[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-18]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES HEARING
ON
AIR FORCE PROJECTION FORCES
AVIATION PROGRAMS AND CAPABILITIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 4, 2015
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
94-220 WASHINGTON : 2015
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
DUNCAN HUNTER, California HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri Georgia
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
John Sullivan, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Katherine Rember, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
WITNESSES
Holmes, Lt Gen James M. ``Mike,'' USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Strategic Plans and Requirements, Department of the Air Force.. 2
LaPlante, Dr. William A., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Acquisition, Department of the Air Force................... 1
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Courtney, Hon. Joe........................................... 17
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 15
LaPlante, Dr. William A., joint with Lt Gen James M. ``Mike''
Holmes..................................................... 18
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 35
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 42
Mr. Forbes................................................... 39
Mr. Larsen................................................... 41
.
AIR FORCE PROJECTION FORCES AVIATION PROGRAMS AND CAPABILITIES FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2016
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 4, 2015.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. We want to welcome everybody today to our
hearing on the Air Force Projection Forces Aviation Programs
and Capabilities for Fiscal Year 2016. The unfortunate thing,
as we all know, they are going to schedule votes or have
scheduled votes anywhere from now to maybe 2:30, so we are
going to waive our opening remarks. Mr. Courtney and I both
have agreed to that. And with that, we want to get right to our
witnesses so they can make whatever comments they would like to
make to the members. I have told them previously, Mr. Courtney
has agreed to this, of course, that all their written remarks
will be made part of the record. You can refer to those if you
would like or you can just talk off the cuff, but we are just
glad to have both of you here.
As you know, we have Dr. William LaPlante here. He is the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition for the
Department of the Air Force. Dr. LaPlante, thank you so much
for joining us and for all the work you do for our country. We
also have Lieutenant General James M. ``Mike'' Holmes, who is
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements
for the Department of the Air Force. General, thank you again
for your service, and to all those people who serve with you
and below you. We appreciate their service to our country.
And with that, Dr. LaPlante, I think you are going to start
us off, and then we will go the General. So the floor is yours.
[The prepared statements of Mr. Forbes and Mr. Courtney can
be found in the Appendix beginning on page 15.]
STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM A. LAPLANTE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Dr. LaPlante. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, and thank you,
Ranking Member Courtney, and the rest of the distinguished
ladies and gentlemen of the committee. I appreciate the work
you do and support you give us in the Pentagon and to the
warfighter. And what you do is very important. And we hope we
can answer all your questions and have a good discussion today.
General Holmes and I both have a joint prepared statement
that we submitted for the record. I am not going to go through
that statement here. I will just make a few remarks and then
turn it over to General Holmes. I will start by saying that,
you know, the challenge we have in our jobs in an acquisition
and programming strategy is quite simple. It is that we have
got these two competing problems. We have modernization, that
is, that is the airplanes, in your case, the mobility
airplanes, the bombers, that we are using today, and literally
using in the fight today. And the pilots flying these airplanes
are flying airplanes that are older than they are and keeping
that going. At the same time, we have to modernize for the
future.
Those two are linked, of course, because if we mess up the
modernization, then we just put more at risk, those pilots
flying those airplanes. So that is our challenge is between
those two things. And our job every day, General Holmes and I,
the Chief, the Secretary, our whole team, is keeping that all
together, keeping it together with a strategy. Oh, and by the
way, in a budget that is, to say the least, very, very
challenging. So all our discussions we have is about the trades
between those two categories, and then making sure that we keep
the modernization programs, the KC-46, the next tanker, the
next bomber, that we keep those programs on track and don't
lose our eye on the ball while we keep the modernization going.
And it is a difficult trade, but that is what--what we are here
to talk to you about. I look forward to your questions.
I will just stop at this point and then let General Holmes
give his remarks.
[The joint prepared statement of Dr. LaPlante and General
Holmes can be found in the Appendix on page 18.]
Mr. Forbes. General.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN JAMES M. ``MIKE'' HOLMES, USAF, DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, DEPARTMENT
OF THE AIR FORCE
General Holmes. Thank you, Dr. LaPlante. Chairman Forbes,
Ranking Member Courtney, gentlemen and ladies of the committee,
thank you for your continued support to the United States Air
Force, our airmen, and their families. Our Air Force remains
the most globally engaged air force on the planet, and we
continue to do our best to deliver global vigilance, global
reach, and global power for America every day. Our Air Force
today is the smallest in our history, and we see no end to the
incredible demand for the capabilities that we deliver. This
demand, coupled with an increasingly challenging global
situation and an uncertain budget environment, drives us to
make some very difficult choices.
