[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-24]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES HEARING
ON
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN AN
UNCERTAIN THREAT ENVIRONMENT:
A REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2016
BUDGET REQUEST FOR U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 18, 2015
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Chairman
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOHN GARAMENDI, California
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Vice Chair DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
MO BROOKS, Alabama PETE AGUILAR, California
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
Peter Villano, Professional Staff Member
Lindsay Kavanaugh, Professional Staff Member
Julie Herbert, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 2
Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.............. 1
WITNESSES
Lumpkin, Hon. Michael D., Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special
Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC).................. 3
Votel, GEN Joseph L., USA, Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command........................................................ 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Lumpkin, Hon. Michael D...................................... 21
Votel, GEN Joseph L.......................................... 37
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 61
Mr. Nugent................................................... 61
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Brooks................................................... 80
Mr. Hunter................................................... 79
Mr. Wilson................................................... 65
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN AN UNCERTAIN
THREAT ENVIRONMENT: A REVIEW OF THE FISCAL
YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 18, 2015.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES
Mr. Wilson. Ladies and gentlemen, I call this briefing of
the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee to order.
I am pleased to welcome everyone here today for this very
important hearing, on our special operations forces [SOF] in
the United States Special Operations Command [SOCOM], as we
review the fiscal year 2016 budget request. With evolving and
persistent threats being posted by state and non-state actors,
our special operation forces have never been more central,
strategic, and sought after. Illegal asymmetric enemy
combatants not in uniform must be stopped overseas.
From the unconventional hybrid threats of an aggressive
Russia, to the troubling expansive and clandestine networks of
Iran, and of course, an evolving Al Qaeda and their affiliates,
now the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant known in the region as
Daesh, we do indeed face an uncertain threat environment.
Our special operations forces have been engaged in heavy
combat and direct action for nearly 14 continuous years. It is
imperative that we properly resource, train, and equip, to now
deal equally as well with the hybrid and asymmetric threats of
tomorrow and do so with the looming shadow of defense
sequestration.
Simply put, our national defense and security of American
families depends on this. The House Armed Services Committee
has consistently supported our special operation forces,
providing additional authorities when warranted, authorizing
additional funds for unmet critical requirements, and most
recently resourcing important family support and suicide
prevention programs to ensure our service men and women, our
warriors and their families, are taken care of and know
firsthand that humans are indeed more important than hardware.
Although our support has been consistent, it has also been
accompanied by prudent oversight and robust dialogue to ensure
that we do all things that are right for the overall defense of
our great Nation. The commitment and sacrifice of our special
operation forces is evident to all of us. We examine this
budget request to ensure that we in Congress are doing
everything that we think is right and necessary for those units
and their families.
So, we look forward to discussing today the priorities for
the U.S. Special Operations Command and our special operations
forces for fiscal year 2016, and perhaps, more importantly,
discussing candidly the challenges that stand before us today.
We have before us a very distinguished panel of witnesses.
The Honorable Michael Lumpkin, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and
General Joseph Votel, the Commanding General of the United
States Special Operations Command. I would like now to turn to
my longtime friend and ranking member Mr. Jim Langevin from
Rhode Island for any comments he would like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today to
discuss the Special Operations Command fiscal year 2016 budget
request. Although our conventional forces have seen increases
in dwell time over the last few years as combat operations in
the Middle East change in character, special operations forces
continue to experience a very high operational tempo.
The demand for SOF is high around the globe due to a
variety of important missions, including counterterrorism.
These operators, and the conventional forces that enable them
to place their lives on the line each and every day far from
home in order to keep us safe, and we should never lose sight
of that sacrifice for which we are all very grateful.
This subcommittee is keenly aware of the threats that we
face and the importance of SOF missions to national security,
and we have acted commensurately, both in funding and unique
authorities such as those provided under section 1208.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about the
importance of these and other unique authorities as well as
about authorities that may need to be extended in the National
Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] for fiscal year 2016. If there
are any new authorities that may be required to combat ISIL or
conduct operations in areas outside the Middle East, like
European Command, I hope that the witnesses will make that case
this afternoon.
Congressional oversight of such authorities as well as
SOCOM funding is obviously very important. Our SOF personnel
operate in uncertain, varying, and evolving environments that
necessitate continuous assessment of the effectiveness and
appropriateness of authorities granted. Our subcommittee has
worked in the past to increase oversight through improved
reporting, and I want to express my appreciation for the
transparency of SOCOM. But internal oversight of SOF operations
and SOCOM is just as important.
Secretary Lumpkin, we recently had the opportunity to
discuss the oversight council that you established, and I would
appreciate it if you could provide the subcommittee with an
understanding of the council, including members, meetings, and
issues of focus.
General Votel, I also look forward to hearing from you as
well on the Preservation of the Force and Families initiative,
among the other things under your responsibility, and I
appreciate the meeting that you and I had yesterday.
As I mentioned earlier, special operations forces continue
to face high operational tempo. The mental health of the
operators and their families remains a priority both for you, I
know, and for Secretary Lumpkin and for this Congress. Last
year our subcommittee, in conjunction with the personnel
subcommittee, increased funding for mental health problems for
SOF due to increases in suicides. Additionally, I sponsored a
provision in the fiscal year 2015 NDAA to assess the
effectiveness of SOCOM's alternative approach to mental and
behavioral health in lieu of existing service programs.
General, I look forward to working with you this year to
continue to support our SOF members and their families. Our
goal on this front, taking care of our force and their
families, are one and the same.
In closing, I want to express again my gratitude to General
Votel for his service to our Nation and to Secretary Lumpkin as
well for all you do for our Nation and the enduring commitment
that you have to our men and women in uniform.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for convening this
hearing today, and I look forward to discussion. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Langevin, thank you very much, and we will
proceed with Secretary Lumpkin. We look forward to your opening
statements, of each of you, and then following that, we will
have a 5-minute question period for each member as we
alternate. And we are very fortunate that Kevin Gates will be
maintaining the time. He is above reproach. So, we will begin
with this Secretary. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT (ASD/SOLIC)
Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you, Chairman Wilson, Ranking
Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am
glad to speak about the health and welfare of our Nation's
special operations community and our capability to meet our
Nation's most pressing national security concerns today and
into the future.
Currently, our special operations force, also known as SOF,
work within an environment where fiscal uncertainty challenges
us to think creatively and bridge gaps between resources and
U.S. national security objectives. And where the changing
nature of the threats we face today demands SOF's attention and
engagement through agile authorities that enable us to remain
ahead of our adversaries. Addressing how SOF will effectively
operate within this environment, I would like to invite your
attention to the following three topics.
Foremost, SOF is navigating a challenging fiscal
environment through enhanced oversight. As the ``service-like
secretary'' of USSOCOM, I provide oversight and supervision of
SOF resources, develop SOF policies for counterterrorism to
counternarcotics, and preserve and protect our special
operations force. This role becomes ever more challenging in a
constrained budgetary environment in which we must use limited
resources efficiently and effectively so that SOF is globally
postured to support the combatant commands.
With sequestration-level cuts set for fiscal year 2016 and
beyond, we continue to strengthen our budget management in
order to maximize taxpayers' return on investment in SOF. In
addition, we look for innovative ways to use existing
resources.
Moving to my second point. SOF is most effective to handle
the changing nature of threats that we face when agile
authorities are available. From ISIL to pro-Russian rebel
forces in Ukraine, the United States and our international
partners face a diverse set of unconventional threats
worldwide. Centered within the physical terrain, the human
domain, information environment, and financial cyberspace.
Additionally, our response efforts often require security force
assistance missions in non-permissive and politically sensitive
areas, where the host station demands discreet U.S. footprint.
Due to its unique irregular and unconventional capabilities,
SOF routinely becomes the force of choice. To this point, agile
authorities maximize SOF capabilities helping support SOF
operations.
Support for foreign partners is fundamental to operational
success in overseas contingency operations, and U.S. financial
and logistic support is necessary to ensure their continued
participation. With the codification of sections 2282, 1004,
and 1022 in title 10 of the U.S. Code, the Global Security
Contingency Fund and the new Counterterrorism Partnership Fund,
we can assist our partners to address emerging threats and
opportunities by building their security capacities before
those threats exceed their ability to effectively respond.
However, building partner capacity takes time. Our building
partnership capacity authorities do not accommodate sustainment
costs, so we work closely with the State Department to ensure
partner nations eventually fund and sustain these programs on
their own.
Agile unallocated funding enables implementers to rapidly
respond to urgent needs of partner nations more expeditiously
and for a greater length of time than is possible through
traditional mechanisms.
And my final point, protection and preservation of SOF is
of utmost importance. Our people are the foundation of special
operations, and we strive to ensure our force and their
families have a support system necessary to ensure their long-
term prosperity and health. Assessing our force structure,
operational requirements, and capabilities at various
resourcing levels, we have reshaped SOF's operational units,
elements, and platforms so that we can meet future operational
requirements.
In addition, we seek to ensure the physical and mental
resilience of the individuals who make up our force. Continual
combat deployments combined with the demanding training regimen
needed to keep the force sharp, have caused stress on the force
and with their families. As ASD SO/LIC, I will continue to
support enhanced resiliency training currently being conducted
through USSOCOM service component programs.
In closing, throughout the entire Department, we are
committed to doing everything we can to ensure that our
Nation's SOF have the best training, equipment, and overall
support that we can possibly provide. We will continue to work
closely with Congress and senior policymakers across the
government to ensure that we have the right policies and
oversight in place, so that SOF effectively operates within the
current and future environments. I thank Congress for its
continuing support of our special operation initiatives,
resourcing, and personnel, and I look forward to your
questions. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Lumpkin can be found
in the Appendix on page 21.]
Mr. Wilson. Secretary Lumpkin, thank you very much. General
Votel.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND
General Votel. Good afternoon, Chairman Wilson, Ranking
Member Langevin, and other distinguished members of
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you to discuss the current posture of the United States Special
Operations Command, or SOCOM, as we call it. I am especially
pleased to be here with my OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] teammate, Assistant Secretary Michael Lumpkin. SOCOM
was created by the Congress to ensure that we always had ready
and capable SOF forces to meet the Nation's challenges. Our
ability to address these challenges is due in large part to the
strong support we get from the Congress, from the House Armed
Services Committee, and especially from this distinguished
subcommittee. Thank you very much.
I would like to start out by commenting on the amazing
actions made every day by our special operations men and women.
Operators, acquirers, logisticians, analysts, and many others,
Active and Reserve, military and civilian, the total SOF force.
Alongside our conventional force partners, the 69,000 quiet
professionals of SOCOM are committed to values-based excellence
and service to our Nation. They relentlessly pursue mission
success, and today, roughly 7,500 of them are deployed to over
90 countries worldwide supporting geographic combatant
commander requirements in named operations.
We are a force that has been heavily deployed over the last
14 years, and our military members, civilians, and their
families have paid a significant price physically and
emotionally serving our country. We are very appreciative of
the support we have received from Congress to address the
visible and invisible challenges, and we never forget that for
SOCOM, people are our most important resource.
Today, the United States is faced with many challenges. The
spread of technology and the diffusion of power are not only
being used by responsible leaders to better societies, but
unfortunately by wicked actors to orchestrate terror and
violence regionally and globally. Non-state actors like Al
Qaeda and ISIL and other violent extremist organizations,
menacing state actors like North Korea, and growingly coercive
actors like Russia are just a few examples of the entities
affecting the strategic environment in which we operate. We are
equally affected by the growing use of cyber capabilities and
social media which make it easy for our adversaries to
communicate, coordinate, execute, and inspire their actions.
The fiscal environment is of concern as well. While SOCOM
has been well supported in recent years, I remain profoundly
concerned by the impact of another round of sequestration and
how it not only impacts SOCOM, but more importantly, how it
will affect the four services upon whom we are absolutely
dependent for mission support.
To address the challenging security environment, SOF
provides a portfolio of options to our national leaders and to
the geographic combatant commanders. Through small footprint
operations and by relying on a network of purposeful
partnerships, SOF provides a comparative advantage through
persistent engagement, partner enablement, network focus, and
discreet rapid response to crisis situations.
While we support military operations across the spectrum,
SOF capabilities are uniquely suited to operate and succeed in
the gray zone between normal international competition and open
conflict, and it is in this area where we see our very best
opportunities to help shape the future environment.
