[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-15]
THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED AUTHORIZATION
FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST
ISIL AND U.S. POLICY, STRATEGY, AND
POSTURE IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 3, 2015
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fourteenth Congress
WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
ROB BISHOP, Utah RICK LARSEN, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JOHN GARAMENDI, California
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado Georgia
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado SCOTT H. PETERS, California
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
MO BROOKS, Alabama RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
PAUL COOK, California GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana PETE AGUILAR, California
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
THOMAS MacARTHUR, New Jersey
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Alex Gallo, Professional Staff Member
Mike Casey, Professional Staff Member
Michael Tehrani, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1
WITNESSES
Austin, GEN Lloyd J., III, USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command.. 6
Wormuth, Hon. Christine E., Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, U.S. Department of Defense............................. 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Austin, GEN Lloyd J., III.................................... 49
Wormuth, Hon. Christine E.................................... 43
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mrs. Hartzler................................................ 103
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 107
THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE
AGAINST ISIL AND U.S. POLICY, STRATEGY, AND POSTURE IN THE GREATER
MIDDLE EAST
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 3, 2015.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. Hearing will come to order.
Good morning. Today, the House Armed Services Committee
meets to hear testimony on the U.S. Central Command's strategic
threats and challenges.
By way of information for our members and guests, we will
go as far as we can go until 10:30, then we will recess to
attend the joint meeting on the House floor, and then we will
resume just as soon as that joint meeting is over.
We explored with our witnesses maybe trying to rearrange
this hearing; that wasn't possible. And so with you all's
patience, we will come back just as soon as the joint meeting
is completed in order to continue the hearing.
Over the past year, the developments in U.S. Central
Command's [CENTCOM] area of responsibility have been troubling.
The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS],
questions about future security situation in Afghanistan, the
Government of Yemen's fall to Iranian-backed rebels, and the
prospect of a deal ratifying Iran as a threshold nuclear power,
all have created serious stress on our strategic position and
on our alliances. Any notion that the U.S. could pivot away
from the Middle East toward other regions has proven to be
naive at best.
Part of the challenge here is the absence of a
comprehensive strategy across the Middle East. The limited
approach that the President has taken has left instability and
weak or failed states from Libya to Yemen. Many of those
locations have become breeding grounds for terrorists, which is
the opposite, of course, of what the administration has tried
to achieve. As various actors in the Middle East and elsewhere
follow our defense budget debates, one of the results of that
has been more doubts about the reliability as an ally.
What I hope to hear today is a comprehensive strategy or at
least the foundations of a strategy which will help provide a
roadmap towards a more stable Middle East led by responsible
actors. These states have just as much at stake in defeating
Islamic terrorism as we do.
This committee also needs to continue to explore
operational concerns we have about various AUMF [authorization
for use of military force] proposals that contain restrictions
on how we engage the enemy. I believe it is critical that we do
not validate Iran's standing in the region by allowing them to
have threshold nuclear capability. That has and will breed
instability and increase security competition in both the
Middle East and the wider geopolitical order. We cannot allow
that to happen.
Mr. Smith.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I agree with the chairman, you, General Austin, you
have the toughest assignment in the military. The problems keep
cropping up in many places. For, you know, over a decade we had
the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Those two areas are
still problematic, but many others have been added since then.
And I think the chairman did a pretty good exhaustive list
looking at Syria and Yemen and other places.
And getting back to stability in that region is an enormous
challenge. I will say that I think it sort of defies a
comprehensive strategy where you come up with the strategy and
then you just, you know, automatically plug it in no matter
what happens. The problems evolve. They move in different
directions, and they are contradictory.
Certainly, we are opposed to Assad's leadership in Syria.
That, you know, bad leadership has led to all kinds of
problems, but, you know, the alternative does not look much
more attractive. So what is your solution? What do you do?
There are no easy answers there, number one; number two, I
think it would be a mistake for us to assume that it is either
the U.S.'s responsibility or that we have the ability ourselves
to solve these problems.
This is primarily a regional issue. This is primarily a
problem of governance, leadership, religion, all manner of
different issues colliding in that region. What we have to do
is see how we can be part of helping to move those countries in
a correct direction to get to greater stability. This is not
something that the U.S. can come up with a plan and then go in
there and implement it and fix Syria or fix Yemen or fix Iraq.
I think if we took that approach, that would be a mistake
and would lead to greater pushback than it would to solutions.
And obviously, one of the biggest problems in the region, aside
from the Islamic extremists, like ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant] and Al Qaeda, is the Sunni-Shia split, you
know, most exemplified by the split between Saudi Arabia and
Iran. That complicates everything. In the offensive that we
have just heard about launched against Tikrit is launched
against ISIL. Obviously that is, you know, one of our foremost
enemies that we want to see defeated. One of the countries
leading that offensive is Iran, another country that we are
troubled by. How do you sort of deal with all of those
different complex situations?
And I think what I want to hear today personally is not
that you have the answer. I am not going to put that burden on
you, to say here is the strategy that is going to solve the
problem. I want to hear how the U.S. can best use its resources
to make the problem better instead of worse, understanding that
it defies any sort of simple solution or defies any sort of
U.S. solution.
And let me just say on Iran, on the idea that somehow if we
do a deal with them we make them a threshold nuclear power,
they have already done that. They made that decision and they
moved forward. There is no deal--I think the deal that
everybody wants is where we go in and we tell Iran you give
everything up and we get to keep the sanctions on you. Well, I
don't think Iran is going to go for that, so we have got to
figure out what is the best approach. And the approach the
administration is trying to take is trying to contain them to
make sure that they cannot break out and get to a nuclear
weapon.
If we don't reach a deal, the risk of that happening goes
up exponentially because then Iran has nothing to lose. The
sanctions are there. How do we monitor it? How do we pursue it?
If we can get an agreement that severely limits their nuclear
program so that we can be confident that they won't be able to
get a nuclear weapon for at least a year or more without us
first knowing that they are trying to do it, I think that is a
significant improvement. If we walk away, the status quo is not
to our advantage. There is no reason to believe that they won't
expand their nuclear situation that could lead to even greater
conflict in the region.
Again, I would prefer the answer that says Iran just walks
away from the nuclear program, no questions asked. I just don't
see that on the table. And I think that is but one example of
the complex set of choices that we face here that defy easy
answers, that defy a U.S. policy that is just going to solve
the problem.
So in a complicated world, like I said, I look forward to
hearing what we can do to hopefully contain the problem and
move things in the right direction, understanding the
limitations of our ability to simply solve them.
With that, I yield back.
The Chairman. I am pleased to welcome back Ms. Christine
Wormuth, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and General
Lloyd Austin, Commander of the U.S. Central Command as our
guest witnesses today.
Without objection, both of your full written statements
will be made part of the record, and we would invite you at
this point to summarize your statements before we go to
questions.
Ms. Wormuth.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking
Member Smith, and members of the committee, for inviting me
here today to talk about DOD [Department of Defense] strategy
and posture in the Greater Middle East. It is a pleasure to be
back here again this week to talk to you about a different and
even more challenging part of the world.
It is also a great pleasure to be here with General Austin.
We are very lucky to have him serving as our commander in
CENTCOM. He is also, frankly, a terrific reminder of the
overall quality of all of our men and women serving in the
region today.
As you all know, our forces in CENTCOM are confronting many
difficult global security challenges. New realities have forced
us to take a hard look at our near- and long-term goals for our
engagement in the Middle East. Although the Department will
face many different challenges in the Middle East, as Ranking
Member Smith noted, two issues are particularly critical and
are at the top of our agenda: The first is how to degrade and
ultimately defeat ISIL, and the second is preventing Iran from
obtaining a nuclear weapon.
In Iraq and Syria, the Department is working with partners
for a truly whole-of-government effort to try and degrade and
ultimately defeat ISIL. We have over 2,600 U.S. service men and
women currently in Iraq working with the Government of Iraq,
and more than 60 countries participating in our global
coalition against ISIL. We are making progress. This is going
to be a long-term campaign and we need to be patient, but we
are making progress.
We have blunted ISIL's momentum. We have degraded its
ability to mass and maneuver forces. We have pressured or
eliminated its leadership cells, and we have disrupted its
command and control and supply lines. In short, we have put
ISIL on the defensive. And I think you are seeing that, and I
am sure General Austin will speak to that in more detail in
various parts of Iraq right now.
But countering ISIL would not be possible without local
partners in the lead. U.S. and coalition partners are
supporting the Government of Iraq by assisting with training,
equipping, and advising its armed forces. Last summer, we stood
up our advise and assist teams to partner with local forces in
the ISF [Iraqi security forces] and the Peshmerga, and early
this year we began training these forces at four different
sites across Iraq. I traveled to Iraq in January and was able
to visit one of the sites myself, Taiji, where I was able to
see firsthand the partnership that we have with Iraqi forces.
In addition to our efforts in Iraq to go after ISIL, we are
also working with our coalition partners in Syria, and we are
also working to build the capabilities of the moderate Syrian
opposition there. We expect the training of our first DOD class
of vetted opposition elements to begin--we expect to begin
training them later this month. Our forces in the region are
strengthening our partners' ability to fight terrorism locally,
but ultimately, it is going to be Iraqi forces and Syrian
fighters who will secure the gains against ISIL and inflict a
lasting defeat.
To support what we are doing, the President has developed
and transmitted to Congress an authorization for the use of
military force that demonstrates a whole-of-government support
for him to successfully prosecute the armed conflict against
ISIL within reasonable limitations. Enacting a bipartisan ISIL-
specific AUMF would provide a clear and powerful signal to the
American people, to our allies, and to our enemies, and very
importantly, I think, to our U.S. service men and women that
the United States stands united to degrade and ultimately
defeat ISIL. And I look forward to talking with you more this
morning about the AUMF proposal.
Defeating ISIL is a major focus and challenge but so is
Iran in the region. As the President has made clear, his top
priority is preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Iran's nuclear ambitions continue to be a consistent area of
concern for us in the Department of Defense. We are hopeful
that the P5+1 negotiations will result in a comprehensive and
verifiable deal that will ensure the peaceful nature of Iran's
nuclear program. But at DOD, our job is to remain vigilant as
well, and we do that by helping to underwrite negotiations with
our robust posture and capabilities in the region, and we
maintain a laser-like focus on that.
As the President has said publicly, we will do whatever is
necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,
including the use of military force, if necessary, and we are
postured to do that in the region today. Beyond Iran's nuclear
program, we have other concerns about Iran's activities in the
region. They are engaged in a variety of destabilizing
activities across the region but also well beyond that. And
even if we are successful in neutralizing Iran's nuclear threat
through hard-nosed diplomacy, we will continue to support U.S.
Government efforts to counter Iran and the full range of
threats that it poses to our friends and allies in the region
and beyond.
Even as we work to degrade and defeat ISIL and to prevent
Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, we are also at the same
time committed to moving to a smaller force in Afghanistan and
consolidating the gains that we have made there over the past
decade of international support to the Afghanistan Government.
The U.S. mission in Afghanistan has helped support the Afghan
people and has protected U.S. national interests by working
with local partners to build up the capacity of the Afghan
National Security Forces.
It is clear that we still have a lot of work to do in the
next 2 years, but I think we have made some very positive
strides, and I am particularly encouraged by the fact that
President Ghani sees the U.S. and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] role and presence as a very important part of his
strategy to bring stability and security to Afghanistan.
We are also going to continue to work with Pakistan and the
Central Asian States to address existing and emerging threats
in the region. Like Afghanistan, Pakistan is also facing a
potent threat from extremists, and I think something we all saw
tragically with the attack on the school in Peshawar. We are
committed to continuing to improve our relationship with
Pakistan by collaborating where our strategic interests come
together and engaging diplomatically where they don't.