The 2016 President's budget took some steps to improve our
situation, and it allowed us to maximize the contributions to
the total force, to reinforce investments in nuclear deterrence
and space control, to emphasize our long-range and global and
non-permissive capabilities, and to preserve our top three
procurement programs: the F-35, the KC-46, and the Long Range
Strike Bomber, two of which fit into your committee's
portfolio.
The President's budget added money above the BCA [Budget
Control Act] caps because the administration believes
additional spending is necessary to meet the requirements of
the strategy, and it gives us the ability to halt reductions in
our total force end strength, to continue our efforts to regain
full-spectrum readiness, and to lay the groundwork for future
innovation with some seed investments. However, we face
shortfalls in our ability to meet all the requirements of the
strategy even at those levels.
In shortfalls in capacity first. I will talk about
capacity, readiness, and modernization. Shortfalls in capacity
mean we must accept some risk in our ability to meet all the
requirements of the strategy. Shortfalls in readiness are
driven by previous funding levels and a continued high ops
[operations] tempo and demand for Air Force forces which
exaggerate the effect of the capacity shortfalls. And then
shortfalls in modernization mean potential adversaries, who
have had 20 years to watch the way the American military does
business and take steps to address it, are closing the
capability gaps that separated the U.S. military from potential
foes. This narrowed gap adds future risk to both mission and
forces. When forced to choose on where to take the risk and to
spread our dollars, the Department of Defense directed us and
all the services to take risk in our current capacity in order
to preserve readiness and the investments required to be ready
in the future.
As we look at the forces that we bring to you in this
committee, primarily our bomber, tanker, and transport forces,
I think that our bomber investment portfolio is in pretty good
shape. There are about $3 billion invested to make those
airplanes both compliant, to let them keep working in the
airspace system, and then to modernize them and make sure they
continue to do the things we require until the Long Range
Strike Bomber is brought on board in the numbers that we need
there.
On the tanker side, although we have a very old fleet, the
investments are in place there to keep those systems compliant
and keep them out there, and the KC-46 program is in place to
replace them. Bringing me then to the airlift side, the C-17,
we thank Congress and the committee for your tireless efforts
to get us that modernized airplane. It is one of our greatest
airplanes, and it is in shape for the future. We have some
investment in 2016 to make sure that we protect that investment
in the airplane. And then the C-5 modernization program is
coming to an end, and we are very happy with the results there.
So what I am left with and that I am most concerned about,
and I know that many members of the committee share that
concern, is our C-130 fleet as we advance into the future. How
do we make sure those airplanes remain safe, that they are
compliant with the requirements of both the national and the
international airspace system, and then that we modernize them
to last through the service life that we need, particularly the
H models, to exist.
We know that we have had years of discussion with you and
with the committee on the best way to go forward. We have
reached the position now that I am concerned that we will not
be able to keep the aircraft compliant to meet the deadlines
that the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] has set
basically by the end of this 5-year defense plan. And if I was
going to put all the money required into the AMP [avionics
modernization program] program to get it done in time to get
those airplanes compliant, I see the bill as coming to about
$2.8 billion over the 5-year defense program.
And Mr. Chairman, that $2.8 billion is kind of equivalent
to retiring the KC-10 fleet for the FYDP [Future Years Defense
Program], or retiring the C-5 fleet over the FYDP, or retiring
about 150 KC-135s. On the combat Air Force's side, it is
equivalent to the A-10 retirement that we had to take, or the
entire B-1 fleet, or a reduction, and a significant reduction
in 40 or so F-35s. So what we hope to do is to be able to work
with the members and with the committee to be able to move out
and to provide the compliance capability that those airplanes
need. We think that we need to move out quickly to provide them
with the radios that are required, 8.33 kilohertz radios with
cockpit video recorder and a digital flight recorder with ADS-B
[automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast] Out with enhanced
Mode S [mode select] and with an enhanced Traffic Alert and
Collision Avoidance System. We think we can do that for about
$2.5 million per airplane, and that we can get that done, if
not by 2020 but shortly after 2020 if we can gain concurrence
with you to move forward.
Now, we know that leaves us a modernization piece, and we
know those airplanes have to be modified. We know that you have
restricted us from pursuing modification if it is not the AMP
program. And what we hope to do is work with you to lay out the
details of a more affordable modernization program that we can
afford to buy over multiple FYDPs, but that will make those
airplanes able to continue to do their mission in an
increasingly challenging environment into the future.
