    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                             FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

                                       ON

        HOW IS DOD RESPONDING TO EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE?

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                               FEBRUARY 25, 2015

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                        One Hundred Fourteenth Congress

                 WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman

    WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina      ADAM SMITH, Washington
    J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia            LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
    JEFF MILLER, Florida                 ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
    ROB BISHOP, Utah                     RICK LARSEN, Washington
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    JOHN KLINE, Minnesota                MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
    MIKE ROGERS, Alabama                 JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania           JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas            HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado                   Georgia
    ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia          JACKIE SPEIER, California
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California            JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana              TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               SCOTT H. PETERS, California
    CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York      MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri             TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada               TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
    STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi       DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
    RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida           MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
    PAUL COOK, California                GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
    JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
    BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio               SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
    JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana             PETE AGUILAR, California
    BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana
    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona
    STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
    THOMAS MacARTHUR, New Jersey

                      Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
                    Katie Sendak, Professional Staff Member
                     Mike Casey, Professional Staff Member
                             Michael Tehrani, Clerk
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
      Member, Committee on Armed Services............................     2
    Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
      Chairman, Committee on Armed Services..........................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Breedlove, GEN Philip M., USAF, Commander, Supreme Allied Command
      Europe and U.S. European Combatant Command.....................     5
    Wormuth, Christine E., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
      U.S. Department of Defense.....................................     3

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Breedlove, GEN Philip M......................................    57
        Smith, Hon. Adam.............................................    48
        Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac''..........................    47
        Wormuth, Christine E.........................................    50

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mrs. Davis...................................................    87
        Mr. Forbes...................................................    87
        Ms. McSally..................................................    88

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. O'Rourke.................................................    94
        Mr. Shuster..................................................    91
        Ms. Tsongas..................................................    91
        Mr. Zinke....................................................    94
        HOW IS DOD RESPONDING TO EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE?

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                          Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 25, 2015.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
    Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
        REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
                                SERVICES

        The Chairman. Committee will come to order. Let me welcome
    our members, witnesses, and guests for this hearing on how the
    Department of Defense [DOD] is responding to emerging security
    challenges in Europe.
        In a world and a time full of complex threats facing the
    United States, it seems to me the situation in Europe poses
    peril on several levels; one is naked aggression of conquest.
    We have seen this before in Europe many times in the past and
    it seems to me if history has taught us anything, it is that
    aggression unchallenged in its early stages leads to greater
    costs and greater misery when it must be confronted.
        A second element is--what I believe is an attempt to
    undermine the rules-based international system that has existed
    since the end of World War II. I am among those who are
    convinced that President Putin is working to undermine that
    system in order to replace it with one that is more of his
    liking, and, unfortunately, he has some unsavory allies in that
    effort.
        A third challenge is the tactics that the Russians are
    using in Ukraine. We have heard a lot about ``little green
    men,'' but the various efforts Russia is using to undermine
    Ukrainian security forces, as well as to pull a facade over its
    own involvement, presents a number of challenges to NATO [North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization] and to the United States. We tend
    not to deal with naked lies and subversion and other forms of
    subterfuge very easily.
        I am pleased to be supporting Mr. Smith's legislation that
    would provide defensive lethal assistance to Ukraine. It seems
    to me that any people ought to be able to defend themselves and
    their country. But beyond the immediate crisis, part of what
    this committee needs to think about as we consider funding,
    organizing, and equipping our troops, is how well we are
    prepared to deal with this sort of threat in Europe and
    elsewhere.
        As Europe and NATO grapple with this crisis, as well as the
    growing threat of jihadi terrorists, the world is watching and
    will draw conclusions about what course they will take in
    response.
        Mr. Smith.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
    the Appendix on page 47.]

    STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
              RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, obviously, that is
    the game-changing issue of the European Command, Russia and
    President Putin's aggressiveness in the Ukraine, and I think
    the chairman summed it up fairly well.
        What Mr. Putin is trying to do is fundamentally alter the
    post-World War II construct in terms of how the world is
    organized. And it is very unfortunate. You know, when the
    Soviet Union broke up and the Cold War ended, there was a real
    opportunity to integrate Russia into that world order which has
    worked reasonably well. And Russia would have been a great
    partner and, you know, history can be written about why that
    didn't work out.
        The bottom line is Russia is now attempting to set up again
    a bi-polar world. They see it as a zero-sum game. What is good
    for the West is not good for them and they are attempting to
    reestablish their power and break away as many people as
    possible from Western influence. And that is bad enough. Worse
    is that they are aggressive militarily in how they go about
    trying to do that.
        We have seen it in Crimea, we have seen it in Eastern
    Ukraine, and the real concern is you read about how Russia's
    top leadership looks at this issue. There is really not much
    reason to believe that they are going to stop. They believe
    this sort of aggression has been rewarded. That they have been
    able to take territory. That they have been able to reestablish
    themselves as a legitimate power on the world stage.
        So confronting that threat is the number one biggest issue,
    and it is not easy to confront. We do not want to start another
    war. We want to figure out some way to stop this aggression in
    a peaceful means. And we have to work with our NATO and
    European partners in order to achieve that. And, yet, that is
    not always an easy process either.
        But it does also raise questions about something I think
    this committee had long assumed, was that we could afford to
    substantially draw down our presence in Europe in order to
    focus whether it was on the pivot to Asia or to focus on the
    rising tide of Islamic extremists in various countries in
    confronting the terrorist threat that that presents.
        Now we realize that our presence in Europe is more
    important than it used to be. So be interested to hear how are
    we properly positioned in Europe to confront this threat. How
    are we aligned with our European allies to, hopefully, you
    know, maximize our assets and theirs, put them together in the
    best way possible? And what is the most logical way to confront
    Putin's aggression. I think that is the fundamental and central
    question that we face in Europe. I look forward to the
    testimony.
        I apologize, I may have to leave a little early. I am
    still, as I said, I am in between hip surgeries. Good news is
    my left hip is getting a lot better. Bad news is my right hip
    is getting a lot worse. But the surgery is coming so sitting
    for extended periods of time is not something I can do so I may
    not be here for the whole hearing, but I do look forward to
    testimony and questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
    Appendix on page 48.]
        The Chairman. Thank you. We are pleased to welcome Ms.
    Christine Wormuth, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and
    General Philip Breedlove, Commander, Supreme Allied Command
    Europe and U.S. European Combatant Command. Thank you all for
    being here.
        Without objection, your full written statement will be made
    part of the record. And we would invite you to make what oral
    statements you would like at this point.
        Ms. Wormuth.

     STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                 FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, and
    Ranking Member Smith and distinguished members of the
    committee. I very much appreciate the opportunity to be with
    you all today to talk about the security situation in Europe
    and our relationship with allies and partners in the region.
        As both of you have noted, in the last 18 months the
    security situation in Europe has changed quite significantly.
    But despite these challenges, Europe is a cornerstone of our
    engagement with the rest of the world and a catalyst for our
    global cooperation.
        Time and again, Europe and NATO have proven to be our
    indispensable strategic partners. We believe that will continue
    to be true and, for these reasons, U.S. engagement in Europe is
    and will remain a vital element of our national security
    strategy.
        It has been almost a year since Russia's occupation and
    attempted annexation of Crimea. Since that time, we have seen
    Russia funding and arming separatists in Eastern Ukraine. We
    have seen direct Russian participation in the fighting. These
    actions, coupled with Russia's continued support of frozen
    conflicts elsewhere, and violations of its obligations under
    numerous treaties, are undermining European stability.
        Russia's actions to undermine the sovereignty of a
    neighboring country and to attempt to change borders and to
    change the international order even, but certainly to change
    borders by force, are unacceptable.
        Russia's aggression against Ukraine challenges our vision
    of a Europe whole and free, which is what we have been working
    so hard on since the end of the Cold War. It changes Europe's
    security landscape, it is causing instability, obviously, on
    NATO's borders, and we are steadfast as a nation in opposing
    Russia's destabilizing actions.
        To do that, we have been working closely with Europe and
    other partners and allies; first and foremost, to impose real
    costs on Russia for its aggressive actions. This has included
    diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions which, combined
    with falling oil prices, are having a substantial and mounting
    impact on Russia's economy.
        We are also taking visible, concrete measures to reassure
    our allies and partners in Europe and to deter further Russian
    aggression. For example, since May 2014, NATO has been
    reassuring allies and deterring Russia by maintaining a
    continuous land, air, and maritime presence and increasing
    military activity particularly in the eastern part of the NATO
    Alliance. These measures are defensive, they are proportionate,
    and they are fully in line with our obligations as NATO members
    regarding allied defense.
        We are also, as part of our strategy, providing substantial
    support to Ukraine as it is dealing with simultaneous economic
    and military crises. Since the start of the crisis, we have
    increased our security-related assistance to Ukraine
    significantly, to both its military, its national guard, and
    its border guard services. And, together, next year, in fiscal
    year 2015, DOD and the State Department will be providing $120
    million to Ukraine as part of the European Reassurance
    Initiative.
        But it is, I think, important to also remember that NATO
    and our European allies are also on the frontlines of the fight
    against ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]. There the
    United States has been leading a coalition of over 60 nations
    across multiple lines of efforts ranging from military
    contributions to humanitarian assistance.
        As part of the coalition military campaign, Europe has been
    stepping up to fill critical roles, particularly in denying
    ISIL safe haven in Iraq and Syria, and helping us build the
    capacity of partners to take the fight to ISIL, including by
    actively striking ISIL targets.
        The threat we see of foreign fighters going into Iraq and
    Syria remains a significant concern for us and for our European
    allies. We are drawing on all forms of our intelligence to
    understand and address the flow of foreign fighters and we are
    working closely with our NATO allies and other partners to have
    an international effort to try to combat this complex problem.
        In addition to the threat of ISIL, it is also, I think,
    important to note that there is significant instability in the
    Middle East and North Africa that also affects NATO's security,
    especially for those allies that are on the southern flank of
    the Alliance. The movement of thousands of migrants to the
    shores of southern Europe can bring instability and sometimes
    violence, particularly because of the transnational criminal
    networks that are involved in human trafficking.
        Finally, as we look beyond Europe, it is also useful to
    reflect on the true strategic partners we have in our European
    NATO allies for a host of challenges that are well outside of
    NATO's boundaries. In particular, I just wanted to note how
    effectively we work together with NATO allies in Africa to be
    part of the international community's response to the Ebola
    crisis.
        Under Operation United Assistance, the Department has
    supported the USAID [U.S. Agency for International
    Development]-led effort to break the back of the Ebola
    outbreak, with the United States focusing primarily in Liberia.
    This mission isn't complete and many lives have been lost but I
    think we can be proud as part of the international community
    with the strong roles that we have played and that European
    allies have played to successfully mobilize all of our
    capabilities to address the emergency.
        Also, in Afghanistan, NATO allies remain our steadfast
    partners in the effort to try to help bring civility and
    security to that country. The Resolute Support Mission, which
    we launched at the beginning of this year, focuses the efforts
    of our NATO allies and other partners on training, advising,
    and assisting the Afghan security institutions at both the
    ministerial and institutional level. Twenty-six of our allies
    and 16 partners are providing forces to the Resolute Support
    Mission, and our allies there have also committed to providing
    sustainment funding to the Afghan National Security Forces
    through 2024, which is going to be critical to locking in the
    gains that we are making there.
        Finally, to do all of this together with our NATO allies
    and to be able to work effectively, it is essential to have a
    robust force posture in Europe. Our U.S. footprint in Europe
    gives us the capability to defend our security interests, to
    enhance trans-Atlantic security, to reassure allies and deter
    aggression which, again, we certainly see in a very marked way
    in recent times.
        In a time of limited resources, however, the United States
    has to be more innovative and explore new posture arrangements
    by increasing our flexibility, our adaptability, and our
    readiness.
        If sequestration returns, and this is something I am very
    personally concerned about--our ability to sustain our posture
    in Europe is going to be at significant risk. If sequestration
    returns, our ability to continue to invest in the capabilities
    we need and to maintain the readiness levels we need to be able
    to effectively respond to crises is going to be at significant
    risk.
        This is a very serious concern. I know it is one that many
    of you share and we look forward to working with this committee
    and with Congress more broadly to try to find solutions to
    these budgetary pressures so that we can maintain the U.S.
    military as the world's finest military force.
        Thank you very much for your time today, and I look forward
    to questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Wormuth can be found
    in the Appendix on page 50.]
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        General.

    STATEMENT OF GEN PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF, COMMANDER, SUPREME
       ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE AND U.S. EUROPEAN COMBATANT COMMAND

