[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
YEMEN UNDER ATTACK BY
IRANIAN BACKED HOUTHIS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 14, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-32
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
94-179 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
TOM EMMER, Minnesota
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina GRACE MENG, New York
TED S. YOHO, Florida LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESS
The Honorable Gerald M. Feierstein, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of
State.......................................................... 8
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Gerald M. Feierstein: Prepared statement........... 10
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 30
Hearing minutes.................................................. 31
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 32
YEMEN UNDER ATTACK BY
IRANIAN-BACKED HOUTHIS
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 14, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5
minutes, as soon as he shows up, each for our opening
statements, I will then recognize other members seeking
recognition for 1 minute.
We will then hear from our witness and without objection,
Mr. Ambassador, your prepared statements will be made a part of
the record. Members may have 5 days in which to insert
statements and questions for the record, subject to the length
limitation and the rules.
I would like to note for the record that the subcommittee
invited the Department of Defense to send an official to
testify before us this afternoon, but DoD stated that they were
unable to participate at this hearing and declined to come. But
we got the better of the deal, because we have you, Mr.
Ambassador.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. On
September 10th of last year, President Obama announced to the
American public his plan to degrade and destroy the terrorist
group ISIL. While making his case for America's role in the
fight against ISIL, the President highlighted our strategy in
Yemen and held it up as a model of success to be emulated in
the fight against ISIL. Yet, about a week later, the Iran-
backed Houthis seized control of the capital and the
government. Despite this, the administration continued to hail
our counterterror operations in Yemen as a model for success,
even though we effectively had no partner on the ground since
President Hadi was forced to flee. But perhaps even more
astonishingly, in what could only be described as alarmingly
tone deaf and short sighted, when Press Secretary Earnest was
asked at a press briefing if this model was still successful
after the Yemeni central Government collapsed and the U.S.
withdrew all of our personnel including our special forces, he
said yes, despite all indications pointing to the contrary.
So where do we stand now? That is the important question.
President Hadi was forced to flee. Saudi Arabia has led a
coalition of over 10 Arab nations in Operation Decisive Storm,
which so far has consisted of air strikes only, but very well
could include ground forces in the near future. Iran feels
emboldened in Yemen because of the leverage it has gained over
the administration through the nuclear negotiations, but I
commend that the Gulf countries, the GCC countries were taking
a strong stance against Iran and stepping up to the plate in
Yemen. Despite their action, the Houthis actually control more
territory now than they did before the Saudi response. Our
Embassy is closed. Our personnel have been evacuated and there
is no Hadi government to speak of. And al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) has taken advantage of the fighting and has
capitalized on the deteriorating situation in Yemen, and we
have very little visibility into their movements or their
actions.
I am concerned that the AQAP, the al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, has gained ground in eastern Yemen and has been left
virtually unchecked to recruit and train. Let us not forget
that it was AQAP that was responsible for the Paris attacks
earlier this year or that it was al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula that was responsible for overtaking a prison last
month and releasing several hundreds of prisoners including a
senior operative of al-Qaeda.
AQAP's leader is a follower of bin Laden and like bin Laden
also seeks to strike Western targets, including right here in
our homeland in the United States.
Iran has reportedly dispatched a naval destroyer near Yemen
in a game of chicken over one of the most important shipping
routes in the Gulf of Aden. This area is a gateway between
Europe and the Middle East and Iran must not be allowed to
escalate any tensions or attempt to disrupt the shipping lanes.
Yet, we continue to see the administration make the same
mistakes it made in Syria. And just like in Syria, today Yemen
is in utter chaos in large part due to Iran's antagonism and
meddling. But we must learn our lesson from Syria and engage in
the Yemeni crisis head on with a comprehensive strategy before
it spirals further out of control. There will be no political
solution in Yemen based on the GCC initiative or restarting the
National Dialogue Conference that collapsed in early 2014
without addressing the underlying issues. The Houthis were
reluctant participants in the National Dialogue in Yemen, but
it was clear that they had no interest in ceding power over to
a centralized government. As a result, they withdrew from the
National Dialogue. It collapsed and the Houthis took control of
Sana'a and now other areas. So why would the administration
think that the circumstances have changed that would allow for
a reconciliation to occur?
It is naive and dangerous to believe that a political
solution is achievable as long as the Houthis are unwilling to
cede their power and as long as Iran continues its support for
these fighters, just like it is naive and dangerous to believe
that a political solution in Syria is achievable as long as
Assad remains in power.
Even more absurd is the fact that Iran, just this morning,
has allegedly proposed a peace plan for Yemen. This is the same
Iran that continues to use its terrorism tentacles throughout
the region to undermine U.S. interests by supplying arms and
fighters aimed to further destabilize its neighboring
countries.
So today, we hope to hear from the administration that we
have a comprehensive plan on how to get to a political
solution, rather than just supporting a reconciliation process
while also addressing the current gap in our intelligence and
counterterror capabilities in Yemen, as well as the
deteriorating humanitarian situation. Because if we act in
Yemen in the same way that we have acted in Syria, then we are
likely going to see the same crisis follow in Yemen, a war with
no end in sight, the rise of dangerous terror groups, a dire
humanitarian crisis, and Iran's increased power grab in the
region.
And with that, I will go to Mr. Connolly for perhaps 1
minute because when Mr. Deutch comes, he will give his 5
minutes.
Mr. Connolly is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for
having the hearing. In listening to the recitation just now of
what happened in Yemen and what happened in Syria, one would, I
guess, infer or one is meant to infer that it is all the
problem and result of policies pursued or not pursued by
President Obama and his administration. Nothing could be
further from the truth.
The inherent instability in Yemen is not new and it
certainly is not unique to the administration currently in
power. Yemen is inherently unstable. It has multiple militia
forces and jihadist forces at work. Towns have been taken and
retaken and transferred. Terrorism and brutality have occurred
and we may very well--there are movements to bifurcate the
country as it once was.
The instability in the region is not the fault or the
responsibility of any administration. Our question really has
to be how do we respond when there are no good options? So how
do we do the least harm? How do we limit our exposure? How do
we try, however indirectly, to effect outcomes positively?
I don't think throwing pot shots at this administration as
if it were omnipotent on the world scene, especially in this
region, is very helpful. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chabot of
Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this
hearing. I want to say at the outset that I have an honor
flight coming in shortly and I have somebody from Bangladesh
back here, the speaker of the House, that I have to meet with,
so I am not going to be able to stay for the testimony, but I
will have staff here and I will certainly read the testimony.
So, I was chair of this committee a while back and during
that time, I went to Yemen, and I think Mr. Connolly is right.
There have been problems there for years, but I would argue
that they certainly have gotten worse under this administration
and you know, it was this administration that claimed that
Yemen was a success story and clearly, it has been anything but
that.
