[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-27]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 24, 2015
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RICK LARSEN, Washington
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
ROB BISHOP, Utah PETE AGUILAR, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana
Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Eric Smith, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Klotz, Lt Gen Frank G., USAF (Ret.), Administrator, National
Nuclear Security Administration................................ 3
Roberson, Jessie H., Vice Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board................................................... 5
Whitney, Mark, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy............ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Klotz, Lt Gen Frank G........................................ 25
Roberson, Jessie H........................................... 50
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 23
Whitney, Mark................................................ 40
Documents Submitted for the Record:
DNFSB Action Plan for Organizational Culture Change.......... 69
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 88
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 90
Mr. Larsen................................................... 89
Mr. Rogers................................................... 75
Mr. Turner................................................... 91
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-27]
. FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 24, 2015.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:32 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. The Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces will come to order. I want to welcome you to our hearing
on the President's fiscal year 2016 budget request for atomic
energy defense activities at the Department of Energy.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. We know
how much work goes into preparing for these hearings, and we
thank you for putting that time and energy into this endeavor.
I want to welcome our guests. We have Lieutenant General Frank
Klotz, Administrator of National Security Administration--
National Nuclear Security [NNSA], a little difference; Mark
Whitney, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management [EM], U.S. Department of Energy; and Ms. Jessie Hill
Roberson, Vice Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board [DNFSB].
General Klotz, you have a few very able folks in support of
you today and I want to recognize them: Dr. Don Cook, Ms. Anne
Harrington, and Admiral John Richardson. If any of our members
have questions directly for them later in the hearing, we will
ensure that they can step up to the table and answer those as
needed.
Before I hand the floor over to the ranking member, let me
briefly highlight just a few key issues for today's hearing.
First, let's be clear on the Nation's defense priorities. Last
November, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said this:
``Our nuclear deterrent plays a critical role in assuring U.S.
national security and it is DOD'S highest priority mission. No
other capability we have is more important.'' This is the
correct priority, but we must remember that fulfilling the
nuclear deterrence mission is the shared responsibility of both
DOD [Department of Defense] and DOE [Department of Energy]. It
is the people, programs, and infrastructure at NNSA's nuclear
enterprise that provides our Nation with that deterrent.
The subcommittee will take a detailed look at NNSA's budget
request and scrub it hard to ensure it is meeting the
military's priorities. In the fiscal environment we are facing,
we must prioritize the core mission of the agency while finding
efficiencies that can be directly applied to that mission.
This is a strong budget request for NNSA, but I fear it may
have only kicked the hardest choices over to Congress. And we
must hear from our witnesses about how devastating
sequestration, or Budget Control Act, funding levels would be
on DOE's defense programs in both NNSA and Environmental
Management. Allowing sequestration to hit us again in fiscal
year 2016 would be like designing a nuclear hand grenade--just
about the dumbest thing we could do.
Moving to governance and management of DOE and NNSA, we
have received a report of the Mies/Augustine Advisory Panel,
and I look forward to receiving General Klotz's response to
that report. I agree with a lot of what the advisory panel
recommended, but not all of it. General, I know there is much
you and I agree on in this area as well. I hope to explore your
thoughts on where we can work together to fix the longstanding
problems related to governance and management. We have to get
on top of these problems if the NNSA is going to be successful
in the long-term. Leadership and accountability will be the key
to this.
Let me end on a bright note. This year, the B61 life
extension program continues to execute on time and on budget.
General, please tell the whole NNSA team to keep up the good
work. This is an important step in rebuilding trust and
confidence with Congress and the American people and our
allies.
Thank you again to our witnesses. I look forward to the
discussion. With that, let me turn it over to my friend and
colleague from Tennessee, the ranking member, Mr. Cooper, for
any opening statement he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 23.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I, too,
welcome the witnesses, and it is a pleasure to work with you on
these issues of vital importance to our national security. As
you noted, no weapons are more important or more dangerous than
these, and we need to make sure that we are doing the best we
possibly can to keep them safe, secure, and reliable. I look
forward to the testimony of the witnesses.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. With that, we will ask each of our
witnesses to make an opening statement, and your full statement
will be submitted for the record. I would ask you to summarize
it in 3 minutes. And without objection, we will accept those
for the record.
The witness order will be first General Klotz, then Mr.
Whitney, and then Ms. Roberson. So, General Klotz, you are
recognized for 3 minutes to summarize your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN FRANK G. KLOTZ, USAF (RET.), ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
General Klotz. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and
members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to
present the President's fiscal year 2016 budget request for the
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration. I am pleased to be joined by Mark Whitney and
Vice Chairman Jessie Roberson, who you have already introduced.
We value this committee's leadership in national security
as well as its robust and abiding support for the mission and
the people of the NNSA. On a personal note, I have benefited
enormously from the insight and guidance you have so generously
and graciously shared over the past 12 months.
Our budget request, which comprises more than 40 percent of
DOE's budget, is $12.6 billion. This is an increase of $1.2
billion, or 10.2 percent over the fiscal year 2015 enacted
level. The funding is extraordinarily important to NNSA's
missions to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
weapon stockpile; to prevent, counter, and respond to the
threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; and to
support the capability of our nuclear-powered Navy to project
power and protect American and allied interests around the
world.
By supporting growth in each of our four appropriations
accounts, this budget represents the commitment by the
administration to NNSA's vital and enduring missions and to
NNSA's role in ensuring a strong national defense. This mission
is accomplished through the hard work and innovative spirit of
a highly talented workforce committed to public service. To
provide them the tools they need to carry out their complex and
challenging tasks, both now and in the future, we must continue
to modernize our scientific, technical, and engineering
capabilities and infrastructure.
In doing so, we are mindful of our obligation to
continually improve our business practices and to be
responsible stewards of the resources that Congress and the
American people have entrusted to us.
For all of these missions, NNSA will continue to drive
improvement in acquisition and project management practices and
policies as well as Federal oversight over the enterprise.
These missions are just a handful of the critical national
security work that this budget funds; however, the looming
possibility of sequestration is a major threat to NNSA's
missions. In developing the budget, NNSA was directed to
request the funds we need to accomplish the missions we have
been tasked to do. The fiscal year 2016 budget request reflects
this.
Another round of sequestration caps would most certainly
have devastating impacts on important programs and projects, to
include pushing them further out into the future or canceling
them altogether. However you slice it, sequestration would
adversely and severely affect our capabilities and our capacity
to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons
stockpile, and to reduce nuclear dangers both at home and
abroad.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, I look forward to
discussing these and other issues with you in more detail
during the question and answer.
[The prepared statement of General Klotz can be found in
the Appendix on page 25.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General.
Mr. Whitney, you are recognized for 3 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARK WHITNEY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Whitney. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking
Member Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to
be here today to represent the Department of Energy's Office of
Environmental Management, and to discuss the positive program
achievements to date and what we plan to accomplish under the
President's fiscal year 2016 budget request.
Our request for $5.818 billion will allow the EM program to
continue to make safe cleanup of the environmental legacy a
priority, a legacy that was brought about from five decades of
nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear
energy research. The request includes $5.055 billion for
defense environmental cleanup activities; an additional $472
million for the defense contribution to the Uranium Enrichment
Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund; a total of $542
million for the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and
Decommissioning Fund cleanup activities; and $220 million for
non-defense environmental cleanup activities.
We continue to make significant cleanup progress. We have
produced nearly 4,000 canisters of vitrified high-level waste
at Savannah River Site in South Carolina, converting it to a
solid glass form suitable for long-term storage or permanent
disposal. This is about half the sludge in the Savannah River
Site tanks.
At Hanford, we have completed the bulk of the river
corridor cleanup project, including more than 500 facilities
and 1,000 remediation sites.
The fiscal year 2016 budget request will allow us to
continue to make significant progress in our ongoing cleanup
priorities of liquid tank waste treatment, and recovery of the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant [WIPP]. For example, the Idaho
National Laboratory, the request supports operations of the
Integrative Waste Treatment Unit. It also covers and supports
cleaning and grouting activities to support closing of the
final four tanks there. It also supports high-level waste tank
progress at the Savannah River Site, including producing 130
canisters of vitrified waste derived from tanks and processed
through the Defense Waste Processing Facility.
The 2016 request will allow us to expedite tank waste
treatment at the Office of River Protection in Hanford through
the direct-feed low-activity waste approach, and this allows us
to continue designing the low-activity waste treatment system,
and continuing construction of the low-activity waste facility,
the analytical laboratory, and balance of the facilities at the
Waste Treatment Plant.
The 2016 request also provides funding in accordance with
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant recovery plan. There are many
sites around the EM complex, of course, that depend on the WIPP
facility and that have transuranic waste at its plant for
disposal.
So that resumption of operations at WIPP is a priority for
us, and we will resume waste emplacement activities in 2016.
The request also completes major facility clean-out and
demolition projects, including the Plutonium Finishing Plant at
Hanford.
In closing, I am honored to be here today representing the
Office of Environmental Management. We are committed to
achieving our mission, and will continue to apply innovative
environmental cleanup strategies to complete work safely and
efficiently, thereby demonstrating value to the American
taxpayer.
Thank you, and I would be pleased to answer any questions
that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Whitney can be found in the
Appendix on page 40.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Whitney.
Ms. Roberson, you are recognized for 3 minutes to summarize
your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JESSIE H. ROBERSON, VICE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE NUCLEAR
FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
Ms. Roberson. Thank you, Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member
Cooper, and other members of the subcommittee. I am the Vice
Chairman of the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board, and I
would like to acknowledge the other two members sitting
directly behind me, Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Santos.
Last year's radioactive release at the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant demonstrated the significant impact likely to
result from a radiological incident at any DOE defense nuclear
facility. Waste disposal operations have already been shut down
for over 13 months. This has impacted cleanup activities across
DOE's entire defense nuclear complex, and illustrates that even
activities judged to be relatively low risk can still have
major safety consequences and large impacts on DOE's ability to
accomplish its mission when radioactive materials are involved.
The board is the only agency that provides independent
safety oversight of DOE's defense nuclear facilities. The
board's budget is devoted to maintaining and supporting an
expert staff of engineers and scientists, nearly all of whom
have advanced technical degrees, to support us in accomplishing
our highly specialized work.
The President's budget request for fiscal year 2016
includes $29.15 million in new budget authority for the board.
It will support a planned staff of 125 personnel. This level of
staffing is needed to provide sufficient independent safety
oversight of DOE's defense nuclear complex, given the pace and
scope of DOE's activities.
The board provides safety oversight of a multitude of
operations critical to national defense. These operations
include assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons,
fabrication of plutonium pits and weapons components,
production and recycling of tritium, nuclear criticality
experiments, sub-critical experiments, and a host of activities
to address the radioactive legacy resulting from 70 years of
nuclear weapons operations.
The board supports and closely oversees DOE and NNSA's
efforts to develop new defense nuclear facilities that
integrate safety into their design at the very earliest stages.
The delays in NNSA's programs to modernize its uranium and
plutonium capabilities require the board to provide continued
safety oversight of ongoing defense programs work, and aging
nuclear facilities that do not meet modern safety standards.
Given the age and condition of many of DOE's defense
nuclear facilities, the board is placing particular emphasis on
emergency preparedness and accident response capabilities
across the complex.
Let me add in closing that the board and DOE together have
built a constructive working relationship. All board members,
myself, Mr. Sullivan, and Mr. Santos, understand that a safe
nuclear security enterprise is our priority.
That concludes my statement. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Roberson can be found in the
Appendix on page 50.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank you. Thank you all for those opening
statements. I will start with questioning now. I will recognize
myself for the first round of questions.
General Klotz, you have a unique perspective to offer this
committee on an issue we focused on for some time: governance
and management at DOE and NNSA. As the first commander of the
Air Force Global Strike Command, you were one of NNSA's primary
customers for nuclear weapons work, and now as Administrator,
you are in charge of the NNSA. Given your background and
experience, I fear that if you can't fix these problems, nobody
can.
And let me be clear. I firmly believe that getting NNSA's
governance and management on track for the long-term must be
one of your core duties.
You owe us a report right now on your views of the Mies/
Augustine Advisory Panel's recommendations. As I said in my
opening remarks, I agree with a lot of their recommendations,
but certainly not all of them.
So tell me, what are your views that you can share with us
today on what that report is going to tell us?
General Klotz. I thank you, Chairman. And let me say that I
take your charge very seriously that the governance and
management of NNSA is, indeed, one of our top priorities, as we
move forward.
As far as the Augustine/Mies Panel is concerned, we have
stated publicly that we appreciate the hard and long work that
the members of the panel put in in giving some very thoughtful
consideration to the issues that face NNSA and the entire
nuclear security enterprise in terms of its governance and its
management, and we appreciate the counsel that they have given
in terms of their recommendation.
As we look across the broad 19 overarching recommendations,
and 63 sub-recommendations, we find, like you, we are in
agreement with most of them. And, in fact, many of the things
that they have suggested, for instance, in the area of
tightening up program management, instilling more rigor and
discipline in project management, in cost estimation, in the
relationship between NNSA and the military services and the
relationship between NNSA and its laboratories and production
plants across the country are things that under Secretary
Moniz's leadership and under the leadership team that is
currently now in place at NNSA, we have been working very, very
hard on.
