[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]








                     COAST GUARD MAJOR ACQUISITIONS

=======================================================================

                                (114-17)

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              MAY 14, 2015

                               __________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure




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             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

                  BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska                    PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee,      ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 
  Vice Chair                             Columbia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida                JERROLD NADLER, New York
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        CORRINE BROWN, Florida
SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DUNCAN HUNTER, California            RICK LARSEN, Washington
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas  MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania           GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas              DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
BOB GIBBS, Ohio                      STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York           ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida              DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
JEFF DENHAM, California              JOHN GARAMENDI, California
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin            ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              JANICE HAHN, California
TOM RICE, South Carolina             RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            DINA TITUS, Nevada
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois               SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina         ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
ROB WOODALL, Georgia                 LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
TODD ROKITA, Indiana                 CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
JOHN KATKO, New York                 JARED HUFFMAN, California
BRIAN BABIN, Texas                   JULIA BROWNLEY, California
CRESENT HARDY, Nevada
RYAN A. COSTELLO, Pennsylvania
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana
MIMI WALTERS, California
BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia
CARLOS CURBELO, Florida
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
                                ------                                

        Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

                  DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska                    JOHN GARAMENDI, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB GIBBS, Ohio                      CORRINE BROWN, Florida
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina         JANICE HAHN, California
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana             LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
CARLOS CURBELO, Florida              JULIA BROWNLEY, California
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina         PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex 
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York                  Officio)
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex 
    Officio)
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................    iv

                               TESTIMONY

Rear Admiral Bruce D. Baffer, Assistant Commandant for 
  Acquisition and Chief Acquisition Officer, U.S. Coast Guard....     3
Michele Mackin, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, 
  U.S. Government Accountability Office..........................     3
James H. Offutt, National President, Navy League of the United 
  States.........................................................     3

               PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

Rear Admiral Bruce D. Baffer.....................................    30
Michele Mackin...................................................    36
James H. Offutt..................................................    53

                       SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Rear Admiral Bruce D. Baffer, Assistant Commandant for 
  Acquisition and Chief Acquisition Officer, U.S. Coast Guard, 
  responses to requests for information from the following 
  Representatives:

    Hon. Duncan Hunter of California requested the history for 
      each of the U.S. Coast Guard's major acquisition program 
      baselines since 2005.......................................    14
    Hon. John Garamendi of California requested information 
      regarding the U.S. Coast Guard's role in issuing drill 
      permits and Shell Oil's Arctic drilling operations.........    21
      
      
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                     COAST GUARD MAJOR ACQUISITIONS

                              ----------                              


                         THURSDAY, MAY 14, 2015

                  House of Representatives,
                        Subcommittee on Coast Guard
                       and Maritime Transportation,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:37 a.m. in 
room 2253, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter 
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Hunter. The subcommittee will come to order. The 
subcommittee is meeting today to review the Coast Guard's major 
acquisition programs.
    As this subcommittee has continually highlighted, the Coast 
Guard currently operates tens, and in some cases, hundreds of 
thousands of hours short of its operational targets. This means 
assets are not there for the Service to secure our ports, 
protect our environment, and ensure the safety of our 
waterways. Last month, the subcommittee held a hearing on Coast 
Guard missions and heard from the Service's vice admiral in 
charge of operations who attributed much of the failure to meet 
mission performance goals to not having a sufficient number of 
modern assets.
    The only way to reverse the decline in the Coast Guard's 
mission performance is to make the necessary investments to 
acquire new and improved assets. Unfortunately, based on the 
fiscal year 2016 budget request, as well as the fiscal year 
2016 through 2020 CIP [Capital Investment Program], it appears 
the President refuses to make those investments.
    The President's budget cuts funding needed to acquire 
critically needed replacement assets by 17 percent. The budget 
also fails to guarantee the funding needed to begin detailed 
design for the Offshore Patrol Cutter. Failure to move into 
detailed design on the OPC by the end of 2016 could result in 
significantly higher costs and substantial acquisition delays. 
Moving this and other acquisitions further to the right will 
only further degrade Coast Guard mission performance.
    Unfortunately, the situation does not improve any time in 
the near future. According to the Coast Guard's Capital 
Investment Plan, over the next 5 years, annual funding for 
acquisitions never exceeds $1.2 billion. That is approximately 
$1 billion less than the GAO and the former Commandant of the 
Coast Guard have testified is needed on an annual basis to keep 
the current acquisition program on schedule and on budget. The 
CIP is nothing more than a roadmap to additional acquisition 
delays, increased costs for taxpayers, and ongoing mission 
performance failures.
    I have said this for some time now: If the President is 
going to send us budgets that fail to pay for the assets needed 
to meet Coast Guard mission requirements, then it is time for 
him and the Coast Guard to review their mission requirements. 
That is why, in the last bill that we passed, the Howard Coble 
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of last year, 
required the Coast Guard to submit a revised Mission Need 
Statement to this committee. The Mission Need Statement is the 
underlying justification for the Service's acquisition program. 
It lays out mission requirements and helps identify gaps in 
capabilities. So, if you don't have the assets, you are not 
going to get the assets unless you change the mission to match 
the assets.
    The Coast Guard has assured the subcommittee that we will 
receive the revised Mission Need Statement in July. At that 
time, I intend to hold a hearing to review it and determine 
whether the administration intends to continue the charade of 
expanding Coast Guard mission requirements without providing 
the Coast Guard the assets it needs to meet those requirements.
    In the interim I look forward to today's update on the 
status of the Coast Guard's current acquisition programs and 
the challenges the Service is facing--we got our gavel, now we 
can--now we are a real subcommittee, that is good.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Hunter. And the challenges that the Service is facing 
in fielding these new assets.
    I thank the witnesses for appearing today and look forward 
to their testimony.
    With that, I yield to Ranking Member Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Chairman, thank you very much. And, to your 
staff, thank you for meeting our need for caffeine and coffee. 
Appreciate that.
    I appreciate the opportunity to once again assess the Coast 
Guard's ongoing efforts to recapitalize its surface, air, and 
communications assets. And nothing should be more important to 
this subcommittee than our responsibility to ensure that our 
Nation's multimission military maritime law enforcement 
authority has the tools it needs to meet the many challenges it 
faces, day in and day out, off our shores and around the world.
    The Coast Guard's Capital Investment Program, or CIP, is 
essentially a roadmap. The Coast Guard provides this plan to 
Congress to help guide our decisions on what and how much we 
should invest annually to fulfill the largest recapitalization 
program in the Service's illustrious history.
    Fortunately, the Coast Guard has been able to make some 
important progress in this effort. For example, it has begun on 
the eighth and last National Security Cutter. Once built, this 
final hull will complete the transition from the legacy fleet 
of High Endurance Cutters to a new, modern cutter fleet that is 
fewer in number, but far more technologically capable than its 
predecessors.
    However, there are concerns. Regrettably, the Offshore 
Patrol Cutter, the largest and most expensive acquisition in 
the entire recapitalization effort, still remains a concept on 
the naval architect's drawing board, and is far, far away from 
entering production. Even some of the new assets that have been 
provided to the Coast Guard, such as the 14 C-27Js, aircraft, 
that were authorized to be transferred from the Air Force to 
the Coast Guard--and, by the way, good work, making that 
happen, thank you--to bring these new assets online is far too 
slow, raising the potential for future operational gaps in the 
Coast Guard's fleet of fixed-wing patrol craft.
    And then there are other unmet needs. We can go on with a 
lengthy list--and I will--of planned or unplanned needs. 
Recapitalization of the Coast Guard's--you will like this, Mr. 
Chairman--polar icebreaker--I think we have heard that 
discussed here many times--of well more than $1 billion 
possibly being spent on that. How are we going to get the money 
for that? Additionally, there is substantial backlog of unmet 
shoreside infrastructure needs that was last estimated at over 
$1.4 billion.
    And, while we should be pleased that the Coast Guard was 
able to complete the Mission Effectiveness Program, MEP, to 
extend the service life of its legacy fleet of Medium Endurance 
Cutters, the delays in the production of the new OPCs will 
almost certainly require yet another round of Mission 
Effectiveness Projects. And that is the challenge for Congress.
    Mr. Chairman, you were speaking about the President's 
budget. And, indeed, it is too little. However, it is 
reflective of this thing called the Budget Control Act, 
otherwise known as sequestration, which is our problem that--we 
need to break through that, and find a much more rational way 
of funding the necessary governmental programs.
    Well, moving back to the Coast Guard, anything less than a 
full-on effort by the Coast Guard to meet its capital 
requirements isn't--will leave the Coast Guard far short of 
always ready, semper paratus. But a Coast Guard that is a 
hollow vestige of the proud maritime institution that has 
served this Nation for very long is not what we want. And we 
share the responsibility of making sure the Coast Guard has 
what it needs to be always ready.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentleman from California. Our first 
witness today is Rear Admiral Bruce D. Baffer, the Coast 
Guard's Assistant Commandant for Acquisition, and Chief 
Acquisition Officer.
    Admiral, you are recognized.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL BRUCE D. BAFFER, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT 
   FOR ACQUISITION AND CHIEF ACQUISITION OFFICER, U.S. COAST 
   GUARD; MICHELE MACKIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING 
MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AND JAMES H. 
  OFFUTT, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