To enable our efforts, I have established five priorities
for the command. First, we must ensure SOF readiness by
developing the right people, skills, and capabilities to meet
future--current and future requirements. To this end, we want
to ensure effectiveness now and into the future with the very
best SOF operators and support personnel enabled by the best
technology and capabilities we can field. Along the way, we
want to make the very best use of the unique MFP-11 [Major
Force Program-11] authority that Congress has granted us.
Second, we must help our Nation win by addressing today's
security challenges. We strive to provide coherent and well-
integrated SOF forces for the geographic combatant commanders
focused on optimizing our SOF activities. Nearly everywhere you
will find SOF forces working alongside and often in support of
their conventional force partners, helping accomplish our
security objectives.
Third, we must build purposeful relationships to improve
global understanding and awareness to create options for our
leaders. We don't own the network, but we are an important part
of it. In working with our partners, we will always produce the
best options for our Nation.
Fourth, we have to prepare for the future security
environment to ensure that SOF is ready to win in an
increasingly complex world. Ultimately, our goal is to match
exquisite people with cutting-edge capability and the very best
ideas to help our Nation succeed against the looming challenges
we will face in the future.
Finally, we must preserve our force and families to ensure
their long-term wellbeing. It is this area we are especially
focused on, where we are especially focused on a holistic
approach to address the invisible challenges of stress and
suicide that are affecting our service members, civilians, and
their family members.
In closing, I remain honored and humbled by the opportunity
to command the best special operations forces in the world. I
am incredibly proud of each and every one of our team members
and their families. I look forward to your questions and our
dialogue today.
[The prepared statement of General Votel can be found in
the Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, General Votel, and thank
both of you for being here this afternoon. We are going to
begin now the 5-minute round of each member of the
subcommittee, and each of us will be strictly held to 5
minutes, and Mr. Gates will maintain those--the clock.
My first question for both of you is--deals with the
impacts of defense sequestration on national security and our
military. I notice this has impacted even the special
operations forces. And for both of you, can you provide
specifics of how defense sequestration has impacted special
operation forces, without a solution to defense sequestration,
what damage will be done? And I am particularly concerned about
readiness. And we will begin with the Secretary.
Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that
question.
The--well, as General Votel mentioned in his opening
statement, the reliance of support from the services is where
we see the largest impact from where I sit is when we look at
what the impacts of sequestration would have on USSOCOM.
Potential of losing ISR [intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance] support, impacts on modernization of our air
fleet, modernization across the board on those service-
supported surface common items. It will also slow our
modernization across the board, and so I have real concerns
about that.
We have had to, based on where we were in 2014, as we ended
up divesting ourselves from program growth and combat support
and combat service support, and I fear that if sequestration
were to take effect in 2016, the services would divest of the
support that we are now more reliant on than we would have been
before. So, I see the impacts, while not direct, would be
significant nonetheless.
General Votel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think where we
will see some immediate impacts will be in perhaps in some of
our key investment areas. That would include the procurement
and recapitalization of some of our air, ground, and maritime
platforms, could affect our enhancing of SOF-specific ISR
capabilities that have been so effective for us, fighting some
of the enemies we deal with today. It could also affect our
communications infrastructure and equipment technology upon
which we depend to conduct global operations, and so that is
the impacts, I think, on SOCOM.
Beyond that, as I mention, I am very concerned about the
impact that it has on the services. The lack of availability of
air, ground, and especially maritime platforms will affect our
readiness and our training exercises that we count on to be
ready to deal with situations that will affect our operational
effectiveness when we are conducting operations.
We depend heavily on service-provided capabilities to
support us. A good example, of course, is the Navy's helicopter
capability that it has provided in the past for us which as it
now goes away is a lost service-provided capability that we no
longer are able to rely on.
Beyond that, we are impacted by SOF--we will be impacted by
SOF-specific enhancements to service-managed programs, as they
draw down some of their areas there. That will impact us, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Wilson. Well, thank both of you, and indeed, I believe
the members of our subcommittee share your concerns. Secretary
Lumpkin, I am really grateful. I work with the Partners of the
Americas program in Colombia, and we have had many exchange
students. Two of my sons went to high school in Cali, Colombia,
and then I have a very significant Filipino-American population
in the district that I represent. And in your written
statement, you indicate about the strategic engagement in both
Colombia and the Philippines. What is the status and what is
the future of what has been so successful in both countries?
Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and you are
absolutely correct. Both of those endeavors have been
successful. They have been--each has been long term. We have
been in Colombia since the--and supporting the government there
since the mid 1980s. We developed Plan Colombia. We have
invested heavily through Plan Colombia itself, and as we are on
the cusp of having a peace dividend, as the peace accords
between the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] and
ELN [National Liberation Army] and the Government of Colombia
are being realized, we will see some reduction there of our
support.
What does concern me is the ideas of a vacuum that may be
created when these insurgent groups are no longer there, and it
may open itself up to transnational organized crime. So, I
think we need to continue to engage decisively with the
Colombians to make sure that we are providing them the support
they need, in those areas have been controlled by these
insurgent groups that criminal activities don't take over.
In the Philippines, again, we have had a lengthy
relationship with our Filipino partners as they work to remove
the insurgents from the southern part of the country. We have--
are transitioning that mission now as we built capacity there,
but we have to remain engaged with them to make sure that we
don't lose the gains that we have made.
Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you. In both countries, I really
wish the American people knew of the success and that success
can be achieved against narcoterrorists and the
destabilization. We now proceed to Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thanks to our
witnesses. Secretary Lumpkin, if I could start with you. Last
year you established the Special Operations Oversight Council,
and I referred to that in my opening statement, to provide
policy oversight and guidance to SOCOM. The council was to
coordinate special operations related matters across the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and service secretary staffs, and
address key issues in the areas of special operations policies
and operational priorities, budget execution, force employment,
legislative changes, and required capabilities.
So, what actions in the areas of policy and operational
priorities, budget execution, force employment, proposed
legislative changes, and required capabilities has the council
reviewed or taken to date, and what were the results of the
review of any related issues?
Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you very much for the question,
sir.
When I created the Special Operations Policy Oversight
Council, it wasn't to supplant any of the responsibilities that
I had as driven by statute as the assistant secretary. Once I
assumed office, what I quickly realized is that as USSOCOM has
grown and become more complex in the nature of their operations
and what they do, we were on a 20 percent manpower reduction
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. So, the scope of
the work was getting more complex and my staff was shrinking.
So, I needed another tool to make sure that I had in my tool
bag in order to make sure I could cut across those issues
within the Department, so we created the council.
We have had numerous meetings of leadership and working
groups which have proven to be profoundly successful. We have
tackled three principal issues thus far. We have tackled
intertheater airlift, support special operations forces within
the different geographic combatant commands. When USSOCOM took
OPCON, Operational Control, of the Theater Special Operations
Commands, when they started doing these--the JCET [Joint
Combined Exchange Training] training, there was issues of who
was going to pay the bills. We were able to work through that
process to make sure it was crosscutting within the Department
and everybody was clear. Unfortunately, this is one of those
where USSOCOM got the bill, but rightly so, because the JCET is
51 percent of the benefit needs to be for the SOF personnel, so
that made sense.
We are also working to establish--the next topic that we
took on was MILCON [military construction], and it is when
should we and when should we not use MFP-11 funding for
military construction. And the final one is coming up with a
real definition of what is SOF-peculiar so we know where the
bill should go with the services versus within USSOCOM.
Those two, we haven't finalized the results yet. We are
still working, but it has proven to be very successful and
gives me the ability to--the other that it really gives me the
ability to do is that I walk a line at times between providing
oversight and advocacy for USSOCOM.
So, what this does when I get a decision that is
crosscutting and everybody is in agreement and I can clearly
shift in everybody's mind from being oversight to advocate, to
make sure that everything is done, and it makes it very easy
for all to understand the building. So for me, that is the real
benefit in addition to being able to navigate some of these
sticky wickets.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you. So, you alluded to this a
little bit, but how do the roles and responsibilities of the
council differ from the roles and responsibilities of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict, SOCOM, or the military department?
Secretary Lumpkin. Again, it is a--I look at it as a tool
that informs me, that helps me make better decisions, and so I
can take it to the Under Secretary of Policy, the Deputy
Secretary, or the Secretary to bring resolution to any
conflict. So again, it is just a tool for me, and it doesn't
supplant any of my roles or responsibilities.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you.
General Votel, as I noted in my opening statement, global
demand for special operations forces obviously continues to be
high. What impact has the continuous high tempo had on force
readiness, training, mental health, and the like, and also,
what steps is the command taking to ensure the global demand
for positioning of special operations forces is met today and
in the future?
General Votel. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman. So, we
have continued to pay a lot of attention to our PERSTEMPO
[personnel tempo] of our deployed members, and we, over the
last couple of years, with the support of Congress, have been
able to get a good process in place where we can manage our
PERSTEMPO much better now, so we understand what the deployment
tempo of our people are, and we put in policies and practices
in place that allow us to actually control that and manage that
and understand what the impact is on the force. And so that has
helped us manage the force better than perhaps we were doing
that in the past.
What that is really translated into is, is our components
being able to organize their forces in a manner so they could
have forces that were forward deployed, deployed doing the work
of the Nation. They could have forces back in recovery and they
could have forces recovering, so it is kind of one-third, one-
third, one-third approach is what we strive to do. And while we
are not complete there in all of our components, we are
definitely moving in the right direction to try to control
that.
Mr. Langevin. Okay.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, and Mr. Langevin, we now
proceed to Congressman Doug Lamborn of Colorado.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for having this
hearing, and thank you all for being here and for your service.
My first question has to do with legal authorities and rules of
engagement. Given the sensitive nature of the missions that
special operation forces conduct and sometimes the fast-moving
nature of those and lethal nature of those engagements, are you
concerned that sometimes the need to lawyer up is just so
burdensome, or that the rules of engagement are so restrictive
that you find it difficult to carry out the missions properly,
and if so, can we help you in that regard?
General Votel. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
The answer, from my perspective, is I don't see that as an
impediment to our operations right now. I think we have very
effectively integrated operational law into our activities, and
in--as in my experience, we have had the rules of engagement or
we have had the process in place that has allowed us to go back
and ask for the rules of engagement that are required to
conduct the operations which we have been asked to undertake.
Mr. Lamborn. Would you care to add anything to that?
Secretary Lumpkin. I agree completely. I haven't seen an
issue where we were up against a rules of engagement issue that
we couldn't resolve in a very rapid and timely manner.
Mr. Lamborn. And to have control and legal authority, is
that a concern at any time?
General Votel. It is not a concern for us right now. We
have been well served by the previous AUMF [authorization for
use of military force], and I am hopeful that future AUMF
will--I think it gives us what we need.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. And I will just comment on that I don't
want to see restrictions on any future AUMF that do tie the
hands of our military too much, so I would like to see that
open-ended as much as possible.
What is the status of--and by the way, I do appreciate the
10th Special Forces [Group], which is in my district at Fort
Carson and Germany, great group of people. I always enjoy
visiting them, and I enjoyed taking Chairman Thornberry out to
see them last August, so.
What is the status of the Preservation of Force and
Families program these days?
General Votel. Thanks. Let me talk about that. I think we
are making significant progress in this area. The investments
that we have made over the last several years with the support
of Congress, I think, are making a big difference. While I
still think the force is stressed, I think it is lessened than
we have seen in the past. So, I have a holistic approach here
that addresses the physical, spiritual, the emotional,
psychological aspect of this, I think is beginning to pay off.
I think we have got a good strategy in place to address our
most pressing problems, which I consider to be the invisible
challenges, the stress that is leading to suicide or suicide
ideations, and I think we have got a good approach to this. And
we are really focused on three big objectives.
One is to empower our people by communicating to them the
variety of resources that are available.
Second, is to enable them by providing as easy of access as
we can to those resources so that they can take advantage of
them.
And then finally is to encourage them by emphasizing that
it is absolutely normal to seek care for yourself and your
family and that we expect that and we encourage it and there is
no stigma associated with that.
And I am--we are beginning to see indicators now that that
message is sinking in and that understanding is going down into
the SOCOM force.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, that is great to hear. I want to
thank you for your service and for being here today. Mr.
Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman Lamborn. And we now
proceed to Congressman Jim Cooper of Tennessee.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was not here for the
opening statements. I will yield to another colleague.
Mr. Wilson. Then Congressman Rich Nugent all the way from
Florida.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
both of you for your service, and we are just up the street
from you, so we appreciate it.
