    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 114-27]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                       ON

           FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                                 MARCH 24, 2015

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                       ______

                             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

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                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                         MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair   LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
    MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               RICK LARSEN, Washington
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
    J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia            BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
    ROB BISHOP, Utah                     PETE AGUILAR, California
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana
                     Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
                             Leonor Tomero, Counsel
                               Eric Smith, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     2
    Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Klotz, Lt Gen Frank G., USAF (Ret.), Administrator, National
      Nuclear Security Administration................................     3
    Roberson, Jessie H., Vice Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities
      Safety Board...................................................     5
    Whitney, Mark, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
      Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy............     4

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Klotz, Lt Gen Frank G........................................    25
        Roberson, Jessie H...........................................    50
        Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................    23
        Whitney, Mark................................................    40

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        DNFSB Action Plan for Organizational Culture Change..........    69

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Cooper...................................................    88
        Mr. Garamendi................................................    90
        Mr. Larsen...................................................    89
        Mr. Rogers...................................................    75
        Mr. Turner...................................................    91

     [H.A.S.C. No. 114-27]

     .  FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                              Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                               Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 24, 2015.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:32 p.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
          ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. The Subcommittee on Strategic
    Forces will come to order. I want to welcome you to our hearing
    on the President's fiscal year 2016 budget request for atomic
    energy defense activities at the Department of Energy.
        I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. We know
    how much work goes into preparing for these hearings, and we
    thank you for putting that time and energy into this endeavor.
    I want to welcome our guests. We have Lieutenant General Frank
    Klotz, Administrator of National Security Administration--
    National Nuclear Security [NNSA], a little difference; Mark
    Whitney, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental
    Management [EM], U.S. Department of Energy; and Ms. Jessie Hill
    Roberson, Vice Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
    Board [DNFSB].
        General Klotz, you have a few very able folks in support of
    you today and I want to recognize them: Dr. Don Cook, Ms. Anne
    Harrington, and Admiral John Richardson. If any of our members
    have questions directly for them later in the hearing, we will
    ensure that they can step up to the table and answer those as
    needed.
        Before I hand the floor over to the ranking member, let me
    briefly highlight just a few key issues for today's hearing.
    First, let's be clear on the Nation's defense priorities. Last
    November, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said this:
    ``Our nuclear deterrent plays a critical role in assuring U.S.
    national security and it is DOD'S highest priority mission. No
    other capability we have is more important.'' This is the
    correct priority, but we must remember that fulfilling the
    nuclear deterrence mission is the shared responsibility of both
    DOD [Department of Defense] and DOE [Department of Energy]. It
    is the people, programs, and infrastructure at NNSA's nuclear
    enterprise that provides our Nation with that deterrent.
        The subcommittee will take a detailed look at NNSA's budget
    request and scrub it hard to ensure it is meeting the
    military's priorities. In the fiscal environment we are facing,
    we must prioritize the core mission of the agency while finding
    efficiencies that can be directly applied to that mission.
        This is a strong budget request for NNSA, but I fear it may
    have only kicked the hardest choices over to Congress. And we
    must hear from our witnesses about how devastating
    sequestration, or Budget Control Act, funding levels would be
    on DOE's defense programs in both NNSA and Environmental
    Management. Allowing sequestration to hit us again in fiscal
    year 2016 would be like designing a nuclear hand grenade--just
    about the dumbest thing we could do.
        Moving to governance and management of DOE and NNSA, we
    have received a report of the Mies/Augustine Advisory Panel,
    and I look forward to receiving General Klotz's response to
    that report. I agree with a lot of what the advisory panel
    recommended, but not all of it. General, I know there is much
    you and I agree on in this area as well. I hope to explore your
    thoughts on where we can work together to fix the longstanding
    problems related to governance and management. We have to get
    on top of these problems if the NNSA is going to be successful
    in the long-term. Leadership and accountability will be the key
    to this.
        Let me end on a bright note. This year, the B61 life
    extension program continues to execute on time and on budget.
    General, please tell the whole NNSA team to keep up the good
    work. This is an important step in rebuilding trust and
    confidence with Congress and the American people and our
    allies.
        Thank you again to our witnesses. I look forward to the
    discussion. With that, let me turn it over to my friend and
    colleague from Tennessee, the ranking member, Mr. Cooper, for
    any opening statement he may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
    Appendix on page 23.]

    STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE,
            RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I, too,
    welcome the witnesses, and it is a pleasure to work with you on
    these issues of vital importance to our national security. As
    you noted, no weapons are more important or more dangerous than
    these, and we need to make sure that we are doing the best we
    possibly can to keep them safe, secure, and reliable. I look
    forward to the testimony of the witnesses.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you. With that, we will ask each of our
    witnesses to make an opening statement, and your full statement
    will be submitted for the record. I would ask you to summarize
    it in 3 minutes. And without objection, we will accept those
    for the record.
        The witness order will be first General Klotz, then Mr.
    Whitney, and then Ms. Roberson. So, General Klotz, you are
    recognized for 3 minutes to summarize your opening statement.

    STATEMENT OF LT GEN FRANK G. KLOTZ, USAF (RET.), ADMINISTRATOR,
                NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        General Klotz. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and
    members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to
    present the President's fiscal year 2016 budget request for the
    Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
    Administration. I am pleased to be joined by Mark Whitney and
    Vice Chairman Jessie Roberson, who you have already introduced.
        We value this committee's leadership in national security
    as well as its robust and abiding support for the mission and
    the people of the NNSA. On a personal note, I have benefited
    enormously from the insight and guidance you have so generously
    and graciously shared over the past 12 months.
        Our budget request, which comprises more than 40 percent of
    DOE's budget, is $12.6 billion. This is an increase of $1.2
    billion, or 10.2 percent over the fiscal year 2015 enacted
    level. The funding is extraordinarily important to NNSA's
    missions to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    weapon stockpile; to prevent, counter, and respond to the
    threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; and to
    support the capability of our nuclear-powered Navy to project
    power and protect American and allied interests around the
    world.
        By supporting growth in each of our four appropriations
    accounts, this budget represents the commitment by the
    administration to NNSA's vital and enduring missions and to
    NNSA's role in ensuring a strong national defense. This mission
    is accomplished through the hard work and innovative spirit of
    a highly talented workforce committed to public service. To
    provide them the tools they need to carry out their complex and
    challenging tasks, both now and in the future, we must continue
    to modernize our scientific, technical, and engineering
    capabilities and infrastructure.
        In doing so, we are mindful of our obligation to
    continually improve our business practices and to be
    responsible stewards of the resources that Congress and the
    American people have entrusted to us.
        For all of these missions, NNSA will continue to drive
    improvement in acquisition and project management practices and
    policies as well as Federal oversight over the enterprise.
    These missions are just a handful of the critical national
    security work that this budget funds; however, the looming
    possibility of sequestration is a major threat to NNSA's
    missions. In developing the budget, NNSA was directed to
    request the funds we need to accomplish the missions we have
    been tasked to do. The fiscal year 2016 budget request reflects
    this.
        Another round of sequestration caps would most certainly
    have devastating impacts on important programs and projects, to
    include pushing them further out into the future or canceling
    them altogether. However you slice it, sequestration would
    adversely and severely affect our capabilities and our capacity
    to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons
    stockpile, and to reduce nuclear dangers both at home and
    abroad.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, I look forward to
    discussing these and other issues with you in more detail
    during the question and answer.
        [The prepared statement of General Klotz can be found in
    the Appendix on page 25.]
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General.
        Mr. Whitney, you are recognized for 3 minutes.

    STATEMENT OF MARK WHITNEY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
        FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Mr. Whitney. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking
    Member Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to
    be here today to represent the Department of Energy's Office of
    Environmental Management, and to discuss the positive program
    achievements to date and what we plan to accomplish under the
    President's fiscal year 2016 budget request.
        Our request for $5.818 billion will allow the EM program to
    continue to make safe cleanup of the environmental legacy a
    priority, a legacy that was brought about from five decades of
    nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear
    energy research. The request includes $5.055 billion for
    defense environmental cleanup activities; an additional $472
    million for the defense contribution to the Uranium Enrichment
    Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund; a total of $542
    million for the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and
    Decommissioning Fund cleanup activities; and $220 million for
    non-defense environmental cleanup activities.
        We continue to make significant cleanup progress. We have
    produced nearly 4,000 canisters of vitrified high-level waste
    at Savannah River Site in South Carolina, converting it to a
    solid glass form suitable for long-term storage or permanent
    disposal. This is about half the sludge in the Savannah River
    Site tanks.
        At Hanford, we have completed the bulk of the river
    corridor cleanup project, including more than 500 facilities
    and 1,000 remediation sites.
        The fiscal year 2016 budget request will allow us to
    continue to make significant progress in our ongoing cleanup
    priorities of liquid tank waste treatment, and recovery of the
    Waste Isolation Pilot Plant [WIPP]. For example, the Idaho
    National Laboratory, the request supports operations of the
    Integrative Waste Treatment Unit. It also covers and supports
    cleaning and grouting activities to support closing of the
    final four tanks there. It also supports high-level waste tank
    progress at the Savannah River Site, including producing 130
    canisters of vitrified waste derived from tanks and processed
    through the Defense Waste Processing Facility.
        The 2016 request will allow us to expedite tank waste
    treatment at the Office of River Protection in Hanford through
    the direct-feed low-activity waste approach, and this allows us
    to continue designing the low-activity waste treatment system,
    and continuing construction of the low-activity waste facility,
    the analytical laboratory, and balance of the facilities at the
    Waste Treatment Plant.
        The 2016 request also provides funding in accordance with
    the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant recovery plan. There are many
    sites around the EM complex, of course, that depend on the WIPP
    facility and that have transuranic waste at its plant for
    disposal.
        So that resumption of operations at WIPP is a priority for
    us, and we will resume waste emplacement activities in 2016.
    The request also completes major facility clean-out and
    demolition projects, including the Plutonium Finishing Plant at
    Hanford.
        In closing, I am honored to be here today representing the
    Office of Environmental Management. We are committed to
    achieving our mission, and will continue to apply innovative
    environmental cleanup strategies to complete work safely and
    efficiently, thereby demonstrating value to the American
    taxpayer.
        Thank you, and I would be pleased to answer any questions
    that you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Whitney can be found in the
    Appendix on page 40.]
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Whitney.
        Ms. Roberson, you are recognized for 3 minutes to summarize
    your opening statement.

    STATEMENT OF JESSIE H. ROBERSON, VICE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE NUCLEAR
                        FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