Meeting the range of challenges that we see in the CENTCOM
AOR [area of responsibility] is going to take a lot of
resources and effort, and it is important that we use those
resources as effectively as possible, as Ranking Member Smith
noted. The President's budget request for 2016 supports our
strategy for the region and enables the services to continue to
address our most critical needs, even as we get smaller and
more capable over the next several years.
If sequestration returns, however, in 2016 and beyond, the
Department's readiness would deteriorate markedly, which would
harm our ability to respond promptly and efficiently when
called upon. As a consequence, we would have fewer forces
available to support operations and respond to crises in a
region as vital as the Middle East.
This is a very dynamic time for our policy in the region.
It is a challenging time. The Secretary has signaled his
commitment to working with our government and international
partners to shape a more secure region in the coming years. We
are clear-eyed about the fiscal constraints we are facing, but
we believe it is necessary even in the face of those
constraints to maintain our commitment to protect our interests
in the region and to combat the threats that we face there.
Thank you.
And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Wormuth can be found
in the Appendix on page 43.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General.
STATEMENT OF GEN LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND
General Austin. Good morning. Chairman Thornberry,
Congressman Smith, distinguished members of the committee, I
want to thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to
talk about the broad efforts and the current posture of the
United States Central Command.
Upfront and most importantly, I would like to thank all of
you for your continued and strong support of our men and women
in uniform and their families. I look forward to talking about
them and about the exceptional contributions that they continue
to make on behalf of the command and our Nation.
I am pleased to appear here this morning alongside Ms.
Wormuth. Christine is widely respected by professionals
throughout the Defense Department, both civilian and military,
and we are most grateful for her support of our efforts at
CENTCOM. I will join her in making a few brief opening comments
and then we are prepared to answer your questions.
Ladies and gentlemen, much has happened in the CENTCOM area
of responsibility since I last appeared before this committee a
year ago. Indeed, the Central Region is today more volatile and
chaotic than I have seen it at any other point, and the stakes
have never been higher. The forces of evil that threaten our
homeland and our interest in that strategically important part
of the world thrive in unstable environments marked by poor
governance, economic uncertainty, ungoverned or under-governed
spaces. And therefore, it is essential that we be present and
engaged and that we cultivate strong partnerships and continue
to do our part to address emerging threats and to move the
region in a direction of greater stability and security. And we
must be properly resourced to do what is required to
effectively protect and promote our interests.
At CENTCOM, in addition to doing all that we can to prevent
problems from occurring, while shaping future outcomes, we
spend a great deal of our time and energy managing real-world
crisis. Over the past year, we dealt with conflicts in Iraq and
Syria, we transitioned combat operations to a train, advise,
and assist CT [counterterrorism]-focused mission in
Afghanistan. At the same time, we dealt with a number of
difficult challenges in Yemen, Egypt, Lebanon, and in a host of
other locations throughout our area of responsibility. We
actively pursued violent extremist groups, and we took measures
to counter the radical ideologies that are espoused by these
groups.
We also dealt with Iran, which continues to act as a
belligerent force in the region, primarily through its Quds
forces and through support to proxy actors, such as Lebanese
Hezbollah. And while we are hopeful that an acceptable
agreement will be reached with Iran with respect to its nuclear
program, either way, whether we reach an agreement or we don't
reach an agreement, Iran will continue to present a challenge
for us going forward.
We are faced with a number of challenges in our region;
however, I firmly believe that challenges also present
opportunities, and we make progress primarily by pursuing these
opportunities, and we do pursue them. And I am confident that
our broad efforts are having a measurable impact. Of course,
the most immediate threat facing us now is a threat posed by
ISIL or Daesh [Arabic acronym for ISIL]. This barbaric
organization must be defeated, and it will be defeated.
We are currently in the process of executing our regional
military campaign plan, and I am pleased to report that we are
making significant progress. At the outset, we said that we
would need to halt ISIL's advance, and we have done that in
Iraq. We said that we are going to have to regenerate and
restructure Iraq's security forces to help them re-establish
the border, and we are in the process of doing that right now.
We said that we would have to help our partners in the
region to bolster their defenses against ISIL, and we continue
to help our friends in Jordan and Lebanon and Turkey. We said
that we would have to build credible ground forces to counter
ISIL in Syria and to guard against ungoverned spaces, and we
will soon begin doing that as a part of our Syria train and
equip program.
So ladies and gentlemen, we are making progress. In fact,
we are about where we said that we would be in the execution of
our military campaign plan, which supports the broader whole-
of-government strategy that is designed to counter ISIL. And we
are having significant effects on the enemy.
Since commencing our air operations in early August, just 7
months ago, we have killed more than 8,500 ISIL fighters, we
have destroyed hundreds of their vehicles along with tanks and
heavy weapons systems. We have significantly degraded his
capability, his ability to command and control his forces, and
also his primary sources of revenue, namely, his oil refineries
and his crude collection points.
The fact is that he can no longer do what he did at the
outset, which is to seize and to hold new territory. He has
assumed a defensive crouch in Iraq. And although he has greater
freedom of movement in Syria, he is largely in a defensive
there as well. He has begun to expand into other areas, namely
North Africa, and in part because he knows that he is losing in
Iraq and Syria and he needs to find other ways to maintain his
legitimacy.
In going forward, we should expect to see this enemy
continue to conduct limited attacks and to orchestrate horrific
scenes in order to create IO [information operations]
opportunities and to distract and to intimidate. But make no
mistake, ISIL is losing this fight, and I am certain that he
will be defeated. Again, he will be defeated.
Having said that, there is still work to be done to get to
that point, and we intend to continue to execute the campaign
as designed, and I say that because how we go about this is
very important. If we don't first get things under control in
Iraq, where there is a government that we can work with and
with some reliable security forces that are available, if we
don't get things right there first before expanding our efforts
in Syria, then we risk making matters worse in both countries.
But done the right way, in light of the limitations that
exist, I believe that we can and we will be successful in our
efforts to defeat ISIL. And at the same time, we can be assured
continued progress in pursuit of our principal goal, which is
to move this strategically important region in the direction of
increased stability and security.
Going forward, we will all be required to make tough
choices, and we will need to find ways to do more or at least
as much with less than the current fiscal environment. That
said, I remain concerned by the fact that capability reductions
can and will impact our ability to respond to crisis, and
especially in the highly volatile Central Region. The resulting
loss of flexibility makes the U.S. and our interests
increasingly vulnerable to external pressures.
And so I would ask Congress to do its part to make sure
that we avoid sequestration and other resourcing limitations
that serve to degrade the readiness of America's military
forces.
Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, members of the
committee, I want to thank you once more for the strong support
that you continue to show to our service members, our
civilians, and their families. They are the very best in the
world at what they do. They continue to demonstrate absolute
selflessness and they make enormous sacrifices in support of
the mission and in support of one another. I am incredibly
proud of them and I know that you are as well.
So thank you again for this opportunity, and I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Austin can be found in
the Appendix on page 49.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General. We share your sentiment
for those who serve our Nation, including yourself.
I don't think we have time to begin the questioning, so the
committee is going to stand in recess until just after the
joint meeting where we will resume.
In the meantime, you all please enjoy our hospitality as
best you can.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Again, Ms. Wormuth, and, General, thank you for your
patience. And we understand the inconvenience of this coming
and going, but we appreciate you all being here. Members will
continue to come in as they come back from the joint meeting.
I don't know, General, did you have a chance to listen to
the Prime Minister's speech?
General Austin. Yes, sir, I did.
The Chairman. Okay. You know, I was struck, your comments
in your opening statement, about Iran's other activities other
than its nuclear programs. And that was certainly a point that
was highlighted by the Prime Minister.
You spend a lot of time dealing with military leaders
throughout your region in the Middle East and North Africa. My
question to you is: If there is an agreement that says that
Iran shall not be closer to--that has the effect of having Iran
not closer than 1 year of having a nuclear weapon, what, in
your estimation, would be the reaction of other countries in
the region? And I am thinking particularly about the Saudis,
the Turks, the Egyptians, people who are interested in this
negotiation other than Israel. What would be their reaction to
that?
General Austin. Sir, no matter what the outcome is, I think
there will be--always be some degree of speculation. I think
the first thing that they will want to know is what the details
of the agreement are before they make an assessment on how it
affects their interests going forward and their security.
To your point that you made earlier, sir, I think the
people--the leaders in the region certainly believe that Iran's
quest for a nuclear weapon is a threat to the region. But they
are also equally concerned about Iran's ability to mine the
Straits, Iran's cyber capabilities, Iran's ICBM
[intercontinental ballistic missile] capability or ballistic
missile capability, as well as the activity of their Quds
forces, which is unhelpful. And so whether we get a deal or
don't get a deal, I think they will still share those concerns.
As we negotiate a deal--and I certainly hope that we are
able to negotiate one, I think one of the things that we will
have to do early on is to go and reassure our allies that we
are going to be with them going forward. And we have--we have
interest in the region that we will have to protect and we will
certainly--certainly move to do that early on.
The Chairman. Yeah. When I have traveled in the region and
also visited with some of their ambassadors here in Washington,
one of the concerns I have heard expressed is that having Iran
be a threshold nuclear state, basically being able to have it
within a year or less, will embolden them with these other kind
of activities that you talked about because, then, they will
have less concern that the regime is threatened and, therefore,
they will be more aggressive in pushing their proxies and
potentially naval matters in the Persian Gulf and so forth. Is
that some of the concerns that you have heard that you think
allies will need to be reassured about?
General Austin. Yes, sir. I think there are arguments on
both side of the fence in terms of, you know, what people
speculate that Iran's reaction will be and what we will need to
do to counter those reactions or hedge against unhelpful
activity.
The Chairman. Yeah. Well, I am concerned not only about
Israel's reaction, which we just heard, but there are a number
of other countries that are vitally interested in this. And so
it seems to me that that also has to be taken into account.
There are lots of topics we can and should talk about,
including ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria], Yemen, and
Afghanistan.
But at this point, I am going to yield to Mr. Smith and
other members for questions they may have.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Following up on the Iran issue, I mean, I certainly would
prefer a situation where Iran gives up all of its nuclear
capacity and, you know, we can take that off the table. And I
don't think there is any disagreement with that. The question
is, you know, how would we get there? And the answer is, at the
moment, we wouldn't. Iran would not agree to that. And I
suppose, as the Prime Minister suggested, we could simply hold
out and hope for a better deal.
But one question I have is, as this--if we were to do that,
if we were to walk away, our sanctions regime is dependent upon
other countries agreeing to it. What is your view on what
Russia and China and Europe would do in terms of maintaining
their sanctions on Iran if we walked away from a deal? And how
would that effect Iran's economy and the entire negotiation?
Secretary Wormuth. Ranking Member Smith, I think obviously
the sanctions regime that we have been able to put in place
with support from the international community has been key to
bringing the Iranians to the table for the negotiations. And I
think it would be an open question, particularly with some of
the countries, as to whether the support for those sanctions
over time for those very, very stiff sanctions, whether they
could be sustained in the absence of an ongoing negotiation as
we have right now.
So again, I think, our judgment to date has been that as
difficult as the situation is--and as you said, Iran has a vote
in this. I mean, they have to be willing to make a deal--our
sense has been that the talks that we are engaged in right now
are the best chance for a potentially lasting solution, and we
want to give them a chance. But if they end and there is not a
deal, you know, I think we will have to revisit the way
forward. But reassurance of the ally--or the partners in the
region is going to be a very key part of that because they are
obviously very nervous.
Mr. Smith. Okay. General Austin, do you have a comment or--
--
General Austin. I don't, sir. I certainly agree----
Mr. Smith. Okay.
General Austin [continuing]. With what Ms. Wormuth has
said, and I wouldn't have anything to add to that, sir.