General Votel, in the NDAA, I will be asking for a report
to explore the future of directed-energy weapons within SOCOM,
and I am encouraged to see that SOCOM already is looking into
directed-energy solutions, and I would just like to emphasize
to you that I am going to be very, very protective of keeping
your flexible and relatively agile acquisition system
uninhibited if I can. For the subcommittee today, would you
just give us some broad strokes of what that report would look
like. In other words, you know, what would SOCOM's future plans
be as relates to directed energy?
General Votel. Congressman, I will take, first of all, I
will take the question for the record and we will provide you a
detailed response, and we will look into the very specific
capabilities.
I thank you for your continued support of our acquisition
capability. You know, the advantage, I think, we have is that
we can--we can very closely link the requirements of the
operators to our acquisition arm, and unlike the service chiefs
that you heard of yesterday, I do have a very close
relationship with my acquisition authority, and because of the
great authority that Congress has provided us, we are able to
respond quickly.
Broadly, to your question on directed energy, we are always
looking at the very best tools that we will require for the
future. Certainly directed energy fits into a model that we
have been proceeding against for some time which is precision
and accuracy in the employment of our weapons systems, and I
think that directed energy offers us a great opportunity in
terms of that. So, I look forward to providing you a more
detailed response on that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 61.]
Mr. Nugent. Well, General, I appreciate that. Now, in the
fiscal year 2015 NDAA directs a report on technology roadmap
for underseas mobility, and of course, I am very interested in
the full details of that report later this year, but I want to
ask for maybe just a preview of just two parts of that dry
combat submersible program. What requirement drives the
development of a dry combat submersible, one, and in an
unclassified setting, what do you need a dry combat submersible
to do, if you could? And I understand this is not a classified
setting so----
General Votel. Yeah. Thanks. And again, I think this
probably would be best discussed in a classified setting,
Congressman, but in general, what it allows us to do is, it
allows us to take the full opportunity of the maritime
environment to pursue the full range of missions that SOCOM
does on behalf of the Nation. And that includes those sensitive
activities that we do out there, and this really does provide
us a very unique capability to--in place our operators or our
folks at the right place to pursue the missions that we have.
So, we look forward to kind of laying that out for you in a
classified setting, but I do think it allows us to take the
full opportunity of the maritime environment to accomplish the
missions that we are assigned.
Mr. Nugent. I appreciate that. I appreciate both your
comments, though, in regards to what sequestration, while may
not directly affect you, but the--you know, the services that
support you, it will affect, and it certainly will have an
effect on you in regards to implementing your mission, and I
worry about the fact that we are going to be limited in regards
to being able to project that force where we need it in
pinpoint accuracy if we continue with sequestration.
I know the chairman is in agreement with that.
Sequestration is a cancer that is going to eat and destroy our
national security, and it is one that we are all very, very
invested in trying to turn around.
So, I appreciate your service, both of you. Thank you very
much, and I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman Nugent. We now proceed
to Congressman John Garamendi of California.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and for the two
witnesses, my apologies for not being here. We seem to have
three Armed Services Committee subcommittees operating at the
same moment, including the Coast Guard subcommittee, so--just a
question. I am going to follow up. I think this is a question
that, Mr. Lumpkin, you were asked, maybe Mr. Langevin asked
this question. And in the operations of the special operation
forces, you do different things and for different parts of the
security--national security. Who winds up paying for the pieces
that--where let's say it might be a naval operation or an Army
or a Marine operation, who winds up paying for these
operations?
Secretary Lumpkin. I think we have two parts of the payment
issue. One of them is in how we procure equipment and things of
that nature. If it is a what we call a service common item,
then the service would pay that requisite bill, and then
anything that was peculiar to the special operations community,
we would use MFP-11, that is Major Force Program-11 funds to go
ahead and pay that, whether it is to modify it or adjust it to
make it useful for us the way we need it--what we need it to
do.
Operations themselves, I mean, for overseas contingency
operations generally come out of the Department's OCO funding,
so we have--there is funding. And so what--who is paying for
the bill really kind of depends on the nature of the operation
of whose OCO account it would come out of, but I can give you a
detailed breakdown of that if you would like. I would be happy
to take that for the record for you.
Mr. Garamendi. Yes, if you would. I think this--I know that
Mr. Langevin was interested in that and as am I, but yes, if
you would please do that.
Secretary Lumpkin. I will do that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 61.]
Mr. Garamendi. We know that in Iraq and Syria, it is
anticipated that the special operations units will be used. Is
that going to be--how does that get paid for, and what is the
extent of that? We are going to have to deal with an AUMF here
pretty quickly, at least we should, and the issue is not just
the men and women that are going to be deployed, but then how
much is it going to cost us to deploy them. Mr. Lumpkin, and
then, General, if you could delve into that.
Secretary Lumpkin. And those operations in Iraq and Syria,
those that are going on today in support of the Iraqi
Government and such are paid for through OCO, but I mean, that
will be part of the breakdown that I will get you is the actual
dollar figures that are being used today. We can do that.
Mr. Garamendi. It seems to me that one of the important
things we ought to be considering as we deal with this AUMF is
that it will be expensive, or have some expense, for the
taxpayers of the United States. We need to know, at least have
some really good idea how much this is going to cost us, and we
also know that it is likely to be expensive for the men and
women that are involved, quite possibly with death and injury.
So, we need to know that also. So that is something that is on
my mind. I hope it is on the rest of my colleagues' minds also.
Finally, in the last few moments here, we spend a lot of
time in other subcommittees dealing with communications. GPS
[Global Positioning System] is vulnerable. What steps are being
taken by the special operations that are extensively using that
particular technology to deal with its interruption? Whichever
one of you would like to jump into that.
General Votel. Thanks. Thank you for the question, Mr.
Congressman. We obviously, as I mention in my opening
statement, we are very concerned about the cyber environment
and these different ways that people can come after our use of
technologies, our use of the Internet to support us. So, in
conjunction with direction we have gotten from the chairman and
working along with Cyber Command, we are very much in the
process of addressing our cyber protection capability, both
reliant on resources that are made available to us from the
Cyber Command and by elements that we will stand up within
SOCOM to get after that particular problem.
So, we are very alert to the threat that you just outlined
right here, and certainly GPS is something that is impacted,
but certainly all of our communications and communications
architecture is potentially at risk as well.
Mr. Garamendi. Much of the rest of the world is looking at
what is known as advanced or eLoran systems. I would like to
have some comment from you on the record about what you may be
using in that regard, not just within the United States but
around the world where this is actually being deployed by some
people that we are very interested in. Thank you.
General Votel. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 62.]
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman Garamendi. We now
proceed to Congressman Mo Brooks of Alabama.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you for your service. As you are aware,
Capitol Hill is engaged in a significant debate over the
budgets. We have got the White House budget, we have got the
House budget, and presumably the Senate is also working on a
budget. The President's proposed budget for national defense is
$561 billion, roughly, for base defense and another $51
billion, roughly speaking, for OCO, for a total, roughly, of
$612 billion. The House budget for national defense is $523
billion for base, that being the amount set forth in the Budget
Control Act, and roughly $90 billion for OCO.
To state it a little bit differently, base defense budget,
President, $561, which is $38 billion more than permitted under
the Budget Control Act, and the $523 billion that the House
budget, at least as of this moment, represents. And on the OCO
side, the President's budget proposes $51 billion while the
House is $39 billion more, OCO.
So, we have $612-, $613 billion from the two budgets being
spent on national defense, but the key issue is, which is
better for our national defense? For the money to be in the
base or the money to be in OCO? Can you please share with me
your insight on which you think is a better place to put the
money and how that affects our security capabilities, and
whoever wants to go first can go first.
Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you. Thank you, sir. I appreciate
the question very much. The challenge we have with OCO is it
is, you know, the money comes that year and you have got the
year. You don't have it in the outyears. It is not something I
can sit here and plan on, so it actually increases my fiscal
uncertainty. Because, I am going to buy a piece of equipment,
for example, and I can't count on I am going to have the
sustainment costs in the outyears because I--it is kind of
like, if I had to give an example, like buying a car and not
knowing you can pay the car insurance 2 years from now or put
gas in it or do the maintenance. And so, while you end up with
the same dollar figure when it is done for that particular
year, and I just don't know what I have got in the future, so
it is very difficult for me to plan.
So as I am looking at programmatics from where I sit, I am
frequently figuring what is my exit strategy if I don't get the
funding in the future to fix it. Each one will meet a very
short-term need, but in the outyears, it becomes problematic
when we have this reliance on OCO and don't move it over to
your base budget.
Mr. Brooks. So, you have got the adverse effect on planning
and what I might infer as the adverse effect on purchasing
capital goods.
Secretary Lumpkin. Exactly.
Mr. Brooks. Long term.
Secretary Lumpkin. Exactly, yes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Brooks. Okay. Anything else? Any other adverse effect?
Or--General Votel?
General Votel. I would just--I would add I agree with
Secretary Lumpkin in his comments that it is better in the
base. I think the big advantage is that the base funding
provides us certainty in a time of uncertainty as we continue
moving forward in this very complex environment.
And so, I think that helps us plan better, I think it helps
us make better investments long term, and then of course it
gives us the best ability to sustain those programs as we move
forward. So like the Secretary said, both of these will work in
the short term. The base, I think, helps us for the longer term
concerns.
Mr. Brooks. Let me focus on the OCO money again for just a
moment. If the House were to pass a budget that spent roughly
$90 billion on OCO, and giving the planning and spending
inhibitions that you have just--or problems that you have just
described, is all that $90 billion have to be spent by the
Department of Defense or is some of it just not going to be
used because you can't properly plan and use it?
And I don't know the answer to these questions. That is why
I am asking them.
Secretary Lumpkin. You know, I don't want to necessarily
speculate on--but I would say there is a possibility of that
that it may not all get used.
Mr. Brooks. General Votel.
General Votel. I would agree. I think the disadvantage of
single-year money, which OCO generally is, does create that
risk that we may not build up, employ large sums of it that
way. As it is right now, you know, our--we do--part of our
budget, we do ask for some OCO funding and so we are able to
plan for some of that, but I--again, I think I would be
speculating a little bit here.
Mr. Brooks. Well, I have got roughly 15, 20 seconds left.
Anything else you all would like to add that would help me
decide how to vote on this issue?
Secretary Lumpkin. I am just of the opinion that if it is
important enough to do and it is part of what you should be
doing every day, it should be in your base budget.
General Votel. I think our people deserve a certainty.
Mr. Brooks. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman Brooks. And at this time
if there are any further questions, they can be submitted for
the record.
And I would like to thank again, Mr. Secretary, General,
for your being here today. I am grateful to be serving with
Congressman Langevin, and at this time we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 18, 2015
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 18, 2015
=======================================================================
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 18, 2015
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. NUGENT
General Votel. USSOCOM is committed to remaining on the cutting
edge of technology to provide the best tools to meet the operational
needs of Special Operations Forces (SOF). Directed energy (DE) remains
a technology of interest for meeting these capability needs. DE offers
the advantage of ultra-precision and rapid target engagement, but has
significant systems engineering, platform integration and operational
policy challenges.
USSOCOM has operational requirements in several mission areas where
DE capabilities have potential applicability. The June 2012,
``Capability Production Document for AC-130 J,'' includes an objective
key performance parameter that calls for the system to provide ``the
capability to incorporate future DE weapons, to include lethal and non-
lethal variations.''
USSOCOM has executed, funded and/or endorsed several development
programs for DE systems in the last 20 years. Only one classified DE
system is currently fielded by USSOCOM and being used in SOF
operations. The Services have fielded laser dazzler systems to some SOF
under Service acquisition programs. USSOCOM is currently assessing
other DE capabilities for SOF operational use. One current initiative
includes a DE development effort funded by the Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) that is being assessed
against sensitive SOF user requirements and concepts of employment
(CONEMP). USSOCOM has initiated assessment of the potential use of DE
as an operational capability for a future upgrade of some AC-130J
aircraft. USSOCOM is also assessing DE as a future capability for
vehicle- or vessel-mounted systems to address approved operational
requirements. These efforts are currently in the technology assessment
stage, and specific development or acquisition plans or timelines have
not yet been developed.
Unfortunately, the majority of USSOCOM's DE development programs
have been terminated prior to fielding. For example, USSOCOM recently
terminated three JIEDDO-funded DE development programs due to
insufficient technology maturity. The cancelled DE development programs
for SOF have failed to meet user requirements for one of the following
two reasons: failure to meet technical performance thresholds (e.g.,
power output, operating time, target effects); and/or inadequate
systems engineering to allow them to operate under the required CONEMP
in SOF operational environments (e.g., ruggedization, resiliency,
platform integration).