So we take that as, to some extent, validation,
justification for a number of things that we have already moved
out very smartly on and are continuing to develop as we move
forward.
So I look forward to finishing off the report. I expect
some time in the next 3 to 4 weeks, we will be able to deliver
it up here, and I look forward to the opportunity to discussing
the specific comments that we have in greater detail with you
and other members of the committee.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Many of the Mies/Augustine
recommendations align with similar efforts this committee has
undertaken in the past: reducing transactional oversight,
clarifying roles and responsibilities, and improving cost
estimation and program management. And although we try to help,
many of these problems are not fixable by Congress, but
Congress can and will continue to provide guidance, direction,
and momentum.
So, General, how can this committee help you address those
issues?
General Klotz. Well, first of all, I think you have taken
the first most important step, and that is to express your
interest, your concern in the governance and management of the
NNSA.
It is so very important for those individuals, those men
and women who work within our enterprise, to know that the
senior leadership of this government in both the executive
branch and the legislative branch understand the importance of
the enduring mission which those people perform and care about
its safe and successful execution.
So, again, as we come forward with this report, we will
have some specific comments on the recommendations in there
that we can discuss with you in terms of the way ahead.
Mr. Rogers. The third area I want to ask about is
accountability. As a part of our effort to reform DOE and NNSA,
we have spent a lot of time in this committee seeking
accountability from major failures, the break-in at Y-12, the
stunning failure of design and oversight with the UPF [Uranium
Processing Facility] that wasted at least half a billion
dollars of taxpayers' money, and the decades of wasted effort
with CMRR [Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
facility]. The list is long.
General, these failures were before your time as the
Administrator, but are you aware that not a single Federal
official was terminated after these disasters? Several retired
and were moved to other jobs, but not one was fired.
So, General Klotz, can you assure this committee that you
will hold Federal employees and contractors fully accountable
for failures of this magnitude? This committee would like to
see a message sent.
General Klotz. Yes, sir, we will. And I think one of the
things that we have worked very hard on is to restore good
order and discipline and a rigorous approach to both security
and to program and project management in the past several
months, and we are beginning to see some of the results of our
effort in that way. And we will not shrink from holding either
Federal officials or the management and operating [M&O]
contractors accountable for their performance in both--when
they do well, to recognize that and to congratulate them, as
you already have in your opening statement. By the same token,
when they fall short of our standards, to make sure that we
communicate to them to that.
I think a review of the most recent cycle of fee
determination shows that we will take tough action when what we
expect from our people and our M&O contractors do not meet our
expectations.
Mr. Rogers. Great. I thank you. And I will now recognize
the ranking member for any questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Continuing the
chairman's theme, let us talk about the WIPP disaster. Hundreds
of millions of dollars to remediate, a year or more of delays,
ripple throughout the entire nuclear establishment. Who has
been held accountable in the WIPP disaster?
Mr. Whitney. Thank you, Congressman Cooper. Yes, the--and
as the general pointed out, you know, a lot of times the
accountability is not as visible, sometimes it is very visible,
but we are very focused on holding our folks accountable.
The general pointed out fee determinations. And I think you
will see with one of the parties that was responsible for the
WIPP incident, they were held accountable in that fee
determination area.
We are very focused on recovering the operations and
resuming operations of that facility. Sir, as you pointed out,
it is critical to the cleanup program. We are making
significant progress under fairly difficult circumstances. The
team there at WIPP, both the Federal side and the contractors,
have done significant amount of work, and we are focused on
resuming operations in 2016.
Mr. Cooper. So some time in the calendar year of 2016 we
will see a resumption?
Mr. Whitney. Yes, sir. We issued a recovery plan in
September, September 30 of this past year, and it calls for us
to resume operations by the end of the first quarter of
calendar year 2016, and that is currently our plan. There are a
few things that will be coming out fairly soon, and that is the
Technical Assessment Team report on what exactly happened,
looking at the drum where we had the incident, as well as the
Accident Investigation Board final report. There will be
corrective actions that will come out of that.
The Secretary has stated that our goal is the end of March
2016 for resuming operations, but we will only do so when we
are confident that it is safe to do so. So we are focused on
that, but we still have the end of March 2016 as our goal. Yes,
sir.
Mr. Cooper. Well, that is the timeline. How much, though,
is it estimated to cost?
Mr. Whitney. The cost, we don't know exactly how much the
cost will be, because a lot of it will depend on the permanent
ventilation system and exhaust shaft. We have begun to request
that money, as you know. Right now the range for that project,
because of the stage of the project, it is pre-Critical
Decision 1, and so we are going through the alternatives
analysis. As we further narrow the design down, we will get a
better sense of the total cost, but right now, the range for
that project is $77 million to $309 million. I think later this
year we will have a better estimate of the cost of that, of
that project, and that will really be the large portion of WIPP
recovery costs.
Mr. Cooper. And this will all be overseen by Ms. Roberson
and the Defense Nuclear Safety Board?
Ms. Roberson. Yes, sir, Mr. Cooper. We are providing
oversight to the project, and we too have looked at--I mean, we
are just over 100 people, so we tend to prioritize, but we have
placed additional emphasis on our oversight investment for this
project.
Mr. Cooper. So back to Mr. Whitney. If the price tag is
between $70 million and $300 million, how much is the
contractor going to be held responsible for?
Mr. Whitney. The contractor also has a fee determination
very soon, and so we will be looking at this, of course. There
have been a couple of actions that we have already taken with
respect to the contract and the fee called conditional payment
of fee actions, which have reduced the amount that they are
able to earn significantly. I believe within the next several
weeks, the final fee determination will be made and made
public.
Mr. Cooper. So, then, that will be publicly available, that
information?
Mr. Whitney. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cooper. General Klotz, you seem to be doing a good job
running an alphabet soup of an agency. There are many
challenges, but as Chairman Rogers said, if anybody can do it,
you are supposed to be the man. We appreciate when you bring in
projects on time and under budget. That is great. I know you
have a lot on your plate, both with life extension programs and
with construction projects.
So we on this committee want to help you with the full
range of your responsibilities, including your nonproliferation
duties and the management of change that you made to include
counterterrorism in that, that you are assured that that will
give us better ability to deter anyone who might be thinking of
a nuclear incident in this country and better opportunity to
not only prevent that from happening, but to identify the
wrongdoers and take prompt action to protect the American
people.
General Klotz. Yes, sir. The change that we made was, in a
sense, how we view the problem of dealing with nuclear
proliferation and nuclear terrorism, both at home and abroad in
a very, very general sense.
You mentioned alphabet soup. Up until we made this change,
we had a lot of different programs that were created in the
aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, and the work that we
did there under the Nunn-Lugar initiatives and other
Cooperative Threat Reduction activities. And a couple of years
ago, Ms. Harrington, who is sitting behind me, started an over-
the-horizon look at positioning our efforts in this area for
the longer term to deal with an increasingly complex and
increasingly dangerous world.
Our thought in approaching this is that we should think of
this issue from start to finish, from cradle to grave as a
continuum of activities that run from protect against the
spread of special nuclear materials that would fall in the
hands of would be proliferators and terrorists; and then if
that fails, be able to counter that, and then if that fails, be
able to respond to any nuclear radiological incident.
So it is a continuum of activities. In fact, just yesterday
we released the first-ever comprehensive report on the full
range of activities that fall within this particular mission
space. So we see that as a compendium, as a companion volume to
the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which we
produced for some number of years now that describes in detail
what we do in the area of weapons activities.
Mr. Cooper. May I suggest that your duties in this regard
are the single-most important function of government, and the
only thing the public will care about if there were to be a
nuclear incident. And I think most of the so-called experts
predicted that there would be one within 10 years of 9/11, and
thank God that hasn't happened, but as the clock ticks, we have
to be increasingly vigilant. So we need to make sure that you
are doing everything possible, and that we are doing everything
possible to make sure this never happens in this country.
If you need anything, anything, call on us. And I know that
all of your budget categories are going up, at least if the
President's request is adhered to. And I could not agree with
you more that we need to get rid of sequestration, but this has
got to be job one for the country.
I see that Admiral Richardson is behind you. I don't want
to stop my questioning without noting that Naval Reactors over
many years seems to have done an exceptional job of keeping up
with its duties, so I hope that your fine example will spread.
If you do have dirty laundry, at least you have kept it more
hid than the other services. I hope it is just a lack of dirty
laundry. But, you know, the tradition that Naval Reactors seems
to have had is a truly remarkable one, so I hope you can
continue that.
I have no more questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the ranking member. Chair now recognizes
the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
the distinguished panel being here today and testifying.
General, I think it was last year we got a report from
Secretary of Defense Hagel indicating that our requirements for
our nuclear capacity was 50 to 80 plutonium pits per year. Is
that still the requirement?
General Klotz. That is the objective which we are working
for as part of a comprehensive plutonium strategy.
Many, many years ago, when we had the facility at Rocky
Flats in California, we had the ability to produce thousands of
nuclear weapon pits each year. Of course, that was at the
height of the Cold War, when our stockpile was much, much
larger than it is today. That facility was shut down. We
moved--or tried to demonstrate the ability to develop pits,
manufacture pits, fabricate pits at Los Alamos National
Laboratory in New Mexico. And we are going through a sustained
process of recreating the ability to produce a smaller number
of pits per year, ultimately up to 50 to 80 per year, in order
to support life extension programs that we see coming in the
2020 to 2030 timeframe as we move there.
Mr. Bridenstine. So is the administration's policy 50 to 80
pits?
General Klotz. That is what the Department of Defense and
the Department of Energy have agreed to, the Nuclear Weapons
Council, which passes judgment on these issues.
Mr. Bridenstine. In the fiscal year 2015 NDAA [National
Defense Authorization Act] signed by the President, section
3112 included a sense of Congress that ``Timelines for creating
certain capacities for production of plutonium pits and other
nuclear weapons components must be driven by the requirements
to hedge against technical and geopolitical risk, and not
solely by the needs of life extension programs.''
Do you agree with that?
General Klotz. I agree with that.
Mr. Bridenstine. The administration has, since 2010, the
2010 Nuclear Posture Review, articulated a policy that it wants
to develop a ``responsive nuclear infrastructure.''
Can you share with us what that means?
General Klotz. Well, in fact, sir, what we were just
talking about is a good example of a responsive infrastructure.
If you have the capability to fabricate pits, if you have the
capability to fabricate other nuclear and non-nuclear
components in a modern, efficient, and agile production system,
then you can adjust what your requirements are to deal with any
technical challenges that may arise through the aging of a
particular warhead, or any significant changes in the political
military environment.
Mr. Bridenstine. Do you believe we currently have a
responsive nuclear posture?
General Klotz. We are pretty agile and we are pretty
flexible, but we could be certainly more so.
Mr. Bridenstine. The life extension program for the W80
nuclear warhead for the long-range standoff [LRSO] cruise
missile is accelerated by 2 years in this year's budget
request, which is a good thing. It now aligns with NNSA's
program with the statutory requirement in the fiscal year 2015
NDAA that you produce the first warhead in this program by
2025. Where does the W80 warhead and the larger LRSO missile
rank in the Nuclear Weapons Council's priority list?
General Klotz. It is right up there. It is one of the life
extension programs we are going with. I wouldn't rank it any
higher or any lower. It is a top priority.
Mr. Bridenstine. Will it happen in fiscal year 2015? I
guess, will you commit that in fiscal year 2015, fiscal year
2016 we will see movements for the next steps in this program?
General Klotz. We have already had some fairly significant
movements in the W80, we call it the W80-4 life extension
program [LEP], which will be the warhead that the Nuclear
Weapons Council agreed would be the one we would field with the
Air Force's long-range standoff capability. We are moving
towards----
Dr. Cook. 6.2 on July 1.
General Klotz. So later this year we will take the next
step in that process. So this is something which we take very,
very seriously.
Mr. Bridenstine. What would be the impact if Congress
significantly cut this program or canceled it altogether?
General Klotz. Well, that is a very good question, and
thank you for asking it. I think it goes without saying that
any significant cuts to this particular program, or a general
sequestration across the board would adversely affect all of
our programs in one way or the other.
Now, whether it would--if you had a general cut, we would
have to engage in discussions with Department of Defense. As
the chairman said in his opening statement, they essentially,
you know, are the customers for what we deliver in the way of a
warhead, so we would want to make sure that we were synced up
with whatever adjustment they had to make for delivery systems.
It would not make sense for us to deliver a warhead if there
wasn't a delivery system ready for it and vice versa. So that
would be something that we would have to work out
collaboratively through the Nuclear Weapons Council process.
Mr. Bridenstine. Well, let's hope that doesn't happen.
I will yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes the
gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen,
thank you for your work.
Just to continue following up on the previous questions, it
looks like we are somewhere north of $17 billion for the W80-4
nuclear warhead LEP program, and the cruise missile that goes
with it. You have accelerated this discussion by, I think, an
incomplete answer. Why was the 2-year acceleration required?