Thank you again for the support that you have given the Air
Force, for the support you give our airmen and families. Thank
you for taking the time and inviting us to come speak to you
today. The world is not becoming less safe or less stable. We
think the world will continue to require on the capabilities
that your committee manages and that the Air Force provides,
and we thank you very much for being here. We are happy to take
your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Holmes and Dr.
LaPlante can be found in the Appendix on page 18.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General and Secretary. The ranking
member and I have decided to defer our questions so we can get
as many member questions in as possible. I have no right to ask
you to do this, but I am going to do it anyway. If you can keep
your questions to about 3 minutes, as short as possible, just
so we can get as many member questions in as possible. And with
that, I recognize the gentlelady from Missouri for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen. I appreciate the tough job that you have. Quickly, I
appreciate all you are doing and have done for the B-2 Stealth
Bomber. Certainly the modernization program and everything is
very, very important. You mention in your testimony that you
are going to continue to pursue a number of sustainment
initiatives to improve aircraft supportability, increase
aircraft availability. I know that is something that I have
been visiting with you all about as part sustainability and
how--can you expand on some of the things that you are doing
there to try to ensure that we have the parts we need for the
B-2?
Dr. LaPlante. Well, in general, in sustainability, what we
are recognizing even more so is that, in fact, a lot of the
money we can save in acquisition is actually in the sustainment
part. So we are keenly, keenly interested in that. The B-2
case, you know, we continue to have the program to bring--do
cost-effective maintenance of the airplane, particularly in
the, for lack of a better word, the materials area, and you
know what I am talking about. So that is a very important
program for the B-2, because in fact, one of the biggest
contributions to the availability challenge is for that
airplane is maintenance of that--those materials. That is
actually something that is going in the right direction. The
availability of that airplane is actually getting better
because of that work, so that I would call out that specific
initiative, and I think it is very important.
The other thing that we are doing, as you indicate, is we
are modernizing the B-2. An important program for the B-2, and
I would like this committee to recognize this, is a program
that is really a defensive military systems program, DMS is the
acronym, but the thing what it does is that B-2, we think of it
as an advanced weapons system, which it is, but in fact, if we
don't do DMS, it is not going to be--have the capabilities to
operate in a modern contested environment. We have to do that
program. It is funded, as General Holmes said. So those are two
things I would call out, but you know, the B-2 is a very, very
important program.
Mrs. Hartzler. Just to follow up on the computer software
program that I understand is being developed, be able to
project the parts that would be needed to help them in advance
be able to get in, do you have an update on that?
Dr. LaPlante. I don't have an update on that specific
program. Do you?
General Holmes. No, ma'am, I don't. I know we are pursuing
about 20 projects that help us manage the signature and the
parts supply and that help us increase the availability rate on
the airplane, but we will have to respond to you----
Mrs. Hartzler. Sure.
LT Gen Holmes [continuing]. On that one.
Dr. LaPlante. Be happy to look into that and get back to
you on that.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you for all that you do. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. I thank the gentlelady. The gentlelady from
Guam is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
Secretary LaPlante and General Holmes, thank you for your
testimony today. As we proceed with the engineering development
of the LRS-B [Long Range Strike Bomber], what are some of the
strategies that have gone into developing the $550 million
average procurement needed cost cap that you have set? Are you
expecting to pursue an arrangement similar to the KC-46,
utilizing a fixed price procurement vehicle?
And though the program is one of the Air Force's top three
acquisition priorities, in fiscal year 2016 you have requested
approximately $1.2 billion for development. What effects would
we see to this program if Congress does not repeal
sequestration?
Dr. LaPlante. Let me answer the last point first. The
effects of sequestration on all these programs is there. We in
the Air Force have done our best, and so far we have been
successful. Even in the sequester years that we have had, we
protected, for the most part, F-35, the tanker, KC-46A, and
LRS-B. We will continue to do it, but I will say this: I think
the sequester happens, a lot of these programs, once again, are
going to be put under tremendous stress. The munitions programs
will be put under tremendous stress. But we try our best to
protect those big three, but we can't promise that they will be
protected.
Let me get at some of the other parts of the LRS-B. The one
question that you asked essentially was in the development, we
are in the development, or about ready to start the development
part of that program, are we going to go for a fixed price
development program like the tanker, or not? I think the short
answer is, and now I am going to talk generically in
acquisition theory, if you can bear with me. The theory behind
when you do fixed price and say development versus cost plus,
which is kind of the classic thing, tends to come down to how
confident are you in the technologies you are developing, and
it--fundamentally, you are cost estimating on those
technologies. To be very simple, if you are developing
something that is very cutting edge, it is very hard to
estimate how much it is going to cost because you are actually
developing something cutting edge. That is why we tend to go
cost plus.