DE shows promise for a variety of missions and target sets if the
technical performance, system engineering and platform integration
challenges can be resolved. USSOCOM is highly dependent on the
Department of Defense research and development communities to address
these DE development and systems engineering challenges, as well as
foster a robust DE industrial base to provide any future capabilities
to SOF. As DE technology matures, additional emphasis needs to be
placed on the systems engineering challenges it poses for integration
into operational platforms for use in combat environments. Given the
complexity of integrating DE on the platforms listed, it is USSOCOM's
intent to leverage Service/Agency development, and serve as early
adopters once the technology and its system engineering challenges have
matured. [See page 12.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Secretary Lumpkin. As a general rule for operations, U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) funds the deployment and sustainment of
its forces. However, for each operation, the Geographic Combatant
Commander (GCC) will normally designate a lead service to provide
common logistics support for all other service units participating in
the operation, including in the planning and execution phases.
These assignments of responsibility can be for multiple common
logistics functions and different locations within the area of
responsibility. For example, during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in
Afghanistan, USSOCOM funded deployment, temporary duty costs,
sustainment, and SOF-peculiar requirements. While the Army, as the
designated lead service in Afghanistan, provided the necessary common
logistics, service-common communications, and installation support for
SOF in Afghanistan. These activities are typically funded through the
Department's Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) appropriation when
applicable. [See page 13.]
General Votel. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
is not investigating eLoran (long-range aid to navigation) as a back-up
system for flight operations in GPS-denied environments. Our aircraft
already have navigation system redundancies that allow the aircrew to
select from multiple navigation sources for both system redundancy, and
for operation in denied or degraded environments. While eLoran does
provide GPS back-up, it does not provide world-wide capability in the
areas of interest for USSOCOM. Although eLoran may provide a
navigational back-up capability in the future, the lower fidelity
information provided would not be sufficient for USSOCOM needs. USSOCOM
supports GPS hardening and software architecture fixes to their fleet
of aircraft to mitigate our specific GPS vulnerabilities. [See page
14.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 18, 2015
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. Many of our potential adversaries have become very
adept at manipulating the information environment to radicalize,
recruit and gain support their cause. That requires a robust, concerted
and strategic effort to counter those messages and kill the ideas that
drive their extremist movement movements. Do we have a strategy for
attacking adversarial messaging and propaganda? What tools do you have
at your disposal to counter those sorts of messages? Where do you see
gaps in our capabilities that you think we should be trying to address?
Secretary Lumpkin. Without going into sensitive or classified
activities, the Department through the Geographic Combatant Commands
executes counter adversarial messaging activities directed at specific
threats. The Department's actions support overarching U.S. Government
strategies, such as the Strategy to Counter ISIL, which includes a
specific counter-messaging line of effort.
A critical DOD influence activity is the employment of Military
Information Support Teams to work with U.S. Embassy country teams and
partner nations' militaries in support of Combatant Commanders'
objectives. In these activities, the Department uses the most
appropriate technology based upon assessments of common mediums for a
target audience.
The main challenge today is the size and pace of communications in
social media, as the information environment has moved beyond static
websites to instantaneously accessible social media.
A recently completed Joint Staff Capability Based Assessment
identified the challenges to influencing adversary and adversary-
related audiences in a social media-dominated internet environment. The
study outlined requirements for increasing DOD's capability, and
directed USSOCOM to develop solutions within its Military Information
Support Operations (MISO) force. As we identify, develop and
demonstrate the effectiveness of new concepts and tools to achieve
influence effects, we will continue the dialogue with the Committee.
Mr. Wilson. What role will SOF play in Afghanistan as we withdraw
forces, and beyond 2015? Can you outline for the committee any
resourcing concerns if high numbers of SOF are required? Can you
provide an update on some of the options being discussed and how you
are planning for those options?
Secretary Lumpkin. Over the next 18 months, U.S. SOF will continue
prosecuting the counterterrorism mission against the remnants of AQ and
other terrorists who threaten our interests and our people. U.S. SOF
will also as contribute to the train, advise, and assist mission with
the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. Through these efforts,
our aim is to build durable gains that will contribute to a robust,
enduring counterterrorism partnership with the Afghans. There are
approximately 2,000 U.S. SOF in Afghanistan. This force level will be
maintained through 2015. As the President stated during President
Ghani's visit to the U.S in March, the specific trajectory of the 2016
drawdown will be established later this year. We are currently
reviewing potential SOF requirements for 2016 and in 2017. As part of
this review, I will work with the Joint Staff and our military
commanders to determine future SOF requirements in Afghanistan.
Mr. Wilson. The fiscal year 2016 budget request continues growth
for SOCOM to more that 69,900 personnel. With declining budgets, how
will you ensure that this force will not become hollow? How will you
ensure we are not choosing quantity over quality?
Secretary Lumpkin. USSOCOM's end strength at approximately 70K
represents a balanced force to meet special operations requirements. We
will not have under-manned or under-equipped units at the FY16 budget
request level of funding. However, at the BCA level of funding, we
might have to make reductions depending on the amount of OCO available,
but we will maintain a balanced force. We continually review this
through USSOCOM readiness reports and during our annual DOD Program
Budget Review (PBR). We will continue to apply rigorous selection
criteria for induction of members into SOF in order to maintain quality
capabilities.
Mr. Wilson. Are you concerned that cuts being made to the Services
could impact our special operations capabilities? Please outline your
largest concerns in this area and discuss what is being done to
minimize risk.
Secretary Lumpkin. Yes, I am concerned over Service reductions
because of the significant Service-provided capabilities that support
Special Operations Forces (SOF), especially in Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), tactical fixed and rotary-wing
lift, combat service support, and maritime platforms. Services are
determining impacts if Budget Control Act (BCA) level of funding
becomes a reality, but these impacts are still being evaluated. Any
reductions in Service budgets will require reliance on Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) funds in order for SOF to maintain
adequate readiness. SOF readiness is directly linked to and dependent
on Service readiness support for training ranges, training facilities,
and service common equipment maintenance schedules--especially at depot
level. In addition, SOF is dependent on the Services for modernization
schedules. One of my greatest concerns is that the A/MC-130J
recapitalization schedule may be delayed if Air Force funding is
reduced. Another concern is that maritime platforms to support SOF may
not be available if the Navy budget is reduced. This could require
USSOCOM to contract for additional leased vessels. Finally, I have
significant reservations that SOF will have adequate ISR support
available if Air Force funding is reduced.
Mr. Wilson. How are the roles of women in SOF changing? Can you
outline for the committee on SOCOM plans for assigning women in
previously closed positions?
Secretary Lumpkin. (1) Today, women serve in a wide variety of
Special Operations career fields such as Civil Affairs, Psychological
Operations, and Air Force Special Operations aviation. As a requirement
of the Women in Service Review (WISR), USSOCOM Service Components are
reviewing and validating standards for SOF occupational specialties.
Once these standards are implemented, those who are best qualified will
serve--including women.
USSOCOM has made significant progress integrating women into
previously closed positions and units. Most of this progress has
occurred in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command component, because
of a previous policy preventing women from serving below the brigade
level in combat arms. The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment
(SOAR) is now open to women--all pilot, crew chief, and enabler
positions opened as of July 23, 2014. The one exception is the Army's
Fire Support Specialist Military Occupational Specialty positions that
are still closed by the Army, pending a review. The first two female
pilots graduated from the 160th SOAR Selection and Assessment program
in September and November 2014, and the first female crew chief
graduated from the U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation training
program in December 2014.
Congress also approved our latest notification packet on November
18, 2014, to open enabler positions down to battalion level in 1st
Special Forces Command and the Special Warfare Center and School.
(2) USSOCOM is conducting the WISR effort in three phases. The
first phase involved a thorough Doctrine, Organization, Training,
Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy
(DOTMLFP-P) analyses and was completed in the spring of 2014. The
second phase was a series of cultural and sociological studies of unit
and social cohesion and combat effectiveness of SOF tactical units if
females were integrated. These studies are currently under final
review. The third phase is training standards validation and is
currently underway. Each service component is analyzing its training
standards to ensure they accurately reflect occupational/mission
requirements. Once validated, these standards will be gender-neutral.
This summer, the USSOCOM commander will collaborate with the services
in order to decide the best way forward for the SOCOM enterprise. His
recommendation will go forward to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in late September of 2015 and ultimately to the Secretary of
Defense in advance of a January 2016 deadline.
Mr. Wilson. What does SOF expect to divest--or get rid of--in the
FY16 budget request and for the next few years? Without divestitures or
reductions in some areas, how will you ensure that we are not building
a hollow force that we cannot afford?
Secretary Lumpkin. In each program budget cycle, the Department
conducts extensive reviews of current and new capability requirements.
As part of this analysis, it is determined what programs can be
divested or reduced in order to support any new initiatives or meet
emerging threats or trends. We saw this most clearly during the FY15
budget review and made some difficult decisions that will carry forward
through FY 2016. For example, in FY2015 and FY2016, USSOCOM will divest
some programmed growth in Combat Support, Combat Service Support, and
Civil Affairs. In addition, in FY2015 and FY2016 we restructured active
component Army Special Forces Groups to realign manpower and force
structure to more effectively meet the challenges of a changing
security environment. We also are divesting older platforms such as the
MC-130P and AC-130H that will be replaced with newer, more capable
platforms (MC-130J and AC-130J). Finally, we will continue to maintain
a balanced force and the FY16 budget request support that.
Mr. Wilson. Special Operations Forces and the Intelligence
Community have experienced an unprecedented integration of both
operational and analytical activities. SOCOM has also considerably
expanded its funding of intelligence capabilities and activities. While
details are classified--can you discuss this integration and are there
any concerns? Can you discuss how the Department conducts appropriate
oversight of these sensitive activities?
Secretary Lumpkin. We provide oversight of sensitive activities in
concert with OUSD(I) and the Director of Intelligence Oversight in
operational, resource, and acquisition processes. We are continuing to
work to strengthen the oversight of those processes. For example,
working with OUSD(I), we provide a Congressional report each quarter
that provides detailed information and updates on these activities.
This year we are working closely in conjunction with OUSD(I) to
strengthen that process.
During the Department's Program Budget Review process, we work
closely with USSOCOM, OUSD(I) and OUSD(AT&L) to ensure that our efforts
complement each other and avoid redundancy or unnecessary duplication.
We are also in the process of identifying gaps and strengthening the
SOF requirements process with Joint Staff and OUSD(I).
Details of these oversight processes will be found in the upcoming
report by the Department on USSOCOM Intelligence in response to Section
1625 of the FY15 NDAA.
Mr. Wilson. Looking across the globe and the considering the threat
of transnational terrorism--what are your largest concerns? Where are
we assuming risk in our current strategies? Are we postured to counter
these threats?
Secretary Lumpkin. Since the 2001 attacks we have made considerable
gains against al-Qa'ida and its affiliates around the world, and there
are continuous efforts to disrupt imminent threats to the United
States. Nevertheless, the combination of poor governance and the
resilience of ideologies that promote violence have allowed for the
continuous recruitment of fighters and supporters. This, in turn, has
contributed to political turmoil and deteriorating security conditions
in parts of the Middle East and Africa. Terrorist groups continue to
exploit these conditions to establish sanctuaries, recruit fighters,
and plot attacks against the United States, our allies, and partners.
In addition to the emergence of new threats in a rapidly changing
security environment, I remain concerned by the ideological appeal of
terrorist groups to certain segments of society in their local areas
and abroad. Defeating these threats will require the efforts of many
parts of our government and the international community. Our current
strategies ensure we do so by aligning military activities, which
depend on continued investments in capabilities, with the efforts of
our inter-agency and foreign government partners in law enforcement,
intelligence, diplomatic, military, capacity building, and homeland
security.
Mr. Wilson. Do our forces and Geographic Combatant Commanders have
the authorities they need to mitigate current and future transnational
terrorist threats? What changes would you recommend, including
potential changes to the AUMF?
Secretary Lumpkin. While we have authorities to achieve our counter
terrorism objectives, the Department continuously reviews existing
authorities and resources to ensure we are postured to address emergent
threats in a rapidly changing security environment. For instance, the
emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as a
regional and transnational threat prompted the President to seek a
bipartisan Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)
specifically tailored to address ISIL. We continue support revisions
and an eventual repeal of the 2001 AUMF, but believe our focus and
priority is on securing passage of an ISIL-specific AUMF.