General Klotz. The acceleration, moving it up 2 years from
2027 to 2025 for the first production unit was taken largely at
the request of the Department of Defense, U.S. Strategic
Command, and the Air Force for an early delivery of the
capability which the long-range standoff system represents.
As Admiral Haney, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command,
has said in open testimony, basically it reflects two concerns:
One is the increasing sophistication of air defenses around the
world; and the second is some concerns about the aging of the
missile, that is the current air-launched cruise missile.
So they felt it was prudent from a military requirements
point of view to move that up. And we support them on that.
And, in fact, perhaps more detail than is needed, but it
actually fits in very, very nicely with our work schedule and
it will allow us to have sort of a smoother approach to how we
do the life extension programs over an extended period of time.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. Not okay, but thank you for the
information. We were talking about responsive infrastructure
before, 50 to 80 pits required. And at what cost? The
infrastructure; not for the pits, but for the infrastructure?
General Klotz. I would have to get you--I could take that
and get you the full cost of the plutonium strategy out through
all the years. For the coming year, what we are asking for us
in fiscal year 2015, Congress enacted 335--I am sorry, 35.7 for
the plutonium strategy and replacement of the chemical,
metallurgical laboratory at Los Alamos. That is going up to
1.55 as our budget request for 2016. As we continue to----
Mr. Garamendi. With a B?
General Klotz. I am sorry?
Mr. Garamendi. $1.55 billion?
General Klotz. Million.
Mr. Garamendi. Million. Okay. And that is the next
investment on, we don't know the--you don't have the total cost
of the facility?
General Klotz. We do have. We can get you that number. I
don't have it.
Mr. Garamendi. You don't have it with you.
General Klotz. If I could carry numbers around in my head,
I would have stayed a math major instead of becoming a poli sci
major.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, I am pleased that you chose the career
you have. The 50 to 80 pits is to actually produce that number
of pits?
General Klotz. It is to show the capacity to produce that
number of pits, is what--as we understand----
Mr. Garamendi. The assumption is at some point we would
need to produce at least 50 to 80 pits?
General Klotz. That is the assumption, yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. And it is based on what assumption? What is
the----
General Klotz. The assumption it is based on as we move
into a life extension program that would affect the W78, which
is a warhead used on the U.S. Air Force's intercontinental
ballistic missile and would also be our first interoperable
warhead [IW], that we would need to be able to produce pits for
that.
Mr. Garamendi. What do you mean ``interoperable''?
General Klotz. Perhaps maybe I will let Dr. Cook describe
this since he came here and we have an open mike for him.
Mr. Cook. Happy to do that. By ``interoperable,'' which is
part of the three-plus-two strategy, it is an agreed Nuclear
Weapon Council strategy to move eventually to three
interoperable ballistic missile systems. That brings down, in
the long haul, some of the technical hedge that we carry to
provide a backup against technical failure for what we have,
and more importantly, as weapons age. Specifically, it means
the ability to have a common nuclear explosive package fit into
each of the large air shells, one for the Air Force, which is
the Mark 21; one for the Navy, which is the Mark 5, to do the
adjustment and all of the balancing required for flight
characteristics with the non-nuclear components. And we pursued
this year after year. It is well beyond the stage of
conceptual.
Within the last 12 months, we believe that we have proven,
to the best extent on paper that this is possible, and now we
will begin maturing the technologies in order to resume the
schedule. As the Administrator said, there was a 5-year delay
in IW-1, in other testimony, and some money is shown in the
fiscal 2020 year budget to resume that work.
Mr. Garamendi. I am out of time, Mr. Chairman, but I want
to get into that in much more detail.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. We will have another round.
Mr. Garamendi. And I will come back. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank all for being
here. Thank you for your service to our country. And I am just
going to jump right in, General Klotz. You have talked about
the responsive infrastructure and you have been asked about
that. Isn't that lacking, because there is a key uranium
facility and a key plutonium facility that need to be planned
and built, and we are not doing that?
General Klotz. We could take--we are working on both of
those, and we can take them separately. On the plutonium side,
as I indicated earlier in an earlier response, we had the
capability at one time at Rocky Flats in Colorado to produce
literally thousands of pits per year for a much larger
stockpile than we now have. We no longer have that kind of
capacity, and we foresee a need in the future for being able to
produce a greater number of pits than we can do on basically a
handful a year now at Los Alamos. So we are building up that
capability.
What has changed from the past is, at one time we were
looking at constructing one large facility to replace an aging
facility where we did analytical chemistry and material
characterization related to plutonium at Los Alamos, and now we
have adopted a more modular approach, re-purposing some
existing facilities, moving equipment around, and beginning the
process of design for some external modules, which will allow
us to increase the capacity of space that we have. So that is
underway. We have got money in the budget, we have an ask and a
request for that.
Mr. Lamborn. How far away is that from being done?
General Klotz. What is the expectation?
Mr. Cook. You are looking at--the expectation for the
plutonium is to have most of the capabilities in for the first
part of the strategy by 2020, and for the second part by about
2025. We will execute a buildup, in a rational way for
capability at 10, 20, and 30 pits per annum and 24, 25, and 26.
We will achieve the capability with plutonium and demonstrate
at the 50 to 80 level in 2030 that capability.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, I am very concerned, because this and
the uranium facility were part of what was promised by the
administration to get the Senate to ratify the New START
[Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty. And when I see that elements
of this are 15 years away, up to 15 years away, I am just
really concerned that the administration hasn't been keeping
its end of the bargain. That is, frankly, what my concern is.
General Klotz. If I could shift to uranium, since you asked
about that, our principal facility for doing that is the Y-12
facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and there we do have the
capacity to conduct uranium operations. Our concern, however,
is if much of the work is done in a facility, we call it 9212,
which is decades old, is really showing signs of wear and tear,
and we are concerned obviously about the safety not only of our
operations there, but more importantly, the people, the
employees.
Mr. Lamborn. And how far away is that from being----
General Klotz. Again, we have changed our approach from
doing a big-box approach where you put everything into one box,
and, therefore, every square foot costs as much as the most
expensive requirement driven by security and safety, to having
a distributed, segregated approach where we segregate
activities by hazard and security category.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Lastly, I want to address Admiral
Richardson. If you could come up to the empty mike, that would
be great. And by the way, I know the chairman recently led a
congressional delegation [CODEL] to Idaho, and you were there
and hosted us at the Naval Reactors. General Klotz, you were
there, and I really appreciate that. I think we all got a lot
out of that.
And since that visit, I have gone to a local firm in my
district, Cogitic. A couple of brothers are getting a business.
It is amazingly capable in producing parts for nuclear
submarines, like the valves, the ball valves and things like
that. So it is just amazing all that goes into the nuclear
enterprise from start to finish. But real quick--oh, gosh. I
have run out of time.
Mr. Rogers. Go ahead.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I will just ask this question. And thank
you, Mr. Chairman, I have to run to the floor on what they are
discussing right now, but my question is this: On low-enriched
uranium, there are some who talk about, well, that can be used
as a substitute for highly enriched uranium. Is there really
any promising future to a military capability for low-enriched
uranium?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, thank you very much for your kind
words and thank you for the question. We do produce a report to
Congress about the feasibility of using low-enriched uranium. I
have a copy of that report here which I submitted in January of
2014. And with the current state of technology right now, if we
were to substitute low-enriched uranium, it would only be even
technically considered for an aircraft carrier application.
And, because of the reduced energy in the low-enriched
uranium, with the current technology, we would introduce
another refueling event in the life of that carrier. That
refueling event would come at a cost of about a billion dollars
and would remove that carrier from being at sea while it comes
into the shipyard to do that refueling operation as well.
We have done some recent exploratory work, and, you know,
the potential exists that we could develop an advanced fuel
system that might increase uranium loading and make low-
enriched uranium possible while still meeting, you know, some
very rigorous performance requirements for naval reactors on
nuclear-powered warships. By no means is success assured by
that.
Mr. Lamborn. Admiral, I am going to have to run, but----
Admiral Richardson. All right.
Mr. Lamborn [continuing]. Do you see a current military
benefit to using low-enriched uranium today?
Admiral Richardson. From a pure military standpoint, no,
sir.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you all for
being here and for your service.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Now let's talk about NNSA on deferred maintenance. I and
several other members of this subcommittee have had the
opportunity to visit Y-12, the labs, the Naval Reactors
facility in Idaho with you, General Klotz and Admiral
Richardson, and other parts of the NNSA enterprise.
At each stop, I ask for the ugly tour to see some of the
massive backlog of deferred maintenance at all of these
decrepit facilities, and we saw a lot of ugly. I am putting
some slides up on the monitors of the recent roof collapse at
the lithium facility at Y-12. A huge chunk of concrete fell
into an operational work area. We are lucky no one was hurt or
killed. We have also got some pictures from Pantex, which has
many areas in equally as bad shape.
Because all of these places are inside secure facilities, I
don't think the American people are aware of just how bad these
buildings have gotten. We have got weeds growing up out the
floors of work areas at Pantex; $14 million diagnostic
equipment covered with tarps because of the lab roof leaks;
duct tape, which I like duct tape, don't get me wrong, duct
tape and plastic around pipes carrying radioactive solutions.
General, you and Secretary Moniz have sought to arrest the
growth of the deferred maintenance backlog at NNSA. That is
laudable, and I know you will have this committee's full
support, but you haven't requested enough money to actually
reduce the backlog. What more could you be doing if provided
additional funding?
General Klotz. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
for you and the committee's leadership on this issue. You are
absolutely right. We face a tremendous challenge. More than 40
percent of NNSA's facilities--more than half of NNSA's
facilities are over 40 years old. Thirty percent of them date
back to the Manhattan Project, that's World War II. And our
deferred maintenance figures have risen to nearly $3.7 billion,
and without arresting that, would continue to grow.
You rightly pointed out that Secretary Moniz has declared
that we will arrest the rise of deferred maintenance across the
entire DOE enterprise, not just at NNSA.
We do have some success stories in the past couple of
years. This past year, 2014, we moved into a brand-new facility
at Kansas City, moving out of a World War II-era factory,
aircraft engine factory, into a brand-new state-of-the-art
facility, which we attained through a lease with the General
Services Administration, GSA, with a private developer. In the
process, we have reduced our footprint from roughly 3 million
square feet to half that, and reduced our operating costs by
$100 million a year.
And in Pantex, we have completed construction, along with
the help of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, of a High Explosives
Pressing Facility and begun the process of certifying. So we
are making inroads.
But what I have observed, both in the NNSA and in my
previous career in the Air Force, is, when dollars are
constrained, the first dollar goes to the pointy edge of the
spear, or goes to the mission program; the next dollar goes for
the next mission of priority. And it is only after you have
been able to expense those particular requirements do we pay
attention to the infrastructure.
Well, quite frankly, we have deferred that too long and the
bill has come due, and we need to take some extraordinary
measures: One, to fund these, but also to think of new and
creative ways in which we can deliver facilities for our people
to work in.
Mr. Rogers. Do you, offhand, have a total number it would
take to remedy these deferred maintenance issues?
General Klotz. Well, right now our backlog right now is
$3.7 billion to do maintenance. Now, we continue to chip away
at that, and I think we are getting smarter, or at least more
analytical in our approach. We have adopted two processes
recently, which the Department of Defense uses to grade the
condition of its facilities and to set the priorities, and I
think that rigor and discipline will help us refine those
numbers even more so.
Mr. Rogers. Great. All right, General. You owe us a plan
for two or more public-private partnerships you wish to pursue
to get workers out of old, dilapidated buildings and into
modern facilities. Do you see these kind of alternative finance
agreements as beneficial to your efforts to get out of these
old facilities faster?
General Klotz. We do. And as I said, we have had several
successes. Two facilities, at Y-12, at Oak Ridge were built in
that way. The Kansas City plant has been built in that way. And
we will be bringing some additional ideas to you of ways in
which we can get people out of facilities, particularly the one
at Pantex, into modern, more efficient buildings.
This is important not only for conduct of operations, it is
also extraordinarily important, in my view, for the recruitment
and retention of the highest caliber people out of our
technical schools and out of our graduate schools, because
given the opportunity to go work in a facility which would use
their scientific, technical, and engineering skills that is
brand-new and modern, like many high tech firms are able to
offer, or something that is, as you described it, dilapidated,
it is a tough sell for recruiting and retaining people into
this enterprise.
Mr. Rogers. Yeah. I have been to those facilities, and I
have shared this with you and I will share with the panel and
the guests here. These people that we have working are very
well-educated. They have options. And, first of all, I am
amazed that we are able to--and it says a lot about their
patriotism, and their belief in how important their work is
that they suffer these intolerable conditions. When you see
somebody with these educational credentials working in some of
the circumstances we just put up on the board, it is just--it
is indefensible.
Ms. Roberson, I will talk to you about deferred
maintenance.
Ms. Roberson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. What are the safety impacts of NNSA's
deteriorating infrastructure and the $3.6 billion backlog of
deterred maintenance you just heard General Klotz reference?
