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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. “MAC” THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

For the first time in nearly a decade, the House Armed Services Committee meets today to hear testimony on threats facing our country from around the world.

And I have certainly been struck by the consensus of opinion from our most respected and practiced statesmen that our country faces a strategic environment today more complex, more diverse, and, in many ways, more dangerous than we have ever faced before.

I noticed just last week Dr. Henry Kissinger testified before the Senate that we have not faced a more diverse and complex array of crises since the end of the Second World War. And former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said we are living through a time of monumental change across the world.

Several observers have said if it was any one or two of these challenges we could probably deal with them, but it is the combination of things all happening at the same time that presents unprecedented national security challenges. From the continued modernization of nuclear programs to conventional and unconventional aggressiveness by rival competitors, to global spread of a terrorist ideology and dealing with new domains of warfare, a clear-eyed look around the world is sobering. And, as members of the National Defense Panel testified before us just about 2 months ago, they expect the situation to deteriorate further.

I think it is essential that we better understand this threat as we approach the annual National Defense Authorization Act and as we discuss with our colleagues the appropriate amount of money that needs to be spent to defend the country.

Today, we are pleased to welcome the new Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Vincent Stewart, as well as Acting Director for Intelligence for the Joint Staff, Mr. Mark Chandler, and the Director for Operations for the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General William Mayville, to give us a consumer perspective on intelligence.
I would ask unanimous consent that my complete opening statement be made part of the record.
And I would yield to the distinguished acting ranking member, Ms. Davis.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I certainly want to welcome our witnesses here today, and thank you very much for joining us.
I want to make just a few comments that Ranking Member Adam Smith had prepared in response to this hearing today on the worldwide threats.
As you acknowledge, Mr. Chairman and others, the world is a dangerous and complicated place, and it seems to be getting more complicated.
It is easy to recite a list of challenges. We see Russia seizing the territory of Ukraine and supplying men, weapons, and assistance to the rebels there.
In recent months, North Korea conducted a cyberattack against a major movie studio, bringing home to many Americans not just the challenge posed by the regime but the very real ways in which cyber operations can impact all of our lives.
While we are engaged in very difficult negotiations with the Iranian regime, they continue to pose challenges in a number of places, such as backing the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Assad regime in Syria.
At the same time, both they and we are assisting the Iraqi Government in its struggles with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, known as ISIL. ISIL and the Syrian conflict at large provide a seemingly endless list of potential challenges and threats, from waves of refugees to stabilizing neighborhood regimes, to the spread of terrorism, to broader Sunni-Shia fighting, to foreign fighters returning home, and the list goes on.
Even as all of this continues, Al Qaeda core has not entirely been eliminated, and some Al Qaeda offshoots continue to plot attacks against us and cause further regional problems. We cannot take our eye off that ball, just as we need to be very cognizant that we still maintain troops in Afghanistan. And that country, while vastly better off than before, is still very fragile.
And, similarly, Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state, is currently conducting major and effective operations against some internal extremist threats but hardly all of them, and the future stability of Pakistan is not a settled matter.
As we look long term, Russia's role in Europe and Asia is not clear, but their recent actions and their renewed and ongoing military buildup are not encouraging signs. Although we should not assume an adversarial relationship with China, their actions in the South China Sea and their military developments bear watching.
In summary, the world has hardly become less complex since the fall of the Iron Curtain. While we may not face the same existen-
tial threat posed by the Soviet Union, the threats we face today are still very real and, again, very complex.

An increase in deep understanding of these threats and the trends and developments that drive them is key for this committee as we work to shape the defense budget and help the Department of Defense [DOD] and the rest of the national security establishment in their ongoing actions in our defense.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We look forward to the presentations today.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Ms. Davis.

For the members’ information, our plan is to have a closed classified session, as time and interest permits, after the open session. So I would just remind everybody we are in open session here and to keep that in mind with the questions. And, obviously, our witnesses will remember that too. That closed session will take place in 2212.

Again, I want to thank you all for being here.

Without objection, your complete written statements will be made part of the record.

And right now we would certainly turn it over to you for any oral statements you would like to make.

General Stewart, welcome.


General Stewart, Thank you, sir.

Good morning, Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Davis, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify and for your continued support to the dedicated intelligence professionals of the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]. I am honored to serve as their director and to represent them at this hearing.

I am also pleased to be joined today by Lieutenant General William Mayville, Director of Operations at the Joint Staff, and Mr. Mark Chandler, Acting Director of Intelligence for the Joint Staff.

Mr. Chairman, the global security environment is the most challenging of our lifetime, a confluence of political, military, social, and technological developments which, taken in aggregate, have created security challenges more diverse and complex than any we have ever experienced. Our challenges range from highly capable, near-peer competitors to empowered individuals with nefarious intentions.

Increasing demands, coupled with today’s challenging fiscal environment, have stressed our defense and intelligence establishments and forced us to accept greater risk. This strategic environment will be with us for some time, and the threats’ increasing scope, volatility, and complexity have become the new normal.

Your DIA focuses on a myriad of threats, actors, and challenges, as noted in our written statement to the committee. I will highlight three of our priorities in my oral remarks.
One, capable military competitors. Russian military activity, for example, is at historically high levels. Moscow is pursuing aggressive foreign and defense policies, including conducting destabilizing operations in the Ukraine, conducting a record number of out-of-area naval operations, and increasing its long-range aviation patrols.

In addition, Beijing is focused on building a modern military capable of achieving success on the 21st-century battlefield and advancing its core interests, which include maintaining its sovereignty, protecting its territorial integrity, and projecting its regional influence.

Two, an increase in vulnerable and ungoverned territory due to the erosion of moderate and secular Islamic states.

While coalition strikes have degraded ISIL’s ability to operate openly in Iraq and Syria, the group retains the ability to conduct limited offensive operations and is seeking to expand its presence and influence beyond these two countries.

Governments in countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, and Lebanon are under stress from a variety of sources, thereby reducing their capability, as a region, to confront the threat posed by violent extremists. The breakdown of order of Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and northern Nigeria are fertile spawning grounds for the growth of terrorist organizations that can pose a significant threat to the U.S. homeland and our allies.

Moreover, Al Qaeda core leaders and followers retain transnational-attack capability and will seek to use its remaining personnel to target Western interests in South Asia and worldwide.

Three, malign actors seeking to challenge the U.S. and our allies in space and cyber domains.

China and Russia increasingly recognize the strategic value of space and are focusing on diminishing our advantage. Both countries are conducting anti-satellite research and developing anti-satellite weapons with the intent of denying the U.S. the use of space in the event of conflict.

For the Department of Defense, the cyber threat is particularly alarming because of the interconnected nature of our military weapons, communications, and networks. At low cost, with limited technical expertise, our adversaries have the potential to cause severe damage and disruption to U.S. systems, leaving little or no footprint behind.

Finally, the exponential growth of communications; both mobile and social media have the potential to magnify international crises and shorten our already compressed decisionmaking cycle.

In closing, I would be remiss if I did not note my concern about the impacts of sequestration on DIA and other members of the military intelligence community. The demand signal for more intelligence from our consumers, including the Congress, has never been greater. Sequestration and the support to crisis operations around the globe has forced us to accept risk in important areas that will have a direct and lasting impact on our ability to provide high-quality, nuanced intelligence required by policymakers and warfighters. I fear that the true cost of these difficult choices today may be paid on the battlefield of the future.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity. We look forward to answering the questions of the committee.

[The prepared statement of General Stewart can be found in the Appendix on page 40.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Who is next?
You all do not have oral statements that you are going to make?
Mr. CHANDLER. That is correct, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Good. Thank you.
General, let me just ask one preliminary question; then I want to get to my colleagues, who obviously have a lot of things on their minds.

For some time, I have cited this book, “America’s First Battles,” where the editors write that “the record of Americans’ ability to predict the nature of the next war, not to mention its causes, location, time, adversaries, and allies, has been uniformly dismal.”

I think General Dempsey has said we have a 100 percent record of getting it right zero percent of the time, of who we are going to fight in our next war.

So do you agree that that is kind of the history of things, we are not very good at predicting? And, secondly, would you amplify a little bit about how resources affect DIA’s ability to gather intelligence and help us be prepared for whatever threat may be coming next?

General STEWART. Congressman, I think historically the community has done a fairly decent job of predicting, in the past, crisis. I think that is getting more complex. I think the ability to cover the globe with the intelligence capability of either the Department or our partners is making it very difficult to see the world, see it in a timely manner, and deliver, convincingly, the argument that says there is a crisis looming.

I think it is also complicated by social media and the current use of media around the globe. Many times, what we can in fact detect is, does it give sufficient warning across the globe?

So our ability to warn is being reduced. Our ability to influence the action compellingly is being reduced. And I don’t see it getting any easier, quite frankly.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

General Mayville, let me ask you briefly, from a consumer-of-intelligence perspective, just give us, if you will, an overview of the challenges you face in your job as the J–3 in the sort of security environment we are in now.

General MAYVILLE. Thank you, sir.

First off, it is important to remember that every one of our adversaries studies us. So, as we evolve and prepare, they take close lessons of our last fight and they look for indications of how we will fight tomorrow. This is dynamic. So one of the challenges is we always come up against adversaries that are well-prepared against us.

Intelligence typically falls down, at least initially, in the last 300 meters of the fight, the tactical fight. I think we are very good at broad, strategic directions. We get a sense of operationally what is in the art of the possible. And indications and warnings vary, but, by and large, I think we have a general sense of the trajectory of
how things are going. Where we typically suffer is understanding the last 300 meters.

And that requires that we have an adaptive force, a force that is well-versed in a wide range of capabilities. But we have leaders that have been developed so that we can shift and adapt to the environment that we have. I saw that in the initial steps of the OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom], when we came in focused against Republican Guard divisions, very much trained for that type of fight, and literally overnight, the nature of the fight changed on us, and we had a different fight on our hands. And what you saw over the last decade or so was an adaptive force that figured it out.

I would say that one of the challenges we have, particularly with non-state actors, is the demand for intelligence is insatiable. It is, in some ways, more complex to try to figure out what is going on. So many other factors impact what your adversary is doing outside just—the traditional military lines of operation. What is going on inside the communities? What is going on inside the tribal constructs? Where are their sources of power? How are they getting that together?

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

Well, I suspect other members will want to explore further how well we have done at predicting state actors, like Russia and Ukraine, and how well we did in predicting ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and a variety of other challenges.

But I will yield to Ms. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And perhaps this is just following up somewhat. I think in even in a whole-of-government approach, because one of the things that we know is that we don't always understand what is going on—on the ground, of course. And I am wondering if you could speak to, I guess, where, in fact, we approach things in a way that we least understand.

And as an example, the Shia-Sunni divide. And do we expect that a Shia government can incorporate, can be inclusive when it comes to the region and the Sunnis there, as well? And there are other examples like that.

Are those some of the ways in which we really have great difficulty trying to understand the dynamics in the region?

General STEWART. I think part of the challenge, our military intelligence was designed for a different type of adversary—large formations constructed to be easily seen and defined.

The conflict we face now is much more diffused. Understanding cultures and understanding tribal interactions and understanding really the deep intent behind some of these extremist ideologies is hard to define with the existing system.

You need probably a much more robust human intelligence capability to get after some of the intentions and the culture and the ideology differences in order to be really effective. We are really
good at finding large formations, targeting large formations, and watching those movements, but some of the nuances that come with individuals and leadership intentions become really, really difficult.

Mrs. DAVIS. Mr. Chandler, did you want to——

Mr. CHANDLER. Ma’am, I will echo General Stewart’s comments, when you look at the cultural intelligence aspects of this and understanding the societies and the interaction between the societies.

And another aspect to go into is the historical nature of some of these conflicts and the tribal alliances that you start to look at, not just in a Sunni-Shia but, as that spreads out, around the globe. The societies that we are looking at, and as General Mayville alluded to, looking deeper into some of the threats and some of the challenges we face, go much beyond state actors, go much beyond what we see in a Western society. And that is where we have to take our intelligence capabilities and look on a different level and in a different contextual framework.

Mrs. DAVIS. Are we positioned to do that?

Mr. CHANDLER. Ma’am, I think we are. I think it is a process that we go through.

As General Stewart said, we are great at finding big formations, targeting them, and then turning that over to our operational elements. However, we have a good core of young intelligence professionals, and we have to nuance this. We have to work our way through an understanding of how we take the large formations, understanding tribal societies and elements and the changes, and look at history. We cannot ignore history, and bring that core of intelligence professionals up.

It’s not an all technological advantage that we can utilize here; it is an understanding. And I think we have a good core of professionals that are starting to work their way through that. So we have the core capability, yes, ma’am.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

I am going to yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to thank you for having this hearing. It is so important that we discuss these threats and bring them to the country’s attention.

And, to each of you gentlemen, thank you for the service that you render to our country, and thank you for being here today. And one of the things that we benefit so much from you being here for is that you are able to give us not just the Department’s view but you are able to give us your best professional military judgment. And that is what I am asking for now.

And, General, for you, here is the dilemma that I have, is, as I listen to you, it obviously concerns me and scares me, as we see all of these enormous threats that are around the world. And yet I look at what we have been doing as a nation for the last 6 years. We cut $780 billion dollars out of national defense before sequestration even got there, and then we got another $500 billion with sequestration. And it looks like those curve lines for our national defense are going down and these threats are just proliferating around the globe.
And so the question I would ask of you today, on your best professional military judgment is: Did the Pentagon just miss all of this that was happening, or did we just ignore it?

General Stewart. Congressman, I think most of the service chiefs have been on the record as saying that the requirements continue to go up while resources continue to go down——

Mr. Forbes. But, General, let me just, if I can—because I respect you so much. They did not. On that $787 billion dollars, I pleaded with them, “Tell us what we need,” and they continued to come up, not sequestration, but up until sequestration, they kept saying, we are good to go with this.

And we just need to learn, maybe from our mistake, and this is our opportunity to do it. Looking back in hindsight, not putting fingers on anybody, did we make a mistake by making all those drastic cuts, when we now see all of these huge threats around the world?

General Stewart. I will offer only this, Congressman. The threat, the requirements for the intelligence community is growing. The resources are going down. The risk is getting greater. At some point, there are things that we will have to say we cannot do.

