[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-17]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
U.S. POLICY, STRATEGY, AND POSTURE
IN AFGHANISTAN: POST-2014 TRANSITION, RISKS, AND LESSONS LEARNED
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 4, 2015
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fourteenth Congress
WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
ROB BISHOP, Utah RICK LARSEN, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JOHN GARAMENDI, California
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado Georgia
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado SCOTT H. PETERS, California
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
MO BROOKS, Alabama RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
PAUL COOK, California GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana PETE AGUILAR, California
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
THOMAS MacARTHUR, New Jersey
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Alex Gallo, Professional Staff Member
Mike Casey, Professional Staff Member
Michael Tehrani, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1
WITNESSES
Campbell, GEN John F., USA, Commander of Operation Resolute
Support and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan............................ 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Campbell, GEN John F......................................... 51
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Charts and photographs displayed by GEN Campbell............. 81
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[Responses provided were classified and retained in committee
files.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 90
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 89
Mr. Smith.................................................... 89
Ms. Tsongas.................................................. 89
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-17]
U.S. POLICY, STRATEGY, AND POSTURE IN
AFGHANISTAN: POST-2014 TRANSITION, RISKS,
AND LESSONS LEARNED
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 4, 2015.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. Committee will come to order. Today the House
Armed Services Committee meets to discuss the ongoing conflict
in Afghanistan.
We have been engaged in military action in Afghanistan for
14 years. The predictions that this would be a long conflict
have proven accurate.
While there have been setbacks in recent years, there is
also cause for cautious optimism. The United States and its
allies, especially the Afghan forces, have made some meaningful
gains.
A counterinsurgency is one of the toughest types of war a
democracy can fight. While this conflict has been a difficult
one, it is not impossible. And both our future security and the
future of the Afghan people depend on our success.
The people in Afghanistan currently have, in my opinion,
the best opportunity for a stable, relatively peaceful country
that they have had in over four decades. Together with the
cooperation of our allies and the Kabul government, we have
built a 352,000-strong Afghan National Security Force [ANSF].
Although building a capable security force takes time, the ANSF
is growing in ability and capability.
But now is a critical moment. We must not repeat the
mistakes of Iraq, where an early withdrawal that was based, in
my view, on political rather than strategic calculations
contributed to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant [ISIL], where an enemy once devastated has reconstituted
itself to pose an even bigger, more deadly threat.
Although the operational outlook is very different than
Iraq, Afghanistan could also become unstable should the United
States end the mission before the Afghan forces are capable of
providing their own security. We should not have, in my view, a
time-based withdrawal from Afghanistan, and I hope that the
President reconsiders his--the approach he has previously
announced and listens to the request of President Ghani.
Today I hope to hear answers on some important questions,
such as: What objectives must be met to secure our gains? What
are the key tactical and operational challenges facing the
ANSF? And, is our presence and the allied presence in
Afghanistan adequate to meet those challenges?
Finally, as Congress considers the President's counter-ISIL
AUMF [authorization for use of military force] request, some of
our questions are what implications that would have on ongoing
and future operations against ISIL, Al Qaeda, and other
terrorist groups in Afghanistan.
And we are fortunate to have General Campbell with us to
answer these and many other questions today, but before turning
to him I would yield to the distinguished ranking member, Mr.
Smith.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
holding this hearing.
I want to thank General Campbell for being here and also
for his service. I think he is the absolute right man for the
job in Afghanistan. Certainly he has had a lot of experience
there in a number of different roles during our conflict in
Afghanistan.
And I think there has been progress just since General
Campbell took over, and I will go ahead and give you all the
credit for this. They finally arrived at a power-sharing
arrangement within the Afghan government; signed a bilateral
security agreement; and really laid the foundation, at least,
to build off that solid government and build a partnership,
unlike in Iraq, where we had, you know, very, very strong
difficulty getting any sort of bilateral security agreement
that would allow us to stay. We have achieved that.
As the chairman mentioned, President Ghani wants us to be
there, and hopefully we can make that relationship work to help
maintain the security.
Ultimately that, you know, that is the big challenge.
Afghanistan has got to be responsible for itself. They have got
to be able to provide for their own security, and they have
made great strides in doing that.
As I am sure the general will point out, they have taken
over the primary security role throughout the country and have
done okay. Not going to, you know, sugar-coat that. It is still
a very tough fight.
But they have held their own, they have managed to keep the
country relatively stable in light of the insurgency, and we
need to build on that because ultimately in Afghanistan and
Iraq and all of these countries, Western military forces cannot
impose security on another country. There is, you know, I mean,
a fine line between helping them and appearing like a foreign
occupying force. In this case, as we draw down and up the
responsibility of the Afghan security forces, I think we have
done it about right, giving them that responsibility.
But going forward, there will continue to be many, many
challenges. The government still has corruption problems. The
Taliban are still very active. The border issues with Pakistan
have not been resolved.
And we definitely have a security interest in that region.
As I have said many times before in this committee, I wish we
didn't. It is a very, very difficult place to deal with.
But we do. The Taliban, Al Qaeda, these are groups that are
part of the larger movement that threatens us, so we need a
strong presence there that can help contain that--but again,
hopefully one that builds towards self-sufficiency and the
Afghan people being able to stand on their own, provide for
their own security and their own governance.
I look forward to hearing from the general today on how we
are progressing on those goals and where we go from here.
With that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Just on an administrative note, all members' offices were
notified yesterday that for the purposes of this hearing we are
going to go in reverse order for those who were here at the
gavel. Part of my thinking is we have had a number of members--
newer members who have sat through a long time on other
hearings before you have gotten to answer questions. In
addition, those of us who have been here a while have had the
opportunity to ask a number of questions about Afghanistan, and
so this is a good opportunity for newer members.
So after we hear from General Campbell, we will start at--
go in reverse order for everyone who was here at the time of
the gavel, and then, as we always do, recognize members in
their order of appearance of coming into the committee room.
So, General Campbell, again, thank you for making time to
be with us. Without objection, your full written statement will
be made part of the record, and the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN F. CAMPBELL, USA, COMMANDER OF OPERATION
RESOLUTE SUPPORT AND U.S. FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
General Campbell. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member
Smith, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you,
really, for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am
honored to lead and represent the service men and women of
United States Forces-Afghanistan.
And I would like to begin by thanking the committee for
your steadfast support of our soldiers, our sailors, our
airmen, our marines, and our civilians. And due to your
leadership and commitment, they are the best-trained, best-
equipped force our Nation has ever deployed, and their
outstanding performance bears testimony to your backing and the
backing of the American people, so thank you very much.
I would like to pay tribute to our military families. They
are the unsung heroes of the last 13-plus years of our
conflict. In many ways, our frequent absences from home are
harder on them than they are on us, and without their love and
support and their strength, we could not succeed. So I thank
the military families.
I would also like to recognize the over 2,200 service men
and women who have been killed in action in Afghanistan and the
over 20,000-plus who have been wounded. Each day we strive to
bring meaning to their sacrifices. And we honor their memories
and their loved ones by continuing to build a secure and stable
Afghanistan and by protecting our own homeland.
Over 13 years have passed since the 9/11 attacks, and we
haven't forgotten why we first came to Afghanistan and why we
remain there. And since 2001 the extraordinary efforts and
courage of our forces have ensured that another terrorist
attack originating from Afghanistan and directed against the
U.S. homeland has not occurred.
Over 6 months have passed since I assumed command, and much
has changed since then. Afghanistan, the region, the enemy, and
our coalition have undergone many tremendous transitions, and
most of these have been very positive.
I would like to emphasize a few of these today in order to
place our current campaign in context and to really reaffirm
the conditions that exist for us to achieve an enduring peace
and potential strategic win for Afghanistan.
And in September Afghanistan completed the first peaceful,
democratic transition in its history, and this was after a
prolonged--very prolonged campaign. And this transition was a
monumental achievement. It represented the Afghans' commitment
to a democratic and open society.
The difference between the new national unity government
and its predecessors is night and day. President Ghani and
chief executive Abdullah have embraced the international
community, our coalition, and the Afghan National Defense [and]
Security Forces, or the ANDSF.
Our partnership is strong. We now have a ratified bilateral
security agreement, and, sir, I would just tell you, a lot of
people worked very, very hard for that; and the NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] status of the forces agreement,
which grant us necessary authorities to continue our mission.
Dynamics within the region continue to evolve, as well.
President Ghani has made regional engagement a top priority in
order to address shared security and economic interest. Nowhere
is this more evident than in Pakistan and Afghan relations. The
Pakistani Taliban's murderous attack in Peshawar on 16 December
may prove to be their 9/11 and really a game-changer for the
region.
Most senior Pakistani officials recognize that they can no
longer separate good terrorists from bad terrorists. And in the
last few months I have witnessed firsthand substantive
improvement in the interactions between Afghan and Pakistani
militaries. They are now talking.
General Raheel, the Pakistan army chief of staff, remarked
during his recent trip to Kabul, ``The enemies of Afghanistan
are the enemies of Pakistan.'' And this is a constructive
admission, and we are doing everything we can to promote their
closer cooperation. And while we must temper our expectations,
I remain optimistic that both countries are working towards a
more productive relationship.
The enemy remains in a state of flux, too. The Taliban
failed to achieve any of their stated goals in 2014. They
failed to disrupt the elections; they failed to undermine the
political transition; and they failed to prevent the Afghan
government from signing a long-term security agreement with
both NATO and the United States.
On the battlefield they achieved no enduring gains. Mullah
Omar hasn't been seen in years.
The Taliban's senior leadership is in disarray. Constantly
pressured by the ANDSF, suffering from dissension within their
own ranks, and lacking popular support, they have turned to
high-profile terrorist attacks, particularly against soft
targets inside of Kabul. In a desperate attempt to remain
relevant, they are failing to win over the Afghan population.
With the coalition off the battlefield, they are primarily
killing their fellow Afghans and Muslims, and they are
murdering innocent civilians. And it is time now for them to
lay down their arms and heed President Ghani's call to help
rebuild the Afghan nation.
The possible rise of Daesh, or ISIL, is also a new
development. Thus far, we believe that the Daesh presence in
Afghanistan represents more of a rebranding of some of the
marginalized Taliban, but we are still taking this potential
threat, with its dangerous rhetoric and ideology, very, very
seriously. We are working very closely with the ANDSF to
evaluate and understand the dynamic nature of this fledging
network.
The potential emergence of Daesh represents an additional
opportunity to bring both Afghanistan and Pakistanis together
to confront this common threat. We will continue to engage
leaders from both countries on ways we can collaborate to meet
this challenge. We are all driven to prevent Daesh from
establishing a meaningful foothold in Central Asia.
United States Forces-Afghanistan and our coalition have
undergone tremendous changes, as well, here in the last 6
months. On January 1st, United States Forces-Afghanistan
formally ended its combat mission, Operation Enduring Freedom,
and commenced its new mission, Operation Freedom's Sentinel.
We have also ended all detainee operations. Simultaneously,
troops from 41 nations, which comprise the new NATO mission,
Resolute Support, began executing their train, advise, and
assist mission in order to develop the capabilities and long-
term sustainability of the ANDSF.
On January 1st the ANDSF also assumed full security
responsibilities. They are ready, and it is time. In their
second fighting season in the lead, the ANDSF were challenged
and tested, but they held their own against a very determined
enemy.
On the battlefield, the ANDSF fought tenaciously and
demonstrated their increasing capabilities. Today, the
government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan remains firmly in
control of all 34 of its provincial capitals and all of its
major cities.
The Afghan special forces, in particular, have proven to be
the most proficient in the entire region. They have constantly
executed unilateral, direct-action missions using their own
intelligence, using their own Special Mission Wing helicopters
to carry out long-range insertions in low illumination. These
are remarkable capabilities for any military.
For both the ANDSF and coalition, Afghanistan continues to
be a dangerous place. Tragically, we lost a coalition soldier
from Turkey last Thursday in a suicide attack inside of Kabul.
ANDSF casualty rates increased in 2004--or 2014, excuse
me--roughly 5 to 7 percent higher than they were in 2013.
However, I think this must be viewed in light of the fact that
their operational tempo was four times greater than it was in
2013 and that over 100,000 coalition forces were not on the
battlefield. Even considering the higher casualty rates, the
ANDSF attrition rates, which account for all losses to the
force, have not impacted combat readiness too severely.
Army and police recruiting has not been a problem. Afghan
youths continue to join the ranks of the ANDSF.
And service in the security forces is widely respected and
viewed as an honorable, patriotic profession. The Afghan
National Army remains the most trusted institution in the
country.
On balance, after watching the ANDSF respond to a variety
of challenges over the past 6 months, I don't believe the
insurgents represent an existential threat to the government.
However, ANDSF still need a great deal of help in developing
the systems and processes necessary to run a modern,
professional army and police force.
They also need sustained support in addressing the
capability gaps of aviation, intelligence, sustainment, and
special operations. To address these gaps, our advisory mission
and mentorship will continue to be vital. Our advisors are at
the security ministries, at the army corps level, in police
zones, and those remain our main efforts.
Although clear challenges exist, I do believe that the
ANDSF capabilities, their capacities, and their morale will be
sufficient, backstopped by our advisory efforts. And this will
provide for Afghanistan's long-term security by the end of the
Resolute Support Mission.
President Ghani recently remarked that, ``Compelled by
tragedy and cemented by mutual sacrifice, the partnership
between Afghanistan, NATO, and the United States has entered a
new phase.'' And I believe we are at a very critical inflection
point in our campaign.