    Admiral Baffer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Hunter, 
Ranking Member Garamendi, members of the subcommittee, good 
morning. Thank you for the opportunity to speak on Coast Guard 
recapitalization. On behalf of the Commandant, as well as the 
men and women of the Coast Guard, thank you for your oversight 
and continued support of our Service. My complete statement has 
been provided, and I ask that it be entered into the record.
    The Coast Guard's acquisition directorate is tasked with 
managing an annual portfolio in excess of $1 billion to deliver 
the goods and services the coastguardsmen need to perform their 
missions in the field. To these ends, we continue to invest in 
our acquisition enterprise, attracting talented professionals 
to the Coast Guard, maturing military and civilian career 
paths, and providing training and certification opportunities 
to grow and retrain our highly capable acquisition workforce. 
We formalized and documented our processes and procedures, and 
we are applying lessons learned.
    I would also like to acknowledge the very effective working 
relationship we enjoy with the Government Accountability 
Office. Over the last 14 years, Ms. Mackin has applied her 
leadership through numerous audits, helping the Coast Guard 
realize our vision as a model acquisition enterprise.
    I would also like to recognize the Navy League for their 
strong, ongoing support of the Coast Guard, both at the 
national and the local chapter levels.
    In short, we have been busy. Over just the past few months, 
we completed the program of record for the Response Boat-
Medium, with delivery of the 174th boat. We completed 
acceptance trials in the fifth National Security Cutter, and 
awarded a contract for the production of the eighth and final 
cutter in the NSC program of record. We issued a request for 
proposals for full and open competition for the remaining 26 
Fast Response Cutters, and took delivery of the seventh and 
eighth C-130J aircraft.
    The Commandant continues to make recapitalization one of 
his highest priorities, and, recognizing the budget 
environment, we are maximizing every dollar. To this end, we 
are emphasizing competition and affordability across the 
portfolio by employing DOD's Better Buying Power Initiative, 
particularly focusing on competition, early industry 
engagement, fixed-price contracts, and affordability as a 
requirement.
    As an example, our highest priority acquisition program, 
the Offshore Patrol Cutter, has been structured to formally 
meet the Coast Guard's most pressing offshore mission 
requirements through the use of commercial standards, fixed-
price contracts, and state-of-the-market technologies. We are 
employing an acquisition strategy that maximizes competition 
and promotes the domestic shipbuilding industrial base by 
removing the traditional barriers to enter the military 
shipbuilding market. We will select a single contractor in 
fiscal year 2016 to complete the detailed design, and 
ultimately construct the vessel.
    On the aviation side, the Coast Guard is regenerating 14 C-
27J medium-lift aircraft, providing much-needed maritime patrol 
capability. This subcommittee played a crucial role in 
facilitating the transfer from the Air Force to the Coast 
Guard, injecting additional capabilities a year ahead of 
schedule, and minimizing costs to taxpayers.
    I know the subcommittee is particularly interested in our 
efforts to increase icebreaking capability. As we continue to 
develop requirements for a new heavy icebreaker, we are also 
beginning the preservation and evaluation process on Polar Sea. 
There is no question that the cost of acquiring a new 
icebreaker and potentially reactivating Polar Sea poses a 
particular challenge in this current budget environment.
    In closing, I am extremely proud to lead the dedicated 
professionals working tirelessly to ensure the Coast Guard has 
the capabilities to safely and affordably carry out our 11 
statutory missions. Successful programs such as the NSC, FRC, 
HC-144, C-130J, RB-M, and Rescue 21 are providing mission 
capability now, and will be for decades to come. I am 
absolutely certain the OPC will be equally successful in 
meeting all of our performance and affordability requirements. 
But none of these successes happen without this subcommittee's 
foresight and commitment.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I thank you 
for your steadfast support of our Coast Guard. I look forward 
to answering your questions.
    Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Admiral.
    Our next witness today is Ms. Mackin, the GAO's Director of 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management.
    You are recognized.
    Ms. Mackin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Ranking 
Member Garamendi, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 
having me here today to discuss Coast Guard acquisitions.
    As we have noted in our recent reports, the Coast Guard has 
made strides in its acquisition management capabilities. As the 
admiral mentioned, competition has been injected into recent 
procurements, and new assets are being delivered to the 
operators. Key test events are also taking place.
    I will briefly touch on three issues this morning. First, 
the C-27J aircraft transfer and overall status of fixed-wing 
flight-hours; second, observations on the major cutter fleet; 
and third, I will discuss what we view as the most pressing 
concern facing the Coast Guard, which is the affordability of 
its acquisition portfolio.
    As you know, the Coast Guard is receiving 14 C-27Js from 
the Air Force at no cost. Once operational, these aircraft will 
contribute to Coast Guard missions. But it will take time and 
money to transfer them from storage, assess their condition, 
establish a spare parts pipeline, and modify them to meet Coast 
Guard missions. The full fleet of 14 operational aircraft is 
anticipated in 2022, and about $600 million will be needed to 
operationalize the fleet.
    A broader observation regarding the fixed-wing fleet is 
that, under the Coast Guard's current plan, even with the C-
27Js, the Coast Guard will fall almost 20 percent short of its 
annual flight-hour goal, which is currently 52,400 hours. The 
Coast Guard is in the process, as was mentioned, of revisiting 
its 2005 Mission Needs Statement, and conducting a fleet mix 
analysis that may result in a different flight-hour goal, or 
different mix of aircraft. However, the fleet mix analysis will 
not be complete until 2019.
    Regarding surface assets, all eight National Security 
Cutters are on-contract or delivered, and the ship recently 
completed operational testing. A general observation there is 
that the NSC was determined operationally effective and 
suitable, but with several major deficiencies. And we are 
currently doing a more detailed review of the test at the 
request of the subcommittee.
    To touch on other cutters, the Coast Guard is preparing to 
recompete the remaining 26 Fast Response Cutters, and it is 
also pursuing a competitive acquisition strategy for the 
Offshore Patrol Cutter. The Coast Guard plans to award a 
contract for design of the first tranche of these ships next 
year. However, the Coast Guard faces a significant gap between 
the projected delivery dates of the OPCs and the end-of-service 
life for the legacy Medium Endurance Cutters these ships are 
replacing. The Coast Guard is studying how to make the legacy 
cutters viable for a longer period to close this gap, but no 
decision has been made.
    Finally, the Coast Guard faces affordability challenges 
that are not reflected in the 5-year Capital Investment Plan. 
The primary driver, of course, is the OPC, expected to cost $12 
billion, which will take up over two-thirds of the Coast 
Guard's acquisition funding while it is being built. Our 
concern is that the Coast Guard has not set forth a long-term 
acquisition plan for its surface and aviation assets, such as 
the 20-year plan we recommended last year, and which this 
subcommittee also calls for in its Coast Guard Authorization 
Act. Such a plan should include necessary tradeoffs that 
reflect budget realities.
    We have recommended, since 2010, that the Coast Guard 
conduct this type of assessment. We believe this approach would 
help ensure that all stakeholders, including Congress, 
understand the constraints the Coast Guard is facing long term, 
and what it can realistically acquire at expected funding 
levels.
    Thank you. This concludes my statement, and I will be happy 
to answer questions at the appropriate time.
    Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Ms. Mackin.
    Our final witness today is Mr. James Offutt, national 
president of the Navy League of the United States.
    Mr. Offutt, you are recognized.
    Mr. Offutt. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Garamendi, members of the 
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 
on such an important topic. I would like to submit my full 
testimony for the record.
    Mr. Hunter. Without objection.
    Mr. Offutt. I offer an abbreviated version now, and look 
forward to your questions.
    The U.S. Coast Guard is a very unique service, with 
military and civil responsibilities, and humanitarian missions. 
The Coast Guard has seen its area of responsibility grow to 11 
statutory missions. But its budget growth has not kept pace 
with this increase, failing to match mission demand or be 
adjusted for inflation.
    Despite their incredible record of achievement, the Coast 
Guard faces many familiar but daunting challenges. Increased 
Arctic activity, increased maritime transportation goods, and 
increased human and drug trafficking all add demands on the 
Coast Guard. The Service will not properly be equipped to meet 
these challenges unless we make serious investments now.
    The Coast Guard has been clear that it needs an acquisition 
budget of $2.5 billion per year to fulfill its mission. 
Unfortunately, the administration continually requests an 
acquisition budget that hovers at or below $1 billion, with 
Congress providing the extra funding. The administration's low-
budget request for acquisition, construction, and improvements, 
or AC&I, represent the bare-minimum funding for the Coast Guard 
to accomplish its missions. The Navy League notes with 