        General Breedlove. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member
    Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
    the opportunity to testify today.
        It is an honor to appear before you representing the
    dedicated soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and our
    civilians of U.S. European Command [EUCOM]. Thank you for all
    you do to support them as they serve our Nation.
        I am particularly happy to be here today with Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy Christine Wormuth.
        Compared to just one year ago, Europe faces a very
    different and much more challenging security environment. Our
    top concern is a resurgent Russia. A Russia attempting to
    exercise power and influence through the use of force and
    intimidation. Russia is blatantly challenging the rules and
    principles that have been the bedrock of European security for
    decades. The challenge is global, not regional, and enduring,
    not temporary.
        Russian aggression is clearly visible in its illegal
    occupation of Crimea and in the continued armed conflict in the
    Donbass, or Eastern Ukraine.
        The best way to bring the conflict in Ukraine to an
    acceptable lasting solution is through a political settlement,
    one that respects state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
    But what we have seen recently and, frankly, over the course of
    the whole conflict, gives us cause for concern.
        Russian forces have supplied separatists with heavy
    weapons, training and mentoring, command and control, artillery
    fire support, tactical and operational-level air defenses; more
    than 1,000 pieces of Russian military equipment have been
    transferred into Ukraine, including tanks, armored personnel
    carriers, heavy artillery pieces, and other military vehicles
    and equipment.
        And in a number of cases, when the separate offensive or
    operations were stalled or were threatened, Russian regular
    forces themselves intervened to right the course. Just this
    month, Russian forces fought hard to change the facts on the
    ground just before the cease fire was scheduled to take effect.
        These are not the actions of a good faith negotiating
    partner. Actions matter much more than words, and what we see
    in the fight on the ground and in the diplomatic efforts
    designed to resolve it, is a revanchist Russia that does not
    play by international rules or norms.
        The crisis in Ukraine affects more than just Ukraine.
    Russian activities are destabilizing to neighboring states and
    to the region as a whole. Russian illegal actions push
    instability closer to the boundaries of NATO. As President
    Obama has clearly stated, the United States will uphold its
    Article 5 commitments under the Washington Treaty.
        In turn, Russia is learning lessons from our responses to
    their actions. If they feel rewarded by the outcomes, this
    might embolden them to try them again elsewhere. And the rest
    of the world, states and non-state actors alike, are also
    keeping eyes on how these events unfold.
        For the longer term, it makes sense to aim for a new
    Russia-U.S. relationship and a new NATO-Russia relationship
    that are based on mutual respect and shared interest. A Europe
    whole, free, at peace, and prosperous, is a vision that would
    benefit everyone. And it would offer the best possible long-
    term protection of U.S. national security interests.
        At the time same, Europe also faces a surge of violent
    extremism. The executions and other brutal actions that ISIL
    has carried out show their total disregard for human life.
    European nations are rightly worried about foreign fighters
    returning home to Europe from the fight in Syria and Iraq with
    new skills and with malign intent. Attacks like those in
    France, Belgium, and Denmark are only likely to become more
    frequent.
        Foreign fighters are part of a much broader pattern of
    insecurity in Europe's south, with its roots in the Middle East
    and North Africa, with flows of migrants and criminal transit
    routes. The spread of instability into Europe and the reach of
    transnational terrorism could have a direct bearing on the
    national security and the U.S. homeland. These challenges are
    transnational. To solve them, nations need to work together and
    our civilian and military institutions are and need to continue
    to cooperate.
        EUCOM is working with European nations bilaterally and
    supporting NATO Alliance initiatives to meet and counter this
    new and more complex security environment.
        Based on the decisions made at NATO's Wales Summit last
    year, the Alliance is adapting in order to improve its
    readiness and responsiveness. The Readiness Action Plan, or
    RAP, is well underway. Our allies are stepping up, making
    contributions and investments that give them a real stake in
    the outcome.
        The United States will have a key and sustained role to
    play supporting and enabling these changes, especially in
    critical areas that are the hardest for our allies to provide
    like lift, sustainment, and enablers such as ISR [intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance]. At the same time, our own
    U.S. efforts in Europe remain utterly essential, more important
    now than at any time in recent history. With Russian troops
    illegally occupying Crimea, soldiers from the 173rd Airborne
    Brigade in Europe deployed to the Baltic States in Poland with
    only 96 hours' notice to reassure our allies and our Air Force
    began flying missions out of Poland within 18 hours of notice.
        The reason that we could respond so quickly is that we were
    there forward and ready. There is simply no substitute for our
    forward force presence in Europe. It is the bedrock of our
    ability to assure our allies, to deter real and potential
    adversaries, and to act in a timely way should deterrence fail.
        That forward force presence ensures that EUCOM can play a
    full array of essential supporting roles for other combatant
    commands from neighboring AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] and
    CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] to STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic
    Command] and TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command]. And it
    supports all the other critical facets of EUCOM's mission,
    including, very importantly, fulfilling our commitment to the
    defense of Israel.
        Rotating presence is no substitute for permanent forward
    presence in the building of relationships or signaling of our
    commitment. But genuine and fully funded rotational presence
    can play a very important role in helping to meet requirements
    in our theatre if it is heel-to-toe and fully resourced.
        The budgetary challenges and resourcing tradeoffs that we
    face now, based on the Budget Control Act, have already forced
    EUCOM to assume risk. Our timelines are longer, our
    preparations are less robust, and our fundability to deter and
    defeat in a timely and effective manner is less sure than it
    could be. The security challenges in and around Europe are only
    growing sharper and more complicated at the same time.
        Your support of EUCOM's mission and your efforts to chart a
    longer-term path toward properly resourcing defense are
    critical steps to ensuring the ability of EUCOM to protect and
    defend its nation and do its mission.
        Thank you for your time and your attention, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Breedlove can be found
    in the Appendix on page 57.]
        The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you both for your testimony.
        General Breedlove, you heard me mention at the beginning
    that I support Mr. Smith's legislation that would require
    defensive lethal assistance be provided to the Ukrainians. Have
    you provided options to the administration for various kinds of
    weapons and equipment that could be provided to the Ukrainians
    that would make a significant difference in their ability to
    defend themselves and, part b, is if a decision were made, how
    long would it take to get it to them?
        General Breedlove. Chairman, thank you for the question.
    And these are important things, especially the second part as
    it relates to how this would play out.
        So what we have seen across the last year in discussing
    these issues with Ukraine is a very consistent picture of the
    things that they tell us they need to move forward in their
    struggle.
        Additionally, the U.S. European Command has had a series of
    broad and deep conversations across all of the aspects of
    military business with the Ukrainian military and their defense
    ministry. And what we have observed about Ukraine is very
    consistent with what Ukraine was telling us about Ukraine.
        And so, Chairman, I have advised to my chain of command
    those things that we have learned in these discussions and
    talked about, categories of things that the Ukrainians would
    need.
        All of these options have timelines. Some timelines are
    short and some are longer. It is pretty straightforward. Small
    arms and some of the other things that you might consider are a
    very short timeline. Longer, more sophisticated capabilities
    take training, they take delivery, et cetera, so there is a
    mixed bag, I think is the best way to answer your question, of
    not only delivery, but training required to bring things to
    fruition.
        The Chairman. And I appreciate the point about training.
    Obviously, that takes some time. I am also--remember that in
    this room just a couple weeks ago we had the King of Jordan who
    said that he is incredibly frustrated when equipment and
    weapons he has requested have been approved but our own
    bureaucracy still takes so long to actually get the things
    delivered. And so my offer to you is that I hope a decision is
    made one way or another soon. If there is something that we can
    do to speed delivery once that decision is made, whether we
    force it or the President decides on his own, then we want to
    do that.
        Ms. Wormuth, let me just ask you briefly. This
    administration probably before your time made a big deal about
    a reset of Russia--of relations with Russia. Even the policy
    folks in the administration admit that didn't really work out
    very well, right?
        Secretary Wormuth. Chairman, what I would say is the reset
    policy did bear some fruit. For example, we were able to
    successfully negotiate with the Russians at that time the New
    START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] treaty which was very
    much in our interest as well as being very much in Russia's
    interests, and they are continuing to comply with that treaty.
        We also were able to cooperate with them to maintain the
    Northern Distribution Network which we very much needed to
    achieve our objectives in Afghanistan. But I would certainly
    say that at this time, we are much more in a posture of needing
    to reassert the importance of deterrence and our Article 5
    obligations with NATO vis-a-vis Russia.
        The Chairman. Well, I appreciate it. I think, as you know,
    we will have continuing conversations about whether Russia is
    meeting its arms control obligations across the board, and I
    think there is considerable doubt about that. But that is for
    another time.
        Ms. Sanchez.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, both
    of the witnesses, for being before us.
        I was just in for a NATO parliamentary meeting and I was in
    Turkey with Mr. Turner and Colonel Cook, so I won't ask a lot
    of questions. But I do have a couple of them.
        The first one is this whole issue of trying to counter ISIS
    [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] recruiting through the social
    media, especially to the young people who we see going. What is
    the military and what--you know, how are we working with our
    European allies, in particular, to ensure that this recruitment
    isn't going on, not just in the United States but, of course,
    in Europe.
        And then my second questions would be with respect to
    Turkey who we know at this point is a key NATO ally, has been
    for a while. We have had our ups and downs in that
    relationship. It is alarming to see recent reports of the
    Turkish government turning a blind eye to arming some of the
    extremist groups like al-Nusra and--some of these reports even
    suggest that they help groups to capture Syrian towns from the
    Syrian army with the use of artillery to move in and out across
    the Turkish border, et cetera.
        So while we are all concerned about ISIS and its great
    cancer in the region, groups like al-Nusra and its allies are
    not far behind from that. So can either of you comment about
    what we are seeing there on the ground and what we intend to do
    about it? Thank you.
        Secretary Wormuth. Congresswoman, on the issue of ISIL
    recruiting and their very effective use of social media, it is
    certainly--ISIL has been remarkable in its effective use of
    social media and we are working very hard, as a whole-of-
    government effort, to try to be more agile in countering that.
        And it really is--first and foremost, the center of gravity
    on that really needs to come from within the region and come
    from figures that have credibility with the Muslim community.
    And so, in many cases, the Department of Defense is playing
    more of a supporting role in trying to counter those recruiting
    efforts.
        But what we are trying to do--I mean, a lot of what makes
    ISIL effective with its recruiting, unfortunately, is its very
    barbaric ideology and the fact that they have been, up until
    recently, able to demonstrate progress on the battlefield and
    they have sort of used that momentum to make themselves
    attractive to potential recruits.
        To try to counter that in the Department, we are working
    already, but want to do a better job of being able to show the
    successes that the coalition and the Iraqi forces are having on
    the ground, again, to try to counter ISIL's message that they
    have the momentum. And the fact that the Kurdish forces in
    Kobane, for example, were able to defeat ISIL.
        You know, we were able to make very good use of that, for
    example, and again, in some of the recent operations in
    northern Iraq, where we have seen the Peshmerga, in particular,
    make progress, we want to try to leverage that, from the
    military perspective, to try to blunt the effectiveness of
    ISIL's use of social media for recruiting.
        Ms. Sanchez. Right. And that might require maybe an off the
    side conversation at some point about what we are really doing.
        The last question, of course, General, Turkey, these other
    groups, slippery border armies--I have some of my constituents
    of Turkish decent coming in with pictures of ISIL-type people
    with armaments stamped Turkish Army. What is going on there?
        General Breedlove. Congresswoman, thank you.
        I am not personally aware of what you have talked about,
    but what I will do is go back and take a hard look at this and
    offer to come to you in a classified engagement.
        I would tell you that--you and I have actually talked about
    this before; Turkey is a great mil-to-mil ally and that is
    where I am focused. Our mil-to-mil relationship is as good as
    it has ever been and I think you are aware we have had a few
    successes this week in things that we have asked of them to
    move forward, both in Syria and Turkey.
        But allow me to take the real meat of your second question
    and come back to you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Jones.
        Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, Madam Secretary, General Breedlove, thank you for
    being here and your service to our Nation.
        Madam Secretary, you were mentioning in some of your
    comments about sequestration and we have heard this before,
    from outside think tanks who have testified, as well as
    military and administration officials like yourself.
        I think we all know that we are looking at some major,
    major decisions forthcoming. My concern is that it is almost
    like we know that we have a problem, but we are not willing to
    deal with the problem.
        General Breedlove, I have great respect for all of our
    military services. I know the stress you all have been under,
    as it relates to budgets, and this brings me to the point I am
    trying to make.
        First of all, Madam Secretary, has this administration
    brought in inspector generals, like John Sopko, to talk about
    the waste, fraud, and abuse in Afghanistan?
        You made mention in your comments that things in
    Afghanistan; we are going to be there to 2024. That is the
    agreement that the President signed with the Afghan government.
    And yet, the waste, fraud, and abuse continues to go on and on.
    Well, that takes away from the military and their needs.
        I have said many times that I just do not see how this
    country can continue to do what is necessary to maintain a
    strong military, unless there is some debate in the Congress
    about a war tax, because I don't know where the money is going
    to come from.
        If we don't level with the American people in this very
    unsafe world that we live in, if we want to win the war or
    protect Americans then we cannot continue to go into deficit
    situations. And this committee is probably tired of hearing me
    saying it, but we are $18.1 trillion in debt.
        And every time I have been told that we--bomb in Iraq for
    about an hour is $300 million an hour. So, I mean, at some
    point in time, I think the administration has got to say to
    Congress, we have got to pay for this war. And it is unfair for
    the American people not to have a Congress that is willing to
    do what is necessary to rebuild and strengthen our military.
        I would like to know your--excuse me; your feelings, as
    well as General Breedlove's, because you can't do the job if
    you don't have the armaments. If you can't afford to buy the
    bombs, you can't bomb. And that is where I am concerned, not
    just for these few months in front of us, but for the years, to
    2024, using the time in Afghanistan. Any comments?
        Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, let me to try to address
    some of the points you raised in sequence.
        First, just to clarify, because I certainly don't want to
    have misled the committee; our NATO allies and other partners
    in Afghanistan have committed to financially continue to help
    sustain the Afghan National Security Forces through 2024.
        As I think you all are very aware, President Obama has made
    clear that our military forces will be drawn down to a Kabul-
    centric footprint by the end of 2016. So I don't want to imply
    that we are contemplating keeping our military there through
    2024. That is just an issue of providing funding to try to help
    the Afghans pay for the security forces they need.
        We are very much in contact with, for example, John Sopko,
    the Special Investigator for Afghanistan. General Campbell and
    he work very closely together. We take the concerns that he
    raises and look into them very deeply and where there is
    clearly, for example, waste or fraud or abuse, we do everything
    we can to try to address that.
        I think your point about how we pay for the military we
    need is well-taken and I think you will hear, when Secretary
    Carter comes up here I think in the near future, to talk about
    the overall budget request for fiscal year 2016, he is going to
    be emphasizing that, just as we come to come to Congress and
    ask you all to support our Defense budget request, we have a
    responsibility to do everything we can to reform how the
    Department of Defense operates so that we are making the best
    use of those Defense dollars.
        And we have been trying to do that, for example, with some
    of the proposals we have made to try to adjust our
    compensation, for example, or requesting authority for base
    closure. But Secretary Carter and his team; we are very aware
    that reforming how we do business is a key part of making sure
    that we are able to spend the resources that we have in an
    effective way.
        The Chairman. Time of the gentleman is expired.
        Mr. Courtney.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you to the witnesses.
        General, in your opening remarks, you used the term
    resurgent Russia, which--I would just like to explore that with
    you for a minute.
        I mean, obviously, a big part of the resurgence is more
    investment in military spending by the Russian government. I
    just wonder if you could sort of walk us through what
    capabilities and forces have been the focus of that change.
        General Breedlove. Thank you, Congressman.
        And what we don't want to do is overstate. You know, that
    has happened in the past, that we used to talk about a 10-foot-
    tall Russia. But what Russia has done, over the past 5 years,
    has steeply ramped up their investment in their military,
    period.
        We see a strong commitment to their nuclear forces in
    upgrading their nuclear forces, making them more survivable and
    then making the bench deeper. So a strong emphasis on their
    nuclear forces.
        And then, what they have learned through the years. As you
    know, when they went into Georgia, it didn't go real well for
    them and they learned some tough lessons. And so they have
    addressed those lessons in their conventional forces and they
    have invested in their mobility, their readiness; they are
    training them to a higher level and they are outfitting them
    with new equipment to make them more capable when they take the
    field.
        So it is sort of a bifurcated path, strong emphasis on
    nuclear weapons, and then the kind of money that you would
    smartly invest in order to bring up the readiness and
    capability of their conventional forces.
        Mr. Courtney. So, you didn't mention naval arena and I--you
    know, obviously, there have been news reports about, you know,
    them sort of showing up near U.K. [United Kingdom] and you
    know, our Scandinavian allies and some talk about, you know,
    boosting their shipyard capacity.
        I was wondering if you [could] talk about that a little
    bit.
        General Breedlove. Yes, sir.
        I am sorry; I lumped air, land, and sea into conventional.
    And to make the point, they have invested in all three. They
    have made strong investment in their land forces, which is what
    you see playing out on the border of Ukraine now.
        They have made strong investment in their aviation
    capability and they are doing the same thing with aircraft that
    they are doing with their naval forces. The investment in the
    naval forces is, again, sort of split; a good emphasis on their
    submarine forces and their nuclear submarine forces, as well as
    their conventional forces.
        But what we see with the more surface navy is just bigger,
    better, exercises, training, more out-of-area operations, as
    you saw the Kuznetsov carrier go all the way into the Eastern
    Med [Mediterranean] and have about a 30-day rotation in the
    Eastern Med. Haven't seen that in a long time; so they are
    investing there.
        Mr. Courtney. And you know, part of the events with the
    Crimean takeover was that they actually, at least for some
    short period of time, seized a number of Ukrainian naval