Many challenges remain before us as the new Afghan
government continues to form. It is still finding its footing,
and it must do so while contending with a security threat,
corruption, and economic challenges.
Yet, all of these changes, transitions over the last 6
months offer us really a tremendous opening and an opportunity.
The Ghani administration offers us a strategic opportunity to
develop a strategic partnership that will stabilize Afghanistan
and then, in turn, provide and offer greater security for the
region, and ultimately the United States homeland.
There is a new spirit of cooperation in Kabul--something we
didn't have before. And I firmly believe that our concurrent
counterterrorism and train, advise, and assist efforts will
reinforce and deepen our strategic partnership and shape
conditions for a favorable outcome to this conflict.
We could offer no greater tribute to the American people,
our fallen, and their loved ones, than by maintaining our
commitment to a long-term stability of Afghanistan and the
enduring protection of our homeland.
I would like to direct the members' attention to the charts
and a couple photographs to your right front that we displayed.
We have also provided paper copies for you to look at.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 81.]
General Campbell. And I am often asked, ``What have we
accomplished? What have we achieved? What is success? Has it
been worth it?''
And I frequently share these statistics and images to
underscore the tremendous progress that has taken place in
Afghanistan in the last 13-plus years. Every measurable piece
you take a look at--roadways, people who use the Internet,
number of people in school, females in school, the workforce.
Pretty incredible. It is unprecedented.
The life expectancy, increase of 21 years just in the last
13 years. That is unprecedented. A remarkable return on our
investment.
And few countries advanced so rapidly over the last several
years, and that is success. And the coalition and our ANDSF
created the conditions for that success--741 million years--
life years of Afghanistan people, based on new life expectancy.
And I want to underscore that we are underwriting this
progress not just for the Afghans, but for the American people.
And the Afghan stability and security contributes to our own.
The next two will be pictures of where we were in 2001 and
where we are in 2014. And the first one shows inside of Kabul
then, and on the bottom now. That is at Maiwand Circle. And
then Kabul at day--or Kabul at night, I am sorry. Fifth fastest
growing city in the country. Remarkable difference.
We have undercut the terrorist appeal, which feeds on
desperation and instability. The hard work and significant
sacrifices of countless U.S. and coalition military personnel
and civilians over the last 13-plus years has created the
conditions where Afghans can now take the responsibility for
their own security and governance.
The Afghans welcome the opportunity to shape their destiny,
but they will--still desire and need our assistance. We are
supporting the emergence of a secure, prosperous Afghanistan
that desires to be and can be our reliable strategic partner,
and one that will never again allow terrorists to use its
territory to launch--to plan and launch attacks against us.
President Ghani has asked for additional flexibility in the
NATO and U.S. mission to account for the fact that his
government remains in transition. He acknowledges that while
the ANDSF are better equipped--better equipped and trained than
ever, work remains to build their bureaucratic processes and
systems. Additionally, he believes that a sustained U.S. and
NATO commitment provides vital stability to the country as a
new government solidifies--a tremendous psychological boost to
the Afghan people.
We will continuously assess the progress of Resolute
Support, and United States Forces-Afghanistan is currently
involved in a comprehensive winter review of our campaign. And
this review is taking a look at all of our lines of effort, not
just the military.
And I have provided various options and recommendations for
adjusting our force posture through my chain of command. One
issue is to determine how long we should stay and can stay
engaged at the regional level before we concentrate inside of
Kabul.
Once again, I express my profound gratitude to the
committee members for your unfailing support of our mission and
our troops in Afghanistan. I am humbled and privileged to lead
the men and women of their caliber and courage, and every day
they are making all of us proud.
And I ask that, again, sir, as you said, that my written
statement submitted earlier be taken for the record. I do look
forward to your questions, and I notice that the first two rows
are filled sir, so I look forward to that, as well.
So thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Campbell can be found in
the Appendix on page 51.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General.
And I would just say, I appreciate the data that you
brought to us. Some of this is surprising to me, and I--some of
the information about the attitudes of the Afghan people I
think are helpful to us--are particularly helpful to us.
I think Mr. Smith and I are going to withhold our questions
at the moment. I would request if we could put the posters
down, just to--unless members have questions about it, just to
not block folks' view.
And I would yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman
from New Jersey, Mr. MacArthur.
Mr. MacArthur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General, I also really appreciated your comments and
want to echo what you said about our men and women in uniform
and their families and the sacrifices they have made. I think
it is important at every opportunity to remember them.
I had a question about a comment that Secretary Carter made
yesterday, and I want to get your take on it. Secretary Carter
told the Senate Armed Services Committee that withdrawal from
Afghanistan would be conditions-based. It seemed to me that
hinted that maybe there was no firm deadline for withdrawal,
and my understanding has been that there has been an
articulated plan by the President to have troop drawdowns by
the end of 2016.
So my question for you is, do you think that extending
withdrawal past 2016 would help you better accomplish your
goals on the ground?
General Campbell. Sir, thank you for the question, and I
did see the Secretary's comments. So I have really provided
options that stay within the framework of what the President
put out there, and it does show the current plan as 9,800 U.S.,
going down to 5,500 by the end of December of 2015, going down
to between 1,000 and 1.5--1,500 by the end of 2016.
The options that I presented forward did not go past 2016;
they are all providing flexibility within 2015 and 2016, sir.
Mr. MacArthur. Not to put you in a difficult position
relative to stated goals by the President, but it is helpful
for us to get your perspective as the commander on the ground.
You showed tremendous progress here, which we, I think, all
celebrate and want to see that continue and be in a position to
be sustained after our mission there is complete.
What would be your level of confidence that you can achieve
that by the end of 2016?
General Campbell. Sir, honestly, I will be very candid, and
I owe you my best military advice, as I do to, you know, my
chain of command. I do not know what we can accomplish in the
summer fighting season 2015 at the train-advise level that we
are currently conducting.
We just started the new Resolute Support Mission on 1
January. What I really want to make sure we could do is get
through a full, what we call a fighting season, April through
the late September timeframe, focused on train, advise, and
assist, plus with our CT [counterterrorism] mission.
And if we can--if we look at a downsize of the 5,500, that
potentially could take our eye off a focus on train, advise,
and assist when we really need it. So that is why the
flexibility, I think, is very, very important.
You know, as the commander on the ground we take a look at
all the different conditions that are out there. We
continuously make assessments, taking into account the enemy
situation, the friendly forces, how they are doing, the people,
the different regions. And so all those will go in as I
continue to make assessments and provide that.
But I really do need to understand and see what we can do
with these new entities what we call TAAC--train, advise,
assist commands--that we have in the--in our spokes in Gambir
and Jalalabad out in the east and Kandahar in the south, Herat
in the west, and Mazar-i-Sharif in the north. This is a new
dynamic. We haven't been at that level before.
My initial assessment right now is we will continue to work
very well, and the Afghans really do--you know, over the last
13-plus years, have continued to develop. This is my third time
in Afghanistan. My last time was as the Regional Command-East
Commander 101st [Airborne Division], 2010 and 2011. Visited a
couple times in between 2011 and when I took over this summer.
The difference from back in 2010 and 2011 to where we are
today is just night and day. It is incredible.
The Afghan security force has continued to progress. They
have an operation ongoing now--I won't go into great detail
because it is an ongoing operation in northern Helmand, but
this was an operation that was entirely planned and led from
the Afghan perspective. I took back briefs on it about 3 weeks
ago when I was down in Helmand.
This is a three-corps operation. The main effort is the
215th in Helmand. It has supporting efforts from the 205th in
Kandahar, the 207th at Herat. I have never seen an Afghan
operation that was that complex back-briefed to me and the
senior leadership inside of Afghanistan and the police and the
army side, and integration between all the Afghan security
pillars--the police, the army, their intelligence was pretty
remarkable, and so I think they continue to get better and
better. I think I would be able to answer that better after we
get through this fighting season to really see how the train,
advise, assist goes, but I do believe that the flexibility that
we have asked for in several different options and that we put
forward will provide us a better opportunity to take advantage
of things that have changed over the last 6 months--President
Ghani and his embracing of the international community, the
relationship between Pakistan, some changes in leadership in
the Afghan security forces.
And I really do think that leadership and then holding
people accountable really makes a difference.
Mr. MacArthur. Thank you, General. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Aguilar.
Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
change in format. I will be sure to add you to the Christmas
card list. Thank you for that.
Thank you, General, for being here. With respect to the
AUMF, if Congress were to pass the proposed AUMF could you
provide us with examples of what you could and could not do
within that?
General Campbell. Thanks for your question, sir. I mean, I
have not read the entire AUMF. I could tell you from looking at
it briefly that what that would provide--I mean, the
authorities I have today and the resources I have today I can
continue to work hard at the CT mission and the train, advise,
assist mission that I have.
With the AUMF, the way I understand it now, with no
geographical boundaries I think I still would be able to
prosecute what I need to for today. After 2015, where my
authorities may change, then I would have to go back and relook
that hard. But, sir, today I have no issues, as I think General
Austin said from CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] yesterday with
that.
Mr. Aguilar. Have detention policies at all changed post 1
January?
General Campbell. Sir, absolutely. I do not have the
authority to detain the insurgents. So all detainees that we
would have had, they have been turned over to Afghanistan or
other countries. I have no detention facilities inside of
Afghanistan.
Mr. Aguilar. Thank you.
One of the things we have talked about extensively is risk.
Can you talk to us--and you mentioned in your testimony that it
wouldn't be affected too severely, but could you add some more
color to the discussion of risk associated with the proposed
drawdown?
General Campbell. Sir, risk, you know, takes in a lot of
different factors--the risk to the coalition and U.S. forces,
the risk to the Afghan security forces. I think, again, any
commander on the ground would like to have more resources, more
people. We continue to work hard through that.
As I make the assessment today and take a look at many of
the things as we have drawn down--I don't say withdrawal, but
we are in a continuous transition. And I think for the next 2
years-plus it will be a continued transition; we have to adapt
to those transitions.
But as you transition you lose people, which provides
security. Most of my force protection and security is by, with,
and through the Afghans as we consolidate.
We have gone from 300-plus COPs, combat outposts, and
forward operating bases to less than 25 today. So that
increases the risk in some areas to force protection, to
security.
As you continue to transition forces you lose some
resources, so the number of aircraft, the number of ISR
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] platforms, all
those things goes into the calculus as I take a look at the
risk assessment both to risk to mission and to risk to force.
And again, as I looked at flexibility--President Ghani
asked for flexibility. As I looked at that I did take in
account all those to try to mitigate risk to force and risk to
mission as we move forward.
Mr. Aguilar. Can you give us some examples--and I know it
could be speculative, but could you give us some examples of
things that President Ghani may discuss when he addresses
Congress later this month?
General Campbell. First off, sir, with President Ghani and
Dr. Abdullah, the senior--the CEO [chief executive officer], I
mean, it is really a new dynamic, and I have had to deal with
President Karzai when I first got there in times afore, and I
think the American people--all the people need to understand
that every time President Ghani or Dr. Abdullah address a crowd
they thank the international community.
They thank the U.S. in particular; they pick the U.S. out.
They thank them for their support. They thank the families for
the sacrifices of their sons and daughters.
You never would have heard that before, so it is a
completely different atmosphere. I think the President will
talk to all of you about that. I think he is quite proud of
that.
He is quite proud that he has taken on his leadership role
as a commander in chief. He has visited training sites. He has
visited military hospitals.
He engages with the corps commanders. I mean, I attend
their national security conferences. I am able to talk to them
about different security issues at any time. I think he would
tell you he spends probably 40 percent on security, 40 percent
on the economics and where they need to go.
But I think he will really talk about, you know, where
Afghanistan has come over the last 13 years, where its security
forces are, where it would not be without the help of the great
coalition and the U.S. in particular, not only for the men and
women that have made sacrifices, for our families, but also for
the economic impact that the U.S. provided, along with many
other donor nations.
I think he may talk a little bit about how he sees the
future and how he is going to get after corruption, and how he
will continue to attack that and how he is going to broaden the
perspective and deal in terms of a regional aspect, how he is
engaged with Pakistan, India, China, Saudi Arabia, the entire
region, and how he needs to do that both from an economic
perspective but also from a security perspective.
Sir, I think he is looking forward to it, and I think all
of you will find that he will be very engaging and his message
will be one of thanks, but also that he has a great vision for
the future of Afghanistan.
Mr. Aguilar. Thank you for your continued service, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Knight.
Mr. Knight. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I would like to talk about a couple other things.
Let's talk about readiness of the forces.
This has been a generation that could have gone into their
military career in 1990 and now be retired, and have been--or
have seen battle for the last 24 years. So here in Congress we
worry about things like sequestration, we worry about readiness
of force, and worry about one-to-one ratios of young men and
women being over there for a year and being back here for a
year, or 6 months and a year, or something of that nature.
Can you give us an idea of the readiness of force today as
compared to maybe 4 or 5 years ago, or even 10 years ago?
General Campbell. Sir, I can talk better and give you a
perspective on the readiness of forces that I get from the
services, as they are service providers. A little bit different
perspective when I was the vice chief of the Army before I went
over there 6 months ago. But all the forces that I get in
Afghanistan, particularly from the U.S., are trained at the
highest level and are focused on their mission in Afghanistan.
So no issue with that.
And I think all the services prioritize their deploying
forces first to ensure that they get that necessary training
because they will be putting their lives on the line.
On the sequestration, I will just tell you that it was 6
months ago when I was a vice and I continue to talk to senior
leadership from all the services that with sequestration that
would devastate the services and their ability to provide the
same type of forces that I get today.