When we were on our way over there, there was a terrorist
attack on a graduation at the military barracks and over 100
new soldiers were murdered by terrorists. So this has been
going on for a while, but the problems in Yemen are just
incredible. I think the thing that is particularly disturbing
is the Iranian involvement there and around the region. Four or
five capitals now in the region are controlled by the Iranians.
So it is a very dangerous situation. I look forward to the
testimony. Even though I won't be here, I will certainly review
that testimony. And thank you for being here, Mr. Ambassador.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. And good luck with
that honor flight. It is always very emotional. And we will
recognize Mr. Deutch after the 1 minute, with his consent. We
will go to Mr. Higgins of New York.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this
important hearing, you know, another trouble spot in a region
that has pervasive trouble. There are no good options here for
the United States, but obviously we have a great interest in
trying to influence stabilization in that region. So I am very
curious to hear the thoughts of our distinguished panelists
today.
Additionally, it was announced that the U.N. Security
Council imposed an arms embargo on the Houthi fighters bent on
for control of Yemen and that resolution which is legally
binding prohibits the sale of weapons to three named Houthi
leaders, its former president, and his son. So I am just kind
of curious as to what, if any, impact that resolution will have
relative to the dynamic that is going on in Yemen right now.
Thank you very much for being here.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, excellent question. Mr. Wilson
of South Carolina.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for
leadership on this issue.
And Ambassador, I just can't imagine a more extraordinary
time for you to be serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary
for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. And hey, I want you to
succeed, but I am obviously very concerned about the Yemeni
evacuation, what this means for the security of the United
States and our allies. I am obviously concerned about Libya,
its dissolution, the murders at Benghazi, with the rise of
ISIL, the failure to have a status force agreement with Iraq
which leads to destabilization of Iraq, the regime in Iran
which has an ideology of death to America, death to Israel.
That is their plan. And as they are moving ahead with nuclear
capability, also building missiles to include an ICBM which
could only be interpreted as a threat to the American people
and American families. And then finally, of course, I am very
concerned about chaos and civil war in Syria, the purported red
line of the President which simply did not have any life and
credibility. But hey, I still want you to succeed, and so I
look forward to working with Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for
your success. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. Mr. Cicilline of
Rhode Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and Ranking
Member Deutch for holding this very timely hearing. And thank
you, Mr. Ambassador, for being here today.
I think it is safe to say that the quick deterioration of
the situation in Yemen took many people here in Washington by
surprise. For many years, Yemen was held up as an example of
counterterrorism cooperation and it looked as though a
political agreement might be achieved in the aftermath of the
Arab Spring. The United States provided approximately $900
million in foreign aid to Yemen since the transition in 2011 to
support counterterrorism and political reconciliation, the
economy, and humanitarian aid.
Now we face a vastly different landscape and have to revise
our assumptions and expectations. Furthermore, we risk being
drawn deeply into another Iranian-backed armed conflict in the
Middle East.
I would particularly like to hear from the witness, you,
Mr. Ambassador, how we might have better detected the oncoming
Houthi rebellion, and what, if anything, could have been done
to prevent it, what the U.S. role is and should be in the
conflict between the parties in Yemen and how we are
cooperating with regional partners and what the processes are
for a solution to this conflict.
I am also very concerned about the plight of civilians in
one of the poorest countries in the world. Its fighting and
political chaos has disrupted an already fragile economy, and
prevents access to food, water, and medical care and I would
like to hear from you what we are doing to alleviate the
humanitarian situation. Thank you very much. I look forward to
your testimony. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Excellent questions. Thank you. Dr. Yoho
does not need to address the panel now. So we will go to Ms.
Meng of New York.
Ms. Meng. Thank you, Chair, and Ranking Member for
assembling this hearing, and our distinguished Ambassador for
joining us here today.
On January 21st, a fragile power-sharing deal between
democratically-elected President Hadi and the Houthi rebel
group in Yemen fell apart and the Houthis began seizing control
of large portions of Yemen. These actions were troubling
because of the Houthis' illegal usurpation of power and their
immediate dissolving of the Yemeni Parliament. Besides their
complete disregard for democratic principles, the Houthis have
very close ties to Iran which is supporting their aggression
and seeking to expand its own sphere of influence in the Middle
East.
On March 26th, Saudi Arabia and more than 10 Arab partners
began air strikes to weaken the Houthi stronghold and reinstate
President Hadi to the presidency. While I am in support of Arab
solidarity and intervention here, I am deeply concerned about
the possibility of a large humanitarian crisis in Yemen and
look forward to delving into these issues this afternoon. I
yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. Meng. Ms. Frankel of
Florida.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair, Mr. Ambassador, thank
you for being here.
We have heard some of my colleagues here describe Iran's
support for the Houthi forces as another Iranian takeover in
the region. And so I am going to be--I am interested in your
assessment of that, given that the Houthis ruled northern Yemen
for nearly a millennium and have been seeking recourse for
decades now, with strong ties to the former regime. So I hope
that you can put Iran's involvement in Yemen in this broader
context, if you would, and just would add to the question what
extent does Iran actually control events in Yemen? Is it more
than funding, supplies, weapons or are there Iranian forces
actually directing action in the country as we have seen in
Syria and Iraq? I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Thank you, Ms.
Frankel. And we were all the warm-up group for our lead guy,
Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for calling today's
hearing and allowing us to address the recent troubling events
in Yemen. Deputy Assistant Secretary Feierstein, welcome back.
I understand you just returned from the Gulf. We look forward
to hearing the administration's assessment of the conflict, its
impact on broader regional politics, and what role we should
play going forward.
Following the deposition of Yemen's long time autocratic
ruler Saleh in 2011, the U.S. supported an inclusive transition
process, via national dialogue, into rebuilding the country's
political and governmental institutions and bridging gaps
between groups that have had a long history of conflict.
Yemen's first newly-elected leader, President Hadi, made clear
his intentions to cooperate closely with the United States.
Hadi's government remained a partner in counterterrorism
cooperation and operations. Yemen, the poorest country on the
peninsula, needed support from the International Community. The
United States has long viewed Yemen as a safe haven for al-
Qaeda terrorists and there is alarming potential for
recruitment by terrorist groups given the dire economic
conditions that they face.
In fact, U.S. Department of Homeland Security considers al-
Qaeda and the Arabian Peninsula the affiliate most likely, the
al-Qaeda affiliate, most likely to attempt transnational
attacks against the United States.
And while the national dialogue was initially viewed as
successful, the process concluded in 2014 with several key
reforms still not completed, including the drafting of a new
constitution. The Hadi government had continued to face deep
opposition for Yemen's northern tribes, mainly the Shiite
Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. Over the past year, the Houthis
in coordination with tribes and military units, still loyal to
Saleh, began increasing their territorial control, eventually
moving into Sana'a. Saleh had long been thought to have used
his existing relationship to undermine the Hadi government.