That’s where we are today. At some point, I will have to come back and identify the things, one through X, that we can do, and everything else will have to be risk. And I’m not comfortable at all with that posture.

Mr. Forbes. General Mayville, in your estimation, your best professional military judgment, looking at it now with hindsight, did we make mistakes by making that many cuts that we did, when we look at these threats that are out there? And did we miss these things, or did we just ignore them?

General Mayville. I won’t look back, Congressman, but I will look forward. I think that we, and what I saw in testimony from the service chiefs is a broad agreement that we have the military we need to meet today's requirements, that we are at minimally acceptable levels for what is required today.

If you are asking me, what are the trend lines for the future, my concern is that we continue to see new threats, threats that have studied us, both state and non-state actors. And I am concerned about our ability to posture ourselves to meet tomorrow's threats.

I think we have the best military—I know we have the best military in the world, and I am confident that we can meet all of the requirements our Nation gives us today. I am, however, concerned about the future.

Mr. Forbes. And, Mr. Chairman, I would just go on the record as saying, because I know you have been preaching this same sermon, but, for the last several years, I have just seen cut after cut after cut to national defense. And now we come in today and we see these enormous risks around the globe. And I think, at some point in time, we need to say enough is enough and begin getting those curve lines turned back in the right direction.

And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.

The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Walz.

Mr. Walz. I pass.

The Chairman. Mr. Takai.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chandler, you have made the statement that we cannot ignore history. And I just hope that we can learn from——
The Chairman. Excuse me. I am sorry, Mr. Scott. It is this Texas accent that people are having trouble with. I want to stay on this side of the aisle, and then I will come back. I——
Mr. Scott. I understand.
The Chairman. Yeah. No, I said Mr. Takai.
Mr. Takai. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Stewart, with all the focus on the Middle East, can we shift gears and tell me what currently is the biggest threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific area?
General Stewart. There are a number of things in the Asia-Pacific area that causes me concern.
North Korea’s destabilizing action is cause for concern. They continue to modernize their military. They continue to seek nuclear capability. That is very destabilizing on the peninsula.
We also see extended operations by the Chinese, as they modernize their military forces and extend their reach into areas such as the South China Sea. Those are destabilizing factors.
Those are probably the two biggest ones in the region.
Mr. Takai. Okay. Thank you.
General Mayville, how does our current force posture in the Pacific align with these responding threats in the Pacific?
General Mayville. In the Pacific, we want to make sure that we have—and we do have—the requisite forces to deter a DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] aggression. We want to make sure that we can dissuade them of the use of nuclear capabilities. We want to be present in meaningful numbers to assure our allies of our U.S. commitment and our reliability. We want to have a presence in the region, and we do have a presence in the region, sufficient to preserve the freedom of navigation through international laws and norms. And we want to have the ability to sustain our presence and be ready not just for what is required today but to be postured to respond to a contingency tomorrow.
Mr. Takai. Thank you.
So would reductions in the U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific exacerbate the current security challenges that we have?
General Mayville. I am not aware of any reductions, planned reductions, within the Department for our forces in the Asia-Pacific. But I think that if what you are referring to is how might the lack of resources impact our current capabilities and presence, it would be significant.
Mr. Takai. Thank you.
Maybe more specifically, there is some discussions regarding possible force reductions on the Army side, in Hawaii specifically. Can you talk about those reductions affecting the security challenges in the Asia-Pacific area?
General Mayville. I apologize. I can’t speak to an Army-specific decision, as, again, I am unaware. But I will take that back and make sure we get you a response from the Army on that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]
Mr. Takai. Okay. Thank you.
And are any countries in a position to prevent the United States from effectively operating in the Western Pacific?

Either of you can answer that.

General Stewart. China has done extensive training to counter U.S. forces in the region. They have sophisticated air and missile and space defense capabilities. I think that they are designing their forces to challenge military presence of the United States in the region. They have fairly sophisticated missile systems that can counter a number of our platforms.

And we would certainly welcome an opportunity to talk a little bit more about this in closed session, but I think both China’s training and some of their weapons capabilities are a significant threat to our forces.

Mr. Takai. Thank you.

One last question. Do you think we are losing, you are speaking about China. What about technology? Do you think we are losing our technological edge to China?

General Stewart. I do not believe we are losing our technological edge to China, but I do believe China has a concerted effort to, as much as possible, gather intellectual property to close the gap between our technological edge and their capability. I do not believe, at this point, that we are losing our technological edge, but it is at risk based on some of their cyber activities.

Mr. Takai. Okay. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

General Stewart, if you don’t mind, if you would pull your microphone closer to your mouth. Especially when you turn your head, it gets a little hard to hear up here in the stratosphere. I would appreciate it.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank each of you for being here today.

And as we are talking about threats to the American people and security around the world, I want to join with Congressman Forbes. I believe that we are at the most dangerous period since 1939 in the instability around the world, the threats to the American people.

And he has already brought up, Congressman Forbes, that there has been projected a trillion dollars in reductions in our defense capability. The result of that is that we will have the smallest Army, and the American people need to know this, the smallest Army since 1939, the smallest Navy since 1916, the smallest Air Force since it was created in 1947.

This is in contravention to something that we learned during the Cold War: Peace through strength. By having a strong military, the American military produced a situation with the broadest spread of democracy in the history of the world. Dozens of countries became free because we had a strong national defense. But the consequence of what I see going on today, under this administration, is putting the American people at risk.

An additional risk is cyber warfare. And for each of you, how would you characterize the disruptive and destructive cyber threats
to the Department of Defense network from state actors and from terrorist organizations such as ISIL and Al Qaeda?

General Mayville.

General MAYVILLE. Thank you, Congressman.

To your point, I think a smaller force puts a greater demand on the force you have. I think it also puts a demand on their families. It will force us to have a greater reliance on our allies and partners, and it will cause us to make tough decisions in terms of operational priorities.

On cyber and the ability of the Department of Defense to defend its networks, I am very, very confident in our abilities to defend our network. It is an area that we look at every day. I am well aware of the intrusions, or attempts at intrusions, and have confidence in our systems, and in our training, as well as in Cyber Command, to address the current threats.

General STEWART. Our ability to defend the networks is pretty strong, but the threat is growing from a number of nation-states: Russia, China, Iran.

The cost of entry in cyberspace operations is pretty low. It doesn't take a really high-tech capability to do damage to our networks. And you only have to get it right once. So the threat is real from a wide range of actors, nation-states and non-nation-states.

So the challenge, I think, going forward for us is, how do you see the threat environment more discretely? Because this is really a tough space. We have built tremendous capabilities to defend our network and to maybe even conduct offensive operations. What we have not done, I believe, is built the intelligence capability to see the threat early enough, warn early enough, rather than reacting to an attack on our network.

Also, the intelligence required to do anything offensively is pretty exquisite. And so I don't know that we have invested sufficiently in that capability to do cyberspace operation in its fullest extent.

Mr. CHANDLER. I would just echo the general's comments on being able to identify the threat early enough based on the complexities of the cyber environment. That is what we have to look at into the future and be able to identify that. We have a great cyber capability within the Department of Defense, but the problem is identifying those threats to the networks early enough.

Mr. WILSON. And I have a real concern, too, of adversaries coming into our systems and determining the technology we have and replicating it to match whatever defensive capabilities we have.

And, General Mayville, I appreciate your comments relative to working with our allies, but, due to economic stagnation that is existent in many countries around the world, particularly allies to the United States and Europe, there is a shift, where the military budgets are extraordinarily reduced to virtually nonexistence.

And so I am very concerned at the thought that we might be counting on countries that, actually, their view is, if not America, who? And so it is not them. And so I look forward to working with you to try to help work together.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Ashford.

Mr. ASHFORD. Pass.
The CHAIRMAN. You pass?
Mr. Moulton.
Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony here this morning and your service to the country.

Having spent some time in the Department of Defense myself, I understand that the strength of our Nation's military is about our capabilities. And there is not always a strict correlation between the strength of a military and the size of the budget or the number of personnel. As a platoon commander in Iraq, there were times when I would have gladly traded another 40-man platoon for one ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] feed.

And so the point is we really have to understand as best we can what the threats are going forward. And I am relatively new to this committee, but it strikes me that much of the testimony we have heard just over the past few weeks has been focused on Russia and China. Now, hearing you describe your own capabilities at the DIA, you note that you are very good, really good, at finding large formations and big adversaries but, also, that many of today's threats are more diverse, dispersed, and difficult to understand.

My question is, looking very broadly and looking long-term, how much do you believe that our focus on Russia and China is a product of the defense intelligence establishment we have built, designed to focus on those larger adversaries, versus a very conscious balance of the threats from those larger adversaries and the terrorist organizations and other dispersed threats that we see around the globe today?

General STEWART. While some of the more dispersed threats can do us harm, Russia and China could be our most existential threat. And so the focus is probably appropriate, to spend time looking and understanding Russian and Chinese capability because they pose the gravest threat to our Nation.

Striking the right balance, though, so that we can cover down on the globe, really, from destabilizing influence, ungoverned spaces across the globe, becomes increasingly challenging.

So I think we are postured about as good as the force that we have today. I would like to see us understand ISIL and Syria and Libya and all those other countries in a lot greater detail, but those are probably some areas we will take risk just because, although they can do us harm, they don’t pose an existential threat to the United States.

Mr. MOULTON. That is very helpful. Thank you.

I would like to shift for a moment to Iraq, in particular, and to your written testimony. You note that defeats of the ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] and the collapse of multiple [Iraqi] army divisions highlight large-scale institutional deficiencies within the ISF.

I would like your opinion on how much it is the institutional deficiencies within the ISF that are at question here or deficiencies within the GOI, the Government of Iraq, that have led to a lack of trust and fundamental corruption within the armed services of Iraq.

General STEWART. I think it may be a little bit of both. I think the forces are not as well trained, not as well equipped, not as well organized, not well paid, and that stems right from the senior lead-
ership and the Government of Iraq. So I think that it is a little bit of both.

General MAYVILLE. There are multiple lines of effort to counter the threat posed by ISIL in Iraq and Syria. The preponderance of those lines of efforts, however, fall outside the military domains. And I think it is very, very important that the pace of operations be such that the military lines of operation, the military lines of effort, don’t get out in front of the political lines of effort that must be achieved in order to get an enduring solution here.

And I think that, as you think about this conflict and what is it going to take to really resolve it, you will find that the finishing solutions exist outside the military tool bag, if you will, and that the management of this campaign and the pace of this campaign has got to be one where what we can achieve militarily does not get out in front of what must be achieved politically.

And I will leave it there.

Mr. MOULTON. Yes, sir.

General STEWART. Can I add also, one of the things that really concerns me going forward, if the Shia forces believe that they can control ISIL without reconciliation with the Sunnis, that could cause some additional issues. So that will not drive towards reconciliation.

The CHAIRMAN. Time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Stewart, can you say, over here. Can you say anything about how Russia, in this venue, is using their Open Skies flights over the United States? And as the principal intelligence officer for the Secretary of Defense, can you tell us if that concerns you? And what are those concerns?

General STEWART. The Open Skies construct was designed for a different era. I am very concerned about how it is applied today. And I would love to talk about that in closed hearing.

Mr. ROGERS. Okay.

Staying with Russia, do you have believe or do you have an assessment as to whether Russia is in any way making moves to come back into compliance with the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty?

General STEWART. There have been some Russian officials who have talked about whether the INF Treaty is still valid today. And there are some things that they are doing that are pushing the envelope. And, again, I regret to say I can talk more about this in closed session. But there have been some officials who have talked about the value of the INF Treaty going forward.

Mr. ROGERS. Yeah. I am one of those officials, you know. If we are the only team that is sticking to the treaty, then I don’t know why we are sticking with the treaty, since they are flagrantly violating it.

But I would love to visit this subject with you in private. And I understand that in this venue we can’t talk about it explicitly, but I think it is important for the record for us to note that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty and making no moves to come back into compliance.

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Aguilar.

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity to have this panel. For those new members, it has been very educational, so I very much appreciate it.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

Gentlemen, this committee has been exploring acquisition reform to ensure the military has the best possible equipment for the mission at the best possible cost.

General Stewart, you mentioned that the conflict is more diffused; it is a very different conflict now. What are your thoughts about how we best approach reform while ensuring the best capabilities to respond to these threats moving forward?

General STEWART. I am probably going to have to come back and follow up on this. I have asked the folks to look at ways that the intelligence community can be more interactive with the acquisition community. So, as the environment changes, how do we shape acquisition decisions throughout the entire process of the acquisition cycle and to be able to do that in a much more timely manner than we currently do today.

So I have some folks looking at that, and if you would allow me, I will come back and talk about how we might do this a little bit more efficiently than we do today. Because I don't think the system currently provides sufficient intelligence to shape the acquisition decisions and then during the process to adjust acquisition decisions as the environment changes.

So we are going to take a good, hard look at that. So if you will allow me, I will come back and talk about that in a separate session.

Mr. AGUILAR. Sure. Thank you very much.

I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here, and thank your families for supporting your efforts. And based on General Mayville’s right sleeve, I suspect those efforts have been quite considerable, to support you in your careers. I appreciate that.

General Stewart, getting back to Russia, I am concerned about Putin and his intentions. Obviously, everyone is. Can you talk to us about the impact that these lower oil prices are having on his ability to maintain his position, the elites in the country, as to what their perspectives are on keeping him in place? And are there any particular threats to him?

And then do you see him accelerating his mischief in eastern Russia to Eastern Europe, excuse me, to help his countrymen rally to the flag while he tries to do the guns-and-butter thing?

General STEWART. Congressman, Russian military modernization remains a strategic priority of the Russian government. In spite of
oil prices, in spite of the ruble value, in spite of the sanctions, that remains a strategic priority. And I don’t see any time in the near term that the effects of the sanctions or effect of the economy will change their desire to build strong strategic forces that will counter our efforts across the globe.

Mr. CONAWAY. I guess, General Stewart, what I am asking is, can you get inside Putin’s head? Can he maintain control in spite of those efforts?

He told his countrymen within the last 10 days, Russians will eat less. Can we do that kind of collection that allows us to try to foresee how he is going to help create the bogeyman that will either be NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] or us to keep his folks focused on Putin protecting them from the rest of the world?

