[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.S. SECRET SERVICE: IDENTIFYING STEPS TO RESTORE THE PROTECTIVE AGENCY
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HEARING
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 12, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-1
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
JIM JORDAN, Ohio ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
TIM WALBERG, Michigan Columbia
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania
CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TED LIEU, California
MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey
KEN BUCK, Colorado STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands
MARK WALKER, North Carolina MARK DeSAULNIER, California
ROD BLUM, Massachusetts BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
JODY B. HICE, Georgia PETER WELCH, Vermont
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin
WILL HURD, Texas
GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
Sean McLaughlin, Staff Director
Rachel Weaver, Deputy Staff Director
Tristan Leavitt, Counsel
Michael Howell, Counsel
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
Melissa Beaumont Clerk
CONTENTS
Page
WITNESSES
The Hon. Thomas J. Perrelli, The Hon. Mark Filip, The Hon.
Danielle C. Gray, The Hon. Joseph W. Hagin, U.S. Secret Service
Protective Mission Panel
Joint Oral Statements........................................ 5
APPENDIX
Executive Summary to Report from the U.S. Secret Service
Protective Mission Panel to the Secretary of Homeland Security. 50
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill, 2014........ 59
Statement of Bennie G. Thompson, Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 63
U.S. SECRET SERVICE: IDENTIFYING STEPS TO RESTORE THE PROTECTIVE AGENCY
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Thursday, February 12, 2015
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Duncan, Jordan,
Walberg, Amash, Gosar, DesJarlais, Gowdy, Farenthold, Massie,
Meadows, DeSantis, Mulvaney, Buck, Walker, Hice, Russell,
Carter, Grothman, Hurd, Palmer, Cummings, Maloney, Norton,
Connolly, Kelly, Lawrence, Lieu, DeSaulnier, and Welch.
Chairman Chaffetz. Good morning. The Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform will come to order. And without
objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any
time.
I am pleased to be holding this hearing today with Ranking
Member Cummings. Reforming and restoring the United States
Secret Service is not a partisan issue. I firmly believe that a
united front with Mr. Cummings and I have presented have driven
change within the agency. Together, we have sent letters to 10
closed-door meetings and briefings with the Secret Service and
asked for change.
Just this morning, in a bipartisan way, we went and visited
the Secret Service headquarters. And we appreciate their
accommodations and the tour of the facility, the management
facility there.
Today, the senior leadership of the Secret Service looks
much different than it did when we began examining the agency.
In fact, we originally planned to have both the Acting Director
and the Deputy Director appear before us today on a second
panel. But with the recent announcement of the Deputy
Director's departure from the agency, we agreed to postpone the
agency's appearance before the committee for another day.
We want to thank Acting Director Clancy and Secretary Jeh
Johnson for being consistently available to us. They have been
very accessible, and we are very appreciative of that. We also
applaud Secretary Jeh Johnson for assembling a panel, which we
will hear from today, to examine the Secret Service. The
panel's report did not mince words, did not skirt the issues,
and provided serious recommendations.
According to the panel's findings, the Secret Service ``is
starved for leadership'' and lacks a ``culture of
accountability.'' The panel recommended the next Secret Service
Director appointed by the President come from outside the
agency. The panel's report states--and I happen to agree--that
``at this time in the agency's history, the need for Secret
Service experience is outweighed by what the Service needs
today, dynamic leadership that can move the Service forward in
the new era and drive change in the organization.'' The report
goes on to say, ``Only a director from outside the Service,
removed from organizational traditions and personal
relationships, will be able to do the honest top-to-bottom
reassessment,'' dealing with what is necessary inside the
agency.
Alarmingly, the panel found that no one inside the Secret
Service has ever taken time to sit down and figure out exactly
what it costs to protect the President. In fact, the panel
found, ``No one has really looked how much the mission done
right actually costs.'' This is simply unacceptable. Combined
with other limitations, like insufficient training, antiquated
technology, and insular attitude, these factors have all
contributed to the recent security breaches. The fact that the
panel made these findings is not surprising. But I will tell
you personally it is very refreshing to have a panel take such
a deep, serious look into the agency and provide some very
candid results and perspective. And he did it in a very swift
manner. And for that, we are very, very thankful.
Over the past several years, a series of security breaches
have raised a number of questions about the effectiveness of
the agency. In 2011, a man fired a high-powered rifle at the
White House while President Obama's daughter was inside the
residence. The Secret Service was unable to confirm that shots
had been fired at the White House until a housekeeper found
broken glass 4 days later. This shooter eluded capture for 5
days, traveling all the way to Pennsylvania, where he was
eventually apprehended by State police.
On September 19 of last year, with a partially amputated
foot and a limp, wearing Crocs, a man was able to jump the
White House fence. Contrary to initial reports from the Secret
Service, this man made it all the way into the green room,
armed with a 3-1/2 inch knife that was serrated.
The same month, an armed security contractor was allowed on
an elevator with the President, unbeknownst to the Secret
Service and in violation of protocol. We still don't know where
the breakdown was that enabled this to happen.
Last month, a gunman fired shots near the Vice President's
residence in Delaware. Security cameras were unable to capture
video of the gunman. To this day, we still don't know who fired
those shots. This was very close to active Secret Service
agents at the residence.
Just 2 weeks ago, a drone crashed into a tree on the White
House lawn, highlighting a security vulnerability that we must
shore up immediately. By examining these security breaches, we
can find out what went wrong and we can work together to fix
it.
Together with Ranking Member Cummings, this committee has
and will continue examining issues surrounding leadership,
culture, budget, training, technology, and protocol. Congress
needs to know why the Secret Service has one of the lowest
levels of employee morale in all of Federal Government. We have
some of the finest men and women serving in the Secret Service.
These are wonderful, caring, patriotic, hardworking, talented
people. We love these people. We thank them for their service.
But the system, the bureaucracy, the leadership has been
failing them, and it has to change. We have to get this right,
and we have to get it right now.
The panel made a number of recommendations, but the main
priority was clear. The first step to success within the Secret
Service is new leadership from outside the agency. I look
forward to discussing the panel's good work today and hearing
how recommendations were developed. And now I would like to
recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings, for his Statement.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank
you for agreeing to hold today's hearing and for working with
us in a bipartisan way. And I also thank you for doing
something else, that is, I notice that you have consistently
given our Federal employees credit for what they do. Every time
I speak before a group of Federal employees, they say that so
often they hear just negative things about them. And I know
that you have said it in private, and now you are saying it in
public about the Secret Service, that we have a phenomenal
number of great dedicated Secret Service agents. And I really
appreciate that and I know they do, too.
You have sought the input from our side and our
participation, and I believe our efforts will be more effective
as a result of that. But more significantly, you have shown
respect for us. We are holding today's hearings because the
independent panel has done a thorough review of the Secret
Service, and we want to hear directly from them before taking
our next steps.
To the panel, I want to thank you for what you have done.
You have done an outstanding job in a short period of time.
They met with more than 170 people from inside and outside the
Secret Service. They made numerous recommendations. And now the
upper managers of the agency have been removed. The chairman
and I both strongly agree that the independent panel's work was
excellent.
We have also discussed the panel's classified report. We
believe it was tough, it was thorough, and crucial to bringing
about real change at the agency. Again, we thank all the
members of the panel. But I want to make two key points today.
First, I completely agree with the panel that the question of
leadership is most important. Although the previous Director
has left and top managers have been removed, the job is only
half done. As the panel concluded, a strong group of new
leaders must now be identified. And that responsibility rests
with the executive branch.
Second, I also agree with the panel that these changes
``require strong leadership, but they will also require
resources.'' And that is our job. That is the job of the
Congress. Their report makes clear that the Secret Service is
stretched too thin; the status quo in long shifts, forced
overtime, inadequate training, and too little rest. I would
like to read briefly from the report describing this problem.
It says this: ``The strains are manifest throughout the agency.
The Service has been forced to pull firearms instructors from
its training academy and uniformed officers guarding foreign
missions to work protective details. The attrition has caused
alarm. 'It is all smoke and mirrors,' says a plain clothes
agent. 'We are like a giant ship teetering on toothpicks,
waiting to collapse,' says another. Our protective mission is
in crisis.'' That was from a press report in 2002, more than a
decade ago.
Let me read another quote: ``While the threat of terrorism
looms large over the White House complex, one of the most
insidious threats of our national security actually comes from
within. With the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security and the fallout from the Hurricane Katrina disaster,
the Secret Service, overall, has suffered much in terms of
budget, or perhaps more appropriately, the lack thereof. ``We
were informed last year that our budget had been cut and that
the Secret Service was going to have to make some changes to
cut costs and save money.'' That quote was from 2007. It was
from a letter sent internally to the Secret Service leadership
by a former uniformed division officer, and we have obtained a
copy.
Last week, the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association
wrote the committee saying this, ``A lack of resources and
funding is the core reason the agency has suffered its
newsworthy deficits. Its moments of honesty, even media
reports, have reStated what is well-known in the Service and
was highlighted by the protective mission review panel that the
Secret Service has been outstretched and underfunded since the
9/11 attacks and continues to be.''
Let me make one last thing clear. I am not saying we should
throw money at the problem, that more money is a silver bullet,
that inadequate funding is an excuse for failure or any other
similar straw-man argument.
I agree with the independent panel that the Secret Service
has atrophied. It needs more funding, and it is our job in
Congress to get it to them. The panel recommended as a first
step adding 200 officers and 85 agents. And it said many more
may be necessary once the new management team assesses the
agency needs. We have heard from others inside and outside the
Secret Service that they are down by at least 500 positions.
The DHS funding bill would start to restore some of this
funding. But unfortunately, it is being held up by our
Republican friends who oppose the President's actions on
immigration.
We have only 2 weeks left before the Department shuts down.
If it happens, the Secret Service employees will be required to
continue working without pay. This is no way to treat the
Secret Service agents, officers. They should not be collateral
damage in this political fight. The fact is that Federal
workers across the board have been hammered over the past 4
years. They have sacrificed nearly $140 billion as a result of
a 3-year pay freeze and pay cuts in the form of increased
retirement contributions for newly hired employees. They have
endured sequestration cuts and furloughs and the elimination of
jobs for the last 3 years. It is time to recognize that these
actions take a toll.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a moment to
address our work here on the committee. I completely agree that
we must reform this agency. Its mission is just too critical. I
have the greatest admiration for the President, and the last
thing I want is for something to happen to him or the other
people that the Secret Service is responsible for protecting.
So I commit to working with you to the best of my ability
and in good faith. In return, I ask that we focus aggressively
on the reforms that are needed, that we avoid spending valuable
time reinvestigating issues that others have already
investigated, and that we continue working closely together, as
we have been, to conduct our investigation in a responsible way
that does no harm to the agency or the mission.
And with that I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentleman. I will hold the
record open for 5 legislative days for any members who would
like to submit a written Statement.
We will now recognize our panel of witnesses. And, first,
let me say thank you so much for your time and dedication and
making the effort and carving out time in your schedules to be
here. We do appreciate that.
The Honorable--today, we have the Honorable Mark Filip, the
Honorable Danielle Gray, the Honorable Joseph W. Hagin, and the
Honorable Thomas Perrelli. We do appreciate you being here.
Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn before
they testify. So if you please rise and raise your right hands.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are
about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth?
Thank you. Let the record reflect that all witnesses
answered in the affirmative. And you may be seated.
My understanding is you are going to give one joint
Statement as opposed to four individual Statements. I am not
sure which--you are going to give--Mr. Perrelli. OK. Thank you.
You are now recognized.
WITNESS STATEMENTS
STATEMENTS OF HON. THOMAS J. PERRELLI, HON. MARK FILIP, HON.
DANIELLE C. GRAY, AND THE HONORABLE JOSEPH W. HAGIN
Mr. Perrelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Cummings, and members of the committee. I am Tom Perrelli, one
of the members of the Secret Service Protective Mission Panel.
And the panel asked me to make brief opening remarks today.
At the outset, we want to express, echoing both the
chairman and the ranking member, our appreciation for the
extraordinary work and dedication of the men and women of the
Secret Service. They work long hours in a mission that has no
tolerance for error, and they do so without desire for fame or
fortune. They deserve all of our thanks and support.
The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security asked
the panel to do a review of the Secret Service's protection of
the White House following the events of September 19th, 2014.
We did not focus solely on that event, but looked more broadly
at concerns about the Service that had been raised by this
committee and others.
From October, when we were commissioned, to the issuance of
our report on December 15th, the panel talked to dozens of
members of the Service from all levels, as well as more than a
hundred experts from the Federal Protective Services, local law
enforcement, the national laboratories, and the defense and
intelligence communities. We thought it was important to hear
perspectives about the Service, about the protective function,
about technology from both insides and outside the Service. We
also reviewed thousands of pages of documents.
Our report and recommendations were completed on December
15th. The report contains substantial sensitive information, as
well as classified information and recommendations. We have had
the opportunity to brief the chairman and the ranking member
and many staff of this and other committees in a classified
setting, and we will tread carefully on subjects related to
operations, tactics, and particular threats in this setting. It
is in the interest of the United States that much of the
Service's work be secret because they are tasked with the
singularly important job of protecting the Commander in Chief,
other protectees in the White House.
But we did release an unclassified summary that lays out
our conclusions and recommendations in a number of areas,
including training, staffing, technology, and leadership. That
summary is incorporated in our written testimony to this
committee. As we described in that executive summary, the panel
concluded that training had fallen below acceptable levels in
no small part because personnel at the Service were stretched
too far. We provide recommendations about increased training as
well as increased staffing. We describe our recommendation for
200 additional uniformed division officers and 85 additional
special agents as a downpayment that we make now so that the
Service can train and perform at the level that all of us
believe is necessary.