The Houthis are well trained, well-funded, and experienced
fighters, having fought the Yemeni Government and Saudi Arabia
in 2009.
Now much has been written by experts and analysts about how
deep Iran's connection to the Houthis go. Some argue it is
overblown and that while the Houthis welcome Iranian support,
they are not an Iranian proxy in the same way as Hezbollah.
Others suggest that the United States has not in the past
recognized how deep the level of support provided by Iran is or
what Iran's real motives are in supporting the Houthis. Perhaps
the fullest extent of Iran's involvement remains unknown, but
as Secretary Kerry said last week, there are obviously supplies
that have been coming from Iran, he said. There are a number of
flights every single week that have been flying in. We trace
those flights and we know this. We are well aware of the
support that Iran has been giving to Yemen and Iran needs to
recognize that the United States is not going to stand by while
the region is destabilized or while people engage in overt
warfare across lines, international boundaries of other
countries.
The most troubling question, I think to examine today, is
whether the conflict in Yemen has now become a symptom of a
larger power struggle in the Gulf. The Saudi-led military
intervention is now in its third week. The U.S. has been
providing resources in support to our regional partners,
engaged on the ground.
Madam Chairman, I would point out that this is yet another
example of why we must act in the closest of security
cooperation with our Gulf friends to counter all of Iran's
destabilizing activities in the region. And I was pleased to
see reports this morning that indicated the United States has
stepped up our support inspecting ships bound for Yemen in
search of arms.
Similarly, today's 14 to nothing vote by the Security
Council to impose an arms embargo on the Houthis is a welcome
step and a needed show of unity from the International
Community.
Iran is, in turn, responding, sending a flotilla to the
Gulf of Aden. And last week on social media, Iran's Supreme
Leader personally attacked Saudi Arabia and its defense
ministers tweeting ``inexperienced youths have taken over the
affairs of the state and are replacing dignity with
barbarity.''
As Members of Congress, we are often asked by our
constituents by the U.S. should be involved in what goes on in
the Middle East. They tell us the years of conflict won't be
solved by U.S. intervention. But Yemen is a clear example of
what is in our national interest. We cannot allow groups like
al-Qaeda and the Arabian Peninsula which tried to attack the
United States in 2009, in 2011, and in 2012, to take advantage
of chaos in Yemen. We need the Yemeni Government that is going
to be a partner in our counterterrorism and regional security
efforts.
And finally, the people of Yemen have long suffered under
dire economic conditions. The population has more than
quadrupled in the past 30 years. Conflict is only making the
humanitarian situation worse. Saudi Arabia is delivering
medical and humanitarian supplies, but it is necessary for the
International Community to continue to support the people of
Yemen. We have seen all too well how quickly humanitarian
crises can slip from the front pages of our papers.
Ambassador Feierstein, thank you again for being here.
Given that U.S. personnel has been evacuated, we look to you to
tell us where U.S. policy toward Yemen currently stands. Will
we continue to see increased level of involvement in the Saudi-
led intervention? How can the two U.N. Security Council
resolutions pertaining to Saleh be enforced? And can there
ultimately be a military solution to Yemen's internal crisis.
We look forward to your responses and appreciate your being
here. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch, an
excellent statement.
And we are so pleased to welcome Ambassador Gerald
Feierstein, who is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Previously, he served as
our Ambassador to Yemen from 2010 to 2013, so he knows this
area very well. He has served in several different postings
throughout the Middle East, including as Deputy Chief of
Mission in Islamabad and Deputy Counsel General in Jerusalem.
Thank you for your service, Mr. Ambassador. We look forward
to your testimony. And may I point out your lovely fiance
sitting behind you. Welcome. Does she know the hours that you
put in every day in your job? She may want to reconsider.
Mr. Ambassador, you are on.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GERALD M. FEIERSTEIN, PRINCIPAL
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Feierstein. Thank you so much, Madam Chairman.
Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, members of the
subcommittee, I greatly appreciate this opportunity to come
before you today to review recent developments in Yemen and the
efforts that the United States is undertaking to support the
Government of Yemen under President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi and
the Saudi-led coalition of Operation Decisive Storm that is
aimed at restoring the legitimate government and restarting the
negotiations to find peaceful, political solutions to Yemen's
internal conflict.
During the week of April 4th to 11th, I traveled with
Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates and Oman. As part of our consultations, we
met with President Hadi and members of his team, the Saudi
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Interior, the
Emirati Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as other senior
Emirati officials in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
Defense and the Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and
his deputy.
In all of these engagements, we found a broad degree of
consistency in their determination to bring operation Decisive
Storm to a rapid and successful conclusion, to establish that
no party to the internal conflict in Yemen will be able to
achieve its objectives through violence and coercion and to set
the framework for a return to negotiations leading to a clear,
verifiable commitment on the part of all parties to the
conflict to implement agreements and complete the political
transition on the basis of the GCC initiative, the conclusions
of the National Dialogue Conference, and applicable U.N.
Security Council resolutions.
There was also a broad agreement among the Yemeni
leadership and Yemen's neighbors that Yemen should not be
allowed to become a locus for foreign intervention that
destabilizes Yemen or threatens the security and stability of
Yemen's neighbors and the region at large.
Madam Chairman, as you know, the conflict in Yemen is
enormously complicated and has roots that are largely parochial
and locally focused. Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab
world with a long history of weak central governance, has for
many years struggled to meet the needs of its diverse
constituencies and address their grievances. Those failures of
governance led to the fall of the previous regime in 2011.
Reflecting significant engagement by the United States and the
International Community, the GCC initiative was put in place to
help Yemen transition to a new, more inclusive government that
would be responsive to the needs and aspirations of all of
Yemen's communities.
The tragedy of the current situation is that the political
process that the Yemenis established in 2011 was achieving
success and they had reason to believe that it would lead to a
more open, democratic, and prosperous nation that was the goal
of the Yemeni people. Regrettably, that transition has been
sidetracked by the Houthi movement, aided and abetted by Ali
Abdallah Saleh and his allies, who decided that they would seek
to achieve by force what they had been unable to accomplish at
the negotiating table. We hope that it is only a temporary
delay.
We remain deeply concerned about Iranian support for the
Houthis' military ambitions. To the best of our understanding,
the Houthis are not controlled directly by Iran. However, we
have seen in recent years significant growth and expansion of
Iranian engagement with the Houthis. We believe that Iran sees
opportunities with the Houthis to expand its influence in Yemen
and threaten Saudi and Gulf Arab interests.
Iran provides financial support, weapons, training, and
intelligence to the Houthis. In the weeks and months since the
Houthis entered Sana'a and forced the legitimate government
first to resign and ultimately to flee from the capital, we
have seen a significant expansion of Iranian involvement in
Yemen's domestic affairs.