        Ms. Roberson. Thank you, Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member
    Cooper, and other members of the subcommittee. I am the Vice
    Chairman of the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board, and I
    would like to acknowledge the other two members sitting
    directly behind me, Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Santos.
        Last year's radioactive release at the Waste Isolation
    Pilot Plant demonstrated the significant impact likely to
    result from a radiological incident at any DOE defense nuclear
    facility. Waste disposal operations have already been shut down
    for over 13 months. This has impacted cleanup activities across
    DOE's entire defense nuclear complex, and illustrates that even
    activities judged to be relatively low risk can still have
    major safety consequences and large impacts on DOE's ability to
    accomplish its mission when radioactive materials are involved.
        The board is the only agency that provides independent
    safety oversight of DOE's defense nuclear facilities. The
    board's budget is devoted to maintaining and supporting an
    expert staff of engineers and scientists, nearly all of whom
    have advanced technical degrees, to support us in accomplishing
    our highly specialized work.
        The President's budget request for fiscal year 2016
    includes $29.15 million in new budget authority for the board.
    It will support a planned staff of 125 personnel. This level of
    staffing is needed to provide sufficient independent safety
    oversight of DOE's defense nuclear complex, given the pace and
    scope of DOE's activities.
        The board provides safety oversight of a multitude of
    operations critical to national defense. These operations
    include assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons,
    fabrication of plutonium pits and weapons components,
    production and recycling of tritium, nuclear criticality
    experiments, sub-critical experiments, and a host of activities
    to address the radioactive legacy resulting from 70 years of
    nuclear weapons operations.
        The board supports and closely oversees DOE and NNSA's
    efforts to develop new defense nuclear facilities that
    integrate safety into their design at the very earliest stages.
    The delays in NNSA's programs to modernize its uranium and
    plutonium capabilities require the board to provide continued
    safety oversight of ongoing defense programs work, and aging
    nuclear facilities that do not meet modern safety standards.
        Given the age and condition of many of DOE's defense
    nuclear facilities, the board is placing particular emphasis on
    emergency preparedness and accident response capabilities
    across the complex.
        Let me add in closing that the board and DOE together have
    built a constructive working relationship. All board members,
    myself, Mr. Sullivan, and Mr. Santos, understand that a safe
    nuclear security enterprise is our priority.
        That concludes my statement. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Roberson can be found in the
    Appendix on page 50.]
        Mr. Rogers. I thank you. Thank you all for those opening
    statements. I will start with questioning now. I will recognize
    myself for the first round of questions.
        General Klotz, you have a unique perspective to offer this
    committee on an issue we focused on for some time: governance
    and management at DOE and NNSA. As the first commander of the
    Air Force Global Strike Command, you were one of NNSA's primary
    customers for nuclear weapons work, and now as Administrator,
    you are in charge of the NNSA. Given your background and
    experience, I fear that if you can't fix these problems, nobody
    can.
        And let me be clear. I firmly believe that getting NNSA's
    governance and management on track for the long-term must be
    one of your core duties.
        You owe us a report right now on your views of the Mies/
    Augustine Advisory Panel's recommendations. As I said in my
    opening remarks, I agree with a lot of their recommendations,
    but certainly not all of them.
        So tell me, what are your views that you can share with us
    today on what that report is going to tell us?
        General Klotz. I thank you, Chairman. And let me say that I
    take your charge very seriously that the governance and
    management of NNSA is, indeed, one of our top priorities, as we
    move forward.
        As far as the Augustine/Mies Panel is concerned, we have
    stated publicly that we appreciate the hard and long work that
    the members of the panel put in in giving some very thoughtful
    consideration to the issues that face NNSA and the entire
    nuclear security enterprise in terms of its governance and its
    management, and we appreciate the counsel that they have given
    in terms of their recommendation.
        As we look across the broad 19 overarching recommendations,
    and 63 sub-recommendations, we find, like you, we are in
    agreement with most of them. And, in fact, many of the things
    that they have suggested, for instance, in the area of
    tightening up program management, instilling more rigor and
    discipline in project management, in cost estimation, in the
    relationship between NNSA and the military services and the
    relationship between NNSA and its laboratories and production
    plants across the country are things that under Secretary
    Moniz's leadership and under the leadership team that is
    currently now in place at NNSA, we have been working very, very
    hard on.
        So we take that as, to some extent, validation,
    justification for a number of things that we have already moved
    out very smartly on and are continuing to develop as we move
    forward.
        So I look forward to finishing off the report. I expect
    some time in the next 3 to 4 weeks, we will be able to deliver
    it up here, and I look forward to the opportunity to discussing
    the specific comments that we have in greater detail with you
    and other members of the committee.
        Mr. Rogers. Great. Many of the Mies/Augustine
    recommendations align with similar efforts this committee has
    undertaken in the past: reducing transactional oversight,
    clarifying roles and responsibilities, and improving cost
    estimation and program management. And although we try to help,
    many of these problems are not fixable by Congress, but
    Congress can and will continue to provide guidance, direction,
    and momentum.
        So, General, how can this committee help you address those
    issues?
        General Klotz. Well, first of all, I think you have taken
    the first most important step, and that is to express your
    interest, your concern in the governance and management of the
    NNSA.
        It is so very important for those individuals, those men
    and women who work within our enterprise, to know that the
    senior leadership of this government in both the executive
    branch and the legislative branch understand the importance of
    the enduring mission which those people perform and care about
    its safe and successful execution.
        So, again, as we come forward with this report, we will
    have some specific comments on the recommendations in there
    that we can discuss with you in terms of the way ahead.
        Mr. Rogers. The third area I want to ask about is
    accountability. As a part of our effort to reform DOE and NNSA,
    we have spent a lot of time in this committee seeking
    accountability from major failures, the break-in at Y-12, the
    stunning failure of design and oversight with the UPF [Uranium
    Processing Facility] that wasted at least half a billion
    dollars of taxpayers' money, and the decades of wasted effort
    with CMRR [Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
    facility]. The list is long.
        General, these failures were before your time as the
    Administrator, but are you aware that not a single Federal
    official was terminated after these disasters? Several retired
    and were moved to other jobs, but not one was fired.
        So, General Klotz, can you assure this committee that you
    will hold Federal employees and contractors fully accountable
    for failures of this magnitude? This committee would like to
    see a message sent.
        General Klotz. Yes, sir, we will. And I think one of the
    things that we have worked very hard on is to restore good
    order and discipline and a rigorous approach to both security
    and to program and project management in the past several
    months, and we are beginning to see some of the results of our
    effort in that way. And we will not shrink from holding either
    Federal officials or the management and operating [M&O]
    contractors accountable for their performance in both--when
    they do well, to recognize that and to congratulate them, as
    you already have in your opening statement. By the same token,
    when they fall short of our standards, to make sure that we
    communicate to them to that.
        I think a review of the most recent cycle of fee
    determination shows that we will take tough action when what we
    expect from our people and our M&O contractors do not meet our
    expectations.
        Mr. Rogers. Great. I thank you. And I will now recognize
    the ranking member for any questions he may have.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Continuing the
    chairman's theme, let us talk about the WIPP disaster. Hundreds
    of millions of dollars to remediate, a year or more of delays,
    ripple throughout the entire nuclear establishment. Who has
    been held accountable in the WIPP disaster?
        Mr. Whitney. Thank you, Congressman Cooper. Yes, the--and
    as the general pointed out, you know, a lot of times the
    accountability is not as visible, sometimes it is very visible,
    but we are very focused on holding our folks accountable.
        The general pointed out fee determinations. And I think you
    will see with one of the parties that was responsible for the
    WIPP incident, they were held accountable in that fee
    determination area.
        We are very focused on recovering the operations and
    resuming operations of that facility. Sir, as you pointed out,
    it is critical to the cleanup program. We are making
    significant progress under fairly difficult circumstances. The
    team there at WIPP, both the Federal side and the contractors,
    have done significant amount of work, and we are focused on
    resuming operations in 2016.
        Mr. Cooper. So some time in the calendar year of 2016 we
    will see a resumption?
        Mr. Whitney. Yes, sir. We issued a recovery plan in
    September, September 30 of this past year, and it calls for us
    to resume operations by the end of the first quarter of
    calendar year 2016, and that is currently our plan. There are a
    few things that will be coming out fairly soon, and that is the
    Technical Assessment Team report on what exactly happened,
    looking at the drum where we had the incident, as well as the
    Accident Investigation Board final report. There will be
    corrective actions that will come out of that.
        The Secretary has stated that our goal is the end of March
    2016 for resuming operations, but we will only do so when we
    are confident that it is safe to do so. So we are focused on
    that, but we still have the end of March 2016 as our goal. Yes,
    sir.
        Mr. Cooper. Well, that is the timeline. How much, though,
    is it estimated to cost?
        Mr. Whitney. The cost, we don't know exactly how much the
    cost will be, because a lot of it will depend on the permanent
    ventilation system and exhaust shaft. We have begun to request
    that money, as you know. Right now the range for that project,
    because of the stage of the project, it is pre-Critical
    Decision 1, and so we are going through the alternatives
    analysis. As we further narrow the design down, we will get a
    better sense of the total cost, but right now, the range for
    that project is $77 million to $309 million. I think later this
    year we will have a better estimate of the cost of that, of
    that project, and that will really be the large portion of WIPP
    recovery costs.
        Mr. Cooper. And this will all be overseen by Ms. Roberson
    and the Defense Nuclear Safety Board?
        Ms. Roberson. Yes, sir, Mr. Cooper. We are providing
    oversight to the project, and we too have looked at--I mean, we
    are just over 100 people, so we tend to prioritize, but we have
    placed additional emphasis on our oversight investment for this
    project.
        Mr. Cooper. So back to Mr. Whitney. If the price tag is
    between $70 million and $300 million, how much is the
    contractor going to be held responsible for?
        Mr. Whitney. The contractor also has a fee determination
    very soon, and so we will be looking at this, of course. There
    have been a couple of actions that we have already taken with
    respect to the contract and the fee called conditional payment
    of fee actions, which have reduced the amount that they are
    able to earn significantly. I believe within the next several
    weeks, the final fee determination will be made and made
    public.
        Mr. Cooper. So, then, that will be publicly available, that
    information?
        Mr. Whitney. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Cooper. General Klotz, you seem to be doing a good job
    running an alphabet soup of an agency. There are many
    challenges, but as Chairman Rogers said, if anybody can do it,
    you are supposed to be the man. We appreciate when you bring in
    projects on time and under budget. That is great. I know you
    have a lot on your plate, both with life extension programs and
    with construction projects.
        So we on this committee want to help you with the full
    range of your responsibilities, including your nonproliferation
    duties and the management of change that you made to include
    counterterrorism in that, that you are assured that that will
    give us better ability to deter anyone who might be thinking of
    a nuclear incident in this country and better opportunity to
    not only prevent that from happening, but to identify the
    wrongdoers and take prompt action to protect the American
    people.
        General Klotz. Yes, sir. The change that we made was, in a
    sense, how we view the problem of dealing with nuclear
    proliferation and nuclear terrorism, both at home and abroad in
    a very, very general sense.
        You mentioned alphabet soup. Up until we made this change,
    we had a lot of different programs that were created in the
    aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, and the work that we
    did there under the Nunn-Lugar initiatives and other
    Cooperative Threat Reduction activities. And a couple of years
    ago, Ms. Harrington, who is sitting behind me, started an over-
    the-horizon look at positioning our efforts in this area for
    the longer term to deal with an increasingly complex and
    increasingly dangerous world.
        Our thought in approaching this is that we should think of
    this issue from start to finish, from cradle to grave as a
    continuum of activities that run from protect against the
    spread of special nuclear materials that would fall in the
    hands of would be proliferators and terrorists; and then if
    that fails, be able to counter that, and then if that fails, be
    able to respond to any nuclear radiological incident.
        So it is a continuum of activities. In fact, just yesterday
    we released the first-ever comprehensive report on the full
    range of activities that fall within this particular mission
    space. So we see that as a compendium, as a companion volume to
    the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which we
    produced for some number of years now that describes in detail
    what we do in the area of weapons activities.
        Mr. Cooper. May I suggest that your duties in this regard
    are the single-most important function of government, and the
    only thing the public will care about if there were to be a
    nuclear incident. And I think most of the so-called experts
    predicted that there would be one within 10 years of 9/11, and
    thank God that hasn't happened, but as the clock ticks, we have
    to be increasingly vigilant. So we need to make sure that you
    are doing everything possible, and that we are doing everything
    possible to make sure this never happens in this country.
        If you need anything, anything, call on us. And I know that
    all of your budget categories are going up, at least if the
    President's request is adhered to. And I could not agree with
    you more that we need to get rid of sequestration, but this has
    got to be job one for the country.
        I see that Admiral Richardson is behind you. I don't want
    to stop my questioning without noting that Naval Reactors over
    many years seems to have done an exceptional job of keeping up
    with its duties, so I hope that your fine example will spread.
    If you do have dirty laundry, at least you have kept it more
    hid than the other services. I hope it is just a lack of dirty
    laundry. But, you know, the tradition that Naval Reactors seems
    to have had is a truly remarkable one, so I hope you can
    continue that.
        I have no more questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank the ranking member. Chair now recognizes
    the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
    the distinguished panel being here today and testifying.
        General, I think it was last year we got a report from
    Secretary of Defense Hagel indicating that our requirements for
    our nuclear capacity was 50 to 80 plutonium pits per year. Is
    that still the requirement?
        General Klotz. That is the objective which we are working
    for as part of a comprehensive plutonium strategy.
        Many, many years ago, when we had the facility at Rocky
    Flats in California, we had the ability to produce thousands of
    nuclear weapon pits each year. Of course, that was at the
    height of the Cold War, when our stockpile was much, much
    larger than it is today. That facility was shut down. We
    moved--or tried to demonstrate the ability to develop pits,
    manufacture pits, fabricate pits at Los Alamos National
    Laboratory in New Mexico. And we are going through a sustained
    process of recreating the ability to produce a smaller number
    of pits per year, ultimately up to 50 to 80 per year, in order
    to support life extension programs that we see coming in the
    2020 to 2030 timeframe as we move there.
        Mr. Bridenstine. So is the administration's policy 50 to 80
    pits?
        General Klotz. That is what the Department of Defense and
    the Department of Energy have agreed to, the Nuclear Weapons
    Council, which passes judgment on these issues.
        Mr. Bridenstine. In the fiscal year 2015 NDAA [National
    Defense Authorization Act] signed by the President, section
    3112 included a sense of Congress that ``Timelines for creating
    certain capacities for production of plutonium pits and other
    nuclear weapons components must be driven by the requirements
    to hedge against technical and geopolitical risk, and not
    solely by the needs of life extension programs.''
        Do you agree with that?
        General Klotz. I agree with that.
        Mr. Bridenstine. The administration has, since 2010, the
    2010 Nuclear Posture Review, articulated a policy that it wants
    to develop a ``responsive nuclear infrastructure.''
        Can you share with us what that means?
        General Klotz. Well, in fact, sir, what we were just
    talking about is a good example of a responsive infrastructure.
    If you have the capability to fabricate pits, if you have the
    capability to fabricate other nuclear and non-nuclear
    components in a modern, efficient, and agile production system,
    then you can adjust what your requirements are to deal with any
    technical challenges that may arise through the aging of a
    particular warhead, or any significant changes in the political
    military environment.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Do you believe we currently have a
    responsive nuclear posture?
        General Klotz. We are pretty agile and we are pretty
    flexible, but we could be certainly more so.
        Mr. Bridenstine. The life extension program for the W80
    nuclear warhead for the long-range standoff [LRSO] cruise
    missile is accelerated by 2 years in this year's budget
    request, which is a good thing. It now aligns with NNSA's
    program with the statutory requirement in the fiscal year 2015
    NDAA that you produce the first warhead in this program by
    2025. Where does the W80 warhead and the larger LRSO missile
    rank in the Nuclear Weapons Council's priority list?
        General Klotz. It is right up there. It is one of the life
    extension programs we are going with. I wouldn't rank it any
    higher or any lower. It is a top priority.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Will it happen in fiscal year 2015? I
    guess, will you commit that in fiscal year 2015, fiscal year
    2016 we will see movements for the next steps in this program?
        General Klotz. We have already had some fairly significant
    movements in the W80, we call it the W80-4 life extension
    program [LEP], which will be the warhead that the Nuclear
    Weapons Council agreed would be the one we would field with the
    Air Force's long-range standoff capability. We are moving
    towards----
        Dr. Cook. 6.2 on July 1.
        General Klotz. So later this year we will take the next
    step in that process. So this is something which we take very,
    very seriously.
