[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAN: BLOCKING OR PAVING TEHRAN'S PATH TO NUCLEAR
WEAPONS?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 19, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-39
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
TOM EMMER, Minnesota
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Antony J. Blinken, Deputy Secretary of State, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 5
Mr. Adam J. Szubin, Acting Under Secretary, Office of Terrorism
and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Department of the Treasury.... 16
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Antony J. Blinken: Prepared statement.............. 8
Mr. Adam J. Szubin: Prepared statement........................... 18
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 60
Hearing minutes.................................................. 61
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 63
Written responses from the Honorable Antony J. Blinken to
questions submitted for the record by:
The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress
from the State of California, and chairman, Committee on
Foreign Affairs.............................................. 64
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida.................................... 67
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in
Congress from the State of New Jersey........................ 68
NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAN: BLOCKING OR
PAVING TEHRAN'S PATH TO NUCLEAR
WEAPONS?
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 2015
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:30 a.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Royce. This hearing will come to order, and the
committee here today will continue to evaluate the
administration's nuclear diplomacy with Iran. That is the
subject of the hearing today.
Negotiators face a high-stakes deadline next week. We will
hear the administration's case today. But it is critical that
the administration hears our bipartisan concerns here.
Deputy Secretary Blinken, this is your first appearance
before the committee, and I congratulate you on your position.
I wish you well.
And after the hearing, I trust you will be in touch with
Secretary Kerry, Under Secretary Sherman and others that are
involved in the negotiating process to report on the
committee's views and I think this is very important.
This committee has been at the forefront of examining the
threat of a nuclear Iran. Much of the pressure that has been
brought on the Islamic Republic of Iran and that brought them
to the table was put in place by Congress, and it was put in
place over the objections of the executive branch.
Now, that is the executive branch whether it was Republican
or Democratic administrations, but it is the House of
Representatives that has driven this process, and we would have
more pressure on Iran today if the administration hadn't
pressured the Senate to sit on the Royce-Engel sanctions bill
that this committee produced and passed in 2013 and passed, by
the way, unanimously--and passed off the House floor 400 to 20.
So Congress is proud of this role and we want to see the
administration get a lasting and meaningful agreement. But,
unfortunately, the administration's negotiating strategy has
been more about managing proliferation than preventing it, and
a case in point that I bring up is Iran's uranium enrichment
program--the key technology needed in developing a nuclear
bomb.
Reportedly, the administration would be agreeable to
leaving much of Iran's enrichment capability in place for a
decade. If Congress will be asked to roll back its sanctions on
Iran, which will certainly fund Iran's terrorist activities
when we roll back those sanctions, then there must be a
substantial rollback of Iran's nuclear program.
And consider that international inspectors report that Iran
has still not revealed its past bomb work despite its
commitment to those inspectors to the IAEA to do that, and the
IAEA is still concerned about signs of Iran's military-related
activities including designing a nuclear payload for a missile.
Iran has not even begun to address these concerns and last
fall over 350 members wrote to the Secretary of State
expressing deep concerns about this lack of cooperation from
Iran. How can we expect Iran to uphold an agreement when they
are not meeting their current commitments?
Indeed, we were not surprised to see Iran continue to
illicitly procure nuclear technology during these negotiations
or that Tehran was caught testing a more advanced centrifuge
that would help produce bomb material quicker--a new grade of
supersonic centrifuge right in the middle of this process.
This was a violation of the spirit and, in my view, the
letter of the interim agreement. Iran's deception is all the
more reason that the administration should obtain zero notice
anywhere anytime inspections on Iran's declared and undeclared
facilities.
You have to have a verification regime in this process that
is going to work for us. And there is also the fact that limits
placed on Iran's nuclear program as part of the final agreement
now being negotiated are going to expire.
They will expire, and that means the final agreement is
just another interim step. What you call the ``final''
agreement is an interim step with the real final step being
Iran treated as any other non-nuclear weapons state under the
Nonproliferation Treaty, thus licensing it to pursue
industrial-scale enrichment.
With a deep history of deception, covert procurement, and
clandestine facilities, Iran is ``not any other country.'' It
is certainly not any other country to be conceded in an
industrial-scale nuclear program.
Any meaningful agreement must keep restrictions in place
for decades, as over 360 Members of Congress, including every
member of this committee, are demanding in a letter to the
President this week.
Meanwhile, Iran is intensifying its destructive role in the
region. The Islamic Republic of Iran is propping up Assad in
Syria while its proxy, Hezbollah, threatens Israel.
Iranian-backed Shi'a militia are killing hopes of a
unified, stable Iraq and last month an Iranian-backed militia
displaced the government in Yemen, formerly a key
counterterrorism partner to the United States.
Many of our allies and partners see Iran pocketing an
advantageous nuclear agreement and ramping up its aggression in
the region as a result of the hard currency that they will have
at their disposal as the sanctions are lifted.
So this committee is prepared to evaluate any agreement to
determine if it is in the long-term national security interests
of the United States and our allies.
Indeed, as Secretary Kerry testified not long ago, any
agreement will have to pass muster with Congress. Those were
his words. Yet, that commitment has been muddied by the
administration's insistence in recent weeks that Congress will
not play a role, and that is not right.
Congress built the sanction structure that brought Iran to
the table, and if the President moves to dismantle it, we will
have a say.
So I now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Eliot Engel of New
York, for his opening remarks.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
calling this very important and timely hearing.
Mr. Deputy Secretary, Mr. Under Secretary, welcome to our
committee. We are grateful for your service and we look forward
to your testimony and I want to congratulate both of you on
your new positions.
The chairman's remarks are very similar to mine. We have
worked very hard on this committee to have bipartisanship
because both the chairman and I agree that if there is one
place where we need bipartisanship more than any other place,
it involves foreign policy.
And so wherever possible we try to talk with one voice, and
I want to associate myself with the chairman's remarks. We have
seen a lot of speculative reporting in the press about might or
might not be included in the comprehensive nuclear deal with
Iran.
Today, we are going to send over a letter to the President
signed by 360 Members of Congress in both parties, a majority
of each party, talking about some of the things that we are
concerned with and we would hope that we could get a prompt
response from the White House.
It is truly a very bipartisan letter expressing Congress'
strong feelings about things that need to be in the agreement.
I want to emphasize--re-emphasize what the chairman said. There
really cannot be any marginalization of Congress.
Congress really needs to play a very active and vital role
in this whole process and any attempts to sidestep Congress
will be resisted on both sides of the aisle. We have seen a lot
of speculative reporting in the press about what might or might
not be included in a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.
We don't technically even know right now if there is going
to be a deal, but if there is I think we would all be wise to
review the details before passing judgment on whether it is a
good deal or bad deal or simply a deal we can live with.
I think it is safe to assume that we are not going to see
what I would consider a perfect deal. I have said all along
that Iran should have been required to freeze enrichment during
the negotiations but they weren't and it is clear that a freeze
is not on the table for a comprehensive agreement.
At this stage, we need to focus on making the deal as good
as it can be. I am hoping that our witnesses can shed light on
a few key areas that, for me, could tip the scales between a
bad deal and a deal that we might be able to live with.
First, as part of any comprehensive agreement, we need
total clarity about where Iran stands in terms of its ability
to weaponize its nuclear material. How far along are they?
Secondly, will the deal give us sufficient time to respond
if Iran reneges and presses full throttle toward a nuclear
weapon. Is a 1-year break-out period the time until Iran has
sufficient enriched uranium to then build a bomb? Is that
enough time to catch their violation and react?
Next, how would a comprehensive agreement stop Iran from
pursuing a nuclear weapon covertly if they make a decision to
sneak out rather than break out? Iran's leaders don't deserve
an ounce of trust. We need very strong safeguards.
Lastly, how will we be certain that sanctions relief won't
just open the faucet for funding terrorism or fueling the
regime's already abysmal human rights record?
In my view, these questions lay out clear markers for what
we need to see. Here is the bottom line. If we say yes to a
deal, will it be worth unraveling the decades of sanctions and
pressure that the United States and our partners have built
against Iran?
But if we say no, would we be able to hold the sanctions
coalition together, and if we maintain or even increase our
sanctions, wouldn't Iran just move full speed ahead toward a
bomb?
I know these negotiations have gone on for months and
months. I know the P5+1 is under intense pressure to produce
something. But we cannot allow those factors to push us into a
bad deal being sold as a good deal.
The administration has argued that reaching a deal is the
best chance to solve a nuclear crisis diplomatically and avoid
another war in the Middle East, that dialing up sanctions at
this stage would undermine the talks.
And as I have repeatedly said, I am willing to see what is
actually in the deal before passing judgment and I strongly
urge my colleagues to do the same.
But make no mistake, Congress will play an important role
in the evaluation of a final deal. Again, I want to say that I
will not stand by and allow Congress to be marginalized.
Any permanent repeal of sanctions is by law Congress'
discretion, and before we do that we must be completely
convinced that this deal blocks all of Iran's pathways to a
nuclear bomb.
So I look forward to your testimony and hope we can have a
frank discussion of these issues and, again, Mr. Chairman,
thank you for calling this hearing today.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
This morning we are pleased to be joined by senior
representatives from State and from Treasury. Mr. Tony Blinken
is the Deputy Secretary of State. Previously, he served as the
assistant to the President and was principal deputy national
security adviser.
Mr. Blinken also worked as the Democratic staff director
for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and just
confirmed last December, we welcome him for his first
appearance before this committee.
Mr. Adam Szubin is the Acting Under Secretary for the
Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence at the
Department of the Treasury. He previously served as the
director of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control.
We welcome him back, and without objection, the witnesses'
full prepared statements will be made part of the record.
Members here will have 5 calendar days to submit any
statements to you or any questions and any extraneous material
for the record. We'll ask you to please summarize your remarks,
and Mr. Secretary, if you would begin.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ANTONY J. BLINKEN, DEPUTY SECRETARY
OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Blinken. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It is
pleasure to be here.
I want to thank you, Ranking Member Engel and the members
of this committee for having us here today and to give us this
opportunity to discuss our efforts to reach a comprehensive
solution to the challenge posed by Iran's nuclear program.
As we speak and as you mentioned, Secretary of State Kerry,
Secretary of Energy Moniz, Under Secretary of State Sherman are
in Switzerland with our P5+1 partners negotiating with the
Government of Iran over the future of its nuclear program.
Our goal for these negotiations is to verifiably ensure
that Iran's program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. To
that end, we seek to cut off the four pathways that Iran could
take to obtain enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon.
There are two uranium pathways through its activities at
the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities, a plutonium
pathway through Iran's heavy water reactor at Arak, and a
potential covert pathway.
To cut off all of these pathways, any comprehensive
arrangement must include exceptional constraints on Iran's
nuclear program and extraordinary monitoring and intrusive and
transparency measures that maximize the international
community's ability to detect any attempt by Iran to break out
overtly or covertly
As a practical matter, we are working to ensure that Iran,
should it renege on its commitments, would take at least 1 year
to produce enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon.
That would provide us with more than enough time to detect
and act on any Iranian transgression. In exchange, the
international community would provide Iran with phased,
proportionate and reversible sanctions relief tied to
verifiable actions on its part. If Iran were to violate its
commitments, sanctions would be quickly reimposed.
It is Iran's responsibility to convince the world by
building a track record of verified compliance that its nuclear
program is exclusively peaceful. That is why we are seeking a
time frame for a comprehensive deal of sufficient length to
firmly establish such a track record.
Only then would Iran be treated like any other non-nuclear
weapons state party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty with
all the rights but also all the obligations of an NPT state,
including continued monitoring and inspections and a verifiably
binding commitment to not build a nuclear weapon.
The Bush administration first proposed this concept for
Iran. Dozens of countries around the world responsibly adhere
to the NPT. Much has been said recently about the fact that a
deal with Iran would have an eventual end date.
In fact, some constraints would be removed after a
significant period of time, others would remain in effect even
longer and some would last indefinitely, including a stringent
and intrusive monitoring and inspections regime.
Iran would have to fully implement the IAEA safeguards
agreement and the additional protocol. Together, these give
inspectors access to all declared nuclear facilities and to any
suspected undeclared facilities.
So even after some core constraints are completed, far more
intrusive inspections will be required of Iran than before this
agreement.
Some have argued that Iran would be free to develop a
nuclear weapon at the conclusion of the comprehensive joint
plan of action if we achieve it. That is simply not true.