Many of our technology recommendations are classified, but
I note our concern that the Service needs to be more engaged
with Federal partners who are using or developing technologies
that would assist the Service in protecting the White House.
Finally, we focused a great deal of attention, as the
chairman said, on leadership. Concluding that the Service needs
dynamic leadership that is unafraid to make change, that
clearly articulates the Service's mission, pursues resources
needed to fulfill that mission, and demonstrates to the work
force that rules will be applied evenhandedly, and that the
best of the best will be promoted to lead the organization into
the future. More detail in our conclusions and recommendations
are in our testimony, and we will be happy to answer questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. And I again appreciate all
four of you.
Chairman Chaffetz. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
The report says, ``More resources would help but what we really
need is leadership.'' In fact, you went on to say, ``Only a
Director from outside, removed from the organizational
traditions and personal relationships will be able to do the
honest, top-to-bottom reassessment this will require.'' Maybe--
I don't know who to address this to. But, yes, Mr. Filip.
Mr. Filip. Yes. Thank you. We gave a lot of attention to
leadership and in that we believe that will be a critical issue
going forward. We fully respect that the choice of the Secret
Service Director is that of the President, and there is a
unique relationship there in that maybe uniquely amongst
appointments in the Federal system, that individual is
responsible for the personal safety of the President and the
First Family. So we respect our role in that regard. But we did
and do think that, all things equal, it would be useful to have
outside perspectives. The reasons for that, I think, are even
more important than the conclusion, because they animate a lot
of our views on a number of things.
We think it is essential for reform that there be a full
look at the activities of the Secret Service through the lens
of the core priority of protecting the President and the White
House, and that the activities and budgeting align with those
core activities. We think that the innovation associated with
the Secret Service's activities also be aligned with those core
priorities. And that the new Director, whoever that is, is
prepared to make tough choices about personnel, independent of
any sort of old-boy's network or friendships or alignments. And
that was part of the reason we thought, all things equal, it
was easier for an outsider to make those assessments as opposed
to someone who is presently with the Service.
And we also think it is important that there be engagement
with the broader intelligence community and a consistent set of
disciplinary rules, independent of prior friendships or
allegiances or experiences. And finally, also, an infusion of
outside expertise in budgetary areas, for example, human
resources, congressional affairs, things of that sort. So we
thought it was more likely that that person would be an
outsider, but obviously we respect that it is the President's
choice. And to the extent we can be a resource, whoever the
next Director is, we would proudly be available to try to help
them.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. One of the questions that
tends to float around here is whether or not we should separate
out the investigation side. Did you look at that and what sort
of assessment did you give that?
Mr. Filip. We did. And our views on that are that there is
certainly some benefits to be gained from the investigative
mission to some extent. Now, there is a continuum in those
investigative activities. To the extent, for example, that
cyber investigations involve the safety of the First Family, of
the President, that is probably going to be part of the core
mission of the Secret Service. To the extent that cyber
involves looking at whether a movie studio has been hacked, or
a health insurance company, or a multinational leak, you know,
retail-type entity, that might be further afield, and other
parts of the Federal Government that are involved in cyber
activities might be better positioned to handle the lead on
that, again, all through the core prism of what the main
mission of the Secret Service is.
So, you know, we had a couple months to look at this. We
don't purport to have the final answers. But we think the
guideposts on this will be what is the core mission of the
Secret Service, and does this particular activity, whatever it
is, further that mission or distract from it?
Chairman Chaffetz. Ok. One last thing I want to--and I know
other members want to ask about this. If you put up the slide,
please, on the training. You know, one of the things that we
are deeply concerned about, these are the training numbers that
we see here. And if you look at from 2008 through 2013, we were
doing roughly special agent basic classes, eight per year,
eight--eight, eight, eight. Then we go down to five. Then we go
down to zero. Then we go to one. Why--why did that happen? How
do we prevent that from happening? What is your assessment of
that?
Ms. Gray. Sure. I am happy----
Chairman Chaffetz. That is great. Move that microphone.
There we go.
Ms. Gray. Sure. You know, training was--our analysis really
began with training. You know, as Mr. Perrelli indicated, we
viewed this as sort of key in animating many of the other
decisions that the Secret Service has to think about, from
staffing to management of overtime and the like. And as your
chart is consistent with what we found in our findings, that
training has fallen below acceptable levels.
There have been a number of reasons that were against us in
the course of our review to explain why that is so, from the
increased activities of the Secret Service and missions, the
number of protective visits that Secret Service members are
staffing and the like, reductions in staffing and the forced
overtime issues. Regardless of those different causes, I think
we all are in agreement that the levels are unacceptably low.
The number in our report that we emphasized, looking at Fiscal
Year 1913 data, the average agent trained about 46 hours in
Fiscal Year 1913. The average uniformed division officer
trained about 25 minutes on average. And by any----
Chairman Chaffetz. For the year?
Ms. Gray. For the year. And so, by any account, those
numbers are unacceptably low and we need to do better.
Chairman Chaffetz. Did you compare that against large
police forces or other----
Ms. Gray. Yes. You know, we spoke to a number of large
metropolitan police forces, and we also spoke to other Federal
agencies that conduct protective missions that are akin to what
the Secret Service is doing. Nothing is an exact apples-to-
apples comparison. But the training levels that we heard for
those agencies ranged anywhere from 5 percent a year to 25
percent a year of time spent doing training. And that type of
training is managed in different ways. You know, some police
forces or protective security agencies conduct sort of focused
training at set times of years. Others integrate it more
naturally month to month. But however it is done, the sort of
levels that we heard from others range between 5 percent to 25
percent, which are obviously significantly higher.
Chairman Chaffetz. Well, thank you.
Now I recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Perrelli, I want to go back to something that you said.
And you said that the Secret Service needs an additional 85
agents and 200 officers. And then you said something that I
want you to explain. You said as a downpayment. What does that
mean?
Mr. Perrelli. We looked at the data provided by the Secret
Service and tried to assess, with the current work force, based
on what we can discern, what would it take to--how many
additional personnel would they need to get to the training
levels that we think are the bare necessity, which, as we
indicated in the report, is a true fourth shift or 20 to 25
percent of training for the President's protective detail, and
at least 10 percent of their time training for the uniform
division.
Based on our--the information that we were able to obtain
from the Service, that led to our recommendation for
immediately the need for 200 additional uniformed division
officers and 85 additional special agents. But I think there
are a couple of things that cause the panel to believe that,
once a full analysis is done by a new Director, more resources
are going to be needed. One is, I think as the chairman said,
there really hasn't been a true analysis of how much it takes
to protect the President and other protectees in the White
House. The Service's internal systems are not well-designed to
do this.
Mr. Hagin and I sat with a Secret Service agent and watched
them put in their time in a DOS-based system with a green
blinking cursor. And those systems don't reflect the actual
hours that people worked. So that once you factor in the
excessive amounts of overtime that we think the agents both
anecdotally told us and that we saw ourselves, once you bring--
try to bring some of those overtime numbers down, we think that
you will discover that more resources are needed.
As we said in our report, we think that a new Director--a
critical function of a new Director is to have a zero-based
budget, start from the beginning and define the mission and
explain to Congress and the executive branch how much it takes
to do this. We think it is going to be more money. We think it
is going to be more agents and more uniform divisions, but we
also think that a new Director might decide to shed or trim
certain missions so that it is not all new money.
Mr. Cummings. Well, if we are able to pass the DHS budget,
we will be able to hire the 85 agents and the 200 officers.
But let me ask you with regard to going back to training.
There is a lot of talk about the fourth shift. And, you know, I
want to go back to what the chairman was asking about. You are
saying they are getting 25 minutes--I hope the committee hears
this--25 minutes a year. Is that what you said?
Ms. Gray. That is for the uniformed division.
Mr. Cummings. Twenty-five minutes of training?
Ms. Gray. Right.
Mr. Cummings. And what would be acceptable?
Ms. Gray. Sir, we sort of thought about this in two ways.
So for the PPD, the Presidential Protective Division, that is
where the fourth shift concept originated. And so historically,
particularly in the 1980's and 1990's, and it is our
understanding from speaking to past Directors and past special
agents, that the fourth shift concept was a very real concept
in the Service. And the idea was agents would spend, you know,
2 weeks on a daytime shift, 2 weeks on a nighttime shift, 2
weeks on a midnight shift, and then 2 weeks in training. Now,
that is not to say sort of all 14 of those days in that 2 weeks
were spent training, obviously. The agent's time was managed in
a way to provide surge capacity if they needed to support
unexpected trips or missions. But that this concept of striving
for roughly spending about 25 percent of the year in training
for the agents in the PPD was very different.
That fourth shift has never really been applicable to the
uniform division, and it has been difficult to get sort of
reliable historical data on this. So we don't actually have a
very good benchmark for the uniform division. But I think what
we do know is that this sort of average that you saw in Fiscal
Year 1913 that we refer to the 25 minutes is unacceptably low.
Mr. Cummings. One of the things that has concerned I am
sure the chairman, and definitely it has concerned me--and I am
wondering how you got into this and what your conclusions may
have been. We have agents who felt more comfortable coming to
the Congress and telling us about their concerns than telling
the higher ups at the Secret Service. And I have said it many
times. I think for this kind of organization, that is not good.
And so, I mean, what do you all see as the--did you find that
to be the case? I mean, well, what conclusions did you come to?
And how do you remedy that?
Mr. Filip. I think that goes, sir, to the culture and
leadership attitudes of the organization going forward. Any
robust organization has to be honest with itself and open to
the fact that if we are going to be a continually improving
organization, we have to accept and objectively evaluate
criticisms about how things are operating. And so I think you
have put your finger on something critically important. I think
we all do. And that is something that the agency and its new
leadership is going to have to get much better at, because no
organization is perfect. It is not a weakness to accept the
idea that there is problems. Face them honestly and objectively
and work forward to improve. So you are right, that is
something important for the new era of the Service and for the
new Director.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. Now I recognize the gentleman
from Tennessee, Mr. Duncan, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Duncan. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And you are sure
getting off to a great start chairing this committee and
calling all these hearings.
Let me, first of all, say that I appreciate this panel and
how they have come in from the outside to take a look at this.
But I do have to tell you that--sort of no criticism of each of
you--but I am very skeptical about some of this, and I will
tell you why. I have been here 26 years. I have served on four
different committees. I have read reports from all the
committees. Every time some Federal agency messes up, the first
thing they say, they say they are underfunded; and the second
thing they say is their technology is out of date. And they
have got more money than any company in the private sector and
more expensive technology than any company in the private
sector. Yet they always come up with those same excuses.
In that time that I have been in Congress, when I first
came here, the national debt was less than $3 trillion. Now, it
is $18 trillion. The Federal budget was not anywhere close to
what it is now. All of the Federal agencies--all of the Federal
departments and agencies, if you looked at the last 2 or 3 or 4
years, we have been doing a better job holding funding
reasonably at a level rate. But if you looked over the last 20
or 25 years, Federal spending has gone way up, and all the
Federal law enforcement agencies have greatly expanded over
that time, and their budgets have gone way up. I don't have the
figures here. I came here a little unprepared for this hearing
because I didn't know until late yesterday that we were going
to have this hearing. And that is my fault. But I had the
figures a few years ago that the F--5 or 6 years ago, the FBI
had tripled in size over the years that I have been here in
numbers of personnel and in their budgets. And I just am very
skeptical that the Secret Service doesn't have enough funding.
And then, second, I remember when I first came here that I
had a hearing on the Aviation Subcommittee, and one of the main
things was they talked about the low morale of air traffic
controllers. And that is another thing I have heard a lot of
times from Federal employees about their low morale. Well, I
can tell you it seems to me the less people have to do on their
job, the more they complain. I almost have never gotten a
complaint from a short-order cook at a Waffle House.
I can tell you that if these Secret Service people who have
low morale, if they don't realize how lucky they are to have
these jobs--and I have got nothing against anybody in the
Secret Service. I am sure they are all nice people and all fine
people. But they need to realize they are very lucky to have
their jobs.
When I first ran for Congress, I had a--they had an ad
signed by every member--there was 300 or 400 members of the
Knoxville Police Department. Every one except seven signed an
ad endorsing me. I was a criminal court judge. I was considered
very pro law enforcement. But I will tell you that our Federal
law enforcement people are our highest paid law enforcement
people in this country. Next are State. And our lowest paid
people are the local law enforcement people who are out there
fighting the real crime, the daily--the day-to-day that
everybody wants to fight. But I will tell you that when I hear
about low morale in the Secret Service, I think they ought to
be ashamed, anybody who feels that way, because they are very
lucky to have their job and the high pay that they get.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. The gentlemen yields back.
I now recognize the gentlewoman from the District of
Columbia, Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we are very
fortunate to have the Secret Service take the risks they take.
And when it comes to their pay, these are the people who have
suffered sequester and have not received increases in pay. So
we value them very highly, and we value your report, which is
very thoughtful. I have been concerned, by the way, with the
really quite shocking underfunding of the Secret Service,
something I think that would shock the American people, because
they always assumed that the protection for the American people
was a first priority because it is a symbol of the United
States itself.
I was concerned about the physical barriers because that is
the most obvious and commonsense way to approach this problem.
And I have distributed to the members and to you a copy of a
picture that was taken outside right after--right after the
most notorious of the fence jumping incidents. And I am asking
this question because you indicate that there are some physical
barriers that have been added. Are you talking about these
barriers that are normally used simply for crowd control, or
are we talking about actual structural physical barriers?
Mr. Hagin. That we recommend adding?
Ms. Norton. You say that the--we understand that there have
been some physical barriers that have been added. I am asking
you if there have been any physical barriers added since the
incident, since our hearing in September and since the fence
jumping that was the basis for that hearing?
Mr. Hagin. The bike rack that is shown in the photo you
distributed is new since the fence jumping incident.