Mr. Smith. Okay. And then the other piece of it is--I mean,
there is a number of arguments. One of the arguments is that
Iran frequently violates deals and doesn't do what they said
they were going to. And if that is the case, there is really
nothing we could do. You know, they are basically going to move
forward and do whatever they are going to do and, you know, we
are limited.
The more interesting question to me is: As has been pointed
out, Iran has been a year or--depending on who you listen to,
anywhere from 3 months to a year away from a nuclear weapon
for, gosh, 10 years now at least. Why, in your estimation, have
they not just gone ahead and built one?
Secretary Wormuth. Congressman Smith, I can't speculate as
to the reasons why they haven't----
Mr. Smith. Well, anyone can speculate.
Secretary Wormuth. Well, I guess what I would say is that
is what it would be. It would be speculation, you know.
Mr. Smith. Right.
Secretary Wormuth. Our sense is, is that Iran's leadership
has not made the decision to go all the way and acquire a
nuclear weapon. Why that is, you know, is known to the Supreme
Leader, but I am not sure it is known to anyone in our
government.
Mr. Smith. Right. No. I mean, it is, I think, a cost-
benefit analysis there. And, you know, arguably the dumbest
policy Iran has pursued in the last, you know, 15 years is the
pursuit of a nuclear weapon because they are doing all manner
of other bad stuff, but this is the one that has united the
international community against them and brought sanctions
against them.
So, you know, I just think that it is worth it to continue
to try to negotiate because if we could take the nuclear weapon
off the table for some extended period of time in Iran, there
is a big benefit to that. Just like, you know, for all of the
missteps that happened in Syria, the fact that we were able to
get rid of Syria's chemical weapons is certainly a positive
given now that ISIL is, you know, running around a good chunk
of Syria relatively free.
So I think we need to keep trying to figure out a way to
get Iran to agree not to build that weapon. And I also think
that it is clear from their past actions that it is--it is a
50/50 question for them. It is not something that they have 100
percent decided to do. Because if they had 100 percent decided
to do it, it would be done at this point by even Prime Minister
Netanyahu's own admission saying they have been, you know, 6
months away from a bomb for 15 years. So I hope we will keep
trying to figure that out.
Final question. And I know this is impossible to answer but
a huge part of the problem in the region--and, believe me,
there are many. But one big part of the problem in the region
is the Shia-Sunni split. As I mentioned in my opening remarks,
we have the ironic situation of Iran fighting ISIL and all of
the different, you know, disruptive activities that are going
on in Lebanon and Syria and elsewhere.
And while we are trying to specifically contain the
extremist threat that is ISIL, you know, part of what funded
them early on was the notion of some of our allies in the
region that, well, you know Assad is friends with Iran, so
whatever we can do to go after him is fine and that added fuel
to the fire.
Is there any hope of any sort of, you know, both sides,
Shia and Sunni, coming to at least--I don't want to say a peace
agreement--but figuring out how to better coexist in that
region in a less extremist way?
General Austin. Sir, you are right. That is a difficult
question to answer, and it involves some speculation going
forward. But I would hope that we would approach this, at
least, on a country-by-country basis at the outset. And
certainly what we are trying to do in Iraq is, is ensure that
the country stays together, it remains focused on the right
things, that the government is accommodating to the Sunni
population and the Kurdish population that is in the country
which is, in my mind, you know, underlines or is a foundation
for a lot of the problems that we have seen recently occur. So
I think, you know, starting with that, I think it would be a
good start.
Also, no matter how we got here in terms of how the
activity was supported in the past, the encouraging thing is
that what we see currently is a lot of countries in the region
and across the globe coming together to try to work with us to
stem the flow of foreign fighters, to also minimize
opportunities for this enemy to resource itself, to finance
itself. And I think those types of things will make a
difference going forward.
And I will yield to Ms. Wormuth.
Secretary Wormuth. I was basically going to make the same
point. I mean, I don't think that there is a single cut-and-
paste solution that you can take. But I think one of the
lessons that we saw coming out perhaps of the previous
experience of Iraq was that Maliki's very sectarian approach to
governing was a big part of how we got here; and that, I think,
[Prime Minister] Abadi has a much greater understanding of the
need for a more inclusive approach. And we continue to strongly
underscore just how important it is that that be central to his
approach to trying to solve this problem with ISIL.
I think it is also--I wouldn't want to overstate it--but I
do think that the--the just pure barbarity of what ISIL has
prosecuted in terms of the beheadings, the immolation of the
Jordanian pilot, that has seemed to cause, I think, many
countries and many of the publics in the region to look at this
in a different way and to really, I think, question the
extremism that they are seeing. So my hope is that perhaps that
will do more to help bring the larger society together to try
to find solutions.
Mr. Smith. Yeah. And I am sorry, final question on Iran. I
guess the big question is: If the negotiations fall apart,
where does that leave us? Because if negotiations fall apart--
and we are not even trying to get them to stop--at that point,
you know, it is a wide open question. Is Iran going to pursue
that nuclear weapon or not?
What do we do then? What do you think Israel does then? Do
they wait and hope that, you know, the last decade continues
and Iran doesn't step across that line? How does that affect
the region?
Secretary Wormuth. I think what I would say, Congressman,
is, you know, if there isn't a deal, certainly from the DOD
perspective, we will continue to have the responsibility to--to
essentially be the insurance policy, if you will, for the
region in terms of making sure that we have the capabilities in
our country to help defend Israel, to help defend our interests
in the region. And we are committed to making sure that we have
those capabilities in a very robust fashion. I think we will
work closely with our partners in the region to reassure them
of that continued commitment. And then I think, you know, how
Israel approaches the problem will be, again, largely up to
them.
But we--our responsibility in DOD is to make sure that we
have the capabilities to respond if we think that there is a
reason to do so and to make sure that we have the ability to
provide a military option if needed.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And to the
two panelists, thank you for being here and for your service to
our Nation.
I am always interested--I have been on this committee for
20 years, so I go back to the Iraq war and 9/11 and all the
tragedies of 9/11.
And I heard you, Madam Secretary, and also, General Austin.
You mentioned, Madam Secretary, sequestration. General Austin
keeps talking about resources.
We have had the service chiefs in here recently to talk
about their budgets, and I know the world is very unsettled. I
know that we have a certain responsibility, first, to the
American people and then to our friends in other regions of the
world. I don't dispute that at all.
But I just wonder, when you--you know, you are talking
about the training these security forces in Afghanistan that it
is--you know, still it is going well or it is going okay--maybe
is a better word than ``well.'' It is a long process.
I just wondered--I am not a great student of history, but I
did study history. I just wonder how much longer can we as a
nation--and you are a national figure because you are in the
administration. General, you are an outstanding military man
yourself.
How much longer can we keep going down this road and expect
our military to continue to do this and that when their budgets
are being cut behind them? And I have been a strong proponent,
if we are going to get serious about the world situation, we
need to have a war tax. We cannot keep playing this budget game
that we keep playing here in Washington and have you come
testify. And then we have to battle this thing on the floor of
the House, the chairman and ranking member do, of trying to
salvage whatever money we can salvage.
So my point is: Are we getting to a point that--as I think
General Austin said, aren't we at a point that we need to say
the administration military leaders, you know, you and Saudi,
you have got a lot of troops, put your troops on the ground. We
have got 100 to 200,000 Iraqis in the military. I know what we
are trying to do. Some approximations I have heard is 20 to
30,000 fighters. General Austin, you say we have already killed
8,000. So let's take the high figure of 30,000 jihadists and
reduce that to 20. I don't understand the numbers of this
thing, the financial numbers, nor do I understand the numbers
of kill.
And how in the world are we going to continue to expand and
send our troops around the world and try to take care of
everybody else's problems if they won't step up and take care
of it themselves and say to America, ``You back us up, but we
are going to be the frontline troops''? I don't know--I am not
criticizing the administration. I just don't know how much
longer this game can keep going on.
Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, if I could try to respond
to a couple of those points. I think fundamentally we have
tried in a number of different areas, particularly I would say
Afghanistan, but also in terms of the counter-ISIL campaign to
work very much by, with, and through partner countries. So in
Afghanistan, you know, we are very much trying to enable the
ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] to be able to take care
of their own security.
You know, fundamentally we got in there, as you well know,
after 9/11 to ensure that Afghanistan would not be a safe haven
for Al Qaeda. But in the next 2 years, I think we feel pretty
good about what we are going to be able to do with the ANSF so
that they will be able to take over by the end of 2016 and take
care of their security themselves. We will stay there in a
relatively small security cooperation footprint in Kabul, but
it will largely be their responsibility at that point.
And in Iraq and Syria, you know, we are working very
closely with a huge coalition, and about more than a dozen of
those members are contributing to the military coalition. So I
think we are very much trying to take an approach that isn't
about America doing everything for everyone but trying to work
with others to help them do more for themselves. And I am sure
General Austin will want to add to that.
General Austin. And in terms of the effects that we are
having on the enemy, sir, and in terms of the numbers, I think
that the numbers are input to the overall calculus in terms of
the effects created. But I think it is more important to focus
on the effects.
And as we look at ISIL's behavior today, you know, you go
back several months ago, ISIL was moving around in large convoy
formations, flying a lot of black flags, taking up large swaths
of territory. They can no longer do that, and it is principally
because of the effects that we have had on--they have the
ability to recruit more fighters into the country, and we know
that. And so it is not about just the kinetic effects alone. It
is about that, plus reducing visibility to recruit foreign
fighters, plus reducing visibility to finance themselves. That
creates the effects that we are beginning to see. And the enemy
is beginning to struggle in a number of areas, in terms of
governing, in terms of ability to control territory. So----
Mr. Jones. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses.
Again, just to go back for a moment regarding some of your
testimony concerning our relationship with the Israeli
Government and military. Again, General Dempsey has been before
this committee a number of times and talked about how the mil-
to-mil connection with Israel has a special sort of quality in
nature that really is almost not matched anywhere in the world.
And I was wondering, General, if you could sort of just kind of
characterize that in terms of your own experience?
And, Ms. Wormuth, you know, you mentioned, you know, that
this is something that is ongoing and that will be there with
or without an agreement. I was wondering, again, if you could
just sort of underscore that point?
General Austin. And, sir, I believe the question is, our
military-to-military relationship with Israel?
As you know, sir, Israel falls in European Command's area
of responsibility. But we certainly--since it borders our
region of responsibility or our area of responsibility, we
certainly see a need to maintain good connectivity.
I had a great relationship with the former chief of defense
there, with Benny Gantz. And I have not had a chance to meet
the new--or his replacement, but I have met him on a VTC [video
teleconference] where he and Benny and I, you know, along with
General Breedlove, were able to share some ideas and concerns.
And so my hope--and I know this will be the case--is that
we will continue to have a very, very strong relationship going
forward. But, again, that--that--Israel is outside of my area
of responsibility.
Secretary Wormuth. I would just add to that, Congressman,
by saying, you know, we have an incredibly strong relationship,
defense relationship, with Israel. Secretary Carter spoke with
Bogie Ya'alon within days of coming into office. And I am sure
that will be, you know, one of his very close counterpart
relationships.
We do many exercises with Israel. We have policy talks with
them every year where we talk about everything from countering
WMD [weapons of mass destruction] to exchanging lessons learned
on homeland defense. We are very committed to preserving their
qualitative military edge, and this is something that we talk
about regularly and actively with the Israelis in terms of our
arms sales to other countries in the region, for example, as
well as our arms sales with Israel itself.
We have provided, in the last several years, over a billion
dollars for Israel's missile defense programs from Iron Dome to
David's Sling to Arrow. So we have a very, I think, robust and
healthy and resilient defense relationship with Israel.
Mr. Courtney. Okay. Thank you.