General STEWART. I think he has already done that. I think he has made the West and NATO the bogeyman. And I think Russians will suffer—the Russian people will suffer far more than the Russian elites will, but it is probably something that Putin is comfortable with.

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay.

General STEWART. And if you would like to talk about Ukraine, I think you asked about Ukraine also?

Mr. CONAWAY. About what?

General STEWART. Or Eastern Europe? I will stop——

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, yeah. The Ukraine is a good example of Mr. Wilson mentioned 1939, that Stalin used the same technique.

Let’s switch gears a little bit. Taliban Five. Can you talk to us about the DIA’s role in the reversal of the White House position they should be detained to sending them Qatar? And was DIA consulted about what that continued detention in Qatar might look like?

General STEWART. DIA participates on the periphery to observe detainees who are transferred with conditions. We know that over the last 4 or 5 years, about 18 percent of detainees have gone back into business, confirmed to have gone back into business. About 11 percent are suspected of having gone back into business.

So if those numbers translate, of the five that were transferred, probably one in five could be expected to go back into the business.

Mr. CONAWAY. Yeah. Well, given that they are, I guess, going to be set free sometime, May-June timeframe, I guess to go back to Afghanistan if they can convince their families to go back to living in mud huts versus the palaces they are living in now, what would DIA’s role be in protecting the 10,000 or so U.S. troops we will have from these 5—either 1, 2, 3, or all 5 of them—working to hurt Americans?

General STEWART. So we continue to provide tactical intelligence support. We continue to look at monitoring the number of sources that would tell us whether these individuals have gone back into business. Directly, though, besides notifying folks that these terrorists have gone back into business, there is very little at this point the DIA could do——

Mr. CONAWAY. Yeah.

General STEWART [continuing]. Besides warning of their continued operations.
Mr. CONAWAY. I know you weren't the head of DIA at the time, but was DIA consulted on the potential, the transfer of these five in exchange for Sergeant Bergdahl?

General STEWART. I would have to get back to you. I do not know the answer to that one.

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay.

General STEWART. Let me take that one back, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. All right.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Like you, I can’t wait to get to the classified section.

We had a discussion here a moment ago about sequestration. The President’s budget blows through sequestration. The question will be ours, whether we accept that, both on the discretionary as well as on the military side. So the real question is not to the military; it is to us, as to whether we are willing to accept a level higher than the Budget Control Act.

A question, I think this will probably have to be in classified. The DIA, the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], the NSA [National Security Agency] coordination, cooperation, and the rest. If you would like to comment now, and maybe we will just save it until later. That will be my question in classified.

General STEWART. The level of cooperation between the agencies?

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes.

General STEWART. Sir, I have been doing this for about 30 years now; I have never seen better cooperation.

And on the battlefield the cooperation is excellent. And even here in Washington, which is where the competition really usually begins, the cooperation and the support for each other is unprecedented, in my opinion. And I have been watching this closely for the last 12 years I have been in the DC area. Very, very good relationship among us all.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I will let it go at that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Fleming.

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Mayville, during the height of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars in 2008, the Army had 48 Active Duty brigade combat teams [BCT]. By the end of the year, we will have 32 BCTs, based on the ongoing Army 2020 process. And if the Army fully executes additional reductions over the next few years, we may end up with between 24 to 26 BCTs.

I am concerned that the Army end strength we are building today and for tomorrow will not be able to meet the various threats we are discussing today.

So my question is, if the Active Duty Army was stressed to fulfill its missions in Iraq and Afghanistan with 48 BCTs, could we fulfill any combat mission in Iraq and Afghanistan today, let alone against some of the other worldwide threats we are discussing
today? And what will be the capability with an Army of only 24 BCTs?

General MAYVILLE. Well, I would add to the scenario that you just laid out, sir. I would also say that, you know, one of the things that we have seen less of is less forward-stationing of the forces. And I think, with a reduced number, the challenge we will face is, how much of the force do you want forward, shaping and preventing, and how much of the force do you want maintaining the high levels of readiness to respond to contingencies? The challenge will be the balance and a sense of operational priorities.

With regards to the situation that—the counter-ISIL mission that we have in Iraq and Syria today, that is a fundamentally different mission statement than the one that we had in the last 10 years under OIF. To that end, I think our strategy is sound. I think it is properly regionally focused. It’s Iraq-first framework to get the Iraqi forces, get their feet underneath them through building partnership capacity. And that train, advise, and assist is the right way. Use of the air campaign has frozen the most immediate threat posed by ISIL forces.

And I think that, as I said earlier, if I was to focus on one area of this campaign, it would be in the non-military lines of effort and the things that we need to do to get the diplomatic and the political outreach. Quite frankly, we need to see in Iraq political outreach that addresses the fact that some 20 million Sunnis are disfranchised with their government.

Dr. FLEMING. Well, I guess, let me approach it from another direction. Certainly, now that we have ISIS, or ISIL, something we didn’t have before, they are—have become a threat around the world and could be a huge threat. We could see another severe attack on the U.S. We may have to go back again, redo the work against a major force.

Do we have, with what we are going to end-strength with, 24 to 26 BCTs, do we have what it takes to deal with that, perhaps to destroy ISIL, as the President has suggested, indicated he would like to do, and to be able to deal with other threats around the world unrelated to ISIL?

General MAYVILLE. To defeat ISIL, we are going to need the partners, and we are going to need a partner in the Government of Iraq, and we are going to need partners in the region, and we are going to need the help of the coalition. This is not one that we would want to put squarely on the back of the United States military.

To that end, I think that the way we have resourced the fight, the phasing of our campaign plans is adequate. And, again, I point back to pace. I think that we can do a lot on the military lines of effort, but it cannot outpace what must be done politically.

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. GABBARD.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Stewart, you spoke briefly about your efforts, particularly in the Middle East, dealing with this Islamic extremist threat that we are seeing growing there. And I wondered if you could speak to how critical your assessments are and the intelligence
that you are gathering regarding the intent behind this extremist ideology informing the strategy to defeat this enemy. And what is that motivation? What is that intent?

General Stewart. I think ISIL, in this particular case, is a radical ideology that must be countered with a moderate ideology. I think they intend, if I were to try to ascribe intent, their intent is to destabilize large countries in the region, force Western countries to depart the region, and then, of course, as they have already stated, to create this Islamic state. It is based on a violent, extremist interpretation of Islam, and it is not, I would argue, common throughout the entire region.

So if I were to map out what ISIL would love to do, ISIL would love to have the United States and Western countries out of the region and slowly pick apart those other moderate nations who would counter their radical ideology. And if they could do that, then they could have a fairly easy opportunity to create this state that they think is appropriate for the region.

Ms. Gabbard. And what are the common elements that you find while much of the action has been occurring in Iraq and Syria, you listed a number of other countries in the Middle East. And we see what is happening in Libya, for example. What are the common elements that you see between these different actors, whether it be ISIL, Al Qaeda, AQAP [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula], Boko Haram? And the list goes on.

General Stewart. Ungoverned states, weak government institution, economic instability, poverty.

Ms. Gabbard. What are the, you are referring to the common elements between the different geographic locations——

General Stewart. That is correct.

Ms. Gabbard [continuing]. Or the common elements between these groups specifically?

General Stewart. The common element really is just a radical approach ideology. I think that is the common element.

ISIL can create, “create” in quotes, regions just by declaring that ISIL is in Libya. It doesn’t have to be anything substantive; it just has to create the impression that it is there and it is a different force to offer to the people in that region.

So I don’t know that there is anything more common than just the very extreme approach, very violent, very strict interpretation of the religion, and finding opportunities in ungoverned spaces.

Ms. Gabbard. I think it is important that we recognize this because as you are well aware, there is a debate right now about whether, about how this ideology, how this motivation must be identified in order to define our enemy, and in order to defeat this threat. And I think it is important as we look at dedication of resources, and strategy, and planning, that this identification of their motivation, of this radical Islamic ideology is made very distinctly, as we would with any other type of enemy.

I know for the members here who have served in the military at one point or another, when we look at a basic thing like the five-paragraph Operations Order, when we look at the situation, we look at and examine our enemy. We look at what their capabilities are, and what their motivations are. And so as we look at this
threat that exists both in the Middle East, and in countries in the
West, that we recognize this and identify it clearly.

Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. If I can just say amen to what the gentlelady
just said. As a matter of fact, we are going to have a hearing next
week on this very topic, and I think it is very, very important.

Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I appreciate you being here and your service to the
country. And Mr. Chandler, I know you said that we cannot ignore
history. I would certainly hope that we could learn from it as a
country. And the Sunnis and the Shias have been in conflict, shall
we say, since the seventh century. I find it hard to believe that a
Judeo-Christian nation can step in and referee that conflict and
that that fight won't just continue once the referee leaves. And I
think that is one of the things that we continue to see.

I want to speak with you briefly, though, about the U.S. involve-
ment and the things that we do that perhaps create the vacuum
that allow organizations like ISIL to expand. And if I could read
from what you presented: "In Libya, political instability and ongo-
ing militia violence have worsened over the year, exacerbating con-
ditions that have already made Libya an attractive terrorist safe
haven. ISIL has increased its presence and influence in Libya, par-
ticularly in Darnah, where it has begun establishing Islamic insti-
tutions. Without a unified government and capable military, there
is limited possibility of stability in the near-term."

People at the DOD and the White House made a decision to take
Qadhafi out. And part of that decision included not putting U.S.
troops on the ground to secure the weapons of Qadhafi. And now
that we have removed him, we acknowledge that the situation is
worse. Yet, we tried to do the same thing with Assad—the adminis-
tration did. And in undermining Assad, it created a vacuum that
in my opinion certainly allowed ISIL to grow in strength.

While at the same time we are engaged in these activities that
are close to or even neighboring Russia and China, we have Cen-
tral and South America that we have basically lost focus on, if you
will. And I would like you to speak to the issue of Russia and
China and the inroads that they are making in our backyard with
Latin America and South America, while we are focusing on these
parts that are so far away from us, and their potential threats to
the United States.

General STEWART. Congressman, even before ISIL, Russia con-
sidered the Western Hemisphere a place that they could stage, get
basing rights, and seek partners, if for nothing else, to curry votes
in the United Nations. China also has done the same thing.

So both for resources, and for partnership, and for influence, we
see China and Russia expanding their reach, establishing cultural
centers, establishing military bases that, to a lesser extent now
than they have, certainly, Russia has in the past. It is for influ-
ence. It is for resources. It is for opportunities in the region. So
that is not new as a result of ISIL, but it is ongoing.

Mr. SCOTT. Would you agree that we have paid more attention
to those parts of the world that are in China and Russia’s backyard
than we have to those parts that are in our backyard?
General Stewart. I don’t know that I would agree with that entirely.

Mr. Scott. Well, I certainly respect your opinion.

I would like to bring to the attention of the committee and other people one last statement in your presentation, “Speaking of Iran, the regime faces no insurmountable technical barriers to producing a nuclear weapon, making Iran’s political will a central issue.” And I think that is one of the reasons that we in the House have certainly tried to at least give the President the authority to bring more sanctions against Iran should they choose to go that path.

If I could, one last question: Iran’s, it has been reported that Iran has recently signed some type of agreement with Russia. Could you speak to that briefly?

General Stewart. I saw recently that the Iranians and the Russians were having some conversations. I have not seen anything that suggests that they have signed a recent agreement.

Mr. Scott. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the remainder of my time.

The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Veasey.

Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I wanted to ask the panel about the spread of terrorism on the continent of Africa. As was pointed out a little bit earlier, obviously, in northern Africa, and places like Libya where we have seen problems that are very well documented, and we know that there are starting to be some issues in other parts of Africa, and I wanted to ask you, what is your assessment of preventing the continent of Africa from going into the same level of disarray as so much of the Middle East seems to be in right now?

General Stewart. Congressman, that is a really tough question because so many of the conditions that we talked about that allows extremist ideology to grow, exists on the continent; ungoverned spaces, weak central government, weak security forces, extreme poverty. Those create opportunities that are exploited by this extreme ideology.

So there are a number of places across the continent. However, having said that, the African Union is starting to push back, and you are starting to see call for forces from moderate states on the continent to fight against those extreme ideologies. But the force alone, the military effort alone, will not stop this movement. It must be replaced by a moderate ideology with all of the other things that will keep that ideology from growing: Good governance, good security forces, good rule of law, all of those things that must be developed. Those are not military solutions, but they are critical to success if you are going to counter terrorism.

Mr. Veasey. How much does it trouble you that a, take for instance a large country like Nigeria, that has resources, they have oil money, they do spend a lot of money on military resources, but yet, they have been unable to, you know, to quell or extinguish a force like Boko Haram. When you look right next door to Nigeria at a country like Chad that is smaller in population, smaller in resources, but yet they were able to push out Boko Haram out of their country in an area that they had recently taken over.
What is your assessment of a, you know, you talk about disorganized governments, or governments where there is no stability, but a large government like Nigeria, is that troubling to you?

General Stewart. It is troubling in that the lack of leadership, the lack of commitment to developing the military, the lack of equipping those forces, caused Nigeria some challenges in, especially in the northeast, to counter Boko Haram. If there is any good news, the oil wealth is to the south and they would have to fight a long way in order to get to that. I am not sure that is their objective. So capitalizing on the oil resources is a long way off.

The other good news is that Chad, and Cameroon, and Niger, and other countries around the region, are starting to take on Boko Haram. So it is a violent, brutal movement, but it is at this point isolated to the northeast portion of Nigeria, and it is starting, we are starting to get some help from neighboring countries to counter that threat.

Mr. Veasey. Do you think that there is some more potential to work with Nigeria to be able to extinguish Boko Haram, or do you think that the government there is not stable enough yet, or not honest enough yet to where we can be able to really work with them, to be able to get this situation more under control?

As you know, there are many Members in Congress that are still, you know, concerned about, obviously, about the kidnapping of those girls, and the government's, I am not going to say unwillingness, but their inability to be able to, you know, have the intelligence and the military power to do something about that.

General Stewart. I think there are elections that will go on the 14th of February and I think the results of the election will give us a better sense of who we have to work with and what we can do to help. So stay tuned for 14 February for the elections, and what else we might be able to do with a new government.