Ms. Norton. Well, you know, if that is----
Mr. Hagin. The Gonzalez incident.
Ms. Norton. I mean, you know--by the way, I consider this
quite outrageous. If that is--what this says to the public is--
and this is a First Amendment space. Lafayette Park is right
there across from the White House because the Framers intended
the White House to be a place where people could go. This is
hardly a barrier. And, in fact, it is very ugly. And there are
two pictures here that show what are really quite temporary--
they are not really barriers. They are not used as barriers.
They are not meant as barriers. They are meant to be movable
because they are crowd control. And is that all that has
happened since the fence jumping?
Mr. Hagin. We have not investigated just recently what, if
anything, the----
Ms. Norton. So as far as you know, that is all that has
happened.
Mr. Hagin. We are--no. We have clearly recommended that a
permanent solution be designed and adopted as quickly as
possible.
Ms. Norton. And yet I appreciate that you have recommended
that. The fence--that the fence itself, consistent with its
historic basis, be raised. Have you put any timeframe on it? Of
all the things that it seems to me could have happened by this
time, it does seem to me, at least the plans for that, could
have been--could have been made.
Chairman Chaffetz. Will the gentlewoman yield? I will tell
you that you can receive a classified briefing about that. Mr.
Cummings and I participated in a meeting where the details, the
timing was laid out. And I would--if any member would like to
have that briefing, I would be happy to arrange another one.
But that was not something this panel looked at, other than
making a general recommendation. But to get a Secret Service
briefing on what they are doing, A, was pretty impressive and,
B, is certainly in the works.
Ms. Norton. Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. Although
I must say, I don't consider it very highly classified for the
terrorists and other fence jumpers to know that there is going
to be a fence that is going to be raised. I don't consider that
very classified information.
I want to say that I am--given your report, which I think
was timely, I am disappointed that we have no information. And
I will seek that information in the way the chairman suggests.
The only disappointment I really had in your report was
that there was no mention that I recall of the public space and
of the tradition that this has been a public space and the
barriers and the security for the President can be improved
without, for example, a magnetometer in the street. That would
mean that even though you are outdoors, you have to go through
this magnetometer before you can get to where the public still
can get, by the way. And I wonder why you did not consider the
access of this space to the public, considering that it is one
of the great First Amendment spaces in the Nation's Capital. It
is not just a tourist site. There are people there every day on
every issue trying to express their point of view.
Mr. Perrelli. Thank you for the question. And I do--I do
think it was of serious consideration to the panel about the
historic nature of both the White House as well as the spaces
around the White House. I think perhaps what is most telling is
the absence of recommendations from this panel to do things
like close off the park or those kinds of things that one could
consider as appropriate security measures, but they would be
inconsistent with the history of those spaces. So perhaps I
think we answer your question by not having recommendations
that would have gone the other way.
Ms. Norton. Well, I so thank you for that, Mr. Perrelli,
because that is what I am going to cite. I am going to say that
the panel said that by not recommending that the public be
excluded, it meant to say that the public should have access to
that space as it has always had.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentlewoman. I now recognize
the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gosar, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gosar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, panel,
for the report.
I want to quote a couple of snippets here--four snippets
and kind of make a summary and then ask some questions for
that, if that is OK.
The first one: ``The Secret Service is stretched too, and
in many cases, beyond its limits. Special agents and uniform
division personnel protecting the White House work an
unsustainable number of hours.''
Second snippet: ``Rather than invest in systems to manage
the organization more effectively and accurately predict its
need, the Service simply adds more overtime for existing
personnel.''
Third snippet: It goes on to say that, ``The Secret Service
needs more agents and officers, even beyond the levels required
to allow for in-service training. The President and other
protectees cannot receive the best possible protection when
agents and officers are deployed for longer and longer hours or
fewer and fewer days off.''
Number 4: ``The Service has to increase the number of
agents and, to an even greater extent, increase the size of the
uniform division to ensure protection of the White House.''
Now, I understand uniform division officers told the panel
that they do not know whether they are working 1 day to the
next or if they are even required to work overtime. The
staffing failures within the uniform division are so bad that
the special agents are flown in from field offices around the
country to detail them for week-long shifts to the White House,
supplementing the uniform division due to the dramatic losses
in staffing it has seen. These are agents--result in special
agents who are unfamiliar with the White House complex being in
charge or defending it.
So my question is: Given this report found that the special
agents and uniform division officers work an unsustainable and
unpredictable number of hours, what must the Service do better
to manage that workload?
Mr. Perrelli. I think there are a couple of things,
Congressman. One is, as we talked about, the Service really
hasn't had the kind of work force planning model to make
sensible personnel decisions about how many people are needed
and control the number of hours that people are working. As I
think the chart that the chairman put up earlier showed, you
have--you know, rather than continuing to hire people and
having more officers and more agents, what ended up happening
was you just had the existing work force working longer and
longer hours.
So I think we have recommended, one, a more robust work
force planning model so that they can, I think, make good
judgments about what is needed and how to deploy those
resources. As we indicated, we do think they need more
personnel, if nothing else, to ensure that the personnel that
they have get adequate training. So I think those are, I think,
core aspects of this. But as--you know, one of our larger
recommendations is that I think the new leadership needs to
take a step back and really define and then come to the
executive branch and Congress with a clear plan that
articulates this is what it takes to protect the White House
and this is why we need the personnel that we think we need.
Mr. Gosar. And I know you can't go into certain technology.
Being a business man, I mean, technology, I mean we can track
patients going through a system, knowing exactly where they are
every time, every point of the day. Is that something being
entertained in regards to a work force for the Secret Service?
Mr. Perrelli. I think on the technology question, as I
think the events of the September 19th indicated, there are
real shortcomings, both on training and communications
technology with respect to the Service's current equipment as
well as their training on that equipment. That is something I
think we think needs to be addressed. And all those things
needs to be integrated together. Because I think you are right,
Congressman, that you need to know where your personnel are if
you are going to be able to respond to an incident.
Mr. Gosar. And when you look at overall, you know, your
evaluation, when you don't have systems to even evaluate, how
hard was it even to come up with some of those recommendations?
I mean you have to look back and look at your past to be able
to go forward.
Mr. Perrelli. I think we wanted to be able to provide more
specific recommendations in certain areas. But as I think we
laid out in the report, because the data we were working from
on the special agent side, it is clear that they do not record
all the hours that they work. They are working many more hours
than show up in their personnel system. And on the uniform
division side, the data really doesn't come from the Service's
own systems, but comes from Federal pay records about overtime,
which isn't necessarily--may not be the most precise way to do
the kind of planning that is needed.
Mr. Gosar. I am going to end it with one last question. So
we have a Commander in Chief, the head of all our military and
stuff. It should be the highest honor to serve in that capacity
to protect the President. So why wouldn't the requirements be
the same for that detail for Secret Service as like, say, the
Navy SEALs or the Rangers? I mean, it should be that protective
an aspect, does it not? And the chart that went up there is
disgraceful when we see that type of application not being the
same type of application. Do you agree?
Mr. Perrelli. I think the panel agrees that we need the
best of the best in this role. And that has been historically
the culture and the belief of the Service. And I think we hope
our recommendations will help them return to that point.
Mr. Gosar. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
We will now recognize the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs.
Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning
to you. And thank you so very much for the work that you have
done. I did take the opportunity to read the briefing that I
had last night, and it was quite extensive and a little bit
scary.
For the record, I just want to ask a question. Is this a
part of the fence that was compromised? For the life of me, I
can't see how you scale a fence that is skinny like this and
this long. Will you----
Mr. Hagin. It is the fence in the background of the photo.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK.
Mr. Hagin. It is not the fence in the foreground.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I know it is not--I know it is not
this. They actually were able to scale this?
Mr. Hagin. They were able to scale the fence that is in the
background of the photo. The bike rack--what they call bike
rack----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Yes.
Mr. Hagin [continuing]. In the foreground was not there at
that time.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. It just seems to me--it is interesting
that they could even scale that. Are any of your
recommendations proposing additional surveillance over these
areas that could possibly be points of access to the White
House?
Mr. Hagin. We feel that they should continue to modernize
technology.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Interoperability of communications?
Mr. Hagin. Interoperability. Across the board, the systems
need to be continually improved. I am being careful here
because--without going into sensitive areas. But we believe
that technology plays an integral part in this multilayer
defense of the facility, and that it must be continually
upgraded and receive a lot of additional focus.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. This is something that I heard in the
5 weeks that I have been here in some briefings, that the
personnel that were on staff at the time of the fence jumping
incident were--and I don't know what time of the night that
was. Can you tell me the time of night----
Mr. Perrelli. Early evening.
Mrs. Watson Coleman [continuing]. Or day? Early evening?
Mr. Perrelli. Yes.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Was that--was the staff that was
predominantly low seniority? Is there something to a staffing
pattern that your seniority gives you a better staff shift? And
is there an assurance that then or now that there are people
who have more seniority and experience are there all the time?
Mr. Perrelli. As I think many on the committee know, there
was a prior report that focused on September 19th done by the
Deputy Secretary of DHS, which focused on the very specific
issues of that night and did find that the personnel on staff
tended to be junior that evening. And I think this goes back
again to this staffing and planning issues as well as the
forced overtime issues that--you know, ensuring that the
personnel, you have the right chain of command, you have the
right mix of seniority and junior personnel, as well as the
right training so that people understand and know the compound
is something that, if the Service implements some new--some
reforms and some new systems, they will be able to ensure in
the future and not have that problem on any given night.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. If you looked at their organizational
staffing requests right now, would they be where they say they
need to be? Because you are asking for 85 and 200. So is that--
does that recognize that their staffing is not complete right
now? Or is that in addition--did they have it and that is in
addition to what they have?
Mr. Perrelli. So, yes, we were heartened to see that there
were additional sums sought in the President's budget, and we
are very supportive of getting the Service to the 85 and 200. I
think others may be able to do the calculation as to whether
the precise amounts sought are--match up with that. But it is
our understanding that, you know, that some of the additional
request is intended to try to reach those levels.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. On the incident on the elevator, was
there an explanation how someone of that nature got on the
elevator with the President?
Mr. Perrelli. So our panel did not look at the elevator
incident. It wasn't part of our mandate.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK. I am very supportive and very
respectful of the Secret Service. And really, when I think of
the Secret Service, I think of it being, you know, without
parallel, the protection for the President and other people
that is uncompromised and incomparable. So these number of
incidences that have come up have been tremendously
disappointing to me. And I just want to go on record as saying
I don't think that we are talking about wasteful spending, and
I don't think we are talking about asking for something that we
don't need. And if we are going to look to where we are going
to save money, we need to make sure that we are applying that
to areas that don't have the kind of sensitivity.
Protecting the President of the United States and those
like him, that is the most important thing that we need to be
doing as it relates to our Secret Service. And I, for one,
support the Homeland Security and its need for a clean funding
bill and for the Secret Service to have new leadership and all
the things that you have identified that it needs. And I thank
you for your report and your work.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
speak.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. I do appreciate it.
Will now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.
DesJarlais, for 5 minutes.
Mr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a followup on a question that Mr. Walberg had asked.
And whoever wants to take this question, feel free. How many
new hire training classes do the Secret Service have funding
for each year?
Mr. Perrelli. In general, they have tried to do eight
classes per year. Funding has been different over different
years, but eight classes per year has been more consistently
the norm. And I think that showed in the early years of the
chairman's chart.
Mr. DesJarlais. OK. And is that what you did in the
previous year? You did eight?
Mr. Perrelli. I have to go back and look. I think that in
1909, 1910, 1911, I think they were--here is the chart. So you
see special agent classes and then uniformed division classes.
Eight was the norm for the special agents. And then for the
uniformed division, you know, the numbers range a bit, although
something between 10 and 11 would be more the norm.
Mr. DesJarlais. OK. Thank you.
Your review found that in 2013, the Service changed its
hiring process, and this resulted in more applicants but a less
effective process at identifying strong candidates. In fact,
more than half the applicants failed the routine polygraph that
occurs during screening. Do you know who was responsible for
this decision?
Mr. Perrelli. We didn't identify a specific individual. I
think our focus was--our concern was on that, that that process
took a very long amount of time, only to have many of the
candidates drop out. So it took a lot of resources and did not
yield enough qualified candidates at the end. It has--that
experience, as well as a number of other things that we found,
are one reason why we think the Service needs to really
professionalize its human resources function and develop hiring
and retention strategies led by experts in that field.
Mr. DesJarlais. OK. Any other downfalls at all that you
didn't identify? OK. What does the Secret Service plan to do to
fix the hiring process to better identify potential candidates?
Mr. Perrelli. So the Service has--is changing--has already
changed its hiring process, and is using more, it is our
understanding, accepted service authority, and has reordered
aspects of its process so that it is less likely to spend a lot
of time on candidates that are going to fall out of the
process. But, again, we think that over the long haul, having
human resources professionals in charge of that process is
going to be more likely to get good outcomes.
Mr. DesJarlais. OK. You note that many of the
recommendations in your report are not new. These
recommendations go back to the 1964 Warren Commission, some are
identified to the 1995 White House security review, and others
track internal recommendations. What were those
recommendations?
Mr. Perrelli. Well, I think there have been many
recommendations, certainly, over the years. But there are a
number of things that we found in our report that, I think,
have been seen over time. Certainly, questions about investment
in the uniform division and the importance of giving focus to
the uniform division and deciding its role. Those issues have
been there. Certainly, issues related to excess overtime have
been--and insufficient personnel have been identified over
time. There are a number of issues that we raise in the
classified aspect of our report that are ones that have been
noted in the past by the Service.
Mr. DesJarlais. Why do you think that a lot of those
recommendations were ignored?