Both of you have talked about the impact of sequestration
in terms of executing your mission in that part of the world. I
remember in March of 2013 when sequestration hit for the first
time, the USS Harry S. Truman, which was scheduled to be
deployed in the Middle East, had to tie up in Virginia for a
number of months before this place finally worked things out.
And I guess the question is, is that, again, if we go into
2016 with sequester-level spending, General, do you have any
testimony or comments regarding the impact of the number of
carriers that might be available and how critical their mission
is?
General Austin. The number of--having a carrier battle
group in the region is absolutely critical to us. And, of
course, I remain concerned about our ability to do that going
forward.
A good example of that is what we recently saw here in our
counter-ISIL efforts. As things unfolded in Iraq and Syria, we
were able to rapidly respond to that issue, that crisis because
we had a carrier in the region and we were able to use that
carrier to put up aircraft over Iraq to help the situation,
gain situational awareness. And so without that degree of
flexibility, it will be very, very difficult to address these
kinds of emerging crisis in the future.
And so when you look at a region that has Afghanistan and
Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Egypt, there will
continue to be challenges. And of course, I worry that we will
have the resources to make sure that we can continue to work
with our partners to address those challenges.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, recently we have heard a lot about Patriot
batteries and the Army air defenders being stretched to their
breaking point. And, in fact, recently deputy commander of the
32nd Air and Missile Defense Command stated this: ``Today we
have air and missile defense forces in nine countries. On any
given day, nearly half of the Army's Patriot batteries are
outside the continental United States and we have begun forward
deploying THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense]
batteries. We are rapidly approaching an inflection point where
we face the risk of breaking our AMD, our air missile defense
force.''
I have two questions. First, as the imminent modernization
of this system creates further strains on the deployment
capability, what are your concerns as a combatant commander?
And the second question is, what are the alternatives to
drawing down force structure to make sure we don't deny our
combatant commanders the capability they need?
General Austin. Sir, on the first question, in terms of a
combatant commander's perspective on this, while I certainly
share the Army services' concerns in being able to manage the
op [operations] tempo of its people, I think that is very, very
important. But as you take a look at the emerging threats in
the region, in the Central Region, certainly I remain concerned
about Iran's ballistic missile capability. Now they continue to
gain more capability and that capability is more accurate and
more lethal as we go forward. So I think there is a need--there
will remain a need for a good air defense capability to make
sure that we protect our interest in the region and also to be
able to work with our allies in the region.
In terms of ways to mitigate this, we are going to have to
continue to work with the allies to help them develop capacity
and capability to, again, not only take care of their own
sovereign territory, but also add to, you know, the greater
potential, the greater capability in the region. And we have a
long way to go in that endeavor, but I think that that is--that
is one of the major ways that we can look to address this issue
going forward.
Mr. Rogers. Have you or OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] or Joint Staff been talking with any of our allies
about hosting some of these assets on a semi-permanent basis
instead of us rotating them around?
General Austin. We have not reached a decision to forward
position any assets, sir. So we have continuing dialogue with
our allies in the region in terms of what is possible, what is
not possible. But, you know, certainly we have not taken a
decision to forward position additional missile defense assets.
Mr. Rogers. If you did, would it take some of the stress
off by not having to rotate?
General Austin. I think it would, sir. I think that would
certainly be one way to address this.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you.
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both
for being here. Sorry we had that break that took us away for
such a while.
You know, it has been said--and I think as we--in hearing
Mr. Netanyahu's speech today and hearing your comments, that
the challenges in the Middle East are like, at least, a three-
dimensional chess game, and I think actually there are probably
even more layers to that.
And I think the fact that we have been given the
opportunity to consider an AUMF is very important. It allows
the Congress to weigh in and think through the implications of
what we are doing and how best to achieve success. But, again,
given that it is so multidimensional, it is actually rather
hard to grapple with. I think we are all struggling with that.
But I--and I think--I just happened to read in the paper
today that Iran is actually playing a significant role in
Tikrit. That their forces are there, you know, helping--helping
push back on ISIL. And I think that highlights the complexity
of the region. While we are trying to negotiate an agreement on
their nuclear weaponization at the same time, we are taking--or
taking advantage of their assistance. And I am curious, General
Austin, how you think this through?
General Austin. Well, it certainly is a complex situation,
ma'am. Thanks.
Obviously, we are focused on helping--providing support to
the country, the Government of Iraq in its efforts to counter
ISIL. And this is a--this is an Iraqi effort. The Iraqis have
to do this. We will enable their efforts with our air power,
with our advice, and the assistance in any way we can. But at
the end of the day, they have to be able to do this.
And, certainly, there are areas in the eastern part of the
country that they have--leading up to this point that they have
gained assistance from their neighbor with and the popular
mobilization forces that are there working. So if you look at
the areas in the eastern part of the country, Jalula, Khanaqin,
they have worked together in those areas. And then leading up
to this, they have done a number of things to get to this
point.
So, in terms of sorting this out, again, our focus is on
the Government of Iraq and working with the Government of Iraq
to provide assistance to them to counter ISIL.
Ms. Tsongas. So, in essence, you defer to their
relationship with Iran in that instance. And then how do you
see that complicates the next step, so that is the
accommodation between the Shia and the Sunni so that, going
forward, the government is representative of the country and we
don't backtrack into the situation we are in today.
General Austin. I think it is absolutely key that they make
sure that they have provisions in place to accommodate the
Sunnis and the Kurds. I think, you know, that lack of inclusion
is what got us to this point, and I think the only way that we
can ensure that we don't go back there is if we have the right
steps taken by the government. So pressure needs to remain on
the government to ensure that they do the right things.
Ms. Tsongas. Another question. I think the other challenge
of ISIS, in my mind, is that it is a little bit like Whac-a-
Mole. You deal with it in one part of, you know, Iraq or Syria.
And then, as you were saying in your testimony, now we are
having to contend with it in North Africa.
How do you think through the--you know, preparing our
military response to those possibilities without always being
able or unless you have adequate intelligence, to assess where
the next challenge is? It seems to me we run the risk of
stretching ourselves very, very thin.
General Austin. This is going to have to be an
international effort going forward. And we are going to have to
count on our strategic intelligence to lead that international
effort as we go forward.
There are certain things that we know about ISIL. We know
that it looks to exploit sectarian tensions. We know that it
wants to be a caliphate. So it looks to control large swaths of
territory, and it must govern that territory. But it is also a
big business, and it requires enormous resources. So, as you
look around the globe, I mean, it is more likely to go to those
places that has ungoverned spaces and also places where it can
acquire resources to support this incredible effort. And I
think, if you can reduce those possibilities, you have a much
better chance of staying ahead of this.
But there is a--there is a greater thing that I think, you
know, feeds all of this and that is, you know, the narrative,
the ideology that supports this, that feeds this. And I think
there has got to be some things that are done to counter that
ideology as well.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, General.
The Chairman. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here.
Ms. Wormuth, I would kind of take off on a question Ms.
Tsongas touched on. Can you provide us with the--sort of the
official DOD policy on military cooperation with Iran forces on
the ground in Iraq?
Secretary Wormuth. Certainly, Congressman. Our policy is
that we don't coordinate with Iranian forces on the ground in
Iraq. We are not communicating with those forces. We are not
coordinating with those forces, so that is our policy.
Mr. Franks. General, thank you for being here. Thank you
for your dedication of your entire life to the cause of
freedom. This committee is always grateful to people like you.
In terms of that question, expanded just slightly, with the
ISF and Iraqi Shia militia many times working to fight the same
enemy, there is a concern that any training on our part for the
Iranian--or the Iraqi forces may turn into training and
equipping the Iran Quds forces. And it seems like we could see
Iran's presence kindle the sectarian violence that has sort of
characterized this entire issue in the first place. And, also,
I am concerned that, to legitimatize Iran's actions there, it
may actually increase their leverage in not only the debate
with the President but with the Iranian commitment to try to
gain nuclear weapons.
So can you tell me any honest assessment of any cooperation
between U.S. and Iranian forces and how do we train and equip
the ISF without helping the Iranian forces or somehow getting
tangled up in that?
General Austin. Sir, there is no cooperation between us and
the Iranian forces, as Ms. Wormuth has said. And we are going
to have to count on the Iraqi Government to do those things
necessary to, number one, ensure that things don't trend toward
greater sectarian violence. And we encourage them to do that on
a routine basis and----
But in terms of ensuring that, you know, our resources
don't migrate over to Shia militia, there is no easy way to be
absolutely certain that that can't happen. But I can tell you
that we will do everything within our power to prevent that
from happening. And, again, I think the first line of defense
here has got to be the Iraqi Government. And we are focused on
helping them, helping their legitimate forces to be successful
in its endeavor.
Mr. Franks. Now, let me shift gears on you here just a
moment and say, you know, it could be or would be your
responsibility as combatant commander under the draft AUMF to
ensure that the mission is accomplished against ISIS and yet
also to make certain that American forces cannot engage in
``enduring offensive ground operations.''
And can you give this committee your best assessment of
your ability to defeat, degrade, and destroy ISIS within 3
years while remaining true to the commitment not to having
enduring offensive ground operations or executing those types
of operations? Just your best military assessment.
General Austin. I am confident--absolutely confident, that
we can defeat ISIL. And I base that upon the progress that we
have made to date. And as you know, we don't have large amounts
of ground forces in Iraq, but we have been very effective in
terms of enabling the Iraqi security forces and enabling the
Peshmerga in the north, and they are having good effects. And
we have also had good effects against this enemy in Syria. So I
am very confident that going forward, we will get this done, we
will defeat ISIL. And so in terms of an enduring requirement
for Iraq, I don't see that requirement there because I think we
will be able to get this done with the approach that we are
taking.
At the end of the day, sir, this has to be--it has to be
done by the Iraqis. And we have to put the measures in place
that will ensure, you know, a lasting solution and not just a
short-term military solution. And we are hopeful that the Iraqi
Government will do the things that are necessary to ensure that
lasting solution.
Mr. Franks. All right. Quickly before I lose my time, can
you tell me what one thing that you might encourage this
committee to try to offer policy-wise or resource-wise that
would help to that end?
General Austin. Sir, policy-wise, as much flexibility as
you can give us as you consider the legislation going forward.
I think flexibility in combatting an enemy like this is
absolutely essential.
And then resource-wise, I need the ability to maintain
capability forward deployed in the region.
The Chairman. Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wormuth and General Austin, thank you very much
for your service and for the information you have provided for
us today. I appreciate that.
I want to follow up on some of the questions that my
colleague was asking a moment ago and very specifically,
General, can ISIS be degraded and defeated without U.S. ground
forces, i.e., infantry brigades, artillery, armor?
General Austin. Sir, I think they can, and they will. But
they will use--we will use the Iraqi security forces and the
Peshmerga forces to do this. And I think, you know, we have
advisors on the ground and how we employ those advisors will
be--you know I will make a decision on that and request for
authorities on a case-by-case basis.
Mr. Garamendi. I would assume that special forces on the
ground, forward observers, and the like would be part of what
you would want to be able to do?
General Austin. Certainly. Part of the calculus, sir, and
when I think I have reached a point where I need to employ
that, then I will go back to my boss and request specifically
for that opportunity.
Mr. Garamendi. And, Madam Secretary, the issue of enduring
has been much discussed. It was discussed here last time we met
last week. And I raised the question, let's be very specific.
The power of the purse remains with us and if we simply don't
allow the general to have money for the brigades, infantry, et
cetera, is that restriction viable in your mind? And your mind
also, General?
Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, just to make sure I
understand your question, are you saying that is it viable to
not conduct enduring ground offensive operations if Congress
doesn't provide the funding?
Mr. Garamendi. Well, if they won't provide the funding, you
wouldn't be able to do it, period. I mean that is very clear.