    vessels. What is the status of that? Did they return any of
    those or did they just enlarge their force by keeping them?
        General Breedlove. Several were kept. Several of the very--
    lesser-capable vessels were given back. At least one, maybe two
    were scuttled, in order to block the entrance and exit from the
    harbor in Sebastopol.
        The main combatant that was retained by Ukraine is their
    flagship, which actually was out of area on a NATO operation
    during the time.
        Mr. Courtney. And so, in terms of our response and our NATO
    allies' response, in terms of, you know their naval forces; can
    you talk about that a little bit, in terms of what is happening
    right now?
        General Breedlove. So, as a part of the assurance measures
    that we have done that the Under Secretary talked about, we
    have upped our presence in the north and in the south in our
    naval presence, so our standing naval group and our standing
    naval mine group showing a stronger presence in the Baltic
    Seas.
        And then, in the south, we have had, not a constant
    presence, but almost constant presence in the Black Sea.
    Originally, in the beginning, by U.S. forces, and now NATO
    forces are folding in with us, so that we keep a NATO or U.S.
    presence in the Black Sea.
        We have done several exercises in the Black Sea, with the
    navies, our NATO navies there, and Ukraine has participated in
    those exercises.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Forbes.
        Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        And, Ms. Wormuth, a few weeks ago, the chairman put
    together a round table with some of the best defense planners
    and strategists in the country and they all concurred that it
    would be fair to categorize Mr. Putin as opportunistic.
        That means he would see an opportunity like Ukraine, move
    in there, then evaluate it, based on the responses, for his
    next movement; that the Chinese were long-term strategists, but
    that the United States has become more reactionary, and they
    felt that one of the biggest weaknesses we had now was a lack
    of strategy.
        When I listen to the chairman correctly talking about the
    need to perhaps give defensive [lethal] assistance, weapons and
    equipment, to the Ukraine now--Ukraine government, I am
    concerned because, for the longest time, this administration
    would not even allow our military to give information, which is
    kind of the baby step before you do anything else, to the
    people in Ukraine.
        We couldn't tell them about Russian troop movements,
    capabilities, locations, all of those kinds of things. In
    hindsight, was that an incorrect strategy?
        Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, I think at the time, we
    made decisions about what kind of support to provide and what
    kind of intelligence to share, based on the situation on the
    ground at the time.
        We are--for several months, certainly, have been providing
    considerable intelligence to Ukraine.
        Mr. Forbes. But what was your strategy, for so long, not
    giving them that information; in fact, prohibiting that
    information from being given?
        Secretary Wormuth. We were giving them information we
    thought would be useful to them and would help them respond----
        Mr. Forbes. You didn't think that the location of where the
    Russian troops and the size of the troops and those kind of
    things would be important to the Ukraine government?
        Secretary Wormuth. To my knowledge, Congressman, we were
    providing intelligence.
        Mr. Forbes. Can you check that and verify that for us?
        Secretary Wormuth. Yes.
        Mr. Forbes. Please give it back to us on the record.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 87.]
        Mr. Forbes. Second thing is talk about this resurgent
    Russia. Many of us were concerned when the Russians asked us to
    pull our missile defense systems out of Europe and this
    administration said sure, we will do that.
        Two questions; in hindsight, was that a bad strategy? And
    secondly, where did you put the additional resources to fill
    that gap?
        Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, the European Phased
    Adaptive Approach that we have for missile defense in Europe is
    a very strong approach to deal with the missile defense threats
    that we face, which are primarily from North Korea, with their
    nuclear program, and to posture us to be able to prevent or
    defend against a potential future Iranian threat.
        We have made the investments needed to support that
    program----
        Mr. Forbes. Can you tell me where you made those
    investments? And if you don't have them now----
        Secretary Wormuth. Certainly.
        Mr. Forbes [continuing]. Would you supply that, because I
    haven't seen where you put those dollars. We put it on the back
    of the Navy, but we continue to wait for when you are going to
    give those additional resources to do it.
        Maybe you could just--if you would, just supply it for the
    record. And again, if you would tell us what your strategy was;
    whether or not a gap has been left because you have done that.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 87.]
        Mr. Forbes. And then, General, the question I would ask for
    you, in follow-up to Mr. Courtney's question about the Navy,
    you know, Europe used to be a hub for our Navy and over the
    last decade, maybe two decades, we have allowed our naval
    presence to decline considerably.
        Based on what we see with Russia now, where do you see us
    going forward? Is there going to be a new level of demand,
    perhaps, that our Navy has? And if so, can you give us a little
    bit of definition of what you think that might look like?
        General Breedlove. Congressman, as you know, this is one of
    the places where our force structure in Europe is growing.
        We have received two of the Aegis destroyers that will go
    into Rota and we have two more that are on schedule to come to
    us. They will be a multi-mission ship, but they will also be
    dedicated to missile defense, because that is their core
    capability. So the U.S. presence in Europe is growing.
        But you rightly question that--are we taking all the right
    steps and here is what I would say. We are making a strong push
    with our NATO allies to better cooperate and bring them into
    these assurance measures and the changes that we are making to
    NATO, because you are----
        Mr. Forbes. General, I would just point out; if we are
    going to do this so-called pivot to the Asia-Pacific area and
    if we see this increase in Europe then we are going to have to
    increase our naval presence if we are going to be able to do
    that.
        And on the ships we are talking about, we really didn't add
    resources to that. We just shifted ships around, which is a big
    difference than adding resources.
        And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield.
        The Chairman. Ranking Member.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The big concern with Russia is what would they do next. I
    mean, obviously, we are focused on the Eastern Ukraine right
    now, but most of the speculation is that, unchecked, this leads
    to further problems.
        What would they do next? What are you guys most fearful of?
    Where might they try their little-green-men strategy next, if
    Eastern Ukraine were to be resolved in their--yes; in their
    favor?
        Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, I think we have probably
    two primary areas of concern, in terms of where might Russia go
    next.
        First is they might go to countries who are not part of
    NATO; for example, Montenegro, some of the smaller countries,
    and try to, again, create some instability to try to use some
    of the information operations; techniques that we have seen
    them use very effectively in Ukraine.
        And we are working through the European Reassurance
    Initiative, for example, to provide support to countries like
    that, to be able to help them to resist those kinds of
    activities.
        Similarly, we also have concerns about the potential for
    Russia to try to destabilize actual NATO member countries,
    particularly, I think, the Baltics or--because, again, those
    countries have sizable ethnic Russian populations.
        So, again, we have been very, very clear and I think Putin
    understands that we are completely committed to upholding our
    Article 5 obligations and that to cross that line would be an
    extremely substantial step.
        But we are working in a variety of ways to try to help
    countries, whether inside of NATO or whether partner countries,
    be able to resist that kind of destabilizing activity.
        Mr. Smith. And at this moment, of those possibilities, are
    there hints that he is moving in one direction to implement one
    of them or is it just pretty much, at this point, speculation
    or have there been active steps that Russia has taken that give
    you concern about one of those specific examples that you
    mentioned?
        Secretary Wormuth. From what I have seen, we don't have--
    there are not significant active steps. I have not seen
    anything, for example, in intelligence that would indicate
    that, but I would ask General Breedlove to comment.
        General Breedlove. Sir, I would just step back.
        I know that your question was really next after Ukraine,
    but think we also need to think about next inside Ukraine,
    because I don't think any of us are sure that he has
    accomplished his objectives inside Ukraine next and so that
    would be my first next.
        And then there might be some revisits. For instance, we
    start to see a more Western-leaning Moldovan government and
    Russian troops in Transnistria are there to keep Moldova from
    leaning to the West and so there may be some revisit in
    Moldova.
        And I think what we should do is watch first where we see
    strong information campaigns picking up. And that is happening
    in Moldova and other places now.
        Mr. Smith. Understood. And how do we change this mindset of
    Russia? Part of the--you know, reason for the chairman and I,
    you know, doing the bill that we did to give Ukraine greater
    position to defend themselves is to sort of up the military
    cost.
        I mean, obviously, if, you know, the Russian military
    decides to go, you know, full-force, no matter what we do, you
    know, they are--Ukraine is no match for them. But the higher
    the cost, the less likely, in my way of thinking, that he would
    try this in the future. And yet, the administration has been a
    little reluctant to cross that line and do that.
        And I understand, you know, we don't want to, you know,
    escalate, but on the other hand, if it was more costly, if it
    did mean that Russia would have to, you know, commit more
    troops, more weaponry, lose more of their soldiers; wouldn't
    that be a discouragement for them to do something in Moldova or
    in Montenegro or any of these other places that you have talked
    about?
        Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, I think that is exactly
    right, in the sense that we are--a key part of our strategy
    vis-a-vis Russia right now is to impose costs on them,
    diplomatic costs, economic costs, and then also to provide
    support to Ukraine. We are--as you know, I mean the President
    said, I think just before the Munich Security Conference or
    just after, considering all options.
        We don't want to take options off the table and there is
    discussion of providing defensive lethal assistance, in an
    effort to, again, raise costs on Russia; not, I think--not from
    the perspective at all of being able to fundamentally alter the
    military balance between Ukraine's military and Russia's
    military, but to try to give Ukraine more ability to defend
    itself against the separatist aggression.
        The Minsk agreements have now been signed and we very much
    want to see those upheld. Obviously, experience to date gives
    us, I think, pause, and actions are going to speak much more
    loudly than words.
        So, as we watch whether those agreements are going to be
    upheld in the coming days, if we see continued violation and
    continued aggressions--pardon?
        Mr. Smith. I see no reason to for a second believe that
    they will be upheld.
        Isn't it rather clear at this point that Putin's strategy
    is to use that negotiation to neutralize Europe from, you know,
    fully engaging and helping, meanwhile continuing to do exactly
    what he wants to do?
        I mean, is there any counterargument to that
    interpretation?
        Secretary Wormuth. We are very concerned and I think
    skeptical of whether this agreement will be upheld. And if it
    is not, we will again look at measures to impose additional
    costs. So I think we--that conversation is still ongoing and is
    very active.
        Mr. Smith. I think we can pretty much count on it not being
    upheld, so we should start planning.
        Because--it is part of the strategy. It is sort of slow-
    rolling it, you know, keeping them at bay as he moves through
    the Eastern Ukraine as he sees fit, so that is something we are
    going to have to do.
        Thank you. I am going to yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Turner.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Breedlove, good to see you. Thank you for your
    comments before the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Munich
    Security Conference.
        You have been a great voice of trying to give us clarity in
    this time period of what you have described as hybrid warfare,
    where we see ambiguity that Russia is trying to create on their
    actions, which makes it more difficult for people to formulate
    policy and then address that policy with having clarity, so
    thank you for the clarity.
        Ms. Wormuth, I have a few questions for you, because also,
    when your position is policy, what we don't want to have is
    issues of ambiguity of things that are true or not true: facts.
        We can disagree as to policy, but facts are those things
    that we shouldn't allow ourselves to degrade to ambiguity, as
    Vladimir Putin tries to get us to do in hybrid warfare.
        Phased Adaptive Approach; you will not deny that Phase 4 of
    the Phased Adaptive Approach was canceled, would you not?
        Secretary Wormuth. Well, we made a different decision; that
    is correct.
        Mr. Turner. So that would be a yes. You canceled Phase 4 of
    the Phased Adaptive Approach.
        The Phased Adaptive Approach was the portion of Phase 4
    that was to actually protect the continental United States. You
    said we have a strong commitment to the Phased Adaptive
    Approach; not so strong, since it is canceled.
        And I do want to give a footnote here; that we are all
    aware that the fourth phase of Phased Adaptive Approach, which
    you cited as being a strong commitment, was canceled after the
    election, prior to the--with the President having had a prior
    conversation with Medvedev in an open mike situation, where he
    said to him, after the election I will have more flexibility
    with respect to the Phased Adaptive Approach, in what many
    people, including myself, refer to as the secret deal, then has
    the appearance of the President making a deal with Russia and
    subsequently canceling the Phased Adaptive Approach, which,
    again, underscore, would have protected the mainland of the
    United States.
        And let's refer to START. You cited START. You would not
    deny, right, that the United States, under START, cut our
    deployed nuclear weapons, correct?
        Secretary Wormuth. The New START negotiations lowered the
    number of nuclear weapons in our arsenal; yes.
        Mr. Turner. Great. You will also not deny that it did not
    require Russia to cut any of their deployed nuclear weapons. In
    fact, they have had the ability to increase the number of their
    deployed nuclear weapons; correct?
        Secretary Wormuth. Congressman----
        Mr. Turner. Correct; right? Yes, no; it is a numbers game.
    These are not ambiguity issues. These are not policy for us to
    have a disagreement. Doesn't the numbers in START not require
    Russia to cut any of their nuclear deployed weapons and
    actually would permit them to increase them?
        Secretary Wormuth. The New START treaty protects our
    interests.
        Mr. Turner. Yes? No? It is yes/no. Please don't give me
    ambiguity. Please don't have, right where we are here in the
    middle of this hearing, a question answered where you leave
    people with an impression other than the truth. The truth is
    under START we cut our deployed nuclear weapons, they don't.
    Correct?
        Secretary Wormuth. We cut our nuclear weapons but not to a
    level to which we couldn't provide a very strong nuclear
    deterrent.
        Mr. Turner. I didn't ask that. Under the numbers under New
    START, they have the ability to increase, we had to cut.
    Correct? I mean, you have to know this. Don't leave us with the
    impression that perhaps you don't know the circumstances.
        Secretary Wormuth. Correct.
        Mr. Turner. Correct. Thank you for giving me that correct.
        Now Russia, at the time of the discussions with us on the
    New START agreement, was violating the INF [Intermediate-Range
    Nuclear Forces] treaty. Correct?
        Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, we raised Russia's
    violation of the INF treaty in 2013.
        Mr. Turner. I am not asking you what you raised. I am
    asking you a correct or not correct. During the New START
    negotiations with the United States, Russia was, at that time,
    in violation of the INF treaty. Correct?
        Secretary Wormuth. We had concerns that they were in
    violation. We know now that they were.
        Mr. Turner. I am not asking you what your concerns at the
    time were. We now have information, we know it clearly. So----
        Secretary Wormuth. Yes, we know now that they were in
    violation.
        Mr. Turner. Russia was violating the INF treaty at the same
    time that we were negotiating START. Correct?
        Secretary Wormuth. Correct. We know that now.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you.
        Now you started to say you had concerns, so you knew that
    it was--that there was a possibility that they were violating
    the INF treaty at the time of New START [Treaty].
        Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, we had not determined that
    they were in violation.
        Mr. Turner. No, no. I am asking you. I am not asking we; I
    am asking you.
        Secretary Wormuth. I was not in a portfolio at that time to
    personally be aware but----
        Mr. Turner. Did you have concerns of the information--did
    you receive information that gave you concerns about their
    possible violation of the INF treaty?
        Secretary Wormuth. At that time, we had not determined that
    they were not compliant.
        Mr. Turner. You had--you personally had no concerns? You
    personally had no concerns?
        Secretary Wormuth. At that time, I was not involved in that
    particular issue, Congressman.
        Mr. Turner. Okay. Could you please tell me why the
    President of the United States refuses to acknowledge that
    Ukraine has been invaded by Russia, when they have invasion
    forces on the ground? What is the term invasion that causes
    difficulty with the administration? I mean, Ukraine's
    territorial integrity has been violated. Russian troops are
    there. Why can't we call it an invasion?
        Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, I think we have been more
    focused on what is happening as opposed to what you call it.
    Russia has absolutely violated Ukraine's territorial integrity
    and has attempted to unlawfully annex Crimea.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
        Mr. O'Rourke.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Breedlove, if we arm Ukraine, what will Russia do?
        General Breedlove. Congressman, it is a great question. It
    is one that we are all working very hard on now. Clearly, we
    don't know what Mr. Putin will do. What we need to do is look
    at what is on the ground, the capabilities and capacities that
    he is building, and make inference from those capability and
    capacities. Right now, we are not arming the Ukrainians with
    lethal weapons.
        And what we see is Russia continues to build their force,
    continues to provide capability to the Eastern Ukrainians. And
    so no--the fact that we are not doing now is not changing their
    path forward. So I think that we have to be cognizant that if
    we arm the Ukrainians, it could cause positive results, it
    could cause negative results, but what we are doing now is not
    changing the results on the ground.
        Mr. O'Rourke. But bottom line, I take your answer to be we
    do not know what Russia will do should we arm Ukraine.
        And Ms. Wormuth, would that be your answer, as well?
        Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, certainly, we don't know
    with certainty how Russia would respond. And I also would add
    that in addition to thinking about whether to provide defensive
    lethal assistance, we also--there are other measures we can
    take to try----
        Mr. O'Rourke. I understand, but the proposal on the table
    in terms of arming Ukraine should beg the question what will
    Russia do, then what are our options when Russia does any
    number of different things and what are the second, third,
    fourth, fifth order of consequences of arming Ukraine. That is
    what I am trying to get to. I understand some of those
    considerations probably should not be discussed here, but I
    think, bottom line, we don't know what Russia will do.
        The information I have shows that we spend a little under 4
    percent of our GDP [gross domestic product] on our Armed
    Forces; Estonia, 1.9 percent, Latvia, 1 percent, Lithuania, .8
    percent, France, a little over 2 percent. Are we not, Ms.
    Wormuth, creating a moral hazard for Europe and especially for
    these Baltic States? What are you doing, what is the
    administration doing to get our NATO allies to spend a more
    significant percent of their budgets on military so that we are
    not asking our taxpayers to do their job?
        Secretary Wormuth. That is a great question, Congressman,
    and we--a couple things I would say there. First, at the Wales
    Summit, all of the allies agreed to a defense investment pledge
    to work towards providing 2 percent GDP as the standard. So
    that is an important step.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Two percent by when and what are the
    consequences if they don't reach it?
        Secretary Wormuth. I don't know if we put a by when on it.
    But what I would say is----
        Mr. O'Rourke. It is pretty urgent right now. Considering
    everything that we just discussed,
        Secretary Wormuth. I absolutely agree.
        Mr. O'Rourke. I would think there would be a date certain
    that you are going to commit if you want to make sure that we
    are going to be there for you. You have got to carry your
    weight. So there is not a date certain or we just don't know
    what that is right now?
        Secretary Wormuth. We think it may be 2020, Congressman,
    but let me check and get back to you on the specific details.
        Couldn't agree with you more that it is essential that our
    European allies invest more in defense, and this has been a