We are also particularly concerned about the ongoing,
destabilizing role played by former President Saleh, who since
his removal from power in 2011 has actively plotted to
undermine President Hadi and the political transition process.
Despite U.N. sanctions and international condemnation of his
actions, Saleh continues to be one of the primary sources of
the chaos in Yemen. We have been working with our Gulf partners
in the international community to isolate him and prevent the
continuation of his efforts to undermine the peaceful
transition. Success in that effort will go a long way to
helping Yemen return to a credible political transition
process.
Finally, the destabilizing actions of the Houthis and their
allies have created conditions that are beneficial to AQAP. The
deterioration of the political situation in Yemen has provided
new openings for AQAP to regain the ground that is lost in
recent years, owing to the efforts of the U.S. and Yemeni
Governments to combat it.
Only through a negotiated resolution of the ongoing
political conflict can we resume the cooperation with the
Government of Yemen to deter, defeat, and ultimately to
eliminate the AQAP threat to Yemen, the United States, and our
friends and partners around the world.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
this afternoon. I look forward to answering any questions you
may have about the situation in Yemen, and our policy
responses.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feierstein follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador. And
you are certainly an expert in this area. I note that it is
important to not minimize Iran's role in Yemen or the sectarian
nature of this conflict, as I believe the administration seems
determined to do. The administration has so far provided only
limited logistical support to the Saudi-led coalition. We
waited to give them the intelligence that they needed, for
example, to know exactly where to hit. The administration is
hoping for a political solution without also having our own
comprehensive strategy in the region. So we are essentially
outsourcing our Yemeni policy to the GCC and Iran, the Gulf
countries.
Are we in conversations with Iran or with Houthi rebels
about the situation in Yemen? And what is our plan if the
Houthis refuse to accept a political resolution?
Ambassador Feierstein. Madam Chairman, we believe that the
Iranians are well aware of our views and our positions on the
situation in Yemen. We have been very clear in articulating
that.
As far as the Houthis are concerned, we have expressed an
interest in establishing a dialogue with them, going all the
way back to frankly the time that I was still in Sana'a. The
Houthis, up until now, have declined the opportunity to engage
with us directly. Nevertheless, we have been able to
communicate with them, to pass messages to them through various
intermediaries. And again, I believe that the Houthis are fully
aware of our views and the positions that we have taken on
their issues going all the way back to the early years of the
21st century.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir. You testified that
current conditions in Yemen are beneficial to al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula and that ISIL is an emerging presence in
Yemen. How large of a presence does ISIL have in Yemen? What
kind of pressure are we applying against them? And now that our
Embassy is closed and all of our personnel have been evacuated,
our intelligence capabilities have been severely restricted.
What kind of intelligence can we collect without a presence in
country and what insight do we have into the various factions?
Ambassador Feierstein. It is a very good question. In terms
of ISIL, it is extremely difficult for us to have a clear
picture of the extent to which they are a factor there. As you
know, they claim credit for several attacks on mosques earlier
this year. This was the first time that ISIL as an entity
emerged really in Yemen.
We would still consider AQAP to be by far the larger and
more significant threat. We have heard some Yemenis and others
speculate that what we are seeing is the return of perhaps of
some Yemeni fighters who were in Syria or Iraq who have come
back to Yemen and are now operating as ISIL, but I think of
that as something that we couldn't confirm at this point.
In terms of the complications in our ability to have a
clear picture, there is no doubt that the fact that we are not
present in Yemen at this moment and that we aren't able to
maintain the level of communications and dialogue and the daily
interactions that we were able to have with Yemeni counterparts
while we were there and while President Hadi's government was
in place, certainly is an obstacle to our ability to continue
to conduct operations.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir. Now State and DoD have
provided a variety of capabilities to Yemeni security forces
including some sensitive equipment such as night vision
goggles. With the closure of our Embassy and with the
relocation of Special Operation Forces from Yemen, it is much
more difficult to monitor the use of such equipment. What do we
know in the U.S. Government about the current status of the
equipment that was previously provided to Yemen? Have they
fallen into the hands of Houthis, al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, or ISIL?
Ambassador Feierstein. We haven't seen any direct evidence
that those items of equipment that we have provided in the past
have been taken by the Houthis or by other elements. There has
been some speculation in the press, but we couldn't confirm
that. We don't have any independent information.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And we have seen reports that
coalition forces have amassed along the Saudi-Yemeni border and
that some Saudi forces are already on the ground in Yemen. Do
you expect to see GCC coalition ground forces in Yemen and what
would Egypt's role be in such an effort? What role would the
United States play in such a scenario?
Ambassador Feierstein. Based on the discussions that we had
with our counterparts in Riyadh and in Abu Dhabi last week, I
think that at this point in time what we understand is that
they don't have any current plans to actually have a ground
presence inside of Yemen. They are, are you said, moving forces
to the border. We believe that that is largely for defensive
purposes. And they are clear that this is something that they
would consider if they see the requirement. But right now, we
haven't seen anything.
As for the Egyptian role, those discussions are ongoing and
there have not been any commitments that we are aware of on the
part of Egypt to participate in any kind of ground activity.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And lastly, you testified that
the humanitarian situation was already dire in Yemen before
this crisis and that malnutrition, bad sanitation, no access to
water, internal displacements, are all rising internal
concerns. What is the U.S. doing to work with Saudi and the
rest of the Gulf Council nations to prioritize the
transportation of water, essential food, fuel, and humanitarian
supplies like medicine into the country and via air and
seaports?
Ambassador Feierstein. One of the fundamental items in
Deputy Secretary Blinken's agenda with our partners in Riyadh
and in Abu Dhabi was precisely to encourage them, to urge them,
to ensure that humanitarian access to Yemen was possible. I
think that the latest information that we have is that the
picture has improved somewhat. It remains very serious. Nearly
half of the population in Yemen right now, based on the
estimates we have seen, is food deprived. So this is a very
serious situation.
We are doing a better job, I think, in getting some of the
humanitarian supplies, not only food, but also medicines and
other essentially humanitarian goods to Yemen. The internal
distribution is extremely difficult because of the various
military activities that are going on around the country, so
the movement has become complicated. And probably the most
significant concern that we have right now is the availability
of fuel which is essential not only for the movement of goods
and people, but also is essential in order to provide water and
also bread because the bakeries run on propane gas and without
propane, they can't bake their bread. So this is having ripple
effects throughout the economy and making the humanitarian
situation that much more serious.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you again for your service, sir.
Mr. Deutch of Florida, the ranking member, is recognized.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Feierstein, you
mentioned you just got back from the region and you don't think
the Saudis this campaign as an open-ended one. Do they think
there is a military solution? You had said they don't have
plans to launch a ground war. Do you envision a situation in
which Saudi or coalition ground troops would go in?