We are concerned about the violence that might come with that election, quite frankly, and that will also shape what we can do in that country going forward.

Mr. Veasey. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Nugent.

Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank both generals for being here today and Mr. Chandler for your service to this country.

And I know this is not of your creation, sequestration. It is our creation. And I am obviously very concerned as, Mr. Thornberry is, in regards to how we move forward, because we know that the end strength of all of the services, but particularly the Army, at the end of this is going to put us in a very precarious situation. We also know that when we had, you know, a 500,000-man Army, we were stretched to the limit to try to fight in two different theaters where we wind up stretching the Army to 15-month deployments and, you know, stop-loss in regards to letting guys retire out that needed to retire.

And so I worry about how we are going to go forward. Like I said, sequestration is not your making. It is ours, and it is our re-
sponsibility, I think, to overturn sequestration as it relates to the military in particular.

But Lieutenant General Stewart, based upon where we are today with the dollars that we have, I mean, how, and maybe we can do this in a closed setting, how stretched are you to actually do all the things that we have talked about, and we have covered a litany of things from Africa, to Asia, you know, to Russia. How do we do that with the confines?

General Stewart. Are you talking from an intelligence standpoint or from forces?

Mr. Nugent. No, no, from an intelligence standpoint.

General Stewart. Yes, sir, we are pretty stretched. Can we talk about that in closed session?

Mr. Nugent. Absolutely.

General Stewart. Yes, sir.

Mr. Nugent. And I have other questions for the closed session.

With that, I yield back my time.

The Chairman. Mr. O'Rourke.

Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to build on the Chairman's comments about the challenges that we have had in predicting the threats that we will face and the kinds of wars that we will fight, and add to that, that we also seem to be challenged in predicting the consequences of our military interventions, whether they are in Iraq, Libya, more recently. And I wanted to ask you, General Stewart, and General Mayville, and Mr. Chandler, how those challenges in the past inform how we approach military interventions going forward and the potential threats that those interventions will generate.

General Stewart. I was trying to rack my brain for the quote about how difficult prediction is, but I couldn't come up with it. But it is hard work, and the environment continues to change, even as you make forecasts about what you think will happen.

So it is a very dynamic environment that especially now, has so many variables, and so many second- and third-order effects. The challenge I think, and we talked about this with my team recently, we are all very interested in the current fight. And so there is an incredible demand from us to talk about what is going on in Syria, and all those things are important.

But it peels away capability to look to the future, and so how we think about how we divide up the challenges from the current fight and allow organizations like DIA to really look deep, to think about what the world looks like 4 or 5 years from now, is one of the great challenges that I think I will face as the director.

Because the insatiable demand for current intelligence robs us of the ability to look a little bit deeper and think about the second- or third-order effects of our current actions. So we are going to try to do this a little bit better going forward. I can't promise you that we will get it all right, but hopefully we won't get it all wrong going forward.

Mr. O'Rourke. General Mayville, let me ask an additional question before you respond. Mr. Scott mentioned some of the vacuums our interventions unintentionally create, some of the problems that we are fighting today you can correlate to previous actions, military and otherwise, and decisions that we have made. How would you,
how are you approaching those second- and third-order consequences in arming moderate opposition forces in Syria, potentially sending weapons and aid to Ukraine?

General MAYVILLE. The training and equipping of moderate Syrian opposition groups fits within a broader counter-ISIL strategy. And in that strategy, it is Iraq first, finding a partner, by that a political partner, not just Iraqi security forces, but a political partner that we can work with. While we do that, we want to take initial steps to allow Syrian opposition groups to defend themselves against ISIL.

And we are just on the beginnings of that. There will be some bumps in the road. I think there will be some challenges as we move forward. I think the initial pace will be very deliberate. Maybe even the first numbers not particularly high, but I think there will be a certain amount of momentum. And I think as that evolves, we go back and look at where we are with the work we are doing to get the Government of Iraq and its military back up on its feet to look at the next phase, and I think you will find that the thinking on that is how do these two lines of operation complement each other.

With regards to the Ukraine, I think first we have got to recognize that what Russia is doing in the Ukraine, first and foremost, represents a challenge to NATO, and we are members of NATO, and we want to look at how we can support NATO. We want to look at responding to this within the context of NATO.

What is most important for us is that we maintain our ability to meet our Article 5 responsibilities. We will not allow that to be held at risk. And we need to look at what we can do to stiffen the confidence in us as a partner, as well as to assure our allies. Specifically, to what we can do in Ukraine, I think we need to look at a wider menu of options and explore that.

Mr. O’ROURKE. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time, but what I am really interested in knowing for the future is what potential threats are we generating by interventions in these two areas, Syria and Ukraine. But I will come back to you and maybe for the record get your response.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bridenstine.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to address the threat from Russia specifically. When you think about the aggressive actions they have taken going back to 2008 with the invasion and occupation of South Ossetia, and of Abkhazia inside Georgia; cutting off of energy going back to the 1990s; cutting off energy to the Baltic States, and people suffering, and in fact, people dying because they don’t have heat in the wintertime; cutting off energy to the Ukraine; threatening, you know, nuclear war in Poland because of a missile defense shield that had no offensive capability, but purely defensive; and of course, the invasion and occupation of Crimea.

And now we hear that the Russians are claiming that international law allows them to put nuclear weapons—we know they...
are in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty that has been established by this administration, and now they are claiming that they have the authority to put nuclear weapons in Crimea.

General Stewart, do you believe they have international law on their side when they put nuclear weapons in Crimea?

General Stewart. No, Congressman, I do not.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And as far as the reaction from the United States when this occurs, if it hasn’t already, and I would love to discuss this more in closed session, what is our reaction to that kind of activity?

General Stewart. I would defer the answer to that question to our policymakers, sir.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. Well, I look forward to getting an answer to that question, because that is a question that is going to be—Mr. Chandler, I see you smiling. Would you like to answer that?

Mr. CHANDLER. No sir, I just agree with General Stewart on deferring that question to the policymakers.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. Well, good. What I would like to say also, General Stewart, and I would like to commend you on the great testimony that you provided to Members of Congress, in particular, one line I think is important for every Member of this body to understand, which is you write that: “Rapidly-evolving commercial space technology will support the global pursuit of enhanced space and counter-space capabilities that may narrow the technological gap with the United States.”

So when you think about Russia, they have launched into space devices that have not been registered with any international body. They are doing, you know, very sophisticated orbital maneuvers, potentially targeting, if you will, or at least moving in the direction of some of the space assets that would be important to the United States. The ability of our adversaries to take advantage of commercial capabilities I think is a concern for all of us. And I would also like to stress the fact that those commercial capabilities are available to us as well to the extent we take advantage of them.

Would you like to expound on your statement about the commercial capabilities?

General Stewart. I would offer only that both China and Russia have counter-space in their doctrine, and will use all of the available means to support a counter-space strategy. Beyond that, we probably got to talk in the classified session, sir.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Yes, and certainly I agree with that.

And when we think about counter-space for people on this committee, as a Navy pilot I relied heavily on space. And ground warriors also rely heavily on space. When we lose space, we lose the ability to fight on land, on sea, and in the air. The enemies of our country have stated this publicly. That is why they are so aggressive in this area.

And certainly, you go back to 2007, the Chinese have launched anti-satellite missiles that have, you know, targeted their own satellites, but created, you know, tens of thousands of pieces of debris that ultimately put at risk not only military assets, but also put at risk commercial assets.
So if space is truly a place for commercial activity, we need to be clear about what proper behavior is as it relates to the international community, and not be rewarding that kind of behavior, especially when it comes to, you know, now we are going to be partnering with China and providing information to them so that their space assets don’t hit the space debris that they themselves created.

In essence, we could be potentially encouraging more bad behavior, and I think this is an area that we need to be very cognizant of going forward.

So my time is expired, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Ms. Stefanik.

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony this morning. This question is for General Mayville and General Stewart. In your opening statement, General Stewart, you state, I quote, “A confluence of global, political, military, social, and technological developments have created security challenges more diverse and complex than those we have experienced in our lifetimes.” Much of today’s testimony focuses upon what we do know.

My question is related to what we don’t know, but should. What do you think are the biggest gaps in our understanding of threats to our national security?

General STEWART. Let me think about that one. I am hesitating just a little bit for a couple of different reasons. One, we have covered a pretty wide front when we talked about the threat. So we talked about existential threat with China and Russia, all the way through terrorism, and narco-terrorist capability in our statement. So the biggest gap is, is really just understanding them all enough, with enough exquisite detail to shape policy early enough.

So we think we have got the scope of the threat about right. How we can do this in a more nuanced, more exquisite way and deliver it early enough for decisionmakers is probably the gap. And do it, as I mentioned earlier, in an environment where it is so dynamic, where events are changing constantly, where social media is shaping our policy because we can now transmit at a moment’s notice around the globe on a whole host of social media devices.

So it makes the decision space that we used to be able to give policymakers much shorter. And so the challenge is finding the key, you know that needle in the haystack, and doing it early enough, and getting out ahead of the social media today, the information space. So, I think that is probably where I would say the gap is. Finding the range of threats, I think we are pretty close.

Ms. STEFANIK. Great, thank you. General Mayville.

General MAYVILLE. So what is going on in the world? Well, we are seeing the emergence of not just violent, extreme organizations, but violent, extreme organizations within a much broader transregional framework. We are seeing global economic shifts. We are seeing shifts in regional power balances. We are seeing rising powers, the return of some geopolitical rivalries. There are clearly some new relationships that we need to develop, and the management of current client states is challenging.
I am concerned that there are conflicts that on the surface don’t appear to affect us, and that we somehow can ignore them. But if you ask me—and that is not true, I think we have to—there are some things that only we can do, and we are a global leader.

But if you ask me what is it that I am most concerned about, I am concerned about our services’ and our forces’ ability, our military force, our joint force, their ability to have the wherewithal, the flexibility to manage the training, the readiness, and the modernization. And I am, it is perhaps, it is important to remember it is an All-Volunteer Force. And the stress and demands that we are placing on this force we should not take for granted.

There are the soldiers, the sailors, the airmen, the marines, and their families. I think we are asking a lot of them, and it is very, very important that as we think about the future, a future that we will continue to not get right, that we need to make sure that we have given to the Department the flexibility it needs to manage the three major balls that we need to manage, the current contingencies, the training, the readiness, the force modernization, and being able to take care of people.

And I think that we will continue to have the force we need. And I think our Nation will continue to be secure and we, your military, will be able to meet its security requirements.

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you very much.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

Ms. McSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today. I really appreciate it.

I agree, I served 26 years in the military, that we live in a more complex and dangerous world than I have seen in my lifetime. So I think we are in agreement. Thanks for the breadth of the testimony. And you know, as I was in the military, we would see that often the intel and the forces would be focused usually CENTCOM [Central Command], PACOM [Pacific Command], EUCOM [European Command], but I live on the border, and you have some mentions of transnational criminal organizations [TCOs], the cartels, and the porous borders.

And there is the opportunity, of course, for additional non-state actors to try and use that vulnerability as an access point for us. And again, usually the preponderance of your assets are not focused in that area, but geographically it is the closest to us for a potential threat to the homeland.

So I was wondering if you could just comment on your assessment of the threat coming from Latin America, and up through the south, and what percentage, and maybe this answer is in the closed session, of your assets, your intel assets, are focused on the threats that might be emanating both from the TCOs and potential other non-state actors to take advantage of those vulnerabilities?

General STEWART. Certainly, the number of capability we would probably have to talk about in closed session.

But drug-traffickers is still a great focus, especially for the folks down at Southern Command and the folks in Texas. And so we provide support to those efforts. I think they would love to have more
capability diverted to that effort. It is, although dangerous to our society, the drugs that are coming in through those narco-traffickers, I think it is viewed as somewhat of a lesser threat. I don’t know that I agree with that ultimately.

Ms. MCSALLY. Nor do I, just for the record.

General STEWART. And so we tend not to devote as much resources there. Violence is down in the region. We are concerned a little bit about elections coming up in Venezuela, and what that might mean in terms of violence and humanitarian efforts.

Colombia has absolutely turned around over the last several years. Plan Colombia has been very effective, so there is less of that threat from the region. We don’t see the same level of insurgency that we did just 10 years ago. So the real threat from Latin and Central America is the drug trafficking, narco-traffickers, and we are invested a little bit, but probably not nearly as much as we should.

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it.

And again, for those who do live on the southern border and the potential for violence, with the cartels trafficking literally onto their lands and through their property, that is a very real threat for us; but again, the potentiality that someone else would take advantage of that for a larger national security threat is something we are concerned about in southern Arizona.

I want to transition to, I was part of the team standing up U.S. Africa Command and running our counterterrorism operations. And we were very limited on resources all the way around. And so in addition to the resource limitations, we were limited in the process for how, when we would find a bad guy, how we would be able to quickly go sensor to shooter, find, fix, finish, and again, this may be more for the closed-door session.

But I do want to have a deeper conversation about, with the ungoverned spaces and the rise of terrorist organizations on that continent that pose a threat to us, again, I saw opportunities we had to take out some of these guys, but we were either limited by resources or by the process, which was too slow and painful. And we would miss opportunities; way too centralized.

And we allowed a number of bad guys to continue to go about their business and train additional terrorists as we watched that happen. So I am deeply concerned about that. And I don’t know if you can comment on it, General Mayville, if any of that has changed? And I look forward to talking more in the closed session.

General MAYVILLE. Much of your question, I think, is better discussed at the policy level, and I will defer to policymakers to take that question.

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay, great.

But resources-wise, intel-wise, we were very limited there, too.

General MAYVILLE. I can speak quickly to that. It continues to be a challenge. You mentioned two networks in your questions, one that goes east-west, from Kabul to Mali, and one that goes north-south in the Western Hemisphere. The demands for resources, the demands for enablers are in those areas, the non-state activities, is quite high and managing them is a challenge.

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you.

My time is expired.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. MacArthur.

Mr. MACARTHUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I sincerely want to thank all three of you for your service to our country. We really owe a debt of gratitude to those that keep us safe day and night, and I want to express that on behalf of my constituents.

General Stewart, you mentioned three threats in your opening remarks. And I heard them this way: Capable military competitors. We are not the only game in town is how I heard that; an increase in ungoverned states, and you talked about ISIS. It is the third that has sort of arrested my attention, and that is, other actors’ focus on space.