And is all of this decrepit infrastructure becoming a safety
hazard?
Ms. Roberson. Mr. Chairman, the consequences are, as I
stated in my opening statement, the questionable reliability of
safety controls and the health of your safety management
programs. So we have really been focusing our oversight, both
for NNSA and EM, because EM also has aging facilities too,
really focusing on the reliability of their safety controls,
the health of their safety management programs, criticality
safety, radiological safety, fire protection, and also on
emergency management, which, at the end of the day, must really
be healthy to ensure you can respond to anything before it
becomes something more than a small incident.
Mr. Rogers. What is your view of NNSA's plan to remain in
these facilities for decades to come?
Ms. Roberson. Well, we think that newer facilities that
meet modern safety standards would be important, I think the
board's been consistent in saying that in the recent years. We
also think that Environmental Management should continue to get
out of facilities that are decrepit, you know, undo them before
they undo themselves. And so I think the board has been
consistent in staying supportive of NNSA's efforts to, you
know, establish, whether it is big box or modular, whatever
they choose, but to establish infrastructure for the workers
and to ensure protection of the public that meet modern safety
standards.
Mr. Rogers. Has DNSFB provided NNSA with a prioritized list
of the safety concerns that you have about these facilities?
Ms. Roberson. I don't know if we have provided them a
prioritized list. We certainly give them lists. We have the
opportunity to discuss the things that we are seeing that we
think are a high priority from a safety perspective on a
routine basis.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes the ranking member for any
additional questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just withhold
until the classified session.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. With that, we have just got a couple of
items we need to discuss for the record in classified, secure
session with General Klotz. So with that, we will recess this
for about 5 minutes to walk to the SCIF [Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facility], and then we will
reconvene.
[Whereupon, at 4:32 p.m., the committee proceeded in closed
session.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 24, 2015
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March 24, 2015
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 24, 2015
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, the B61-12 and W76-1 life extension
programs are both well underway at this point. Please give us a status
update on these programs. Are you confident they will finish on time
and on budget?
General Klotz. The B61-12 is in Phase 6.3 (Development
Engineering). The B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) completed more
than 20 B61-12 LEP system-level joint, ground, and aircraft integration
tests using functional developmental hardware. The first integration
B61-12 LEP bomb assembly and tail kit assembly test was completed with
aircraft platform interfaces, and the B61-12 will complete the first
joint flight test in 2015. The primary future milestones will be to
obtain Phase 6.4 (Production Engineering) approval in FY 2016; to
obtain Phase 6.5 (First Production Unit) approval in FY 2019; and to
complete the first production unit no later than March 2020. The B61-12
LEP is on schedule and within budget for a first production unit in FY
2020. The W76-1 is in Phase 6.6 (Full Scale Production). Last year, the
W76-1 program achieved a major milestone by completing 50 percent of
the planned warhead production. Our primary objectives in FY 2015,
which are progressing as planned, are to: achieve annual refurbished
warhead production rates; deliver refurbished warheads on schedule to
the Navy for deployment; and produce and deliver joint test assemblies
(JTA) for surveillance flight tests. In fact, NNSA has been successful
in already completing half of the total planned warhead delivery
quantities to the Navy for the year within the first third of the
fiscal year. We are currently on schedule to complete the remaining FY
2015 warhead production and deliveries to the Navy, which should be
accomplished within our current funding allocations. If the requested
funding is received, we are confident the program can remain on
schedule for completion of production in FY 2019.
Mr. Rogers. What are the major risks to these programs executing
successfully? Are they technical? Or are they in getting the funding
needed to execute?
General Klotz. The major risks to successful execution of W76-1 LEP
production and B61-12 LEP engineering development are a combination of
technical and funding risks which adversely affect the execution of
warhead production and delivery schedules. In addition, other risks of
primary concern to the W76-1 LEP are single-point failures associated
with aging infrastructure (facilities and production equipment) within
the nuclear weapons complex. We continue to reduce these risks by
replacing aging infrastructure and by maintaining margin to delivery
requirements. Funding requested for these two programs in FY 2016 FYNSP
continues their current progress.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, are you confident the uranium facility
in Tennessee and the plutonium facility in New Mexico will each be
successfully built on the timelines and budgets NNSA has laid out in
the FY16 budget request? Can you assure this committee that these
critical facilities will be built on-time and on-schedule?
General Klotz. NNSA is confident that we will successfully deliver
CMRR and UPF after we complete our designs and establish performance
baselines for these projects. Over the past four years, NNSA has
focused on putting the right policies, principles, people, processes,
procedures, and partnerships in place to implement the Office of
Management and Budget's (OMB) Circular A-11 for Capital Acquisition
Projects, Department of Energy Order 413.3B on project management and
the Secretary's January 2015 enhanced project management policies. In
2013, GAO narrowed the focus of its High Risk list for NNSA to
contracts and projects with a Total Project Cost greater than $750
million as a result of the improvements NNSA is making in its contract
and project management. NNSA is confident that the same policies and
processes are scalable to the Major System Acquisition projects, such
as CMRR and UPF.
On both projects, NNSA is in the process of developing a high
quality credible estimates utilizing NNSA's policies and procedures and
GAO's best practices. Once these complex first-of-a-kind nuclear
projects achieve 90% design maturity, NNSA will establish cost and
schedule baselines that we are confident we can achieve.
Mr. Rogers. What are the major risks to successfully completing
these projects?
General Klotz. Major risks to completion are:
Escalation on commodities and equipment procurements;
Inability to attract and retain nuclear qualified workers
at assumed labor rates with the possible resurgence of industrial and
nuclear construction;
Availability of vendors qualified to produce materials
and equipment to meet current nuclear construction standards (NQA-1);
Changes to project requirements, codes, and standards;
Delays in authorizations to start construction activities
consistent with the proposed execution approach.
Mr. Rogers. What happens if NNSA does not successfully complete
these projects on the timelines laid out? What risks to safety and to
NNSA's mission does this incur?
General Klotz. The UPF project in Tennessee is vital to
modernization efforts at Y-12, allowing the NNSA to cease enriched
uranium (EU) programmatic operations in Building 9212 no later than FY
2025. The NNSA is committed to ceasing these operations and is
executing a strategy to deliver the critical UPF project while making
additional program investments at the Y-12 Plant. These additional
program investments allow the most hazardous operations in Building
9212 to be stopped prior to FY 2025, reducing the safety risks and
program risks immediately upon doing so. Failure to deliver the UPF
project by FY 2025 would result in a major delay in ceasing casting,
special oxide production and salvage and accountability operations from
Building 9212.
The execution of Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building
(RLUOB) Equipment Installation Phase 2 (REI2) and PF-4 Equipment
Installation (PEI) is critical to maintaining continuity in our
analytical chemistry (AC) and materials characterization (MC)
capabilities. Failure to complete these activities on the projected
schedule may impact our ability to cease programmatic operations in the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility in 2019, and would
likely impact our ability to provide the AC and MC capabilities needed
to support pit production and other plutonium activities at Los Alamos
National Laboratory.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, do you believe your Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation programs align with the highest nuclear risks around
the world? How do you prioritize NNSA's nonproliferation funding and
direct it to the highest priority risks? Do you rely on intelligence
community assessments of those risks?
General Klotz. Previously, each program office under the Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) appropriation has applied rigorous
internal risk assessment and prioritization approaches (including
Intelligence Community assessments) to inform, develop, and provide the
foundation for its fiscal year funding request. Although significant
program-level coordination continues, the realignment of the Nuclear
Counterterrorism and Incident Response (NCTIR) Program under the DNN
appropriation, the reorganization of the Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, and the standup of NNSA's new Cost Estimating and
Program Evaluation Office will now provide NNSA with a more integrated
structure for program planning, budgeting, and evaluation as well as
cross-program prioritization.
NNSA participates in whole-of-government policy and program
coordination processes to ensure that NNSA activities are aligned and
integrated with broad U.S. national priorities and capabilities. NNSA,
working particularly with the Departments of State and Defense, has
been central to U.S. efforts to develop and implement domestic and
international programs and strategies to meet the enduring and evolving
challenges to the global nuclear security environment.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, counterintelligence and cybersecurity
threats to NNSA and its facilities are increasing in quantity and
sophistication. Can you assure us NNSA can defend against all of these
threats and prevent the escape of sensitive information?
General Klotz. The current cyber defense model deployed by NNSA
Headquarters, laboratories and plants has provided the necessary
protection of NNSA information and information assets without any major
compromises to date. However, it is important to note that with the
increase in the number of threats and threat actors to the Nuclear
Security Enterprise the current model will not remain effective or
efficient without changes to the protection capabilities currently in
place. These changes not only include replacement, upgrades, and/or
enhancement to the technical infrastructure, but also an increase in
the number, type, and skill level of the personnel required to protect
these environments.
We use a risk-based approach to evaluate tools/program/software/
hardware and their potential impact to our security environment. This
security approach implements a defense-in-depth strategy to deter,
detect, respond, and recover. These tools include firewalls, malware
detection, intrusion prevention systems, and anti-virus systems on
desktop workstations; custom tools and applications; and Commercial
Off-the-Shelf (COTS) products within DOE/NNSA that were developed by
the plants and labs across the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE). We
constantly evaluate new tools that can enhance our current
capabilities. The current threat environment requires our cyber
defenses to be effective 100% of the time while our adversaries only
have to succeed once to inflict major harm to our systems and networks.
I am confident that our current cyber defense program is deterring the
threats we face today, and we will implement the tools necessary to
maintain security as threats evolve.
Mr. Rogers. Are NNSA's management and operating contractors able to
meet their requirements on cybersecurity and counterintelligence?
General Klotz. Management and operating (M&O) contractors implement
the current Risk Management Framework (RMF) approach. Implementation of
the RMF is a signed agreement between the M&O Director and the NNSA
Field Office Manager, regarding how the site will deploy cyber defenses
to protect the information and information assets within the funding
model for the site. Under the current Risk Management Framework, the
security framework is signed off on by the federal site lead for
cybersecurity. Once the federal lead has signed off on the framework
the M&O has the authority to operate the system within the standards of
the framework. If the M&O is required to implement a standard which is
not within the current agreement, the M&O must go back to the federal
lead for agreement before implementation of the new standard or
requirement.
Mr. Rogers. Please update us on the status of the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant in New Mexico subsequent to the events early last year that
caused a radiation release and shutdown of the facility's underground
operations. How long do you expect the shutdown to last?
General Klotz and Mr. Whitney. The Department's target for initial
resumption of waste emplacement at WIPP is the first quarter of
calendar year 2016. The safety envelope for the facility continues to
be analyzed and DOE will only resume operations when it is safe to do
so.
Mr. Rogers. How is the shutdown at WIPP sending ripple effects
across the NNSA and DOE-EM complex?
General Klotz and Mr. Whitney. The current plan for recovery of the
WIPP is to begin initial disposal operation in 2016 and resume full
operations in the 2018 timeframe, but DOE will only resume operations
when it is safe to do so. Active transuranic (TRU) waste generators
other than Los Alamos National Laboratory (Idaho, Oak Ridge and Argonne
National Laboratory) are continuing characterization and certification
activities and are providing interim storage of TRU waste for eventual
shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). TRU waste generator
sites have storage capacity for certified waste ready for WIPP disposal
through at least fiscal year 2016.
Mr. Rogers. How is NNSA holding the people and organizations
responsible for this incident accountable?
General Klotz and Mr. Whitney. As required, the Office of
Environmental Management), NNSA, Carlsbad Field Office, Nuclear Waste
Partnership, LLC (the WIPP management and operations contractor), and
LANL will develop corrective actions to address the issues identified
in the accident investigation report for the WIPP radiological event.
Based on information identified to date, the following actions have
been taken to ensure accountability for the event.
Since the WIPP event, LANL has performed extensive
scientific reviews, changed leadership in the Environmental Programs
Directorate, completed an external root cause analysis and is currently
performing an extent of condition review. LANL will evaluate its
ongoing recovery efforts and will ensure corrective actions to address
issues in the report are integrated with its overall recovery efforts.
The November 14, 2014 EM Transition Plan documented a
decision to remove EM-funded program work from the LANL contract and
require future legacy environmental cleanup work at Los Alamos
performed by a separately competed EM contract.
The November 14, 2014 EM Transition Plan for Los Alamos
also focuses on streamlining and clarifying roles and responsibilities
between EM and NNSA. Consistent with this plan, the EM Los Alamos Field
Office was stood up on March 22, 2014 to manage the EM-funded program
work.
Enhanced oversight by the Carlsbad Field Office and EM HQ
will occur prior to the resumption of repackaging of TRU waste at LANL,
and as the normal course of business at LANL and other sites in the
future, e.g., the Certification Program will focus additional oversight
efforts on understanding and validating upstream waste processing.
Enhanced DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management oversight is
being planned.