Mr. Wilson. Do our Special Operations Forces have all of the
authorities they need to counter the influence of Russian actions and
aggression in Eastern Europe, or Iranian influence in the Middle East?
What specific role do you see Special Operations playing in this area?
Secretary Lumpkin. Our forces have the authorities necessary to
carry out their assigned missions. We constantly reevaluate our
authorities given the dynamic threat environment. Generally, in the
context of countering the Russian and Iranian influence within their
respective regions, Special Operations Forces (SOF) could work within a
larger whole of government approach to bolster our allies and partners
by playing key roles in conducting security force assistance, and
building the capacity of our partners to resist such aggression.
Moreover, SOF are essential in helping counter the negative narratives
and propaganda of an adversary through information operations,
primarily through Military Information Support Teams. If we determine
we have an authority gap, we will work with Congress to identify
possible solutions.
Mr. Wilson. A great deal has been written and said about the
relationship between Special Operations Forces and the CIA. What is
your opinion of how the CIA and SOF should share responsibilities that
interlock and overlap, given respective strengths and weaknesses? What
coordination role does your office (Special Operations/Low Intensity
Conflict) play in helping to coordinate and de-conflict CIA-DOD
operations and activities? What are some areas of improvement?
Secretary Lumpkin. With respect to our counterterrorism plans,
policies, and operations, the CIA and DOD work in concert within our
distinct statutory authorities and policy guidance where applicable, to
improve the whole of government approach in attaining national
objectives. Each organization possesses specific strengths that can be
leveraged to support other organizations. Regular staff interaction
facilitates the development of solutions to the full suite of issues
related to counterterrorism plans, policies, and operations.
SO/LIC conducts oversight of the Department's special operations
activities with an understanding that these activities should be
complementary, but not duplicative, of efforts taken by the CIA. The
division of responsibility varies by issue and the dynamics of
particular areas of operations; but the Department has the right people
and policies in place to ensure intelligence and military operations
reinforce each other.
The Department continues to seek improvement of cooperation and
coordination through increased communication and information sharing.
Additional information sharing and clarity on responsibilities and
operations reduces redundancy to preserve our precious resources.
Mr. Wilson. What changes can you recommend to the present set of
Security Force Assistance authorities such as 1206 and Global Security
Contingency Fund? Are these the right types of authorities to satisfy
future Geographic Combatant Commander requirements to develop partner
nation capabilities?
Secretary Lumpkin. I believe our current Security Force Assistance
(SFA) authorities are appropriate for achieving the limited set of
objectives for which they were designed. The 1206 ``train and equip''
program, for example, has enabled the Department of Defense to provide
partner nations capabilities to conduct counterterrorism and
stabilization operations. However, we continue to look at ways to
accelerate current material solutions to our partnership capacity
efforts, which sometimes limit Geographic Combatant Commanders' ability
to act expeditiously.
The Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) has provided
additional resources and flexibility, and the additional $2.1 billion
included in the President's FY16 budget request would enable us to
satisfy foreseeable Geographical Combatant Command requirements
appropriate to the CTPF mission-set.
I would point out, however, that both 1206 and the Global Security
Contingency Fund (GSCF) are tailored in their scope, and there may be
additional areas in which security force assistance is needed that 1206
and GSCF do not adequately address. As you know, my responsibilities
are focused on special operations and low intensity conflict; other
elements of the Department are better suited to respond to the adequacy
of SFA authorities for the full array of partner nation requirements.
Mr. Wilson. A recent report on Special Operations Forces by the
Council on Foreign Relations suggested that, ``the Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict has
difficulty fully providing civilian oversight of U.S. Special
Operations Command's policy and resources as directed by law.'' Do you
agree with this assessment? Can you outline for the committee how that
office conducts oversight of policy and resources of SOCOM?
Secretary Lumpkin. I do not agree with that assertion. We are able
to meet our statutory oversight responsibilities and we do so. My
office has policy oversight of USSOCOM budget and resourcing, in
accordance with well-established Department processes. I have a
dedicated directorate within SOLIC to perform these functions. I also
leverage the subject matter expertise of the Joint Staff and relevant
offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, such as experts
in personnel, intelligence, and acquisition matters, to assist me.
Moreover, I recognize that many other organizations within the
Department have an active role to play in the oversight of SOCOM. To
that end, I created and chair the Special Operations Policy Oversight
Committee (SOPOC), which brings together all SOCOM stakeholders
periodically to address key contemporary issues. I am pleased to say
that the SOPOC has received strong support and participation from the
service secretaries, relevant OSD offices, the Joint Staff, and SOCOM
leaders, and has helped me to continue to meet my statutory
obligations.
Mr. Wilson. Many of our potential adversaries have become very
adept at manipulating the information environment to radicalize,
recruit and gain support their cause. That requires a robust, concerted
and strategic effort to counter those messages and kill the ideas that
drive their extremist movement movements. Do we have a strategy for
attacking adversarial messaging and propaganda? What tools do you have
at your disposal to counter those sorts of messages? Where do you see
gaps in our capabilities that you think we should be trying to address?
General Votel. USSOCOM has not developed its own counter-ISIL
messaging strategy; it supports activities such as Line of Effort (LOE)
#6 ``Expose ISIL's True Nature'' of the U.S. Government's (USG)
strategy developed by the National Security Council Staff. U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) has provided influence planning expertise
to the Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs and Public
Diplomacy and the National Counter Terrorism Center, which co-chair the
implementation of LOE #6.
Congress has expressed concern with DOD engaging violent extremist
propaganda on the Internet, except in very limited ways. They tend to
view the Internet as a strategic platform and efforts to influence
civilians outside an area of conflict as Public Diplomacy, the
responsibility of the Department of State or Broadcasting Board of
Governors. We believe there is a complimentary role for the Department
of Defense (DOD) in this space which acknowledges the need for a
civilian lead, but allows DOD to pursue appropriate missions, such as
counter-recruitment and reducing the flow of foreign fighters. This can
be done in a coordinated manner as part of the whole of government
effort without militarizing U.S. foreign policy. An explicit directive
from Congress outlining the necessity of DOD to engage in this space
would greatly enhance our ability to respond.
USSOCOM's primary tool for countering adversarial messaging is its
Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Soldiers and various
activities. These Special Operations Forces (SOF)trained Soldiers
support Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) with forces specially
trained in using information to modify foreign audiences' behavior.
Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) deploy to various Embassies
around the globe to assist in the achievement of GCC Theater Campaign
objectives as well as advance Chief of Mission goals. The current MISO
force structure supports the persistent deployment of about 20-30
MISTs. Additionally, MISO planners support all GCCs with the capability
to monitor, track, analyze, and provide recommendations for the most
effective way of engaging in the extremist debate. Other MISO
activities include Senior Military Engagement Program (SMEP) which
facilitates mil-to-mil engagement via digital and print magazines
through discussion of strategic issues affecting regional partners
within a GCC Area of Responsibility (AOR).
Two substantial gaps exist; one has already been identified in the
third paragraph regarding elimination of DOD permissions to engage
online to counter violent extremists' narratives and recruitment.
Another gap exists in the MISO community's ability to operate on social
media and the Internet, due to a lack of organic capability. This
shortfall, and the requirement to integrate indigenous language and
cultural capability, has necessitated the use of contractors. DOD will
reduce, but not eliminate, reliance on contracted capabilities through
its current efforts to update doctrine, expand training and implement
technical and material solutions to improve the Department's ability to
effectively operate in the social media and broader online information
space.
Finally, the ability to rapidly respond to adversarial messaging
and propaganda, particularly with offensive cyberspace operations to
deny, disrupt, degrade or corrupt those messages, requires an Execute
Order (EXORD) and is limited by current U.S. government policies. The
review and approval process for conducting offensive cyberspace
operations is lengthy, time consuming and held at the highest levels of
government. However, a rapid response is frequently required in order
to effectively counter the message because cyber targets can be
fleeting, access is dynamic, and attribution can be difficult to
determine. Additionally, international standards and laws do not exist
for defining sovereignty in cyberspace.
Mr. Wilson. What role will SOF play in Afghanistan as we withdraw
forces, and beyond 2015?
General Votel. Aligned with Commander Resolute Support's (COM RS)
functionally-based Security Force Assistance (SFA) framework, U.S. and
Coalition Special Operations Forces (SOF) will continue to advise
Afghan Special Security Force (ASSF) partners on critical enablers like
aviation, logistics, intelligence, and command and control. This
functional framework is designed to facilitate a coordinated (Afghan
and Coalition) problem solving effort and enduring relationships. While
the overall force draws down, SOF will remain relatively robust in
order to advise and ensure sustainability of the ASSF.
The NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan/Special
Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan(NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A) has five (5)
Special Operations Advisory Groups (SOAGs) focused on mentoring and
advising our ASSF partners to ensure they can command, control,
maintain, and sustain their tactical units spread across the country.
These special military and police units are our most capable partners
in the Counterterrorism (CT) fight. In order to ensure our ASSF
partners continue to take the fight to our enemies, U.S. SOF must
continue advising at the tactical level even as we draw down our
forces. We must show our continued commitment to Afghan security
efforts in order to maintain the mutually beneficial relationships we
need to meet U.S. objectives in the region.
Mr. Wilson. Can you outline for the committee any resourcing
concerns if high numbers of SOF are required?
General Votel. There are very limited resourcing concerns from the
SOF/Major Force Program (MFP) 11 perspective depending on how high the
SOF numbers go. The only relevant concern is when the number of SOF
supporting this effort increases to the extent that the amplified
competition for resources in terms of personnel, equipment, and funding
is allocated to support other global priorities.
Another concern specifically applies to equipment. Current
resourcing projections include funding to continue retrograde,
redeployment, and material reduction of SOF peculiar equipment. There
may be a need for additional resourcing if we are required to send
equipment back into theater to support higher SOF numbers. The concern
increases over time in 2016 as a continued reduction in personnel and
equipment would require additional shipping of equipment in an
environment with limited reception and distribution capacity and
capability.
More importantly would be a continued conventional force support to
SOF. The greatest concern going forward is ensuring adequate resourcing
and necessary authorities exist to support all of the non-SOF peculiar
requirements in theater generated by a larger number of SOF such as
basing, fuel and ammunition.
Mr. Wilson. Can you provide an update on some of the options being
discussed and how you are planning for those options?
General Votel. The ASSF will be the central mechanism to ensuring
``relative stability'' over the next few years. Afghan Special Security
Forces (ASSF) formations are already conducting unilateral security
operations and are integrating across the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and
Ministry of Interior (MOI) enterprise. However, they still require
continued Special Operations Train, Advise and Assist (SOF TAA),
especially in the areas of logistics and command and control. The
Afghan Local Police (ALP), while not part of the ASSF, are integral to
Afghanistan's enduring layered security architecture. They have proven
to be the Taliban's most formidable obstacle to regaining influence and
power, and merit continued SOF TAA at the ALP headquarters level.
Several ASSF development efforts will need to extend beyond 2016. Three
specific programs that warrant extension due to the critical/unique
capabilities they provide: the Special Mission Wing (SMW) PC-12 and Mi-
17 program, the ASSF Intelligence Enterprise, and Ktah Khas (KKA).
The continued development of these command and control mechanisms
is critical and will require continued support at the ministerial and
operational levels to ensure appropriate support to and utilization of
ASSF. By the end of 2016, we expect to make significant improvements to
the enabling functions of the ASSF, particularly their abilities to
force generate; sustain the force; plan, resource, and execute
effective security campaigns; and harness intelligence capabilities and
processes. This is critical to U.S. interests as we will be reliant
upon ASSF to conduct missions to combat terrorists in Afghanistan and
deny them safe haven.
Thwarting the Taliban is not an ANSF mission alone; this will
continue to be a collective effort. Government of the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan (GIRoA) must demonstrate to the Afghan people that it is
the clear cut, better governing option. The Taliban can only be
decisively defeated if their popular support is comprehensively eroded
away. Therefore, we will continue working with State Department, USAID,
other U.S. Government (USG) and coalition partners in Afghanistan to
legitimize GIRoA.
Mr. Wilson. The fiscal year 2016 budget request continues growth
for SOCOM to more that 69,900 personnel. With declining budgets, how
will you ensure that this force will not become hollow? How will you
ensure we are not choosing quantity over quality?
General Votel. USSOCOM's end strength at approximately 70K
represents a balanced force to meet special operations requirements. We
will not have under-manned or under-equipped units at the FY16 budget
request level of funding. However, at the Budget Control Act (BCA)
level of funding, we might have to make some reductions depending on
the amount of OCO available, but we will maintain a balanced force. We
continually review this through USSOCOM readiness reports and during
the annual Department Program Budget Review (PBR). We will continue to
apply rigorous selection criteria for induction of members into Special
Operations Forces (SOF) to maintain quality personnel.