And I wanted to ask you about that. You talked about anti-satellite actions, and I thought I heard you say that with low cost and relative ease that rogue actors could interrupt our assets in space. And I think about, if I leave my cell phone home, I am an ungoverned state. We are so dependent on technology as a nation, both in our military response, but in our day-to-day life, in our financial markets, in everything we do.

And so I wanted to ask you to elaborate a little bit on what do you mean by low cost and relative ease? How vulnerable are those assets to the degree you can talk about it? And then what do we do about that? What are we doing? What could we do to make those assets more secure?

General STEWART. So I clearly wasn’t as clear as I had hoped to be. The low cost and ease of capability is in reference to things in cyberspace, not in terms of our space assets.

So in terms of cyberspace, it is relatively easy to buy the tools and find the information on the network to conduct low-level cyber-space operations. Whether that is destroying or degrading, or in some cases being—denying services.

So in terms of cyberspace activity, the cost of entry is low. In terms of counter-space, that is pretty high tech, and a pretty high barrier to entry there.

Mr. MACARTHUR. Okay. Well, thank you.

Cyberspace is a whole different subject, disturbing as well. But I think you have touched on that.

My second question is for any of you, or all of you. And it is in regard to sequestration. I find it difficult to get my mind around how much is enough. How much spending is enough? To what degree does sequestration interrupt your operations? And I would like to hear some examples from you of where sequestration has squeezed your operational or intelligence-gathering operations and compromised our readiness.

General STEWART. I can tell you that we have taken cuts in modernizing our information services, which as we talked about, the cyberspace threat. We are taking some hits there.

We have not invested, in fact, we have taken a significant cut in intelligence support to cyberspace operations, and that happened in 2013, if I remember the numbers correctly.

And I think we are right on the margins, doing about as much as we can in support of counterterrorism operations as a result of the cuts. So those are three areas that come immediately to mind where we are really cutting into muscle at this point.
Mr. MACARTHUR. So does it follow back to my first question about vulnerability in cyberspace, as it turns out, and that is an area that we are cutting investment in intel support to that area where you are saying it is relatively easy for people to come after us?

General STEWART. I am uncomfortable with how much intelligence capability I have within DIA and within the DIA enterprise to support the exquisite level of intelligence you need to conduct full-spectrum cyberspace operations. I am uncomfortable with the level of capability at this point.

Now, we built tremendous mission teams, and those things are in the process of being built. But in terms of how you support that with the level of intelligence I think you need to do this well, I don’t think we are there at this point.

Mr. MACARTHUR. All right, thank you.

My time is expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Wenstrup.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank you all for being here today. We touched on a lot of things. And it literally makes your head spin when you think of all the things we have to deal with to keep ourselves safe and to try and make the world a better place.

You know, when it comes to so many of the things taking place, I think of the battles that we have, you know, we use our diplomatic intelligence, military, economic means to handle things. We also have to have the American people behind us. And I think of a quote from our colleague Sam Johnson, who spent 7 years as a POW [prisoner of war] in Vietnam. He talks about, “The taste of freedom is an experience that is lost on the protected.” And so you talk about a volunteer force, and those that serve, and the struggles that they go through, and the appreciation you have for peace in a safe environment in your home.

But we need the American people to understand all that we face beyond just this room and amongst our peers in Congress as well. And it makes it difficult. But to shift just a little bit to go to another topic that ties into probably everything that we are talking about, the immediate threat is to our homeland. Are you comfortable with where we are right now as a nation as far as our border security? And what can we do to make it better, to make the American people feel safer when it comes to drugs, disease, terrorism, et cetera?

General STEWART. In terms of how we secure the border, I probably am out of my depth to talk about that, but I can talk a little bit about the threat. There are Westerners who have gone to participate in activities in the Middle East. We think that number is upwards of 3,000. We know that some of those are Americans who have gone or have tried to go in support of operations with ISIL. And so that is a concern.

I think within the country I am very confident that the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and the director of FBI have got a program to account for those individuals. And beyond that in terms of the policy, how we counter that, I probably am going to stop there, sir.

Dr. WENSTRUP. I thank you for your honesty on that.
But let's also take a look at things near to us; possibly the rise of Russian involvement in Cuba. This is getting into more conventional type things, but how do you see that type of threat, and do you see something on the horizon with them engaging more in Cuba, which is very near to us?

General STEWART. All right, we have seen no indications that the relationship between Russia and Cuba has changed. Cuba remains a base of operations. They provide a good bit of support—the Russians do—to the Cuban economy. We haven't seen anything that changed either in terms of growth or decrease in activity. So it is a pretty stable environment at this point.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you very much.

I yield back.

Did you have something to add, sir?

General MAYVILLE. No, sir, I don't, but thank you for the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brooks.

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Stewart, are you familiar with the Chinese technology company Huawei, H-u-a-w-e-i?

General STEWART. Yes, sir, Huawei.

Mr. BROOKS. Huawei, thank you.

Is Huawei telecommunications equipment a potential threat to the United States security?

General STEWART. I believe any time that we put systems on our networks that are developed in foreign countries, we ought to make sure that we have the assurances that that equipment is clean, can be looked at all the way down to the BIOS [basic input/output system] level to ensure that there are no malicious tools.

So I won't necessarily single out the Chinese company, but I would be very concerned about our supply chain with any equipment that transits countries that we have dissimilar interests.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, in your position with the Defense Intelligence Agency, would you recommend or oppose any, say that again.

General STEWART. Huawei.

Mr. BROOKS. Huawei.

General STEWART. Yes sir.

Mr. BROOKS. I wish it was spelled that way. Would you approve the procurement of Huawei technology for DIA?

General STEWART. I would be very hesitant without some real assurance that I could look inside of those equipments to make sure they did not have any malicious code or capability within those systems.

Mr. BROOKS. Are you familiar with any of their technology now being in use at the DIA?

General STEWART. I am not aware. I will ask that question, but I would be surprised, because I think we are pretty good at making sure we have an approved list of vendors that we acquire equipment from. I can't imagine that that is one of the approved vendors.

Mr. BROOKS. Let me expand on that a little bit. If you are asked by the Secretary of Defense whether any of their technological equipment should be used in the Department of Defense generally, would you have a recommendation?
General STEWART. I would probably want to make sure we have some pretty good assurance. I wouldn’t be comfortable making that recommendation on its face.

Mr. BROOKS. Is there anything in particular about this Chinese company that causes you to be hesitant?

General STEWART. Just controlling the entire supply chain of the equipment would make me a little bit nervous.

Mr. BROOKS. All right. General Stewart, do you have a judgment of how much unclassified controlled technical information China has obtained from cleared defense contractors?

General STEWART. No, sir, not a definitive amount, but that is, in fact, an area where China continues to make attempts to steal intellectual property. I couldn’t quantify the amount, but I would probably put it in a substantive amount.

Mr. BROOKS. How would you describe the term “substantive”?

General STEWART. I am a Marine, sir. A lot.

Mr. BROOKS. A lot. Okay.

General STEWART. I don’t know that there is a real way, because in this space, you may take out a number of files and the files may contain a large quantity of information within the one particular file. So it becomes very hard to quantify how much is being taken through intellectual property theft.

So I think it is an effort that China continues to pursue. And so I would say that there is a good deal, but I couldn’t give you X number of terabytes or petabytes that would make anyone here comfortable. That would be an absolute guess.

Mr. BROOKS. So in your position with DIA, you are familiar with a lot of technical information with our DOD efforts that China has obtained. Of course, there is also the quantity that we don’t yet know about. Would that be a fair statement?

General STEWART. Theft of intellectual property is as old as history itself. And they are just doing it in cyberspace, where you can get a lot more than you could by sending someone to steal that property.

So we do know some is taken. We don’t know how much, and we don’t know if we have a good sense if it is all, or just a portion.

Mr. BROOKS. And do you have a judgment as to whether or not China’s theft of our defense technological information has adversely affected our defense capabilities?

General STEWART. I would probably want to take that into a closed session, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. All right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. There is just a handful of things I wanted to touch on, gentlemen, before we go into the closed briefing. Just briefly, hopefully.

Is the Ukrainian government outgunned by the Russian-supported rebels?

General STEWART. I looked at that this morning. And Russia has set up basically a no-fly zone over the area. So not a whole lot of Ukrainian aircraft can operate in the area. They have got a number of battalion tactical groups that are poised on the Russian side of the border that freezes Ukrainian forces from moving.
The separatists are well armed. They have lots of artillery tubes. They have got support from the Russians in terms of ISR capability. I probably could, pretty close to saying outgunned.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Next week we are going to have a hearing focusing on state actors using unconventional tactics, folks without uniforms, various forms of political warfare, subversion, and so forth.

General Stewart, you struck me with one of your earlier comments saying, “Our military intelligence was geared for formations marching across borders where we can see,” and so forth. How is our military intelligence geared for detecting and dealing with these unconventional threats that we are increasingly seeing? And I am talking about in addition to insurgency sorts of, and terrorism operations?

General Stewart. I would argue that over the last 12 or 13 years, as we have gotten into this counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism fight, we are probably better in that space than we have been in the past. It is very easy, though, to default back to that easy Soviet motorized regiment coming across the Fulda Gap. That is an easy, relatively easy problem set.

I worry that we don’t strike the right balance between understanding that threat that is really an existential, and understanding some of the smaller formations where you really need exquisite, on-the-ground support and on-the-ground intelligence in order to understand.

Trying to find five guys in an urban environment is a hard, hard problem. You don’t do that very effectively from some of our very technical capabilities. And so that makes understanding them very difficult, sir.

General Mayville. Mr. Chairman, could I add one other area of concern, not only in the hybrid fight, but our adversaries’ use of social media. I think that increasingly we are finding our adversaries very skillfully and very effectively using social media for military activities. And I am concerned about our ability to deal in this particular domain. So as you look at the non-state activities or the hybrid fights, I would also encourage that we consider the social media as well.

The CHAIRMAN. That might be a good topic for our Emerging Threats Subcommittee to dig into a little bit further. I appreciate that.

Just a few months ago, Ebola was a huge thing. The only folks who could deal with it was the U.S. military, and we sent them. Obviously, that was, or I assume, everybody assumes that was naturally caused and created.

On the other hand, we know that terrorists have experimented with various sorts of biological agents. How are we set up to detect biological threats, whether naturally created, or manmade-induced in the future?

General Stewart. Can I take that one for the record, come back with a good answer?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

[The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

General Stewart. I don’t have a good answer for that one, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate it.

Mr. Chandler, I want to give the hard one to you. There are some folks who believe that increased domestic stability inside Russia and inside China will lead them to be more aggressive outside. They need to distract their people, they need to, you know, focus on an enemy, et cetera. It is going to be a natural reaction.

Do you think that is true? Do you think that is something we have to prepare for because there are clearly stresses inside of Russia and China going on right now?

Mr. CHANDLER. I think that the internal dynamics don’t necessarily have a direct correlation to what either China or Russia are going to do externally. We have seen historically proven, and China is on a path for regional expansion and assertiveness in the East China Sea and South China Sea, regardless of the internal domestic situation.

Russia is, in its near abroad, takes its most important actions to the near abroad. Regardless of that, Putin today has about an 85 percent approval rating today, despite the economic problems that they are facing. But when challenged there, and you have to remember that the Russians have suffered, if you go back historically, tremendous amounts, and Putin is going to push forward whatever he needs to do on his agenda.

So I don’t necessarily think there is a one-for-one correlation between domestic strife and what either country will do to push outward. They have their objectives and they will go ahead and pursue those.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Fair point.

General Stewart, and is it your assessment that it is possible to talk Iran out of voluntarily continuing their nuclear program?

General STEWART. Can you negotiate them out of their nuclear program? I think that is a great question, Congressman. I know that Iran has done everything that it could at this point to retain that capability. The decision to go down the path of a nuclear weapon has not been made.

So if the decision, when they have the capability to do so, has not been made, suggests that you could negotiate them out of doing a nuclear capability. Because there is nothing that could stop them right now if they said, if the Supreme Leader said go, they have all of the technology, they have all of the capability. They could go. So there must be something that would convince them to not take that path. So I think there is room for negotiation yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Or at least delay.

General STEWART. The delay probably adds not a whole lot for them. If they decided to go, they could go fairly quickly.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The last question I have got, you answered a previous question that roughly we think 30 percent of the folks who have been in Guantanamo Bay detention facility have either been confirmed or suspected of returning to the fight. But that figure is true over the life of the releases from Guantanamo, is it not? So that the folks that are left are the people who we have judged not—to be less releasable, if you will. And so the chances of the people who would be released now returning to the fight could well be even greater. Do you agree with that?
General Stewart. I have significant concerns about the remaining detainees. And I think it is also important, I want to add for the record, that DIA was not consulted on the release of the Taliban Five. I wanted to make sure that got on the record. But the remaining detainees cause me concern, and I think we can talk about that in the closed session.

The Chairman. Okay, I think that is good.

Thank you all very much for answering questions on a whole variety of topics.

We will adjourn this hearing, and then everybody has time to make a pit stop, but we will move quickly upstairs to 2212 for a classified briefing.

And with that, the hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
Statement of Hon. William M. “Mac” Thornberry, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

HEARING ON
Worldwide Threats
February 3, 2015

I have been struck by the consensus of opinion among our most respected statesmen and practitioners of national security policy: Our country has never faced a strategic environment as complex and multi-faceted as we see today.

Just last week, Dr. Henry Kissinger testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that, “The United States has not faced a more diverse and complex array of crises since the end of the Second World War.” And former Secretary of State Madeline Albright said “[W]e are living through a time of monumental change across the world.”

Several observers have noted that any one or two of these challenges would be daunting, but the combination of them poses unique, serious dangers to our country and its future.

From the continued modernization of nuclear programs to conventional and unconventional aggressiveness by rival competitors, from the global spread of terrorist ideology to new domains of warfare, a clear-eyed look around the world is sobering. And, as members of the National Defense Panel testified in December, the situation is volatile and deteriorating.

I believe that it is essential that we better understand this threat environment before we consider this year’s National Defense Authorization Act and that we help all of our colleagues and the American people understand it before we vote on a budget resolution next month.