Ambassador Feierstein. Under the current set of
circumstances, no. They are looking at various scenarios, but
they have been very clear with us that that is not where they
want to go. And the history in Yemen is not favorable for
foreign ground forces. And I think that the Saudis are well
aware of that.
I do believe and based on the conversations that we have,
the Saudis do not believe there is a military solution to this
conflict. They understand, as we do, that ultimately the only
solution is to bring the parties back to the negotiating table
and their intent is to try to demonstrate through their current
military activities that a military solution on the part of the
Houthis or Ali Abdallah Saleh is not achievable, and therefore
they need to return to negotiations.
Mr. Deutch. There were two, so far anyway, two stories with
respect to Iran and Yemen that have arisen today. One reports
that Iran may be trying to send surface-to-air missiles to the
Houthis and that the United States is stepping up our
inspections to ships bound for Yemen. First, on that one, can
we expect to see greater U.S. involvement as the conflict drags
on?
Ambassador Feierstein. I think that at this particular
moment our intent is to try to support the Saudi coalition and
our partners. And so what we are doing is aimed at empowering,
facilitating, enhancing their capacity to take on this mission.
In the situation of the shipping, we will be taking a very
careful look at and examining very closely efforts to violate
the embargo. Of course, we had the arms embargo that was passed
today by the U.N. Security Council, but we also have long
standing arms embargo on Iran and any effort on the part of the
Iranians to export weapons would be a violation of other U.S.
Security Council resolutions. And we will be looking at ways to
ensure that that embargo is enforced.
Mr. Deutch. And Iran allegedly released some draft of a
peace plan today. Can you comment on that?
Ambassador Feierstein. Well, I think that the comment we
have on that is that it is ironic that the Iranians have put
forward a peace plan that encompasses the four points that we
were actually trying to implement when the Houthis, with
Iranian encouragement, blocked the negotiations and created the
humanitarian crisis that we are confronting today. And so I
think from our perspective, if the Iranians are serious about
their peace plan in the first instance they should stop sending
weapons to the Houthis and they should also give their advice
to the Houthis that they should be returning to the peace talks
and the negotiating table.
Mr. Deutch. That would be sound advice. Mr. Ambassador, has
this become or does this risk becoming proxy war for regional
influence between the Saudis and the Iranians?
Ambassador Feierstein. I think from our perspective, I
would say that Yemen is a unique situation for the Saudis, that
this is on their border. It represents a threat in a way that
no other situation would represent. And while, of course, there
is concern in the Gulf and we heard from our partners in the
Gulf about the situation in Syria and Iraq and also their
concerns about developments in Lebanon and elsewhere in the
region, I think our sense is that the perception of the
situation in Yemen is different and more threatening.
Mr. Deutch. Again, my last question is what do we make of
the Iran flotilla that has moved in?
Ambassador Feierstein. We are again tracking it. The
Iranians, of course, have claimed that they are only there as
part of the larger international effort to prevent piracy in
the Bab al-Mandeb and the Red Sea. We will be keeping a careful
eye on it. We also have significant forces in the area and we
will be tracking.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you. Thanks, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. They just want to help. They are just
misunderstood. Thank you, Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina.
Mr. Wilson. Again, thank you, Mr. Secretary, and I
appreciate, too, you and I have something in common in that I
have two sons who have served in Iraq. One is a physician and
another is field artillery and I know that you have had a son
serve there. And then with your background, what a
distinguished background, and as I stated from the beginning, I
am just so hopeful for your success because I believe, sadly,
that as safe havens are created throughout that region and into
Central Asia and North Africa, that the American people are at
risk. So we want you to succeed and with that in mind, and you
referenced that a minute ago and that is what impact do you
believe the administration's nuclear negotiations with the
regime in Tehran have had with the support of the Iranian
Government to be provided to the Houthis?
Ambassador Feierstein. Thank you very much, Congressman
Wilson, for your kind words. In terms of the relationship or
any correlation between the nuclear talks and the situation in
Yemen or more broadly in the region, I think that our
perspective is that what we have achieved by establishing the
framework for an agreement that, of course, we hope is
completed by the end of June, that this is something that will
contribute to regional security and stability and that
certainly one of the things that we discussed with our friends
in the region and I think that President Obama, when he meets
with the GCC leaders in summit in a few weeks, will also make
clear that despite the negotiations on the nuclear account and
despite what we hope is an agreement to block any further
Iranian effort to acquire a nuclear weapon, nevertheless, the
other concerns that we have about Iranian activities including
in areas like Yemen have not changed and that we will continue
to pursue aggressively a program of confronting and challenging
any Iranian efforts to destabilize the region.
Mr. Wilson. And I see, actually, a direct relationship of
the negotiations and what's going on in Yemen and that is
untruthfulness. The Iranian regime has indicated that they have
no presence, no support, no interest whatever, and then as
correctly pointed out, an armada of ships appears off the
coast. But with proven untruthfulness, I just can't imagine
that we would be placing faith in regard to their now denial of
developing a nuclear capability while they are building a
missile system. And so do you see the relationship of
untruthfulness?
Ambassador Feierstein. I think that certainly Iranian
behavior merits very close observation and I don't think that
it is the intent of the administration to place any faith
whatsoever in what the Iranians say. The important thing is to
establish a very tight system of verification that would enable
us to see if, in fact, the Iranians are cheating or otherwise
violating the terms of any agreement that we might reach. So I
don't think there is any trust or faith involved in this.
Mr. Wilson. I appreciate your concern there. And what
impact do you believe that depletion of Yemen's oil reserves as
early as 2017 will have on the Houthi relationship with other
nations in the region?
Ambassador Feierstein. Well, I think more broadly, of
course, one of the issues and one of the things that we as the
United States were working on, along with our international
partners, was the effort to try to provide Yemen with a
foundation for economic development. We recognize that it is
the failure of the government to provide for its people, the
failure to provide any kind of economic horizon or any optimism
for the future is feeding into these issues, not only with the
Houthis, but with AQAP and other violent extremist
organizations. And so one of the things, as we go forward, not
only to try to resolve some of the outstanding political
issues, but also to work on these economic issues and to
provide for our future. Having spent 3 years in Yemen, I can
say that I was always optimistic that given an opportunity,
Yemen could actually develop and provide for its people
economically. Unfortunately, the political situation, the
security situation, have undermined their ability and our
ability to really build that kind of a future.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I appreciate your service there. I know
it must be very distressing to you to see the current
condition, but your service means a lot to the American people.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Wilson, and thank you to
your family for the valuable contribution to keeping our
homeland safe. Thank you. Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Ambassador. First, I would like to ask you as much as you can
share in an open setting, would you speak to how the current
conflict has impacted our counterterrorism efforts within
Yemen? You mentioned in your opening remarks that AQAP is
taking advantage of this opportunity and my question really is
do we have in place an alternative counterterrorism plan that
will continue to disrupt AQAP and ISIS operations? What is the
relationship of these three groups on the ground? Are they
coordinating? But during this period of unrest, how are we
protecting American security interests?