Mr. Wilson. Are you concerned that cuts being made to the Services
could impact our special operations capabilities? Please outline your
largest concerns in this area and discuss what is being done to
minimize risk.
General Votel. There are many potential impacts that would affect
Special Operations Capabilities including personnel, training,
schooling, equipment and deployments. Specific examples follow:
Naval Special Warfare (NSW): There will be reductions in service
provided by air mobility. Budget reductions will impact NSW's ability
to conduct Seal Deliver Vehicle (SDV) training at the unit level and
certification-to-deploy training at off-island training sites. Training
at these sites is required as a result of limited on-island training in
Hawaii and the unavailability of cold-water training environments to
certify a SDV Platoon in accordance with mission essential tasks. NSW
is currently conducting MFP-11 FYDP planning to address long-term
reductions.
U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC): A shortfall in
Military Training Specific Allotment (MTSA) will curtail mandatory
education and adversely impact the morale, professional development and
career advancement of our officers and enlisted force. USASOC will not
be able to meet the requirements to train Army Special Forces Soldiers
as directed by Department of the Army. Duty position-required training
and TDY en-route to meet readiness requirements will not be met.
Authorized training to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations, HQDA will cease due to the reductions. USASOC will compete
for available resources during HQDA budget office mid-year review data
call.
Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC): At the end of FY13
and beginning of FY14 the furlough and sequestration actions had some
measurable negative affect on AFSOC C-130 aircraft program. Because of
that, AFSOC C-130 aircrafts were being pushed 45-60 days behind at the
depot for maintenance, which is past the 16 month requirement and the
deliveries were late by 30 days. The lateness continues because the
maintainers are not allowed to work overtime due to no funding.
Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC): The unforeseen
impacts would affect the use of the USMC ranges due to lack of funding
for the range operators and support personnel.
Rotary Wing Support: In recent years, U.S. Navy (USN) provided
dedicated Rotary Wing support to Special Operations Forces (SOF)
through a USN-SOCOM memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that provided for the
employment of two Navy Reserve H-60 squadrons. Specifically, the
squadrons supported both our Components and Theater Special Operations
Command (TSOCs) in operational and training support. As a result of
Service budget cuts concerning these two Reserve Squadrons, the Navy
requested no funds for FY-16, with divestiture to be completed by the
end of the fiscal year.
Contract support to SOF enterprise. Contracting support is one of
the key logistics enablers that SOF relies on the Services to provide.
Due to the force reductions tied to the current budget reductions the
Army is targeting to increase the number of Soldiers filling
Contracting Military Occupation Specialties (MOSs). Contracting support
is a critical operational need that is expected to grow with Campaign
Plan-Global Special Operations (CP-GSO) expanded persistent presence in
support of Geographic Combatant Commands' SOF requirements.
Mr. Wilson. How are the roles of women in SOF changing? Can you
outline for the committee on SOCOM plans for assigning women in
previously closed positions?
General Votel. (1) Women serve in a wide variety of operations and
in career fields such as Civil Affairs, Military Information Support
Operations (MISO), and Air Force Special Operations aviation. As part
of the Women in Service Review (WISR), USSOCOM Components are reviewing
and validating standards of SOF occupational specialties to ensure they
are operationally relevant, occupational specific and applied in a
gender-neutral manner. Once these standards are implemented, those who
are best qualified will serve--including women.
USSOCOM has made significant progress integrating women into
previously closed positions and units. Since Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) rescinded the Direct Ground Combat Assignment Rule (DGCAR) in
January 2013, USSOCOM, in coordination with the Services, has opened
over 7000 position to include the 160th Special Operations Aviation
Regiment (SOAR). Most of this progress has occurred in the U.S. Army
Special Operations Command component because of DCAR which prevented
women from serving below the brigade level in combat arms and Service
assignment policies. Army Directive 2015-08 (Expanding Positions in
Open Occupations for the Assignment of Female Soldiers within U.S. Army
Special Operations Command) opened the majority of the positions within
U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The entire 160th Special
Operations Aviation Regiment is now open--all pilot, crew chief, and
enabler positions opened as of July 23, 2014 (except 13F which is still
a closed MOS in the Army). Currently there are three female pilots and
one female crew chief serving in the 160th SOAR.
Congress approved our latest notification packet on November 18,
2014 to open enabler positions down to battalion level in 1st Special
Forces Command and the Special Warfare Center and School. The remaining
positions closed to women in SOF are in closed occupations such as
SEAL, Special Forces (18 series), the 75th Ranger Regiment, and enabler
positions attached to SOF tactical units or that require an additional
skill identifier from a closed school such as Army Ranger School. (2)
USSOCOM is conducting the WISR effort in three phases. The first phase
involved a thorough Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,
Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLFP-P) analysis and
was completed in the spring of 2014. The second phase consists of
cultural and sociological studies focusing on unit, social and task
cohesion in SOF tactical units. The studies were conducted by RAND,
Joint Special Operations University and Kansas University. The third
phase is training standards validation and is currently underway. Each
service component analyzes training standards to ensure they accurately
reflect occupational/mission requirements, which includes third party
support (Naval Health and Research Center, Office of Personnel
Management) to provide non-biased job analysis and scientific data to
ensure standards are operationally valid and occupational specific.
Once validated, the standards will be implemented in a gender neutral
manner. Lastly, the USSOCOM commander will collaborate with the
services in order to decide the best way forward for the SOCOM
enterprise. His recommendation will go forward to the SECDEF, in
coordination with the Services, in September 2015. Assignment of women
to newly opened positions will be accomplished through coordination
with the Services and in accordance with Service assignment policies
and procedures.
Mr. Wilson. What does SOF expect to divest--or get rid of--in the
FY16 budget request and for the next few years? Without divestitures or
reductions in some areas, how will you ensure that we are not building
a hollow force that we cannot afford?
General Votel. United States Special Operations Command remains
committed to maintaining a balanced, capable force. Capability
requirements, both current and new, are subjected to comprehensive
reviews and analysis. As part of these reviews, it is determined what
programs can be divested or reduced in order to support any new
initiative. In addition to exploring potential divestitures or
reductions, we are also recapitalizing older platforms such as the MC-
130P and AC-130H in a one-for-one replacement with newer, more capable
platforms (MC-130J and AC-130J). Other reductions and divestitures from
previous years will be continue to be evident in the FY16 budget
request. These include the planned divestiture of MQ-1 Predators from
24-10 by the end of FY16, the reduction of C-145A (M-28) platforms from
16 to 5 while retaining pilot proficiency and currency at the Aviation
Foreign Internal Defense (AvFID) squadrons, and continuing realignment
of U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) forces from
Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA) to smaller Operational Detachment
Golfs (ODG) and supporting detachments to better meet evolving
Geographical Combatant Command (GCC) requirements. These
recapitalizations, divestitures, reductions and realignments in the
FY16 budget request ensure we continue to maintain a capable and
balanced force ready to protect the Nation's vital interests.
Mr. Wilson. Special Operations Forces and the Intelligence
Community have experienced an unprecedented integration of both
operational and analytical activities. SOCOM has also considerably
expanded its funding of intelligence capabilities and activities. While
details are classified--can you discuss this integration and are there
any concerns? Can you discuss how the Department conducts appropriate
oversight of these sensitive activities?
General Votel. At current, we do not have concerns with the level
of integration between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the
intelligence community (IC). Our interagency relationships are strong
and we, in the SOF community, are always interested in opportunities to
improve communication, coordination, collaboration, and integration
with our IC partners.
USSOCOM and the greater SOF enterprise places an emphasis on
communicating, coordinating, collaborating, and, where applicable,
integrating with our Intelligence Community partners both in our
operational and analytical activities. These partnerships allow us to
share the burden of managing conflicts and enhancing capabilities that
allow us all to formulate and implement a better whole-of-government
response.
At the operational to strategic level, the preponderance of
intelligence consumed by Special Operations units is collected,
processed, exploited and disseminated by other U.S. Government (USG)/
Department of Defense (DOD) elements across the IC. SOF intelligence
analysts communicate and coordinate daily with IC partners on all
aspects of intelligence collection, analysis, and production to
mitigate and avoid duplication of effort and ensure compliance with
established IC directives.
Additionally, to further reduce duplicity and redundancy, USSOCOM
maintains a team of interagency liaisons throughout the SOF enterprise
and provides SOF liaisons to many interagency headquarters. These
relationships help facilitate better de-confliction and synchronization
of intelligence in support of SOF operations, and assists in providing
situational awareness of overseas events and activities. The main focus
is to ensure the most efficient and effective use of intelligence
professionals, systems, and resources in order to deliver timely
information to SOF.
Only when the pre-existing IC data is exhausted, the intelligence
and operational requirements are SOF niche, or compressed timelines
associated with special operations will SOF solely rely on our
dedicated tactical organic collection and analysis. However, even in
these cases, SOF intelligence operations and analysis is coordinated
fully with the necessary IC partners.
Oversight of SOF intelligence and intelligence-related capabilities
is shared by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)),
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), and the recently re-designated
Department of Defense Senior Intelligence Oversight Official (DOD
SIOO).
Federal law and Executive Order (EO) assigned specific oversight
requirements to the USD(I), the ASD(SO/LIC), and the SIOO regarding the
employment of SOF. These requirements are amplified by DOD policies.
The below chart (Figure 1) identifies both policy and funding
responsibilities.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Because the House Rule X(j)(1)(c) definition of intelligence
activities includes ``clandestine activities'' and spans both
intelligence and Special Operations traditional military sensitive
activities, the USD(I), the ASD(SO/LIC), and the SIOO each exercise
oversight of special operations organizations based on the activities
that these operational elements conduct.
The following chart outlines the key questions that enables USD(I),
ASD(SO/LIC), and SIOO to understand the activity and how the elements
were funded and developed. This chart (Figure 2) also frames how
USD(I), ASD(SO/LIC), and SIOO cooperate to ensure oversight between all
three entities.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Wilson. Given the nature of diminishing resources and
budget constraints, what is the current and future status of the
Command's Global SOF Network initiative?
General Votel. In an era of constrained budgets, pursuing an
international network approach is more important than ever. When
Admiral McRaven initially described his vision for a ``global SOF
network'' in January 2013, he based it on analysis of national
strategic guidance, and it encompassed three distinct objectives:
-- Strengthen the global network of SOF, U.S. government partners,
and partner nations
-- Provide Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) and Chiefs of
Mission with improved special operations capacity, and
-- Align structures, processes, and authorities to enable that
network.
USSOCOM described this network approach and the function of each
node in a Concept of Operations (CONOPS), which was endorsed by the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in October 2013.
As national security challenges and threats are increasingly global
and interconnected, USSOCOM continues to prioritize a globally
networked approach to addressing them. That is why in my posture
statement designated ``building relationships'' as one of my top
priorities. While moving away from the terminology ``global SOF
network,'' USSOCOM is continuing to build relationships and strengthen
its international network, through sustained security cooperation,
expanded communication architectures and liaison activities.
Below are some updates on initiatives related to building
relationships. These initiatives do not entail requests for additional
resources, but rather shift existing resources. At its core, the
international approach is a way of doing business.
USSOCOM now has SOF representatives from 13 different
nations working at its headquarters. Liaison/exchange positions are
established upon completion of a Memorandum of Agreement between the
United States and each individual country, as authorized by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense for Policy. USSOCOM currently hosts special
operations international liaison and exchange officers from: Australia,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Jordan, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. Officers from
Italy, Singapore, and Poland are expected to be assigned within the
coming months.
These partner nation SOF representatives work in a
section of the headquarters specifically modified to ensure security of
information while enabling multi-national collaboration, the J3-
International (J3-I) Division. The J3-I offices are collocated within
the headquarters in close proximity to other J3 office spaces. The
space was renovated in 2014 to ensure that there was a purpose-built
area in full compliance with applicable U.S. law, policy, and
intelligence community directives for international coordination.
As a complement to integrating SOF representatives into
USSOCOM headquarters, USSOCOM assigns U.S. officers as Special
Operations Liaison Officers (SOLOs) to key SOF partners across the
globe. Currently, there are 15 SOLOs assigned to U.S. Embassies abroad
with locations in every geographic area of responsibility. The intent
of the SOLO program is to maintain enduring presence with select
partner nation SOF in order to support the development of key SOF
partners, prepare for future contingencies, and build mutually
beneficial relationships in support of Geographic Combatant Command
priorities.