To the contrary, Iran would be prohibited from developing a
nuclear weapon in perpetuity and we would have a much greater
ability to detect any effort by Iran to do so. Iran would be
allowed to have a peaceful civilian nuclear program,
continuously verified by the IAEA.
Our goal is to reach an agreement on the major elements of
the deal by the end of this month and to complete the technical
details by the end of June. There has been a lot of reporting
in the press about where we are. This is what I can tell you as
of today.
In Switzerland, the negotiations have been substantive and
intense. We have made some progress on some of the core issues.
Significant gaps remain on some of the other issues between
what we and our partners in the P5+1 believe must be part of
the comprehensive deal and what Iran is willing to do.
While the negotiations are taking place, it is vital, in
our judgment, that we avoid any actions that would lead the
world to believe that the United States was responsible for
their failure.
Such actions include enacting new sanctions legislation
now. New sanctions at this time, including through so-called
trigger legislation, are unnecessary. Iran knows very well that
if it refuses a reasonable agreement or reneges on its
commitments, new sanctions can and will be passed in a matter
of days.
New sanctions now would be inconsistent with our
commitments under the interim agreement. They would undermine
our sanctions coalition. They would give Iran an excuse to walk
away from the talks or take a hard line that makes an agreement
impossible to achieve while blaming the failure on us.
In our judgment, we also must avoid actions that call into
question the President's authority to make commitments that the
United States will keep. Negotiating with a foreign nation is
the President's responsibility.
If there is confusion on this basic point, no foreign
government will trust that when a President purports to speak
for our country, he actually does.
In this case, such confusion could embolden hardliners in
Iran, divide us from our allies, poison the prospects for a
deal and make it much more difficult to sustain international
support for the existing sanctions, never mind new ones, if
negotiations collapse.
That international support is critical to the success of
the sanctions regime that Congress took such an important role
in building. Up until now, we have kept other countries onboard
despite the hardship it has caused some of them, in large part
because they are convinced we are serious about reaching a
diplomatic solution. If they lose that conviction, the United
States, not Iran, could be isolated and the sanctions regime
could collapse.
Congress has played and will continue to play a central
leading role in these efforts. Congressional legislation gave
us the tools to get Iran to the negotiating table and, as has
been noted, only Congress has the authority to lift sanctions
as part of any comprehensive solution.
Since signing the interim deal, we have been on the Hill
dozens of times to update on the progress of the talks--in all,
more than 200 briefings, meetings, hearings and phone calls.
If we reach an agreement we will welcome intense robust
scrutiny. We also will expect that any critics explain not only
why the deal is lacking but also what would be a better
alternative and how it could be achieved.
Our nuclear discussions with Iran do not alter our
commitment to the security of our allies in the region who are
deeply affected by Iran's efforts to spread instability and
support terrorism. That commitment will not change with or
without a deal.
We will retain the necessary tools and the determination to
continue countering Iran's troubling behavior. Indeed, the most
important thing we can do to keep Iran from feeling further
emboldened is to deny them a nuclear weapon and we will
continue to support those in Iran demanding greater respect for
the universal human rights and rule of law that they deserve
and we will continue to insist that Iran release Saeed Abedini,
Amir Hekmati and Jason Rezaian and help us find Robert
Levinson.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blinken follows:]
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----------
Chairman Royce. Mr. Szubin.
STATEMENT OF MR. ADAM J. SZUBIN, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE
OF TERRORISM AND FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY
Mr. Szubin. Thank you and good morning, Chairman Royce,
Ranking Member Engel, distinguished members of the committee.
It is a pleasure to be here today and thank you for the
invitation.
This is my first appearance, as you noted, before a
congressional committee in my new role as Acting Under
Secretary for TFI at the Treasury Department.
In my time at Treasury, including 9 years leading the
Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC, I have devoted the
majority of my working hours to building, honing and
implementing sanctions on Iran--both executive sanctions and
the strong congressional bipartisan sanctions that you all have
enacted. So I am particularly appreciative of being able to
testify here today on this vital issue.
The global architecture of our sanctions on Iran is
unprecedented both in terms of its strength and the
international foundations that underpin it. Working together
with our partners around the world and with Congress, we have
assembled a coalition that has fundamentally altered Iran's
economic posture.
As a result, we today have a chance of resolving one of the
world's most vexing and persistent security threats. At this
critical juncture in the talks, it is important to note that
Iran remains under massive strain and has no viable route to an
economic recovery without negotiated relief from international
sanctions.
This strain is visible across every sector in Iran's
economy. First, their financial lifeline--oil. In 2012, Iran
was exporting about 2.5 billion--I am sorry, 2.5 million
barrels per day of oil to some 20 jurisdictions.
Today, Iran is exporting 60 percent less oil than just 3
years ago to just six jurisdictions. The losses, of course,
have been compounded by the steep drop in global oil prices
such that Iran's chief revenue source is today bringing in less
than one quarter of what it brought in for Iran just 3 years
ago.
Just as troubling for Iran is the fact that it can't freely
access those revenues. It has a reduced stream of revenues
that, thanks to Congress, are going into restricted accounts,
either frozen or tied up in banks around the world.
Foreign investment in Iran has dropped precipitously. From
2004 to 2013, as foreign capital was pouring into developing
countries, Iran saw an 80-percent drop in foreign investment.
Iran's oil minister recently estimated that Iran's oil, gas
and petro-chem sectors will need approximately $170 billion to
recover. The Iranian rial has depreciated 52 percent since 2012
and has lost 12 percent of its value just under the JPOA period
alone as we have been negotiating.
The IMF for this coming year projects that Iran's economy
will enter stagnation, with GDP growth falling to .6 percent.
This is the lowest projected rate of any country the IMF looks
at in the Middle East and North Africa region, including
countries like Afghanistan that sell no oil.
Finally, Iran's banking sector remains isolated and holds a
high proportion of nonperforming loans. As you can hear, their
economy is under strain, but this sanctions pressure cannot be
sustained without work.
Accordingly, over the JPOA period we have worked very
intensively to enforce our sanctions. In the past 15 months, we
have targeted nearly 100 actors, individuals and companies who
were either helping Iran evade sanctions or helping Iran
conduct other misconduct.
We have imposed nearly $\1/2\ billion in penalties on
companies that were conducting illicit transactions under our
Iran sanctions and we will not soften our enforcement of
existing sanctions.
Now, as we speak, negotiators are hard at work trying to
secure a joint comprehensive plan of action. Regardless of
whether or not these negotiations succeed, I want to assure
this committee that the Treasury Department and the
administration as a whole are prepared for whatever comes next.
If we are able to secure a comprehensive understanding, we
will structure nuclear-related sanctions relief in a way that
is phased, proportionate and reversible. We will need to see
verified steps on Iran's part before sanctions are lifted and
we believe that powerful U.S. legislative sanctions should not
be terminated for years to come so that we continue to retain
important leverage years into a deal.
Alternatively, if we determine that a comprehensive deal
with Iran cannot be obtained, the administration, working with
Congress, is prepared to ratchet up the pressure. Over the past
decade, we have developed very subtle insights into Iran's
financial flows, its economic stress points and how it attempts
to work around sanctions.
We stand ready to raise the costs on Iran substantially
should it make clear that it is unwilling to address the
international community's concerns. Of course, while we must
prepare for every contingency, we remain hopeful that we can
achieve a peaceful resolution to this serious and long-standing
threat.
Thank you again for inviting me to appear here today and I
look forward to taking your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Szubin follows:]
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----------
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Szubin.
If I could go to my first question here--it goes to the
sunset. Deputy Secretary Blinken, a major concern here is the
expiration date.
In as little as 10 years, all of the restrictions and other
measures that you are touting here today are going to come off
and Iran's nuclear program is going to be then treated as
though it was the equivalent of the Netherlands.
So why 10 years? Does the administration believe or hope
that the Iranian regime will have moderated within that time
frame?
Mr. Blinken. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, there is no agreement on the duration of
various obligations. All of that is the subject of current
negotiations. So whether some aspects are 10 years, more or
less, that is all to be negotiated.
I think looking at this as a sunset is not the accurate way
to look at what we are trying to achieve. What we are proposing
and seeking to achieve is a series of constraints and
obligations.
Some will end after a long period of time, others will
continue longer than that and still others will be indefinite,
in perpetuity. The bottom line is that even after certain
obligations are completed by Iran, it cannot become a nuclear
weapon state.
It will be legally bound under the nonproliferation treaty
not to make or acquire a nuclear weapon. There will be legally
binding safeguards on material to verify and deter its
diversion. It will have to sign and implement a comprehensive
safeguards agreement and the additional protocol.
Chairman Royce. But that is why we are here today. You are
putting this stock in Iran's signature to the NPT and its
safeguards agreement, right? They have had those same
commitments. They have been violating those commitments for
years.
That is why this process. I would just--I would just point
that out. And the other point I would make is that 10 years or
whatever that time frame is, they are then going to be treated
as any other non-nuclear weapon NPT state, and that means no
sanctions, no restrictions on procurement, no restrictions on
the stockpile or the number of centrifuges it can spend at that
point, 10 years out, or on the purity level to which it may
enrich uranium.
And I will just give you an example of where this would put
Iran. They would enrich uranium at that point to levels near
weapon grade, I am presuming, claiming the desire to power a
nuclear navy because that is what Brazil is doing. So I am
going to assume that they are going to do the same thing there.
And that would all be permissible. It would all be blessed
under this agreement, as I read it, no matter who is in charge
of Iran in 10 years.
And that's why Ranking Member Engel and I have a letter
going to the President, signed by over 350 Members of Congress,
demanding that the verifiable constraints on Iran's program
last decades, not, as being discussed, a shorter period of
time. So I just want to make that point.
Let me go to my next question, and that goes to the 1-year
breakout. The administration has set a benchmark--a 1-year
breakout period. But is a year sufficient to detect and then
reverse potential Iranian violations and why not insist on a
period of 2 or 3 years?
Mr. Blinken. Mr. Chairman, we think that a 1-year breakout
time not only is sufficient but, indeed, is quite conservative.
We believe that with the verification and inspections and
monitoring that we will insist on in any agreement that would
give us more than enough time not only to detect any abuse of
the agreement but also to act on it.
If you look at what various experts have said, many have
said that a far lesser period of time would be sufficient to
detect and act on any violations.
Chairman Royce. Well, let----
Mr. Blinken. This is--let me also, just if I can just add
to this very quickly, Mr. Chairman.
One year is very conservative. First of all, that is the
most--if everything went perfectly for Iran. Second, the idea
that any country, including Iran, would break out for one
bomb's worth of material is highly unlikely. Like I said, we
are----
Chairman Royce. Okay. But let me go to this question then.
Will you insist that the IAEA inspectors have anywhere anytime
access to all facilities in Iran including Revolutionary Guard
bases, from what we know about what has gone on there, and will
Iran have to satisfy all questions that the IAEA has regarding
Iran's covert research on a nuclear warhead including access to
key scientific personnel and paperwork?
Mr. Blinken. So without going into the details because all
of this is this still subject to negotiation, we will insist
that the IAEA have the access is must have in order to do its
job and to verify.
Chairman Royce. Yes, I understand your perspective of what
is necessary to do their job. But mine is a specific list of
criteria based upon my discussions with the IAEA, and I want to
make certain that those are found and then are followed.
And then lastly, it seems the administration plans to push
the Security Council to adopt a new resolution to basically
bless this agreement and relax sanctions, but at the same time
you are pushing off Congress.
Why push for U.N. action but not Congress?
Mr. Blinken. We are not pushing off either. I think, as you
said and as Ranking Member Engel said, Congress will have to
exercise its authority to lift sanctions at the end of an
agreement if Iran complies and, indeed, keeping that until the
end, until we see that Iran is complying, is the best way to
sustain leverage.
Chairman Royce. Well, our concern here is if you push us
off for 10 years, let us say, in theory, and if this is
consequential enough to go to the U.N. Security Council at the
outset under a resolution under Chapter 7, which by definition
deals with a threat to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of
aggression, then it would certainly be consequential enough to
be submitted to the Senate for advise and consent. That is the
point I wanted to make.
Mr. Blinken. So the Security Council--this is an
international agreement. It is an agreement that would be made
with the other members of the Security Council, with Iran.