If you are developing something that is based heavily on,
say, a commercial item, something we have high confidence that
we know how much it should cost, then we feel much more
comfortable going to fixed price development. Now, here is why
it matters. If you are in a fixed price contract, it is really
important to have a good estimate of what you think it is going
to cost. If you get--if you are wrong on that, let's say you
are wrong 50 percent one way or the other, somebody is going to
really get hurt, right? If you are wrong, if the contractor
ends up 50 percent over in a fixed price, they are very hurt,
they may not survive. The program may not survive. The
opposite, we would get rightfully criticized to say why are you
giving a windfall buying something for twice the price that it
cost.
So you really want to have a good idea on the cost estimate
in development. So the question then comes down to, for KC-46,
the government made a decision that said, look, this is based
as much on a 767. We think we have a pretty good idea on what
the cost estimate should be. We are going to go a little--we
are going to do a fixed price. That is not--it is actually
unusual. Most development programs are cost plus. Okay. My
belief on the LRS-B is it is going to be more traditional in
the sense that we are doing a little bit more cutting edge. It
is not based upon a commercial item, and so I think more likely
it is going to be in the cost plus regime.
But here is the important point. You brought up the $550
million number, and there has been some in the press on this. I
would like just to make a couple of points on this. The first
thing is, there's been a lot of studies on why acquisition goes
wrong. What they constantly come down to are some very much
fundamental principles you have to do at the beginning to do it
right. The first is you have to fix your requirements,
understand the requirements and fix them, don't change your
requirements, number one. Number two, it has often been said
why isn't cost built in as a requirement when you start a
program? Why do we always say, well, maybe we will have a
target? Number three, what we also see when programs don't do
well, is we typically try to put too much into the program, and
the program usually gets slid to the right, more then gets put
in, and you end up in this circle.
So what we have done with our LRS-B--and it wasn't me or
General Holmes, it was our predecessors--back in 2010, they set
the program up to exactly address all of those issues. Number
one, they said we are going to make the cost a requirement. We
are going to make the cost a requirement. We are going to pick
a number after analysis, $550 million, the document was signed
in 2010, that is why it is 2010 dollars, and people say, well,
you didn't take into account inflation. You can go to the
Internet, run an inflation calculator and find out that $55 in
2010 is $57 or $58 today, so we know that. But we put it in as
a requirement. To build 100 airplanes, it is going to cost $550
million. What that does is, that drives the design. Industry
has to design to that number, and we are going to assess
against that number. That is why we did it.
And the second thing is we are building an adaptable
architecture as well to address some of these other issues. And
final point, we have not changed the requirement on it.
Ms. Bordallo. General, my time is up. I do have a question,
if I could place it on the record.
Mr. Forbes. Certainly can, and submit it for the record.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Yield back.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Oklahoma is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Just out of curiosity, they called votes;
is that correct?
Mr. Forbes. That is correct, and so we only have minutes
left.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay.
Mr. Forbes. And we will have--get your question in because
I don't think our members will be coming back----
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. After this, so yours will be the
final question.
Mr. Bridenstine. I will try to be brief. For Dr. LaPlante,
did Congress authorize an appropriate funding for the C-130
Avionics Modernization Program in fiscal year 2012?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes.
Mr. Bridenstine. And were those funds obligated in fiscal
year 2012?
Dr. LaPlante. As far as I know.
Mr. Bridenstine. They were not.
Dr. LaPlante. 2012 they were not.
Mr. Bridenstine. They were not.
Dr. LaPlante. Not in 2013 or 2014 either.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. So in fiscal year 2013, as you
mentioned, it was authorized and appropriated by Congress, and
those funds were not obligated----
Dr. LaPlante. That is correct.
Mr. Bridenstine [continuing]. In 2013.
Dr. LaPlante. Or 2014.
Mr. Bridenstine. Or 2014.
Dr. LaPlante. That is correct.
Mr. Bridenstine. Where it was authorized and appropriated
but not obligated in 2014.
Dr. LaPlante. That is correct.
Mr. Bridenstine. And in 2015, is it authorized and
appropriated for 2015?
Dr. LaPlante. Well, with the--I believe----
Mr. Bridenstine. The answer is yes. The question is----
Dr. LaPlante. With----
Mr. Bridenstine [continuing]. Do you intend to obligate
those funds this year?
Dr. LaPlante. Oh, yes. Our plan is--if we get the approval,
our plan is to take the money that has been obligated that we
have and obligate it by the end of this fiscal year.