To this end, we will welcome the new Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Vincent Stewart, as well as the Acting Director for Intelligence for the Joint Staff (J-2), Mr. Mark Chandler, and the Director for Operations for the Joint Staff (J-3), Lieutenant General William Mayville.
Statement for the Record

Worldwide Threat Assessment

Armed Services Committee
United States House of Representatives

Vincent R. Stewart, Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
February 3, 2015

*Information available as of January 31, 2015 was used in the preparation of this assessment*
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INTRODUCTION

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to provide the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) assessment of the global security environment and to address the threats facing the nation. A confluence of global political, military, social, and technological developments, which, taken in aggregate, have created security challenges more diverse and complex than those we have experienced in our lifetimes.

Our challenges range from highly capable, near-peer competitors to empowered individuals and the concomitant reduction in our own capacity will make those challenges all the more stressing on our defense and intelligence establishments. This strategic environment will be with us for some time, and the threat’s increasing scope, volatility, and complexity will be the “new normal”.

The 16,500 men and women of DIA stationed around the globe are confronting this rapidly evolving defense landscape head-on, and leading the Intelligence Community (IC) in providing unique defense intelligence from the strategic to the tactical to deliver a decision advantage to warfighters, defense planners, the defense acquisition community, and policymakers. The men and women – both uniformed and civilian – of your DIA know they have a vital responsibility to the American people and take great pride in their work. I am privileged to serve with them and present their analysis to you. My hope is that this hearing will help the nation – through the important oversight role of Congress – to better
understand the diversity of the global challenges we face and to support this committee in developing possible responses to these threats. Thank you for your confidence and support.

I will begin first with an assessment of Iraq, followed by Afghanistan, where the Department of Defense (DoD), DIA, the IC, and our Coalition partners are on the front lines, actively supporting military operations against threats from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qaeda, and the Taliban. I will then transition to a selected group of violent extremist organizations and conclude with other regional challenges and global threats.

**IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN**

ISIL’s resurgence since the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011 was vividly displayed by the group’s rapid advance across much of northern and western Iraq last spring. Since that time, coalition airstrikes have resulted in the removal of a number of ISIL senior leaders and degraded the group’s ability to operate openly in Iraq and Syria. We expect ISIL to continue entrenching itself and consolidating gains in Sunni areas of Iraq and Syria while also fighting for territory outside those areas. However, we also expect ISIL to continue limited offensive operations, such as the group’s recent operations in Syria and in Anbar province of Iraq. Seizing and holding Shia- and Kurdish-populated areas of Iraq have been, and will continue to be difficult for ISIL in 2015. We expect the group will continue to use traditional terrorist tactics, such as suicide, car bomb, and assassination attacks. Terrorist attacks in Baghdad have been nearly a daily occurrence this past year and the rate is unlikely to significantly change in 2015. ISIL’s ability to govern the areas it has captured in Iraq and Syria, and its ability to keep the support – or at least acquiescence – of the Sunni population will be key indicators of the success or failure of the self-declared “Islamic state.”
Particularly concerning has been the spread of ISIL beyond Syria and Iraq. With affiliates in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, the group is beginning to assemble a growing international footprint that includes ungoverned and under governed areas. Similarly, the flow of foreign fighters into, and out of, Syria and Iraq – many of whom are aligned with ISIL – is troubling. In 2015, we expect ISIL to continue its outreach to other elements of the global extremist movement, and to continue benefitting from a robust foreign terrorist fighter flow.

Defeats of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the collapse of multiple army divisions highlight large-scale institutional deficiencies within the ISF. Several of the more concerning deficiencies include poor logistics and endemic corruption that has bred ineffective commanders and poor morale. Force generation efforts will be complicated by a lack of experienced and qualified soldiers. Local and tribal pro-government forces suffer from similar supply and manning shortages.

The ISF remains unable to defend against external threats or sustain conventional military operations against internal challenges without foreign assistance. Iraq is diversifying its defense acquisitions through numerous foreign military sales including with Russia and other non-U.S. suppliers to overcome equipment shortfalls and capability gaps, these decisions are reducing ISF interoperability.

Turning to Afghanistan, the still-developing Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) remain stalemated with the Taliban-led insurgency. In 2015, we expect the ANSF to maintain
stability and security in Kabul and key urban areas while retaining freedom of movement on major highways. However, the Taliban, al-Qa‘ida, and their extremist allies will likely seek to exploit the reduced Coalition presence by pressuring ANSF units in rural areas, conducting high profile attacks in major population centers, and expanding their safe havens.

ANSF will remain reliant on Coalition enablers for air, intelligence, and maintenance support. As NATO and our allies carry out their scheduled drawdown, the ANSF will struggle to effectively replace these lost enablers, deal with interoperability challenges between the army and police, and address persistent maintenance and logistical issues.

The Afghan National Army (ANA) is the most proficient security institution in Afghanistan, and has shown the capacity to plan and conduct multi-Corps operations in high-threat areas. However, the ANA will continue to struggle with permanently denying insurgents freedom of movement in rural areas and will remain constrained by its stretched airlift and logistical capacity. High attrition also continues to plague the force, which has struggled to keep its numbers near full capacity.

The Afghan National Police (ANP) provide sufficient presence and security within urban centers and provincial and district hubs, but remain vulnerable in controlling high-threat, rural areas. ANP challenges include manpower shortages, inadequate training, attrition, logistics shortfalls, and the corrosive influence of corruption. These factors have diminished the effectiveness of the ANP and undermined its popular image.

In 2014, the Afghan Air Force (AAF) improved its support to ground operations, significantly increasing the number of casualty evacuation missions and forward deployments of Mi-17
Transport helicopters and Mi-35 gunships into contested areas. Despite these improvements, the AAF is not a reliable source of close air support and still struggles with recruiting qualified pilots and technicians.

The development of ANSF capabilities in 2015 will be critical as the insurgency will again attempt to increase its influence in rural areas, operate in larger formations, and continue to test security forces by temporarily seizing a number of vulnerable rural Afghan checkpoints and district centers. This will include increased high profile attacks, particularly in Kabul, where the Taliban seeks to undermine perceptions of Afghan security. The Taliban will probably sustain the capability to propagate a rural-based insurgency that can project intermittent attacks in urban areas through at least 2018.

**TERRORISM**

Beyond the immediate threats posed by ISIL, the Afghan insurgency, and homegrown violent extremists aspired to travel overseas, particularly to Syria and Iraq, al-Qa‘ida will remain a difficult and critical intelligence challenge in 2015. Al-Qa‘ida core is now focused on physical survival following battlefield losses. At the same time, the group is also trying to retain its status as vanguard of the global extremist movement, being eclipsed now by ISIL's rising global prominence and powerful competition for adherents. Despite the fracturing of the global extremist movement, al-Qa‘ida core in Pakistan continues to retain the loyalty of its global affiliates in Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, Syria, and South Asia.

Despite ongoing counterterrorism (CT) pressure and competition from ISIL, al-Qa‘ida will likely attempt to retain a transnational attack capability, and the group will continue to use
its remaining paramilitary units, trained recruits, and extremist affiliates and allies to target Western interests in South Asia and worldwide. Al-Qa’ida also will likely try to expand its limited presence in eastern Afghanistan as Western CT operations there decline, and in the face of continued CT pressure from Pakistan.

Beyond core al-Qa’ida, I would like to highlight for the committee a handful of other violent extremist groups that are of particular concern to DIA.

**Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)** remains committed to attacking the West, probably by targeting commercial aviation with innovative explosives.

**Al-Qa’ida in Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)** recently increased efforts to expand its operating areas across North and West Africa by working with, and through, other regional terrorist groups. AQIM almost certainly continues to plan attacks and kidnapping operations against U.S. allies in the region.

As part of the larger al-Qa’ida network, we are concerned about the support **Al-Nusrah Front** provides to transnational terrorist attack plotting against U.S. and Western interests. We expect the group will try to expand its territory in 2015 beyond its Syrian operating areas and enhance its operational capabilities in Lebanon, where it already conducts operations.

**The Khorasan Group** is a cadre of experienced al-Qa’ida operatives that works closely with and relies upon al-Nusrah Front to provide personnel and space for training facilities in northwestern Syria. The group is primarily focused on transnational terrorist attack plotting. Coalition airstrikes in Syria probably killed a number of senior al-Nusrah Front and Khorasan
Group operatives, but the group almost certainly has maintained some capability to continue plotting against Western interests.

**Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Lebanese Hizballah are**

instruments of Iran’s foreign policy and its ability to project power in Iraq, Syria, and beyond. Hizballah continues to support the regime of Syrian President Asad, pro-regime militants and Iraqi Shia militants in Syria. Hizballah has sent trainers and advisors to Iraq to assist Iranian and Iraqi Shia militias fighting Sunni extremists there. Select Iraqi Shia militant groups also warned of their willingness to fight U.S. forces returning to Iraq.

**Boko Haram (BH)** is engaged in a brutal, multi-front offensive in northeastern Nigeria largely against the Nigerian government and continues to carry out near daily attacks. The Nigerian government has failed to improve its force-centric efforts against BH, let alone implement a whole-of-government counterinsurgency approach. If continued along the same trajectory, BH’s successes could grow into a significant regional crisis with implications outside of northwest Africa.

**REGIONAL THREATS**

**RUSSIA**

Moscow has made significant progress in modernizing its nuclear and conventional forces, improving its training and joint operational proficiency, modernizing its military doctrine to integrate new methods of warfare and developing long range precision strike capabilities.
Despite its economic difficulties, Moscow is fully committed to modernizing both nuclear and conventional forces and we anticipate continued high levels of Russian military activity in 2015.

In 2014, Moscow moved to shape events in Ukraine, employing its improved military capabilities to occupy and attempt to annex Ukrainian territory and to create a long-term conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas and Luhansk regions. All indications are that Moscow will continue to employ a mix of military and nonmilitary pressure against Kyiv this year, to include the use of propaganda and information operations, cyberspace operations, covert agents, regular military personnel operating as “volunteers,” mercenaries, para-institutional organizations, and the threat of military intervention. These actions are consistent with Russia’s new military doctrine and strategy, which will continue to raise anxieties with states along Russia’s periphery.

Russia’s future force will be smaller and more agile, capable of handling a range of contingencies. During the next year, we expect continued efforts to improve joint operations capabilities and rearmament because of the high priority that Russian leadership places on these portfolios.

At the same time, Russian forces have conducted exercises and a record numbers of out-of-area air and naval operations. We expect this to continue this year to include greater activity in the Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas.

Moscow affirmed its intent to improve the military’s capability to control the Russian Arctic region, stressing that area’s current and future strategic and economic importance.
Recently, Moscow has increased its exercise activities and established new airbases in its Arctic region. Russia also plans to establish additional air defense, coastal missile defense, and ground forces there. Highlighting the importance of the Arctic to Russian leaders, Moscow announced the 1 December activation of a Joint Service Command (OSK) North.

Russia will continue to place the highest priority on the maintenance of a robust and capable arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. Priorities for the strategic nuclear forces include the modernization of its road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and upgrades to strategic forces' command and control facilities. In the next year, Russia will field more road-mobile SS-27 Mod-2 ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. It also will continue development of the RS-26 ballistic missile, the Dolgorukiy ballistic missile submarine and its SS-N-32 Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile, and next-generation air- and ground-launched cruise missiles.

**EAST ASIA**

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is building a modern military capable of defending China's "core interests" of preserving its political system, protecting territorial integrity and sovereignty (China views these to include Taiwan and other contested claims to land and water), and ensuring sustainable economic and social development.

The PLA remains focused on transforming the Army to a fully mechanized force. The PLA is converting divisions to brigades to increase lethality and improve combat capabilities. China's national-level training focus has been on brigade-level exercises that stress unit
combat mission capabilities under realistic conditions, long distance mobility, and command and control. We expect these trends to continue.

The PLA Navy continues to expand its operational and deployment areas. China’s first aircraft carrier, commissioned in late 2012, will not reach its full potential until it acquires a fully operational fixed-wing air regiment, but we expect the Navy will make progress toward this goal this year.

The South China Sea (SCS) remains a potential flashpoint. Overlapping claims among China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei, exacerbated by large-scale construction or major steps to militarize or expand law enforcement has increased tensions among SCS claimants, and has prompted an increase in defense acquisition to include submarine capabilities in some of these countries.

In 2014, China twice deployed submarines to the Indian Ocean. The submarines probably conducted area familiarization to form a baseline for increasing China’s power projection. China continues production of JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. We expect China to conduct its first nuclear deterrence patrols this year.

The PLA Air Force is approaching modernization on a scale unprecedented in its history. China now has two stealth fighter programs. The third and fourth J-20 stealth fighter prototypes conducted their first flights in March and July 2014 and further development is anticipated.
China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of 50-60 ICBMs. China is adding more survivable road-mobile systems, enhancing its silo-based systems, and developing a sea-based nuclear deterrent. They are also augmenting the more than 1,200 conventional short-range ballistic missiles deployed opposite Taiwan with a limited but growing number of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-16, which will improve China’s ability to strike regional targets. China continues to deploy growing numbers of the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile and is developing a tiered ballistic missile defense system, having successfully tested the upper-tier capability on two occasions.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) primary goals are preserving the control of the Kim family regime, improving its poor economy, and deterring attack by improving its strategic and conventional military capabilities. Pyongyang maintains that nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities are essential to ensure its sovereignty.

The DPRK continues to place a priority on readiness in its large, forward-deployed forces, and is stressing increased realism in military training, but exercises still appear to do little more than maintain basic competencies. Because of its conventional military deficiencies, the DPRK also has concentrated on improving its deterrence capabilities, especially its nuclear technology and ballistic missile forces.

We believe the DPRK continues to develop its nuclear weapons and missile programs which pose a serious threat to the U.S. and regional allies. We remain concerned that the DPRK will conduct a nuclear test in the future. Following United Nations condemnation of its human rights record in November 2014, North Korea indicated it would “not refrain any further
from conducting a nuclear test.” This followed a statement in March 2014 wherein North Korea’s Foreign Ministry warned it “would not rule out a new form of nuclear test”.