Under these circumstances, it would be normal for the
Security Council to take note of any agreement and then to
create a basis for lifting the U.N.-related sanctions.
Chairman Royce. But let me----
Mr. Blinken. Yes, Congress will eventually have to decide
whether to lift U.S. sanctions.
Chairman Royce. My time has expired, but suggesting that
Congress has a role to play by voting on sanctions relief years
from now once a deal has run its course, that to me is
disingenuous. But that is my view of it.
We will go to Mr. Engel for his questions. Thank you.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me, first, also emphasize that the trepidation that all
of us have about these negotiations involves, at least for me,
what the chairman said, that any deal that would sunset in 10
years or however much we were very, obviously, concerned about
and I know you are well and we, obviously, want to push that
back as much as we possibly can because we really just don't
trust Iran.
And I think the chairman is right on the mark in terms of
our concern with the sunset in 10 years or so. Another thing
that has bothered us, you know, and again, as the chairman
mentioned, he and I had legislation which passed the House 2
years ago by 400 to 20 and unanimously out of this committee,
which involved strong sanctions, and had the Senate followed
suit and been signed into law I think we would have been in a
much stronger position now.
But one of the things that is really annoying to all of us
is that we are sitting and negotiating with Iran over its
nuclear program at a time when Iran continues to be a bad actor
all around the world.
You take a look at capitals that Iran essentially controls,
now Yemen being added to that--Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut. This
is not a regime that looks like it wants peace. Iran continues
to fuel terrorism around the globe.
It is the number one, in my opinion, state supporter of
terrorism around the globe. So I believe that a nuclear
agreement should not whitewash the fact that Iran remains a
destabilizing actor in the region and funds terrorism.
Now, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps theoretically
could take advantage of any sanctions relief that results from
an agreement between the P5+1 and Iran because money is
fungible. So how could such relief be structured to minimize
any benefits to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps?
Mr. Blinken. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Engel.
First, let me just say we share your deep concerns about
Iran's activities in the region--destabilizing activities,
support for terrorism and, of course, its own abuse of human
rights at home, which is why we will and we will continue to
vigorously oppose those efforts.
And, indeed, throughout the interim agreement we have
pushed back very hard on proliferation activities, WMD-related
activities, terrorism support activities, sanctioning
designating individuals, intercepting cargoes, et cetera, and
working with our partners as we have been for more than 6 years
to build up their capacity.
With regard to any money that Iran receives as a result of
relief from sanctions, I would turn to my colleague to discuss
this. But let me just say I think what we see is that Iran is
in a very deep economic hole and a large part of the reason
that Rouhani was elected as President was to respond to the
desire of the people to try and get out of the hole.
So in one instance at least we believe that a significant
portion of any revenues they receive would go to trying to plug
their economic holes at home.
That said, you are exactly right. Money is fungible and
presumably that would free up some resources for the IRGC. That
said, we also believe that denying Iran a nuclear weapon is the
single most significant thing we could do to prevent further
emboldening Iran it its actions in the region.
Mr. Engel. And let us me just say, before Mr. Szubin talks,
that is precisely what we are concerned about because Iran is
in a deep economic hole.
By having an agreement and releasing that, helping them, so
to speak, get out of that hole, we want to, obviously, make
sure, and you do as well, obviously, to make sure that the
safeguards are in there as well.
That is what makes me nervous because once you lose that
leverage it is very, very hard to get back. Mr. Szubin?
Mr. Szubin. Yes. Ranking Member Engel, thank you and I will
say as well that is a concern we have been keenly focused on.
The truth is the size of the hole that Iran is in, across
almost any indicator you look at, is far deeper than the relief
that is on the table, even the substantial relief, should Iran
make good on all of the commitments that are being set out by
the negotiators.
We are talking about a hole that could be described, in one
sense, as a $200-billion hole, which are the losses that we
assess they have suffered since 2012 due to sanctions.
In just the energy infrastructure, as I mentioned during my
opening statement, their minister came out recently and said
they need $170 billion just to regain their footing in that
sector alone.
The average Iranian has seen steady decreases in their
standard of living, decreases in their purchasing power, even
since Rouhani came into office, even since the JPOA went into
effect.
And so it is going to be a tremendous effort, a years-long
effort, for Iran to right itself, and that is not going to
happen overnight.
Finally, I just want to reiterate what Deputy Secretary
Blinken said. None of our sanctions targeting the nefarious
activities that you mentioned are going away. None of those are
on the table for discussion.
So with respect to the Quds Force interventions in Yemen
and Syria, we--and Hezbollah, very notably, we will continue to
pressure any forms of support that we see.
Mr. Engel. Let me ask you one final quick question because
you mentioned Hezbollah, and I want to say that we all agree
that Iran continues to support terrorism and sow instability in
the Middle East.
However, the director of national intelligence did not
include Iranian terrorism or Hezbollah or any terrorist threat
for that matter in the 2015 worldwide threat assessment of the
U.S. intelligence communities.
Can you tell me why? That didn't make any sense to me. Or
you can--we can talk and you can send me a letter about it.
Mr. Szubin. Yes, I am happy to get back to you on that. But
my understanding is, first of all, Hezbollah remains front and
center in our concerns. I think the director was talking about
the immediate front-burner concern that we have with ISIL and
that was the focus of his remarks.
But it remains a foreign terrorist organization. It remains
very much in the spotlight of our efforts to counter it, to
push back on it, to isolate it around the world.
Mr. Engel. And could not exist if it wasn't for Iran?
Mr. Szubin. That is correct.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
We go now to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Blinken, during your confirmation hearing in the Senate
you had promised Senator Rubio and the Foreign Relations
Committee that you and the administration would consult
Congress on any policy changes the administration was seeking
toward Cuba.
That turned out to be a complete falsehood. I worry that
the Cuba example was a deliberate attempt by the administration
to keep Congress in the dark regarding the Castro negotiations.
And why is this important? Not only because of the Cuba
deal but of how that implicates the Iranian deal. Keeping us in
the dark it foreshadows the administration's approach to
Congress and keeping us out of the loop on the Iranian deal.
The administration has made it clear that it does not want
Congress to vote on the Iranian deal anytime soon.
But you just said to Mr. Royce that the U.N. Security
Council will be having a vote, a binding vote, on the Iranian
deal. Just to make it clear, you will be going to the U.N.
Security Council to ask for a vote on the Iranian deal--yes or
no?
Mr. Blinken. We will be going to the Security Council
presumably, because this is an international agreement,
implicating----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yes?
Mr. Blinken [continuing]. All the members of the Security
Council to take note of the deal and if there are any
requirements----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Vote on the deal?
Mr. Blinken. If there are any requirements of the Security
Council pursuant to the deal----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. To vote?
Mr. Blinken [continuing]. To make clear that it will make
good----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Congress can wait for the U.N. Security
Council.
Mr. Blinken [continuing]. On its commitments just as
Congress will have to vote and decide----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We have 10 years from now.
Mr. Blinken [continuing]. On any lifting sanctions.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Sure. No problem. And Palestinian
statehood--there have been reports last night that in order for
President Obama to continue his temper tantrum toward Prime
Minister Netanyahu, what we will be doing in the United Nations
is push in the shadows for a vote on Palestinian statehood in
order to pressure Israel to be at the negotiation table with
the Palestinians.
Is that true? Is that press report true?
Mr. Blinken. No. The administration's support for Israel is
absolutely unshakable. We have done more for Israel's security
over the last 6 years----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Oh, that support is very clear. Thank
you. Thank you. No, that support is very clear.
Mr. Blinken [continuing]. Than any administration has.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And I am going to ask you
another question on Iran for a minute.
But I wanted to ask Mr. Szubin, your Cuba sanctions
regulatory revisions earlier this year took a very broad view
of the administration's licensing authority under the Trading
with the Enemy Act, and I fear that the administration is using
Cuba as a test case, as I said, for normalizing relations with
Tehran and will utilize its licensing authority to provide
broad relief for Iran.
Under the JPOA, the U.S. is committed to removing nuclear-
related sanctions on Iran. However, as the author of the Iran
sanctions law, the concept of an exclusively defined nuclear-
related sanction on Iran does not exist in U.S. law because the
sanctions are intertwined with Iran's human rights record, its
ballistic missile program and its support for terrorism.
So I ask you, Mr. Szubin, which sanctions will you seek to
suspend and ultimately lift under a final agreement and will
you come to Congress to ask for authorities before such action
is taken?
Mr. Szubin. Thank you, Congresswoman.
With respect to the actions we took in the Cuba amendments
amending our regulations, I will note that the licensing
authority is one that has been drawn on by administrations,
Democratic and Republican, over the last decade and I have been
involved under both presidencies, and it is an authority that--
--
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. We will leave--it is going to
take a long time.
Mr. Blinken, Iran has been cheating, skirting the rules,
violating international agreements, you have heard, from both
Mr. Engel and Mr. Royce on that.
What mechanism do we have to enforce any violation? Will
there be penalties imbedded in the nuclear deal? If you could
be specific.
Mr. Blinken. Thank you. First, I should note that the IAEA
has said repeatedly that Iran has complied with its obligations
under the interim agreement.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Is that all that the IAEA has said? Has
the IAEA also not said that Iran is not complying and is not
letting them in, as the IAEA has asked?
Mr. Blinken. No. It has said that under the agreement Iran
has complied. It has also said--you are correct--that outside
of the agreement Iran, of course, is seeking to do whatever----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. So you look at their reports and say--you
cherry pick and you say, okay, the IAEA is happy with this?
Mr. Blinken. No.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. You should give the totality of what they
have been saying----
Mr. Blinken. No, no.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [continuing]. And how frustrated that
agency has been with Iran throughout all of these negotiations.
Mr. Blinken. No, no. I want to be clear, to answer your
question, that the IAEA said that with regard to its
obligations under the interim agreement, Iran has complied.
You are also absolutely correct that outside of the
agreement, including the critical question of the possible
military dimensions of Iran's program in the past or for that
matter now, it has not complied with what the IAEA is seeking
and, indeed, that will have to be part of any agreement.
And as to enforcement, it is very straightforward. As the
Under Secretary said, as I said, in the event Iran were to
renege on any commitment it made the sanctions would snap back
in full force.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And I am sure that Iran is just shaking
at that because that is very----
Mr. Blinken. That is why they are at the table.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Oh, yes. Absolutely.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
We go to Mr. Brad Sherman of California, ranking member of
the Asia Subcommittee.
Mr. Sherman. We should remember why we are in this
situation. The executive branch under the Bush administration
refused to enforce sanctions and violated American statutes for
the benefit of Iran for 8 continuous years.
The Bush administration prevented Congress from passing and
used all of its power in Congress to prevent us passing new
statutory sanctions. Now, that doesn't fit with the image we
have of President Bush until you realize that at the time the
sanctions all focused on international oil companies, which was
not President Bush's target of choice.
Had we continued President Bush's policies--well, we should
know that during the Bush administration Iran went from zero to
5,000 installed centrifuges--had we continued those policies,
Iran would have $300 billion more available to it in cash right
now because we have frozen $100 billion, and $200 billion has
been lost to Iran in lost oil sales.
But it is not the executive branch but Congress that has
had it right for the last 15 years, which is why I take such
offense when I hear the administration say, Congress, if we
have a view, we are interfering and undermining. When you read
the United States Constitution you will see that when it comes
to economic sanctions and international economics, all the
power is vested in Congress except to the extent that the
President negotiates a treaty that is ratified by the Senate.
Yet, I fear that what the administration is doing is using
foreign ropes to tie the hands of the United States Congress
because the foreign minister of Iran was able to cite Article
27 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties saying, well, the
United States will be in violation of international law if
Congress doesn't do whatever the President promises Congress
will do.
I would--and the administration feeds into that when a high
administration official declares foreign policy runs through
the executive branch and the President and does not go through
other channels.
I fear that we will have a situation where the executive
branch comes to us and says, you have to take this action. You
are prohibited from taking that action because you are going to
hold the United States up to ridicule for being in violation of
international law.
I would hope that you would look at the memo issued by the
Carter Department of Justice that stated Congress may enact
legislation modifying or abrogating executive agreements, and
that if that was formally turned over to the Iran delegation,
that would get us support under Article 46 of the Vienna
Convention on Treaties.