Ambassador Feierstein. It is a challenge. And certainly in
the efforts that we have been making over the past several
years with the support of President Hadi and his government, a
lot of our cooperation or a lot of our effort was dependent on
the cooperation that we were receiving from the Yemenis and
that really enabled and expanded our ability to act effectively
against violent extremist organizations. That, of course, both
because we are not physically present in Yemen right now and
because of the overall collapse of the Government of Yemen,
that kind of cooperation is no longer viable, at least for the
moment.
What we are trying to do, of course, is that to the extent
possible, we will continue to use our own independent means to
gather intelligence and to try to understand what is happening
in Yemen, but it is not as effective or efficient as it would
otherwise be. And so our effort is really as part of a return
to a political negotiation and hopefully the restoration of a
legitimate government in Sana'a to be able to resume the kind
of cooperation that we had earlier on.
In terms of the interactions of the various extremist
organizations, it is very difficult to say. We really don't
have much of an understanding of ISIL or what their
relationships are, who they are. It is possible, of course,
that they are simply people who are using that name because
they believe it adds a certain amount of veracity to what they
are trying to do. So in the absence again of any kind of
presence on the ground or ability to really collect
intelligence, it is difficult to say.
Mr. Cicilline. And Mr. Feierstein, in light of the current
situation in Yemen, are there any changes that need to be made
to the administration's FY 16 request for Yemen to reflect
these realities or to reflect an adjustment in the policy goals
for Yemen?
Ambassador Feierstein. It is something that we are looking
at and I think that we will adjust. I mean, obviously, our hope
would be that if we can get the situation stabilized and get
the political process going again, that we would be able to
return and that we would be able to continue implementing the
kinds of programs that we were trying to achieve that are aimed
at economic growth and development as well as supporting
democratic governance and the opportunity to try to build
solid, political foundations for the society. At this
particular moment, we can't do that, but it is hard to predict
where we might be in 6 months or 9 months from now.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, and Mr. Feierstein, my final
question is the United Nations reports that Yemen relies on
imports for 90 percent of its staple food and we can surmise
that as a result of the conflict that there will be disruption
and obviously the World Food Program reports that 10 million
people, 42.5 percent of the population were already unable to
meet their basic food needs. So would you speak a little bit
about what we are doing, what the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is
doing to ensure that the food is getting to the right places,
that the transportation is being permitted, that medicine is
getting in and also are we tracking it? Do we have some
oversight to be sure that it is actually getting to the people
who need it because this has all the makings of a catastrophic
humanitarian crisis?
Ambassador Feierstein. Yes, sir. And again, I think, one,
of course, the United States is and has been traditionally the
largest donor to World Food Program, UNICEF, other
international organizations that are providing humanitarian
relief to the Yemeni people and will continue to do that. There
has not been any interruption in our support for humanitarian
assistance.
Secretary Blinken, during this visit to Riyadh and to Abu
Dhabi, had at the top of his agenda urging our partners in the
Gulf to ensure that they made accommodations to allow for
humanitarian relief supplies to reach Yemen. And our
understanding from what we are seeing over these last several
days is that, in fact, the flow of humanitarian goods into
Yemen has improved. Two ships carrying wheat have arrived at
Yemeni ports. ICRC and Medecins Sans Frontieres and UNICEF have
been able to get relief supplies in by both ship and plane over
the last several days. And so we are seeing improvements on
that side, but the internal distribution, as you pointed out,
the internal distribution remains problematic.
Understand that, for example, truck drivers are very
concerned, unwilling to move because of the fighting in the
country. There are fuel shortages that complicate that. And so
internally, we are still seeing difficulties getting the
necessary supplies to the right places. It is something that we
are discussing with our partners in the humanitarian community
and we will see if we can improve it.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I yield back,
Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Cicilline. Mr.
Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ambassador, is it
Feierstein or Feierstein?
Ambassador Feierstein. I say Feierstein. My parents said
Feierstein.
Mr. Yoho. Well, good. I am satisfying both of you. What
warning signs were there present prior to the fall of the Hadi
government? What did we see? Did we know this was coming or was
this kind of out of the blue?
Ambassador Feierstein. The situation with the Houthis has
been complicated for a long period of time and we have been in
a situation when we had the initial uprising, the political
uprising in 2011 and '12, the Houthis were part of the
opposition to the Saleh regime. And there was a strong desire
on the part of all of the political groups in Yemen to see if
they couldn't bring them into the political process. I think
there was a broad understanding that the Houthis had legitimate
concerns and legitimate grievances about the way they had been
treated over the years. And there was a hope that they could be
accommodated through the negotiations and through the
implementation of the GCC initiative in a way to make them a
part of the larger political fabric. And that was really the
main effort for a long period of time.
Unfortunately, low-level conflict continued throughout that
period between the Houthis and some of the other elements, some
of the conservative Sunni elements of the society and that
flared up last summer in an area, in the northern part of the
country near the traditional Houthi area in a place called----
Mr. Yoho. Let me interject in here. So what you are saying?
And I think what I am hearing is the Houthis didn't feel like
they were involved sufficiently in the Hadi government. They
didn't have enough input? Is that----
Ambassador Feierstein. They weren't technically part of the
Hadi government. They didn't have any seats in Hadi government.
They were part of the larger political process. They were
participants in the National Dialogue Conference and in the
implementation of the GCC initiative.
Mr. Yoho. And will Khaled Bahah's appointment as Vice
President help be sufficient to satisfy what they are looking
for as far as representation? And the other part of that
question is does the appointment of Mr. Bahah as Vice
President, does that weaken President Hadi's effectiveness if
he were to go back into power?
Ambassador Feierstein. The appointment of Khaled Bahah as
prime minister last September was one of the elements that
resolved the first confrontation with the Houthis, last
September when they signed an agreement. And they approved the
appointment of Khaled Bahah as the prime minister.
Yesterday or the day before yesterday, when he was named as
the Vice President, they objected, not because they have any
concern about him. He is, I think, somebody who is universally
respected inside of Yemen, but because they objected to the
process that led to his appointment. But we do think that he is
someone who is acceptable to all of the elements of society. We
don't think that it would undermine the legitimacy of President
Hadi's government. In fact, it accomplishes something that
President Hadi had been encouraged to do for a long period of
time.
Mr. Yoho. Do you see him with a resolution of this
conflict? Do you see President Hadi coming back and running
that country?
Ambassador Feierstein. I think both the United States and
more broadly, the International Community, see that the
legitimacy----
Mr. Yoho. They see him as a legitimate President?
Ambassador Feierstein [continuing]. Is still with President
Hadi. What exactly the format might be that would bring him
back to Sana'a is negotiable. And if there is some other format
that would be acceptable to the Yemenis, would be acceptable to
us.