        Mr. Bridenstine. What would be the impact if Congress
    significantly cut this program or canceled it altogether?
        General Klotz. Well, that is a very good question, and
    thank you for asking it. I think it goes without saying that
    any significant cuts to this particular program, or a general
    sequestration across the board would adversely affect all of
    our programs in one way or the other.
        Now, whether it would--if you had a general cut, we would
    have to engage in discussions with Department of Defense. As
    the chairman said in his opening statement, they essentially,
    you know, are the customers for what we deliver in the way of a
    warhead, so we would want to make sure that we were synced up
    with whatever adjustment they had to make for delivery systems.
    It would not make sense for us to deliver a warhead if there
    wasn't a delivery system ready for it and vice versa. So that
    would be something that we would have to work out
    collaboratively through the Nuclear Weapons Council process.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Well, let's hope that doesn't happen.
        I will yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes the
    gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen,
    thank you for your work.
        Just to continue following up on the previous questions, it
    looks like we are somewhere north of $17 billion for the W80-4
    nuclear warhead LEP program, and the cruise missile that goes
    with it. You have accelerated this discussion by, I think, an
    incomplete answer. Why was the 2-year acceleration required?
        General Klotz. The acceleration, moving it up 2 years from
    2027 to 2025 for the first production unit was taken largely at
    the request of the Department of Defense, U.S. Strategic
    Command, and the Air Force for an early delivery of the
    capability which the long-range standoff system represents.
        As Admiral Haney, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command,
    has said in open testimony, basically it reflects two concerns:
    One is the increasing sophistication of air defenses around the
    world; and the second is some concerns about the aging of the
    missile, that is the current air-launched cruise missile.
        So they felt it was prudent from a military requirements
    point of view to move that up. And we support them on that.
    And, in fact, perhaps more detail than is needed, but it
    actually fits in very, very nicely with our work schedule and
    it will allow us to have sort of a smoother approach to how we
    do the life extension programs over an extended period of time.
        Mr. Garamendi. Okay. Not okay, but thank you for the
    information. We were talking about responsive infrastructure
    before, 50 to 80 pits required. And at what cost? The
    infrastructure; not for the pits, but for the infrastructure?
        General Klotz. I would have to get you--I could take that
    and get you the full cost of the plutonium strategy out through
    all the years. For the coming year, what we are asking for us
    in fiscal year 2015, Congress enacted 335--I am sorry, 35.7 for
    the plutonium strategy and replacement of the chemical,
    metallurgical laboratory at Los Alamos. That is going up to
    1.55 as our budget request for 2016. As we continue to----
        Mr. Garamendi. With a B?
        General Klotz. I am sorry?
        Mr. Garamendi. $1.55 billion?
        General Klotz. Million.
        Mr. Garamendi. Million. Okay. And that is the next
    investment on, we don't know the--you don't have the total cost
    of the facility?
        General Klotz. We do have. We can get you that number. I
    don't have it.
        Mr. Garamendi. You don't have it with you.
        General Klotz. If I could carry numbers around in my head,
    I would have stayed a math major instead of becoming a poli sci
    major.
        Mr. Garamendi. Well, I am pleased that you chose the career
    you have. The 50 to 80 pits is to actually produce that number
    of pits?
        General Klotz. It is to show the capacity to produce that
    number of pits, is what--as we understand----
        Mr. Garamendi. The assumption is at some point we would
    need to produce at least 50 to 80 pits?
        General Klotz. That is the assumption, yes, sir.
        Mr. Garamendi. And it is based on what assumption? What is
    the----
        General Klotz. The assumption it is based on as we move
    into a life extension program that would affect the W78, which
    is a warhead used on the U.S. Air Force's intercontinental
    ballistic missile and would also be our first interoperable
    warhead [IW], that we would need to be able to produce pits for
    that.
        Mr. Garamendi. What do you mean ``interoperable''?
        General Klotz. Perhaps maybe I will let Dr. Cook describe
    this since he came here and we have an open mike for him.
        Mr. Cook. Happy to do that. By ``interoperable,'' which is
    part of the three-plus-two strategy, it is an agreed Nuclear
    Weapon Council strategy to move eventually to three
    interoperable ballistic missile systems. That brings down, in
    the long haul, some of the technical hedge that we carry to
    provide a backup against technical failure for what we have,
    and more importantly, as weapons age. Specifically, it means
    the ability to have a common nuclear explosive package fit into
    each of the large air shells, one for the Air Force, which is
    the Mark 21; one for the Navy, which is the Mark 5, to do the
    adjustment and all of the balancing required for flight
    characteristics with the non-nuclear components. And we pursued
    this year after year. It is well beyond the stage of
    conceptual.
        Within the last 12 months, we believe that we have proven,
    to the best extent on paper that this is possible, and now we
    will begin maturing the technologies in order to resume the
    schedule. As the Administrator said, there was a 5-year delay
    in IW-1, in other testimony, and some money is shown in the
    fiscal 2020 year budget to resume that work.
        Mr. Garamendi. I am out of time, Mr. Chairman, but I want
    to get into that in much more detail.
        Mr. Rogers. Okay. We will have another round.
        Mr. Garamendi. And I will come back. Thank you.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank all for being
    here. Thank you for your service to our country. And I am just
    going to jump right in, General Klotz. You have talked about
    the responsive infrastructure and you have been asked about
    that. Isn't that lacking, because there is a key uranium
    facility and a key plutonium facility that need to be planned
    and built, and we are not doing that?
        General Klotz. We could take--we are working on both of
    those, and we can take them separately. On the plutonium side,
    as I indicated earlier in an earlier response, we had the
    capability at one time at Rocky Flats in Colorado to produce
    literally thousands of pits per year for a much larger
    stockpile than we now have. We no longer have that kind of
    capacity, and we foresee a need in the future for being able to
    produce a greater number of pits than we can do on basically a
    handful a year now at Los Alamos. So we are building up that
    capability.
        What has changed from the past is, at one time we were
    looking at constructing one large facility to replace an aging
    facility where we did analytical chemistry and material
    characterization related to plutonium at Los Alamos, and now we
    have adopted a more modular approach, re-purposing some
    existing facilities, moving equipment around, and beginning the
    process of design for some external modules, which will allow
    us to increase the capacity of space that we have. So that is
    underway. We have got money in the budget, we have an ask and a
    request for that.
        Mr. Lamborn. How far away is that from being done?
        General Klotz. What is the expectation?
        Mr. Cook. You are looking at--the expectation for the
    plutonium is to have most of the capabilities in for the first
    part of the strategy by 2020, and for the second part by about
    2025. We will execute a buildup, in a rational way for
    capability at 10, 20, and 30 pits per annum and 24, 25, and 26.
    We will achieve the capability with plutonium and demonstrate
    at the 50 to 80 level in 2030 that capability.
        Mr. Lamborn. Well, I am very concerned, because this and
    the uranium facility were part of what was promised by the
    administration to get the Senate to ratify the New START
    [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty. And when I see that elements
    of this are 15 years away, up to 15 years away, I am just
    really concerned that the administration hasn't been keeping
    its end of the bargain. That is, frankly, what my concern is.
        General Klotz. If I could shift to uranium, since you asked
    about that, our principal facility for doing that is the Y-12
    facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and there we do have the
    capacity to conduct uranium operations. Our concern, however,
    is if much of the work is done in a facility, we call it 9212,
    which is decades old, is really showing signs of wear and tear,
    and we are concerned obviously about the safety not only of our
    operations there, but more importantly, the people, the
    employees.
        Mr. Lamborn. And how far away is that from being----
        General Klotz. Again, we have changed our approach from
    doing a big-box approach where you put everything into one box,
    and, therefore, every square foot costs as much as the most
    expensive requirement driven by security and safety, to having
    a distributed, segregated approach where we segregate
    activities by hazard and security category.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Lastly, I want to address Admiral
    Richardson. If you could come up to the empty mike, that would
    be great. And by the way, I know the chairman recently led a
    congressional delegation [CODEL] to Idaho, and you were there
    and hosted us at the Naval Reactors. General Klotz, you were
    there, and I really appreciate that. I think we all got a lot
    out of that.
        And since that visit, I have gone to a local firm in my
    district, Cogitic. A couple of brothers are getting a business.
    It is amazingly capable in producing parts for nuclear
    submarines, like the valves, the ball valves and things like
    that. So it is just amazing all that goes into the nuclear
    enterprise from start to finish. But real quick--oh, gosh. I
    have run out of time.
        Mr. Rogers. Go ahead.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I will just ask this question. And thank
    you, Mr. Chairman, I have to run to the floor on what they are
    discussing right now, but my question is this: On low-enriched
    uranium, there are some who talk about, well, that can be used
    as a substitute for highly enriched uranium. Is there really
    any promising future to a military capability for low-enriched
    uranium?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, thank you very much for your kind
    words and thank you for the question. We do produce a report to
    Congress about the feasibility of using low-enriched uranium. I
    have a copy of that report here which I submitted in January of
    2014. And with the current state of technology right now, if we
    were to substitute low-enriched uranium, it would only be even
    technically considered for an aircraft carrier application.
        And, because of the reduced energy in the low-enriched
    uranium, with the current technology, we would introduce
    another refueling event in the life of that carrier. That
    refueling event would come at a cost of about a billion dollars
    and would remove that carrier from being at sea while it comes
    into the shipyard to do that refueling operation as well.
        We have done some recent exploratory work, and, you know,
    the potential exists that we could develop an advanced fuel
    system that might increase uranium loading and make low-
    enriched uranium possible while still meeting, you know, some
    very rigorous performance requirements for naval reactors on
    nuclear-powered warships. By no means is success assured by
    that.
        Mr. Lamborn. Admiral, I am going to have to run, but----
        Admiral Richardson. All right.
        Mr. Lamborn [continuing]. Do you see a current military
    benefit to using low-enriched uranium today?
        Admiral Richardson. From a pure military standpoint, no,
    sir.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you all for
    being here and for your service.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        Now let's talk about NNSA on deferred maintenance. I and
    several other members of this subcommittee have had the
    opportunity to visit Y-12, the labs, the Naval Reactors
    facility in Idaho with you, General Klotz and Admiral
    Richardson, and other parts of the NNSA enterprise.
        At each stop, I ask for the ugly tour to see some of the
    massive backlog of deferred maintenance at all of these
    decrepit facilities, and we saw a lot of ugly. I am putting
    some slides up on the monitors of the recent roof collapse at
    the lithium facility at Y-12. A huge chunk of concrete fell
    into an operational work area. We are lucky no one was hurt or
    killed. We have also got some pictures from Pantex, which has
    many areas in equally as bad shape.
        Because all of these places are inside secure facilities, I
    don't think the American people are aware of just how bad these
    buildings have gotten. We have got weeds growing up out the
    floors of work areas at Pantex; $14 million diagnostic
    equipment covered with tarps because of the lab roof leaks;
    duct tape, which I like duct tape, don't get me wrong, duct
    tape and plastic around pipes carrying radioactive solutions.
        General, you and Secretary Moniz have sought to arrest the
    growth of the deferred maintenance backlog at NNSA. That is
    laudable, and I know you will have this committee's full
    support, but you haven't requested enough money to actually
    reduce the backlog. What more could you be doing if provided
    additional funding?
        General Klotz. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
    for you and the committee's leadership on this issue. You are
    absolutely right. We face a tremendous challenge. More than 40
    percent of NNSA's facilities--more than half of NNSA's
    facilities are over 40 years old. Thirty percent of them date
    back to the Manhattan Project, that's World War II. And our
    deferred maintenance figures have risen to nearly $3.7 billion,
    and without arresting that, would continue to grow.
        You rightly pointed out that Secretary Moniz has declared
    that we will arrest the rise of deferred maintenance across the
    entire DOE enterprise, not just at NNSA.
        We do have some success stories in the past couple of
    years. This past year, 2014, we moved into a brand-new facility
    at Kansas City, moving out of a World War II-era factory,
    aircraft engine factory, into a brand-new state-of-the-art
    facility, which we attained through a lease with the General
    Services Administration, GSA, with a private developer. In the
    process, we have reduced our footprint from roughly 3 million
    square feet to half that, and reduced our operating costs by
    $100 million a year.
        And in Pantex, we have completed construction, along with
    the help of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, of a High Explosives
    Pressing Facility and begun the process of certifying. So we
    are making inroads.
        But what I have observed, both in the NNSA and in my
    previous career in the Air Force, is, when dollars are
    constrained, the first dollar goes to the pointy edge of the
    spear, or goes to the mission program; the next dollar goes for
    the next mission of priority. And it is only after you have
    been able to expense those particular requirements do we pay
    attention to the infrastructure.
        Well, quite frankly, we have deferred that too long and the
    bill has come due, and we need to take some extraordinary
    measures: One, to fund these, but also to think of new and
    creative ways in which we can deliver facilities for our people
    to work in.
        Mr. Rogers. Do you, offhand, have a total number it would
    take to remedy these deferred maintenance issues?
        General Klotz. Well, right now our backlog right now is
    $3.7 billion to do maintenance. Now, we continue to chip away
    at that, and I think we are getting smarter, or at least more
    analytical in our approach. We have adopted two processes
    recently, which the Department of Defense uses to grade the
    condition of its facilities and to set the priorities, and I
    think that rigor and discipline will help us refine those
    numbers even more so.
        Mr. Rogers. Great. All right, General. You owe us a plan
    for two or more public-private partnerships you wish to pursue
    to get workers out of old, dilapidated buildings and into
    modern facilities. Do you see these kind of alternative finance
    agreements as beneficial to your efforts to get out of these
    old facilities faster?
        General Klotz. We do. And as I said, we have had several
    successes. Two facilities, at Y-12, at Oak Ridge were built in
    that way. The Kansas City plant has been built in that way. And
    we will be bringing some additional ideas to you of ways in
    which we can get people out of facilities, particularly the one
    at Pantex, into modern, more efficient buildings.
        This is important not only for conduct of operations, it is
    also extraordinarily important, in my view, for the recruitment
    and retention of the highest caliber people out of our
    technical schools and out of our graduate schools, because
    given the opportunity to go work in a facility which would use
    their scientific, technical, and engineering skills that is
    brand-new and modern, like many high tech firms are able to
    offer, or something that is, as you described it, dilapidated,
    it is a tough sell for recruiting and retaining people into
    this enterprise.
        Mr. Rogers. Yeah. I have been to those facilities, and I
    have shared this with you and I will share with the panel and
    the guests here. These people that we have working are very
    well-educated. They have options. And, first of all, I am
    amazed that we are able to--and it says a lot about their
    patriotism, and their belief in how important their work is
    that they suffer these intolerable conditions. When you see
    somebody with these educational credentials working in some of
    the circumstances we just put up on the board, it is just--it
    is indefensible.
        Ms. Roberson, I will talk to you about deferred
    maintenance.
        Ms. Roberson. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. What are the safety impacts of NNSA's
    deteriorating infrastructure and the $3.6 billion backlog of
    deterred maintenance you just heard General Klotz reference?
    And is all of this decrepit infrastructure becoming a safety
    hazard?
        Ms. Roberson. Mr. Chairman, the consequences are, as I
    stated in my opening statement, the questionable reliability of
    safety controls and the health of your safety management
    programs. So we have really been focusing our oversight, both
    for NNSA and EM, because EM also has aging facilities too,
    really focusing on the reliability of their safety controls,
    the health of their safety management programs, criticality
    safety, radiological safety, fire protection, and also on
    emergency management, which, at the end of the day, must really
    be healthy to ensure you can respond to anything before it
    becomes something more than a small incident.
        Mr. Rogers. What is your view of NNSA's plan to remain in
    these facilities for decades to come?
        Ms. Roberson. Well, we think that newer facilities that
    meet modern safety standards would be important, I think the
    board's been consistent in saying that in the recent years. We
    also think that Environmental Management should continue to get
    out of facilities that are decrepit, you know, undo them before
    they undo themselves. And so I think the board has been
    consistent in staying supportive of NNSA's efforts to, you
    know, establish, whether it is big box or modular, whatever
    they choose, but to establish infrastructure for the workers
    and to ensure protection of the public that meet modern safety
    standards.
        Mr. Rogers. Has DNSFB provided NNSA with a prioritized list
    of the safety concerns that you have about these facilities?
        Ms. Roberson. I don't know if we have provided them a
    prioritized list. We certainly give them lists. We have the
    opportunity to discuss the things that we are seeing that we
    think are a high priority from a safety perspective on a
    routine basis.
        Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
        The chair now recognizes the ranking member for any
    additional questions he may have.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just withhold
    until the classified session.
        Mr. Rogers. Okay. With that, we have just got a couple of
    items we need to discuss for the record in classified, secure
    session with General Klotz. So with that, we will recess this
    for about 5 minutes to walk to the SCIF [Sensitive
    Compartmented Information Facility], and then we will
    reconvene.
        [Whereupon, at 4:32 p.m., the committee proceeded in closed
    session.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 March 24, 2015

