[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
2020 CENSUS: OUTCOMES OF THE 2016 SITE TESTS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 16, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-169
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
JIM JORDAN, Ohio ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
TIM WALBERG, Michigan Columbia
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TED LIEU, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey
MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands
KEN BUCK, Colorado MARK DeSAULNIER, California
MARK WALKER, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ROD BLUM, Iowa PETER WELCH, Vermont
JODY B. HICE, Georgia MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma
EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin
WILL HURD, Texas
GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
Jennifer Hemingway, Staff Director
Andrew Dockham, General Counsel
Jeffrey Post, Government Operations Subcommittee Deputy Staff Director
Patrick Hartobey, Counsel
Sharon Casey, Deputy Chief Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Government Operations
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina, Chairman
JIM JORDAN, Ohio GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia,
TIM WALBERG, Michigan, Vice Chair Ranking Minority Member
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina Columbia
KEN BUCK, Colorado WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands
GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on November 16, 2016................................ 1
WITNESSES
The Hon. John H. Thompson, Director, U.S. Census Bureau
Oral Statement............................................... 5
Written Statement............................................ 7
Mr. Kevin B. Smith, Associate Director for Information Technology
and Chief Information Officer, U.S. Census Bureau
Oral Statement............................................... 29
Written Statement............................................ 31
Mr. David Powner, Director of Information Technology Management
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Oral Statement............................................... 42
Written Statement............................................ 44
Mr. Robert Goldenkoff, Director, Strategic Issues--Census Issues,
U.S. Government Accountability Office
Oral Statement............................................... 61
Written Statement............................................ 63
2020 CENSUS: OUTCOMES OF THE 2016 SITE TESTS
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Wednesday, November 16, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Government Operations,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m., in
Room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark Meadows
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Meadows, Buck, Carter, Grothman,
Connolly, Maloney, and Norton.
Mr. Meadows. The Subcommittee on Government Operations will
come to order. And, without objection, the chair is authorized
to declare a recess at any time.
Before I go into my opening statement, Director Thompson, I
want to just say thank you to you and your team who not only
made a special effort to come to my district with regards to
some of the onsite testing. It was very illuminating. And I
just want to say thank you for making the special effort to
help me understand that process. So kudos to you and your staff
in a very busy time for making the time to help us be better
informed.
The 2020 Census will be unlike any others in 2020-plus
years since the first census happened in 1790, and for the
first time the Census Bureau will be using technology ranging
from mobile devices to Internet self-response to carry out one
of the most important tasks for the Federal Government,
counting the people of this great Nation. The use of this new
technology and modernization has the potential to create
tremendous cost savings for the American taxpayer.
Along with this great promise, however, the Bureau's effort
also can carry significant risk. For example, if the testing
and delivery schedules are not met or is strictly adhered to,
instead of the cost savings, there could be cost overruns.
We've seen that in previous censuses, so this is not our first
rodeo as we look at this.
In prior hearings, and actually in prior meetings that
we've had, the committee has identified a number of areas where
the Bureau is at risk of cost and schedule overruns, perhaps
incomplete census data, and information security breaches or
the potential for that.
The time is running out to address those. I think we all
realize that we're on a critical time mission. And, again, I
want to acknowledge the fact that as we have come together,
seen those issues, it is critically important that we keep all
hands on deck.
I believe that even though we may have a difference of
opinions in terms of the severity of the challenges that face
us, that we're committed to do that. And I want to acknowledge
that the last meeting that we had here, which was not a public
hearing where many of you here, we had frank discussions and
concerns, and yet at the same time, I think we're able to go
apart to say that we're committed to making this thing happen.
And I'm optimistic that we will be able to do that.
But only by correcting some of the issues that we have will
we be able to make sure that the new administration and the
2020 Census will be placed in a scenario for success. Decisions
that we're making now, quite frankly, will have an impact for
the next 4 years. And so it is critically important that we
make good decisions as we start to implement a number of these
areas.
I have some serious concerns, as Director Thompson knows,
with the Bureau's contracting schedule for the 2020 systems, as
well as their commitment to making those 2020 commitments the
highest priority for those programs.
The Bureau's modernization effort entails a design,
building, delivery, and implementation system of some 52
different systems. Any time that you have that many moving
parts, it can be troubling. Each of these systems should be
field tested in their final form before being rolled out in the
2020 Census.
Today, obviously, we'll hear from the GAO that with 8
months left before the final testing, half of those 50 systems
to be tested in 2018 will either be delivered after the start
of the testing or, worse yet, their delivery date is still
unknown. The fact that there is even a suggestion that IT
products will go untested is unacceptable, and no system or
product, not a single one, can be allowed to be used to collect
and process the American public's sensitive personal
information without first being tested.
Despite the need to test more than 50 systems, the Bureau
recently announced the cancellation of the 2017 field testing
operations. And so I look forward to hearing on how we can
maybe combine some of those as we start to address some of the
issues, whether it be testing in a different mode, or how we
make sure that there is that integrity.
The Bureau has claimed that budgetary constraints are
preventing them from this testing; however, when I start to
look at some of the numbers, I guess my concern is that it
seems like the Bureau has opted on its own to kind of reduce
the 2020 budget by more than $120 million, which would have an
impact now. And so I would like to get some greater clarity on
why that decision was made, what we need to do there.
No other program in the Bureau's portfolio is being cut
anywhere near that amount. And so I guess, to give you an
example, the American Community Survey, which is probably the
single thing we get the most complaints about as it relates to
the census because of the nature of the questions, that program
is only being reduced by a mere $3 million.
So I want to see where our priorities are as we start to
look at it, Director. The 2020 program should be the highest
priority program. It should not be shouldering roughly 75
percent of any anticipated budget reductions.
I'd like to thank all of the witnesses for being here
today. I believe that we will be able to make some real
progress.
And with that, I'll recognize the ranking member, my good
friend, Gerry Connolly. And congratulations on your reelection.
You did that in spite the fact that I endorsed you.
Mr. Connolly. We have a mutual pact. If it helps him, I'll
campaign against him or for him back home, and he's offered to
do the same for me.
That you, Mr. Meadows, and congratulations to you as well.
I think this is an important hearing to examine the Census
Bureau's 2016 test for the all-important 2020 Decennial Census.
The decennial census is a cornerstone of our constitutional
system. It is used to apportion seats here in the House, to
define State legislative districts, and determine school
district assignments.
Census data helps the private sector make sound investments
by identifying unsaturated or emerging growth markets and
developing business plans and loan applications. The data also
helps Congress make decisions in how to fund special education
grants, for example, or provide adoption assistance, or create
small business development centers, rural business enterprise
grants, and other programs. Very important to the U.S. economy
and its growth.
The 2020 Decennial Census will be the first to embrace
information-collection technology on a broad scale. According
to the Bureau's calculations, the Bureau's information
technology plans will make this census leaner and result in
$5.2 billion in savings compared to the last census.
But those savings can only be effectuated if the Bureau's
plans are fully implemented and operate without interruption,
and if the Bureau is able to accomplish its constitutional
mandate and accurately count all residents.
The Government Accountability Office--I'm glad to see Mr.
Powner here again, thank you--is advising Congress that it has
concerns. They tell us that 25 percent of the households in a
recent field test could not be contacted by Bureau enumerators
even after six attempts. For example, large multi-unit
buildings and locked or gated communities were problematic, as
one might imagine, as enumerators were unable to enter the
property.
The Bureau's software also made it difficult for
enumerators to leave notes, which would help indicate what time
of day a dwelling's resident was likely to be present or not.
The Bureau also had difficulty in creating enumerated canvas
lists from administrative data, and enumerators had training
difficulties which resulted in diminished performance.