NNSA Los Alamos Field Office has hired or is in the
process of hiring key staff positions to enhance its oversight
capability. Such positions include the Senior Safety Technical Advisor
(on board as of March 8, 2015), an Assistant Manager for Operations, a
Deputy Assistant Manager for Operations, a temporary Deputy Manager
with a strong safety background (on board in a few weeks), Safety Basis
Specialists and Facility Representatives.
NWP finalized its contractor recovery team in the spring
of 2014, shortly after the event. Changes included a new Project
Manager and Deputy Project Manager (who also serves as the Recovery
Manager). Other new managers hired by NWP: Deputy Recovery Manager,
Environmental Safety and Health manager, nuclear safety leader,
maintenance manager, radiological manager, emergency manager,
procedures and training manager, deputy operations manager, and deputy
engineering manager.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, what are your top priorities for Naval
Reactors (NR) for FY16?
General Klotz. All of Naval Reactors' budget supports the safe and
effective operation of the nuclear-powered Fleet, today and tomorrow.
Naval Reactors' funding requests can be directly linked to this single,
over-arching priority of supporting the safe and effective operation of
the nuclear-powered fleet. In FY16, this entails effective oversight of
the operation and maintenance of 96 reactors in 71 submarines, 10
aircraft carriers, and 4 training and research reactors. This priority
will be met in the most effective and judicious way possible. The main
components that support today's operating fleet are Naval Reactors
Operations and Infrastructure (NOI), Naval Reactors Development (NRD),
Program Direction and Construction. The remainder of the budget,
primarily OHIO-Class Replacement Reactor Systems Development, S8G
Prototype Refueling and the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization
Project, supports tomorrow's fleet. In FY16, the OHIO-Class Replacement
project will continue life of the ship reactor core manufacturing
development activities and detailed design of reactor plant heavy
equipment to support FY19 GFE procurement. The S8G Prototype Refueling
will continue construction of the Radiological Work and Storage
Building and preparations for the FY18 refueling. The Spent Fuel
Handling Recapitalization Project will continue required development,
fuel design, and will issue an Environmental Impact Statement.
Mr. Rogers. Is NR's budget aligned with that of the larger Navy?
General Klotz. Yes. We work closely every day with our partners in
the Navy to ensure that we are aligned with the mission, performance
requirements and schedules.
Mr. Rogers. What happens if this program gets out of alignment with
Navy programs like the OHIO-class Replacement program?
General Klotz. Naval Reactors' Department of Energy and Navy
efforts are directed at supporting this schedule, including development
of the propulsion plant design to support procurement of long-lead
components in FY19 to support a construction start in FY21 and ship
delivery in FY28. After completing ship operational testing, the first
OHIO-Class Replacement must be on strategic patrol by 2031 to meet
STRATCOM force level requirements. Given that the first OHIO-Class
Replacement submarine, a ship twice the size of the VIRGINIA-Class
submarine, is planned to be constructed within the same span of time;
this schedule is aggressive and requires close coupling of Department
of Energy and Department of Navy activities to ensure on time ship
delivery. The design and construction of OHIO-Class Replacement is a
complex effort that requires extensive coordination between not only
Naval Reactors and the Navy's Shipbuilders, but also the Navy's
Strategic Systems Programs that are responsible for the missile systems
and the British Navy, who will use the Common Missile Compartment
design in their upcoming SSBNs. Because they each depend so heavily on
each other, these four design efforts must be synchronized, in close
collaboration to retire risk early and minimize estimated construction
costs.
Given the criticality of Naval Reactors' Department of Energy
activities to Navy priorities and mission, funding cuts to Naval
Reactors' DOE budget can adversely impact strategic objectives and
plans, especially ship design and construction and nuclear operator
training.
Mr. Rogers. What has been the effect of the budget cuts Naval
Reactors has received over the past four or five years?
General Klotz. Over the past six years, Congress reduced Naval
Reactors' funding by more than $600M below the Budget requests. These
reduced funding levels have substantially impacted plans to
recapitalize the spent fuel handling infrastructure, advanced
technology development, and maintenance on prototype reactors,
facilities and infrastructure. These functional areas are foundational
to the Program and support Naval Reactors' ability to sustain the
current nuclear-powered fleet and develop the future fleet. The
following are specific examples of these impacts:
Recapitalization of the naval nuclear spent fuel handling
capability has been delayed by over five years. This delay has
increased the project cost by more than $400M. As well, to manage the
delay without affecting aircraft carrier schedules, the Navy will have
to procure additional, otherwise unnecessary spent fuel shipping
containers at a cost of approximately $500M. Because of the aging
condition of the current facility, these delays also increase the risk
that the current capabilities fail and we are unable to support the
Navy's refueling schedule or conduct the research required to resolve
important technical issues in the operating fleet. Therefore,
additional investment has been required to maintain these aging
facilities.
Advanced technology development has been drastically
reduced. Today, it is possible to design a life-of-ship core for the
OHIO-Class Replacement, saving the Nation over $40B, because of
technology development efforts conducted over the last four decades.
Other leaps in stealth and operational technologies give our ships an
enormous advantage over our adversaries. With current funding levels,
there will be insufficient reactor technology developed in time for use
in the next classification of nuclear powered ships to make advances
such as this achieved for the OHIO-Class Replacement. Therefore, this
work must be restored in order to maintain tactical superiority over
our adversaries of the future and to attract and maintain the crucial
engineering and scientific talent needed to successfully complete the
mission at current levels.
Maintenance and replacement of the Program's aging
laboratory facilities and infrastructure has been delayed. Many of
these facilities date from the dawn of the atomic age and are vital to
support the nuclear-powered Fleet. In total, over 40 General Plant
Projects and 4 Major Construction Projects have been delayed or
canceled. In addition, funding reductions have resulted in the deferral
of critical infrastructure maintenance resulting in significant
failures and restriction of Naval Reactors' ability to manage the
impact of emergent work as the existing infrastructure continues to
age. Examples include:
Bettis High Power Transformer (Failed in 2014)
Bettis Acoustic Testing Generator (Failures over 2009
to 2011)
NRF Storm Drain System (Failed in 2014)
NRF Prototype Facilities (Roof failed in 2014)
KAPL Water Main (Repeated Failures since 2004,
approx. 3-4 per year)
Bettis Spring Water Intercept System (Failed in 2011
and 2013)
Bettis Materials Evaluation Laboratory (Legacy
Radioactive Contamination)
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, what happens to NNSA's programs if you
are hit with sequestration in FY16? Will you still be able to deliver
on DOD's top priorities, including life extension programs, nuclear
infrastructure modernization, and Naval Reactors programs?
General Klotz. The 2016 Budget proposes to reverse sequestration,
paid for with a balanced mix of commonsense spending cuts and tax
loophole closers, while also proposing additional deficit reduction
that would put debt on a downward path as a share of the economy. The
President has made clear that he will not accept a budget that reverses
our progress by locking in sequestration going forward. Locking in
sequestration would bring real defense and non-defense funding to the
lowest levels in a decade. It would damage our national security,
ultimately resulting in a military that is too small and equipment that
is too old to fully implement the defense strategy. It would also
damage our economy, preventing us from making pro-growth investments.
As the President has stated, he will not accept a budget that severs
the vital link between our national and economic security, both of
which are important to the Nation's safety, international standing, and
long-term prosperity.
Mr. Rogers. In FY13, DOD was given the chance to protect certain
programs from sequestration. It chose to protect ongoing operations in
Central Command and sustainment and operation of U.S. nuclear forces.
Given a choice under a potential sequestration in FY16, as
Administrator what NNSA programs would you choose to protect?
General Klotz. The 2016 Budget proposes to reverse sequestration,
paid for with a balanced mix of commonsense spending cuts and tax
loophole closers, while also proposing additional deficit reduction
that would put debt on a downward path as a share of the economy. The
President has made clear that he will not accept a budget that reverses
our progress by locking in sequestration going forward. Locking in
sequestration would bring real defense and non-defense funding to the
lowest levels in a decade. It would damage our national security,
ultimately resulting in a military that is too small and equipment that
is too old to fully implement the defense strategy. It would also
damage our economy, preventing us from making pro-growth investments.
As the President has stated, he will not accept a budget that severs
the vital link between our national and economic security, both of
which are important to the Nation's safety, international standing, and
long-term prosperity.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, this committee has focused on ensuring
we get maximum value for every dollar. We've included language in
several previous NDAA's encouraging NNSA to go find efficiencies and
cost savings that we can apply directly to NNSA's mission.
Specifically, what efficiencies are you striving for in FY15? What
efficiencies are you proposing to chase in your FY16 budget request?
General Klotz. NNSA is continuously looking for ways to improve use
of resources to support its missions. During the past few years, NNSA
worked with DOE to streamline DOE orders and directives to eliminate
duplication, incentivize cost savings in management and operating
contracts, make use of contract vehicles that appropriately share cost
risk between the government and the contractor, and encourage NNSA
plants and laboratories to more efficiently use resources.
Together, NNSA and its NNSA's M&O contractors are committed to
making the National Nuclear Security Enterprise a model for efficient
business operations. Large scale efforts undertaken by NNSA recently to
drive down operating costs include the relocation of the Kansas City
Plant to a more modern facility, the competition of the Pantex and Y-12
plants as a combined contract, and more efficient approaches to
replacement of aging uranium and plutonium facilities. The award of the
combined Pantex and Y-12 plants resulted in immediate cost savings that
will continue to save in fiscal year (FY) 2015 and beyond. For example,
the government realized an immediate savings of roughly $80 million in
decreased award fee; money that was redirected to national security
missions. Efficient business operations across the enterprise are
critical to achieving the NNSA mission.
On November 20, 2014, NNSA initiated an annual efficiencies review
as an internal tool to drive continuous improvement in managing
infrastructure. NNSA laboratories, plants, and federal Field Office
Managers were directed to identify specific plans to pursue
efficiencies for the current fiscal year and record achievements from
the previous one. NNSA also sought input on oversight and governance
changes that could enhance productivity.
NNSA laboratories, plants, and federal Field Office Managers are in
the process of sharing efficiency ideas from this effort and addressing
suggestions from the labs and plants on changes NNSA can make to
further efficiencies. NNSA also sponsored a day-long workshop with all
of the NNSA labs, plants, and field offices at the end of May. The
group will establish a framework of common definitions and best
practices to enable an enterprise-wide approach which can be repeated
year to year. NNSA is committed to continuous improvement and driving
more efficient operations. The identified efficiencies for FY 2014
covered a broad range of business operations. These included reducing
the costs of goods and services, making major mission operations such
as those at the National Ignition Facility more efficient, better
managing the growing costs of employee benefit programs, and reducing
key subcontracting costs. Efficiencies of this type will be critical to
meeting FY 2016 mission.
Finally, the FY 2014 budget request identified $320 million in
efficiencies that would be obtained in executing the FY 2014 budget,
and Section 3114 of the FY 2014 NDAA directed the identification of
about half, or $139.5 million, in efficiencies during FY 2014. As
reported in its May 214 Notification of NNSA Efficiencies, NNSA
identified $80 million of these efficiencies.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, one of the big recommendations coming
out of the Y-12 security incident in 2012 was that roles and
responsibilities for security were not clear at NNSA or its
contractors. What specific action have you taken since taking the helm
a year ago to clarify roles, responsibilities, authority, and
accountability for each person at NNSA? Have you updated any NNSA
directives? Spelled them out in policy guidance?
General Klotz. Prior to my appointment, my predecessor issued a
memorandum (dated 5 December, 2014) which made fundamental changes to
the Office of the Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security/
Chief, Defense Nuclear Security (NA-70), by moving and consolidating
the lines of operational authority, accountability, and line
management. That reorganization transferred to NA-70 the mission and
functions of security operations from NA-00-30 as well as the budget
activity from NA-00-50 (within the Office of the Associate
Administrator for Infrastructure and Operations). We are currently in
the process of publishing a supplemental directive that will further
delineate responsibilities for oversight of our security programs.
During my first year as NNSA Administrator, I have made it my
priority to select and staff key senior leadership positions with
seasoned leaders, possessing extensive nuclear security experience.
I've firmed up our Office of Defense Nuclear Security senior leadership
by hiring career security managers, with a proven track record in
leading organizations to success, for the following positions: Chief of
Defense Nuclear Security (CDNS), Deputy CDNS and Director of Security
Operations and Programmatic Planning.
This full complement of Senior Executive Service managers provides
much needed continuity and stability to our Enterprise Field Offices in
the area of security. The addition of my Principal Deputy Administrator
in July 2014, is also having a positive impact on security decisions as
we move forward.
A new M&O contractor has been selected since the 2012 Y-12 security
incident. Consolidated Nuclear Security (CNS) began operating our
Pantex and Y-12 sites on 1 July 2014. They are bringing a fresh
perspective to site operations, which include all aspects of security
operations. It also places all security operations are under one
contract. That was not the case in 2012 when the incident occurred.
Shortly after CNS began operations, the DOE Office of Enterprise
Assessments conducted an assessment at Y-12. The report regarding the
inspection, conducted in August of 2014, states: ``significant progress
has been made in correcting many of the deficiencies identified during
the 2012 inspection.''