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 March 24, 2015

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

        Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, the B61-12 and W76-1 life extension
    programs are both well underway at this point. Please give us a status
    update on these programs. Are you confident they will finish on time
    and on budget?
        General Klotz. The B61-12 is in Phase 6.3 (Development
    Engineering). The B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) completed more
    than 20 B61-12 LEP system-level joint, ground, and aircraft integration
    tests using functional developmental hardware. The first integration
    B61-12 LEP bomb assembly and tail kit assembly test was completed with
    aircraft platform interfaces, and the B61-12 will complete the first
    joint flight test in 2015. The primary future milestones will be to
    obtain Phase 6.4 (Production Engineering) approval in FY 2016; to
    obtain Phase 6.5 (First Production Unit) approval in FY 2019; and to
    complete the first production unit no later than March 2020. The B61-12
    LEP is on schedule and within budget for a first production unit in FY
    2020. The W76-1 is in Phase 6.6 (Full Scale Production). Last year, the
    W76-1 program achieved a major milestone by completing 50 percent of
    the planned warhead production. Our primary objectives in FY 2015,
    which are progressing as planned, are to: achieve annual refurbished
    warhead production rates; deliver refurbished warheads on schedule to
    the Navy for deployment; and produce and deliver joint test assemblies
    (JTA) for surveillance flight tests. In fact, NNSA has been successful
    in already completing half of the total planned warhead delivery
    quantities to the Navy for the year within the first third of the
    fiscal year. We are currently on schedule to complete the remaining FY
    2015 warhead production and deliveries to the Navy, which should be
    accomplished within our current funding allocations. If the requested
    funding is received, we are confident the program can remain on
    schedule for completion of production in FY 2019.
        Mr. Rogers. What are the major risks to these programs executing
    successfully? Are they technical? Or are they in getting the funding
    needed to execute?
        General Klotz. The major risks to successful execution of W76-1 LEP
    production and B61-12 LEP engineering development are a combination of
    technical and funding risks which adversely affect the execution of
    warhead production and delivery schedules. In addition, other risks of
    primary concern to the W76-1 LEP are single-point failures associated
    with aging infrastructure (facilities and production equipment) within
    the nuclear weapons complex. We continue to reduce these risks by
    replacing aging infrastructure and by maintaining margin to delivery
    requirements. Funding requested for these two programs in FY 2016 FYNSP
    continues their current progress.
        Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, are you confident the uranium facility
    in Tennessee and the plutonium facility in New Mexico will each be
    successfully built on the timelines and budgets NNSA has laid out in
    the FY16 budget request? Can you assure this committee that these
    critical facilities will be built on-time and on-schedule?
        General Klotz. NNSA is confident that we will successfully deliver
    CMRR and UPF after we complete our designs and establish performance
    baselines for these projects. Over the past four years, NNSA has
    focused on putting the right policies, principles, people, processes,
    procedures, and partnerships in place to implement the Office of
    Management and Budget's (OMB) Circular A-11 for Capital Acquisition
    Projects, Department of Energy Order 413.3B on project management and
    the Secretary's January 2015 enhanced project management policies. In
    2013, GAO narrowed the focus of its High Risk list for NNSA to
    contracts and projects with a Total Project Cost greater than $750
    million as a result of the improvements NNSA is making in its contract
    and project management. NNSA is confident that the same policies and
    processes are scalable to the Major System Acquisition projects, such
    as CMRR and UPF.
        On both projects, NNSA is in the process of developing a high
    quality credible estimates utilizing NNSA's policies and procedures and
    GAO's best practices. Once these complex first-of-a-kind nuclear
    projects achieve 90% design maturity, NNSA will establish cost and
    schedule baselines that we are confident we can achieve.
        Mr. Rogers. What are the major risks to successfully completing
    these projects?
        General Klotz. Major risks to completion are:
          Escalation on commodities and equipment procurements;
          Inability to attract and retain nuclear qualified workers
    at assumed labor rates with the possible resurgence of industrial and
    nuclear construction;
          Availability of vendors qualified to produce materials
    and equipment to meet current nuclear construction standards (NQA-1);
          Changes to project requirements, codes, and standards;
          Delays in authorizations to start construction activities
    consistent with the proposed execution approach.
        Mr. Rogers. What happens if NNSA does not successfully complete
    these projects on the timelines laid out? What risks to safety and to
    NNSA's mission does this incur?
        General Klotz. The UPF project in Tennessee is vital to
    modernization efforts at Y-12, allowing the NNSA to cease enriched
    uranium (EU) programmatic operations in Building 9212 no later than FY
    2025. The NNSA is committed to ceasing these operations and is
    executing a strategy to deliver the critical UPF project while making
    additional program investments at the Y-12 Plant. These additional
    program investments allow the most hazardous operations in Building
    9212 to be stopped prior to FY 2025, reducing the safety risks and
    program risks immediately upon doing so. Failure to deliver the UPF
    project by FY 2025 would result in a major delay in ceasing casting,
    special oxide production and salvage and accountability operations from
    Building 9212.
        The execution of Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building
    (RLUOB) Equipment Installation Phase 2 (REI2) and PF-4 Equipment
    Installation (PEI) is critical to maintaining continuity in our
    analytical chemistry (AC) and materials characterization (MC)
    capabilities. Failure to complete these activities on the projected
    schedule may impact our ability to cease programmatic operations in the
    Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility in 2019, and would
    likely impact our ability to provide the AC and MC capabilities needed
    to support pit production and other plutonium activities at Los Alamos
    National Laboratory.
        Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, do you believe your Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation programs align with the highest nuclear risks around
    the world? How do you prioritize NNSA's nonproliferation funding and
    direct it to the highest priority risks? Do you rely on intelligence
    community assessments of those risks?
        General Klotz. Previously, each program office under the Defense
    Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) appropriation has applied rigorous
    internal risk assessment and prioritization approaches (including
    Intelligence Community assessments) to inform, develop, and provide the
    foundation for its fiscal year funding request. Although significant
    program-level coordination continues, the realignment of the Nuclear
    Counterterrorism and Incident Response (NCTIR) Program under the DNN
    appropriation, the reorganization of the Office of Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation, and the standup of NNSA's new Cost Estimating and
    Program Evaluation Office will now provide NNSA with a more integrated
    structure for program planning, budgeting, and evaluation as well as
    cross-program prioritization.
        NNSA participates in whole-of-government policy and program
    coordination processes to ensure that NNSA activities are aligned and
    integrated with broad U.S. national priorities and capabilities. NNSA,
    working particularly with the Departments of State and Defense, has
    been central to U.S. efforts to develop and implement domestic and
    international programs and strategies to meet the enduring and evolving
    challenges to the global nuclear security environment.
        Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, counterintelligence and cybersecurity
    threats to NNSA and its facilities are increasing in quantity and
    sophistication. Can you assure us NNSA can defend against all of these
    threats and prevent the escape of sensitive information?
        General Klotz. The current cyber defense model deployed by NNSA
    Headquarters, laboratories and plants has provided the necessary
    protection of NNSA information and information assets without any major
    compromises to date. However, it is important to note that with the
    increase in the number of threats and threat actors to the Nuclear
    Security Enterprise the current model will not remain effective or
    efficient without changes to the protection capabilities currently in
    place. These changes not only include replacement, upgrades, and/or
    enhancement to the technical infrastructure, but also an increase in
    the number, type, and skill level of the personnel required to protect
    these environments.
        We use a risk-based approach to evaluate tools/program/software/
    hardware and their potential impact to our security environment. This
    security approach implements a defense-in-depth strategy to deter,
    detect, respond, and recover. These tools include firewalls, malware
    detection, intrusion prevention systems, and anti-virus systems on
    desktop workstations; custom tools and applications; and Commercial
    Off-the-Shelf (COTS) products within DOE/NNSA that were developed by
    the plants and labs across the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE). We
    constantly evaluate new tools that can enhance our current
    capabilities. The current threat environment requires our cyber
    defenses to be effective 100% of the time while our adversaries only
    have to succeed once to inflict major harm to our systems and networks.
    I am confident that our current cyber defense program is deterring the
    threats we face today, and we will implement the tools necessary to
    maintain security as threats evolve.
        Mr. Rogers. Are NNSA's management and operating contractors able to
    meet their requirements on cybersecurity and counterintelligence?
        General Klotz. Management and operating (M&O) contractors implement
    the current Risk Management Framework (RMF) approach. Implementation of
    the RMF is a signed agreement between the M&O Director and the NNSA
    Field Office Manager, regarding how the site will deploy cyber defenses
    to protect the information and information assets within the funding
    model for the site. Under the current Risk Management Framework, the
    security framework is signed off on by the federal site lead for
    cybersecurity. Once the federal lead has signed off on the framework
    the M&O has the authority to operate the system within the standards of
    the framework. If the M&O is required to implement a standard which is
    not within the current agreement, the M&O must go back to the federal
    lead for agreement before implementation of the new standard or
    requirement.
        Mr. Rogers. Please update us on the status of the Waste Isolation
    Pilot Plant in New Mexico subsequent to the events early last year that
    caused a radiation release and shutdown of the facility's underground
    operations. How long do you expect the shutdown to last?
        General Klotz and Mr. Whitney. The Department's target for initial
    resumption of waste emplacement at WIPP is the first quarter of
    calendar year 2016. The safety envelope for the facility continues to
    be analyzed and DOE will only resume operations when it is safe to do
    so.
        Mr. Rogers. How is the shutdown at WIPP sending ripple effects
    across the NNSA and DOE-EM complex?
        General Klotz and Mr. Whitney. The current plan for recovery of the
    WIPP is to begin initial disposal operation in 2016 and resume full
    operations in the 2018 timeframe, but DOE will only resume operations
    when it is safe to do so. Active transuranic (TRU) waste generators
    other than Los Alamos National Laboratory (Idaho, Oak Ridge and Argonne
    National Laboratory) are continuing characterization and certification
    activities and are providing interim storage of TRU waste for eventual
    shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). TRU waste generator
    sites have storage capacity for certified waste ready for WIPP disposal
    through at least fiscal year 2016.
        Mr. Rogers. How is NNSA holding the people and organizations
    responsible for this incident accountable?
        General Klotz and Mr. Whitney. As required, the Office of
    Environmental Management), NNSA, Carlsbad Field Office, Nuclear Waste
    Partnership, LLC (the WIPP management and operations contractor), and
    LANL will develop corrective actions to address the issues identified
    in the accident investigation report for the WIPP radiological event.
    Based on information identified to date, the following actions have
    been taken to ensure accountability for the event.
          Since the WIPP event, LANL has performed extensive
    scientific reviews, changed leadership in the Environmental Programs
    Directorate, completed an external root cause analysis and is currently
    performing an extent of condition review. LANL will evaluate its
    ongoing recovery efforts and will ensure corrective actions to address
    issues in the report are integrated with its overall recovery efforts.
          The November 14, 2014 EM Transition Plan documented a
    decision to remove EM-funded program work from the LANL contract and
    require future legacy environmental cleanup work at Los Alamos
    performed by a separately competed EM contract.
          The November 14, 2014 EM Transition Plan for Los Alamos
    also focuses on streamlining and clarifying roles and responsibilities
    between EM and NNSA. Consistent with this plan, the EM Los Alamos Field
    Office was stood up on March 22, 2014 to manage the EM-funded program
    work.
          Enhanced oversight by the Carlsbad Field Office and EM HQ
    will occur prior to the resumption of repackaging of TRU waste at LANL,
    and as the normal course of business at LANL and other sites in the
    future, e.g., the Certification Program will focus additional oversight
    efforts on understanding and validating upstream waste processing.
    Enhanced DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management oversight is
    being planned.
          NNSA Los Alamos Field Office has hired or is in the
    process of hiring key staff positions to enhance its oversight
    capability. Such positions include the Senior Safety Technical Advisor
    (on board as of March 8, 2015), an Assistant Manager for Operations, a
    Deputy Assistant Manager for Operations, a temporary Deputy Manager
    with a strong safety background (on board in a few weeks), Safety Basis
    Specialists and Facility Representatives.
          NWP finalized its contractor recovery team in the spring
    of 2014, shortly after the event. Changes included a new Project
    Manager and Deputy Project Manager (who also serves as the Recovery
    Manager). Other new managers hired by NWP: Deputy Recovery Manager,
    Environmental Safety and Health manager, nuclear safety leader,
    maintenance manager, radiological manager, emergency manager,
    procedures and training manager, deputy operations manager, and deputy
    engineering manager.
        Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, what are your top priorities for Naval
    Reactors (NR) for FY16?
        General Klotz. All of Naval Reactors' budget supports the safe and
    effective operation of the nuclear-powered Fleet, today and tomorrow.
    Naval Reactors' funding requests can be directly linked to this single,
    over-arching priority of supporting the safe and effective operation of
    the nuclear-powered fleet. In FY16, this entails effective oversight of
    the operation and maintenance of 96 reactors in 71 submarines, 10
    aircraft carriers, and 4 training and research reactors. This priority
    will be met in the most effective and judicious way possible. The main
    components that support today's operating fleet are Naval Reactors
    Operations and Infrastructure (NOI), Naval Reactors Development (NRD),
    Program Direction and Construction. The remainder of the budget,
    primarily OHIO-Class Replacement Reactor Systems Development, S8G
    Prototype Refueling and the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization
    Project, supports tomorrow's fleet. In FY16, the OHIO-Class Replacement
    project will continue life of the ship reactor core manufacturing
    development activities and detailed design of reactor plant heavy