Our goal in this hearing is to ensure that the Bureau
answers the concerns of the GAO and learns the lessons from its
fields tests and shares them with us and fixes problems in
advance of the census itself.
This subcommittee has a role to play in a successful
census, and we're committed to a successful census on a
bipartisan basis. We must ensure the Bureau continues to make
progress in the next 3 years, improve its policies, procedures,
and technology based on information gained in those field
tests, and test and retest those improvements before the 2020
Census.
In October, I joined Chairman Chaffetz and Ranking Member
Cummings and Chairman Meadows of this subcommittee in inquiring
on the status of the critical IT decisions related to the 2020
Census that had yet to be made and the Bureau's overall
preparedness for the census. We were pleased to receive a quick
response and will continue to work with the Bureau to ensure
that the CEDCaP initiative stays on schedule.
The Bureau has been making progress. It recently hired a
new chief information officer, Mr. Kevin Smith, who is with us
today. The presence of Mr. Smith in an office that has been
without a permanent leader for nearly a year is, finally, a
welcome sign. While he has only been in the position for a few
months, I look forward to hearing the steps he's taken to
improve the Bureau's IT infrastructure and how he proposes to
implement FITARA, also known as Connolly-Issa.
Mr. Meadows. I agree.
Mr. Connolly. Again, I want to thank you, Chairman Meadows,
for calling this hearing and keeping us focused on the
importance of this subject matter.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Meadows. I thank the gentleman.
And I will hold the record open for 5 legislative days for
any member who would like to submit a written statement.
We'll now recognize our panel of witnesses. I'm pleased to
welcome the Honorable John Thompson, director of the U.S.
Census Bureau.
Welcome, Director Thompson.
Mr. Kevin Smith, the chief information officer at the U.S.
Census Bureau.
Welcome, Mr. Smith.
Mr. David Powner, director of information technology
management issues at the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
Welcome.
And Mr. Robert Goldenkoff, director of strategic issues and
census issues at the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
Welcome.
And welcome to you all. Pursuant to committee rules, all
witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. So if you'll
please rise and raise your right hand.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you
are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth?
Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the
affirmative.
You may take your seat. And in order to allow time for
discussion, I would ask that your oral testimony be limited to
5 minutes. However, your entire written testimony will be made
part of the record.
And so, Director Thompson, we'll now recognize you for 5
minutes.
WITNESS STATEMENTS
STATEMENT OF JOHN H. THOMPSON
Mr. Thompson. Good morning, Chairman Meadows, Ranking
Member Connolly, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate
the opportunity to update you on the 2020 Census.
In June, I testified that we were on track to execute a
census that is innovative, efficient, and accurate. Since then,
I've appreciated the many opportunities to engage further with
you, Chairman Meadows, as well as other committee members and
committee staff. We've continued to make progress in our
preparations, and I am proud to report that we remain on track
and on schedule.
The last time I testified, we discussed the Census Bureau's
Integrated Master Schedule for the 2020 Census and we provided
the committee with a copy of that schedule. Our operational
plan for 2020 includes 350 design decisions. As of right now,
259 of them, or 74 percent, have been made, and we are on
schedule for making the rest.
We update the GAO on the schedule every month, and I would
be happy to provide those updates to you and your subcommittee
as well to further assure you that we are ready and on time
with those systems and operations.
As described in my written testimony for the record, the
Census Bureau is pursuing four key innovation areas that will
make it easier for people to participate and save taxpayers
more than $5 billion. And census tests are critical as we work
toward to implement these innovation areas. We learn what works
and what doesn't, and we make adjustments.
Most recently, we completed our 2016 Census Test in Harris
County, Texas, and in Los Angeles County, California. We tested
core census operations, including how we process, store, and
protect the data we receive from respondents.
As I said, we learned many lessons from the 2016 Census
Test, including several notable successes and insights, such as
higher response rates by using a letter as the first reminder
and using language services in brochures and inserts. As in
past census tests, we successfully matched the large majority
of respondent addresses to our address frame with non-ID
processing methods.
We expanded language support services to include Chinese
and Korean. We used administrative records and third-party data
to reduce the nonresponse follow-up work load for vacant and
occupied addresses.
We implemented staffing ratios that increase the number of
enumerators per supervisor. These staffing ratios were
successful due to increased automation. We worked with the U.S.
Postal Service to reduce our nonresponse workload by gaining a
better understanding of mail processing, including reasons why
mail can't be delivered.
And finally, we improved optimized assignments and routing
for our enumerators and our use of smartphones for data
collection.
Just as important as the successes, we identified areas
that need improvement. These areas, which are described in
detail in my testimony, include better training for
enumerators, better procedures for enumerators in multi-unit
structures, enhancements due to proxy interview process, and
continued development of closeout procedures for data-
collection operations.
We are already implementing what we learned from the 2016
Census Test and will continue to do so to prepare for the 2018
End-to-End Test.
In addition, we began testing our address canvassing
procedures and systems in parts of Buncombe County, North
Carolina, and St. Louis, Missouri. And thank you to Chairman
Meadows for observing our field operations earlier this month
in Buncombe County. We're testing methodologies and data
sources to detect new residential developments to show
neighborhoods that remain unchanged since the 2010 Census.
In addition to the address canvassing test, the Census
Bureau had been planning field testing operations for 2017. Due
to funding uncertainty, on October 18, the Census Bureau was
forced to announce that we're stopping work on two planned
field tests in 2017 in Puerto Rico and on two tribal
reservations. Stopping these tests is not an ideal outcome for
the operational risk of the 2018 End-to-End Test and the 2020
Census, but overall it's the best option given the funding
uncertainty for fiscal year 2017.
We will continue to prioritize our funding resources and
activities that are critical to preparing for the 2018 End-to-
End Census Test.
I should also note, and as described in my written
testimony, we've awarded four significant contracts relating to
the census. I'd be happy to discuss these later.
In the last three months, we've met key milestones for the
2020 Census, and we remain on track and on time. I thank the
subcommittee for your continued support and interest in our
work.
I am confident the Census Bureau will achieve its goal of
counting everyone in America once, only once, and in the right
place in 2020. And I look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Thompson follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Director Thompson. And thank you
for keeping the dogs away from both of us when we were out
there doing the field test.
Mr. Smith, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN B. SMITH
Mr. Smith. Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Connolly, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify this morning. I am pleased to update you on our ongoing
work to make the 2020 Census a success.
I began my role as chief information officer at the Census
Bureau over 4 months ago. Since then I've gained a deep
appreciation of the steps the Bureau has taken to introduce
innovations into their operation processes and supporting
technology to make the 2020 Census more effective and efficient
than ever before.
The Census Bureau has taken positive steps to innovate with
technology, not invent technology, by using industry available
solutions wherever possible.
I have been involved in developing first-of-their-kind
industry solutions and large-scale technology modernization
efforts in both government and in the private sector. I'm
excited and honored to lead the IT team that will help deliver
the most automated census ever.
I have spent much of my time at the Census Bureau reviewing
the IT organization and the Bureau's technology and governance.
We have a talented staff of IT professionals, and the
foundation for a successful census is in place. I am
particularly pleased with the start of our new CEDCaP chief
security engineer in July. He has a rich background in
information security, a strong history of private sector
experience, and a wealth of knowledge about securing federal
information systems.
I'd like to focus today on two key areas, our cybersecurity
and the progress of the Census Enterprise Data Collection and
Processing program, known as CEDCaP. We take the task of
ensuring the integrity and security of our systems and data
against the evolving landscape of cybersecurity threats very
seriously. Our cybersecurity approach will ensure that
individuals have limited, appropriate access to 2020 Census
data. We'll keep the census systems running through possible
cyber threats by taking informed actions in redundant systems
with layers, isolation, views, and encryption whenever and
wherever possible.