Mr. Bridenstine. To the AMP program?
Dr. LaPlante. Our plan is to do it towards the compliance
items that General Holmes described.
Mr. Bridenstine. So did you read section 134 of the fiscal
year 2015 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]?
Dr. LaPlante. We all have seen that language, yes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Did you read the report language as well?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes.
Mr. Bridenstine. The report language says, ``We are
specifically directing the Secretary of the Air Force not to
transfer or repurpose funds authorized and appropriated for the
AMP program to execute such additional modernizations unless
the modifications are included as a part of the AMP program of
record.'' Are you going to authorize the funds as part of the--
are you going to obligate the funds as part of the AMP program
of record?
Dr. LaPlante. We are not--I think as I said, we are going
to obligate those funds towards the compliance items that
General Holmes described.
Mr. Bridenstine. No, but the AMP program of record is
what--that is specifically the report language in the NDAA from
fiscal year 2015.
Dr. LaPlante. We have a different--we have different
interpretations of what that language means.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. Well, Congress is clear. The Air
Force can do ADS-B Out, as you indicated.
Dr. LaPlante. Right.
Mr. Bridenstine. But it cannot take the money from AMP.
That has to be within the AMP program. The Air Force can do
CNS/ATM [communications, navigation, surveillance/air traffic
management] or other program----
Dr. LaPlante. Correct.
Mr. Bridenstine [continuing]. In CNS/ATM, but it has to be
part of the AMP program of record. Are you aware of the
limitation placed on the Secretary of the Air Force's budget in
section 134?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes, and Congressman, let me make sure I am
understanding. I think--I think we are doing exactly what you
are saying. We are--we are using the money for this--CT--ATM/
CNS, we are using it for the ADS-B Out and the radios as
General----
Mr. Bridenstine. As part of the AMP program of record?
Dr. LaPlante. It is going to be that money, yes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. So it needs to be part of the AMP
program of record by law.
Dr. LaPlante. I am not sure what that means, but--well, I
am not sure what the--maybe we are doing exactly what you are
saying. We are taking that money and we are going to buy those
items.
Mr. Bridenstine. So you are familiar with this. I just
read--it was the fiscal year 2015 President's budget request,
C-130, CNS/ATM program. It looks like you guys have changed the
name of it to the VAAP [Viability and Airspace Access Program]
program, Increment 1; is that correct? Are you familiar with
this, the VAAP program, Increment 1?
General Holmes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bridenstine. Is that what you intended? Did you change
the name or are you changing the program and how is this
working? Because the law is pretty clear.
General Holmes. Sir, our lawyers believe that when
certified by the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of
Defense delegated that to Mr. Kendall, that when Mr. Kendall
says it is necessary for us to spend money from those accounts
that were previously obligated----
Mr. Bridenstine. A couple of things. I get that. I
understand in 134 there is that out, but also in section 134,
it fences 15 percent of the Secretary of the Air Force's money
until the Air Force obligates fiscal year 2015 and prior years'
funds to the AMP program of record. There is no exception made
to this limitation provision. There is no limitation. So if you
want to say that we are going to go forward with a different
program under a different name, that means you are saying that
we are going to cut 15 percent of the Secretary of the Air
Force's operations and maintenance budget. Are you--do you
understand that is what you are doing? That is in the law.
General Holmes. Yes, sir, it is, and we have--our lawyers--
--
Mr. Bridenstine. Are you going to follow the law is my
question?
General Holmes. We are going to follow the law as
interpreted by the general counsel.
Mr. Bridenstine. And for the chairman of this committee, if
we follow the law and you go forward under the program that I
understand you are going forward with in the President's budget
request, you are, in essence--we on this committee are required
to make sure that the Secretary of the Air Force uses 15
percent of her operations and maintenance budget.
Now, this--this is in the law. I just want to make sure
everybody here understands this.
Dr. LaPlante. Yeah. And Representative, we hear you. I just
want to make sure that we have to do what our legal experts
read the law tell us we can do and so----
Mr. Bridenstine. So you tell me. You can't make it any more
clear. It is written----
Dr. LaPlante. Well, I am not a lawyer, but yes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Sure. A couple of other things. In the
2014 NDAA, you know, section 133 prohibits the Air Force from
using any funding to initiate----
Mr. Forbes. I am sorry to cut the gentleman off, but we
have votes we have to go to, as time has expired. So if you
would like to follow up with any written questions, we can do
it.
General, we also would like for you to respond, if you
could, on the details of that modernization program. I
apologize to everybody that we have only got a couple of
minutes left for this vote.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 35.]