Mr. Yoho. And we have known for a long time that the
Iranian influence with the Houthis has been there for a long
time. Have you seen their interference in this conflict more
prevalent than it has been in the past?
Ambassador Feierstein. Yes.
Mr. Yoho. You have seen it step up?
Ambassador Feierstein. Yes.
Mr. Yoho. Do you have any feeling that there is an increase
of that activity due to the Iranian nuclear negotiations that
we are going through? Have they been emboldened more?
Ambassador Feierstein. We believe that there are a number
of factors that are feeding into Iran, a sense that it has the
upper hand was because of its engagement elsewhere in the
region, because of the weakness or the disarray within the
Sunni community, the Iranians may be emboldened. I think our
sense is that the Iranian nuclear negotiations would not be a
factor.
Mr. Yoho. I find it interesting that the Iranians have
stepped up their involvement and have taken over four capitals
and we see a big influence of them in Venezuela. All this time
when they have been under sanctions and they are supposedly
struggling internally, yet we see more influence. In fact, they
just purchased that missile defense system from Russia for $800
million and it doesn't look like a country that is in financial
constraints or having difficulties making its presence. I think
for them to step forward and show this kind of leadership in
that region is certainly not the kind of leadership I want to
see. I would think the influence that we have with Saudi
Arabia's would be stronger. What are your thoughts on that?
Ambassador Feierstein. Well, certainly I think that what we
would like to do is see. You know, we have the nuclear
agreement now. I think our view is that potentially that could
contribute to regional security and stability. Certainly, the
support that we are providing to Saudi Arabia and the Saudi
coalition and Operation Decisive Storm is an important element
and an important opportunity for us to demonstrate to our
friends in the region that despite the nuclear negotiations and
the framework agreement, our commitment to their security and
stability is not affected, and that we will continue to
confront and challenge Iranian activity where we see it playing
a negative role in the region.
Mr. Yoho. Ambassador Feierstein, I appreciate your time. I
yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Yoho. Ms. Meng of New
York.
Ms. Meng. Ambassador, I thought that when the campaign
started the Saudis were very smart to brand this as a pan-Arab
effort. But with the rising of civilian casualties, can you
give us a sense of the perspective of this on the Arab street
today?
Ambassador Feierstein. It varies. And I do believe that
broadly on the Arab street that there is a great deal of
support for what the coalition is trying to accomplish in a
sense that it is appropriate for the Saudis to take a
leadership position in confronting Iranian malign intent.
Within Yemen, of course, the situation is a little bit
different and the concerns about some of the civilian
casualties is obviously, and understandably much higher. We, as
one of the elements of our support, and one of the things that
we're trying to accomplish in providing support to the
international coalition is precisely to help them avoid those
kinds of civilian casualties and to ensure that when they are
going after a particular target, that they are doing everything
possible to make sure that there is no collateral damage.
Ms. Meng. My last question, it appears that Turkey and
Pakistan have backed off their initial support for this
operation. Can you speak about that and do you foresee this new
found Arab coalition working effectively together beyond Yemen?
Ambassador Feierstein. I think for Turkey and for Pakistan,
the issue is more complicated. I can speak a little bit, am I
am more familiar with the situation in Pakistan than in Turkey.
But in Pakistan, you have, of course, a long border with Iran,
an important relationship between Pakistan and Iran, as well as
an important and long-standing relationship with Saudi Arabia.
And so for the Pakistanis, this was probably a situation where
they didn't see, frankly, that there was a good way forward for
them to participate. They have been very clear in saying that
they would be absolutely committed to supporting Saudi Arabia
if there were any kind of threat to Saudi Arabia specifically,
but in the case of Yemen, a little bit more complicated for
them and probably something that politically inside of Pakistan
would have been extremely difficult.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Ms. Meng. Mr.
DeSantis, my wonderful colleague from Florida.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I think this is an
important topic. I am going to get to this, but we just got the
news over the wire that the President is planning on removing
Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Now this is
something that, although outrageous for us, is something that I
think was expected. I think it was baked in the cake. But I
think it is really, really troubling when--Cuba hasn't done
anything. They have given no concession. They haven't done
anything on behalf of their people there. They are arresting
more people, repressing more people since we have had this
change. They have harbored somebody on the FBI's list of most
wanted terrorists. Nothing is being done. This is just a pure,
unadulterated concession with absolutely no basis or grounding
in facts.
I was happy to lead a special order on the floor last night
with some of the post-9/11 veterans who were in Congress and
the two countries that we seem to have better relationships
with now, Iran and Cuba. The question is what have we received
in return for that? Mostly, it is just us giving concessions to
these countries. And I think a foreign policy based on the idea
that we are going to be dancing with dictators is not a foreign
policy that is going to succeed. And I think it is really
alienating us from a lot of our allies and tragically, I think,
is leaving people who are fighting for freedom in places like
Cuba, completely in the lurch. This is not going to be the last
that we talk about this, I know, but it is really, really
disappointing.
Sorry about that, Ambassador. I know that is not your cup
of tea, but it is something that we work on on this committee
and I know that the chairwoman especially has done it for a
long time.
Did the State Department approve President Obama's remarks
in September when he announced the campaign against ISIS and he
cited Yemen as a success?
Ambassador Feierstein. I am not entirely sure.
Mr. DeSantis. Because I know there was a lot of discussion
back when Bush was President about approving the WMD passages.
Is it standard that that goes through State when a President
makes a major speech about foreign policy or is it just kind of
the State has got to respond to what the White House said? I am
just not even clear about how the process normally works.
Ambassador Feierstein. I think as a matter of principle, it
is up to the President to decide how he wants to prepare his
speeches.
Mr. DeSantis. Once this statement was made and Yemen was
cited as an example of success, were there concerns in the
State Department that were raised about that given, the actual
reality on the ground in Yemen at the time?
Ambassador Feierstein. I would say that the record of our
activities in Yemen from 2011, 2012, until quite recently, in
terms of the effectiveness of our unilateral actions against
AQAP, as well as the cooperation and the ability of the United
States to partner effectively with our counterparts inside of
Yemen was positive. And as a result of what we were able to
accomplish together, we saw a number of positive developments
in terms of taking some of the leadership elements out of AQAP
off the table and also forcing AQAP to change its strategy.
When the political crisis came in Yemen in 2011, AQAP was able
to take advantage of that and increase its territorial control
to the extent that they were actually declaring areas of the
country to be an Islamic caliphate, not unlike what we see with
ISIL in Iraq and Syria these days.