A communications infrastructure is imperative in
supporting the international network and partnership initiatives.
USSOCOM is capitalizing on the capabilities provided by the
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD-I) through its U.S.
Battlefield Information Collaboration and Exploitation System (US
BICES) for SECRET Releasable collaboration and the Defense Information
Support Agency's (DISA) All Partner Access Network (APAN) for
unclassified collaboration. Enterprise systems like APAN and BICES
ensure broad collaboration and information exchange capabilities are
available to USSOCOM and accredited partner nations to enable the
global network approach to function effectively. NOTE: Additional
unclassified capabilities are required to address USSOCOM and GCC's
requirements to collaborate and communicate sensitive, but unclassified
information at an enterprise level. USSOCOM is actively working through
multiple OSD agencies to ensure these requirements are met in a timely
manner.
These initiatives have demonstrated value and return on investment,
most recently exemplified by the rapid employment of partner nation SOF
to support U.S. Central Command's Operation INHERENT RESOLVE.
Through this networked approach, USSOCOM can support partners in a
region where they may be better positioned to achieve shared desired
outcomes, due to historic, political, or geographic relationships. By
enabling and working with SOF partners, USSOCOM can share the burden of
managing conflicts and work together to increase capabilities of
regional partners, to provide security solutions to meet threats at
their origin.
This is the network approach in action--providing national
decision-makers the opportunity to pursue multinational, tailored
efforts that best meet the specific problem set, context, and
preference of regional partners. Not to mention, this approach enables
the U.S. to collectively shoulder resource requirements with partners
in an era of constrained defense budgets.
Mr. Wilson. The February 2013 Unified Campaign Plan assigned
theater special operations commands as sub-unified commands to SOCOM
rather than the geographic combatant commands. Please explain why the
UCP was changed. a. Do you plan to expand the theater special-
operations commands and, if so, how much and for what purposes? b. How
will you coordinate future activities with the geographic combatant
commands?
General Votel. The proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan
(UCP) will improve USSOCOM's ability to prioritize, deploy and balance
global Special Operation Forces (SOF) requirements in support of the
Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). It will allow USSOCOM to shift
SOF, with the concurrence of the GCC Commanders, globally to meet
rapidly evolving requirements.
The UCP establishes the missions, responsibilities, and force
structure for unified combatant commands, delineates Area of
Responsibility (AOR) boundaries for GCCs, and specifies
responsibilities for Functional Combatant Commands (FCCs). The UCP
currently states ``Commander, United States Special Operations Command
(CDRUSSOCOM) is responsible for synchronizing planning for global
operations against terrorist networks. . . .'' The changes we seek
broadens USSOCOM's role to include synchronizing the employment of
global SOF operations; the proposed language reads ``CDRUSSOCOM is
responsible for synchronizing the planning and employment of special
operations globally, and will do so in coordination with other
combatant commands, the Services, and, as directed, appropriate U.S.
Government agencies.'' This change will improve our ability to
prioritize, deploy and balance SOF requirements and will codify how we
posture SOF to meet requirements within and across GCCs.
The Secretary of Defense uses the ``Forces For'' Memorandum and
Unified Command Assignment Tables to assign and allocate forces to GCCs
and FCCs. The changes reflected in the February 11, 2013 memorandum
formally assigned USSOCOM combatant command (COCOM) authority of the
Theater Special Operation Commands (TSOCs) and forward stationed SOF,
making USSOCOM responsible for the readiness and training of all SOF
regardless of assignment location. However, having COCOM of the TSOCs
does not change the Operational Command (OPCON) relationships between
the GCCs and SOF assigned to their AORs. The GCCs retain OPCON
authority of the TSOCS and remain the Supported Command with USSOCOM as
the Supporting Command.
To support and implement the ``Forces For'' memorandum, the
Department transferred baseline TSOC Headquarters (HQ) resources from
the GCC/Service Major Force Program (MFP-2) accounts to USSOCOM (MFP-
11) during the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 budget cycle. This transfer
included funding and manpower associated with TSOC training, mission
support and planning, communications/IT, personnel, headquarters
management, and command and control (C2) activities.
USSOCOM's FY 2016 Budget Request also includes additional resource
and manpower adjustments that will better enable the TSOCs to optimize
their ability to address GCC requirements. Additional manpower,
critical Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
(C4I), and other operational support will improve TSOC structure, C2
capabilities, and provide flexibility to meet emerging requirements.
These enhancements support USSOCOM's intent to provide an equally
capable TSOC to each GCC. Manpower adjustments include the internal
realignment of over 800 military and civilian positions (across FY14-
20), from Headquarters USSOCOM and its Service Components, to the TSOCs
to provide command and control and other operational support
activities. In FY 2016, additional O&M was provided to enable these
personnel to support the TSOC mission.
The proposed changes to the UCP regarding USSOCOM synchronizer
responsibilities and the assignment of COCOM authority to USSOCOM in
the Forces For memorandum does not change USSOCOM's obligation and
commitment to support the GCCs by providing them a SOF capabilities
through the TSOCs. However, it does enhance USSOCOM's ability to
support the GCCs by tailoring SOF capability and capacity of the TSOCs
to meet the operational demands of the GCC commanders in their Area of
Responsibility (AOR). To balance global special operation activities,
USSOCOM is implementing a synchronization and prioritization framework
to develop recommendations for DOD-level decisions that prioritize
special operations, actions, and activities such that GCCs/TSOCs--who
will be active participants in the process--understand how USSOCOM will
address priorities for SOF; where and why USSOCOM intends to recommend
allocation of special operation resources; and what resources GCCs can
reasonably expect for planning.
Mr. Wilson. U.S. Northern Command recently established Special
Operations Command North (SOCNORTH). Please discuss how SOCOM has
helped resource this command and how SOCOM is working with this
particular theater special operations command (TSOC). Are there any
issues with Special Operations Forces working within a domestic
framework?
General Votel. SOCOM has helped resourcing this command by:
Total ``start-up'' funding obligated for SOCNORTH is $6.1M (MFP-2)
and $3.8M (MFP-11) from both FY 2013 and FY 2014. Additionally, SOCOM
has budgeted $250K in MFP-11 O&M funding to support SOCNORTH in FY15.
The Air Force, at the behest of SOCOM, funded a $6.1M renovation
(less C4I costs) of Hangar 104 to provide SOCNORTH an interim facility.
SOCNORTH's anticipated move-in date is late April/early May 2015.
USSOCOM has actively engaged with USNORTHCOM and SOCNORTH to obtain
Air Force military construction funding for a new, permanent $58
million operations facility. This project, requested for FY 2018, will
support SOCNORTH's permanent bed-down at Peterson AFB, Colorado.
SOCNORTH has been designated by Commander, USNORTHCOM as the
supported command for all counter terrorism related activities, and
specialized support of federal law enforcement within the USNORTHCOM
AOR.
SOCNORTH will support federal law enforcement agencies tasked to
provide the capacity, expertise, and the global focus against threat
networks supporting USNORTHCOM plans.
SOCNORTH continues to thicken its network of partners, improving
its understanding and building relationships, while establishing
processes with the U.S. interagency and other partners through
engagements and exercises.
Mr. Wilson. Can you outline some of the more difficult advanced
technology requirements that SOF needs in order to maintain an edge on
the battlefield? a. As we withdraw from major combat in Afghanistan,
will the need for non-lethal weapons and directed energy weapons
increase? b. How are you managing to stay ahead in research and
development while your budget in this area has steadily declined over
the past several fiscal years? c. What role does the Combating
Terrorism and Technical Support Office (CTTSO) play in filling SOF
technology requirements?
General Votel. a. The withdraw of General Purpose Forces from major
combat in Afghanistan will not increase the need for non-lethal (NL) or
directed energy (DE) weapons for SOF. SOF operations outside of
declared areas of armed conflict (ODTAAC) are typically politically
sensitive and require ultra-precision for target engagement and direct
action. All types of NL and lethal technologies that enable ultra-
precision for SOF target engagement and direct action will be needed.
These technologies include focused and tailored effects for kinetic
weapons, as well as NL and DE weapons. NL weapons include a variety of
technologies that produce specific types of target effects. DE is a
type of weapons technology that can produce lethal or non-lethal target
effects, depending on the DE parameters and target vulnerabilities. DE
weapons offer the advantage of ultra-precision and rapid target
engagement, but have significant systems engineering, platform
integration, and operational policy challenges. NL weapons may offer
advantages for use in politically sensitive offensive operations that
limit or restrict the use of lethal force, or when U.S. forces, non-
combatants and/or hostages may in close proximity to enemy targets.
b. USSOCOM will continue to leverage Service, Agency, and
Department of Energy technology development investments, limiting Major
Force Program Eleven (MFP-11) resources on SOF-unique development and
system modification efforts. Through a deliberate campaign to share SOF
capability needs, we have been able to influence and benefit greatly
from the work already being done. For some technologies, such as
precision munitions and DE, USSOCOM is highly reliant on larger Service
development investments. Because of the technological challenges with
NL and DE weapons, USSOCOM's intent is to leverage Service/Agency
development and serve as early adaptors once the technologies and
system engineering challenges mature.
More emphasis for longer-range airborne, ground and maritime NL
weapons capabilities to support offensive operations is needed to
support SOF capability needs. More emphasis on systems engineering
early in the development process is needed for DE weapons to make them
more viable options for SOF. Other advanced technologies of interest to
SOF include: advanced seekers for munitions to improve the probability
of kill against fast, erratically maneuvering targets; non-lethal
personnel immobilization; signature reduction technologies
(multispectral, acoustic); strength and endurance enhancement; night
vision; unbreakable/unjammable, encrypted, low probability to detect/
low probability of intercept communications; long-range non-lethal
vehicle stopping; clandestine non-lethal vessel stopping; clandestine
non-lethal equipment and facility disablement/defeat; full spectrum
threat platform defense (aircraft, vehicle, vessel); combined effects
weapons; advanced offensive and defensive cyber capabilities; tethered
sensors for target detection, identification and engagement in all
weather conditions; clandestine tagging, tracking, and locating;
intelligence data trend detection, extraction and display; weapons of
mass destruction render safe; chemical and biological agent defeat.
c. The CTTSO has funded technology development projects and
established Memoranda of Agreement with Partner Nations for technology
development information sharing to support SOF counterterrorism (CT)
capability needs. CTTSO plays an important role in taking operational
needs from our SOF components and rapidly producing usable prototypes
to help refine requirements for SOF operators. CTTSO hosts yearly
reviews to identify user needs that are able to be addressed through
mature technologies typically within 12-18 months. The CTTSO also
offers a viable program to support weapons technology development for
SOF CT operations that falls outside the criteria for the Joint NL
Weapons Program. Recent changes in DOD NL weapons policy limits the NL
weapons definition to only weapons that have immediate, predictable
target effects that are intended to be relatively reversible and return
the target to its pre-engagement function. CTTSO offers USSOCOM an
avenue to pursue legal, treaty-compliant weapons technologies that are
neither intended to produce relatively reversible nor lethal target
effects.
Mr. Wilson. Can you update the committee on SOCOM's intelligence
functions, requirements, and initiatives? What specific intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements do you have?
General Votel. a. USSOCOM's Intelligence Functions: Geographic
Combatant Commanders (GCCs) assign specific tasks and missions to
allocated Special Operations Forces (SOF); in turn, SOF conduct
activities that are different from conventional military missions.
These activities and missions have unique intelligence requirements
that require special capabilities for collection. Where conventional
forces are often most focused on the operational to strategic level of
intelligence, special operations require the most precise and specific
level of detailed tactical information possible in order to ensure
mission success. A distinct analytic capability, based on unique SOF
collection requirements, is required to ensure SOF receive tailored,
detailed, and timely intelligence. In order to execute DOD's mandate as
part of national strategy and policy, SOF mist assess current and
future threats within each GCC's area of responsibility and posture to
minimize of defeat those threats. This requires a deeper level and
finer resolution of analysis covering social networks, human identity,
political environment, economics/business and organizational networks.
b. USSOCOM's Intelligence Requirements: Since 2011, operational
requirements for SOF ISR and Service ISR support to SOF have grown
between 10% and 14% per year while available ISR sourcing solutions
have declined, with the sharpest decrease (36%) from FY14 to FY15.