    equipment to support FY19 GFE procurement. The S8G Prototype Refueling
    will continue construction of the Radiological Work and Storage
    Building and preparations for the FY18 refueling. The Spent Fuel
    Handling Recapitalization Project will continue required development,
    fuel design, and will issue an Environmental Impact Statement.
        Mr. Rogers. Is NR's budget aligned with that of the larger Navy?
        General Klotz. Yes. We work closely every day with our partners in
    the Navy to ensure that we are aligned with the mission, performance
    requirements and schedules.
        Mr. Rogers. What happens if this program gets out of alignment with
    Navy programs like the OHIO-class Replacement program?
        General Klotz. Naval Reactors' Department of Energy and Navy
    efforts are directed at supporting this schedule, including development
    of the propulsion plant design to support procurement of long-lead
    components in FY19 to support a construction start in FY21 and ship
    delivery in FY28. After completing ship operational testing, the first
    OHIO-Class Replacement must be on strategic patrol by 2031 to meet
    STRATCOM force level requirements. Given that the first OHIO-Class
    Replacement submarine, a ship twice the size of the VIRGINIA-Class
    submarine, is planned to be constructed within the same span of time;
    this schedule is aggressive and requires close coupling of Department
    of Energy and Department of Navy activities to ensure on time ship
    delivery. The design and construction of OHIO-Class Replacement is a
    complex effort that requires extensive coordination between not only
    Naval Reactors and the Navy's Shipbuilders, but also the Navy's
    Strategic Systems Programs that are responsible for the missile systems
    and the British Navy, who will use the Common Missile Compartment
    design in their upcoming SSBNs. Because they each depend so heavily on
    each other, these four design efforts must be synchronized, in close
    collaboration to retire risk early and minimize estimated construction
    costs.
        Given the criticality of Naval Reactors' Department of Energy
    activities to Navy priorities and mission, funding cuts to Naval
    Reactors' DOE budget can adversely impact strategic objectives and
    plans, especially ship design and construction and nuclear operator
    training.
        Mr. Rogers. What has been the effect of the budget cuts Naval
    Reactors has received over the past four or five years?
        General Klotz. Over the past six years, Congress reduced Naval
    Reactors' funding by more than $600M below the Budget requests. These
    reduced funding levels have substantially impacted plans to
    recapitalize the spent fuel handling infrastructure, advanced
    technology development, and maintenance on prototype reactors,
    facilities and infrastructure. These functional areas are foundational
    to the Program and support Naval Reactors' ability to sustain the
    current nuclear-powered fleet and develop the future fleet. The
    following are specific examples of these impacts:
          Recapitalization of the naval nuclear spent fuel handling
    capability has been delayed by over five years. This delay has
    increased the project cost by more than $400M. As well, to manage the
    delay without affecting aircraft carrier schedules, the Navy will have
    to procure additional, otherwise unnecessary spent fuel shipping
    containers at a cost of approximately $500M. Because of the aging
    condition of the current facility, these delays also increase the risk
    that the current capabilities fail and we are unable to support the
    Navy's refueling schedule or conduct the research required to resolve
    important technical issues in the operating fleet. Therefore,
    additional investment has been required to maintain these aging
    facilities.
          Advanced technology development has been drastically
    reduced. Today, it is possible to design a life-of-ship core for the
    OHIO-Class Replacement, saving the Nation over $40B, because of
    technology development efforts conducted over the last four decades.
    Other leaps in stealth and operational technologies give our ships an
    enormous advantage over our adversaries. With current funding levels,
    there will be insufficient reactor technology developed in time for use
    in the next classification of nuclear powered ships to make advances
    such as this achieved for the OHIO-Class Replacement. Therefore, this
    work must be restored in order to maintain tactical superiority over
    our adversaries of the future and to attract and maintain the crucial
    engineering and scientific talent needed to successfully complete the
    mission at current levels.
          Maintenance and replacement of the Program's aging
    laboratory facilities and infrastructure has been delayed. Many of
    these facilities date from the dawn of the atomic age and are vital to
    support the nuclear-powered Fleet. In total, over 40 General Plant
    Projects and 4 Major Construction Projects have been delayed or
    canceled. In addition, funding reductions have resulted in the deferral
    of critical infrastructure maintenance resulting in significant
    failures and restriction of Naval Reactors' ability to manage the
    impact of emergent work as the existing infrastructure continues to
    age. Examples include:
              Bettis High Power Transformer (Failed in 2014)
              Bettis Acoustic Testing Generator (Failures over 2009
            to 2011)
              NRF Storm Drain System (Failed in 2014)
              NRF Prototype Facilities (Roof failed in 2014)
              KAPL Water Main (Repeated Failures since 2004,
            approx. 3-4 per year)
              Bettis Spring Water Intercept System (Failed in 2011
            and 2013)
              Bettis Materials Evaluation Laboratory (Legacy
            Radioactive Contamination)
        Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, what happens to NNSA's programs if you
    are hit with sequestration in FY16? Will you still be able to deliver
    on DOD's top priorities, including life extension programs, nuclear
    infrastructure modernization, and Naval Reactors programs?
        General Klotz. The 2016 Budget proposes to reverse sequestration,
    paid for with a balanced mix of commonsense spending cuts and tax
    loophole closers, while also proposing additional deficit reduction
    that would put debt on a downward path as a share of the economy. The
    President has made clear that he will not accept a budget that reverses
    our progress by locking in sequestration going forward. Locking in
    sequestration would bring real defense and non-defense funding to the
    lowest levels in a decade. It would damage our national security,
    ultimately resulting in a military that is too small and equipment that
    is too old to fully implement the defense strategy. It would also
    damage our economy, preventing us from making pro-growth investments.
    As the President has stated, he will not accept a budget that severs
    the vital link between our national and economic security, both of
    which are important to the Nation's safety, international standing, and
    long-term prosperity.
        Mr. Rogers. In FY13, DOD was given the chance to protect certain
    programs from sequestration. It chose to protect ongoing operations in
    Central Command and sustainment and operation of U.S. nuclear forces.
    Given a choice under a potential sequestration in FY16, as
    Administrator what NNSA programs would you choose to protect?
        General Klotz. The 2016 Budget proposes to reverse sequestration,
    paid for with a balanced mix of commonsense spending cuts and tax
    loophole closers, while also proposing additional deficit reduction
    that would put debt on a downward path as a share of the economy. The
    President has made clear that he will not accept a budget that reverses
    our progress by locking in sequestration going forward. Locking in
    sequestration would bring real defense and non-defense funding to the
    lowest levels in a decade. It would damage our national security,
    ultimately resulting in a military that is too small and equipment that
    is too old to fully implement the defense strategy. It would also
    damage our economy, preventing us from making pro-growth investments.
    As the President has stated, he will not accept a budget that severs
    the vital link between our national and economic security, both of
    which are important to the Nation's safety, international standing, and
    long-term prosperity.
        Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, this committee has focused on ensuring
    we get maximum value for every dollar. We've included language in
    several previous NDAA's encouraging NNSA to go find efficiencies and
    cost savings that we can apply directly to NNSA's mission.
    Specifically, what efficiencies are you striving for in FY15? What
    efficiencies are you proposing to chase in your FY16 budget request?
        General Klotz. NNSA is continuously looking for ways to improve use
    of resources to support its missions. During the past few years, NNSA
    worked with DOE to streamline DOE orders and directives to eliminate
    duplication, incentivize cost savings in management and operating
    contracts, make use of contract vehicles that appropriately share cost
    risk between the government and the contractor, and encourage NNSA
    plants and laboratories to more efficiently use resources.
        Together, NNSA and its NNSA's M&O contractors are committed to
    making the National Nuclear Security Enterprise a model for efficient
    business operations. Large scale efforts undertaken by NNSA recently to
    drive down operating costs include the relocation of the Kansas City
    Plant to a more modern facility, the competition of the Pantex and Y-12
    plants as a combined contract, and more efficient approaches to
    replacement of aging uranium and plutonium facilities. The award of the
    combined Pantex and Y-12 plants resulted in immediate cost savings that
    will continue to save in fiscal year (FY) 2015 and beyond. For example,
    the government realized an immediate savings of roughly $80 million in
    decreased award fee; money that was redirected to national security
    missions. Efficient business operations across the enterprise are
    critical to achieving the NNSA mission.
        On November 20, 2014, NNSA initiated an annual efficiencies review
    as an internal tool to drive continuous improvement in managing
    infrastructure. NNSA laboratories, plants, and federal Field Office
    Managers were directed to identify specific plans to pursue
    efficiencies for the current fiscal year and record achievements from
    the previous one. NNSA also sought input on oversight and governance
    changes that could enhance productivity.
        NNSA laboratories, plants, and federal Field Office Managers are in
    the process of sharing efficiency ideas from this effort and addressing
    suggestions from the labs and plants on changes NNSA can make to
    further efficiencies. NNSA also sponsored a day-long workshop with all
    of the NNSA labs, plants, and field offices at the end of May. The
    group will establish a framework of common definitions and best
    practices to enable an enterprise-wide approach which can be repeated
    year to year. NNSA is committed to continuous improvement and driving
    more efficient operations. The identified efficiencies for FY 2014
    covered a broad range of business operations. These included reducing
    the costs of goods and services, making major mission operations such
    as those at the National Ignition Facility more efficient, better
    managing the growing costs of employee benefit programs, and reducing
    key subcontracting costs. Efficiencies of this type will be critical to
    meeting FY 2016 mission.
        Finally, the FY 2014 budget request identified $320 million in
    efficiencies that would be obtained in executing the FY 2014 budget,
    and Section 3114 of the FY 2014 NDAA directed the identification of
    about half, or $139.5 million, in efficiencies during FY 2014. As
    reported in its May 214 Notification of NNSA Efficiencies, NNSA
    identified $80 million of these efficiencies.
        Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, one of the big recommendations coming
    out of the Y-12 security incident in 2012 was that roles and
    responsibilities for security were not clear at NNSA or its
    contractors. What specific action have you taken since taking the helm
    a year ago to clarify roles, responsibilities, authority, and
    accountability for each person at NNSA? Have you updated any NNSA
    directives? Spelled them out in policy guidance?
        General Klotz. Prior to my appointment, my predecessor issued a
    memorandum (dated 5 December, 2014) which made fundamental changes to
    the Office of the Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security/
    Chief, Defense Nuclear Security (NA-70), by moving and consolidating
    the lines of operational authority, accountability, and line
    management. That reorganization transferred to NA-70 the mission and
    functions of security operations from NA-00-30 as well as the budget
    activity from NA-00-50 (within the Office of the Associate
    Administrator for Infrastructure and Operations). We are currently in
    the process of publishing a supplemental directive that will further
    delineate responsibilities for oversight of our security programs.
        During my first year as NNSA Administrator, I have made it my
    priority to select and staff key senior leadership positions with
    seasoned leaders, possessing extensive nuclear security experience.
    I've firmed up our Office of Defense Nuclear Security senior leadership
    by hiring career security managers, with a proven track record in
    leading organizations to success, for the following positions: Chief of
    Defense Nuclear Security (CDNS), Deputy CDNS and Director of Security
    Operations and Programmatic Planning.
        This full complement of Senior Executive Service managers provides
    much needed continuity and stability to our Enterprise Field Offices in
    the area of security. The addition of my Principal Deputy Administrator
    in July 2014, is also having a positive impact on security decisions as
    we move forward.
        A new M&O contractor has been selected since the 2012 Y-12 security
    incident. Consolidated Nuclear Security (CNS) began operating our
    Pantex and Y-12 sites on 1 July 2014. They are bringing a fresh
    perspective to site operations, which include all aspects of security
    operations. It also places all security operations are under one
    contract. That was not the case in 2012 when the incident occurred.
    Shortly after CNS began operations, the DOE Office of Enterprise
    Assessments conducted an assessment at Y-12. The report regarding the
    inspection, conducted in August of 2014, states: ``significant progress
    has been made in correcting many of the deficiencies identified during
    the 2012 inspection.''
        Based on the inspection results, the DOE Departmental Internal
    Control and Audit Review Council, comprised of senior members of DOE
    leadership, recommended downgrading the Y-12 security issue from a
    material weakness to a reportable condition. The CDNS will continue to
    monitor the implementation of corrective actions at the site until they
    are closed.
        Lastly, our Federal team has taken a more direct and active role in
    contractor oversight. Several teams comprised of subject matter experts
    from our Headquarters and across NNSA have provided assessments of Y-12
    security operations. Examples include one team focused on nuisance and
    false alarm analysis and a team that recently assessed physical
    security system maintenance, operations and management. These
    assessments resulted in recommendations focused on continuously
    improving operations at Y-12.
        Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, DNFSB sent you a recommendation on
    concerns with DOE/NNSA's emergency management and response. What is
    your organization doing to improve in this area?
        General Klotz. The Department of Energy (DOE) is committed to
    achieving an end state of an improved Emergency Management Enterprise,
    and more specifically, improving emergency preparedness and emergency
    response capabilities across its defense nuclear facilities. DOE/NNSA
    will implement actions to prioritize improvements related to the DNFSB
    report findings and DOE's self-assessed need for improvements. The
    Department has developed an Implementation Plan containing initiatives
    that address all three aspects of Readiness Assurance at defense
    nuclear facilities: improve the management and oversight process,
    improve the corrective actions process, and reinvigorate a reporting
    process that shares successes and opportunities with DOE leadership. In
    addition, the Department will revise and restructure its Emergency
    Management Order, DOE Order 151.1C, Comprehensive Emergency Management
    System. The restructured Order will bring ease of application and
    consistency to emergency management programs. It will also be flexible
    enough to provide comprehensive guidance for users to respond to