Based on the inspection results, the DOE Departmental Internal
Control and Audit Review Council, comprised of senior members of DOE
leadership, recommended downgrading the Y-12 security issue from a
material weakness to a reportable condition. The CDNS will continue to
monitor the implementation of corrective actions at the site until they
are closed.
Lastly, our Federal team has taken a more direct and active role in
contractor oversight. Several teams comprised of subject matter experts
from our Headquarters and across NNSA have provided assessments of Y-12
security operations. Examples include one team focused on nuisance and
false alarm analysis and a team that recently assessed physical
security system maintenance, operations and management. These
assessments resulted in recommendations focused on continuously
improving operations at Y-12.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, DNFSB sent you a recommendation on
concerns with DOE/NNSA's emergency management and response. What is
your organization doing to improve in this area?
General Klotz. The Department of Energy (DOE) is committed to
achieving an end state of an improved Emergency Management Enterprise,
and more specifically, improving emergency preparedness and emergency
response capabilities across its defense nuclear facilities. DOE/NNSA
will implement actions to prioritize improvements related to the DNFSB
report findings and DOE's self-assessed need for improvements. The
Department has developed an Implementation Plan containing initiatives
that address all three aspects of Readiness Assurance at defense
nuclear facilities: improve the management and oversight process,
improve the corrective actions process, and reinvigorate a reporting
process that shares successes and opportunities with DOE leadership. In
addition, the Department will revise and restructure its Emergency
Management Order, DOE Order 151.1C, Comprehensive Emergency Management
System. The restructured Order will bring ease of application and
consistency to emergency management programs. It will also be flexible
enough to provide comprehensive guidance for users to respond to
incidents ranging from local, single facility events, to multiple
facility regional events.
In addition to developing the Implementation Plan, DOE/NNSA has
been working to improve emergency management. This included required
evaluation reviews of emergency response for severe accidents and/or
events that could have widespread impact at all DOE facilities,
including defense nuclear facilities. These reviews have resulted in
activities to expand plans for severe event scenarios at defense
nuclear facilities. Also, additional training for responders was
conducted at many of the defense nuclear facilities and a series of
discussion-based tabletop exercises was performed to verify severe
event procedures, interfaces and resources for multi-facility events,
offsite asset resources and priorities, and critical decision-making.
This training was followed by full-scale exercises at ten defense
nuclear facilities, to formally test their capabilities for responding
to severe events.
Other examples of emergency management program improvements across
the defense nuclear complex included:
Severe event related improvements
Sandia--Conducted a Self-Assessment of Severe Natural
Phenomena Events (NPE) that identified issues related to habitability
and back-up power; corrective actions were developed and are being
implemented and tracked.
Livermore--Improved the habitability of the site's
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) with the replacement of four high-
efficiency gas absorption (HEGA) filters.
Livermore--Established a Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL) Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program to
support its Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and the site
population after a disaster/severe event.
Nevada--Implemented fully functional primary and
alternate facilities for both the Operations Command Center and the
Emergency Operations Center.
Idaho--Conducted a severe Natural Phenomena Event (NPE)
exercise that identified issues related to habitability and back-up
power; corrective actions were developed and are being implemented and
monitored.
Training and drill improvements
Sandia--Revised training procedures to include annual
performance testing to demonstrate competency. Conducted self-
assessment and identified an issue in training record documentation.
Nevada--Drill and Exercise Program is integrated with the
issues management processes and incorporates exercise After Action
Report findings into an issue, which is assigned to a Responsible
Manager.
Exercise improvements
Sandia--Severe event exercise scheduled for July 2015 to
verify corrective actions implemented from FY 2014 Severe Event
Exercise are effective.
Livermore--Conducted four exercises in FY 2014 in
response to a NPE (e.g., earthquake) to demonstrate ability to respond
to simultaneous events at multiple hazardous facilities.
SRS--SRNS-Tritium facility developed and conducted a
tornado drill with all of the shifts affecting multiple facilities and
all non-essential personnel.
West Valley Demonstration Project--Conducted an exercise
to test and validate the effectiveness of the Emergency Response
Organization, Technical Support Center, Incident Command, Joint
Information Center and field support.
Readiness assurance improvements
Sandia--Conducted Self-Assessments to identify issues
with Corrective Action implementation.
Livermore--Established an Accountability Disaster Call
Center to improve communications with the field during a major
earthquake or other disaster event and to provide prioritized damage
assessment information to the Fire Branch Disaster Dispatch Center.
Savannah River Site--DOE issued a formal letter to SRNS
directing a comprehensive, independent review of all of the emergency
management elements to address concern about a decline in the emergency
management program.
Nevada--Emergency Management program has qualified and
experienced staff in developing/facilitating Root Cause Analysis to
address the root issue and the extent of condition.
Emergency Operations is developing a process to track
findings/deficiencies identified during site assessments. Each finding
will have a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) and will be tracked to
closure. Over time, the CAPs will produce trending data that will
indicate where the Office of Environmental Management should shift the
focus of site assessments and surveys. EM will periodically re-examine
the effectiveness of closed CAPs after implementation of the corrective
action(s).
Sandia--Identified an issue that resources are not
adequate to implement an effective readiness assurance program, then
submitted and received approval for a Full Time Equivalent (FTE)/
Funding request for a Program Administration Team Lead.
DOE Headquarters undertook several initiatives over the past year
to address emergency management issues across its full range of
responsibilities, which also enhance our capabilities to respond to
emergencies at defense nuclear facilities.
DOE established an Energy Incident Management Council (EIMC),
chaired by the Deputy Secretary, to increase cooperation and
coordination across the Department to prepare for, mitigate, respond
to, and recover from emergencies. DOE's ongoing project to revitalize
the Headquarters Emergency Management Team (EMT includes rewriting the
HQ Emergency Plan and implementing procedures; conducting job task
analyses and developing position specific training for EMT members; and
retraining EMT members on these new procedures. Plans for testing this
expanded capability include frequent testing of the EMT in response to
a variety of emergency response scenarios such as:
nuclear weapons accident,
radiological release,
hazardous chemical spill, and
severe event damage to DOE defense nuclear facilities.
DOE's working relationship with its Federal interagency partners
was improved during 2014 through a series of exercises, most notably
the annual multi-agency nuclear weapons accident exercise, 2014 NUWAIX,
for which DOE was the lead planning agency.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, I and several members of this
subcommittee joined you and Admiral Richardson on a trip to the Naval
Reactors Facility in Idaho last month. What goes on at this facility
and why does the budget request include funding for recapitalization of
the Spent Fuel Handling facility out there?
General Klotz. The Expended Core Facility (ECF) at the Naval
Reactors Facility in Idaho is the only facility in the country capable
of receiving, examining and packaging spent Naval nuclear fuel.
The budget request includes funding the Spent Fuel Handling
Recapitalization Project (SFHP) at the Naval Reactors Facility which
will provide a new facility to replace the more than 55-year old ECF
for receipt, preparation, and packaging of naval spent nuclear fuel for
secure dry storage. Although the Expended Core Facility continues to be
maintained and operated in a safe and environmentally responsible
manner, it no longer efficiently supports the nuclear fleet. Further,
increasing sustainment efforts and required infrastructure upgrades
pose a substantial risk to Expended Core Facility operations and
production workflow, thereby challenging Naval Reactors' ability to
support the Navy's nuclear-powered fleet refueling and defueling
schedules. An interruption to these refueling and defueling schedules
would adversely affect the operational availability of the nuclear
fleet. If this interruption were to extend over long periods, the
ability to sustain fleet operations would be impacted, ultimately
resulting in significant decrement to the Navy's responsiveness and
agility to fulfill military missions worldwide.
Mr. Rogers. Absent this funding, will costs increase in the long-
term for either NNSA or the Navy?
General Klotz. The main risk of further cost increases to the Spent
Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project is a lack of funding stability.
One could expect cost increases if the project is not funded
sufficiently to meet the current schedule. Further delays to the
project would also incur costs for additional spent fuel shipping
containers that would be borne by the Navy.
The original Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project plan
included a project duration of 10 years and a total project cost
estimate of $1.249B. Due to funding restrictions since FY12, the
project has been extended nearly six years, resulting in a project cost
increase of approximately $400M. The increased cost resulted from
escalation due to these delays and inefficiencies and rework associated
with the unstable funding environment, which has required de-staffing
and re-staffing of the project multiple times. Further, the estimated
total project cost of the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project
does not account for the additional M-290 shipping containers that the
Navy will need to procure for temporary storage of naval spent nuclear
fuel until the new spent fuel handling facility becomes operational.
Procurement of these additional shipping containers is only necessary
because the project has been delayed, as discussed above. To support
aircraft carrier refueling schedules, the Navy will need to procure
these containers at a total cost of approximately $500M.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, how is NNSA supporting next year's
Nuclear Security Summit in Chicago? What initiatives are being proposed
for discussion at the Summit and what is NNSA doing to advance them?
General Klotz. NNSA is carrying out activities across many of its
program areas in support of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process.
NNSA has designated a Senior Coordinator who acts as a liaison for the
Department of Energy (DOE) to the White House on all Summit issues. The
coordinator facilitates DOE input to the NSS planning process,
including in drafting NSS Action Plans to sustain the work of Summit
participants through institutions and initiatives like the
International Atomic Energy Agency, United Nations, Interpol, the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the G7 Global
Partnership.
In advance of the 2016 NSS, NNSA also plays a leading role in the
development of a range of specific country and regional plans. These
action plans will propose how to accelerate the completion of existing
Summit deliverables and on how to identify specific opportunities for
new Summit deliverables, including actions we can take bi- or
multilaterally to secure, reduce and eliminate nuclear and radiological
materials. NNSA will continue to implement and complete commitments
from the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Summits, including minimizing highly
enriched uranium and plutonium, detecting nuclear smuggling,
strengthening strategic trade controls, and increasing security of
nuclear and radiological materials.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, please provide us a description of
accountability actions taken towards contractors and Federal employees
with responsibility for major recent failures, such as the UPF design,
the WIPP event, and the Y-12 security incident. How were they
penalized? Were any terminated from employment? Did any of these
contractors or Federal employees receive bonuses subsequent to those
failures?
General Klotz. [NNSA has declined to provide a written response.]
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, Naval Reactors has taken significant
funding reductions to its technical base in recent years. What is the
technical base, why is it important, and what are the impacts of cuts
to NR's base operations?
General Klotz. The Base solely supports Naval Reactors'
responsibilities that allows for a safe and reliable operation of the
nuclear fleet. It contains Naval Reactors Operations and Infrastructure
(NOI), Naval Reactors Development (NRD), and Program Direction (PD). It
includes resources to meet the goals and operational demands of today's
fleet, to develop tomorrow's fleet, to support environmental
stewardship, and to procure and construct the required tools and
infrastructure that facilitate Naval Reactors' mission. Naval Reactors
executes these responsibilities by management and regulation of an
enterprise that includes over 7,000 highly-skilled personnel at
Department of Energy laboratories and prime contractors, a specialized
domestic nuclear power industrial base of 28 principal suppliers, 110
secondary suppliers with about 25,000 personnel, more than 64,000
workers at the nation's six nuclear-capable shipyards, and over 16,000
trained nuclear operators. This team collaborates with experts at other
DOE National laboratories where there are opportunities for mutual
gain. No other single organization in the U.S. currently integrates the
research, design, construction, operation, life-cycle support, and
disposal functions to successfully deliver an enduring nuclear power
capability.
The highest priority for Naval Reactors is uncompromising and
timely support for safe nuclear fleet operation. In FY 2016, $935
million funds the Base and supports the 96 operating reactors at sea on
ships and at our training and research sites. The talented men and
women, along with the equipment and facilities upon which they depend,
stand ready and are called upon 24 hours per day, 365 days per year to
advance the mission and respond to emergent fleet needs for assistance.
The teams at Naval Reactors' four Program sites--the Bettis Laboratory
in Pittsburgh, the Knolls Laboratory and Kesselring Site in greater
Albany, and our spent nuclear fuel facilities in Idaho--perform the
research and development, analysis, engineering and testing needed to
support today's fleet and to develop future nuclear-powered warships.
The teams in the Base provide tremendous value to the nation. Among the
many examples of the work they do includes:
Adding more than 21 years of operational life across 14
LOS ANGELES-Class attack submarines.
Avoiding 14 years of lost aircraft carrier operational
time and ensuring no impact to the deployment plan.
Over the past six years, Congress reduced Naval Reactors' funding
by more than $600M. These reduced funding levels have substantially
impacted plans to recapitalize the spent fuel handling infrastructure,
advanced technology development, and maintenance on prototype reactors,
facilities and infrastructure. These functional areas are foundational
to the Program and support Naval Reactors' ability to sustain the
current nuclear-powered fleet and develop the future fleet.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Whitney, please explain the Uranium Enrichment
Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) Fund. Why is $472 million
being requested for the Federal Government's portion of this fund when
the reauthorization for collection of the nuclear power industry's
portion has not been passed?
Mr. Whitney. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct) established the
Uranium Enrichment (UE) D&D fund to provide resources for the cleanup
activities. Under the EPAct, both the Government and domestic private
utilities were required to contribute to the fund, with the Government
providing roughly two thirds of the funding and the utilities providing
the remaining one third.