    longstanding challenge that we have had, frankly, with our NATO
    allies. Many Secretaries have raised this.
        I do think that with everything that is happening vis-a-vis
    Russia right now, but also the threats posed by ISIL, our
    European friends have a greater appreciation for what they are
    truly facing and some of them are revisiting in their own
    parliaments and governments how much they are investing.
        Mr. O'Rourke. So I will just ask that you--I appreciate
    that but I will ask that you give us a definite answer to that.
    You know, I certainly would like that and I think my colleagues
    would like to know that as well.
        Secretary Wormuth. Certainly.
        Mr. O'Rourke. My last question, for General Breedlove, what
    lessons do you take from the 2008 Russian/Georgia war that we
    could apply to what we are seeing today?
        General Breedlove. So the lessons are not good ones. As I
    mentioned just a little earlier in one of my comments, the
    Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 was accomplished but it was
    not a very clean operation for them. They lost aircraft. They
    lost lives. It was a tough slog for them, and I don't think
    they expected it to be a tough slog.
        And what we have seen is they have been a very learning and
    adaptive force. They have completely cleaned up the issues that
    we saw in Georgia as they went into Crimea. I would love to
    offer you a classified briefing to show you the depth and
    breadth of the way they have corrected their problems, their
    military issues, the way they ran the military piece into
    Crimea. And then just from Crimea to Donbass, or the eastern
    part of Ukraine, they have corrected problems there as well.
    So----
        Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you. I will take you up on your offer.
        I yield back. Thanks.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Franks.
        Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And Mr. Chairman, Mr. Turner pursued my line of questioning
    with Ms. Wormuth and he did a much better job than I would have
    done. So if it is alright, I am just going to suggest that some
    of us were very concerned about the New START because we saw it
    allow Russia to build up a stockpile of strategic weapons and
    for us to be required to build down.
        And it did not take into consideration the tactical
    capability of Russia, especially in Europe. And in retrospect,
    it appears to me that this Russia reset has been a startling
    failure. And that is a sincere conclusion, and I know it
    doesn't really probably track with your own perspective.
        So I am going to, if I could, switch over to General
    Breedlove here.
        And General, you know, every time you come here I try to
    say something nice about you because I think you--people like
    you that stand out there and give your whole lives for the
    cause of freedom are the noblest among us. And I am just
    wondering how he keeps carrying those stars he keeps--they keep
    putting on him here. It is starting to be pretty good thing for
    such an old guy, you know? But I say that having been in an F-
    16 with him during a 360-degree loop, so I had a lot of
    confidence in him at that time.
        But the EPAA [European Phased Adaptive Approach] Phase 2
    was set fully to be implemented this year. Can you just discuss
    the need for increased missile defense capability in your AOR
    [area of responsibility]?
        General Breedlove. Congressman, thank you for that. EPAA
    Phase 2 is on track for delivery capability in 2016 to be
    ready. We see all of the actions on the ground doing well. The
    budget is going well. We may be a month or so behind in the
    construction but we think we are ready to deliver on time for
    that. We see the authorities and everything that we need
    shaping up there. And we also see that the progress on starting
    the next phase in Poland is tracking as well.
        Mr. Franks. Let me ask you now, the Department has
    requested a multi-year procurement authority for the SM-3 IB
    [missile] and that hopefully would achieve critical cost
    savings and production stability. Can you speak to that request
    and its significance or importance?
        General Breedlove. Congressman, my facts agree with yours
    that the proposed way to go forward on purchasing these
    missiles now will save us, I think the number is 14 percent
    across the first buy, and that is significant. And it also
    addresses some of the long-lead-term items, issues that a
    company would be working in to deliver those missiles.
        More importantly to me is that the capability inherent in
    that SM-3 IB is important to the mission that we need to do in
    both of these sites, the site in Romania and the site in
    Poland. And so we hope to stay on track with delivery of the
    capabilities that that missile brings.
        Mr. Franks. I will just ask two last questions and they are
    a little bit eclectic and just give you the time to elaborate
    as you will. Given your area of expertise with the whole
    situation happening in Crimea and Ukraine, number one--first
    question is what would you suggest would be the most important
    policy or strategic initiative we should pursue to contain that
    problem the best that we can, given the circumstances.
        And then number two, completely different subject, related
    to the danger of ISIS and Islamist terrorism in the world. What
    do you consider, as a general, to be the most significant, at
    least strategic approach, that we might have? I know tactically
    we have engaged them very effectively, but strategically, what
    do you think is the most important thing that we are missing
    here, and how significant do you think the failure to
    approach--to address that is?
        General Breedlove. If you will allow me, I will lightly
    remark to the policy and strategy piece, and I might ask the
    Secretary to remark to that. Let me start with ISIS because I
    don't want to run your time out. As we understand the problem
    of ISIS, one of the main things that I think we need to focus
    on is their legitimacy. This caliphate draws to it those who
    would want to come and fight for the caliphate.
        And the incredible information campaign that they have out
    there and other things that just transmits the legitimacy of
    this caliphate, we need to attack it. We understand, and I
    won't go into it here, it would take all your time, those
    elements that make the caliphate real to those who would follow
    it, and I think we attack them in detail.
        The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
        Mrs. Davis.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here, for your service.
        You know, we have had a discussion about just the question
    what would Russia do, and I wanted to just be certain and
    clarify there are, obviously, proposals about providing more
    than non-lethal support to Ukraine and that does trigger our
    thinking about their using conventional, perhaps even tactical
    weapons at some point. Can you tell us some more about, you
    know, how that calculation is and sort of the response of the
    Congress and what you would like to see?
        Secretary Wormuth. Congresswoman, in terms--again, we don't
    know with certainty what Russia would do if we were to provide
    defensive lethal assistance. I think what needs to be weighed
    is, again, providing that those kinds of systems, for example,
    might well strengthen Ukraine's ability to defend itself, be
    more effective against Russian tanks, for example. But the
    potential concern that has to be weighed is does Russia then
    double-down and provide even more heavy equipment and just
    escalate the violence, cause more human suffering and continue
    to sort of prosecute its campaign.
        So part of, I think, what we have to look at is whether
    there are other tools that might also impose costs on Russia
    and cause Russia to pause and reevaluate where it is going, and
    do the pros and cons of those other tools, for example, such as
    economic sanctions or other steps that could be taken in the
    financial domain, would they potentially be more effective and
    have fewer downsides. So I think those are some of the issues
    that we need to be weighing as we think it through.
        Mrs. Davis. I think I am asking, too, about how the
    discussions here in the Congress are read in terms of what we
    would anticipate or what we would like to see. I don't know,
    General, if you want to weigh in on that.
        General Breedlove. Ma'am, first, I would echo what the
    Secretary has said and that I think that the important--the
    discussion of defensive lethal aid is very important. It is one
    of the tools. We talk about DIME, diplomatic, informational,
    military and economic, and I think that these need to be
    worked--all worked at the same time. Mr. Putin is putting
    intense diplomatic pressure in Kiev. The information campaign
    is quite impressive. And the--I call it the disinformation
    campaign is quite impressive. Clearly, Mr. Putin is all in when
    it comes to the military element.
        And then he is attempting to put economic pressure through
    energy and recalling loans early, et cetera, on Ukraine. And so
    I think that the discussion about the military element is
    incredibly important, but we also have to continue to bring the
    pressure on all fronts in--across these four areas.
        Mrs. Davis. Okay. Thank you.
        We have talked about our allies providing more defensive
    support. And just going back to your numbers, General, about
    the military personnel at EUCOM, you mentioned 65,000 as a--how
    much are--does that include allied personnel?
        General Breedlove. No, Congresswoman. That is our U.S.
    personnel in European Command.
        Mrs. Davis. And so allied personnel is where in that?
        General Breedlove. That is more--we talk about them more in
    terms of the NATO Alliance and how--what they bring to that
    Alliance. And clearly, the depth and breadth of all of the
    nations of NATO and their militaries is quite significant, but
    the readiness and capability are the things that we are working
    on together to raise that capability in our NATO allies.
        Mrs. Davis. So the fact that you are working on that in
    terms of readiness doesn't necessarily mean that they are ready
    to deploy alongside U.S. troops at this time or in----
        General Breedlove. Ma'am, I would say that they have some
    of the same problems that we have in our military. They have
    forces that are capable and ready right now and others that are
    at a more increased responsiveness.
        Mrs. Davis. Is there a number that you would be more
    comfortable with when you think about adequately staffing EUCOM
    for our current global missions?
        General Breedlove. Ma'am, I would like to come back to you
    on that. I didn't come prepared to talk about growing my
    command. Right now, we are just working on the mission that we
    have, but I would love to come back and talk to you about that.
        Mrs. Davis. Okay. I was going to turn really quickly to
    Afghanistan as well because Secretary Carter is now talking
    about slowing the withdrawal. Do we have the support, again,
    with our partners, in being able to do that? And we can take
    that later for the record.
        Thank you.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 87.]
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        It occurs to me that we--nobody can know for certain how
    Putin would respond to us providing weapons. What we can know
    for certain is how he has responded without us providing
    weapons and that hasn't gone very well.
        Mr. Wittman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Wormuth, General Breedlove, thank you for joining us.
        I want to ask, so far, the administration's strategy to
    counter Russian aggression is focused on sanctions. We heard
    senior Russian officials, though, say that Russians will eat
    less food and use less electricity. Just this past Saturday,
    Secretary Kerry said the administration is exploring additional
    sanctions on Russia. Give me your perspective.
        How effective to this point have sanctions been? Will they
    be more effective in the future in changing the Russian
    calculus? And what military options have you suggested to the
    administration to counter Russian aggression in Ukraine?
        Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, on the sanctions and their
    effectiveness, you know, the sanctions that we and the
    Europeans have put in place on Russia are having a very
    significant effect on their economy and that--and those effects
    are growing over time. But I think we would all agree that it
    hasn't changed what Russia has been doing on the ground.
        Mr. Wittman. Give us some specifics about what those
    effects are. I mean, that is a general terminology, they are
    affecting their economy. Tell me, how is it affecting the
    economy? The lives--the daily lives of Russians, it is really
    hurting them? Give us some perspective on what that is.
        Secretary Wormuth. I will try to do that. The value of the
    ruble, for example, has fallen substantially. They are--they
    have very large strategic financial reserves but they are
    having to draw those down to be able to provide fluidity in
    their economy. So the size of those financial reserves are
    shrinking substantially and will continue to do that.
        And I think, you know, we will see that effect happen over
    time, and sort of have a cumulative effect. But again, I think,
    you know, we would agree that despite the significant economic
    costs that are starting to have effects on the Russian
    population and on the oligarchs. You know, we are hearing, for
    example, more dissatisfaction of the oligarchs who to date have
    been very supportive of Putin. They are concerned about the
    impact it is having on their businesses, on their own financial
    holdings.
        But it has not changed so far what Russia has been doing on
    the ground. And that is the great concern we have, and that is
    where there is a need to again look at the overall package of
    cost-imposing strategies towards Russia, and also support to
    Ukraine, to see if we can change the calculus going forward.
        Mr. Wittman. General Breedlove.
        General Breedlove. Congressman, on the military options to
    date, I will talk just briefly to U.S. and to our allies. Both
    U.S. and allies have brought primarily non-lethal aid to the
    table to help the Ukrainian military, and these are well known,
    everything from medical capabilities, food, to probably on the
    high end, our counter-mortar radars that we have delivered to
    them, which are defensive in nature, to allow the Ukrainians to
    understand when they are under attack, et cetera.
        And the change now is that while we are considering, and
    you are deliberating, possibilities of lethal aid, now nations
    are beginning to also do what for nations outside of the U.S.,
    I would categorize as training. You recently heard both Canada
    and U.K. announce that they are going in to do training in
    various things.
        In the United States, we have a deep relationship with the
    Ukrainians that was already underway before this all started.
    And we are doing coaching and mentoring. You probably have
    heard and seen reported in the paper today that we have a team
    going in to do medical coaching and mentoring now.
        So, we have non-lethal aid; nations doing training; U.S.
    forces doing coaching and mentoring. And then, of course, our
    Nation is deliberating the next step.
        Mr. Wittman. Very good. General Breedlove, let me ask you
    this, from your perspective. Do you believe that Vladimir
    Putin's strategy is to undermine the credibility of NATO as it
    relates to its Article 5 obligations to protect NATO nations?
    And if so, do you believe that his next move might be to
    Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, and trying to destabilize that
    region?
        General Breedlove. Congressman, I think that the main goal
    of Mr. Putin is to divide the West in general; in EU [European
    Union] terms, economically, as you see him try to build his own
    economic union; and also militarily to divide NATO; to try to
    find those cracks, live in them, expand them, and try to bring
    dissent to the conversation.
        So I absolutely believe that is his number one goal. If he
    divides NATO, he gets Ukraine. It would happen.
        As to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, I am not sure that would
    be the next targets. He understands what Article 5 means.
        The Chairman. Mr. Moulton.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Breedlove, I am interested in whether you think
    that we have essentially exhausted our means of supporting
    Ukraine with non-lethal aid at this point? And whether that,
    therefore, lethal aid is the next logical step?
        General Breedlove. Congressman, no, I don't think we have
    exhausted the options in non-lethal aid, but I don't think that
    is directly tied to should lethal be the next step.
        Mr. Moulton. I agree.
        General Breedlove. I mean, there is much more that we can
    continue to do. But that doesn't preclude, then, should we also
    consider lethal.
        Mr. Moulton. No, I agree with that point. I am just curious
    whether we have exhausted those options.
        I am also interested in what both from the OSD [Office of
    the Secretary of Defense] perspective and from your
    perspective, would be other avenues of escalation. And I
    understand that some of this may be classified, but if you can
    speak to that for a minute, I would appreciate it.
        General Breedlove. So, Congressman, thank you for that.
    There are other--as we just talked about a few minutes ago. We
    are focused on the military piece of the four pieces of--four
    types of power that a nation has. But diplomatic efforts can
    continue and we can step those up. Informational work--we are
    frankly well behind the Russians in this area. Their
    disinformation campaign is very impressive.
        And then as you know, the debate about will there be
    further economic tools used. That continues to be talked about.
    So, I completely agree that we need to go back at Russia across
    all four elements of national power.
        Mr. Moulton. Great. Ms. Wormuth, do you have anything to
    add to that?
        Secretary Wormuth. No. I think that is a very good
    elucidation of what we are trying to do.
        Mr. Moulton. Okay, great.
        Could you just take a minute to comment for a second on
    your view as to whether the New START was in our national
    security interests or not?
        Secretary Wormuth. Certainly, Congressman. Thank you.
        The New START treaty was in our interest. We were able to
    negotiate with the Russians and come to an agreement as to the
    size of both arsenals. We would not--I mean, fundamentally, the
    only reason to pursue negotiated arms control treaties is to do
    it if it is in the interests of the United States from our
    perspective, for example.
        So, our view was very much that through New START, in
    addition to looking at the overall size of the strategic
    arsenal, it gave us a verification regime. It allowed us to go
    in and have transparency to the Russian arsenal; to have
    predictability in terms of understanding what they are doing
    with that part of their nuclear arsenal. And all of that adds
    to strategic stability.
        So I think the administration's view is very much that the
    New START treaty was in our interest.
        Mr. Moulton. Right. But could you just explain that a bit
    more? Because Mr. Turner raised the question that if the
    overall number of Russian weapons goes up and ours stays the
    same or goes down, it doesn't seem to the sort of casual
    observer that that would be a favorable agreement.
        Secretary Wormuth. Well, again, in terms of the overall
    levels of our arsenal versus the Russian arsenal, there are,
    you know, we do not have exact strategic parity in terms of
    down to the very last number. But what we negotiated through
    New START was a level for both sides that provided for the,
    basically the fundamental soundness of our strategic deterrent.
        So, you know, and it is fair to say that the tactical
    nuclear weapons that Russia had were outside of that agreement.
    But from a strategic nuclear force perspective, the levels that
    we have are ones that very much allow us to provide the kind of
    nuclear deterrent that we need to have.
        Mr. Moulton. Given that--given Mr. Putin's new ambitions in
    Europe, would you say that leaving tactical nuclear weapons out
    of that agreement is a greater concern now?
        Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, I don't think it is a
    greater concern necessarily. I mean, the--you know, it would be
    desirable certainly to convince Russia to be able to reduce its
    overall amount of tactical nuclear weapons. They have a very
    large number. But a country has to be willing to do that.
        That disparity existed before the situation we have now. I
    don't think there is a need to be more concerned about it
    before. I mean, again, I think fundamentally we have to make
    sure that we have the full range of military capabilities to
    deter Russia effectively. And we do that through a combination
    of our conventional force posture and our nuclear force
    posture.
        Mr. Moulton. I think 10 years ago, we didn't expect this
    kind of movement on behalf of Russia.
        Secretary Wormuth. That is certainly true.
        Mr. Moulton. Do you think that we should consider expanding
    our tactical nuclear arms?
        Secretary Wormuth. I think the nuclear deterrent we have
    today very much protects our national security interests. I
    don't----
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Important questions we will dig deeper into
    in the future.
        Mr. Gibson.
        Mr. Gibson. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Appreciate the panelists being here today.
        First, a question about Lieutenant Nadiya Savchenko. I am
    interested in what we know about her current health and about
    release.
        General Breedlove. Congressman, we don't know as much as we
    would like to know. What we do hear is that she is well cared
    for. It is not an arduous affair. But that is clearly what we
    are being told. We have no indications one way or the other.
        And this is a strong point of constant contact as Ukraine
    negotiates forward.
        Mr. Gibson. I am following that situation very closely and
    appreciate your attention to that as well.
        Question now is really more one of a whole-of-government.
    So Ms. Wormuth, I am interested in your insights with regard to
    your actions in the interagency. And specifically here I am
    asking about the status of political-military cohesion and
    unity within Ukraine and across Ukraine, and the status of
    civil-military relations inside Ukraine. Because really the
    focus, the thrust of the question is: How are we doing as far
    as helping Ukraine strengthen itself?
        Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Congressman, for that
    question.
        I think we are working very hard across a range of fronts
    to try to help Ukraine strengthen itself. And I think the DIME
    construct is a good way to try and talk about that. So, you
    know, for example, the State Department is engaging at all
    levels, from Secretary Kerry and President Poroshenko, down to
