI)
    users since FY2014 and will be certified as an independent source for
    BA/TI by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in July
    2015.
        Mr. Rogers. When does the Air Force plan to finalize its
    acquisition strategy for the next phase, phase 2 starting in fiscal
    year 2018, of the EELV program? Please describe the options being
    considered for that strategy.
        General Hyten. During phase 2, the Air Force plans to transition
    off the Russian RD-180 by investing in launch systems that enable
    assured access to space by allowing the Air Force to acquire launch
    services from two or more domestic, commercially viable launch
    providers. The Air Force plans to use a four step plan that both
    invests in industry's emerging launch system development and procures
    the phase 2 launch services starting in FY2018. Step 1, the Technical
    Maturation and Risk Reduction addressing the highest technical risks
    associated with transitioning off the RD-180, is underway. The
    acquisition strategy for steps 2 and 3, which is the Government
    investment in industry's Rocket Propulsion Systems (Step 2) and the
    associated Launch Systems (Step 3), was signed by the Air Force Service
    Acquisition Executive on 5 June 2015. The development of the
    acquisition strategy for step 4, procuring the launch services starting
    in FY2018, will begin later this year. Therefore the final acquisition
    strategy for step 4 will likely not be approved in late FY2016 or early
    FY2017. Regardless, the goal of the strategy will be to assure access
    to space with two or more launch systems available at all times, while
    leveraging competition to the maximum extent possible.
        Mr. Rogers. With the delays of both GPS III and OCX, when does the
    Air Force plan to deploy Military code (M-code) signal capability?
        General Hyten. M-Code test and user equipment integration
    capability is available today, with 16 satellites broadcasting M-Code
    messages provided by a test capability attached to the ground system.
    The current estimate for the space segment to attain 18 satellites
    broadcasting M-Code is 4QCY2015 with GPS IIF-11. The ground segment
    full command and control capability (OCX Block 1) is scheduled for
    delivery July 2019. The Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) is based on
    service schedules, however the first platform scheduled to complete is
    the B-2 in 2017.
        Mr. Rogers. Given the GPS III and OCX delays, what is the risk of
    not sustaining the current, as well as required, levels of GPS service,
    and what is being done about this risk?
        General Hyten. The required GPS level of service is at risk if
    capability is not delivered by the constellation sustainment need date.
    This date is currently driven by GPS III Space Vehicle 01 (SV01)
    entering the operational constellation, which requires GPS III SV01 to
    be ready to launch as well as having a ground system ready to launch,
    checkout, and operationally command the satellite. The GPS Next
    Generation Operational Control System (OCX) is under development to
    provide the ground launch, checkout, and command and control
    capability.
        The current schedules for both OCX Block 1 and GPS III SV01 project
    delivery in time to meet the constellation sustainment need date and
    maintain the required levels of GPS service. In the event of future
    schedule delays to the OCX Block 1 ground system, the program office
    initiated development of a short-term GPS III Contingency Operations
    capability that will enable interim on-orbit operation of GPS III
    satellites and reduce risk of diminished levels of PNT services should
    OCX Block 1 delivery be further delayed. Although the GPS III satellite
    development has been delayed more than 2 years, we are seeing progress
    and believe it will be delivered prior to the constellation sustainment
    need date with margin.
        Mr. Rogers. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Space
    Based Infrared System (SBIRS) programs are in the process of assessing
    options for future systems through Analyses of Alternatives (AOAs).
    Both programs face the reality of making acquisition decisions for
    future systems within the next several years. However, the AOA efforts
    have experienced delays.
        a. To what extent will the AOA delays affect the DOD's ability to
    make informed acquisition decisions?
        b. When do decisions need to be made for how to proceed with
    satellite systems, such as AEHF and SBIRS?
        Mr. Loverro. Both the Protected Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
    Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Space-Based Infrared
    System (SBIRS) Analyses of Alternatives (AoAs) will conclude this
    summer, and although this is later than originally planned, there has
    been minimal effect on the Department's ability to make informed
    acquisition decisions. Acquisition decisions for both follow-on
    capabilities will benefit from the additional comprehensive analysis of
    architectural alternatives. Military Department and capability
    acquisition representatives have participated extensively in both AoA
    processes, and they have used this knowledge to inform their Fiscal
    Year 2016-2020 President's Budget request submissions.
        Both AoAs will have concluded prior to the Department needing to
    begin making decisions on future acquisitions. Initial acquisition
    decisions are needed in early 2016 for a polar SATCOM follow-on
    capability and to enable timely fielding of protected tactical SATCOM
    capabilities. Based on constellation replenishment needs dates, the
    Department will need to make a decision for both the AEHF follow-on
    capability and the SBIRS follow-on decision to support program starts
    by FY2018.