    incidents ranging from local, single facility events, to multiple
    facility regional events.
        In addition to developing the Implementation Plan, DOE/NNSA has
    been working to improve emergency management. This included required
    evaluation reviews of emergency response for severe accidents and/or
    events that could have widespread impact at all DOE facilities,
    including defense nuclear facilities. These reviews have resulted in
    activities to expand plans for severe event scenarios at defense
    nuclear facilities. Also, additional training for responders was
    conducted at many of the defense nuclear facilities and a series of
    discussion-based tabletop exercises was performed to verify severe
    event procedures, interfaces and resources for multi-facility events,
    offsite asset resources and priorities, and critical decision-making.
    This training was followed by full-scale exercises at ten defense
    nuclear facilities, to formally test their capabilities for responding
    to severe events.
        Other examples of emergency management program improvements across
    the defense nuclear complex included:
        Severe event related improvements
          Sandia--Conducted a Self-Assessment of Severe Natural
    Phenomena Events (NPE) that identified issues related to habitability
    and back-up power; corrective actions were developed and are being
    implemented and tracked.
          Livermore--Improved the habitability of the site's
    Emergency Operations Center (EOC) with the replacement of four high-
    efficiency gas absorption (HEGA) filters.
          Livermore--Established a Lawrence Livermore National
    Laboratory (LLNL) Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program to
    support its Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and the site
    population after a disaster/severe event.
          Nevada--Implemented fully functional primary and
    alternate facilities for both the Operations Command Center and the
    Emergency Operations Center.
          Idaho--Conducted a severe Natural Phenomena Event (NPE)
    exercise that identified issues related to habitability and back-up
    power; corrective actions were developed and are being implemented and
    monitored.
        Training and drill improvements
          Sandia--Revised training procedures to include annual
    performance testing to demonstrate competency. Conducted self-
    assessment and identified an issue in training record documentation.
          Nevada--Drill and Exercise Program is integrated with the
    issues management processes and incorporates exercise After Action
    Report findings into an issue, which is assigned to a Responsible
    Manager.
        Exercise improvements
          Sandia--Severe event exercise scheduled for July 2015 to
    verify corrective actions implemented from FY 2014 Severe Event
    Exercise are effective.
          Livermore--Conducted four exercises in FY 2014 in
    response to a NPE (e.g., earthquake) to demonstrate ability to respond
    to simultaneous events at multiple hazardous facilities.
          SRS--SRNS-Tritium facility developed and conducted a
    tornado drill with all of the shifts affecting multiple facilities and
    all non-essential personnel.
          West Valley Demonstration Project--Conducted an exercise
    to test and validate the effectiveness of the Emergency Response
    Organization, Technical Support Center, Incident Command, Joint
    Information Center and field support.
        Readiness assurance improvements
          Sandia--Conducted Self-Assessments to identify issues
    with Corrective Action implementation.
          Livermore--Established an Accountability Disaster Call
    Center to improve communications with the field during a major
    earthquake or other disaster event and to provide prioritized damage
    assessment information to the Fire Branch Disaster Dispatch Center.
          Savannah River Site--DOE issued a formal letter to SRNS
    directing a comprehensive, independent review of all of the emergency
    management elements to address concern about a decline in the emergency
    management program.
          Nevada--Emergency Management program has qualified and
    experienced staff in developing/facilitating Root Cause Analysis to
    address the root issue and the extent of condition.
          Emergency Operations is developing a process to track
    findings/deficiencies identified during site assessments. Each finding
    will have a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) and will be tracked to
    closure. Over time, the CAPs will produce trending data that will
    indicate where the Office of Environmental Management should shift the
    focus of site assessments and surveys. EM will periodically re-examine
    the effectiveness of closed CAPs after implementation of the corrective
    action(s).
          Sandia--Identified an issue that resources are not
    adequate to implement an effective readiness assurance program, then
    submitted and received approval for a Full Time Equivalent (FTE)/
    Funding request for a Program Administration Team Lead.
        DOE Headquarters undertook several initiatives over the past year
    to address emergency management issues across its full range of
    responsibilities, which also enhance our capabilities to respond to
    emergencies at defense nuclear facilities.
        DOE established an Energy Incident Management Council (EIMC),
    chaired by the Deputy Secretary, to increase cooperation and
    coordination across the Department to prepare for, mitigate, respond
    to, and recover from emergencies. DOE's ongoing project to revitalize
    the Headquarters Emergency Management Team (EMT includes rewriting the
    HQ Emergency Plan and implementing procedures; conducting job task
    analyses and developing position specific training for EMT members; and
    retraining EMT members on these new procedures. Plans for testing this
    expanded capability include frequent testing of the EMT in response to
    a variety of emergency response scenarios such as:
          nuclear weapons accident,
          radiological release,
          hazardous chemical spill, and
          severe event damage to DOE defense nuclear facilities.
        DOE's working relationship with its Federal interagency partners
    was improved during 2014 through a series of exercises, most notably
    the annual multi-agency nuclear weapons accident exercise, 2014 NUWAIX,
    for which DOE was the lead planning agency.
        Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, I and several members of this
    subcommittee joined you and Admiral Richardson on a trip to the Naval
    Reactors Facility in Idaho last month. What goes on at this facility
    and why does the budget request include funding for recapitalization of
    the Spent Fuel Handling facility out there?
        General Klotz. The Expended Core Facility (ECF) at the Naval
    Reactors Facility in Idaho is the only facility in the country capable
    of receiving, examining and packaging spent Naval nuclear fuel.
        The budget request includes funding the Spent Fuel Handling
    Recapitalization Project (SFHP) at the Naval Reactors Facility which
    will provide a new facility to replace the more than 55-year old ECF
    for receipt, preparation, and packaging of naval spent nuclear fuel for
    secure dry storage. Although the Expended Core Facility continues to be
    maintained and operated in a safe and environmentally responsible
    manner, it no longer efficiently supports the nuclear fleet. Further,
    increasing sustainment efforts and required infrastructure upgrades
    pose a substantial risk to Expended Core Facility operations and
    production workflow, thereby challenging Naval Reactors' ability to
    support the Navy's nuclear-powered fleet refueling and defueling
    schedules. An interruption to these refueling and defueling schedules
    would adversely affect the operational availability of the nuclear
    fleet. If this interruption were to extend over long periods, the
    ability to sustain fleet operations would be impacted, ultimately
    resulting in significant decrement to the Navy's responsiveness and
    agility to fulfill military missions worldwide.
        Mr. Rogers. Absent this funding, will costs increase in the long-
    term for either NNSA or the Navy?
        General Klotz. The main risk of further cost increases to the Spent
    Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project is a lack of funding stability.
    One could expect cost increases if the project is not funded
    sufficiently to meet the current schedule. Further delays to the
    project would also incur costs for additional spent fuel shipping
    containers that would be borne by the Navy.
        The original Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project plan
    included a project duration of 10 years and a total project cost
    estimate of $1.249B. Due to funding restrictions since FY12, the
    project has been extended nearly six years, resulting in a project cost
    increase of approximately $400M. The increased cost resulted from
    escalation due to these delays and inefficiencies and rework associated
    with the unstable funding environment, which has required de-staffing
    and re-staffing of the project multiple times. Further, the estimated
    total project cost of the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project
    does not account for the additional M-290 shipping containers that the
    Navy will need to procure for temporary storage of naval spent nuclear
    fuel until the new spent fuel handling facility becomes operational.
    Procurement of these additional shipping containers is only necessary
    because the project has been delayed, as discussed above. To support
    aircraft carrier refueling schedules, the Navy will need to procure
    these containers at a total cost of approximately $500M.
        Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, how is NNSA supporting next year's
    Nuclear Security Summit in Chicago? What initiatives are being proposed
    for discussion at the Summit and what is NNSA doing to advance them?
        General Klotz. NNSA is carrying out activities across many of its
    program areas in support of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process.
    NNSA has designated a Senior Coordinator who acts as a liaison for the
    Department of Energy (DOE) to the White House on all Summit issues. The
    coordinator facilitates DOE input to the NSS planning process,
    including in drafting NSS Action Plans to sustain the work of Summit
    participants through institutions and initiatives like the
    International Atomic Energy Agency, United Nations, Interpol, the
    Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the G7 Global
    Partnership.
        In advance of the 2016 NSS, NNSA also plays a leading role in the
    development of a range of specific country and regional plans. These
    action plans will propose how to accelerate the completion of existing
    Summit deliverables and on how to identify specific opportunities for
    new Summit deliverables, including actions we can take bi- or
    multilaterally to secure, reduce and eliminate nuclear and radiological
    materials. NNSA will continue to implement and complete commitments
    from the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Summits, including minimizing highly
    enriched uranium and plutonium, detecting nuclear smuggling,
    strengthening strategic trade controls, and increasing security of
    nuclear and radiological materials.
        Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, please provide us a description of
    accountability actions taken towards contractors and Federal employees
    with responsibility for major recent failures, such as the UPF design,
    the WIPP event, and the Y-12 security incident. How were they
    penalized? Were any terminated from employment? Did any of these
    contractors or Federal employees receive bonuses subsequent to those
    failures?
        General Klotz. [NNSA has declined to provide a written response.]
        Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, Naval Reactors has taken significant
    funding reductions to its technical base in recent years. What is the
    technical base, why is it important, and what are the impacts of cuts
    to NR's base operations?
        General Klotz. The Base solely supports Naval Reactors'
    responsibilities that allows for a safe and reliable operation of the
    nuclear fleet. It contains Naval Reactors Operations and Infrastructure
    (NOI), Naval Reactors Development (NRD), and Program Direction (PD). It
    includes resources to meet the goals and operational demands of today's
    fleet, to develop tomorrow's fleet, to support environmental
    stewardship, and to procure and construct the required tools and
    infrastructure that facilitate Naval Reactors' mission. Naval Reactors
    executes these responsibilities by management and regulation of an
    enterprise that includes over 7,000 highly-skilled personnel at
    Department of Energy laboratories and prime contractors, a specialized
    domestic nuclear power industrial base of 28 principal suppliers, 110
    secondary suppliers with about 25,000 personnel, more than 64,000
    workers at the nation's six nuclear-capable shipyards, and over 16,000
    trained nuclear operators. This team collaborates with experts at other
    DOE National laboratories where there are opportunities for mutual
    gain. No other single organization in the U.S. currently integrates the
    research, design, construction, operation, life-cycle support, and
    disposal functions to successfully deliver an enduring nuclear power
    capability.
        The highest priority for Naval Reactors is uncompromising and
    timely support for safe nuclear fleet operation. In FY 2016, $935
    million funds the Base and supports the 96 operating reactors at sea on
    ships and at our training and research sites. The talented men and
    women, along with the equipment and facilities upon which they depend,
    stand ready and are called upon 24 hours per day, 365 days per year to
    advance the mission and respond to emergent fleet needs for assistance.
    The teams at Naval Reactors' four Program sites--the Bettis Laboratory
    in Pittsburgh, the Knolls Laboratory and Kesselring Site in greater
    Albany, and our spent nuclear fuel facilities in Idaho--perform the
    research and development, analysis, engineering and testing needed to
    support today's fleet and to develop future nuclear-powered warships.
    The teams in the Base provide tremendous value to the nation. Among the
    many examples of the work they do includes:
          Adding more than 21 years of operational life across 14
    LOS ANGELES-Class attack submarines.
          Avoiding 14 years of lost aircraft carrier operational
    time and ensuring no impact to the deployment plan.
        Over the past six years, Congress reduced Naval Reactors' funding
    by more than $600M. These reduced funding levels have substantially
    impacted plans to recapitalize the spent fuel handling infrastructure,
    advanced technology development, and maintenance on prototype reactors,
    facilities and infrastructure. These functional areas are foundational
    to the Program and support Naval Reactors' ability to sustain the
    current nuclear-powered fleet and develop the future fleet.
        Mr. Rogers. Mr. Whitney, please explain the Uranium Enrichment
    Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) Fund. Why is $472 million
    being requested for the Federal Government's portion of this fund when
    the reauthorization for collection of the nuclear power industry's
    portion has not been passed?
        Mr. Whitney. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct) established the
    Uranium Enrichment (UE) D&D fund to provide resources for the cleanup
    activities. Under the EPAct, both the Government and domestic private
    utilities were required to contribute to the fund, with the Government
    providing roughly two thirds of the funding and the utilities providing
    the remaining one third.
        Both the Government and private utilities have completed their
    contributions into the fund as required by the EPAct. However, as of
    the end of fiscal year (FY) 2014, the total UE D&D cleanup costs are
    expected to exceed the balance of the fund by 2022 if no additional
    contributions are received. As such, the Administration is seeking
    reauthorization of both Government and utility contributions beginning
    in FY 2016.
        Mr. Rogers. Mr. Whitney, is EM on track to meet its regulatory and
    compliance agreements for FY15? What about for FY16 and beyond?
        Mr. Whitney. We are on track to meet our FY15 and FY16 milestone
    commitments. Beyond FY16, the Department's ability to fulfill its
    milestone requirements is difficult to forecast as it is dependent upon
    the completion of pre-cursor activities and the assumptions upon which
    work plans are based.
        To the extent milestones are delayed, DOE will follow the
    provisions in its cleanup agreements for making notifications and
    working with federal and State regulators regarding schedule
    adjustments if necessary.
        Mr. Rogers. Ms. Roberson, DNFSB sent a letter to DOE last year