Both the Government and private utilities have completed their
contributions into the fund as required by the EPAct. However, as of
the end of fiscal year (FY) 2014, the total UE D&D cleanup costs are
expected to exceed the balance of the fund by 2022 if no additional
contributions are received. As such, the Administration is seeking
reauthorization of both Government and utility contributions beginning
in FY 2016.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Whitney, is EM on track to meet its regulatory and
compliance agreements for FY15? What about for FY16 and beyond?
Mr. Whitney. We are on track to meet our FY15 and FY16 milestone
commitments. Beyond FY16, the Department's ability to fulfill its
milestone requirements is difficult to forecast as it is dependent upon
the completion of pre-cursor activities and the assumptions upon which
work plans are based.
To the extent milestones are delayed, DOE will follow the
provisions in its cleanup agreements for making notifications and
working with federal and State regulators regarding schedule
adjustments if necessary.
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Roberson, DNFSB sent a letter to DOE last year
recommending improvements to DOE's emergency response programs. What
are the specific concerns you outlined in that recommendation? What
specific steps would DNFSB like to see taken by DOE to improve in this
area?
Ms. Roberson. 1) The DNFSB (Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board) identified concerns with specific requirements in the Department
of Energy's (DOE) emergency management directive as well as the
implementation of the requirements at various DOE sites with defense
nuclear facilities. Based on these concerns, the DNFSB believes that
DOE has not comprehensively and consistently demonstrated its ability
to adequately protect workers and the public in the event of an
emergency. These concerns focus on DOE's role as a regulator.
2) The DNFSB identified the following specific deficiencies that we
believe DOE needs to address:
a. Standardize and improve the DOE criteria and review approach to
confirm that all sites with defense nuclear facilities:
Have a robust emergency response infrastructure that is
survivable, habitable, and maintained to function during emergencies,
including severe events that can impact multiple facilities and
potentially overwhelm emergency response resources.
Have a training and drill program that ensures that
emergency response personnel are fully competent in accordance with the
expectations delineated in DOE's directive and associated guidance.
Are conducting exercises that fully demonstrate their
emergency response is capable of responding to scenarios that challenge
existing capability, including response during severe events.
Are identifying deficiencies with emergency preparedness
and response, conducting causal analysis, developing and implementing
effective corrective actions to address these deficiencies, and
evaluating the effectiveness of the corrective actions.
Have an effective Readiness Assurance Program consistent
with DOE's requirements.
b. Update its emergency management directive (DOE Order 151.1C,
Comprehensive Emergency Management System) to address:
Severe events, including requirements that address
hazards assessments and exercises, and ``beyond design basis''
operational and natural phenomena events.
Reliability and habitability of emergency response
facilities and support equipment.
Criteria for training and drills, including requirements
that address facility conduct of operations drill programs and the
interface with emergency response organization team drills.
Criteria for exercises to ensure that they are an
adequate demonstration of proficiency.
Vulnerabilities identified during independent
assessments.
We received DOE's Implementation Plan for this Recommendation on
April 24, 2015. Our staff is reviewing the Implementation Plan to
determine the adequacy of DOE's proposed activities to address the
deficiencies identified in the Recommendation. The staff was engaged
with their DOE counterparts during the development of the plan and
provided comments. During the execution of the Implementation Plan, the
Board's staff will work closely with DOE to provide appropriate
actionable suggestions regarding implementation of activities in the
plan.
The technical supporting document for Recommendation 2014-1
identified examples of deficiencies with site-level emergency
preparedness and response. These include:
``Some sites do not have a 5-year plan for exercises that involves
all of the hazards and accidents at their facilities with EPHAs
[Emergency Planning Hazards Assessment]. In addition, some sites do not
exercise all of their facilities with EPHAs and all of their response
elements on an annual basis.'' DOE Order 151.1C requires sites to
demonstrate response capabilities by executing emergency exercises. In
order to meet this requirement, sites such as Pantex and Sandia
National Laboratories should be executing a variety of exercises to
demonstrate response capability to the spectrum of possible hazards at
each facility, as well as providing adequate training and drills to
develop and maintain this capability.
``Planning and implementing recovery actions are typically not
demonstrated in detail during the normal scope of annual emergency
exercises at DOE sites [such as the Savannah River Site and the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant], or in follow-on exercises.'' DOE Order 151.1C
also requires sites to demonstrate recovery capability. The ability to
conduct initial recovery actions, including how to map a transition
from emergency to recovery to normal operations, should be practiced
frequently enough that site leadership can effectively conduct this
activity when real-life operational emergencies occur.
``. . . [M]any of the emergency response facilities may not be
habitable in the aftermath of a hazardous or radiological material
release event, or survivable in the aftermath of a severe natural
phenomena event. These facilities were not designed to survive an
earthquake, and many do not have ventilation systems that will filter
radiological and toxicological materials. Examples of such facilities
include the Emergency Control Center (ECC), the Technical Support
Center (TSC), and the fire house at Y-12; the EOC [Emergency Operations
Center] at the Hanford Site; the EOC and alternate EOC, the Department
Operations Centers, and the Emergency Communications Center at LLNL
[Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory]; and the EOC and Central
Monitoring Room at WIPP [Waste Isolation Pilot Plant].'' DOE Order
151.1C does not include explicit requirements concerning emergency
facility habitability; other agencies, such as the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, do provide such requirements. The DNFSB Recommendation
identifies the need to update the directive to address this gap.
``Members of the Board's staff also observed problems with systems used
to support emergency communications and notifications. For example, the
staff observed problems with the systems used to notify workers and
visitors about an emergency and protective actions that are to be
taken, such as was observed recently at WIPP during the underground
truck fire.'' DOE Order 151.1C provides requirements for emergency
notification systems at DOE sites, including notification to the site
workers and off-site notification to the public. However, guidance to
implement this requirement is deficient. Sites must develop clear
criteria for when to continue operations when notification systems are
degraded or failed, including compensatory measures that are tested and
effective to ensure workers receive notification that an operational
emergency is occurring and the necessary protective actions to take.
Robust, survivable, and tested notification systems installed in and
around facilities at sites such as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, the
Savannah River Site, the Hanford Site, and Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory are a necessary first step to address this concern.
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Roberson, is the DNFSB preparing an implementation
plan to address the recommendations and corrective actions within the
LMI study on DNFSB's workforce and culture? When will this plan be
complete?
Ms. Roberson. The DNFSB has prepared an informal action plan to
address the recommendations and corrective actions within the LMI
study. For example, all DNFSB executives and Board Members are working
with an executive coach to develop better communication techniques and
enhance leadership effectiveness. Regular staff meetings are being held
at both the agency and office level to provide increased opportunities
for employee feedback and participation. The full action plan for
organizational culture change is attached.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
69.]
In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) recently completed a Culture Climate Survey of
the DNFSB staff. The response rate exceeded 70%, and the OIG will be
briefing the results to the DNFSB management and staff on May 21st. I
anticipate additional actions will be planned as a result of that
additional feedback.
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Roberson, does DNFSB intend to review NNSA's large
list of deferred maintenance projects for safety risks? Would DNFSB be
willing to provide NNSA its views on prioritizing this list with
regards to safety risk?
Ms. Roberson. The DNFSB has evaluated deferred maintenance
documentation and databases during site-specific maintenance reviews
and generally found the management of safety risk to be acceptable.
(NNSA's list of deferred maintenance is housed in the Department of
Energy's Facilities Information Management System [FIMS].) The majority
of the deferred maintenance had a relatively low impact on nuclear
safety and was being worked as resource availability permitted. The
management and operating contractors at each site commonly make it a
high priority to minimize deferred preventive maintenance of safety
class and safety significant structures, systems, and components (SSC)
that are credited to perform safety-related functions in the Documented
Safety Analyses for nuclear facilities. The DNFSB will continue to
review maintenance programs at NNSA sites, including assessments of
deferred maintenance, to ensure SSCs critical to preserving the safety
of nuclear operations are appropriately managed.
It should be noted, however, that the overall NNSA deferred
maintenance backlog of $3.6B includes many non-defense nuclear
facilities and associated infrastructure exceeding 60 years of service
that have little or no bearing on the safety of nuclear operations.
Many of the items in NNSA's deferred maintenance database are roofs,
office air conditioning systems, shop utilities, and the like. At some
sites these types of deferred maintenance vastly surpass corrective
maintenance backlogs or deferred preventive maintenance on nuclear
safety-related SSCs and processing equipment. Nevertheless,
infrastructure risk in a non-defense nuclear facility can pose a
nuclear safety risk under the right circumstances. For example, a major
fire in a non-defense nuclear facility could threaten a nearby defense
nuclear facility. In such a case, we would expect the credited fire
suppression systems in the defense nuclear facility to provide for the
adequate protection of the public and workers from radiological
consequences. Clearly, though, it would be preferable to avoid a major
fire in the first place.
To help prevent degradation of the nuclear facility safety posture,
equipment owners or system engineers at the sites are typically
expected to provide technical input during the decision process for
deferring maintenance of safety SSCs. For example, if preventive
maintenance activities for safety SSCs will exceed defined schedules,
it is necessary to obtain a deferral evaluation and approval or make a
determination of compensatory measures to be implemented.
DOE Order 430.1B, Real Property Asset Management, requires DOE/NNSA
sites to annually use condition assessment data to determine and report
the deferred maintenance information in FIMS. The site contractor must
maintain FIMS data and records, which are DOE's corporate real property
inventory database for all buildings and other structures and
facilities. Although, it is expected to be difficult to evaluate
comparative risk among the NNSA sites, the DNFSB has requested FIMS
database information relevant to deferred maintenance at defense
nuclear facilities. In addition to reviewing the FIMS data in an
attempt to identify any potential safety risks related to deferred
maintenance, the DNFSB will continue to execute site-specific
maintenance reviews. Any safety concerns related to the prioritization
of deferred maintenance will be brought to the attention of responsible
NNSA management.
The Board's response to Question 21 [which follows] provides
additional details on deferred maintenance.
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Roberson, what are the safety impacts of NNSA's
deteriorating infrastructure and $3.6 billion backlog of deferred
maintenance? NNSA officials have said that ``infrastructure risk
becomes safety risk.'' Do you agree? [Question #21, for cross-
reference.]
Ms. Roberson. The DNFSB agrees that infrastructure risk can become
safety risk. It should be noted, however, that the overall NNSA
deferred maintenance backlog of $3.6B includes non-defense nuclear
facilities and infrastructure that have little or no bearing on the
safety of nuclear operations. Many of the items in NNSA's deferred
maintenance database are roofs, office air conditioning systems, shop
utilities, and the like. At some sites these types of deferred
maintenance vastly exceed corrective maintenance backlogs or deferred
preventive maintenance on nuclear safety-related structures, systems,
and components (SSC) and processing equipment. Nevertheless,
infrastructure risk in a non-defense nuclear facility can pose a
nuclear safety risk under the right circumstances. For example, a major
fire in a non-defense nuclear facility could threaten a nearby defense
nuclear facility. In such a case, we would expect the credited fire
suppression systems in the defense nuclear facility to provide for the
adequate protection of the public and workers from radiological
consequences. Clearly, though, it would be preferable to avoid a major
fire in the first place.
Safe performance of work includes allotting adequate resources to
system and equipment maintenance, maintaining up-to-date configuration
control, and making necessary upgrades to support system
infrastructure. A lesson learned from the recent Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant events is that degraded and out of service safety-related
equipment must not be accepted and tolerated. Deficient and poorly
maintained safety-related infrastructure, including credited safety
SSCs that support nuclear activities, can pose safety risks to the
public and workers, and can jeopardize NNSA's ability to accomplish
mission-related work.
Infrastructure is defined in DOE Order 430.1B, Real Property Asset
Management, as ``All real property, installed equipment, and related
real property that is not solely supporting a single program mission at
a multi-program site or that is not programmatic real property at a
single program site.'' DOE Order 430.1B defines deferred maintenance as
``maintenance that was not performed when it should have been or was
scheduled to be and which, therefore, is put off or delayed for a
future period.'' Maintenance activities are expected to be scheduled
and performed within established intervals; preventive maintenance
should be waived or deferred only with approval by an appropriate
authority that considers the significance of the SSC and the length of
delay. Further, any deferral of planned tasks should have a technical
basis.
The number and severity of risks increases when the amount of
deferred preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance backlog
rises. Each nuclear facility has a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and
accompanying Technical Safety Requirements which set forth the
preventive maintenance and surveillance requirements for the safety
class and safety significant SSCs credited by the DSA to prevent or
mitigate hazardous accident scenarios. The implementation of these
maintenance and surveillance requirements is key to ensuring the SSCs
will reliably perform their credited safety functions on an on-going
basis. As such, completion of the maintenance and surveillance
requirements is carefully controlled or, if not achievable,
compensatory measures are implemented or the associated operations are
shut down until the required maintenance or surveillance is complete.