Mr. Perrelli. I think that the Service itself has noted
that it has not always done what it needed to do in terms of
follow-through of its own recommendations. And I think--our
hope is that, coming out of this report, that there will be a
real opportunity to focus on these specific recommendations and
real follow-through in tracking to make sure that they actually
get implemented.
Mr. DesJarlais. So how will future Secret Service leaders
be held accountable for implementing your recommendations?
Mr. Perrelli. Well, I certainly think that if there is a
real process to--you know, and I am sure this committee will
have a role in it and other committees will have a role in it,
too, to ask the Service what has it done to implement the
recommendations and where is that going? And I also assume that
this and future Presidents will hold them accountable as well.
Mr. DesJarlais. OK. And then the last question. Then how do
you define that success or how should success be defined if you
have implemented these recommendations properly?
Mr. Perrelli. I think from our perspective, if we see the
kind of cultural change and leadership change that we have
talked about that really defines the mission, we talked a
little bit in the report saying that if in 5 years the budget
that the Service submits to Congress looks kind of more of the
same or about the same with a little bit of extra money on it,
that we will not have moved the ball forward.
Mr. DesJarlais. Thank you so much for your answers. I yield
back.
Mr. Filip. One thing to add to your last question, there
never will be a point in time where the Secret Service can
declare success. Every day they have to get better. It has to
be a continual improvement organization. And people have to
have that in their DNA. So those benchmarks are signals that
people can look to to say that improvement has been real. But
there will never be a point in time, given the nature of the
mission and I don't think that good leadership would ever think
that there is, where people can say we have won, let's take a
break, we can 2 weeks off. It is going to have to be a
continual improvement organization, just like any successful
football team or engineering team or military organization.
That is what is going to take.
Mr. DesJarlais. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Chairman Chaffetz. Now recognize the gentlewoman from
Michigan, Ms. Lawrence, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Lawrence. Thank you. After today's hearing, my desire
is that there will no longer be any legitimate doubt that the
Secret Service needs more resources critical to the mission
that you perform. And I join with the ranking chair and the
chairman of recognizing how important you are and the service
that you give. But we clearly know that there is areas of
concern. And I feel strongly that the option of continuing the
way we have in the past does not exist. And it will not be
something that will be tolerated.
I wanted to give you a quote that I would like to be
addressed. The ranking member of the Committee on Homeland
Security, Congressman Thompson, he Stated: ``Within the next 5
years, the Secret Service will provide protection through two
Presidential election cycles, two Democratic national
conventions, two Republican national conventions, the 75th
anniversary of the United Nations, and other National Security
special events.'' To his point, on top of your current
responsibilities of protecting the President and protecting
your area of responsibility, and we know that there is some
problems with leadership resources, we are also entering a
period where there is going to be additional demand. My
background is in HR. And I know that when you start hiring and
training, there is a gap in your resources. So we have to be
realistic about that. For us to get where we need to be, we are
going to have to pull resources that we already have. Do you
agree with that?
Mr. Perrelli. I think that is right. One of the concerns
that the panel had--and again, pointing to the charts that the
chairman put up--when you don't bring on new classes, that is
going to show up. Because the average Secret Service Agent
takes 4 to 5 to 6 years in the field getting trained before
they show up on the President's detail. That gap in hiring is
going to be show up and be most acute in that 4 to 5 years down
the road. So you are right that an issue with hiring that shows
up today may not have an immediate effect----
Mrs. Lawrence. Exactly.
Mr. Perrelli [continuing]. But will show up in the future.
Mrs. Lawrence. In our planning in discussing what the
expectations are of improvement, getting additional resources,
I see with the additional responsibilities coming up that
training gap, there is a concern, an additional concern; do you
agree with that concern? What is the plan to address that
concern if you agree?
Mr. Perrelli. We do agree with that concern. And I think
that is why our proposal of, again, 200 additional Uniformed
Division Officers and 85 additional special agents, we thought
that that would allow the current work force to reach training
levels that we thought were acceptable. It doesn't answer the
question of what is the long-term right size of the
organization. And, of course, there are, as occurs regularly on
4-year cycles, the Service both draws from its investigative
force for Presidential campaigns, but also usually receives,
seeks and receives additional appropriations every 4 years in
order to plan for those campaigns because the amount of travel
which is very unpredictable increases.
Mrs. Lawrence. So I want to be clear that our ask that we
saw in the report will enable us to have an expectation that
you will have the resources to address all of these concerns.
Because if this report or your ask for resources only takes you
up to a point to cover the existing concerns, then my concern
is that we are going to see additional gaps. And that is my
concern right now. And I wanted to be clear that in the
proposal, that we don't come back later and say we still don't
have the resources to do the job, knowing that all these
additional things and the gap is going to be added.
Mr. Perrelli. As an answer to that question, the proposal
we made in terms of specific numbers was what we thought would
address an immediate need. It was not intended to estimate how
much the 2016 political campaign would cost or the 2020
political campaign would cost. Nor was it an attempt to set the
sort of long-term size of the Service. As we said in the
report, we think that a new Director needs to do a zero-based
budget, needs to start from the beginning and define that, and
then come again to the executive branch and to Congress and
justify that. But we do think that immediate infusion of
resources is needed today, recognizing, as we said before, that
it is going to take some period of time for those people to be
able to be deployed at the White House.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentlewoman. Now recognize the
gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank each of you for
your work, for your recommendations. Ms. Gray, I want to come
to you first. I have received a number of phone calls from
agents, male, female, all over the country. They have actually
gotten ahold of a Member of Congress, talked to me. Any time I
get a blocked number, I know it is them. My concern is is that
it sounds like there is a culture of fear within the rank and
file. Would you agree with that assessment having talked to so
many people?
Ms. Gray. I think one of the things that we heard from a
number of agents was a sense of disappointment in some of their
leadership. And I think this goes back to the question that was
asked earlier by Congressman Cummings about people finding
different outlets, finding a Member of Congress or going to the
media and other things. And so that is something that, you
know, we hope the recommendations that we made in our report
that get to a leadership that respects input from the rank and
file, that provides opportunities for agents and officers to
suggest changes within the organization, that gets to why we
think that is very important.
Mr. Meadows. Let me followup on that. So if we have a
culture of fear within the Service, and I am quoting from your
report, it says they do not have the confidence that discipline
is imposed in a fair and consistent manner, that they feel like
that some people get off easier or some people get punished.
Would you agree with that assessment, Ms. Gray?
Ms. Gray. We heard a number of agents and officers express
disappointment in the transparency around the disciplinary
process. And I think over time, the Service has experimented
with different models, from having more direct supervisors
imposing discipline, to having discipline imposed more from
central command of the Secret Service. And I think there has
been, and we heard a lot of it, a sense of disappointment in
the transparency around these processes which leads to some
concluding that discipline is not taking seriously.
Mr. Meadows. So if we have those two issues--and there is
essentially another quote from your report, a good-old-boy
network in terms of the management. Would you agree with that
assessment, that that is the feeling within the Service?
Ms. Gray. We heard a lot of comments. I don't want to----
Mr. Meadows. Would that be accurate--I am taking it from
your report.
Ms. Gray. Yes.
Mr. Meadows. So if there is a good-old-boy spirit of fear
within management, and we are talking about resources, I think
both Democrats and Republicans are committed to providing the
resources to make sure that this agency has what it needs. But
my concern is is the budget last time, under the Director that
is no longer with the Service, actually asked for less money,
asked to reduce the level of experience by an average of 5
years, actually went even further to say that they were going
to reduce full-time equivalent people. And part of the people
that made up that budget request got a promotion in January of
this year. Do you find that that would create a real problem
from a morale standpoint?
Ms. Gray. Absolutely from a morale standpoint.
Mr. Meadows. So there were seven people who got a promotion
in January. What did the rank and file say about that, senior-
level executives?
Ms. Gray. So we didn't get into discussions about
particular individuals or particular members of the management
team. But we did hear, overall, a sense of disappointment with
the leadership in the agency. And our focus, rather than on
individual performance of individual members of the management
team, our focus was much more thinking, you know, from the sort
of bottom up, what are the qualities that this agency needs to
have in its management team as----
Mr. Meadows. Let me tell you what I have heard. I have
heard from agents that said that the 8th floor, they need to
clean house of a lot of those folks. Have you guys heard
similar Statements like that?
Mr. Perrelli. One of the most telling things that I think
we heard from, it was remarkable how consistent this was, was
with the rank and file saying to us if what comes of this
report is just more money, we need more resources, that is
true, but what we really need is leadership. We need a
different, dynamic leadership, not specified to one particular
floor, but a clear sense from the rank and file that their
confidence in the organization would really improve only if
they saw substantial change at the top.
Mr. Meadows. I am going to close with this because I made a
promise to a couple of agents, there is this forcing of
transferring of people across the country where they will be
working for 12 years, 10 years, and then they are forced to
move somewhere else. And they are encouraged in such a way that
if they don't do it, they may lose their clearance. Is that
something that the panel looked into?
Mr. Perrelli. We heard concerns about the transfer
policies, concerns, frankly, at the management level, as well
as from the line level. I think it didn't become a big part of
our report. But I do think that from a budget and management
standpoint, that is one of the issues that we think a new
Director has got to look at seriously in sort of charting the
future course of the organization.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentleman. Now recognize the
gentleman from California, Mr. Lieu, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Chaffetz. Ms. Gray, if you could move your
microphone just a little more central, that would be helpful.
Thank you.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to the panel
for your excellent report. I think many of us agree with you
that you need better leadership. But it is awfully hard to lead
without the appropriate resources. And I wanted to sort of give
you the opportunity to respond to what a member very early in
the panel had Stated about--because other law enforcement
agencies like the FBI had an increase in funding, therefore,
the Secret Service must also have had adequate funding. But, in
fact, that's not true, right? Hasn't the budgets remained
largely flat while your missions have actually increased in
complexity?
Mr. Perrelli. I think there has been an increase in
missions. And I think what we looked at and talked about in our
report and something that gave us confidence that the 285
recommendations that we made for immediate needs was adding 85
agents to the President's protective detail would really only
bring it up to where it was in 2004. Now, that is not the
budget of the entire organization. And there are folks doing
the investigative mission. And so the organization's budget has
increased over time. But for the Uniform Division, adding 200
positions would not even bring it to its high-water mark. We
thought that was important to do today. But as we said, we
think, longer term, a new Director has got to take a serious
look at what is the right size, what are the right missions to
keep and maybe to shed. We think it is going to take more money
once that plan is put together. But it is not to say that all
of it is new money.
Mr. Lieu. I have a question for you, the immediately prior
member asked a question and sort of stated that folks last year
requested a smaller budget. Was that because they were ordered
to do so because of sequestration? They just had to come up
with numbers to meet a certain threshold?
Mr. Perrelli. I don't think we can speak really about what
happened precisely in another budget process. There is no
question that--and again, I think we talk about this in our
report--I think we found that the Service did what perhaps
other agencies do, which is they look at what they have, they
think about what they might be able to get through the agency,
the OMB, and through Congress. And they ask for a little bit
more. And they maybe ask for a little bit more in an area that
they think might be one that Congress is interested in funding.
Our concern is that over time, what happened with the
Service is that they weren't continuing to increase their
staffing, they weren't asking, necessarily modeling and making
decisions about how much they really needed. And at some point,
over a number of years, what they had and what they needed
really diverged in no small part because their missions
continued to increase, both the protective mission and,
frankly, the investigative mission.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you. Representative Lawrence had read from
Bennie Thompson's letter to us. I am going to read another part
of the letter. He says ``years of making budget requests,
combined with the reduction of appropriations have left the
agency struggling to meet its multi-faceted mission and failing
to meet our expectations.'' I assume you agree with that?
Mr. Perrelli. Yes.
Mr. Lieu. So, Mr. Chairman, with unanimous consent, I ask
that Ranking Member Thompson's full Statement be entered into
the official hearing record.
Chairman Chaffetz. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Lieu. So I am very pleased that you are here, that you
issued the report. And I hope we can begin the process of
restoring both the Secret Service, as well as protection for
our homeland. And we can do that by, first of all, passing a
clean DHS bill, so I yield back.
Mr. Connolly. Will my friend yield? My friend here, would
you yield?
Mr. Lieu. I will yield.
Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend. Mr. Perrelli, in response
to Mr. Lieu about the fact that 85 more uniform personnel would
only bring us back to the level of 2004--I, for one, am stunned
by that. But isn't it also about turnover? I mean, part of the
problem with the agency is not just how many uniform people we
got, but how long they are there. They are being raided by
other agencies. I am going to get into inadequate training in
my questioning time. But it is also unbelievable--I mean,the
average tenure of a uniform person is what?
Mr. Perrelli. I don't have that figure at my fingertips.
But turnover is high, you know, in no small part because
Uniform Divisions have a TS/SCI clearance and a full polygraph,
making them very attractive candidates for other law
enforcement jobs as well. So there is no question that I think
that turnover is high. And that is something that, as we talked
about in our report, there is a need to make a decision, make a
set of choices about what the Uniform Division needs to be. And
that will drive how you think about investment in the Uniform
Division or how you might change its mission. We proposed two
different paths in the report, but left it to a new Director to
make that call.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. And I thank my colleague.
Chairman Chaffetz. If the gentleman will yield, I am sure
our chairman will give them more time. I would also like to
enter into the record and ask unanimous consent to enter the
Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill, this was
May 29, 2013. I want to read from this. It says the committee--
this is the Appropriation Committee--``is concerned that the
President's budget request creates a pay shortfall and results
in the reduction of at least 376 FTEs from the Secret Service
in Fiscal Year 2014, and fundamentally alters the dual-mission
requirements of the Secret Service. At the current rate of
attrition,'' to the gentleman's point, ``by Fiscal Year 2018,
the Secret Service work force would have been decimated by the
loss of more than 1500 FTEs.''