    the level of our ambassador. And we are very much, you know,
    working with them and talking with them about their political
    situation.
        In terms of, you know, as I have said earlier, we have
    significantly increased our security assistance to the
    Ukrainian military. And as General Breedlove mentioned, we are
    providing training. We have something called the Joint
    Commission with Ukraine's military that we have used to talk
    with them about what their requirements are both in the near
    term, but also over the long term as they try to
    professionalize their military.
        On the economic front, we are working to--through the IMF
    [International Monetary Fund] to try to secure additional
    economic assistance. Because obviously, Ukraine has a very
    difficult economic situation as well.
        So I think across all fronts, we are doing a lot to try to
    help Ukraine strengthen itself and be better able to determine
    its own path as a sovereign country.
        Mr. Gibson. So then, more specifically, what I am concerned
    about is certainly the reports that I read and from my
    constituents. I have strong Ukrainian-American communities in
    upstate New York, Kerhonkson and other places, and so I often
    hear of, at times, different approaches in different parts of
    Ukraine.
        So now, I have a geographic question, and how are we
    interacting that maybe helps strengthen and unifying some of
    the geographic differences of opinion as it relates to
    political-military. And then, of course, that question is still
    on the table: Do you have any concerns on the civil-military
    relations inside Ukraine?
        Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, I don't have significant
    concerns about the civil-military situation in Ukraine. I would
    certainly ask General Breedlove if he wants to elaborate on
    that. But I saw our ambassador to Ukraine when I was in Munich
    just a few weeks ago, and the report I had from him was that
    those relationships are pretty strong.
        I was also struck in talking with him about his sense that
    when you drive throughout all different parts of Ukraine, if
    anything, the Russian aggression in most areas has strengthened
    Ukrainian nationalism and--which, you know, again, I think
    gives the lie to the whole idea that somehow this is an
    indigenous movement that is coming out of Ukraine and that
    there are individuals who feel that their, you know, rights are
    at risk.
        I think--you know, he talked about how roads, farmland,
    fences were painted blue and yellow, again, as an expression of
    their strong nationalism.
        General Breedlove. I will just jump on that a little bit,
    and that was a vignette I was going to use. Post-Crimea, prior
    to Donbass, this nationalism was very, very high. I think that
    you would find east of the Dnieper River that it is probably a
    little strained now because of what they have seen. I don't
    think we have targeted any geographic unity, but what we do
    know is that Mr. Putin is trying to drive a wedge in the
    government, and we are trying to help them to fight that.
        Mr. Gibson. That is an encouraging report. And I will
    continue to watch very closely. Mr. Chairman, thank you very
    much.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Larsen.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My quick assessment is
    that, for Russia on the economic front, they care about what is
    going on and they can care more. Diplomatically, they don't
    care what people think, and militarily, the West has to find a
    way to get them to care more. And right now, we are not,
    because backing diplomacy with nothing is going to continue to
    get us--you know, we will have Minsk III and Minsk IV and Minsk
    V and still no action out of Russia, in my view.
        General, I want to ask you a question. I was asking you, or
    somebody, at the NATO PA [Parliamentary Assembly], and it is
    simple. I mean, do you think Russia understands the difference
    between a NATO country and a non-NATO country?
        General Breedlove. Congressman, the short answer is yes. I
    believe they do understand what Article 5 means and I think
    they do respect that. But that does not mean that they will not
    reach out to those dense Russian-speaking populations that
    might be in a couple of our border NATO nations to see if there
    is a way to raise and foment unrest there.
        Mr. Larsen. Thanks. And do you think a--would a lack of
    quick NATO consensus on a specific action to counter an Article
    5 violation would preclude any one NATO ally from acting to
    defend Article 5?
        General Breedlove. Congressman, I would just say that I was
    at Wales and I have been at every meeting since Wales. And one
    of the things that was most striking to me is that while we
    have lots of tough conversations--as you know, NATO is not only
    facing Russia to the north and east, but there is a growing
    concern about the south, what is coming across the Med from
    Africa, what is coming out of the Levant and Syria and Iraq. So
    there are lots of things that sort of cause us to have
    conversations about where we should focus.
        But what I was struck by in every meeting since Wales is
    the iron-clad commitment to Article 5 responsibilities and
    defense.
        Mr. Larsen. Ms. Wormuth, what do you think has been the
    primary objective of Russia's military modernization?
        Secretary Wormuth. I think, Congressman, the primary
    objective of military--of Russia's military modernization is to
    demonstrate its vision of itself, which is to be a global power
    on the world stage. And, you know, in the wake of the Cold War,
    Russia's military declined to a significant degree, and Putin
    has very methodically, as General Breedlove outlined, gone
    about rebuilding in many ways the conventional and nuclear
    sides of the Russian force. And I think Putin sees that strong
    military as an important tool in his ability to function in his
    own mind as a global power and to be able to protect what he
    sees as Russia's rightful sphere of influence.
        Mr. Larsen. Well General, talk a little bit about that
    rightful sphere of influence because in your testimony,
    although you didn't cover it in your oral, in your written, you
    discussed the Russian investment in infrastructure in the
    Arctic, and the United States actually chairs the Arctic
    Council starting in April of this year. And Commandant Papp,
    former Commandant of the Coast Guard, is the State Department's
    designee to that.
        Russia is a member of the Arctic Council. I don't imagine
    that is going to get in the way of the Arctic Council doing
    whatever it needs to do. But there is this issue of the Arctic
    opening up, more water days per year, and then you have this
    heavy investment, it seems, from Russia in the Arctic. Can you
    talk a little bit about that?
        General Breedlove. Congressman, just to agree with much of
    what you said, that there is this opening and changing way that
    we might be able to use the Arctic. And frankly, one would hope
    that we could see that as an opportunity and a place that we
    might cooperate. But there are concerns by the NATO nations who
    are along the Arctic--or all of the eight nations of the Arctic
    really are watching what is going on up there, and some have
    more concern than others.
        Clearly, as you state, the Russians are changing the nature
    and capabilities of their infrastructure in the Arctic. This
    could either be for good or not.
        Mr. Larsen. You know what? I have got a question, but I
    don't want to get tapped down by the chairman, so I will yield
    back.
        The Chairman. I appreciate the gentleman's consideration.
    With the largest committee in the Congress, we have got to stay
    on time.
        Gotcha. Mr. Scott.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ma'am, General
    Breedlove. General, thank you for joining me at Robins Air
    Force Base a couple of weeks ago. We have picked up all the
    Georgia Tech stickers and tags that we handed out prior to your
    arrival, but should you choose to come back, we will be more
    than willing to hand them out again. And I hope you will. I
    hope you will join us at Robins or at Moody, but I know you are
    busy.
        And I want to talk about one of the platforms that flies
    out of Robins Air Force Base right now, if I can, and that is
    the JSTARs [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System]. We
    have worked to recapitalize that program over the last several
    years. The Air Force has asked for that. Certainly, want to
    continue that.
        The new budget submission provides funding to keep the five
    additional E-8Cs [JSTARS] that were scheduled for divestment to
    recapitalize the fleet. And just like to hear the battle
    management command and control capabilities of that system, how
    they have benefited in the current fights that we are in, that
    you are directly in control of and that capability.
        And then again, making sure that--understanding the needs
    of that platform. We are going to continue with the
    recapitalization of it to get that ISR platform that--not only
    us, but our allies' needs in these fights.
        General Breedlove. Congressman, thanks for that. And I will
    refrain from the Georgia-Georgia Tech discussion.
        Clearly, the capabilities of this aircraft are key and
    essential to everything that we do. The ability not only to
    have some command and control capability aloft but the other
    part of the mission and looking at the ground, et cetera, et
    cetera. So we are--as I would say that every COCOM [combatant
    commander] that sits here in front of you would tell you that
    these are capabilities we need into the future to be able to do
    not only our ISR business, but our command and control.
        Mr. Scott. Do you consider it urgent? Would that be an
    appropriate word to use with regard to----
        General Breedlove. I think that the demonstration of how
    fiercely we compete to have that capability in our theater
    points to how needed it is. It is a requirement we need.
        Mr. Scott. Well, I look forward to working with you to
    expand that capability. And thank you for your support of
    Robins.
        Ma'am, I want to talk about our NATO allies for a second.
    One of my primary concerns as a husband and a father is that
    when I look at our overall budget picture, within 5 years the
    net interest on our national debt will exceed what we spend on
    national security. And I look at what our NATO partners are
    committed to contribute towards what I would consider global
    security, and I look at what they are contributing and they are
    not living up to their end of the bargain, if you will.
        What do we need to do differently to explain to them that
    while we as the United States want to be a good partner, we are
    perfectly willing to take the lead, we are perfectly willing
    to, on a dollar share, put more in because our economy is
    stronger, but we can't carry all of the weight. How do we get
    our NATO partners to put in what they committed to put in?
        Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, that is a great question.
    And I share your concern, I share concern as a taxpayer and as
    a parent. I have two daughters and was trying to explain to
    them last night what sequestration is. So it is a very good
    question to ask what do we need to do differently, or what more
    can we do, because this conversation about defense investment
    with our NATO allies has been a long-standing conversation.
        And I--you know, I think what we can do is take steps like
    we did at the Wales summit where we got NATO allies to sign up
    to a defense investment pledge. The hard work, though, is going
    to be, going forward, making sure that they do live up to that.
    But what we can do and what we are doing is both raising it at
    the highest levels--this is something that when Secretary Hagel
    met with the German MOD [Minister of Defense] a few months ago,
    he raised it with her. Secretary Carter will be raising this
    with his counterparts.
        But we also can be having very serious conversations, I
    think, with the Europeans about the very real and serious
    security threats that they are facing and how to be able to
    have the capabilities they need to be able to be interoperable
    with us, they simply have to make those investments. And part
    of the defense investment pledge was to say that 20 percent of
    their defense budget should go to investment in major equipment
    systems----
        Mr. Scott. M'aam.
        Secretary Wormuth [continuing]. And more R&D [research and
    development].
        Mr. Scott. I am out of time. If I could finish with one
    statement, Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me. We can push
    whoever we need to out of a territory. We, as the United States
    with our allies. But at some point somebody has got to hold
    that territory. It is a big world. We can't hold it all. And if
    our NATO allies aren't putting in their share so that they can
    hold their own territory--and I recognize the Ukraine is not
    NATO, with us, but they have to be able to hold their own
    territory. We can't hold every country for them.
        The Chairman. Ms. Gabbard.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Breedlove, I
    am wondering if you can talk to the unconventional tactics
    being used by Russia, specifically what is being done to
    counter those? You know, when we look at Ukraine, everyone is--
    obviously recognizes that there is no head-to-head or tank-to-
    tank battle that is possible between Ukraine and Russia. So I
    am wondering what is being done, whether it is done by the U.S.
    or done by other countries, to assist Ukraine.
        We have talked about lethal assistance but also, with
    regards to training assistance for them to counter these
    unconventional tactics with unconventional tactics and to begin
    to exact a toll on the Russian military that becomes more
    evident to the Russian people beyond the toll that is there
    from the sanctions.
        General Breedlove. Congressman, thanks. And if I could just
    open the question a little bit, too. We talk a lot about the
    unconventional tactics in the military side but I think we have
    to remember that they are being unconventional in diplomatic,
    incredibly unconventional in the information sphere, and then
    they are using those sort of tough tools in the economics, as
    well. So, the ``D'' [diplomatic], the ``I'' [intelligence], and
    the ``E'' [economic] of DIME are all in unconventional
    operations for the Russians. And so we need to help our
    partners to be able to work that.
        Broadly, then, in the military piece, there are three
    things we are helping all of our nations and this is work we
    are doing in the Baltics right now even more so than in
    Ukraine, to preclude this problem in the future, and that is to
    give our nations the ability to understand it is more than
    military, it is normally almost more a ministry of interior
    problem to develop the capabilities to do three things:
    Recognize that we have unconventional warfare going on;
    characterize it as unconventional as opposed to just normal
    issues, political issues in the populace; and then attribute it
    to an aggressor nation if it is being imposed.
        So recognize, characterize, and attribute. And, then, when
    we can do that, we can have other nations to be more involved
    in how we fight that battle. So we are developing right now
    capabilities inside these nations to take those steps and get
    their laws and authorities right inside their own nations to be
    able to attack this when it occurs to them.
        Ms. Gabbard. I have another question with regard to the EU
    but I think that is an issue that I and others on the committee
    would like to hear more about specifically because Ukraine is
    where things are happening and then also how the other Baltic
    States and NATO allies are also preparing.
        With regards to the traffic of foreign fighters and the
    flow between Syria and through Turkey, what is the EU doing and
    what role are you playing in working with them to address that
    issue and the fact that their ability to or their willingness
    to cross-reference names on terror watch lists, for example,
    and to track people who are coming through those porous borders
    in between these EU nations, how is that being addressed and
    improved given these weaknesses have been identified?
        General Breedlove. Do you want me to take this one?
        Secretary Wormuth. Oh, I can. Congresswoman, that is a
    great question. One of the major lines of effort in our
    counter-ISIL strategy is trying to address the foreign fighter
    network problem. There are I think at the last that I read as
    many as 20,000 foreign fighters flowing from more than 90
    countries into Iraq and Syria. So it is an extremely
    significant challenge.
        We are working with the countries in the European Union to
    try to help them--I mean, much as combating some of these
    unconventional tactics to try to help them strengthen their
    laws that govern their border security, that govern their
    travel regulations. We are working with them to try to help
    them strengthen their intelligence organization's ability to
    identify these networks and to identify where the facilitators
    are.
        There is more work to be done but this is a major prong in
    our strategy. It has to be a truly international effort because
    if you only address it in a particular region or within the
    context of Europe, you know, the water----
        Ms. Gabbard. But wouldn't you say a majority of those
    numbers that you threw out are, though, within that region at
    this juncture?
        Secretary Wormuth. Many of them are coming from European
    countries.
        Ms. Gabbard. Right.
        Secretary Wormuth. That is certainly true. We also see them
    coming from places like Indonesia----
        Ms. Gabbard. Right.
        Secretary Wormuth [continuing]. And elsewhere in Asia.
        Ms. Gabbard. But I am--since we are talking about this
    region right now, is Turkey on board?
        Secretary Wormuth. Turkey has been steadily improving.
    There is more work to be done though. Turkey is one of the
    transit points that we are most concerned about. They are
    getting better. They have put more people on their watch list.
    But there is more work to be done with Turkey.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much.
        The Chairman. Mr. Bridenstine.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General
    Breedlove, I would like--I think there are a lot of people that
    don't understand the important relationship between U.S.
    European Command and the nation of Israel. Could you brief us
    on some of our commitments to Israel? Maybe some of our mil-to-
    mil exercises, that kind of thing. How important is what you do
    to the nation of Israel?
        General Breedlove. Congressman, thank you. Some I can
    discuss here, others I would be glad to come talk to you in a
    classified environment.
        U.S. European Command has been given the mission of
    assisting in the defense of Israel. The most--probably the most
    visible piece of that is our joint work in ballistic missile
    defense and how we would help Israel to do that because of
    their, as you know, strategic depth is not something that
    Israel has and so being able to help them defend that.
        And that is--we have a series of exercises that are some of
    the best that we do in this ballistic missile business. We have
    great exercises in the air defense, Air Force across the board.
    And I think, at that point, I would defer to a more classified
    conversation.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Well, I appreciate that. And another
    question I had is--and maybe this is for you, Ms. Wormuth. If
    we were to go continue through the sequestration process, maybe
    you could help us understand a little bit about how that would
    impact the nation of Israel and European Command and maybe,
    General Breedlove, you could highlight as well, too, because we
    are about to go through a budget process here in the U.S.
    Congress and I, for one, believe we need to get beyond
    sequestration, especially as it relates to our defense forces.
    And we hear all the time about the increased risk. Can you guys
    quantify that for us?
        Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Congressman. Let me try to
    answer your question there. I think if we return to
    sequestration levels of funding, it will have a profound
    impact--a profound negative impact, I would argue, on what we
    are trying to do in European Command and that in the Europe
    AOR, but also globally.
        You know, at the current level of funding that the
    President has requested, we are able to execute our strategy at
    a manageable risk level, I would argue, but we are already now
    at the point where we don't really have a margin.
        You know, I think you have heard General Breedlove say, for
    example, he is showing American presence through a rotational
    approach as opposed to permanent presence in some cases. And
    under sequestration, we would be forced to look at choices
    between the size of our Army, our Air Force. We would be, just
    as we did in 2013, we would be having to eliminate exercises
    with countries in Europe, for example, potentially Israel. We
    would be facing some very difficult choices.
        And in terms of speaking to the risk in a little bit more
    concrete way, you know, the way I think about it is part of
    what we do is to try to prevent crises from arising and we do
    that through our forward presence. We do that through our
    engagement. Under sequestration, we will have a smaller
    military that will make it difficult for us to maintain that
    presence. We will have a military that will be less ready and
    less able to respond to crises. If we were to get in a major
    conflict, that conflict would extend far longer than we want it
    to be, it would be higher casualties, so there are very
    substantial, real-world implications to that kind of risk.
        Mr. Bridenstine. And, General, I can tell you would like to
    answer this as well, but I would like to move on to one last
    question with my one remaining minute. We know that, you know,
    Iran is continuing with an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic
    missile] program. We know that Hamas and Hezbollah are
    reconstituting their missile capabilities. ISIS, of course, is
    in the region. My question is this. What did the administration
    go through as far as a process to determine in its budget
    request that it was appropriate to cut $150 million from
    missile defense for Israel?
        Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, I don't have the figures at
    my fingertips in terms of what level of cuts we made. As
    General Breedlove indicated, we are supporting Israel very
    robustly through programs like Iron Dome, David Sling, the
    Arrow program and----
        Mr. Bridenstine. Just real quick, with my 23 seconds, Arrow
    was cut, I think $45 million, David's Sling was cut $100
    million from appropriated levels last year. Any comments on
    that?
        Secretary Wormuth. Well, we are making very difficult
    choices, you know, over--since 2012, we have absorbed almost a
    trillion dollars in reductions to planned defense spending over