I should point out for the record that in 2007, Senator
Clinton introduced, with the co-sponsorships of Senator Obama
and Senator Kerry, the Oversight of Iraq Agreements Act, which
stated that any status of forces agreement between the United
States and Iraq that was not a treaty approved by two-thirds of
the Senate or authorized by legislation would not have the
force of law and prohibited funding to implement that.
For the record, because I just don't have time to give you
at this moment, I would like you to explain whether under the
standards of the Obama administration the introduction of that
act by those three senators constituted an interference with
policy undermining President Bush's policy, et cetera.
But I want to focus on a particular question. There is a
question here. I fear that you have misled this committee in
telling us that once Iran has the rights of a non-nuclear
state, subject to the additional protocol, that you will be
able to stop sneak out because you have said first that, well,
they can't develop a nuclear weapon because that would be
illegal. That is a preposterous argument. Obviously, they are
willing to break the law.
And the next point is that you have conjured up this idea
there will be inspections. The question is, inspections of
suspected sites. There is nothing in the additional protocol
that adds to the NPT. The NPT was in force and it took 2 years
after it was widely suspected that Fordow was a secret site for
the IAEA to get there.
So why do you tell us that oh, this IAEA, it has worked
fine for Japan and the Netherlands--it will work great for
Iran--when it won't allow us to get in quickly to suspected
sites? Mr. Deputy Secretary.
Mr. Blinken. Thank you very much.
First, if Iran makes an agreement it will make it with the
full knowledge that if it violates the agreement there will be
severe consequences.
Mr. Sherman. I was talking about sneaking, not being
detected. Secret sites.
Mr. Blinken. The inspections regime that we will insist on,
first of all, for any initial duration--let me finish, if I
may, please--will be beyond that, that any country has had
anytime, anywhere in the world.
That will--from cradle to grave of the production
progress--mines, mills, factories, centrifuge facilities. That
will create a basis of knowledge of the people, the places, the
documents, that will last far beyond the duration of any of
those provisions.
Then beyond that, its obligations under a safeguards
agreement, under the additional protocol, under Modified Code
3.1. All of those taken together will, with any other measures
that we might achieve on top of that and those remain to be
negotiated, give us the confidence that the inspectors will
have the ability to detect in a timely fashion any efforts by
Iran to break out of the agreement.
Mr. Sherman. So you need an intrusive inspection regime,
you will have it for a few years and then, for reasons you
can't explain, the blindfolds will go on and we will hope that
we can prevent sneak-out thereafter.
I yield back.
Mr. Blinken. The blindfolds won't be on. They will be off.
Chairman Royce. Okay.
So Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California, chairman of the
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It does
get a little tiring to keep being reminded that President Bush
is responsible for all of our problems. After all of these
years they are still blaming President Bush.
Mr. Sherman. If the gentleman will yield. I blame the
executive branch and I spent four of it blaming the current
executive branch.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
I am--are we actually more concerned about the mullah
regime in Iran having possession of a nuclear weapon versus
what we seem to be just talking about--is their ability to
manufacture a nuclear weapon?
Don't we see this--do you see that in this debate, Mr.
Secretary, and shouldn't we be--I think, frankly, with Mr.
Netanyahu's speech as well as what we have been hearing here, I
think the American people are being lulled into a false sense
of security--that if we just prevent them from being able to
manufacture the weapon that these crazy mullahs aren't going to
have their hands on the ability to have possession a nuclear
weapon.
Mr. Blinken. The issue is----
Mr. Rohrabacher. You have to push a button on it.
Mr. Blinken. I apologize. Thank you.
Like it or not, Iran has mastered the fuel cycle and we
can't bomb that away, we can't sanction that away and,
unfortunately, we probably can't negotiate that away.
So they have the----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Negotiate what away?
Mr. Blinken. The fuel--their mastery of the fuel cycle.
They have the knowledge of how to put together a weapon.
So the issue is whether the program that they have is so
limited, so constrained, so inspected, so transparent, that as
a practical matter they cannot develop material for a bomb, or
if they did we would detect it and have time to do something
about it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is not my question. Whether they can
manufacture it or not, couldn't they get one from Pakistan or
from China or from Korea or perhaps somebody stole a couple
nuclear weapons as the Soviet Union was collapsing?
Mr. Blinken. Yes. No, your point is very well taken, which
is exactly why, as a my colleague said, even if there is an
agreement, the various sanctions and stringent efforts we are
making around the world to prevent Iran from proliferating or
from receiving the benefits of proliferation will continue.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, the only--the only way we are going
to prevent these bad guys from having the nuclear weapon--we
keep saying Iran. We don't really mean Iran. The people of Iran
are really nice people.
In fact, I understand they like Americans more than just
about any other country in the world. It is the mullah regime.
It is these the bloody mullahs that are supporting terrorism
around the world, that are repressing their own people.
Isn't the real answer trying to make ourselves partners
with those people in Iran who want a more democratic country, a
more democratic country, and has not this administration passed
up time and time again the opportunity to work with the people
of Iran to free themselves from these mullahs?
Mr. Blinken. Congressman, I think you are exactly right
that the actions of the regime are the problem, whether it is
destabilizing activities in the region, whether it is support
for terrorist groups including Hezbollah and whether it is,
indeed, their abusive human rights at home, which is exactly
why across the board, whether it is standing up and supporting
those who are trying get greater rights in Iran, whether it is
working with our partners in the region to increase their
defensive capacities, whether it is pushing back on
proliferation and on support for terrorism through the actions
we have taken, that is exactly why we are doing that and that
is exactly why those actions will continue.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, I would suggest--I would suggest
that I give you an A+ in terms of being able to focus people's
attention on these negotiations dealing with the ability for
them to manufacture a weapon.
I would give you an F- when it comes to whether or not we
can try to get rid of the threat by helping the people of Iran
institute a democratic government there.
This administration from day one in order to--frankly, the
irony of this is, I believe this administration is bending over
backwards not to try to threaten the mullah regime in Iran in
order to get a nuclear deal which will make no difference at
all because it still leaves the mullahs with the right to own
and possess a nuclear weapon that they didn't manufacture
themselves, which leaves us vulnerable to these very same----
Mr. Blinken. I want to assure you they won't have the that
right, period.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Albio Sires of New Jersey.
He is the ranking member of the Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being
here.
I think you can take back to the department how concerned
this body is that we don't seem to be part of any of this
negotiation and we don't seem--that we seem to be bypassed.
I remember when the Secretary was here. We talked about
Cuba, and I asked him point blank about negotiations. They said
that nothing was going on in exchange for Alan Gross.
Now we have a situation similar to what we had in those
hearings. One of the questions that I have is, can you speak to
how the U.N. Security Council resolutions are being handled in
the negotiations?
Because once these sanctions are lifted, I think it is
going to be virtually impossible to reimpose them because I
don't think Russia and China are going to go along with it.
They have veto powers. So how are we handling this?
Mr. Blinken. Thank you. First, on your first point,
Congressman, I have to say having been part of this, you know,
there have been by our count, since the interim agreement was
signed, more than 200 briefings, hearings meetings, phone calls
with Members of Congress on the ramifications.
Mr. Sires. With all due respect, we don't get--you know, we
don't get much on those briefings. That is like, you know,
these classified briefings that we get--I can get more
information on anything in my district than what I get here.
Mr. Blinken. You will understand that in--while
negotiations are going on it is difficult sometimes to provide
all of the details. It is something that is going back and
forth on a virtually continuous basis. That said, I would be
happy to talk to you further about this.
Mr. Sires. But the problem is some of this stuff leaks out
and then we look like--the press comes to us and we look like
well, we don't know what is going on with the administration.
You know, I mean----
Mr. Blinken. Don't always believe what you read.
Mr. Sires. Yes, I know. I don't believe what I listen to
when people come in front of me either, you know. Can you talk
a little bit about the sanctions, about the----
Mr. Blinken. Yes, absolutely. So, again, and I will also
invite my colleague to do the same thing, just as with our own
sanctions, with regard to U.N. sanctions, first of all, we
would preserve sanctions related to the non-nuclear aspects of
Iran's behavior.
Second, any U.N.-related sanctions also would be--have to
be lifted in a way that shows, first, Iranian compliance with
various obligations under the agreement.
So they too in some fashion would have to be sequenced
depending on Iran's fulfilling its obligations. We want to see
a demonstration that Iran is serious. But all of that,
including the sequencing, is under negotiation.
But Adam, do you want to add to that?
Mr. Szubin. Only to add that you are absolutely right to
focus on the ability to restore sanctions in the event of a
breach. That is something that, obviously, is very much at the
forefront of our mind when we look at any possible sanctions
relief is, is it reversible.
And it is a trickier question when you talk about U.N.
Security Council resolutions where we are obviously not the
only member of that council. But we are very focused on that in
the negotiations to make sure that if there is a violation
there isn't the ability for one country to stand in the way of
snapping back those sanctions.
Mr. Sires. Have you had these conversations with China and
Russia, you know, on this issue?
Mr. Szubin. Yes, absolutely. That is very much part of the
conversations that we have among the negotiating partners as
well as, obviously, the conversations we have with the
Iranians, yes.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
We go now to Mr. Steve Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Iran has repeatedly violated its obligations under the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It has built secret nuclear
facilities. It has illicitly procured nuclear materials. It has
denied IAEA inspectors access to the suspected facilities.
So isn't it foolish to trust them now? Wouldn't a bad deal
be throwing Israel under the proverbial bus? And, because of
Iran's intercontinental ballistic missile goals, placing the
U.S. at great risk as well? Now, I know you are going to say
something to the effect that we are not trusting or this is
trusting and verifying, but there are a whole lot of us on both
sides of the aisle who, clearly, aren't buying it.
Mr. Blinken. Thank you, Congressman.
You are exactly right. Iran has repeatedly violated various
obligations, which is exactly why it is in the position that it
is in now--that is, facing the isolation and the sanction of
the entire world and exactly why it is at the table now trying
to negotiate an agreement.
Those violations are what led to our ability to impose the
most severe sanctions on Iran of any country in history and
convinced other countries to come along.
Mr. Chabot. We are, clearly, concerned that we are going to
end up in a bad deal. Let me go to the second question I have
for you.
President Obama, clearly, has disdain for the winner of the
Israeli elections held this week. Maybe the only group I can
think of that he might have more disdain for is the elected
representatives of the American people--this Congress.
Since Israel will be the most directly affected by a bad
deal with Iran, how is the administration going to repair
relations with our key ally in the region?
Mr. Blinken. Congressman, in my judgment, no administration
has done more for Israel's security than this administration.
If you look at the measures we have taken, the steps we have
taken to provide for Israel's security over the past 6 years,
they are exceptionally extraordinary and, indeed, Prime
Minister Netanyahu has called them such, and that will--that
will endure.
Mr. Chabot. That is the least credible answer I have heard
all morning, that this--no President has done more for the
American-Israeli relationship than this President.
Mr. Blinken. No, that is not what I said.
Mr. Chabot. That is----
Mr. Blinken. I said for Israel's security.
Mr. Chabot. Security, relations, whatever. This President--
there has been no President that has damaged relations between
the United States and Israel more than this President.
Let me go to my third question. One of the concerns about a
bad deal with Iran has always been proliferation in the
region--that there is a nuclear arms race with the Saudis, the
Gulf States, Turkey and perhaps others developing enrichment
programs and eventually nuclear weapons.
There are indications that the Saudis in particular are so
alarmed that a bad deal is in the cards that they are already
moving in that direction. What is your response?
Mr. Blinken. Thank you, Congressman.
Well, of course, if there is no deal Iran could rush to a
nuclear capacity and a nuclear weapon tomorrow, which I imagine
is exactly what would spark an arms race.
So, indeed, the best way to prevent countries from feeling
the necessity to do that is to prevent Iran from getting a
weapon. The model that is being set by this agreement, if there
is an agreement, is hardly one that other countries would want
to follow if they decided that they needed to acquire the
capacity to build a nuclear weapon because the Iranian model is
a decade or more of isolation and sanctions and, indeed,
anything that emerges from this agreement will require such
intrusive inspections, access and monitoring I doubt any
country would want to follow that model.
The answer is exactly what we have been doing, which is to
do everything we can to prevent Iran from getting a weapon so
other countries don't feel the need to do it and to build up
their capacity to defend themselves.