We're committed to partnering with industry and other
Federal agencies to leverage their cybersecurity services and
to create as strong a cybersecurity posture as possible. In
particular, we have engaged the Department of Homeland Security
to review our design and security architecture for the 2020
Census systems. In addition, we have reached out to the
National Security Agency and other offices within the
Department of Commerce for assistance in threat identification
and management.
During the 2020 Census, we'll focus on phishing threats
through respondents and Census Bureau employees. For
respondents, we will work closely with our Integrated
Communications Contract to address the threat of phishing both
before and during the 2020 Census.
Within the Census Bureau, we conducted regular
cybersecurity training and phishing evaluations to educate our
employees. We have also worked with DHS to evaluate and test
our procedures for phishing. We will use an industry-leading
solution to detect rogue and suspect emails and Web sites
impersonating the Census Bureau. And finally, we will leverage
the security protections of our cloud service providers for
additional layers of security.
The CEDCaP program has been underway since 2015. Much work
remains. In May, the Census Bureau announced the decision to
unify the functions of a number of existing systems onto a
single platform-based COTS solution. The transition to the COTS
platform for the 2020 Census began in June.
The CEDCaP systems are built using an agile development
approach that allows us to work closely with the decennial
business product owners. This approach ensures that we deliver
the right level of technology incrementally and make the most
effective improvements for the census.
We are hard at work to deliver the new version of the
previously tested Internet self-response capability in the 2017
Census Test. Overall, for the 2018 End-to-End Test, half of the
systems needed are already in use and going through
enhancements. Over half of the needed systems will be ready for
system-integration testing within the next 6 months.
Looking ahead, I believe the measures we are taking will
prepare us to react to any difficulty, including the threat of
cyber attacks. Preserving the integrity and security of our
systems and data is a top priority.
First, we will protect the data we collect. And, second, we
will sustain secure data-collection services so that
respondents may confidently respond to the 2020 Census. To do
that, we will layer our technology in ways that isolate data
and systems from each other with the views that let us take
immediate action when a threat is detected.
This approach puts in place the majority of the technical
security controls that we need to protect the data and systems
from threats. This allows for systems to inherit best practice
technical security within the framework while we continue to
develop the systems.
GAO recently expressed the importance of engaging service
providers and the IT vendor community to help mitigate risks,
and I completely agree with their recommendation.
With the continued hard work from our team and
congressional support, I am confident the Census Bureau can
achieve our objectives. I look forward to discussing other
aspects of our planning for the 2020 Census with you. I am
grateful for this opportunity to testify before the
subcommittee, and I am pleased to answer any questions you
have. Thank you.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
Mr. Powner, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID POWNER
Mr. Powner. Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Connolly, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting us to
testify on the Bureau's plans to deliver tests and secure key
technologies for the 2020 Census.
Clearly, utilizing an Internet response, mobile devices for
enumeration follow-up, and cloud solutions are important steps
to improving our Nation's response rates and securing citizens'
data. However, the Bureau has a history of poor IT delivery,
and many of the broader IT initiatives this committee has
focused on during this Congress are major challenges at the
Bureau, including appropriate CIO authority, delivering
incrementally, having the right governance and accountability
over IT acquisitions, and securing systems and information.
This morning, I'd like to focus on what needs to be done to
deliver and secure these technologies.
First, integrate IT deliverables with the 2020 schedule. My
colleague, Carol Harris, made this point repeatedly before this
committee at prior hearings, and this is still clearly a major
issue since several of the IT schedules are still being
developed. Clearly, schedule risk is a bright red risk at this
point.
Oversee delivery and readiness of the 50-plus systems. The
Bureau needs to deliver about 50 systems to be included in the
2018 End-to-End Test starting in August of next year. I have a
figure in my written statement that shows half of those systems
are to be delivered after the start of the End-to-End Test or
that they lack firm delivery dates.
Clearly, the 12 projects associated with CEDCaP, including
the Internet response capability, mobile devices, and the
centralized operations component are critical systems.
A key question with CEDCaP commercial products is the
amount of customization that the Bureau plans. Modifying these
products will have cost and schedule implications that we plan
to monitor closely.
Next, they need to oversee integration activities. An
integration contractor recently began work in October. The
contractor is responsible for delivering and implementing a
decennial system of systems. The staffing plan here includes
hundreds of contractors and a cost of about $900 million. The
contractor acknowledges the key risks are schedule,
scalability, and security.
Currently, they are working on detailed schedules. It is
very important for the Bureau to oversee this contractor's work
and the associated costs. Currently, the Bureau is expanding
its program management office by about 40 staff to do so. We
think this is very important, but also very late in the game to
be doing so.
Next, they need to make decisions on infrastructure. The
integration contractor is working on an analysis of
infrastructure needs. Decisions need to be made on data centers
and security operation centers.
Next, they need to improve IT governance. Overseeing the
delivery of the 12 CEDCaP systems, the additional 40 systems,
and integration and testing activities is extremely important.
The Bureau has several governing boards to do this, including
the CEDCaP in 2020, executive steering committees.
Most of this is the direct responsibility of the 2020
office, not the CIO. This is another instance, Mr. Chairman,
where the delivery of key systems is not under the direct
authority of the CIO.
Mr. Smith, though, to his credit, has assured us that he
can manage risks associated with IT through these governing
bodies. We hope he is right, and we will be continuing to
monitor this for the committee.
To do so, we'll need meeting minutes of these governance
bodies, and even better yet, we'd like to be observers at key
governance meetings.
To the Bureau's credit, we like agile development,
commercial products, and using an integration contractor that
does include subcontractors with prior census experience.
However, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to point to a hearing you
and Chairman Hurd, along with Ranking Member Kelly, held this
summer on 18F and the digital service teams, and I wonder why
these private sector experts are not engaged with the decennial
IT deliverables. Clearly, the Bureau could use help in this
area.
Turning to security. The Bureau needs to continue its
diligence in this area, since it has been the target of recent
data breaches; although, it has been reported that no
personally identifiable information was compromised. Moving
forward, we have ongoing work that will focus on the Bureau
minimizing the threat of phishing, securing 300 mobile devices,
securing cloud services, and properly configuring the 2020
systems.
A key oversight area for this committee will be the
authority to test and operate the many systems associated with
the decennial.
In conclusion, there is a lot to do over the next 9 months
leading to the End-to-End Test, and not everything is
completely decided or defined. Decisions, delivery,
integration, and testing needs to occur and needs to be closely
monitored.
In addition, the IT costs of the decennial needs much more
transparency. Right now, the total IT cost for the decennial is
not clear, but we will be getting you solid numbers with our
upcoming review. Look forward to your questions.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Meadows. Thank you so much.
Mr. Goldenkoff, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT GOLDENKOFF
Mr. Goldenkoff. Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Connolly,
and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
to be here today to discuss the Census Bureau's preparations
for the 2020 Census.
As you know, to help control costs and maintain the
accuracy of the next enumeration, the Bureau is planning to
employ new procedures and technology that have not been used to
a large degree in prior decennials, if at all. While the Bureau
estimates that its planned innovations can save as much as $5.2
billion compared to a repeat of the approach it used in 2020,
those same innovations also introduce new risks.
As a result, it will be important to thoroughly test the
operations plan for 2020 to help ensure that they will produce
needed cost savings, function in concert with other census
operations, and work at the scale needed for the national head
count. The Bureau's failure to fully test some key operations
prior to the 2010 Census was a key factor that led us to
designate the 2010 Decennial a GAO high-risk area.
In my remarks today, I will provide some preliminary
observations on two such tests occurring this year: the
Bureau's test of nonresponse follow-up operations in Los
Angeles County, California, and Harris County, Texas, and the
ongoing test of address canvassing procedures in Buncombe
County, North Carolina, and in St. Louis, Missouri. I will also
discuss some key lessons learned from the 2010 Census that can
be applied to the Bureau's preparations for 2020.
The 2016 test of nonresponse follow-up operations where
enumerators visited households that did not respond to the
census generally proceeded according to the Bureau's
operational plans. However, preliminary data at both the Harris
County and L.A. Test sites indicate that the Bureau experienced
a large number of non-interviews, as much as 30 percent of the
workload, where either no or insufficient data were collected.
Bureau officials are not certain why there were so many non-
interviews and are researching the potential causes.
Going forward, it will be important for the Bureau to
identify and address the factors that contributed to the non-
interview rate, as they could have implications for the cost
and accuracy of the final population count.
Our preliminary observations also revealed that refining
some key enumeration procedures could produce additional
efficiencies by enabling the Bureau to be more responsive to
situations enumerators encounter on the ground. These
refinements include providing more flexible access to recently
closed, incomplete cases, improving communication with managers
of multi-unit properties to better coordinate enumerators'
visits, and improving the ability to update the automated case
management system with information on the best time of day to
visit households.
Meanwhile, in Buncombe County, North Carolina, and in St.
Louis, Missouri, the Bureau is testing new procedures for
building its master address list for 2020. The Bureau plans to
employ aerial imagery, street imagery, and address file data
from State, local, and tribal partners to update address and
map information. The goal is to limit the more expensive and
traditional door-to-door address canvassing only to those areas
most in need of updating, such as areas with recent housing
growth. The Bureau anticipates that by using this new or
targeted approach, just 25 percent of housing units will
require field canvassing.
While this initiative shows promise for controlling cost,
the Bureau has identified a series of risks that could affect
its cost or quality. These risks include, for example, locating
hidden housing units, such as converted garages and basements,
and monitoring changes in housing stocks.
In summary, while the Bureau has made considerable progress
in developing more cost-effective enumeration procedures, a
number of risks and uncertainties remain and key lessons
learned in planning for the 2010 head count can enhance the
Bureau's readiness for 2020.
Based on our prior work, these lessons include ensuring key
census activities are fully tested, developing and managing the
enumeration on a basis of reliable cost estimates, and
sustaining workforce planning efforts to ensure the Bureau has
the optimal mix of skills to cost effectively conduct the
enumeration.
Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Connolly, this concludes
my remarks. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that
you or other members of the subcommittee might have.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Goldenkoff follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Meadows. Thank you. Thank you all for your testimony.
So the chair recognize himself for a series of questions.
So, Mr. Smith, let me come directly to you, since it seems
that a lot of this is following in your area. And Mr. Powner
talked about your assurances with regards to a couple of areas
where you don't have the direct authority but believe that you
can deliver.
How do you do that when things go wrong? And I guess my
concern is, is when everything is going right, there's enough
people around to take credit. When they go wrong, you know,
then all of a sudden there is a lot of finger pointing. And so
should we address that now to make sure that you have the
ultimate authority as the GAO would encourage you to have?
Mr. Smith. Chairman Meadows, thank you for the question.
What I have in place to assure from a FATARA standpoint and
also assure from an execution standpoint that the census will
be successful is governance to make sure the acquisitions are
done appropriately, as well as governance on all of the
technology solutions being proposed from the infrastructure
support to make sure they're done the right way and they are
actually done with the least amount of risk from a technology
standpoint.
By putting these in place, I am comfortable that I am able
to give the business, decennial as well as from the mission
standpoint, the Census Bureau director and others, the right
level of risk that potential solutions may have and we make the
right decisions to move forward.
I think----
Mr. Meadows. All right. Let me interrupt you. What is the
right level of risk? Because that's a qualitative statement,
and I want to make sure we are all on the same sheet of music.
Mr. Smith. Absolutely. My first and foremost importance is
to make sure that the systems are ultimately secure, the data
is confidential, integral, and the systems are available. There
are some potential reasons why you would want to do some of
those solutions a little bit different for the 2020 based on
the scale and the size of the data coming in. To me, these are
not large-level risks as long as we have a large-level view of
what it means from the security aspect and the ability to
recover the systems.
Mr. Meadows. Well, then let's go ahead and talk about that
a little bit. Because I guess one of my concerns is it seems
like half of the systems--and maybe I misheard what you said--
but half of the systems will not actually be implemented before
we start end-to-end testing. Is that correct?
Mr. Smith. That is not completely accurate. Some of the
tentative dates that were not in the master--the IIP plan,
those are to be delivered as well. They are all tentatively
scheduled before August. Sixty percent of the systems are to be
delivered before August.
Mr. Meadows. So only 40 percent of them will not be
implemented for end-to-end testing. So I was wrong by 10
percent.
Mr. Smith. Uh-huh. But some of the ones----
Mr. Meadows. All right. So let me get to the crux of the
matter. The big one, fraud prevention, according to what you've
given us, it doesn't look like you plan to deliver that until
March of 2020. And so I'm looking at this, and it's very
troubling, because we've got a 2020 go-live estimate, and
you've got fraud detection systems, the delivery is March 20 of
2020, and then we've got the other one of real-time non-ID
processing, which says, basically, is this the real person that
is coming in and actually filling it out, and you've got a
delivery of March 20 of 2020 on that one as well.
How in the world are you going to test something and plan
to go live a month or 2 after that with those two critical
components? I mean, I see that as the crux of why we're here
today. And your delivery schedule would suggest that we're
going to do all the testing and then throw in fraud prevention
a month or 2 before we actually go live?
Mr. Smith. Chairman Meadows, I completely agree with the
concern. I will have to go look back at the tests, the system
lists we delivered, and the dates to see how they would say
2020.
Mr. Thompson. May I?
Mr. Smith. You can.
Mr. Thompson. Congressman, if I could just say something.
So we are continually working on understanding the cyber risks
of our fraud protection. And so we will run something in the
2018 End-to-End Test. We will continue to improve upon that
using knowledge that comes in about what are potential vehicles
for fraud, and we want to keep that open quite a bit so we keep
updating the system.
But let me assure you, we plan an extensive program where
we will reinterview a sample of every response we get to the
census, both non-ID and ID'ed, and use that information to
determine the quality of the responses in the census.
Mr. Meadows. So when do we deliver those systems? Because,
we can't deliver them, Director, you know we can't deliver them
in March of 2020 and expect to have any kind of integrity and
confidence in those, even if we may be doing some type of
testing now.
Mr. Smith. And, Chairman Meadows, my answer to the delivery
date that was there, there is obviously a delivery date that is
going to be done for 2018. I need to get back to the group with
what that date is. Our intentions are to have some of the
system in place to do some testing in 2018.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So do I have your commitment that
the delivery of the fraud prevention and the non-ID will be
done before we do end-to-end testing, you know, pure and
simple?
Mr. Smith. Yes, sir, you do.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. And so you will get back to this
committee and with Mr. Powner in terms of that?
Is that something that you can live with, Mr. Powner?
Mr. Powner. Yeah. I think your questions, Chairman, are
right on. I mean, clearly, there are delivery dates, but
there's also delivery dates, there's some integration to key
systems that should occur prior to the end-to-end test.
I think the thing is, if you look at this realistically,
everything be done, all 52 systems by August of 2017? Likely
not. Likely not. And if it's not done----
Mr. Meadows. Yeah. Of course, he modified that. He said
that 40 percent of them won't be done.
Mr. Powner. If it's not done, let's look at it
realistically, if it's not done, then there's ways to test it
by other means. I mean, this may be not ideal with the
operations, but that's why it's so important that these
systems, we need to really dog the delivery, the integration,
and the results of the tests.
So if everything doesn't go smoothly with the end-to-end
test, we still do have some time to test not ideally, but we
could still test leading up to the actual decennial. But I
think what we need is real transparency on delivery dates,
costs, and all that stuff so we can all effectively work
together.
Mr. Smith and I have had some really good conversations
about this. I was around for the 2010 Decennial. I testified in
front of this committee multiple times when the handhelds
failed. There's a history of not having strong governance over
these things. I do think the integration contract could help
them, but also, too, the integration contractor, we're putting
a lot of responsibility on them. It's close to a billion-
contract, and we need to ensure that there's real delivery
coming from that contractor, too. I imagine you're going to be
talking to that contractor down the road.
Mr. Meadows. Sooner than later, yes. And I think as we look
at that, I appreciate you acknowledging the back-and-forth,
because I do believe that we've had that, these key things.
We're going to find a lot of stuff that is troubling, but we
have a very, very short window. I mean, it's even shorter than
6 months. Some of the decisions that have to be made, as we've
talked about, they need to be made, you know, in the next 60 to
90 days, and so as we look at that.
So let me finish up with one, and then I'll recognize the
ranking member.
Director Thompson, in your opening testimony you talked
about a lot of the testing and a lot of the things that are
going on. So help me really take all of that testimony and, I
guess, fine-tune it. With the test results that you've seen to
date and where we are, how do you feel like that will compare
to the actual results of the census when it comes in? I mean,
what are the anomalies, I guess, is what I'm saying?
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Chairman Meadows.
As GAO testified, we found in our work in the 2016 test
that we needed to work on our training procedures for our
enumerators more. We need to do more work on preparing to
enumerate in multi-unit structures. And we need to do more work
on what we refer to as closeout procedures and what Mr.
Goldenkoff was discussing as more of an unresolved. But we need
to work on that, we learned that, and we have processes in
place to get that set for the 2018 End-to-End Test.
And, again, we will have the same results coming out of
that test. We'll share the results with the GAO, we'll share
the results with you, so we all know where we are at that time.
Mr. Meadows. So if a number of 10 says we're all the way
there, where are we today based on the test results that you've
seen?
Mr. Thompson. I'm just smiling, because the last time I did
probabilities, I got in a lot of trouble. But I would give it
an eight.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. Thank you, Director.
And the chair recognizes the gentlewoman from New York,
Mrs. Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you. And thank all the panelists.
And I share the chairman's concern about security for the
2020 Census, cybersecurity. As we know, in 2015 the cyber
breach of the Office of Personnel Management resulted in the
theft of personal identifiable information of more than 21
million Americans. And the 2020 Census will create a repository
vastly larger than what the hackers stole from OPM.
So the security of the census information is of truly
utmost concern by individuals, and they want to be assured that
it's there before they even participate. And there is no
question that encryption is a key component of information
security.
But, Mr. Smith, I understand that some 2020 Decennial
computers for the census are too old to use encryption. Is that
correct?
Mr. Smith. Congresswoman, I appreciate the question.
I have to go look back to see which ones are too old to use
encryption. There's encryption in transit and there's
encryption at rest from data.
I will assure you from the standpoint from the security
aspect that the approach we are taking to layer and isolate the
security parameters in the network actually make these legacy
systems, if they are too old for encryption, they are well
behind and inside of the census data centers, that the ability
to interact with these systems is limited from the outside
world.
From the data-collection aspect, when people are responding
to the Internet site, we're taking very specific and
intentional steps to make sure that that data is well protected
and safeguarded and secure, which these systems you mentioned,
that wouldn't apply to if they're ``too old,'' quote, to go
through encryption. I'd have to look at that, though.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, I think it would be important to get
back to the chairman a listing of how many of these computers
and their systems are too old for encryption.
Mr. Smith, what concerns does that raise, and how will they
be addressed?
Director Powner's GAO ``Better Management of
Interdependencies Between Programs Supporting the 2020 Census
is Needed'' report highlighted the fact that the 2020 Census
will be the first one in which respondents are heavily
encouraged to respond by the Internet. And GAO has previously
reported that malicious email attacks are among the growing
cyber threats facing the Federal Government.
So, Mr. Smith and Director Powner, your comments?
Mr. Smith. So from the malicious emails aspect, what we are
doing is we are going to engage industry-leading solutions to
detect rogue emails, detect Web sites that are impersonating
the census, and put some specific things within our system so
the public can identify what is a census system they should be
applying to in interacting with the Internet self-response.
We're also going to be taking steps with the communications
contract we have signed with the decennial to go through and
educate the public on what they should be doing for phishing,
what they should be doing against these attacks to get in front
of it as much as possible both before the 2020 Census occurs
and regularly through the 2020 Census.
Mrs. Maloney. And Director Powner, adding to my question,
does the 2020 Census' reliance on the Internet create an
additional risk of respondents falling victim to attacks?
Mr. Powner. Yeah. Clearly, we're concerned about phishing
attacks. Also, too, if you look at it holistically, you have to
also secure the mobile devices. We have cloud services we're
likely going to be procuring, we need to ensure there is the
appropriate level of security with the cloud. And then
configuring all the 2020 systems, these 50 systems that we
talked about, we're looking at that for you right now. We're
going to continue to report back to the committee on that. But
clearly, it's a concern.
I do think folks at the Census Bureau, it's a high priority
for them. When we talked to the contractors, there, too, it's
also one of the high-risk areas. So there's a heavy focus on
that right now. But we'll continue to track that for you.
Mrs. Maloney. Okay. And, Mr. Smith, is the Bureau using the
services of outside organizations to help implement and test
cybersecurity?
Mr. Smith. Yes, we are. We're using outside resources,
Department of Homeland Security. We're also using industry-
leading companies to help evaluate our security architecture,
as well as test the vulnerabilities and test the penetration,
which basically means attempt to break through the architecture
we've designed for the 2020 Census systems.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, Director Powner, based on what you've
heard today, how confident are you that the Census Bureau and
the Department of Commerce are implementing sufficient levels
of cybersecurity for the 2020 Census? And, you know, your
report showed that there are many intelligence challenges
because of the new technologies.
Mr. Powner. Yeah. Clearly, what we will be looking at, I
think the penetration tests that Mr. Smith mentioned, we want
to look at how complete they are, what the results are.
And I mentioned in my oral statement, too, I think a key
oversight area for this committee is the authority to operate
signature on all these systems. You know, clearly if you look
back on healthcare.gov, I testified on that, that was a key
issue. There was an authority to operate, but there were
vulnerabilities associated with the authority to operate that
some would argue weren't acceptable. And I think that will be a
key oversight item for this committee.
Mrs. Maloney. And, Mr. Smith, what assurances can you give
that the Bureau's IT progress is appropriate? I mean, there are
new, tremendous challenges in IT. Last month, the Bureau
provided the committee with information relating to its
remaining IT decisions, and we were told that there are 48 IT-
related decisions left. Is that correct? So how would you
characterize the Bureau's progress, or lack thereof, of meeting
its deadlines?
Mr. Smith. Thank you for the question.
There are approximately 40 IT decisions left from the list.
These are decisions that we're going to make as we learn from
the operational tests, things that need to be implemented.
I can assure the subcommittee from the standpoint of how
we're securing the technology enables us to actually develop
the technology iteratively and agilely, which is recommended by
the Federal Government as far as approaching large-scale
systems of this nature. And I can assure the subcommittee that
by developing things agilely, we are going to know how things
work and how secure they are along the way as we are developing
it. We are not going to wait till the end to do the testing and
do the security of these systems.
Mrs. Maloney. Any other comments?
My time has expired. Thank you.
Mr. Meadows. I thank the gentlewoman.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.
Grothman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Grothman. Thank you.
A couple of questions where, I guess, the Census Bureau
gets in the news. There's been a lot of discussion in recent
times in the newspapers about undocumented or illegal
immigrants, and I think the number is to a certain extent based
on Census Bureau data. Do you guys generate the numbers of
people who are not citizens in this country?
Mr. Thompson? Director Thompson?
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. We don't produce a number of the
undocumented people in the country. I mean, we do produce data
that researchers in the field use to make estimates of that,
but that's not a Census Bureau product.
Mr. Grothman. Okay. So when you give us the total people in
the country, you have no idea whether they are citizens or not?
That is not something you concern yourself with?
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Congressman.
When we produce our estimates from the decennial census, it
includes everyone in the country, and we don't distinguish
between those that are documented and not documented, and we
don't ask.
Mr. Grothman. Okay. So we have no idea whether they are a
student here on a visa or a short-term visa or a person who is
here illegally, you have no idea?
You said you make an estimate, though. How do you make that
estimate?
Mr. Thompson. I'd have to get back to you on that.
Mr. Grothman. You have no idea?
Mr. Thompson. I'm not a demographer. But we do have a lot
of good demographers at the Census Bureau.
Mr. Grothman. Any other guys know?
And as I understand it, in banding about this 11 million
figure for 15 years or something, I'm told it's based on census
data. Do you any of you guys know how they generate that
number? It's used by a lot of politicians. I just wondered. Why
don't you guys get back to us on that.
Mr. Grothman. Okay. The next question is, you have a
tendency to generate statistics by what we'd call race. Is that
right?
Mr. Thompson. We do. We do provide statistics by race.
Mr. Grothman. And how is that determined, the race of
those? They all self-identified, or how would you define? Given
that in today's world we have more and more I guess what you'd
call biracial people, how do you generate those numbers? First
of all, give me the breakdown on the different races that you
try to identify.
Mr. Thompson. So we follow the guidance of the Office of
Management and Budget and establish the racial classifications
that are used in the United States. And this includes major
categories, such as African American, such as White, such as
Asian, such as Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders and
American Indians and Alaska Natives.
Within that, because we have a decennial census, we collect
more detailed information. We also collect the category on the
decennial census other race.
Again, all this follows the guidance that the Office of
Management and Budget establishes for assigning racial
classifications in the United States.
Mr. Grothman. We're dealing with kind of inflammatory
stuff. I would think over time more and more Americans are not
100 percent something.
Mr. Thompson. Congressman, let me also say that, starting
in 1997, the OMB directed that respondents be given the option
of responding to more than one race. So respondents can
identify with any particular race or combination of races that
they feel describes them.
Mr. Grothman. Okay. Our President, how should he fill out
that form?
Mr. Thompson. That's up to our President. I mean,
seriously, it's self-response. So we don't--we present the
categories, we present the information to our respondents, and
then they identify with what they believe describes them.
Mr. Grothman. Okay. So the figures are largely no guidance.
Okay. I could be one-eighth American Indian, if I put down
American Indian, that's what I am, right, according to guys?
Mr. Thompson. That would be your census response.
Mr. Grothman. Okay.
Now I'll give a question to Mr. Goldenkoff.
The GAO found last time 25 percent of your cases resulted
in non-interviews after six visits. So somebody went there six
times, six attempts, nobody gave you the information. Is that
right? Are those figures right?
Mr. Goldenkoff. Yeah. And just to clarify, I believe it was
30 percent at the Texas test site and 20 percent at the Los
Angeles test site.
Mr. Grothman. Okay. Does this concern you?
Mr. Goldenkoff. It does concern the GAO, and for several
reasons. One, it concerns us because the Bureau doesn't know
the factors that contributed to the high levels of non-
interviews. And then also, of course, that information would
need to be imputed statistically on those missing housing
units.
So there are a couple of factors that could have influenced
those high non-interview rates. It could have been, for
example, the enumerators not following certain procedures they
were supposed to if they couldn't get an interview. They were
supposed to go to a neighbor or somebody nearby. But then this
is where Director Thompson was talking about where the training
needed to be improved. Perhaps that the enumerators didn't
recognize the importance of going to a proxy. There are some
other factors that could have influenced that as well.
But it is concerning to us, and that hopefully that the
Bureau will be able to, you know, have data from this 2016 test
to get a better understanding of what was behind those high
non-interview rates.
Mr. Grothman. Okay. I can see I've exceeded my 5 minutes,
so we'll have to, when we go to conference later this week,
we'll have to tell all our colleagues they missed an exciting
hearing.
Mr. Meadows. I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin. It's
duly noted. I appreciate the gentleman's questions.
We'll recognize the gentlewoman from the District of
Columbia, Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is
always an important hearing. It's important. It's timely. I
would say it's timely. I hope it's in time.
And the enigma, of course, of the census is not whether you
have one drop of black blood, but of how to count people and to
give them the opportunity. I indicate that because there was a
time in our country when that was, if not of the census, a way
in which some States decided who is African American in our
country. So the only thing a diverse democracy can do is to ask
you, ``Who in the hell are you?'' and to have you fill it out.
I note that some people are using these apps and are
finding that they are of many different ethnicities. But at the
same time, they probably answer and many of them are answering
``other.''
I also want to say for the record that census is in the
Constitution. At the time of the census, most people weren't
even citizens, because they had arrived here and we were
getting people coming in such large numbers. So it was
important from the beginning just to know how many people were
here. And from that, of course, scientifically, we can now--we
now have a way to find who is documented and who is not.
Ms. Norton. But I want to ask questions about this what I
am calling the enigma of the minorities, which always vex the
census. I want to turn to this Harris County field test. So
that even using new technology, approximately 30 percent of the
households--I think this is for you, Mr. Goldenkoff--
approximately 30 percent of the households in the test could
not be contacted after six good faith attempts.
My first question is, compared to how many attempts did it
take for the 70 percent that could be contacted?
Mr. Goldenkoff. Well, that varied. It was between one and
six.
Ms. Norton. Yeah, well, obviously, it was between one and
six.
Mr. Goldenkoff. Right. And, specifically, I don't know.
Ms. Norton. I would like you to report back to this
committee how many attempts does it take on the average to get
a response. Because I think six is a good number. So I would
like to have some explanation of these results.
Mr. Goldenkoff, how is this problem to be fixed? I mean,
those people are out there. Surely they can't go uncounted.
Mr. Goldenkoff. Well, the first way of fixing it is getting
a better understanding of what was causing it. And we were out
there, I personally was out in Los Angeles, we had other GAOers
out in L.A. And also in Texas. And, you know, based on our
observations, as well as our conversations with Census
officials, there are a couple of things that could be behind
it.
First, just the nature of the test itself may have high
non-interview rates, and that is because it is not an actual
census, and so the public may not be as aware that the census
was being conducted as they would during an actual census just
because during the actual census enumerators are under more
time pressure; the Census Bureau also conducts a lot more
outreach and promotion. So it could have been an awareness
issue, people just don't want to answer their doors.
Another reason could be the devices themselves, that, you
know, the way those hand-held devices worked, that after an
attempt was made, they couldn't reopen a case. And so if
someone came home and the enumerator was still in the area--and
we did see this happen on a number of cases--they couldn't
reopen that case to enumerate that person.
Ms. Norton. They couldn't reopen the case?
Mr. Goldenkoff. Because it's just the way the hand-held
devices worked, that there were certain--there are some reasons
for that, you know, and I think this is just a more generic
issue of being able to better balance the efficiencies that you
get with the centralized control of an automated case
management system with the flexibility that you get with
enumerators on the ground being able to adapt procedures as
they see fit. And it's a balancing act.
And so maybe, and this is something that we have been
discussing with the Census Bureau, is how to, through the
business rules and how the devices are managed, to allow for a
little bit more flexibility in the procedures.
Ms. Norton. Could I just ask, some of these seem important
hypotheses. Are they being acted on? They seem to be a warning
sign.
Mr. Thompson. Congresswoman, those rates are unacceptable
for the 2020 Census. We have the information that will be
available to make sure that we can go back to those households
as many times as it takes to get a response. And we will do
that, because we are not going to leave that much of the
population----
Ms. Norton. I understand that. That is important to here.
And documenting what of the hypotheses you just heard was the
cause would be important for the future as well.
Director Goldenkoff, is there any way to know--there should
be a way to know--what percentage of those who did not use the
Internet response option in the two tests were minorities?
Mr. Goldenkoff. Who did not use the Internet? So basically,
if I understand your question correctly, you are asking
minorities who responded other than the Internet through
means----
Ms. Norton. Who did not use the Internet response, who did
not use the Internet response option in the two tests. I am
talking about this test in this Harris County field test.
Mr. Goldenkoff. Right.
Ms. Norton. How many were minorities?
Mr. Goldenkoff. That would be something that the Bureau
could determine, I imagine.
Mr. Thompson. Congresswoman, we have that information. But
let me say that for 2020 we aren't offering the Internet as the
only response option. So in 2020, for the first time, people
can call up and give their interview over the phone.
Also, we do know that there are a number of people, a
number of communities where they don't want to respond by the
Internet. So we will be actually mailing out a questionnaire
directly to about 20 percent of the households in the United
States based on information we have about what kind of method
they would prefer to respond.
Ms. Norton. Well, the new technology may have gotten in the
way here of getting an accurate count of people, particularly
undocumented people or people who are leery of responding to
people who open the door, I mean. Yet you did the field test
using new technology. Was it to see whether new technology
would be more efficient, would work?
Mr. Thompson. So our philosophy----
Ms. Norton. You didn't use enumerators in this field test.
Mr. Thompson. We used enumerators, certainly.
Ms. Norton. You did?
Mr. Thompson. Of course.
Ms. Norton. In this field test, the Harris County field
test?
Mr. Thompson. We certainly did. We certainly did. Now, like
I said, if someone wants to respond by paper, eventually they
will get a paper questionnaire, or they might get one right at
the start.
Ms. Norton. Do you imagine that among those that it took
six attempts and still you couldn't respond, that they probably
need to have some face-to-face or paper enumeration?
Mr. Thompson. The ones that took six were six face-to-face
attempts. We went to the door and knocked on the door and
nobody was--see that nobody was home or the door wouldn't be
opened. These were six attempts after they received four----
Ms. Norton. That is troubling.
Mr. Thompson. --contacts by the mail to respond.
Ms. Norton. Very troubling. I don't know if it's when
people go. Do people go only in the daytime? People may be, I
hope, away at work.
Mr. Goldenkoff.
Mr. Goldenkoff. Yeah. I think that is one of the points
that we made in my statement, is that being able to leverage
the knowledge that the enumerators see on the ground. And, for
example, one of the things that we saw time and time again was
that enumerators would start their assignments about the middle
of the afternoon, for example, but a lot of people aren't home.
But then at the end of the day they would be finishing up
around 5 o'clock when people were returning home, they could
not reopen those cases. We saw this in multi-unit dwellings.
Ms. Norton. This is a huge error.
Mr. Goldenkoff. Well, you know, this is something that, you
know, this is what you learn by testing.
Ms. Norton. Well, my God, we have been doing this--we have
had, you know, we either have had two-parent families where
both go out to work or single-parent families where we hope
somebody is working for a very long time, and the notion that
we don't know that people aren't home in the middle of the day.
Mr. Thompson. Congresswoman, if I might.
Ms. Norton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. In previous censuses, what we would do is we
would give an enumerator a stack of questionnaires and we would
tell them to go out and get those questionnaires enumerated. We
had no idea of what time they were going out or when they were
going or where they were going.
Now we do have the ability to know when they are going to a
house, and we have the ability to tell them they can't go
during the day and they have to go in the evening. So we do
have that ability now that we didn't have before.
Ms. Norton. This is very important. You know, I would
hazard a guess--I do have one important question, if I can go
before this--I would hazard a guess that most Americans are not
home in the middle of the day if they are fortunate enough to
have a job or if they have children and they are in school. I
don't know why enumerators wouldn't begin later in the day if
we want an accurate census.
Mr. Goldenkoff. Well, in many cases they did. It all comes
down to local knowledge, because we also saw examples where
people worked the night shift, and the best time to get them
was the middle of the day.
But one of the things, and this is where the need for that
flexibility comes in, is that even though they could not
leverage in a very centralized way, you know, an enumerator
could write in ``come back at 6 p.m. tomorrow,'' it was not
managed centrally in a very good way. And that is what needs to
be improved. I think there were procedures to do that, but it
just didn't happen as often as it should have.
Ms. Norton. And I see the need for a central management of
the system along with the flexibility you were speaking of.
I do have to ask about what I believe is really a
constitutional question, and that is prison gerrymandering, a
huge distortion of the count because, for example, big cities
will rarely have a prison in the middle of the city, and so it
will be in another area, less populated.
This has gone to court. Recent cases have held that prison
gerrymandering violates the Constitution. I hope we are finally
going to settle this. But the Bureau recently put out a request
for comment on its residence criteria, and here I am going to
quote what you said: ``The usual residence for counting
purposes would be the prison in which the inmate is held.''
Now, some States have moved forward to correct this huge
distortion that can affect everything from where we count for
Members of Congress, not to mention where resources go. So you
are overcompensating where the resources may in fact not be
going to schools, for example, in those schools and prisons.
I don't see how we can have it both ways, and want to know
are we going to settle this question or are you looking forward
to the census facing really a huge constitutional question
because there are a number of cases and they will be on their
way up. What are you doing to settle this question before the
census?
Mr. Meadows. The gentlewoman's time has expired. You can
answer very quickly if you have a response to that.
Mr. Thompson. I do have a response.
So we issued--and this was in the interests of being open,
this is the first time we have done this--we issued our
proposed criteria for determining residence in a Federal
Register notice at the end of June. We gave a 30-day comment
period. We extended the 30-day comment period based on requests
from the committee. We have gotten over 78,000 comments,
responses to that Federal Register notice, and we are now in
the process of evaluating the very thoughtful comments that we
got so that we can issue a final determination.
Ms. Norton. Well, let's hope you take into account the
recent litigation. You cannot have censuses where some States
have corrected this, other States haven't, and then go to the
American people and say we have an accurate census. You can't
have two ways of counting the same population based on what
State they are in.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Meadows. I thank the gentlewoman for her interest in
making sure that everybody is properly counted.
So let me kind of close out by asking a few questions to
make sure that we are all marching to the same drumbeat,
because I think we are getting closer. And so, Mr. Smith, let
me start with you.
In October, we talked about doing, I guess it was a single
operating system for deploying on mobile devices as part of
that working group. And I think I read that indeed that is
where you are going with that. Was that an accurate report or
is it--was that correct?
Mr. Smith. Chairman Meadows, I recall that we are going
through to determine the mobile devices that are going to come
in through a contract, and based on the operating systems the
mobile device may choose to provide as a bid. The platform we
are using to develop for the enumerators to produce the
application can work on either mobile platform. There are very,
very, very small changes beneath working on an Android or
working on an iOS or working on other mobile device platforms.
So the system itself can be----
Mr. Meadows. So for a non-techie, is that a ``yes'' to my
question or a ``no'' to my question? I mean, is it a single
operating system or not?
Mr. Smith. No.
Mr. Meadows. So the reports were wrong.
Mr. Smith. From the mobile device aspect----
Mr. Meadows. I think the reports basically said that you
were going to that. And so----
Mr. Thompson. Congressman, we have just released our
request for procurement for our device as a service contract.
It came out yesterday. And we are going to carefully examine
the solutions that the vendors propose. And it may very well be
that some vendors will propose only one operating system.
Mr. Meadows. I understand what they are going to. What are
you going to require? I mean, they will propose a lot of other
things.
I guess here was my concern, is as we get to these
different devices, and I talked to you about having one
operating system on one and another on another, you are going
to create the potential conflict there. So I thought we had
made progress, and I was about to say hurray for Mr. Smith,
thank you for listening. And what I am hearing is that that may
not be accurate.
Mr. Smith. Yes, sir. The system itself is portable. It is
like running Microsoft Word on an Apple computer or running it
on a Microsoft computer. That version of the word processing
software works on both.
I am comfortable with picking this industry leader to help
produce the application, that their application works on
Android, works on iOS, and will be able to work with whatever
comes back from the device as a service.
Mr. Meadows. I guess it was an article by Phil Goldstein in
FedTech. Were you all familiar with that? Maybe we follow this
stuff closer than you do. It said Census Bureau plans to go
mobile and rationalize their device portfolios. And it just
talked about a device footprint. So perhaps we can clear it up.
I still have great concern if we have different operating
systems. So the October meeting, that concern still stays
there. So if you will just let me know as the procurement,
Director Thompson, gets a little bit, what you are going to
anticipate from our vendors.
Mr. Powner, let me come to you, because some of these
timeframes, and according to Mr. Smith we are talking about 40
percent of those systems not being in place for end-to-end
testing, is it possible for you to identify what systems could
be descoped and would be appropriate to be descoped if the
mission is too great?
Mr. Powner. I think the key question on the descoping, and
this is something we have talked to Mr. Smith about, is
understanding what the critical path is. Not all those 50
systems are on the critical path. So there is a critical path.
I mean, sure enough, the Internet response and the mobile
devices and the centralized, there are some things that are
very big and important, right? We know those are on the
critical path. But identifying everything on the critical path
and then looking at potential descoping, you don't want to
descope items on the critical path.
Right now, with the integration contractor and the
integration test, I think that's a TBD, everything that really
is on the critical path. So that's a key question about what is
on that critical path from an integration point of view.
Mr. Meadows. So would you agree with that, Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So if you agree with that, then can
you report back to this committee by the end of this year, and
so I would say by December 31, with what I would call is a
critical path analysis?
Mr. Meadows. A is critical path, we have got it, these are
must haves. B would be, yeah, it's critical, these are nice to
haves. And C, it's not part of the critical path at all, so
those would be subject to descoping, as Mr. Powner talked
about.
Mr. Smith. And, sir, I would like to also address in the
conversation we will have with GAO, it comes down to the
context of the systems, too. As Mr. Powner discussed, data
collection is utmost of importance, that the systems are
prioritized and being done. Some of the things that are done
after August are things that can by timeframe be done after
August, and some of them are enhancements to existing systems,
like paper collection. So the context of the systems will also
play----
Mr. Meadows. Well, and what I will ask on that A, B, and C,
if you will put in parentheses a T next to it, if it is a
timetable initiative that makes it perhaps less critical in
terms of our end-to-end testing or where it is. Because I need
to know what your thinking is on this, is, well, this is not
critical because we can deal with it in November of 2019 versus
this is just not critical. Does that make sense?
Mr. Smith. Yes, it does.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. All right.
So Director Thompson, let me come back to you in terms of
budgets on two different questions. So Ms. Holmes Norton was
talking about going from Internet to paper and phone. If there
is a disproportionate share of those that respond by phone or
paper, you know, some other collection mode, how does that
affect the budget and will that affect those numbers adversely
in a significant way?
Mr. Thompson. Right now we have estimates of getting about
63.5 percent response in directly. It would cost more if more
people preferred paper and more people preferred telephone. But
it would certainly cost more if people did not self-respond at
all and we had to go out and do the nonresponse follow-up.
So we do plan for contingencies in 2020 to allow us to be
able to both fund and process if we get more paper or if we get
more telephone calls. So that is in our contingencies for the
2020 Census.
Mr. Meadows. So can you provide to this committee then, and
I won't fine tune it too much, but for each 2 percent miss in
that 63 percent response rate, financially what does that mean?
All right? So we won't do 1 percent or half percent, but we
will assume that you've----
Mr. Thompson. So typically what we have done, and we will
do this again, is we have said for every percent of increased
nonresponse follow-up this is the marginal cost increase.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So you will do it for every--I was
going to give you a break there. Mr. Goldenkoff is sitting
there shaking his head ``yes.'' So you will submit that to the
committee so that we have an expectation from a budgetary
standpoint.
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So let me talk about priorities.
And I mentioned it in my opening statement with the reduction
in the 2020 budget and what that has done in priorities.
Would you not agree that the most important aspect of your
job is the 2020 Census, is the highest priority out of
everything that you do?
Mr. Thompson. I would agree, Congressman, it's a
constitutional mandate. But having said that, when we made our
decisions for the 2017 budget we looked at both making sure
that we could deliver a census in 2020 that would be cost-
effective and innovative and on track, and at the same time
maintain the important data we produce on the economy and give
the Federal agencies the help----
Mr. Meadows. I was trying to give you a softball, Director
Thompson, and your response is a swing and a miss.
Mr. Thompson. I was anticipating where you were going.
Mr. Meadows. Yeah, I am sure that you were. So let me be
very clear. If we are going to cut the budget, it doesn't need
to be cut from the census, it needs to be cut from other areas
of responsibility, from my perspective. And then you know you
have got an open door, that I am willing to go to the
appropriators and I am willing to advocate on your behalf.
But if we are fully funding the other operations and we are
not fully funding the 2020, I am not going to get calls on
whether the other aspects of your job are done or not when they
don't get fulfilled as much as I would the 2020 Census. Do you
understand the importance of it from my standpoint and Ranking
Member Connolly's standpoint?
The egg on our face will not happen with some of the other,
granted, very important aspects that you have under your
jurisdiction. But whether they get done or not, I get a call
from someone in the bureaucracy here saying why haven't we done
it, moreso than I will if we don't have the 2020 Census done
properly and effectively. Would you not agree with that?
Mr. Thompson. I have got to say my number one goal is to do
the 2020 Census in new and innovative ways, and effectively and
accurately.
Mr. Meadows. I agree with that. I guess here is what I am
asking you to do, is if you were making budget concerns that
impact the implementation of this critical process that we have
all been talking about, where it is, you know, 75 percent--or a
25 percent cut actually came out of the 2020 Census and very
little cut came from some of the other responsibilities, and so
I guess I question that decision in light of the priority that
I deem the 2020 Census to be. And so let's have some further
discussion, I will let you off a little easier on that.
Mr. Thompson. Congressman, I appreciate your willingness to
talk about a number of things on the census and your
willingness to engage with us. It has been very refreshing to
work with you. So thank you.
Mr. Meadows. Well, if you will let me know--and I have told
your staff this--from a budgetary standpoint, I am willing to
camp out in the appropriators' lobbies until they want me to go
home. How about that? And we will make sure that you get the
resources, as long as you can get me those other numbers.
So I want to just say thank you. Let me just tell you, to
have two different missions for your agencies in terms of your
primary focus, but having one mission in terms of making sure
that this is successful, I am pleased with the back and forth
and the tension that sometimes is there and acknowledged, but
yet at the same time what I am hearing is real progress. And
so, Director Thompson, I want to just acknowledge that in terms
of your leadership and your willingness to do that.
And so as we work going forward, I look forward to having
each of you update us on a regular basis to make sure that we
are making good progress.
And with that being said, if there is no further business
before the subcommittee, it stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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