If we could put up the slide here on the funding levels,
you will find that Congress actually appropriated more than
what the President asked for. It does get to the core of what
this panel found which is they don't have a zero-based
budgeting approach. They don't necessarily have the talent in
place to do it. When you are entering into a DOS Operating
System, your time codes, they have no idea what these people
are actually working. And the feedback that we both got is that
they are terribly frustrated, they don't get adequately
compensated, nobody understands what they are really trying to
go through. And then they end up with 25 minutes of training
time in an entire year. And so we share a responsibility in
making sure--that is why I am glad we are providing this
oversight.
The panel has illuminated lots of these things. And I hope
we do work in a bipartisan basis to provide the adequate
funding, to make sure those agents and officers, we understand
what they are going through and that we get those staffing
levels up, because you combine the lack of staffing, the drop
in that, the drop and reduction in training, and you have got a
vortex of vulnerability that is totally unacceptable. With
that, my time is more than expired. I will recognize the
gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis, for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank for
leading the mission over the Secret Service this morning. It
was good to see that. I will just comment on the State of the
DHS bill in the Senate. What you have is a minority of Senators
taking a position that they will not even allow that bill to be
debated, no debate at all, unless the President is allowed to
issue 5 million work permits and Social Security numbers to
people who are in the country illegally, which is, of course,
contrary to statute and something he said he could not do
previously.
So to me, I think that is absolutely irresponsible that you
won't even have this debate. This is a critical constitutional
issue. And I think the country deserves better. And so a
``clean bill'' would not include any funding for this radical
policy change. A clean bill would just focus on funding the
core functions of DHS that they had traditionally done, without
this new policy that the President unilaterally implemented.
Let me ask you this: This is probably outside of what you guys
were tasked with doing, but Mr. Filip, I will just ask you to
start, how has, becausesome of the problems I think that you
identified are great, need more leadership, better
administrative capacities, too much insularity, people have
commented about the low morale. So how has the transition of
the Secret Service from Treasury to DHS, I know it has been 12
years, 13 years now, having it be in a bigger bureaucracy with
more red tape, to me that would exacerbate these problems. Can
you comment on whether the Secret Service is better served
having been in DHS?
Mr. Filip. Thank, you, Congressman. We did not focus on
that question, given that we just had a couple months' time and
we thought we had an awfully big agenda just on the core safety
issues. I suspect the agency could be improved within DHS or
within Treasury. I am sure there is strong arguments on each
side. And we have heard arguments exactly like you just shared
to the pro Treasury side. And we have heard arguments to the
pro DHS side.
Mr. DeSantis. But where were those arguments? Were these
line agents? The people who said that they like Treasury
better, were they more administrators?
Mr. Filip. Generally they were, people who brought up the
subject were people who had been with the Secret Service for a
long period of time and, thus, had been in both places. And
there were a variety of views as you might expect. But for
folks who just, you know, naturally folks who only know one
thing, that tends to be what they think about. For folks who
have seen different options, they have strengths and weaknesses
as to each.
Mr. DeSantis. Mr. Hagin, were you working in the White
House when this change was made, if I read your bio correctly?
Mr. Hagin. I was.
Mr. DeSantis. OK. So can you comment on looking back or
either in the course of your investigation or just using your
experience, because it just seems to me that when you have more
bureaucracy and you put these folks in an even bigger maze, we
talk about personnel, well, the funding is much different when
you have all these agencies in DHS than it would have been at
Treasury. So can you provide any insight into how you see that
issue?
Mr. Hagin. There was a decision that all enforcement was
leaving Treasury. So the question really was, at least in my
involvement, was Justice Department, Homeland Security, where
is the natural fit? When you look at the Department of Homeland
Security, you have Coast Guard, who regularly, on a routine
basis, supports the Secret Service quite a bit with aerial
support and motorcades, other things like that. You have TSA,
who has been supporting the Secret Service with magnetometers,
especially during political campaigns when they are stretched
very, very thin. There is a lot of support from sister agencies
within DHS and that was looked at.
Mr. DeSantis. But the Secret Service does get support from
the FBI and from other agencies who are outside of Homeland
Security, correct?
Mr. Hagin. Not to the extent that I think you see with
Coast Guard and TSA.
Mr. DeSantis. So do you think that the change, to move the
Secret Service into DHS, put the TSA as a new creation of
that,but there was obviously a Coast Guard before then, so the
Secret Service's interactions with the Coast Guard and the
support that the Coast Guard has provided has actually been
enhanced by having a Department of Homeland Security?
Mr. Hagin. Again, the panel didn't look into that question.
Mr. DeSantis. And you don't have a personal opinion?
Mr. Hagin. My sense is that the Service has, the
cooperation has been enhanced by being within the same agency.
Mr. Perrelli. I guess I would just like to add that I think
the panel's conclusion was, we identified a substantial number
of issues that needed reform at the Service. For those issues,
we didn't think moving them from one agency to another would
address really any of the issues that we identified. And so
while we understand that that was a serious debate, we thought
that the focus really needed to be on solving the problems that
we found.
Mr. Hagin. If I could say one more thing, I think one
interesting piece on Treasury was that--being an older guy, I
remember well a lot of the discussion back in those days from
within the Service about, gosh, Treasury officials, Wall Street
guys, finance guys, they really don't understand the
enforcement mission well.
So over time, you have had complaints about, you know,
wherever they are, people are going to think it is better
somewhere else. And I believe it is correct to say that at that
point, the Director of the Secret Service reported to either an
Assistant Secretary or an Undersecretary of Treasury. And when
the change was made, there was an, it was clear that the
Director of the Secret Service would report directly to the
Secretary of Homeland Security. So I think we addressed it
properly in the report.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentleman. Now recognize the
gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to pick
up on that very last point, Mr. Hagin. One of the reasons
obviously it was originally at Treasury is because of the dual
mission of the Secret Service. And I want to get into that.
Your report says the paramount mission is protecting the
President and other high-ranking national officials and allows
no tolerance for error. We agree. But if you look at Secret
Service's own documents, their presentation to the Congress for
their budget, it says they carry out a unique dual mission of
protection and investigation, meaning currency investigation.
In their mission Statement, their own mission Statement,
they say the mission is to ensure the security of the
President, Vice President and families, et cetera, and protects
the integrity of our currency, and investigates crimes against
national financial systems committed by criminals around the
world and cyberspace. I want to ask--we are all focused on the
protection of our senior officials in government and
dignitaries who may visit the United States, but they have got
a dual mission. And the question is, is that now, frankly, a
problem for the Secret Service? They are having trouble with
the paramount mission you have identified. Maybe it is time to
re-examine whether this dual mission thing makes sense any
longer, especially since we moved them out of Treasury.
Mr. Filip. Congressman, we looked at that issue. And we
think that is a very serious question. We think that the
investigative mission in some form is consistent with the
protective mission. Some of those skills, some of those
technologies dovetail in very nicely. That said, protecting the
financial system of the United States is a massive endeavor if
there aren't bounds and limits put on it. And it is likely the
case--and we think this is important because it also flows
through the budgeting and personnel issues--that there has to
be a very hard, good-faith look at whether or not investigative
functions enhance the ability to protect or distract. And so
the issue you have identified is very real. We shared that
concern. That is one of the most important things we think a
new Director and a new leadership team is going to have to look
at.
Mr. Perrelli. And let me add on the question, one of the
reasons why you find that the investigative mission supports
the protective mission is because of the need for surge
capacity or additional capacity when the President or other
protectees travel, particularly foreign travel, as well as
certainly during political campaigns, the arrival of the Pope
in the United States, and those kinds of things where you need
to be able to draw on a significant force. You also need a
period of time, those 4 or 5 years in the field, to train and
then ultimately come to Washington to be part of the protective
detail. If you didn't have the investigative mission, you would
have a very different looking organization, really focused
solely on protection. And that, I think, is, would be a very
substantial change with a variety of pros and cons. Ultimately,
as a panel, we decided that we think, as Mr. Filip said, that
the investigative mission does support that protective mission.
But that because we believe that the protective mission is
paramount, a new Director has to make some serious choices.
Mr. Connolly. My time is going to run out. But I think what
also--and I really appreciate Mr. Filip's candor--the currency
side is a massive enterprise. And I don't know that it makes
sense any longer to marry the two. It may have once. I agree
there is spillover and externalities, positive externalities
about the investigative part. But, frankly, the protective
mission need not preclude investigations. In fact, quite the
opposite. I, myself, have called the Secret Service on occasion
to ask them to investigate a potential threat against a public
official, including the President of the United States. So they
already have that capacity, not tied necessarily to the
currency part. And I would say the chairman, who has invited
bipartisan cooperation here, this may be something, Mr.
Chairman, we really need to look into, whether this continues
to make any sense. I would yield if my time could be frozen.
Chairman Chaffetz. Yes. Your time could certainly be
frozen.
Mr. Connolly. I think it was frozen at 55.
Chairman Chaffetz. Our staff has been working together. I
do agree with you that I think we should seriously look at
separating out the currency, the protection of the currency,
the investigation of that. I do think that Secret Service does
need an investigative arm. It does go hand in glove with their
mission.
Mr. Connolly. Their mission.
Chairman Chaffetz. Yes. But separating out the currency and
giving that responsibility to the Treasury is something we
should revisit. And we will continue to work with you and your
staff. And we may very well jointly introduce something later.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. I welcome that. And I absolutely
welcome working with you and the ranking member on that. This
is something that has bothered me for a long time. Final
question--because I am going to run out of time and I thank the
chair--training, your report is very troubling and you actually
say training has diminished to the point of being far below
acceptable levels. That just sent a chill down my spine when I
read it. What could go wrong with that? And I wonder if you
could just elaborate a little bit on what can we do
efficaciously to turn that around and get it to far above
acceptable levels?
Ms. Gray. Thank you for the question. And I think it is,
you know, I want to be clear----
Chairman Chaffetz. You have got to straighten out that mic
and put it right there. There you go. All right.
Ms. Gray. I think it is important to be very clear about
what we are talking about. Both agents and the PPD and officers
in Uniform Division, when they first go to the protective
detail, there is hundreds of hours of training, you know, when
they are first brought on. So really what we are talking about
is in-service training, the kind of training to keep you sharp,
to hone instincts, to train together in an integrated way, to
train around new threat scenarios. And for that, I think in
terms of the what we can do about it, I think one of the things
that we strive to do in our report was to set a benchmark, to
have a standard that leaders could be measured against in terms
of whether or not they were seeking to fulfill that standard
and have a staffing model to support actually implementation of
that.
So we set two benchmarks. We set a return to the 4th shift
concept for the PPD. And we took a look at large metropolitan
police forces, similar Federal agencies with a protective
mission, their training levels are between 5 and 25 percent.
And we thought, as a panel, you know, at least 10 percent for
the Uniform Division, which, if you think about it, is about 2
days a month, is something that we should want to aspire to. So
we think setting benchmarks will go a long way.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentleman. Now recognize the
gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the
panel. Your report noted that there was a common critique that
you heard, that the service was too insular. What are the areas
of greatest concern in which the agency needs to improve?
Mr. Filip. I think these go to the leadership question,
Congressman. The insularity goes, I think, at least in
substantial part, to the idea of kind of an old boy's network
for want of a better term, that discipline is not always
transparent, or perhaps even uniform, based on whether or not
people have served together in the past or have familiarity
with each other. The insularity also goes to the point of
reaching out to a broader intelligence community and law
enforcement community to gain insights about new technologies
and new techniques that are available, perhaps even going so
far as to reach out to sister agencies at friendly allied
nations, you know, whether it be the Israelis or the British
Secret Service equivalents, to find out what techniques they
have found helpful in real-threat environments. In the past,
that had been done. And it seemed as though that sort of
coordination with other folks who might have good insights and
experts had diminished.
So those were the main sort of insularities I think that we
were looking at. Part of it also was infusing in outside
expertise in areas like human resources, budgeting, technology,
congressional relations, that leadership might come in those
areas that is more effective than folks trained in a protective
or law enforcement background.
Mr. Walberg. Who are the main individuals or groups that
are bringing these concerns to you? Were these coming from
agents on the line?
Mr. Filip. Yes, sir. But we also would hear admissions to
that effect, Statements to that effect from senior people. It
was a uniform, there were a lot of voices to that effect.
Mr. Walberg. You noted hearing that Secret Service would
send low-level representatives with little authority to
interagency meetings and that they were, in your words,
hamstrung from deriving benefits from their participation. Who
at the Service was responsible for this practice? And I guess
the other question is why?
Mr. Filip. I think it would be sort of deputy-level folks
within their subject matter areas would select the people who
would go to those meetings. Why? I think it was just a lack of
priority being placed on or maybe a failure to appreciate the
benefits that could come from being in dialogs with other parts
of law enforcement and intelligence community in the U.S.
Mr. Walberg. And that is a problem with insularity then?
Mr. Filip. Yes, sir.
Mr. Walberg. Didn't want to branch out and find anything
different than what was normal?
Mr. Filip. I think, sir, in its most benign form, it was
that folks are proud of their own organization. But pride can
be a virtue. And pride can be a failing too. There needs to be
humility and an appreciation that you can gain a lot from other
folks too.
Mr. Walberg. How far down the chain of command does this
extend, that attitude extend?
Mr. Filip. I think it is probably not uniform with each and
every person. It certainly is something that is organization,
the organization has had for some time. I think there is some
people at senior levels who are more open to outside
perspectives, some people less, some people at junior levels
with the same dynamic. It certainly is something that is
prevalent enough that a new Director and a new leadership team
has to, we think, respectfully, pay serious attention to.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentleman. Now recognize the
gentlewoman from New York, Ms. Maloney, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and ranking member
for holding this hearing on really a critical issue, the
security of the leaders of our country. It is incredibly
important. And I thank all the panelists for being here today
and all your hard work. You would not have to be a security or
a law enforcement professional to recognize that there are some
very serious problems with your department, with the United
States Secret Service. You would just have to read a newspaper
or have some common sense to see that you are an agency in deep
trouble. The repeated headlines about tawdry scandals with
prostitutes, and Secret Service professionals, the horrendous
lapses of judgment and high-profile breaches of security,
including breaking into the President of the United States'
home.