        Mr. Rogers. What are the plans for the Operationally Responsive
    Space program office?
        Mr. Loverro. The Operationally Responsive Space Program Office will
    continue to provide a transformational way by which DOD designs,
    builds, and launches national security satellites. Specifically, the
    Program Office is intended to ensure rapid development and deployment
    capability for satellites in response to unanticipated needs and
    persistent threats in space. The FY 2016 DOD Budget Request requests
    $6.5M for the Program Office to continue its work on this mandate. The
    Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center is working with the Program
    Office to incorporate transformational concepts into its own
    acquisition and development processes, and retains the possibility of
    utilizing the Program Office to meet warfighter requirements on a rapid
    timeline if the need arises.
        Mr. Rogers. Several systems continue to experience synchronization
    problems (such as Global Positioning System [GPS] III, GPS Next
    Generation Operational Control System, and Military GPS User Equipment;
    Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites and Family of Advanced
    Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals; Mobile User Objective System and the
    user terminals; and the Space Based Infrared System and its supporting
    ground system). What is being done to avoid these alignment issues in
    the future? What have the opportunity costs been as a result of these
    delays?
        Mr. Loverro. The Department takes seriously all program delays and
    issues with systems synchronization. To address these issues and avoid
    them in the future, in late 2014 the Department conducted a
    comprehensive study to look at these programs and their associated
    synchronization issues. The study found that many of the
    synchronization issues are the result of insufficiently defined
    measures and processes for system alignment. To address these issues,
    the study provided standardized Department-wide metrics for whole-of-
    system synchronization. DOD is now implementing a standard assessment
    of integration and synchronization efforts across the space portfolio
    to ensure that issues are addressed early in the development and
    acquisition process and are successfully resolved.
        Beyond the establishment of standard metrics of assessment,
    tangible mitigating efforts are being implemented to ensure future
    synchronization. For example, the Space-Based Infrared System is now
    operating on a stable delivery schedule for its third and fourth
    Geosynchronous Earth Orbit satellites, and the current program has
    effectively synchronized space and ground system development for
    delivery of additional capability in FY2018. Furthermore, a lack of
    synchronization between the Global Positioning System (GPS)-III
    constellation and its Next-Generation Operational Control Segment has
    largely been mitigated by extending the battery life on current GPS IIR
    satellites.
        Mr. Rogers. What are the major acquisition challenges regarding the
    development, deployment, and sustainment of space systems?
        a. What plans are in development and/or in place for addressing
    these challenges?
        Mr. Weatherington. The major acquisition challenges to space
    systems are driven by the increasingly contested space environment.
    With the emergence of new threats to satellite systems from China and
    Russia, resiliency has become a top requirement for our space
    architectures to ensure those capabilities will be there when needed.
    The need for resilience has driven the Department to examine a range of
    alternate future architectures for our space capabilities. The major
    challenge will be to transition to these more resilient architectures,
    across several mission areas, while maintaining current capabilities
    and services. Specifically, 1) our development and deployment timelines
    must be aligned with need dates, 2) our new architecture must, in some
    cases, be compatible with existing ground and user infrastructure, and
    3) our architecture decisions must be coordinated and synchronized
    across related mission areas. All of this must be accomplished against
    the backdrop of a challenged industrial base and constantly evolving
    threat environment.
        At the same time, the increase in both private sector and
    international activity in space provides opportunity. The Department
    may be able to achieve more of its space-based capability needs through
    agreements and collaboration with foreign strategic partners and
    emerging private sector space-based services. Fully exploring and
    leveraging these opportunities, however, will require increased
    acquisition agility to keep pace with the private sector decision
    timelines. We must also develop new approaches to risk management;
    putting sufficient safeguards in place to ensure national security
    objectives can be achieved even in the event of bankruptcy, strikes,
    partner nation budget fluctuations and other uncertainties.
        Mr. Rogers. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Space
    Based Infrared System (SBIRS) programs are in the process of assessing
    options for future systems through Analyses of Alternatives (AOAs).
    Both programs face the reality of making acquisition decisions for
    future systems within the next several years. However, the AOA efforts
    have experienced delays.
        a. To what extent will the AOA delays affect the DOD's ability to
    make informed acquisition decisions?
        b. When do decisions need to be made for how to proceed with
    satellite systems, such as AEHF and SBIRS?