    recommending improvements to DOE's emergency response programs. What
    are the specific concerns you outlined in that recommendation? What
    specific steps would DNFSB like to see taken by DOE to improve in this
    area?
        Ms. Roberson. 1) The DNFSB (Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
    Board) identified concerns with specific requirements in the Department
    of Energy's (DOE) emergency management directive as well as the
    implementation of the requirements at various DOE sites with defense
    nuclear facilities. Based on these concerns, the DNFSB believes that
    DOE has not comprehensively and consistently demonstrated its ability
    to adequately protect workers and the public in the event of an
    emergency. These concerns focus on DOE's role as a regulator.
        2) The DNFSB identified the following specific deficiencies that we
    believe DOE needs to address:
        a. Standardize and improve the DOE criteria and review approach to
    confirm that all sites with defense nuclear facilities:
          Have a robust emergency response infrastructure that is
    survivable, habitable, and maintained to function during emergencies,
    including severe events that can impact multiple facilities and
    potentially overwhelm emergency response resources.
          Have a training and drill program that ensures that
    emergency response personnel are fully competent in accordance with the
    expectations delineated in DOE's directive and associated guidance.
          Are conducting exercises that fully demonstrate their
    emergency response is capable of responding to scenarios that challenge
    existing capability, including response during severe events.
          Are identifying deficiencies with emergency preparedness
    and response, conducting causal analysis, developing and implementing
    effective corrective actions to address these deficiencies, and
    evaluating the effectiveness of the corrective actions.
          Have an effective Readiness Assurance Program consistent
    with DOE's requirements.
        b. Update its emergency management directive (DOE Order 151.1C,
    Comprehensive Emergency Management System) to address:
          Severe events, including requirements that address
    hazards assessments and exercises, and ``beyond design basis''
    operational and natural phenomena events.
          Reliability and habitability of emergency response
    facilities and support equipment.
          Criteria for training and drills, including requirements
    that address facility conduct of operations drill programs and the
    interface with emergency response organization team drills.
          Criteria for exercises to ensure that they are an
    adequate demonstration of proficiency.
          Vulnerabilities identified during independent
    assessments.
        We received DOE's Implementation Plan for this Recommendation on
    April 24, 2015. Our staff is reviewing the Implementation Plan to
    determine the adequacy of DOE's proposed activities to address the
    deficiencies identified in the Recommendation. The staff was engaged
    with their DOE counterparts during the development of the plan and
    provided comments. During the execution of the Implementation Plan, the
    Board's staff will work closely with DOE to provide appropriate
    actionable suggestions regarding implementation of activities in the
    plan.
        The technical supporting document for Recommendation 2014-1
    identified examples of deficiencies with site-level emergency
    preparedness and response. These include:
        ``Some sites do not have a 5-year plan for exercises that involves
    all of the hazards and accidents at their facilities with EPHAs
    [Emergency Planning Hazards Assessment]. In addition, some sites do not
    exercise all of their facilities with EPHAs and all of their response
    elements on an annual basis.'' DOE Order 151.1C requires sites to
    demonstrate response capabilities by executing emergency exercises. In
    order to meet this requirement, sites such as Pantex and Sandia
    National Laboratories should be executing a variety of exercises to
    demonstrate response capability to the spectrum of possible hazards at
    each facility, as well as providing adequate training and drills to
    develop and maintain this capability.
        ``Planning and implementing recovery actions are typically not
    demonstrated in detail during the normal scope of annual emergency
    exercises at DOE sites [such as the Savannah River Site and the Waste
    Isolation Pilot Plant], or in follow-on exercises.'' DOE Order 151.1C
    also requires sites to demonstrate recovery capability. The ability to
    conduct initial recovery actions, including how to map a transition
    from emergency to recovery to normal operations, should be practiced
    frequently enough that site leadership can effectively conduct this
    activity when real-life operational emergencies occur.
        ``. . . [M]any of the emergency response facilities may not be
    habitable in the aftermath of a hazardous or radiological material
    release event, or survivable in the aftermath of a severe natural
    phenomena event. These facilities were not designed to survive an
    earthquake, and many do not have ventilation systems that will filter
    radiological and toxicological materials. Examples of such facilities
    include the Emergency Control Center (ECC), the Technical Support
    Center (TSC), and the fire house at Y-12; the EOC [Emergency Operations
    Center] at the Hanford Site; the EOC and alternate EOC, the Department
    Operations Centers, and the Emergency Communications Center at LLNL
    [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory]; and the EOC and Central
    Monitoring Room at WIPP [Waste Isolation Pilot Plant].'' DOE Order
    151.1C does not include explicit requirements concerning emergency
    facility habitability; other agencies, such as the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission, do provide such requirements. The DNFSB Recommendation
    identifies the need to update the directive to address this gap.
    ``Members of the Board's staff also observed problems with systems used
    to support emergency communications and notifications. For example, the
    staff observed problems with the systems used to notify workers and
    visitors about an emergency and protective actions that are to be
    taken, such as was observed recently at WIPP during the underground
    truck fire.'' DOE Order 151.1C provides requirements for emergency
    notification systems at DOE sites, including notification to the site
    workers and off-site notification to the public. However, guidance to
    implement this requirement is deficient. Sites must develop clear
    criteria for when to continue operations when notification systems are
    degraded or failed, including compensatory measures that are tested and
    effective to ensure workers receive notification that an operational
    emergency is occurring and the necessary protective actions to take.
    Robust, survivable, and tested notification systems installed in and
    around facilities at sites such as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, the
    Savannah River Site, the Hanford Site, and Lawrence Livermore National
    Laboratory are a necessary first step to address this concern.
        Mr. Rogers. Ms. Roberson, is the DNFSB preparing an implementation
    plan to address the recommendations and corrective actions within the
    LMI study on DNFSB's workforce and culture? When will this plan be
    complete?
        Ms. Roberson. The DNFSB has prepared an informal action plan to
    address the recommendations and corrective actions within the LMI
    study. For example, all DNFSB executives and Board Members are working
    with an executive coach to develop better communication techniques and
    enhance leadership effectiveness. Regular staff meetings are being held
    at both the agency and office level to provide increased opportunities
    for employee feedback and participation. The full action plan for
    organizational culture change is attached.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
    69.]
        In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the
    Inspector General (OIG) recently completed a Culture Climate Survey of
    the DNFSB staff. The response rate exceeded 70%, and the OIG will be
    briefing the results to the DNFSB management and staff on May 21st. I
    anticipate additional actions will be planned as a result of that
    additional feedback.
        Mr. Rogers. Ms. Roberson, does DNFSB intend to review NNSA's large
    list of deferred maintenance projects for safety risks? Would DNFSB be
    willing to provide NNSA its views on prioritizing this list with
    regards to safety risk?
        Ms. Roberson. The DNFSB has evaluated deferred maintenance
    documentation and databases during site-specific maintenance reviews
    and generally found the management of safety risk to be acceptable.
    (NNSA's list of deferred maintenance is housed in the Department of
    Energy's Facilities Information Management System [FIMS].) The majority
    of the deferred maintenance had a relatively low impact on nuclear
    safety and was being worked as resource availability permitted. The
    management and operating contractors at each site commonly make it a
    high priority to minimize deferred preventive maintenance of safety
    class and safety significant structures, systems, and components (SSC)
    that are credited to perform safety-related functions in the Documented
    Safety Analyses for nuclear facilities. The DNFSB will continue to
    review maintenance programs at NNSA sites, including assessments of
    deferred maintenance, to ensure SSCs critical to preserving the safety
    of nuclear operations are appropriately managed.
        It should be noted, however, that the overall NNSA deferred
    maintenance backlog of $3.6B includes many non-defense nuclear
    facilities and associated infrastructure exceeding 60 years of service
    that have little or no bearing on the safety of nuclear operations.
    Many of the items in NNSA's deferred maintenance database are roofs,
    office air conditioning systems, shop utilities, and the like. At some
    sites these types of deferred maintenance vastly surpass corrective
    maintenance backlogs or deferred preventive maintenance on nuclear
    safety-related SSCs and processing equipment. Nevertheless,
    infrastructure risk in a non-defense nuclear facility can pose a
    nuclear safety risk under the right circumstances. For example, a major
    fire in a non-defense nuclear facility could threaten a nearby defense
    nuclear facility. In such a case, we would expect the credited fire
    suppression systems in the defense nuclear facility to provide for the
    adequate protection of the public and workers from radiological
    consequences. Clearly, though, it would be preferable to avoid a major
    fire in the first place.
        To help prevent degradation of the nuclear facility safety posture,
    equipment owners or system engineers at the sites are typically
    expected to provide technical input during the decision process for
    deferring maintenance of safety SSCs. For example, if preventive
    maintenance activities for safety SSCs will exceed defined schedules,
    it is necessary to obtain a deferral evaluation and approval or make a
    determination of compensatory measures to be implemented.
        DOE Order 430.1B, Real Property Asset Management, requires DOE/NNSA
    sites to annually use condition assessment data to determine and report
    the deferred maintenance information in FIMS. The site contractor must
    maintain FIMS data and records, which are DOE's corporate real property
    inventory database for all buildings and other structures and
    facilities. Although, it is expected to be difficult to evaluate
    comparative risk among the NNSA sites, the DNFSB has requested FIMS
    database information relevant to deferred maintenance at defense
    nuclear facilities. In addition to reviewing the FIMS data in an
    attempt to identify any potential safety risks related to deferred
    maintenance, the DNFSB will continue to execute site-specific
    maintenance reviews. Any safety concerns related to the prioritization
    of deferred maintenance will be brought to the attention of responsible
    NNSA management.
        The Board's response to Question 21 [which follows] provides
    additional details on deferred maintenance.
        Mr. Rogers. Ms. Roberson, what are the safety impacts of NNSA's
    deteriorating infrastructure and $3.6 billion backlog of deferred
    maintenance? NNSA officials have said that ``infrastructure risk
    becomes safety risk.'' Do you agree? [Question #21, for cross-
    reference.]
        Ms. Roberson. The DNFSB agrees that infrastructure risk can become
    safety risk. It should be noted, however, that the overall NNSA
    deferred maintenance backlog of $3.6B includes non-defense nuclear
    facilities and infrastructure that have little or no bearing on the
    safety of nuclear operations. Many of the items in NNSA's deferred
    maintenance database are roofs, office air conditioning systems, shop
    utilities, and the like. At some sites these types of deferred
    maintenance vastly exceed corrective maintenance backlogs or deferred
    preventive maintenance on nuclear safety-related structures, systems,
    and components (SSC) and processing equipment. Nevertheless,
    infrastructure risk in a non-defense nuclear facility can pose a
    nuclear safety risk under the right circumstances. For example, a major
    fire in a non-defense nuclear facility could threaten a nearby defense
    nuclear facility. In such a case, we would expect the credited fire
    suppression systems in the defense nuclear facility to provide for the
    adequate protection of the public and workers from radiological
    consequences. Clearly, though, it would be preferable to avoid a major
    fire in the first place.
        Safe performance of work includes allotting adequate resources to
    system and equipment maintenance, maintaining up-to-date configuration
    control, and making necessary upgrades to support system
    infrastructure. A lesson learned from the recent Waste Isolation Pilot
    Plant events is that degraded and out of service safety-related
    equipment must not be accepted and tolerated. Deficient and poorly
    maintained safety-related infrastructure, including credited safety
    SSCs that support nuclear activities, can pose safety risks to the
    public and workers, and can jeopardize NNSA's ability to accomplish
    mission-related work.
        Infrastructure is defined in DOE Order 430.1B, Real Property Asset
    Management, as ``All real property, installed equipment, and related
    real property that is not solely supporting a single program mission at
    a multi-program site or that is not programmatic real property at a
    single program site.'' DOE Order 430.1B defines deferred maintenance as
    ``maintenance that was not performed when it should have been or was
    scheduled to be and which, therefore, is put off or delayed for a
    future period.'' Maintenance activities are expected to be scheduled
    and performed within established intervals; preventive maintenance
    should be waived or deferred only with approval by an appropriate
    authority that considers the significance of the SSC and the length of
    delay. Further, any deferral of planned tasks should have a technical
    basis.
        The number and severity of risks increases when the amount of
    deferred preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance backlog
    rises. Each nuclear facility has a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and
    accompanying Technical Safety Requirements which set forth the
    preventive maintenance and surveillance requirements for the safety
    class and safety significant SSCs credited by the DSA to prevent or
    mitigate hazardous accident scenarios. The implementation of these
    maintenance and surveillance requirements is key to ensuring the SSCs
    will reliably perform their credited safety functions on an on-going
    basis. As such, completion of the maintenance and surveillance
    requirements is carefully controlled or, if not achievable,
    compensatory measures are implemented or the associated operations are
    shut down until the required maintenance or surveillance is complete.
        Deferred maintenance associated with safety-related SSCs credited
    in DSAs is of paramount concern to the Board. Maintenance on other
    safety-related programmatic and infrastructure equipment is also
    important to maintaining the safety envelope of defense nuclear
    facilities. Preventive and corrective maintenance should only be
    deferred if sufficient technical justification exists to do so.
        The DNFSB has identified preventive maintenance deferrals at NNSA/
    DOE sites whose justifications were less than adequate. For example,
    preventive maintenance has been deferred because parts were not
    ordered, or because materials or craft resources to support the work
    were not available. Similarly, the DNFSB has seen cases where
    preventive maintenance schedules were modified based on business
    decisions. The maintenance deferral process must ensure adequate
    reviews are carried out to understand the possible impact of not