All these examples make it clear that something is
seriously wrong in the culture and in the management of the
Secret Service. In any organization, it is not fair to assume
that the bad behavior of a few is representative of the many.
But we also understand that this is not just any organization,
this is the United States Secret Service. It used to be one of
the most respected agencies in our government. And you are
tasked with some of the most critical law enforcement missions
in our country. Among them, and first and foremost, is
protecting the President of the United States, the Commander in
Chief, and the leader of the free world. There is no margin for
error in your job. There is no slack to be granted. And there
is absolutely no possibilities for do-overs.
So far more important today than just fixing the blame and
talking about all of these reports is fixing the problem. Now,
the question that I hear from my constituents is how in the
world did someone jump over the fence, break into the White
House, roam around the home where our President sleeps and roam
around rooms where his children play, how in the world did that
happen? I don't want to know specifics. I just want to know in
an overall Statement, can we go to bed tonight and feel that
the Secret Service is going to protect the President of the
United States? I am going to ask Ms. Gray.
Ms. Gray. Thank you for the question. I think our panel
believes that the Secret Service is doing a job protecting the
President, and the President ultimately is safe. There is a lot
of multiple layers around the President and around his personal
protection. But I think to your question about sort of how
could something like that happen that you hear from your
constituents and the like, I think the report by Deputy
Secretary Mayorkas detailed that a series of lapses and also
failures in training and communications led to that event. And
that is something that, you know, we hope our recommendations
going forward can try to address.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, how can we make sure that there is no
longer failures in communication and there are no longer lapses
in protecting--I find that the people are concerned about it.
Because the No. 1 goal of government is to protect our citizens
and to protect our population. And we created the Homeland
Security, we took many strong steps in a bipartisan way after
9/11 to better protect our citizens. So when our citizens see
the President's home broken into, it is very terrifying to them
because they put themselves in the same situation of being
afraid of someone breaking into their home. And I just find it
startling that this ever happened in the first place. And I
also find your recommendation calling for a new Director from
outside of the Secret Service, I have never heard of an agency
basically say we can't handle it ourselves, we have got to have
someone from the outside come in and tell us how to handle it.
Can you explain why you made this recommendation and why do
you think it is going to work and why do you think that someone
with the ability--it is very difficult to get in the Secret
Service and the training and everything else that you have,
that someone from the Service cannot run the Service. And do
you now have a separate agency that is looking at protecting
the President and the Vice President As they move around in
their homes? Mrs. Gray again, and then anyone else who wants to
come in.
Ms. Gray. Sure. I mean, I think our assessment of the need
for an outside Director was that we thought that many of the
challenges that will actually lead to addressing some of these
issues in the future uniquely, at this moment in time, could
benefit from outside leadership. One of the things we say in
our report obviously is that that may not have always been true
throughout the time during the Secret Service. But right now,
given the need to have in place a staffing model so that they
can make decisions that reflect actually the mission, given
some of the prioritization issues that we have been talking
about, how do you make sure that protection of the White House
compound and the President are a priority every year and that,
you know, the mission creep with other areas is not infecting
the organization. All of those challenges we thought could
benefit from outside leadership at this time.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentlewoman. Now recognize the
gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Walker, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, panel, for
being here today. I want to talk about what appears to be the
No. 1 glaring concern with the fence jumper. But I also want to
talk about that from a budget perspective. So let me make sure
that I am clear on this. In your opinion, the fence breach was
caused because of insufficient training, is that correct?
Mr. Perrelli. I think we think that--and this, I think, is
detailed in Deputy Secretary Mayorkas' report--that training
and communications issues were a substantial component of that,
of allowing that individual to get as far as he did. We make a
number of recommendations, both in our unclassified and
classified portions of our report, that I think would address
some of those issues. And we also think that increasing--
changing and increasing the height of the fence would decrease
the ability of somebody to get over the fence at all, much less
get as far as that individual did.
Mr. Walker. Sure. But a couple times this morning I have
heard it try to be tied into some kind of budgetary issue. My
question would be if one of you guys saw someone jump the
fence, would you know what to do?
Mr. Perrelli. There is no question that, and I think the
Service has, if you talk to people, rank and file, across the
Service, they would have said, I think many individuals would
say yes, I know what I would have done. What we did find,
though, is there was disagreement about that. In other words,
there were certainly individuals in the Service who thought
lethal force, they would have immediately deployed lethal
force, others who said lethal force was not appropriate, many
who said putting hands on and actually tackling the person was
the right approach. And what the concern that that led to for
us was that there was a lack of training, so that you would
know in the instant that you needed to react what you were
supposed to do.
Mr. Walker. Sure. But we cannot correlate that to being a
budgetary issue, is that fair to say? I mean, we just recently
passed a human trafficking bill that would train tens of
thousands of agents to spot out some of the perpetrators or the
victims. There is no additional funding for it. So sometimes
training, to me, has no boundary from the sense it is connected
with funding, is that a fair Statement in your report?
Mr. Perrelli. I think where budget and training go together
is the concern that because of--training has really disappeared
because of, or at least in no small part because of, but not
solely because of, the excess overtime that individuals are
working. They have canceled in-service trainings, particularly
for the Uniform Division, now that training is to an
unacceptable level. And those folks are working very, very long
hours. So there is an aspect of this I think that relates to
resources. As I think we tried to make clear in the report, we
do think that, long term, a new Director is going to have to
define the priorities and the mission in a way that the Service
hasn't to date.
I think the chairman put up a slide about funding. It has
not been a question of Congress not appropriating funds, but
the Service not coming to Congress and saying what it needed,
as well as making some of the hard choices about other aspects
of the mission.
Mr. Walker. Granted. But, Ms. Gray, I believe you even used
the term part of the responsibility was to keep sharp and to
hone instincts. I don't see where that necessarily ties into
more funding. I believe that training can be done without
additional resources. Is that part of your report? Do you think
that is fair?
Mr. Perrelli. I think our view is that, that the reason why
training has reduced so significantly is because the work force
is so overstretched. So we do think that you need more
personnel at the White House, both in the Uniform Division and
special agent population. And I do think that means more
resources in the near term.
Mr. Walker. Fair enough. Let me use the last bit of my time
to talk about budget transparency. Were you surprised that no
one in the Secret Service could answer some of the budgetary
questions that you proposed?
Mr. Perrelli. We were concerned about that. And, as we
indicated, the Service needs to professionalize those aspects
of the Service so that they can justify, within the
administration as well as here, the needs that they have.
Because we did the best that we could to identify what we
thought was a reasonable number of an increase that they needed
in the immediate term. So we were, and I think our word was we
were hamstrung in making a more definitive----
Mr. Walker. Maybe could we say that was one of your larger,
if not largest, surprises, that there was no go-to person when
you had budgetary questions?
Mr. Perrelli. We were certainly disappointed that we could
not get a number of questions answered.
Mr. Walker. And is that part of the reason you are
recommending a Director from the outside, someone who would
bring a completely different perspective, including not just
the Secret Service side, the protection side, but also the
budgetary side?
Mr. Perrelli. We do think they need real experts in that
area and that promoting from the agent population is not
probably the way to go there.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentleman. Recognize Mr. Hice
from Georgia for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the
panel for showing up. One question that I had that I am still,
frankly, trying to wrap my mind around in relation to what you
were just referring to, the panel found that the Secret Service
does not have in place a system budgetarily in order to even
make the most prudent budget decisions. And yet, at the same
time, we are saying we need to provide more resources. So I am
trying to wrap my mind around this whole understanding of how
can we say conclusively that more resources are needed when we
are, likewise, admitting that they don't have a system of
tracking the budget that they have, they don't even know how to
manage and spend the money that they are already receiving. So
can you just clarify that?
Mr. Perrelli. Certainly. So it is not so much about
tracking the money that they receive is the issue, but it is a
work force and staffing model to make decisions about how do
deploy the resources that they have. Again, it is more in the
planning side where we found and the retention, the capturing
of data side that we found deficiencies. I think on this
question of more resources, for us, training really drove
resources. If we wanted to, you know, we were unable, I think,
to do the analysis to say, if we want to bring everyone down to
a 55-hour week, how would do you it? What we were able to look
at was if we wanted to bring everyone up to an appropriate
level of training, pursuant to the benchmarks that Ms. Gray
talked about earlier, how much would it take? That analysis we
were able to do. And that is the basis for the 200 additional
Uniform Division and 85 additional special agents.
Mr. Hice. OK. Thank you. And just going on on the training
issue, I think all of us are stunned and appalled by the fact
that something as simple as an incident, someone jumping over
the fence, that so many people didn't know what to do. That
seems like it is 101-type information that everyone agent ought
to know. But also the panel looked into training conditions
that replicate the environment in which these agents are
actually operating. And there was evidently during that fence-
jumping incident, there was one team that actually reported
that they were not even aware of the layout inside the White
House. This is amazing. So just respond to that as well. What
plan is there in the training aspect, if any, to not only
provide more training, but specific training as to where these
agencies are operating?
Ms. Gray. Thank you for the question. Our report attempted
to address what I would call the sort of quality of training
issues that you are raising in sort of two different ways. One
is more integrated training. So one of the things that Deputy
Secretary Mayorkas' report found is that some of the Uniform
Division officers were not fully aware of the roles that others
officers were playing. And so those standing at post at the
door, those on the ERT team, those in the K-9 unit, the
different roles and responsibilities in terms of intercepting
that person. And so that, in part, reflects a lack of
sufficient integrated training, training together as teams. So
that is one recommendation that goes to that.
On the familiarization with the White House, as you noted,
there was indication in Deputy Secretary Mayorkas' report that
members of the Secret Service that were responding to the
incident on the 19th were not familiar with the inside layout
of the White House. So one of our recommendations, we don't
think this should be very hard to do, but one of our
recommendations is that the Service invest in a replica so that
you can actually have training in a real-time environment.
Mr. Hice. OK. Thank you. I want to go to Mr. Filip. You had
mentioned a while ago about the human resources issue and the
fact that you believe that there needs to be a human resource
director from the outside coming in. I am assuming from that
that the method up to this point has been agents from within
who have been overseeing human resources, is that true?
Mr. Filip. Yes, sir. Historically, the agents have always
occupied senior leadership positions in a number of areas that
perhaps their background and experience doesn't best prepare
them to perform. In the FBI, for example, under Director
Mueller, benefited substantially--we think there is a broad
consensus on that--by bringing in folks from the outside, who
have spent their careers in those areas, perhaps outside in the
private industry or other areas, in coming to lead those. And
we think that is something that would be beneficial here.
Mr. Hice. OK. And one final question, I understand that
there has been changes over the last several years in the
hiring process, among other things, online hiring, that type of
thing. Who has been pushing these changes? Where has this been
coming from?
Mr. Filip. Sir, I don't think we got a keen sense in the
time we were looking at where those changes were coming from.
It seems as though people sincerely were trying to find methods
that would be better. And they did not work. And there needs to
be--that is part of the reason why we think bringing in
somebody from the outside who does this for a living is going
to be able to improve things. And, if I could, sir, just please
answer one question that a number of folks have asked because I
don't want to have us fighting people on this.
The events of the fence jumper were a failure. OK. We are
not part of the Secret Service. But the Secret Service does not
dispute that those events were a failure. And at some level,
you can train for 100 years, maybe things would have been
different. Under any scenario, they were a failure. And so we
are not trying to say that events with the fence jumper, there
should never be a situation, period, where anybody gets in the
front door of the White House with a knife or otherwise. And I
just don't want to leave the impression that we have any
ambiguity about that or, frankly, that people, I think the
Secret Service has acknowledged that too. And it obviously can
never happen again.
Mr. Hice. Thank you.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentleman. Recognize the
gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Russell, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Russell. I appreciate all the hard work that the panel
has done. And I think it is a tough task that you have dug into
in a great bipartisan fashion. My questions will focus
specifically on the training aspects, because I think that is
what is crucial ultimately in getting the job done. If the
personnel currently are too deployed to train, how will the
additional uniformed and other agents be trained?
Ms. Gray. I think this is where our staffing
recommendations and our training recommendations interlink. I
think part of what we were attempting to do is to sort of start
with asking the question what would be the ideal training
benchmarks that we would want to achieve and try to back out of
that staffing numbers so you could achieve that without having
people do, without having to navigate around the forced
overtime and other staffing issues. So I think that is the
answer to that.
Mr. Russell. So with the increase in the additional agents,
obviously you are going to have to absorb those to be able to
train them?
Ms. Gray. Right.
Mr. Russell. It is almost counterproductive because they
are already too deployed, you are going to put a bunch of new
agents, make the recommendation that that happens and then--and
that is the focus of the question is how would that be
absorbed?
Mr. Perrelli. I think probably the way this is likely to
happen, obviously we would like the new leadership team to make
very specific choices about this, but you would bring in an
additional special agent population. Those individuals would
come on board. They would go out to the field and begin their
sort of 4-to 5-year training period that they get before they
would come to the President's detail. And then you would bring
individuals in from the field to increase the levels at the
White House for the special agents.
Mr. Russell. Thank you. I think all of us are just taken
aback by the 25 minutes of average training. As a former combat
infantryman, that is just astounding when you are entrusted
with so many things, where you may have to protect somebody's
life. That just seems totally inadequate. Did any of that 25
minutes of training include sustaining the accurate employment
of firearms?