Mr. Bridenstine. Sure.
Mr. Forbes. But with that, Mr. Courtney has agreed we are
adjourned, and we will follow up with any written questions.
And if you would be so kind as to answer them for the record,
we would appreciate it. With that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 4, 2015
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 4, 2015
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 4, 2015
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
General Holmes. The Air Force continues to work towards the safety,
compliance and modernization of our legacy C-130 fleet. Because of the
cost and time required to conduct the modernization of the legacy C-130
fleet, we believe, and DOD has certified, that we need to fund the
airspace compliance modifications first. The Air Force intends to
follow the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act guidance
and we want to work with the Congress and our Total Force partners to
develop an affordable C-130 modernization program. [See page 10.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 4, 2015
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. Knowing that the KC-46 tanker contract is fixed-price,
how important is it to maintain funding stability for the program and
what are the risks to the program if funding gets interrupted?
Dr. LaPlante. Funding stability is extremely important to the
success of the KC-46 program. Funding stability ensures the Air Force
fulfills its contractual obligations required for Boeing to deliver 18
operationally-ready aircraft by August 2017 (Required Assets Available
(RAA)). The fixed-price contract caps government Engineering &
Manufacturing Development liability at $4.9B and provides 13 planned,
on-contract procurement lots at Firm-Fixed Price or Not-To-Exceed
levels. While these planned procurements provide a range for variable
order quantities, a variation in production quantity affects the lot-
to-lot pricing.
Additionally, while the government and Boeing have successfully met
all contractual obligations to date, the program is entering its most
challenging part in flight test. For these reasons, RDT&E funding
stability remains important to ensure necessary funds are available to
address remaining program content, as well as program risks that may
materialize. Production funding stability remains important to enable
Boeing's achievement of RAA and ensure the government does not pay
additional per aircraft costs due to quantity variations. Any
government-induced issues or delays could lead to a Boeing request for
equitable adjustment and potentially re-open the contract.
Mr. Forbes. In the past year, Boeing has experienced wiring
problems in building the first two KC-46 tankers which has delayed the
development schedule. What impact will this delay have on initial
operational capability in August 2017?
Dr. LaPlante. Internal Boeing schedule events have shifted due to
the delays in the first flights of the Engineering & Manufacturing
Development aircraft. However, the final contractual milestone,
Required Assets Available (RAA), has not shifted. RAA will still
require Boeing to deliver 18 operationally-ready aircraft by August
2017. These delays eliminate the margin Boeing built into their
original schedule, to include all schedule margin to the RAA
contractual milestone date.
Mr. Forbes. A recent draft GAO report noted that the original KC-46
schedule planned to have 13 months of testing on two aircraft before
the October 2015 low-rate initial production decision. Now, due to
delays resulting from wiring problems, the program will have only one
aircraft in test for a three-month period before the October 2015 low-
rate initial production decision. How will the Air Force ensure that
key aerial refueling capabilities are demonstrated before the October
2015 low-rate initial production decision?
Dr. LaPlante. Development testing required for the Milestone (MS) C
Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) decision consists of a combination
of ground and flight testing, both which have commenced. Ground testing
began in November 2014 and flight testing began with EMD #1's First
Flight on 28 December 2014. The flight testing required for MS C is
modest and can all be executed on one aircraft. The other three EMD
aircraft will be used throughout the remainder of the program for full
requirements verification and operational testing, both which are
required for the Full Rate Production decision in CY2017. Finally, MS C
is an event-driven milestone, the program continues to make measurable
progress each and every day toward a successful MS C, and the AF will
not ask the Defense Acquisition Executive for a decision to enter LRIP
until all pre-coordinated entrance criteria are complete.
Mr. Forbes. The Air Force has ignored congressional intent for the
past three budget cycles and does not plan to obligate the $47.0
million in funding authorized and appropriated in fiscal year 2014 for
the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), The Air Force has sunk
$1.5 billion in developing and successfully testing this program, but
now plans to shelve that investment. If the Air Force does not intend
to utilize AMP, can you explain how the Air Force intends to address
the growing obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing sources (DMS) of
the C-130H fleet?
Dr. LaPlante. The Air Force continues to work towards the safety,
compliance and modernization of our C-130H fleet. Because of the cost
and time required to conduct the modernization of the C-130H fleet, we
believe, and DOD has certified, that the AF must primarily address
airspace compliance modifications. The Air Force intends to comply with
the FY15 NDAA and work with Congress and Total Force partners to
address avionics modernization efforts for the C-130H fleet.