disappointment that the requested funding level for fiscal year 
2016 is totally unsatisfactory. Given the fiscal climate, the 
Navy League recommends a budget of at least $1.5 billion per 
year, as this committee has authorized, to help the Coast Guard 
achieve its recapitalization goals.
    The highest AC&I priority for the Coast Guard is to lay the 
groundwork for construction of the Offshore Patrol Cutter, 
which will replace cutters built in the 1960s and 1980s. The 
importance of the OPC cannot be overstated. It will function as 
a Service operational workhorse to carry out the Coast Guard's 
primary missions over the next 40 years. Given the magnitude of 
the impending capability gap caused by the cutters, the Navy 
League believes Congress should fund the construction of two 
OPCs, annually.
    Facing more complex challenges and growing demand signal, 
Coast Guard will need Fast Response Cutters acquired at six per 
year. What a great ship. I visited one in Key West. The 
capabilities are multiple times the cutters that they are 
replacing. I am amazed at the bridge. The bridge has a very 
modern layout, makes the seakeeping very easy, and greatly 
reduces that seakeeping workload, and allows the crew to 
concentrate more on a mission.
    The National Security Cutter acquisition success story. 
These cutters work well in far-off regions, and provide better 
seakeeping, higher sustained transit speeds, and greater 
endurance and range. They also provide an increased array of 
mission versatility, among their other benefits.
    The Navy League is concerned with the increasing capability 
gap caused by the rapid decommissioning of operational assets 
before replacements are available. This cost-driven strategy is 
not in the best interest of homeland security. The answer is 
new ships sooner. The old ones cannot be run effectively. And, 
in some cases, can't be run safely.
    On the aviation front the Coast Guard will begin using the 
C-27J aircraft acquired through the interservice transfer. It 
will save about a half a billion dollars in acquisition costs. 
It is a great example of interservice cooperation.
    In the near future, the Coast Guard will need to make 
significant investments in its unmanned aircraft systems. This 
will be a significant part of the total force package for major 
cutters.
    The Coast Guard still faces many of the same challenges 
that come with every major acquisition program, including 
increased costs, driven by material cost increases and less-
than-optimum production runs. However, these increased costs 
have not been met with increased funds, meaning program delays 
which, in turn, increase costs for in-service vessel 
sustainment. This diverts already-limited funds from 
acquisition, further exacerbating the funding shortfall.
    Shore infrastructure repairs are estimated to cost $1.4 
billion, but the Coast Guard has only been given about $40 
million a year for this needed investment. The costs are 
increasing faster than the Coast Guard can pay--yet another 
devastating cycle.
    The need for a new polar icebreaker deserves special 
consideration. The Coast Guard must have a sustained presence 
there. We need to invest more, but we cannot allow this 
investment to disrupt other planned capitalization. The top 
line of the acquisition budget must increase. The committee 
could also consider a special fund outside the normal AC&I 
budget for an icebreaker similar to the National Sea-Based 
Strategic Deterrence Fund, created for the National Defense 
Authorization Act. The alternative is not funding a new polar 
icebreaker, and is a U.S. abdication of Arctic influence and 
responsibility.
    All the major decisionmakers have agreed the Coast Guard's 
recapitalization and modernization at current funding levels 
will not sustain the Coast Guard mission. We recognize the 
fiscal environment. But, given the role of the Coast Guard, 
saving American lives, safeguarding our national security, and 
contributing to economic prosperity by ensuring the free flow 
of commerce, we believe the Service deserves special 
consideration.
    In his annual address, the Commandant stated the Coast 
Guard has lost nearly 40 percent of our acquisition budget over 
the last 4 years. This pattern can no longer continue. The lack 
of assets and presence where needed causes the Coast Guard to 
make tough decisions every day about which mission to support.
    The Navy League would like to thank this committee for its 
leadership, thank Congress for being supportive of the Coast 
Guard and ensuring they have the resources they need. We must 
be good shipmates to all of them, as they have been to every 
American.
    Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Hunter. Thank you very much for your testimony. All of 
you, thank you very much.
    The point of this hearing is to get to how we get you the 
most stuff, with the least amount of money, on time. That is 
the point of this, I guess. And finishing, or piggybacking on 
what Mr. Offutt said, if the Coast Guard is making--and the GAO 
has said that the Coast Guard makes tradeoffs within the annual 
budget process every year. We have heard that from you before. 
It is not a good strategy, long term. And I would like you to 
tell us why, number one.
    And, number two, what does the Coast Guard risk by doing it 
like that every year? Thank you.
    Ms. Mackin. Mr. Chairman, you are right. We have said that 
for, actually, a number of years now. What they risk by this 
every year, when the budget comes through, is, obviously, 
delaying some assets. We have seen that recently, with the Fast 
Response Cutter, which will lead to more costs down the road.
    What we would like to see, as we have said for a number of 
years, is a long-term plan that sets forth what is needed and, 
importantly, addresses these tradeoffs that can be made, so 
that everybody--there is transparency. Everybody can see what 
is coming down the pike, what is needed to pay for it, and what 
some of the tradeoff options might be.
    Mr. Hunter. And again, what are the downsides? If they 
don't do it through their CIP, and they do it every year, and 
react quickly to whatever the budget request is from the 
President and our authorization appropriations, what do they 
risk?
    Ms. Mackin. The risk is that they had, for example, planned 
to buy six Fast Response Cutters a year. The budget comes in 
less than they had expected. They have to stretch the 
procurement out. That is just an example. That could happen in 
any number of different programs.
    So, stretching out schedule means operators aren't getting 
the assets on the schedule that they had expected them. And it 
can also lead to increased costs.
    Mr. Hunter. Admiral, one question here. Based on the CIP 
that you have now, and kind of along this same line of thought, 
what programs of record, what acquisition items, will be 
delivered on time?
    Admiral Baffer. We are delivering all of our acquisition 
programs on time right now.
    Mr. Hunter. So everything?
    Admiral Baffer. The problem is what is the baseline. When 
we have to change the schedule based on funding, then they get 
pushed to the right.
    So, if you look back at the original baseline, they are 
delayed. But if you look at what they require, based on that 
funding level, they are delivering on time. We are delivering 
on time and on budget.
    Mr. Hunter. So you are saying--when you change the schedule 
to match the budget, then things are on time in the new 
schedule. If you use an old schedule, an original one, then 
things are no longer on time.
    Admiral Baffer. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Hunter. OK.
    Admiral Baffer. That is correct. And what happens is, when 
we stretch them out, that lack of predictable funding increases 
costs for the program. Time cost money, especially on a major 
program. And, as we stretch them out, you still incur the 
overhead and the fixed costs that go along with that 
production.
    Let me just give you an example. We have got the same team 
building NSCs right now, where we have got four of them on 
contract that we did when we only had one on contract. So we 
are able to apply that same overhead, the same oversight, to a 
greater number of cutters, greater number of assets. So the 
per-unit cost is much more efficient when you can build them 
fast. When we spread them out it slows it down. And then that 
increases the per-unit cost.
    Ms. Mackin. I think what he said is absolutely right. It is 
that churn every year that, in the past, has led to having to 
do new baselines every year, which is not a small thing to 
undertake, to reflect the stretched-out schedules. That is just 
not the most efficient way to operate an acquisition program.
    Mr. Hunter. So, fill me in, then. Out of ignorance--because 
I don't know--how do you compare--if you are trying to compare 
whether you are on time or not, and whether programs are being 
delivered on time, how do you do that if your schedule--what 
baseline do you use? If you really wanted to get an accurate 
look at, originally, when are things supposed to be built, and 
being delivered, what baseline do you use?
    Admiral Baffer. We use the currently approved APB, the 
Acquisition Project Baseline, that is approved by the 
Department. When things get stretched out because of funding 
problems, that requires a new APB. Otherwise, you would go into 
breach.
    Mr. Hunter. OK, so--but--right. But how do you tell if 
stuff is being delivered on time or not, based on--if you 
change the baseline every year, and you change the schedule to 
match the programs not being on time, but you change the 
schedule to match them, so that they are on time, how do you 
know which projects are really not on time? Meaning what is 
your--what original baseline do you use from 3 or 4 years ago?
    Admiral Baffer. Well, it really----
    Mr. Hunter. Do you do that at all now?
    Admiral Baffer. Well, yes, sir, we do. It comes down to 
what is the cause. If it is a funding delay or a contract 
delay, is it a program management problem or is it just--we 
didn't have the funding to put it on contract? So, in the big 
picture, you would go back to the original baseline and say, we 
are behind in recapitalizing the Coast Guard because we haven't 
built all these ships that we thought we were going to have 