    a 10-year period and, in that context, we are having to make
    difficult choices already.
        The Chairman. Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
    being here. General Breedlove, in your opinion has Russia
    achieved an operational capability of its INF Treaty-violating
    ground-launch cruise missile?
        General Breedlove. Congressman, I would really like to talk
    to you about that in a classified environment. And I would--I
    will get on your calendar to do that.
        Mr. Rogers. I would appreciate that. Let me ask this, do
    you agree with Chairman Dempsey that Russia's INF systems pose
    a threat to our deployed forces in Europe?
        General Breedlove. Yes, sir, I do.
        Mr. Rogers. And what is your best military advice about the
    response most likely to assure our allies and to prevent Russia
    from attaining military advantage from these actions?
        General Breedlove. Congressman, there are a series of
    things that we can do and some of those were discussed by some
    of our senior leaders in the past days. We need to first and
    foremost signal that we cannot accept this change and that, if
    this change is continued, that we will have to change the cost
    calculus for Russia in order to help them to find their way to
    a less bellicose position.
        Mr. Rogers. A little while ago one of our--my predecessors
    on the dais up here asked you about what would Russia do next,
    in your opinion, if it continues unopposed across Ukraine, and
    they specifically asked if you thought that the Baltics,
    Estonia, Lithuania, would be the next target and you stated
    that you felt that Vladimir Putin fully understood Article 5.
    So what is your professional opinion as to what might be the
    next concern that we would have in that region?
        General Breedlove. Congressman, it is a tough question and
    there are several options available. As I mentioned before, I
    think, first and foremost, Mr. Putin has not accomplished his
    objectives yet in Ukraine, so next is probably more action in
    Ukraine.
        We do see the seeds of issues in Transnistria and Eastern
    Moldova. We do see, as you know, continued pressure being put
    on Georgia and Gagauzia. So there are several places where
    pressure is being brought on these nations to keep them from
    leaning West and so there are options there.
        I do, as I have said already today, believe that Mr. Putin
    understands Article 5 but I do not believe that that would
    preclude Mr. Putin from taking some actions in reaching out to
    the disparate Russian-speaking populations that are in some of
    our easternmost nations in NATO.
        Mr. Rogers. Is it your opinion that if we don't--and I am
    asking your opinion, I don't want to be leading in this
    question. But if lethal aid is not provided by the United
    States, does your best military opinion that the Ukrainian
    military can, in fact, stop the progress of the Russian troops
    across their country? Or can they not?
        General Breedlove. Congressman, in the current
    configuration, I do not think that the Ukrainian forces can
    stop a Russian advance in Eastern Ukraine. And to the degree
    that we can supply help, I am not sure that they could stop a
    Russian advance in Eastern Ukraine even if we supply aid. I
    think that our----
        Mr. Rogers. Lethal aid?
        General Breedlove. Lethal aid, that is correct.
    Congressman, I think that what we are talking about is changing
    the calculus of the decisions that Mr. Putin has to make and
    the cost to him in his internal environment more than the
    external environment.
        Mr. Rogers. You are talking body bags?
        General Breedlove. That is right. I think we should talk
    about raising the cost for Russia in many dimensions, yes, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. Ms. Wormuth--thank you, General. In reading
    your opening statement I was concerned that you made no
    reference at all to INF Treaty violations by Russia, given that
    Secretary Carter right out of the gate has made it clear. This
    is a big problem that we are facing and he takes it seriously.
    Why did you not think it was worthy of mentioning in your
    opening statement?
        Secretary Wormuth. Congressman, that was an--excuse me. I
    don't want to be yelling at you. The fact that it wasn't
    mentioned in my written statement was not an indication that we
    are not deeply concerned about it. They are in violation. It is
    a problem. We have been raising this with them since 2013,
    making clear that their violation is unacceptable, and we are
    quite concerned about it as General Breedlove said. We want to
    continue to try to bring them back into compliance, but if they
    do not do that, we do not want them to have a military
    advantage over us and will look at what responses are
    appropriate to take.
        Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Ms. McSally.
        Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for your
    testimony today. General Breedlove, I wanted to talk to you a
    little bit about truth in disclosure. I was part of a team to
    stand up Africa Command back in 2007 and 2010. And you
    mentioned the 65,000 assigned to you that includes forces that
    are dual-hatted, components to Africa Command and also forces
    assigned to you as a staff officer.
        Great frustration that, you know, we did not have the
    forces required to include crisis response forces. So I haven't
    been there in a while so just wanted to get your perspective on
    especially with the increasing activity in your theater and
    responsibilities, how is that working and do you see if there
    is a crisis where you need a crisis response team in your
    theater but we also have a Benghazi-like situation in Africa
    Command, how does that work? Have you seen any shortfalls where
    you haven't been able to fill missions?
        And, also, as we are looking for places to gain savings, I
    have heard some of my colleagues talk about how Africa Command
    can just roll back into EUCOM again and, having been a part of
    that, with all you have on your plate, adding another 53
    countries in Africa and the ungoverned spaces and the terrorism
    threat and everything we are doing there, I strongly disagree
    with that. So I wanted to hear your perspectives on that
    proposal as we move forward. Thanks.
        General Breedlove. So there has been some very good news
    since you left in that, as you may or may not heard, we have
    been given the authority at the combatant commander and deputy
    combatant commander level between EUCOM and AFRICOM to move
    forces back and forth without going through the DEPORD
    [deployment order] book process in the Pentagon. So when----
        Ms. McSally. There is a conflict there. How do you have two
    crises at once, something has got to get a priority, right?
        General Breedlove. There is no doubt about that and that
    priority would probably be adjudicated. But what happens is
    that Rod Rodriguez and I can make these decisions now very
    quickly and move the forces back and forth and you had it
    right, almost all the force is in EUCOM, there are some small
    crisis response--forces in AFRICOM but we are free to share at
    a very quick and easy way.
        I completely agree with you about Africa Command and EUCOM
    but for a different reason. In Africa, the growing mission--the
    growing problem with radicals and with terrorists and
    ungoverned spaces in these nations, the focus that AFRICOM is
    able to bring on that is unique to the fact that there is a
    combatant commander assigned to focus on that. And I don't
    think that where the next problem really is going to be would
    be the place that we would want to lose focus.
        Ms. McSally. No, I do agree for the same reasons. Next
    question is we closed down the squadron of A-10s [Thunderbolt
    II aircraft] at Spangdahlem [Air Base] a couple years ago, and
    the squadron that I commanded at Davis-Monthan just deployed
    over to Spangdahlem. You can't make this stuff up. So we are in
    a situation where we are closing down A-10s in Europe and then
    we are deploying A-10s from CONUS [continental United States]
    to Europe. Can we walk through kind of a logic behind that and
    the cost?
        Maybe you don't have that but maybe for the record later,
    the cost of deploying units forward versus having kept them
    there in the first place, and are you seeing value with that
    deployment? And you certainly can't have the squadron from
    Davis-Monthan full time but in a future discussion hindsight,
    should we have just kept a squadron of A-10s at Spang
    [Spangdahlem]?
        General Breedlove. I would defer to the Under Secretary for
    some of the policy piece of that. I would like to say that it
    is clear that the capabilities that these aircraft bring is
    needed. You already know, I think, in the military as a
    combatant commander we try not to prescribe the tool. We ask
    for a capability, and in an anti-armor capability certainly the
    A-10s bring a great capability forward to Spang.
        I have often said that I favor forward-stationed forces.
    When the budget changes and precludes and forces are cut or
    brought down, then it is important that we have the ability to
    bring rotational forces. Rotational forces are only good if
    they have solid fiscal backing in order to be able to deploy.
        Secretary Wormuth. Congresswoman, I would just again go
    back to the figure I cited before, where we, you know, we have
    absorbed just a very, very large set of reductions from what we
    planned just a few years ago. And as General Welsh has
    testified, the A-10 is a great platform and all other things
    being equal, we would like to keep that.
        But in order to modernize the Air Force, which is in
    desperate need of recapitalization, we have had to make some
    tough choices. I think that is what you are seeing.
        Ms. McSally. And my time is expired, but I just say I would
    like a cost analysis of keeping a squadron at Spang versus the
    cost of sending them TDY [temporary duty], which potentially
    could be more costly in the long run. So if we are gaining
    savings, let's make sure we are actually gaining savings. Thank
    you.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 88.]
        The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Nugent.
        Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you General
    Breedlove and Ms. Wormuth for being here. Just a follow-up on
    the A-10 issue, and we all know that it is more than just armor
    that it can devastate. Having sons that actually saw the use of
    A-10s on unconventional forces and the fear factor that placed
    upon them was huge. So I would just, once again, I happen to
    like the A-10s because my kids, who called upon them to protect
    them when danger was close, was phenomenal.
        But getting past that and we've talked about Russia, I
    think, and a lot of this needs to be in a classified setting, I
    agree. But when you talk about ISIS, and particularly forget
    about ISIS but talk about the Islamic extremism that is rampant
    across this world, I start to worry that, you know, we try to
    isolate--you know, we have got European Command, what goes on
    within Europe. Then we have, you know, Africa Command, which is
    under-resourced, obviously. One of my sons actually did a tour
    down in Africa training up Ghanaian soldiers.
        But when you look at the threat, and we had King Abdullah
    here, that really gave us, I think, a very enlightened aspect
    in regards to, you know, the fight is within Islam itself. And
    until I think we identify the fact that is where the fight is,
    that is problematic on strategy.
        But he was saying, and I tend to agree, is that it needs to
    be a coordinated attack across the broad spectrum, and I don't
    know that we have the ability to have a coordinated fight
    brought to the Islamic extremists when you have them parceled
    out by Africa Command, European Command, and what goes on in
    PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command].
        Is there a way to coordinate all of that? Because I worry
    that we are not--and he was talking about that coordinated
    approach in particular.
        General Breedlove. I will allow the Secretary to talk to
    the larger part of the question, but let me assure you that we
    are not doing disparate attacks. I just literally came from
    Kuwait, where all of the leaders, to include our new Secretary
    of Defense, came together to talk about just your issue, of how
    we stay coordinated.
        That area of the world, where CENTCOM, AFRICOM, and EUCOM
    comes together, Rod Rodriguez and Lloyd Austin and I work this
    personally all the time to not allow seams. Again, witnessed by
    what we just did in Kuwait. I will turn the rest of the
    question over to the Secretary.
        Secretary Wormuth. I was basically going to say the same
    thing, Congressman. You see we are also trying to do things
    like have conferences with the chiefs of defense from all of
    the different countries. We have John Allen, who is working to
    bring together all of the coalition countries. So while it is
    certainly true that the membership of the coalition crosses
    EUCOM's AOR, CENTCOM's AOR, AFRICOM's AOR, we have a number of
    mechanisms in place to make sure that we are working together
    and that we are seeing it holistically and comprehensively and
    not through a soda straw.
        General Breedlove. A two-second pile-on. An example. To
    stay unclassified, I won't name the base. So we take off an ISR
    asset and that ISR asset may change two or three times in the
    same mission, who it is really supporting as we gather on
    targets. So this is an extremely well-orchestrated dance.
        Mr. Nugent. And I think that was the biggest concern that
    we have as a committee in regards to what is the strategy. And
    I think that we have been somewhat reluctant in regards to the
    strategy. We are going to hear, you know, on AUMF
    [authorization for use of military force] and what is the real
    strategy going forward. And it is not just ISIS. This is a much
    broader issue of Islamic extremism.
        And until I think the administration actually drills down
    and says the words, it kind of diminishes. And what you don't
    want to do is give credence to the caliphate or ISIL or
    whatever. I think that just creates a bigger problem for us
    when we add legitimacy to that.
        And lastly, just on Ukraine, I would just say--and I agree
    with the chairman--it hasn't worked so far. And I understand
    what happens when we ratchet up and we give lethal aid to the
    Ukrainians. But I had a meeting last night with some Ukrainians
    in an off setting and they are absolutely concerned about their
    loved ones that are still there and what is going to happen to
    them. And these folks are U.S. citizens concerned about what is
    going to happen.
        And so I would think that we have not been very successful
    in predicting Mr. Putin's actions, but I think our inaction is
    more of an appeasement than it is of showing leadership.
        And I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you. I don't want to try y'all's
    patience too long. I do have just a handful of things I would
    like to ask about briefly. Several people asked about NATO
    defense budgets, Wales summit sets a goal 2 percent. General, I
    know you have these conversations with your counterparts all
    the time in NATO.
        So far do you see anybody heading up, and who is?
        General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, it is a great question and
    I would like to answer it in two ways. Yes, we have seen
    nations, including some of the Baltics that were mentioned
    earlier, who have made a pledge and showed a plan on how they
    will attain their 2 percent spending. Now they are very
    motivated. Other nations also are in the same boat.
        We also, in truth, have seen a couple of nations whose
    administrations have changed. Remember this was national
    leaders that made this commitment and those national leaders
    have changed and we see a little regression in a couple.
        Let me not try to pump sunshine but point out a few good
    things, and that is, separate from the 2 percent, also
    important is that their militaries step up to the mission we
    need to do. Defense starts at home. And as we have made these
    three basic changes in NATO as a function of the Readiness
    Action Plan, RAP, we are standing up the Very High Readiness
    Task Force. We needed three or four nations to be center
    brigades for that task force. We got six volunteer nations to
    step up to that in our recent defense ministerials.
        As we stand up these six new units in our easternmost
    nations, they are NATO Force Integration Units--we jokingly
    call them nephews--they will be receiving an onward moving
    capability of NATO nations in these countries. And we have
    strong pledges, again, for the manning and standing up those
    units.
        And then last but not least, the fundamental change in what
    we are going to expect from the Multinational Corps Northeast
    in Stechin, Poland, which will take on that Article 5
    responsibility in the east and the north, strong manning
    conference and a strong pledge by the three framework nations,
    including us, the United States, stepping up our participation
    in that headquarters to bring it to capability.
        So I painted a long picture, but the bottom line is we also
    ask them to step up with their forces, and to this point they
    are answering, Chairman.
        The Chairman. That is helpful. Thank you. One issue that I
    don't believe has come up today is the threat of Islamic
    infiltration through the Mediterranean. So we all saw or knew
    of this horrible beheading of Coptic Christians on the coast of
    Libya. There is clearly an ISIS presence there. I read that the
    Italians are quite concerned about what is going to come up
    from the south.
        Is NATO considering naval patrols of some sort to deal with
    this threat? Or is it a real threat, I guess?
        General Breedlove. Chairman, it is a real threat and it is
    one of the primary concerns of our southern NATO nations. I
    think you heard me mention a little bit earlier that coming out
    of Wales and every meeting since we have had a strong
    recognition that we have to adapt NATO to be able to react to
    the north and east and the problem with a revanchist Russia,
    but we also have to look to the south because we have a
    multifaceted problem in the south. From migration flows,
    organized crime, terror, all the problems that are occurring in
    the ungoverned spaces in northern Africa are bleeding across
    the Mediterranean in the south.
        And as a part of the tasking I was given in my other hat as
    the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, we have to deliver a
    plan for addressing that. We will deliver that on the 31st of
    March. We delivered first the plan to address the north and the
    east, and next we will deliver our papers to look at the south
    threat as well. And you are right, Chairman, this is a
    multifaceted approach to include naval applications.
        The Chairman. If I were in some of those nations, I would
    be concerned about how long that is taking to get a plan
    because these folks seem to move really quickly. I think you
    may have answered this, but other than budgetary
    considerations, your preference would be to have a permanent
    stationing of forces in Eastern Europe rather than a rotational
    one, is that correct?
        General Breedlove. Chairman, yes.
        The Chairman. And it would be those Eastern European
    countries' preference as well.
        General Breedlove. Chairman, if I could back up and clarify
    what I just said. I am in favor of permanent stationed forces
    in Europe. I think that the discussion of in our easternmost
    nations this is a different discussion for all of the reasons
    that you understand. Does that answer?
        The Chairman. We need to go country by country as to their
    preferences. That makes sense.
        Ms. Wormuth, lots of discussion about arms control and
    tactical nukes and so forth. But isn't it true that the Russian
    public doctrine is evolving to include the potential use of
    tactical nuclear weapons against even conventional forces? So
    that this potential danger by these tactical nukes that were
    not included in New START is taking on a little bit of a
    different enhanced meaning?
        Secretary Wormuth. Chairman, I think it is fair to say that
    Russia is in the process of evolving its doctrine in some very
    important ways. I would prefer to talk to you about that in a
    classified session and would be happy to do that, but I think
    it is fair to say in an open hearing that they are making some
    doctrinal changes that are concerning to us and that we need to
    take into account as we look to how we are going to deter
    Russia going forward.
        The Chairman. Well, I am just referring to some of the
    things they are publishing openly. Now obviously there are
    other conversations to have as well. Last question I have got:
    General, you mentioned in answer to one of the questions that--
    talking about what the Russians learned from the Georgian
    invasion, and you said the Russians are a learning and adaptive
    force.
        My question is, are we? And especially as we see these
    hybrid tactics and all that in this theater Russia is using to
    advance their national interest, seems to me it presents us
    some really difficult challenges. And from where you sit, are
    we learning and adaptive to deal with these new challenges that
    try to strike at some of our weaknesses?
        General Breedlove. Chairman, I would like to assure you
    that, yes, we are learning and adaptive. And I am encouraged by
    some of the things that even our young people have helped us to
    understand and how do we approach some of these hybrid
    challenges we see.
        There is a lot of mystique around this word ``hybrid
    warfare.'' All it really is is a different way to use tools
    that we have known about forever. The things that they bring to
    the table and use in a more--in a way that creates ambiguity.
        And so how we address those ambiguities are very important.
    And so that I don't give away some of the more, I would say
    very ingenious ways that our young folks have worked, we will
    make those available to you. But the bottom line is, yes, sir,
    we are a learning and adaptive force.
        The Chairman. Well, I hope we are in a timely way. Because
    it is whether we are talking about the threat from terrorism,
    whether we are talking about what the Russians are doing, or a
    number of other threats around the world, adversaries seem to
    be moving very quickly, looking for those asymmetric advantages
    that they can gain against us and looking for our weak spots.
        And one of our weak spots is we don't do very well with
    somebody who lies and cheats and does all the things that we
    have seen coming out of the Russians. But that is the world we
    live in and we have to adapt.
        Thank you both. We have touched on a lot of subjects today.
    I very much appreciate your being here and appreciate the
    seriousness of the issues which confront each of you as well as
    this committee.
        And with that the hearing will stand adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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                               A P P E N D I X