        Mr. Weatherington. The delays will impact the DOD, but in a
    positive manner. Our experience gained from the recent AoAs have
    resulted in a higher level of collaboration and understanding across
    the DOD for these informational needs and various perspectives, and
    added attention to resiliency driven by increased threats. As part of
    the Department's decision process, insights from AoAs complement other
    important information derived from national security strategy and
    future challenges, relationships to future plans and programs,
    knowledge of current and projected capabilities and gaps, current and
    projected intelligence and threat assessments. The results of these
    AoAs should strengthen DOD's decision making process from the
    perspective of capabilities/needs assessment, PPBE, and acquisition.
        The SBIRS Follow-On AoA has completed the analysis phase and the
    Air Force is synthesizing the insights including cost, schedule,
    performance, and resiliency, to inform architectural deliberations
    across the Department this summer. Similarly, the Department expects to
    gain important insights from the Protected Satellite Communications AoA
    when its analysis phase concludes later this summer.
        The decisions for these systems need to be made by Fall 2015/early
    in FY 2016. More specifically, the formal acquisition decisions for the
    aforementioned systems depend on the selected architecture, functional
    availability analysis of the existing SBIRS, AEHF and Enhanced Polar
    System constellations, and the transition strategies from today's
    architectures to the future architectures. The results of the
    Department's deliberations this summer will inform decisions
    potentially as early as FY2016 and guide pre-acquisition activities in
    advance of formal program initiation.
        Mr. Rogers. What are the plans for the Operationally Responsive
    Space program office?
        Mr. Weatherington. The Department of Defense included $6.5M in its
    FY16 Budget Request for the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
    Office. The program office has a unique mandate and acquisition
    authorities to drive down cost and decrease delivery time for urgently
    needed space capabilities, thus enabling a broad range of replenishment
    and reconstitution options.
        Two examples where the Air Force looks to integrate ORS concepts
    are Weather System Follow-On (WSF) and Space Based Space Surveillance
    Follow-On (SBSS-FO). These candidate programs have well defined funding
    and requirements, good commercial small system concepts, and will
    benefit from streamlined acquisition authorities.
        The WSF program plans to use flight proven technologies and designs
    for a low risk solution to satisfy weather capability gaps. It also
    plans to utilize ORS contractual vehicles that allow for a responsive
    procurement of a commercial satellite bus and responsive acquisition
    practices to deliver the operational capability over two years sooner.
    The SBSS-FO mission is a cost-constrained program using mature
    ``commercial-like'' technologies to meet a current space surveillance
    system end-of-life capability gap. It is utilizing technology from the
    prototype ORS-5 mission in order to provide reuse of government
    reference designs.
        Mr. Rogers. Several systems continue to experience synchronization
    problems (such as Global Positioning System [GPS] III, GPS Next
    Generation Operational Control System, and Military GPS User Equipment;
    Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites and Family of Advanced
    Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals; Mobile User Objective System and the
    user terminals; and the Space Based Infrared System and its supporting
    ground system). What is being done to avoid these alignment issues in
    the future? What have the opportunity costs been as a result of these
    delays?
        Mr. Weatherington. USD(AT&L) constantly strives to eliminate
    synchronization issues in our acquisition efforts. The Department
    determined the definition and metrics for ``synchronization'' across
    space mission areas did not exist. The Department is implementing a
    standard assessment of integration/synchronization across the space
    portfolio more closely integrated with the budget formulation and
    deliberation process. As Mr. Kendall indicated in his January 26, 2015
    letter to the congressional defense committees, the Department will be
    submitting an initial exemplar report covering a single representative
    program (Space Based Infrared System) in June 2015, and a comprehensive
    initial annual report with submission of the FY 2017 President's
    Budget. Additionally, this approach can be applied for future programs
    being approved at Milestone B in order to fulfill the statutory
    requirements contained in the FY 2013 NDAA.
        As Chairman Rogers noted, significant opportunity costs have
    resulted from the lack of synchronization. An example of this problem
    is the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) waveform capable user
    terminals. The legacy transponder payload side of the MUOS satellite is
    being used for operations, but the full operational use of the MUOS
    satellites will not be possible until a significant number of terminals
    of different types are fielded. Synchronization of MUOS and the user
    terminals is highly complex and has significant challenges. Despite
    these challenges, the Navy, in close coordination with the Army, has
    successfully integrated the MUOS waveform with the Army's Handheld,
    Manpack, Small Formfit (HMS) Manpack terminal. As much as the
    Department has recognized the synchronization problems with MUOS, we
    have also identified synchronization issues in other space mission
    areas. In addition to the measures identified herein, the Department
    will continue to work diligently to close these synchronization issues
    across the space enterprise.