You know, my son is a sergeant in the Army. He has been to
Afghanistan twice. He has served in Ghazni; he has served in
Jalalabad. He was in the 82nd Airborne [Division]. He is
currently in the 101st.
And I worry about, you know, both as a father and then as a
commander, the ability to make sure that we continue to provide
the very best training, and all the resources and the things
that go with that, for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
and our civilians that deploy. And sequestration would put--
would dampen that--would elevate the risk, absolutely.
Mr. Knight. Thank you. And I think that you have got a lot
of committed people here that believe that, too.
Secondly, when we talk about detainees and you say that you
turn them over to the security forces or to Afghan--what
happens from there? Is there some sort of a prosecution?
Is there some sort of judicial action there? Or are they
just detained? Or are they released?
General Campbell. Sir, it is probably all of the above,
quite frankly. But with the detainees that we had there was a
long process we went through to get assurances from either
countries that they were sent to or to Afghanistan, as well, to
make sure that the right assurance was put in place that they
would be tried, if they had to go through that process that
they would be treated humanely.
And so that was carefully taken a look at, at all of the
different detainees that were released from U.S. control,
coalition control. Again, no longer do we have detention
facilities.
Inside of the Afghan system that continues to grow. Up at
Parwan outside of Baghram is probably the very best detention
facility in all of Afghanistan, continues to be I think the
gold standard that they have there.
They are in the process right now, based on direction from
President Ghani, to move really the national threat detainees
to Parwan and get them out of places that are overcrowded, like
down in Kandahar or Pul-e-Charkhi, inside of Kabul, to make
sure that they can lessen that, that they have the right
security so that they are not freed without going through the
proper trials.
And so I think they continue to work that very hard, but
Parwan is a gold standard. It has the right prosecution
efforts, has the right folks, the judges all kind of contained
in one unit there. And we do have a very small train and
advise, assist cell that will continue to help build that
capability for them.
Mr. Knight. Thank you, General. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General, thank you very much for joining us this
morning. I was impressed by what I saw on the CODEL
[congressional delegation] 2 weeks ago, with the progress that
you have made.
And I share the chairman's view of the situation in Iraq,
where I think that all the progress that we made, or much of
the progress we made during the surge, has now been squandered
by withdrawing too quickly and not providing the ongoing
political and diplomatic support that we frankly knew was
necessary, that Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus called
for at the end of the surge.
So, I am interested to hear from you what specifically you
are doing differently in Afghanistan this time around. And I
will add that I have the highest respect for President Ghani,
but I am not interested in hearing what is different about our
partner, because I think that after you invest trillions of
dollars of our national treasure, after you invest thousands of
lives, we shouldn't leave the eventual success of our mission
up to the whims of our partner.
So I am interested in what you and the U.S. effort there is
doing differently from Iraq.
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question. And again,
thank you for visiting our troops there. I apologize for not
being there. I was back here doing the SASC [Senate Armed
Services Committee] testimony as you were forward.
So I would think--again, I spent 19--18, 19 months in Iraq
as a one-star back in 2006, 2007 during the surge, inside of
Baghdad. And I think the fundamental difference for me is
really the Afghan security forces and their leadership and
their determination to make sure--they see the news, they see
the media.
They understand what is going on with Iraq. And they have
personally told me, many of the senior leadership, that they
will not let happen to Afghanistan what happened to Iraq.
You know, during the political instability last fall many
people thought that they would divide among the ethnic
fractures, which is what happened inside of Iraq. In
Afghanistan they did not do that, despite a lot of talk. In
fact, they solidified around that and took that as a point of
pride to make sure that they didn't fracture, and that they
were above that, and that they were a national force, and they
take great pride in doing that.
I think the training that I have seen for the most part is
all Afghan-led training. I was out in the 207th Corps in Herat
a couple weeks ago and kind of unannounced I said let's--I
asked the corps commander, ``Let's go look at some training.''
He took me to medical training, to some of their marksmanship
training. I saw them clearing buildings.
Again, this was unannounced----
Mr. Moulton. General, with all due respect, that is
fantastic news, but that is what the Afghans are doing and that
is how the Afghans are doing things differently than the
Iraqis. But what are we doing to ensure that?
I mean, President Ghani is a great partner today. He could,
you know--God willing, this won't happen, but he could be gone
tomorrow.
So what sort of backstops are we putting in place to ensure
that if this does start to head south for any reason, we can
recover and we won't end up with a situation like we had with
Prime Minister Maliki in Iraq?
General Campbell. Sir, now thanks. I think really for me
the continued train, advise, assist at the ministry level and
what we are doing with the MOD [Ministry of Defense] and the
MOI [Ministry of the Interior], and all levels of both those
organizations that control the army, that control the police.
We are working on their transparency, accountability,
oversight. We are working on their planning, programming, and
budgeting. We are working on their sustainment. We are working
on their planning capability. We are working on their strategic
communications. Working on their intelligence.
These are all essential functions that we think they need
to continue to have, you know, as we come out of there. And I
think our continued work in those areas at the ministry levels
will continue to help that.
The other piece is that they are looking hard at ensuring
that they are a professional army and a professional police.
And they have leadership courses that continue to go on. They
pick bright leaders at all the ranks and bring them into
special courses on leadership, and they understand the
leadership makes a difference--I think different from what you
saw in Iraq.
Mr. Moulton. Are you seeing the State Department devote the
level of resources needed to continue this mentorship and
support at--on their diplomatic side of the house?
General Campbell. We have a great relationship with
Ambassador McKinley and the folks, you know, right--we are
connected right next to embassy there. They don't do the MOD
and MOI, but they are engaged in all the other ministries and
the NGOs [non-governmental organizations] there, and I do think
that they are very dedicated and they continue to work very
hard.
Again, all the coalition, all the state department of all
the different embassies are all there because they are
passionate about where Afghanistan could go in the future. They
are excited about the future of Afghanistan.
I think everybody is working very hard, and the fact that
what has happened in Iraq has been on the news, this gives them
more determination to say, ``This ain't gonna happen here.''
Mr. Moulton. And just my last question, just to ensure that
we are maintaining our commitment to the long-term stability of
Afghanistan, as you said in your earlier--in your spoken
testimony, what is the ongoing financial commitment of the
United States to make that happen?
General Campbell. Sir, we are looking very, very hard at
how we continue to be more efficient and how we can reduce
that, but it is about--for 2015 about $4.1 billion; and looking
at fiscal year 2016 I think I have got that down to about $3.8
billion because of some efficiencies that we have garnered both
in their forces and in how we operate, and we will continue to
look at that very, very hard. They are very dependent upon the
U.S. and all the other donor nations to have this army and
police they have, absolutely.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, General.
Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Ms. Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General Campbell, for your service and
leadership. I, too, had the privilege to participate in the
CODEL chaired by our subcommittee chair, Joe Wilson, and I
joined Congressman Moulton and Congressman Ashford on the trip.
It was great to visit some of the troops deployed from my
district.
So my question is, in late February the DOD [Department of
Defense] announced the three units to deploy as the upcoming
rotation of forces in Afghanistan, and one of those units is
the 2nd Brigade from the 10th Mountain Division, which I have
the privilege of representing, which is located at Fort Drum,
as you know. The 10th Mountain has supported operations in
Afghanistan since 2001. It is the most deployed unit in the
U.S. Army since 9/11 to both Iraq and Afghanistan.
So based upon my visit and our privilege of meeting with
President Ghani and the upcoming deployment of soldiers in my
district that I represent, I would like to know from you your
assessment of the risks to the security situation as we draw
down in Afghanistan and how that will impact our future
operations against the Taliban.
General Campbell. Ma'am, again, thank you for visiting, and
thank you for the question. I do have Colonel Pat Frank with me
over here that commanded 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain and was
down in the southern part of Afghanistan back in 2010, 2011,
and we are very appreciative of the 10th Mountain support.
You know, what I would tell you is that they will come in
and they will work the train, advise, and assist. Force
protection is our number one priority. The President has told
me that is his number one priority.
I look at that every single day. We continuously monitor
the threat streams both inside of Kabul and at all of our
combat outposts and our TAACs. Every single day we are looking
at ways on how we mitigate that threat.
You know, but frankly, it will continue to be a very
dangerous environment. There will be insurgents that want to
kill our soldiers. You know, we shouldn't make--we shouldn't
put that aside. That is out there every single day.
So every day what we can't do is become complacent. We tell
our soldiers, you know, that in a 9-month, a 12-month rotation
that they have their--they will have an opportunity to make a
difference.
It may only be 15 seconds where they make that difference
in their entire tour when it comes in terms of force
protection. The issue is they don't get to pick when that 15
seconds is, so they have to be ready all the time.
And I think the services do a great job and our
noncommissioned officers do a great job of preparing our
soldiers to understand the risk that will become when they do
deploy. And again, many of our soldiers have been there
numerous times; they understand that.
It is changing and we continue to take a hard look at that.
The green-on-blue incidents that have been out in the news here
the last several years, where we have Afghan soldiers or police
attack coalition or attack U.S. members--that continues to get
much less as we have mitigated that through our own training
with different programs to provide over-watch. The Afghans do a
much better job on vetting both soldiers and police in how they
do their training.
So that has gone way down and we feel, you know, we can't
get complacent. We will continue to look at that.
But believe me, ma'am, the force protection is utmost in
our mind and we work that very hard in our pre-deployment
training, and once they get into country they are continually
reminded and go through processes that make sure that they
don't become complacent.
Ms. Stefanik. I wanted to ask one follow-up. In our
discussions with President Ghani we talked about the threat of
ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and the potential for
ISIS to grow in Afghanistan and their most recent recruiting
efforts.
Does that concern you? Can you talk about what those
challenges are going to be not just in the short term but the
long term?
General Campbell. Again, thank you for the question. You
know, it is a potential threat, is how President Ghani has used
that. A concern to him, so it is a concern to me.
We take a hard look at that. We have engaged with our
Afghan security partners in making sure we are seeing what they
see, we understand how they see it. With all the other
intelligence organizations that we have inside of Afghanistan
we come together to discuss that potential threat.
I will tell you right now, we have seen some recruiting in
different parts of the country. We have seen some night letter
drops.
We have not seen it operationalize. We have not seen a lot
of money come in and we have not seen those forces gather and
prosecute targets at all.
But again, it is a potential threat for Afghanistan and
Pakistan. So as I said in my opening comments, it is an area
where I think Afghanistan and Pakistan can continue to work
together to go after a potential threat that has already
displayed, you know, how horrendous they will be.
And the Afghan security institutions and the army and the
police have told me they will not let that happen. And the
dynamics inside of Afghanistan are different than Iraq. You
know, with the Sunni prosecution, how that has been in Iraq,
the political piece.
This is not just--didn't just happen here the last several
months. This has been building up for years and years in Syria
and Iraq, and in Afghanistan it is a different dynamic with the
culture that you have there, as well.
But we will see it, and we will continue to monitor it and
make sure that we have a strategy that can attack it on a
short-term, and mid-term, and a long-term.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Ashford.
Mr. Ashford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General Campbell. I can tell you that when
we went to see General Ghani he was so terribly appreciative of
your efforts and all the efforts of our military and our
support personnel. It was absolutely incredible.
I was also happy to hear from President Ghani that--of his
relationship with the University of Nebraska at Omaha, and
the--Tom Gouttierre and the Afghan studies program, which has
been going on there for over 30 years. So I was glad to hear
that.
And I want to thank Congressman Wilson, who is the chairman
of our Emerging Threats Subcommittee, for his leadership, and
also my two colleagues, who--it was an immensely important
opportunity for me and I think our district to see what was
going on.
Obviously we went to Jordan and Iraq and to Afghanistan, so
we got the entire picture, in a way. And Congresswoman Stefanik
I think asked a critical question that I was left with is--you
know, we have many fewer members of the armed services in Iraq
and--than we do in Afghanistan, and for historic reasons and
for reasons that you have discussed.
Could I just ask you to comment just a little more on this
situation? If the ISIS situation becomes more--it already is
very dangerous, but where more troops from the American side
are necessary, or whatever the eventuality may be, could you
just comment a little bit more on that interrelationship?
President Ghani did talk about what you suggest, that they
are observing, watching. He talked about his Pakistani--his
openings to Pakistan and his discussions with Pakistan, which
seem very, very positive.
But this threat in Syria and Iraq, which is growing and--
but were contained to a certain degree, it is the same Middle
East area, so how do you--again, could you just comment a
little more on that interrelationship? What if it becomes more
difficult for the Iraqi forces to be successful in their
country? Thank you.
General Campbell. Sir, I can't comment on the Iraqi forces;
I can comment on the Afghan forces. And again, they have--the
senior leadership of the Afghan police and army have told me on
several occasions that, you know, they will not let what
happened to Iraq happen to Afghanistan. They are very
determined about that, have gone out of their way to tell that
to me as, you know, that question has been raised in many
different instances with them, and as they talk to their
leadership, as they have talked to the President.
The President brings this up, though, because he wants
people to understand that the environment in Afghanistan
continues to evolve. It is a dynamic environment and he doesn't
want his forces to become complacent. He wants them to
understand that what happened in Syria and Iraq and this
network can jump stages of growing to this network, and that it
evolves very, very quickly.
And so I think he just wants to make sure that his forces,
his intelligence services are taking a look at everything and
making sure that it doesn't get a foothold inside of
Afghanistan and continues to spread. And he can be helped with
this association with Pakistan because they have the same
issues there, and I think that relationship and understanding
that they have a common enemy that they can work toward
together will help them.
So I think that they are looking at this very hard. He gets
several security updates a day, and the Daesh or the ISIL piece
continues to be on his mind.
But in the National Security Council meetings that I sit in
he has all the senior cabinet folks in there, that is a point
of discussion in most of them. But I think they view it as a
potential threat and ensuring that they have a strategy as we
move forward, and I think they will--that will continue to
evolve over time.
Mr. Ashford. Thank you, General.
And I would yield back my time at this point. I had a
question about Pakistan I am sure it will be asked and
answered, so thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Zinke.
Mr. Zinke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General, it is always good to see you again. I tell
you, I sleep better at night knowing you are there.
You know, as a former deputy commander and acting commander
of special forces in Iraq, you know, I think we left Iraq too
soon. I think we--when we left Iran or Iraq on a timeline
rather than a condition on the ground, it affected the Sunnis;
we disenfranchised them, I believe. We isolated the Kurds.
We, to a degree, empowered a centralized government to be
non-inclusive. And the result was a vacuum. And that vacuum, I
think what we are seeing today, was filled by ISIS.
And my concern is we don't repeat the same model in
Afghanistan, and I think the concern of the committee remains
the same.
Looking forward, what would you consider to be your three
priority conditions, and what is that end strength to support
that?
And lastly, in my experience, having a detention center--at
least a temporary detention center--gave us the ability to
rapidly turn around sensitive site exploitation and do follow-
on missions in a timely manner that made a difference on the
ground. And not having the ability to have a detention center--
at least a temporary detention center--to me would adversely
affect your ability, when you find a target, to rapidly turn
around and do follow-on missions. If you would comment on that,
whether, in fact, it does adversely affect your ability to turn
around?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for your service, and thank
you for the questions, as well.
If I can answer the last one first, then come back to the
ISIL piece on the intelligence. So intelligence, as you know,
drives operations, and that is what we really try to instill in
our Afghan partners, that all their operations should be
intelligence-based, and we continue to work that very hard.
We do have a very good relationship with the MOI and the
MOD, and the NDS [National Directorate of Security], which is
their intel [intelligence] service. And so as they have the
detainees, we work a relationship to make sure that we can
partner with them, and the intelligence, the information they
get from their detainees, we try to make sure that we can get
that information as well, because it impacts our force
protection and we can also help guide them.
They are building a fusion cell, which combines the MOD,
the MOI, and the NDS together--lessons that we have learned
over years and years. They are stove-piped where they are now,
and so you have MOI working off different pieces, MOD working
off pieces, and NDS working off pieces. And what we are really
trying to force is this sharing.
They are testing this really with a pilot down in northern
Helmand in this operation today, and we are seeing quite good
success off of this as they do share all that intelligence and
understand that it makes them a better-capable force as they
get this intelligence, turn it very quickly to drive to other
targets. So I think our relationship over the last 13-plus
years of working with them at the ministry levels now and at
the corps levels, we have a relationship to enable to make sure
that we can help them with that intelligence. So I feel
comfortable where we are at.
Still got a lot of work to do with that. They don't have
the same type of ISR or those platforms that provide us some of
that. We share where we can, but we have got to make sure we
continue to build their capabilities.
So we are working on how we build the intel capability.
Intelligence is one of the eight essential functions that we
continue to build at all the ministry levels. My senior deputy
chief of staff for intelligence, the J-2, Major General Scotty
Berrier, was a CENTCOM J-2 before this assignment. He really is
the senior intel advisor that I have in country and he works
with both the MOI and MOD to build that intel capability.
So I feel much better than where we were on building that,
and I think that is going to help all of us in the end.
On the ISIS piece, sir, on conditions, you know, I take a
look every single day and assess different conditions. Time is
one of those conditions, number of people on the ground, both
from a coalition perspective and from an Afghan security
institution perspective is another condition.
So I think I would take a look at all those. I really do
want to take a look at what happens after this first full
fighting season, where the Afghans are really totally on their
own. They have led it for the last 2 years but this is the
first time that they really are on their own and we really are
just in the train, advise, assist and don't have the resources
to provide for them, and they are working very hard on their
own capacity for close air support, intelligence, and those
areas.
And so, you know, I can't give you a number that I would
feel comfortable with right now. I think I need to let this
play out.
But I do believe that we are--the best thing that we can do
to hedge against Afghanistan not becoming an Iraq, my number
one priority would be to continue to train, advise, assist, and
build their own capacity and their capability both in close air
support, both in their special operating forces, which
increases their CT capability. And they want to be--and
President Ghani has said many times, you know, he is a
strategic partner and wants to continue to build the Afghan CT
capability so down the road they have that, and then we will
continue to work with them on that.
Mr. Zinke. I will follow up on the detention centers. Do we
have the ability--if you get a high-priority target, do we have
the ability to be present during those initial interrogations
and interviews, or is it separate?
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Is there a one-sentence answer, General?
General Campbell. Sir, I would rather cover that with you
in a closed session, sir, and I can give you a little more
detail on that.
Mr. Zinke. All right, sir. Thank you.
The Chairman. Ms. Graham.
Ms. Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General. It is so good to hear some good
news of--so thank you for your report.
One thing that you stated is that the terrorist appeal has
been undercut in Afghanistan. That is something that we need to
figure out how do we bring that reality into other places in
the region.
But my question focuses on local law enforcement. I am
aware that recently that Prime Minister Ghani has changed some
of the leaders of the local police forces, and I was wondering,
what is the interaction between military and law enforcement?
My husband happens to be law enforcement, and I know how
important it is to have that close relationship. It is often
those closest to us that can have the greatest impact on our
behaviors.
So is the military involved in working with local law
enforcement, and do you see that as a positive development with
the changes in law enforcement recently in Kabul? Thank you.
General Campbell. Thank you, ma'am, for the question. You
know, in Afghanistan it really is--we talk about pillars and
the security pillars, and the police and the army being two
different pillars there. And what I tell people is when these
pillars--they do cross-pillar coordination, they work together,
the army and the police, then they are much stronger and they
can't be beat.
And I attend a Saturday 3-, 4-hour session every Saturday,
which we call the senior security shura, and that has the
senior members of MOD, the senior members of MOI, NDS, which is
their intel arm, and then the national security advisor,
Minister Atmar. And so the police and the army interaction is
daily, every single day.
The police operate a little bit differently. They do have
the law enforcement aspect; they continue to work through that.
But in many places they are the only security institution in
the far reaches of Afghanistan, and so they are a threat to the
insurgency.
Afghan Local Police, which are designed to provide security
inside of the villages, are probably the most attacked. They
have the least amount of training, they don't have the same
weapons as the regular police or the army. And so they do get
attacked, but they do stand up and they do protect, and they
are feared by the Taliban and the other insurgents because they
are directly linked to the people inside the communities.
But I think the linkage between the police and the army is
a strong one and they continue to work it.
In the provinces they have what they call OCCPs or OCCRs.
These are institutions that the governors have that have
police, army, and the intel folks all together inside one, for
lack of a better term, an operational command and control
element at both the regional and then at the provincial level.
And they provide interaction between the police and army.
They sit right next to each other in desks and work that, and
then they interact with their higher headquarters, which also
has police and army.
In my headquarters inside of Kabul I have army--Afghan army
representatives, Afghan police that sit right next to each
other inside of my combined joint operations center, as well.
So that interaction is very good.
And if I could just hit the intel piece or the terrorist
appeal piece, what I will tell you is that less than 10 percent
of the people in Afghanistan embrace the Taliban, and that
number continues to go down. And a lot of that is because of
the actions of the Taliban, and they understand that the
civilian casualty piece--although a report said something like
75 percent are caused by the insurgents, you know, our records
show potentially above 90 percent are caused by the terrorists,
and the people are just frankly tired of this.
And they want a better life--they want the exact same thing
we want. They want to be able to send their kids to school.
They want to be--have a roof over their head. They want to have
a job to provide for them.
And so they understand that underneath this national unity
government--85 percent of the people want this government, they
want it to do well, and they are tired of what--the Taliban and
what they represent. That is a big change from where we were
just a couple years ago.
Ms. Graham. Well, thank you very much for that positive
report. I want to correct myself--President Ghani, get his
title correct.
And let's hope that what you have accomplished in
Afghanistan will continue and can be spread throughout the
region. Thank you for your time, General, and your service.
The Chairman. Ms. Walorski.
Mrs. Walorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General,
for being here.
My question is, I think it has been fairly disconcerting--
it has to me, anyway--of how much information, when it comes to
operational security, the President of the United States has
given out and how we read it every day in the media. We learn
about the withdrawal, the troop size; we learn, as the Taliban
does at the same time, all kinds of unbelievable information.
And to kind of follow up on my colleague's comment--and I
really don't want to ask you this for public disclosure, but I
want to ask you for this either in writing or a classified
briefing. I want to know the detailed Plan B. What are the
flags and the signs that are going to trigger our reengagement,
should this go awry?
I really do want to know, because I want to know that we do
have a plan. And I don't want to ask it in public for everybody
in the world to listen, because it really does concern me, but
I would ask for you to provide that in writing or a classified
briefing. What are we looking for that is going to happen so we
don't end up again with more loss of blood and life and an
engagement for America, as we are looking at in Iraq?
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mrs. Walorski. And then my other question is on this new
AUMF with ISIL. As you understand your role--I had attended a
briefing a couple of months ago and somebody was here from the
State Department and we were talking about current rules of
engagement, current AUMF as it pertains to Afghanistan with
this train, advise, and assist mission. And my question
specifically was, as we know ISIL is networking all over that
part of the world, we know ISIL is looking around and
recruiting in Afghanistan.
So my question was--under this current operation you are
under--was, ``If ISIL is identified by American troops or
Afghan National Security Forces, in our train, advise, and
assist mode that we are in, can we absolutely destroy ISIL when
they are identified?''
And the answer from the State Department was, ``No, ma'am.
They would not be considered a threat to the United States at
that point.''
My comment was, ``I would consider the fact that we are at
war with them and the mere existence of ISIL means we should
destroy them.''
So in your role right now, what is your understanding in
your current AUMF when ISIL is identified? Are they taken out
because we are at war with them or are they given a pass?
General Campbell. Ma'am, thanks for your question. We don't
talk about rules of engagement, obviously, and the tactics,
techniques, and procedures, the TTPs that go along with that.
I would just answer that and say that I am comfortable with
the authorities that I have today that I can prosecute the
mission both from a CT perspective and from a train, advise,
and assist perspective, and also protect the force that I have.
But I can't go into the rules of----
Mrs. Walorski. I understand.
General Campbell [continuing]. Engagement in this
environment.
Mrs. Walorski. I understand. And again, I would like to
have a conversation or some kind of follow-up that talks about
that in----
General Campbell. Absolutely, ma'am.
Mrs. Walorski [continuing]. At some point.
And then also, with this new AUMF, what is the difference
going to be in how you can engage ISIS now? Do you see further
gains--do you have more advantages in this new AUMF than you do
now?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I haven't seen the final written
document that has gone through, but I have glanced through
pieces of it. I know that there is no geographical boundaries,
which would help out in Afghanistan.
I would have to do a more detailed look at that. But again,
for right now I have the authorities that I need to be able to
prosecute the CT and the train, advise, assist mission I have.
I would have to take a harder look at that and I can come to
you on the AUMF and how that would impact 2015, and then, you
know, more importantly for me, as we transition----
Mrs. Walorski. I appreciate it.
General Campbell [continuing]. Into 2016 and beyond.
Mrs. Walorski. And then, in relation to the size of the
troops and the troop strength, 10,000, 5,000--10,000, 5,000--
compared to what you are doing right now, where are--what
additional kinds of missions and what additional kind of
coverage do you have right now that you are going to lose? And
if that is something that we can't talk about here either I
would like to have a conversation about that.
When we are talking about drawing down from 10,000 to
5,000, what are we actually losing there? And again, what steps
are in between there that talk about for our purposes of the
train, assist, and assist the Afghani forces?
What does that mean? How much coverage, then, are the
Afghan forces going to be having to do on their own? What does
that mean as far as risk?
I understand you probably can't talk about a lot of that
here, but I really do want to follow up answers to those
questions so that we know, as Members of Congress who are going
to be voting on this new AUMF, that there really is some kind
of a plan, and we are not going to sit here again--I don't
think anybody can take anybody's word for anything. We may have
all the faith in the world in this new President, but we also
see how these things change on a dime. And I think we are--we
owe the American public a chance to at least have seen, even in
a classified setting, that there is a plan.
So I appreciate it, and I look forward to your responses
either in writing or in a classified briefing. Thank you, sir.
I yield back my time.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
General Campbell. Thank you, ma'am.
The Chairman. Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I would first like to thank you and those who
serve and have served under you, including the Bulldog Brigade
from Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas, for the incredible job that
you are doing and have done in Afghanistan. And I join my
colleagues in just thanking you for this terrific performance,
which goes beyond any claims that someone could made or
anecdote, but actually by the numbers and by the pictures and
what we can see and what my colleagues were able to see in
their recent visit.
And I agree with many of the comments made so far that I
think there are many lessons that we can apply from your
success, this country's success, in Afghanistan to our
operations and objectives in Iraq.
When it comes to the proposed AUMF that we are considering
to combat ISIS, my understanding that the immediate goal is to
stop ISIS and ultimately to degrade, defeat, and destroy ISIS.
What is our goal in Afghanistan relative to the Taliban?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks. And I really do believe
that, again, on the AUMF--I have to look at that harder and
look forward to other questions in maybe a closed setting and
we can talk through that on the resources that we have to be
able to do that.
Sir, on the Taliban piece what I would tell you is our goal
really is to build the Afghan capacity, both in their police
and in their army, to be able to have a secure, stable
Afghanistan for the future. And the Taliban and their message,
you know, is not having any traction with the Afghan people.
As I said in my opening comments, it really is time now for
the Afghan Taliban to take a look at what they are trying to do
and become part of the political process. President Ghani, in
his inauguration speech, opened the door there for them to come
back and really work hard on reconciliation, which could
potentially be a game-changer down the road. But, you know,
that has to work with Pakistan and where they go, and where
Afghanistan is, as they continue to build their Afghan security
force capability.
But I do believe that, you know, they want to get the
Taliban to where they are part of the Afghan vision moving
forward, and killing other Afghans is not part of that vision.
And so they have to operate from a position of strength, and I
think 352,000 Afghan security forces and another 30,000 Afghan
Local Police give them that capability.
And the Taliban now are looking around and saying, ``You
know, the coalition forces, they have signed a BSA [bilateral
security agreement], a SOFA [status of forces agreement]; they
are going to continue to help and provide train, assist, and
advise--you know, what we have been trying to do here for the
last year. We have got to cut this out. We have got to come
in.''
And so I think that is really where we are going with the
Taliban, but is because the Afghan security forces are going to
drive this, not the coalition.
Mr. O'Rourke. And to that point, I think we are seeing
record casualties and losses from the Afghan security forces
and thankfully, and much to do, I think, with your leadership
and the service of our men and women on the ground, diminished
casualties from coalition forces.
You have, or military commanders have asked for additional
flexibility, something that I think makes a lot of sense and
fully endorse, given the lessons that we learned from Iraq and
are learning from Iraq. I am assuming that flexibility includes
the ability for airstrikes, raids against terrorists and those
who seek to do us harm.
What status--and to the degree that you can offer clarity
in this--what will you have to see on the ground in that
country to recommend that we no longer need that flexibility
and that we can meet our--what is going to be in 2016 our goal
of having normal embassy level of protection? Again, through
numbers or as clearly as you can, describe what that condition
will have to look like for you to make that recommendation.
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question. If I could
address the casualty piece first and just tell you that, as I
talked about in my opening statement, 5 to 7 percent, probably
larger or more increase than 2013; but again, if you put it in
context, it is about--the operational tempo that both the
police and the army have, four times greater than they had in
2013.
And again, 100,000 coalition were not out there, and so it
was expected that casualties would rise. You know, one casualty
is too much, but what we have continued to focus on are two
things.
One is continue to improve the Afghan capability to reduce
the died of wounds and work on their CASEVAC [casualty
evacuation], their MEDEVAC [medical evacuation], their doctors,
their combat medics, their lifesaver capabilities. So we are
working that all very hard. That continues to progress.
And then also, the recruiting piece. They have got that
much better. You know, they don't recruit all year round, like
all of our services do. They kind of stop during the summer in
the fighting season. Now they have got processes in place to do
it kind of year round, and so it doesn't ebb and flow like
that.
And really the casualty piece is not the--is not really
from a--the attrition rate is not just based on the casualties.
In fact, the number one reason is leadership, and making sure
they have the right leadership, as opposed to combat
casualties.
So what it would take for me, really, I think, to recommend
that, you know, we would continue to transition and work a
glide slope differently would--to make sure that the seams and
the gaps that we have identified for a very long time, that we
need to continue to work on the Afghan security forces and on
their ministries, that we have gotten them to a level that they
can have the processes that they need without us.
So the areas of aviation. You know, we continue to build up
our aviation capability. Their close air support. You know, the
first thing I always get asked for is close air support, or
building their close air support.
And so when I get a request that says, ``Hey, can you fly
close air support?'' I have asked them first, ``Do you have a
quick reaction force out there? Have you fired your mortars?
Have you fired your artillery? Have you taken your Mi-17s
[transport helicopters] that have forward-firing machine guns
on them? You have a few Mi-35s [attack helicopters]. Have you
used those?''
So we try to get all those out there to make sure they are
working through those processes.
We are working the MD-530, which is a Little Bird
helicopter that has two 50-cal [caliber] machine guns on the
sides. We will continue to work that.
They won't have much for the next fighting season, but that
will continue to develop. And we are working on a fixed-wing
capability that provides them close air support in the future,
as well, an A-29 Super Tucano. So that will continue to grow.
But once we get the close--the aviation support, once we
get their intelligence, once we work on their sustainment, once
we continue to build their special forces capability, I would
feel much better as we close the gap on those seams that we had
out there.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Mr. Bridenstine.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, the President's stated policy is to take our
strength from 10,800 troops in Afghanistan down to 5,000 troops
by the end of 2015. In your best professional military
judgment, is that the right end strength at the end of 2015?
General Campbell. Sir, it is about 5,500, half of--
somewhere around 5,500 by the end of December, and again, the
options that I provided I think provide flexibility both for
President Ghani and as the commander on the ground to take a
look at force protection and how to get after the train,
advise, and assist.
Mr. Bridenstine. In 2014 the Afghan security forces lost
over 20,000 personnel to desertions and deaths. Does that
concern you?
General Campbell. Sir, the numbers, again, as I talked
about, if you put it in the context then I think we are working
processes and procedures to make sure that that doesn't have a
great impact. As I said up front, it hasn't had a severe impact
on their readiness.
Any desertion, any casualty, of course that will--would
concern me. It concerns their leadership. It concerns the
President.
But I think, again, it is about having processes in place
to bring those people on board, to keep them in. And it really
isn't about the combat casualties. That is a fraction of it.
But the--a lot of the desertion piece is on leadership and
making sure that, you know, people are looking at them and
saying, ``Are they getting paid? Do they have the right living
conditions?''
Mr. Bridenstine. In your judgment, is there a correlation
between our drawdown, cutting our troops by half, and their
desertions?
General Campbell. Sir, I haven't looked at that hard but my
gut would tell me no.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay.
On page 16 of your testimony you discuss the Islamic State.
As the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, you suggest
that ISIS is your priority--is one of your priority
intelligence requirements.
Can you share with this panel--ISIS? What is going on with
ISIS in Afghanistan now that makes it a priority intelligence
requirement?
General Campbell. Thanks for the question.
So, you know, PIR, or priority intelligence requirement, I
have several of those; that is not my only PIR. And so as we
took a look at--and talking to President Ghani, as we kind of
did a deep dive with all of the security agencies and the intel
agencies inside of Afghanistan to look at what they were doing,
I said I need to learn more about this, and one way to do that
is to make it a PIR for my intel folks.
So as we go through a number of things that we take a look
at it, as we allocate resources from ISR platforms, other
things, because it is a PIR it will get more--a better look at
it and provide me more continued updates on that.
And that is why I did that, because again, concern for
President Ghani, concern for me. Could grow very rapidly.
Again, at this state the term that has been out there is
``nascent.'' It is a nascent organization.
But again, as we talked about, it grew very quickly in Iraq
and Syria. They have the potential to jump over different
stages and build a network, and we want to make sure that we
are looking at that very hard. So making it PIR just gives me a
little bit better visibility on it.
Mr. Bridenstine. Press reports in early February indicate
that Mullah Abdul Rauf was killed in Afghanistan in a drone
strike. The Washington Post called Rauf a figure actively
recruiting for ISIS in Afghanistan, specifically Helmand, where
coalition troops withdrew in October.
Can you confirm these reports? This was in The Washington
Post.
General Campbell. Yes, sir. It has been in a lot of the
media. Mullah Rauf Khadim was designated as a deputy emir of
Daesh, or ISIL, inside of Afghanistan, the emir of what they
call the Khorasan, which is Pakistan, Afghanistan, in that
area. Was actually a TTP [Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan] from
Pakistan, so this was the guy that said, hey, I am the deputy
emir, and----
Mr. Bridenstine. I have got 1 minute left, so I have a few
more questions about this, General----
General Campbell. Answer is yes on----
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. Okay. You are aware.
So when you think about Rauf, he was a Taliban commander.
He was detained at GTMO [Guantanamo Bay Naval Facility],
released. We turned him over to the Afghan detention facility
where he escaped and he became a recruiter for ISIS. Are you
aware of all this?
General Campbell. Sir, I am aware he is from GTMO, that he
was underneath Afghan control. I don't know any details on the
escape at all.
Mr. Bridenstine. As we look at the NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] coming forward here, we have got to make
decisions about GTMO in the NDAA. Does it concern you that our
troops in Afghanistan are fighting the same enemy twice?
General Campbell. Sir, it concerns me that they are
fighting any enemy. If it is once or twice I would have the
same concern, absolutely, but----
Mr. Bridenstine. In your best military judgment, is closing
GTMO at this time, knowing that 30 percent of the people are
going back into the war, is that good or bad judgment?
General Campbell. Sir, that is a policy question and I am a
military guy. You know, I don't want to get drug into that
policy.
What I would tell you is I--what I want to make sure I have
the ability to do is if people are going to come back into
Afghanistan, that I have the ability to make sure I am
comfortable with the assurances that Afghanistan, or whatever
country makes when they release people and turn them over to
another country, that I have the ability to make sure I
understand what assurances we have that these people will not
attack coalition forces again. So I want to make sure I am tied
into that as we move forward.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to ask the general a couple of questions based on
the popular opinion poll that he gave us here, and it was
talking about Afghans expressing confidence in their new
government.
Do you have any sort of sense of how Afghans feel as far as
confidence is concerned with Afghan capability post-U.S. or
U.S.--post-U.S. drawdown?
General Campbell. Sir, again, it is--you know, like
anything else, I think they understand the capability that just
having the coalition with them provides, and a lot of it is
just giving them some confidence.
You know, as I have taken a look on close air support--I
give you that as an example that I get asked a lot of times,
``I need close air support. I need close air support.''
What I tell the Afghans is, ``Don't plan your operation
wholly dependent upon close air support. You have the
capability. The Taliban doesn't have close air support. The
Taliban doesn't have up-armored Humvees. That Taliban doesn't
have [122 millimeter] D-30 howitzers. The Taliban doesn't have,
you know, the weapons that you have.''
So a part of it is just leadership again, and then really
having the confidence to take this fight to the enemy. But if
you go out on the streets of Kabul and you engage with, you
know, 85 percent or 80-plus percent of the people, they would
tell you they are thankful for the coalition, that they want
the coalition around.
I think they are more comfortable if they have a coalition
because it knows, you know, one, from helping out the security
forces; it also provides them the opportunity to engage, have
jobs, and that kind of thing. So I think they would tell you
that they feel comfortable with the coalition presence.
Mr. Veasey. Right. Exactly.
Well, what about with a U.S. drawdown, how would that be
perceived out in the terror community? Do you think the people
in the terror community, whether it is the Taliban or even
outside of the Taliban, outside of Afghanistan, you know, how
do they view, you know, the Afghans' capability as far as being
able to protect their own country?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks. I think, you know, I would
go back--if I can answer the last one a little bit more in
detail.
There was, I think, at different points in time a sense of
abandonment if you talk to some Afghans. But for the most part
the security forces, as they get the message out and show the
people of Afghanistan what they are capable of, then I think
that increases their confidence that the Afghan security forces
can handle this. So there was early on, I think, some
abandonment-type discussion going on. I have not seen that,
quite frankly, in the last several months as the Afghan
security forces continue to get better and better.
I think on the terror community that you talked about, I
think they were thinking that the coalition would be gone after
2014 and that, you know, they would wait that out. I think with
the BSA and the SOFA now signed they understand that for many,
many years we will have a continued commitment by the
international community to remain in Afghanistan both in some
number, but also in the resources provided to Afghanistan.
And again, I think that the time has come that they have
got to become part of the political process. They have got to
get back into--to being part of Afghanistan--they can't have
Afghans killing Afghans, Muslims killing Muslims.
And I think it is a sign of strength that President Ghani,
on his first day of office, signed the BSA and the SOFA, and
the message is sent to the terrorist community is, hey, you
know, we thought it was going to go away and it is not.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back my time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Cook.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, first of all, I want to commend you on your
testimony, your years of service in combat, peace, the--can't
even add up all the deployments you have been through, and I--
what I wanted to address is something that isn't here, and it
is of concern to our NATO partners, maybe under the radar, and
that is the situation of the poppy and the drugs and the
corruption that, from a rational viewpoint, it affects Europe.
How are we doing on--can you comment on the status of that
and where it is going right now?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question.
There have been a lot of different reports on the
cultivation of poppies and what--the impact that it has
financially for the insurgents in the area, a lot of that
coming out of the Helmand area. Media reports will say that has
increased over the last couple years as opposed to going down.
Trade is a concern to President Ghani. He has talked about
it. He is looking hard at a strategy on how he goes after that
and deals with the people that produce it, that deals with the
insurgents that use it for their gain.
They have looked at different options down there. They do
have quite a good record of a small task force that goes after
and seizes different places and, for lack of a better term,
drug labs that produce what comes out of there. But, you know,
quite frankly, you know, it has not been enough and the
strategy there has not taken that away from the insurgents.
That is not part of my TAA or part of my CT mission, so I
can't comment, you know, further on that piece of it. But
bottom line, it does provide, you know fuel, financial
assistance to the Taliban, and we have to take--and the
government of Afghanistan is looking hard at a holistic look at
how they can combat that.
Mr. Cook. Thank you.
The relationship with Pakistan obviously has improved quite
a bit--the military. The equipment--at one time we were always
concerned about the equipment backlog going through Pakistan
and everything else. Are we in pretty good shape right now on
that? We had containers backed up to the sky, and just a quick
update on that or----
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question. I mean, the
logistical community and what our Nation has done with
retrograde of equipment is phenomenal. I think, you know, years
down the road when people take a look at this and understand--
fully understand the amount of equipment that came out and how
it came out, this is--they will be--this is record-setting.
And so we are on glide path now. We hit those back--all the
numbers that we thought we needed to hit coming out of the
mission to where we are today, we are on those numbers. So I
feel very, very comfortable.
It ebbs and flows on how we do that through Torkham,
through down in the south, based on the relationship with
Pakistan. But again, the relationship with Pakistan today in
Afghanistan is the best I have seen it in all the times I have
been over there, and a lot of that is because of General
Raheel, chief of the army in Pakistan, and then President
Ghani, and their relationship--how they come together.
But the retrograde, I think, is on glide slope. I have no
concerns there right now.
Mr. Cook. Yes. I was very, very happy to hear that.
I want to switch gears real quick. Uzbekistan in the north.
Landlocked country, obviously. I think they have to have good
relations with Pakistan. Iran is a whole new ballgame, as you
know.
What is the relationship with Uzbekistan right now? I know
at one time they were working on that bridge or that--the--I
think it was the train that was going down there. Is that still
ongoing or----
General Campbell. Sir, I haven't seen a final piece where
they have signed an MOU, memorandum of understanding, or MOA,
agreement. I know that President Ghani has personally reached
out to all the countries in the region. He has visited many of
them.
I don't think in the last couple months that he has visited
Uzbekistan, but I know he has talked to the senior leadership
there. They have talked about the rail; they have talked about
the bridges; they have talked about sharing of intelligence
back and forth and how they can fight different insurgents.
Really a lot in the north is around criminal activity as
opposed to, you know, the insurgent piece. There is arms
trafficking, there is drug trafficking, and those kind of
things. So they are working together.
He has sent senior members of his administration to
different countries around--I couldn't--I can find out, but I
know that I think several members of senior positions in
Afghanistan have gone to visit Uzbekistan, as well.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much. Again, thank you for your
service. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for being here today.
At a time of sequestration, when we are cutting our funding
for U.S. forces here in the U.S. and looking at everything from
shutting down commissaries on bases to adjusting retirement
benefits for our forces, we are looking at our future
expenditures in Afghanistan. Now, I have concerns that we have
sufficient oversight with how the Afghans are spending the
money that we are providing them with the resource. And
specifically, you had mentioned, you know, their lack of self-
sustaining capability, logistical capability.
I would like to look specifically at their ability to
account for personnel. We talked about already the over 20,000
troop attrition in the Afghan forces that has been reported.
You know, I rely on the Special Inspector Generals for
Afghanistan Reconstruction's [SIGAR] reports as to what is
going on there and I see that there have been some real
concerns. I mean, the numbers of Afghan military and police
forces fluctuate significantly, sometime from quarter to
quarter by as much as 20,000 or 40,000 personnel.
And I am worried that we are spending this money, we are
not spending as much on our own U.S. forces here, we are
spending money there, but, you know, those 40,000 troop
fluctuations, are those best case scenario an accounting error?
Those folks were never there, or they quit? Or were we paying
for folks that were never there--ghost soldiers, as you were,
that were on the books?
So can you talk a little bit about how we are providing
oversight for the Afghans and help to them to figure out how
they can get a handle on their forces and how they are spending
this money that we are providing?
General Campbell. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for your service,
as well.
You know, that is always a very, very tough, complex thing
to get your hands around. People in our own Army, as you know,
we have a hard time sometimes figuring out exactly who is
present for duty, who is not.
Many of the figures I think you have seen in the last
several days on numbers--you know, first off, we need to make
sure that SIGAR and Members of Congress have total transparency
on everything that we are doing inside of Afghanistan, and I
want to make sure--and we are committed to provide SIGAR and,
again, Congress everything they need to do that.
Some of the things are classified, and I--and back in
August timeframe--so this is not a new story, but back in
August when I got there I asked that we take a holistic look at
all the information that was going out to not only the SIGAR
but to the press and everybody else, and I said, ``Anything
that is readiness data''--and sometimes numbers of people and
how you take a look at that could be construed as readiness
data--but I said, ``Anything that is readiness data for the
Afghans needs to be classified.'' We just can't put that out,
for the Afghans' good and also because we are wholly dependent
upon the Afghans now for our own force protection. It became
more so that I needed to have the readiness data classified.
The U.S. Army's readiness data is classified. All of our
services' data is classified, as you know.
So that decision was made in August. I reaffirmed with
President Ghani--in fact, he approached me about having that
kind of data classified. And again, here in the last probably 2
weeks or so I went back to him and said, ``I want to make sure
you are comfortable, because I am getting asked a lot of
questions on this.''
He was absolutely adamant that Afghan data that pertained
to readiness data was classified. So I feel very comfortable
where we are at.
And I have not, as has been reported in some media, changed
my mind. I have not. Readiness data remains classified.
Now, on the numbers of people--and again, the last report
that came out a couple days ago from SIGAR, I think what
happened there--and there is--again, I want to make sure SIGAR
has everything they need to do their job and Congress has that
information, as well. But I think numbers reported and numbers
where you get that information comes from many different
sources, and there is a report, called the 1230 Report, that
Congress has dictated that I give, and that is sort of the--
that is the base line, and that is where the numbers need to
come from. And I think SIGAR understands that as well.
But I think some of the reports you saw and where the
discrepancy were were like quarterly reports, and they may not
have even come from my headquarters but they came from maybe
lower headquarters, where members of potentially SIGAR went
down to a lower headquarters, said, ``Hey, what are your
numbers?'' And so we have to do a much better job at my
headquarters to make sure that we have processes in place that
we can provide the right data at the right time, but we have to
have a better procedure to do that.
And we are working on that. I just signed a standard
operating procedure to consolidate how we work that.
We have over 50, probably 62 different audits going on
inside of Afghanistan, from SIGAR to AAA [Army Audit Agency] to
DODIG [Department of Defense Inspector General]--60-plus. And
so as we have transitioned and brought our numbers down, I
don't have the people in country to do all of that.
I am dependent upon reach-back or other ways, and we have
got to come up with a way to be able to figure out how we
provide audit data, but at the same time continue to
transition. And I don't have that capability. I have to raise
that with my own leadership as we go forward.
But the numbers that I think you saw the last couple days,
I think there is a miscommunication. When I learned through The
New York Times, not through SIGAR, that these numbers are going
to be replaced, I contacted John Sopko with SIGAR and said,
``Hey, we need to take a hard look at this data you are getting
ready to release. I don't think it is right.''
So I alerted him to that, they stopped the release of that
piece. And again, we are looking hard at how we can continue to
work making sure everybody gets the right data. Hopefully that
got to your question.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for being here.
If there is one thing we have learned over the last several
months it is that the people of a country have to be willing to
hold that country, and I am speaking specifically of Iraq.
Afghanistan obviously a very different country. I think that
from the context of the American citizen that maybe the way it
is talked about the perception is it is all one and the same
issue, if you will.
And I do think that we need to do a better job of getting
that message out when we do have the victories, because all
America is hearing right now is the bad that is happening in
the Middle East. So thank you for your service.
I want to talk with you about one of the issues that you
have talked about a couple of times: close air support.
Obviously, in order for Afghanistan to be a success they have
to be able to hold that country from the Taliban and other
terrorist organizations when we are hopefully completely out of
there.
The Afghanistan Air Force, the A-29 [Super Tucano] light
air support mission right now is currently--they are being
trained at Moody Air Force Base in Valdosta. If you could just
speak to the--that element, how critical it is, the air support
and Afghanistan's being able to carry out their own air support
long term, and then how many A-29s do you expect we should be
prepared to provide for the Afghanistan Air Force?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question. And again,
we are very thankful in Georgia that they have that capability
to provide the training for the A-29s. It is a very long
process. You know, looking in hindsight, I wish we would have
started that years ago and we would have that capability now,
but we are where we are and I think what is happening there--
training the pilots, training the maintainers for this fixed-
wing close air support capability--is critical for Afghanistan
and their air force as we move to the future.
You know, quite frankly, we can't get it quick enough for
them. The current program has about 20 aircraft over the next 3
years that will come to Afghanistan.
We won't have any for this fighting season 2015. We will
get some at the end of the year, a couple more before start of
fighting season 2016. But most will come out in 2017 and then
in 2018. So that is another reason we need to continue to have
this train, advise, and assist for the next several years,
working at least on the air force piece.
But it is a great, great capability. They are looking
forward to it. And I think it will give them, and the people in
that region will understand, that the Afghans have this great
close air support capability.
We are working other ways to work that here in the near
term with forward-firing machine guns under Mi-17s, with MD-
530, this Little Bird I talked about. And again, they do have
indirect-fire mortars, 120 mortars, D-30 howitzers that will
continue to work with them on different ways to improve that
capability. But this is a huge asset they are looking forward
to getting inside of Afghanistan.
Mr. Scott. You know, we have to make sure that when we
leave that country that that country is prepared to hold and
govern themselves. Just the situation in Iraq right now is--
that is certainly lessons learned the hard way, if you will.
Mr. Chairman, I don't have any further questions.
Thank you for the A-29 mention, and if we can ever host you
at Moody Air Force Base, be happy to have you down there.
With that, I yield the remainder of my time.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General, for your endurance and service.
Tomorrow night at the state armory in Hartford there is
going to be a sendoff for the Connecticut Army National Guard
192nd Military Police Battalion, who are heading off to
Afghanistan. And, you know, first of all, they were given
notice almost 60 days ago to the day that they were being sent
over. And I realize this is not sort of in your lane in terms
of, you know, making the decisions about, you know, reaching
into Guard and Reserve units.
You know, what I would say is that, frankly, there are
folks who are kind of scratching their heads that if we are at
a force level of about 10,000, you know, Guard and Reserves--
there was, I think, an understanding and an acceptance back
during the surge days, you know, when we had hundreds of
thousands of people over in the Middle East--you know, tapping
into the Guard at this point, and frankly, doing it with almost
the bare notice required by law, is something that, again,
folks are struggling with.
And so first of all, I guess I would ask you--and I don't
mean to put you on the spot, but if you were in front of those
families tomorrow night, you know, what you would share with
them. And I am not asking you to, you know, explain the
decision-making process, because I realize that that happens
somewhere else, in terms of your command.
But again, as their leader over in Afghanistan, you know,
what would be your thoughts that you would share with the
families?
General Campbell. Sir, thank you. And again, the Army--all
of our service could not do what we do without our military
families. So I would first thank them for their sacrifice, for
having to allow us to have that soldier continue to serve.
I would tell them that what they are getting ready to do,
you know, two things--is a very, very important mission, will
mean a great deal to the Afghan people but also provide for our
own security back here.
I would ask them to watch out for each other and always
take care of brothers and sisters on their left and right to
make sure that force protection is always foremost in their
mind. I would ask them never to get complacent. But that they
do have a very, very important job.
You know, many times when I tell the soldiers, airmen,
sailors, marines over there that sometimes you are too close to
it; they can't see some of these changes we talked about
earlier, and they--you know, people serve for different
reasons, but they do serve because they know that they are
serving for the greater good. And when they come to Afghanistan
I tell them, you know, ``Whatever you do, make that place
better than when you found it,'' and I think I have seen over
the years everybody continues to do that.
They will have an impact on whatever they do and whoever
they touch. And again, sometimes this is an impact that they
can't be able to put into words, but I would just tell you
their service would be honored and that they will feel good
about what they have done after they leave there.
I can't speak to the service provider piece, that only
that, you know, for many, many years our National Guard, our
U.S. Army Reserve have played an important role both in Iraq
and Afghanistan and will continue as we move forward. And so I
appreciate their service.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you. And I will share
those thoughts.
You know, frankly, I think as we have sort of wrestled with
the drawdown and force reduction and sequestration and the
Budget Control Act, you know, it sort of has reignited a little
bit of the sort of tension about whether or not the Guard and
Reserve really are on parity, in terms of the rest of the
forces. And again, the fact that they got this order to head
over, you know, again, at a time when maybe the average person
wouldn't think that kind of, you know, is consistent with the
rest of the force level, underscores to me the value that
Active Duty still apply--you know, believes exists, in terms of
the Guard and Reserve units.
And they have done yeoman's work during both conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. And, you know, they deserve all the kudos
and appreciation that we can possibly give them.
So again, thank you for your comments, and again, I will
pass them along.
I will yield back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, General Campbell,
thank you and your staff for being here today.
And I am going to take a little different approach. I
looked at your narrative and the comment by Senator Levin, who
is now retired, and says, ``I just cite these public opinion
polls--Americans, 65 or 70 percent think we haven't achieved
anything.'' And then he is critical of the people that don't
think we have achieved anything by saying at the end of it,
``And the people who are 7,000 miles away think we haven't?''
You know, well, I would say to the Senator, it is those
people back home that are paying the bills. They need to get
something out of the tax dollars that they are paying.
When we went into Afghanistan in 2001 the debt of our
Nation was $5.95 trillion. Today it is over $18 trillion in
debt. And you know from your brothers and sisters in the
military what we are faced with with budgets.
All right. Then I read in a blog from yesterday by Jason
Ditz--D-I-T-Z--between casualties and desertion, Afghan
military is shrinking fast. ``The desertion problem is a
longstanding one, with many Afghans signing up for the
military, sticking around long enough to get their first
paycheck, then bailing, and often taking their weapons with
them as a sort of severance package.''
Then in The Guardian yesterday, ``Afghan Officials Sanction
Murder, Torture, Rape, Says Report.'' Now, I realize that this
is from Human Rights Watch, and we can have our views on that,
whether it is a liberal group or a conservative group or
whatever. That is fair. But they still write this, and
apparently there has been no dispute.
And I will read just one paragraph: ``The report focuses on
eight commanders and officials across Afghanistan, some of them
counted among the country's most powerful men, and key allies
for foreign troops. Some are accused of personally inflicting
violence, others of having responsibility for militias or
government forces that commit the crimes.''
I know some good things are happening. I don't question
that at all. But where--Afghanistan has been proving in history
it is the Wild West.
What my concern is that we have got 9 more years of a
financial commitment and a military commitment, which might be
limited in numbers but they are still young men and women over
there walking the roads to be shot at and have their legs blown
off. I just wondered, because we in Congress are going to be
grappling with sequestration this year.
The chairman and ranking member, who are doing a great job,
are very concerned about the military budget, and I think all
of us here are, as well. I know I am. I have Camp Lejeune down
in my district and Cherry Point Marine Air Station.
But I get to a point that I just wonder--not talking about
you, sir; you are an outstanding, great military person--but
will there ever be anyone in the diplomatic corps or the
military that say, ``You know, we have done about all we can
do?'' Some things are impossible.
Yes, some people will benefit, but when I read reports like
this, whether they be from the left or the right--Pat Buchanan
is one of my biggest heroes. Ron Paul is one of my dearest
friends. And I continue to see 9 more years of spending money
that we don't have so we can decrease the number in our
military.
It doesn't make any sense. I know you don't make the policy
decisions. I understand that.
But will there ever be someone who follows behind you and
follows behind me that will be honest to the Congress and the
American people who have to pay the bill that we have done
about as much as we can do?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question.
Sir, I would answer like this: Again, you know, quite
frankly, this is the world we live in, not maybe the world we
want. And I think the complexity of the world we live in is a
generational piece that is going to go on long after you and I
are out of here, and we need to understand that and look at it
as a generational issue and put strategies and policies in
place that will get at this long-term.
So it is not going to change overnight, and I think we just
have to change our mindset on where we are at. And I think the
American people are well served by the great men and women who
continue to raise their right hand and serve, knowing that they
can go into harm's way, knowing that despite trying to do
something bigger than themselves, that they are going to face
going into a service that is going to have budget issues that
is going to take away.
And so I think this is a long-term issue we have to get at.
But what I am pleased about is that, you know, you
mentioned all those different reports there, and there are
challenges, not only in Afghanistan but many places in the
world. I do see Afghanistan as a place, because of the
significant investment in lives and in financial that we have
provided to them, that this can be the bright spot, that this
is, for lack of a better term, a strategic win that will carry
on in this part of the world that is a very complex, dangerous
part.
And for very little continued investment, we can make this
the shining light of Central Asia and that part of the world.
And I think, you know, we have got to start someplace, and
Afghanistan is the good news story among all these other bad
things that are coming out.
And for every bad news report you just mentioned there,
sir, there are probably 9 or 10 good news that do not get out
because, as you know, good news doesn't sell. What I have had
to do is take--I give President Ghani a good news story
storyboard that I collect each week.
I have my commanders provide me a good news storyboard that
talks about the good things that Afghans are doing in different
areas, and when I meet with him I say, ``Mr. President, Dr.
Abdullah, here are some good news stories. You are not hearing
about it in the news but you need to know this is happening.''
And I give them 10 or 15 PowerPoint slides with pictures
showing good news story in Afghanistan, and that word just
doesn't get out because it doesn't sell. But believe me, sir,
for every VBIED [vehicle-borne improvised explosive device],
suicide vest that went off in Kabul, there are 9 or 10 that are
stopped.
And so there is good news out there.
The Chairman. Gentlelady from Guam, Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Campbell, thank you for your challenging leadership
in Afghanistan.
I want to quote the 2015 National Security Strategy in
saying, ``We must recognize that a smart national security
strategy does not rely solely on military power. Indeed, in the
long term our efforts to work with other countries to counter
the ideology and the root causes of violent extremists will be
more important.''
I strongly support this approach, General. However, I am
also concerned that the persistence we have shown in
Afghanistan and our presence there can have harmful effects on
our long-term readiness.
As we draw down to a force capable of protecting our
security interests in the region, how will we capitalize and
re-utilize the equipment--and I know this was brought up
earlier--that we currently have in-country to protect the
readiness of our total force? Specifically, can you comment on
retrograde efforts, as they are supported in the fiscal year
2016 budget, and what impact sequestration would have on this
effort if sequestration is not repealed?
General Campbell. Thank you, ma'am. And thank you for your
visit last fall, as well.
I haven't looked at the numbers for the retrograde portion
for fiscal year 2016. I would tell you that we will continue to
need the necessary resources, the financial piece to bring back
the retrograde that we have in Afghanistan so that we can put
that back into the force here. Probably 80 percent of that now
is for the Army.
But the very best equipment that we have is in Afghanistan,
so we need to continue to make sure we get that back, get it
reset, and get that into the force.
I do think that we are on glide slope to do that. We had
some concerns, you know, a year, year and a half ago, but as a
vice then now as a commander on the ground, I don't have those
same concerns and we will continue to get that back to the
Army.
Sequestration, from a different perspective, I think will
impact the readiness of all of our services. And again, that is
why I think all the service chiefs, the chairmen have come out,
as you know, and said that it would have a really, really bad
impact if we go to sequestration--on readiness.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much, General.
And my second question is, recently the first lady of
Afghanistan had said, ``Women come to me and say you have
forgotten us.'' I am a strong champion of women's rights and
wonder, what can we do, working with the Afghans and NATO, to
ensure women's rights are respected across the country as we
continue to draw down our forces? How are we encouraging or
working with the Afghan government to ensure greater inclusion
of women in civic society?
And a few years back I traveled with Speaker--then Speaker
leader Pelosi, and we visited many of the women leaders in
Afghanistan, and they were very, very concerned about the
future. So can you comment on that, General?
General Campbell. Thank you, ma'am. And we work very hard,
both from a coalition perspective, but also President Ghani
works very hard to make sure that he looks hard at how he is
working on the gender issues, and particularly the women piece
here, both from a military perspective, security perspective,
and getting women into the police and getting them into the
army.
The money, $25 million, that Congress has approved for
this, specifically pinpointed to work on these type of issues,
is very, very helpful, and we are thankful of that support.
But it will take time for the police and the army--and the
police are doing much better than the army, quite frankly, on
integrating women into the force. But we will look very hard as
we go through there. But some of the cultural differences they
have make that, you know, a little bit tougher.
But I think they are both committed, from the MOI
perspective, Ministry of Interior--and I will engage the
minister of defense once we have new minister of defense. I
have engaged the current acting and the chief of army on this,
and they are always looking at ways on how they can improve.
You know, I want to say 24 percent of parliament is women.
You know, I don't think we have that in our own Congress, so
that is very good in Afghanistan.
So President Ghani and the first lady have really put a
hard press on those throughout Afghanistan and reaching out, as
well. I do have a gender advisor from my force, from Australia,
actually, that focuses on a lot of different activities that
are going on to see how we can do that much better. She engages
with NATO and all of our NATO and partner forces, as well, to
ensure we are doing everything we can to enrich this and
continue to keep emphasis on it.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, thank you very much, General, for your
comments. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlelady.
Dr. Wenstrup.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Campbell, thank you so much for your service and
taking on the mission that you are taking on. And it is
encouraging to see the positive that we don't often hear about.
I would agree with you wholeheartedly, I think it was a
great move by Ghani to sign a BSA and the SOFA. That bodes well
for all of us. And I think it was probably wise, from where I
sit, for Ghani and Abdullah to come together as governance
partners.
And so my question to you is, what are you seeing as far as
that relationship between the two of them and its effect on any
national unity in Afghanistan?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks. That is a great question.
I look at this every day and I do think that both President
Ghani and Dr. Abdullah gave up some to make sure that they can
continue to have Afghanistan as a nation continue to move
forward. They both did that after a long period there.
As they work together and as I see both of them many times,
both together and then separately, I think they complement each
other as they work together. They both have great vision for
where they want to take Afghanistan.
And, you know, it is--it really is a people around each of
them I think that they have to continue to work through, and
they have run into instances where they have had differences,
but I think they work hard to make sure as they come out to the
public that they have one voice as they move forward. That is
not easy all the time, but I think they understand how
important it is so they work toward that, both from a security
perspective and then from an economic perspective.
But again, I think they complement each other and I am
honored to have the opportunity to engage with both of them
quite a few times every week.
Dr. Wenstrup. So, General, in that sense, is that carried
over to the military in some ways, as far as unity and cohesion
amongst the military and the morale within the military--the
Afghan forces?
General Campbell. Sir, absolutely. As I said, he is--Dr.
Ghani, President Ghani is a commander in chief. He said that up
front. And so his interaction with all the security forces is
completely different from where we were underneath President
Karzai.
Their morale, you know, just--it has gone way up just
knowing that they have somebody that cares for their welfare,
that has visited them at training sites, that has visited their
wounded in hospitals, that has talked to them about changing
the authorities for corps commanders on what they can and can't
do.
He has video teleconferences several times since I have
been with him with the senior leadership. He has a National
Security Council meeting every week that he brings in the
senior leadership from the police and the army.
So again, I think they are thankful that they do have a
commander in chief that has taken not only their own welfare
but also their families' welfare, as he looks at different ways
to help out wounded warriors, those kind of things. So it is
quite good.
Dr. Wenstrup. And with that in mind, since they have not
been in office very long, do you anticipate--you know, the
question has come up a couple times about the deserters. Do you
anticipate that that rate will slow down as a result, or
hopefully, anyway?
General Campbell. Sir, what they are--how would I try to
make that tie-in, and I think, you know, President Ghani, what
he is trying to do is put leadership in that can make a
difference. So he is taking a hard look at all of his generals.
He has retired on order of about 60 general officers since he
has been--as the President.
You know, they hadn't had any retirements in the last 4 or
5 years underneath President Karzai. So in the last 4 months or
so they had--they have had about 60-plus.
So that is infusing new blood. He is looking hard at the
people that he puts into those positions. You know, he is
trying to interview every one of his general officers or the
people that he promotes to be general officer. He is trying to
put them based on their merit, you know, which is very good.
And I think leadership is going to change the attrition
piece. You know, what happens on the attrition, I said part of
it is combat casualties. That is only a small piece.
The desertion, if you take a hard look at why people
desert--and they have instituted an attrition working group in
the army that I have senior advisors that attend now. It went
dormant for a while. We have instituted that back up to make
sure we get after this issue.
But when you take a hard look at it, it is leadership. It
is, for instance, having a soldier that is assigned to the
215th Corps in Helmand and he has been there for 4 years, so
all he knows is combat after combat after combat. And they
haven't been able to get on a cyclic, so they have sort of a
red, amber, green, so they can go through and they can take
leave, they can have training, and then they can fight.
And so they are just now starting to have that cyclic force
generation process that gives them that ability. And once they
get that into place I really do think you will see the
desertion piece go way down.
Part of it is they are assigned to the 215th, you get down
there, you see no future about being rotated to another corps
and you are always going to be on it because their personnel
management, how they do talent management is not right. They
are moving toward that. If you are in the 215th down in Helmand
but you live in Badakhshan, way up north, you know, it takes
you days to get back there, or you may never get back there,
and once you do get back there and you interact with your
family and they are out in the fields trying to harvest, you
know, you may go past what your 20 days of leave would be, and
then you are considered a deserter, and then you don't want to
come back, although many do.
So I think leadership is going to make the difference on
the attrition piece, and I think President Ghani is a big part
of that.
Dr. Wenstrup. Well, those sound like logical things to
address.
And if I may, Mr. Chairman, just one quick question.
You did mention wounded warriors. What percentage of the
medical care being given in theater right now is coming from
American personnel, would you estimate, as opposed to----
General Campbell. For the Afghans, sir?
Dr. Wenstrup. For the whole theater. You talk about, you
know, the wounded warriors. Is it U.S. physicians, surgeons
taking care of the wounded predominantly, or is the Afghan
medical----
General Campbell. No, sir. You know, they have their own
medical system. I have sat down with the Afghan army's surgeon
general and talked to him on one occasion on how they can
improve different areas of that, but no, they have regional
hospitals.
We have some advisors at different places that are
continuing to work through that, but they only come to a
coalition facility, like at Bagram, if it is a very, very, you
know, worst case that they can't handle, and that has been on
very few instances since I have been there.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you very much, and----
General Campbell. Thank you, sir.
Dr. Wenstrup [continuing]. We will have a chance to meet
with you again in a classified setting, and appreciate it.
The Chairman. Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General, for hanging in here. I have
appreciated very much your knowledge and very nuanced
testimony.
I want to follow up on Congresswoman Bordallo's last
comment. As a Member of Congress I have made six trips to
Afghanistan, and four with a delegation of women--generally
three Republican congressional--Congresswomen and three
Democratic Congresswomen.
And our goal really has been twofold. It has been over
Mother's Day, so to thank our women soldiers. Often we
commiserate with them, know how hard it is to be away from home
on Mother's Day, as it is for all of those who are serving.
But we have also had the real opportunity to see the gains
that have been made for women in Afghanistan. And while they
are not as widespread as we would like, I think Kabul has been
a prime beneficiary of them, but--and other urban settings--but
nevertheless, those gains have been real and your report showed
that, in terms of health care, access to education, a whole--
access to work, although--however, limited.
So as we are drawing down, our concern really is that those
gains are not somehow traded away. And as you have talked about
President Ghani's reaching out and referencing the Taliban in
his inaugural speech, I can tell you that as we meet with women
over there those comments send chills through them because we
know how terribly they suffered under the Taliban regime.
And so I think our concern, our bipartisan concern, has
become, you know, how do we protect the gains that have been
made? And as we have talked today about some of the differences
about Afghanistan and Iraq, it seems to me that one of them has
really been the signing of the bilateral security agreement,
and that it has set up a very different framework and I think
has given us leverage, a role in Afghanistan as it transitions
to its next phase.
So I am curious--while the security situation is really
your role and many of these other gains have been investments
that have come about through other parts of our presence
there--how you see the United States' role using its ongoing
relationship with the government to make sure that, let's just
say negotiations do go forward with the Taliban, how we make
sure, how we use our leverage there, how you use your leverage,
representing the United States, to make sure that women's gains
remain on the table and they are somehow not traded away as
others argue for a path forward in which the Taliban are
brought into the government?
General Campbell. Ma'am, thank you for your visits. Thank
you for your question.
Again, I think leadership has a big deal here to play. I
think, again, the difference here is that President Ghani and
Dr. Abdullah are very committed to this. It is written in their
constitution, and so as they work with the Taliban, if there is
reconciliation down the road, I think one of the key parameters
there will be is that the constitution will hold, and inside
the constitution it talks about respect of women's rights.
Again, I think with the first lady, with President Ghani,
with Ambassador McKinley and his team at the embassy, with the
30, 40-plus ambassadors I interact with periodically, they all
have this upmost in their mind. It comes up in different
settings, different meetings I am at.
And so, you know, it is sort of a drum beat that President
Ghani, Dr. Abdullah, senior leadership, and then the other
ministries continue to hear, and they understand how important
it is that they abide by, you know, their constitution and
where they want to go.
So I think leadership will make a difference, and I
understand that in my realm, in the security realm, what we
are--what we have changed now is everything is conditions-
based. And so we sign letters of commitment to provide finance,
to provide fuel, on and on and on and on.
And I think this is where the same ways we look forward in
this area that it could be conditions-based, and everything
that we continue to do through different NGOs we make
conditions-based and they abide by their constitution, and I
think the leadership can make that happen over there.
Ms. Tsongas. I can remember a hearing we had here where a
woman who is a leader of one of the NGOs over there said the
first indication that things are not going well for women will
be the street--if you stop seeing women on the street. So that
really does come back to the role of the Afghan National
Police.
Are you confident that they are up to the task? And if not,
do you see--how would we challenge them to do it better?
General Campbell. Ma'am, the police have done much better
on integrating women into their force. They are doing much
better now on understanding how they have to deal with
communities and understanding community policing.
As we did a deep dive back in December on all the security
incidents inside of Kabul, we talked about the high-profile
attacks. One way of getting after that was having a police
force that had community policing on their mind, understood
what that meant.
As was mentioned earlier by one of the members, President
Ghani made a change on many of the district commanders inside
of Kabul, made a change here. They have been talking about that
for a while. He just did that. I think that will adjust.
As I travel around the streets of Kabul the streets are
bustling, a lot of women are out and around. And so that
indication there says that continues to build.
Again, I think this will be a challenge that they will--
that leadership, in keeping a spotlight on this and having the
international community make sure they understand how important
it is, and that if they don't continue to abide by this then
there is a conditionality where they--you take away something,
whether it is financial and--you know, they are very dependent
upon the donor nations right now, so I think conditions have to
go on this.
And I know they are working very, very hard on this and
they are dedicated toward that. But there will be challenges as
they move forward.
And, ma'am, it is going to take time. So, you know, as I
talk about within their army they have a goal--a very hard goal
of getting 10 percent into their army. They are less than 1
percent today; they are trying to work toward that.
But I look at my own Army, and after 239 years we are at
about 15 percent, you know, so it is going to take time and it
is harder based on the cultural differences they have there,
but I think they are committed to working at this very hard.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, General. Thank you for your
testimony.
The Chairman. General, I mentioned to you that I thought
the questions would be better starting from the bottom, or the
more junior members, and I think the questioning has been
excellent today. I think we have touched on a lot of topics.
You have had a number of questions about ISIS, or ISIL, and
I realize that you are not here as a lawyer, and that you
haven't read and studied carefully the implications of what the
President has proposed. And I heard you say that at this point
ISIS is a nascent threat, although--in Afghanistan, although
one you are watching very carefully.
But as we explore this AUMF that the President has
requested for ISIS, thinking about how it would work for people
like you, whether we are talking about Afghanistan, Syria,
Iraq, or whatever, one of the concerns is that it has more
restrictions on ISIS than the current AUMF has on Al Qaeda, and
some of these groups live side by side.
And so to me, there is just a commonsense concern here that
if you have got two different standards to go after two
different terrorist groups, how do you have the intelligence to
know which is which? And then operationally, how do you have
a--have to have a lawyer by your side to make every single
decision?
I mean, isn't that--if it comes to be that way--and I--this
is a big if, and I am--again, I am not trying to put you on the
spot either, but operationally would that not be a matter of
concern?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question. And, you
know, any commander on the ground would tell you he wants as
much flexibility as he can get. And so any policy that provides
commanders on the ground the flexibility to make decisions in a
timely manner is something that I would--I will be in favor of.
You are right though, sir, the insurgents--and I can only
speak for Afghanistan, but the insurgents inside of
Afghanistan, they in many cases feed off of each other, and
they are interrelated in many different ways and you may have
one that provides, you know, finance, food, lodging to one; one
that may provide weapons, and secure routes for another. But
some fight each other internally, but also it is very, very
tough, as we take a hard look at it, to separate some of these
organizations.
What I do have right now is the authorities to prosecute
those who come after the coalition, and that is how I take a
look at it as I try to bend those, is that those that--not by
their status, but by their conduct--come after coalition
forces.
The Chairman. The reason we are in Afghanistan to begin
with is because that is the place from which a plot was
launched that ultimately killed 3,000 Americans. And what can
you tell us about your assessment of Al Qaeda's core ability to
reconstitute itself were it not to be under constant pressure
from us?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks again for that question. I do
think we have to make sure we understand the threat and how the
threat will continue to evolve.
The continued pressure that we provide now with our very
credible CT capability, the very best in the world, I believe
has prevented a--another attack on the homeland. And I do
believe if you do not have pressure--continued pressure on AQ,
that it would be a matter of time that they would regenerate
that capability.
The Chairman. Under the current drawdown plan, would your
ability to gather intelligence for the CT mission be
significantly downgraded in this calendar year?
General Campbell. Sir, I--you know, as I look at it, I
would much rather go into a classified session with you to
discuss that piece----
The Chairman. And I sure don't want to get into details.
General Campbell. But, sir, as you know, as you go from a--
any time you go from one number to another, you have to make
very, very tough decisions on where you balance that.
And, you know, as I talked before, force protection is
utmost in my mind. ISR and other pieces that provide--they do
provide continued force protection for me, and so, you know, I
look at it very hard and I have to balance that. And so those
numbers--well, I am going to make some very tough decisions on
where you take that, and then what I have to do if I don't feel
comfortable with that, I need to make sure that I come forward
to my senior leadership and provide them, you know, what I
believe the risk to force is and what the risk to mission is.
The Chairman. Yes. Well, and I appreciate that. Again, I am
just thinking from a commonsense measure, if you are in fewer
places around the country you have fewer opportunities to
gather intelligence, include on force protection, as you
mentioned, and on counterterrorism mission, as well, which is
of concern to me.
Just to clarify--and I think you answered this earlier--all
of the high-value terrorists who were in our custody have now
been turned over to Afghan custody, correct?
General Campbell. Sir, not all Afghan. They have been
turned over to some other third countries, as well. But I do
not have any detainees. I do not have detention authority
underneath my authorities after 1 January.
The Chairman. Okay. So they have all gone somewhere, but
not all necessarily to the Afghans.
General Campbell. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. Okay.
Last thought: I am struck. We had, as you know, General
Austin here yesterday, and I am struck by the number of members
on this committee on both sides of the aisle who have served in
Iraq and Afghanistan and feel very strongly that they do not
want the sacrifice that has been made in Afghanistan to--I hate
to say go to waste, but there is tremendous frustration at what
has happened in Iraq, and you got a sense of that today.
I know from your service and from those who serve under
you, you share that determination to make sure that, whether we
are talking taxpayer dollars or American lives, that the
sacrifice is upheld and honored and that it is not wasted
because of policy decisions.
The only thing I would request of you is, as you watch this
situation in Afghanistan, probably closer than anybody else, if
you believe that we are headed down the wrong path, i.e.,
headed down a path that we went down in Iraq, I know this
committee expects and requests you to raise a flag to us as
well as your chain of command and say, ``This is headed in the
wrong path,'' because I--this committee obviously shares what I
have no doubt is your commitment to make sure that all of that
sacrifice these last 14 years results in a stable, relatively
peaceful Afghanistan from which terrorists cannot again launch
attacks against us.
So I will appreciate that, sir. You are welcome to say
anything you want, but you don't have to.
General Campbell. Sir, absolutely. I am committed to that.
That is what I owe my leadership and Congress here, to give you
my best military advice as we move forward on that, and I am
absolutely committed to that.
And, sir, thank you for your leadership, as well.
The Chairman. Great.
Well, thank you, sir. I appreciate answering all our
questions today.
And with that, the hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 4, 2015
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 4, 2015
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 4, 2015
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 4, 2015
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. In your testimony, you cited a recent approval for a
$900 million procurement of HMMWVs and light and medium tactical
vehicles that will replace aged-out and destroyed vehicles. With regard
to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) vehicle replacement and
sustainment decisions, has a reset and full fleet audit occurred to
determine true ANSF vehicle inventory, condition and need for
replacement versus refurbishment? If not, is an effort underway to
implement a formal reset/audit program prior to new vehicle procurement
and delivery across the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police
fleets?
General Campbell. [The information referred to is for official use
only and retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Smith. In your testimony you discussed some of the inherent
differences between how the Afghan National Army as a military entity
and the Afghan National Police as a civilian entity function. As new
Train, Advise, and Assist contracts are developed for critical Afghan
National Security Forces support functions, such as vehicle
maintenance, supply and fleet management, are these differing
operational dynamics being considered to ensure proper training and
management mechanisms are implemented to limit waste and corruption
once control is handed over to the Afghans? Are current coalition
contractors providing these services being engaged to gain insights
regarding challenges, successes and lessons learned as new contracts
and training programs are being developed?
General Campbell. [The information referred to is for official use
only and retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Shuster. General Campbell, how do you interpret the phrase
``enduring ground operations,'' which are prohibited in the President's
proposed Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)? Do you
believe that phrase is clear?
General, what in your opinion are the most important things we have
learned during our operations in Afghanistan that can be put to use in
the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)?
In reference to ISIL, you stated in January 2015, ``We are seeing
reports of some recruiting. There have been some night letter drops,
there have been reports of people trying to recruit both in Afghanistan
and Pakistan.'' How serious do you perceive the threat to be in
Afghanistan from ISIL?
What limitations are presently in place under the 2001 and 2002
AUMFs that you would hope to see changed with a new AUMF?
General Campbell. [The information referred to is for official use
only and retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
Ms. Tsongas. 2013 marked the first time since establishment of the
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund that money has been explicitly
authorized and appropriated for recruitment and retention of women in
the Afghan National Security Forces. How will you work to ensure that
money is directed to impact not only the number of women in the forces
but also the institutional reforms needed to ensure the safety and
security of these women?
General Campbell. [The information referred to is for official use
only and retained in the committee files.]
Ms. Tsongas. In your view, what impact can more women serving in
the Afghan National Security Forces have on the achievement of ongoing
U.S. objectives in Afghanistan?
General Campbell. Women make up 50 percent of the Afghan population
and their contribution to the peace and security of Afghanistan is
essential. A professional and sustainable ANDSF must include the equal
opportunity for women to serve in the security forces in order to
maximize the talent that exists within the Afghan population. Women are
largely discriminated against and segregated in Afghan society and
there is no better way to ensure their human rights than through
enabling their participation and service in the Afghan security forces.
Gender integration in all aspects of society is essential to
societal change, economic growth and peace and stability. As Afghan
women become more educated and it becomes more culturally acceptable
for women to participate in the workforce, more opportunities will
arise for women to secure their own future. Women are the largest
untapped human resource in Afghanistan. Peace and security are more
likely to be achieved if the government and security institutions
incorporate and empower women and there is no better way of
legitimizing this than through serving in the security institutions.
The increasing number of women in the police has largely contributed to
a greater number of gender based violence cases being reported due to
the level of trust that women have in other women. The employment of
women in the military also increases human intelligence capability and
enables searches to be conducted of the homes of insurgents in which
women reside.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. Will Train, Advise, and Assist teams, Special
Operation Command teams or other units be integrated into the Afghan
National Security Forces structure below the corps level?
General Campbell. [The information referred to is for official use
only and retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Coffman. Will Train, Advise, and Assist Teams or any other
military element be integrated into Afghan National Security Forces
combat operations at the tactical level?
General Campbell. [The information referred to is for official use
only and retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Coffman. Does the Afghan National Security Forces have the
proficiency, resources, and force structure to conduct close air
support, conduct of fire, and other core combined arms capabilities? Do
they require NATO support in order to conduct these types of missions
and at what level?
General Campbell. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
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