built by this time, so we are behind.
    From a project manager's point of view, contract 
management, what you bought, are you delivering, you know, 
within the contract that you said you were going to buy it to, 
you can manage to that and you are on time. But it is really--
it is two separate timelines that you are managing to, and it 
is very difficult to keep them all straight.
    Mr. Hunter. Got you. Thank you.
    Mr. Garamendi?
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go to the 
heart of the question here.
    It appears as though--Ms. Mackin, if you could help me with 
this--that the maximum money needed annually is somewhere north 
of $2 billion for the acquisition programs, for all of it.
    Ms. Mackin. That is approximately right. Again, based on 
the current Mission Need Statement and program of record, 
which, in essence, is the Deepwater program. So that is why we 
are--the Coast Guard is now revisiting that Mission Need 
Statement. That is important. We are still dealing, to a large 
extent, with a very dated Mission Need Statement.
    Mr. Garamendi. In your analysis, and for all three of you, 
the--there are two ways to get at this. You adjust the Mission 
Need Statement to the available money, or you adjust the 
Mission Need Statement to the available needs of the 11 
statutory responsibilities. Which are you suggesting be done, 
which of those two options?
    Ms. Mackin. Well, what we would really like to see, and as 
this subcommittee has also called for in the Authorization Act, 
is a long-term plan that sheds some light on what is needed 
over a 20-year period, and indicates what these tradeoffs need 
to be. And that way, decisionmakers at DHS and Congress can see 
what those tradeoffs are. With the current 5-year CIP or annual 
budget process, you don't have that long-term visibility that 
we think would really help the Coast Guard get what it needs to 
meet its missions.
    Mr. Offutt. If I may?
    Mr. Garamendi. Yes.
    Mr. Offutt. I believe that the Mission Need Statement is a 
different statement that says, based on all of my statutory 
requirements and everything, if I were to fulfill all of those 
needs, here is what I would have to have, and that is the 
Mission Need Statement.
    Then you have perhaps this 20-year plan, which recognizes 
the budget realities, and shows, in essence, what I would call 
a working budget document, which most every business develops, 
says, here is where I think I am, and then you could compare 
the two and see what your gap is for your Mission Need 
Statement. But I wouldn't want to take that Mission Need 
Statement, which takes all of your statutory authorities, you 
know, from Congress, administration, down through your 
interaction with DOD and change that--and I agree, that needs 
updated.
    So, I think what the problem is is getting this correct in 
your--CIP, you are calling it? Yes.
    Mr. Garamendi. Admiral, considering what the two have said, 
what is your response? What about the Mission Need Statement? 
How do we get there? Are we even trying to get a new Mission 
Need Statement?
    Admiral Baffer. Yes, Ranking Member. We are doing a new 
Mission Need Statement this summer, as was mentioned earlier. 
And that is going to drive to a new CONOPS [Concept of 
Operations], and then we are going to be reevaluating the 
program of record, both across aviation cutters and everything 
else, because it is a balanced system. The number of cutters 
influences the number of aircraft, and the C-27Js have 
certainly thrown a new wrinkle into that program of record. So 
we do need to visit that. But you have to start with that 
Mission Need Statement.
    Whether we start with a constrained Mission Need Statement 
or an unconstrained Mission Need Statement, I think it needs to 
start with an unconstrained Mission Need Statement that says 
what is the mission we are required to do, but--and it also has 
to be adjusted for the budget realities.
    Mr. Garamendi. Therefore, it would seem to me that, for our 
purposes, we would need to see the unconstrained Mission Need 
Statement, and then compare that to the constrained Mission 
Need Statement, the latter being, really, a result of the 
inability of the administration and Congress to provide the 
wherewithal for the unconstrained Mission Need Statement. So, 
the two would then put pressure on us to address the 
differential. Am I correct here? Is that how this could be 
done?
    Now, when will you complete this process, so that we might 
actually be forced to make a decision?
    Admiral Baffer. We are doing the Mission Need Statement 
this summer in the CONOPS, and we are going to be doing the 
simulations of potential fleet mixes, and measuring the 
effectiveness of all those potential fleet mixes throughout the 
year. And we are looking at the end of fiscal year 2016 of 
having all those potential fleet mixes figured out, where we 
have the mission effectiveness of those fleet mixes balanced 
against the cost of those fleet mixes.
    But it all starts with the Mission Need Statement that is 
coming out this summer, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. So we are really looking at the next 
Congress before we are going to be able to really drill down 
and address this fundamental challenge. I think that is, as I 
look at the timing, about the way it will be. Am I correct? I 
think so.
    Admiral Baffer. It would be the fourth quarter of 2016.
    Mr. Garamendi. Well, that is the next Congress that will 
deal with it.
    In any case, Ms. Mackin, is there--in--I will ask all three 
of you. In looking at this, as you know it today, given the 
uncertainty because of the process not being completed, is 
there any reason to believe that we are not going to be looking 
at a number north of $2 billion?
    Ms. Mackin. I will just say that the last time the Coast 
Guard did a fleet mix analysis, which was a few years ago, it 
was not constrained, and it came in quite high, quite a bit 
higher than the program of record. At that point, the program 
of record was considered the floor. It could not be breached. 
What we would like to see is, you know, the realistic budget 
projections showing, as you indicated, what can you do in a 
more constrained environment, so that that can be transparent, 
and then the tradeoffs can be made in an informed way.
    Mr. Garamendi. I think what I am driving at, or want to 
drive at here, is that it looks to me as though, under any 
circumstance going forward, however this thing turns out, we 
could wait until the next Congress, a year and a half--
actually, a little more than a year and a half from now, and 
then go back through it. Or we can begin to prepare ourselves 
today for the reality that we are going to have to look at 
something close to or greater than $2 billion a year, in order 
to meet even the minimum requirements. I can't imagine a 
situation where it is going to come in less than that, unless 
you are adjusting the requirements to the constrained budget 
situation.
    Now, an additional $1 billion for the Coast Guard 
activities would seem to be impossible, until we consider all 
of the choices that the Congress makes about where to spend 
money. For example, Mr. Hunter and I have spent some time on 
the Armed Services Committee, where vast amounts of money are 
spent on projects that may or may not be as essential as the 
Coast Guard's programs.
    So, my concern, as a Member of Congress, is that we look 
across the program lines--stovepipes, if you will--and say, 
maybe we should move $1 billion a year from some activity in 
the defense budget or in one of the social welfare budgets, 
over to the Coast Guard, so that the Coast Guard could have the 
assets that it needs to pluck surfers out of the surf on the 
beaches of California when they are in trouble, or all of the 
other missions that you have. So I think this is a challenge 
for us, and particularly a challenge that our budget committees 
ought to be looking at.
    Now, am I willing to wait until the next Congress, which I 
would hope to participate in but may not, to get at this? The 
answer is no. So I want us, in our role--and particularly, I 
think, Mr. Hunter and I, who play a role on both committees--to 
look at this in a more total-systems way. We know, for example, 
that the U.S. Navy cannot operate in the Arctic without an 
icebreaker. Yet we have no money for the icebreaker in the 
Coast Guard budget. We know that the U.S. Navy must be prepared 
to operate in the Arctic. There is no question about that.
    So, how can we move money from one pot to another pot to 
achieve the purposes of addressing the United States 
Government's responsibilities in the Arctic? And the answer is 
we could do that if we thought about this in a more holistic 
way.
    And that is the end of my speech on this matter, but I am 
intending to pursue that, and would need your help. I don't 
want to wait until 2016, the next Congress. I would like to 
have an interim report along the way, as you develop your new 
approach to what is necessary.
    So, at the end of the summer, you expect to have the first 
stage done. Is that right, Admiral?
    Admiral Baffer. Ranking Member, yes, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. Are you prepared to deliver to us at that 
point the elements of the first stage, the results of the first 
stage?
    Admiral Baffer. We are committed, being very open and 
transparent with Congress. And anything we can do to help----
    Mr. Garamendi. Good.
    Admiral Baffer [continuing]. We would be--we are----
    Mr. Garamendi. We know how to find each other.
    Admiral Baffer. Yes, sir.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I will yield back.
    Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentleman.
    And, Admiral, on that same thing, if you could get us--if 
you could just get us all of your major acquisition program of 
record projects, and all together would be nice, and I would 
like what you had for a baseline 10 years ago, maybe every 2 
years, and I would like to see where it started, before I was 
even here, and then how it is proceeding, and how the baseline 
has changed to where it was to where it is. If you could do 
that, that is everything with an acquisition project baseline, 
right?
    Admiral Baffer. Right. We can certainly do that, Mr. 
Chairman.
    [The information follows:]