                               February 25, 2015

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                               February 25, 2015

    =======================================================================

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                               February 25, 2015

    =======================================================================

                 RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

        Secretary Wormuth. Yes, we are providing Ukraine intelligence. I am
    happy to provide greater fidelity in a classified setting.   [See page
    14.]
        Secretary Wormuth. The U.S. missile defense systems previously
    planned by the President Bush Administration for deployment in Europe,
    and the systems now planned and being deployed to Europe, were never
    designed or intended to defend against threat missiles launched by the
    Russian Federation.
        The ten Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) that were planned for
    deployment to the Republic of Poland and the long-range discrimination
    radar that was planned for deployment to the Czech Republic, the
    combination of which was known as the ``Third Site,'' were never
    intended or designed to counter Russian strategic systems.
        In 2009, we replaced the Third Site with the European Phased
    Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which is intended to be phased to match
    advances in our missile defense technology and to be adaptive to
    changes in the threat. There are three phases planned for EPAA. Phase 1
    has been operational since 2011. It consists of an AN/TPY-2 radar in
    Forward-Based Mode that is deployed to Turkey; a multi-mission,
    Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)-capable Aegis ship in the eastern
    Mediterranean, which is forward-deployed to Rota, Spain; and the
    Command-and-Control Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC), which
    is the command-and-control network for the BMD system. Phase 2 is on
    track for completion by the end of 2015. It will add an Aegis Ashore
    site in Deveselu Base, Romania, equipped with the SM-3 Block IB missile
    to the current Phase 1 systems. Phase 3 will be completed in 2018 and
    will provide coverage for all of NATO Europe. It will add an Aegis
    Ashore site in Rzedikowo, Poland, and also consists of software and
    hardware upgrades to the existing Aegis Ashore site in Romania and the
    deployment of a new variant of the SM-3 missile, the Block IIA.   [See
    page 14.]
                                     ______

                  RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS
        General Breedlove. Since last appearing before the committee, the
    United States has chosen to slow its withdrawal of troops from the
    Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Our North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    (NATO) Allies and partner nations are currently staffing the options
    internally and are waiting on the associated detailed plan for the U.S.
    drawdown in 2016 in order to make an informed decision on their way
    forward. While we won't have any assurances, national force
    contributions are confirmed in June 2015. We believe the majority of
    nations will continue to follow our lead as they have done for the past
    several years. However, several of our Allies and partners are reliant
    on the unique enablers that we provide in Afghanistan, and their
    commitments to stay longer could be contingent upon these enablers
    remaining. Some of these countries are also reliant upon distinctive
    authorities provided by Congress such as the Coalition Readiness
    Support Program, Global Lift and Sustain, and section 1207 to deploy
    into theater and sustain interoperability with United States and NATO
    forces. The early U.S. decision on continued troop levels in
    Afghanistan will assist the U.S. and NATO to work with the Framework
    Nations and the force generation process to resource and stabilize
    troop levels in calendar year 2016.
        It's important to mention that in no other region of the world does
    the United States find more willing, capable, and reliable partners for
    global military operations than in Europe. Some specific points
    highlighting this commitment include:
        Historically, European Allies and partners have contributed 88
    percent--92 percent of non-U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan.
        Since 2003, European Allies and partners have contributed more than
    275,000 personnel to operations in Afghanistan. These very significant
    troop contributions reduce operational demands on U.S. forces and
    enhance the legitimacy and credibility of U.S.-led military operations.
        In particular, some of our newer Allies and partners have
    consistently shown the political willingness and military capability to
    fight alongside U.S. forces. Unfortunately, our increased shared
    security requirements are occurring while our security cooperation
    efforts such as Foreign Military Financing have been dramatically
    reduced. These countries reliance on former Soviet-era equipment
    further exasperates our ability to effectively sustain these very
    strategic partnerships.
        European Allies and partners account for 36 of the 41 troop
    contributing nations to the RESOLUTE SUPPORT Mission (RSM) and over
    5,000 personnel (as of April 2015), which comprises 92 percent of non-
    U.S. forces in RSM.
        European Allies and partners provide critical capabilities to RSM,
    including leadership of Train, Advise, Assist Commands, Afghan National
    Army/Police training teams, and special operations forces that conduct
    counter-insurgency operations.   [See page 24.]
                                     ______

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. McSALLY
        General Breedlove. This is a complicated question that is very
    difficult to quantifiably answer. European Command (EUCOM) has reached
    out to the U.S. Air Force to get their help in answering this question
    as they the services maintain the costing data to answer this question.
    The RAND Corporation addressed a similar question in their
    Congressionally mandated, Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces
    report in which they concluded, ``If the sending base is closed
    (greatly increasing the savings), substituting full rotational presence
    (12 months out of the year) for permanent presence sometimes saves
    money, sometimes costs money, and sometimes roughly breaks even,
    depending on the service, unit type, region, frequency and length of
    rotations, and equipment policy options (transporting versus
    prepositioning unit equipment). In particular, achieving extensive
    presence through high-frequency, short rotations would greatly increase
    costs, leaving longer rotations as the only option that enables some
    savings or avoidance of increased costs while maintaining high
    presence. If only partial, rotational presence is substituted for
    permanent presence, then, depending upon the rotational design, savings
    can be more substantial. In other words, we found no single, definitive
    comparison for permanent versus rotational presence. Each case must be
    examined individually.'' We agree with the RAND report--there are
    numerous factors in determining the cost of permanently stationed
    forward-based force against a rotational force.   [See page 38.]