Mr. Forbes. USTRANSCOM has stated a requirement for 567 aerial
tankers to meet its steady-state and contingency surge requirements,
yet the Air Force only has an inventory of 454 tankers. What risk is
the Air Force incurring by not having the sufficient number of tankers
in the inventory to meet USTRANSCOM's requirements?
General Holmes. The Air Force is incurring significant risk with
the current fleet of 455 aerial refueling tankers. KC-46A deliveries
improve risk to ``moderate'' once the fleet reaches the USTRANSCOM
amended requirement of 479 aircraft (aligning with the Mobility
Capability Assessment-2018 (MCA-18) analysis in their 2 February 2015
report to Congress on ``KC-10 Aerial Refueling Aircraft Force
Structure''). This will match the level required against the updated
scenarios, strategies, concept of operations, assumptions, and
capabilities determined by the MCA-18.
Mr. Forbes. If the Air Force is required to execute fiscal
resources at Budget Control Act sequestration levels, what operational
risk do you incur by having to divest the entire KC-10 tanker aircraft
fleet? What other programmatic options would you have to execute if
Congress prohibited the retirement of KC-10 aircraft?
General Holmes. The KC-10 represents 13 percent of our tanker fleet
and 30 percent of our air refueling capacity. If held to Budget Control
Act level funding, we will be compelled to divest the KC-10 across the
Future Years Defense Plan. According to the Mobility Capability
Assessment-2018, divesting the 59 KC-10s would delay achieving a
moderate risk level force structure by three years (from Fiscal Year
2018 (FY18) to FY21).
If forced to retain the KC-10 without the funding associated with
its operations, the Air Force would have to find other sources to
offset $2.8 billion--the equivalent of roughly 150 KC-135s, which
represents 30 percent of our tanker fleet and 33 percent of our air
refueling capacity.
Mr. Forbes. Knowing that the KC-46 tanker contract is fixed-price,
how important is it to maintain funding stability for the program and
what are the risks to the program if funding gets interrupted?
General Holmes. Funding stability is extremely important to the
success of the KC-46 program. Funding stability ensures the Air Force
fulfills its contractual obligations required for Boeing to deliver 18
operationally-ready aircraft by August 2017 (Required Assets Available
(RAA)). The fixed-price contract caps government Engineering &
Manufacturing Development liability at $4.9B and provides 13 planned,
on-contract procurement lots at Firm-Fixed Price or Not-To-Exceed
levels. While these planned procurements provide a range for variable
order quantities, a variation in production quantity affects the lot-
to-lot pricing.
Additionally, while the government and Boeing have successfully met
all contractual obligations to date, the program is entering its most
challenging part in flight test. For these reasons, RDT&E funding
stability remains important to ensure necessary funds are available to
address remaining program content, as well as program risks that may
materialize. Production funding stability remains important to enable
Boeing's achievement of RAA and ensure the government does not pay
additional per aircraft costs due to quantity variations. Any
government-induced issues or delays could lead to a Boeing request for
equitable adjustment and potentially re-open the contract.
Mr. Forbes. The Air Force is required by law to maintain a B-1
combat-coded inventory of 36 aircraft, for which the Air Force is
complying with. However, the subcommittee understands that for three of
those 36 aircraft, they do not have the same crew ratio or flying hours
programmed against them as the other 33 B-1 combat coded aircraft. Can
you explain to the subcommittee the reason for this difference, and
what risk do you incur in meeting combatant commander requirements if
all 36 combat-coded B-1 aircraft were required to meet presence and
operational requirements?
General Holmes. Since 33 aircraft meets current combatant commander
requirements, the Air Force reduced flying hour and manpower funding on
the three aircraft to fund other higher priorities. If combatant
commanders' presence and operational requirements necessitates the full
fleet of 36 aircraft, the Air Force will satisfy this requirement by
using other combat-ready aircrews/maintainers as required to man/
maintain the remaining three combat-coded aircraft under reduced
manning. Aside from potential increased risk in training operations,
the Air Force expects no increased risk in meeting combatant commander
requirements.
Mr. Forbes. New START treaty requires a reduced number of deployed
nuclear weapons, which in turn, will require the Air Force to decertify
a certain number of B-52 aircraft. What is the projected number of B-52
aircraft that you will decertify in order to meet New START
requirements? And, are these aircraft modifications reversible if ever
needed to increase nuclear bomber capability in the future?