        The tables below include the history for each of the U.S. Coast 
        Guard's major acquisition program baselines (APB) since 2005.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Revised Deepwater Baseline    Deepwater APB v1.1 May 15,       Program-specific APB revision 1.0       Program-specific APB revision 2.0 (if    Program-specific APB revision 3.0 (if
                                                    v1.0 December 21, 2005                 2007             ------------------------------------------                applicable)                              applicable)
                                                ------------------------------------------------------------                                          ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Comple-      TAC              Comple-      TAC       Approval   Number  Comple-      TAC       Approval           Comple-      TAC       Approval          Comple-      TAC
                                                 Number  tion\1\  ($M)\1\,\2\  Number  tion\1\  ($M)\1\,\2\     Date             tion\1\  ($M)\1\,\2\     Date     Number  tion\1\  ($M)\1\,\2\     Date    Number  tion\1\  ($M)\1\,\2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                 SURFACE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSC............................................       8     2017     $2,875         8     2014     $3,450      Dec 2008       8     2016     $4,749     Jan 2014        8     2019     $5,504    .........  ......  .......  ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPC............................................      25     2027     $7,056        25     2021     $8,098      Apr 2012      25     2033    $10,523     Sep 2014       25     2034    $10,523    .........  ......  .......  ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRC............................................      58     2027     $3,277        58     2017     $3,206      Aug 2009      58     2022     $3,928     Oct 2012       58     2023     $3,928    .........  ......  .......  ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110-123'                                             41     2021       $116        41     2022        $95    ..........  ......  .......  ...........  .........  .......  .......  ...........  .........  ......  .......  ...........
Conversion\3\..................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WMEC MEP\3\....................................      27    2026/       $338        27     2016       $317      Dec 2008      27     2016     $296.8    .........  .......  .......  ...........  .........  ......  .......  ...........
                                                            2020
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Patrol Boat                                      ......  .......  ...........      17     2013       $117      Dec 2008      20     2013     $179.7    .........  .......  .......  ...........  .........  ......  .......  ...........
Sustain-
ment\3\........................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                AIRCRAFT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HC-130H                                              16     2015       $383        16     2017       $610      Jun 2009      16     2017       $690    .........  .......  .......  ...........  .........  ......  .......  ...........
Sustain-
ment\3\........................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HC-130J                                               6     2008   Not Speci-       6     2009        $11      May 2009       6     2010       $163    .........  .......  .......  ...........  .........  ......  .......  ...........
Missioniza-....................................                       fied
tion\3\........................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LRS............................................  ......  .......  ...........  ......  .......  ...........   July 2012      22     2026     $2,761    .........  .......  .......  ...........  .........  ......  .......  ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HC-144.........................................      36     2017     $1,590        36     2016     $1,706      Feb 2009      36     2020     $2,222     Oct 2012       36     2025     $2,756    .........  ......  .......  ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-27J..........................................  ......  .......  ...........  ......  .......  ...........  APB will be developed prior to ADE 2A/2B  .........  .......  .......  ...........  .........  ......  .......  ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H-60...........................................      42     2016       $456        42     2019       $451      Aug 2009      42    Not         $451     Nov 2012       42     2015     $466.6    .........  ......  .......  ...........
                                                                                                                                  Speci-
                                                                                                                                   fied
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H-65...........................................      95     2016       $549       102    Not         $741      May 2009     102     2017     $901.2     Feb 2011      102     2019     $929.4     Mar 2014     102     2021      $917.4
                                                                                        Speci-
                                                                                         fied
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                  OTHER
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C4ISR..........................................    Not     Not       $3,481      Not     Not       $1,353      Feb 2011    Not      2026     $1,353     Nov 2013    Not       2026     $1,053     Dec 2014    Not      2026      $1,053
                                                 Speci-   Speci-               Speci-   Speci-                           Speci-                                    Speci-                                   Speci-
                                                  fied     fied                 fied     fied                             fied                                      fied                                     fied
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Objective figures shown for all completion dates and total acquisition costs.
\2\ All funding amounts shown in then-year dollars.
\3\ Program completed or cancelled.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Original Baseline               APB revision 1.0 (if applicable)        APB revision 2.0 (if applicable)      Program-specific APB revision 3.0 (if   Program-specific APB revision 4.0 (if
                                 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------               applicable)                             applicable)
         Non- Deepwater                                                                                                                                  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Approval  Number  Comple-      TAC      Approval  Number  Comple-      TAC      Approval  Number  Comple-      TAC      Approval          Comple-      TAC      Approval          Comple-      TAC
                                    Date            tion\1\  ($M)\1\,\2\    Date            tion\1\  ($M)\1\,\2\    Date            tion\1\  ($M)\1\,\2\    Date    Number  tion\1\  ($M)\1\,\2\    Date    Number  tion\1\  ($M)\1\,\2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RB-M............................  Apr 2005     180     2013       $401    Jul 2010     180     2015       $610    Nov 2013     170     2015      $576     ........  ......  .......  ...........  ........  ......  .......  ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Polar IB........................  APB will be developed prior to ADE 2A/  ........  ......  .......  ...........  ........  ......  .......  ...........  ........  ......  .......  ...........  ........  ......  .......  ...........
                                                    2B
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rescue 21.......................  Apr 1999      46     2005       $200    Nov 1999      46     2005       $240    Mar 2002      46     2005      $475     May 2005      46     2007      $641     Apr 2006      46     2011       $730
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R21 (cont.).....................  ........  ......  .......  ...........  May 2008      39     2012      $1066    Nov 2014      37     2017      $845     ........  ......  .......  ...........  ........  ......  .......  ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAIS............................  Jan 2007   58/11     2013     $276.8    Nov 2014   58/11     2016     $111.9    ........  ......  .......  ...........  ........  ......  .......  ...........  ........  ......  .......  ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FMSII...........................  Jul 2014    Not      2020      $54.7    ........  ......  .......  ...........  ........  ......  .......  ...........  ........  ......  .......  ...........  ........  ......  .......  ...........
                                            Speci-
                                             fied
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Objective figures shown for all completion dates and total acquisition costs.
\2\ All funding amounts shown in then-year dollars.