Ms. Gray. So the data that we were given from the Secret
Service did not include the time spent on firearms or
qualifications and the like. So the numbers that we provided in
our report, 42 hours of training in Fiscal Year 1913 for PPD
and 25 minutes on average for the Uniform Division, that was
apart from firearms or qualifications.
Mr. Russell. So what specifically then was the training
focused on? I mean, if you had other aspects of training, here
we are quoting 25 minutes but, you know, obviously firearms
training or maybe drills training or protecting people that
have been injured or whatever it might be, what aspects of
training were you looking at?
Ms. Gray. So the data that we received gave us the
aggregate training data. And I think we can talk about where,
you know, I think we briefed on some of the different training
protocols in the classified setting. And we want to be careful
about that here.
Mr. Russell. Sure.
Ms. Gray. But, I think, for example, just to give an
example, one of the things in the Mayorkas report talked about
lack of training around communications equipment and how to
properly use communications equipment. And that is like an
appropriate subject of training. And I think there is
indication that there has not been a lot of that in recent
years.
Mr. Russell. And then were there any training
recommendations that you made focused on proper reduction of
threats and uniform rules of engagement?
Mr. Perrelli. We looked at this question of the use of
force policy, for example, which had been discussed quite a bit
in the Mayorkas report. I think what we found was very
different views, notwithstanding the same words on the page and
the same, very different views about what force was appropriate
in various circumstances. And I think we felt that both that
additional training on that was needed, but also that they
needed integrated training so that each individual knew what
their role was, who is the person who is the last line of
defense at the door, who is the person who is doing the
tackling, all of those, you know, how do you work in an
environment where a K-9 has been released, those kinds of
things we felt, and again, I think the events of September 19th
indicated, needed to be addressed.
Mr. Filip. Mr. Congressman, there are parts of the
classified report that speak to threat reduction as well.
Mr. Russell. I appreciate that. And I do appreciate the
sensitivity on that. And I guess I was, my question was
focused, did you recommend a standard uniform rules of
engagement?
Mr. Filip. The rule that the Secret Service uses comes from
Supreme Court law about dealing with appropriate use of force
that is pretty uniform whether we were looking at the
metropolitan police in a big city or the Secret Service or the
FBI or whatnot. It is not so much there is ambiguity about the
policy, it is the execution of it, sir.
Mr. Russell. I see. That answers it. Thank you. I yield
back my time.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentlemen. And I think this
is a big area that needs to continue to be looked at. Because
the use of force, lethal if necessary, has got to be well
understood by every single person. And you can never, ever make
a mistake. In this day and age of ISIL and other terrorists,
you don't know what is underneath them. I think it is terribly
unfair to assume somebody doesn't have anything underneath
their clothing. In this day and age, we have to assume that
that person might have an improvised explosive device or some
sort of chemical agent or whatnot. And we should deal with it
appropriately. That brings up a good point.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Carter, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you
for being here. And thank you for what you do. And this is
helping us out tremendously. So we appreciate your efforts in
this. I want to concentrate just for a couple minutes on
staffing because I am concerned here. Can you tell me how we
are doing as far as new recruits go and are we getting new
recruits in?
Mr. Perrelli. Again, I refer back to the chairman's chart
at the outset, that there was certainly a period of time where
the Service's hiring process was not functioning as intended,
whether for budgetary or other reasons. Because problems with
the hiring process, they were not getting classes through. Our
sense is that that has improved. They are using different
hiring practices again. And we think that is improving. But as
Mr. Filip indicated, we continue to believe that having--some
of the mistakes that have been made in the past related to not
having a professionalized human resources function, or led by
professionals in that area. And we think that is an important
change going forward.
Mr. Carter. So you are acknowledging, then, that there has
been a decrease in the number of new hires of people coming in?
Mr. Perrelli. There was a gap, a number--2 or 3 years there
where they were not bringing classes through at the levels that
they needed to sustain the work force.
Mr. Carter. But your assertion is that that was not caused
by a lack of interest of applicants, but instead by the hiring
process itself?
Mr. Perrelli. I think there were budgetary issues. And
then--but it was also the hiring process. It wasn't that they
lacked for applicants. It was that they struggled to get them
through the process in a timely way. You would have people
start the process, go through the process for up to a year, and
then fall out of the process either because they failed a
polygraph or for other reasons.
Mr. Carter. OK. All right. Hang with me real quick here.
What about the force as it is today? Where are we at with our
labor pool? Are we--what percentage will we see retiring in the
next 5 to 10 or be eligible to retire? I am worried about the
fact that we are going to get into a situation where we don't
have enough Secret Service agents.
Mr. Perrelli. And I think our concern was, again, looking
at that gap that the--really looking 3 or 4 years out from now
where the individuals who, in an ordinary year, would have been
hired and weren't, would be starting their rotation in
Washington as part of the President or the Vice President's
protective detail. So I think we think a new Director needs to
start planning now for that. And that also includes, as you
look forward, 2020 is going to be a year with the 75th
anniversary of the United Nations, a Presidential campaign.
That is going to be a year where the Service is going to be
quite busy. And they need to make sure that they have the
personnel ready to go and trained for that period. And that
takes preparation now.
Mr. Carter. Would you say that the White House recognizes
this? Because it is my understanding that the last budgets that
had been submitted by the White House that Congress has
actually put more money in there in order to address this
scenario.
Mr. Perrelli. And I think, as we talked about in our
report, I think the issue that we really saw was the Service
having difficulty in defining what it needed and seeking
resources for that. So it wasn't so much that--it wasn't that
Congress was saying, you know, we are not going to provide the
President's budget. It was that, as this was working up through
the process, the Service was approaching its budget by saying,
``Here is how much we have. Maybe we ask for a little bit
more,'' rather than saying, ``Here is what the mission is, here
is what we need to achieve it,'' and pursuing those resources.
Mr. Carter. Well, for myself--and I suspect and I hope for
you as well--one of the most disappointing things that occurred
to me in this report was the low morale. I mean, how did that
come about? Did these guys not watch these movies? I mean, man,
they get you all excited about being a Secret Service agent.
What happened?
Mr. Perrelli. Well, you know, one, these folks are working
extremely long hours. And as I think we--in our leadership
recommendations, we talk about the lack of confidence in the
work force about disciplinary and other decisions, which I
think, you know, has an impact there.
You know, if you are--you know, we met with uniform
division sergeants just shortly before Thanksgiving. And for
them, they didn't know whether they were working on--and they
didn't know if they would be--they didn't think they would know
whether they were working on Thanksgiving until Thanksgiving
morning. Those kinds of things, plus long hours of forced
overtime, they take a toll on the work force.
Mr. Carter. Listen, that sounds--you know, I am a business
owner. That sounds like a management problem. That needs to be
addressed immediately. Well, thank you again for everything you
have done. We appreciate your efforts.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder of my time.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. I appreciate the gentleman. I
now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Gowdy, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for
your consistently hard work on this issue while you have been
the chairman and even before that when you were on the
committee.
I will throw this question to any of the four panelists who
can answer it. Explain to me, picking up on Mr. Connolly's
question, how working counterfeit currency prepares you for
personal protection.
Mr. Hagin. When a new agent comes out of Beltsville out of
basic training, they are assigned to a field office for 4 to 5
years. During that assignment, they have, you know, various
investigative roles, but they are also serving as manpower for
protective stops. So if the President, the Vice President, and
any of the protectees come into your region, you are assigned
from your investigative role to be part of the manpower squad,
which is how they start to become familiar with protective
operations.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, I get how practicing protection details
helps you with protection details. I am trying to figure out
how investigating someone using an inkjet printer to print
counterfeit percent100 bills prepares you for that. I am trying
to understand how those two missions are combined.
Mr. Hagin. Well, they develop law enforcement skills. They
develop the--you know, the sense of when someone is lying, when
someone is to be----
Mr. Gowdy. Which leads to this question: Your applicant
pool, do you draw heavily from those women and men who are
already in law enforcement and may already have those skills?
Mr. Hagin. I believe in the previous hiring practices over
the last few years that that is not the case. They were hiring
off of USA Jobs and----
Mr. Gowdy. Why not hire ex-military? I know there is an age
cutoff, but why not hire ex-military, State and local law
enforcement, a field that already has that basic investigatory
skill package that you are looking for instead of hiring
somebody who was an accounting major that just decided they
want to join Federal law enforcement?
Mr. Perrelli. I think that you are likely to see,
Congressman, with the change in hiring process a shift to
probably drawing more from State and local law enforcement and
ex-military, which I think has been more common to the Service
prior to the period when we think their hiring practices really
became problematic.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, you know--and I am sure the four of you
know this. The U.S. Marshals have the broadest jurisdiction of
any Federal law enforcement agency. They just don't use it.
They search for fugitives. They provide security in the
courtroom. They provide security for courthouses. But they have
very, very broad jurisdiction, they just don't use it. They
have become experts in a very--in a narrower field.
I loved all of my years working with Secret Service. I
thought they were really good on the currency and the
counterfeiting cases. I just never understood how those two
skill sets go together. Searching for missing persons and doing
personal protection, I see how those go together. But
investigating the use of an inkjet printer to print fake $100
bills and providing protection for the President or Vice
President, I just don't see how those skill sets go together.
But it seems to me that you all are already on top of that.
One question that arose with the former Director that I am
not sure I got a good answer to. You mentioned training. I
don't think the failure to secure and search a crime scene is a
training issue. And I say that, because I believe the
housekeeper, who did not train at either Glynco or Quantico,
knew enough to alert someone, you might want to come up and
search this part of the White House. I just--if you have to be
trained to secure and search a potential crime scene, you are
probably not in the right line of work. So what explanation
were you all, if any, able to uncover for how they missed that?
Mr. Filip. Congressman, I think you are putting your finger
on something very important, and it also relates to the man who
got inside the front door of the White House with a knife.
There aren't adequate explanations for failure to secure that
evidence of the shooting up in the residence. Nor--you can talk
about things forever and you can talk about training forever.
If there were never another hour of training for 10 years, no
one should get in the front door of the White House again.
We are not here to defend either of those, period. Those
were both grave mistakes, and neither one of them should have
happened.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, I appreciate your candor, and I appreciate
the work that you did. And the Secret Service has a very rich,
deep, good reputation and history. And I would like to see it
get back to the days where I remember it. It is a very
important agency. We have to get it right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentleman. Recognize the
gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Palmer, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Ms. Gray, you mentioned the excessive amounts of
overtime. And it has been mentioned several times in this
hearing. Do you have an idea of how many overtime hours have
been worked annually?
Mr. Perrelli. So I think when we looked at--so with respect
to the agent population, we just don't think there are actually
accurate records for that because what we found was agents
routinely enter 8 hours and 2 hours of a law enforcement
availability pay time, even when they are working 17, 18, 20
hours. So that, I think, we--we think the accurate records for
that are difficult to find.
With respect----
Mr. Palmer. Let me ask you this: If the agents are not
logging the hours they are working, does that mean they are
uncompensated for overtime?
Mr. Perrelli. Well, they are getting paid for their 8 hours
and their LEA pay. You know, I think--you know, frankly, we
want a high-performing culture. We don't want a group of
individuals in the Secret Service punching the clock. I don't
think they view it as uncompensated time because I think--but
certainly they are working, you know, extraordinarily long
hours, well beyond what anybody has measured.
Mr. Palmer. I don't think I am communicating this
correctly. What I am trying to find out is, within your budget
process, you have so much budgeted for salaries and benefits
and certain professional--certain professions when you work
beyond the 8--not beyond 8 hours, but beyond 40 hours, you are
compensated for your overtime. Some is time and a half, some is
straight time. That is what I am trying to find out.
Mr. Perrelli. So in the uniform division, they are
compensated for overtime. And what we found in the uniform
division side is that there were wide variations. Some people
were working extraordinary amounts of overtime. I think the--
the precise number I don't have right at my fingertips, but I
think it is 58 hours on average, but again with wide variation.
Mr. Palmer. All right. That is almost 50 percent more than
what they normally should work. And obviously that has
implications for stamina over time. If you are working
consistent hours, that--working those kind of hours on a
consistent basis. It also, though, has a budget impact, because
generally you shouldn't be budgeting personnel to work those
kind of hours.
So what I want to know is that we are paying for this. Does
it make sense to be paying for overtime when we could convert
what we are spending on that to new personnel?
Mr. Perrelli. And I do think that is a finding of our
report, is that rather than bring on new personnel and train
them up and get them ready, what happened was the need kept
increasing, the personnel on board did not keep increasing, and
they essentially substituted overtime for bringing on new
personnel. So again, you are looking at the chairman's chart.
If you see the gap in hiring and the number of classes that go
through, that is made up through overtime. And we think a less
tired work force would, you know--some of that obviously would
be compensated--and bringing on new people, having a less tired
work force, some of that would be compensated by less overtime.
Mr. Palmer. Well, even on the training side, you could have
them trained up, but if you are working that many hours you are
reducing their effectiveness. But the thing that gets me is, it
is a management issue, is that you are spending money on
overtime, and someone is making a decision to pay overtime
rather than bring in these new hires, which would reduce the
demand on your personnel. That just doesn't make sense.
Mr. Perrelli. We agree with that.
Mr. Palmer. The clock changed on me. I thought for a moment
there that I was out of time.
The thing that keeps coming up--and from some of the other
testimony that I have heard--is it seems to me there is an
overall decline in morale in the Service. And I commend you for
the work you are doing. I commend--I don't know how much input
you had into the report that we read on the recommendations for
reforms, but I wholeheartedly support what is in the report,
particularly bringing in someone from the outside. I am a big
believer in bringing people in from the outside into a huge
organization because they can see things that nobody else
inside sees. You develop a culture over time where you just
start to miss the obvious.
So I want to encourage whoever needs to be encouraged to
pursue someone from outside the agency, at least in a
transitional-type setting, to be able to come in and make the
changes that will bring the agency back up to the standard of
excellence that you have enjoyed for years and years and that
we all expect.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentleman.