Mr. Chabot. Well, our concern, obviously, is that we are
going to end up with a bad deal--they are going to get nuclear
weapons and the other countries in the region are going to feel
threatened. Then all the other countries are going to end up
with them and Israel is right in the middle of that, and God
help us if that is where we end up.
My final question: What is the difference between the road
that we traveled down with North Korea and we are now traveling
down with Iran, other than Iran is a far more dangerous country
than North Korea?
There are a lot of us who believe that we have seen this
movie before and we know how it is going to end.
Mr. Blinken. Thank you. They are very different cases.
The North Korean program was far more advanced. First of
all, when the Clinton administration was in office, Iran, we
believe, had the material for nuclear weapons and there is some
analysis that suggests that it already had nuclear weapons
before the agreed framework was signed. By the time President
Obama came in, of course, North Korea had nuclear weapons.
Iran has neither. It is not--doesn't have the weapons,
doesn't have the material for the weapons. It hasn't tested
and, of course, North Korea, as you know, has also tested. So
they are in far different situations.
The inspections regime that existed at various points for
North Korea was far, far less than what Iran faces right now
under the interim agreement and certainly far less than it
would face under any comprehensive agreement.
Mr. Chabot. Well, my time has expired. But, again----
Mr. Blinken. And we have also taken lessons. I want to
assure you we have taken lessons from that----
Mr. Chabot [continuing]. There is great skepticism on both
sides of the aisle here and, I believe, for good reason. I
yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida, ranking member
on the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to you and
Ranking Member Engel. Thanks to our witnesses, Deputy Secretary
Blinken and Acting Under Secretary Szubin. It is great to have
you both here in your new roles.
Let me start with this. I understand that we are now
approaching a deadline and I want to express my thanks, as I
have every single time I have had the opportunity, for the
focus on working to bring my constituent, Bob Levinson, home.
But as we approach these last days, let me just say that
raising the issue at this point can no longer suffice, and that
with respect to Pastor Abedini and Amir Hekmati and Jason
Rezaian and Bob Levinson, if anyone is to take Iran seriously,
that there is any commitment that they can make that can be
adhered to, then the best show of good faith that they can make
would be to return those Americans. I urge you to make that a
priority. That is number one.
Next, I have been clear. I know we are not supposed to
prejudge any deal but there are certainly things that would
concern us in any deal that I think it is okay for us to
address and I want to just go through a few of those.
First, a couple of straightforward questions. Deputy
Secretary Blinken, will a final agreement and the technical
annexes and side agreements be made public? Will they be
readily available to Congress and to the public?
Mr. Blinken. Thank you.
Can I just start by saying, first of all, we strongly,
strongly agree with your statement about the American citizens
who are unjustly imprisoned in Iran.
I want to assure you this is something that we are working
on virtually every day. The only issue that comes up regularly
within the context of the nuclear discussions, apart from those
discussions, is the--is our American citizens. We are working
on it very, very vigorously. We want to bring them home and we
very much share your commitment to do that.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
Mr. Blinken. With regard to whether the agreement will be
made public, certainly, the core elements will. I don't know at
this stage because we don't know exactly what form any
agreement would take, whether certain pieces would be--would
remain made classified and be subject to classified review,
what parts would be public. I can't tell you at this stage
because we don't know the exact----
Mr. Deutch. The greater the transparency the easier it will
be for people to----
Mr. Blinken. I think we saw with the interim agreement that
we reached that it was made public and Congress had full access
to it.
Mr. Deutch. Congress had full access to it. The American
people didn't. Let me just go on.
Next, again, just a couple of straightforward questions.
Does Iran--Secretary Blinken, does Iran remained the world's
most active state sponsor of terror?
Mr. Blinken. Whether it is the most active, it certainly
for sure in the very top percentile.
Mr. Deutch. And is the administration in any way
considering removing them from the state sponsor of terrorism
list?
Mr. Blinken. No.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
Now, when it comes to the issues that we are dealing with
that concern me in any deal, one, we have talked about the
number of centrifuges and the infrastructure. A question I have
is whether the ultimate number of centrifuges is reduced from
the close to 20,000 to 6,000 or 7,000 or 3,000, whatever the
number is, what will happen to the rest?
Will any of them be dismantled? Will they go into a closet?
Will they go into an attic? Will they be readily available for
Iran at the expiration of the deal?
Mr. Blinken. All of that is subject to the negotiations.
That remains to be determined. I think you are right to point
in general to the centrifuges. Obviously, that is a key
component. But it also important to understand it is not the
only component.
Mr. Deutch. I understand. I understand, and I only have a
little time. But I would encourage--I would suggest that if the
ultimate deal doesn't require that a single one of those
centrifuges is dismantled, it is going to make it awfully
difficult for a lot of us to be comfortable that this is a
serious enough step to prevent them from breaking out.
Next, I just--I think you can understand, and I am not
going to have time to get to my other--so I will just focus on
this. I think you can understand the frustration that we have
when both you, Secretary Blinken and Mr. Szubin, both talked
about phased, proportionate and reversible sanctions relief but
then went on to acknowledge the plan to go to the United
Nations Security Council and to make clear that at the U.N.,
Venezuela, Malaysia, Nigeria may get a chance to vote on this
deal now but Congress, ultimately, will have a chance to vote
on this perhaps 5, perhaps 10, perhaps 15 years in the future.
That is what we are being told. I hope you can understand
the frustration and how can--and the real question I have is
how can the sanctions relief be reversible if the plan is to go
to the United Nations to reverse all of the multilateral
sanctions, leaving only the American sanctions in place?
Mr. Blinken. Again, I just want to try to make it clear
that this is, if it happens, an international agreement that
has other parties to the agreement. That is done through the
Security Council.
The Security Council would take note of any agreement and
it would make clear that it is prepared, once Iran demonstrates
that it is meeting its commitments, which would be at some
point in the future because there would be a series of
commitments under the deal, at that point to suspend or lift
any international sanctions.
Our own sanctions, again, would be under our own discretion
and ultimately Congress has to pass judgment on that.
Mr. Deutch. And Mr. Chairman, if I could just ask to have
Mr. Szubin provide to us, because I am out of time, provide to
us after this hearing a breakdown to the extent that you have
done it of the $700 million that has been released every--the
money that has been released every few months under the interim
deal, and if you have done analysis on a deal of what a final
deal might look like of sanctions relief, to the extent that
$10 billion, $20 billion, $50 billion of the frozen money was
released all at one time where any that money in the case of
the interim deal has gone in Iran, where it would go under
the--under the permanent deal and whether it would simply wind
up going to benefit the Revolutionary Guard, the military and
their terrorist activities.
I thank you and I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Without objection, so ordered. And we go to
Mr. Mike McCaul of Texas.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Section 1, 2 and 3 of the Atomic Energy Act,
as you know, requires that all significant U.S. nuclear
cooperation agreements must be approved by both houses of
Congress.
Last year, Congress approved two such agreements, one with
South Korea and the other one with Great Britain, who are our
allies. However, in this case, when we are dealing with the
world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, the position of
this administration is that that should not be subject to
approval by the United States Congress.
I don't quite understand that distinction. Can you explain
that to me?
Mr. Blinken. Thank you, Congressman.
I think the issue is what is the best form of an agreement
in order for us to have the flexibility that we need to make
sure that Iran is living up to its obligations and to be able
to reimpose sanctions quickly if it is not. We--what we are
seeking is--and the issue here is really whether this is a
legally binding agreement or not.
If it is a legally binding agreement, it would be subject
to the rules of international law on how you get into an
agreement and how you get out of it, which can be quite
burdensome.
So having a nonbinding agreement allows us to have the
flexibility we need if necessary to snap back sanctions
immediately, not wait for international partners to agree or
not agree.
With regard to whether it is a treaty or not and so subject
to the advice and consent of the United States Senate, as you
know, the vast bulk of international agreements that we have
made under Democratic administrations and Republican
administrations in the nonproliferation area and the foreign
policy area more generally in fact are not treaties and are not
subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
And I can go through the list under the nonproliferation
area. We have everything from the missile technology control
regime, which has been very successful in creating voluntary
export licensing around the world, the nuclear security
guidelines----
Mr. McCaul. And my time is limited, and I appreciate what
you are saying. I just think we are treating our allies
different from a state sponsor of terror and I think that the
American people, through its representatives, should be
weighing in this deal. But I know we disagree on that point.
ICBMs--this concerns me greatly. There has been no--this
has been off the table, not part of the discussions at all, and
the intelligence community and the Pentagon in its annual
report on military power of Iran have noted that by--as early
as 2015 of this year they may have ICBM technology--missile
ranges that could potentially reach as far as the United States
of America.
And then the Ayatollah, the Supreme Leader, says that to
limit this program would be a stupid idiotic expectation and
that the Revolutionary Guard should definitely carry out their
program and should mass produce.
Why in the world isn't this on the table and does that not
concern you about their intent here?
Mr. Blinken. Yes. The missile program is absolutely a
concern which is, again, why we have been working very
vigorously around the world to deny, where we can, Iran the
technology for that program and to push back against
proliferation.
In that effort, whether there is an agreement or not, we
will persist in those sanctions and the various measures we are
taking will continue regardless of whether there is an
agreement.
The scope of this agreement, if there is one, is the
nuclear program. That is what our partners have agreed to. That
is what is being negotiated. It is not a missile agreement.
Now, there are aspects of it that come into this that are
critical in terms of Iran's capacity to make, potentially, a
nuclear weapon to a missile and, indeed, we are focused on that
because that does fall within the confines of what we are----
Mr. McCaul. Well, because that is the delivery device for a
nuclear warhead.
Mr. Blinken. Exactly. Exactly.
Mr. McCaul. And so they are not backing down on that, which
kind of makes me question, you know, their whole good faith
analysis here. You know, if I could just say, when I read their
own words, President Rouhani, who you say is taking a different
tack and trying to be a peacemaker here, says that in Geneva
agreement world powers surrendered to the Iranian nation's
will, and that is in his words.
And then, you know, they said that the centrifuges were
spinning and will never stop. When Prime Minister Netanyahu
gave his speech at the joint session of Congress, Iran was they
were blowing up a mock of the USS Nimitz in the Red Sea,
simultaneously.
I question the good faith here. You have an extraordinary
challenge, sir, and I wish you all the best. But I cannot--I
just have to question the good faith on the part of Iran.
Mr. Blinken. Sir, you are exactly right. It is not a
question of good faith.
It is a question--and by the way, whether it is President
Rouhani or the foreign minister or any others, it is not that
we think these are good guys who like the United States.
It is that there are some people who are somewhat more
pragmatic about what Iran needs to do for its own interest in
the future and they believe that negotiating an agreement and
getting some relief from the pressure that they have been under
is what makes the most sense for their country, again, not
because they like us or have good intentions.
The other thing I would say that I think is important is
that there are abhorrent statements made on a regular basis by
Iran's leaders on all sorts of issues. In some instances,
though, some of these statements are made for domestic
political purposes.
We sometimes have a tendency to see Iran as the only
country on Earth that doesn't have politics. In fact, it has
very intense politics and there is a lot of politics going on
right now between those in Iran who would want an agreement,
again, because they believe it is in the interest of the
country, and those who don't want one, and some of the
statements you are seeing, as objectionable and as abhorrent as
they may be, some of those designed for political consumption
at home to push back against those who do not want an
agreement. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. I hear ``Death to America'' on an ongoing
basis regardless of the politics and that is concerning for us.
We go now to David Cicilline of Rhode Island. Mr.
Cicilline?
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much
for being here and for giving us your insight on this very
important issue.
I am hopeful that the ongoing negotiations will ultimately
result in an agreement that we can get behind and I think, as
our chairman and our ranking member said, many of us have a lot
of questions about the details of a final agreement and in a
letter I think we will express to you what some of those
concerns are.
As I listen to the--my colleagues today, you know,
guaranteeing that actors to a negotiated agreement are going to
behave in a certain way is always difficult and we have no
guarantee of that.
And so it seems to me what the goal of this agreement
should be is to be sure that we set it out so that it is
difficult for them to violate the agreement, that we make it
certain that we can detect it if they do and that we have an
opportunity to respond to it.
I mean, that is really the best we can do other than
imagining that we can control the decisions of lots of other
people.
And so with respect to that, last year the Pentagon's
Defense Science Board released a report that found the U.S.
Government mechanisms for detection and monitoring of small
nuclear enterprises or covert facilities are ``either
inadequate or, more often, do not exist.''