Pyongyang also is making efforts to expand and modernize its deployed missile forces consisting of close-, short-, medium-, and intermediate-range systems. It seeks to develop longer-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the United States, and continues efforts to bring its KN08 road-mobile ICBM to operational capacity. In 2015, North Korea will continue its efforts to improve the combat proficiency of its deployed ballistic missile force and will work to improve missile designs to boost their overall capability. The North likely will launch additional ballistic missiles as part of its training and research and development process. We remain concerned by North Korea’s illicit proliferation activities and attempts to evade UN sanctions.

**MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to threaten U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East. Iran’s actions and policies are designed to further its goal of becoming the dominant regional power, as well as to enhance its strategic depth. Tehran views the United States as its most capable adversary and has fashioned its military strategy and doctrine accordingly. Iran’s military posture is primarily defensive. This strategy is designed to deter an attack, survive an initial attack and retaliate against the aggressor to force a diplomatic resolution. Numerous underground facilities reduce the vulnerability of critical elements of Iran’s military. We do not anticipate any changes to this posture in 2015.
We continue to assess that Iran’s goal is to develop capabilities that would allow it build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, should a decision be made to do so. The regime faces no insurmountable technical barriers to producing a nuclear weapon, making Iran’s political will the central issue.

Iran’s overall defense strategy relies on a substantial inventory of theater ballistic missiles capable of reaching as far as southeastern Europe. Iran continues to develop more sophisticated missiles and to improve the range and accuracy of current missile systems. Iran has publicly stated it intends to launch a space-launch vehicle as early as this year that could be capable of intercontinental ballistic missile ranges, if configured as such.

Iran also is steadily improving its military capabilities. The navy is developing faster, more lethal surface vessels, growing its submarine force, expanding its cruise missile defense capabilities, and increasing its presence in international waters. The navy aspires to travel as far as the Atlantic Ocean.

Iran is laboring to modernize its air and air defense forces under the weight of international sanctions. Each year, Iran unveils what it claims are state-of-the-art, Iranian-made systems, including SAMs, radars, and unmanned aerial vehicles. It continues to seek an advanced long-range surface-to-air missile system.

In Syria, we assess the conflict is trending in the Asad regime’s favor. The regime holds the military advantage in Aleppo, Syria’s largest city, and we anticipate that in 2015 the regime’s strategy will be to encircle Aleppo, cut opposition supply lines, and besiege the opposition. Damascus’ key allies in its fight against the opposition – Hizballah and Iran – continue to
provide training, advice, and extensive logistic support to the Syrian government and its supporters. Despite the Syrian regime’s military advantage—particularly in firepower and air superiority—it will continue to struggle and be unable to decisively defeat the opposition in 2015.

In Libya, political instability and ongoing militia violence have worsened over the year, exacerbating conditions that have already made Libya an attractive terrorist safe haven. ISIL has increased its presence and influence in Libya, particularly in Darnah, where it has begun establishing Islamic institutions. Without a unified government and capable military, there is limited possibility of stability in the near-term.

In Yemen, instability has increased since the Huthis, a northern Zaydi Shia group with Iranian ties, captured the Presidential Palace in mid-January and attained senior positions in nearly all key Yemeni government and security institutions. Current conditions in the country provide AQAP operational space, with Yemen’s neighbors increasingly concerned about instability spilling over the borders bringing the potential of another humanitarian crisis in the region.

As Egypt prepares for parliamentary elections starting in March, its leaders are facing numerous security concerns driven by regional unrest and several major terrorist attacks in 2014. Egyptian security forces face frequent attacks in Sinai and the Nile Valley despite suppressing most political unrest in the last year. Egypt has responded to these attacks by increasing its counterterrorism campaign in Sinai and tightening security on the Gaza and Libya borders to reduce militant and arms flow into Egypt. The upcoming year will likely see
Egyptian security forces stressed by internal terrorist activities and efforts to manage instability in Libya.

**SOUTH ASIA**

*Pakistan*’s Army and paramilitary forces remain deployed in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. Army ground operations in North Waziristan Agency (NWA) have cleared antistate militants from most population centers, and we expect the military will continue targeting remaining militant strongholds in 2015. The December 2014 Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attack against the Army-run school in Peshawar that killed more than 140 people, mostly children, has emboldened military efforts against antistate militants, including intensified airstrikes against TTP leadership and fighters. The government and military are also working together to implement a national action plan against terrorism, which includes the establishment of military courts.

Despite ongoing military operations, Pakistan will continue to face internal security threats from militant, sectarian, and separatist groups. Additionally, Pakistan remains concerned about ISIL outreach and propaganda in South Asia.

Pakistan continues to take steps to improve security of its nuclear arsenal. We anticipate that Pakistan will continue development of new delivery systems, including cruise missiles and close-range “battlefield” nuclear weapons to augment its existing ballistic missiles.

*India* is in the midst of a major military modernization effort – undertaken by all three military services – to address problems with its aging equipment and to better posture itself
to defend against both Pakistan and China. New Delhi is working to address impediments to modernization, such as its cumbersome procurement process, budget constraints, and a domestic defense industry that has struggled to provide military equipment that meets service requirements.

Relations with Pakistan remain strained. Both sides engaged in periodic skirmishes on or near the Line of Control that separates Indian and Pakistani Kashmir, resulting in the highest number of civilian casualties since 2003. Occasional unofficial Track-II dialogue continued throughout the year, but resulted in little progress in resolving bilateral disputes.

New Delhi and Beijing maintain limited military-to-military engagement and continue to discuss their longstanding border dispute, despite occasional altercations between troops patrolling the border. India is concerned over Chinese logistical improvements along the border and is raising additional ground forces, improving logistical capacity, and is basing advanced fighter aircraft opposite the China border. India also is concerned over China’s increased activity in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

India continues to conduct periodic tests of its nuclear-capable missiles to enhance and verify missile reliability and capabilities. In early December 2014, India successfully tested the Agni-IV intermediate-range ballistic missile, which New Delhi claims has a range of 4,000 kilometers. India will continue developing an ICBM, the Agni-VI, which will reportedly carry multiple warheads, and is working on the development of several variants of a submarine-launched ballistic missile.
AFRICA

Security conditions in **Somalia** improved in 2014 as progress was made against al-Shabaab. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army (SNA) conducted two rounds of offensive operations liberating several al-Shabaab-held towns in south-central Somalia, including the lucrative port city of Baraawe. Somali militia participated in these operations, but they remain unable to maintain control of cleared areas primarily due to endemic corruption and underlying clan dynamics. Mogadishu's focus on governance and force integration efforts should help decrease prospects for instability as regional administrations evolve during the next year.

**Nigeria**'s military forces have been challenged by mass desertions and often retreat on first contact with BH. The military leadership – often focused on advancing private gain over strategic imperatives – has failed to properly resource and train troops. Nigeria recently acquired new weapons systems, but troops lack the training and motivation to effectively employ them. The presidential election this month probably will be the most close and contentious since civilian rule was restored in 1999. Violence throughout the election – and probably thereafter – will stretch security and military forces thin. These problems are likely to lead to massive population displacements, more civilian deaths and kidnappings, growing extremist safe havens and refugee spillover into neighboring countries.

LATIN AMERICA

In Latin America, transnational threats such as drug- and arms-trafficking and special interest alien transit, coupled with porous borders, have increased insecurity and challenged
stability and prosperity. Moreover, outside actors are increasingly seeking to challenge the U.S. as the defense partner of choice in the region.

**Mexico** remains the principal transit country for U.S.-bound cocaine, and the primary foreign supplier of methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana to the United States. Civilian and military security force pressure on all major drug trafficking groups has likely contributed to the recent decline in drug-related homicides.

The **Colombian** government has made significant progress to reduce cocaine production. Colombia is no longer the top cocaine producer globally, but remains the principal supplier of cocaine and a supplier of heroin to the United States. Drug profits fund insurgent and illegal armed groups, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and criminal gangs (BACRIM). These groups increasingly work directly with Mexican drug cartels and their networks also move money, weapons, and people. During 2015, Bogota will be focused on reducing urban violence and maintaining a state presence in rural zones.

**Venezuelan** President Nicolás Maduro has not resolved the factors that contributed to nationwide antigovernment protests in 2014, including a poor economy, shortages of basic goods, unchecked violent crime, and the government’s authoritarian tactics against the political opposition. In 2015, we anticipate student organizations and the political opposition will stage protests in the months leading up to legislative elections. Military leaders have remained loyal and will continue to quell antigovernment protests. We anticipate security forces occasionally will use heavy-handed tactics to restore order.
In Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, violence tied to gang, drug, and criminal activity remains amongst the highest levels in the world. Crime levels are forcing these nations to continue to rely on their militaries to provide security while concurrently addressing long-term police, judicial, and prison reform.

**GLOBAL THREATS**

The threat to U.S. space systems and services will increase as potential adversaries pursue disruptive and destructive counterspace capabilities. Rapidly evolving commercial space technology will support the global pursuit of enhanced space and counterspace capabilities that may narrow the technological gap with the United States.

Chinese and Russia military leaders understand the unique information advantages afforded by space systems and are developing capabilities to deny U.S. use of space in the event of a conflict. Chinese military writings specifically highlight the need to interfere with, damage, and destroy reconnaissance, navigation, and communication satellites. China has satellite jamming capabilities and is pursuing other antisatellite systems. In July 2014, China conducted a non-destructive antisatellite missile test. A previous destructive test with this same system in 2007 created long-lived space debris.

Russia’s Military Doctrine emphasizes space defense as a vital component of its national defense. Russian leaders openly assert that the Russian armed forces have antisatellite weapons and conduct antisatellite research.
The global cyber threat environment presents numerous persistent challenges to the security and integrity of DoD networks and information. Threat actors now demonstrate an increased ability and willingness to conduct aggressive cyberspace operations—including both service disruptions and espionage—against U.S. and allied defense information networks. Similarly, we note with increasing concern recent destructive cyber actions against U.S. private-sector networks demonstrating capabilities that could hold U.S. government and defense networks at risk. For 2015, we expect espionage against U.S. government defense and defense contractor networks to continue largely unabated, while destructive network attack capabilities continue to develop and proliferate worldwide. We are also concerned about the threat to the integrity of U.S. defense procurement networks posed by supply chain vulnerabilities from counterfeit and sub-quality components.

Threat actors increasingly are willing to incorporate cyber options into regional and global power projection capabilities. The absence of universally accepted and enforceable norms of behavior in cyberspace contributes to this situation. In response, states worldwide are forming “cyber command” organizations and developing national capabilities. Similarly, cyberspace operations are playing increasingly important roles in regional conflicts—for example, in eastern Ukraine—where online network disruptions, espionage, disinformation and propaganda activities are now integral to the conflict.

Iran and North Korea now consider disruptive and destructive cyberspace operations a valid instrument of statecraft, including during what the U.S. considers peacetime. These states likely view cyberspace operations as an effective means of imposing costs on their adversaries while limiting the likelihood of damaging reprisals.
Non-state actors often express the desire to conduct malicious cyber attacks, but likely lack the capability to conduct high-level cyber operations. However, non-state actors, such as Hizballah, AQAP, and ISIL will continue during the next year to effectively use the Internet for communication, propaganda, fundraising and recruitment.

The proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles is a grave and enduring threat. Securing nuclear weapons, materials, and the scientific capabilities to develop chemical and biological weapons is a worldwide imperative. The time when only a few states had access to the most dangerous technologies is past, and the use of chemicals in Syria further demonstrates the threat of WMD is real.

China will continue to be a source of dual-use WMD-applicable goods, equipment, and materials to countries of concern, like Iran, North Korea, and Syria. North Korea is among the world’s leading suppliers of ballistic missiles and related technologies and, despite the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, the DPRK continues proliferating weapons-related materiel. Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea engage in national-level military denial and deception programs that include the use of underground facilities to conceal and protect WMDs, and command, control and other strategic assets and functions.

The proliferation of advanced conventional weapons, especially air defense systems and antiship cruise missiles, is a military issue of growing concern. Russian exports of these arms, including the SA-17, SA-22, SA-20 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and the SS-N-26 Yakhont supersonic antiship cruise missile is particular troubling. Russia has exported
several of these systems to countries of concern, including the SA-17 to Venezuela, and the SA-17, SA-22 and Yakhont to Syria. The 300-kilometer-range Yakhont poses a major threat to U.S. naval operations particularly in the eastern Mediterranean. There are no signs these sales will abate in 2015. If Russia was to sell the SA-20 to Iran, it would significantly increase Iranian military capabilities.

**Infectious diseases** are emerging as a global health concern. The Ebola epidemic in West Africa is the most visible reminder that health issues can suddenly materialize from anywhere and threaten American lives and interests. Our ability to mitigate and control health threats before they impact the United States relies on early warning, despite the absence of precise indicators of when and where new diseases will emerge. Pandemic warning likely will become more challenging and complex in 2015.

Finally, **Foreign intelligence threats** from Russian, Chinese, and Cuban intelligence services continue to be a challenge. Trusted insiders who disclose sensitive U.S. information for nefarious purposes will also remain a significant threat in 2015. The technical sophistication of this insider threat exacerbates the challenge.
LIEUTENANT GENERAL VINCENT R. STEWART, USMC
Director

Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart became the 20th Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency on 23 January 2015. He formerly served as the Commander, Marine Forces Cyber.

Lieutenant General Stewart received his baccalaureate degree from Western Illinois University, Macomb, IL, where he majored in History (1981). He also earned master’s degrees in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, Newport, RI (1995) and in National Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Washington, DC (2002).


His principal staff assignments include: Project Officer, Light Armored Vehicle, Anti-Tank, Twenty-Nine Palms, CA, (1983-1984); Assistant Signals Intelligence Officer, 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, (1990-1991); Assistant Operations Officer, 2d Radio Battalion, Camp Lejeune, NC, (1991-1992); Chief, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Officer, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, Experimental, Quantico, VA, (1996-1999); Deputy Director, Intelligence Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, C3I (2001-2002); Deputy G-2, Marine Forces Central Command (2002); Senior Intelligence Planner, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (2002-2005); Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Marine Corps Forces Command, Norfolk, VA, (2005-2006); Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, 2d Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, NC, (2008-2009); and Director of Intelligence, HQMC, Washington, DC, (2009-2013).