Now recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Grothman,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Grothman. Thank you very much.
Chairman Chaffetz. Sorry. Hit the talk button there, if you
could please. Than you.
Mr. Grothman. OK. Very good. I have got a couple of
questions for you folks. First of all, thanks for spending so
much time with us today. I really appreciate you doing that.
Obviously, there is a lot of discussion about who the new
Director is going to be. There is a feeling that he ought to
come from outside the agency now. I just want your opinions.
Why do you believe the next Director should come from outside
the agency?
Mr. Filip. And maybe we all should speak to that, and I
will take the first crack at it, Mr. Congressman. We think that
all things equal, it is easier for an outsider to achieve some
of the things that are important, taking a fresh look at
priorities, having consistent discipline, making tough
personnel decisions, bringing in outside folks in the H.R., in
the congressional relations, budgeting areas perhaps as
appropriate. So again all things equal, it is easier for an
outsider to come in and do that. The FBI does that
historically. The CIA does that historically.
Again, just to underscore this, obviously that is the
President's choice ultimately. And sometimes all things aren't
equal in the world in that, you know, someone from the inside
brings in an outside leadership team with him or her, and they
are the right person at the right time. We will support whoever
the President chooses to the extent we can be supportive of
them. But all things equal, we do think an outsider would
probably be able to do some of those other things easier.
Ms. Gray. Yes. I would agree with that. The only other
thing I would add is that, you know, our report goes into
detail in some of the budget and administrative functions of
the organization that really need to have a priority in order
to support the protective mission of the agency. And I think we
think an outside Director can really bring a fresh perspective
to that.
Mr. Perrelli. I would echo that. And, you know, we--one of
the opportunities that we had as a panel was to talk broadly
across the Federal Government in areas of technology and
management. And we think there is a lot of talent that could
help the Service. And we think that while, you know, certainly
promoting from within for certain positions is important, we
also think that there should be more people at senior levels
who come from outside the Service with different backgrounds.
Mr. Hagin. And having someone who has the experience at
changing an organization and being able to aggressively drive
the changes that are needed here to, you know, both the use of
technology, the management of technology, the human resource
and budget issues really need a change agent.
There are a lot of really great people in the Secret
Service. And I think that we met and talked with quite a few
people who we feel that with, you know, some further experience
and education in terms of management training could be great
directors of the Service going forward. But at this point in
their history, they need somebody who can aggressively drive
change, and our view was that that person best come from the
outside.
Mr. Grothman. That is kind of illuminating, because usually
when you deal in government people like--you know, they are
afraid of somebody from the outside. But it says a lot for you
guys. You guys would not--you feel that somebody other than
Acting Director Clancy, kind of that outside view, would be an
improvement?
Mr. Filip. Well, we did not do any sort of personnel review
of Acting Director Clancy. He has done a great job and he has
been a great public servant. And we just didn't do a review to
that effect.
Again, all things equal, there is certain parts of this job
that are easier, we thought, on average for an outsider. But I
think we all have great respect for him.
Mr. Grothman. OK. One other question, because we are
running out of time here. Right now you guys fly in agents to
supplement the uniformed division at the White House. And
apparently that is very expensive. Could you comment on that
practice?
Mr. Perrelli. Well, I think--and it does reflect an effort
by the Service to address, you know, a short-term, trying to
ensure they have adequate manpower at the White House. But I
think similar to the questions we talked about about overtime,
that is not a cost effective and long-term strategy for dealing
with these issues. That is why we recommend them bringing on
more people, permanent hires, the 200 additional uniformed
division, the 85 additional special agents, because we think
that that is a better way to do this than more expensive ways
to do that that have--they are really only for short-term.
Mr. Grothman. OK. So you feel we are spending money
unnecessarily by doing things this way?
Mr. Perrelli. I think that is right.
Mr. Grothman. OK. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentleman.
Recognize the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Again, I want to thank you all for all you
have done. I just want to zero in on something that we have not
spent a lot of time on. When I was the chairman of the
Subcommittee over Maritime Transportation and the Coast Guard,
under the Transportation Committee, we had a situation where
the Coast Guard was purchasing boats that didn't float,
literally. Literally. And what we discovered was that the Coast
Guard did not--the way they constructed their contracts and did
their procurement, the major problem is they didn't have people
in-house who knew about procurement, which is incredible. And
we literally lost hundreds of millions of dollars.
And that takes me back to the piece where you all talk
about maybe we need to have people who are experts in certain
areas to do that. And then I was listening to what the chairman
was reading--I guess that was budget language. And I asked
myself, well, how do those things happen? You know, an
accounting-type person speaks accounting. And so I was
wondering, how significant is that? And it sounds like what
they do is they take agents and put them in these positions
that they may not--I don't want to say may not be qualified
for. But there are probably people who have trained in those
expertise that would be better in that. And can you tell me the
significance of that? And have I got that right?
Mr. Filip. You do, sir. I think the significance of it is
real. I guess the way I would put it, I think the nicest way to
put it is that in life you try to put people in a position
where they have the best chance of succeeding, both for
themselves and for the organization. And if you have somebody
who is an A-plus protective person or law enforcement person,
they may not be an A-plus person at media relations or
congressional relations, any more than any of us would be good
at being emergency room technicians or some such thing. We all
have our strengths and weaknesses.
What the FBI has done under--did under Director Mueller--
and it seemed to be a material improvement in their endeavors,
was to try to recruit--and it is not always easy. It is hard to
get people to leave their positions, to move, things of that
sort. But to put a real focus on recruiting experts who would
come into the Secret Service. They were attracted--in that
case, the Bureau. They were attracted to the mission. It was a
way to engage in public service. It was a way to make a
difference in America and be involved in human relations, be
involved in IT efforts for the Bureau. And they improved
things.
The Bureau has a well-publicized history where it wasn't
that great at IT for a while. They had a lot of expensive
challenges and frankly failures, and they got better. And so we
think, respectfully again, that this is an area that would
merit serious consideration, because bringing in senior-level
people in human resources, in budgeting, in technology,
congressional relations could really move the needle for the
whole organization, and it would be something that would be
great public service for the senior folks who came in.
Mr. Hagin. To be fair, the Service does employ experts in
human resources, technology, and others areas. They do not ever
occupy the senior-most spot. And when you are trying to again,
drive change, it is hard when the top guy--top person holding
that responsibility is not the expert.
Mr. Perrelli. OK. I think it--and I just echo. I also think
it is--you need to bring in those experts and you need to give
them a seat at the leadership table.
Mr. Cummings. Last but not least, we talk about morale. One
of the things that we find in hiring people even here on the
Hill, people like to know that they have a chance to move up in
an organization. I guess it--the military is sort of like that,
I guess.
The people that you talk to, the agents, did they say that
they would prefer somebody from the outside? I am just curious.
Mr. Perrelli. We got a mix of views on that. And again, I
think very, very telling that there were a number of
individuals who talked to us who said, you know, that, you
know, we really needed--that would be a sign of change and that
we think that as an organization we would benefit from that. So
we did get a mix of views on that.
There is--you know, within the agent population, I think,
as we talk about in the report, there were questions about
promotions and whether--was this one being fairly applied and
were promotions being fairly applied? And I think that is
something that a new Director has got to regain the confidence
of the work force on.
On the uniform division side, over time there have been
eras in the Secret Service where it was possible to move up
from the uniform division up through the special agent ranks,
even to the Director of the Service. What we see, at least
today, is a view of the uniform division that that pathway
isn't really open. And I think a new Director has got to think
about opening that up again.
Mr. Cummings. As I close, let me just say this: That we--
that the chairman and I have been working very hard on this
issue. And your report and your work, without a doubt, has been
a guiding light. And I cannot tell you how much we appreciate
it. It has allowed us to be able to delve into some things that
we probably would not even have known about. And the way you--
and your recommendations, all of that will help us
tremendously.
And I think your report serves as an example of where, when
we have crises like this, and I do consider it a crisis, that
it is the kind of thing we probably need to start with so that
we could then delve even deeper. So again, I want to thank you.
And I want you to know that, you know, I think what you have
done will make the Secret Service a much stronger organization
and, as someone said, restore the honor that we have known for
many, many years. Thank you.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentleman. I have a couple
just procedural questions for you, and then we will wrap up.
And let me first highlight how much we appreciate Homeland
Security Secretary Johnson, Mr. Mayorkas, others who made this
a priority and made it happen and were smart enough to engage
you all in putting this together, because it is a first-rate
panel. And we appreciate the depth in which you were able to
get information. And the report is so valuable to us. I can't
thank you enough for your time.
What types of documents, how many--can you give me a sense
of the documents that you were able to review, the size, the
quantity, what types of documents?
Mr. Perrelli. Thousands of pages of documents. Everything
from, you know, prior reports, sort of of the kind--you know,
in the 1990's, for example, there was the plane that went
down----
Chairman Chaffetz. Right.
Mr. Perrelli [continuing]. In the White House property. So
there were a series of reports that came out of that. But as
well as lots of budgetary documents, certainly, you know,
manuals about everything from training to how to undertake
certain operational activities. So I think a pretty wide range
of information. Certainly with respect to our classified
report, we give details on specific classified documents as
part of this report.
Chairman Chaffetz. And how were they produced to you? On
paper? Electronically?
Mr. Perrelli. I think both.
Chairman Chaffetz. And how long did it take from the time
you made a request til you actually got the documents?
Mr. Perrelli. I think that we got terrific response from
the Service when we asked for things. And so I think we were
very happy with the responsiveness, both of the documents. And,
frankly, folks came to us with a lot of candor, you know, and
gave us their unvarnished view.
Chairman Chaffetz. So if you were to ask for documents, how
long would that--how long did that take to get them back to
you?
Mr. Perrelli. I would probably have to ask our staff to
talk about timeframes, because I probably wasn't as focused on
them. I am not sure any of the panel members were.
Chairman Chaffetz. I am just looking for a generality. You
were--you started your work. Day one was----
Mr. Perrelli. We were brought on board at the end of
October and then we worked through December 15th.
Chairman Chaffetz. Yes. That is an amazing amount of time.
Did the Secret Service ever complain about giving you these
documents?
Mr. Filip. No, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. Any challenges with getting these
documents? Any personnel issues that they cited?
Mr. Perrelli. No. I think--as I think we indicated, I think
one of the challenges was trying to get the kind of budget----
Chairman Chaffetz. Right.
Mr. Perrelli [continuing]. The kind of resource documents
with respect to evaluating some of the staffing issues that we
were concerned about. So, as I think we noted, trying to get
that information was challenging and I think, in no small part,
because I don't think they have it in a form that is--you know,
would be sort of useful to use. And so I think that--you know,
I would identify that as a challenge that we had.
Chairman Chaffetz. The budget?
Mr. Perrelli. Those documents, because I think--or that
information. I think more of it as information than documents.
We wanted to make some, you know, even more specific
recommendations about the appropriate size of the Service. And
because it was difficult to get information about manpower
usage and about particular staffing, you know, as I think I
indicated to one member, you know, we were able to assess from
the bottom up what you would need to bring the training level
up. But it was much more difficult to assess if you wanted to
bring everybody's hours down to a reasonable level, what would
that take?
Chairman Chaffetz. Right.
Mr. Perrelli. And we weren't able to do that.
Chairman Chaffetz. Again, on behalf of this committee, we
want to thank you for your good work. You put a lot of time and
effort in it. We appreciate you being here today. You made
quite a sacrifice, but it is truly valuable. I think the
Service is listening to you, and I think Homeland Security is
listening to you. Certainly we are. And I hope that we find
that, as time goes on, that all of these recommendations are
implemented in their fullest. So we thank you again for your
participation today.
Sorry. Mr. Cummings?
Mr. Cummings. This is for our own sake, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Filip?
Mr. Filip. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. You said something a minute ago that--you
said--you were talking about--you were answering a question,
and you said--you were talking about the President making a
selection. But then you went on to say, ``We could support
that.'' I mean, what does that mean? In other--not necessarily
that particular question.
So, I mean, what do you see as you all's role now? That is
what I am trying to get to.
Mr. Filip. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Yes.
Mr. Filip. I don't mean to sort of arrogate our expertise
or anything, or elevate it unnecessarily, but we did put a lot
of time into it. Our staffs put a lot of time into it. We hope
that folks think that we generated some insights that are
useful. Whoever gets picked to be the next Director, if it
would be useful for them to meet with us or their chief of
staff or whoever it is, so long as it is OK under the rules of
appointment and all that, I can speak with great confidence for
everybody involved that we would be happy to try to be
supportive and useful to them in whatever role they would find
useful.
Mr. Cummings. Was it your understanding, when you were
appointed, that that would be part of it or is that something
that you all are basically saying we are willing to do? Are you
following me?
Mr. Filip. I think we are just willing to do it. To be
honest, sir, there is all sorts of rules and bureaucracy about
how many days you can serve and all this and that. And, to be
honest, I don't really know how that all works out. I think we
are just saying, if we can do it consistent with the
regulations and the rules and stuff--we have developed a great
respect for the Secret Service in this process, and obviously
this is an issue that, you know, anybody who cares about the
country, and we all truly do, in the most bipartisan way that
you all have embodied, can, you know, feel very proud to have
any small contribution toward, and if we can make any further
small contribution, we would be proud to do it.
Mr. Cummings. Well, that makes me quadruple my thanks. You
know, I am serious that you would do your duty and then say
that we--you know, we are willing to followup to help make this
organization the very best that it can be. And I think that
this is what America is all about. This is what--you all are
what make this country the great country that it is. And I
don't say that lightly. And I really appreciate it, and I know
that our committee does, too.
Chairman Chaffetz. Again, we thank you. We thank your
staff. We appreciate the great work that was done. This
committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:35p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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