So in that context, how will we know and what are we doing
to ensure that we would learn if Iran was pursuing a covert
program, particularly after the sunset of a comprehensive
agreement, and will the additional protocols in the NPT address
this?
But isn't that a fair question to know? We are not
particularly good at that from the sounds of it in general, and
with respect to Iran in particular what are the protections?
Mr. Blinken. Thank you very much, Congressman.
Yes, I think you make a very important point and, indeed, I
am well aware of the report by the Defense Science Board. We
are factoring in the report's recommendations as we work on and
think about any agreement with Iran.
I think it underscores the absolute necessity of having the
most intrusive significant monitoring access transparency
regime anywhere, anytime, anyplace in the world, and in terms
of what happens in perpetuity it underscores the absolute
necessity of having at the very least the combination of the
additional protocol, Modified Code 3.1, and a safeguards
agreement.
Those things taken together, the storehouse of knowledge
that will be built up by the exceptional transparency measures,
we believe that all of those things taken together will give us
the ability to detect any efforts by Iran to break out or to
sneak out.
But I think the report underscores the absolute essential
nature of those components of any agreement.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. And would you speak for a moment
about kind of what you see as the kind of scenario if no
agreement is reached?
There has been a lot of discussion about the urgency of
enacting additional sanctions, which I think Congress would do
immediately and the President would support. But to the extent
that happens, do you foresee that that actually would prevent
the development of a nuclear weapon?
I mean, the goal here we shouldn't lose sight of is not
just to impose pain on Iran but impose conditions such that
they don't develop a nuclear weapon. That is the ultimate goal.
And I am wondering if you would speak to what is the
alternative of a good comprehensive agreement here. What do you
likely see even if additional sanctions were imposed if these
talks fall apart? Do we prevent a nuclear Iran in that
scenario?
Mr. Blinken. Well, I think it depends very much on how an
agreement is not reached. That is to say, if it is clear at the
end of this process that Iran is simply not able and will not
make a reasonable agreement, then, clearly, that calls not only
for sustaining the existing pressure but adding to it in an
effort to get them to rethink that very unfortunate position
and, indeed, to bear down on all fronts in its efforts to
acquire technology for a nuclear program and the resources for
a nuclear program. So that is where we would want to go.
Now, if on the other hand, we are at the end of March very
close, having gotten agreement on many of the key elements but
not all of them, and because nothing is agreed until everything
is agreed we can't put the whole thing together, then I can see
a circumstance where it might be useful to take the time that
we still have until June under the nature of the interim
agreement that we signed. So we have to see exactly where we
are.
The third possibility, of course, is that for whatever
reason we are perceived as having been responsible for the
failure to reach an agreement or at least there is enough mud
in the waters to create that impression, that--were that to
happen, which absolutely cannot and must not happen, that would
make it more challenging, not only to add new sanctions and add
more pressure but just to sustain the pressure that we have
because it is very important to keep remembering that this is
not just about us.
The power, the efficacy of the sanctions that Congress has
produced and that we have been implementing is exponentially
magnified by the participation of other countries around the
world. If that goes away a lot of the power of the sanctions
will.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Poe of Texas.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentlelady.
I have a lot of questions and I think you can answer many
of them with just a yes or no. They are not gotcha questions.
But unless I ask you to explain the answer, don't explain the
answer, if you would.
The 10-year agreement or however many years it is going to
be. Is the deal that the sanctions will be lifted--all of the
penalties, I should say--after the agreement is over with
whenever that is? With Iran, are the penalties coming to an
end?
Mr. Blinken. Congressman, it would be--it would be phased.
That is, we would insist on Iran demonstrating compliance and
then certain sanctions might be at that point suspended, not
ended. And after still more compliance, at some point sanctions
would actually be ended, assuming Congress agreed to end them.
Similarly, on the international front with the U.N., we
would be looking at demonstrated compliance by Iran and then
suspension and then ending. And then if Iran didn't do what it
was supposed to do or if it cheated or reneged, we would have
snap back provisions both here and internationally.
Mr. Poe. Okay. The purpose of this agreement is to prevent
Iran from getting nuclear weapons. Would you agree that Israel
is probably concerned, being a neighbor, about Iran getting
nuclear weapons?
Mr. Blinken. Yes.
Mr. Poe. And the United States are both concerned about--
the United States as well?
Mr. Blinken. Yes.
Mr. Poe. The ICBM issue--that is not even being discussed
as a part of this agreement, is it?
Mr. Blinken. That is correct.
Mr. Poe. And the Supreme Leader has said they want to get
rid of Israel first and then take on us--calls us the Great
Satan. And one way to get to us is the ICBMs, correct?
Mr. Blinken. That is correct.
Mr. Poe. ICBMs aren't needed to eliminate Israel. They have
got other missiles that can already go and reach Israel. Is
that correct?
Mr. Blinken. That is correct.
Mr. Poe. We are not talking about trying to prevent the
ICBMs. All we are trying to do, if I understand the State
Department's position, is to keep them from getting technology.
Mr. Blinken. What we are trying to do apart from this
agreement----
Mr. Poe. Is that correct? We are trying to get them----
Mr. Blinken. The contours of this agreement go to the
nuclear program and to the United Nations Security Council
resolutions regarding that program. That is what needs to be
satisfied. Those are the terms of the negotiations that our
partners sign on to.
Mr. Poe. Okay.
Mr. Blinken. Separate and apart from that, though, we are
working very hard to prevent Iran from getting the technology.
Mr. Poe. That is what I just asked you. It is a yes or no.
We are trying to prevent them from getting technology. But
isn't it true that Iran is pursuing the development of ICBMs in
their country?
Mr. Blinken. I am sure that is true, yes.
Mr. Poe. So it is true. So they are building the missiles.
We are not trying to stop them, except we just don't want them
to get the technology from the North Koreans or the Chinese or
Russians.
Mr. Blinken. Well, that is why they need--that is why they
need to develop it and they need to get technology from other
countries with knowledge----
Mr. Poe. Reclaiming my time. They are developing
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Is that correct?
Mr. Blinken. They are trying to do so, yes. That is
correct.
Mr. Poe. And we are not dealing with that issue, I don't
think, at all.
Mr. Blinken. We are, but just not part of this----
Mr. Poe. Excuse me, sir. Excuse me.
Mr. Blinken. Sorry, Congressman.
Mr. Poe. We are trying to prevent them from getting nuclear
weapons, which I think at the end of the day if this agreement
is signed and delivered they will get them eventually and then
they may have the capability to send them to us.
I think this is a long-term threat to the world and
especially the United States and Israel and peace-loving
countries. Iran gets nuclear capability. Assume this. Would you
agree that Saudi Arabia will get it next? Turkey will get it?
Egypt will get it? And who else knows in the Middle East to
balance the power over the Middle East?
Mr. Blinken. Yes, it sigificantly increases the likelihood,
which is why we are trying to prevent them from getting one.
Mr. Poe. Just a couple of more questions.
The 2015 Worldwide Threat Assessment put out by the
Director of National Intelligence, you said that this report
focused on ISIS.
If it is a worldwide assessment--worldwide--wouldn't you
think that it would mention Hezbollah? You think it might?
Should?
Mr. Blinken. Hezbollah is a foreign terrorist organization.
It remains designated. It remains a focus of our activities.
Mr. Poe. But it is not mentioned as a worldwide threat in
this report. That confuses me. If the Federal Government comes
out with a report and it reports on everything, and it is a
worldwide threat assessment of terrorism, we leave off of the
state sponsor of terrorism--Iran--and we leave off their
puppet, who is causing mischief all over the world--Hezbollah--
that seems a little bit confusing to me.
So would you recommend that maybe the intelligence agency
go back and have an addendum to this worldwide report and add
these other two organizations?
Mr. Blinken. What I can tell you is, led by the
intelligence agencies, we are pushing back every single day on
Hezbollah's activities----
Mr. Poe. So you think they ought to add to the report that
Hezbollah and Iran are terrorism threats to the world?
Mr. Blinken. Let me go back and look at the report.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you, Judge Poe.
Ms. Frankel of Florida.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, gentlemen,
for being here today.
Well, it does sound like the one thing that we all agree on
is that Iran should not be able to get a nuclear weapon. I have
a couple of questions. I want to--if I could just state them
first and then you can answer.
First--my first question is if there is no deal, how long
would it take Iran to--at this point, do you think, to break
out to have a nuclear weapon?
It is interesting because I hear the frustration of so many
of my colleagues about, you know, not trusting Iran. I think
we--no one trusts Iran. But if we do not get a deal, we do not
get a deal, is the alternative--the realistic alternative a
military operation?
What would that look like? And if there was a military
operation, how long do you think that could delay Iran from
getting a nuclear weapon and what do you think would be the
interim collateral damage? I mean, what would you--I am sure
you have discussed this.
You know, what is the scenario of not having a deal? Now,
and just to add to that, you have said, well, if there is no
deal, then we are going to increase the sanctions. But I am
assuming that you have made the calculation that we have taken
them--that this is a time to get a deal. So you can respond to
those thoughts.
Mr. Blinken. Thank you very much, and I think that you
raise very important questions.
First, with regard to the break-out time, this is something
we can, I think, best deal with in a classified setting. But
what I can tell you broadly is this, that currently the break-
out time is a matter of a few months, if everything went just
right.
But, of course, we would--even under the interim agreement,
we would see that immediately. But that is--that is where we
are. So if there was no deal, that is where they would be.
But, presumably, under various scenarios they would then
seek to speed to increase the number of centrifuges, and
increase the other capacity, move forward on Fordow, move
forward on Iraq. And as a result of all of that over some
period of period of time the break-out time would drop,
presumably, even further.
What are the alternatives? Well, I think that is a critical
question because at the end of the day any agreement that is
reached has to be evaluated, first of all, under the terms of
the agreement. That is the most important thing. People will
have to decide whether the agreement holds up, makes sense and
advances our security.
But I think it is also going to be very important for those
who would oppose the agreement, if there is one, to say what
the alternative would be and how it would be achievable. Those
are critical questions because we are not operating in a vacuum
and in an abstraction.
So a lot, again, as I suggested earlier, depends on why
there would be no deal. That is, if it was clear that Iran
simply was not going to make an agreement and the international
community recognized that, I think we would be in a position
not only to sustain the sanctions that we have now but to
increase the pressure and increase the sanctions.
Now, however, if for whatever reason that didn't happen, if
Iran started speeding to a weapons capacity and to a bomb, then
a military option has always been on the table. It would remain
on the table. If military action were taken, it could certainly
set back Iran's program for some period of time.
But, again, it is important to understand that because Iran
has the knowledge and that we can't bomb that away, we can't
sanction it away, that at some point they would resume their
activities.
They would probably go underground. We would lose the
benefit probably of the international sanctions regime and
pressure and Iran would be in a better position than it is
today and, certainly, than it would be under an agreement.
Ms. Frankel. And, if you could, because I am sure you have
talked about this, what would be the ramifications especially
in the region if all of a sudden there was a war with Iran?
What would be the consequences, for example, to Israel? What
would you expect?
Mr. Blinken. Well, I think, first of all, if Iran were in a
position where it was rushing to a nuclear weapon, many of the
concerns that have been raised by other members of the
committee in terms of what other countries in the region would
do would be front and center.
That is, it would be, I think, very tempting for other
countries to feel that they needed to pursue a nuclear weapon
to protect themselves. That is exactly one of the reasons we
are trying to prevent Iran from getting a weapon. We do not
want to see an arms race in the region.
In terms of Israel, it faces an existential threat from
Iran and, indeed, one of the reasons we are trying to prevent
Iran from getting a weapon is in defense of our close ally and
partner, Israel.
Ms. Frankel. But would you--would you expect further acts
of terrorism?
Mr. Blinken. Oh, I would--I would expect that Iran
unshackled with a weapon or speeding toward one, would feel
further emboldened to take actions in the region, including
against Israel.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. Frankel.
Subcommittee chair, Mr. Duncan, is recognized.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chair. And this has been a
very informative hearing. Yesterday, we had a hearing on Iran
as well. Mr. Deputy Secretary, do you believe Iran is present
and active in the Western Hemisphere?
Mr. Blinken. Yes.
Mr. Duncan. Do you believe their influence is steady? Do
you think it is increasing, as General Kelly may say, or do you
believe it is not?