        Mr. Rogers. What is your perspective on the importance of having a
    capability to support urgent warfighter space requirements, as the
    Operationally Responsive Space office was intended?
        General Raymond. It is imperative that the warfighter has access to
    responsive space-based capabilities in this increasingly contested,
    congested and competitive space environment. The Operationally
    Responsive Space Office is a great asset that anticipates, and responds
    to, challenges within the space domain. The office also addresses
    urgent warfighter requirements that can be met with space-based assets,
    and helps us to extend our advantages in space and increase resiliency.
    The importance of having this capability will increase as the trend
    toward smaller operationally relevant CubeSats materializes.
        Mr. Rogers. Are there any space capabilities that you currently
    rely on from the Air Force, in order to most effectively and
    efficiently perform your mission? Please describe these capabilities
    and dependency relationships, the plan going forward, and the impact on
    the warfighter.
        Mr. Cardillo. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Rogers. What are the major acquisition challenges regarding the
    development, deployment, and sustainment of space systems?
        a. What plans are in development and/or in place for addressing
    these challenges?
        Ms. Sapp. The operating environment in which the NRO finds itself
    continues to grow in complexity. Targets are becoming increasingly
    vague and fleeting, and our adversaries are aggressively pursuing
    denial and deception techniques. They are developing capabilities to
    threaten our collection assets, and the pace of change is as rapid as
    it has ever been. Therefore, we must continually seek increasingly
    innovative approaches to keep pace and improve our capabilities. At
    NRO, we are thinking outside the box to create unusual or unexpected
    uses of existing sensor systems. Our adversaries continue to develop
    new and improved means to destroy our freedom of action in space, so we
    must develop collection systems with enhanced survivability built in
    from the beginning. We must also factor in affordability; we are
    designing architectures, systems, and technologies to increase
    intelligence collection value, to improve efficiency, and to reduce
    cost of ownership. Innovation enables us to meet these challenges and
    lead the world in intelligence dominance. To ensure that we are always
    on the leading edge with the newest technologies, the NRO has one
    office, the Advanced Systems and Technology Directorate (AS&T), focused
    on research and development. AS&T explores, tests, and develops, and
    transitions revolutionary new capabilities to our current and future
    architecture. AS&T hosts a variety of forums and collaborative research
    programs with industry, government, and academia, always searching for
    the most promising technologies. Another mechanism to address
    acquisition challenges is having a strong acquisition workforce, which
    applies best practices and maintains and close and enduring partnership
    with our industry partners. A critical NRO organizational asset is the
    Acquisition Center of Excellence (ACE). For the past 17 years, ACE has
    provided targeted acquisition training; acquisition support services;
    and helped to ensure open communications with industry. ACE provides
    vital acquisition support services to the NRO workforce, particularly
    for competitive acquisitions. It provides the facilities, tools, and
    support for competitive source selection processes. In doing this, ACE
    helps to ensure the NRO selects the best value solution to its mission
    requirements. Additionally, ACE provides a communication capability
    with our industry partners. Within the ACE is the Acquisition Research
    Center, which provides classified and unclassified web sites as portals
    for industry into NRO business opportunities, including upcoming
    solicitations and on-going acquisitions. The ARC allows industry to
    access data on upcoming NRO acquisitions and helps ACE reach a broader
    industry base for NRO's mission requirements. The ARC capability
    enables industry to communicate with the NRO early in the acquisition
    planning phase. This is extremely important since early industry input
    can help us revise our requirements to attract the widest industry
    interest.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
        Mr. Lamborn. We know that civil agencies can get OPIR data, such as
    that from SBIRS, at a classified level. This is useful where those
    civil agencies can declassify the data. However, there are agencies who
    need the data, but who cannot declassify the data and/or who do not
    have appropriate clearances. What is the Air Force doing to advance
    policy and technical solutions that meet the civil needs for
    declassified OPIR data, such as for use in fighting forest fires in
    Colorado and other high-risk states?
        General Hyten. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) is in the process of
    completing a review and updating our security classification guidance
    across all programs to ensure that we provided consistent guidance with
    the appropriate classification risk levels. Specifically, we are
    conducting a review and in the process of updating Space Based Infrared
    System (SBIRS) security classification guide. Today, AFSPC units
    provide OPIR data and reports to DOD and civil agencies where they are
    able to interpret the data and provide the appropriate context in
    conjunction with other data sources. In accordance with our current
    security guidance, when SBIRS derived products are combined with data
    from other sources, from areas where there is enough viable sources to
    provide plausible deniability, the end products would be unclassified.
        Mr. Lamborn. We have read the recent press about the Air Force's
    desire to turn Wideband Global SATCOM operations over to industry. How
    is the Air Force posturing itself to take advantage of this and other
    opportunities, such as enabling AFSCN connectivity to commercial
    antenna networks?
        General Hyten. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) continues to explore
    opportunities to partner with commercial industry to provide
    uninterrupted space effects to the US warfighter. The initial space
    operation effort focuses on transitioning from purely military
    operations to a proper mixture of military and contractor personnel,
    with Global Positioning System (GPS) as the pathfinder. Additional
    potential manpower savings, either military or contractor can be gained
    through enhanced automation opportunities of ground command and control
    systems.
        Concerning the Air Force's desire to transition Wideband Global
    SATCOM (WGS) satellite vehicle operations from military operations to
    industry operations, AFSPC has not determined a specific timeline to
    potentially transition WGS Satellite operations from military to
    commercial industry. Lessons learned from GPS effort will inform
    decisions on future opportunities in other space capability areas.
        Concerning the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN), AFSPC
    conducted a preliminary study on AFSCN Commercial Provisioning, but
    there is more work to do. There is an independent review underway to
    explore broader options that could include AFSCN that should culminate
    later this year.
        Mr. Lamborn. The performance issues with Raytheon's OCX contract
    have been well documented, particularly in recent weeks. How is Air
    Force Space Command reducing risk and creating potential GPS III ground
    control requirement off-ramps should Raytheon continue to perform
    poorly?
        General Hyten. The Space and Missile Systems Center, Global
    Positioning Systems Directorate has initiated a short-term GPS III
    Contingency Operations capability development to allow GPS III
    satellites to support the constellation sustainment need date. This
    provides risk reduction in the event of late GPS Next Generation
    Command and Control System (OCX) delivery.
        On 9 February 2015, a Federal Business Opportunities (FBO)
    announcement was released for this activity. Anticipated contract award
    is in 2QFY16. The program office is also studying a long-term solution
    to provide executable options in the event an off-ramp is needed. The
    Air Force will balance the affordability of the current strategy versus
    the regrets of pursuing an off-ramp strategy.
        Mr. Lamborn. We know that civil agencies can get OPIR data, such as
    that from SBIRS, at a classified level. This is useful where those
    civil agencies can declassify the data. However, there are agencies who
    need the data, but who cannot declassify the data and/or who do not
    have appropriate clearances. What is the Air Force doing to advance
    policy and technical solutions that meet the civil needs for
    declassified OPIR data, such as for use in fighting forest fires in
    Colorado and other high-risk states?
        Mr. Loverro. The Air Force, through Air Space Command, provides
    Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) data throughout DOD and to civil
    agencies for data interpretation and analysis. The Air Force
    understands that there is an issue with the release of classified OPIR
    data to U.S. departments and agencies without appropriate security
    clearances. To address this issue, Air Force Space Command is
    conducting a review of its security classification guidance, especially
    for data from the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). Once this review
    is complete, the Department expects to be able to release more
    unclassified SBIRS data to U.S. departments and agencies that require
    access to the data.
        Mr. Lamborn. We have read the recent press about the Air Force's
    desire to turn Wideband Global SATCOM operations over to industry. How
    is the Air Force posturing itself to take advantage of this and other
    opportunities, such as enabling AFSCN connectivity to commercial
    antenna networks?
        Mr. Weatherington. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and Space and
    Missile Systems Center (SMC) are exploring ways to contract for
    commercial services to operate Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) and AFSCN
    Telemetry, Tracking, and Command (TT&C) to take advantage of industry
    efficiencies. Currently, AFSPC and SMC are analyzing the results of a
    recently completed Commercial Provisioning study that will be used to
    develop future options based on mission requirements. This will also
    require legal review of the options to ascertain if there are any
    barriers to various approaches.
        Mr. Lamborn. The performance issues with Raytheon's OCX contract
    have been well documented, particularly in recent weeks. How is Air
    Force Space Command reducing risk and creating potential GPS III ground
    control requirement off-ramps should Raytheon continue to perform
    poorly?
        Mr. Weatherington. Air Force Space Command has initiated a short-
    term GPS III Contingency Operations ground system capability
    development to reduce the constellation sustainment risk associated
    with any additional delays to OCX. Contingency Operations will allow
    the Air Force, prior to the full OCX functionality, to launch and
    checkout the initial GPS III satellites and make their signals
    operationally available to GPS users. The Air Force is also studying a
    potential long-term solution for meeting all validated OCX requirements
    should intractable problems with the current acquisition program
    require the Service to pursue an alternative strategy.

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