It is the power of the purse. You don't have money for that
particular operation. And so the point that I am making here is
that rather than some wishy-washy mushy language like
``enduring,'' we simply say, General, you have all the money
you need for all of the other things, except for ground
operations, that is, infantry brigades, other artillery,
armored, et cetera, but all the rest of it you have whatever
you might need?
Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, I think Congress clearly
always has the power of the purse. The intent with the AUMF
proposal was to include a reasonable limitation that made clear
that we were not going to prosecute the campaign against ISIL
in the same way that we were in Iraq, for example, in the last
decade or in Afghanistan. Those kind of very large-scale
operations.
I also just wanted to take the opportunity quickly--
Congressman Franks asked the question--also, the 3-year clause
in the AUMF, that is not intended to be an indication that we
believe--certainly, that this Department believes that we will
necessarily defeat ISIL within that timeframe. It is a
recognition that the executive branch and the legislative
branch may well want to revisit the authorization at that time,
but we think the campaign could well go on longer.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, I couldn't agree more with you.
Presumably, we will continue to be in session year after year.
And if, for example, we were to restrict the funding, as I just
described, we could revisit it at any moment and provide
whatever money might be necessary at that time. But it does
provide a restriction going in as does the 3-year time limit.
And as I said last week, I think it is extremely important
that the next Presidential campaign focus on this issue. And if
you have a 3-year time limit, it most definitely will be
focusing on the issue of how are we going to conduct ourselves
militarily or other ways in the Middle East. I think that is
extremely important that that happen in the next Presidential
campaign.
I think we are just nearly out of time. General, I want to
just review what you said and that is that ISIL can be
defeated--degraded and defeated without U.S. ground forces?
General Austin. Mr. Garamendi, we have ground forces in the
country right now. But I think we are talking about brigades--
battalions and brigades, large formations.
Mr. Garamendi. Exactly.
General Austin. Sir, yes. My answer is yes. And I make that
statement based upon what we are doing now.
ISIL is losing this fight. We are having significant
effects on this enemy. We have got to do a lot more going
forward. We always said that it would take time, but it will
require the work of the Iraqi ground forces in order to get
this done.
Mr. Garamendi. I appreciate that. And I would also assume
that there may be a role for Jordan, Turkey, and other
countries to have their troops on the ground. Would that be
correct?
General Austin. Sir, there is always that possibility. We
invite anyone who wants to contribute to this and certainly
those types of decisions are made by the individual countries
as you know, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Understood. Yeah. Thank you very much,
General, and appreciate your support. And Madam Secretary,
also.
The Chairman. Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Ms.
Wormuth, and, General Austin, particularly for your service to
this country.
You know, when I hear--when we talk about Iran and Iran's
troops or advisors or whatever they are calling them assisting
Iraq, what I worry is that the sectarian violence that Iran
really does push. And in 2011, you know, when Maliki was
beholding to Iran and Hezbollah actually attacked our troops
with an IRAM [improvised rocket assisted mortar], Iranian
warhead and killed five of our 1st Infantry Division kids the
night that I was in Iraq, the night that my son was with the
1st Infantry Division.
So I wonder how this is going to play out if we allow Iran
to have that kind of play today if, in fact, we do have to use
some special forces or something other than a brigade-sized
team to assist the Iraqis? How is that going to play out,
particularly with Iran's past performance in supporting
terrorism across the world but particularly Hezbollah and
particularly killing American troops just, you know, 4 years
ago?
General Austin. Sir, I certainly share your concern with
the possibility of increasing sectarian activity as we go
forward. And this is something that we continue to emphasize,
again, with the Government of--to the Government of Iraq that,
you know, they must be mindful of this. They must control the
activities of Shia militia. They must guard against any kind of
atrocities going forward of those elements. And they have to
be, most importantly, inclusive of the Sunnis and the Kurds.
And I think that is the biggest piece in this equation. And
when that is done, I think you see the Sunnis coming into the
government a bit more and balancing things out.
So I--you know, I was in Iraq. I was a commander of Iraq
when that IRAM attack occurred. I was the first senior officer
on the scene there to--you know, after that attack and worked
with Colonel Gainey who was then Lieutenant Colonel Gainey. Now
he is 0-6 [Colonel] Gainey. But some tremendous 1st [Infantry]
Division soldiers there, great--great courage and great
discipline.
But clearly I share your concern. We are going to do
everything we can to encourage the Iraqi Government to stay
focused on this, to be inclusive of the Sunnis and the Kurds.
And I think, if they do that, I think this comes out in a
better place.
Mr. Nugent. Let me ask you this: Are we in a position
within Iraq to have a good handle on regards to what the
Iranian forces are doing in regards to the Shias within the
country? Do we have a good handle on that or is that kind of we
don't know for sure?
General Austin. Sir, we do not coordinate with the Iranians
or--you know, I mean, there is no communication between us and
them.
Mr. Nugent. Well I understand.
General Austin. So absolute knowledge of what their intent
is--is not always there. But, clearly, we have very good
intelligence services and we have good overhead imagery and
those types of things. So, you know, the activity in Tikrit was
no surprise. You know, I saw this coming many days leading up
to this. It is a logical progression of what they have been
doing in the east of the country, but we don't coordinate with
them.
Mr. Nugent. I appreciate that.
And lastly a question on the AUMF. I think that, you know,
you hear--I mean, there is a lot of discussion obviously. But--
and we are worried about strategy. Strategy really needs to be
larger than just ISIS. I mean, it really is. And I know the
President doesn't want to go there, but it is radical extremism
in Islam across the globe that is affecting us and our friends
across the globe. And so I am worried, with AUMF, if it is
just--and ISIS, does that really--is that really the strategy?
I mean that is part of the strategy, but is that really where
we need to be? Because you see it firsthand across the globe.
And I know that all the combatant commands talk about it, I am
sure.
Secretary Wormuth. Why don't I take a crack at this quickly
and then have General Austin pile on.
The AUMF proposal, first of all, as I am sure you are
aware, doesn't have a geographic limitation, and that was very
deliberate to address exactly the kinds of concerns that you
have. Similarly, there is the associated forces, which is
designed to give us some breadth and discretion as to who we go
after.
Mr. Nugent. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Sorry I ran out of time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Wormuth, General Austin said that ISIS could be
defeated without using U.S. ground troops. I am assuming--and,
General Austin, you alluded to this--that would be primarily
through the use of Iraqi ground troops. Are there any other
partners who have committed to joining those Iraqi ground
troops to defeat ISIS in Iraq?
Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, first of all, we have a
number of the coalition partners who are participating with us
in the air strike campaign.
Mr. O'Rourke. I was speaking of ground troops, forces on
the ground. So please answer that question.
Secretary Wormuth. As General Austin has indicated, this is
fundamentally a campaign that is being led by the Government of
Iraq and any offer to have ground troops from another country
come in would have to be accepted by the Iraqi Government. So
those----
Mr. O'Rourke. Is the answer that there are no other forces
than Iraq----
Secretary Wormuth. Right now, we only have advisors on the
ground.
Mr. O'Rourke. You said that part of our policy going
forward would be to train and equip and advise those Iraqi
ground forces. How much do we spend doing that between 2003 and
2013?
Secretary Wormuth. Sir, I don't have an exact number off
the top of my head, but I imagine it was many billions of
dollars.
Mr. O'Rourke. In the tens of billions of dollars.
And you also mentioned that we are going to use a whole-of-
government approach. We are going to try to get the larger
society together to find solutions. I am not sure that that
affords us enough clarity to know exactly how this is going to
be different than it was last time, never mind the increasing
difficulty and complexity of Syria. We are just talking about
Iraq right now.
Can you put those concerns to rest and tell us whether
there is a plan to enlist other countries' ground military
forces or if, in fact, you will be coming back to us if the
Iraqi ground forces are insufficient to defeat ISIS to ask us
to add additional U.S. ground forces to the mix?
Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, at this time, you know, the
AUMF does not envision--the proposal that this administration
put forward doesn't envision large--it doesn't envision
employment of large ground combat formations. So that is what
we are asking for now.
In terms of the broader approach, I think fundamentally
something that is different between today and in the past
decade is we have much more of a partner in the Iraqi
Government. You know, Prime Minister Abadi wants us and wants
the broader coalition there to help him.
Mr. O'Rourke. How long is his term in office?
Secretary Wormuth. I don't know off the top of my head.
Mr. O'Rourke. You will not be able to predict his
successor. Would you agree?
Secretary Wormuth. No. That is true. But I am sure we will
work to give the Iraqi Government as much advice as we can
about the kinds of leader that they would need to succeed him
whenever that happens.
Mr. O'Rourke. Is the administration taking seriously
proposals to rethink Iraq as a state, to rethink our partners
in Iraq, like the Kurds who have proven to be our only reliable
allies on the ground in the fight against ISIS to ensure that
they have greater autonomy to maybe look at the fact that Syria
and Iraq, to a degree, have arbitrary lines set up a hundred
years ago that don't seem to be working for the peoples in
those states and only seem to hold together when you have a
brutal, repressive dictator, and the experiment in democracy so
far in Iraq has been an abject failure? I don't know that I
have heard from the administration and from you some larger
strategy about how we are approaching problems there, outside
of a military solution to the immediate threat of ISIS? Would
you care to comment on any of that?
Secretary Wormuth. Certainly. Sorry.
Fundamentally, our approach is based on a federal
government in Baghdad. We believe that we have better prospects
for success, both in terms of sustaining Iraq as a country, but
also in terms of defeating ISIL, which is one of our
fundamental concerns, doing that through a single Iraqi state
as opposed to a partition solution, for example, you know,
which has been discussed and was certainly discussed in years
past.
So we are fundamentally taking the approach that we need to
provide support through Baghdad to the Peshmerga, for example,
who have been phenomenal partners and have been incredibly
effective on the ground with the Sunni tribe elements, bringing
them inside to get them into the fight.
But right now, our approach is based on a federal Iraq.
Mr. O'Rourke. Could you--it is not outlined in the AUMF
proposal from the President. Could you define ``victory''?
Secretary Wormuth. Certainly. I think victory is defined as
when ISIL is no longer a threat to Iraq, to its existence, to
our partners and allies in the region, and to the United
States. And to get to that, I think, will take some time.
Mr. O'Rourke. So as long as ISIL is seen as a threat to
ourselves or any of our partners around the world, we have not
won?
Secretary Wormuth. I think that is fair.
Mr. O'Rourke. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Dr. Wenstrup.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both
for being here today to take our questions and inform us on
many things.
My first question is: How many nations are considered part
of the coalition of this fight in Iraq today?
Secretary Wormuth. Sir, we have 60 countries with us, I
believe, currently in the operation. And somewhere between a
dozen and 15 are with us in the air strike campaign.
Dr. Wenstrup. Okay. Who would you say are the top 5, maybe
10 contributors? Because 60 is a big number, and I don't know
if that means somebody is donating a box of pens or really
being engaged? So who would you say are the top contributors to
this effort?
Secretary Wormuth. I don't think I would want to get into a
list of top contributors because different countries are
contributing in different ways. As I said, we have about, you
know, 12 to 15 who are very engaged in the military part of the
campaign, whether in the air strikes or, also, in terms of
contributing trainers or helping with the advise and assist
mission.
But we also have countries that are working with us very
closely on things like the counter-messaging campaign. So, for
example, Qatar has been very focused on that. We also have
countries that are very involved with us, across the whole
coalition, on trying to address the counter-financing campaign.
So really different countries are taking their particular
strengths and applying them where they make the most sense.
Dr. Wenstrup. And is it a good mix, say, of our traditional
allies, like our NATO allies and Middle Eastern allies?
Secretary Wormuth. Yes. I believe so. We have wide
representation from NATO as well as from countries in the
region.