Deferred maintenance associated with safety-related SSCs credited
in DSAs is of paramount concern to the Board. Maintenance on other
safety-related programmatic and infrastructure equipment is also
important to maintaining the safety envelope of defense nuclear
facilities. Preventive and corrective maintenance should only be
deferred if sufficient technical justification exists to do so.
The DNFSB has identified preventive maintenance deferrals at NNSA/
DOE sites whose justifications were less than adequate. For example,
preventive maintenance has been deferred because parts were not
ordered, or because materials or craft resources to support the work
were not available. Similarly, the DNFSB has seen cases where
preventive maintenance schedules were modified based on business
decisions. The maintenance deferral process must ensure adequate
reviews are carried out to understand the possible impact of not
performing a maintenance task on schedule, applicable compensatory
measures are instituted to manage those risks, and understanding and
acceptance of any added risks are documented.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. General Klotz, what are the long-term goals and
challenges for DNN, and what initiatives are you leading that will
ensure we are well-postured to address the proliferation threats that
might emerge in a decade? Are there opportunities to further improve
and invest in verification and detection technology?
General Klotz. Because of its world leadership in scientific and
technical expertise and programmatic capabilities in the nuclear
security arena, DOE, mostly through the NNSA, plays a central U.S.
Government role in pursuing U.S. nuclear security goals. NNSA makes
full use of all the resources at its disposal to fulfill its
nonproliferation and counterterrorism missions by:
Developing and implementing policy and technical
solutions to eliminate proliferation-sensitive materials and limit or
prevent the spread of materials, technology, and expertise related to
nuclear and radiological weapons and programs around the world.
Providing expertise, practical tools, and technically
informed policy recommendations required to advance U.S. nuclear
counterterrorism and counterproliferation objectives.
Maintaining essential components of the U.S. capability
to respond to nuclear or radiological crises and manage the
consequences (domestically or internationally) of civilian radiation
exposure resulting from a nuclear or radiological incident, especially
those involving terrorism.
To pursue these U.S. nuclear security goals within this enduring
and evolving nuclear threat environment, the NNSA program strategy is
to organize its nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism actions
into three primary areas that cover the nuclear threat spectrum:
Prevent non-state actors and additional countries from
developing nuclear weapons or acquiring weapons-usable nuclear
materials, equipment, technology, and expertise; and prevent non-state
actors from acquiring radiological materials for a radiological threat
device.
Counter the efforts of both proliferant states and non-
state actors to steal, acquire, develop, disseminate, transport, or
deliver the materials, expertise, or components necessary for a nuclear
or radiological threat device or the devices themselves.
Respond to nuclear or radiological terrorist acts, or
accidental/unintentional incidents, by searching for and rendering safe
threat devices, components, and/or radiological and nuclear materials,
and by conducting consequence management actions following an event to
save lives, protect property and the environment, and enable the
provision of emergency services.
Mr. Cooper. General Klotz, how does DOE plan to afford the $30
billion or more that will be required to construct and operate MOX?
Should NNSA re-baseline the MOX project in FY16?
General Klotz. The Administration remains firmly committed to
disposing of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, directed that construction
on the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX) project continue and
that cost studies and technology alternative studies be conducted. The
Department of Energy requested Aerospace Corporation, a federally
funded research and development center, to assess and validate the
analysis of options for disposing of 34 metric tons of weapon-grade
plutonium mandated by Congress. The assessment and validation is
expected to be completed in late FY 2015. This independent validation
will inform the final policy decision on what disposition path the
United States Government will adopt in compliance with the Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement. Once a final decision is made, a
rebaseline of the MOX project would be required and could take
approximately 18-24 months to complete.
Mr. Cooper. General Klotz, is it worth an effort to assess whether
it would be feasible to use low enriched uranium (LEU) (instead of
highly enriched uranium) in naval reactor fuel to the next generation
of aircraft carriers?
General Klotz. It is feasible but is not practical or cost
effective with our current technology. Today, using LEU would increase
the amount of refuelings required, which has the follow-on effect of
requiring additional ships to meet the same military requirements.
Theoretically, advances in technology could partially recover the loss
in core-life from that which we have today in our HEU cores, but we
would need a significant R&D effort to develop those technologies.
Further effort would then be required to design the LEU reactor plant
and other associated systems before we would be ready to build an LEU
powered ship.
Mr. Cooper. Would there be any benefit to assessing the potential
for LEU in naval fuel, such as nonproliferation or security benefits
even if there might not be any driving military benefits?
General Klotz. If we could develop the technology to the point
where we use exclusively LEU, it would ultimately have a non-
proliferation benefit because we would no longer require HEU for naval
nuclear propulsion.
Security costs would also be reduced, as HEU facilities have
greater requirements, but we would still require a substantial security
presence in terms of physical infrastructure and manpower.
Mr. Cooper. Would this help sustain the necessary R&D funding and
capability for Naval Reactors?
General Klotz. Developing the technologies required to use LEU in
our plants would be a substantial, multi-year research effort that
works at the cutting edge of nuclear science. Advanced fuel development
would sustain one area of unique expertise that the Naval Reactors
Program relies upon to deal with the day-to-day issues involved in
naval reactor design, construction, operation, and disposal, which
require a detailed understanding of naval fuel. Naval fuel performance
knowledge is unique and exists only within the Naval Reactor Program.
Advanced fuel development attracts talent and maintains our knowledge
base.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Mr. Larsen. General Klotz, what are the risks of NNSA modernization
plan, including executing 4-5 concurrent life-extension programs and
overseeing major construction projects at Y-12 and Los Alamos National
Laboratory in the 2020s?
General Klotz. NNSA has developed long term modernization efforts
for the nuclear security enterprise described in the FY 2016 Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan. Modernization efforts for warheads
through approved Life Extension Programs face a number of risks. First,
the ability to certify designs that include new or updated material
combinations or surety features is a challenge for life extension
programs in the absence of underground testing. To address this
challenge, the national security laboratories have improved their
fundamental understanding of physics package interactions through
numerous enhanced physics experiments, greater computing power, and
advanced simulations. Second, NNSA must mature technologies and
components to transform the stockpile over the next twenty years.
Technology maturation enables development and delivery of design-to-
manufacturing capabilities to meeting current and future nuclear
weapons needs for the Nation's stockpile. NNSA uses the Component
Maturation Framework, which is a portfolio management tool used to
integrate preliminary scope, proposed technology and manufacturing
readiness levels, and planning estimates, to inform decisions on
component development, technology maturation and timely insertion. NNSA
is establishing plans to mature technologies sufficiently in advance of
planned insertion points to cost-effectively minimize risk. Third,
although the president's budget fully funds these activities, cuts due
to sequestration can put them at risk.
For major construction projects, NNSA is committed to delivering
its capital asset projects on budget and schedule. Over the past four
years, NNSA has focused on putting the right policies, principles,
people, processes, procedures, and partnerships in place to implement
the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Circular A-11 for Capital
Acquisition Projects, Department of Energy Order 413.3B on project
management, and the Secretary's January 2015 enhanced project
management policies. In 2013, GAO narrowed the focus of its High Risk
list for NNSA to contracts and projects with a Total Project Cost
greater than $750 million as a result of the improvements NNSA has been
making in its contract and project management. NNSA is confident that
the same policies and processes for projects less than $750 million are
scalable to the major system acquisition projects at Los Alamos
National Laboratory and Y-12.
Following are risks to NNSA's portfolio of construction projects:
Escalation on commodities and equipment procurements
Difficulties attracting and retaining nuclear qualified
workers at assumed labor rates
Availability of vendors qualified to produce materials
and equipment to meet current nuclear construction standards (NQA-1)
Changes to project requirements, codes, and standards
Delays in authorizations to start construction activities
Mr. Larsen. Do you have the expertise and management in place to
lower the risk of schedule slips and cost increases? Are you confident
NNSA can execute this plan?
General Klotz. NNSA has the expertise and management processes in
place to effectively plan and execute planned weapon system
modernization activities. NNSA has established an office (NA-19) to
focus on weapon system modernization. To control costs, earned value
management practices are being implemented for every weapon system
acquisition. The NNSA weapons workload has grown over the last several
years to include 3 life extension programs and one major weapon system
alteration, and each of these programs requires trained and qualified
federal managers and selected subject matter experts. NNSA has
developed staffing plans that will, over time and with Congressional
support, align federal resources required to execute our assigned
program of work.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. General Klotz, is there a plan for retiring B83 and
W76-0? What is the timeline?
General Klotz. Both the B83 and W76-0 are planned to be retired
once confidence is gained in the B61-12 and W76-1 Life Extension
Programs (LEPs), respectively. Specific planned retirement dates can be
provided in a classified response.
Mr. Garamendi. General Klotz, there is some concern that the
second-line of defense funding for fixed portal monitors at ports may
not provide the best value for the funding. Do you agree? Why or why
not?
General Klotz. The fixed radiation portal monitors deployed by
NNSA's Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) Program
(formerly known as the Second Line of Defense) are a critical element
of the U.S. Government's layered approach to countering the threat of
illicit trafficking. NSDD provides international partners with a suite
of tools, including fixed, mobile and handheld detection equipment,
training, and technical support to enhance their capabilities to
detect, deter and interdict the illicit trafficking of nuclear and
radiological materials. Before deploying equipment, NSDD considers a
wide range of factors, including trafficking pathways, deployment
environments, and partner capabilities in order to determine the most
appropriate mix of equipment to counter the threat of smuggling in a
particular country or region.
NSDD's fixed portal monitors work in concert with mobile detection
systems to provide partners with multiple tools to prevent nuclear
smuggling. Given the consequences of a nuclear or radiological device
incident, it is imperative that all available tools be brought to bear
to create a robust and layered defense against nuclear smuggling.
Regarding the capabilities of the fixed portal monitors, they are
effective in detecting some special nuclear materials as well as
radiological materials that could be used in a radiological dispersal
device (RDD) or radiological exposure device (RED). Further, fixed
portal monitors have detected materials of concern in the past. More
detail on specific interdiction cases, as well as portal monitor
capabilities, can be provided in a classified setting. Fixed portal
monitors also help deter trafficking by complicating potential
smugglers' task, forcing them to use alternate means that increase the
probability of detection.
Mr. Garamendi. General Klotz, what is the impact of Russia
withdrawing from cooperation with the United States on securing and
removing fissile material in Russia? What are the alternatives to
ensure these materials are not stolen or diverted?
General Klotz. Material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A)
cooperation with key non-Rosatom sites and organizations is continuing
under the Multilateral Nuclear and Environmental Programme in the
Russian Federation (MNEPR) framework agreement, as is cooperation at a
limited number of Rosatom sites and organizations. However, Rosatom
informed us last December that existing cooperation would cease with
most Rosatom nuclear sites and organizations as of the end of 2014.
Existing work will continue in the near future to complete security
upgrades and sustainability work directly with a subset of Rosatom and
non-Rosatom sites. The Russian decision to scale back cooperation has
accelerated the shift from assistance to technical engagement on key
foundational elements of modern and effective security. Given that
Russia maintains the largest holdings of weapons-usable material, DOE/
NNSA will continue to seek engagement on nuclear material security best
practices with Russian sites and organizations. This includes topics
such as training, regulatory development and inspections, and
transportation security.
DOE/NNSA also expects to continue cooperation with Russia and third
parties, including the repatriation of Russian-origin highly enriched
uranium (HEU).
DOE/NNSA will also work to maintain nuclear security relationships
with neighboring countries, offering continued training and training-
center support to also maintain regional capabilities. We will continue
to help strengthen border and port security programs with partner
countries around Russia, to enable detection and interdiction of any
trafficked nuclear material, including consideration of additional
measures that would be prudent to pursue.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. The President's budget request clearly supports Uranium
enrichment technology. In your opinion, do you find that maintaining
the American Centrifuge capability is important?
General Klotz. A reliable supply of enriched uranium is required to
meet U.S. national security requirements. Any enrichment technology
used to meet these requirements, should the interagency determine that
such technology is the best way forward, must be U.S. origin. Enriched
uranium provided via foreign technology, even if located in the U.S.,
may not be used for national security purposes due to international
peaceful-use assurances. The President's budget request maintains the
operability of the centrifuge technology at the pilot plant in Piketon,
OH, and the development and test facility in the East Tennessee
Technology Park (ETTP) Building K-1600. Maintaining these near-term
domestic-origin technologies that could produce low enriched uranium
unencumbered by peaceful-use restrictions is important while U.S.
Interagency Policy Committee develops the best path forward to meet our
national security requirements for enriched uranium.
Mr. Turner. Additionally, do you agree that with further
development and deployment of U.S. Uranium enrichment technology will
help meet future security needs?
General Klotz. A domestic uranium enrichment capability would meet
national security and nonproliferation missions that require
unobligated low-enriched uranium (LEU) for commercial light water
reactors involved in tritium production, high assay LEU for research
reactors, and eventually highly enriched uranium (HEU) for Naval
Reactors. The Department will provide a report to Congress in the near
future that will inform discussions regarding the path forward for
meeting the nation's needs for unencumbered enriched uranium.
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