Lieutenant General Stewart’s military decorations include: the Defense Superior Service Medal; the Legion of Merit with one gold star; the Bronze Star; the Meritorious Service Medal with one gold star; the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, with two gold stars; the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal; the Combat Action Ribbon; the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal; and various unit awards.

January 2015
Lieutenant General William C. Mayville, Jr. graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1982, branched Infantry and began his career as a Weapons Platoon Leader, Rifle Platoon Leader, and Company Executive Officer with the 1st Battalion, 75th Rangers at Hunter Army Airfield in Savannah, Georgia.

Following attendance at the Infantry Officers Advance Course, LTG Mayville served as a Maintenance Officer and Company Commander in 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 7th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division. He served as the Brigade Adjutant for the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division and later, the Battalion Operations Officer for 3d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment. He subsequently served in the 75th Ranger Regiment as the Logistics Officer (S-4) and Regimental Executive Officer before taking command of 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division.

Following Battalion Command, he was assigned as Chief of Plans and Training, JS Operations, at the Joint Special Operations Command.

In June 2002, LTG Mayville assumed command of the 173d Airborne Brigade in Vicenza, Italy and commanded the Brigade during its airborne assault in northern Iraq as part of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM in March, 2003. Following Brigade Command, he served as Chief of Staff for US Army Southern European Command and the Combined Joint Task Force 76, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.

His assignments as a General Officer include Deputy Director for Operations, J-3 and Deputy Director for Plans and Policy, J-5, for United States European Command; Deputy Commanding General for Support, 82d Airborne Division and Combined Joint Task Force 82, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, and the Director of Operations for HQ, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). LTG Mayville commanded the First Infantry Division—"The Big Red One"—deploying to OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and commanding coalition operations in Regional Command East.

LTG Mayville's awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal with Valor and Oak Leaf Cluster, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with Oak Leaf Clusters, the Army Commendation Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Army Achievement Medal, second award of the Combat Infantryman's Badge, Expert Infantryman's Badge, Master Parachutist Badge (with two Bronze Stars), Pathfinder Badge, and the Ranger Tab. His military and civilian education includes the Command and General Staff College, the Naval War College, and the Georgia Institute of Technology.
Mark S. Chandler  
Deputy Director for Intelligence, J2

Mr. Chandler assumed duties as the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff J2 in May 2012. He is responsible for all aspects of the management and execution of the Joint Staff’s intelligence support to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. He leads a team of professionals providing current and crisis intelligence, indications and warning, and intelligence insights and advice to operations, policy and plans, and acquisitions.

Prior to his assignment as Deputy Joint Staff J2, he served on the Office of Undersecretary of Intelligence staff as the Senior Advisor for Warfighter Support from May 2010 to May 2012. He was responsible for providing policy oversight, guidance and support to the Combatant Command J2s and their respective Joint Intelligence Operations Centers. He also was responsible for ensuring the Commands’ operational requirements received the level and adequacy of intelligence support as could be provided by the Combat Support Agencies and other intelligence community organizations.

Prior to joining the USD/I staff, Mr Chandler was the Vice Deputy Director for Intelligence Operations, Plans and Policy, J2S, and Chief of Current Operations and Plans Support Division Joint Staff, J2, from June 2007 to May 2010. He was pivotal in establishing operational planning, policy development and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance support to the CJCS and the Joint Staff. His assignment before moving to the Joint Staff was as Chief, Enemy Denial and Deception, Joint Warfare Support, DIA.

Prior to joining the Federal government, Mr Chandler was a key member of the initial standup of the Joint Forces Component Command, ISR (JFCC-ISR) from 2005 to 2006. He was the Senior Planner responsible for supporting CINC Operational Support Planning and ISR Planning.

Mr. Chandler retired from the Marine Corps in 2005 after serving over 20 years as an intelligence officer. At the time of his retirement, he was the Branch Chief, Intelligence Plans and Policy, HQMC. While serving in the Marine Corps, he was stationed on both coasts, in the Pacific and Europe. His Service and Joint experience includes collection management, target intelligence and plans officer and analysis. He also served in multiple Executive Officer and Operations Officer billets at key points throughout his career. Mr. Chandler was fortunate to serve in Desert Shield/Storm as the I MEF Target Intelligence Officer. During the initial OIF operations he established the first-ever direct support to Marine and Army forces conducting combat operations in Afghanistan. During the planning and combat operations for OIF-I, he served as the I MEF G2 Operations Officer and MEF (Fwd) G2. He received numerous awards throughout his career, to include the Legion of Merit and the Bronze Star among them.

Mr. Chandler was born in Muscle Shoals, AL. He received his B.A. in Political Science from The University of Alabama, Huntsville, and his M. A. in International Relations from Troy University.

(Current as of June 2014)
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

February 3, 2015
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY

General STEWART. Late in the hearing General Stewart came back to this question and answered it [see page 34]: “General STEWART. I have significant concerns about the remaining detainees. And I think it is also important, I want to add for the record, that DIA was not consulted on release of the Taliban Five. I wanted to make sure that got on the record.” [See page 16.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. O’ROURKE

General MAYVILLE. We have no intelligence indicators that U.S. actions related to Syria and Ukraine are generating new, specific threats to the United States. I defer analysis of potential threats to the Intelligence Community. [See page 23.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TAKAI

General MAYVILLE. Upon consultation with the US Army Staff and the Joint Staff J5/OSD Policy Global Posture Integration Team, force structure decisions beyond FY15 for Army's active force have not yet been made. Future force reductions could impact U.S. Army Pacific forces and increase risk to OPLANs and CONPLANs by reducing the number of ready and available forces required for successful plan execution. [See page 9.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

February 3, 2015
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

Mr. Rogers. The United States has ceased its development of “new” nuclear weapons with new military capabilities to show its “leadership in nonproliferation and disarmament.” What state has followed our lead? Are any of the following states developing new nuclear weapons with new military capabilities: China, Russia, India, or Pakistan? Are they all doing so?

General Stewart. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. Rogers. Can you please provide a complete list of states developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with an intention of threatening the U.S. homeland?

General Stewart. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. Rogers. Please describe the types and quantities of Russian tactical nuclear weapons. Is it true they deploy nuclear land mines, nuclear artillery, nuclear torpedoes, and other systems? How many of these tactical nuclear weapons do they have? How many does the United States have?

General Stewart. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. Rogers. There is a concept called disaggregation for space systems, which would change the approach from having large highly capable satellites to move to smaller distributed space systems. For example, one notion is to separate the strategic and tactical aspects of the missile warning missions. What would be the practical impact of such a move on potential Chinese and Russian counter-space activity? Would this provide greater protection to our space systems?

General Stewart. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. Rogers. Recently, the Under Secretary for Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics briefed the committee on the state of U.S. technical superiority. Given the erosion manifest by our adversaries' relentless pursuit of U.S. intellectual capital, what are you and the Defense Intelligence Agency doing about it?

General Stewart. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. Rogers. Given that we have a need to more closely tie intelligence to acquisition and requirements, what is your assessment of the value/role of Scientific & Technical Intelligence in achieving that goal?

General Stewart. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. Rogers. What is the health of the Scientific and Technical Intelligence community in being able to support our acquisition, operations, and warfighters?

General Stewart. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. Rogers. How would you describe the relationship between Scientific & Technical Intelligence and S&T? Where do we need to move the communities in the future and why? What can Congress do to help in the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2016, including as part of the acquisition reform push we are engaged in at present?

General Stewart. There is a close relationship between Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&T) and Science and Technology (S&T). "Science" is the description, identification, and investigation of natural and physical processes and events to explain and understand observed events. "Technology" is the application of science to solve problems and to achieve specific objectives. S&T organizations in the U.S. and abroad leverage scientific understanding of defense and intelligence problems to devise technical solutions to defeat and overcome our adversaries' weapons systems and defense capabilities, and to understand unexplained foreign activities, research and construction. Defense Intelligence S&T solutions can include new ground and satellite collection platforms, nontraditional exploitation capabilities, and breakthrough weapons systems. S&T is the systematic study and analysis of foreign S&T research, development, and engineering. S&T products are used to warn of foreign
technical developments and capabilities that may threaten or compromise U.S. commercial, defense, and intelligence advantage. S&TI's focus spans near-term weapons development to game-changing technologies and landmark scientific advances.

DIA's Defense Intelligence Office for Scientific and Technical Intelligence is responsible for integrating scientific and technical intelligence across the defense intelligence enterprise to develop a strategic S&TI plan aimed at preventing technical surprise in critical domains. The mission of DIA's Directorate for Science and Technology is to develop and deliver leading-edge scientific and technical understanding and capabilities to provide our warfighters and policymakers with a decisive advantage.

We fully endorse and support the current efforts underway in USD (AT&L) related to the Better Buying Power 3.0 initiative: Anticipate and plan for responsive and emerging threats and build stronger partnerships between the acquisition, requirements and intelligence communities. The defense intelligence enterprise must become more adaptive, responsive, and flexible to best address the time-sensitive needs of the defense acquisition and requirements communities. DIA is currently piloting several new tools and capabilities to provide greater acquisition efficiency.

Mr. Rogers. Russia and China like to complain about U.S. missile defenses and prompt global strike systems. So, I have two questions for you: (1) Are Russia and China developing missile defenses to counter U.S. nuclear forces and are they developing their own prompt strike capabilities? (2) If the U.S. ceased to deploy missile defense and halted development of prompt strike systems tomorrow, would Russia cease its incredible reliance on nuclear weapons? (3) Does Russia deploy nuclear-tipped ballistic missile defense systems? Does the United States?

General Stewart. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER

Mr. Shuster. Do you believe we have the necessary industrial base capacity for our current as well as our future military commitments?

General Stewart. Generally speaking, contracts with the defense industrial base support our current capabilities with manageable risks and are meeting current military commitments. While future military commitments are largely undefined, additional capacity beyond contractual requirements may require additional time and funding. I defer further analysis to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

Mr. Shuster. How would a reduction in industrial base capacity impact the ability of the warfighter to respond to the array of threats that have been mentioned here today?

General Stewart. The defense industrial base is extremely diverse, with varying capabilities and business dynamics residing in separate sectors and tiers of the supply chain. The Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy (MIBP), in coordination with the Services, perform multiple industrial base assessments and analyses across programs to identify and mitigate risks that impede the Department's effort to deliver systems and services to the warfighter. I defer to the MIBP office within the OSD (AT&L) staff.

Mr. Shuster. In your estimation, is the United States maintaining its historical advantage in industrial base capability compared to emerging powers like China?

General Stewart. DIA is not the proper agency to address this question and defers to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Shuster. Do you believe the industrial base still has the capacity to support U.S. action in a major, large-scale conflict?

General Mayville. Generally speaking, contracts with the defense industrial base support our current capabilities, including surge capacity in some instances, with manageable risks. Because commercial suppliers normally guarantee only what is under contract, any additional capacity beyond contractual requirements may require additional time and funding. I defer further analysis to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

Mr. Shuster. If our industrial base capacity were reduced through the loss of one or more of our depots, how badly would this hurt our military's ability to respond?

General Mayville. To prevent the loss of necessary depot capacity, 10 U.S.C § 2464, Core Logistics Capabilities requires the Services to maintain a ready and controlled source of technical competence and the resources necessary to ensure effective and timely response to mobilization, national defense contingency situations, and other emergency requirements. The Services annually report their ability to
meet this requirement for core depot capacity. I defer further impact analysis to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. AGUILAR

Mr. AGUILAR. The committee has been exploring acquisition reform to ensure the military has the best possible equipment for the mission at the best possible cost. What are your thoughts about how best to approach this reform effort while ensuring we have the best capabilities to respond to threats? General Stewart indicated that the Defense Intelligence Agency is doing a review about the deficiencies in the current acquisition process and that there may be significant room for improvement. Please provide the committee with at least an initial overview of your findings. I hope we can work together to improve the process to ensure we are able to respond efficiently and effectively to threats around the world.

General STEWART. DIA has been actively involved with OUSD (AT&L) to improve the overall acquisition process and develop stronger linkages within acquisition policy through USD(AT&L)'s Better Buying Power 3.0 initiative. DIA is an IC leader in areas such as competition where DIA achieved 81% against a 74% FY14 competition goal, and a small business utilization rate close to 25%. DIA continues in its efforts to improve intelligence support to acquisition and has an active dialog with OUSD (AT&L) and USD(I) on acquisition improvements. DIA also completed a Contracting Task Force in 2013 that uncovered a few cases of duplication and overlap in the acquisition process, and adjustments were made to various Acquisition Strategies which were incorporated into the Spend Plan build for 2014 and the out-years. DIA contracting is set up to be rapid and agile, with many Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity type contracts, that DIA (and in many cases other agencies and the Services) can place orders against as warfighter needs arise. DIA also utilizes flexibility with placing surge requirements on many of our contracts, to be rapidly utilized as world events unfold. Additionally, DIA has a strong working relationship with the contractor community, and has initiated industry forums and cross-talks on a routine basis with appropriate business-side personnel to compare best practices and lessons-learned, which enhances our partnerships.

From the defense intelligence perspective, DIA has conducted a review on intelligence support to acquisition and is developing a plan to address how DIA and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise can better support defense acquisition requirements. DIA recognizes the difficulties in providing intelligence on future threats to OUSD(AT&L) and USD(I) on acquisition improvements. DIA also completed a Contracting Task Force in 2013 that uncovered a few cases of duplication and overlap in the acquisition process, and adjustments were made to various Acquisition Strategies which were incorporated into the Spend Plan build for 2014 and the out-years. DIA contracting is set up to be rapid and agile, with many Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity type contracts, that DIA (and in many cases other agencies and the Services) can place orders against as warfighter needs arise. DIA also utilizes flexibility with placing surge requirements on many of our contracts, to be rapidly utilized as world events unfold. Additionally, DIA has a strong working relationship with the contractor community, and has initiated industry forums and cross-talks on a routine basis with appropriate business-side personnel to compare best practices and lessons-learned, which enhances our partnerships.

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Mr. CHANDLER. Congressman Aguilar, thank you for the opportunity to address military equipment acquisition reform. While I agree that ensuring our military has the best possible equipment at the best possible price is an important priority, I must respectfully request to defer comment to the experts on the OSD and DIA staffs that specialize in Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics.