[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TERRORIST TRAVEL: VETTING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 17, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-176
__________
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
JIM JORDAN, Ohio ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
TIM WALBERG, Michigan Columbia
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TED LIEU, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey
MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands
KEN BUCK, Colorado MARK DeSAULNIER, California
MARK WALKER, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ROD BLUM, Iowa PETER WELCH, Vermont
JODY B. HICE, Georgia MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma
EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin
WILL HURD, Texas
GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
Sean McLaughlin, Staff Director
Andrew Arthur, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dimple Shah, Deputy Counsel National Security Subcommittee
William Marx, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on December 17, 2015................................ 1
WITNESSES
The Hon. Alan Bersin, Assistant Secretary for International
Affairs, Chief Diplomatic Officer for the Office of Policy,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 4
The Hon. Leon Rodriguez, Director, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 5
The Hon. Michele Thoren Bond, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Oral Statement............................................... 7
Written Statement............................................ 9
The Hon. Anne C. Richard, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Population, Refugees and Migration, U.S. Department of State
Oral Statement............................................... 17
Written Statement............................................ 19
APPENDIX
Article for the Record titled, ``San Bernardino Terrorists Didn't
Post Public Messages, FBI Director James Comey says,''
submitted by Ranking Member Cummings........................... 92
Article for the Record titled, ``Exclusive: Homeland Security
Passed on Plan to Vet Visa Applicants' Social Media,''
submitted by Chairman Chaffetz................................. 93
November 20, 2014, Memo from Secretary Jeh Johnson, submitted by
Chairman Chaffetz.............................................. 94
Questions for the Record for The Hon. Alan Bersin, submitted by
Chairman Chaffetz.............................................. 100
TERRORIST TRAVEL: VETTING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
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Thursday, December 17, 2015
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:03 a.m., in Room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Duncan, Jordan,
Walberg, Amash, Gosar, DesJarlais, Gowdy, Farenthold, Lummis,
Massie, Meadows, DeSantis, Mulvaney, Buck, Walker, Blum, Hice,
Russell, Carter, Grothman, Hurd, Palmer, Cummings, Maloney,
Lynch, Connolly, Cartwright, Duckworth, Kelly, Lawrence, Lieu,
Plaskett, DeSaulnier, and Lujan Grisham.
Chairman Chaffetz. Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform will come to order. Without objection, the chair is
authorized to declare a recess at any time.
The United States has the most generous immigration system
in the world. In fiscal year 2015, the State Department issued
almost 10 million visas for people seeking temporary entry into
the United States. The State Department issued an additional
531,463 immigrant visas last year alone. Those 10.5 million
immigrants and nonimmigrant visa holders joined an estimated 20
million others who entered the United States without visas
under the Visa Waiver Program. Our government also issued
1,075,063 border crossing cards to Mexican nationals in just
the first 10 months of fiscal year 2015.
There are an estimated, we are guessing, close to 10
million border crossing cards in circulation today. On top of
that, more than 1 million nonimmigrant students are lawfully
studying in the United States on student visas. Some 2,093,711
individuals were granted employment authorization in fiscal
year 2015. In fiscal year 2013, the last year for which
statistics are available, the United States granted asylum
status to 25,199 people. And from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal
year 2014, the number of individuals claiming a credible fear
of persecution in their home country increased some 921
percent.
If we can put that graphic up, I would appreciate it.
We are seeing a rapid rise in people coming to the United
States, stepping foot into our country and claiming asylum. We
have had a lot of discussion about refugees, who the
administration want to import to the United States of America,
but let's also understand the surge that is happening on our
borders. Just today on the front page of The Washington Post is
talking--has a front page story about the number of children
that are coming across our borders.
You can put that graphic down. Thank you.
The total number of asylum applications filed between
fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2014 more than doubled, going
from 47,000-plus to over 108,000. And 69,933 refugees were
resettled in the United States just last year, but that's an
incomplete picture, and, evidently, not enough for the Obama
administration. Not everyone who is--who is here came legally,
or obtained lawful status once they got here. In fiscal year
2013, 241,424--sorry--241,442 people were processed for
expedited removal. In fiscal year 2014, the Border Patrol made
486,651 apprehensions. Still, there's up to an estimated 15
million people that are here illegally. It's estimated that 40
percent of those folks entered legally and simply did not
leave.
These numbers beg the question of whether the United States
is doing enough to vet people who are applying to come to the
United States. Our world is changing, and along with it, the
types of threats that we encounter. Certainly with our
experience with 9/11, the Boston bombers, and the more recent
terrorist attacks make it clear that the immigration screening
process is a critical element in protecting the American
people.
Reviewing the background of foreign nationals before they
come to the United States is crucial to understanding who is
entering the United States, and the recent terrorist attacks in
San Bernardino and Paris highlight how important these
background checks have to be.
We saw some of the most horrific terror episodes that we've
had in our Nation recently in California: 14 people murdered,
wounding 21 more. It was the deadliest terrorist attack on the
United States soil since September 11. Tashfeen Malik came to
the United States on a fiance(e) visa before getting her green
card. She reportedly passed three background checks as she
emigrated to the United States from Pakistan.
First, DHS checked her name against American law
enforcement and national security databases, then the State
Department used her fingerprints to do a criminal background
check. Finally, when she was applying for a lawful permanent
resident status, DHS checked her out again. She cleared each
check, no red flags were raised. But it was pretty clear, now
looking back, that it was well known among her friends and
family that she supported violent jihad against the United
States.
It's being reported this morning, I think it's MSNBC, that
as early as 2011, Homeland Security was preparing to check
social media, and yet Homeland Security decided that was a bad
idea. Almost every story I've ever heard, read, and seen is
about--even the President has made comments about terrorists
who are really good at using social media. And back in 2011,
when Homeland Security was thinking about using social media,
the decision in Homeland Security was, bad idea. They made the
wrong call. They made the really wrong call.
It is unclear what DHS will actually do when it encounters
fraud via social media or other tools it utilizes for
applicants seeking admission to the United States. It's my
understanding that Homeland Security might start looking at it.
This is publicly available information. Under current law,
overstaying a visa, violating its terms, or committing fraud in
the immigration process is sufficient to render an alien
deportable, but now, pursuant to executive actions, such
conduct is not necessarily a priority for removal.
All too often, we hear stories of offenders who are
encountered by law enforcement and told they overstayed and
committed crimes, and then Jeh Johnson, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, puts out guidance and says even if you
commit sex crimes, even if you do certain other crimes, don't
necessarily need to deport them. They're here illegally, they
commit a crime, and Homeland Security is saying, use
discretion, we may not want to--we may not want to deport these
people. It's not a threat to public safety.
You tell a woman who's been raped that it's not--that it's
not against public safety to that have person here. We're going
to go through that in this committee here today.
The joint subcommittee hearing last Thursday left many of
this committee's members frustrated and confused about the
country's ability to address a growing threat. Homeland
Security sent its Deputy Assistant Secretary for Screening
Coordination Office to this committee. It was an embarrassment.
As the Deputy Assistant Secretary, her bio states she, quote,
``deters, detects, and denies access to, or withholds benefits
from individuals who may pose a threat to the United States of
America.'' She couldn't answer a single question. ``I don't
know.'' ``I'll have to get back with you.''
All the promises she made, by the way, she didn't fulfill.
She couldn't even tell me if more people come in by land, by
sea, or by air. She thinks most people come into this country
by air. And she's in charge of screening.
You can see why we're scared to death that this
administration, the Department of Homeland Security, the State
Department is not protecting the American people. She has
worked in that office since 2007. The basic lack of information
of a senior official raises serious concerns, it inspires
little confidence, and Americans have legitimate concerns about
the threat that radical extremists pose to their safety and the
safety of their friends, families, and communities.
I'd like to complete my opening remarks with a video. This
is of the national security advisor, and then followed up by--
followed up by--you'll see. It will speak for itself.
[Video shown.]
Chairman Chaffetz. At least the FBI Director calls it like
it is. At least the FBI Director was telling us candidly what's
happening out there. And in the case of the most recent
terrorist attacks, when the person maybe hasn't been here, or
there are other circumstances, you can see why we have great
cause for concern.
So we have a series of questions today. What I'd like to do
is introduce the panel, allow for their opening statements,
then we will have the opening statement from Mr. Cummings, and
we will go to questions from there.
I would--I will hold the record open for 5 legislative days
for any members who would like to submit a written statement.
We're now going to recognize our witnesses. We're pleased
to welcome the Honorable Alan Bersin, Assistant Secretary for
International Affairs and Chief Diplomatic Officer for the
Office of Policy at the United States Department of Homeland
Security; the Honorable Leon Rodriguez, Director of the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services; the Honorable
Michele Thoren Bond, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of
Consular Affairs at the United States Department of State; and
the Honorable Anne Richard, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration, United States Department
of State. We welcome you all, and thank you for being here.
Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses are sworn before
they testify. If you will please rise and raise your right
hand.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are
about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth?
Thank you. Please be seated.
And let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in
the affirmative.
In order to allow time for discussion, we would appreciate
if you please limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes. Your
entire written record will be--statement will be made part of
the record. We'll do the four opening statements, and then
we'll hear the opening statement from Mr. Cummings, and then we
will go to questions from there. Mr. Bersin, you are now
recognized for 5 minutes.
WITNESS STATEMENTS
STATEMENT OF ALAN BERSIN
Mr. Bersin. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. The last time I had the privilege of being here, it
was to discuss the issue of Libya. I'm happy to be here this
morning. I look forward to our dialogue.
I, also, in this 15th year since 2001, since September 11,
2001, want to express the support and sympathy that I and my
family feel, and I'm sure my colleagues on the panel share and
our colleagues across Federal service, for the families of
the--those killed in San Bernardino and for the families and
the victims who were injured, the 21 victims injured in that
terrorist attack.
Our written testimonies and the statements submitted to the
committee actually describe, in some detail, the systems that
have been put in place for screening of terrorist travel. What
I'd like to do in the 4 minutes I have left is to give you an
overview to look at the system, and the four major shaping
factors that have built it since 9/11. And I point out that
this is a system that was built under the leadership of two
presidents, one Republican and one Democrat; it was built under
the leadership of four Homeland Security Secretaries, two
Democratic and two Republican; it was built under four
Secretaries of State, two Republicans and two Democrats.
What we faced after 9/11 was a situation in which we did
not have a unified system. I was the United States Attorney in
southern California, and I recall in the 1990s that there were
terrorist watch lists in each of the various departments. We
were stovepiped. In the aftermath in the 14 years since 9/11,
we have built a system that can--that brings together the
information of the United States Government, and
institutionalizes it in a multiagency way. We have the National
Counterterrorism Center, the NCTC, that maintains the TIDE, the
Terrorist Identities Database Environment; we have the TSDB,
the Terrorist Screening Database, managed by a multiagency
terrorist screening center, the terrorist watch list. We
actually have brought the system together and we do
communicate, and I trust during this hearing, we will have an
opportunity to discuss that.
The second major shaping influence was we realized that 98
or 99 percent of all trade and travel into the United States is
perfectly lawful and legitimate, and therefore, we needed to
see security and travel facilitation and trade not as being
mutually exclusive, but as being part of the same process. We
needed to introduce a risk management into the trade and travel
vetting systems.
The third influence was that we recognized, in a global
world where there's a massive instantaneous constant flow of
goods, people, ideas, capital, electrons, images, and ideas,
that, in fact, protecting the homeland, the Homeland Security
enterprise is inherently transnational. And we built out a
system in which, together with the State Department, the
Defense Department, the intelligence agencies, DHS has a
presence abroad to watch the movement of cargo and move--and
the movement of persons toward the homeland.
And fourthly, what we've seen recently, and that is shaping
the system now, is that, in fact, we have a transnational
threat that is cyber-enabled, and that our terrorist enemies
are actually using the Internet to radicalize those who listen
to their message and are receptive to it.
So at end, what we have built, and what we need to continue
to build, hopefully in a bipartisan fashion, is a system that
protects the American people by building up a Homeland Security
enterprise that takes into account predeparture toward the
United States, departure toward the United States, entry at the
United States, and then exit from the United States in due
course.
Lastly, Mr. Chairman, I would be--with all due respect, I
would be remiss if I did not say on behalf of Kelli Ann
Burriesci, that I know of no other career person in the policy
office that I'm responsible for who is more dedicated, more
knowledgeable about screening. The fact of the matter is, Mr.
Chairman, she came to this hearing expecting to talk about the
Visa Waiver Program, and she was hardly questioned at all about
it. I make no apologies for her. She is first-rate. She's an
American, she's a patriot, and I regret that you came away with
a different impression.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. That, we will be discussing.
Mr. Rodriguez, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF LEON RODRIGUEZ
Mr. Rodriguez. Good morning, chairman, ranking member,
members of the committee. One of our--our very most obligation
as public servants is to safeguard public safety and national
security. That is particularly true when we are briefing
benefits and privileges. So when we give somebody a driver's
license, we require a test so we know that that person will
drive safely. When we give professionals licenses, we test them
to know that they can practice their professions in a manner
that poses minimal threat of harm. We work in every respect in
what we do to minimize risk. That is particularly true in the
area of citizenship and immigration. When we grant citizenship
and immigration benefits, we take a number of safeguards to
protect the national security.
An observation made by Congressman Gowdy last week at a
hearing before his subcommittee resonated with me particularly,
and he challenged us that when incidents occur, we be talking
not just about what we are doing in response to that incident,
but that we really be thinking in terms of prevention of future
challenges. And as I reflected on that, that, in fact, has been
our posture and will continue to be our posture in the future,
and I'll give a few examples.
We are, as Secretary Johnson has frequently observed, in an
evolving threat environment. More and more, the threats are not
the threats posed by organizations acting in a concerted
manner, but increasingly those threats are the threats of
isolated individuals, or isolated groups of people, perhaps
inspired by the organizations that present a threat to our
country. In light of that combination of threats, the organized
and also the isolated threats, we have been taking a number of
measures over the past few years to reinforce the work that we
do. One clear example is the institution of the interagency
check that we apply in refugee vetting and in other
environments. That gives us a very organized, a very methodical
way to query against intelligence databases when we are
screening particular individuals.
So I know there have been discussions about individuals who
entered the United States at earlier times. Some of those
individuals were not subject to that sort of screening. They
would be today, and, in many cases, that would have prevented
their entry.
When we screen Syrian refugees, we--we prescreen cases
before interviews are conducted. That is another innovation in
a spirit of prevention.
And we have been piloting the use of social media for the
vetting of particular categories of people seeking individuals.
There have, in fact, been three pilots that USCIS has used in
combination with its intelligence community and law enforcement
partners to screen particular categories of individuals seeking
immigration benefits. We have already concluded two of those
pilots, which operated on a relatively small group of people.
We have learned a number of important lessons from that pilot,
which, no doubt, I will have an opportunity to expand on those
lessons in this hearing, and now we are in a--the midst of a
third pilot, which, in fact, has been applied and is in the
process of being applied to literally thousands of applicants
for immigration benefits.
So any thought that the Department of Homeland Security had
simply foregone the use of social media for purposes of
immigration screening is a mistaken thought. We have not spoken
about it in great detail, because the fact is the more we speak
about it, the more those who will use it will cease to use it,
knowing that we will be examining that content.
What happened in San Bernardino is a tragedy, and we should
take no other lesson from what happened in San Bernardino that
we need to look at what we do and make sure that something like
that does not happen again, that a tragedy of that type does
not happen again. And, in fact, we have been working together
with our partners at the State Department, our partners
elsewhere in DHS, our partners in the intelligence community,
to further look at opportunities to strengthen the manner in
which we screen individuals.
As I have read news accounts of what occurred in San
Bernardino, I am struck by the fact that among the victims in
San Bernardino are individuals who news reports related were
immigrants themselves, who had come from all over the world,
who had come here to live lives of service, serving the most
vulnerable people in our society. And I do feel that my oath
applies to those individuals as well as all of the victims of
San Bernardino to protect them.
While immigration is a privilege as to any one individual,
it is not a luxury for our country. It is necessary for the
vitality of our economy, it is necessary for the stability and
unity of our families, it is fundamental to our values, and I
pledge to operate my part of the immigration system in a way
that maximizes every opportunity that we have to protect the
American people, to protect our national security.
Thank you, Chairman, for inviting us here today.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. Thank you.
Ms. Bond, you're now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MICHELE THOREN BOND
Ms. Bond. Thank you, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member
Cummings, and distinguished members of the committee. As has
been described by my colleagues from the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of State, along with partner agencies
throughout the Federal Government, have built a layered visa
and border security screening system in order to review and
assess the visa eligibility and status of foreign visitors from
their visa applications throughout their travel to and arrival
in the United States. We take our commitment to protect
America's borders and citizens seriously, and we constantly
analyze and update clearance procedures and look for new ways
to do an even better vetting process.
My written statement, which I request be put in the record,
describes the screening regimen that applies to all visa
categories. And although the tragedy, the terrorist attack in
San Bernardino sparked particular interest in the fiance(e)
visa, we apply equally rigorous security screening to all visa
applicants, all travelers to the United States.
The vast majority of visa applicants, and all immigrant and
fiance(e) visa applicants, are interviewed by a consular
officer. And the information that has been provided describes
the extensive training which is provided to the officers: A
strong emphasis on border security and fraud prevention,
interagency coordination, how to conduct those interviews, how
to ensure that the name check process throughout the
interagency is thoroughly done, all applicants' data are vetted
in this interagency process against databases that contain
millions of records of individuals found ineligible for visas,
or regarding whom potentially derogatory information exists,
including the Terrorist Identity Database, which was referred
to. We fingerprint them and screen theme against DHS and FBI
databases of known suspected terrorists, wanted persons,
immigration law violators, and criminals.
We screen their photos against the photos are known or
suspected terrorists and the entire gallery of individuals who
have ever applied for a visa, which is contained in our
database at the State Department.
When the interagency screening process generates a red
light hit, the consular officer suspends visa processing and
submits the application for a Washington-based interagency
review conducted by Federal law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, and the Department of State.
At individual overseas posts, we have additional screening
done by DHS's visa security program staff and the PATRIOT
system. The visa security units are located in over 20 high-
threat posts, and ICE special agents assigned to the visa
security units provide onsite vetting of visa applications and
other law enforcement support to consular officers.
Security reviews do not stop when the visa is issued. The
Department and partner agencies continuously match new threat
information with our records of existing visas or Visa Waiver
Program travelers, and we use our authority to revoke these as
when indicated. Since 2001, the Department has revoked over
122,000 visas for a variety of reasons, including nearly 9,500
for suspected links to terrorism.
We are engaged with interagency partners in the senior
level review of the fiance(e) visa process ordered by President
Obama, and I expect that recommendations developed in this
review will apply to all visa screening.
We're also working with the Department of Homeland Security
and the Bureau of Counterterrorism at the Department on
security screening of Visa Waiver Program travelers and
enhancing the data sharing commitments required for VWP
membership.
We are investigating the applicability of advanced
technology in data analysis, risk screening, and credibility
assessment tools.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, and distinguished
members, the Department of State has no higher priority than
the safety of our fellow citizens at home and abroad, and the
security of the traveling public. Every visa decision is a
national security decision. There is nothing routine about our
work. We appreciate the support of Congress as we continuously
work to strengthen our defenses.
Mr. Chairman, I know you have visited consular sections in
Mexico. I encourage every one of you to visit our consular
sections when you are abroad, to meet with our staff, and to
observe for yourselves the process that applicants undergo.
I look forward to your questions.
[Prepared statement of Ms. Bond follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
Ms. Richard, you're now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ANNE C. RICHARD
Ms. Richard. Chairman Chaffetz, and distinguished members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before this committee regarding U.S. Refugee Admissions
program, and security vetting for refugees considered for
resettlement in the United States.
In fiscal year 2015, nearly 70,000 refugees of 67 different
nationalities were admitted for permanent resettlement in the
United States, including 1,700 Syrians. In fiscal year 2016,
the President has determined that we should increase the
overall number to 85,000, including at least 10,000 Syrians. We
recognize that admitting more Syrian refugees to the United
States is only part of the solution to the current global
refugee and migration crisis, but it is in keeping with our
American tradition. It shows the world that we seek to provide
refuge for those most in need; it sets an example for others to
follow; and it adds to the diversity and strength of American
society.
Resettlement is offered to refugees who are among the most
vulnerable, people for whom a return to Syria someday would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, such as women and girls
at risk, survivors of torture, children and adolescents at
risk, and refugees with medical needs, disabilities, or
physical or legal protection needs.
Families or individuals who could benefit the most from
resettlement are referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions
program by the UNHCR, the U.N. refugee agency. But let me make
clear, the UN refugee agency does not determine who comes to
the United States. That determination is made by the Department
of Homeland Security.
I know the murderous attacks in Paris on November 13 have
raised many questions about the spillover of not just migrants
to Europe, but also the spread of violence from war zones in
the Middle East to the streets of a major European capital.
Let me assure you that the entire executive branch and the
State Department that I represent, has the safety and security
of Americans as our highest priority. As an essential
fundamental part of the U.S. Refugee Admissions program, we
screen applicants carefully in an effort to ensure that no one
who poses a threat to the safety and security of Americans is
able to enter our country. Consequently, resettlement is a
deliberate process that can take 18 to 24 months.
Refugees of all nationalities considered for admission to
the United States undergo intensive security screening
involving multiple Federal intelligence, security, and law
enforcement agencies, including the National Counterterrorism
Center, the FBI's Terror Screening Center, and the Departments
of Homeland Security, State, and Defense.
And I want to make clear that we work in very close
partnership with USCIS that is headed by Leon Rodriguez, and so
it is--our offices are in constant touch.
Our responsibility is to help prepare the refugees for
their interview, and to prepare them, those who qualify, for
life in the United States. DHS, though, has the heavy burden of
determining whether someone qualifies for a refugee, and
screening out anyone who can pose a possible threat. No one has
a right to come to the United States as a refugee, and so if
there's any doubt, they screen people out.
Applicants to the U.S. Refugee Admissions program, as you
know, are currently subject to the highest level of security
checks of any category of travel to the United States. These
safeguards include biometric or fingerprint and biographic
checks, and a lengthy in-person overseas interview by
specially-trained DHS officers, who scrutinize the applicant's
explanation of individual circumstances to ensure the applicant
is a bona fide refugee, and is not known to present security
concerns to the U.S.
The vast majority of the 3 million refugees who have been
admitted to the United States since the Vietnam era, including
from some of the most troubled regions in the world, have
proven to be hardworking and productive residents. They pay
taxes, send their children to school, and after 5 years, many
take the test to become citizens. Some serve in the U.S.
military and undertake other forms of service for their
communities and our country.
I'm happy to answer any questions you may have about our
refugee resettlement program, or our contributions to aid
refugees and victims of conflict overseas and our diplomatic
efforts related to humanitarian operations around the world.
Thank you.
[Prepared statement of Ms. Richard follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
We'll now recognize our ranking member, Mr. Cummings of
Maryland.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank
you for calling this hearing.
And I think that if we were to--as I listened to the
testimony, there are two words that ring out for me, and I hope
that it will be the theme of this hearing, and they are two
words that I repeat to my staff over and over and over again:
effectiveness and efficiency, effectiveness and efficiency.
I believe that I speak for every member of this committee
when I express our condemnation for the actions of these two
depraved terrorists, Syed Farook and Tashfeen Malik, who
murdered 14 innocent people in cold blood, and injured many,
many others in their sickening rampage in California just 2
weeks ago. Certainly we send our prayers to the people who were
injured and to the families of the innocent victims. We know
that their lives will be changed forever by this horrific act.
We also extend our profound thanks to the hundreds of law
enforcement officials, emergency first responders, and
healthcare providers who responded then and are still
responding today to this act of cowardice and evil.
This attack was unusual because it was carried out by a
husband, a United States citizen, and a woman who came into our
country on a fiance(e) visa, married this man and then had a
baby with him, and their baby was only 6 months old at the time
of the attack.
Last week, the Director of the FBI, James Comey, testified
before the Senate that based on the FBI's ongoing
investigation, it appears that both Mr. Farook and Ms. Malik
were radicalized before Malik entered the United States.
Director Comey explained yesterday, however, that contrary
to suggestion that a simple Google search would have revealed
Malik's radicalism, these terrorists did not post their
messages on publicly available social media. Director Comey
stated, and I quote, ``We found no evidence of a posting on
social media by either of them at that period of time or
thereafter reflecting their commitment to jihad or martyrdom,''
end of quote.
Director Comey also said this, and I quote, ``I see no
indication that either of these killers came across our screen,
tripped any tripwires,'' end of quote. He also stated that he
had not seen anything that, quote, ``should have put them on
our screen,'' end of quote.
Unfortunately, due to the extremely short turnaround for
today's hearing, we do not have anyone here from the FBI.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to place this Fox
News story into the record, which is entitled, ``San Bernardino
Terrorists Didn't Post Public Messages, FBI Director Comey
Says.''
Chairman Chaffetz. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So if a search of the public social media would not, in
fact, have prevented the attack, the question before us today
is what else, and this is the question that is so vital to our
witnesses and we need to know this--and by the way, Mr.
Rodriguez, I agree with you when you referred to our
distinguished--distinguished gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
Gowdy, about preventing things--but the question is, what else
needs to be done to identify foreign nationals seeking to enter
the United States who pose a risk to our national security?
Again, effectiveness and efficiency. For example, should
the United States agencies attempt to access password-protected
platforms, like the one reportedly used by Mr. Malik? How
should they identify people who use alternate identities, which
law enforcement officials also believe Malik apparently used?
Which agency should do it, the State Department? The DHS? The
FBI? Our intelligence agencies? All of them?
And once they conduct the screening, how should they report
the results? Should they go into the National Counterterrorism
Center's TIDE database? The FBI's terrorist screening database?
Or others?
And, finally, should Federal agencies be able to access
communications over social media accounts of U.S. citizens who
sponsor foreign nationals, and if so, under what circumstances?
These are all very difficult questions, and a lot of the
answers may involve classified information.
I understand that there are several pilot programs already
in the works. I also understand that the President has ordered
a review, that is currently ongoing.
Our job is to grapple with these issues and develop
solutions that help protect this great Nation. The American
people expect aggressive and urgent action to screen people
entering the country to ensure that they do not pose risks to
our national security. Again, effectiveness and efficiency.
For these reasons, I believe that one of the most
constructive steps our committee can take today is to examine
the various information databases used by Federal agencies to
make sure they are sharing as much information as possible to
promote our national security.
And so I thank our State Department and DHS witnesses for
being here on such short notice, and I look forward to your
testimony as you address that question of how we can be more
effective and efficient.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your
courtesy, and I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
We'll now recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bersin, in your opening statement, you said that the
witness we had last week, Ms. Burriesci, was a patriot, so no
one's questioning that, but then you also said that she came
prepared to answer questions about the Visa Waiver Program last
week. I just want to read from the transcript last week. Here
was question one.
``How many Visa Waiver Program overstays are there
currently in the United States?'' Ms. Burriesci said, ``I
didn't bring that number.''
Second question, ``How many overstays in the Visa Waiver
Program may have traveled to Syria before they got here? Do you
have that number?'' Her response, ``I don't know that number.''
Final question was ``How many people came from a Visa
Waiver Program country that are here today and then may have
been in Syria or Iraq before they came here? Do we know that?''
``I don't have that answer.''
So she obviously wasn't prepared to answer questions about
the subject you told her.
Now, does Ms. Burriesci work for you, Mr. Bersin?
Mr. Bersin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. So why didn't you just come last week?
Mr. Bersin. I was in London with Secretary Johnson at the
G6 plus 1 meeting with----
Mr. Jordan. Are you prepared to answer the questions----
Mr. Bersin. --Homeland Security----
Mr. Jordan. --today?
Mr. Bersin. --on the Paris attacks.
Mr. Jordan. We sent an email asking for some of these
numbers. Are you prepared to give us the answers today?
Mr. Bersin. With regard to overstays, as was indicated, Mr.
Jordan, the--this has been an issue spanning both Republican
and Democratic administrations with regard to the overstay.
Mr. Jordan. Let me just ask you some specifics. How many
Visa Waiver Program travelers are in the country today?
Mr. Bersin. Sir, if you give me an opportunity, I'd be
pleased to respond to your question.
Mr. Jordan. Okay.
Mr. Bersin. The overstay report, which has been the subject
of attention to this committee and to the Congress for many
years, if you'd like to understand why that report has not been
produced despite 20 years of requests, I'd be happy to provide
that.
Mr. Jordan. I'm not asking for a report, I'm asking for a
number. How many people--how many Visa Waiver Program travelers
are in the country today? Just the overall number, not even
overstays, just how many are here today?
Mr. Bersin. There are 20 million--there are 20 million
persons who enter the country each year on the Visa Waiver
Program.
Mr. Jordan. Twenty million a year. Do we know how many are
here today?
Mr. Bersin. I do not know. I cannot give you a number on--
given the way in which the 90 days----
Mr. Jordan. Of that 20 million, how many--how many
overstays are here in a year's time, then----
Mr. Bersin. We do not track----
Mr. Jordan. --how many overstays?
Mr. Bersin. We track overstays and we are preparing a
report for that. We do not have a number that has been vet----
Mr. Jordan. Let me ask you this: Of the 20 million who come
in here in a year, do we know how many may have been to Syria
and/or Iraq, some traveled there to Syria and Iraq and then
come to the United States in the Visa Waiver Program. Do we
know?
Mr. Bersin. The Homeland Security investigations, the
counterterrorism and criminal exploitation unit has opened up a
number of investigations with respect to the number of
Syrians----
Mr. Jordan. But do we know a number?
Mr. Bersin. --who have entered this country.
Mr. Jordan. You said 20 million come in the Visa Waiver
Program in a year, a bunch of those overstay. We know that. You
can't give me that number. I'm asking, of the people who come
on the Visa Waiver Program travelers, of those people, do we
know of any of those who were in Syria and Iraq some time in
the year or so before they come here on the Visa Waiver
Program?
Mr. Bersin. We do. There were 113 investigations opened up
by Homeland Security investigations with regard to that matter,
Mr. Jordan, and the bulk of those investigations have actually
been closed. And, in fact, there are 18 ongoing investigations
associated with Syrian nationals.
Mr. Jordan. Did that 113 number specific--specific to the
question I asked, people in the Visa Waiver Program who may
have traveled to--who did travel to Syria or Iraq before they
came here?
Mr. Bersin. I do not have a specific number. I'm telling
you that on the overstays that were identified----
Mr. Jordan. So it could be much higher than 113?
Mr. Bersin. Mr. Jordan, I am very eager to answer your
questions, but I cannot answer----
Mr. Jordan. And I've got a minute and 20 seconds.
Mr. Bersin. --questions if you interrupt me every time I
begin to do so.
Mr. Jordan. All right. I'm sorry. Keep going.
Mr. Bersin. Thank you. There are investigations, and over
the last year in fiscal year 2015, there have been 118
investigations of Syrians. I cannot tell you which ones of
those entered the country on the Visa Waiver Program. I can
tell you that those were overstays that have been identified as
having come from Syria. Of that 108--118, 11 were
administratively arrested, and the remainder were closed, with
the exception of 18 ongoing investigations----
Mr. Jordan. Okay.
Mr. Bersin. --which are connected to Syrians and overstays.
Mr. Jordan. All right. I'm--that gives us a few seconds.
Let me switch subjects.
This news account that I think was MSNBC, top officials of
the Department of Homeland Security considered a specific
policy to strengthen security screenings for foreign visa
applicants' social media accounts, but that proposal was
ultimately rejected.
Were you part of the team that put together the memorandum
and then rejected the idea of actually screening potential
entrants into the country's social media accounts?
Mr. Bersin. No, sir. I was not in the Office of Policy at
that point. And I do know that Secretary Johnson has encouraged
the components of DHS to continue the work referenced by
Director Rodriguez to continue the work they've been engaged in
with regard to social media.
I'm aware of no memorandum, secret or otherwise, that bars
components of DHS from using social media.
Mr. Jordan. Mr. Chairman, real quick. One different--
different subject, but in your opening statement, Mr. Bersin,
you mentioned the last time you testified in front of Congress,
you testified about Libya. I'm just curious. Do you think the
situation in Libya today is more stable than it was in 2011, or
less stable?
Mr. Bersin. The hearing on which----
Mr. Jordan. I'm asking your opinion on the stability of
Libya today.
Mr. Bersin. I am--I would defer to the State Department. In
my personal opinion, which is not relevant, it's not any more
stable, but it had nothing to do with the issue that was before
this committee.
Mr. Jordan. Is it true ISIL is down in Libya as well?
Chairman Chaffetz. The gentleman's time has expired.
Go ahead and answer the question, Mr. Bersin.
Mr. Bersin. I'll--I'll defer to the State Department on
that judgment.
Chairman Chaffetz. You are the chief diplomatic officer for
policy. I think your opinion is relevant.
Mr. Bersin. What is that--the question, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Chaffetz. The question Mr. Jordan answered--or
asked you, what is your opinion of that question? Do you----
Mr. Bersin. Having to do with ISIL?
Chairman Chaffetz. Yes.
Mr. Bersin. Or with Libya?
Chairman Chaffetz. Well, both.
Mr. Bersin. I gave the answer with regard to Libya. And
with regard to ISIL, I think ISIL remains a substantial threat,
that is being treated as such by every rational political
leader I know across the world, in addition to the European
leaders that Secretary Johnson, Attorney General Lynch met with
last week in London.
Chairman Chaffetz. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Lynch, is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning. I want to thank the witnesses for helping the
committee with its work and for your service to our country.
I do want to go back, Secretary Bersin, about the overstay
issue, because last week, Ms. Burriesci, who is a fine person,
she just didn't have her numbers person with her, she had four
staff, but they had no numbers for us, and that was tragic,
unresponsive to a huge number of questions, unfortunately, and
I'm sure she's a fine person, but we're after the facts, and
she didn't have many.
Okay. So she told us last week--we had to recess the
hearing so she could call the office. She told us that 20
million people a year come in under the Visa Waiver Program.
She said that there was 2 percent overstay each year, that's
what she told us, which comes to 400,000 overstays per year.
And are you telling me something different here today?
Mr. Bersin. The--the estimate is in that--in that range,
but the number that----
Mr. Lynch. Okay. I'm good with that. I don't want to eat up
my time on that, but I just--I just thought you--I was going to
come out of this hearing with less facts than what I came in
with.
Mr. Bersin. But I did--I did want to say that this--this
issue of the overstay and the submission of a report, which is
underway, and I admit----
Mr. Lynch. It's been underway a long time. I'm not a young
man, so I don't even want to do anything more on this, because
I just don't think that's happening. We've been promised that
information for years, and----
Mr. Bersin. Well, I----
Mr. Lynch. --that ain't happening. All right.
Mr. Bersin. I--I----
Mr. Lynch. When I see the report, I'll believe it. All
right.
Mr. Bersin. Fair enough.
Mr. Lynch. Let me go on. Look, between what Director Comey
has said even just yesterday--look, if you talk to the folks in
our national security community, the Islamic State is using
social media as a main recruiting tool; this is their game,
this is their world, they're doing this all over the globe. And
yet when we look at what Department of Homeland Security is
doing, we don't have a regular, widespread requirement that our
people review the social media of people coming from trouble
areas where you've got a lot of terrorists, places like
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and Tunisia, parts of north
Africa, where you've got, you know, a lot of support for
radical jihad, violent jihad, we're not reviewing the social
media, even though that's the world in which they operate, and
we don't regularly review that, and that's a major problem.
So, look, I think if someone is applying for citizenship to
the United States, it is entirely reasonable that we ask for
their social media contacts, their information that--these
people don't radicalize overnight. A lot of them have had
public statements, not--not their private emails. And I know
that Tashfeen Malik, maybe her stuff was direct and it was
private, we should have got that anyway. We should have said we
want your social media, both your private stuff and the public
stuff. That's entirely reasonable to ask people who are coming
from countries that are known to sponsor terrorism.
Why aren't we doing that? Why aren't we asking people for
their--look, my colleges--you know, I represent Massachusetts.
Fifty-two percent of our colleges request all the information
on that social media from applicants to college. Half of our
employers do. They want to know what's going on on your--you
know, your Facebook, you know, your social media.
If the employers--if half of the employers in America are
doing that in the private sector, if your colleges are doing it
for students, why the hell wouldn't Department of Homeland
Security do it for someone coming from a terrorist country, or
a country that sponsors terrorism, coming into the United
States? It would seem to be, you know, I dare say, a no-
brainer, but--but it's not happening. So it's got me worried
that we're not doing any of this.
Anybody care to respond to that?
Mr. Rodriguez. Yeah. I can--I can certainly take part of
that question, Congressman. I think, as I tried to make clear
in my opening remarks, we have been piloting, and, again, the
number of cases touched by----
Mr. Lynch. Very few, though. It's a pilot program. I know
you've got some pilot programs there, but we've got millions
and millions of people that are out there that want to come
into this country, and we're doing a very small bit. And we
don't even look at their public stuff. That's what kills me.
DHS doesn't even regularly require that their--their
administration officers for people coming--we don't even look
at their public stuff.
Mr. Rodriguez. To be clear, we are moving--both in the
refugee and other immigration contexts, we have been doing some
of it. We are working to develop more of it.
Mr. Lynch. You've got three very small pilot programs
going, and I--look, you know, we've talked to the folks
overseas about what they're doing, and it's not regular, it's
not routine, it's not widespread, just to be fair, and even
our--even--and I talked to you before the hearing about what's
going on in Beirut. We haven't had a regular vetting team there
in a year. They fly in, they fly out, because of the conditions
there. But I don't want happy talk, and sometimes I hear a lot
of that, that we're doing fine overseas, and when I drove down,
when I go to Beirut, you know, when I go to the Syrian border,
when you go to Amman, what you're telling us, the--is just
happy talk.
And they say they don't have the resources. They didn't
have the resources when we had, you know, 160 applicants a
year--excuse me, a week, 160 a week, now they're getting 16,000
a week, and we have the same amount of resources we had before
to vet them. It just--it just troubles me greatly. I don't--I
don't think we're doing a good job, and I think we can do
better. And I'd like to get the resources and the people to vet
people well, and then if we deem them eligible, then you could
take them in as refugees, but do--we can be smart and then we
can be compassionate, but right now, it doesn't seem like we're
doing either.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. The gentleman's time has expired. We'll
now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rodriguez, going back to that issue that my colleague,
Mr. Lynch, broached with you, DHS has indicated that it began
three pilot programs, we've talked about that, to include
social media screening in the visa adjudication process in the
fall of 2014.
Has DHS ever had a policy preventing adjudicators and
attorneys from reviewing applicants' social media posts?
Mr. Rodriguez. I am not aware of a policy that prevented it
per se. There have obviously--there are various privacy and
other issues that govern, but there has never been a privacy
per se. And certainly, during just about the entire time that
I've been director, and that Secretary Johnson has been
Secretary, what we have been doing is, in fact, piloting and
developing the capacity to use social media in a--in a
thoughtful, functional manner for vetting purposes.
Mr. Walberg. Well, the ``per se''--the ``per se'' bothers
me a bit.
Mr. Rodriguez. I'm sorry, sir?
Mr. Walberg. The ``per se'' bothers me a bit. You're
indicating that there is no direct policy preventing----
Mr. Rodriguez. I am not aware of a policy. I am not----
Mr. Walberg. Then why wasn't----
Mr. Rodriguez. I----
Mr. Walberg. Then why wasn't it happening?
Mr. Rodriguez. Yeah. If I said that, I wouldn't read too
much into the phrase ``per se.'' I am not aware of there ever
having been a policy that prohibited the use of social media.
Mr. Walberg. Well, then we have--we have conflicting
reports, then, in the last several days----
Mr. Rodriguez. Well----
Mr. Walberg. --that there was and there wasn't.
Mr. Rodriguez. Again, I know full well that during my
tenure as director, we have, in fact, been developing and
piloting that capacity.
Mr. Walberg. So it's a good policy that we look into social
media?
Mr. Rodriguez. I do believe, and I believe that many of my
intelligence community partners have the same view, that there
is information of vetting value that may be garnered from
social media.
Mr. Walberg. And it will be ramped up?
Mr. Rodriguez. We are in the process of doing that as we
speak.
Mr. Walberg. Mr. Bersin, why did DHS wait, if there are
three basic pilot projects, wait until 2014 to create these
pilots?
Mr. Bersin. The activities, with regard to social media,
have been conducted by the components, principally CIS, Mr.
Rodriguez's agency; Homeland Security investigations, or ICE;
and CBP have conducted their activities. There was no
headquarters' overarching policy prohibiting that. To the
contrary, these pilots have been going on under Secretary
Johnson's leadership, and he's encouraged the components to--to
actually expand their ongoing efforts.
Mr. Walberg. Why did they wait until 2014 to initiate these
pilots? Mr. Rodriguez, could you help me on that?
Mr. Rodriguez. I'm sorry.
Mr. Walberg. Why did we wait till 2014 to initiate, or to
create these pilot projects?
Mr. Rodriguez. I don't know. Again, during my tenure----
Chairman Chaffetz. I think you need to--if you can bring
the microphone----
Mr. Rodriguez. --we have been busy doing this. So I am
really unable today to speak to what occurred before. I
certainly would be happy to get that information, to the extent
that it's not privileged, and get that before the committee.
Mr. Walberg. When could we get that? We're getting used to
hearing we don't have that information here in this----
Mr. Rodriguez. Yeah. I--I think for us here, the main point
is we are--we are doing it. One of the reasons--I just don't
know what occurred years before I got here.
What we can say now is we are doing it, we are doing it in
an abundant manner, we are looking to have it actually be
useful for screening purposes. That seems to me the most
important discussion. What happened 3 or 4 or 5 years ago, I
can't speak to that, sir.
Mr. Walberg. What have been the results of what you're
doing now?
Mr. Rodriguez. Well, I think there--there is less there
that is actually of screening value than you would expect, at
least in those small early samples. Some of the things that we
have seen have been more ambiguous than clear. There are
challenges in terms of people using foreign alphabets to post.
That's a capacity that will need to be developed. As everybody
has observed, many of these communications, as we've now
learned from the Director, may have applied in the San
Bernardino situation, are private communications, they're not
openly--open posts. Those are challenges that we've identified.
That said, I think we all continue to believe that there is
a potential for there to be information of screening value,
particularly as Congressman Lynch, and I think you have also
observed, in particularly high-risk environments.
Mr. Walberg. Well, I think recent events have shown there
is probably significant, significant important information that
we can get using the information gained from social media.
Mr. Rodriguez. We do not disagree.
Mr. Walberg. And we would hope that that would continue.
And we hope to get more answers, and not to push back that this
is something that we don't know. We have to know that. And when
we hear, as we saw on the video earlier, the White House
representative telling us that we are doing everything in our
vetting process to secure, and then we see the results that are
horrendous taking place, like in San Bernardino, we have got a
problem. And I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. The gentleman yields back. I now
recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Lieu, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you. Let me first thank the panel for their
public service. I have a question for Mr. Rodriguez, but first
I want to make a statement. I am honored to be a U.S. citizen,
and that's because you get amazing benefits of being a citizen
of the most amazing country in the world, one of which the
Constitution applies to you against your government. But for
some time, it does seem to me that the executive branch has
been blurring the lines between U.S. citizens and foreign
nationals, and sometimes you got it on backwards. Let me give
you three examples.
In 2011, the executive branch deliberately, and I believe
wrongfully, executed an American citizen via a drone strike.
The Department of Justice has now said at least four Americans
have been killed by U.S. drone strikes, four American citizens.
Second example, the executive branch, through the NSA, has
been seizing hundreds of millions of phone records of U.S.
citizens. They knew who we called, when we called, who called
us, the duration of those calls, and it got so bad that
Congress had to step in early this year, and prevent NSA from
violating the Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. citizens.
And then the third example, which is this social media,
there has been multiple reports, ABC News says that a secret
U.S. policy blocks agents from looking at social media of folks
seeking entry into the United States new visa program. The Hill
reports immigration officials prohibited from looking at visa
applicants. Politico says that Secretary Jeh Johnson believes
that there are privacy reasons for why DHS is doing this.
Mr. Rodriguez, you mentioned, again, the privacy reason,
and I just want to note, the U.S. Constitution does not apply
to foreign nationals seeking entry into the United States. And
so do not give foreign nationals seeking entry into the United
States more rights than American citizens have. If you are an
American citizen, and you seek a job in the private sector, or
the public sector, or in my office, we are going to look at
your social media. And the response I have from you all today
is, well, now you are doing three small pilot projects. That is
not an adequate response.
And my question to you is, you need to reverse those--that
policy if, in fact, there is a secret policy. Maybe there
isn't. But at the very least, you need to have a department-
wide policy that we are going to look at social media, not just
three small pilot projects. And I want to know why you can't,
starting tomorrow, have a department-wide policy doing this
instead of having three small pilot projects.
Mr. Rodriguez. So let me be clear. First of all, there is,
not now, nor was there ever, a secret policy prohibiting use of
social media for vetting. There needs to be a structure to
these things. There needs to be a plan for doing these things.
That is what we have been doing for many, many months now. In
fact, a third of the pilots--we are talking about small
numbers--a third of the pilots actually is being applied to
thousands of individuals. I won't go into details beyond that,
because I don't want to tip people off as to what we might be
looking at.
I agree with you that U.S. privacy strictures apply to U.S.
citizens. They do not apply in the same way to foreign persons.
There are numerous examples in the manner in which we receive
people at ports of entries, what we do at our foreign posts.
There is evidence of that--of that distinction. So I do not--
I'm not sure I accept the premise that somehow we are
safeguarding the privacy of foreign nationals, nationals to any
greater degree. However, there are legal concerns that do need
to be addressed.
Mr. Lieu. What are the legal concerns? We asked DHS earlier
this week, give us a legal case, or a provision in the
Constitution that says there is any privacy, any legal concerns
with looking at anything related to a foreign national seeking
entry into the United States. And I don't know where these
legal concerns come from. I don't understand the quote that
Secretary Johnson has attributed to him saying, there are, you
know, legal concerns about scrutinizing Web postings. What is
that case you all are relying on?
Mr. Rodriguez. There--and again, I am not--I am not the
privacy law expert for purposes of this hearing. In fact, there
are issues that we need to make sure are satisfied with
respect, potentially, to treaty obligations that apply, with
respect to our own laws that may apply, a variety of issues.
And we are----
Mr. Lieu. That's more than----
Mr. Rodriguez. And also, I would also add----
Mr. Lieu. And let me just suggest, U.S. Constitution does
not extend privacy protection to foreign nationals seeking
entry into the United States. You need to not just have three
pilot programs. There needs to be a policy of our government to
look at social media, and other publicly available information
of people seeking entry into the United States. And with that,
I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. Mr. Lieu, I would ask unanimous consent
to enter into the record an article put out today. This is from
MSNBC. You cited FOX News. I'm citing MSNBC.
Mr. Cummings. Fair and balanced.
Chairman Chaffetz. Yeah, fair and balanced. Fair enough.
Mr. Rodriguez. I must say, I appreciate the bipartisan----
Chairman Chaffetz. The title of this article: ``Exclusive:
Homeland Security rejected plan to vet visa applicants' social
media,'' included in with this is an attachment supposedly from
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. We have
not vetted that, but in the spirit of getting to the bottom of
this, I would ask unanimous consent to enter that into the
record.
Without objection, so ordered.
Chairman Chaffetz. I now recognize the gentleman from
Tennessee, Mr. DesJarlais, for 5 minutes.
Mr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Richard, could
you--is it your understanding that the President still intends
to bring about 10,000 Syrian refugees into the country this
year?
Ms. Richard. Yes, sir.
Mr. DesJarlais. Could you tell the American taxpayer
approximately what it costs per refugee per year to bring them
here?
Ms. Richard. I don't have a per refugee cost. The overall
program, though, is when you add together the costs of State
Department, Department of Homeland Security, and Health and
Human Services, that provide assistance to the States to help
refugees once they are here, is close to $1 billion.
Mr. DesJarlais. I had heard a number about $84,000 per
refugee. Does that sound reasonable?
Ms. Richard. I will have double-check that. I didn't have
that----
Mr. DesJarlais. How many--what percentage of the 10,000
refugees would be fighting-age men?
Ms. Richard. So far, we are putting a priority on bringing
people who are the most vulnerable, so we have only brought 2
percent--so far, only 2 percent of the ones we have brought,
the Syrians we have brought, are fighting-age men who are
traveling without any family. So it would be a slightly--it
would be a higher percentage in terms of fighting-age men who
are traveling with family. But the 2 percent number you may
have heard are the ones who come as single without family
attachment or ties.
Mr. DesJarlais. Okay. All right, I just hope the next time
America gets attacked, that our fighting-age men don't want to
resettle somewhere else. I hope they would stay and fight for
our freedom.
Mr. Bersin, you said about 20 million people come on the
Visa Waiver Program each year--or Bersin, I'm sorry.
Mr. Bersin. Yes, sir.
Mr. DesJarlais. Okay. And did I hear that about 400,000
overstay?
Mr. Bersin. That's in the range of the estimate made, yes,
sir.
Mr. DesJarlais. Okay. What are the repercussions for
overstaying your visa?
Mr. Bersin. So if it's--it has two, one potentially legal,
and one in terms of your attempt to come back in to the country
after using the ESTA. As I indicated, there is an Immigration
and Customs Enforcement unit called the Counterterrorism and
Criminal Exploitation Unit that tracks the overstays, and there
have been relatively few, but some prosecutions for overstay.
There have been removals of people who have overstayed,
administratively deported.
Mr. DesJarlais. So out of 400,000 who have come here, you
have opened 113 cases. So there's not much repercussion for
breaking the law for overstaying your visa.
Mr. Bersin. The main sanction that is applied, sir, is
inability to get back into the country, depending on the facts
of the particular overstay.
Mr. DesJarlais. How many of the terrorists that perpetrated
9/11 were--had overstayed their visa?
Mr. Bersin. A number of them, sir, of the 9/11----
Mr. DesJarlais. So we need to do much better. The Syrian
refugees, how many of the Syrian refugees have been arrested in
other countries in 2015, and have been accused of supporting of
the Islamic State.
Mr. Rodriguez. I'm not aware of that number, I'm--as we
speak. If we have that information, we can certainly----
Mr. DesJarlais. Okay. And we probably----
Mr. Rodriguez. I'm not aware of that----
Mr. DesJarlais. --actually, we don't really know, do we? We
really probably couldn't get that information due to the lack
of infrastructure in Syria.
Mr. Rodriguez. And I want to make sure I understand the
question. This is individuals now in Europe, is that your
question, or----
Mr. DesJarlais. In Europe, yes.
Mr. Rodriguez. I see. Yeah, I don't know, and I doubt,
actually, that we would have that information.
Mr. DesJarlais. But Ms. Richard said, we are going to go
ahead and bring 10,000 Syrian refugees into the country. The
President, President Obama said we are going to go ahead and do
this, but yet, even the FBI Director said there is no way we
can vet these people because we can't access the Syrian
database.
Bashar al-Assad is not going to help us--tell us who the
good ones and the bad ones are. So wouldn't it make sense to
halt this program until we can tell the American people that we
can safely protect them?
Mr. Rodriguez. Yeah, in addition to the passage by the FBI
Director that was played on TV earlier, the FBI Director has
also acknowledged that our vetting process is an extremely
tough and thorough vetting process that involves multiple
interviews, queries against multiple databases, so I don't
think that was ever what the FBI Director said.
Mr. DesJarlais. I think it was exactly what he said. He
said that we don't have access to any records because we have
no cooperation from the Syrian Government, so we cannot
adequately vet these people, correct?
Mr. Rodriguez. There is considerable data that we use, as I
have repeated many times. In fact, there have been people who
have been denied refugee status because of information that we
found in law enforcement intelligence databases, as well as
hundreds of people that have been placed on hold, either
because of what was in those databases, or that, in combination
with information discovered during interviews. And, in fact,
that has been acknowledged by Director Comey.
Again, if you can play one passage on TV. That is not the
totality of what Director Comey has said about our screening
process.
Mr. DesJarlais. I appreciate your confidence, but if we are
bringing 10,000 refugees and we miss just 1 percent, that's 100
terrorists. It didn't take that many in Paris and it certainly
didn't take that many in San Bernardino.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. I now recognize
the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Cartwright, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cartwright. Thank you, Chairman Chaffetz. I want to
follow up what--the immediately preceding discussion with you,
Ms. Richard. You are Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population
Refugees and Migration for the State Department, right? Is it
fair to say you are intimately familiar with the vetting
process for the refugees coming to this country?
Ms. Richard. I don't know it as well as Leon Rodriguez
does.
Mr. Cartwright. Would you turn your microphone on, please?
Ms. Richard. I don't know the vetting processes as
intimately as Leon Rodriguez does, because he oversees the
people doing the vetting, but I am responsible for the overall
program.
Mr. Cartwright. Well, that's what I'm interested in, the
overall program. Because I think what a lot of people don't
realize, and you correct me if I'm wrong about this, Ms.
Richard.
If you are somebody applying to be a refugee who is going
to be resettled, relocated, you apply to the UNHCR, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Am I correct on that?
Ms. Richard. Yes.
Mr. Cartwright. And when you apply, you know, you are in
one of these migrant camps. You have got your little kids with
you. You don't know where you are going to turn next. You apply
to the UNHCR. You don't get to say what country you want to go
to. Am I correct in that?
Ms. Richard. That's correct. You can express a preference
if you have family living in Australia, Canada, the U.S., but
you don't get to decide that.
Mr. Cartwright. You don't get to decide where you are
going?
Ms. Richard. And most refugees do not get resettled. Most
stay in these countries to which they have fled.
Mr. Cartwright. So let's look at it from the shoes of
somebody who wants to do harm to the United States. If you are
an ISIS terrorist, and you want to sneak into the U.S., that
would be the dumbest avenue you could take to apply for UNHCR
resettlement to the United States that you could end up in
Norway after the 24-month vetting process. Am I correct on
that?
Ms. Richard. I agree.
It is not an efficient way for a would-be terrorist to
enter the United States. But that doesn't mean we let down our
guard, because it would only take one bad guy to completely
ruin the entire program. And we love this program. This program
does so much good for tens of thousands of people every year.
Mr. Cartwright. Sure. Sure. And by the way, the shootings
in California, were those perpetrated by refugees who were
resettled?
Ms. Richard. No, sir. No. No refugees have carried out
terrorist activities in the United States.
Mr. Cartwright. No refugees have carried out terrorist
activities in the United States.
Ms. Richard. Successfully carried out an attack against
American citizens in the United States.
Mr. Cartwright. Okay. What we really--what I have been more
concerned about is the visa program, and I want to follow up.
Director Rodriguez, FBI Director James Comey reported publicly
that the agency had no incriminating information about the
shooters in the San Bernardino case. Is that consistent with
your understanding, Director Rodriguez?
Mr. Rodriguez. That is on--that is what I have come to
understand from Director Comey, sir.
Mr. Cartwright. And Director Rodriguez and Assistant
Secretary Bond, it has also been publicly reported that both
the State Department and DHS followed all vetting and
background check policies and procedures in this case. Is that
also correct?
Ms. Bond. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Cartwright. Now, Mr. Bersin, the K-1 process begins
when an American citizen petitions to bring his or her fiance
to the U.S. Is that correct?
Mr. Bersin. That's my understanding, yes.
Mr. Cartwright. Mr. Bersin, how does the Department of
Homeland Security screen the American citizen's K-1 petition?
Mr. Bersin. That would be an answer the CIA----
Mr. Rodriguez. My--my portfolio, sir. So what we do at the
point that a petition is made, remember the petition--our sole,
authorized purpose at the petition stage is just to adjudicate
the relationship between the two individuals to determine
whether they are, in fact, fiances. Nonetheless, we do run
background checks at that stage, including the tax check, which
goes against a number of law enforcement sources, both against
the petitioner and the potential beneficiary. The results of
those screens are then turned over to the applicable embassy
for use in the actual visa screening.
Mr. Cartwright. Is the American citizen involved in the K-1
petition and interviewed at that time?
Mr. Rodriguez. Ordinarily, not interviewed at that time.
Mr. Cartwright. Why not?
Mr. Rodriguez. If they are not--well, that's actually one
of the points that we are exploring right now. Again, the
adjudicative purpose for that interview at that point is
limited. It's really, again, to determine whether the
relationship exists. If we are satisfied on the information
provided, that that should be granted, obviously, the situation
now--and this is where, again, we say--we say very clearly we
should not act like nothing is wrong here.
I don't want to be giving, as Congressman Lynch worries,
happy talk here. This is something we need to be thinking
about, whether at least certain individuals need to be
interviewed at that stage with the petitioner.
Mr. Cartwright. That's why I asked the question. And I do
encourage you to look hard at adding an interview at that point
in the process. And my time is up, and I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. I now recognize
the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Gowdy, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bersin, Secretary Johnson is quoted as saying that
there were legal limits on his ability to do some background
investigations. I think that was a really unfortunate phrase
that he used, but let's you and I see if we can kind of
demystify that a little bit.
Do you agree that noncitizens who are not in the United
States are not afforded any protections under the Fourth
Amendment?
Mr. Bersin. That's my understanding, Mr. Gowdy.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, you were a U.S. attorney. You are being
modest. Not only is that your understanding, it's also the law.
The Fourth Amendment does not apply to non-U.S. citizens who
are not here, any more than the Eighth Amendment applies to
non-U.S. citizens who are not here.
Would you agree with me that there is no legal bar to
accessing data from noncitizens who are not present in the
United States?
Mr. Bersin. Absent a treaty to the contrary, that's my
understanding, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. Would you also agree with me that there is no
legal right to emigrate to the United States? It's a privilege
that we confer on people, but it is not a right.
Mr. Bersin. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. So would you also agree that you can condition
the conference of a privilege on just about anything you want,
so long as you don't violate a treaty, or----
Mr. Bersin. Or the Constitution.
Mr. Gowdy. Or the Constitution. But you made, I'm sure,
extensive use of polygraphs when you were the United States
Attorney.
Mr. Bersin. From time to time, yes, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. All right. And they are not admissible in court.
Are they?
Mr. Bersin. Not generally, no.
Mr. Gowdy. But we still use them, because they are a very
effective investigative tool. Do we use them in the vetting of
people who want to come here?
Mr. Bersin. With regard to immigration benefits, I'm not
familiar with the policy in the refugee context. We do not
regularly use a polygraph. If there's significant doubt in the
operational component given the border authorities that ICE and
CBP have, typically, the decision would be made to bar entry
rather than go to the extent of trying to ascertain veracity.
Mr. Gowdy. But you and I just didn't use polygraphs in our
previous lives because we had doubt. Sometimes it incents the
person to want to embrace the truth when they think it might be
a threat that they are going to be polygraphed. I mean, you
certainly can't admit it in court, so it's not only the result,
deception or otherwise, it is the threat that you may be
polygraphed that sometimes provides people what the incentive
to either tell the truth, or they need not apply in the first
place, right?
Mr. Bersin. That can be one reaction from an individual.
And I'm not aware, Mr. Gowdy, of any policy that would prevent
that. I'm also not aware operationally as a former CBP
commissioner that it's been used in any regular way.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, let me tell you where I find myself. I
just listened to Ben Rhodes give a series of words like
``extensive,'' ``thorough,'' ``careful.'' I have heard
``tough.'' I have heard ``multiple,'' all in connection with
the word ``vetting.'' It's all amplified the word ``vetting.''
And I just sat here and thought, well, if all of that was true,
how did we miss the lady in San Bernardino?
Mr. Bersin. As the FBI Director said, Mr. Gowdy, and I
think is the fact that there were no--there was nothing in the
system that we used that would pick that up. There was no data
that we would turn into actionable information to deny
admission.
Mr. Gowdy. I get you, Mr. Bersin, but I got to be candid
with you. That doesn't make me feel any better. I mean, it is
one thing to argue that there was information there and we
missed it. That's one set of corrective measures.
Mr. Bersin. Right.
Mr. Gowdy. It's another thing to argue, as I hear we are
currently arguing this administration, that we missed nothing.
So we have someone willing and capable of killing 14 people,
and there was nothing in her background that this
administration says we missed, or should have picked up on, and
yet, there's still 14 dead people. So how does that make us
feel better?
Mr. Bersin. Mr. Gowdy, I think--I don't think anyone would
gainsay the sense of tragedy, and I don't think anyone is
saying that were that information, that data in the system,
that we would not all be over-relieved and thankful if it had
led to the apprehension of that--those murderers. The issue
that you asked us factually were--were there data in the system
by which we could tell that this risk existed? And the answer
to that is no. I think the inquiry that is being made here
today is a valid one, as Director Rodriguez suggests, and that
we need to actually look at this hard and long in terms of the
utilization of means.
I will say that there is no secret policy in DHS against
the use of social media, and there is nothing in the privacy
policy that would bar it for screening purposes.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, it couldn't be because it doesn't apply to
non-U.S. citizens. I'm out of time. I just want to tell you the
dichotomy as I see it. We have a choice. We can either tell the
American people that our process and our systems are flawed,
and that we have missed information that is otherwise
available, and let them deal with that, or we can just tell our
fellow citizens, we missed nothing. We did everything we were
supposed to do, and there's still 14 funerals in California, so
you just need to get used to the risk. Neither one of those is
acceptable, I would argue to you.
Mr. Bersin. Mr. Gowdy, I have not heard anyone who was
involved in law enforcement or in the Homeland Security
enterprise that wouldn't say that we need to strengthen our
systems. We have been doing that continuously for the 14 years
since 9/11.
Chairman Chaffetz. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Gowdy. All right. Forgive me for noticing the trend of
extending time, but I will yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. Yes, you will. We will now recognize the
gentlewoman from Michigan, Mrs. Lawrence, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Lawrence. Thank you, Mr. Chair. To everyone that's is
here today, thank you for being here. Assistant Secretary Bond,
I want to ask you about the report of the visa office, which
was issued by the Bureau of Consular Affairs at the State
Department. According to this report, in 2014, Foreign Services
posts issued about 467,000 immigrant visas, and 9.9 million
nonimmigrant visas. The K-1, or the fiance(e) visas, which has
received significant attention recently, are classified as a
nonimmigrant visa. Is that correct?
Ms. Bond. The K-1 visa is an unusual, you could call it a
hybrid. We process it as an immigrant visa case; we do all of
the work on a fiance(e) visa that we would do for an immigrant
visa case. For example, the applicant has to undergo a medical
exam to show that there are no communicable diseases or other
things. We wouldn't do that for a nonimmigrant. But when we
actually issue the visa, it's a nonimmigrant visa, because
until that person has married the petitioner and then applied
for adjustment to legal permanent resident status, they don't
have the right to remain in the United States after entering.
So they are not coming in on an immigrant visa. But it's our
Immigrant Visa Unit that does all of the preparatory--all of
the work----
Mrs. Lawrence. So for the record, are we saying that
although it is classified as a nonimmigrant, you are saying,
for the record, that they must go through everything as an
immigrant--through the complete process?
Ms. Bond. Exactly right.
Mrs. Lawrence. How many nonimmigrant visas do we have in
the United States and we are processing in your department, and
what are some of the other nonimmigrant visas?
Ms. Bond. There's an alphabet of them.
Mrs. Lawrence. So how many?
Ms. Bond. Examples of nonimmigrant visas are those that we
issue to foreign diplomats who are coming here to serve in
their embassies or consulates; to people who are coming as
tourists, or on business, or they might be coming, for example,
for medical care. We have people who are coming in as crew
members, flying in on planes. They are coming in on ships, so--
--
Mrs. Lawrence. Ms. Bond, if I am coming in under the
nonimmigrant fiance(e), at what point are we reviewed again to
document? Is there any--is there another step that happens? So
I come in. I have to have a nonimmigrant. So I come back and
just give you a marriage license and it's done, or is there
additional screening?
Ms. Bond. In most cases, the fiance(e), the reason they are
getting a fiance(e) visa is that they intend to marry and
remain in the United States. So--and they have 90 days to do
that. We give them a one entry visa. They are allowed to enter
the United States and they have 90 days, after entry, to either
marry or depart. Most of them, having married, remain in the
United States, and therefore, they get in touch with Director
Rodriguez' colleagues in order to adjust status and, yes, they
would--they would provide proof that they have married.
Mrs. Lawrence. Now, this is a question I have, and it was
referred to by your colleague that they are reviewing the
interview process of American spouses, because we don't
interview the spouse. We just interview this application for
the fiance(e) nonimmigrant visa. My question to you: The
President has directed the State Department to review them.
What is the review? When will this review be completed? And
what is--what is the objective of the review? Can you outline
that, please?
Ms. Bond. Yes. The objective of the review which is an
interagency effort, we are working very closely with different
parts of the Department of Homeland Security and with other
parts of the government, to take a look at every single element
of the process. The specific focus is on the fiance(e) visa. So
that you have the initial stage where the American citizen
files a petition. We are examining that to see what more could
we do there.
Then you have the stage where the information is vetted and
then transferred to an embassy where the applicant is going to
be interviewed. We are looking at that process, which is
primarily under the direction of my colleagues in the Bureau of
Consular Affairs.
Mrs. Lawrence. My time is running out, so my final question
is, what is the timeline to complete this review and to report
out?
Ms. Bond. My understanding is that we have to be providing
a review to the NSC in January.
Mrs. Lawrence. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. Members are advised that we
have a vote on the floor. There are 11 minutes left in that
vote. The intention of the chair is, I'm going to recognize
myself for questioning. We will do one more Democrat, and then
we will recess until approximately 11 a.m., or whenever the
votes conclude.
So with that, I will now recognize myself.
Ms. Richard, you said that State Department is helping to
prioritize the most vulnerable in Syria. Yet, in Syria, my
understanding is in fiscal year 2015, only 29 people were
Christians. I would think Christians in Syria are some of the
most vulnerable people. Why is that number so low? It's less
than 3 percent of those brought in, and, yet, Christians
represent roughly 10 percent of the population in Syria.
Ms. Richard. I agree with you that Christians in the Middle
East are some of the most vulnerable people, especially in the
ISIL-controlled areas. And so that's one reason we have
brought, in terms of our Iraqi refugees who we have brought to
the United States, 40 percent have been Christians or other
minorities.
Chairman Chaffetz. Okay, my question is about Syria. Look,
I would appreciate if you would get back to me on this. I would
spend a half hour going through it if I could. Please get back
to us on that question.
Ms. Richard. We are bringing Christians from Syria.
Chairman Chaffetz. Not very many; 29 in a whole year, so--
--
Ms. Richard. They are underrepresented, in part, because
they make up a smaller percentage of the refugees from Syria.
Chairman Chaffetz. And that's the problem.
Ms. Richard. They are not fleeing because they feel----
Chairman Chaffetz. Ms. Richard, I'm done with that
question. I'm moving on. Ms. Bond--I want you to get back to us
with this question.
Ms. Bond, you wrote in your testimony since 2001, the
Department has revoked approximately 122,000 visas for a
variety of reasons, including nearly 9,500 for suspected links
to terrorism. Of the 122,000 revoked visas, how many of those
people are still in the United States?
Ms. Bond. I don't know.
Chairman Chaffetz. Doesn't that scare you?
Ms. Bond. Many of the people whose visas are revoked were
not in the United States when we revoked the visa.
Chairman Chaffetz. You have no idea how many of those
people are in the United States? Of the revoked visas, do you
give those to the Department of Homeland Security?
Ms. Bond. Exactly. We revoke the visa and the information
is----
Chairman Chaffetz. So Homeland Security, how many revoked
visas are still in the United States of America?
Mr. Bersin. Mr. Chairman, I don't have that----
Chairman Chaffetz. You don't have a clue, do you? These are
people that State Department, State Department, who gave the
visa, thought about it, got more information, and decided, we
better revoke that. Ninety-five hundred were tied to
terrorists, and you don't have a clue who they are. Do you?
Mr. Bersin. No, Mr. Chairman, please understand that I head
up the Office of Policy, the operational components that would
have that information are not here.
Chairman Chaffetz. When will I get that? When will I get
that information?
Mr. Bersin. I'm willing to during the recess see if we can
find that.
Chairman Chaffetz. When will I get that information?
Mr. Bersin. If the operational representatives have that
information, we will provide it to you when the hearing starts
up again. If not, we will get it to you as soon as we can. I do
not administer that.
Chairman Chaffetz. Mr. Rodriguez, do you have anything to
add to that?
Mr. Rodriguez. I am--we are not the operational component,
so I don't.
Chairman Chaffetz. Okay. Is a visa overstay a key indicator
of a threat to public safety and potential terrorism? Mr.
Bersin.
Mr. Bersin. It could be, depending on the facts. But in--
given the number of people involved in--who come into this
country who are processed, a million people a day, I don't
suspect it's a large fraction at all. No, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. Of the terrorist attacks that have
happened in the United States, it's been a disproportionate
number, hasn't it? How quickly, how quickly we forget about 9/
11. Nineteen, I believe, of those people are visa overstays,
correct? It's not even in the top three priorities for the
Secretary of Homeland Security. That's what I got a problem
with.
This memo of November 20, 2014, where the Secretary
outlines the priorities for deportation. Category number two.
And I want you to understand what I'm seeing at the end of
category--this is, again, not the top priority for removal, but
number two. These aliens should be removed unless there are
factors indicating the alien is not a threat to national
security, border security, or public safety. And should not,
therefore, be an enforcement priority.
Now, I don't know how you come to that conclusion about
they are not a threat to public safety, border security, or
national security. First of all, they are here illegally. That
should be enough, in my book. But let me list to you,
offensive--offense of domestic violence, sexual abuse or
exploitation, burglary, unlawful possession of a firearm, drug
distribution or trafficking, driving under the influence, and
that is not an automatic deportation?
Well, you have got to be kidding me. And to think that they
might--do you think that's terrorism if a woman is raped? Do
you, Mr. Bersin?
Mr. Bersin. Do I think that that is terrorism?
Chairman Chaffetz. Yeah.
Mr. Bersin. No, but it's an egregious, horrible crime which
is the--I think it is a horrible crime.
Chairman Chaffetz. It is for that woman. It is for that
family, and you don't deport them. How do you do that? You give
them an excuse to make a decision, put some poor officer there,
to say, you know, maybe they should go ahead and stay here in
this country. We had more than 66,000 criminal aliens in your
control, and you let them go. You didn't deport them. You let
them go. Why do you do that?
Mr. Bersin. Mr. Chairman, the policy provides that if they
are a threat to national security, or border security, or
public safety, that they are eligible----
Chairman Chaffetz. Give me a scenario when a woman gets
raped and the person is here illegally, that they are not a
threat to public safety. Explain to me that scenario.
Mr. Bersin. I didn't say that. I said that they would be
subject----
Chairman Chaffetz. That's what the memo says.
Mr. Bersin. They would be subject--I believe the memo says,
unless they are a threat to border security, unless they are
not a threat to border security, national security, or public
safety.
Chairman Chaffetz. How are they not a threat--how are they
not a threat to public safety?
Mr. Rodriguez. If I may, if a woman is raped, and the
perpetrator is convicted of rape, that is a felony. That is a
serious crime. That is a top priority for removal. So I'm not
sure----
Chairman Chaffetz. It is not the top priority.
Mr. Rodriguez. I'm not sure where----
Chairman Chaffetz. It's already number two for the
Department of Homeland Security, so says the memo.
Mr. Rodriguez. That person would be removed.
Chairman Chaffetz. It doesn't say that. It says, ``unless
there are factors indicating the alien is not a threat, or
should not therefore be an enforcement priority.'' Jeh Johnson
went out of his way to tell people, if you commit rape, rape,
if you're in a DUI situation, if you commit burglary, don't
necessarily deport these people.
Mr. Rodriguez. Respectfully, Congressman, I don't think you
are reading that policy correctly. Rape is a serious crime that
is a removal--a removable offense. That is the policy.
Chairman Chaffetz. It is a removable offense, unless,
unless, and it's priority number two for the Department of
Homeland Security. I want some answers about that. I am going
to give you a copy to read. You are going to have a half-hour
to go through it. And I want to understand why you let 66,000
criminal aliens remain in the United States of America.
That's a threat to the homeland. That's a threat of
terrorism. That's a threat to every American. Those people
should be priorities for removal and you had them in your
possession, and you let them go. You did not deport them.
Mr. Cummings. If the gentleman will yield. Mr. Chairman, if
your staff will give us a copy--I just want a copy of whatever
you are reading from, so we will know what you are talking
about, the memo you just referred to.
Chairman Chaffetz. I ask unanimous consent to enter it into
the record, and I will make sure all of the witnesses have a
copy of it.
Mr. Cummings. No problem. I just wanted to make sure that
we have it.
Chairman Chaffetz. Fair enough.
Mr. Cummings. Can we get it quickly?
Chairman Chaffetz. Yes. I'm sorry, yes. I will now
recognize the gentlewoman from New York, Mrs. Maloney, for 5
minutes.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, thank you very much, and this is an
important hearing, but the chairman said how quickly we all
forget 9/11. I want to publicly thank all of the Members of
Congress that are remembering 9/11 by including it in the
omnibus which we will be voting on tomorrow. So I think that
that is a wonderful way to remember 9/11 by providing permanent
health care to the heroes and heroines, and survivors of 9/11,
those who risked their lives to save others.
It was a bipartisan effort, and certainly one that we could
all agree on. And I think we can all agree that we need to
really work together on this whole area. Due to the questioning
earlier, the woman who came in from Pakistan who became the
terrorist, they didn't find her in the database. But according
to a report from the IG in 2015 from the Department of Homeland
Security, they said that TSA did not identify 73 people who had
links to terrorism, and I find that very troubling. And
according to this IG's report, this happened because TSA was
not authorized to receive full information from the TIDE, the
terrorist database run by the National Counterterrorism Center.
I think we have two main questions. One is, if people are
dangerous, we have to figure out how to get them into the
database, but it's extremely troubling that they are in the
database, and yet, a visa is given to them, which happened in
this particular case.
So I would like to ask Mr. Bersin, can you briefly explain
why TSA did not have access to all of the information in the
TIDE database, which would have kept 73 people out of the
country who had links to terrorism?
Mr. Bersin. Yes, ma'am. Actually, the 73 people referenced
in the report were people who were credentialed to be in
critical infrastructure. So of equal importance, but this was
not a visa situation. Subsequent investigation actually
demonstrated those 73 were not known as suspected terrorists.
However, the larger point that you make, which is TSA access to
TIDE's data, is something that is under consideration. I
believe a policy decision permitting that access could be made,
and is certainly under consideration right now.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, it seems to me that you have got to
have access to who is--why have the list if people don't have
access to it in making decisions about who comes into the
country? I mean, I find that--I think that is something we can
all agree on. We have to--we certainly want legitimate
visitors, but anyone on a terrorist watch list, you know, we
should not be granting access. So can you give me any reason
why TSA should not have access? You are saying it's under
consideration that they have access. Why in the world would TSA
not have access to this counterterrorism list when it's their
role to decide who comes in and who doesn't? I mean----
Mr. Bersin. It is the policy position of DHS, including
TSA, that it have access to that data, ma'am.
Mrs. Maloney. That they have it?
Mr. Bersin. Yes.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, then, who is stopping that access?
Mr. Bersin. No, no, that they--that they be authorized to
receive that information directly from the TIDE.
Mrs. Maloney. But they are not receiving it.
Mr. Bersin. At this moment, no, but as I indicated, that
policy has been under review, and I believe a decision will be
made in--shortly.
Mrs. Maloney. And who would make that decision?
Mr. Bersin. It would be a combination of an interagency
process that would determine----
Mrs. Maloney. Who has the ultimate decision, the State
Department, or----
Mr. Bersin. No, this--ultimately, the Secretary would work
with his counterparts in the cabinet, and it would be a
decision that would be made by the interagency of the United
States Government.
Mrs. Maloney. The interagency. Who heads the interagency of
the United States Government?
Mr. Bersin. At the end of the process, the President,
ma'am.
Mrs. Maloney. So it's the President of the United States?
Mr. Bersin. But this would not be--it would be decided in
the process of the National Security Council, headed by
Ambassador Rice.
Mrs. Maloney. The National Security--well, I think this
should be changed immediately. This seems like a bureaucratic
mistake. So do you have any sense when they will make this
decision?
Mr. Bersin. The best I can offer you is shortly.
Mrs. Maloney. Okay. Well, I would like the committee to
send a letter--at least I'll send my own--expressing that this
policy change should take place.
May I just ask one brief question? Which entity has the
final say on whether a visa applicant is approved to receive a
visa?
Ms. Bond. The Department of State issues the visa when
every part of the interagency clearance has cleared and there
are no objections and no red lights. So we would not issue over
the objection of one of the interagency partners.
Mrs. Maloney. My time is expired.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. The committee is going to go
into recess. Witnesses are advised that we will reconvene no
sooner than 5 minutes after 11, and we will pick up from there.
The committee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Chairman Chaffetz. The committee will come to order as we
reconvene.
Mr. Bersin, I wanted to recognize you for a moment. You
wanted to clarify something?
Mr. Bersin. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Two points. The
last set of questions and answers with Mrs. Maloney had to do
with the access of TSA to TIDE data, and I talked about a
policy change that was underway. On a manual case-by-case
basis, that's been done from time to time. The policy change
that I'm confident the Member of Congress would be pleased to
hear is that this has to do with automated access of TSA to
TIDE's data.
The second matter, Mr. Chairman, was that in responding to
Mr. Walberg, I indicated that the number of visa--of overstays
were in the 4- to 500,000 range. And that number was correct,
but my staff has corrected me, and I apparently misheard. This
relates to both Visa Waiver Program, and also to all visas. So
it was not just the Visa Waiver Program. There were
approximately 4- to 500,000 overstays, but I believe when the
overstay report does come, and Mr. Lynch is entitled to be
skeptical, but I believe it is en route to the Congress, it
will indicate a visa--an overstay for the Visa Waiver Program
that is considerably lower than the number I suggested
inaccurately in my testimony, having misheard the Member of
Congress. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. I appreciate the clarification. We now
recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Farenthold, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. Mr. Bersin, in your
testimony, you talked about the various watch lists that were
coordinated and maintained as a result of 9/11. Can you talk a
little bit about what--how someone gets on one of those watch
lists?
Mr. Bersin. Yes, sir. There is a formal process. There is
only one consolidated terrorist watch list in the United States
following 9/11. And the way in which that happens is there is
an interagency process. Any agency can nominate, and there are
standards that govern the movement of a name----
Mr. Farenthold. Right.
Mr. Bersin.--onto the terrorist screening base, or
terrorist watch list.
Mr. Farenthold. There's a wide variety of agencies. Does
there have to be some level of proof that you are on there, or
is that a list based on suspicion?
Mr. Bersin. The standard followed for most, all cases,
are--is reasonable suspicion. There are other placements on the
TSDB based on a couple of other factors that are actually much
smaller, but for various immigration, or other reasons. But
the----
Mr. Farenthold. So it's pretty easy to--but it's pretty
easy to get somebody on the list. What about getting off the
list? If, for some reason, let's say I were put on the list.
How easy would it be to get off?
Mr. Bersin. So with regard to----
Mr. Farenthold. And would I know?
Mr. Bersin. With regard to a subset of the TSDB, which is
the way in which people typically know that they are on the
TSPB is if they are not permitted to fly abroad or within the
United States, and there is a redress process that people can
apply to to be removed, to ask to be removed from----
Mr. Farenthold. Do you know how long that process typically
takes?
Mr. Bersin. It's an extended process, yes, sir.
Mr. Farenthold. Are we talking years or months?
Mr. Bersin. It depends on the particular redress
application.
Mr. Farenthold. And there are American citizens on this
list?
Mr. Bersin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Farenthold. Do you have any idea how many American
citizens?
Mr. Bersin. Very--the number of American citizens that are
on the no-fly list, or the selectee list, are a very, very
small fraction.
Mr. Farenthold. But there is a substantial number?
Mr. Bersin. There is a--there are less than 0.1 percent,
I'm told, with regard to the no-fly list.
Mr. Farenthold. All right. I guess my concern with this is
there has been a lot of talk recently about using these watch
lists for purposes other than they were intended, for instance,
in determining whether or not Americans are able to exercise
their rights under the Second Amendment.
Do you think it's appropriate that these lists be used
outside of what they were designed for?
Mr. Bersin. I've not heard that, and I don't believe that
it would be--and I believe it would be apples and oranges.
Mr. Farenthold. All right, thank you very much.
Ms. Bond, I wanted to ask you a quick question about the
folks that are interviewing folks who are coming into this
country for a visa. That's done in your Consular Service
Division. Right?
Ms. Bond. Yes. That's right.
Mr. Farenthold. And correct me if I'm wrong, is that not
the entry-level job that almost everybody at the State
Department has to start off and do a stint in the Consular
Services section?
Ms. Bond. Almost every Foreign Service officer will serve
in a consular tour in their first or second tour, and sometimes
on----
Mr. Farenthold. And how long, typically, would someone
serve in that position?
Ms. Bond. Two years.
Mr. Farenthold. And how many folks that are screening folks
that are coming into the United States have been there, you
know, for an extended period of time and have a high level of
experience? To me, you testified they are adequately trained,
but it's everybody's first 2-year stint. I assume most people
don't choose to stay there.
Ms. Bond. I did. The people, the officers, as they arrive
at post, if they are doing this as a first experience, a first
consular tour, they are very carefully monitored during the
first----
Mr. Farenthold. How many stay? I'm running out of time and
I have got a question for Ms. Richard.
Ms. Bond. You stay--you know, when we come into the Foreign
Service, we come in in a cone, political, economic, consular.
Approximately, I think, 20 percent of the Foreign Service are
consular coned officers.
Mr. Farenthold. All right. Thank you very much. And I
wanted to ask Ms. Richard. When we are admitting refugees into
the United States from folks like Syria or countries of
concern, what level of coordination is there with the States?
Do we talk to the governors, or anybody within the States? I
know Governor Abbott in Texas is none too pleased about some
folks that are being resettled in Texas.
Ms. Richard. Every governor, I think 49 of them, have a
State refugee coordinator that is involved in making sure that
the governor's office works with and talks to the local groups
that are helping to resettle the refugees.
Mr. Farenthold. But they have no authority to stop it, or
any formal process for expressing concerns. They are basically
just informed, is that not----
Ms. Richard. We insist that our local partners consult with
local government officials, including the State refugee
coordinator from the governor's office. So they should be
consulted.
Mr. Farenthold. Can you give me a definition of what
``consulted'' means? I'm out of time, and if you'll just kind
of give me an idea.
Ms. Richard. You tell who is coming, how many, where they
are going, all of that information.
Mr. Farenthold. So this is basically just a one-way----
Ms. Richard. Notification.
Mr. Farenthold. All right. Thank you. The States don't
really have a lot of opportunity. Thank you very much. I yield
back.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. I will now
recognize the gentlewoman from Illinois, Ms. Duckworth, for 5
minutes.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Bond, how long
is that training process for those new Foreign Service officers
who end up in Consular Services?
Ms. Bond. The officers who are going out for a consular
assignment for the first time take a training course that is 6
weeks long at the Foreign Service Institute here, and then, as
I say, after arriving at post, are normally engaged in the
process that each post sets up for assigning a more experienced
officer to work with them for the first few months.
Ms. Duckworth. For the first few months.
Ms. Bond. Also, of course, we have managers in the section,
more experienced officers, and the visa decisions, issuances,
and refusals of the less experienced officers are reviewed by
more senior officers, and are the basis of discussion to talk
about what that officer looked at, what they based their
decision on, what questions they asked, what questions they
might have considered, or pursued, and so, it's--there is, of
course, an ongoing training program as people are settling into
the job.
Ms. Duckworth. So approximately about equivalent to an
infantryman who goes to basic training, and then goes--we'd
send them to combat under the supervision of more experienced
leaders. And if we can trust our young Americans to go to
combat with that amount of experience, I would think that we
should be able to trust our consular officers who have been
trained and are under supervision of far more experienced
consular officers. You know, I strongly----
Ms. Bond. I think it's also worth noting that the--we are
talking about Foreign Service officers, so these are people who
have gone through a very rigorous, competitive program to be
admitted to the Foreign Service. Many are lawyers, or have
formerly worked in immigration law, or, you know, have been
teachers, or many are, in fact, former military.
Ms. Duckworth. Right. So by no means are these
inexperienced people, and even so, they get at least the same
amount in terms of quantity of training as somebody we are
sending into harm's way. I'm sure you are very proud of our
consular officers, as am I, and I thank them for their service.
Ms. Bond. Thank you.
Ms. Duckworth. I strongly believe that we must do
everything in our power to protect our country, but we can do
it without devolving into demagoguery and focusing on imaginary
problems. I agree with my colleagues that we must consider any
and all options to improve the security of our refugees
screening process, but let's remember that these refugees are
fleeing the same terrorists that we are fighting, ISIS, and the
brutal Assad regime.
Turning our backs on people who are being persecuted and
killed, betrays our Nation's deeply-held values and ideals and
weakens national security by helping ISIL recruit a new
generation of terrorists through anti-American propaganda. And
as we have already discussed, our current process already
requires the collaboration of vetting of seven separate
Homeland Security departments and takes on average about 2
years to complete.
Mr. Bersin, and Mr. Rodriguez, you said that this process
is incredibly rigorous. I would like to know if there are any
other ways that we can further strengthen the refugee vetting
process because, of course, I think we should if there are. But
in your opinion, are there any other ways that we can further
strengthen this process?
Mr. Rodriguez. Well, I certainly think that one key way
that we have been starting to use piloting, could--could be the
use of social media research. There are other tools that we can
use that I would not necessarily feel comfortable discussing in
a public setting.
Ms. Duckworth. Okay.
Mr. Rodriguez. But needless to say, we are in a constant
process of looking how we reinforce our security and law
enforcement vetting across all lines of business. So I think
it's helpful to talk about refugees, helpful to talk about the
K visas, but I think it's also important that we realize that
these security tools, in fact, are ones we need to think about
using across all of our lines of business.
Ms. Duckworth. So it is not a stagnant process. It's
something where you are constantly reviewing and when you have
new cases, such as in the San Bernardino case, you go back and
you look at other things that could be done. Mr. Bersin, you
are nodding.
Mr. Bersin. Yes. I think the so-called hot wash, the after-
incident, particularly of a tragedy of that proportion, always
leads to a lot of examination, a lot of soul searching about
how do we strengthen the system. And we will never get to the
point where that process ends. This is--this is clearly an
example of something that requires continuous improvement. And
when we have an incident, a tragedy of that proportion, yes, we
look very carefully at what could have been done, what should
have we known? What can we know? And then begin to address
that, ma'am.
Ms. Duckworth. Do you have a regular process that's in
place that is a periodic review of the--of your processes that
result in further improvement or adjustments?
Mr. Bersin. We do within DHS, and we do in the interagency.
There is a constant review on an annual basis through, for
example, the watch listing guidance. How do we actually manage
these vetting processes. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentlewoman. We will now
recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank each of you
for your testimony. Mr. Bersin, I'm going to come to you.
You're a smart guy: Yale, Harvard, Oxford. You know, look at
your resume. You know, you're a gifted attorney, and so as I
look at all of that, I'm puzzled by a little bit of your
opening testimony.
Tell me, and let me quote you here, because it says that
the second major-shaping influence is that we realize that 98
or 99 percent of all trade and travel in the United States is
perfectly lawful and legitimate. How do you know that?
Mr. Bersin. The estimate comes, Mr. Meadows, from when CBP,
for example, makes judgments about--with regard to cargo, and
with regard to the people who are coming in and out of the
States. We have those assessments of that. And I think it's----
Mr. Meadows. All right. So following that logic, since it's
an estimate, of the 20 million people that come here with a
visa, you're saying that between 2 and 1 percent come here for
less than lawful purposes?
Mr. Bersin. If you applied that figure, sir, to the----
Mr. Meadows. Well, if you are applying it to one, you have
to apply it to all, don't you? I mean, either it's lawful or
it's unlawful.
Mr. Bersin. No, the point is that when you look at, in the
globalized world we operate in, with the 70,000 containers that
come in, with the----
Mr. Meadows. Oh, so you are talking more about trade than
people?
Mr. Bersin. No, I'm also talking about the million people a
day that----
Mr. Meadows. All right. So let's talk about the million
people. Because really when we look at terrorist activity, we
are talking about 20 million people who come here with a visa,
and perhaps overstay. Is that correct?
Mr. Bersin. No.
Mr. Meadows. Twenty million a year.
Mr. Bersin. No, 20 million people come under the Visa
Waiver Program.
Mr. Meadows. Okay, and of that, how many overstay?
Mr. Bersin. The estimate, as I indicated to the chairman on
the clarification that I made, it's a--when the overstay report
comes out, the numbers that I have seen suggest that it is a
relatively small number of----
Mr. Meadows. Okay. So you are talking about the internal
document that you go----
Mr. Bersin. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Meadows. So what is the number on that internal
document?
Mr. Bersin. Well, I'm--it's less than----
Mr. Meadows. What's the number? Now, you have got a 2-inch
binder there that has all kinds of research. In fact, it has
got our pictures and our bios, so you have done good research.
So you knew I was going to ask this question, I assume.
Mr. Bersin. I do, but I also have a duty----
Mr. Meadows. So are you going to give me the number?
Mr. Bersin. Mr. Meadows, I'm not going to give you a
number. No.
Mr. Meadows. Why?
Mr. Bersin. I'm not going to give you a number because
there is a report that's is in preparation with a process that
has to be followed.
Mr. Meadows. Is that the report that has been in process
for 20 years?
Mr. Bersin. I--it's that delay that makes me understand
your skepticism.
Mr. Meadows. The person who appointed you, Ms. Napolitano,
promised it to this Congress in 2013, December of 2013, that it
would be here. So are you all still working on that report?
Mr. Bersin. So, Mr. Meadows, I know you don't have enough
time for me to explain why it's happened, but I take the
criticism. I think it's a fair criticism.
Mr. Meadows. So when will we get the report?
Mr. Bersin. I believe that that report is in process, and
the expectation is that it will be--it will be delivered to the
Congress within the next 6 months, and sooner if----
Mr. Meadows. So help me----
Mr. Bersin. --this hearing----
Mr. Meadows. So help me understand this----
Mr. Bersin. --has an impact.
Mr. Meadows. --Mr. Bersin. We're supposed to believe you
that you're vetting all the people coming here with
unbelievable surety, and it's going to take 6 months to just
give me a number?
Mr. Bersin. No.
Mr. Meadows. Because let me quote you, Mr. Bersin. You said
that 400,000 is in the range of the estimate made. Now,
that's--that's an interesting--it's in the range of an estimate
that's made.
Mr. Bersin. 400,000 to 500,000 are the--are the total--the
total overstays, and that was the clarification asked for.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So answer this. The GAO said that
there was potentially 1.6 million overstays in 2011. The GAO
said potentially there was over 1 million overstays in 2013.
How did you make such good progress, Mr. Bersin, if it's only
500,000 now, which is--if you take the same numbers, means that
there could be as many as 4,000 people here doing unlawful
things, but how did you make good progress?
Mr. Bersin. The difficulty in the overstay process that
we've had for 20 years is that in fact there is--the entire
exit industry--the exit from our country for the last--from the
time it was organized did not build in the notion that we would
screen people on the way out. It is based on screening people
on the way in.
Mr. Meadows. That's exactly what I wanted to get to. So,
Mr. Bersin, your testimony here today is you don't know who
leaves this country. That's what you just said.
Mr. Bersin. No, I didn't say that. I said that when we--the
difficulty----
Mr. Meadows. So you do know? You do know how many people
leave?
Mr. Bersin. We have a portion through the different
mechanisms, we have, yes, we know a certain portion. Those who
come by air and leave by air, we can count them.
Mr. Meadows. So if they leave by boat or walk or car, you
don't know?
Mr. Bersin. No. In the northern border, we've worked out
with the government of Canada an entry-exit process where an
entry into Canada is communicated to us for non-U.S. citizens
and non-Canadians, so for that portion, we know. We also--but
the areas that we do not know----
Mr. Meadows. So you're under sworn testimony. The last
question.
Mr. Bersin. Of the land borders of Mexico.
Mr. Meadows. Do you know the number of people that leave
the United States each and every year?
Mr. Bersin. The----
Mr. Meadows. You're under sworn testimony. Yes or no.
Mr. Bersin. We can give you a large proportion of those,
but not all, no, so we don't know.
Mr. Meadows. All right. I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
As I listen to this, it is very upsetting. It really is. I
feel like--you know, one of the things that I will go to my
grave remembering is Katrina. We had a situation there where
people constantly told everybody that things were going to be
all right if we had an emergency. And they said, ``When the
rubber meets the road, everything will be fine,'' but when it
came time for the rubber to meet the road, we discovered there
was no road.
The chairman and I, I think, when we looked at the Secret
Service--we looked at a number of situations where things are
not as they appeared to be.
And the thing is, is that lives depend upon a lot of these
things. And so I guess what I'm trying to figure out is, what
did we learn? I want to get down to the bottom line. We can go
through this all day, but I'm trying to get to the bottom line
of something you said, Mr. Rodriguez, about how do we prevent,
and what are we doing now to make sure things don't happen?
First of all, did we learn anything from the San Bernardino
incident? And if we did, what did we learn, and what are we
going to do about it, and what are we doing about it? Now, if
you tell me we learned nothing, that's okay; you can tell me
that. Or if you tell me we learned something, but we're not
going to do anything, but I need to know because I am of the
firm belief that we need to--we need to be frank about this,
was it--and by the way, we want to know whether it was an
intelligence failure. What was it? Talk to me.
Mr. Bersin. So----
Mr. Cummings. And by the way, let me tell you something:
That 6-month thing, you can do better than that. All right? You
need to get that information faster than that. All right? But
go ahead.
Mr. Bersin. I was putting an outer limit on it, sir, so I
didn't limit myself.
Mr. Cummings. Let's limit it--you need to bring in the
limit a little bit, but go ahead.
Mr. Bersin. I hear you.
Mr. Cummings. All right.
Mr. Bersin. So what did we learn? As I indicated, the
fourth major influence is what Secretary Johnson and the
President have been indicating, is that the threat is evolving
and that, in fact, right now, we're dealing with something that
is an online, cyber-enabled radicalization of people. It's the
active shooter in the context of the lone wolf or lone wolves
that are not necessarily organized, trained, and equipped by
ISIL but actually inspired by the propaganda that is online.
And I think what we've--what we've learned, as we saw, is
that it was not in the system. And I think many of the
questions that have been pursued and the inquiry that this
committee is making about how far can we go with regard to
social media, how far can we go into people's Facebooks and
private chats, are all issues that are legitimate and need to
be discussed. They----
Mr. Cummings. Idealistically, what would you do if you had
the resources today that we would not have thought about or
done prior to the incident? I guess that's what I'm trying to
get to where are we going to, if we're going anywhere?
Mr. Bersin. I think with regard to legal authority and
privacy policy, I think all of those matters need to be looked
at. We--there are restrictions, but, for example, the privacy
policy in DHS does not prohibit the use of social media for
screening purposes. The question is, what are the other
purposes that might permit that? What are the other civil
liberties and protections that would actually say to us, ``No,
it would violate our values to actually go there''? But that's
the debate that I take--I take it is triggered by this action.
Mr. Cummings. Did you want to say something, Mr. Rodriguez?
Mr. Rodriguez. Yeah. I think I would say that we are--we're
hot--we're autopsying the situation now.
Mr. Cummings. You're doing what?
Mr. Rodriguez. We are hot washing the situation.
Mr. Cummings. Hot washing.
Mr. Rodriguez. Yeah. In the sense that we are looking at it
to see what lessons are learned. There are some preliminary
lessons. You know, the question--the point that Director Comey
had made about a ripple in the pond, and we need to know--just
about everybody actually does leave a ripple in the pond, the
question is, can we find the ripple in the pond?
Social media is clearly something that we need to be
talking about. It is something that we have been building and
are going to continue to build. We've been focusing primarily
on the refugee setting. We're going to be looking at also using
it in nonrefugee settings as well. It's also a question of how,
when, and who we interview because all of these tools need to
be used together. So one of the questions here is, do we need
to be doing things differently, more or less differently in the
interview setting? That is something that we are digging into
as part of our interagency collaborative process.
Mr. Cummings. Very quickly, Mr. Bersin, did TSA--following
up on Mrs. Maloney's question, did TSA submit requests? Does
TSA now have all the information it needs from TIDE, the TIDE
database?
Mr. Bersin. As I said, Mr. Cummings, they have manual
access right now. The issue is to give them automated access,
and we believe that decision will be made in the--before the--
before 6 months.
Mr. Cummings. Has the request been made? Has the request
been made?
Mr. Bersin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And how soon--you said ``within 6 months''?
Mr. Bersin. No, no. I said sooner than 6 months. And
actually I think this one is in the--in the--in the near
future.
Mr. Cummings. The only thing I'm trying to get to, and we
all should be concerned about this, is the sharing of
information. Is that a problem? You know, sometimes, you know,
I've found that Federal agencies act in silos, and the next
thing you know, one person has got--somebody's got information
over here, somebody's got some over there. Is that part of the
problem?
Mr. Bersin. So, Mr. Cummings, that was clearly the case
before 9/11. I think the testimony of your witnesses here today
and the reality we know is that we don't have those silos with
regard to the vetting process. There are other silos, to be
sure, but not with regard to the exchange of metadata or the
use of metadata to make judgments about whether or not a person
is a high- or low-risk traveler.
Mr. Cummings. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mrs. Maloney. Will the gentleman yield for a second?
Mr. Cummings. I'll yield for a second.
Mrs. Maloney. You know, who doesn't have access to the TIDE
terrorist database? TSA doesn't have access to it. Are there
other groups that don't have access to it, the K-1 visa, the
other visa, visa waiver people, do they not have access to it?
Who doesn't have access to that TIDE base? They should all have
access to it.
Mr. Cummings. Reclaiming my time. Please answer.
Mr. Bersin. So the--the TIDE's--the Terrorist Identities
Datamart Environment is actually a nexus of people who have--in
which there is derogatory information with an international
nexus. For it to be operational, it comes into the--it comes
into the Terrorist Screening Database.
The issue on TSA is that in doing its credentialing, we
want them to have access on an automated basis so that they can
get flags----
Mrs. Maloney. Yeah.
Mr. Bersin. --about potential problems, and that's the
issue that's at stake right now.
Mrs. Maloney. But I would think the other groups should
have it too.
Chairman Chaffetz. The gentlewoman's time has expired. The
gentleman's time has expired.
I now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Mulvaney, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mulvaney. South Carolina.
Chairman Chaffetz. South Carolina.
Mr. Mulvaney. I thank the chairman.
Ms. Richard, we've had the chance to meet before. You and I
have met with Congressman Gowdy to talk about some resettlement
programs in South Carolina. I know that our staffs have worked
together closely on that, and I appreciate your participation.
We find out yesterday in the media that your group has
placed some Syrian refugees this month in South Carolina. I'd
like to ask you about that. And full disclosure, it's a very
small number of people. It's one couple, we understand. So this
is not specific to these folks. But our Governor had reached
out to you and asked you not to do this. And when we had met
previously, you said that one of the things that your
organization considers when looking at placing folks is whether
or not they are going into areas where you feel like they would
be welcomed to the point where they would be easier to
assimilate.
And I would suggest to you that maybe the Governor's letter
to you might send a message that now is not the right time to
send Syrian refugees into South Carolina. So why did you do it
anyway? And why didn't you tell the Governor you were going to
do it?
Ms. Richard. I didn't know we had sent a couple of Syrian
refugees to South Carolina, so I will find out when that was,
and I'll get back to you.
Mr. Mulvaney. How is it possible that that happened without
you knowing about it, especially in light of the--how many
meetings have you had with me and Mr. Gowdy and our staff?
Ms. Richard. Oh, several, but I don't track all of the
70,000 refugees coming to the United States. That's carried
out, you know, in a----
Mr. Mulvaney. How many delegations----
Ms. Richard. --statewide----
Mr. Mulvaney. --have you met with in the last year,
congressional delegations----
Ms. Richard. Oh, lots and lots and lots.
Mr. Mulvaney. A dozen?
Ms. Richard. I'll find out right away and get back to you,
you know, why we have a couple of Syrian refugees there. Our
program is continuing, and it's continuing across the United
States. And this is all legal, of course, but I----
Mr. Mulvaney. But that wasn't the standard you set, right?
The standard was not a legal standard. We know you have the
right to do it, and you have been very candid in your position
that the Governors don't have the right to stop it, and we--
that's the law, but it is not a legal standard that you set out
to hit, was it? You were going to try and put these folks in
places where they would be welcome, so it would be easier for
them to assimilate.
Ms. Richard. Yeah. And I suspect that the couple that's
gone to South Carolina is welcome there as well, but I still
would like to know----
Mr. Mulvaney. And let's talk about that, because----
Ms. Richard. --where the Syrians are going.
Mr. Mulvaney. I'm sorry to cut you off, but let's talk
about that because I hope very much that they are welcomed in
South Carolina, and knowing what I know about my folks back
home, I believe that they will be. But here's where we are, and
where we are is we're in the middle of a debate nationwide over
your vetting processes, we've got the FBI Director saying that
while they're good, they're not perfect, and he can't certify
that everybody who comes in is safe and not a national security
threat. We had a bill that we voted on in the House, had a
veto-proof majority to pause this resettlement program. This
issue gets a lot of attention. Now I have two folks who have
been resettled in South Carolina, and sooner or later, the
folks in their neighborhood are going to find out who they are.
And I'm going to have people who look differently at those--
those refugees than they would otherwise. And in the back of
their mind, they're always going to wonder: You know what? I
wonder if these are the two who got through the system. FBI
Director tells us it's not safe.
Doesn't it make it more difficult for refugees to
assimilate if we haven't perfected our vetting process?
Ms. Richard. I think we have a very, very strong, robust
vetting process for----
Mr. Mulvaney. Mr. Rodriguez and Mr. Bersin just said that
this is an evolving threat and they're changing the way that
they do business. Have you changed the way that you've vetted
in the last 6 months?
Ms. Richard. We are going over how we vet in a very active
way, not because----
Mr. Mulvaney. Have you changed the way----
Ms. Richard. --we think we're letting in anyone----
Mr. Mulvaney. Have you changed the way you vet?
Ms. Richard. --but because we're trying to make it even
better.
Mr. Mulvaney. Have you made any change in the way you vet
since San Bernardino?
Ms. Richard. Since--no, but there were no refugees involved
in San Bernardino.
Mr. Mulvaney. Okay. Fair enough. No. I get that. But are we
not--didn't we just have a discussion about silos? Aren't we
going to learn something about the fiance(e) visa process and
apply it to the refugee process? Are you looking at social
media?
Ms. Richard. That I have to defer to Leon Rodriguez on.
Mr. Mulvaney. Mr. Rodriguez, are you all looking at social
media----
Mr. Rodriguez. No. And----
Mr. Mulvaney. --in the refugee program?
Mr. Rodriguez. As I've said very clearly, yes, we have
been. We're not using it 100 percent. We've been piloting the
use. We are now in the middle of a third pilot. I think I
talked before about the lessons that we learned from that and
how they're going to be applied prospectively, but, yes, we are
building the capacity----
Mr. Mulvaney. And there's no way to know if the folks that
got placed in my State yesterday have been through that process
or not, is there?
Mr. Rodriguez. I think, as you know, the process is a very
long and rigorous one. So I don't know. I don't know as to
these two particular folks when they were interviewed and
when----
Mr. Mulvaney. Here's my point. And I apologize, but I'm
running out of time. Here's my point. Folks on your side of the
table, folks on our side of the table recognize that the
vetting process could be better. I think if we're really
interested in having a viable refugee program that allows
people to resettle here and to integrate and assimilate, that
process has to be the very best that it can be. And the folks
back home are entitled to that because they are entitled as
citizens to know that if you want to place citizens in their
community, which is what you've done, over our objections, they
are entitled to know that you have done everything possible to
make sure that it is safe to do so. And all I know right now is
that we can't tell them that. So I will ask you to do what
we've been unable to do legislatively, which is simply pause
the process until you can give us that guarantee and tell us
the folks back home are safe.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time. Thanks.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman from South
Carolina.
I now recognize the gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands,
Ms. Plaskett, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Plaskett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member.
Thank you, witnesses, for being here today.
I just have several questions that are related to a hearing
that went on last week about the no-fly list. And it's our
understanding that TSA draws this list from the Terrorist
Screening Database, which is maintained by the FBI, and that
the no-fly list contains a small subset of names who, quote,
are prevented from boarding an aircraft when flying within, to,
from, and over the United States.
Assistant Secretary Bersin, according to the FBI's
frequently asked questions, I'm going to quote here: ``Before
an individual may be placed on the no-fly list, there must be
credible information that demonstrates the individual poses a
threat of committing a violent act of terrorism with respect to
civil aviation, the homeland, the United States' interests
located abroad, or is operationally capable of doing so.''
Could you explain to us what types of information can credibly
demonstrate that an individual poses a threat?
Mr. Bersin. So when a name is imported from TIDE into the
TSDB and then you have a subset that goes onto the no-fly list,
there are numerous kinds of data that would establish the
reasonable suspicion or provide additional derogatory
information that would say, ``This is not someone that we wish
to have flying to the United States, within the United States,
or out of the United States,'' things like associations, things
like acts, this may be a person who has been involved in a--in
a criminal terrorist investigation. So, I mean, there--every
case stands on its--on its--on its own, all four points. It
depends on the facts, but there are many kinds of data that
would suggest that this is a very, very high-risk person that
we don't want to take a chance with.
Ms. Plaskett. Okay. Thank you. And I know it's almost
unfair, since the FBI are not here, in asking these questions.
Can you explain to us what social media, what the role of
social media has in posting in the no-fly list?
Mr. Bersin. I cannot speak to that in terms of the
investigative tools that are used to establish those facts,
ma'am.
Ms. Plaskett. And why can't you speak to those?
Mr. Bersin. Because I'm not operationally involved in
supervising those activities.
Ms. Plaskett. Okay. So would you be able to explain to us
with visa applicants, any of the witnesses, what information
does social media play in the screening for other visa
applications, or is it only for those that have already been
considered for the no-fly list?
Ms. Bond. As part of the visa process, as I think has been
described, when the vice consul is beginning to interview
somebody at the window, they already have a lot of information
about that person. Some of it came from the applicant
themselves. It's information that's on their application. Some
of it may have come from the interagency screen that's been
done. We know, for example, if it's an individual who has
traveled to the states, then right there on our computer, we
can see their face, the photo taken every time they entered. We
know that they've traveled. So we have a background of
information of things that we can ask people about, and that
directs the line of questioning that is going to be used with a
particular--you know, if we're interested because they have
close family members in the states, then we're going to be
pursuing that. If we're interested in where they studied or
what they studied or--you know, it will depend on the
individual.
It happens frequently that the consular officer comes to a
decision that if everything that is being said is true, then he
or she is comfortable approving that visa, but they want to
confirm some of that information, they don't want it to be only
based on the interview or what's being said in the interview.
And in that case, what they often do is to refer the case to
the fraud team at the consulate, and everyone has a fraud
officer or office, and they often use social media in their----
Ms. Plaskett. So the social media----
Ms. Bond. --verifying information.
Ms. Plaskett. --component does not come in until the case
is flagged, and at that point, then the fraud office will then
use that?
Ms. Bond. At this point, that is when we typically might
use social media as one of the ways that we could--we might
also--for example, if we want to know if someone really works
at a particular place, we might have one of the local employees
on the staff call that place and ask to speak and confirm it
that way, but as part of the review, following the attack in
San Bernardino, which, as I say, is looking at the K-1 process,
but is applicable really----
Ms. Plaskett. Sure.
Ms. Bond. --to all that we do, we are--the agencies are
looking at the broader use of social media.
Ms. Plaskett. I guess I'm just trying to pinpoint--I'm
sorry. I don't have a lot of time, and I am an impatient person
anyway. At what point in the process does the social media
process come in? Is it----
Ms. Bond. It can----
Ms. Plaskett. --at the point when they consider that
there's a question as to whether or not the information that
has been given is incorrect, or does it come to the officer
when the individual steps to that screen? What you're saying is
it happens if there's a question about them, and it's going to
the fraud component? Is that correct?
Ms. Bond. Yeah. That's exactly right. Either the officer is
fully satisfied that it's a good case and approves it; or has
decided to refuse the case and isn't going to waste resources
doing more research; or is at a point where--is willing and
ready to issue but wants to confirm some of the data that has
been provided, and social media is one of the tools that we may
use in the process of confirming information that has been
given to us.
Ms. Plaskett. Okay. Thank you.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentlewoman.
We now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Walker, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Richard, the Washington Post reports that Christians
are terrorized in U.N. refugee camps and, as a result, are
unfairly excluded from the United Nations process. Is it true
that Christians are underrepresented in the refugee camps
because they're at risk of being attacked by non-Christians in
the refugee camp?
Ms. Richard. We are very concerned about Christian
refugees. And most refugees are not in camps in the Middle
East. And so we've placed a priority on resettling refugees who
are Christian or minorities if they are in danger.
Mr. Walker. You said you place a priority on Christians?
Ms. Richard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Walker. Did I hear you earlier say in this hearing, I
might have misunderstood, that Christians are not fleeing Syria
because they feel safe?
Ms. Richard. No. 4 percent----
Mr. Walker. We'll continue to hold because I'd like to play
that back, if we would, please, on the video, because I'm
pretty sure that's what you said.
And would you play that video, please?
[Video shown.]
Mr. Walker. You said they're not fleeing because they feel
safe. Ms. Richard, how many----
Ms. Richard. Some, some.
Mr. Walker. --how many Christians have we brought in in the
last 5 years.
Ms. Richard. So in 2014----
Mr. Walker. Ms. Richard, answer the question. In the last 5
years, how many Christians refugees have we brought in?
Ms. Richard. Four percent of all the Syrians we have
brought have been Christian or other minorities.
Mr. Walker. You've brought in 53. You tell me that's 4
percent? Because according to the numbers, that aren't hard to
find, you can look this up on CNN----
Ms. Richard. We can----
Mr. Walker. --social media or anyplace else, there are 2
million Christians decimated, okay, 2 million Christians.
According do Pope Francis, he calls it genocide. Just last
month, a Syrian bishop for pleading for ransom money, 200
hostages held, some young ladies. Do you know what ISIS does to
the young females? It's brutal. I'm sure you're aware of that,
working for the State Department.
So please tell me why that we have brought in 53
Christians. How do you know they're Christians? What's the
process?
Ms. Richard. We had just checked the number. It's 4 percent
of the 2,400 total Syrians brought in since 2011 have been
Christians or other minorities.
Mr. Walker. I want to----
Ms. Richard. They are brought in because they feel that
they are in danger because of that.
Mr. Walker. So----
Ms. Richard. We agree with you 100 percent that these
people should be given a chance for resettlement if they
present a case.
Mr. Walker. But you said today that Christians are not
fleeing Syria because they feel safer. Would you like to
retract that?
Ms. Richard. Some, some. What I would like to say----
Mr. Walker. Some Christians? How many is some?
Ms. Richard. Ten percent of the prewar population of Syria
was Christians.
Mr. Walker. Around 2 million, yes.
Ms. Richard. And so we are seeing less than 10 percent of
the refugees coming out are Christians.
Mr. Walker. 200,000, according to the numbers.
Ms. Richard. And a disproportionate number of Syrians
staying in the country are Christian. Now, why is this? It's
because a higher percentage of them support Assad and feel
safer with him there, but the ones who come out, who choose to
flee and feel that they are in danger, those are the people we
want to help, absolutely.
Mr. Walker. Nine per year since the last 6 years. You see
why there's a credibility issue, Ms. Richard.
I'd like to yield the balance of my time to my good friend
from South Carolina, Mr. Trey Gowdy.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank my friend from North Carolina.
Mr. Chairman, we have two former prosecutors here, so I
want to see if we can kind of disabuse some folks of some
incorrect apprehensions with respect to the current gun laws.
Mr. Bersin and Mr. Rodriguez, would you agree with me that
it is currently against the law for somebody who crosses the
border without permission to possess or purchase a firearm?
It's sometimes unfair----
Mr. Rodriguez. I'm remembering back to my days prosecuting
gun crimes, which has been a while, Congressman. I think you
and I share that.
My recollection is that, yes, that would be----
Mr. Gowdy. It is sometimes unfair to----
Mr. Rodriguez. Yeah.
Mr. Gowdy. --to put pop quizzes to folks who haven't done
something in a while. So just trust me when I tell you that if
you have crossed the border without permission, you cannot
legally purchase or possess a firearm. If you have overstayed a
visa, you cannot legally purchase or possess a firearm. In
fact, if you're legally here on a visa, only in very limited
circumstances can you legally possess or purchase a firearm. So
those are all categories with existing law where you can't
purchase or possess a firearm.
Are those lists made available to federally licensed
firearms dealers so they can make sure they don't sell firearms
to those three categories of prohibited people?
Mr. Bersin. Mr. Gowdy, I'm just not familiar with the ATF
process with regard to that. I know that I'd be--I don't
believe that DHS circulates those lists.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, this is the frustration that I face, is I
listen to an administration call for additional gun laws. They
want additional gun control in the wake of almost every
tragedy. That's the very first place they run. And it just
forces me to ask: Well, I wonder how we're doing with the
current gun laws that we have.
And I'm not going to ask you for the statistics because I
didn't tell you I was going to, and you shouldn't be prepared
and probably would not be prepared, but I would encourage both
of you as former prosecutors to go back and look at the
statistics coming out of the Department of Justice on how many
prosecutions exist for current gun law violations on all those
three categories. And if we're going to create a list with, by
the way, no due process, called a watch list, then, at a
minimum, we ought to give the list of visa overstays to
federally licensed firearms dealers because that list already
exists. We already know who's on that list, so your due process
rights have already been afforded to you. So if there's going
to be a list given to FFLs, I would think it ought to be the
visa overstay list before it would be some list conjured up by
folks that we're not familiar with. So I would encourage both
of you, put on your former hats, and maybe we can meet
privately and find out what you learn on that.
With that, I would yield back to the chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Connolly of Virginia is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. Let me ask about the line of questioning that
somehow implies we ought to prioritize a particular religious
group over all others. Mr. Bersin, Mr. Rodriguez, Ms. Bond,
would that be constitutional?
Ms. Richard. Well, related to refugees, Mr. Connolly, one
of the five ways that someone can be determined to be a refugee
is if they've been persecuted on the basis of their religion.
And from the perspective of my office, it doesn't matter what
the religion is, but if it's the reason that they're being
persecuted, then they could qualify to be determined to be a
refugee. And so we see people fleeing from around the world----
Mr. Connolly. But that's not my question----
Ms. Richard. Oh.
Mr. Connolly. --and I don't think that was the question
being asked. Are we constitutionally permitted, could you and
your office put a little asterisk, we give a little extra
weight if you're of a particular religion? Is that
constitutional? Do you have the authority to do that?
Ms. Richard. If it's the cause of their persecution.
Mr. Connolly. No, no. I'm not asking that question.
Ms. Richard. I'm not--I'm not going to change the program
to somehow bring more of one particular religion than another.
Mr. Connolly. You're going to look at the nature of the----
Ms. Richard. The persecution.
Mr. Connolly. --refugee status.
Ms. Richard. Right.
Mr. Connolly. Irrespective of religion.
Ms. Richard. That's right.
Mr. Connolly. Is that how it should work, in your opinion?
Ms. Richard. Yes. I'm absolutely very comfortable with
that.
Mr. Connolly. Because actually that's what refugee programs
are designed to do, isn't it? We're trying to help people who
are suffering violence, oppression, discrimination in extremis,
and provide a safe haven. And after all, it's not a huge
program, right, about 70,000 a year----
Ms. Richard. That's right.
Mr. Connolly. --total refugees?
Ms. Richard. Well, and proposing to go to 85,000 this year.
Mr. Connolly. Okay. And the actual number, for example, of
Syrian refugees is very small.
Ms. Richard. That's right.
Mr. Connolly. Have I got it right that it's under 3,000 in
the last 3 years?
Ms. Richard. Yeah, 2,400 total since 2011.
Mr. Connolly. In the last 4 years.
Ms. Richard. Yeah.
Mr. Connolly. Why is that such a small number given the
fact we have 4-1/2 million Syrian refugees?
Ms. Richard. Part of the reason is that the first response
to a refugee crisis should not be to resettle people; instead,
it should be make sure that they're safe where they've gotten
to and also to see if the crisis can be resolved so they can go
home again. Most Syrian refugees would prefer to go home and
again and live in peace in their own home country.
However, as the time went on, it became clear that for some
of the Syrian refugees, there would be no going home again.
They had seen terrible things happen to them and their
families. And for the most vulnerable people, who really can't
make it on their own in the cities and the towns in the Middle
East to which they fled or the camps that they may be living
in, we have a program to offer resettlement in other countries,
and the U.S. is the leader in taking refugees under that
program.
Mr. Connolly. My understanding is it takes on average for
Syrian refugees 18 to 24 months.
Ms. Richard. That's correct.
Mr. Connolly. Is that unusually long?
Ms. Richard. It's longer than other countries.
Mr. Connolly. And the reason for that is?
Ms. Richard. We are very thorough and----
Mr. Connolly. Okay. So we're being careful.
Ms. Richard. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. I assume it can also be--I mean, if you flee,
I don't know, the insurgent group or the Syrian Army is going
to shell your village, your town, you may have to leave with
what's on your back and your family, and that's it.
Ms. Richard. That's correct.
Mr. Connolly. So you don't have documents to prove who you
are.
Ms. Richard. The surprising thing to me is that our
colleagues at DHS--and Leon can talk about this--are finding
that many of the Syrian refugees do have documents, but
documents are not the only piece of evidence that they have to
provide to make the case that they are bona fide refugees. It's
a multilayered, multifaceted review.
Mr. Connolly. All right.
Mr. Rodriguez, I think this question is to you, but I know
you covered a little bit the whole issue of the use of social
media. We got a pilot program, but I guess my question would be
a little bit broader. In the private sector, when people are
looking at employment, they go to public social media sites as
part of a screening process. Why wouldn't we do that routinely
when it comes to granting somebody a status to come into the
United States, whether it be refugee status, visa, various visa
statuses, and so forth? Why wouldn't we do that just like we do
any other background document because it's part of the
landscape now?
Mr. Rodriguez. That may well be where we end up. I think we
have been focusing on areas where we detect a heightened risk.
Obviously, in many of our conversations when we talk about
individuals coming from countries where there is active
terrorist activity, active terrorist recruitment, those seem to
be the areas where we should primarily focus.
I think the question is going to be what's--what ends up
being the value. And if, in fact, there is value, if the work
that we're doing shows that there is value, then we may well
end up exactly in the place that you describe. That is--that is
what we have been evaluating for months now. We're certainly
increasing the scope of our pilots, but that--so there--it may
well be that the point that you make turns out to be correct.
Mr. Connolly. You--I guess I'm a little puzzled, as
somebody with both public sector and private management
experience. I mean, clearly, the private sector sees the value
in using it as part of the background check when they are
hiring or screening. Why wouldn't we do that in this case? And
then I'll yield back my time.
Mr. Rodriguez. I mean, I personally believe that as we get
further into this, we will discover information of value. I
think what is also going to happen, though, is that people will
go underground and, knowing that we're looking at those
mediums, will cease to use them, certainly in a public
environment.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hice, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I asked this question the other day to Ms. Burriesci. In
fact, there were many, many questions, as you've already heard
today, that she was absolutely unable to answer that ought to
be rather basic questions. So I want to ask you, Mr. Bersin, do
you have any idea how many passports are reported stolen each
year?
Mr. Bersin. I'm pausing, Congressman, because I know that
the--as the former vice president of INTERPOL, which maintains
the lost and stolen passport database, I have a number of how
many there are. I would defer to Ms. Bond, who administers the
passport, because our----
Mr. Hice. All right. Ms. Bond, do you have any idea how
many are reported stolen?
Ms. Bond. In terms of how many U.S. passports are reported
stolen every year, I'm going to find out for you right now. I
did not bring that number with me.
Mr. Hice. All right. What about non-U.S. passports? Do you
have any way of getting that number?
Ms. Bond. Individual governments report that data to
INTERPOL, and so, yes, we can go to INTERPOL and ask them for
that, but it's not--that's not data that this government
maintains.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Well, if you could get both of those for me
as well.
Whether you or Mr. Rodriguez, with that awareness that we
don't know, I would think that some of you would know how many
passports are stolen. That's kind of what this whole hearing is
about in an indirect way. We want to know what kind of--what is
the standard procedure when a passport is stolen or missing?
What, if anything, is done--do we do to make sure that it's not
fraudulently picked up and used?
Ms. Bond. When----
Mr. Bersin. So--go ahead.
Ms. Bond. When a U.S. passport is reported lost or stolen,
we immediately deactivate it. It wouldn't be accepted. You
wouldn't be able to travel with it, wouldn't be able to board a
plane with it, and we notify INTERPOL very promptly.
Mr. Hice. Okay. What about a passport from somewhere else
in the world? Are we notified in any way?
Mr. Bersin?
Mr. Bersin. Yes. This would be on the vetting. So when
someone comes to the--a port of entry or actually applies
through the ESTA program, presents the passport, that part of
the database that it's run against for vetting would be the
Stolen and Lost Travel Document database of INTERPOL, which has
just under 55 million records in it, and you would--you would--
you would then be told if they were on alert--that that was in
the database--then further inquiry would be certainly made.
Mr. Hice. Is there a penalty for a country that does not
report this type of information?
Mr. Bersin. So with respect to currently--currently, no,
there is not a penalty. And, in fact, that's one of the
problems we have in terms of international information sharing.
Mr. Hice. So how do we know that those passports that have
been stolen are being reported to INTERPOL?
Mr. Bersin. We have as part of our Visa Waiver Program with
the 38 countries that are part of the Visa Waiver Program,
that's a requirement that they actually report----
Mr. Hice. Is there a penalty for one of those 38 countries
if they do not report that information?
Mr. Bersin. They would then be subject to being suspended
or being put on provisional status in the Visa Waiver Program.
Mr. Hice. So there is a penalty?
Mr. Bersin. There--yes, sir, there is a penalty.
Mr. Hice. Is that automatic?
Mr. Bersin. It's not automatic, no, sir.
Mr. Hice. Okay. So it has to go through what kind of
procedure, quickly?
Mr. Bersin. Yes, but the--it's the monitoring of the Visa
Waiver Program that's done on a 2-year basis that under
Representative Miller's bill would actually be shortened to a
1-year period.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Let me ask this, then. What about, be it
Syrian refugees or--well, let's just use the Syrian refugees
who are being resettled in Europe. Are they able to travel to
the United States through the Visa Waiver Program?
Ms. Bond. No. No, they are not.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Then let me go back--that's--I'm glad to
hear that. Let me go back, Mr. Rodriguez, to the social media
question.
Did I hear you correctly a moment ago when you said that an
applicant's social media profile is now a part of the screening
process?
Mr. Rodriguez. No. We are piloting it with certain groups.
The size of those groups is increasing. I don't want to leave
the impression that that has yet become a comprehensive part of
what we do. We are building toward that as we speak.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Could you discuss the lessons that have
been learned from the piloted programs? Is this working? Is
the--getting info from social media working?
Mr. Rodriguez. So far, the information that we have seen in
the pilots has been ambiguous rather than conclusive about an
individual's intent. And it shows the importance, however we
proceed down this enterprise of social media use, that it
really be thought of in the context of all the tools that we
use to screen people, that this be thought of as a holistic
process that involves interviews, screening across law
enforcement and intelligence databases, further investigation
and inquiry as the case might be appropriate.
Right now, the things that we've seen so far are relatively
ambiguous. They would not necessarily lead you to conclude that
the individual would trigger an inadmissibility under our laws.
They would require further inquiry.
Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank----
Ms. Bond. Mr. Chairman, if I--forgive me----
Chairman Chaffetz. Sure.
Ms. Bond. --but I do have an answer for Mr. Hice's
question. He asked----
Chairman Chaffetz. Sure.
Ms. Bond. --how many U.S. passports are reported lost or
stolen annually. On average, 300,000 passports worldwide are
reported lost or stolen, and about 20,000 passport cards,
which, as you may know, are used for people who are going
across land borders.
Mr. Hice. Are those 300--U.S. citizen passports?
Ms. Bond. Exactly.
Mr. Hice. Thank you.
Ms. Bond. And it's also perhaps of interest that when we
are adjudicating visa applications, we always check against the
INTERPOL database to be sure the person is not presenting a
passport that's been reported lost or stolen.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. Appreciate the clarification.
Ms. Kelly is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I wanted to ask about information sharing with our allies.
The 9/11 Commission recognized the importance of working with
other nations when it wrote in its 2004 report, and I quote,
``The U.S. Government cannot meet its own obligations to the
American people to prevent the entry of terrorists without a
major effort to collaborate with other governments. We should
do more to exchange terrorist information with trusted allies
and raise U.S. and global border security standards for travel
and border crossing over the medium and long term through
extensive international cooperation.''
Assistant Secretary Bond, it has been 11 years since the 9/
11 Commission issued that finding. How are we doing on
information sharing with our allies?
Mr. Bersin. Ms. Kelly, I'm probably in a better position to
respond to that.
So international information sharing relates to that third,
that--what I called the second major influence on our vetting
process, the idea that the Homeland Security enterprise is
transnational, inherently transnational, which means that we
need to increase the information sharing with our foreign
partners. And we do that, for example, while there's a long way
to go, the Visa Waiver Program, with regard to the 38 countries
in the Visa Waiver Program, they're required by congressional
statute to provide information regarding known or suspected
terrorists and also the certain criminal information under the
so-called preventing and combating serious crime.
Part of Secretary Johnson's enhancements introduced during
the summer, that are echoed in Representative Miller's bill on
the Visa Waiver Program, actually now will embody the
requirement, the legal requirement, that for countries that do
not respond under those agreements, that there would be
sanctions under the Visa Waiver Program.
So I think one of the challenges we face is that we do not
have the kind of information sharing internationally that would
be of utility. That's why the administration, led by Secretary
Johnson in this case, actually went to the U.N. And sought
under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178 the idea that we
need to be sharing information about foreign terrorist fighters
in ways that we had not been. So the point is well taken,
ma'am.
Ms. Kelly. And how is it accepted? Do you see that there's
going to be an improvement?
Mr. Bersin. It--there will be an improvement, I suspect, to
the extent that countries that want very much the benefits,
including ourselves, of the Visa Waiver Program will understand
that this is not a--it's not optional. And, in fact, since the
Secretary began the enhancements last summer, we've seen in our
engagements with visa waiver countries a real stepping up.
That, frankly, together with the events in Europe, including
Paris, have actually led to much greater willingness on the
part of European countries in particular to extend their
willingness to share information.
Ms. Kelly. Okay. Also information sharing, as you know, is
one piece of the puzzle, but there are other ways to engage our
global partners. So to the extent that you can in an
unclassified setting, can you discuss how our existing
databases and information portals draw on information gathered
by our international allies and partners?
Mr. Bersin. So it probably would be more appropriate in a
different setting to go into great detail about the way in
which that data is ingested, so-called, and then disseminated.
Ms. Kelly. Okay. I'll accept that.
I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentlewoman.
We'll now recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr.
Russell, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Bersin, in rough figures, how many people are on
the terror watch list?
Mr. Bersin. So I'm just checking to see what--on the
terrorist--the consolidated terrorist watch list, we're talking
just under 1 million.
Mr. Russell. Under 1 million.
Okay. What--what countries, and this could be for anyone,
constitute the greatest threat and attempts to enter the United
States illegally that would be, you know, perhaps flagged by
being on these lists?
Mr. Bersin. I can't--so there--of those million records,
there are the subsets of the no-fly list, which is about
100,000, and the selectee list, which is about 25,000. And I
cannot give you the breakdown on the countries from which they
come, although----
Mr. Russell. Do one or two come to mind?
Mr. Bersin. Well, I think the ones in which we have seen
terrorist threats would be obvious candidates.
Mr. Russell. Such as?
Mr. Bersin. We've seen threats in Libya. We've seen threats
in Pakistan. We've seen threats in a variety of countries in
the Middle East and the Levant and some in Central Asia.
Mr. Russell. Of the half million a year that we think are
overstaying their visas, given that we have no comprehensive
exit tracking program, what countries have abused this the
most?
Mr. Bersin. So, Mr. Russell, remember, in order to come
into the country in the first place, whether by visa or by the
Visa Waiver Program, there is extensive vetting against all of
the lists. And, in fact, in order to enter the country, there
is a vetting. So it's not a question of people being on those
lists----
Mr. Russell. I understand the visa waiver will have
necessarily better or a higher bar, but of those that have been
granted visas and they have overstayed them, what countries
would you say violate that the most, to the extent--since we
don't have an exit tracking program that's comprehensive? Who
would they be? What countries?
Mr. Bersin. So the first point is that they were not on any
of the lists, the known or suspected terrorist lists that we've
discussed. In terms of what the breakdown is of that estimate,
I cannot----
Mr. Russell. Do a couple of countries come to mind?
Mr. Bersin. But I would--I suspect they're those in which
many of the people come from countries in which you send many
people here. And you might see people here for violating the
no-work rule, for example, people who are coming here for--they
purport to come for a tourist B-1/B-2 reasons, and they end up
staying to work. So those are going to be a different subset of
countries than those that----
Mr. Russell. Well, that goes to my point, Mr. Secretary. I
think that the magnitude of the problem and trying to protect
our country is--you know, it is enormous, we all recognize
that, and we certainly recognize the dedication from
administration to administration and folks like yourselves. You
know, I mean, you didn't just enter this field. You've been at
it through decades through different administrations, and I
respect that. But I point these things out because wouldn't we
want to focus on those particular areas where the threat may be
highest?
And with regard to visa waivers, once an individual obtains
an Electronic System Travel Authorization, it is good for 2
full years as long as the passport is valid. Given that ISIS'
rise has been less than 2 years, what steps are being taken to
change the 2-year eligibility of the electronic travel
authorization, and is this an area that is even being examined?
Mr. Bersin. So, yes, indeed, Mr. Russell, the ability to
dial up and dial down the validity of the ESTA is one that the
Secretary is very well aware of. It's contained in the Miller
bill. And, in fact, Secretary Johnson as part of his own
enhancements actually added questions to the ESTA.
Mr. Russell. Don't you think we ought to just reset all
eligibility at this point? Given that ISIS has been on the rise
for less than 2 years and now we have 2-year eligibilities out
there, they could have been coopted, converted. There's any
number of issues that could have happened.
Mr. Bersin. The way in which these databases operate and
the way in which the vetting process takes place is there is 7/
24, 24/7, 365 re-vetting of that against whatever new
information might come into the database. So, in fact, there is
an updated--it is updated by this constant refreshing of the
database and the re-vetting of the names against the lists.
Mr. Russell. And then my last question, with the chairman's
indulgence, is given that we have 1.8 million Chinese that come
to the United States each year for travel and for tourism and
the like, they don't seem to have a problem conducting
business, I would suggest that this entire Visa Waiver Program,
although it will have material impact on economies and other
things, what do you see as the way ahead to restrict it so that
we can secure our people the best, when other countries seem to
be able to operate without it?
Mr. Bersin. So the Visa Waiver Program, the only
difference--first of all, China's not a member of the Visa
Waiver Program----
Mr. Russell. That's my point.
Mr. Bersin. --and not contemplated to become one. The Visa
Waiver Program, the only difference between the visa process
and the Visa Waiver Program is the consular office interview.
You defer the time in which a U.S. official actually looks
someone in the eye from the Consular Affairs office abroad to
the time when a CBP officer sees that person coming in, but
there's been all of this security vetting through the ESTA
before that person arrives on our shore.
Mr. Russell. Two-year eligibility on the ESTA, correct? I
mean, so once you've been eligible, it's good for 2 years.
Chairman Chaffetz. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Bersin. That--a CBP officer can actually make a counter
decision upon encountering someone at the point of entry.
Mr. Russell. Thank you.
Chairman Chaffetz. We now recognize the gentleman from
California, Mr. DeSaulnier, for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to
thank all of you for testifying.
Assistant Secretary Bersin, I wanted to talk to you in
general about, as Mr. Rodriguez said, areas of heightened risk,
and specifically the PATRIOT system program, or it's that
acronym has bureaucratically been introduced, the Pre-
adjudicated Threat Recognition Intelligence Operations Team. So
in previous testimony in front of this committee and the House
Judiciary Committee last year, you said, and I quote: PATRIOT
is currently operational at 20 ICE visa security program staff
locations overseas and will be rolled out incrementally
worldwide throughout 2015. When implemented, PATRIOT will
prescreen 100 percent of non-immigrant visas applications
submitted online before the Department of State adjudicates the
application.
So could you tell me a little bit about how staff is using
the PATRIOT program in the rollout in the sense of areas of
heightened concern, and then what differentiates an application
going through this program versus the general population?
Mr. Bersin. Okay. This is something both Ms. Bond and I can
address, but let me begin.
So the PATRIOT system is actually installed abroad, and it
works with the visa security units, the Homeland Security
investigators, the 1811s, who are stationed abroad for the
purpose of assisting the State Department to make judgments
about whether this person should or should not receive a visa.
So what the PATRIOT system does is it automates--it automates
the vetting process so that the kinds of checks that we've
talked about here today are actually being done through a
federated computer search of all the databases, so that when a
visa security agent working with a Consular Affairs office,
they've got the benefit of that, and if something needs to be
investigated, that then proceeds. So it is an automation of--
and an acceleration, a telescoping of the process so that the
consular officer has the benefit of it before a decision's
made.
Mr. DeSaulnier. So to the point that Mr. Cummings made
about agencies working together, at least the concept here is
everybody's working together and the investment is being
targeted. So tell me a little bit about--I appreciate the
background, but how--as in the rollout, how are you vetting
this to make sure that you're actually getting really good
returns on the system?
Mr. Bersin. So when the plan for the visa security units to
expand this around to additional his offices is something that
it's a decision that's being made subject to the--to the
budgetary resources being made available in the appropriations,
but there's a positive result, yes, yes.
Mr. DeSaulnier. So you've evaluated it. It's working. It's
in high-risk areas. It's in the Middle East. It's in Islamabad
I'm told.
Mr. Bersin. Yes.
Mr. DeSaulnier. So coming from California to specifically
San Bernardino, Ms. Malik went through this system. Is that
right?
Ms. Bond. Yes. At the 20 posts, or roughly, where we have
the visa security units, who are officers from DHS, those
officers review all of the issued visas. In other words, if a
consular officer has approved a visa for issuance, it then gets
a second look by the colleagues from DHS. And, of course,
they're all working together in the same space, and so they are
talking about it. If there were disagreement, they would be
talking about, you know, I'm seeing this and I think it's not a
good case and so forth. It is extremely close collaboration.
The team from the--the DHS colleagues have access to the
DHS data, and a lot of that has to do with things like
overstays or people who were refused admittance at the border
even though they arrived with a visa and so forth. Sometimes
those are instances where it is possible to resolve and approve
issuance, where they can say: Oh, well, see, the person did
this or that, but it wasn't a security threat. It may have been
a mistake.
Mr. DeSaulnier. Well, and I'm going to interrupt just
because I have just a few seconds left.
So the program--you think--is working in terms of your
assessment, but--and I know this is just one instance, but this
is a heightened screening process, as I take it, using the
resources more effectively. Unfortunately, Ms. Malik went
through this program. So the President has asked you to
evaluate the program. It would be helpful at least for me and I
think the committee to know what kind of evaluation you used.
And, Mr. Rodriguez, just back to the social media, it is a
little frustrating, as Mr. Connolly said, is we want you to do
your due diligence to make sure that it's an investment you
want to make, but given that there are other applications at
less risk in the private sector, when is the point when you
say, ``The pilot project has some merit, and we should go
forward,'' which seems, as a generalist, very obvious that you
probably should use social media to vet?
Mr. Rodriguez. What I would say, we are moving, both in the
refugee context and other contexts, pretty aggressively, pretty
quickly. Probably the next time that we are all together, we
will have a whole lot more to say about this subject. But we
are moving very, very decisively. I would not venture to talk
beyond that.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. I will now
recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Palmer, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Richard, regarding
an earlier line of questions, you pointed out the refugees may
request any country for refugee status. Is that correct?
Ms. Richard. I'm sorry. I didn't understand the question.
Mr. Palmer. You, in a response to a question from Mr.
Cartwright, you said that just because a refugee requests entry
into one particular country, that doesn't necessarily mean they
will gain entrance. They could be sent to any country.
Ms. Richard. That's right.
Mr. Palmer. Has it occurred to you that any foreign
national who gains refugee status in another country is not
necessarily prevented from obtaining a visa or passport in that
nation, subsequently entering the United States, particularly
in regard to the number of lost and stolen passports?
Ms. Richard. Go ahead.
Ms. Bond. Sir, if I may respond to that. If someone is, for
example, accepted in a country that is a visa waiver country,
is given permission to settle there with his family, they
would--they may, at some point, obtain citizenship in that
country, and, in principle, would be eligible to apply to use
the Visa Waiver Program. But that would be a period of some
years, of course, after arriving.
Mr. Palmer. Well, it's not that long. It's 5 years.
Ms. Bond. Uh-huh.
Mr. Palmer. But, in response to a question earlier that you
gave to Mr. Hice, you didn't really make that clear. He asked
you if someone could get a visa, or a visa--go through the Visa
Waiver Program, and you didn't--I don't think that you made
that clear.
Ms. Bond. No. I apologize if that was unclear. The question
from Mr. Hice was, can these people who are arriving in Europe
qualify for the Visa Waiver Program, and I should have said,
no, they cannot. As refugees----
Mr. Palmer. Ma'am, what we are trying to figure out is how
many holes there are in a bucket in terms of our ability to
screen people getting into this country. And I think, you know,
we sit here for an hour and a half, 2 hours, whatever it takes,
trying to get information, and it's increasingly difficult to
get straight answers. And the answer to his question, frankly,
was that, yes, if they stayed there long enough, they can get a
visa waiver.
Now, my question is, are we evaluating those people whether
they are citizens of Belgium, France, Germany, it doesn't
matter, if they came from one of these countries that we ought
to be tracking, are you evaluating those? Ms. Bond.
Ms. Bond. So, and I do, I apologize for the fact that I was
responding to his specific reference to arriving refugees. An
individual who has become a citizen of a visa waiver country is
eligible to apply to use the Visa Waiver Program.
Mr. Palmer. I get that.
Ms. Bond. And they apply by signing up for ESTA, and those
are not always approved. But it is a DHS program, so I would
ask Mr. Bersin to respond.
Mr. Bersin. So the issue is, after the vetting, would they
be precluded? The Miller bill actually has a provision that
says for those people who have traveled to certain--Syria,
Iraq, other war zones, and who don't--were not there for
diplomatic or military reasons, that those people could not
participate in the Visa Waiver Program.
Mr. Palmer. Well, my concern about that as well, is that
they travel back and forth to these countries that some of
them, it's their country of origin. But they don't have the
same databases and the same security for passports in a lot of
the European countries that we do, particularly on the
fingerprint database. They are not using, excuse me, the
information that INTERPOL has.
So are we being proactive in vetting these people before
they come in, whether they are citizens of another country or
not?
Mr. Bersin. Yes, sir. Anyone coming in under the Visa
Waiver Program would go through the extensive vetting that we
have talked about.
Mr. Palmer. Well, apparently, Malik didn't.
Mr. Bersin. She didn't come in under the Visa Waiver
Program.
Mr. Palmer. It was my understanding that you had an
opportunity to evaluate her. You didn't take advantage of that
through the social media, and it concerns me that we are not
doing our due diligence to make sure that we know who is coming
into the country, and making sure that people who pose a
potential threat to us are kept out. Would you like to respond?
Mr. Bersin. That is, without question, the intent, and the
reason for the vetting, and to the extent that we currently do
it, sir.
Ms. Bond. Sir, if I may also add, that is also the purpose
of the review that is currently underway, to examine what more
can we do as part of the process. Because the very thorough
review that was done for that visa applicant did not reveal the
fact that she was coming into the United States, and either
then or later, decided to commit murder. So the purpose of the
review is to look at, is there more that we can do then in
order to identify this if possible?
Mr. Palmer. Well, that's our number one obligation to the
American people. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
Mr. Mica. [Presiding.] Thank you. Ms. Lujan Grisham, you
are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Lujan Grisham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Bond, you
actually gave me a great lead-in, because I think that's our
frustration. And frankly, in the last hearing last week, I was
so frustrated, I was having trouble--I was having trouble
making it as fair and--as possible, because when you don't get
any information from the administration, and when there's this
continual sense of, we're doing everything, and no matter what
we do, you will have some gaps. I want specificity. Exactly,
what are you doing to close those holes, to assure that those
gaps get narrowed? I don't want to hear we are working
together.
And in fact, I think that getting a response during this
hearing about, we got to really assess the value, certainly, we
understand that this is all subject to the priorities and
resources. But beyond that, keeping this country safe, there
should be no limitation in figuring out what you can do to do
it all better. And you ought to be proactive about it. It
shouldn't take one tragedy after another. And quite frankly,
what I expect is that you come to this committee and say, wow,
we figured out 12 things we could do better. And now we want
your assistance--if you need our assistance--to make sure that
those are fully integrated, or, they're in the hands of the
central agency that needs those tools and resources the most.
And given that, I wouldn't hire anyone today in my official
capacity, or my unofficial capacity, where I don't do a
Facebook check, or a social media check that doesn't create a
privacy problem. And we understand that there are those issues.
But just exactly, what are you doing with great specificity
that's proactive in nature, that gives us the confidence that
you evaluate with or without a tragedy, figuring out how you
can securely, and safely, and effectively, given all of the
other things that you have got to control, including other
countries' data points, to do a better job? Give me one that
you are doing since the last tragedy in San Bernardino?
Ms. Bond. First of all, let me say that we all agree with
you 100 percent that there is--there is nothing that is more
important than getting it right. And there is never a point
when anybody would say, okay, this is good enough. We have got
it. We nailed it. We are always looking for ways to improve the
vetting and to improve the screening, and to identify a trigger
that indicates we should look more carefully at this case.
That's--that was what we did not see in this case of Malik,
that there wasn't anything in that case that was a flag. So one
of the things that is underway since the tragedy in San
Bernardino is a careful examination of what else could we look
at, what could----
Ms. Lujan Grisham. Could you be specific about that?
Ms. Bond. All right. For example, and there're lots of, you
know, there's a review process and people are talking about it.
But so, for example, would it make sense to interview someone
after arrival in the United States, after marrying the fiance
as promised, and they get to the point where they are going to
change status. Should they be interviewed again at that point?