    Mr. Hunter. OK. That would be great.
    Mr. Graves?
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you for being here this 
morning. I appreciate your testimony. It was very helpful, all 
three of you.
    Admiral, the initial Mission Need Statement with the 
acquisition schedule back in 2005, in retrospect, was that 
flawed?
    Admiral Baffer. That was done during the Deepwater era. The 
program of record was pretty good. All of our studies since 
then have validated that program of record, and that is why we 
have stayed with it. Some of the scheduling and funding 
requirements were probably flawed, but the actual program of 
record itself was actually a good piece of work, and it has 
been validated many times over the course of the years.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. You are a law enforcement agency, 
and I am going to take a guess that you have received a 
speeding ticket or something at some point in your life. You 
look like maybe no. All right, well----
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I sure have. But let me ask you. I 
mean if you were a cop, and you pulled somebody over, and that 
person goes back to the speed limit sign and says ``no, no, no, 
it actually isn't 60 miles an hour, it is 80 miles an hour, and 
so I am fine now,'' you know, you can't change the rules in the 
middle.
    And, you know, you indicated that the Mission Need 
Statement in 2005 was largely appropriate. But it sounds like, 
as you were answering questions before, that you guys have 
repeatedly revised the schedule in accordance with funding 
availability. And I am trying to discern--and I think, going 
back to the previous questions--what kind of problems is that 
causing, if you are continuing to move the chart to the right, 
move your schedule to the right?
    You know, look, this was obviously put together with the 
idea that you were going to be able to deliver certain services 
and perform certain duties. Are you still able to fulfill your 
mission?
    Admiral Baffer. Congressman Graves, it--as we move 
schedules to the right, it is very disruptive to the programs 
and the projects. It is very inefficient. Major acquisitions 
have a lot of mass momentum. The contracts are structured for a 
certain schedule. When you deviate from that schedule, it is 
very difficult to change that, and it causes a lot of 
disruption and a lot of inefficiency, both on the Government 
side and the contractor side.
    One of the things we are trying to do now, and we are doing 
it--you see with the NSCs--is get on annual efficient 
production rates. We had a big gap on the NSC between the third 
and fourth and the second and third, and that caused us a lot 
of reduced learning and cost problems at the yard. Now we are 
on an annual rate between four, five, six, seven, and eight, 
and we are seeing the increased efficiency. We are going down 
the learning curve, and we are seeing the cost benefits of 
doing that. We are trying to do that with all of our--the 
remaining programs.
    OPC is structured to be as efficient as possible, and to be 
able to stay on that original baseline, and not deviate as we 
go. Because, once you deviate as you go, and you have a delay, 
delays tend to cause more delays. They tend to cascade on you, 
and it all costs additional funds.
    Mr. Offutt. Mr. Graves, may I comment?
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Sure, please.
    Mr. Offutt. Two quick comments. One, you asked if they 
could perform the mission. All the services will perform their 
mission to the best of the ability they have with all the 
assets they have. There is absolutely no question about that. 
So the answer is yes, they will do the missions that are in 
front of them to the best of their ability.
    The question about Deepwater, which hasn't been raised, is 
that the program of record still looks fairly good, based on 
what you knew in 2005. Remember, in Deepwater there was a 
management scheme chosen that just didn't work out, for a lot 
of number--for a number of reasons. And so, the changing of 
that management scheme, taking the--you know, taking--getting 
rid of a prime contractor and bringing it back into the 
internal Government and Coast Guard actually has probably 
helped a lot. But, remember, that was one of the major 
perturbations in that program, even though it----
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Which--sure. And so you would 
expect, as a result of that change, that you would perhaps go 
back and revisit schedules. But it seems like that some of the 
budget requests that we are seeing right now are compounding 
schedule problems even more than that evolution from Deepwater 
to the changes.
    But let me pivot over to the OPC. As I understand, that is 
the Coast Guard's number-one acquisition priority. Yet there is 
no funding in the budget request this year for that vessel. Are 
you ready to go to detailed design this year?
    Admiral Baffer. We are--well, we will be awarding detailed 
design in 2016. We just finished preliminary design. We are--
couldn't be happier with the progress that the contractors are 
making. All three contractors have moved to the contract design 
phase, and we are going to be ready to award detailed design 
this summer, and pick the final contractor.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Last question. What are the 
negative implications of delays on schedules for the OPC, in--
you know, you--at previous hearings we had, joint hearing with 
the HASC [House Armed Services Committee], you know, the Coast 
Guard has a mission that is zippered in with the Navy and other 
services in many cases, and, of course, domestic missions with 
drug interdiction, alien interdiction, and others. Could you 
address that?
    Admiral Baffer. Certainly, sir. The OPC was designed for 
affordability. The whole acquisition strategy was designed for 
affordability. And that requires us staying on schedule, 
getting to two-per-year production. We are not looking for 
innovative designs, in terms of technology. We are looking for 
innovation, in terms of production efficiency.
    So, it is designed for production efficiency. That is how 
we are going to make it affordable, and using the competition 
to get there, but we need to stay on schedule so that the 
contractors get the two per year, where they can run down that 
learning curve and accrue all the benefits that accrue by 
having a steady, stable, predictable funding stream.
    Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from 
Florida is recognized.
    Ms. Frankel. Thank you very much. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    So--from south Florida, so, obviously, the Coast Guard 
plays a very important role for our economy and our security. I 
just wanted to follow up on Mr. Graves's question, because we 
got a memo here that said that there was not money in the 
budget for the work that needs to be done on the OPC. So where 
is the money going to come from?
    Admiral Baffer. There is a general provision in the budget 
request to allow the Department to reallocate funding to 
provide the detailed design, the $70 million, basically, hole 
that we have in our budget for detailed design to make that 
award in 2016.
    Ms. Frankel. So you have that. Then how long does it take 
after that? What is the timeline, once that is done?
    Admiral Baffer. Once we down-select to a contractor, there 
is an 18-month detailed design period. And during that design 
period, they also order the material. And as soon as we are 
done with the detailed design, we will be starting 
construction.
    Ms. Frankel. And is there money for that?
    Admiral Baffer. There isn't money for that, but we don't 
need that yet, because that will be an option on the contract. 
So we will need that, you know, in future years, in the out-
years.
    Ms. Frankel. So, what is your estimate, your best estimate, 
as to actually when those assets will be delivered?
    Admiral Baffer. They will start delivering in 2021, ma'am.
    Ms. Frankel. Oh, OK. What--so what happens to the assets 
that we are using in the meantime? Are they going to last?
    Admiral Baffer. That is what our concern is. Some of the 
assets that are being replaced are 50 years old, the oldest one 
being the Coast Guard Cutter Reliance--is 51 years old. It is 
currently getting the job done. But, as you put Band-Aids on 
them, at some point there is nothing for the Band-Aid to stick 
to. Those assets need to be decommissioned and replaced.
    The other class that the OPC will replace is the 270-foot 
class, and they are 30 years old now. We just finished the MEP, 
the Mission Effectiveness Project, on them, and that bought us 
a few years, and we are evaluating their condition right now to 
see what we have to do to those ships to extend them a little 
bit longer. Our goal is not to spend any more money than we 
have to on the legacy fleet, but to make sure we can cover our 
capability gaps until the OPCs replace them.
    Ms. Frankel. So what are the potential consequences of this 
gap, and not getting our--the current fleet up to standards, 
while we wait for the new fleet?
    Admiral Baffer. If we maintain our current schedule, the 
gap is not that large. It is manageable. The concern is, if we 
don't get started on OPC, the gap could be very large. And then 
it causes the question: What is our offshore mission capability 
in the future?
    Ms. Frankel. So, could you be more specific as what would 
be potential consequences?
    Admiral Baffer. Drug enforcement, marine environmental 
protection. These cutters perform the whole host of Coast Guard 
missions off our coasts and in our EEZ [exclusive economic 
zone]. So, depending on what part of the country you're in, it 
is the fishery stocks up in New England; it is migrant 
interdiction down in the Caribbean; drug interdiction in the 
Caribbean and also in the Eastern Pacific; LMR [living marine 
resources] up in Alaska. That is a big concern for us. Our 
fishery stocks are very important to us, and we need to be able 
to manage them in the future.
    Ms. Frankel. OK. Thank you. Thank you. I waive the rest of 
my time.
    Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentlelady. I want to go back 
really quick.
    You are getting $70 million for the final design review, or 
the final design. That is going to come from within the 
Department, meaning it hasn't been--it is not authorized, it is 
not--it is maybe probably not going to be appropriated. The way 
you are doing it right now is DHS just says, ``Hey, we had 
some--we had 70 million bucks in our general fund that was 
unaccounted for, and we would like you to have it.''
    Admiral Baffer. Mr. Chairman, I would be----
    Mr. Hunter. Is that what it is, or----
    Admiral Baffer. General provision----
    Mr. Hunter. I was trying to mischaracterize it, but I 
didn't. That was the actual----
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Hunter. So that is what is happening?
    Admiral Baffer. In short, yes, sir.
    Mr. Hunter. So what happens if they don't give you the $70 
million? I mean what if something else breaks in some other 
department, and they have to spend the money for that?
    Admiral Baffer. Well, we have--you know, this is the Coast 
Guard's number-one priority. The Secretary is very interested 
in Coast Guard recapitalization, and he is certainly making it 
one of his priorities. And we are working with DHS to make sure 
that we have the money available when we want to make the award 
this summer.
    Mr. Hunter. OK. Ms. Mackin, could you help? Explain to me, 
because I am fairly new here, right? How does that work? If the 
money is not authorized and it is not appropriated, it just 
comes out of the Department, could you explain that to me? I 
mean how do you--when it comes to tracking, and when it comes 
to having foresight on these things, and scheduling, how does 
that work?
    Ms. Mackin. To be honest, I don't have any more details 
than you do on this. We saw what you did, which was the general 
provision that was referenced that directed DHS to transfer the 
money to the Coast Guard. I am not quite sure how that will 
work, in terms of the mechanics. Sorry.
    Mr. Hunter. Would it hurt--what happens if the money is 
appropriated from Congress, as opposed to a handshake deal with 
DHS? Anything? Or the money is the money, it doesn't matter?
    Admiral Baffer. On the acquisition side, we are in the 
execution business. We execute the funds that are provided to 
us, wherever they come from.
    Mr. Hunter. So it doesn't matter, really.
    Admiral Baffer. Not to us, no.
    Mr. Hunter. Mr. Graves, you have any more questions?
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I do.
    Mr. Hunter. Mr. Graves is recognized.
    I am sorry, Mr. Garamendi is recognized. Sorry.
    Mr. Garamendi. That is OK, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Graves had 
some very good questions, and I want to yield just a few 
minutes at the end of this to my colleague, who has a question 
that she will ask.
    But I got to--as a whole series of questions I think we 
need for the record, and we will make those available to you--
the Fast Response Cutter engine problem, we need to have some 
information on that. The C-27Js, while you do have seven or 
eight of them, are they operational? What is going to be 
necessary to make them operational? What additional work needs 
to be done on that?
    This question is about operational testing, the 
effectiveness of that whole program. We will get you the 
specifics on these, and if you could preset those to us in 
writing for the record, it will save some time here.
    I do have just one very specific question, probably because 
of my history dealing with this issue. The Department of the 
Interior recently this week issued a permit for Shell Oil to 
drill off the Arctic coast. Was the Coast Guard involved in 
that? And how do you propose to provide the necessary--or the 
potential support for that drilling? I know it is not 
acquisition, but----
    Admiral Baffer. Well, Ranking Member, I know we are 
currently involved with the Department of the Interior and BSEE 
[Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement], and, you 
know, and the partnership, because it is--we are all involved 
in those communications and those deliberations----
    Mr. Garamendi. And, for the record, because--and it is 
really not your turf--I would like to know a specific 
involvement of the Coast Guard in providing the support. The 
last time Shell attempted to drill in that area they had a 
problem that required a lot of support from the Coast Guard. 
And I want to know how the Coast Guard intends to work on that.
    But my next question--so, for the record, if you can----
    Admiral Baffer. Be happy to provide that, sir.
    [The information follows:]