    performing a maintenance task on schedule, applicable compensatory
    measures are instituted to manage those risks, and understanding and
    acceptance of any added risks are documented.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
        Mr. Cooper. General Klotz, what are the long-term goals and
    challenges for DNN, and what initiatives are you leading that will
    ensure we are well-postured to address the proliferation threats that
    might emerge in a decade? Are there opportunities to further improve
    and invest in verification and detection technology?
        General Klotz. Because of its world leadership in scientific and
    technical expertise and programmatic capabilities in the nuclear
    security arena, DOE, mostly through the NNSA, plays a central U.S.
    Government role in pursuing U.S. nuclear security goals. NNSA makes
    full use of all the resources at its disposal to fulfill its
    nonproliferation and counterterrorism missions by:
          Developing and implementing policy and technical
    solutions to eliminate proliferation-sensitive materials and limit or
    prevent the spread of materials, technology, and expertise related to
    nuclear and radiological weapons and programs around the world.
          Providing expertise, practical tools, and technically
    informed policy recommendations required to advance U.S. nuclear
    counterterrorism and counterproliferation objectives.
          Maintaining essential components of the U.S. capability
    to respond to nuclear or radiological crises and manage the
    consequences (domestically or internationally) of civilian radiation
    exposure resulting from a nuclear or radiological incident, especially
    those involving terrorism.
        To pursue these U.S. nuclear security goals within this enduring
    and evolving nuclear threat environment, the NNSA program strategy is
    to organize its nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism actions
    into three primary areas that cover the nuclear threat spectrum:
          Prevent non-state actors and additional countries from
    developing nuclear weapons or acquiring weapons-usable nuclear
    materials, equipment, technology, and expertise; and prevent non-state
    actors from acquiring radiological materials for a radiological threat
    device.
          Counter the efforts of both proliferant states and non-
    state actors to steal, acquire, develop, disseminate, transport, or
    deliver the materials, expertise, or components necessary for a nuclear
    or radiological threat device or the devices themselves.
          Respond to nuclear or radiological terrorist acts, or
    accidental/unintentional incidents, by searching for and rendering safe
    threat devices, components, and/or radiological and nuclear materials,
    and by conducting consequence management actions following an event to
    save lives, protect property and the environment, and enable the
    provision of emergency services.
        Mr. Cooper. General Klotz, how does DOE plan to afford the $30
    billion or more that will be required to construct and operate MOX?
    Should NNSA re-baseline the MOX project in FY16?
        General Klotz. The Administration remains firmly committed to
    disposing of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The Consolidated and
    Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, directed that construction
    on the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX) project continue and
    that cost studies and technology alternative studies be conducted. The
    Department of Energy requested Aerospace Corporation, a federally
    funded research and development center, to assess and validate the
    analysis of options for disposing of 34 metric tons of weapon-grade
    plutonium mandated by Congress. The assessment and validation is
    expected to be completed in late FY 2015. This independent validation
    will inform the final policy decision on what disposition path the
    United States Government will adopt in compliance with the Plutonium
    Management and Disposition Agreement. Once a final decision is made, a
    rebaseline of the MOX project would be required and could take
    approximately 18-24 months to complete.
        Mr. Cooper. General Klotz, is it worth an effort to assess whether
    it would be feasible to use low enriched uranium (LEU) (instead of
    highly enriched uranium) in naval reactor fuel to the next generation
    of aircraft carriers?
        General Klotz. It is feasible but is not practical or cost
    effective with our current technology. Today, using LEU would increase
    the amount of refuelings required, which has the follow-on effect of
    requiring additional ships to meet the same military requirements.
    Theoretically, advances in technology could partially recover the loss
    in core-life from that which we have today in our HEU cores, but we
    would need a significant R&D effort to develop those technologies.
    Further effort would then be required to design the LEU reactor plant
    and other associated systems before we would be ready to build an LEU
    powered ship.
        Mr. Cooper. Would there be any benefit to assessing the potential
    for LEU in naval fuel, such as nonproliferation or security benefits
    even if there might not be any driving military benefits?
        General Klotz. If we could develop the technology to the point
    where we use exclusively LEU, it would ultimately have a non-
    proliferation benefit because we would no longer require HEU for naval
    nuclear propulsion.
        Security costs would also be reduced, as HEU facilities have
    greater requirements, but we would still require a substantial security
    presence in terms of physical infrastructure and manpower.
        Mr. Cooper. Would this help sustain the necessary R&D funding and
    capability for Naval Reactors?
        General Klotz. Developing the technologies required to use LEU in
    our plants would be a substantial, multi-year research effort that
    works at the cutting edge of nuclear science. Advanced fuel development
    would sustain one area of unique expertise that the Naval Reactors
    Program relies upon to deal with the day-to-day issues involved in
    naval reactor design, construction, operation, and disposal, which
    require a detailed understanding of naval fuel. Naval fuel performance
    knowledge is unique and exists only within the Naval Reactor Program.
    Advanced fuel development attracts talent and maintains our knowledge
    base.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
        Mr. Larsen. General Klotz, what are the risks of NNSA modernization
    plan, including executing 4-5 concurrent life-extension programs and
    overseeing major construction projects at Y-12 and Los Alamos National
    Laboratory in the 2020s?
        General Klotz. NNSA has developed long term modernization efforts
    for the nuclear security enterprise described in the FY 2016 Stockpile
    Stewardship and Management Plan. Modernization efforts for warheads
    through approved Life Extension Programs face a number of risks. First,
    the ability to certify designs that include new or updated material
    combinations or surety features is a challenge for life extension
    programs in the absence of underground testing. To address this
    challenge, the national security laboratories have improved their
    fundamental understanding of physics package interactions through
    numerous enhanced physics experiments, greater computing power, and
    advanced simulations. Second, NNSA must mature technologies and
    components to transform the stockpile over the next twenty years.
    Technology maturation enables development and delivery of design-to-
    manufacturing capabilities to meeting current and future nuclear
    weapons needs for the Nation's stockpile. NNSA uses the Component
    Maturation Framework, which is a portfolio management tool used to
    integrate preliminary scope, proposed technology and manufacturing
    readiness levels, and planning estimates, to inform decisions on
    component development, technology maturation and timely insertion. NNSA
    is establishing plans to mature technologies sufficiently in advance of
    planned insertion points to cost-effectively minimize risk. Third,
    although the president's budget fully funds these activities, cuts due
    to sequestration can put them at risk.
        For major construction projects, NNSA is committed to delivering
    its capital asset projects on budget and schedule. Over the past four
    years, NNSA has focused on putting the right policies, principles,
    people, processes, procedures, and partnerships in place to implement
    the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Circular A-11 for Capital
    Acquisition Projects, Department of Energy Order 413.3B on project
    management, and the Secretary's January 2015 enhanced project
    management policies. In 2013, GAO narrowed the focus of its High Risk
    list for NNSA to contracts and projects with a Total Project Cost
    greater than $750 million as a result of the improvements NNSA has been
    making in its contract and project management. NNSA is confident that
    the same policies and processes for projects less than $750 million are
    scalable to the major system acquisition projects at Los Alamos
    National Laboratory and Y-12.
        Following are risks to NNSA's portfolio of construction projects:
          Escalation on commodities and equipment procurements
          Difficulties attracting and retaining nuclear qualified
    workers at assumed labor rates
          Availability of vendors qualified to produce materials
    and equipment to meet current nuclear construction standards (NQA-1)
          Changes to project requirements, codes, and standards
    Delays in authorizations to start construction activities
        Mr. Larsen. Do you have the expertise and management in place to
    lower the risk of schedule slips and cost increases? Are you confident
    NNSA can execute this plan?
        General Klotz. NNSA has the expertise and management processes in
    place to effectively plan and execute planned weapon system
    modernization activities. NNSA has established an office (NA-19) to
    focus on weapon system modernization. To control costs, earned value
    management practices are being implemented for every weapon system
    acquisition. The NNSA weapons workload has grown over the last several
    years to include 3 life extension programs and one major weapon system
    alteration, and each of these programs requires trained and qualified
    federal managers and selected subject matter experts. NNSA has
    developed staffing plans that will, over time and with Congressional
    support, align federal resources required to execute our assigned
    program of work.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
        Mr. Garamendi. General Klotz, is there a plan for retiring B83 and
    W76-0? What is the timeline?
        General Klotz. Both the B83 and W76-0 are planned to be retired
    once confidence is gained in the B61-12 and W76-1 Life Extension
    Programs (LEPs), respectively. Specific planned retirement dates can be
    provided in a classified response.
        Mr. Garamendi. General Klotz, there is some concern that the
    second-line of defense funding for fixed portal monitors at ports may
    not provide the best value for the funding. Do you agree? Why or why
    not?
        General Klotz. The fixed radiation portal monitors deployed by
    NNSA's Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) Program
    (formerly known as the Second Line of Defense) are a critical element
    of the U.S. Government's layered approach to countering the threat of
    illicit trafficking. NSDD provides international partners with a suite
    of tools, including fixed, mobile and handheld detection equipment,
    training, and technical support to enhance their capabilities to
    detect, deter and interdict the illicit trafficking of nuclear and
    radiological materials. Before deploying equipment, NSDD considers a
    wide range of factors, including trafficking pathways, deployment
    environments, and partner capabilities in order to determine the most
    appropriate mix of equipment to counter the threat of smuggling in a
    particular country or region.
        NSDD's fixed portal monitors work in concert with mobile detection
    systems to provide partners with multiple tools to prevent nuclear
    smuggling. Given the consequences of a nuclear or radiological device
    incident, it is imperative that all available tools be brought to bear
    to create a robust and layered defense against nuclear smuggling.
        Regarding the capabilities of the fixed portal monitors, they are
    effective in detecting some special nuclear materials as well as
    radiological materials that could be used in a radiological dispersal
    device (RDD) or radiological exposure device (RED). Further, fixed
    portal monitors have detected materials of concern in the past. More
    detail on specific interdiction cases, as well as portal monitor
    capabilities, can be provided in a classified setting. Fixed portal
    monitors also help deter trafficking by complicating potential
    smugglers' task, forcing them to use alternate means that increase the
    probability of detection.
        Mr. Garamendi. General Klotz, what is the impact of Russia
    withdrawing from cooperation with the United States on securing and
    removing fissile material in Russia? What are the alternatives to
    ensure these materials are not stolen or diverted?
        General Klotz. Material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A)
    cooperation with key non-Rosatom sites and organizations is continuing
    under the Multilateral Nuclear and Environmental Programme in the
    Russian Federation (MNEPR) framework agreement, as is cooperation at a
    limited number of Rosatom sites and organizations. However, Rosatom
    informed us last December that existing cooperation would cease with
    most Rosatom nuclear sites and organizations as of the end of 2014.
        Existing work will continue in the near future to complete security
    upgrades and sustainability work directly with a subset of Rosatom and
    non-Rosatom sites. The Russian decision to scale back cooperation has
    accelerated the shift from assistance to technical engagement on key
    foundational elements of modern and effective security. Given that
    Russia maintains the largest holdings of weapons-usable material, DOE/
    NNSA will continue to seek engagement on nuclear material security best
    practices with Russian sites and organizations. This includes topics
    such as training, regulatory development and inspections, and
    transportation security.
        DOE/NNSA also expects to continue cooperation with Russia and third
    parties, including the repatriation of Russian-origin highly enriched
    uranium (HEU).
        DOE/NNSA will also work to maintain nuclear security relationships
    with neighboring countries, offering continued training and training-
    center support to also maintain regional capabilities. We will continue
    to help strengthen border and port security programs with partner
    countries around Russia, to enable detection and interdiction of any
    trafficked nuclear material, including consideration of additional
    measures that would be prudent to pursue.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
        Mr. Turner. The President's budget request clearly supports Uranium
    enrichment technology. In your opinion, do you find that maintaining
    the American Centrifuge capability is important?
        General Klotz. A reliable supply of enriched uranium is required to
    meet U.S. national security requirements. Any enrichment technology
    used to meet these requirements, should the interagency determine that
    such technology is the best way forward, must be U.S. origin. Enriched
    uranium provided via foreign technology, even if located in the U.S.,
    may not be used for national security purposes due to international
    peaceful-use assurances. The President's budget request maintains the
    operability of the centrifuge technology at the pilot plant in Piketon,
    OH, and the development and test facility in the East Tennessee
    Technology Park (ETTP) Building K-1600. Maintaining these near-term
    domestic-origin technologies that could produce low enriched uranium
    unencumbered by peaceful-use restrictions is important while U.S.
    Interagency Policy Committee develops the best path forward to meet our
    national security requirements for enriched uranium.
        Mr. Turner. Additionally, do you agree that with further
    development and deployment of U.S. Uranium enrichment technology will
    help meet future security needs?
        General Klotz. A domestic uranium enrichment capability would meet
    national security and nonproliferation missions that require
    unobligated low-enriched uranium (LEU) for commercial light water
    reactors involved in tritium production, high assay LEU for research
    reactors, and eventually highly enriched uranium (HEU) for Naval
    Reactors. The Department will provide a report to Congress in the near
    future that will inform discussions regarding the path forward for
    meeting the nation's needs for unencumbered enriched uranium.

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