Or should we be looking at is there some other database that we
could be looking at, maybe social media. I don't know. But so
that's an example of what we are looking at in the review
process.
Ms. Lujan Grisham. You go outside your agencies to--and
tell me how you are using that same evaluation process with all
of your international partners? Do they get to weigh in? Do we
take their ideas credibly too? Because again, this is after the
fact, and one of the--while I don't want to dispute that idea,
I appreciate the notion that someone is here. Let's continue to
the degree that we can look at that individual. But what could
we have done better to maybe not approve that Ms. Malik came to
the United States in the first place?
Ms. Bond. All right, well, I think----
Ms. Lujan Grisham. Because she is not going to be alone. We
know that other folks are going to try to get here or, frankly,
are already here. So what are we doing about that?
Ms. Bond. Well, I will give an answer, and then I think Mr.
Bersin will probably also want to speak to this.
Ms. Lujan Grisham. I have 20 seconds, unfortunately.
Ms. Bond. So absolutely, talking to the government of
Pakistan about--because she was a citizen of Pakistan to say,
you know, what more could we do in terms of our collaboration
to try to share information about people who might be a threat
to our citizens or to Pakistan's? What information do you have?
What information do we have? And are we sharing it effectively?
We are, of course, having that conversation with other
governments too. What more can we be doing to share
information?
Ms. Lujan Grisham. So my time has expired. Mr. Chairman,
with your indulgence, I would really like, without creating,
you know, a written record that is problematic for national
security, of course, but I want specificity. What's transpiring
after these conversations that would give us, this committee
and our constituents the sense that we're doing better all of
the time, and this is a constant process that's meaningful,
because I'm not there. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bersin. Mr. Chairman, may I just add one short----
Mr. Mica. Very briefly. Go ahead.
Mr. Bersin. We're the people who actually do the vetting,
and what you've rightfully said, how do we actually get
additional information, and I would suggest that the committee
hasn't. Remember that it's the--with regard to the domestic
affairs, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has the principal
counterintelligence and intelligence function, and with regard
to abroad, it's the national security agencies that do that.
It's not--I'm not just passing it along. We use that
information, but I would think a classified hearing in which
you would understand exactly what the FBI is doing in a
classified setting, and what the intelligence agents are doing,
I think would be of great utility in answering your question.
Mr. Mica. You might want to arrange that. I thank the
gentlelady.
Ms. Lujan Grisham. I just want to mention, we have all
participated in all of those high-level--I want to make sure
that the viewers recognize that Members of Congress have been
invited to a series of significant classified briefings. We
take that very seriously, and we still have questions.
Mr. Mica. Well, for all of the witnesses and sort of in
conclusion as we get to the end of the hearing here, we
basically have lost control of our borders. We have somewhere
between 11-, and I have heard 15 million people here who are
illegal entrants. Is that correct? Anyone? Is that the range?
Yes or no?
Mr. Bersin. The usual number is 11 million.
Mr. Mica. I have heard 11 to 15.
Mr. Rodriguez. Yeah, sir, actually the number that I have
always heard is 11, and actually declining, sir.
Mr. Mica. Okay, 11 to 15. Everybody pretty much agrees. So
we will just take it at 11. And about half of those people here
overstayed a visa, or a tourist thing, or student, I'm told,
just round numbers. And the others just came across the border
illegally in that range. Rodriguez, about that range?
Mr. Rodriguez. That's consistent with what----
Mr. Mica. Okay, thank you. The President's executive--I
mean, we are talking about a visa, controlling our visas and
the visa waiver control, and we have here about 4- to 6 million
people, in that range, who have overstayed their visa. The
biggest Visa Waiver Program in the history of mankind is the
Obama waiver. He gave executive--an executive order to allow
those people to stay in spite of their being here illegally,
isn't that correct?
Mr. Rodriguez. The President----
Mr. Mica. Yes, it's correct. The President gave an
executive order, so----
Mr. Rodriguez. Well, we are not implementing it because the
court has stopped us, but we are----
Mr. Mica. We had to go to court, but he implemented--again,
we have got--and you have got hundreds or thousands of them
that are illegal. So it's your job, Mr. Rodriguez, to deport
some of those people. And I see that numbers of people, the
removals has actually--where's my figures here? Let's go; 2008,
244,000 removed; 2013, 133,000; 2014, last year, we are down to
104,000. Are these figures basically correct?
Mr. Rodriguez. We--we are--they sound right to me. We are
exercising our process for----
Mr. Mica. And it's not a question of resources. We provided
enough money to deport up to 400,000, which was the request we
had from you. So ICE is doing less with more resources. In
fact, criminal alien arrests have declined by 11 percent
between 2012 and 2013. Are you aware of that, Mr. Rodriguez? Is
it your job to deport these people?
Mr. Rodriguez. No, I am not--it is not my job.
Mr. Mica. You are Homeland Security.
Mr. Rodriguez. Certainly, the Department of Homeland
Security, removal, removal of----
Mr. Mica. So we have got illegals here. Ms. Bond, we
interviewed that lady, a consular official interviewed the
female terrorist from San Bernardino how many years ago? A
couple of years ago?
Ms. Bond. In 2014.
Mr. Mica. Last year.
Ms. Bond. Yes.
Mr. Mica. Okay, and but she came here and she was fully
vetted, according to the process that we have now. Is that
correct?
Ms. Bond. Yes, it is.
Mr. Mica. Okay, and she thwarted that process. Is there
anything you could recommend to us that we could do to stop
that? And if she thwarted it, and we got hundreds of thousands
of people who have entered the United States illegally, and
then we have them coming in, you approving them legally, you
see why the American people have concerns about what's coming
next.
Is there any way, or anything you could recommend that we
could do to change that situation?
Ms. Bond. We are conducting a very thorough review.
Mr. Mica. Of what took place?
Ms. Bond. Not only of what took place, Congressman, but
also of what it is that we do.
Mr. Mica. Yeah, do you tape that interview?
Ms. Bond. No.
Mr. Mica. You don't.
Ms. Bond. No.
Mr. Mica. I just wondered if it was taped, if we have any
record. Have any of you known anyone who has joined ISIS of the
Christian faith? Does anyone know anyone who is involved or--
no, okay. Just thought I would ask that question.
Well, obviously, we closed the door too late. We also have
now information that ISIS has obtained Syrian passport
machines. Does anyone know about that?
Ms. Bond. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. Have they obtained them? Can you disclose that to
the committee?
Ms. Bond. Yeah, I do have some information on that, sir. In
August 2015, the State Department received a report of 3,800
stolen Syrian----
Mr. Mica. No, this is not stolen. There are many stolen.
There're, we disclosed today, 300,000 lost or misplaced
American passports. I'm told that ISIS has captured passport
machines in Syria. Is that correct? Does anyone know? Mr.
Bersin.
Mr. Bersin. There have been--I have seen open source
reports to that effect.
Mr. Mica. Okay, well, that creates a whole new set of
problems. And then, you're the refugee screener lady. I was
told that you get--these Syrian refugees, are first vetted by
the U.N. Is that correct?
Ms. Richard. UNHCR takes the initial application.
Mr. Mica. So we are getting our recommended entrants from
the U.N.?
Ms. Richard. Normally. Not 100 percent, but normally that's
true.
Mr. Mica. Well, I was told--where's the rest of them?
Ms. Richard. Sometimes if someone comes to the attention of
the embassy, they could be put in that process.
Mr. Mica. But that's a small, small percentage.
Ms. Richard. That's right. Most come through the U.N.
refugee agency.
Mr. Mica. Have you vetted the U.N. process?
Ms. Richard. Yeah.
Mr. Mica. They are checking with Syrians to see if they
have any ISIS connections?
Ms. Richard. We wouldn't check with the Assad regime on
whether----
Mr. Mica. But you are saying the U.N. Somebody--they are
recommending these people. That's where you are getting them
from. And they told us, don't worry. The U.N. has approved
these people, and we are recommending them for entry into the
United States.
Ms. Richard. They haven't approved them. They don't get to
decide whether they come to the United States. They are
referring the cases to us to match the things we have asked
them to find.
Mr. Mica. But again, do you know if the U.N. is vetting
them with Syrian and Assad officials and checking to see if
they have ISIS connections?
Ms. Richard. I hope they don't check with the Assad
officials because some of these people are fleeing Assad's
torture chambers.
Mr. Mica. I recognize Mr. Gosar.
Mr. Gosar. I thank the gentleman. Now, I would like to get
some clarification from all of these witnesses on the vetting
and the investigative process for seeking entry into the U.S.
by visa or refugee status.
So my question first, and we will go down the line. Mr.
Bersin, you will go first, but the same questions for all four
of you. Is there any specific guidances, doctrines, directives,
or memorandum, in effect now, either from this or a previous
administration, that ties the hands of investigators in regards
to getting the information they need to make informed admission
decisions for those seeking to enter the U.S.?
Mr. Bersin. Only to the extent that there were
constitutional and/or privacy policies that----
Mr. Gosar. There is no constitutional privacy--
constitutional applications for those seeking asylum that are
not citizens. Mr. Gowdy went through that before. So, I mean,
any doctrines--I'm going to say it again, because it's very
specific. Specific guidances, doctrines, or memorandum in
effect now that either, from this or previous administrations,
that ties the hands of investigators in regards to getting the
information they need to make informed admission decisions for
those seeking to enter the U.S.?
Mr. Bersin. I'm not familiar with any, except to the extent
that there are privacy concerns, Congressman. I--but I'm aware
of no restrictions of that kind for screening purposes.
Mr. Gosar. But you earlier made constitutional remarks--but
constitutional remarks to our Constitution do not apply to
refugees or those noncitizens?
Mr. Bersin. No. I didn't hear your asylum or refugees.
Mr. Gosar. Okay, but your answer is no.
Mr. Bersin. Yes.
Mr. Gosar. Mr. Rodriguez?
Mr. Rodriguez. No.
Mr. Gosar. Ms. Bond?
Ms. Bond. No.
Mr. Gosar. Ms. Richard?
Ms. Richard. No.
Mr. Gosar. So under the current policy and procedure, you
have access to all of the information you need to make an
accurate security assessment for all visitors. Mr. Bersin.
Mr. Bersin. We could only strengthen, and I think that's
what the discussion has been, but yes, we have--we seek to
strengthen it. We have the authority to do the screening that
we need to do, yes.
Mr. Gosar. Okay. Mr. Rodriguez.
Mr. Rodriguez. As to the refugees that we screen and the
immigrant visas that we process, yes, we have quite robust
resources that we bring to bear for all of those programs.
Mr. Gosar. Ms. Bond.
Ms. Bond. There are no restrictions on our access to the
information that we seek, unless we can't get it because it's,
you know, it's sometimes some other government might have it or
something. But there is nothing from the part of our government
that ties our hands in terms of seeking information we need to
adjudicate a visa.
Mr. Gosar. Ms. Richard.
Ms. Richard. I defer to Director Rodriguez's judgment on
this, but I want to reassure all of you that if you think there
are sources out there that we are not checking that we should
be, we're very open to looking at more work on this, but we
have a very robust refugee vetting system.
Mr. Gosar. So going back to you, Mr. Bersin, and going back
down, so there are no firewalls at all between the agencies for
sharing this pertinent information?
Mr. Bersin. On screening, that's my understanding, yes,
sir.
Mr. Gosar. Mr. Rodriguez.
Mr. Rodriguez. Also mine, Congressman.
Mr. Gosar. Ms. Bond.
Ms. Bond. Yes, the screening of applications goes through
the entire interagency process.
Mr. Gosar. Okay, no firewalls?
Ms. Bond. No.
Mr. Gosar. Ms. Richard.
Ms. Richard. No.
Mr. Gosar. Ms. Richard, earlier in the testimony, you made
the comment that you are not aware of--I think you didn't even
say that. There is no relationship to an asylee, political
asylee for acts of terrorism in this country, true?
Ms. Richard. No, I didn't address that.
Mr. Gosar. I think you said that----
Ms. Richard. I said no refugee that came in through this
process has carried out a successful terrorist attack against
Americans in the United States. There have been--there have
been some troublemakers that have come in through this process.
Mr. Gosar. I would like to know how many of those
troublemakers, by the way?
Ms. Richard. About a dozen.
Mr. Gosar. About a dozen?
Ms. Richard. Yeah.
Mr. Gosar. Any in Arizona?
Ms. Richard. Well, and then probably, you know, there is
also an element of people who break the law, too, that is
probably bigger.
Mr. Gosar. Oh, okay. And how many----
Ms. Richard. But I don't know----
Mr. Gosar. And how many of----
Ms. Richard. I have to refer you to the FBI on this.
Mr. Gosar. I would like to get those numbers. And what
happens when they have a problem?
Ms. Richard. Well, the FBI has a program to track people
that they are afraid will be, you know, their
counterintelligence program to track people. So I have to defer
to them. But we do have--have heard of, you know, there were--
the famous case was the two Iraqis who were brought to Bowling
Green, Kentucky, and then it was discovered that they had been
up to no good in Iraq, and so they were arrested.
Mr. Gosar. Well, we had a gentleman in Casa Grande Arizona,
Mr. Aldosary, that tried to blow up the Social Security
building during my first term. So that was kind of fun. So
that's why I asked the question. I do have--a little bit of
indulgence here. There's a reason I asked you a question at the
very beginning about guidance of specific memos. Are you
familiar with the ``words matter'' memo, Mr. Bersin?
Mr. Bersin. Not by that title, no, sir.
Mr. Gosar. Mr. Rodriguez?
Mr. Rodriguez. No, sir.
Mr. Gosar. Ms. Bond?
Ms. Bond. No.
Mr. Gosar. Okay, I thank the gentleman. I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. [Presiding.] Thank you. I now recognize
myself. I have a few wrap-up questions. There may be another
member or two that come back.
Ms. Richard, you were quoted in this hearing as saying by
the way--Mr. Cartwright said, by the way, were the shootings in
California perpetrated by refugees who were resettled? Your
answer was no. And then you went on and you said, No refugees
have carried out terrorist activities in the United States. And
then Mr. Cartwright repeated that and then you said, that have
successfully carried out an attack against American citizens in
the United States.
Ms. Richard. Correct, correct. So the second is correct.
Chairman Chaffetz. The second. The first statement by
itself is not correct.
Ms. Richard. Well, I think the FBI would--is concerned
about a small number of refugees that have come in. That was a
while ago that they came in. Under the current system, we
haven't had anyone recently in that category.
Chairman Chaffetz. I would point to--at least, I have got
about a dozen names here of Senator Sessions, it's up on
Breitbart. One of the more recent charges here, is August 12,
2015. I can't pronounce his last name, last name ``Kurbanov, a
native of Uzbekistan came to the United States as a refugee in
2009 was found guilty on charges that he conspired and
attempted to provide material support to a designated foreign
terrorist organization, and possessed an unregistered
destructive device. U.S. Assistant Attorney General John Carlin
stated that he 'conspired to provide material support to the
Islamic movement of Uzbekistan and procured bomb-making
materials in the interest of perpetrating a terrorist attack on
American soil.''' He came to the country as a refugee in 2009.
Look, most of the refugees that I have interacted with we
have a good, healthy refugee population in Utah. They are good,
decent people that come from terrible situations. I don't think
anybody suggested we don't bring any refugees in. What we have
asked is for a pause and a time out so that we can make sure
that the vetting is there in place. And when you have the FBI
Director saying we can only vet as good as the information is,
I think it's a little bit of an overstatement to say, Hey,
refugees are not your problem. Let me go back to the slide I
brought up at the beginning, and this is of deep concern to me.
This is--these are the number of people making credible
fear, and so refugees are imported to the United States of
America. You have people that are claiming asylum who come
somehow to the United States of America. You can come here
legally and lawfully, but you can also sneak into the country,
as I witnessed down on the Arizona border, where people came
across the border. They didn't run from border patrol. They
wanted to get caught and the reason they wanted to get caught
is, they wanted to go through this process.
And so Mr. Rodriguez, I want to ask you about this. This is
a massive rise in the number of people claiming a credible fear
with asylum. How many asylum officers are there at Homeland
Security?
Mr. Rodriguez. The asylum core, give or take, is
approximately 400 individuals.
Chairman Chaffetz. So you have 400 individuals, and in
fiscal year 2014, we had 51,001 people claiming credible fear.
There has been a lot from this administration about these
exhaustive interviews. How much time does an officer spend
interviewing and investigating somebody who claims credible
fear?
Mr. Rodriguez. Well, I think in credible fear, I think it,
obviously, varies on the case. I have observed them. They seem
to be approximately an hour. I will also say----
Chairman Chaffetz. Is that on average?
Mr. Rodriguez. --reviewing them as a former--that is my
understanding. As a former prosecutor, observing those
interviews, they appear to me to be robust interviews by very
well-trained officers.
Chairman Chaffetz. So you have one officer. I want to make
sure I get the math right here. You are saying one officer will
take 1 hour to interview somebody. You have 400 officers, and
we have over 50,000 people just in 2014 making that claim?
You were looking at the notes. Go ahead.
Mr. Rodriguez. I'm sorry. I--in the particular case of
credible fear, we have actually plussed up in the locations
where we are screening people for credible fear as a result.
Those screenings are getting conducted actually quite
expeditiously.
Chairman Chaffetz. Well, that's my concern is that they are
too expeditious. So my question is, how long is the average
interview, and how many people are doing the interviews?
Mr. Rodriguez. Again, I will have to get back to you on the
exact number. I believe----
Chairman Chaffetz. Yeah, this is a hearing about--this is a
hearing about vetting.
Mr. Rodriguez. Right.
Chairman Chaffetz. So I'm asking a very specific question
about vetting.
Mr. Rodriguez. I believe at any given time, there are
approximately 40 individuals, give or take. We are going to get
you the exact number, but that's the neighborhood of the
number, who are in the locations where we are screening
individuals who have come across the border, and they are
conducting those credible fear and reasonable fear interviews.
Again, within the timeframes that the law--that the law and our
policies require.
Chairman Chaffetz. Okay, you put a lot of asterisks on
that.
Mr. Rodriguez. You also asked me about the direct----
Chairman Chaffetz. Forty or 400?
Mr. Rodriguez. Four hundred is the total asylum core. So
those individuals are doing credible fear and asylum. They are
doing credible fear and reasonable fear. They are also doing
the general work of asylum screening----
Chairman Chaffetz. Okay.
Mr. Rodriguez. --as well----
Chairman Chaffetz. Okay. So who are the 40?
Mr. Rodriguez. The 40 are the ones who are deployed
specifically to be meeting our goals, to process individuals
claiming credible fear and reasonable fear at the border.
Chairman Chaffetz. How long, if you come across, and I'm
assuming they have come across illegally. There's people that
come across legally, but there are a lot of them are coming
across illegally. How long are they detained until they have
completed that process, on average?
Mr. Rodriguez. I would--it's roughly--I think our target,
basically, is 20 days. If they're--in terms of either getting
them into expedited removal or moving them into some sort of
proceedings. A lot of those people, obviously, go into----
Chairman Chaffetz. You said you are going to give me some
additional information. When will I get that?
Mr. Rodriguez. We will work to get it to you as soon as
possible.
Chairman Chaffetz. No, give me a date. Give me a date. I
know it's the holiday season, but give me a date.
Mr. Rodriguez. Given that, let's target the end of the
first week of January.
Chairman Chaffetz. The end of the first week of January. I
think that's reasonable. Because the math doesn't seem to add
up. Here's the problem. Refugees have the State Department and
other assets working towards that. I've got huge, huge
questions. But now, as we look back at asylum, we are saying we
have got 40 people with 50,000 people coming in the door. Think
of a football stadium, okay. You have a football stadium full
of people coming at us each year. You are saying that that
these people do interviews, background checks, write-ups. They
are not able to do that 8 hours a day. They have got other
responsibilities, paperwork they have got to do.
Here's the problem. Here's what I experienced. When I went
to Arizona and I saw people come across and they wanted to
claim credible fear, they would go to a judge and say, an
administrative judge and say, Your honor, you know, I have got
credible fear, and they'd read a little statement, and then the
judge would say, Well, okay, we are going to have to go through
the adjudication process. And that adjudication process means
what? What in Arizona is the next time we are going to see
these people?
Mr. Rodriguez. Yeah, that's the ordinary asylum process,
and it is a number of--quite a number of months before they are
seen.
Chairman Chaffetz. You mean years?
Mr. Rodriguez. It can be years, yes.
Chairman Chaffetz. Okay, so in Arizona when I went there
last year, I believe it was last year, the dates they were
giving out, the court date was for 2020. And so what often
happens is, the people have come here illegally. They claim
asylum. They say, oh, you might have credible fear. We are
going to give you a court date, and now the backlog is so big
that they are not going to get a court date until 2020, and
then what happens? They do what? They apply for a work permit.
How many work permits are you handing out each year?
Mr. Rodriguez. I don't know the exact number. I certainly
can----
Chairman Chaffetz. It's a big one. Now they are in the
United States legally. They can work and they can compete with
an American taxpayer for jobs and all the other resources. They
get benefits. They go to our schools. They do a lot of things
just like an American citizen does. And I got a problem with
that. I got a problem with that.
Mr. Bersin, did you want to say something?
Mr. Bersin. Sir, when the last time we had the surge in the
summer of 2014, the administration put a bill up and one of the
key elements of that bill was to build an immigration court
system that actually would work. Because you put your finger on
the problem. We have 243 immigration judges, and we need many
more in order for an immigration process to work and produce
the result either way, but to produce a result in a timely
fashion.
Chairman Chaffetz. And the frustration is, you got to lock
down that border. And you have got to get rid of the people who
are here committing crimes, for goodness sake. They are here
legally committing crimes, and you all release them back out in
the public. Some 60-plus thousand times you did that. These are
the criminal element. Don't tell me about the nice, you know,
lady who is just trying to help her family. These are people
committing crimes, get caught, they get convicted, they are in
your hands, and Homeland Security says, no, go back out into
the community. Right? Am I--did I say anything that's wrong
there?
Mr. Rodriguez. Again, to be clear, the removal priorities
are that if an individual is convicted of a felony they are
priority one for removal. Returning to our earlier conversation
that includes rape. That is a priority one priority for
removal. Just to be clear, and so the public is clear about
what that is----
Chairman Chaffetz. So if they commit a rape, and maybe just
pled down, am I wrong on the number two, they plead down to say
sexual abuse and exploitation, that's not good enough?
Mr. Rodriguez. If the person, if their top count of
conviction is rape, which is a serious felony, then in that
case, they are----
Chairman Chaffetz. But sexual abuse is not?
Mr. Rodriguez. Sexual abuse may not necessarily be rape. So
in fact, in the criminal law----
Chairman Chaffetz. But it might, right?
Mr. Rodriguez. Well, certainly as a prosecutor, I have seen
people pled down to sexual abuse, if that's the point you are
trying to make. So let's be clear about that. What sexual abuse
actually means in the criminal law is not rape.
Chairman Chaffetz. So based on the Homeland Security
directive from Secretary Johnson, if you commit and are
convicted of sexual abuse, or exploitation, that is priority
two?
Mr. Rodriguez. Which means that you are still a priority, a
priority for removal.
Chairman Chaffetz. You are not the top priority. You're not
the top priority.
Mr. Rodriguez. But if you are convicted of rape, the felony
of rape, you are a top priority for removal. Let's not--let's
not have people misunderstand that fact. If you are convicted
of a rape, you are a top priority for removal. Let's not have
the American people believe anything else.
Chairman Chaffetz. But let's get the list of the things
that are number two: Offense of domestic violence, sexual abuse
or exploitation, burglary, unlawful possession or use of a
firearm, drug distribution or trafficking, driving under the
influence; all of which are not the top priority of Homeland
Security.
Mr. Bersin. Mr. Chairman, you have heard Secretary Johnson
say that his top priority is national security and public
safety. And with all due respect, the priority one goes to
felonies, the priority two--and sexual abuse can often, short
of rape, be a felony. If it's a felony, it's priority one. The
priority two that you're referring to are significant
misdemeanors. And frankly, as a former prosecutor, I think the
felony should take precedence. It doesn't mean that we don't
pay attention.