Mr. Blinken. I think they are trying in various parts of
the world including in our own hemisphere to position
themselves and to take advantage of any openings that they
have.
Mr. Duncan. The State Department report that came out in
2013 says that the Iranian threat in the Western Hemisphere is
waning. Are you aware of that?
Mr. Blinken. I am yes.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. If Iran is--is Iran still on the state
sponsor of terrorists list?
Mr. Blinken. Yes.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. So they are still aiding and abetting
terrorist organizations like Hezbollah all over the world,
correct?
Mr. Blinken. Yes.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. What is going to--what is going to change
with this agreement with regard to their being on the state
sponsor of terrorists list, as of the administration?
Mr. Blinken. Nothing.
Mr. Duncan. So we are negotiating with a country that is
not willing to quit exporting terrorist items to terrorist
organizations that could threaten the United States and its
friends and allies, right?
Mr. Blinken. So we are negotiating in order to deny them a
nuclear weapon which would further embolden those activities.
And at the same time, we are making it very clear that whether
or not there is an agreement we will continue to be taking
action against its efforts to do all of the things you just
cited.
Mr. Duncan. Iran has continually violated past obligations
with regards to sanctions and sanctions relief and all of that.
What is to make us think that they are not going to violate
this?
Mr. Blinken. Because of the penalties that they would have
to pay. The reason that they are at the table now is because
they violated----
Mr. Duncan. But it is not legally binding on us. Do you--
will you all of a sudden think it is going to be legally
binding on them?
Mr. Blinken. I don't think----
Mr. Duncan. How do you think they--how do you think they
view that statement?
Mr. Blinken. Oh, I think the issue is not whether it is
legally binding. The issue is whether it is very clear, and it
will be, that if they violate the agreement there will be
serious consequences.
It doesn't matter if that is legally binding or not. The
sanctions will come back into full force and there will be more
sanctions.
Mr. Duncan. North Korea has the same sanctions and they
violated those and they have the bomb now.
Mr. Blinken. But, again, with regard to Iran the very
reason they are at the table is because they spent years and
years and years violating their obligations. Thanks to
Congress, thanks to the administration, thanks to our
international partners, we exerted significant pressure on them
and now, faced with that pressure, they are seeking to make an
agreement.
Mr. Duncan. I think pressure works. I think the sanctions
worked. I think Mr. Szubin talked about some of the
repercussions of that.
Now, let me move on. In April 2014, Secretary of State John
Kerry said that the Obama administration will consult with
Congress about sanctions relief contained in a final agreement
and he said, well--and this is his quote: ``Well, of course, we
would be obligated under the law,'' he said, adding ``What we
do will have to pass muster with Congress. We well understand
that.''
Yet, the Secretary's testimony in the Senate last week,
excuse me--Deputy Secretary Blinken said and Under Secretary
Cohen indicated that the Obama administration would not submit
a potential agreement to Congress for a vote. Instead, the
administration will sign what is termed a political agreement.
So What is the difference between what Secretary Kerry said
in 2014 and what is being said by the administration now?
Mr. Blinken. No, I don't there is a difference, sir. I
think the Secretary is exactly right. First of all, in our
judgment, at least, we have consulted extensively throughout
the duration of these negotiations--as I cited earlier, more
than 200 hearings, meetings, calls, briefings.
If there is an agreement, obviously, we will go through
that in great detail in Congress in open sessions and closed
sessions, in meetings, in calls. And as we have been clear all
along, the agreement at some point will call--will require the
lifting of sanctions and only Congress can decide whether to do
that or not.
So Congress will have a vote and, indeed, keeping that
Sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of the Iranians--that
is, the knowledge that the sanctions have been suspended but
not ended and that Congress has the authority to end them--we
think will be leverage to make sure that they make good on
their commitments.
Mr. Duncan. Okay.
Madam chair, I don't have a whole lot of other questions.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Duncan. A lot them I asked. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Because although there is a vote on and
we have two votes, the subcommittee--I mean, the full committee
will come back. But we would never break without the
opportunity of recognizing Mr. Connolly for his 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend.
Unfortunately, I have to begin by chastising my friend. You
know, my friend, the chair, who is truly my friend, referred to
the President having a temper tantrum about Prime Minister
Netanyahu, and Mr. Chabot, my friend from Ohio, and he is also
my friend, said there is no President who has done more to
damage the U.S.-Israeli relationship.
I cannot let that go by. A foreign leader has insulted the
head of state of the United States Government. It is not a
temper tantrum and it didn't start with President Obama. It
started with Bibi Netanyahu.
You can decide for yourself whether it was appropriate for
him to speak to a joint session. But the process is beyond
dispute.
It was an insult to this government. Friends don't act that
way, and I would say to my friend, Mr. Chabot from Ohio, it
would come as news to Shimon Peres, the outgoing President of
Israel who gave President Obama the highest award that the
Israeli Government can give, for his support of Israel.
At some point, does the partisan rhetoric ever stop? Where
are your loyalties with respect to the prerogatives of this
government and our country? And the shameless way Mr. Netanyahu
has conducted himself deserves reproach and I think the
President has actually shown restraint.
And I say this as somebody who has a 35-year record of
unwavering support for Israel. I am not a critic of the Israeli
Government. But I am a critic of how this Prime Minister has
treated my President--everyone's President--and I cannot sit
here and listen to the waving away of bad behavior that is an
insult to my country.
We have one President, whether you like him or not, whether
you want to take political issue with him or not. Fair enough.
That is fair game.
But when a foreign leader insults him, that should not be
fair game and that should never be apologized away because it
damages relationships long-term. It puts a divide where there
was never a divide in public opinion in my country and I worry
about that long term. I hope you do too.
Let me say, Mr. Deputy Secretary, it seems to me there are
five issues that Congress has to be concerned about. There is
the broad extensional question, are we better with a deal or
without.
I would argue that same Prime Minister of Israel has never
supported any agreement with Iran even though we are where we
are, and he would like zero centrifuges. He would like zero
enrichment capability.
He would like a complete roll back so that there is no
nuclear capability, and so would I. But I don't know anybody
who can achieve that, realistically, and if you feel that, if
those are your goals, the only option is what has
euphemistically been called the kinetic option if you are not
willing to accept any nuclear capability and I am not sure the
American people support that. I am not even sure the Israeli
people support that. Would you agree with that analysis, Mr.
Deputy Secretary?
Mr. Blinken. Thank you. I would agree. As we discussed
earlier, that Iran has knowledge of the fuel cycle. They know
how to make a bomb if they choose to do it and we can't bomb
that away. We can delay it. We can't eliminate it. It is
knowledge.
Mr. Connolly. Let me--let me say I think there are five
issues. If we move on--okay. Let us accept that and so we need
an agreement. We are going to get the best agreement or we need
to seek the best agreement we can.
I think with respect to my colleagues in Congress including
myself there are five issues that have to be addressed and that
the administration is going to have to convince us you have
addressed efficaciously to the best of your ability to our
satisfaction.
One is what capability is left in place? Number of
centrifuges, percentage of enrichment--something we can live
with? Something we got to worry about? Two, cheating, and
that--the inspection regime to me is all important. If there
are holes in the inspection regime I don't see how you are
going to get any confidence in the agreement.
Thirdly, sanctions--how do we phase in the lifting of
sanctions assuming an efficacious agreement and how
expeditiously can we reimpose them? Our worry up here is that
we might be okay but our allies may not.
Fourth, the threshold time frame--there are a lot of--there
is a lot of legitimate concern up here that it is too fast,
that Iran can quickly rush to nuclear capability under the
reported terms of the agreement.
And, finally, the expiration of an agreement--the time
frame for expiration. A lot of people are very concerned about
the that, that it is almost an open invitation to a future
Iranian Government to proceed.
Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly, and it is not my
temper tantrum to cut you off. We really are out of time.
Mr. Connolly. I know. I know.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And to all the committee members and
witnesses, we have two votes on the floor. We will recess
briefly and then come back to get to the most amount of members
that we can get to before our witnesses have to depart.
And so with that, the committee stands in recess. Thank
you.
[Recess.]
Chairman Royce. We will re-adjourn and go to Mr. Tom Emmer
of Minnesota.
Mr. Emmer. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to both the
witnesses for being here today.
Just a couple of questions because you pretty much have
been running the range today in front of the committee. But
first, Mr. Blinken, thank you for being here, again, and thank
you for your service.
Your opening remarks were assuring to somebody like me who
wants to see the branches as they were constructed work the way
they are supposed to and I just want to confirm, if you will
bear with me.
I believe it is Article 1 Section 8 says that it is the
sole responsibility of Congress to enter into agreements with
foreign nations, which would include treaties or agreements
such as the one that we have been discussing, and I believe
that you confirmed that again this morning that it will be
Congress's obligation to finalize, ratify any negotiated
agreement.
Mr. Blinken. Because Congress imposed and legislated the
sanctions on Iran, if those sanctions are ever to be lifted
Congress must be the one to do it. Congress has the--only
Congress has the authority to do that.
Mr. Emmer. But that is what is already in place. That part
aside, any agreement with the details that the administration
is participating in the negotiations in right now it is
Congress that not only--I think your words this morning will
play a very important role--that was number one, which
indicates to me there will be much communication once this
framework, if it is reached by the end of this month--once that
is reached there will be some significant communication.
Mr. Blinken. Absolutely.
Mr. Emmer. And after that, assuming that can you can arrive
at the final details by the end of June, then I just want to
make sure that I understand your position on behalf of the
State Department is that Congress will have to approve or will
not any final agreement.
Mr. Blinken. No, Congressman, that is not our position.
This would not be a treaty that would be subject to the advice
and consent of the Senate.
This would be an agreement that, obviously, as I said
before, for its terms to be implemented, assuming that
sanctions are to be lifted, Congress would have to play that
role and it could decide whether or not to do that.
And you are absolutely right that just as we have sought to
consult fully throughout this process in hearings and briefings
and meetings and phone calls, you are absolutely right that if
there is an agreement in the coming weeks that we would consult
intensely with Congress on that agreement. Every aspect of that
agreement would be----
Mr. Emmer. But all you--but all you are going to ask for,
based on what you are testifying to this morning, is that
Congress lift the sanctions. You are not going to ask for
Congressional approval of the final agreement.
Mr. Blinken. That is correct.
Mr. Emmer. So if it is not legally binding then, as
Secretary of State Kerry has discussed, what do you actually
believe that you are getting out of it then? And let me just
add to it because I am trying to be very measured.
It disturbs me greatly to have people talk about giving an
organization that is not interested in peace around the globe,
that is actually and being an aggressor and trying to roil up
problems--we are going to give them all kinds of hard currency.
Explain to me how this is a good idea.
Mr. Blinken. So two things. Thank you, Congressman. First,
with regard to whether it is legally binding or not, if this is
really a question of international law, first and foremost, if
you make a legally binding agreement then it is subject to
various provisions of international law which actually make it
more difficult to do things we may have to do if Iran violates
the agreement.
There are all sorts of treaty law formalities that we would
have to go through if we said Iran is violating the agreement.
We would have to present a legally defensible reason to
cease our implementation of our commitments under the
agreement. We might get into a debate with our international
partners if they did not agree. I am making----
Mr. Emmer. Well, I am going to run out of time, with all
due respect. I am going to run out of time. So I just--I think
that this is the problem that the administration has had and
now the administration and Congress are having is this
breakdown in an understanding of respective positions in the
process, and the idea that this administration is going to get
approval from the U.N. Security Council as opposed to coming to
Congress is not only disturbing, it is wrong, from my
perspective.
Mr. Blinken. Thank you, Congressman.
Could I just mention--you know, again, I just want to be
clear. We will have to go, if there is an agreement, to both.
That is, there are sanctions that are pursuant to the United
Nations Security Council that have been implemented by the
Council so the Council will have the authority and will have to
decide whether to lift them or not, suspend them or not.
Similarly, our own sanctions have been imposed and
legislated by Congress. Only Congress can decide whether to end
them. And, as you know, the vast majority of the international
agreements that we strike around the world, a key tool of our
foreign policy and national security policy, are nonbinding.
Mr. Emmer. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I am going to yield back.
But I just want to make the comment that it is amazing to
me that this administration apparently puts Congress and the
U.N. on the same level in terms of who they are going to deal
with.