        To fulfill our mandated missions in the region, the Coast 
        Guard's presence in the Arctic will remain active during the 
        summer operational window starting in June and ending in 
        October. The Coast Guard's role in the Arctic is not solely for 
        the purpose of oversight of Shell's drilling operations, if 
        approved. Operation Arctic Shield 2015 will provide the Coast 
        Guard with much broader Arctic domain awareness and an enhanced 
        opportunity to respond to maritime safety and security 
        incidents, including fulfillment of our spill response 
        oversight and direction role as the Federal On-Scene 
        Coordinator if a spill were to occur.

        The Coast Guard has cooperated closely with the Department of 
        the Interior, in particular with Interior's Bureau of Safety 
        and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) relative to their role in 
        ensuring offshore operations are properly permitted and 
        conducted in a safe and efficient manner, with industry Oil 
        Spill Response Plans and associated equipment and personnel at 
        the ready. For Shell's 2015 Arctic operations, predesignated 
        resources are available and on scene during drilling operations 
        in order to ensure the most rapid response possible in the 
        Arctic's challenging environment. The Coast Guard coordinated 
        with BSEE on their review and approval of the Oil Spill 
        Response Plan for Shell's Arctic exploratory drilling to ensure 
        adequacy for Arctic operations.

    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. This is a question for the Navy 
League.
    You have made a proposal here that there be some sort of a 
special account for the recapitalization of the icebreaker. 
Could you expand on that and tell us how that might work?
    Mr. Offutt. I am sorry, I keep forgetting. Since both of 
you were on the Armed Services Committee, and we actually 
proposed a long time ago, I think--I don't know if the idea 
originated with Navy League, or it came somewhere else--that 
the replacement program also----
    Mr. Garamendi. Take credit or blame, as the case might be--
--
    Mr. Offutt. Fine, whichever.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Offutt. We will take the credit, OK. We have been 
proposing something like that in our maritime policy, which we 
develop annually, for a long time. And it has come to fruition. 
I just think it is a great way--part of the problem we have in 
Government is getting our different agencies to work together. 
And we ought to look and see who this benefits. And, quite 
frankly, there are five or six different agencies that could, 
in fact, participate in this program of a superfund, if you 
want--maybe that has got a bad taste in my mouth, but a 
different--a strategic fund that would contribute to the 
icebreaker problem.
    And, you know, one is not enough. As we have said before, 
it is somewhere in the three to six region, if we are going to 
cover our responsibilities, both in the Antarctic and the 
Arctic, with what we are seeing with icecap retreat, and some 
of those kinds of things. So--and I would leave it to your 
counsels to figure out how that fund could get set up. That is 
what lawyers are for.
    Mr. Garamendi. So there was the National Sea-Based 
Strategic Deterrent Fund, which are submarines.
    Mr. Offutt. Yes.
    Mr. Garamendi. And that was set aside. So you are 
suggesting something similar to that.
    Mr. Offutt. Correct, I am.
    Mr. Garamendi. Well, we need to work on that. And I have 
already talked about the cross--across these two budgets.
    I would like to yield the remaining--my time to my----
    Ms. Frankel. I will wait.
    Mr. Garamendi. OK. Very good. Then I will just let it go at 
that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Hunter. Mr. Graves?
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Going back to OPC, if you can't award the contract in 
2016--and going back to the somewhat tenuous funding--what is 
the impact to the Coast Guard folks in the fleet?
    Admiral Baffer. Well, Congressman, the biggest impact to 
the fleet will be that gap that we talked about, and having to 
spend additional funds on ships that probably aren't worthy of 
those additional funds.
    The--just a quick aside, I was assigned to the Coast Guard 
Cutter Reliance, which is the oldest, the first ship that this 
OPC will be replacing. When I first graduated in 1984 from the 
Academy, it was 20 years old at the time, and it was already 
late for its midlife. The ship was not safe to sail. And I kind 
of still carry some--harbor some resentment to the leadership 
of the Coast Guard, that they asked us to sail on that ship 
that could not make water, where nothing worked, where it was 
full of lead paint and asbestos. And when Challenger blew up in 
1986 we couldn't get underway, even though we were right there, 
in Port Canaveral, for the recovery efforts, because our 
exhaust stacks were cracked, and we would fill the ship with 
carbon monoxide every time we lit the engines off.
    Admittedly, the ship is in much better shape now.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Sounds like college.
    [Laughter.]
    Admiral Baffer. We took it, and it had to be--you know, the 
Coast Guard took it, and it moved it up in the midlife cycle, 
and that was part of the recovery process for that ship. And I 
visited it while I was at the Coast Guard yard a couple years 
ago. It is in much better shape now. But, again, you get to the 
point where we just can't ask our young folks to get underway 
any more on ships like that. We went 2 years without showers at 
sea because we couldn't make water. Those kind of conditions I 
wouldn't put my son, who is in the Coast Guard, on a ship like 
that, and I wouldn't put other people's children on a ship like 
that.
    So, we are getting to the point where we need to do 
something on the OPC, or we are going to have to put people's 
children on ships like that.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I thank you very much. I 
appreciate the feedback there. That is very helpful.
    Pivoting over to the FRC acquisition, there is--going 
smoothly from your perspective? I heard Mr. Offutt talk about 
the--how much he enjoyed those boats.
    Admiral Baffer. It is--we have the RFP on the street right 
now for the remaining 26. We have 32 on contract on the first 
phase. They are very successful operational platforms. They are 
down working the Caribbean. They were very busy this spring, 
with the changing of the relationship with Cuba. And there was 
some misinformation on the potential change in what--
immigration policies, and they were very busy. But, because 
they were there, and they took care of business, and--we didn't 
have a large migration effort, or a large migration incident 
because of that.
    It has been a very successful program for us. The ranking 
member mentioned the engines. We have had some warranty issues 
with the engine. It is a firm, fixed-price contract with a 
rock-solid warranty, so the engine manufacturer has been very 
forthright in fixing those things, and taking care of those 
things, but we have had more issues than we would expect on 
the--with that particular engine. But we are working our way 
through it, and we anticipate more on-time and on-schedule 
deliveries for that cutter class.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Which would be awarding 26 in 
April of next year?
    Admiral Baffer. It will be awarded in 2016. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK. Last question for Ms. Mackin 
and for you, Admiral, on the Arctic and Antarctic capabilities, 
icebreaker capabilities.
    In comparing U.S. capabilities to other countries, do you 
think we are where we need to be? Yes or no?
    Admiral Baffer. Well, I mean, obviously, I am biased. We, 
obviously, are not where we need to be.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. It has been a--somewhat of a 
tortured process, watching for the last 10-plus years, this 
whole decision on Polar Sea, Polar Star. Where do we go from 
here? You are asking for additional funds to do another 
condition assessment and chart a path forward. Could you just 
try and paint a--paint your vision on what the appropriate path 
forward is for us to get where we need to be, in regard to 
icebreaking capabilities?
    Again, Ms. Mackin, I would love to hear your thoughts on 
that, as well.
    Admiral Baffer. First we are going to have to build a new 
polar icebreaker. Polar Star, it would be a potential 
bridging--I am sorry, Polar Sea would be a potential bridging 
gap. But, at the end of the day, we are still going to have a 
ship, if we reactivate her, that has fuel against the hull, 
that doesn't meet Clean Air Act requirements, that doesn't have 
the environmental capabilities that current ships need to have, 
especially working in a pristine environment, like we see in 
Antarctica and up in the Arctic.
    So, it only delays the inevitable. We still need to build a 
new icebreaker. The problem with a new icebreaker is it has 
such a long lead time. It is a very significant asset. The 
design is very unique. The construction is very unique. It is 
going to take a long time to build. So we need to get started 
with that, whether or not we reactive Polar Sea, or not.
    Reactivating Polar Sea is a very interesting question, 
because the hull is pretty good. But if we tried to take 
everything out of the hull and rebuild it from the top, it is a 
very expensive shipbuilding evolution. Modern ships are built 
in blocks, not in--stick built, from the ground up. So whether 
we would actually be cost-effective or feasible in reactivating 
Polar Sea in that way remains to be seen. And we have got some 
significant engineering work that we have to do to make a smart 
decision on that.
    Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentleman. Ms. Frankel----
    Ms. Frankel. Thank you.
    Mr. Hunter [continuing]. Is recognized.
    Ms. Frankel. Well, it does sound like there was a--I put it 
politely--a planning error, probably on the part of, probably, 
Congress, but I don't know. Because--with this gap.
    I was going to say how much is it going to cost, do you 
think, to do these repairs during the gap period?
    Admiral Baffer. Ms. Frankel, it would depend on how big the 
gap is, what our new program of record comes out to be, in 
terms of how many cutters we need, and what that new Mission 
Need Statement says. Our goal would be not to spend any more on 
old ships than we have to. And we probably wouldn't have to do 
all of them. It would be: take the best couple, and do what we 
have to do to them to carry ourselves across.
    But at this point, until we come up with a new program of 
record, and we finish our engineering work on assessing what 
the 270s would take, we really can't provide a number.
    Ms. Frankel. Well, I mean, do you think it is going to be 
in the millions?
    Admiral Baffer. Oh, yes, ma'am. Definitely in the millions. 
I mean it is very significant. If it wasn't----
    Ms. Frankel. Yes.
    Admiral Baffer [continuing]. We would just be doing it.
    Ms. Frankel. OK. All right. Let me--I am going to go to 
another subject. That sounds like it is a touchy subject for 
you. But sure we didn't help you much with this.
    I have a problem with bridges. I don't know whether you 
have anything to do with bridges, but south Florida--maybe you 
have heard of this issue--we have--it is a--down in Broward 
County, Fort Lauderdale, there is what I call a train bridge. 
There is a bridge that, in order for the trains to go back and 
forth, the bridge goes down, and then there is no boats--I mean 
not even--I don't even--I have been there--not even a canoe. I 
mean you would have to sort of lie flat in a canoe to even get 
under it.
    And we literally have hundreds of businesses that cater to 
boats and yachts, and so forth, but there is no way to get from 
the intercoastal--from the east part of the bridge to the west 
part of the bridge under that bridge when it is down. And there 
are going to be lots more trains going back and forth, and this 
is a very slow bridge, getting up and down.
    So, I am just--do you get involved with these kinds of 
bridges?
    Admiral Baffer. I use bridges, but I am not part of the 
regulatory process of bridges. And we would be more than happy 
to take a question for the record, and----
    Ms. Frankel. Well, do you know----
    Admiral Baffer [continuing]. Address that, specifically.
    Ms. Frankel. Is there a budget for bridges? Does the Coast 
Guard have----
    Admiral Baffer. Well, we regulate the bridges, and we 
permit them, and we are certainly involved in them. I don't 
suspect that we pay for all the bridges out of the Coast Guard 
budget.
    Ms. Frankel. I will yield to----
    Mr. Garamendi. If I recall correctly, within the law there 