Chairman Chaffetz. But why not just get rid of all of them?
You have got them in your possession.
Mr. Bersin. Because you know that when you actually
allocate resources either as a prosecutor or----
Chairman Chaffetz. Are you saying it's a resource problem?
Are you saying it's a resource problem?
Mr. Bersin. No, I'm saying that when you have a choice to
be made----
Chairman Chaffetz. Why is--if somebody is convicted for any
crime, why are they not deported? Immediately? I mean, or serve
time and then be deported? Why don't they all get deported? Why
are there exceptions?
Mr. Bersin. So 90--more than 90 percent of priority one and
two removals, so I don't think it's fair to suggest that there
is no attention to priority two. There is. And it----
Chairman Chaffetz. We obviously have a--we obviously have a
policy discussion--difference. I don't think I misunderstand. I
think you understand it as well. My point is, you got people
convicted. They are here illegally. They are convicted, and you
let them go. If it's only 90 percent----
Mr. Bersin. That's a different--that's a different issue
than the priorities for enforcement. The issue of removal----
Chairman Chaffetz. Is it true or not true that during 2
fiscal years, you had 66,000 people in your possession that
were convicted of crimes that you released into the public.
True or false?
Mr. Bersin. What crimes?
Chairman Chaffetz. Any crime.
Mr. Bersin. Yes. So, well, you say any traffic violation, a
misdemeanor. Look, I understand----
Chairman Chaffetz. Are there people on priority one and
priority two?
Mr. Bersin. There are minor--there are minor offenses that
are misdemeanors that are not top priority.
Chairman Chaffetz. I just--no, yes or no, 66,000 people
over two-year fiscal year period, that you had in your
possession and that you released into the public. You did not
deport them. Correct?
Mr. Bersin. Chairman----
Chairman Chaffetz. True or false?
Mr. Bersin. It's not just a yes or no, because you know
there are requirements----
Chairman Chaffetz. Is it true or false?
Mr. Bersin. The answer is that there are requirements to
release people under court decisions that you're aware of.
Chairman Chaffetz. This is so screwed up about the Obama
administration. You're here illegally, you commit a crime, you
deport them. Get rid of them. Serve your time, and get rid of
them. They are a threat to public safety. They are a threat for
terrorism. And they should not be released back into the
public. That's what's so outrageous.
Let me recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis
for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeSantis. The priorities are related to your failure to
remove these folks because you say, oh, they are priority two,
we will still get to them. The fact is, that those 66,000, when
we got the individual offenses, you did have people convicted
of homicide that were released. You had people convicted of
sexual assault, rape, child molestation; really, really
significant crimes. And to say there are court decisions,
that's a rationalization for why you released them, but you did
release them and that's putting the public at risk.
And so I second the chairman's concern about that. And the
fact of the matter is, I was a prosecutor, particularly with
some of the child molestation stuff, you do plead that down,
some prosecutors do, because you don't want to put the child on
the stand. And so they end up with offenses that could probably
be considered priority two. And that's putting the American
people at risk. But I digress.
Ms. Richard, you were quoted recently as saying that the
biggest myth is people coming here could be terrorists in
relation to the Syrian refugee situation. Why are you so
dismissive of the possibility that they are going to have
terrorists in the refugee flow?
Ms. Richard. I am not dismissive of the idea that terrorist
organizations----
Mr. DeSantis. You said it was a myth. Why did you say it
was a myth then?
Ms. Richard. I don't remember saying that.
Mr. DeSantis. You said the biggest myth is that people
coming could be terrorists, and your point was that they were
likely to be fleeing terrorists. But the issue is, is that if
you have 10,000 people, even if 99 percent of them are, you
know, no threat, 1 percent, that's a significant number of
people that would be injected into our society. We just saw,
recently, two refugees linked to the Paris attack were arrested
in an Austrian refugee camp, and you will acknowledge, will you
not, that we have had refugees come to this country who have
been prosecuted for material support to terrorism, correct?
Ms. Richard. Correct.
Mr. DeSantis. You will acknowledge that?
Ms. Richard. Yeah.
Mr. DeSantis. Because we had a number of them just this
year, you know, the Eastern District of Virginia, Liban Haji
Mohamed. You had Abdinassir Mohamud Ibrahim from the Western
District of Texas. A lot of these people came as refugees. Some
then ended up getting LPR status, some even citizenship. But
the fact of the matter is, these are folks who have come
through the program and have gone to terrorism.
Let me ask you this: What is your appraisal of how the
Somali refugee community in Minnesota has worked out for the
interest of the United States?
Ms. Richard. What I wanted to say was that most--all bona
fide refugees are people who are fleeing terrible things,
including terrorists.
Mr. DeSantis. That's the point though. I think a lot of us
are concerned that we can't tell the difference between a bona
fide refugee, given what the FBI Director has said, and given
what other very high officials have said. So I take that point.
But what about the situation with the Somali refugees in
Minneapolis? There's tens of thousands have settled there over
the last 20 years. We know that there is very high rates of
cash assistance, and food assistance paid for by the taxpayer.
And here's the thing: You have had over 50 people from that
community go to join ISIS, or al-Shabaab, or other terrorist
groups in the Middle East. Is that something that's in the
United States' interest?
Ms. Richard. No, it's not. The U.S. is closed to al-Shabaab
and to ISIS and to ISIL.
Mr. DeSantis. Well, how did that end up happening then?
Ms. Richard. This, to me, is the key question, why anyone
would be attracted by ISIL or al-Shabaab. People born in the
United States, people who are converts to this--these
followings, people who are refugees who came into the United
States.
Mr. DeSantis. So you're not sure why it happens?
Ms. Richard. I think this is the key question for all of
us. What is the attraction?
Mr. DeSantis. But here's why your statement bothered me
because what I think the Somali experience in Minnesota shows,
a lot of people who were coming directly, when they were
adults, were not necessarily involved in terrorism and did not
pursue terrorism when they got to the United States. But then
they have the families and you have the second generation. You
have U.S. citizens. So their choice, they could have grown up
in Somalia, and they draw the biggest, you know, it's like a
royal flush to be able to grow up in America, and given all of
that, how do they thank the United States? They go join the
jihad.
Ms. Richard. I agree with you 100 percent.
Mr. DeSantis. Well, here's the point, though.
Ms. Richard. This is what keeps me awake at night. Why
would someone who grows up in the United States be attracted to
this?
Mr. DeSantis. But here's the point: The refugee policy that
we have, even getting beyond the vetting initially, you are
having to essentially try to figure out what's going to happen
10, 20 years down the road. And so the folks that we are
bringing in now, we don't know what the downstream effects of
that are going to be. So when I see something like what's
happened in Somalia, it gives me a lot of cause for concern.
Mr. Rodriguez, let me ask you this: We have got Tashfeen
Malik's form that she executed when she was applying for her K-
1 visa. She was asked, there's a question on there basically
saying, ``Are you a terrorist? Check yes or no.''
Is that really the best that we can do, because I think
even from her perspective, I don't even think she has to lie
because she probably doesn't consider herself to be a
terrorist.
Mr. Rodriguez. I think you are referring to the consular
interview. I will talk about what we know and what we think we
need to do. For example, in the refugee screening process, we
developed lines of questioning as part of the interview that go
beyond just what might appear on a mere form, and actually----
Mr. DeSantis. So you are in the process of developing that?
Mr. Rodriguez. No. No, that exists. That has existed for
years. And those are being reinforced.
Mr. DeSantis. What about her address application? They
asked that question.
Mr. Rodriguez. That, the unless there is a--under current
practice, unless there is a specific trigger, some derogatory
information that would lead us to probe into those kinds of
issues, we don't, obviously, that's one of the things we need
to be thinking about.
Mr. DeSantis. Well, see, I think, you know, this is
somebody who obviously we know that there was statements that
she had been making over the Internet. She is traveling from
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and those are hotbeds of Salafist
ideology, very, very dicey when you start talking about
individuals.
Ms. Bond, is the State Department recommending that
Congress, do you guys need to us change any laws so that we can
have a system that would screen out people like Tashfeen Malik?
Ms. Bond. We do have laws that would screen out the likes
of Tashfeen Malik.
Mr. DeSantis. So you don't think there needs to be any
changes?
Ms. Bond. If we identify them. And we are looking at----
Mr. DeSantis. But that's my point. Does Congress need to
give you authority or change policy in any way so that they are
identified? Obviously, if they are identified, I hope they
wouldn't be let in. I mean, that would be to me--but we are not
identifying everybody now, and the question is, is this just
kind of bureaucratic mistakes, or do we need to change
policies? Do you have recommendations for us?
Ms. Bond. I would--I do not at this moment, but I think,
based on the review that we are looking at now, it's possible
that some of the ideas that we generate might require a change
in the law.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you, as we conclude, I do have to
get through a couple more, and then we will be done.
I really do believe that one of the untold stories, the
biggest--one of the biggest threats that we have, are those
that are coming illegally to the United States, and those that
are coming to the country illegally and claiming asylum because
they will get papers. They will be working. They don't go
through a vigorous insightful interview. And I think that is a
huge, gaping hole that has to be plugged. There's a reason why
that we have had this huge ascent, this huge growing number.
I went to the Eloy detention facility in Arizona. There
were some 150 different countries represented there; a lot of
people coming that have to be addressed. We still, in this
country, do not have an entry-exit program. There have been at
least a half dozen times, where law has been put in place since
1996. Why do we not have an entry-exit program?
Mr. Bersin. So, with respect, I have been asked, and I'm
prepared to answer that, Mr. Chairman, to the best of my
ability. There was, apparently, an agreement for a hard stop at
1 o'clock, and I would ask if we can, in due course, bring the
hearing to a conclusion as staff had negotiated. I happen to
have a----
Chairman Chaffetz. I don't--I'm sorry, but I'm just not
negotiating the end time here. We are going to answer these
questions. I think it will be a few minutes.
Mr. Bersin. Okay. So the--starting in 2012, CBP started to
get the resources to be able to start to develop in earnest,
the entry-exit system. As I indicated before, Mr. Chairman, the
way in which our airports, our whole infrastructure was
constructed, it was not--you were not able to capture
biometrics on the way out. There was no screening on the way
out. The focus was screening on the way in.
So CBP, and I remember this during my tenure there, Mr.
Chairman, there were three ways you could do it. You could
actually rebuild the infrastructure, and that was rejected for
cost reasons. You could actually put CBP----
Chairman Chaffetz. Who rejected that?
Mr. Bersin. That was a decision made with--I participated
and I recommended that, in fact, we not rebuild all of the
airports and the seaports.
Chairman Chaffetz. Where is the proposal, and when was it
rejected?
Mr. Bersin. I will, if, in fact, it was ever--if it came to
the Congress, which I don't believe it did, I will--I will
endeavor to get it by the end of January.
Chairman Chaffetz. When will I get that?
Mr. Bersin. The second reason----
Chairman Chaffetz. Wait, wait, wait. When will I get that
proposal that was rejected?
Mr. Bersin. By the end of--consistent with Mr. Rodriguez's
schedule, by the end of January.
Chairman Chaffetz. The end of the first week of January, I
believe is what he said.
Mr. Bersin. Were you that generous, Mr. Rodriguez?
Mr. Rodriguez. Well, I think a more modest----
Chairman Chaffetz. I want you to leave right now as you
want to go at 1 o'clock, but I'm hopeful that it is to go get
this report. But----
Mr. Bersin. The second was----
Chairman Chaffetz. No, no, no. What's the date? Tell me the
date.
Mr. Bersin. January 30.
Chairman Chaffetz. Okay.
Mr. Bersin. The second was to put CBP officers, and we
actually had a pilot where CBP officers would be placed at
the--would be placed at the ports of entry. And the estimate
there was that it would--that would take resources away from
other functions that we did not have in terms of CBP officers.
Chairman Chaffetz. So you're saying that this is rejected,
those two instances, because of money?
Mr. Bersin. Yes, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. And yet----
Mr. Bersin. Well, not only money in the first order
because, in fact, it would have required a complete
restructuring of our ports of entry. So it would also interfere
with commercial activities and other interests we had.
Chairman Chaffetz. There was a conscious choice not to have
an exit program. My question here, and again, I'm trying to
wrap up here, but if it's a resource problem, why did Homeland
Security come to--and reprogram $113 million from ICE, and give
it to Secret Service and FEMA?
Mr. Bersin. I'm not familiar with that decision, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. Homeland Security recently gave $150
million to the Mexican Government. It may be worthwhile. But I
just don't understand, since it's law six times over, why there
isn't an exit program. I just don't understand that.
Mr. Bersin. The effort to get an overstay report, which I
have communicated to the committee, is underway, is part of
this process that has been initiated to capture all of the
biographic. We actually do a fair amount. You will see in the
overstay report, we do a fair amount that actually captures
biographic; those who come in, and those that go out.
Chairman Chaffetz. Do most people come in by land, sea, or
air?
Mr. Bersin. There are 180 crossings--182 million crossings
on the land. We have about a million people a day that are
processed in. And it's--most of the people are coming by air.
Chairman Chaffetz. You think that most people are coming in
the air?
Mr. Bersin. Individual people. So I'm saying of the 182
million crossings that we have, those are repeated crossings
going back and forth. Separate individuals, but in terms of
sheer traffic, it's the land, obviously. But the crossings and
individual people is actually more coming by air.
Chairman Chaffetz. With nearly 10 million border crossing
cards, do you collect biographical, or biometric information on
those people?
Mr. Bersin. We do not, no.
Chairman Chaffetz. Okay, I could go on and on. It is such a
mess and a disaster. Let me recognize the gentleman from
Georgia, Mr. Carter, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.
Thank you for staying, and I will be respectful of your time.
And I will try to be as quick as I can.
Ms. Bond, based on earlier testimony, a K-1 fiance(e) visa
is classified like a nonimmigrant visa, but the applicant must
go through the full immigration visa screening process. Is that
correct?
Ms. Bond. Yes.
Mr. Carter. So what kind of screening and tests must a K-1
applicant pass?
Ms. Bond. Okay. Because it is treated like an immigrant
visa, in other words, this is an individual that we expect to
remain permanently in the United States, and so, they get
exactly the same security screening as any other traveler to
the United States. We don't distinguish between immigrant and
nonimmigrant in terms of the interagency security terrorism
criminal background, all of that review. However, for example,
if you are applying for an immigrant visa, you do have to
undergo a medical exam. And so someone who is getting a
fiance(e) visa gets that medical exam.
If you are applying for an immigrant visa, you have to
present a police certificate from any country where you have
lived for more than 6 months since you were 16, showing that
you didn't have a criminal record in that country.
Mr. Carter. So that's the background check that you do?
Ms. Bond. That is part of the process for immigrant visas
that you wouldn't require if someone is coming in a
nonimmigrant capacity.
Mr. Carter. Okay. Was Tashfeen Malik, was she subject to
that process as a K-1 visa applicant?
Ms. Bond. Yes.
Mr. Carter. She was? So nonimmigrant visas, such as those
that under the Visa Waiver Program, are they less stringent
than a K-1 visa?
Ms. Bond. If you're applying for a nonimmigrant visa, for
example, a tourist visa, we do not require you to submit proof
that you have a clean criminal record in every country where
you have lived.
Mr. Carter. So your answer would be yes?
Ms. Bond. Yes.
Mr. Carter. So a nonimmigrant visa, such as those under the
Visa Waiver Program, they are less stringent than a K-1 visa?
Ms. Bond. Right. We ask the question about whether you have
any criminal record, but you are not required to prove it.
Mr. Carter. So we have got 1.6 million overstays in the
backlog, 400,000 of which are from the Visa Waiver Program,
which is the less stringent program, correct?
Ms. Bond. The Visa Waiver Program is not less stringent in
terms of the security check that is done than the other visa--
--
Mr. Carter. But the background is?
Ms. Bond. Well, the interagency name check is the same for
all of them. But if you're traveling as a nonimmigrant, you are
normally not required to provide the police certificate, for
example. You are not required to undergo a health exam that you
would if you were coming in as an immigrant.
Mr. Carter. Well, I would say that that's less stringent
then. Would you not agree?
Ms. Bond. Yes, I agree that the paperwork that is
required--for example, also, if you are coming in as an
immigrant, we have to see a certified copy of your birth
certificate. If you are coming in as a married couple, we need
a certified copy, of your marriage certificate. We are not
asking for that kind of documentation for nonimmigrants. So
there are a number of documents that have to be in the file if
you are moving permanently to the United States, which we do
not require if you are.
Chairman Chaffetz. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Carter. I yield.
Chairman Chaffetz. You don't have to actually provide a
marriage certificate prior to coming on a K-1 visa, correct?
Ms. Bond. No. If you are coming on a K-1 visa, you wouldn't
have a marriage certificate, but you would have to provide a--
in other words, if you are not married, you don't have to
provide a marriage certificate. However, you would have to
provide--suppose you are someone who has been married before,
we would need a certified copy of the divorce decree, or the
death certificate.
Chairman Chaffetz. No, you just suggested, if I heard it
right, that you had suggested that they had to--anyway, I just
wanted to clarify because in the case of San Bernardino, that's
how she got here, was claiming that she would get married, and
it looks like she did get married based on records that I have
seen. But I just wanted to clarify that for----
Ms. Bond. Okay. But what I was saying was, if you were a
married couple coming into the United States on immigrant
visas, we would need to see your marriage certificate. I wasn't
talking about a fiance. Although, again, if she were previously
married, or if a petitioner was previously married, we have to
see, or USCIS has to see a certified copy of the death
certificate or the divorce decree that ended the previous
marriage.
Chairman Chaffetz. Yield back.
Mr. Carter. So we have got almost 400,000 immigrants who
are under this Visa Waiver Program who are on backlog, as we
understand it, through a system that you are telling me is
perhaps less stringent than what we would require of others,
and I'm just disturbed by that. You can understand where my
concern is, especially in light of the recent events that we
have experienced here on our homeland.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. I want to thank all of the
members and our witnesses today, as the clarifier, particularly
to Mr. Gowdy's comments about the sharing of lists, and there
were several members, both sides of the aisle, talking about
sharing as we go through the vetting process. There are people
that are here illegally. There are people that are here legally
and have committed crimes. There are people that are here on
visas. There are people who have overstayed their visas. I
mean, I could keep going on and on. But they are not eligible
to purchase a firearm.
The question is, do you share that information with
appropriate authorities, and are those lists given to those
other agencies, particularly ATF, FBI? There's others that I'm
not thinking about, but there's certainly State needs as well.
When can you give me that information?
I mean, we are simply interested in whether or not--it
should be a fairly easy--there are other agencies, particularly
the Department of Justice, that are responsible for those, but
I need to know if you are giving them that?
Mr. Bersin. We will make inquiry. I know that they have
access to them, and let me make inquiry by the last week in
January. I think the question that is being asked in return is
whether or not people who were on the terrorist screening
database ought to be included as well. I think that's the
question.
Chairman Chaffetz. Correct. That's what I'm saying. There's
a lot of lists that you all go to great lengths to populate.
Then the question becomes, do those populated lists get in the
hands, so if somebody was here at, say, a visa overstay, and
they go to purchase a firearm, because there are States that
are handing out driver's licenses. One of my questions that I
would appreciate, part of that answer is, if you have somebody
who is here illegally, and they have taken their driver's
license--and they have got a driver's license, we know and now
have identified that person, can we, have we shared that
information? So last week of January, is that fair enough?
Mr. Bersin. Yes, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. All right, thank you. And I would like
to know on those that are here and refugees, do you track or do
anything in terms of any of those people, have they committed
any crimes?
Ms. Richard. No. Our Bureau does not do that.
Chairman Chaffetz. Give us one moment. Mr. Palmer has two
quick questions and we will adjourn.
Mr. Palmer. Thank you for indulgence, Mr. Chairman. I want
to go back to the discussion that we had earlier about people
who were allowed to enter the country, and in the context of
refugees, do you keep track of people who transition from
refugee status to immigrant status?
Mr. Rodriguez. Well, we keep track of them in the sense
that at the time, presumably, that they apply for adjustment,
which they are, in fact, required to do. We encounter them
again; we know that they have applied for adjustment. We know
the address that they are giving at that time. We run a fresh
set of checks at that point, so in that respect, we do keep
track of them.
Mr. Palmer. Is there a time limit? Is there a length of
time that they have to be here before they are eligible to
apply for immigrant status?
Mr. Rodriguez. They are expected to apply for adjustment
within a year of----
Mr. Palmer. Well, all I'm asking is, is that--you have to
be here a year before you are eligible to apply?
Mr. Rodriguez. That is the time of your eligibility. That
is correct.
Mr. Palmer. So after you have been here 1 year, you can
apply for your immigrant status?
Mr. Rodriguez. That's correct.
Mr. Palmer. If they have been here a year, can they apply
for citizenship?
Mr. Rodriguez. They will then need to wait 5 years after
they have become legal permanent residents before they can
become citizens.
Mr. Palmer. So 6 years?
Mr. Rodriguez. That is correct.
Mr. Palmer. Okay. And what is the typical wait time for
them once they have applied for citizenship? Do you have a----
Mr. Rodriguez. As we speak right now, we are at target on
processing naturalization applications, which is 5 months.
Mr. Palmer. Five months.
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, sir.
Mr. Palmer. So you have people who have applied for
citizenship, you know, who have come here legally and applied
for citizenship, who literally wait years at an enormous cost,
but are we giving--are we expediting, giving priority to the
folks that have come here as refugees, and became, you know,
applied for immigrant status and applied for citizenship?
Mr. Rodriguez. Not in any of those processes, no. I mean,
they are in the queue. Essentially first in, first out.
Mr. Palmer. Why is it you can then process them faster than
you do people who have been here for years trying to----
Mr. Rodriguez. It is just, the point--the law for refugees
is that they are expected to apply for legal permanent
residence within a year. At that point their wait time to
become citizens is another 5 years. That's just the way--that's
the law. That's not our processing. That's the law.
Mr. Palmer. But that 5-year wait applies to other
immigrants as well.
Mr. Rodriguez. It's anybody who has become a legal
permanent resident. That is correct, with certain exceptions.
Mr. Palmer. But my point is that those who have come here
legally, and Mr. Chairman, I hear report after report, after
report, of people who have immigrated here legally who have
applied for citizenship after 5 years that literally have to
wait years and spend enormous amounts of money relative to
their--to their net worth, and can't get--and still are on a
waiting list to become citizens.
Mr. Rodriguez. Yeah, years.
Mr. Palmer. And just it troubles me, Mr. Chairman, that it
appears that not only are we not doing a particularly good job
of vetting people coming here on visas, we are not adequately
vetting the refugees before we admit them, particularly from
countries that might be problematic, that somehow people get
moved to the head of the line.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the balance of my time.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. A, I want to thank the
witnesses here today. B, I want to especially thank the men and
women who go out and do a very hard job, thankless job, that
are out there serving their country, and doing so to the very
best of their ability, sometimes with very limited tools and
resources. We do this in the spirit of trying to help and to
fix this in a bipartisan way, and our thanks and gratitude goes
to them.
Let me be clear. We do not make deals as to when hearings
will end. And so for staff to suggest that we agreed 1
o'clock--I'm sorry, that never came to me. I want to be clear
for future hearings, that's just not a deal we are going to
make. Under House Rules, each member is allowed to ask 5
minutes of questions per witness. So all told, we can have all
of these members ask four sets of 5-minute questions. Most
members ask one question, some members didn't show up, and I
think I asked three questions. So I just want to understand and
clarify that.
The other thing is, we weren't planning to have this
hearing this week because we expected last week's hearing to be
productive, and it wasn't. I think we made our point on that.
But please help us and provide us people who come as witnesses
to this committee, as you would other committees, and make sure
that they are properly prepared to answer the full array of
questions. Again, we thank you all for your time.
We wish you best this holiday season and the committee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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