General Holmes. The Air Force will modify a total of 42 B-52H
aircraft to a conventional-only role by permanently removing the
nuclear code enable switch and associated equipment, and installing
tamper-resistant blocker panels where the equipment used to reside. Of
the 42 aircraft, 30 are Active Duty/AF Reserve B-52H's and the
remaining 12 B-52H's are currently parked at the Aerospace Maintenance
and Regeneration Group (AMARG) B-52 located at Davis-Monthan AFB. Once
a B-52H is converted to a convention-only role, it is not reversible.
Mr. Forbes. FY16 PB proposes to cut the number of C-130s from 358
today to 308 by the end of FY20. Can you tell us what that number is
based on and what kind of risk it poses?
General Holmes. Pursuant to the language in the Fiscal Year 2013
(FY13) National Defense Authorization Act, the Air Force conducted an
analysis of mobility assets to determine the appropriate number of
aircraft required to fulfill contingency, humanitarian and homeland
defense missions. This analysis, presented in the Mobility Capabilities
Assessment (MCA) study determined ``there is no surge scenario
associated with the current defense strategy--even one in which a
significant homeland defense event occurs concurrently with two
warfights--that requires a fleet of 358 C-130s.'' Rather, the analysis
concluded the C-130 fleet size requirement ranges between 248 and 320
aircraft.
Driven by fiscal constraints, yet recognizing the important role of
intra-theater airlift in homeland defense and disaster response, the
FY15 President's Budget (FY15 PB) reduced the C-130 fleet to 328
aircraft by FY19. This force structure continued to exceed the MCA's
recommended level. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated in July 2013
that ``the Air Force could reduce tactical aircraft squadrons--
potentially as many as five--and cut the size of the C-130 fleet with
minimal risk.'' In order to reduce excess capacity in the C-130 fleet
and improve allocation of scarce resources, the Air Force made the
decision to more closely align the C-130 fleet structure with the
findings and recommendations of the MCA.
The FY16 PB reduces the C-130 force structure to 300 total
aircraft, balancing operational requirements and the realities of
Budget Control Act constraints. These reductions allow the Total Force
to invest in the remaining C-130 force and other requirements to
counter existing and emerging national security threats.
A fleet size of 300 presents a moderate risk force that can
accomplish the operational requirements defined in the MCA.
Mr. Forbes. Last year, the Air Force began a new program to upgrade
the C-130 fleet called the Viability and Airspace Access Program, also
known as ``VAAP.'' We understand the VAAP is currently planned for two
increments with Increment 1 modifying 172 C-130Hs with new radios,
updated transponders, and an updated cockpit voice recorder and digital
flight recorder. VAAP 2 is undefined at the point. What viability and
airspace access programs are planned for VAAP 2? Will the VAAP keep the
C-130H fleet viable to 2030 and beyond?
General Holmes. The Air Force continues to work towards the safety,
compliance and modernization of our legacy C-130 fleet. Because of the
cost and time required to conduct the modernization of the legacy C-130
fleet, we believe, and DOD has certified, that we need to fund the
airspace compliance modifications first to include new radios, updated
transponders, and an updated cockpit voice recorder and digital flight
recorder. The Air Force intends to follow the Fiscal Year 2015 National
Defense Authorization Act guidance and we want to work with the
Congress and our Total Force partners to develop an affordable C-130
modernization program.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Mr. Larsen. The FY16 proposed budget shows an increase to $1.246B
in funding for LRS-B. Does the increase reflect additional costs, an
effort to shorten the program schedule, a combination of both or
something else?
Dr. LaPlante. The FY16 budget request reflects the schedule for the
development phase of the program. There have been no cost increases to
the program and the overall schedule remains on track.
Mr. Larsen. It is my understanding that Boeing is actively
marketing the KC-46 to allies. Does the Air Force have a view on this
activity?
General Holmes. ``The USAF is constantly educating our allies on
the importance of establishing and maintaining certain capabilities,
such as airborne refueling. We encourage our allies desiring an
airborne refueling capability to purchase the KC-46 in order to
provide: the best receiver air refueling platform, an increase in
airlift capability, an airframe of improved force protection and
survivability, multi-point air refueling, capable of both day and night
operations, while providing rapid, global capability and
interoperability between U.S., Joint, Allied, and Coalition forces.''
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. Where do we stand on the development of the concept
of operations for employing the LRS-B? Should we expect a similar
basing arrangement for the LRS-B as our current bomber fleet?
General Holmes. The LRS-B Concept of Employment has been developed
at the classified level and has been approved by Air Force senior
leadership. Basing decisions for LRS-B have not yet been made; however,
the Air Force anticipates going through the traditional staffing and
approval processes for these decisions and will start this activity at
the appropriate time to allow for any needed infrastructure changes.
[all]