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                               February 25, 2015

    =======================================================================

                       QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS

        Ms. Tsongas. General Breedlove, Poland, Germany, and Turkey are all
    considering PATRIOT for their Air and Missile Defense requirements,
    Congress recognizes that in the United States, selection of PATRIOT
    would send a strong signal of trans-Atlantic commitment from our North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies.
        General, how would Poland, German, Turkey selection of PATRIOT be
    perceived in your area of responsibility?
        General Breedlove. The United States maintains a Global Response
    Force, including PATRIOT missile units, which is capable of rapidly
    deploying to respond to a range of worldwide contingencies. These
    United States forces, along with the capabilities of North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies, provide flexible options to defend
    our NATO Allies in the event of an imminent threat.
        Heavy global Combatant Command demand for ballistic missile defense
    forces has the U.S. Patriot force stretched to capacity. Thus, the
    future acquisition of these forces by our Allies will address critical
    shortfalls in NATO capability, alleviate the burden on overstretched
    U.S. PATRIOT forces, send a clear signal of cooperation, recognize the
    need to generate modern defense capabilities, and demonstrate a
    commitment to protect our strategic interests.
        Current proposals for PATRIOT systems are being reviewed by the
    Governments of Poland and Turkey, and European Command (EUCOM) is
    working with the Department of State and the Department of Defense to
    advocate for the selection of PATRIOT. In the context of Turkey and
    Poland, the level of technology transfer to improve domestic industrial
    capabilities, the participation by those nations in the continued
    development of PATRIOT technology and the long term commitment of the
    United States to continue development of the PATRIOT system are
    critical considerations. Turkey and Poland are important regional
    partners for EUCOM, and hold significant influence in regional
    security. Acquisition of Patriot by these nations would be an important
    signal to their regional partners and other NATO Allies that could lead
    to additional, potentially multilateral, acquisition of a similar or
    complementary capability. With regard to Germany, they are currently
    equipped with PATRIOT and are ably employing this weapon system
    alongside the United States and Spain in NATO's Operation ACTIVE FENCE.
        All acquisitions of capable and interoperable air and missile
    defense systems work to strengthen the collective defensive capability
    available to the Alliance to defend NATO populations, territory, and
    forces. This growing capacity should give pause to those who would
    potentially use air and missile systems against members of the
    Alliance.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
        Mr. Shuster. The United States manufactures a number of weapons
    systems that our allies in Europe can utilize to offset the military
    advantages of Russia. Countries like Poland are increasingly looking to
    proven weapons systems, such as the PATRIOT Air and Missile Defense
    System, which are maintained and modified right here in America at
    Letterkenny Army Depot in my district. In light of this, how do you
    believe we can best utilize our organic industrial base to assist
    allies our allies in the region?
        Secretary Wormuth. The United States has a strong domestic
    industrial base that is a global leader in the development of advanced
    technology and is well-placed to assist Allies and partners in Europe
    with emerging requirements. Once specific needs are established, the
    Department of Defense works with industry and the potential customer to
    develop a responsive and competitive offer that leverages our unique
    capabilities. As with all cases, any weapon systems cooperation efforts
    with our Allies and partners will consider the best use of U.S.
    domestic shipyards, depots, and arsenals to maintain and modify those
    systems, and also must comply with national laws and regulations. We
    are committed to doing all we can to continue supporting our defense
    industrial base.
        Mr. Shuster. Ms. Wormuth, how would you characterize U.S.-Russian
    relations? Would you call President Obama's ``reset'' policy a success?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Russian Federation's military capabilities
    and modernization, coupled with its ongoing violations of its
    neighbors' sovereignty, are undermining stability and security in
    Europe and threatening the international order. Russia's actions of
    concern include the ongoing occupation and attempted annexation of
    Crimea, its occupation of the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
    in Georgia, and violations of its international obligations under
    nuclear and conventional arms control agreements.
        The Administration's reset policy netted positive results before
    Russia chose its current course. Under the reset policy, we cooperated
    on the Northern Distribution Network, a series of logistics
    arrangements connecting Baltic and Caspian ports with Afghanistan via
    Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus; agreed to reduce nuclear
    weapons and their proliferation with the New Strategic Arms Reduction
    Treaty and a 123 Agreement on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy;
    obtained Russian cooperation in the United Nations for our actions in
    Libya; and jointly agreed to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons
    stockpiles.
        Mr. Shuster. In response to continued Russian violations of the
    Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Secretary of Defense Ash
    Carter recently stated ``U.S. responses must make clear to Russia that
    if it does not return to compliance, our responses will make them less
    secure than they are today.'' How do you think the United States should
    best respond to these violations, and do you believe that the United
    States should continue to abide by the treaty if the Russians will not?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Department of Defense continues to support
    efforts to convince the Russian Federation to return to compliance with
    the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty while protecting the
    security interests of the United States and our allies and partners.
    The security of the United States and its allies is not negotiable.
        The INF Treaty benefits the security of all of the Treaty parties,
    including the United States and the Russian Federation. The INF Treaty
    also benefits our allies and partners in Europe and Asia. For that
    reason, we are continuing to comply with the INF Treaty while we
    determine whether we can convince Russia to return to compliance with
    it. However, our patience is not without limits, and we are considering
    an array of responses that would seek to ensure that Russia gains no
    significant military advantage from its violation.
        If Russia does not come into compliance, it will ultimately require
    the United States to take action to protect our interests and security
    along with those of our allies and partners. Those actions will make
    Russia less secure. Some of those options are INF Treaty-compliant, and
    some are not.
        Mr. Shuster. Ms. Wormuth, the United States continues to reinforce
    our commitment to our NATO allies through the use of Operation Atlantic
    Resolve, which increased United States military rotational deployments,
    and the European Reassurance Initiative, which provided $1 billion to
    reassure and build partner capacities. Should our support to the region
    expand beyond our NATO partners to countries at risk of illegal
    occupation and if so, what should be the extent of our assistance?
        Secretary Wormuth. OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE (OAR) is a
    demonstration of our continued commitment to the collective security of
    the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies and dedication to
    the enduring peace and stability in the region, in light of the Russian
    intervention in Ukraine specifically. In meeting our global security
    commitments, the United States must have strong, committed, and capable
    Allies, which is why we have fought, exercised, and trained with our
    European Allies for the past 70 years. Aided by the European
    Reassurance Initiative, OAR will remain in place as long as the need
    exists to reassure our Allies and deter Russia from further aggressive
    actions.
        In keeping with our goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace, our
    support should and does extend beyond our NATO Allies. For example, we
    plan to sustain a significant level of security assistance to Ukraine
    throughout this year. Congress appropriated $118 Million for fiscal
    year 2014 for Department of Defense activities in Ukraine, and in
    fiscal year 2015, Congress appropriated at least an additional $75
    Million for Ukraine. We are also providing additional funds for
    security assistance to Georgia and the Republic of Moldova to support
    their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity in light of
    recent aggressive Russian actions.
        The Department of Defense continues to monitor the evolving
    security situation in Europe, particularly along the southern and
    eastern regions, and is prepared to adjust the level of assistance
    necessary to reassure NATO Allies and partners in the region of our
    commitment to collective security.
        Mr. Shuster. Last week, German broadcaster ``ARD'' broke the story
    that German soldiers made an effort to disguise their lack of arms by
    painting wooden broomsticks black and attaching them to their armored
    vehicles during a NATO exercise last year, in an effort to make them
    look like heavy machine guns. Media reports have also indicated that 41
    percent of German soldiers lack pistols they would carry in a genuine
    rapid deployment situation; and 31 percent of their MG3 general-purpose
    machine-guns are absent. Given this information, do you still believe
    our NATO allies in the region are prepared to honor their Article 5
    obligation in the face of major threats such as Russia?
        General Breedlove. I fully believe that every North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) Ally is prepared to honor Article 5 of the North
    Atlantic Treaty. However, the general decline in defense spending by
    many NATO Allies is threatening their ability to generate the right
    forces, capabilities, and readiness levels to respond to a changed
    European security environment highlighted by Russian aggression. As
    spelled out in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, every nation has a
    requirement to be capable of its own defense. Increased defense
    spending on the right capabilities, forces, and readiness is an
    unmistakable signal that NATO is fully prepared for any situation and
    provides a road map to meet our current strategic dilemma in responding
    to aggression in Europe. At the September 2014 NATO Summit in Wales,
    Allied leaders committed to raise and maintain defense spending minimum
    of 2 percent of gross domestic product. Several major European nations
    have announced significant increases in defense spending, and Germany
    itself announced it will increase defense spending by 6.2 percent per
    year for each of the next four years. However, we must remain engaged
    across the board with all our Allies to encourage them to abide by
    their pledge made in Wales.
        Mr. Shuster. You state in your written testimony ``After years of
    force structure and other personnel reductions, fewer than 65,000 U.S.
    military personnel remain permanently stationed in Europe . . . the
    size of our military presence forces difficult decisions daily on how
    to best use the limited resources we have to assure, stabilize, and
    support.'' In your estimation, how many personnel do you believe would
    be optimal to have permanently stationed in Europe given the array of
    threats the region currently faces?
        General Breedlove. The answer is not necessarily how many personnel
    are required but rather what capabilities are needed to meet the
    threats we currently face. United States European Command (EUCOM)
    requires, at minimum, the deferral of previously planned force
    reductions and an increased presence of U.S. forces in Europe through
    stepped-up rotations. These actions close the capacity gap in steady-
    state operations, enable building partner capacity and
    interoperability, provide a tangible measure of reassurance to the
    North American Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and partners, and
    demonstrate through unambiguous actions that the security commitment to
    Europe remains unshakable. Subject to the Global Force Management
    allocation process, the Army would augment presence through the
    rotation of continental United States (CONUS)-based units from an
    Armored Brigade Combat Team which is allocated to the NATO Response
    Force. The U.S. Navy could expand its presence in the Black and Baltic
    Seas as would the Marine Corps via its Black Sea Rotational Force. The
    U.S. Air Force would sustain its current air superiority force by
    rotating CONUS-based Air Forces squadrons to participate in Theater
    Security Package training and exercise events along NATO's Eastern
    Flank, and rotating C-130s in support of Mobility Air Force missions.
    Special Operations Forces would expand its presence to increase
    partnership activities in Central and Eastern Europe. Dedicated
    analytic support at EUCOM's Joint Intelligence Operations Center and
    NATO Intelligence Fusion Center would provide timely indications and
    warnings and enhanced exercise planning. With the exception of the
    aforementioned naval forces, these initiatives are currently nested and
    implementing the President 's European Reassurance Initiative.
        Mr. Shuster. General Breedlove, you state ``Russia uses energy as a
    tool of coercion.'' Last month the House passed the LNG [liquid natural
    gas] Permitting Certainty and Transparency Act, which expands export
    opportunities for the natural gas industry to send energy to nations
    like the Ukraine. America is blessed with an abundance of energy
    resources, including massive natural gas reserves such as the Marcellus
    shale, which is estimated to hold about 141 trillion cubic feet of
    technically recoverable natural gas reserves. In what other ways do you
    believe the United States can offset Russia's energy coercion with our
    own resources?
        General Breedlove. As the primary energy supplier to Ukraine and
    the Baltic states, the Russian Federation has the ability to
    unilaterally control the energy market in those countries, and has
    demonstrated on several occasions its willingness to do so. As voiced
    by Secretary of State Kerry, energy must not be used as a political
    weapon, and by opening those markets to U.S. natural gas suppliers at a
    competitive prices, Russia's stranglehold will be meaningfully
    weakened.
        More broadly, we should consider a whole of government approach--in
    collaboration with the Department of State and the Department of
    Energy, for instance--to expand Ukrainian access to energy supplies
    less vulnerable to Russian influence as well as provide technical
    expertise for improving power generation and distribution efficiency.
        (1) Optimize domestic energy production. The United States and the
    European Union have extensive expertise in both coal and nuclear plant
    optimization and could help Ukraine maximize efficiency from existing
    plants. Recent developments in clean coal technologies would be
    particularly useful in an already sizeable Ukrainian coal market.
        (2) Build-up renewable energy. Ukrainian officials are already
    calling for investment in green technologies to take advantage of the
    abundant natural resources in the country, particularly hydro, solar,
    and biomass.
                                     ______

                       QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. O'ROURKE
        Mr. O'Rourke. During the hearing, you stated that our NATO allies
    have pledged to bring their defense spending up to 2 percent of gross
    domestic product, in line with NATO requirements, following the Wales
    Summit in September 2014. When must other NATO members reach this
    benchmark to be compliant with the Wales Summit deal, and what are the
    consequences if they do not meet this goal?
        Secretary Wormuth. The pledge states that Allies will seek to
    increase defense spending in real terms as gross domestic product
    grows; and to move towards the 2 percent guideline within a decade.
    More significantly for the near term, Allies spending less than 2
    percent of gross domestic product on defense undertook to halt any
    further decline in defense spending. Allies agreed that progress would
    be reviewed at least annually and discussed at future Ministerials and
    Summits. This is the first time such a commitment has been made at the
    level of Heads of State and Government. It will empower Defense
    Ministers within European coalition governments to fight more
    effectively for adequate funding, with the support of the United States
    and other Allies. While there are no defined consequences for failing
    to meet the goals of the pledge, I will ensure allies who are in danger
    of falling into this category and fully understand the importance the
    United States puts on the pledge's fulfillment, and the high standard
    to which we hold members of the NATO Alliance.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ZINKE
        Mr. Zinke. Would you argue that a major leverage point against
    Russia is its economic frailty, and to what regard do you think the
    U.S. exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) to European markets will
    have on Russia's economy and influence in the region. Please give
    describe both short term implications (from the time the LNG is being
    exported) and long term implications.
        Secretary Wormuth. Although the Department of Defense does not have
    responsibility for liquefied natural gas (LNG) market issues, I agree
    that LNG market diversification in Europe would help to limit the
    leverage the Russian Federation has over European customers who are
    heavily reliant on Russian gas supplies, as well as provide alternative
    sources for European nations to ensure they are not reliant on a single
    supplier for their gas needs.
        The United States, in coordination with the European Union and
    other partners, has used targeted sanctions, including in the energy
    sector, to raise the costs to Russia for its actions in Ukraine over
    the past year, and this has had a sharp impact on the Russian economy.
    Over the long-term, Russia's failure to diversify and over-reliance on
    hydrocarbon sales would also have negative consequences, providing an
    important point of leverage on Russia.
        Mr. Zinke. Would you argue that a major leverage point against
    Russia is its economic frailty, and to what regard do you think the
    U.S. exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) to European markets will
    have on Russia's economy and influence in the region. Please give
    describe both short term implications (from the time the LNG is being
    exported) and long term implications.
        General Breedlove. The diversification of European energy sources
    and supply routes is a longstanding priority of U.S. energy diplomacy.
    Even before the current crisis in Ukraine, the Russian Federation has
    deftly used natural-gas supplies as leverage in pursuing long-term
    goals in the former Soviet space and in Europe as a whole. Growing
    availability of liquid natural gas has given Europe greater leverage in
    negotiations with Russia, and we should continue working with our
    partners on diversifying Europe's supply sources.

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