And because of our cooperation, primarily our cooperation
with Yemeni security forces, we were able to defeat that at a
significant loss of life for AQAP. As a result of that, they
changed their tactics. They went back to being a more
traditional terrorist organization. They were able to attack
locations inside of Sana'a and elsewhere. But the fact of the
matter is that we were achieving progress in our ability to
pressure them and to keep them on the defensive as opposed to
giving them lots of time. And remember, in 2009, in 2010, we
saw AQAP mount fairly serious efforts, the underwear bomber and
then also the cassette tape effort, to attack the United
States. After 2010, they were not able to do that, despite the
fact that their intent was still as clear and as strong as it
was before.
And so while AQAP was by no means defeated, and continued
to be a major threat to security here in the United States, as
well as in Yemen and elsewhere around the world, nevertheless,
I think that it was legitimate to say that we had achieved some
success in the fight against AQAP. Unfortunately, what we are
seeing now because of the change in the situation again inside
of Yemen is that we are losing some of the gains that we were
able to make during that period of 2012 to 2014. And that is
why it is so important that we have the ability to get the
political negotiations started again so that we can re-
establish legitimate government inside of Sana'a that will
cooperate with us once again in this fight against violent
extremist organizations.
Mr. DeSantis. Great. My time has expired. I appreciate
that. There was a lot there and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. DeSantis, and I look
forward to watching the video of your remarks along with our
other vets last night. Congratulations.
I wanted to ask an additional question, so the members can
as well. Because of its geographic location, Yemen is so close,
just a little short boat ride away from Africa, for example.
Eritrea is right there and very unstable. Do you worry about
were the movement to take place that the Houthi rebels, ISIL or
whatever faction of terrorist organization could very well move
their troops a little boat ride away and be in yet another area
where they can control that land and destabilize an already
troubled region?
Ambassador Feierstein. We certainly worried a lot about
linkages between particularly the AQAP in Yemen and Shabab in
Somalia. And we knew, for example, that Shabab was sending some
of their people across to Yemen to receive training and so as
you say, quite correctly, the distances are very short. We are
talking about from Yemen to Djibouti, maybe 20 miles by sea. So
it is very close by. And it is something that would be of
concern to us. And again, as part of our efforts against both
AQAP and Shabab, it was something that were trying to monitor
and defeat aggressively.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, I do worry about it because we have
a lot of American personnel, Embassies, consulates, we have a
presence throughout that region. So that is a worrisome future
development perhaps. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. I just have one more question also. With the
coalition focused as it is on the Houthis, and since we have
lost at least for now our counterterrorism partner in the
Yemeni Government and military, what pressure is there to the
extent there is any on al-Qaeda and ISIS as well?
Ambassador Feierstein. We, of course, to the extent that we
can, it is more limited now, but to the extent that we can we
will continue to engage AQAP unilaterally in order to try to
disrupt or defeat any threats against us. When Secretary
Blinken was in the region, it was also an issue that we raise
with the Saudis, in particular, and urged them also as part of
their effort to go after AQAP targets as well as other targets
so that we can continue the pressure.
Mr. Deutch. Can you tell us how that was received?
Ambassador Feierstein. They agree, of course, because AQAP
is a direct threat to their security, too.
Mr. Deutch. And have we seen that happen?
Ambassador Feierstein. I can't say for certain, whether we
have given them any AQ targets to go after or whether they have
been effective in servicing those.
Mr. Deutch. I appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. Mr. Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair. Just kind of a follow-up
question, with the administration coming out and saying that it
is a success over there back in September and they are still
touting that as of March 24th or 25th, I have here in an
article, how can we be that far off? I know you explained the
counterterrorism portion, but yet to have a country taken over
while we are sitting there working with them and this happen, I
feel it just kind of happened over night, the way our Embassy
got run out of town and just say you have to leave, your
Marines cannot take their weapons with them. I don't understand
how that happens or how we can be that disconnected.
What are your thoughts on that? Is it just denial or is
it--I don't know what it is. I am confused because before you
answer, it says its counter intuitive claim puzzles national
security experts and it says it enrages--it says Republicans,
but I am sure it enrages a lot of people. I am just kind of
baffled.
Ambassador Feierstein. You know, it was very frustrating.
Again, I think that if you go back to where we were a year ago,
the successful conclusion of the National Dialogue Conference
which was really the last major hurdle in completion of the GCC
initiative. Houthis participated in that. They participated in
constitutional drafting exercise which was completed
successfully. And so we were in the process of moving through
all of the requirements of the GCC initiative that would allow
us to complete successfully the political transition.
I think there were a combination of things. One that there
was a view on the part of the Houthis that they were not
getting everything that they wanted. They were provoked in our
view by Ali Abdallah Saleh who never stopped plotting from the
very first day after he signed the agreement on the GCC
initiative. He never stopped plotting to try to block the
political transition. And there was, to be frank, there was a
weakness in the government, an inability on the part of the
government to really build the kind of alliances and coalition
that would allow them to sustain popular support and to bring
this to a successful conclusion.
And so I think that all through this period, there was a
sense that we were moving forward and that we believe that we
could succeed in implementing this peaceful transition, and yet
we always knew that on the margins there were threats and there
were risks. And unfortunately, we got to a point where the
Houthis and Ali Abdallah Saleh, my personal view is that they
recognized that they had reached the last possible moment where
they could obstruct the peaceful, political transition that was
bad for them because it would mean that they wouldn't get
everything that they wanted. And so they saw that time was
running out for them and they decided to act and unfortunately,
the government was unable to stop them.
Mr. Yoho. I appreciate it. And it just concerns me
extremely, a lot, that we are calling this a success and we
missed the mark way past the mark. If we are missing this, what
else are we missing in our foreign policies?
Can I ask one other thing? We have invested $900 million
since 2011, roughly. It doesn't seem like we have gotten the
bang for our buck in our foreign policy. In your opinion, how
would you direct foreign policy in a country like Yemen to
where we get the results we want?
Ambassador Feierstein. It is a good question. And what I
would say is that in a place like Yemen, we have to recognize
what the limitations are in those societies. And accept the
fact that if we are going to make a difference, it is going to
be a very long-term investment on our part. It is unfortunate
that Yemen has taken a turn that it has taken. I don't think
that the situation is irretrievable. I think that with some
effort on our part and the part of the rest of the
International Community, we can get it back on track. And then
I would hope that we would then stay with it and help the
Yemeni people achieve a good outcome. They are good people.
They are people who probably deserve a lot better than they
have gotten and it would be good if we could a part of the
success.
Mr. Yoho. Ambassador, I appreciate your time. Madam Chair,
thanks for the indulgence.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Yoho.
And Mr. Ambassador, Yemen is a quickly-moving terrain, so
we would appreciate if you could keep our subcommittee abreast
of any developments. We don't have to have a formal hearing. We
can have a meeting in one of the meeting rooms. Thank you for
being accessible. There are lots of moving parts and we would
like to be abreast of every development. Thank you, sir.
Ambassador Feierstein. Thank you. It would be my pleasure.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Your testimony was excellent and with
that, the subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Record
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[all]