Dr. Wenstrup. Okay. Thank you.
Yeah.
General Austin. If I could add to that. You know, I--you
recall back on the 23rd of September when we began flying
missions into Syria, that night we had five Sunni Arab-led
nations that flew with us on that attack. And that was really
remarkable. And I think it speaks to the conviction of the
folks in the region to really want to stand up and deal with
this very horrible entity, ISIL.
And for the most part, they have stayed with us and they
are still flying, and I think that speaks volumes in and of
itself as well. And there--as Ms. Wormuth said, there are a
number of countries that are contributing in various ways from
everything from helping the counter--the ideology to providing
kinetic capability.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
I somewhat envision that we could have basically two
coalitions, if you will. Because I think it would help the Arab
nations to have their own coalition and not appear subservient
to us and to our coalition, but that we are working together.
And I think if we had that posture and that is what the world
saw, it would help those nations engage better and serve us all
a little bit better and coordinate on command and control.
Let me ask you one question as it goes to the AUMF, and I
am really not trying to be flippant about this. But as a
commander especially, I just don't--I would--maybe finish this
sentence for me. You know, how does--finish this sentence:
Publicly stating that we won't use ground forces or large
brigades is a good idea because?
General Austin. Sir, how about if I take another approach
and give you my thoughts on----
Dr. Wenstrup. With all due respect, I thought you might say
that, sir. Go ahead.
General Austin [continuing]. Present commander.
Dr. Wenstrup. Go ahead.
General Austin. So rest assured that I am going to ask for
whatever I need to accomplish the mission as a commander. And,
you know, I think we should--we should focus our efforts by
providing good, clear mission statements and objectives. But as
a commander on the ground or commander of the region--in the
region, you expect for me to ask for what it is I need to be
successful, and so you can count on me always doing that.
Dr. Wenstrup. I appreciate that. And what I don't want to
do is ever tie your hands on that. I think it is great if we
can use other forces, but at the same time, I would not want to
tie your hands and put you in that position.
Thank you very much. I do appreciate it.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here.
Ms. Wormuth, following up on a statement that you made a
few minutes ago, why is it the administration's position that a
single federal Iraqi state is necessary to defeating ISIS when
the reality is that it is this single federal Shia-led,
Iranian-influenced central government in Baghdad that has
oppressed the Sunni people, created the oxygen for ISIS to come
in and take advantage where the Sunnis have been forced to look
in that direction in order to escape the oppression and
persecution of this Shia-led government, and that this is the
main cause for ISIS growing in its presence and strength in
Iraq today?
Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the
question.
I think what I would say is, to date, that the previous
government in Iraq, under Maliki, was very problematic and did
create many of, I think, the characteristics or the dynamics
that you are speaking of on the ground.
Ms. Gabbard. So understanding that, how can the
administration place its hopes on the success of this on an
individual person, in this new President when you have a
parliament to deal with, you have Shia militias who are on the
ground operating, sometimes in alliance, sometimes on their
own, and you have the Iranian Revolutionary Guard on the
ground?
Secretary Wormuth. First, I would say that I don't think we
are putting our confidence in a single person. Certainly, I
think, you know, we think Prime Minister Abadi is a much more
promising partner than what we had in Maliki, but we also are
working with his entire government. And he has taken some steps
that I think are indicative of his commitment personally but
also more broadly of his government to try to take a more
inclusive approach, things like signing the oil deal with the
Kurds, things like submitting the national guard legislation to
the Council of Representatives.
And while, you know, I would not dispute at all that it is
a very difficult political environment there and it is going to
be very challenging to help the Abadi administration continue
to have a more inclusive approach, we think that that is a more
promising pathway than seeing the country break apart into
divisions where, you know, a Kurdistan in the north, a
Shiastan, a Sunnistan, as, you know, some people in the think
tank community have talked about, those would only harden all
of the divisions, I think, that we have seen that have created
many of the complexities. And an approach that tries to bring
those together, we believe, is a more promising approach,
without underestimating how difficult that will be.
Ms. Gabbard. To follow up, General Austin, on a previous
comment that you made to this point about the necessity of, I
think specifically you said the inclusion of Sunnis and Kurds
is essential, and that the government must be pressured to do
that.
And while there have been some steps and some rhetoric in
that direction, really what it comes right down to, there is
very little evidence that that is happening, where we see the
right rhetoric but still on the ground we are not seeing the
Kurds getting the heavy weaponry and the arms that they need,
and they have been our most dependable ground force on the
ground.
We have the Sunnis who are coming here to Washington saying
we are not getting what we need from this central government in
Iraq and this is not just something long term; it is relevant
now with this attack in Tikrit. So I am wondering specifically
if you can address, what is the plan to ensure that the Sunni
stronghold, like Tikrit and Mosul, have a plan or an agreement
in place for the Sunnis to be in charge of security and
governance for these places once the attack is successful and
ISIS is driven out?
General Austin. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I think the plan is we have to continue to engage and
influence the Iraqi Government. And you asked why this is
important, why we want to continue to do this. Iraq is an
important country. It has got borders with allies that are key
to us: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait. And what we are doing is
working to counter an evil that we have not seen before: ISIL.
And I think unless we help in this endeavor, we can look for
this thing to spread over into the neighboring countries. And,
again, the goal of this enemy is to establish a caliphate to
control more turf.
So I think you are right, Congresswoman. I think we have to
do everything in our power to make sure we continue to engage
the Iraqi Government and make sure----
Ms. Gabbard. Sorry, General Austin, my time is about to run
out.
Specifically with Tikrit and Mosul, is there a plan in
place for the Sunnis to have governance over security on these
towns post-attack?
General Austin. Well, the Iraqi Government has got to put
such a plan into action, and that is the intent, I am sure. But
in terms of specifics of the plan to do that, at this point, I
could not lay that out for you. But that must be the way ahead
so----
Ms. Gabbard. I agree.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Ms. Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to both of the witnesses here today.
We have spoken a lot about Iraq, Iran, and I want to turn
toward Syria.
Ms. Wormuth, what is the U.S. policy toward the Assad
regime? And the reason I am asking this question is, I believe
that the brutality of the Assad regime has contributed greatly
to the ability for ISIS to rise and gain strongholds in Syria.
Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the
question.
Our policy towards the Assad regime specifically is that
Assad has completely lost his legitimacy and his legitimacy to
govern. He has created a situation where there is tremendous
instability in his country. He is not really governing much of
his country. There have been over 200,000 casualties, I
believe, to date. And what we have to do, our view, is that
there isn't a strictly military solution to that problem. What
we need to do is to find a political settlement that would have
a transition where Assad leaves the government.
And in terms of the ISIL challenge in Syria, what we are
trying to do is develop a partner on the ground. We obviously
don't have the same kind of partner on the ground that we have
in Iraq, but we believe to be able to push ISIL out in Syria,
we need to build that. And that is what our Department's train
and equip program is designed to do.
Ms. Stefanik. So do you agree with me when I state that the
rise of ISIS in Syria is related to the brutality of the Assad
regime in providing the circumstances that ISIS has been able
to recruit supporters?
Secretary Wormuth. I would say that the tremendous
instability in Syria has certainly been fertile ground for ISIL
to spread.
Ms. Stefanik. And my other question is, so just to delve
further on our policy towards Syria, is it that we oppose the
regime in principle but have a policy of taking no actions that
would harm the regime's survival?
Secretary Wormuth. Congresswoman, I think, again, our view
is that fundamentally what we need to do is pursue a diplomatic
and political solution that sees Assad leaving that government;
that militarily there isn't a solution.
You know, I wouldn't say we are taking no action. We have
an extensive humanitarian assistance program underway to try to
help support the Syrian population. We have worked with
neighbors in the region like Turkey and Jordan and others to
try to enhance their security as they deal with all of the
refugee flows, but ultimately, we need to find a diplomatic
solution.
Ms. Stefanik. I believe, Ms. Wormuth, with all due respect,
that the administration's lack of leadership in dealing with
the Assad regime and having a coherent Syria policy has led us
to where we are today.
Thank you for representing the views, but I fundamentally
disagree.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And General Austin, thank you very much for your service.
And Ms. Wormuth, thank you for your service as well.
Ms. Wormuth, you said earlier that Maliki sectarian
approach to governing is how we got here, and there are a lot
of nodding heads around the room. What are we doing in our plan
going forward to ensure that that doesn't happen again?
Secretary Wormuth. That is a great question, Congressman.
You know, fundamentally, one of the lines of effort in our
counter-ISIL campaign is governance and it is about helping the
Iraqis, again, develop a stronger government that takes a very
inclusive approach to how they are trying to bring everyone
together, bring in the Kurds, bring in the Sunnis, bring in
other religious minorities, for example.
You know, and fundamentally, this is primarily the work of
the State Department, but it is a major emphasis in terms of
what we are trying to do. We don't believe--without that focus
and without that focus on building a stronger, inclusive
government in Baghdad; we do not believe that the military
campaign on its own will succeed.
Mr. Moulton. So can you just name one thing specifically
that you are doing differently from, say, the period of 2010 to
2013? When I served in Iraq last in 2008, we had a very heavy
hand on the Iraqi Government. We were very involved in their
affairs. We made sure to keep Prime Minister Maliki within the
lanes so that he wouldn't become too sectarian. I wish we had a
prime minister that didn't require that kind of guidance, but
we did and we provided it. But it seems that that was lost. So
what specifically are we doing differently this time around?
Secretary Wormuth. Well, Congressman, I think one thing we
are doing differently--I mean, I think I would say
fundamentally, ultimately part of why things did not succeed in
Iraq the first time is because when the United States left--and
that was because, again, Maliki, as you know well, did not want
the United States to stay and was not willing to submit the
kinds of agreements to the Council of Representatives--all of
the things, many of the things that we worked with them on
through those many years started to dissipate when we left. And
I think fundamentally one of the lessons from that this time is
that we have to partner with the Iraqis, but they have to want
it for themselves, at least as much as we do.
And so we are now, I think, trying to provide advice to
them, political advice, governance advice, military advice to
help them build up their institutions, but fundamentally
emphasize that they are a sovereign country and they have to be
in the lead. And I think that is going to be challenging, but
unless we want to stay there for an indeterminate period, they
have to be able to do what needs to be done on their own.
Mr. Moulton. What I want to make sure is, is not just that
we don't have to stay there for an indeterminate period but
that we don't have to come back. And I will tell you, as
someone who fought during the surge, it is not very comforting
to hear that we are just going to leave that up to the Iraqis,
that ultimately we are just going to say pass it off to them
and maybe they will succeed and maybe they won't and we will be
right back.
Secretary Wormuth. Well, I think what I would say,
Congressman, is we are not going to leave them abruptly. You
know, we are working with them in partnership in a whole range
of ways, diplomatic, political, economic, military, trying to
help them do what needs to be done across the whole range of
challenges that they face. And we will continue to work with
them. Again, this campaign against ISIL we don't expect to end
anytime soon.
Mr. Moulton. General Austin, could you comment on this as
well. I mean, you were there during part of this period. What
specifically do you see being done differently this time around
to ensure we don't have to again see our military effort go in
vain and then have to come back again 3 or 4 years down the
road?
General Austin. Well, we certainly have learned some
lessons from the past in terms of the requirement to remain
engaged with the Iraqi leadership.
But I think we have to use more than just the influence
that the military brings. We have to use, you know, economic
influence, international pressure, and a host of other things
to put pressure on this government----
Mr. Moulton. And are we doing that?
General Austin. I think so. I think we are increasing,
but----
Mr. Moulton. So if you think so, it just doesn't give me a
lot of confidence that this plan is actually being executed.