Chairman Royce. If the gentleman will yield. I am not sure
it is on the same level because I think the U.N. vote will come
immediately.
Mr. Emmer. Again, I was trying to be measured.
Chairman Royce. You were being measured and I appreciate
that, Tom.
I do think that it is going to be a considerable amount of
time under the calculus that the administration is working
under when they intend to come to Congress for that vote and
that is very, very concern concerning. But I appreciate the
gentleman raising this issue.
We go now to Brian Higgins of New York.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, is this the most
complicated negotiation that the administration has been
involved with internationally?
Mr. Blinken. It is--I think the answer is yes. I am
searching my mind to think of anything that could rise to a
higher level of complexity. You know, arguably, the new START
agreement was complicated. But I would I have to say this
probably tops the list.
Mr. Higgins. Yes. Now, the interesting thing is, you know,
it is still an agreement. You hear varying reports saying that,
you know, 90 percent is done and 60 percent is done. But, you
know, the bottom line is that it is still very fluid.
Mr. Blinken. That is correct.
Mr. Higgins. And those issues that remain will always be
the most critical issues because they are the most difficult to
find mutuality on.
Mr. Blinken. That is correct.
Mr. Higgins. But, clearly, the issue of fuel and enrichment
capacity are central to this and inspections and verification.
How many pounds of enriched uranium is Iran though to have
currently?
Mr. Blinken. So they have a stockpile of low enriched
uranium at about 3.5 percent that is, I recall, is about 7,000
kilos. Is that correct?
Mr. Higgins. And under the current draft framework, what
would become of that 3.5 percent enriched uranium?
Mr. Blinken. So you will understand I can't get into the
details. This is all subject to negotiations. But one of the
elements, and you are right to point to it, that would be
important in figuring out their break-out time is the available
stockpile of material that they have to work with.
So centrifuges--the number of the centrifuges is one
component. The configuration of the centrifuges is another. The
stockpile is a third. And depending on how you put those
elements together you limit their break-out time.
But I can't tell you what the limitation might be under an
agreement because that is all subject to the negotiation.
Mr. Higgins. The proliferation of centrifuges 10 years ago,
really, under Rouhani, there were probably, you know, less than
200 centrifuges.
Now there is over 19,000. Now we are talking about advanced
centrifuges. We are talking about next generation centrifuges.
We are talking about, as you mentioned in your response, a
knowledge that you can't destroy.
Is it--is it plausible, is it--is it realistic to accept
the uranium--Iranian argument that they need so many
centrifuges in order to sustain a civil peaceful nuclear
program?
Mr. Blinken. Well, look, obviously, we are highly skeptical
of that argument. The fact of the matter is that they, clearly,
had the military aspirations for their program at least through
2003.
That is, certainly, the assessment that our intelligence
community made at the time. And, of course, so many aspects of
this program strongly suggest that they are seeking or have
been seeking a nuclear weapons capacity.
That said, their argument, for what it is worth, is that
they do want to build a nuclear power program for the country.
They, obviously, have vast oil resources so why they would need
it is a very good question.
They say that they want to devote oil to exports. They want
to have the nuclear program for domestic energy production.
They talk about a post-carbon future, which other countries
talk about.
But all of that said, their activities, of course, suggest
the opposite and if that is really what they were focused on,
they could presumably, you know, buy nuclear fuel abroad
instead of produce it.
Mr. Higgins. Well, let me ask you this. What percentage of
Iranian's domestic nuclear power is nuclear?
Mr. Blinken. It is very de minimis but I will get you the
exact number. But what they--what they purport to be looking at
is a much more significant piece of their domestic energy
program being provided by nuclear.
That is the argument they make for why they would need a
significant enrichment capacity in the future and, again, we
are certainly skeptical of that, especially given their oil
resources.
Mr. Higgins. The--you know, it is just, you know, again,
very, very difficult within the context of what Iran is engaged
in today.
Qasem Soleimani, head of the Quds Forces, is on the ground
in Iraq today, probably, you know, directly leading the Shi'a
militias in Iraq today to defeat ISIS.
He saved Bashir al-Assad in the 11th hour to preserve Syria
as a land bridge into Lebanon, to Hezbollah, which acts as a
proxy for Iran.
And yet here we sit with them face to face in negotiations.
I do understand the complexity of diplomacy and the fact that
you use diplomacy with your enemies more than your--but this is
a very, very, very hard thing not only technically from the
standpoint of a negotiator--and we do appreciate your efforts--
but politically as well. You know trust is a hard thing and
America is an extraordinary superpower.
But I do believe that even if, you know, in the end we have
to exercise a military option because negotiations fail, I do
think we have to demonstrate to the international community
that every diplomatic avenue was exhausted before that can
happen and that is, unfortunately, the responsibility of
America as the indispensable world power.
I yield back.
Mr. Blinken. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
We are going to Mr. Ted Yoho of Florida.
Mr. Yoho. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it and I am not really
sure where to start, I have so many questions, and just looking
for clarification.
I think the best way to start is that there was a quote
from President Dwight Eisenhower 60 years ago when he announced
the Atoms for Peace program: ``One lesson is clear. Civilian
nuclear programs flourish only through cooperation and
openness. Secrecy and isolation are typically signs of a
nuclear weapons program.''
I don't think that has differed and, you know, we look at
Iran over the last 30 years and if you have you read, and I am
sure you have, Ambassador John Bolton's book, ``Surrender is
Not an Option,'' Iran has been moving steadily in this
direction ever since then. They have played the cat and mouse
game. They have lied and deceived.
It is a pure game of sophistry, and sophistry, as we all
know, is a well orchestrated deception, misdirection and we
call that a lie, in the country. And I see that going on with
our nuclear negotiations and I mean that in the sense that I
think it is great that we are negotiating to prevent them from
getting nuclear arms but I think we are all in agreement they
are going to get nuclear arms.
I have sat here for 2 years. I am going into the third
year. We have had expert after expert after expert sitting
where you are that said Iran within 6 months--that is when I
first got here in January 2013--within 6 months to a year has
enough fissile material for five to six bombs.
And so that has been over a year so I can only assume,
because the experts like you have told us, they are going to
have that. And for us to say no, they are not, and then you
look at Iran has prevented the IAEA to go in to inspect, we
have got evidence that they have detonated a nuclear trigger in
the region of Parchin but they won't let the IAEA go in.
And going back to what President Eisenhower said is if they
are not going to be forthright and honest and open, is it
prudent for the United States of America to go forward with
this versus backing up from the negotiation table and say, when
you are serious, Iran, let us know and we will take the
sanctions off.
Mr. Szubin, you brought up that Iran is in a crisis mode.
They are in a hole. It will take over a $160 billion to get out
of it. Yet, yesterday on the Western Hemisphere meeting we had
the experts again and the report from the State Department said
that Iran and Hezbollah has got the most activity they have
ever had in the Western Hemisphere since 2009.
Iran is working with Iraq to beat ISIS so they are funding
a war in Iraq. They have funded the takeover of Yemen, and I
ask you is that the nation--is that the status of a nation that
is in crisis and they are starving and they are on their last
dollar?
Would they be investing money into that or would they
investing it into their own country? What are your thoughts on
that?
Mr. Szubin. Thank you, Congressman. If I could take the
last part of your question and then----
Mr. Yoho. Sure.
Mr. Szubin [continuing]. Actually defer to my colleague.
Mr. Yoho. And I have got another one I want to ask you real
quick so go ahead.
Mr. Szubin. Sure. So I did not say that they were on their
last dollar and, obviously, we are talking about a
sophisticated large industrialized country. What I talked about
the were indicators of the economic strain on their society and
the economic strain is massive.
That doesn't mean that they don't have the thousands of
dollars or even hundreds of thousands of dollars to provide to
nefarious actors in their region or even in Latin America and,
unfortunately, some of this activity, as dangerous as it is,
comes cheap.
Mr. Yoho. Right. And their goal is--again, we hear over and
over again Fidel Castro met with the Ayatollah roughly 10 years
ago, said we have a common enemy--that enemy is America and our
goal is to bring them jointly together to its knees.
I don't see that any different, and with the narrative
coming out of there, the rhetoric you hear, it is like Chairman
Royce says, you know, ``Death to America.''
You can pick up a paper pretty much every week and you will
find that in there. To move forward, thinking that we are
stopping them--and Henry Kissinger said the move that we are--
we are moving to prevent proliferation to managing it.
So I think we should come clean with the American people,
say they going to have a nuclear weapon. I think that we should
put emphasis on what are we going to do the day that they do
have that and have our foreign policy because you are already
seeing Saudi Arabia and Egypt wanting to run a nuclear program.
Are we going to monitor them? Are we going to say, no, you
can't? And then at what point do you intervene? And so I think
all of this we are going through, I appreciate you going
through it. But I think we are putting emphasis on something to
say we are trying to prevent it and we know they are not going
to prevent it.
Mr. Blinken. Thank you very much, Congressman.
I would say, first of all, as in many things and most
things President Eisenhower was very wise----
Mr. Yoho. Yes, he was.
Mr. Blinken [continuing]. And so I think apply very
appropriately to what we are looking at now, and it is
precisely because of Iran's efforts to cheat and to dodge its
responsibilities and dodge its commitments and proceed with a
program that the world has called them out and the world has
exerted extraordinary pressure on them and that is why they are
at the table.
And the only reason that they are there is in order to
relieve some of that pressure and the fact that that pressure
could be reimposed is the strong incentive they would have to
make good on the agreement.
And I would note again that under the interim agreement--
under the terms of the agreement they have made good on those
commitments for its duration. Going forward, we have to have,
and we will have for there to be any agreement, the most
exceptional intrusive monitoring, access and inspection regime
than any country has ever seen.
That is the only thing that can give us confidence that we
are not trusting Iran's word. We are looking at its actions and
we will find out if it is violating its commitments.
That is what this is about. At the end of the day, again,
we have to deal with--and by the way, I should say we don't
accept the proposition that they would get a nuclear weapon.
The entire effort that we are making is to make sure that they
don't.
If there is no agreement, then there is a good chance that
they will rush to a weapon or, certainly, rush to have the
capacity to make one.
Mr. Yoho. Does that make all those experts previously that
said that they were going to have it wrong?
Mr. Blinken. I think what they were--I would have to go
back, Congressman, and see what--exactly what they said. I
think what they were talking about was what is their capacity,
where are they in terms of the capacity of producing a weapon
should they choose to do it.
I believe that is what they are talking about and what
would the time line be. We are pushing that back. We are making
sure that if they did decide to do that we would see it and we
would be able to do something about it. That is what this is
about.
Mr. Yoho. My time has expired and I appreciate it. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Blinken. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. I thank the gentleman and I thank Secretary
Blinken and Mr. Szubin. Thank you very much for your testimony
here today.
I also want to remind you about the points that we made
here, the points that we made in the opening statements. I
implore you to convey those views immediately, if you would, to
Secretary Kerry and the negotiating team.
You heard deep concerns over the sunset provision here, the
fact it is only 10 years, over the question of verification of
the agreement itself and whether at the--as part of this
process whether Iran is going to be required to reveal its
clandestine work that it has took on trying to develop a
nuclear weapon in the past as part of any final agreement.
You can't have real verification going forward unless you
have that revealed to the IAEA. You heard our concerns about
previous military activities on the part of the regime,
previous testing, what actually went on at the sites that they
won't give us access to, as well as Iran's vast ballistic
missile program that is underway as we speak and about
Congress' role in this.
So, there is a number of the other issues raised as well so
I hope you can convey that there are some profound bipartisan
concerns that need to be heard, as a deal may be announced any
day.
And while our hearing was taking place there is news
breaking from Switzerland that a draft is circulating there
among the parties and in that draft Iran would have 6,000
spinning centrifuges for the next decade.
So I know the committee is frustrated to read the press
about drafts circulating. It does says something about the
administration's commitment to transparency when the press has
the information and we are reading it off the news wire. So----
Mr. Blinken. Mr. Chairman, just on that point----
Chairman Royce. Yes.
Mr. Blinken [continuing]. My understanding is that there is
no draft--that that report is erroneous and, indeed, our
spokesperson clarified that.
Chairman Royce. That is good news. So we appreciate that.
Mr. Blinken. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. So when there is a draft, please share it
with the members of this committee and of the Congress.
We thank you again for your testimony, and for now, we will
stand adjourned.
Mr. Blinken. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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