[House Hearing, 114 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] EXAMINING FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT IN FLINT,MICHIGAN, PART II ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ MARCH 15, 2016 __________ Serial No. 114-149 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov http://www.house.gov/reform __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 25-928 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JIM JORDAN, Ohio ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of TIM WALBERG, Michigan Columbia JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee JIM COOPER, Tennessee TREY GOWDY, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan RON DeSANTIS, Florida TED LIEU, California MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey KEN BUCK, Colorado STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands MARK WALKER, North Carolina MARK DeSAULNIER, California ROD BLUM, Iowa BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania JODY B. HICE, Georgia PETER WELCH, Vermont STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin WILL HURD, Texas GARY J. PALMER, Alabama Jennifer Hemingway, Staff Director Andrew Dockham, General Counsel William McGrath, Interior Subcommittee Staff Director Sharon Casey, Deputy Chief Clerk David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on March 15, 2016................................... 1 WITNESSES Ms. Susan Hedman, Former Region 5 Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Oral Statement............................................... 7 Written Statement............................................ 10 Mr. Darnell Earley, Former Emergency Manager, Flint, Michigan Oral Statement............................................... 22 Written Statement............................................ 25 Mr. Dayne Walling, Former Mayor, Flint, Michigan Oral Statement............................................... 81 Written Statement............................................ 83 Mr. Marc Edwards, Charles P. Lundsford Professor of Environmental and Water Resources Engineering, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Oral Statement............................................... 92 Written Statement............................................ 94 APPENDIX 2015-09-24 EPA Email on Flint's Financial Practices submitted by Mr. Chaffetz................................................... 220 2014-06-20 Order No 15 Water Authority to Mayor Walling submitted by Mr. Chaffetz................................................ 221 2015-07-08 Mr. Del Toral Email Denied Milwaukee Travel submitted by Mr. Chaffetz................................................ 223 2015-07-15 Mr. Del Toral Email Worried EPA Giving False LCR Info submitted by Mr. Chaffetz...................................... 225 2015-09-22 Del Toral EPA to Poy Bair Damato Email submitted by Mr. Chaffetz................................................... 223 2015-11-03 EPA Legal Memo on Corrosion Control submitted by Mr. Chaffetz....................................................... 237 2014-03-07 Earley-Flint EM to McCormick-Detroit WSD-Flint Water Contract w Detroit re 2-12 submitted by Mr. Clay............... 239 2016-01-25 Salon ``It's not just a Flint problem'' submitted by Mr. Lieu....................................................... 241 RESPONSE from Mr. Earley to Questions for the Record............. 243 RESPONSE from Dr. Edwards to Questions for the Record............ 247 EXAMINING FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT IN FLINT, MICHIGAN, PART II ---------- Tuesday, March 15, 2016 House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 2141, Rayburn Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz [chairman of the committee] presiding. Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Duncan, Jordan, Walberg, Amash, Gosar, DesJarlais, Gowdy, Farenthold, Lummis, Meadows, DeSantis, Mulvaney, Buck, Walker, Blum, Hice, Carter, Grothman, Hurd, Palmer, Cummings, Maloney, Norton, Clay, Connolly, Cartwright, Kelly, Lawrence, Lieu, Watson Coleman, Plaskett, DeSaulnier, Welch, and Grisham. Chairman Chaffetz. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. Ms. Hedman from the EPA is supposed to be here. Ms. Hedman, are you here? [No response.] Chairman Chaffetz. I should say she's formerly from the EPA. As I said, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. Ms. Hedman is now here. We will go ahead and start. Flint, Michigan was a financial disaster and had the highest water rates in the Nation, and yet some of the poorest water. In the spring of 2013, emergency manager, Ed Kurtz, approved a plan that was going to change the trajectory of the water. In a 7 to 1 vote, the city council also voted to support this, although they did not have the authority to execute that. They were going to move from Detroit Water to the Karegnondi Water Authority. It was a roughly $200 million build for cheaper water and associated jobs that would come along with it. Detroit Water canceled the contract a few days later, so Flint had a year to find another source of water, so they went with a Flint water source. In April of 2014, a switch is made, and the problems begin--bacteria, TTHM issues, Legionella, lead in the water. These are all some of the things that happened. Keep in mind, there is no acceptable level--none--no acceptable level of lead in any water. But these are when the problems started. LeAnne Walters, who is here in the audience today--we appreciate the brave nature in which you have stepped forward. She is a citizen. She is not a water expert, but she stepped forward. She did the difficult thing. And somehow, someway she found the fortitude to get a hold of the EPA in February of 2015 where Miguel del Toral at the EPA came out to Michigan and actually started doing some testing. By June of 2015, a report was finalized. That report was then leaked, if you will, it was put out there. We have with us the mayor at the time, Mayor Walling. And look at his resume. Mayor Walling is a smart person. He is well educated. He has been very great in the community. And he went out on television, and I want to show a clip from that television because there is a reason why he actually went on television. And I want to show that clip now. [Video shown.] Chairman Chaffetz. That was July 8th of 2015. The report was finalized by Miguel del Toral in June. I think we are going to hear testimony that Ms. Hedman and EPA communicated to the mayor that it was safe to drink the water, and that message was then conveyed to the citizens. And it was not until January of this year that the EPA actually took some definitive action. Now, it is not to say that the EPA is the only one at fault. The Department of Environmental Quality of the State of Michigan is also at fault here. But if the EPA or the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality would have taken action in the summer of 2015 when the EPA Region 5 regulations manger, Miguel del Toral, wrote the memo to his superiors warning of the dangerously high levels of lead in the drinking water, perhaps none of this would have happened. What is sickening about this is it was totally avoidable. The former head of Region 5, Ms. Susan Hedman, who is with us today, dismissed and downplayed this memo calling it ``a preliminary draft,'' and asserting, ``It would be premature to draw any conclusions.'' So the residents of Flint continued to drink the water, poisoning them and their families. The next opportunity for EPA to take action came from outcries for help from city officials. Congressman Dan Kildee was also very engaged in this. It reached a fever pitch in September of 2015, and still no action was taken. In fall of 2015, local Flint residents filed an emergency petition with the EPA. Ms. Hedman continued to dismiss the problem, and claimed the EPA was monitoring the situation. In December of 2015, the City of Flint declared a state of emergency. A month later, Governor Snyder declared a state of emergency for Flint, activated the State's Emergency Operations Center, and requested a Federal declaration of disaster. Finally on January 21st, 2016, nearly 7 months after Miguel del Toral's memo, the EPA issued an emergency administrative order citing, ``Imminent and substantial endangerment exists'' with regard to the high levels of lead in the Flint water supply. But how many more people were poisoned in those 7 months? How many illnesses were worsened in those 7 months? On that same day that emergency order went out, that same day Ms. Hedman rightfully resigned, but her resignation does not heal the sick and ease the suffering of the residents of Flint. What concerns me, and we will deal with on Thursday, is the action of resigning by Ms. Hedman was characterized by the EPA administrator as courageous. It was courage according to the administrator. But we will, like I said, deal with that on Thursday. What happened in Flint can never happen again, and it is almost unbelievable how many bad decisions were made. Government at every level--local, State, and Federal--made poor decisions. And our role on the committee is to ensure Federal agencies and employees do their job. According to the EPA's website, its mission is ``to protect human health and the environment.'' They failed at every single level. Instead the EPA seems to be working on other things, other priorities. I am going to enter some things into the record, and it is going to make some people uncomfortable. There have been a lot of accusations about was this driven by race. Was this driven by the fact that this was a poor city? Is this because they are under served? There are a lot of accusations out here. This is an internal memo, and before you put it up, I want you to understand who this is going back and forth with. This is Jennifer Cooks, EPA Michigan program manager, Region 5, Debbie Baltazar, EPA Region 5 branch manager, Timothy Henry, EPA Region 5 associate director of the Water Division, and Steve Marquardt--I do not how to pronounce his name--EPA environmental engineer. This is an internal memo. Go ahead and put it up. September 24th. ``Perhaps she already knows all this, but I'm not so sure Flint is the community we want to go out on a limb for.'' Are you kidding me? The EPA administrator says that Susan Hedman was courageous for resigning. It did not take us but a couple of hours once we got these memos to find the problem here. You can take down that. Why is Flint not the community they go to? You know, of all the communities out there, the one that is having the toughest time is the one that needs the most protection. And you can shake your head and say, oh, yeah. But the EPA had every opportunity to make the right move here, and they did not. And the Department of Environmental Quality, do not think you get off the hook either because of the one the things that is fundamentally and totally wrong here is they had the information and they would not release it to the public. The Congress now, at least the House, has passed a piece of legislation saying when you have this information, you have to release it within hours. That is just common sense. It should not take an act of Congress to tell the EPA that they need to make this information public. We are going to a good, vibrant hearing today. So I would unanimous consent to enter this into the record. Without objection, so ordered. Chairman Chaffetz. I also would like to enter into the record a Darnell Earley directive, an Order Number 15, dated June 20th, 2014, turning over to Mayor Walling form Darnell Earley, the emergency manager at the time, the day-to-day operations for the Department of Planning and Development and the Department of Public Works. Without objection, so ordered. Chairman Chaffetz. An email from Miguel del Toral. This is correspondence back and forth dated July 8th, 2015. And one of the concerns is you got a Miguel del Toral. He is pretty much on the line, right? He is right there on the front lines. One of the things I have heard that is probably the most disturbing is that he felt like he was retaliated against. In fact, we had a hearing last year about the actions of Susan Hedman in Region 5 and the retaliation, three whistleblowers coming up talking about retaliation efforts. And here you have Miguel del Toral on July 8th, finally gets fed up. One of the things he said is, ``It almost sounds like I'm stuck in a corner holding up a potted plant because of Flint. One misstep in 27-plus years here, and people lose their minds.'' A guy who was not allowed to travel. He suddenly had to go to ethics training. He had to do all these other things. That is how Region 5 and the EPA was operating. This guy should be put up as getting a raise. You want to give a bonus to somebody? Give it to Miguel del Toral. He was doing the right thing. Instead he is being reprimanded. And I would ask that this be entered into the record as well. Without objection, so ordered. Chairman Chaffetz. On July 15th, 2015, I will enter this also into the record. Without objection, so ordered. [The information follows:] Chairman Chaffetz. And then finally, Miguel del Toral gets fed up on September 22nd of 2015. This is how he starts the email: ``This is no surprise. Lead lines plus no treatment equals high lead in water, equals lead poisoned children.'' This is how it starts in September, and the EPA did not do anything until January. I do not understand that. This is the kind of thing that has to immediately get out into the public. Immediately. Let me read another paragraph from this email. ``At every stage of this process, it seems we spend more time trying to maintain state and local relationships than we do trying to protect the children. I said this from the very beginning, and I will say it again. You do not have to drop a bowling ball off of every building in every city to prove that gravity and science will work the same everywhere. It is basic chemistry.'' I ask unanimous consent to enter that into the record. Without objection, so ordered. Chairman Chaffetz. And I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record an EPA internal memo, November 3rd, 2015. Chairman Chaffetz. ``After reviewing the rule with our Office of General Counsel, it appears there are different possible interpretations of the lead-copper rule with respect to how the rule's optimal corrosion control treatment processes apply to this situation, which may have led to some uncertainty with respect to the Flint water system.'' The law, something already passed out of this Congress, the Lead and Copper Rule is supposed to be updated every 6 years. We are now being told it will not be updated until 2018, 12 years after it was supposed to. And you will hear back and forth in the correspondence about concern from the State, and the Department of Environmental Quality what are they supposed to do? And this is the general counsel--I am sorry--the director of the Office of Groundwater and Drinking Water saying, yeah, this continues to be a problem. Mr. Edwards has highlighted this as an ongoing problem. So there is a lot here to discuss, okay? This should never, ever have happened in the first place. With that, I will now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings. Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing today and for agreeing to our request to obtain documents as part of this investigation, and for calling the person who has not been mentioned yet, Governor Snyder, to testify on Thursday. Some people in your position might have shied away from this investigation, but you came through on your promises, and I thank you for that. I also want to thank you for agreeing to our request to conduct transcribed interviews of key witnesses. Last week our staff traveled to Michigan to interview Dan Wyant, the former director of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality. He, too, has not been mentioned yet. Mr. Wyant resigned on December the 29th, the same day the governor's task force issued its damning report. The governor's task force. According to that report, Mr. Wyant's staff told officials in Flint that corrosion control treatment was, and I quote, ``not necessary.'' Mr. Wyant said that. Mr. Wyant's staff also misinterpreted the Federal Lead and Copper Rule, and their failures, and I quote, and this comes from the governor's task force now, ``Led directly to the contamination of the Flint water system.'' Again, this is all according to the governor's own task force. Mr. Wyant was a very difficult witness who evaded many of our questions. Last December he apologized to the people of Flint, but he was not remorseful or apologetic in his interview with the committee. In fact, he disputed almost everything the governor's task force concluded about his failures. Despite this obstruction, Mr. Wyant did tell us an interesting fact, and this was very, very interesting. He said in all the time he served as director, and despite all of the public outrage about the State's inaction, the topic of Flint water was never raised in any cabinet meeting, not by Mr. Wyant, not by the governor, and not by anyone else. Ladies and gentlemen, there is something wrong with that picture. That was all the way through December of last year. I do not know if this is accurate, but if it is so, it is absolutely astonishing. In addition to interviewing Mr. Wyant, our staff also interviewed one of Governor Snyder's emergency manager for Flint, Jerry Ambrose. The State law that Governor Synder championed in 2011 gave him authority to basically disenfranchise local officials, overrule their votes, and appoint his own emergency managers with complete power over the city's decision making. City employees were required to obey their orders. During his interview, Mr. Ambrose told us that his number one priority--his number one priority--and the top priority of all of the governor's emergency managers was to cut spending. Cut spending. Everything else was viewed through the lens of cost cutting, and public health and safety clearly suffered as a result. This is why in March of 2015, when the Flint City Council voted to reconnect the clean drinking from Detroit, Mr. Ambrose used his power to overrule their vote. He thought it was too expensive, and it was cheaper to keep using corrosive water from the Flint River. Something is wrong with that picture. Even though the State of Michigan had major budget surpluses, and Mr. Ambrose told us that he never once--not once--asked for funds to help Flint switch back to clean drinking water from Detroit. Mr. Chairman, our investigation is not complete. We have another interview coming up with Edward Kurtz, the governor's second emergency manager in Flint, and there are key questions he needs to answer. For example, there was a general agreement that shifting from Detroit Water to the new pipeline being built by the Karegnondi Water Authority, or KWA, could save money. But the KWA pipeline was still under construction, and there was going to be a gap of about 2 years. Genesee County chose to stay on Detroit Water during this period, but Mr. Kurtz hired an engineering firm to use the Flint water as the primary source of drinking water. We have yet to see any detailed studies before this switch analyzing what would need to be done to ensure that the water coming out of the taps would be safe, and how much that might cost. Where are the analyses? Where are the documents? We have not seen them. Finally, we have heard Republicans focus their criticism almost extensively and exclusively on the EPA. I agree. The EPA officials could have done more, and I agree that everyone at fault must be held accountable. If you will recall, Mr. Chairman, when you asked me about bringing the head of the EPA, I said bring every single person that might have anything to do with this. I am not trying to protect anybody except the people of Flint. But under Federal law and regulations, States have the primary responsibility to enforce the Safe Drinking Water Act. In this case, Michigan officials displayed, and I quote, ``an abysmal public response.'' That is according to the governor's task force. I did not say that. The governor's task force said that. The actions were, and, again, the governor's task force, ``Simply insufficient to the task of public protection.'' Again, those are not my words. They are the words of the governor's task force. And the task force concluded with this as I close, and I quote. They said, ``We believe that the primary responsibility for what happened in Flint rests with the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality.'' And so, we will continue our investigation. There are 15 people that Congresswoman Lawrence and I asked that we meet with and have conducted interviews of. None of them would cooperate, and so we still have work to do. And, again, Mr. Chairman, I mean it sincerely. I thank you for holding this hearing. I thank you for holding the hearing on February 3rd, today, and the one coming up on Thursday. With that, I yield back. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. I appreciate that. We will hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any member who would like to submit a written statement. Chairman Chaffetz. I will now recognize our panel of witnesses. We welcome Ms. Susan Hedman, former Region 5 administrator at the United States Environmental Protection Agency, Mr. Darnell Earley, former emergency manager of the City of Flint, Michigan. It is important to note that there have been a couple different emergency managers. Mr. Earley served for portions of that time, not the entire time. Mr. Dayne Walling is the former mayor the City of Flint. He was elected initially in August of 2009 in a special election, reelected to a 4-year term in 2011. And Dr. Marc Edwards, the Charles P. Lundsford Professor of Environmental and Water Resources Engineering at the Virginia Polytech Institute and State University. Mr. Edwards' contribution to this process has been invaluable. I appreciate his participation here as really somebody independent who understands the technicalities of the water. And his unbelievable dedication of time, and effort, and expertise has been most appreciated by both sides of this aisle. I know that Mr. Cummings and a number of others have gone to Flint. I was in Flint this weekend along with some of the Michigan delegation, and there was Mr. Edwards on the ground talking to people in Michigan answering their questions. And we appreciate your commitment and your perspective here. Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn before they testify. If you will all please rise and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? [A chorus ayes.] Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. Each of your written statements will be entered into the record in its entirety. In order to allow time for discussion and questioning by members, we would appreciate if you would limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes. Ms. Hedman, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. Turn on the mics there. WITNESS STATEMENTS STATEMENT OF SUSAN HEDMAN, PH.D. Ms. Hedman. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, and distinguished members of the committee. I'm Susan Hedman, the former EPA Region 5 administrator. Thank you for this opportunity to testify about my role in EPA's response to the Flint water crisis and the reasons that I decided to resign. I first learned that Flint was not implementing corrosion control on June 30th, 2015 approximately 14 months after the city started using Flint River water that was not treated with orthophosphate. The very next day I offered technical assistance to Flint's mayor, assistance from EPA's experts on lead and drinking water distribution systems. The following week, we issued our first statement encouraging Flint residents to contact their water utility for lead testing, and providing information about limiting exposure to lead in tap water. On July 21st, 3 weeks after I first heard about this problem, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality agreed with EPA's recommendation to require Flint to implement corrosion control as soon as possible, a recommendation that my staff had been making since late April when they first found out that corrosion control was not being implemented. That should've solved the problem. It did not. During the weeks and months that followed, MDEQ was slow to deliver on our agreement from July 21st, and the City of Flint was hampered by a lack of institutional capacity and resources. EPA responded the only way we could, by working within the cooperative federalism framework of the Safe Drinking Water Act. That framework assigns legal primacy to States to implement drinking water regulations, and give EPA the job of setting standards and providing technical assistance. So in keeping with that framework, we provided technical support to the State and the city to implement corrosion control and to provide the assistance that Flint residents needed to limit their exposure to lead. Most of the time, this cooperative federalism model works well, even in a crisis. In fact, it worked exactly the way it's supposed to work when the Toledo water crisis occurred in 2014. But as we all know, it did not work in Flint. Consequently, EPA was forced to evaluate the enforcement tools available under the Safe Drinking Water Act, which are more limited than the enforcement provisions of other environmental statutes. And while I used the threat of enforcement to motivate the State and city to move forward, we found that the enforcement options available to us were of limited utility last fall due to the unique circumstances of this case. In the end, with the help of the EPA Flint Task Force, corrosion control was finally implemented, and testing now indicates that the protective coating that prevents lead from leeching into tap water is being restored. That's the good news. The bad news is that this problem should never have happened in the first place, and I need to remind you EPA had nothing to do with that. Finally, I'd like to say a few words about my resignation. I resigned in part because of the false allegations about me that were published in early January when EPA was unable to correct the record before those allegations began to damage the Agency's ability to perform critical work in Flint. By the third week of January, I was widely portrayed in the media as someone who ``sat on the sidelines during the crisis and downplayed concerns by an EPA scientist about lead in the water.'' That's completely untrue. My testimony today and the material in Appendices 2 and 3 make clear that I did not sit on the sidelines, and I did not downplay any concerns raised by EPA scientists or apologize for any memos they wrote. In fact, I repeatedly asked for a final memo about lead in drinking water in Flint in a form that EPA could publicly release. And when MDEQ attacked a Region 5 scientist by calling him ``a rogue employee,'' I immediately called the MDEQ director to complain, and in a subsequent call with the MDEQ director and the governor's staff, I made it clear that this scientist is a valued member of the Region 5 water team, a point which I made even clearer when I subsequently appointed him to the Flint Task Force. There wasn't time for these explanations in January in the wake of all the emergency declarations. Flint residents had lost trust in government, and the false allegations about me gave the people of Flint less reason to trust EPA. On the day I resigned, I sent a note to Administrator McCarthy saying in light of the allegations that have been made about me and the time it will take to set the record straight, I think this is the best course of action to ensure the effectiveness of EPA's response to the Flint water crisis, and to make sure that Flint residents get the help that they deserve. That was one reason for my resignation, but there was another. Quite simply, this tragedy happened on my watch. I did not make the catastrophic decision to provide drinking without corrosion control treatment. I did not vote to cut funding for water infrastructure or for EPA. And I did not design the imperfect statutory framework that we rely on to keep our water safe. But I was the regional administrator when this crisis occurred. Having spent my entire adult life as an advocate for the environment and public health and much of that time representing citizen groups, I knew that only one thing mattered to Flint residents: the water wasn't safe to drink. What happened in Flint should not have happened anywhere in the United States, and I was horrified that it happened in my region, the Great Lakes Region. I thought and still think that resigning was the honorable thing to do. Although I have left government service, I've not stopped worrying about the people of Flint. I'm very encouraged to see that the corrosion control treatment that was implemented in December is recoating the pipes and that the water may be soon be safe to drink. I'm even more encouraged to read that there is growing congressional support for funding to replace the lead surface lines in Flint, and to fund water infrastructure throughout the country. I'd like to close by asking all of you to support that legislation and, more generally, to support the long overdue investments that are needed in this Nation's water infrastructure. Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I welcome any questions. [Prepared statement of Ms. Hedman follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. Mr. Earley, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF DARNELL EARLEY Mr. Earley. Thank you, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, Congresswoman Lawrence from Michigan, and to the other members of this committee, I, too, thank you for the opportunity to appear at today's hearing. It gives me an opportunity to share with you any and all factual information regarding the public water crisis in Flint, Michigan. My name is Darnell Earley. I've been a public servant for nearly 40 years in Michigan fulfilling roles as a city, township, county manager and administrator, as well as a state government appointee. I've also served as acting mayor Flint during the time I was city administrator, and I would hope that you would glean from my comments this morning that I have a deep affinity for the City of Flint and for the people that reside there. I recently served as one of four emergency managers appointed to Flint by Governor Rick Snyder during the period discussed, and that was between 2011 and 2015. My appointment was October 2013, and I served until January of 2015. And some on these committees, as I listened to the hearing before, expressed concern about the emergency manager law and its negative effect on communities. The law certainly does not provide for limitless disenfranchisement and total disregard of the community, its elected officials, and certainly not its people. During my tenure as a city manager and as a township manager, I've always--always--involved the elected and appointed officials in the management of the day-to-day operations of the city. I did no different in Flint. Indeed as the chairman has just shared with you, I signed an order delegating day-to-day operational authority over not only the Department of Planning and Development, but over the Department of Public Works, which included the Flint water treatment plant. I assigned that to the mayor. The mayor served as part of our core team, as part of our administrative staff, and had day-to-day responsibilities that I consulted with him as well as other members of our core team about the day-to-day operations of the City of Flint. That's what city managers do. As the crisis in Flint has unfolded, we've all now witnessed some very difficult and inexcusable actions on the part of governmental agencies, delay, some inexplicable miscalculations about protocol. And in the midst of all this crisis, I must tell you that I believe that I have been unjustly persecuted, vilified and smeared both personally and professionally in the media and by some local, State, and Federal officials, as well as by a misinformed public. It's important for me to state that because part of my main reason or being here today is set the record straight, and to make clear that people understand that the role of an emergency manager is designed to benefit a community and to help it regain its financial solvency and stability. There are four clear points I want to make regarding my comments with you. The first is that the decision to switch from DWSD, the Detroit Water and Sewage Department, to KWA was a local decision. As the chairman has just shared with you, the city council voted to move from the DWSD to the KWA. This was not an immediate kind of decision made in a vacuum. There have been discussions about leaving the Detroit Water and Sewer Department and building its own water system since the time that I was there as city administrator, from 2001 to 2004. So this is not new discussion. The second point I want to make is that I made no decision about the use of the Flint River. That was all a part of the discussions of moving from DWSD to KWA, having a 2-year period within which we had to find water. The city had to have water. In the notice from the Detroit Water and Sewage Department that they sent, they terminated the contract which left the city with no viable options for water. The Flint River had served as the backup for the DWSD water system, and it also served as the primary water source for the City of Flint prior to the mid- 1960s. So this was a known commodity. The fact that I was EM at the time that the switch was made does mean that it was my decision. And that's an important point to make because there were four emergency managers appointed during that time. I had the responsibility of having it happen on my watch because the contract terminated, but in that process I involved everyone in the discussion. We did all that we could in order to move the city forward towards a new water system. And that brings me to my third point, and that is during my tenure as emergency manager, when complaints were raised regarding the water, the water treatment staff, everyone worked diligently to address those issues. The issues we were addressing, however, and I must make this very clear, we were related to the treatment and the chemistry of the river. Within the treatment of the chemistry of the river created residue that caused a lot of negative impact on the water. But those impacts had nothing to do with lead leeching into the pipes. We were not told of that as an issue. We were trying to create a situation of treatment for the TTHM, or the residual, if you will, for treating the water. So we did those things that were necessary. We gave two boil water advisories at the direction of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality. Boil water advisories are common in the administration of water systems, but after two of those boil water advisories, I began to feel that we were not getting to the heart of the issue, and had asked that we bring in a separate water consulting authority, the Viola National Group, to take a look at this and find out what was going on. Even in their analysis, there was not mention of the lead leeching into the water. So we were treating water contaminated based on TTHM and other residual chlorides, not the lead issue. The lead issue surfaced after I completed my term as emergency manager in January of 2015. As we all know, we were grossly misled by the experts at MDEQ and EPA. And while I don't have any great pride in knowing that, I do think it is important because not only does the City of Flint depend on the regulatory agencies, but every city in the State of Michigan as well as the United States of America. Let me just also state, Mr. Chairman and members, know that I am sad and that I am very, very deeply hurt by what has happened on my watch as emergency manager. I'm disappointed in the water crisis in Flint. As I said earlier, I have a special affinity for the community and the people residing there. I used to live in Flint when I was city administrator. I have relatives there now. I have family members there. I've worshipped in the churches alongside the parishioners in the City of Flint. I've patronized its buildings. I went back to Flint as emergency manager because I believed I could make a difference. I, too, drank the water. As a former acting mayor of Flint, I sincerely regret what has transpired. The human nature inside of me cries out for a resolution of this matter on behalf of those who are less fortunate and do not have the capacity to make these things right. Well, we do have the capacity to do that. But this is a water treatment issue. This is not a leadership issue. This is not who's responsible, who can we blame. This is how do we fix a bad situation and make it better for a community that's now only about 60 miles from where I live, where I go, and I know the people. And not one day goes by that I do not pray for a resolution of this problem. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, in closing, the hard work and dedication of many will be needed to solve this problem, and to be reasonably sure that it will never happen again. It is, therefore, my prayer that everyone's attention will now turn towards solving these challenges, including formulating plans to address the aged and crumbled condition of water distribution systems that exist not only throughout Flint and Genesee County, but throughout urban core America, because until we do this, many other cities are just one expert's mistake away from an outcome similar to the Flint water crisis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I'll be happy to answer any questions you may have. [Prepared statement of Mr. Earley follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Earley. We will now recognize Mayor Walling for 5 minutes. You are now recognized. STATEMENT OF DAYNE WALLING Mr. Walling. Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and honorable members of the committee. I also thank you for the opportunity to present testimony and to be invited to this hearing. The drinking water crisis in Flint is a catastrophe that's had a devastating effect on our families, our most vulnerable children and seniors, our schools, neighborhoods, businesses, the entire community. Flint is a strong city. It's going to survive. With the right support it will thrive. But Flint never should have been in this situation. As a father raising my own family in Flint, I'm deeply concerned for the children and all the people who have been affected. I am sorry this crisis happened every single day. I'm angry more was not done to respond to the water problems, especially by the State which controlled both the MDEQ and the city. I appreciate the committee's efforts to identify what went wrong so problems can be fixed, Flint can move forward, and this never happens again in America. From my experience as mayor, until November 2015, I have three main points. One, Michigan's financial manager system focused too much on cutting costs without adequate safeguards and transparency. The regulators provided false assurances to us about the safety of the water and withheld risks. And third, Governor Synder unfortunately discounted local concerns and did not act with urgency. The problems started with the switch to the Flint River for the city's drinking water under the control of a governor appointed financial manager mandated to cut costs. The switch was decided by EFM Kurtz in June 2013 who signed an engineering contract to upgrade the water plant, and who adopted a 2-year budget for the river water implementation without any public input or involvement from us as local elected officials. I was there. That's what happened. The actions taken by myself and the city council in March of 2013 to support the long-term use of a new Lake Huron pipeline did not include using the river as an interim source. The finance director's projections--finance director, Jerry Ambrose, who later became emergency manager--showed payments for Detroit Water being made until the new pipeline became operational. But the reality was the State and financial managers had full control of the city's budgets, finances, and personnel for nearly 4 years. And even as I and the city council were granted some responsibilities, the appointed managers continued to parcel out information and make all of the purchasing, personnel, and legal decisions in consultation with the State. I didn't sign one city contract or purchasing resolution during the time that the emergency managers were in place. From day one with the river, the State regulatory agency, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, provided assurances to us that the Flint water was safe and met the standards of the Safe Drinking Water Act. When I reached out to the EPA for guidance, I did receive information and assistance, but the full risks were not shared. I had my own concerns about the river, was hearing concerns from the public, but I did rely on the information provided from the MDEQ and the appointed public works leadership. My family and I drank the water in our home. I echoed these assurance to the public, which I wholly regret and will never do again. We know now that we were getting bad information and, worse, water. Children were poisoned with lead, and we found out because local doctors analyzed health data themselves despite continued resistance from the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services in October of 2015. I pushed for the return to Detroit Water as the fastest way to bring corrosion control in, and the county declared a public health emergency. Tragically, there were opportunities missed and dismissed that could have averted the water crisis. I called for reforms and programs in January 2015 to make the water safe with all test results publicly released. The city was releasing operational reports, but the lead tests were not being shared and disclosed. I contacted the governor directly with my plan as I believe any mayor in a crisis should do regardless of the emergency managers. My initial request was for $20 million, yet we received only $2 million in grants. Now the costs are hundreds of millions with an unknown number of children and families affected. The governor discounted the complaints, even of concerned pastors and parents, apparently from his office's emails because we were viewed as adversaries of the financial manager system with illegitimate claims, when, in fact, we're Michigan citizens with toxic water. As someone who continues to live and work in Flint, I hope more will be done to aid the city, help the city heal. Flint citizens have fought so hard. Our families have endured so much. We simply deserve the same safety and opportunities for our families and children in Flint as anywhere else in America. Thank you for the opportunity, and I look forward to your questions. [Prepared statement of Mr. Walling follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you, Mayor. And now I will turn to Mr. Edwards. You are now recognized for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF MARC EDWARDS, PH.D. Mr. Edwards. After hearing the testimony of Susan Hedman this morning, I can't help but comment on the qualities that seem to be valued in administrators at the EPA. Willful blindness, in this case to the pain and suffering of Flint residents, unremorseful for their role in causing this manmade disaster, and completely unrepentant and unable to learn from their mistakes. Ms. Hedman said EPA had nothing to do with creating Flint. EPA had everything to do with creating Flint. Malfeasance at the U.S. EPA from 2001 to the present has harmed cities all over the United States. And incredibly even as National Guard walked the streets of Flint distributing bottled water and installing filters on taps, Michigan and the EPA are able to say that Flint has never failed the Lead and Copper Rule. And this is possible because the EPA has effectively condoned cheating on the Lead and Copper Rule monitoring since 2006. This is because EPA and other agencies caused a similar lead and crisis in Washington, D.C. from 2001 to 2004, that actually was 20 to 30 times worse in terms of health harm to children in Washington, D.C. And the completely covered that up for 6 years and wrote falsified scientific reports. And it created a climate in which anything goes across the United States, anything at all to cover up health harm from lead in drinking water. Since 2006 when we realized that this cheating was occurring, I worked with a small group of people who tried to expose these practices to EPA, and we failed. We failed to get EPA to take lead in water risks seriously, and because we failed I was not surprised when Flint occurred. I was expecting a Flint to occur. If a landlord were to engage in similar practices and through their negligence to allow even a single child to be exposed to lead paint risk, the EPA would argue for prosecution and incarceration. Yet EPA has allowed entire cities to be unnecessarily exposed to elevated lead in their drinking water, and they've covered up evidence of their unethical actions by authoring these falsified scientific reports. And they never apologized for what they did in Washington, D.C., and incredibly to this day they have not apologize for what they did in Flint, Michigan. No apology from EPA. Completely unrepentant and unable to learn from their mistakes. I guess being a government agency means you never have to say you're sorry. And yesterday I have to say I was dumbfounded to read an op-ed by EPA administrator, Gina McCarthy, that effective absolved EPA of any wrongdoing or any role in creating the Flint disaster. Aside from creating this climate in which a Flint was allowed to occur, I purposely observed, witnessed, and uncovered wrongdoing by Ms. Susan Hedman at the U.S. EPA in covering up this problem. Ms. Hedman at every step aided, abetted, and emboldened the unethical behavior of civil servants at the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality. She allowed Flint's children to be harmed. And why should she not suffer the same or a worse fate than a common landlord who does the same thing? Had Flint residents not fought for the truth with the assistance of compassionate outsiders, it's incredible the harm to Flint's children never would've been exposed. And so, to quote Ms. McCarthy's closing op-ed statement, I do agree with her, ``It's tragic it took a disaster of this sort to get this issue the attention it deserves. Let's do something about it.'' Ms. McCarthy, you could start by acknowledging EPA's failure over the last decade to enforce the provisions of the Environmental Protection Agency Lead and Copper Rule. This is a critical and necessary first step to make EPA once again worthy and deserving of the public trust and its noble mission. Thank you. [Prepared statement of Mr. Edwards follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Edwards. We appreciate it. We will now go to questioning, and we will first recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5 minutes. Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the fact that we have had a hearing. We are now having this hearing and another hearing, and I know that we are intent on getting answers and ultimately addressing the concerns of people, children, the faces that are in the room that we had the privilege to see this past Saturday in Flint standing alongside our colleague, Dale Kildee, as well. We want answers, but we want action, and ultimately we want solutions. Ms. Hedman, you say in your testimony, and I will reiterate it again. You read it. ``The bad news is that this problem should have never happened.'' And looking at the faces of the children, the community members there in Flint on Saturday, they would concur with you. As I would concur with you as well. But you went on to say as did Gina McCarthy, administrator of EPA in her article just referred to that I read with shock and awe that she would make the statements in the Washington Post that she did. But you made them today as well when you said, ``And I need to remind you EPA had nothing at all to do with that.'' To be clear, you actually think the EPA had nothing with the crisis in Flint? Ms. Hedman. No. Mr. Walberg. Okay. Ms. Hedman, I have here in front of me Section 1431. Ms. Hedman. Yes. Mr. Walberg. It is the law. 1431 of the Safe Drinking Water Act pulled from the EPA's Web site this this morning, which describes the emergency powers authority given to the EPA ``in the event of an imminent--let me state that again--``an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health.'' Do you believe the people of Flint have at any time faced an imminent or substantial endangerment to their health? Ms. Hedman. Yes. Mr. Walberg. Then was this endangerment to the people of Flint not evident when the EPA learned of the high lead levels in June 2015? Ms. Hedman. Well, Section 1431 requires that there be both substantial endangerment and that the State fails or the city fails to take action. Mr. Walberg. Well, did they fail to take action? Ms. Hedman. Well ---- Mr. Walberg. I think the answer is yes, do you not? Ms. Hedman. The legal advice that I got was that once the State had issued the order directing the City of Flint to implement corrosion control, and the mayor stepped forward to indicate that he would do as soon as possible, that it was likely that the State of Michigan would argue that there was a jurisdictional bar. Mr. Walberg. Well, I mean, argument is one thing. Dealing with the job that you have is another thing. Ms. Hedman. Yeah, and ---- Mr. Walberg. The issue was we had seen so far the action was not being taken. Mr. Edwards and others, community members and others that we have all heard from thankfully, they pressed it. It was not happening. Why did the EPA not intervene and take control of the situation as soon as it learned of the Flint water crisis? This is a crisis to human health. Mr. Edwards, do you think Ms. Hedman's response was adequate? Mr. Edwards. Completely unacceptable and criminal frankly. Mr. Walberg. How soon should she have taken action according to law and according to human decency as well? Mr. Edwards. I do not know the law, but as a human being she should have told people immediately. Mr. Walberg. Ms. Hedman, in July 2015, you told Flint's mayor to disregard Mr. del Toral's preliminary memo that found high levels of lead in Flint water supply. Why did it take another 5 months for the final report to come out? Ms. Hedman. I never told the mayor to disregard that memo. In fact, if you look at Appendix 3 to my testimony, you will see what actually occurred during the conversation that I had with the mayor ---- Mr. Walberg. There is great dispute on that coming across the board. Ms. Hedman. Yes. I wrote the email, and I know what I said. And if we could take the time to take a moment to talk about that, I think we could clear that up. Mr. Walberg. I am not sure we could. Mr. del Toral certainly has a different recollection of it, as well as responses to him. And I had the opportunity to talk with him in Flint this Saturday as well. Very different from what we are being told here, and that is the concern. Again, the human decency act. When the issue was brought to you by authorities in the field, by actual testing, the EPA did not do what it needed to do, even if the other entities going down to the local level and the State level were not doing their duty, and we are certainly going to ask them about those issues. And I look forward to their responses as well, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has expired. I yield back, and hopefully I can gain some other time from other individuals down the road. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman, Mr. Walberg. I will now recognize the gentlewoman from New York, Ms. Maloney, for 5 minutes. Ms. Maloney. The Flint drinking water crisis is a national scandal, and it cries out for accountability from those that are responsible. And that is what we are trying to accomplish today. I would like to begin with Mayor Walling. Mayor Walling, in Mr. Earley's statement for this committee, he made several statements that specifically concern the involvement of yourself and the city council in the decision to switch to the Flint water. First, Mr. Earley alleges, and I quote, ``The concept of using the Flint River an interim water source was inherent in the city council's KWA water authority vote, and Kurtz's March 2013th order.'' So, Mayor Walling, at any time did the city council ever vote on using the Flint River as an interim source of water? Mr. Walling. No. Ms. Maloney. Now, Mr. Earley never says that the city council voted on this issue. Rather he implies, he very clearly implies, that somehow their vote to join the KWA Water Authority meant that they approved the use of the Flint River as an interim source. So Mr. Walling, in your prepared statement today before the committee, I quote, ``The decision in June of 2013 to switch to the Flint River was contrary to the water plans and financial forecasts provided to me and the Flint City Council in March of 2013.'' I am going to put on the screen a document entitled, ``Original Projection Summary Comparison: The KWA and DWSD Water Authority to the Detroit Authority.'' And what is notable to me when you see this, this is a seamless movement. Never does this document mention the taking of water from the Flint River. Is that correct, Mr. Mayor? Mr. Walling. That is correct. Ms. Maloney. And this was what was put before the city council. Is that correct?? Mr. Walling. That is right. That was March 2013. Ms. Maloney. And if I were a member of that city council, I would think that was a seamless movement, and that the Flint River was never touched, and that the KWA and Detroit Water would be what was there. Is that your interpretation of it? Mr. Walling. That was what was provided in the documents. That is what took place in the city council meetings, the comments that I and others made. Ms. Maloney. Now, Mr. Earley also alleges that he, ``delegated all day-to-day operational responsibilities of the Department of Planning and Development and the Department of Public Works to Mayor Walling as of June 2014,'' which notably is after--after--the switchover. So, Mayor Walling, it appears to me that Mr. Earley is attempting to deflect blame for this crisis onto you and to the city council of Flint. What is your response to that? Mr. Walling. I was surprised when this statement was first made. It was made through an op-ed, I believe, in October of 2015. And, you know, first of all, Mr. Earley at the time was serving as city manager in the City of Saginaw. He was not serving in the City of Flint. I was, and I know what happened and what the process was. The first frequently asked questions that the City of Flint provided in early February of 2015 when so many of the issues came out about the TTHM crisis was that the finance director and the city's public works director provided that recommendation to EFM Kurtz in June of 2013. Ms. Maloney. So in reality, to cut to the chase of it, who actually made the major decision related to the water issues in Flint? Who made those decisions? Mr. Walling. They were in place by Emergency Financial Manager Kurtz in June of 2013. That included an adopted 2-year budget that set the equipment, and purchasing, and personnel for the Department of Public Works for the next 2 years. That is what Mr. Earley later inherited. Ms. Maloney. And, Mayor Walling, my time is up, but just would Mr. Early have had the power to keep clean Detroit Water flowing if he wanted to? Mr. Walling. Yes. The emergency managers often amended the budgets that they were working with in consultation with the State. Ms. Maloney. And they had that power, not the city council. Mr. Walling. Correct. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentlewoman. I will now recognize the gentleman form Michigan, Mr. Amash, for 5 minutes. Mr. Amash. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the panel for being here. Thank you especially to Professor Edwards, who has been an extremely valuable expert in this area. And I share your concerns about the EPA and its role, and Ms. Hedman's role in this, and Mr. Walberg made many important points in that regard. I am going to ask some questions to Mr. Earley. Mr. Earley, you wrote a column for the Detroit News in October 2015. Is that correct? Mr. Earley. That is correct, sir. Mr. Amash. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter this op-ed into the record. Chairman Chaffetz. Without objection, so ordered. Mr. Amash. You have made clear here today and in your column that the decision to switch over to the Flint River was made by the previous emergency manager and the city council, correct? Mr. Earley. That is correct. Mr. Amash. In your op-ed, you say, ``It fell to me to oversee the implementation,'' correct? Mr. Amash. That is correct. Mr. Amash. Now, also in your op-ed it says, ``It did not fall to me to question, second guess, or invalidate the actions taken prior to my appointment.'' Do you really believe that? Mr. Earley. I believe that based on the fact that there was no petition. There was no effort made to engage me to change what had already been implemented. When I ---- Mr. Amash. I am sorry. So you believe as an emergency manager, as someone who is put in charge of the City of Flint, it does not fall on you to question, second guess, or invalidate any actions taken prior to your appointment? Mr. Earley. No. What I mean by that is that it does not fall to me to arbitrarily change that, and that is what I was referring to. Mr. Amash. Is it not the job of a city manager to question things? Is that not why you are brought in? Mr. Earley. That is part of the reason, yes. Mr. Amash. If as a congressman, if I took the position that it is not my job to question, second guess, or invalidate any actions that happened prior to my being here, would I be doing my job? Mr. Earley. Well, if everybody were telling you that the project was on course and everything was going well, there was nothing to second guess. Mr. Amash. So if Congress passes something in a previous term and I get elected, I am just supposed to say, oh, well, everything is okay. I do not have any work here. Is that right? Mr. Earley. What I am saying is that you would obviously have to do your own due diligence, but if it comes up that there is nothing to change, there is nothing to change. And if people are telling you that the project is on course. Keep in mind that was only one of many projects in a distressed community that the emergency manager was responsible for. Mr. Amash. So in your op-ed, you also say, ``At the time the decision was made, there was no way to predict such an unfortunate outcome.'' You also call it ``an unintended consequence with no blame to affix.'' So as a person appointed in this position or as an elected official like me, are we not supposed to concern ourselves with unintended consequences? We are just not supposed to think about those things? Mr. Earley. No, that is not what I am saying. What I am saying is that because of those unintended consequences, we now have what is known as the Flint water crisis. In hindsight, there is probably a lot more that everyone would have done, a lot more questioning everyone would have done. But when you have an 18-month window to turn around a distressed community going through its second round of State intervention, the object is to get the work done and enlist as many people as you can to assist you in getting that work done. Mr. Amash. Is it not your job to think about unintended consequences? Mr. Earley. Well, we always think about the possibility of hypotheticals, absolutely. Mr. Amash. And do you feel you did that in this case? Mr. Earley. Well, I believe based on the information we were given, we acted responsibly and did what we did knowing the information we had at the time. Yes, sir. Mr. Amash. All right. According to Michigan's emergency manager law, ``Upon appointment, an emergency manager shall act for and in the place and stead of the governing body and the office of chief administrator officer of the local government. Additionally, the emergency manager shall have broad powers to assure the local government's capacity to provide or cause to be provided as necessary governmental services essential to the public health, safety, and welfare.'' What in your view is the emergency manager's role in overseeing the daily duties of city employees? Mr. Earley. Well, as I said earlier in my comments, as the city manager I have always involved the elected and the appointed officials in the work that I do. And I did no different as the emergency manager and involving them because they are the experts. They are the ones that handle the day-to- day operations. They were very much involved in it, yes. Mr. Amash. So when a city has an emergency manager, whose responsible for ensuring compliance with State and Federal laws regarding safe drinking water? Mr. Earley. Well, regarding anything, the emergency manager obviously is the person responsible for making sure that those things get done, and I have always accepted that. Mr. Amash. So you take responsibility for that because in your op-ed you say, the headline is, ``Don't Blame EM for Flint Water Disaster.'' Mr. Earley. I am trying to draw a distinction between responsibility and blame, sir. And we were all responsible by virtue of our roles. I was very responsible in my role as emergency manger. Mr. Amash. What role did you have, and what steps did you take in ensuring the water treatment plant was prepared to meet State and Federal drinking water standards, knowing that the Flint River would be the primary water source? Mr. Earley. Well, we had regular meetings on the progress. We are upgrading the plant as we got up to the switching over to the Flint Water. I had regular meetings with the treatment staff. The mayor was a part of some regular meetings that we had. We all had discussions about the progress and the things that were being encountered in this switch. Once we made the switch and we got the complaints about the quality of the water, we went to the DEQ. We got boil water advisories, which are common in the case of treating water. We had meetings on a couple of occasions with the MDEQ to talk about what is going and what is actually being treated. And let me again state for the record, in none of those meetings were the current issues that we are dealing with no a problem. They were not addressed. They were not issues brought to our attention. But we did everything we could to make sure we were being responsible to the complaints and the concerns about the quality of the water. Mr. Amash. I think responsibility involves paying attention to unintended consequences, thinking about what might happen. I see my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. I will now recognize the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton, for 5 minutes. Ms. Norton. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Edwards talked about willful blindness. I want to warn everybody about the willful blindness that is built into the separation of powers system, and that is why finger pointing of the Federal and the State side, either on this committee or among our witnesses, is quite inappropriate. Now, this committee has recognized this. To its credit, this committee passed this past February a bill, actually passed a law that requires the EPA to notify residents of high levels of lead when water samples show lead levels for the highest 10 percent of homes tested are above 15 parts per billion. Why do you think we needed a law? Because there is unusual deference on the part of Federal officials. And apparently it took a law to say when people's lives are in danger, when their health is in danger, there is an obligation to speak up when the State is not doing its part. Mr. del Toral did speak up to his supervisors, but he risked being a whistleblower, and we know what happens to whistleblowers in our system. So my questions are not aimed at finger pointing. It is clear, though, that once you have the slightest evidence of lead in the water wherever you are in the system, you better speak up because this is irreversible. You cannot turn this one around, people. So I have a question for Mr. Earley recognizing the Federal responsibility as well as the State responsibility, sir. But let us speak to your responsibility. You know, people are not crazy. They began to smell odors in the water. They saw the color of the Flint water change. And that started a month after the water plant began processing, during your watch, sir, the Flint water. Now, they began to speak out. They complained even about skin rashes and hair loss. Those complaints, it is our information, continued for 8 months while you were emergency manager of Flint. Did you ever consider given those complaints switching back to Detroit Water once the public started to sicken and to speak out? Mr. Earley. Well, let me just make, again, very clear that the fact of the complaints, we responded to those. We sent our water staff out and collected samples. But keep in mind we were also working very closely with the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality on these issues. And while the water did have some discoloration, we were told a number of reasons for that, none of which raised the fact that the water was not fit for human consumption. We relied on the information we received from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality as this was a manageable issue. And we did what we ---- Ms. Norton. Yeah, Mr. Earley, you have extraordinary powers as an emergency manager. Was money ever a concern or enough of a concern for you to ask the governor for State funds to reconnect to the Detroit Water System during your time, during your watch? Mr. Earley. Again, we were trying to manage the issue. Ms. Norton. And the smell of the water and the constant complaints were not enough of a warning for you to try to do something beyond rely on the experts. I mean, the experts seem to have been, Mr. Earley, in the public drinking the water. Mr. Earley. We relied on the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, and we got the information from them, and ---- Ms. Norton. All right. Mr. Earley, I am sorry. My time is limited. Sue McCormack of Detroit Water wrote to you offering to continue supplying water to Flint, Michigan until the Water Authority's project was complete. But you wrote back, ``There will be no need for Flint to continue purchasing water to serve its residences and business after April 17th, 2014.'' Why did you reject this offer to continue using Detroit Water as a source? Mr. Earley. Just to be clear, the letter you refer to went to the city clerk. At the time ---- Ms. Norton. You had no knowledge of this letter. Mr. Earley. I was not the emergency manager at the time that the letter came in. By the time I got there, we had already been notified that the contract had been terminated, but we could still ---- Ms. Norton. But you were the emergency manager before the switch was implemented on your watch. You could say, wait a minute, I am in charge now. Was this not your job to look at what should be done now now that you are in charge, sir? Mr. Earley. We did look at that, and, again, we followed the guidelines based on the information we were given. But importantly in that letter is that ---- Ms. Norton. What about the warning that came, now, imagine receiving a warning from somebody in the line who says, ``I have people above me making plans to distribute water as soon as possible. I was reluctant to go before, but after looking at the monitoring schedule and current staffing, I do not anticipate giving the okay to begin sending this water out any time. If any water is distributed from this plant in the next couple of weeks, it will be against my direction.'' What more did you need, Mr. Earley? Mr. Earley. That did not go to me, ma'am. That did not go to me. That email went to the director of the Department, I do believe. It did not go to me. Ms. Norton. Your name is on the letter, Mr. Earley. Mr. Earley. You are talking two different things. Ms. Norton. What is the other thing, sir? Mr. Earley. Well, the letter from the DWSD and an email that came from one of the operators that talked about the distribution of water. Chairman Chaffetz. The gentlewoman's time has far expired. I will now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Micah. Mr. Mica. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I think this hearing is going to be known as the great finger pointing hearing. And we have got the Flint mayor throwing people under the bus. We have got the Flint emergency manager throwing people under the bus. And we have got Ms. Hedman, former EPA administrator for that area, throwing people under the bus. But somewhere it seems like people were asleep at the tap and not doing their job. Now, if the locals failed, and the mayor failed, and the emergency managers failed, and there were failures there, Mr. Edwards, what role would the Federal government have? Mr. Edwards. They are the last resort. They are the last line of defense. They are the last hope of Flint residents. Mr. Mica. And the reason we put EPA together was to protect people, right, in cities, in communities, and States where they did not act to protect the water of the people, right? Mr. Edwards. That is correct. Mr. Mica. Okay. Were they notified? Well, there are some heroes in this. First, the hero is, and she is here today, is Ms. Walters and her family because they notified the local people, and the Federal people, and everybody they could that they were poisoning their kids. Mr. del Toral wrote an incredible memo. He acted. Ms. Hedman, was he not an EPA official? Ms. Hedman. He is an EPA scientist. Mr. Mica. Yeah, he did a great job. Ms. Hedman. Yes, he did. Mr. Mica. A higher schooler could read his memo, which he produced. Here is a copy of his memo, June 24th. It tells you the violations of the city. It tells you the incompetence. Then it tells you the poisoning of their children. It is documented and all the steps, and the violations of Flint are listed here. Not just this, but they have a history. They are listed on the back. A higher schooler could read this and evaluate it. Now, you got that memo, right, Ms. Hedman? Ms. Hedman. I am not sure when I got that memo, but I did get it. Mr. Mica. Well, you got it, right? Okay, June. And, Mayor, you were aware of this, and you two talked, did you not? Did you talk to her about this memo, Mayor? Mr. Walling. Yes. Mr. Mica. You did talk to her. But, sir, I went back and checked to see if you talked to your constituent, the woman and family whose kids were being poisoned. We knew this early in 2015. They knew it at the end of 2014. We had the tests here that proved, and he went in and he tested the pipes. He did everything. First they said the pipes were lead into the house. They were not lead. They were plastic. They were PVC. There was no lead in there. So you told her at the library on March 31st you were aware of it. You went to Ms. Walters and told her you were aware of the situation, and you would take care of it, right? You would do anything. Did you not tell that to your constituent? Mr. Walling. Yes. Mr. Mica. She showed up April 2nd, 2015 at your office, and they said you were gone for Easter, but they would be back with her on Monday, right? That is what they told her, I am telling you. And that is what she told me. Today is, what, 2016, March 15th. You have not been back with her since. But you were aware of this memo. You read this memo. They tried to suppress this memo. This was not a pretty memo because it said your constituents were being poisoned. So this is an incredible failure, I believe, at all levels, particularly the Federal level. That is our responsibility. When we get a memo like this from someone with the EPA doing their job, and a constituent who reports it, and we have the evidence of the poisoning. This Mr. del Toral is a hero, and the things he did, every test possible. He conducted every test possible, is that right? You read it, Mr. Edwards. Did you read this? Mr. Edwards. His memo has proven to be 100 percent accurate in every way, shape, and form. Mr. Mica. And yet ignored at the local level, ignored at the emergency management level, and then the worst thing. That is our responsibility. When all these levels fail, EPA. You never acted for, what, 5 months after this memo, Ms. Hedman? Ms. Hedman. That is incorrect. In fact, the following day I offered lead experts to the mayor. Mr. Mica. Yeah, what they did. Ms. Hedman. And within 3 weeks we had concluded an agreement with MDEQ to order Flint to issue corrosion control. Mr. Mica. And what did they do? Ms. Hedman. They issued an order ---- Mr. Mica. Did they do it? Ms. Hedman. They did eventually. Mr. Mica. Eventually when? Ms. Hedman. They issued an order on August 17th directing the City of Flint to implement corrosion control on September 3rd. Mr. Mica. And the time is ticking, and nothing is done, and you never went back on them. There was really no plan in place for more than 5 months. Ms. Hedman. That is not true. Mr. Mica. It was ignored. It is the whole truth and nothing but the truth, I hate to tell you. And, again, I think EPA also failed. So we had failure at multiple levels. Mr. Edwards, you have seen cases. You said this is not uncommon of how they failed across the country. Is that not the case in Flint? Mr. Edwards. Well, I mean, there is a climate out there where lead and water problems are covered up, people are cheating on the sampling, and that climate allowed Flint to occur. It allowed these unethical civil servants at MDEQ to claim that there was no problem in the water whatsoever, even when they were breaking Federal corrosion control law. Mr. Mica. Thank you. Mr. Jordan. [Presiding.] Thank the gentleman. Mr. Clay is recognized for his 5 minutes. Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, there were numerous red flags that should have led the State to agree to return to the Detroit Water System. Bacterial contamination in the water as early as summer 2014, the Legionella outbreak, the astronomical lead readings in LeAnne Walters' home, all of these early signs should have been reason enough to consider returning to a safe water supply. But the response was always the same. It was not in the emergency manager's financial plan for the city to return to the Detroit Water System. On January 9th, 2015, in response to concerns that had been raised about the safety of Flint's water, Mr. Early, you wrote, and I quote, ``Suggestions have been made that the City of Flint should return to using water purchased through the Detroit Water and Sewage Department.'' For many reasons, financial and otherwise, the City of Flint can ill afford to switch courses at this point. You also said it is not financially prudent to spend $18 million to purchase water that meets the same DEQ standards as the water now available from the Flint River. Mr. Earley, obviously now we know that the water from the Flint River was not meeting the same standard as water coming from Detroit Water. Is that correct? Mr. Earley. Yes, sir. Mr. Clay. And then did you consider changing course at any point after serious concerns had been raised about the quality and safety of the river water? Mr. Earley. Well, at the time that you referenced, we had already enlisted the aid of another water expert to determine exactly what the causes were. We were trying to diagnosis the causes. Again, we were dealing with the issue of coliform, TTHM, E. coli, and other issues. We were not talking about lead at the time. The point is simply this. The City of Flint did not have the money. Mr. Clay. Yeah, but sometimes, I mean, look, common sense should take over. The General Motors plant stopped using the water when it started to rust new parts. What would that tell the average person? That means they need to stop drinking it. I mean, come on. Is that that difficult to determine? Mr. Earley. We continued to rely on the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, and until such time as they deemed the water unsafe to drink, we were doing all that we could to manage the contamination and to also make the water accessible and potable. Mr. Clay. Okay, look. Look. After that January 15th letter, a few days later the director of the Detroit Water System sent you a letter offering to reconnect the City of Flint to the Detroit Water supply. Why did you reject the director's offer? Mr. Earley. I did not do that. I was gone from Flint. I had left Flint by that time that letter came out. That rejection was written by my successor. Again, there were four emergency managers during this period. That letter of rejection came from my successor. Mr. Clay. Okay. And so, it came down to you or your successor trying to save $18 million? Mr. Earley. No, it came down to the fact that the city did not have $18 million. They were already paying some of the most exorbitant and the highest water rates in the country. We have litigation pending now from the customers who are fighting the rates for the water, even before the contamination issues. Mr. Clay. Okay. Going along with your line of thinking then, when do we say, okay, public health and safety matters? And it is the responsibility of the State of Michigan or the EPA to step in and say we are endangering lives. We are damaging people for the rest of their lives. And when does that occur? Mr. Earley. From day one, sir. From day one. Mr. Clay. Yeah, but you did not do it. Mr. Earley. The issues of lead contamination came out in 2015. They came out after that. The issues we were dealing with in terms of contaminated water were the TTHMs, the E. coli, and the coliform materials that were found in the water. And that was a result of the distribution system age. It was the result of the number of water main breaks that we had at that particular time. I mean, this was the perfect storm for things to happen while we were switching from one water source to another. But we tried to manage those. Mr. Clay. Well, I mean, but did not common sense tell you what General Motors did when they changed the water system that they were using because it was rusting the parts. What did that say to you? Mr. Earley. What we were told regarding that situation was because of the raw nature of the machine parts that General Motors was producing, the treatment materials we were putting in to treat the water was indeed having a negative impact on their products. But it did not correlate to a negative impact on consumption of the water according to the MDEQ. Mr. Clay. Mr. Chairman, for the record, I have a letter in response signed by Darnell Earley rejecting the Detroit Water's offer to change back. So make this part of the record, too. Chairman Chaffetz. [Presiding.] Without objection, so ordered. Mr. Clay. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Chairman Chaffetz. And before the gentleman yields back, Mr. Edwards, I will give you an opportunity to respond to this inquiry as well. It sounded like you wanted, okay. The gentleman yields back. I now actually recognize myself for 5 minutes. Ms. Hedman, when did you first know there was a problem about water in Flint? Ms. Hedman. The first time I was briefed was December of 2014. I was briefed on the TTHM issue, the disinfection byproduct issue. My staff have instructions that when there is a significant violation in a system to bring it to my attention. And they briefed me shortly before ---- Chairman Chaffetz. So you knew about it in 2014. When did you have your first conversation with Mayor Walling? Ms. Hedman. My first conversation about TTHM, about the disinfection byproducts, occurred in late February. He requested a drinking water expert in that area, and I supplied him with an expert from the EPA lab in Cincinnati. Chairman Chaffetz. So, Mr. Walling, you went on television in July of 2015 and told everybody that it was safe to drink the water. Did you just do that on your own, or who told you that that was a viable thing to say? Mr. Walling. MDEQ had repeatedly provided assurances. We heard over and over again in our technical advisory meetings, discussions with staff that the water was meeting the standards, that it was safe to drink. Chairman Chaffetz. Did you have a discussion with the EPA? Mr. Walling. Dr. Hedman and I spoke around that time after the del Toral memo was provided to me in Flint. Chairman Chaffetz. What did she say? Mr. Walling. And it was explained to me that that memo was under review, that the scope of the problem was being assessed. And my understanding at the time was this was limited to very particular cases because of what was there for lead surface lines and plumbing in individual houses. Chairman Chaffetz. Mr. Edwards, what is your take on that? Mr. Edwards. Well, the email is very clear from Ms. Hedman that she apologized for Mr. del Toral's memo, and Mr. Walling asked her if there was anything that should be of concern to Flint residents. And she said, frankly, no. Chairman Chaffetz. Ms. Hedman, why did you do that? Ms. Hedman. I did not apologize for the memo. I apologized for taking all day to get back to the mayor. And that is because I was out of the office for a medical procedure. And, in fact ---- Chairman Chaffetz. Okay. So that was one day, so. Ms. Hedman. And, in fact, during the entire time period that Mr. Edwards imagines I was covering up data and silencing scientists, I was actually out of the office. I did not return until July 13th. During that time period, my deputy, Bob Kaplan, who Dr. Edwards describes as one of the good guys, was actually in charge of the office. Chairman Chaffetz. So, Mr. Edwards, this memo from Mr. del Toral is pretty comprehensive, is it not? Does it tackle the issue? Does it inform them as to the health of this water? Mr. Edwards. Yes, it points out that Flint is not being protected by Federal law, and that the public health is in danger. Chairman Chaffetz. When should that information have been released? Mr. Edwards. Had EPA just stayed silent and not apologized for the memo to Mr. Walling and told Mr. Walling that Mr. del Toral was accurate in what he said, I doubt Mr. Walling would have gone on TV to drink the water and tell Flint residents it was safe. Chairman Chaffetz. Is that true, Mr. Walling? Were you talked out of it? I mean, the memo comes out. You are getting inquiries from news organizations, the ACLU, and others saying, hey, what are you doing about this. And you go on television and say it is safe. Mr. Walling. I did trust the guidance that I was receiving, and that is what I regret in this looking back. But I deliberately reached out. I asked the White House Office of Intergovernmental Affairs for a point of contact in the EPA. This is while the City of Flint was still under emergency manager because I wanted to double check on what we were hearing from the State regulators. And when we are hearing essentially the same thing from the State and the Federal regulators, then I relied on that information, and that is what I ---- Chairman Chaffetz. So what did the White House ask you to do? They asked you to communicate with who? Mr. Walling. No, I asked the White House for a point of contact. Chairman Chaffetz. Right. And the White House directed you to? Mr. Walling. Dr. Susan Hedman. Chairman Chaffetz. How long did it take before the EPA finally confirmed, came back and said, yeah, that del Toral report is accurate? They did not, did they? They never did. That is the point. If you left office, you were there for months, and months, and months, and they never did come back and actually confirm it. Mr. Edwards, is that correct? Mr. Edwards. That is correct. Chairman Chaffetz. Ms. Hedman, you were in office. You were here being paid by the taxpayers until late January of 2016. Why did it take you so long? Ms. Hedman. Mr. del Toral's memo actually dealt with lead in one residence and two neighboring residences. And the conclusion of the final version of his memo was that the problem had been caused by a physical disturbance of a lead surface line, and that it was particular to that household. Chairman Chaffetz. Mr. Edwards, this was not a report about one house, was it? Mr. Edwards. Mr. del Toral clearly pointed out that Flint was not being protected by Federal corrosion control laws period, and that the public health of an entire city was in danger. Chairman Chaffetz. This is where you are fundamentally and totally wrong, Ms. Hedman, and if you do not recognize that now. We are in mid-March 2016, and you still do not get it. You still do not get it, and neither does the EPA administrator. You screwed up, and you messed up people's lives. Ms. Hedman. Mr. Chairman, Mr. del Toral ---- [Applause.] Chairman Chaffetz. No, no, no. The audience, please. Ms. Hedman? Ms. Hedman. Mr. del Toral was just one of several people at Region 5 who were concerned about the failure to implement corrosion control, and had been communicating to MDEQ at higher and higher levels of EPA management ---- Chairman Chaffetz. This information was out there publicly. It had been released. You did not like it, did you? If somebody released that report, did he do the right thing or not do the right thing? Ms. Hedman. I do not believe he released the report. Chairman Chaffetz. Okay. Ms. Hedman. I think we need to be clear that there was ---- Chairman Chaffetz. Was that the right thing for that report to go public? Ms. Hedman. There were three reasons why EPA could not release that report. Chairman Chaffetz. What are those? Ms. Hedman. The first is that it contained personally identifiable information, health information, and that kind of information is not something that we could release. And so, before a report is released, that is typically redacted by our Office of Regional Counsel. Chairman Chaffetz. Okay. So a black pen would take 10 seconds or so? Yeah, okay. Keep going. Ms. Hedman. Right, and secondly, the material in the report included enforcement sensitive information. And we do not release that to the targets or to the general public. Again, that would have been a redaction issue. And then additionally, there was data in the report that we neither collected nor analyzed, and it needed to go through a kind of standard QAQC. I directed that that be done as soon as possible. It was my expectation that the report could be finalized and put in a form that could be publicly released before the reporter had to file his story. That was my expectation at the time. Chairman Chaffetz. And it took 7 months. Mr. Edwards, your reaction to her comments? Mr. Edwards. I am just in disbelief. Chairman Chaffetz. My time has well expired. I will now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes. Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I was in local government, Mr. Edwards, for 14 years in Virginia. And my point of contact on the environment almost always was the Department of Environmental Quality. I thought you gave a very eloquent, passionate, and suitably outraged opening statement, but you focus on EPA almost exclusively in that statement. But when we actually get to how government works and what the mechanics of it are, a local government relates first to the Department of Environmental Quality, and the Environmental Protection Agency does not run water authorities around the country. It relies on the State DEQ. You know, I have heard a lot of talk about let us not finger point, but we do need to get to the bottom of this and how it works. And I do not think this EPA's finest moment, but I for one, coming from local government for 14 years, am not going to let the local DEQ off the hook because it sounds better for one political philosophy to try to shift this entire blame onto the Federal government. There is plenty of blame to go around, but I do not want to be an enabler to avoid getting to the bottom of what happened and who let it happen. Let me just say, Mr. Early, you said that it was your successor who declined the offer of Detroit Water, but my colleague, Mr. Clay, entered into the record a letter dated March 7th, 2014 addressed to Sue McCormick, Detroit Water and Sewer Department, signed by you. And you say in that letter, ``We expect the Flint water treatment plan will be fully operational and capable of treating Flint water prior to the date of termination. In that case, there will be no need for Flint to continue purchasing water service to serve its residents and businesses after April 17th.'' Now, Sue McCormick took that letter to be a rejection letter of the offer. Mr. Earley. Okay. Mr. Connolly. Did you intend it to be a rejection letter of the offer? Mr. Earley. Let me respond to that letter. There were very distinct letters back to the Detroit Water and Sewage Department. One was drafted by me before the issues of lead were discussed. That is the letter that you are making reference to. And then there was another drafted by the successor, Mr. Ambrose, that also said the same thing. My letter was in response to the fact that the project was already underway, that the city had invested millions of dollars into the new water system, and they wanted a long-term water agreement, which was not feasible. Mr. Connolly. Were you aware when you wrote this letter of concerns about the quality of water coming from the Flint River? Mr. Earley. In March of? Mr. Connolly. This is March 7th, 2014. Mr. Earley. That was before the switch. That was before the switch from the ---- Mr. Connolly. But you were planning the switch. Mr. Earley. The switch was already planned well before I got there. Mr. Connolly. I understand. Mr. Earley. Yeah. Mr. Connolly. Were you aware when you wrote this letter that there were concerns about the quality of water coming from the Flint River? Mr. Earley. We had not switched yet. We had not ---- Mr. Connolly. I am not asking that question. Were you aware? Had any one brought to your attention ---- Mr. Earley. No. Mr. Connolly.--that there were concerns about the Flint River? Mr. Earley. No. Mr. Connolly. Did you have any reason to believe there could be water quality concerns taking water from the Flint River? Mr. Earley. I did not, sir, because the DEQ had certified the water. The State had given the permits, all of the things were necessary to move forward with the project. Mr. Connolly. Okay. Your testimony today and other things you have written are pretty harsh about the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, correct? Mr. Earley. Yes. Mr. Connolly. You say it missed its opportunity to identify serious pipe corrosion problems. You say that it multiple emphatic warnings from the EPA. Is that correct? Mr. Earley. Yes. Mr. Connolly. Is it your testimony that MDEQ ignored warnings from the EPA? Mr. Earley. I cannot speak to why they reacted the way that they did. Mr. Connolly. I did not ask that question. Factually are you saying by saying that they had multiple emphatic warnings from the EPA, the clear implication of that statement, and they ignored them. Is that your testimony? Mr. Earley. No. Mr. Connolly. Ms. Hedman, that statement that there were multiple emphatic warnings from the EPA, what is Mr. Early referring to from your point of view? Ms. Hedman. What date is the letter again, please? Mr. Connolly. He says in his testimony that the MDEQ received multiple emphatic warnings from the EPA warning. Ms. Hedman. I thought you were referring to the letter. Yes, we ---- Mr. Connolly. No, I am not referring to the letter. I am referring to the Mr. Earley's testimony. Ms. Hedman. So in February of 2015, EPA inquired about the type of corrosion control that was being implemented in Flint. And my staff was told that Flint was fully optimized for corrosion control. It was not until April 24th that the MDEQ admitted to my staff for the first time that Flint was not practicing corrosion control. And at that time, from that day forward, at higher and higher levels at EPA, we repeatedly emphatically and urgently told MDEQ that it was important to implement corrosion control as soon as possible. Mr. Connolly. All right, my time is up. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the hearing, and I want to thank you again for Thursday's planned hearing. Irrespective of our politics or anything else, this is a catastrophic failure with our citizens. And if government exists for any purpose, it is to protect our citizens in health and safety, and this is a catastrophic failure in that mission. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. I will recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan. Mr. Jordan. I thank the chairman. I would yield my time to the gentleman from Michigan. Chairman Chaffetz. Mr. Walberg, sir. Mr. Walberg. I thank the gentleman from Ohio. Let us go a little bit different track. I would like to come back to Ms. Hedman again. But initially or first, EPA finally actively intervened in Flint in late January 2016. Mr. Edwards or Dr. Edwards, in the last few months what steps have been taken to make Flint's water lead free? I saw you there Saturday. I saw you talking with residents, talking about filters, and all of the rest. What steps have been taken? Mr. Edwards. They have switched back to Detroit Water. EPA has implemented very good corrosion control effective December. We believe the lead levels are dropping dramatically as the pipe coating is reestablished. And we are currently sampling with Flint residents last week to see house by house how much lower lead levels are now. And it is our hypothesis that lead is about 4 times better now than it was back during the height of the lead poisoning incidents in Flint neighborhoods. Mr. Walberg. How long do you think it will take for, reasonably speaking, for Flint's water to be safe? Mr. Edwards. In order to meet existing Federal standards, which is not a high bar as I have already said, you have to do a federally approved lead and copper sampling event that Flint has never done in its history because they have never sampled the right homes. And they have been using sampling protocols that missed lead in water risk ---- Mr. Walberg. Do you have records even of those homes that they have sampled? Mr. Edwards. Yes, we do, yeah. But they did not have lead pipes as is specified like other cities around the United States. Philadelphia, it is now acknowledged they did not sample enough homes with lead pipes according to the requirements of the law. This is something that EPA has been allowing since 2006. Mr. Walberg. Do you believe it is necessary and reasonable for Flint to replace all of the lead pipes? Mr. Edwards. You know, obviously that is desirable. I think everyone wants that to happen. No one wants it more than me. But I think we have to consider seriously what is the best place to invest in Flint's future to help Flint get back on their feet. They have needs in terms of the water mains. Flint has more water main breaks per mile than almost any other city in the United States. That is one of the reasons their water bills are so high. So there is many infrastructure needs that have to be addressed, and that is why I am in favor, although I do not think it does enough, I am in favor of this Flint bill to get money to Flint residents for their infrastructure. Mr. Walberg. We heard, I believe, Saturday 40 percent water being wasted due to breaks in the lines, leaking out. That is amazing. And then you are talking about people having to pay those water bills when they are not even getting the water, let alone the water being safe to drink. Let me go back to Ms. Hedman. In your testimony, you stated that, ``I resigned in part because of the false allegations about me that were published in early January.'' You specifically cite a January 12th Detroit News article titled, ``EPA Stayed Silent on Flint's Tainted Water,'' in which Marc Edwards is extensively quoted saying that the people who knew about the lack of corrosion controls should have acted immediately. Let me ask you. Is it a false allegation to say that people who knew about the contaminated water should have acted? Ms. Hedman. No, and we did. We did. As soon as I learned about this, I offered lead experts to the mayor, and we reached out again to MDEQ. And within 3 weeks had reached agreement that MDEQ would order to Flint to implement corrosion control as soon as possible. And in the interim, we issued a statement ---- Mr. Walberg. I think Mr. del Toral would not agree with that. And, Mr. Edwards, what is your position? Mr. Edwards. She did nothing to protect Flint's children. Nothing. Mr. Walberg. The article also quoted Michigan Senate Minority Leader, Jim Ananich, of Flint who says, ``Anyone who read his memo and failed to act should be held accountable to the fullest extent of the law.'' That is the minority leader of the Michigan legislature, Mr. Ananich. Is he wrong, Ms. Hedman? Ms. Hedman. Mr. del Toral's memo contained the same recommendations that I had been receiving from others in EPA who had followed through starting on June 10th before that del Toral ---- Mr. Walberg. Yes, he was disciplined for his memo. Ms. Hedman. No, he was not. Mr. Walberg. He was disciplined for standing up as a whistleblower. Ms. Hedman. He was not. Mr. Walberg. He was absolutely. Ms. Hedman. He was not. He was not. Mr. Walberg. Mr. Chairman, with that disagreement, I yield back. Chairman Chaffetz. If the gentleman would yield first, did you make him go through ethics training? Ms. Hedman. No. Chairman Chaffetz. No. Ms. Hedman. No. Chairman Chaffetz. You really believe that. Did you limit his travel? Ms. Hedman. No. Chairman Chaffetz. There was no discipline whatsoever. Ms. Hedman. None whatsoever. Chairman Chaffetz. Is he a hero or a villain in this? Ms. Hedman. He is a hero, and to be clear I recommended him for EPA's highest award. Chairman Chaffetz. When? Ms. Hedman. In about September, and in his typical modest way, he declined to be nominated because his work was not finished. Chairman Chaffetz. You need to go back and read the emails and the memos that were provided to us by the EPA because that is not what was happening within your organization. And you were in charge of that organization. Ms. Hedman. So I can tell you that my deputy, who was in charge during the time period that you are concerned about, got wind of that, and he went down to the Water Division and put an end to it. And when I called him, he told me that I did not even have to tell him. He took care of it. Chairman Chaffetz. Did anybody at the EPA do anything wrong? Ms. Hedman. Are you asking me the question if I could do this all over again, is there something I would do ---- Chairman Chaffetz. No. I am asking you, you were in charge. Did anybody at the EPA do anything wrong? Ms. Hedman. I do not think anyone at EPA did anything wrong, but I do believe we could have done more. Chairman Chaffetz. Wow. Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman? Chairman Chaffetz. Mr. Cummings. Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, I want to clear. Ms. Hedman, you are under oath. Do you understand that? Ms. Hedman. Yes. Mr. Cummings. And I just want to make sure you are clear as to what you are saying because if you are not clear, I do not want you to be subjected to some kind of criminal inquiry, so I just want to ask you this. Did you retaliate against Mr. del Toral in any way? Ms. Hedman. Absolutely not. Mr. Cummings. And so, you said something just a moment ago. You said your deputy did something. What was that? You said he cleared it up. What did he clear up? Ms. Hedman. So after I sent an email to the mayor, the mayor requested that we reach out to the reporter again. And I replied to the mayor by saying at this point I am not inclined to have my staff have contact with the reporter. They need to finish the report because I did believe they would be able to get a final report out. I understand through a series of emails that came to me later, I would say around July 7th or 8th, that that was forwarded and interpreted as some sort of direction that nobody was supposed to talk to reporters. And when I saw that email, I called my deputy because I was concerned about the flavor of that interpretation. And he said, no problem, I have already handled it. Mr. Cummings. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. We will now go to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Cartwright, for 5 minutes. Mr. Cartwright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Earley, I want to revisit a question with you on the decision on using the Flint River. You submitted an opening statement in writing. Am I correct in that? Mr. Earley. That is correct, sir. Mr. Cartwright. And I read it, and you said, ``It was not my decision to use the Flint River, nor was it a two-pronged decision.'' You said, ``The concept of using the Flint River as an interim water source was inherent in the city council's KWA vote and Kurtz's March 2013 order.'' Have I read that correctly? Mr. Earley. Yes, sir. Mr. Cartwright. So you said, ``The decision to use the Flint River was inherent in the city's council's vote.'' That's as opposed to explicit. It was not explicit, correct? Mr. Earley. That is correct, sir. Mr. Cartwright. All right. But you know what? That is not what Mayor Walling testified to. In fact, Mayor Walling also submitted a written statement, and he said on page 4 of 9, ``Contrary to the facts, Governor Snyder's office and former emergency manager, Darnell Earley, have stated and repeated blatantly false claims that I and the Flint City Council made the switch to the Flint River.'' Did you read that? Did you have access to his opening statement? Mr. Earley. I did not, sir. Mr. Cartwright. Okay. Well, he said that. And, Mr. Walling, a simple ``yes'' or ``no,'' do you stand by that remark? Mr. Walling. Yes. Mr. Cartwright. That is a yes for the record. Mr. Walling. Yes. Mr. Cartwright. All right. So here is the point, Mr. Earley. You were the one with the power at the time. I would like to clarify your powers as emergency manager at the time. I want to read to you the passage from the 2012 law that created the position of emergency manager. And it says this: ``The emergency manager shall have broad powers and receivership to rectify the financial emergency and to assure the fiscal accountability of the local government and the local government's capacity to provide or cause to be provided necessary government services essential to the public health, safety, and welfare.'' Have I read that correctly? Mr. Earley. That is correct, sir. Mr. Cartwright. Mr. Earley, do you agree that as emergency manager you had broad powers? Mr. Earley. Yes, sir. Mr. Cartwright. And once you issued an opinion, it was law. The emergency manager law says, ``An order issued under this section is binding on the local elected and appointed officials and employees, agents, and contractors.'' Have I read that correctly? Mr. Earley. Yes, sir. Mr. Cartwright. And you used those broad powers to cut about $18 million from the budget by moving away from Detroit Water to the Flint River, and this was the agenda from Governor Snyder's office to save money. That was the emergency referred to in ``emergency manager.'' It was not an emergency in the environment, or in public water, or drinking supply. It was an emergency about money. It was a money emergency manager that you were. In your testimony you said a proposal to stay on Detroit Water was ``an unsustainable financial fantasy.'' Have I read that correctly? Mr. Earley. Yes, sir. Mr. Cartwright. Did you at any time use your broad powers to request additional State funds to help Flint purchase safe Detroit water during the transition to KWA? Mr. Earley. No, sir. Mr. Cartwright. But that is exactly what they did after tens of thousands of people were poisoned by lead in the drinking water of Flint, correct? Mr. Earley. Yes, sir. Mr. Cartwright. Mr. Earley, it took a public health crisis of these proportions with thousands of victims for Flint finally to receive the State funds it needed to protect its citizens, did it not? Mr. Earley. Yes, sir. Mr. Cartwright. So I wonder what all this says about the governor of Michigan. The emergency manager law says this, and I quote, ``The emergency manager shall serve at the pleasure of the governor.'' You were doing the governor's bidding. In fact, I read the Detroit News this morning, and your pastor, Reverend Marlon Jennings. Is that your pastor? Mr. Earley. He is a pastor that I do know from the City of Flint, yes. Mr. Cartwright. He was talking about you in today's paper. ``It is unfortunate that he was caught up in this quagmire of responsibility to the governor in his position, and at the same time trying to serve the people of Flint, Jennings said.'' ``It turned out that the two were diametrically opposed. His job as emergency manager is to carry out the wishes and execute the plan and program of the governor.'' Did you see that in the paper this morning? Mr. Earley. I have not seen that yet, sir. Mr. Cartwright. You do not have reason to disagree with the pastor, do you? Mr. Earley. Well, I would say that the role as defined there is pretty narrow. It is a much broader role. I think the real goal is to return the city or the school district back to financial solvency. Mr. Cartwright. After all of this, the governor appointed you to be emergency manager of the Detroit Public Schools after you got done with the Flint, and your salary for that job was $41,000 more than what you made in Flint. Am I correct in that? Mr. Earley. Yes. Mr. Cartwright. It looks like the governor was pleased with your performance in Flint. [Laughter.] Mr. Cartwright. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. I will now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows, for 5 minutes. Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Hedman, let me come to you because the chairman and the ranking member both questioned, I guess, your last round of testimony. And so, is it your sworn testimony that you did not directly or indirectly retaliate against Mr. del Toral for him being a whistleblower? Is that your sworn testimony? Ms. Hedman. My sworn testimony is that I certainly did not, and I have no knowledge of anyone in EPA who did so. Mr. Meadows. And you have looked very closely at that, because we have been led to believe very differently, and that is why I am giving you one last chance to perhaps correct your testimony here today because you are under sworn testimony, and we are very concerned that we get the whole truth and nothing but the truth. So you have no knowledge indirectly or directly of any retaliation that came against him. Ms. Hedman. No. Mr. Meadows. All right. Mr. Edwards, you worked very closely with Mr. del Toral. How would you characterize that statement in light of your close working with him? Mr. Edwards. I do not think Ms. Hedman understands the climate she created at Region 5 EPA. Even before Mr. del Toral wrote that memo, he told me that he had to protect Flint's children while minimizing the likelihood he would be retaliated against. Mr. Meadows. Had he shared with you that he has been retaliated against? Is that your belief? Mr. Edwards. Well, I mean, obviously he was told not to talk to anyone to Flint or about Flint. A deal of some sort was made between EPA and MDEQ where MDEQ felt emboldened to say that ``they had handled Mr. del Toral.'' That Flint residents would not be hearing from Mr. del Toral again. And so, that is when we got involved. I mean, I invested $200,000 of my own money. A team of 25 volunteers from Virginia Tech had to go in and demonstrate that Flint residents were not crazy, and that lead in water was high. Mr. Meadows. So is it your testimony that somehow Mr. del Toral was handled by the EPA and the Department of Water Quality Michigan to silence him in his defense of the children of Flint, Michigan? Mr. Edwards. Absolutely. Mr. Meadows. Ms. Hedman, how do you respond to that? Ms. Hedman. I know of absolutely no evidence to substantiate that claim. Mr. Meadows. Well, let me go a little bit further because some of what you know and what you do not know is, I guess, the problem because your testimony here today says that the EPA had no fault. That was in your opening testimony. There is no fault. Ms. Hedman. No. Mr. Meadows. And so, you stand by, I mean, in light of everything that is coming out, that there is no fault for the EPA on behalf of the EPA. Ms. Hedman. That is not what I said in my testimony or in my answers to the questions. Mr. Meadows. All right. So the EPA is at fault. Ms. Hedman. I said that I thought we could have done more. Mr. Meadows. Listen, that is political speak. Are you at fault or not? Yes or no. Ms. Hedman. In what respect? Mr. Meadows. In any respect, I guess, Ms. Hedman. I mean, here is the problem is we have got children that have been harmed, and yet we are sitting here equivocating over words that may or may not establish blame. And I am concerned that what we are doing is we are just wiping our hands of it and saying that I had nothing to do with it. Is that your testimony? Ms. Hedman. It is not. Mr. Meadows. All right. So EPA partially at fault? Ms. Hedman. I believe we could have done more. Mr. Meadows. All right. So let me go on a little bit further. Mr. Edwards, in our last time when you were here before this exact same committee, I asked you about a FOIA request from the EPA because you had gotten lots of information from Michigan and zero from the EPA. Did you ever get your FOIA request responded to? Mr. Edwards. No. There are still outstanding appeals from 9 years ago. The request that we had for Flint emails came in all redacted, so I hope ---- Mr. Meadows. So when did those come in? When did those come in? The day after the hearing? Mr. Edwards. Oh, I did get one FOIA the day after the hearing, yeah. That was ---- Mr. Meadows. Is it not amazing how it takes a congressional hearing to have the Federal law adhered to. So and it is redacted? Mr. Edwards. The emails in relation to Flint ---- Mr. Meadows. More than personal information. Obviously we want to redact personal information. Mr. Edwards. The emails that we requested about the Flint water crisis from EPA were almost 90 percent redacted in terms of deliberative, attorney-client privilege, or unresponsive. Everything virtually was redacted from those emails. Mr. Meadows. Ms. Hedman, I mean, so redacting all of that. Normally when we redact it is for national security concerns. Do you think the EPA has a national security concern here? Ms. Hedman. I am not familiar at all with the emails. Mr. Meadows. I will yield back. Chairman Chaffetz. Before the gentleman yields back ---- Mr. Cummings. No, I was going to take a turn. Chairman Chaffetz. I will now recognize the ranking member for 5 minutes. Mr. Cummings. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back. I want to follow up on some of the things that Mr. Meadows said. The chairman introduced, Ms. Hedman, a document. It is an email, and it, first of all, Email Exhibit 6. Is that right? Anyway, Mr. del Toral, he is writing a letter to somebody named Rita Bair. Do you know Rita Bair? Ms. Hedman. She works in the Region 5 Water Division. Mr. Cummings. And so, apparently he had been denied an opportunity to go to Milwaukee for some kind of conference. And this is what kind of struck me, and it kind of bears out what the chairman and Mr. Meadows has been getting to. It says, ``I told you about this project during the check-ins as well as in my performance review, so I'm not sure what you intend by your message.'' This is the piece that gets me. ``It almost sounds like I'm to be stuck in a corner holding up a potted plant because of Flint. One misstep in 27-plus years here, and people lose their minds.'' Well, why do you think he said that? Ms. Hedman. First of all, I ---- Mr. Cummings. It sounds like he feels like he's being retaliated against. Ms. Hedman. First of all, I had never heard of that email until this morning, and I am appalled that anything might have been done to make him feel that way. Mr. Cummings. Yeah. Well, I am kind of glad you quit. I am glad you resigned. Let me tell you why, and I have told the chairman this. There is something going on in that Region 5 that we need to deal with. And I do not know exactly what it is, but there are problems. And I am determined to make sure that we do that. You know, Mr. Earley, I got to tell you, I almost vomited when I heard you say something a moment ago. You said that even after you found out that newly manufactured parts were starting to rust out by using the Flint water, that you did not see that as a problem. I mean, wait a minute now. I am confused. If they are going to rust out, newly manufactured parts, you mean that does not send you a warning that maybe human beings might be being harmed? Come on now. Mr. Earley. Well, again, I was relying on the information that I was getting from the MDEQ and from the staff. I mean -- -- Mr. Cummings. But if somebody ---- Mr. Earley.--I am not a water treatment expert. Mr. Cummings. You do not have to be a water treatment expert. A five-year-old could figure that out. But anyway, let me go on to Mr. Walling. As you know, Governor Snyder has agreed to testify, Mr. Walling, before us on Thursday, and I am looking forward to that. And I really do thank the chairman for having him. It is clear that the governor had a very important role to play in the Flint water crisis. The governor appointed emergency managers who ran Flint during the crisis, and the governor made the belated decision to help pay for Flint to reconnect to the Detroit Water System in October of last year. Mayor Walling, I want to get your perspective on how the governor handled the Flint water crisis because I want to make sure we address everybody who may have been responsible for this fiasco. Mayor Walling, when did you first start having serious concerns about the safety of the water coming from the Flint River? Mr. Walling. I had growing concerns as the complaints were coming in from the citizens. Mr. Cummings. Give me a date. Give me a date. Mr. Walling. Throughout the summer of 2014. Mr. Cummings. All right. And when did you first reach out to the governor for help? Mr. Walling. I reached out to the governor in January of 2015. Mr. Cummings. All right. And in your January 18th letter you wrote, and I quote, ``I am writing to convey serious concerns about water quality and to request your support for my proposed Flint water improvement plan.'' Mayor, why did you write the letter to the governor, and what were you hoping to achieve? Mr. Walling. I was not seeing enough being done by the emergency managers in Flint to address this problem. I believe this needed to go directly to the governor. I, of course, did not know what his staff were telling him or not. But he needed to hear directly from me as the mayor of the city what needed to be done to protect and serve the citizens. Mr. Cummings. And so, let me read an internal email from one of the governor's senior staff commenting on your request. He wrote, and I quote, ``Mayor Walling is seeking to drag the governor into the conflict with both hands.'' Mayor Walling, what is your response to that, and why do you think the governor's folks wrote that? Mr. Walling. I have read similar emails and what has been disclosed, and I was highly disappointed that the chief elected official for the State of Michigan would view my concerns as the chief elected official for the City of Flint in that kind of manner, and that staff around him would be giving him that counsel. Here is a community that is already under a financial manager that is now dealing with a TTHM crisis and other issues that are unresolved. And I come to the governor with a professional letter, comprehensive, and asking for him to respond to help invest, to come to the City of Flint and meet with residents, which it took him a year to do. Mr. Cummings. I got it. I got it. I get the gist of it. I do not have but so much time. You sent another letter to Governor Snyder about 8 months later on September 14th, 2015. Is that correct? Mr. Walling. Yes. Mr. Cummings. You wrote, and I quote, ``The community has heightened concern about lead leeching into the water from old surface lines and home plumbing, and also needs to be addressed.'' So 8 months after your first letter, you were still asking for help to improve the safety of the water in your community, and still nothing was happening. Mayor Walling, how did you feel when you found out that the State was not treating the Flint River water with corrosion control agents for nearly a year and a half? How did you feel? Mr. Walling. I was just stunned because it had been said to me, I know to other staff, to our community in public forums that it was meeting the standards, that it was comparable with Detroit, that it was safe. We had heard that time and time and time again. And this was from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality that we looked to for that guidance. Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, I just need one more minute. Let me read you another email that Governor Snyder's chief of staff, Dennis Muchmore. And by the way, do you know Dennis Muchmore? Mr. Walling. I do. Mr. Cummings. He will not talk to us, okay? He was the chief of staff, but he refused to talk to us. So Mr. Muchmore sent to the governor September 2015, he wrote, and I quote, listen to this one. ``Frankly I think we both know that Walling went out on a CYA effort.'' You know that means, right? Mr. Walling. Yes, I do. Mr. Cummings. Yeah, cover it, ``due to the election. But, of course, can't say so.'' What is your reaction to that email? Mr. Walling. Well, it is sickening because this is when we are getting the research results from Dr. Edwards, and we are looking for ways to respond despite getting resistance. And to suggest that that was a political motive on my part when I am doing everything I can despite the budgets that we are required to follow, the contracts that are in place. We are looking for answers. We are looking for help. And it appears that the governor's office did that a cross the board with our local elected officials, that we were all discounted for some reason. Mr. Cummings. All right. I got to quit now, but I got to tell you, as I am sitting here listening to all of this, it is sickening, all of it. I mean, there is no reason in 2016 that people should be, when they turn on their faucet should be getting poisoned water. And you know what? And somebody said it a little earlier. This is like the pointing of the finger. You did it. You did it. You did it. You know, we are so much better than this, and we have to be. This cannot be the norm. And I do not know why that is, but I am telling you I think there are a lot of failures, and I hope that we get to the bottom of it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. I will now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hice, for 5 minutes. Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Edwards, let me begin with you. Last month when you were here, I asked you some very pointed questions about the EPA's responsibility. And, quite frankly, I am shocked, stunned by the audacity of Ms. Hedman's testimony today. Let us begin, if we can, with a brief clip from the hearing last month. [Video shown.] Mr. Hice. All right. Those were powerful words. After seeing this clip, do you still stand by those statements? Mr. Edwards. Yes, I do, and I will point out that silence on the part of the EPA is interpreted as acquiescence. Mr. Hice. All right. Well, let us go further then because there has been more information brought to the table today. Is there anything you would like to add to your statement that we just watched based on testimonies we have heard today? Mr. Edwards. Just that Mr. del Toral's ``misstep,'' as quoted in his email, was his proudest moment and one of EPA's proudest moments, too. Mr. Hice. A few moments ago, Ms. Hedman stated that she responded immediately, and I noticed while she was saying that that you were shaking your head. In fact, when given the opportunity, you responded authoritatively that she did nothing. You said it a couple of times, ``she did nothing.'' First of all, do you believe that Ms. Hedman has provided some false testimony today when you are saying one thing and she is saying another? Mr. Edwards. The bottom line is she did nothing immediately to get Flint's children out of harm's way. And she has that obligation. She is the top policeman in the region. And by remaining silent about what was happening, she was acquiescent. She was allowing Mr. Walling to believe that Mr. del Toral was a rogue employee that did not speak for the Agency. Mr. Walling was quoted in the paper on that. At no point did Ms. Hedman tell Mr. Walling that Mr. del Toral had done his job and that memo was accurate. Mr. Hice. So it very questionable to you when she says that she acted immediately whether or not that really took place. The ranking member, Mr. Cummings, a few moments ago stated that, in essence, he smells a rat in Region 5. Was the situation at Flint the first time that you heard of problems in the way that Region 5 was being handled under the leadership of Ms. Hedman? Mr. Edwards. The first time I heard of problems was when Mr. del Toral was thinking about how to reveal the problem. Mr. del Toral was afraid that he would be retaliated against, but he nonetheless had the moral obligation to protect Flint's children. And so, in that type of environment, what is an employee to do? He took the best course of action that he could to get this memo out both in EPA and into the hands of Ms. Walters and myself. A press story was written about this memo, and even then Ms. Hedman covered this up. Mr. Hice. So you firmly believe there was a cover up. Mr. Edwards. Nothing was done to protect Flint's children. Mr. Hice. Okay. Let me ask you ---- Mr. Edwards. Until we got involved, until we started sampling, and I invested $200,000, and this team of volunteers from Virginia Tech donated four-person years of effort, they never would have installed corrosion control. Mr. Hice. So it would still be taking place had you not -- -- Mr. Edwards. I believe so. I believe there is no record that MDEQ would have been forced to meet Federal law in Flint. Mr. Hice. Okay. Well, Mr. Chairman, I see my time has expired. Thank you. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. I will now recognize the gentlewoman from Illinois, Ms. Kelly, for 5 minutes. Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member for working together to bring those responsible for this crisis here. And I want to thank Mr. Edwards for coming back before this committee again. The crisis in Flint is an inexcusable failure at various levels of government, but we also have an obligation to learn how we can prevent further tragedy. Flint's water crisis is causing local municipalities and cities to take a closer look at their own water supply. Every day I hear from constituents who want to know if their town's water is safe. I have pregnant mothers that have called me from Fort Heights, and fathers in Pembroke Township who want to know that their local governments are not mismanaging their water supply given the grave public health and safety dangers that can arise. Mr. Edwards, what would you recommend to municipalities using lead pipes or pipes with lead soldering that are now concerned about their own water supply? Mr. Edwards. Well, I actually applaud an action EPA took 2 weeks ago to finally close some of the loopholes in sampling that allow lead in water to be low when you collect samples and high when people drink the water. These practices are occurring all over the country, and we have been complaining about them, shouting about them for 10 years. And it took something like Flint before EPA Office of Drinking Water and Groundwater released a memo that will better meet the intent of the Lead and Copper Rule. Ms. Kelly. Anything else you would recommend along those line? Mr. Edwards. All I have ever wanted was the original intent of the Lead and Copper Rule to be met. Ms. Kelly. Okay. And what about State governments? What more can they do? Mr. Edwards. Well, you know, the State governments have been operating in this climate that EPA created in which cheating was condoned. And MDEQ exploited every one of those loopholes to hide the high lead in Flint's water, even to the point where they would not have had to install corrosion control. That is a fact. It is absolutely clear in the record they were passing the Lead and Copper Rule using these loopholes, and they were using that as an excuse to not install corrosion control. And, in fact, there is an email where Mr. del Toral asked MDEQ to stop pre-flushing, pre-cleaning the pipes the night before sampling. This is something we have been screaming about to stop because it caused lead poisoning of children in D.C. in 2006 to 2008. And MDEQ said, well, it is not the law yet, and we are not going to do that until EPA makes it the law. And so, that was very clear in the emails that they were going to use every single loophole, every trick that EPA allowed to hide this lead in water problem. Ms. Kelly. Then finally, what we can do as a Congress or as a committee to ensure that governments at levels are doing all they can to perform basic functioning and providing every American with safe drinking water? Mr. Edwards. Well, I think the most important thing is to create a climate in which the thousands and thousands of great employees at EPA all across the country and at MDEQs all across the country can do their job, where employees like Mr. del Toral are allowed to their job without fear of being retaliated against either directly or indirectly. Ms. Kelly. Okay, thank you. Ms. Hedman, you were the Region 5 administrator for the EPA, and prior to that worked as an environmental attorney in the Office of the Illinois Attorney General. Do you agree with Mr. Edwards' assessments? Ms. Hedman. I agree generally that there are improvements to be made in sampling protocols and in the Lead and Copper Rule. And although I am no longer at EPA, I am very pleased to see that EPA is moving in that direction. Ms. Kelly. Okay. One thing I would like to see that we continue to have hearings. Like we do not have these hearings and just stop. It may be 6 months from now or a year from now that we check back on Flint so the people of Flint still know that we are concerned. Of course they know they have Representative Lawrence and Kildee and my colleagues on the other side from Michigan. But I want you to know that we are all concerned. And with that, I yield the remainder of my time to Ranking Member Cummings. Mr. Cummings. I want to just say to the gentlelady that I agree with you that we have to continuously follow up on this situation because the thing that I do not want, every time I think about Flint, I think about Katrina, to be frank with you. And so, after all the cameras are gone and the attention moves away, the question is where are the people left? Where are these children left? And I know we talk a lot about children, but I am also concerned about the adults because they, too, are drinking this water. So I am sure the chairman will work with us. I am looking forward that just so that we can stay on top of it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chaffetz. Absolutely. I concur, and I appreciate the gentlewoman's questions, and she has my commitment that we will continue to follow up. I will now recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Grothman, for 5 minutes. Mr. Grothman. Sure. I just have a few questions for Ms. Hedman. Sometimes it is good to flush out your background, and I see you graduated from the University of Wisconsin Law School with me, so congratulations. I want to find out a little bit how you got the job. You know, you used to work for Ferlice and Madigan down there in Illinois, and you switched over to this job. Can I ask why you applied for the job? Who let you know the job was available, that sort of thing? Ms. Hedman. I did not apply for the job. In fact, I actually wrote a number of recommendations for other people to take the job. And when I was first approached, my answer was no. I, however, was persuaded to take the job. I will tell you that one of the reasons I was hesitant is I recognized the huge, huge problems that EPA has to deal with in a period of declining budgets, particularly infrastructure budgets. And it seemed a huge task to take on, but I did. Mr. Grothman. Okay. Who approached you about the job? You said you did not want the job, but people approached and kind of begged you to take it. Ms. Hedman. I received a call from the EPA administrator. Mr. Grothman. Secretary Jackson? Ms. Hedman. Yes. Mr. Grothman. Okay. Ms. Hedman. Administrator Jackson. Mr. Grothman. Okay. Mr. Edwards, are you kind of familiar with Ms. Hedman's background? Chairman Chaffetz. Sorry. Mr. Edwards, we can come back to you. He has his own personal water issue in a moment, so he will be right back. [Laughter.] Mr. Grothman. Okay. Chairman Chaffetz. We will come back to you if you would like. Oh, there he comes. Here he comes. Sorry. He is back. We will not dock you the time. Go ahead, Mr. Grothman. Mr. Grothman. Well, I will do one more question. Why specifically or what was your background that caused Secretary Jackson to feel you would be qualified for this job? Ms. Hedman. I understand I had been recommended by a number of people to her. I have, as you pointed out, a law degree. I also have a Ph.D. in environmental studies, and I have spent my entire life essentially working to protect public health and the environment often representing citizen groups, like the good people of Flint. Mr. Grothman. Okay. Mr. Edwards, we just asked a question of Ms. Hedman. Are you familiar with her background, or could you comment in general about what you feel are her qualifications for running District 5? Mr. Edwards. No, I do not know anything about her background. Mr. Grothman. So in other words, okay, back to Ms. Hedman. So you were hired for EPA at the suggestion of Ms. Jackson. Other people may have recommended you. Could you give me examples of people that you said brought it up that would cause you to be a good person at District 5? You said other people had recommended you. Do you know who those people were? Ms. Hedman. I believe that some people in environmental groups actually recommended me for the job. Mr. Grothman. Okay. I will yield. Would you like me to yield my remaining time to you? Chairman Chaffetz. We will come back next I think. Mr. Grothman. Okay. I will yield the remainder of my time. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. I will now recognize the gentlewoman from Michigan, Ms. Lawrence, for 5 minutes. Ms. Lawrence. I want to thank the ranking member and the chairman for calling this hearing. You know, I am a child of Michigan, and have dedicated 25 years of my life to public service. And this issue has created anxiety, sadness, frustration, and right now I have knots in my stomach because as my colleagues have said, we are pointing the fingers at each other where this is a point where each of you should stand up and accept responsibility. I want to ask a few questions. Mr. Edwards, because we need to fix this problem. And I share with you your frustration and your passion about EPA, and we collectively, because everyone is, you know, talking about is this a partisan issue. We work together. First of all, we are here today because we work together. The Republican chair and the ranking member Democrat agree that this is something that is worthy of a hearing. And EPA should have, as we have now passed a law that does not give them an option. It was a loophole, and you agreed to that. Let us talk about the primacy issue. So the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality has primacy, and that means that they have the responsibility for the public water system. And something that was interesting to me, they did not provide the corrosion control. Why not? Mr. Edwards. For the life of me, I cannot figure this out. This is such a specialized skill. That's why we have a law that says thou shalt have corrosion control. We have people at the State, at the primary agency to make sure that law is followed. So for the life of me, I do not understand why it was not followed because every dollar you spend on corrosion control not only protects from lead, it saves $10 at minimum in terms of damage to your pipe infrastructure. And in Flint's case it would have saved $10,000 for dollar invested. Ms. Lawrence. Mr. Earley, you are an appointee of the State. The Michigan Environmental Department is a State. Can you tell me why, have you been advised or told why the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality did not provide erosion control? Was it financial? Was it, oops, we forgot, because there was clear documentation that EPA, although they did not tell the public, made them aware. You in your capacity as an appointee of the State, has anyone made you aware of why they did not provide the corrosion? Mr. Earley. No, that has not been brought to my attention. The issue of the corrosion control and all of that came pretty much after I was there. As I tried to say earlier, the issues we were dealing with were related to the TTHM and the other contaminants. Ms. Lawrence. And that is a good point because clearly water that we drink out of our faucets do not have that in there, so there should have been some chemical added to the water. It sounds as if they went to the Flint River and just turned on the faucet. So why did not they provide at minimum bacteria control? Mr. Earley. I cannot answer the reason why they did not. Ms. Lawrence. Did anyone while you were there ask that question? Why did they not treat the water in Flint? Mr. Earley. The questions we were asking during my tenure was how to deal with the contaminants that we knew were in the water, the TTHM, the E. coli, and the coliform. Ms. Lawrence. And at no time did anyone ask why in the City of Flint you would turn water on, make it go through the faucets for human beings to drink, and they are experts. You have a water treatment system, and no one treated the water. Mr. Earley. Well, the water was treated, but the corrosion controls were not there, and they were not part of the discussion. Ms. Lawrence. Sir, at first we had bacteria in the water. You do not have bacteria in water that is treated. So when we are talking about the corrosion control, that is for the lead. But under your leadership, it was contaminated water. Mr. Earley. Yes. Ms. Lawrence. And no one asked the question. So how do we know how to fix it if no one ever asked why would we in America in 2016 with you being in charge, and you signed the contract, regardless of who initiated it, and people in Flint, including yourself, knew that the water that was drinking had bacteria in it, which is unacceptable. At no time did we ask why did this happen. Mr. Earley. Of course we asked why did it happen as it related to ---- Ms. Lawrence. And what was the answer? Mr. Earley. As it related to the issues that we were treating, we were told the protocols in which to treat the contaminants that we were working with, the TTHM and the E. coli, and the coliform treatments. The issue of lead treatment and lead corrosion ---- Ms. Lawrence. I am not talking about lead. Let us talk about when you were there. Mr. Earley. Okay. Well, when I was there, we treated for the contaminants that were in the water. We followed the DEQ protocols for boiling water advisories on two separate occasions. When we still had problems with the water and we still were not ---- Ms. Lawrence. In America we do not normally boil water. We turn on the faucet and drink it, and trust the government to provide us with water that is safe. If I was responsible for the public trust, that would have been my number one answer to make sure we did not have to keep boiling the water. Why did it happen? Mr. Earley. Well, when it happened the second time, I sought the ---- Ms. Lawrence. The second time? Mr. Earley. Yes, because we were told after we did the things that we had done before, we were given all clears for the water, and that the treatment, the precautionary measures had worked. Ms. Lawrence. I served as the mayor of a local community, and this is my core problem with emergency managers. At any time did you hold a public meeting with the citizens to find out what their concerns were? Did you hold public input meetings? Mr. Earley. There were meetings held after the issue of the contamination when I left in January. There were meetings held after that. Ms. Lawrence. But while you were there, you did not engage the public. Mr. Earley. We did not have meetings ---- Ms. Lawrence. You did not engage the public. Mr. Earley. The water staff did engage the public as complaints came in and were a part of trying to find solutions for the problems that we were dealing with. Ms. Lawrence. This is a fundamental problem with emergency management philosophy is that you report only to a bottom line and to the governor, and that the voice of the people are eliminated in this process. Mr. Chair, I know I am over, but may I ask one more question? I want to ask this question when it comes to primacy. See, I am infuriated that someone made the deliberate decision not to treat this water when the primacy or the responsibility of drinking water rests with the State. Yes, we should hold EPA accountable. We have passed a law now from all sides, both sides agreeing that this shall not, EPA must notify the public and stop the water. But before that, how do we get our arms around as a congressional body that no State will take the arrogance and the destructive criminal, I feel, criminal activity to poison people? How do we get there? Mr. Edwards. I would like to know that question myself, how this decision was made to not follow the law. I mean, did they forget? Were they trying to save money? I really have no idea. Ms. Lawrence. Mr. Earley, he said he was sitting there in charge as emergency manager. You do not know the answer. Mayor Walling, can you give me an answer? Mr. Walling. I do not have an answer because the initial treatment design did not include the carbon filter that later had to be added. That actually meant there was additional chlorine and the TTHM problem. So there was no corrosion control. There was no carbon filter. All of these warning signs that were going off, they all go back to the original treatment design that the MDEQ and the emergency manager put in place and budgeted for in June of 2013. And we are still waiting on answers as to how those decisions actually got made, what the considerations were. I do not know. Ms. Lawrence. I yield back my time. This is where we need to go because we cannot have this happen again. Thank you. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentlewoman. I now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Palmer, for 5 minutes. Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Edwards, in an email recently released to the public dated September 11th, 2015, EPA's Michigan program director states the following: ``Just to clarify, on our call I wanted to remind you that Miguel's report had the DEQ cc'd. So if the legislature or whoever might say you were all cc'd, you can truthfully respond that it was the EPA's request that the report not be sent to the cc's. Consequently, you all never received the report from Miguel. Good to talk with you all.'' The program director was referring to Miguel del Toral's memo that had recently been made public and is addressed to a number of employees with EPA.gov and Michigan.gov domain names. It appears to function to instruct such employees on a way to circumvent public and legislative accountability. It also portrays government collaboration to manage and a spin a situation. When you see an email like this, Mr. Edwards, what does it tell you about the government prioritizing obfuscation over protecting the public interest? Mr. Edwards. Well, it is very clear that MDEQ and EPA were working hand-in-hand to cover this problem up as reflected by that email with Jennifer Crooks. And this revisionist history where EPA was fighting MDEQ every step of the way is just ludicrous. Mr. Palmer. What does this email tell you about the EPA's continued disregard for Mr. del Toral's warnings? Mr. Edwards. I just do not know how you could have disregarded those warnings as they did. They just sat there silent. Mr. Palmer. Well, there has got to be a reason for why they did not want his warnings to get out there, why they wanted to apparently give cover. Mr. Edwards. They provided all kinds of cover for MDEQ at every step of the way. Every step of the way EPA was there covering up for MDEQ. Mr. Palmer. Do you believe it provides cover, that a memo like that was intended to provide cover? Mr. Edwards. Well, MDEQ actually took her advice in the letter responding to Kildee. They basically cited that excuse verbatim. Mr. Palmer. Do you believe this email shows at a minimum callous disregard for public safety? Mr. Edwards. Amongst a few EPA employees. The vast majority of EPA employees at Region 5 come to work every day and do their best to do their job under difficult circumstances. Mr. Palmer. I thank you for that clarification because I agree with you that most, and I believe this is true across the board with Federal employees. They come to work every day to do the best job they can, but it is that handful who do not that create problems like this, and that cause incredible suffering for the public. Ms. Hedman, or I should, I guess, refer to you as ``Dr. Hedman.'' Following up on the questions posed earlier regarding outstanding FOIA requests, the email I read to Dr. Edwards shows the EPA Michigan program director, your former colleague, emailing other EPA and Michigan employees to their official accounts to provide them cover from the legislature or whoever who might theoretically ask about their exposure to Mr. del Toral's memo. It is worth noting that the program director sent this from her personal Gmail account to their official email. EPA has a history of using such methods to circumvent transparency. For instance, Gina McCarthy has been called before this committee or, I believe, it was the Science Committee, for example, because of using her personal email for government business. This is email that I read today appears to me to be evidence of a deliberate intention to mislead going back to the fact that most employees try to do the best they can and that a handful do not. I think that this indicates that there is a culture of secrecy and a lack of a transparency that starts at the top. How would you respond to that? Ms. Hedman. I would respond by saying that EPA has a policy of not using personal email, and if there is an instance where it is necessary for technical reasons to copy one's government account. Mr. Palmer. Well, you know, she did that 6 weeks later. I have a copy of the law here, Title 44, regarding Federal records that requires that indicates, Mr. Chairman, that she did not copy this in a timely manner. You know, this is not about finger pointing, and that is what troubles me about this hearing. It is not about politics. It is about these people who have suffered injury because of the failure of government. And I just want to say this. I believe every member of this committee has a responsibility to get to the truth, to make sure that government fulfills its responsibility to serve the public and, in this case, to protect the public. We want the truth. I have gotten to know a lot of members on this committee, and I can assure you we can handle the truth, the whole truth. Mr. Chairman, I am just not at all confident that we have heard the whole truth today. I yield back. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. I will now recognize the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Ms. Watson Coleman, for 5 minutes. Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to you and our ranking member for holding this hearing. This is indeed a sad day and a little bit confusing how we get to the bottom of something when everyone is pointing their finger in another direction with the exception of Mayor Walling and Mr. Edwards. Mr. Edwards, I want to ask you a question that has nothing to do with Flint. My State, the State of New Jersey, is experiencing a knowledge of high lead content, particularly in 11 cities, but right now concentrating on one city. Do you know whether or not EPA is at all monitoring or getting involved in that situation at this early stage so that we will not have a Flint, Michigan situation? Mr. Edwards. My suspicion is that they are probably not, although they did send that memo. And, again, I applaud this that they sent the memo out that basically said thou shalt stop cheating on the Lead and Copper Rule monitoring. It took too long to get to that point, but that memo has gone out. It is not going to help you in the short term because it is going to take 6 months before those rules are changed. Ms. Watson Coleman. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Cummings, I believe that this issue is broader than what we are experiencing in this very sad situation. And I very much would look forward to having an Oversight Committee hearing on EPA's role in this whole issue across the United States, because I think it will be very revealing and very scary what is happening in our older, poorer communities. And so, I make that request for your consideration. Ms. Hedman, where is Mr. del Toral? Ms. Hedman. Where is he ---- Ms. Watson Coleman. Where is he? Ms. Hedman. Physically right now? Ms. Watson Coleman. Working? Where is he working? Where is he located? Where is he working? Ms. Hedman. Well, he works out of the Region 5 office. I know that recently he has spent a great deal of time in Flint, so he may very well be there working right now. Ms. Watson Coleman. So let me ask you this question. For 50 years, Flint, Michigan was receiving its water from the Detroit system. Is that correct? Ms. Hedman. [Nonverbal response.] Ms. Watson Coleman. So for that 50 years, the water treatment system in Flint was dormant? Is that fair? Ms. Hedman. [Nonverbal response.] Ms. Watson Coleman. Okay. Was there any requirement that before you reactivate a dormant system that you do certain precautionary testing and preparation? Ms. Hedman. I know that there are requirements, but I cannot speak to the specifics. Ms. Watson Coleman. Are there any EPA requirements? Ms. Hedman. Again, I cannot speak to the specifics of that. Ms. Watson Coleman. Mr. Edwards, can you answer that question? Mr. Edwards. The law requires that when you switch to a new water source that you do corrosion control studies in advance of the switch to make sure that you have effective corrosion control in place. And in the absence of doing a study, the simplest thing, the minimum that would have been allowed under the law would have been to continue the corrosion control that was used in Detroit water, which would have been dosing of orthophosphates. So had they done the minimum under the law, adding that orthophosphate to the Flint River water, which had been done for 50 years under Detroit, the vast majority of these problems, including the leaking pipes, the Legionella, the lead, would not have occurred. Ms. Watson Coleman. So tell me, give the timeframe because I am confused somewhat about the timeframe when this should have happened. Should that have happened in April of 2014? Mr. Edwards. This should have been done months before the switch. Ms. Watson Coleman. The switch was April of 2014? Mr. Edwards. Yes. Ms. Watson Coleman. And who was the emergency manager during that period of time? Mr. Edwards. I do not know at all. Ms. Watson Coleman. Do you know, Mr. Earley? Mr. Earley. Yes. In April of 2014, I was the emergency manager. Ms. Watson Coleman. So then why did you not as the emergency manager ensure that before this switch was going to take place that all of the safety and security measures were in place? Mr. Earley. I did, and I was assured that all that were required had taken place. We had been monitoring this switch. Again, as I said, the project started before I got there, and once I got there, we continued to monitor, and I received updates from ---- Ms. Watson Coleman. Well, Mr. Earley, who told you? Who assured you that these safety and security measures were in place before actually turning on the switch? Mr. Earley. The director of the Department of Public Works, which is also the director of the Flint Water Treatment Supply or Water Treatment Department. It was his responsibility to make sure that all of those things were in place, and he had staff working with him. And they in turn worked directly with MDEQ and the EPA to make sure we were meeting all of the requirements. Those were the requirements for being licensed. Ms. Watson Coleman. So now we have introduced another level, the local sanitation department or water department manager? Mr. Earley. The treatment people at the water plant. Ms. Watson Coleman. The treatment people? Mr. Earley. Yes. Ms. Watson Coleman. So now it is was his responsibility to ensure that these measures were in place, and he is the one that informed you that these measures were in place. He misrepresented? Mr. Earley. That we were meeting the requirements ---- Ms. Watson Coleman. Did he misrepresent? Did he tell you the truth? Mr. Earley. Well, we all know now that the information that we all got was somewhat misinformed based on ---- Ms. Watson Coleman. Where did the lie start? Mr. Earley. Well, the information that we got was from MDEQ which governed our switch from the Detroit Water and Sewer Department to the Flint River. We relied on the information we received from the State regulatory agencies. Ms. Watson Coleman. I cannot believe my 5 minutes is up so quickly ---- [Laughter.] Ms. Watson Coleman.--because God knows we have not gotten to the bottom of this yet. But thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. This is incredibly upsetting. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentlewoman. I will now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Carter, for 5 minutes. Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Hedman, I am correct when I say that EPA has the authority to intervene when there is contamination in drinking water that poses a threat to humans. Is that correct? Yes. Ms. Hedman. When there is a threat and the State has failed to ---- Mr. Carter. When there is a threat to human, EPA has the authority to intervene, correct. Ms. Hedman. And the State has failed to take action. Mr. Carter. Come on, Ms. Hedman. EPA has responsibility to the citizens. You have to intervene not when the State does not do it. When you see that it happens, you have to do it then. No, no. I will ask the questions, okay? You are aware of the memo that came in June of 2015 from Miguel del Toral, right? You are aware of that memo. In June of 2015, Mr. del Toral's title was regulations manager, Groundwater and Drinking Water Branch. He is a Drinking Water specialist. Ms. Hedman. Yes. Mr. Carter. In fact, I believe that he was one of the key members of your Safe Drinking Water team. Ms. Hedman. Yes. Mr. Carter. In fact, I believe that you have said he is one of the top experts in his field. Ms. Hedman. He is. Mr. Carter. He is. Yet when Mr. del Toral reported the high levels of lead in Flint's drinking water, not only did you silence him, but you sat around idly and did nothing. Why would you do that? Ms. Hedman. I did not do that. Mr. Carter. If he is an expert as you have acknowledged, why did you not listen to him? Ms. Hedman. I did, and I did not sit silently. I did not -- -- Mr. Carter. I beg to differ, Ms. Hedman. Instead of heeding the warning of one of your top experts, one of your top experts. Listen, all of us here, we depend on people. We depend on staff, but if we do not listen to them, they do us no good whatsoever. You surround yourself with good people, as you did. You surrounded yourself with a specialist. You got to listen to him, but you did not do that. Ms. Hedman. I did. Mr. Carter. Not only did you not listen to him, you tried to silence him. Ms. Hedman. I did not. Mr. Carter. You know, so what did you do? You sought a legal opinion. Is that correct? Ms. Hedman. Well, immediately ---- Mr. Carter. Immediately. Ms. Hedman. Immediately in June, I offered technical assistance to the Flint mayor. That was July 1st. On July 10th, we issued our first statement urging Flint residents to get their water tested, and to take precautions to limit ---- Mr. Carter. Here you have an expert who is telling you we have got a problem. We have got lead in our drinking water. Instead of protecting the citizens, that is what EPA is about, environmental protection. EPA, Environmental Protection Agency. Ms. Hedman. Yes. Mr. Carter. Protecting the public, and instead of saying we have got an expert here, one of my team members who is an expert in this field is telling us we have got lead in this water, stop drinking it. Stop drinking it right now. But you did not do that. You sought a legal opinion ---- Ms. Hedman. No. Mr. Carter.--because you were wanting to follow the law? Ms. Hedman. No. Let us be clear. The data reported in Mr. del Toral's memo was data related to one residence, first of all. My first question about that was had the lead surface line been removed. It was, and the follow-up testing showed that the water was safe to drink. And then two neighboring houses, one of which did show high lead levels and one which did not. That data by itself indicated something about the tap water in those three residences, and ultimately Mr. del Toral's final version of the memo concluded that the residents with very high lead levels had high lead levels not due to lack of corrosion control, but because of physical disturbance of the lead surface line. Mr. Carter. Because a physical disturbance of the lead surface line. Ms. Hedman. Construction in the street. Mr. Carter. Construction in the street. You know, I ---- Ms. Hedman. And so, the point being his memo also made the point that corrosion control had not been implemented in Flint. That was a point that previously other ---- Mr. Carter. Dr. Hedman, I am sorry. Dr. Edwards, what do you make of this? Mr. Edwards. I am kind of wondering if she has read the memo to this day because there are three reports that the city had collected high lead in drinking from LeAnne's house, 100, 300, 700 parts per billion before there was any disturbance. And moreover, her statement that she warned Flint residents to start flushing the water, no Flint residents got a warning that the water was unsafe to drink. What they got is Mr. Walling going on TV and saying that the water is safe to drink. That is what the message that was sent. No Flint resident got any warning about dangerous levels of lead in drinking water, the fact that corrosion control laws were not being followed in Flint. No one knew that. Mr. Carter. You know, let me tell you. Ms. Hedman, I am sorry, there is a special place in hell for actions like this. Madam Chair, I yield. [Applause.] Chairman Chaffetz. The gentleman yields back. I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Lieu, for 5 minutes. Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to start with the national issues and then come down to Flint. We know that in addition to Flint, we have had lead-tainted water in Washington, D.C., in Sebring, Ohio, and now in Newark, New Jersey, where schoolchildren have been poisoned. Ms. Hedman, this really is a national issue as well, is it not? Ms. Hedman. Given that I am no longer at the Agency, I do not want to speak for EPA. But indeed lead is an issue of concern throughout the country. Mr. Lieu. I have two articles here. One is a report from the NRDC that says, ``Study Finds Safe Drinking Water in U.S. Cities At Risk: NRDC Reports On Drinking Water Systems of 19 Cities and Finds That Pollution, Old Pipes, and Outdated Treatment Threaten Tap Water Quality.'' And then I have a second article in Salon. It says, ``It's Not Just A Flint Problem: Other U.S. Cities Are Suffering From Toxic Water.'' And, Mr. Chairman, if I could enter these into the record. Chairman Chaffetz. Without objection, so ordered. Mr. Lieu. Ms. Hedman, I am going to read you a couple of sentences from the Salon article. The author writes, ``The Safe Drinking Water Act, enacted in 1986, required the EPA to set standards for the concentration of lead in public pipes with a push for lead free. This stirred the country on a road towards replacing old water pipes with plastic pipes as an ecofriendly alternative. However, many poor municipalities instead turn to anti-corrosive agents as a cheaper and faster solution.'' If Flint had plastic pipes, none of us would be here today, correct? Ms. Hedman. That is true. Mr. Lieu. In fact, if Sebring, Newark, and Washington, D.C. had plastic pipes, none of that lead contamination would have happened, correct? Ms. Hedman. That is true, although if there were lead in fixtures, it would still be a concern. Mr. Lieu. I understand. Thank you. Now, let us talk about Flint. Mr. Earley, I read your testimony, and I heard it today as well. You essentially say everything was fine, and everyone told you everything was fine. And you had regular meetings with the water treatment officials. Did you know that the water treatment plant operator, Michael Glasgow, wrote an email saying, ``I have people above me making plans to distribute water ASAP. If water is distributed from this plant in the next couple of weeks, it will be against my direction.'' So it was not fine for Michael Glasgow. Were you aware of that? Ms. Hedman. I was--oh, I am sorry. Mr. Lieu. Mr. Earley, yes. Mr. Earley. I was made aware of that email when I sat before the governor's task force. It was the first time I had seen that email. So I am not sure what he is referring to when he talks about people above him because there were at least two other layers, possibly two other layers of supervision before it got to me. Mr. Lieu. So even though you regularly, as you said, regularly met with water treatment plant officials, you had no idea that the water treatment plant operator had said I am not ready to go on this. You had no idea. Mr. Earley. No, there was no discussion on that in our regular meetings. What was going on ---- Mr. Lieu. All right, stop. Stop right there. You also testified that this was not a leadership issue. This was purely a water treatment issue. I suggest that this was a leadership issue if you had no idea, even though you had regular meetings, that this water treatment plant operator was making these statements that he was not ready to go. I am curious. You know, Mr. Walling, I commend him for saying I am sorry and for apologizing. That took courage. Mr. Earley, I do not see anywhere in your testimony. Are you ready to say you are sorry? Mr. Earley. What I said and will say again is that, you know, I was responsible. It happened on my watch. Mr. Lieu. Are you sorry? Mr. Earley. I feel very badly about that, and, yes, I am sorry that the people of the City of Flint have had to go through--I said that earlier--this crisis. It tears me up inside. I am very regretful and remorseful for what has happened. Mr. Lieu. All right. Ms. Hedman, the EPA knew in April that corrosive agents were not being put in. Why did it take so long for them to let you know at the end of the June that that was not happening? Ms. Hedman. I think from the review of the emails that I have seen during that time period that the first reaction was if we simply tell MDEQ they need to do this, they will do it. Mr. Lieu. When were corrosive agents actually put in? Ms. Hedman. December 9th is when corrosion control began. Mr. Lieu. Okay. So April, May, June, July, August, September, October, November, children of Flint were drinking lead-contaminated water. Why in July or August did you not just stand up and yell and scream, stop this? Give them bottled water. Why did it take so long? To me, this is negligence bordering on deliberate indifference. You knew. EPA knew in April corrosive agents not done. In June you were notified of that, and then you were given a report that said lots of lead in this drinking water. And then nothing is done until December. There is no excuse for that. Someone needed to have yelled and screamed and said stop this. People are being poisoned. It should have been done in at least July or August, maybe September, at least by October. That was so wrong. This was a crime of epic proportions that could have been prevented. I yield back. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. I will now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Mulvaney, for 5 minutes. Mr. Mulvaney. I thank the chairman. I thank the committee. I will try and, I guess, start as simply as I know how, which is, Mr. Edwards, I think at the end of Mr. Carter's testimony, he asked a question of Ms. Hedman, and I will go ahead and ask it. He asked, did you warn Flint residents to flush their water? Ms. Hedman. On July 10th, 10 days after I first learned about this, EPA Region 5 issued the first statement advising Flint residents to get their water tested by their water utility, and referring them to EPA information on the Web about limiting exposure to lead in drinking water. Mr. Mulvaney. So is that your testimony when you said you gave them warning to flush their water? That is what you are referring to? Ms. Hedman. Right. That was the first time that we did that. Mr. Mulvaney. Okay. That was in July. Ms. Hedman. July 10th. Mr. Mulvaney. I am looking at an email that has been mentioned a couple of times, and to the extent it has not been entered into the record, Mr. Chairman, it is an email of Miguel del Toral dated September 22nd, 2015. I ask it to be added to the record. Chairman Chaffetz. Without objection, so ordered. Mr. Mulvaney. Are you familiar with this email, Ms. Hedman? Ms. Hedman. I am not sure what the email is. Mr. Mulvaney. That begins, it is to Thomas Ploy, Rita Bair, Nicholas D'Amato, Joanna Glowacki, and Andrea Porter amongst others from Miguel del Toral, September 22nd, 2015. It begins, ``This is no surprise. Lead lines plus no treatment equals high lead in water, equals lead poisoned children.'' Are you familiar with that email? Ms. Hedman. Only hearing it from you. Mr. Mulvaney. Okay. If you read down the email, and by the way I think the email is an email that you sent Mr. Edwards that was then forwarded. I will get to that in a second I hope. It says, ``Even worse, absent anything from EPA, MDEQ, and the city other than they are in full compliance, other folks have to alert the public to the risk.'' Do you get the impression from the email that Mr. del Toral thinks that the EPA warned the folks in Flint in September to flush their water? Ms. Hedman. We had been told on August 31st by MDEQ, it was MCH, the old acronym for the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, was, in fact, implementing a public information campaign. On September 15th, I held calls with both the mayor and with the director of MDEQ urging expedited implementation of corrosion control and expanded public information campaigns. And the mayor and the county did issue a health advisory with that kind of information 10 days later. Mr. Mulvaney. All right. I wish I could go into every single of those. I know Dr. Edwards is probably eager to do that. You said something earlier today, which I think took a lot of us off guard, surprised a lot of people sitting here when you did not think the EPA had done anything wrong through this entire process. And my guess is if I asked you for evidence of that, you would lay out what you have just laid out. We did this on this date, this on this date. Let me ask you this. Is that the standard to which you held yourself at the EPA just not to do anything wrong? Ms. Hedman. No. Mr. Mulvaney. What was the standard to which you held yourself when you were with EPA? Ms. Hedman. To do the best job possible. Mr. Mulvaney. Did you do the best job possible? Ms. Hedman. In retrospect knowing what I know now, I wish we had issued more frequent and more urgent statements about -- -- Mr. Mulvaney. But it is still your belief and your testimony that the EPA and you did not do anything wrong in handling the Flint situation. Ms. Hedman. As I said, I wish we had done more. I wish when MDEQ represented facts to us we had verified those facts. Mr. Mulvaney. Let me ask you about that because that is another thing you said that, again, caught me a little bit off guard. It says the EPA, yes, in answer to questions from someone--I apologize, forgetting who --is supposed to step in to protect safety, but only if there is a threat, which clearly there was, and the State has failed to act. Do you remember that testimony? Ms. Hedman. Yes. Yes. Mr. Mulvaney. Is it your testimony then the State had not failed to act? Ms. Hedman. At which point in time? Mr. Mulvaney. At any point in time. Pick one. I do not care. Mr. del Toral's email of September 22nd, had the State failed to act by that time? Ms. Hedman. By that time, the State had issued an order to Flint directing Flint to implement corrosion control, and he mayor had announced that he was going to take that action. Mr. Mulvaney. Not my question. My question is had the State failed to act? Ms. Hedman. The State had taken some actions, and let me -- -- Mr. Mulvaney. Not the standard. You said the EPA is not really supposed to get involved unless there is a threat, number one, and the State has failed to act, number two. So I am asking you as of September, had the State failed to act. Ms. Hedman. We were involved, and the legal advice that I received at that time ---- Mr. Mulvaney. You were involved, but people were still drinking lead-contaminated water. How is that possible? Ms. Hedman. There are two things that we tried every day to make happen. One is implementation of corrosion control. Mr. Mulvaney. Okay. Ms. Hedman. And two is a public information campaign to make sure that Flint residents knew what they needed to do to reduce risk until corrosion control worked. Mr. Mulvaney. I am not going to have nearly enough time to do any of this. I do want to ask Dr. Edwards one question. You said something, sir, earlier that interested me as well, which you said that in a different environment this would be criminal. What did you mean when you said that? I apologize if that is not the exact words, but you did use the words ``criminal.'' Mr. Edwards. I think in any environment it is criminal when you know children are being harmed and not being protected by Federal law, and you sit there silent. Mr. Mulvaney. And if I ---- Mr. Edwards. I would point out Virginia Tech issued the first warning to not to drink the water in August 2015. MDEQ invoked the authority of EPA in its response to the press to our warning about the dangers of Flint water to say the water was safe to drink. EPA sat there silent at a minimum as the State attacked us for saying Flint water was not safe to drink. Mr. Mulvaney. If I had done this as a terrorist to the children of Flint and I got caught, would I be in jail? Mr. Edwards. I have already said if a landlord did this, he would be in jail. Mr. Mulvaney. Or a builder, a homebuilder, which is what I used to do. If I built a house that poisoned my residents the same way the City of Flint has done it, I would be in jail, would I not? Which leads to my last question. Ms. Hedman, should the government be held to a different standard than its citizens? Ms. Hedman. Everyone should be required to follow the law. Mr. Mulvaney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. I will now recognize the gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands, Ms. Plaskett, for 5 minutes. Ms. Plaskett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member. Witnesses, thank you for being here this morning. Mr. Earley, on February 2nd, the governor of Michigan, Rick Snyder, issued a State informing the public of your resignation that was going to be effective on February 29th. Have you seen that press release? Mr. Earley. Yes. Ms. Plaskett. Okay. And in it, it states, and I am going to quote here, ``Governor Snyder and I agreed that our goal was for me to be the last emergency manager appointed to DPS. I have completed the comprehensive restructuring necessary to downsizing the central office.'' That is your quote, correct? Mr. Earley. That is. Ms. Plaskett. And do you remember giving the quote to the governor for the press release for that? Mr. Earley. Excuse me? Ms. Plaskett. Do you remember giving the governor that quote for his press release? Mr. Earley. Yes, I remember. Not directly to him, but I discussed it with his communications people, yes. Ms. Plaskett. Okay. And that press release and your resignation came a day before, less than 24 hours before this committee was having a hearing on Flint, Michigan on February 3rd. Chairman Chaffetz and Ranking Member Cummings sent a letter in January for you to testify at that time, but you refused to come. When you were giving the quote to the governor's office for the press release the day before the hearing took place, did you have a conversation with the governor or with those individuals in his office about testifying before this committee? Mr. Earley. No, my conversations regarding the letter that you refer to took place before that. They were only drafted on the first of February because we had pretty much done all in Detroit Public Schools as an emergency manager that I would be able to do. Ms. Plaskett. So you discussed with him around February 1st your resignation on February 2nd and what the quote was going to be. But you knew that you had a pending request to testify before this committee at that time. Is that not correct? Mr. Earley. The exact ---- Ms. Plaskett. Did you know that you had to testify, that there was a request for you to testify on February 3rd when you were having discussions with the governor and his staff about your resignation on February 1st or 2nd? Mr. Earley. We had that discussion prior to the 2nd. Ms. Plaskett. You just said the 1st. Mr. Earley. Well, the 1st. The press release came out after the ---- Ms. Plaskett. The press release came out on February 2nd, less than 24 hours before this hearing. In your discussions with the governor about that press release, did you discuss with him your request, the request for you to testify before this committee? Mr. Earley. It had nothing to do with the ---- Ms. Plaskett. It is a yes or a no. Yes or no, did you discuss it with him? Mr. Earley. Yes. Ms. Plaskett. You did discuss testifying before this committee? Mr. Earley. I did discuss that I had received the invitation, yes. Ms. Plaskett. And what was said during that discussion? Mr. Earley. That I had received an invitation. Ms. Plaskett. And the governor, did he direct you to comply with that? Mr. Earley. No. Ms. Plaskett. And you did not at that time, so clearly you had a discussion with the governor, a governor who has said he wants transparent and accountability for the individuals that are working, and you worked for the pleasure of the governor. He did not direct you to testify when the request had been by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform about this. So on February 2nd when Chairman Chaffetz's staff informed your lawyer that the chairman was considering issuing a subpoena to compel you to testify before the committee on that day, did you discuss that with the governor? Mr. Earley. No, I had that discussion with the attorney because I had to seek out some advice as to respond to the initial invite because I did not have time to prepare for a hearing. I was more than willing and certainly wanted to come forward and discuss the facts of this. That had nothing to do with my appointment at Detroit Public Schools. Ms. Plaskett. But your appointment was made by this same governor, and you have within you to discuss it with him, and you are serving at his direction. And even though that discussion has taken place, your attorney that you said you sought out about the subpoena, you told the attorney and asked him to refuse to accept the service of the chairman's subpoena because you said you did not have time to coordinate your testimony, but you had time to coordinate on October 26th your op-ed in which you said do not blame the emergency manager for the Flint water disaster, and outlined reasons why that was your position at that time. Mr. Earley. No, I did not discuss the subpoena in terms of not coming to this hearing. That was never a discussion that I had. I sought counsel because I wanted to understand the process. The invitation was what I said that I was not prepared to attend, not the subpoena. Ms. Plaskett. So you did not tell your attorney to refuse service of the subpoena ---- Mr. Earley. No. Ms. Plaskett.--that was potentially being ---- Mr. Earley. No. Ms. Plaskett. Okay. That is important for us to note for the record. We have an email that says that you were being told that a subpoena was going to be issued to you at that time. You are aware of that? Mr. Earley. I do not recall ---- Ms. Plaskett. We have the email, Mr. Earley. Do you want me to put it on the screen? Mr. Earley. Yes, if you would, please. Ms. Plaskett. Okay. Could we do that? And at that time, while they are putting that up, that email exchange with your attorney, so now you are saying that the attorney did not tell you that you were supposed to potentially be subpoenaed to testify before this committee? Mr. Earley. I sought advice of counsel on the issue regarding the invitation, and then declined the invitation because I did not have an opportunity to ---- Ms. Plaskett. I have moved on from the invitation. I am now talking about the subpoena. Mr. Earley. Okay. Ms. Plaskett. Did you have a discussion with your attorney about service and acceptance of the potential subpoena? Mr. Earley. That is an attorney-client issue that I would like to refer to my attorney to answer if that is possible. Ms. Plaskett. I am glad he is not a potted plant in this one and he is going to give you some advice about that. That was very good. So did you inform the governor that you were going to refuse to testify even after a potential subpoena was going to be issued? Mr. Earley. No, I did not. Ms. Plaskett. And did the governor ever instruct you to cooperate with this committee, and did they encourage you to comply with the request when it was an invitation? Mr. Earley. No, it was strictly my decision based on my conversation with my counsel about preparation for a very important hearing. And that was pretty much the extent of it. Ms. Plaskett. And so, the governor did not tell you yes or no whether he thought it was a good reason that you should or should not testify. Mr. Earley. The governor did not advise me on that because I sought legal advice on that. Ms. Plaskett. No, no, no. We went by earlier, in your testimony you said that you let the governor know that you had an invitation to testify. Did he respond to that particular comment that you made to him? Mr. Earley. I think the response was, as I recall it, was, you know, it is your decision, do what you have to do. Do what you, you know, you feel most comfortable doing. Ms. Plaskett. Do we have the email? No? Okay, thank you. Thank you very much. And actually, Mr. Chairman, I know it is unusual, but the gentlewoman from Michigan wanted me to yield time to her. But, you know, in getting a witness to actually answer a question, it was a little difficult. Would you give us the indulgence of allowing her? Chairman Chaffetz. Under House rules you can do a second round, but we need to go through everybody first. Ms. Plaskett. Thank you. Okay, thank you, sir. Chairman Chaffetz. So we are going to actually now recognize gentlewoman from New Mexico, Ms. Lujan Grisham. Ms. Plaskett. Thank you, sir. Ms. Lujan Grisham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Then I will be happy to provide a minute to my colleague, Ms. Lawrence, and yield to her. Ms. Lawrence. I have a question for each of them. Mr. Edwards, in your communications on this issue, do you feel that governor knew what was happening? Mr. Edwards. I have not seen emails that showed that he knew about ---- Ms. Lawrence. Do you feel he should have known? Mr. Edwards. I feel that the governor should have listened more to the people of Flint and been less trusting of EPA and MDEQ. Ms. Lawrence. Mr. Walling, in your role, would the governor or should the governor have known, or are you aware that he knew? You said you contacted his office. Did he know? Mr. Walling. He knew of the issues we had in January of 2015 because we did have a follow-up phone call. From the emails that I have seen, it appears that all of his senior aides were aware of extensive issues with MDEQ and DHHS. Ms. Lawrence. Okay, thank you. Mr. Early, you were his direct appointee. Did you communicate with the governor? Was the governor aware of this water situation in Flint? Mr. Earley. The situation that I communicated to the governor involved, as I have said, the contamination issues that we were trying to manage when I was there. I had no discussions with the governor regarding lead corrosion or lead contamination. Ms. Lawrence. But you communicated with him that there was a water issue in the City of Flint. Mr. Earley. Yes, when we switched. Ms. Lawrence. Ms. Hedman, did you communicate directly with the governor's staff, the governor, to inform him of the situation that was happening with EPA and the water situation in Flint? Ms. Hedman. My only communication with the governor's staff occurred in the days leading up to the announcement of the Flint action plan, which I think occurred on October 2nd. Ms. Lawrence. Thank you. I yield back the rest of my time. Ms. Lujan Grisham. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. So I am going to try to dig a little deeper in that context because what we all want is good and effective government. And for me it is irrelevant whether that good and effective protective government is at the Federal level, at the State level, or the local level. It should all be working to serve and protect its citizens. And, Ms. Hedman, I appreciate your recognition that you could have been more vigorous, but in the context of is the State's primary responsibility, and that when a State fails, as was the case in Michigan, we have a terrible end result. We have people drinking unsafe water. And I think people want to know if the State of Michigan's failures are typical of other State governments, which it should cause all of Congress to think about the role of Federal government, EPA, and what we do about State accountability in this regard. Now, Ms. Hedman, in a footnote in your written testimony, you mentioned a drinking water crisis that occurred in Toledo, Ohio in 2014. Was the danger to human health in that crisis, was there danger? Ms. Hedman. There was. It was the toxin microcystin. Ms. Lujan Grisham. And how long did it take the mayor of Toledo, based on that message from you, to issue a do not drink notice? Ms. Hedman. He immediately issued a do not drink order. Ms. Lujan Grisham. So he immediately reacts. Did the Ohio EPA resist the sampling protocol EPA was recommending as MDEQ did in the case of Flint? Ms. Hedman. No, not at all. They took on board all of the sampling advice and worked very closely with our Cincinnati labs ---- Ms. Lujan Grisham. And, in fact, in your written testimony you commend Governor Kasich for his handling of that particular crisis. In fact, you note that he called on the National Guard immediately. Ms. Hedman. Immediately. Governor Kasich said he would call out the National Guard to deliver bottled water, and he did it. Ms. Lujan Grisham. So I take it that you believe that there is a serious critical difference between the response of Governor Snyder and the response of Governor Kasich. Ms. Hedman. Yes. Ms. Lujan Grisham. In in our investigation of the Michigan crisis, the committee received startling testimony from the former head of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality. He told us that the topic of the Flint water crisis never even made it to the agenda of Governor Snyder's cabinet meetings. Never, not once. In your experience working with Ohio, did Governor Kasich make Toledo's drinking water a priority of his entire administration? Ms. Hedman. Well, I can tell you that he not only responded quickly in terms of calling out the National Guard to get the water out. After the entire scenario had ended, I believe that he actually reached out and thanked ---- Ms. Lujan Grisham. So we can see a stark and dramatic difference between the responsibility of these two States. And I think it is the job of this committee to make sure that the Federal government, the State government, and the local government are doing all it can, and should, and is requested to do to protect its citizens, correct? Ms. Hedman. I agree. Ms. Lujan Grisham. Thank you. So one last thing. I am about out of time. But, quite frankly, given this testimony, if Governor Snyder had reacted the Flint water crisis in the same in which Governor Kasich reacted to the Toledo water crisis, do you believe it would have made a significant difference to human health and safety in regards to the drinking water situation in Flint, Michigan? Ms. Hedman. I do. Ms. Lujan Grisham. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentlelady. I have a few more questions I would like to go through. Ms. Hedman, you have cited repeatedly how urgent it was and how important it is. We spent over the course of 3 days a transcribed interview with Mr. Dan Wyant. Do you know who he is? Ms. Hedman. Yes. He was the director of MDEQ. Chairman Chaffetz. When did you have the first conversation with him about the concerns of what is going on in Flint, Michigan? Ms. Hedman. I know from checking my records that I definitely had a conversation with him on September 15th right before I had a conversation with the mayor. I believe I also had a shorter conversation with him on September 1st as part of a commissioners roundtable. Chairman Chaffetz. At least according to Mr. Wyant, and it is a little while ago, his first conversation with you was September 27th. Now, whether it is the 15th or the 27th, can you see the concern that it took that long before you actually talked to the person who is in charge of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality? What the heck are you doing if you are not calling him? Ms. Hedman. So, again, I believe I also talked with him on the 1st. But the point ---- Chairman Chaffetz. Okay, September 1st. Okay. So I am going to go ahead and give you a little latitude there. I do not believe you because I do not see any reason to trust you. But let us assume that that is true for a second. Why did it take so long? Ms. Hedman. My staff was reporting ---- Chairman Chaffetz. So it was your staff's fault. Ms. Hedman. No, no. No, no, no, that Michigan was taking the required action, that Michigan was reporting that there was going to be a public information campaign. And if Michigan staff had said we will not issue the order that EPA has required, then I would have gone directly to the director. Chairman Chaffetz. But they did not, did they? Ms. Hedman. They did on August 17th. Chairman Chaffetz. So this is the fundamental problem with government and big government. It is, oh, well, we will delegate this instead of just picking up the phone and talking to somebody and having a discussion with them. They have these emails here. For instance, this one is dated October 1st where he was led to believe that you actually supported what they were doing. And this is the communication back and forth that Mr. Edwards talks about that. Where they are then led to believe that they are actually in compliance. In fact, it is later on even in November when the EPA admits that the Lead and Copper Rule is ambiguous. There is not clarity there. They admit that. It is your own internal email. Mr. Edwards, can you comment on this? You have been so good at giving a perspective on all this, but for those that do not how to read these reports, what is your analysis of that? Mr. Edwards. Well, I think that EPA was embarrassed by how long it took them to actually act, that it became a national and international embarrassment by that point. And then what are they going to do, say that they knew there was no confusion right from the start? When I read that memo, it was essentially a get out of jail free card for both EPA and MDEQ. We not understand our own law is essentially what that memo said. So I just thought it was absurd. Chairman Chaffetz. Ms. Hedman, are you familiar with the, we had a hearing here in July of last year about you and your region. Are you familiar with that? Ms. Hedman. I did hear about it. I was actually visiting some Indian tribes in northern Minnesota when that occurred. Chairman Chaffetz. So did you get a follow up? Did you read about? Tell me what you know about that. Ms. Hedman. I did, and I was very, very concerned about some of the allegations that were made. And let me say as someone who has been an intern here on Capitol Hill in the 1970s, and someone who early in my career experienced both sexual harassment and sexual discrimination, I have zero tolerance for that in the workplace. Chairman Chaffetz. Then why did we have three of your employees do a very brave and courageous thing, and step forward, and testify to Congress that you tried to retaliate against them for talking about this, that some of them were asked to remove the investigators. I mean, it is one thing when I get one person, but when we get three people testifying before Congress, putting their lives, and their livelihood, and their careers on the line, there is some smoke there, is there not? Are you telling me you did nothing wrong? Ms. Hedman. I can tell you that I asked for a follow-up to look into those allegations, and ---- Chairman Chaffetz. And what was the conclusion? Ms. Hedman. At no point did anyone ever present any evidence that those allegations were, in fact, true. Chairman Chaffetz. We sat here for a couple of hours and heard testimony. There is some evidence there. I just wish you were at the EPA so I could call on you to be fired because you should have never been in this position. It is so frustrating. This is what happens. 99 percent of the people, good Federal employees. They are patriotic. They are hardworking, and they do the right thing. And then we get somebody who comes along who spoils it. They are bad apples, and they just say, oh, I will just retire, full benefits, full everything. That was absolutely fundamentally, totally wrong. Ms. Hedman. Mr. Chairman, I do want you to know that I appointed a new assistant regional administrator who has aggressively dealt with these kinds of situations. And I personally recall a case where we removed someone for sexual harassment, and another case, which the inspector general gave us very high marks for where we removed an individual who viewed child pornography on a Federal computer. And he is in Federal prison. Chairman Chaffetz. Well, and there are ongoing investigations right now by the inspector general, and this should have been dealt with at a much higher level. Let me go on to Mr. Walling. I need help, Mayor, for some clarification. You became the mayor in 2009 in a special election. Elected, reelected, in 2011. But I honestly do not know what this means, but I want to understand. In your bio, you were the chairman of the Karegnondi Water Authority from 2010 to 2015. Were you paid or compensated in any way, shape, or form for being the chairman of the KWA? Mr. Walling. I was not. I served as a function of being mayor. The mayor of an incorporating community in that authority serves as does the current mayor serves in that role now. Chairman Chaffetz. So when you become the mayor, you then get to be the head of that, you know, because one of the concerns is are there conflicts of interest because essentially the KWA gets $200 million or so to start building this pipeline, and that puts you in a pretty powerful position to direct dollars, and locations, and knowledge ahead of time. It gives you essentially insider information, does it not? Mr. Walling. It is a major project. It was a major responsibility. The chairmanship came to me through an election of the members of that authority. That happens on an annual basis the officers of that authority are elected. Chairman Chaffetz. Are you here to testify, again, I just want to be clear. I do not want to disparage you unfairly in any way, shape, or form, but I need to know from you personally here. Did you benefit personally in any way, shape, or form from that assignment and that knowledge? Mr. Walling. No, I did not, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chaffetz. Okay. Mr. Edwards, tell me what DEQ, in your opinion, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, what did they do right and what did they do wrong? Did they do anything right? Mr. Edwards. No. [Laughter.] Mr. Edwards. Honestly as I sit here, I cannot thing of a single thing they did right. Chairman Chaffetz. Did the EPA do anything right? Mr. Edwards. Mr. del Toral did everything every EPA employee should aspire to do. His memo could have made EPA the heroes here in this particular case. Even despite the 10 years of allowing utilities to cheat on the Lead and Copper Rule prior to that time, he realized the danger that puts children in. Chairman Chaffetz. And what is your personal assessment of what the governor has done or is doing now? Mr. Edwards. Well, unlike EPA, the governor has taken responsibility for what occurred. Certainly he was guilty of not listening to Flint residents. Certainly he was guilty of being overly trusting of MDEQ and EPA. But at present he says that he wants to be part of the solution, and he is actively engaged in this. And so, I am willing to work with anyone who wants to be part of the solution, and I think he is sincere about trying to help Flint get back on its feet. Chairman Chaffetz. We are about to have a vote called on the floor. If the Ranking Member has another--yes. Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Earley, I am little stunned by what you told Representative Plaskett. You said that you talked to the governor's office about our request for you to testify on February 3rd. And by the way, that was a joint request, Democrats and Republicans. And you said that the governor never directed you to cooperate with us, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and that they just told you to do whatever you had to do. Is that correct? Mr. Earley. Well, basically it was, you know, to make my own decision about going. And because it was, as I said, an invitation and I was not prepared to sit before this committee, I declined the invitation, and that was the extent of the conversation I had with the governor. But the subpoena that you are referring to or that has been referred to was issued a night before. I could not have gotten here physically to do that. So, you know, and it was never served on me. So my announcement basically that, you know, I was declining the invitation was in hopes that I could enough time to prepare, and to get here, and to meet with this committee. Mr. Cummings. Now, you also had said that you had had some discussions with the governor. Did you have discussions with Mr. Muchmore? Do you know who he is? Mr. Earley. Yes, I know Mr. Muchmore. Mr. Cummings. And did you have discussions with him about what was going on in Flint with regard to the water? Mr. Earley. Not specifically. He was a part of some of the meetings that we had as we were briefing them on the progress. But, again, this was all on the contamination issues prior to the lead leeching issues that we now deal with. But they were apprised of the progress we were making and converting from DWSD to the use of the Flint River during the interim while the KWA was being completed. Yes, we had those discussions. Mr. Cummings. Okay. Did it surprise you that Mr. Wyant had told us that it was never brought up in the governor's cabinet meetings? Mr. Earley. That is a surprise. Mr. Cummings. Why do you say that? Mr. Earley. Well ---- Chairman Chaffetz. This was a major thing, right? I mean, this was not ---- Mr. Earley. Yes. Yes. That is a surprise. I was not a part of the governor's cabinet, yeah. Mr. Cummings. I understand that. Mr. Earley. So I did not know what was being discussed in those meetings, and I can only take that as, you know, a comment from a former employee. Mr. Cummings. Mr. Walling, did you have discussions with Mr. Muchmore? Mr. Walling. I did on a few occasions, a phone call. Mr. Cummings. And was he aware of what was going on, I mean, in Flint ---- Mr. Walling. Yes. Mr. Cummings.--with regard to the water? Mr. Walling. Yes. Mr. Cummings. And so, is it fair that you would have had more conversations with him than you would have had with the governor? Mr. Walling. Yes, I did. I would call the chief of staff and also one of his direct reports, Harvey Hollins, who is his urban initiatives director, was in, you know, regular communication with us even as elected officials during the emergency manager. Mr. Cummings. One of the things that we concluded is that the governor probably did not do a lot of communicating in writing with regard to this event, this whole water thing and crisis. So, therefore, in order for us to get any kind of information we needed, we needed to talk to folks. And that is the 15 people we were trying to get to including Mr. Muchmore and I think the other gentleman you just mentioned. And, again, they refused to talk to us, so hopefully they will have a change of heart. I yield back. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. I recognize Ms. Plaskett for a moment. Ms. Plaskett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We were concerned about this email, and I do have the redacted version of for you and for your attorney if you would like at some point to have a look at this. And you may want to make an amendment to your testimony after such a review. The chairman and the staff can make this available for the both of you. Chairman Chaffetz. We will allow 72 hours for such clarification. Ms. Plaskett. Thank you. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. We have a vote on the floor. I want to thank the four of you for your time. This is very illuminating. Again, our hearts, and prayers, and thoughts go to the people who actually live in Flint who were affected by this and are going to continue to be affected by this. We look forward to part three of our hearing with Governor Synder as well as the EPA administrator. And that will take place in this room on Thursday at 9:00 a.m. We stand adjourned. [Whereupon, at 1:37 p.m., the sub/committee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- Material Submitted for the Hearing Record [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]