General Austin. Understand, sir. I think--when I say that,
I say that, you know, this is a young government and we are
using every lever in the inventory to influence it. And----
Mr. Moulton. General, with all due respect, I was in
Baghdad 2 weeks ago, and that was not the story I heard on the
ground which was that we were using all these levers. I mean,
Iran has a very active effort to influence the Iraqi
Government. It doesn't seem like ours even is a shadow of that.
General Austin. I can't speak to how much--I can say that
Iran's influence is growing in Iraq, but how much they have, I
can't speak to that. But I can tell you that we recognize the
need to use everything that we can to influence and shape
activities, and we will continue to stay after this, sir.
Mr. Moulton. If I may ask just one final question. You have
talked about how important a diplomatic solution is in Syria.
Who is our political partner there?
Secretary Wormuth. Well, that is one of the many challenges
we have in Syria, is that the Syrian opposition council is the
primary, as I am sure you know, opposition entity, but it has
been fractured over time. And so we are working--part of what
the State Department is doing----
Mr. Moulton. Do we have a political partner?
Secretary Wormuth. Well, we have--again, we are working
with the opposition council. We also are obviously working with
other countries who also believe that what is needed is a
transition for Assad out of the government. But we are
certainly--we don't have a partner in, in the Syrian
Government, but we are working to build up the opposition
council.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Very important questions.
Ms. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you so much for being here today. Very important
questions and topics. And one that I think hasn't been touched
on, I am very concerned about, is the basically eradication of
Christians in Iraq. At one time, over 1.5 million Christians
there. Now we estimate between, what, 200 and 300,000 perhaps.
Maybe you have some insights on the numbers there. But
certainly that is the birthplace of many of famous Christian
historic sites.
And the reports last week of ISIL burning hundreds or
thousands of years old documents and destroying religious sites
is certainly very, very disturbing.
So first, I was wondering if you could give me an update on
the situation for Christians there, both in their persons and
their safety, how many are still there, what their situation
is, their well-being, but then also give me an update on the
ISIL strategy and how many historic sites have been destroyed?
Secretary Wormuth. Congresswoman, what I would like to do
is to give you a much more specific laydown of some of the
questions that you are asking for the record, if that would be
all right. But I think it is fair to say that, you know, we
very much share your concern about the status of Christians in
Iraq, but also other religious minorities, obviously.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 103.]
Secretary Wormuth. ISIL has persecuted and prosecuted their
barbaric approaches on Christians all over the country, and we
are very disturbed about that, and it is one of the many
reasons we are trying to defeat them in Iraq. I think something
we have emphasized particularly again with the Abadi government
is that as these military operations take place, it is very
important that the ISF forces and the popular mobilization
militias not conduct atrocities as they go into these towns.
And Prime Minister Abadi was very vocal this morning saying
that he has the responsibility and the Iraqi security forces
have the responsibility to protect all of Iraqi citizens. But
we share your concerns, and I would certainly like to get you a
more detailed report for the record. But General Austin may
have more specifics to share.
General Austin. I agree. We will take that for the record,
Ms. Wormuth.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 103.]
General Austin. I would just say, Congresswoman, that
having served in Iraq three times and now the Central Command
commander, I have spent a lot of time with senior leaders,
senior Iraqi leaders, and work with them on issues involving
Christian and other religious minorities. And I can tell you
that they value--they treasure the Christian population as a
part of their community, their environment. And so when we saw
Christians leaving Baghdad, for example, several years ago,
they were concerned about that.
So they want this population to be a part of their
environment, and I think that we will have to continue to work
with the government to ensure that as we go forward that they
are doing the right things to protect these minorities.
Mrs. Hartzler. When can I expect a response back on--for
the record?
Secretary Wormuth. I am sure we can get you something by
the end of the week, ma'am.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. That would be great.
Now in the Nineveh, there is a lot of Christians there. And
I read an article last week how an independent group has come
in to help train some of the people who live there, how to
defend their own villages, you know, independent of us.
But in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], we
put over $1 billion in there to help train local forces against
ISIL. Are we targeting and helping to specifically train some
Iraqi Christians? Are they receiving any of the funds that we
designated for this?
Secretary Wormuth. As of right now, Congresswoman, the
funds for the Iraqi train and equip program are largely being
spent on training the nine Iraqi Army brigades and the three
Peshmerga brigades. I think about almost $19 million of that
$1.3 billion is going to equip Sunni tribal elements.
But to my knowledge, that money is not being spent on
training other groups outside of the ISF and the Sunni tribes.
Mrs. Hartzler. Do you think that might be a good idea since
ISIL is trying to exterminate them?
Secretary Wormuth. Well, Congresswoman, there are, again, I
think what we have been trying to do is work the train and
equip program through the Iraqi Government. We could certainly
talk with them.
I know they--General Austin may have more information about
some of these other training programs that the Iraqi Government
is doing itself of more local populations.
General Austin. That has been our approach in the past, and
certainly it will be our approach going forward. I think this
is best done in working with the Iraqi Government because at
the end of the day, as we transition, they are going to have to
be the folks that really continue to take care of these
elements.
Mrs. Hartzler. Well, I am encouraged to hear that you think
the Iraqi Government is concerned as well and cares about them.
And I would ask you to visit with them specifically about this,
ask them to reach out to these groups and specifically try to
train them, because it would just be a travesty of historic
proportions if this area has no Christians where so many of
them have been there for thousands of years.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. McSally.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Austin, I want to switch to the topic of combat
search and rescue [CSAR]. And I was retired colonel A-10 pilot
but also ran the Joint Search and Rescue Center for CENTCOM
Forward for JTF-SWA [Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia] in the
early days of the Afghanistan operations.
And my concern is, with our operations in Iraq and Syria, I
have been hearing from some colleagues that we have limitations
on the combat search and rescue. The Jordanian pilot, as you
know, has strategic implications with how he was murdered in a
horrific way.
And we have got our pilots flying single-engine F-16s into
Iraq and Syria today. And in order to make sure that if they
have to eject, even if they are not shot down, that we have
somebody overhead right away, on-scene commander and then
somebody else right behind them to immediately locate,
communicate, and protect them, shoot anything that moves, that
comes anywhere near them, in that geography you can't hide. It
takes a very robust capability of ground-alert assets,
airborne-alert assets.
The A-10, which I flew, is the only one that provides a
rescue mission commander, SANDY One and SANDY Two, to be able
to get to them and then the helicopter should go in and get
them. And we have got to snatch them right away, as you know,
because if they get picked up then it is disastrous
consequences, not just for them and their family but
strategically for our country. Can you imagine if we had now an
American pilot that is the next one captured?
So I know you know this is a challenge, but my question is,
and I am asking for a classified briefing, what was the CSAR
posture when we first started flying sorties there and
specifically when the Jordanian pilot ejected, and has it
changed since then? And are you limited at all from the
arbitrary 3,100-person boots-on-the-ground cap by this
administration to make sure that we have a posture that
provides what I just described; that we have a covenant with
those that are flying sorties are on the ground; that we are
going to go get them, that we are going to rescue them.
I have concerns from talking to my colleagues in the
military that there is a pretty damning after-action report
from the Jordanian pilot situation, and I am deeply concerned
that we don't have the combat search and rescue capability.
Also, if you only have 12 A-10s over there and they are the
only ones that can do the SANDY mission plus close air support,
why don't we bring more over? What are your limitations? What
can we do moving forward?
General Austin. Let me assure you, Congresswoman, that I
won't put one pilot in the air if I don't feel like I have the
adequate means to recover those pilots. In working with my
senior airmen and my air component, I think they have done a
masterful job of ensuring that we have adequate coverage in a
number of places to address our CSAR issues.
As you know, we have forward-deployed CSAR capabilities
currently, and we also are looking to perhaps put CSAR
capability in other places, like Turkey, and we continue to
work that.
So I am confident that we have the adequate means to take
care of our pilots, and if I feel that the risk has increased
to the point where I need to, we will put CSAR assets in the
air while the mission is being conducted. And we have done that
and we will continue to do that.
Ms. McSally. So you feel that there is no limitations right
now? You have this CSAR posture that you need in order to make
sure that we can rescue anybody who has to eject?
General Austin. I think we have adequate CSAR capability.
In this business, as you know, there is no such thing as
enough, and so if I can get more, I will get more.
And if I can position assets in Turkey, and we believe we
can, we will move forward and do that.
Ms. McSally. Okay. And is the 3,100 boots-on-the-ground
limitation impacting at all bringing in a more robust CSAR
capability forward-deployed to make sure that we can be true to
that covenant?
General Austin. I think we have adequate capability to take
care of our troops with what we have on the ground and what we
can potentially put into other places. I think that will
increase that capability.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Great.
Again, for the record, I would like a very detailed
classified briefing on the CSAR posture and that after-action
report on the Jordanian pilot. And I look forward to working
with your staff to further discuss this important issue.
General Austin. We look forward to providing you that,
ma'am. And by the way, in response to your point that you made
earlier about a damning report, after-action report, I know of
no such report.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Great. I look forward to following up
with you, then.
Thank you.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Let me touch on a couple things that we haven't quite
gotten to yet today: One is Yemen. General, for several years
now we have heard that the most serious threat against our
homeland, as far as terrorism goes, has emanated from Yemen,
with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP]. How do you
evaluate that threat today, and what effect does the overthrow
of government there have on our counterterrorism operations to
diminish that threat?
General Austin. I will take the first stab at this, sir,
and if Ms. Wormuth wants to contribute then certainly, with
your permission, I will ask her to do so.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, we have always said, is
a very significant threat or a serious threat. We know that
there are folks in that organization that have tried to export
violence to our homeland, and so we remain focused on this
extremist organization and we feel that there is a need to keep
pressure on it.
We have found that over the years, not only in Yemen but in
other places around the region and across the globe, that the
best way to counter these types of threats is to limit the
amount of ungoverned spaces that they have available to operate
out of. And so the more that we can do to help train and equip
and advise host nations to control their own sovereign spaces,
the less of an opportunity that there is for these
organizations to export mischief to other places.
Also, their ability to counter--host nations' ability to
counter these types of threats, I think, is also important. So
what we have done over the years is when we had a viable
government in place that was willing to work with us, we have
worked with them to increase their capability so that they can
do more to control their own sovereign spaces. And that
certainly has helped us in countering some of the extremist
organizations.
In addition to that, you also obviously have to keep
pressure on the organization, making sure that you understand
what is going on with the organization and that where possible,
you bring, you know, key operatives to justice when that
opportunity is presented.
The Chairman. Yeah, but General, let me go back and try
again. Today, what is the threat like from AQAP in Yemen
against our homeland? Is it still serious?
And secondly, what effect has the overthrow of the
government had on our ability to diminish that threat?
Secretary Wormuth. Chairman, if you don't mind, I am happy
to----
The Chairman. Well, I think it is really a military
question not a policy question.
General Austin. Yeah. So there is still a significant
threat, sir, and so without the--and I apologize for not
directly answering your question. But without the government
fully operational, that makes it more difficult to do the
things that I described earlier, to keep pressure on this
organization, and so the threat will increase over time.
The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
They have called votes, so I am trying to get to several
things and I don't mean to cut you short. I will get to Mrs.
Walorski in just a second but I want to cover a couple things.
Ms. Wormuth, I was with President Ghani a few weeks ago
when he said that he would like for us not to reduce the number
of troops we have in Afghanistan for the remainder of the year.
We are going to have General Campbell here tomorrow. But the
question I have got is where is that request in the
administration, and when is it going to be answered?
Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Chairman.
We are very much aware, obviously, of that request.
President Ghani has asked us to consider giving him more--or he
has asked us to perhaps have some flexibility in terms of the
glide slope of the approach, and we are actively discussing
that right now. And I think it will very much be a topic when
the President comes here later this month.