is such a program, unfunded for many, many years now.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Truman-Hobbs Program. And, yes, 
this administration has not funded it, but it deals in 
impediments to navigation, yes.
    Mr. Garamendi. So go find some money.
    Ms. Frankel. Impediment to navigation, OK. Thank you. We 
will submit the question.
    Admiral Baffer. Yes, ma'am. We would be happy to answer 
that.
    Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentlelady.
    Mr. Curbelo?
    Mr. Curbelo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you 
for your time this morning.
    The fiscal year 2016 budget request, $340 million to 
acquire six Fast Response Cutters, these are very important to 
our area, certainly, in south Florida. And this would be the 
first order under the recompeted contract that the Service 
expects to award by April 2016. Do you still expect to award 
the recompeted contract for the remaining 26 FRCs by April?
    Admiral Baffer. Yes, sir, we do. The RFP is on the street 
now. We are answering questions from potential vendors. And we 
see no reason why we would have any problems meeting that date.
    Mr. Curbelo. That is wonderful. I commend you on that, and 
I will hold you to it, because, in my visits down to Key West 
and Miami, we all know how critical these vessels are. So I 
appreciate it.
    That is all I got, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentleman. Hey, on the OPC, let me 
see. Before you award next year, OMB wants you to do an 
alternatives analysis. Is that right? Of different types of 
ship designs?
    Admiral Baffer. Of different sea state-type sizes. One 
would be a modernized MEC, if we took the existing capabilities 
of the existing MEC fleet of a 270, modernized it to current 
conditions, what would that cost.
    Mr. Hunter. But do you--meaning how much is it going to 
cost you to do the design alternatives? Do you have to take a 
lot of money to do that, to do ship design, or--you don't have 
to go as far on it, so it is not as expensive, or what?
    Admiral Baffer. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it is not a complete 
design. It was just a kind of a concept using parametric 
figures on--for costs, and what would that ship look like, if 
we tried to build it today to modern standards. And then, what 
would be a parametric rough order of magnitude cost of that. It 
is not a complete design study.
    Mr. Hunter. But your RFP that is out there now--right? The 
RFP that is out there now has a specific design to--or no, not 
at all? Or----
    Admiral Baffer. What we have out there is we have 
performance requirements that--it is required to meet the naval 
vessel rules. It has also got a Coast Guard addendum, which 
applies many commercial specs to the NVR.
    So it is not a Navy ship and it is not a commercial ship, 
it is a Coast Guard cutter. It is designed to be a specific 
Coast Guard cutter. It is not plans and specs on how to build a 
ship. It is not like what is out on the FRC right now, because 
each contractor is designing their ship, their product, to be 
built efficiently in their yard. So they have got to meet all 
the requirements, and all the NVR specifications, and 
everything that we required. It is a pretty thick, lengthy 
specification, because we have been operating ships like this a 
long time. We know what we need. But they have to meet those 
performance requirements. And then that is what they are 
submitting. That will be evaluated and awarded.
    Mr. Hunter. OK. Could you get us--could you get this 
committee the alternatives that you are looking at, just the--
like the 210 MEC change, and whatever other alternatives you 
guys have in mind?
    And you are not doing that--I am just having a hard time 
understanding you. Are you doing that for fun?
    Admiral Baffer. No, we are doing it just----
    Mr. Hunter. Because you are not really going to use it, you 
are just doing it.
    Admiral Baffer. It is a cost excursion, it is somewhat of 
an academic exercise, just to make sure that our program of 
record is the most optimum program that we are doing, and we 
get the greatest bang for the buck from the cost-benefit 
perspective that meets the mission need, at what cost. It is 
all part of our affordability program for the OPC.
    Mr. Hunter. OK. Last month, Admiral Michel said that the 
recompete for the FRCs that is going on right now, he said that 
they made some changes. The subcommittee was unaware that you 
were going to put in different design requirements for the 
second batch of FRCs. And he said no, that is the way it was 
supposed to be, all along.
    So, I would like to ask Ms. Mackin. When it comes to 
changing specs, can they--because Admiral Michel was very 
straightforward and said this will not raise costs, or it will 
not make it go over schedule, either. He goes, ``It is just a 
few changes, and it will be fine.'' On the Armed Services 
Committee and other acquisition stuff, there is no such thing 
as a few changes and it will all be fine.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Hunter. So, I would just like your point of view on 
that, on them changing specs, minimum--they are doing small 
changes, nothing crazy. But, still, how do you think that is 
going to affect the schedule and the budget for the FRC, the 
second tranche of buys?
    Ms. Mackin. Well, it is correct, this was always the plan, 
to recompete the second part of the FRC buy, and we definitely 
think competition--and, especially in a firm, fixed-price 
environment like the FRC, will drive prices down. It is 
infinitely better than a sole-source environment. So, from that 
perspective, we certainly do support the Coast Guard strategy.
    That said, I think you are right, they will have to be 
careful about managing their requirements, scrutinizing what 
the contractors may come back with, to make sure that costs do 
stay under control.
    Admiral Baffer. Sir, if I could, because we are competing 
it, and because you had an incumbent shipbuilder, if we just 
said, ``Here are the plans and specs, build the exact same 
ship,'' that would have a negative effect on competition. 
Because who could come in and compete with a shipyard that is 
already building the exact same ship?
    So, when we went out to industry and we asked them in our 
industry engagement, we realized that we were going to have a 
lack of competition if we did say, ``Build the exact same 
ship.'' We like the same--we would like to get the same ship. 
We like the ship. And, from a life-cycle perspective, that is 
the way to do it. On the other hand, in order to get the 
competition to drive down acquisition costs, as Ms. Mackin 
mentions is the way to do that, we want to open up as much as 
the ship as we can.
    The performance requirements are all the same. It has to 
meet all the same performance requirements. We took the things 
that were really important to us to have standardized, because 
we have got a large infrastructure associated with it in terms 
of training, and things like that, spare parts, so we specified 
things like electrical switchboards, engines, things that they 
couldn't change. And then the other things we said, ``OK, 
outside of these things, you can change, if you like.'' And 
that was done to, hopefully, increase competition, and let 
alternative vendors come in and then----
    Mr. Hunter. OK, let me ask it this way. I am all for 
competition, but--and maybe, Ms. Mackin, you can answer this, 
or maybe Mr. Offutt, too. If you have a batch where you make 20 
ships--let's just say you got a company that makes 20 ships. 
You then change a few specs on it and then you now say, ``We 
are going to recompete this as a brandnew thing, we are going 
to put it out there on the market and see who can bite at 
this,'' I don't know how anybody could still match the company 
that made the first 20 ships.
    No matter what you do, by changing requirements to try to 
get the competition out there, I don't understand how that 
works. Right? Because they don't have--you already have a 
pipeline, they already have their employees, they already have 
everything for those 20 ships. And to have a new company come 
in and say, ``Hey, we can do it cheaper,'' how? Because, 
usually, that is not the case in real life. Right?
    Ms. Mackin. I think it--the supply chain is a factor, but 
you know, the incumbent contractor might also sharpen his 
pencil, now that there is competition out there. And, with the 
trade space that other potential vendors have, they might be 
able to get a better price. It is possible, just by the basis 
of their own supply chain, the relationship with their vendors 
and suppliers.
    So, as I said, though, the Coast Guard will have to manage 
the requirements and make sure that the costs don't increase, 
as a result of this.
    Mr. Hunter. OK. How likely do you think that is, that costs 
will not increase as a result of this? You are dealing with a 
brandnew--let's say somebody brandnew gets this contract, 
right? You are dealing with a brandnew contractor that you 
might not be familiar with, a--different design specs in 
certain ways, but nothing crazy. Right? You said the majority 
is staying the same. How do costs not go up?
    I am just not understanding. Knowing how Government works, 
and acquisition stuff--at least on the armed services side--
there is no way that costs don't go up.
    Admiral Baffer. The major thing is it is a firm, fixed-
price contract. The contractors are bidding at a firm, fixed 
price that they are going to build that ship to meet those 
performance requirements at a fixed price. There is no share 
line. It is firm, fixed price. So that is really our--not 
guaranteed, but that is our warranty against the prices going 
up. It is not a cost-plus contract. You would certainly not 
want to do this with a different type of contracting vehicle.
    Mr. Hunter. All right. Anybody else?
    Mr. Garamendi. You have raised some very important 
questions, Mr. Chairman, and the answers are almost complete.
    The word ``life-cycle cost'' was used in this discussion a 
moment ago. And it is possible that the next tranche of ships--
20-plus--could be different in significant ways. And that could 
affect the life-cycle costs. You now have two different 
maintenance systems that you are going to have to have, and two 
different operational systems.
    The question, therefore, is are you considering the life-
cycle cost in the equation on the cheapest, best deal?
    Admiral Baffer. Ranking Member, not in terms of our 
selection criteria, but in terms of how we picked what items 
have to be the same, and what items could be changed. Those 
have the life-cycle cost----
    Mr. Garamendi. So in the----
    Admiral Baffer [continuing]. Attributes.
    Mr. Garamendi. At the outset you have taken into account 
the change that could occur in the life-cycle cost, and you 
have tried to eliminate those factors, or those issues, 
equipment, whatever, that would have an affect on the life-
cycle cost. Is that correct?
    Admiral Baffer. That is absolutely correct, Ranking Member.
    Mr. Garamendi. Ms. Mackin, do you agree?
    Ms. Mackin. Our understanding of the situation is as the 
admiral described it.
    Mr. Garamendi. And you will be watching closely as this----
    Ms. Mackin. We will be very interested to see how this 
turns out.
    Mr. Garamendi. I said earlier that this is an ongoing 
process. We were talking about the OPC at the time, but it is 
an ongoing process. And, as one member of the committee--and I 
suspect not the only member--as the process goes forward, I 
would like to know, at the critical stages, how is it going, 
and not wait until it is a done deal and then call you up here 
annually and find out why it didn't work out as we thought.
    Ms. Mackin. We would be happy to track that.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. That is my--I yield back.
    Mr. Hunter. The gentlelady from Florida is recognized.
    Ms. Frankel. Just follow up on that question. Are you 
required by law to take the cheapest bid? Or do you look to see 
what is the best quality?
    Admiral Baffer. These are--we use best value contracts.
    Ms. Frankel. Best value, OK.
    Admiral Baffer. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Frankel. All right. That is it. Thank you.
    Mr. Hunter. I think that is it. I would just like to just 
keep us--please keep us informed when the--when Secretary 
Johnson gives you a check for $70 million or so.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Hunter. Let us know when that happens, please. And we 
are going to try to keep working that here. So, just in case 
something else comes up and they don't do that, there is still 
maybe a possibility for a different funding stream, so that the 
whole schedule is not put off.
    But thank you all for being here. Appreciate your 
testimony. And I think we have learned a lot today. And we will 
just--we will stay on it. The hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
    
    
    
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