While we cannot accurately predict the growth of SOF ISR requirements
over time, it is apparent that the global demand for SOF Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities will continue to
grow over the next several years.
c. USSOCOM's Intelligence Initiatives:
1. Continued Interagency Coordination: USSOCOM maintains a close-
knit relationship with the U.S. Government partners in the Intelligence
Community (IC). However, SOF niche requirements and the compressed
timelines associated with special operations do require dedicated
tactical organic collection and analysis as part of the SOF enterprise.
Extensive coordination is done between agencies and in-depth research
accomplished to ensure compliance with established procedures. SOF
intelligence analysts communicate daily with IC partners on all aspects
of intelligence production to mitigate and avoid duplication of effort
in the production cycle.
2. USSOCOM ISR Roadmap: The ISR Roadmap outlines analysis of the
command's overarching plan for ISR. It compares projected requirements
against programmed resources, identifying investment strategies and
characterizing gaps between SOF and service plans. The fundamental
pillar of this roadmap is the shift in ISR terminology, which
characterizes varying levels of capability across the four legs of the
ISR pyramid: platforms, sensors, data transport, and processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (PED). This differentiation between
levels of ISR capability is critical to the Roadmap as it enables
commanders to better articulate what they need. This refined
terminology enables USSOCOM to make better resourcing and acquisition
decisions.
Mr. Wilson. What manned and unmanned ISR systems are you investing
in, and why? How do you coordinate with the Services in these areas?
General Votel. a. USSOCOM ISR Investments:
1. Airborne ISR (AISR) manned and unmanned platforms have been
operating in mostly permissive threat environments and good weather
conditions. Manned platforms have been used to help mitigate the
impacts of poor weather to effective ISR, but come with limited
endurance. SOF's global mission and emerging threats dictate that SOF
AISR must be able to operate in non-permissive, hostile, or sensitive
areas where our current platform inventory cannot operate without risk
of compromise.
2. Through analysis supporting the development of the ISR Roadmap,
shortfalls in tactical/organic capability were identified to support
theater SOF missions. In response to those gaps, two distinctly
different UAS capabilities are being pursued to provide a collection
capability for the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs); the
Multi-Mission Tactical UAS and the Army Group III UAS. These two
systems will provide an unmanned option to meet TSOC collection
requirements. Following the decision to retain the U-28, USSOCOM
initiated a Next Generation AISR study as part of the development of an
Initial Capabilities Document identifying the requirements of the
manned AISR platform to replace the U-28.
b. USSOCOM-Service ISR Coordination: Coordination with the Services
is conducted through a variety of opportunities including individual
Key Leader Engagements, SOCOM-Service Warfighter Talks, submission of
Integrated Priority Lists, participation in OSD and Joint Staff
Battlespace Awareness meetings and integration forums, and review and
coordination of Joint Capability Integration Development System
requirement documentation.
Mr. Wilson. What role does your J2 (Intelligence) Director play in
identifying and filling those unique requirements?
General Votel. a. Within USSOCOM J2, the J24 Intelligence
Capabilities and Requirements Division oversees the Intelligence
Portfolio and manages J2 responsibilities for the identification,
evaluation, and validation of SOF-peculiar intelligence related
requirements as well as providing resourcing advocacy on behalf of the
SOF intelligence network. The J2 utilizes data calls, Defense Readiness
Reporting System, and integrated priority lists (IPL) submissions in
addition to leading multiple requirements forums, including the SOF ISR
Council, to conduct planning, analysis, development, and implementation
of TSOC and Component intelligence requirements in accordance with
Special Operations Forces Capability Integration Development (SOFCIDS)
Authority. Additionally, the J2 oversees critical intelligence
capability initiatives that require formal documentation and validation
through the SOFCIDS and Special Operations Command Requirements
Evaluation Board (SOCREB) processes.
b. USSOCOM, as authorized by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC), is designated the Joint Capabilities Board and has
delegation of authority to approve and pursue Special Operations
Capabilities. This authority is recognized by the Joint Staff and the
Services and supported by the Department. When USSOCOM validates its
Requirements it does so with the authority of the JS and JROC.
c. Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Memorandum 179-09
(dtd: 2 Nov 09) approved USSOCOM's SOCREB designation as the Special
Operations Joint Capabilities Board (JCB). The SOCREB manages and
approves all Special Operations-Peculiar capability documents
designated below the Joint Staffing Designator (JSD) of JROC Interest.
Having the authorities to approve Special Operations-Peculiar
capability documents also gives SOCOM the responsibility for
certifications and/or endorsements of all documents designated JCB
Interest and below.
d. In the cases where the Joint Staff has responsibility (JROC
Interest) for certification and endorsements, and the JROC has
validation authority, USSOCOM documents will be endorsed by the SOCREB,
the Joint Staff organization will certify, endorse, or waive each item,
and provide an associated memo to the Joint Staff Gatekeeper to support
staffing and validation.
Mr. Wilson. How is SOCOM working to resource Theater Special
Operations Command intelligence requirements?
General Votel. a. Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC)
intelligence requirements are resourced in accordance with
authoritative guidance outlined in DODD 5100.03, Defense Planning
Guidance (DPG), USSOCOM Capabilities and Planning Guidance (CPG), and
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Preparation Instructions (PPI).
TSOC's intelligence requirements are assessed to ensure they are SOF-
peculiar, supported by validated requirements, and satisfy USSOCOM's
highest priorities.
b. TSOCs intelligence requirements appropriate for DIA MIP funding
are submitting through the Intelligence POM (IPOM) process, whereas
TSOC intelligence requirements that meet SOF current and future mission
requirements are submitted through the POM process are resourced with
MFP-11 and MFP-3. Validated TSOC intelligence priority shortfalls may
be supported and resourced through annual un-funded requirement (UFR)
process.
Mr. Wilson. What role is SOCOM playing in the Defense Intelligence
Agency's new Defense Clandestine Service?
General Votel. USSOCOM's relationship to DIA/DCS is similar to that
of the military services. Specific details were provided at a
classified level in response to House Appropriations Committee-Defense
(HAC-D) requests for information (RFIs) on 27 Aug 2014 by the Office of
the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence. USSOCOM provided
additional information in response to RFIs from the House
Appropriations Committee on Surveys and Investigations (HAC S&I).
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. Hunter. General Votel, I'm aware that almost every Army Special
Operations unit under your command is requesting a commercially
available product to fill capability gaps in their intelligence
requirements. These units are saying that the current program of record
does not meet their operational needs. Given this information and the
obvious failure of DCGS-SOF to provide this capability, how do you plan
to hold program managers and staff accountable to the tax payer and the
men and women under your command that expect a working system?
General Votel. Special operations personnel have always had a high
demand for advanced analytical capabilities to understand and target
enemy networks. During the course of the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, some special operations units relied on capabilities
provided by Palantir to meet these requirements. In 2009 USSOCOM
directed that Palantir be used as an interim solution for advanced
analytics. To date, USSOCOM has invested over $30M in fielding Palantir
for Special Operations Forces (SOF). This interim solution continues to
deliver advanced analytic capabilities to our operators and
intelligence personnel and makes a difference on the battlefield.
USSOCOM continues to field Palantir to units supporting counter-
ISIL operations in Iraq and Syria. However, the FY 2014 National
Defense Authorization Act directed all DCGS programs to openly compete
requirements for commercial solutions. Therefore, USSOCOM released an
All-Source Analytic Environment (ASAE) Request for Proposal to industry
to create a long-term program of record solution to address these
requirements. USSOCOM is currently in vendor source selection for this
program, and will look to employ the best solution as part of DCGS-SOF.
DCGS-SOF continues to provide Full Motion Video Processing,
Exploitation and Dissemination (FMV PED) and Signals Intelligence
(SIGINT) enablers to SOF. These capabilities are fully fielded and
employed every day. Deployed operators and intelligence personnel don't
need to request the DCGS-SOF Enterprise SOF Data Layer, because it is
already there providing access to key information.
The program manager and the entire DCGS-SOF team are keenly aware
of the need to deliver capability to the operator and value to the
taxpayer. Since 2008, the DCGS-SOF team has been providing exceptional
capability to the SOF operator supporting the FMV PED and SIGINT
missions. Over the long term, the team is committed to maintaining an
advanced analytic capability that delivers on targeting enemy networks.
DCGS-SOF will remain the overarching program we use to deliver
outstanding intelligence capability to our special operators around the
globe.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
Mr. Brooks. What is the status of FY15 Counterterrorism
Partnerships Fund (CTPF) execution?
Secretary Lumpkin. First, thank you for making the Counterterrorism
Partnerships Fund (CTPF) available to the Department of Defense to
provide additional support and assistance to partner nation security
forces for counterterrorism and crisis response activities. Since my
designation as the Department's fund manager in February of this year,
I have been overseeing the development of an implementation strategy
that provides support in an efficient and effective manner.
On February 24, 2015, and March 16, 2015, the Department of Defense
notified Congress of its intent to transfer $220.5 million and $279.5
million, respectively, from the fund to Operation and Maintenance
accounts to provide immediate assistance to vetted elements of the
Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrians and groups for
the remainder of fiscal year (FY) 2015. The Syria Train and Equip
program consists of four inter-related efforts to train and equip,
sustain, and increase the numbers of appropriately vetted Syrian
opposition forces.
Additionally, the Department has developed partnership concepts for
five regions in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. Africa
Command (USAFRICOM) areas of responsibility: the Levant, Yemen, the
Lake Chad Basin, Sahel-Maghreb, and East Africa. Interagency review of
these papers was completed on Friday, April 3. The concepts will serve
as the strategic foundation for the development of program-level
proposals to support counterterrorism and crisis response activities in
each of the five regions. These activities may include partner nation
capacity building, U.S. forces enabling support, and other activities
authorized under a number of different authorities available to the
Department.
USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM planners have begun developing program-
level proposals to support each of the five partnership concepts. These
proposals are currently being reviewed to identify which can be
executed in FY 2015, and which should be scheduled for execution in FY
2016. Programs to support the partnership concept for Yemen will be
delayed until the security and political situation there improves
sufficiently.
Mr. Brooks. What are the Department's priorities and the process
for allies and the Services to request FY15 CTPF funding?
Secretary Lumpkin. In determining Department of Defense (DOD)
priorities for Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) funding that
are consistent with the new authority, we have worked closely with an
interagency counterterrorism board in developing a governance mechanism
that uses the National Strategy for Counterterrorism Tier Focus Areas
as a foundation for our effort. We determined that these focus areas,
that are used to inform regional and functional CT strategies, would be
appropriate in developing strategies and programs to be funded under
the CTPF. Additionally, we excluded Tier Focus Areas that are already
well-funded; for example, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Using the Tier Focus Areas as a starting point, SOLIC leadership
oversaw the development of strategic-level partnership concepts for
five regions in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. Africa
Command (USAFRICOM) areas of responsibility: the Levant, Yemen, the
Lake Chad Basin, Sahel-Maghreb, and East Africa. These concepts were
developed in close coordination with USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, the Joint
Staff, relevant regional and functional offices within OSD Policy, and
DOD Comptroller. They were subsequently reviewed by other departments
and agencies through an NSC-led interagency review process that
concluded on April 3, 2015.
Now that these concepts are finalized, they will serve as the
strategic foundation for the development of program-level proposals to
support CT and crisis response activities in each of the five regions.
Country teams have been working closely with partner nation militaries
to identify capability gaps and assess current and future absorptive
capacity. Based on that information, USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM will
submit program-level proposals to support each of the five partnership
concepts. These program-level proposals will be analyzed and
prioritized based on their urgency and executability.
Mr. Brooks. When will the committee receive the Department's
reprogramming requests for use of FY15 CTPF?
Secretary Lumpkin. On February 24, 2015, and March 16, 2015, the
Department notified Congress of its intent to transfer $220.5 million
and $279.5 million, respectively, from the fund to Operation and
Maintenance accounts to continue to provide immediate assistance to
vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted
Syrian groups for the remainder of fiscal year (FY) 2015.
I anticipate that the Department will submit other reprogramming
requests within the next 60 days to fund other programs of assistance
identified to support partner and U.S. counterterrorism and crisis
response activities, as program-level proposals are approved. As part
of the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) proposal review
process, CTPF stakeholders are determining which proposals can be
executed in FY 2015, and which should be scheduled for execution in FY
2016.
Mr. Brooks. Has the Department released the detailed FY16 CTPF
budget justification material? If not, does it plan to release the FY16
CTPF justification details?
Secretary Lumpkin. The Department of Defense released the fiscal
year 2016 Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund budget justification
material on Monday, April 6, 2015.
[all]