The Chairman. So you think it is going to hang at least
through the end of the month, at least? I am concerned that, on
the current trajectory, we are reducing the number of people
throughout the country, we are reducing our intelligence-
gathering capability throughout the country, we are reducing a
variety of capabilities we have throughout the country, and
meanwhile we are studying it.
Secretary Wormuth. Congressman--or excuse me, Chairman----
The Chairman. It doesn't matter. Mac is fine.
Secretary Wormuth. Well, I certainly wouldn't go that far.
We are taking President Ghani's request very seriously, and
it is being discussed at the highest level. The President has
not made a decision yet, but I think we are very aware of the
importance of this request and want to do what we can to make
the most of the next 2 years.
So, again, I think that will be a discussion when the
President gets here, but it is being looked at a very high
level and in great detail.
The Chairman. Well, as you can tell, I am frustrated at
what we are losing in the meantime.
Let me ask one more thing and then I will yield to Mrs.
Walorski.
General, last week in the Senate, General Allen, who is now
the special Presidential envoy, said that ``enduring'' in the
administration's AUMF proposal could mean 2 weeks or it could
mean 2 years.
And then Secretary [of State] Kerry also testified in the
Senate that ``enduring'' could mean weeks and weeks but then he
came over to the House [of Representatives], and he said, well,
it could mean months, not years.
So if this passed as submitted, you are the combatant
commander responsible for implementing this AUMF, and so my
question to you is, how long is enduring? Is it two weeks? Two
months? Two years?
General Austin. Well, I think it is--you would have to
evaluate the requirements on a mission-by-mission basis, and I
would hope that, we could be--you know, when I am given
objectives and goals and missions that they are specific enough
for me to lay out how long it will take.
But in terms of, you know, a mark on the wall of exactly
how long enduring is, that is ill defined or not defined.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Smith and I got a letter from one
of your predecessors, General Mattis, last week, who basically
argued that we should not put restrictions as far as the kind
of capability that we would limit our military commanders from
using to achieve those objections.
I heard you tell Mr. Franks a while ago that you thought
more flexibility was better. I presume that that would be your
outlook. If you are given a mission, you would just as soon
have all means necessary--or at your disposal--available to
carry out that mission?
General Austin. That is correct, Chairman. And I would ask
for whatever I thought was necessary to accomplish the mission.
The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
Mrs. Walorski.
Mrs. Walorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Austin, you have been deployed on several
operational tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan. What
limitations have other AUMFs placed on your missions and
operational abilities, number one; number two, if in your
operational experience you have been most effective as
accomplishing your mission without AUMF limitations, why would
this AUMF provide you with the quote, unquote, ``flexibility''
you need to accomplish this mission?
General Austin. Well, you know, certainly, I have been
involved in, over the last decade-plus, in fighting in
Afghanistan and Iraq. And we have had what we needed to have to
accomplish our goals and objectives in both instances.
In terms of any limitations that this current--the proposed
AUMF would place on us, the way it is laid out to--I think we
will have what we need, we will have the flexibility to address
the counter-ISIL campaign.
And so to accomplish what has been given to me in this
current mission set, I think we have the flexibility to get the
work done.
Mrs. Walorski. And just reflecting again on what the
chairman said, but, you know, I was heavily impacted last week
when I read the letter from General Mattis. And--when he talked
about to the committee last week that they should not set any
arbitrary guidelines, AUMF should not establish geographic
limits, AUMF should put the enemy on notice that we will use
all military capabilities, even if it includes ground forces.
And we have heard other, just through the news and just through
talk, other senior military leaders saying the same thing.
And I have got to believe, with him being your predecessor,
would you not agree with General Mattis' views, that we simply
cannot have these kind of ground game rules, number one,
already established; and number two, we are telling ISIL and
all interested parties exactly what we are not going to do?
General Austin. Well General Mattis is a great friend, a
guy who I respect a lot. And I will tell you that we agree on
some things; we don't agree on everything. But in this case,
Congresswoman, my thoughts are the more flexibility that I can
have, the better it is for me in terms of prosecuting this kind
of a fight.
Mrs. Walorski. Wouldn't it be easier to have an AUMF that
says destroy ISIL, period? Wouldn't that give you unbelievable
flexibility, unbelievable authority, and send a strong message
to the other side, to the enemy camp that there is number one
mission in this country, and all the bounds are off, all the
rules are off, and you are in charge of a command that can go
and do what the American people want, which is to destroy ISIL,
even if they show up in Afghanistan, even if they show up in
other places where we already know there is connections and
networks being made?
General Austin. Well, again, the more flexibility I can
have as a commander----
Mrs. Walorski. Would you support that kind of AUMF, sir,
that said destroy ISIL?
General Austin. I am confident I will never get that kind
of an AUMF, but I take your point.
Mrs. Walorski. I appreciate.
I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Coffman, do you have something right
quick?
Mr. Coffman. No, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Okay.
Thank you, all, for your patience. A vote came just in
time.
And so we appreciate both of you and the challenges that
you face in sorting through a very difficult, messy situation
in the Central Command area of responsibility.
Thank you again for being here today, and we will look
forward to further discussions.
With that, the hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:44 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
?
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A P P E N D I X
March 3, 2015
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 3, 2015
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 3, 2015
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
Secretary Wormuth. First, we very much share your concern about the
status of Christians and other minorities in Iraq. We strongly condemn
ISIL's recent attacks on the ancient city of Nimrud, in Iraq, and on
Christian villages in northeastern Syria--as well as their continued
use of barbaric tactics to massacre and enslave innocent people, and
persecute minority populations. This is among the very reasons we are
working to defeat ISIL in Iraq. Unfortunately, DOD does not track the
specific number of Christian tombs, shrines, statues, and other
religious sites that have been destroyed by ISIL, so we do not have
more detailed information to share. The State Department and USAID
[U.S. Agency for International Development] may be able to give you a
more comprehensive briefing, based on their relationships with NGOs.
What we do know is, as you suggested, there are an estimated
300,000-350,000 Christians remaining in Iraq. Prior to 2003, Iraq's
Christian population was approximately 1.4 million, historically
concentrated in northeastern Ninewa province, with small populations in
several urban centers such as Mosul, Baghdad, Erbil, and Kirkuk city.
Approximately one million Christians left Iraq due to security
concerns, discrimination, and limited economic opportunities in the
years following 2003.
Today, Christians and other religious minorities are
disproportionately represented among displacement camps in northern
Iraq due to ISIL's incursion and threats upon their historic
communities. Most Christians still in Iraq are located in relatively
secure Kurdish-controlled areas. Nonetheless, Christian communities in
Iraq remain concerned about their future in the country due to ongoing
sectarian violence and a lack of economic opportunity. [See page 31.]
General Austin. We do not track or have the information to share
with you concerning the number of Christian tombs, shrines, statues,
and other religious sites that have been destroyed by ISIL. What we do
know is that there are an estimated 300,000-350,000 Christians
remaining in Iraq. Prior to 2003, Iraq's Christian population was
approximately 1.4 million (of an estimated total population of 26
million). Historically, Christians were concentrated in northeastern
Ninewa province, with small populations in several urban centers such
as Mosul, Baghdad, Erbil, and Kirkuk city. In the years following 2003,
approximately one million Christians emigrated from Iraq due to
security concerns, discrimination, and limited economic opportunities.
Today, most Christians remaining in Iraq are located in relatively
secure Kurdish-controlled areas of the north. Unfortunately, Christian
communities in Iraq may still be susceptible to sectarian violence and
are concerned about a lack of economic opportunity. [See page 31.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 3, 2015
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Shuster. President Obama's proposal for a new Authorization for
the Use of Military Force ``does not authorize the use of the United
States Armed Forces in enduring offensive ground combat operations.''
Please specifically define ``enduring ground operations.'' Do you
believe the reference to ``enduring ground operations'' will be clear
to our commanders on the ground? Since the administration has not yet
adequately defined ``enduring ground operations,'' which will be
responsible for determining whether an action violated the stipulation
against ``enduring ground operations''?
Secretary Wormuth. The AUMF would not authorize long-term, large-
scale ground combat operations like those the United States conducted
in Iraq and Afghanistan. It would provide the flexibility to conduct
ground combat operations in more limited circumstances, such as rescue
operations involving U.S. or coalition personnel or special operations
to take military action against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
leadership.
I do believe that the reference to enduring ground combat
operations would be clear to our commanders on the ground, and
certainly to the President and Secretary of Defense initiating any such
action. Any requirement for U.S. ground combat operations would be
assessed on a mission-by-mission basis. In light of existing guidance
limiting the role of U.S. ground forces as described in the reports
submitted by the President consistent with the War Powers Resolution,
we do not believe there would be opportunities for the commanders on
the ground to engage in ``enduring ground operations'' without further
orders from Washington.
Mr. Shuster. A number of friendly nations continue to acquire and
maintain American weapons technology, including systems like the PAC
GEM-T missile, as an effective and efficient countermeasure to regional
threats. How can we better leverage our industrial base in this manner
to support our Middle Eastern allies in their fight against the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant?
Secretary Wormuth. The Department of Defense (DOD) is working
closely with the U.S. defense industry and partners in the Middle East
region to help them build capabilities that facilitate their own
security and that of the region. In support of this effort, DOD
maintains close relationships with the defense industry to leverage new
and existing technologies that meet the unique requirements of partners
around the world. It is through the increased collaboration and
dialogue with both industry and partner nations that the Department
provides cost-effective solutions for greater capability as well as
partner interoperability with U.S. forces and each other.
The Department continues to work bilaterally with partners in the
Middle East to support the development of air and missile defense
capabilities while also establishing the foundation for increased
regional collaboration in support of U.S. national security interests.
The DOD-defense industry partnership has played a vital role in
developing both bilateral solutions and opportunities for system
integration in support of these efforts.
Although missile defense remains a priority in the Middle East
region, effective counter Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (C-ISIL)
operations demand a different set of capabilities. DOD continues to
work closely with interagency partners and industry to expedite
delivery of defense articles and services in response to urgent
requirements of partners engaged in C-ISIL operations.
Mr. Shuster. The President has placed a 3-year limitation in his
proposed Authorization for the Use of Military Force. Do you believe
that the current strategy will defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) in that time window? We have seen a steady decline in
government stability that expands beyond the Middle East, into Africa
and elsewhere. Has President Obama, as Commander in Chief, too narrowly
defined and too marginally addressed extremist threats? Do you
presently believe there are any other emerging terrorist threats or
organizations that have the potential to fill the power vacuum that
would be created by ISIL's defeat?
General Austin. I believe the strategy that calls for the use of
indigenous forces supported by a broad coalition to defeat ISIL is the
right strategy and it will succeed. We are only in month eight of a 36-
month campaign, and the coalition already has made significant progress
in the fight against ISIL. Specifically, the combined air-ground
campaign continues to deny the enemy freedom of movement, while
disrupting their ability to resupply and seize and hold new terrain.
Overall, I assess that we are about where we said that we would be at
this point in the campaign. That said, if more time is required, I am
confident our national leadership will provide the necessary
authorities to support our continued efforts to defeat ISIL. In the
meantime, I do believe we should work by, with and through our
coalition partners to achieve our shared goals and objectives. In the
end, we want to defeat ISIL, and also take the necessary steps to
ensure that what we see happening now in Iraq and Syria does not happen
again in the future.
The threat posed by a number of violent extremist organizations
will likely persist after ISIL has been defeated. Certainly al-Qaida
and/or its affiliates, such as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
and al-Qaida in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), present an
enduring threat to stability and security in the Central region. These
groups have global ambitions and they aspire to topple ``apostate
regimes'' and conduct attacks against the West and western interests.
And so, we must continue to maintain pressure on these groups going
forward, while also helping our regional partners to effectively
address the `underlying currents' or the root causes of the instability
that are at play in that volatile and strategically-important part of
the world.
[all]