[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STOPPING THE NEXT ATTACK: HOW TO KEEP OUR CITY STREETS FROM BECOMING
THE BATTLEGROUND
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 21, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-87
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Mr. Art Acevedo, Chief of Police, Austin, Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Michael J. Bouchard, Oakland County Sheriff's Office, Oakland
County, Michigan:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Mr. Jerry L. Demings, Orange County Sheriff's Office, Orange
County, Florida:
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
Mr. John Miller, Deputy Commissioner, Intelligence and
Counterterrorism, New York City Police Department.............. 28
For the Record
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Article........................................................ 57
Appendix
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Art Acevedo. 65
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Michael J.
Bouchard....................................................... 65
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Jerry L.
Dem- ings...................................................... 66
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for John Miller. 66
STOPPING THE NEXT ATTACK: HOW TO KEEP OUR CITY STREETS FROM BECOMING
THE BATTLEGROUND
----------
Wednesday, September 21, 2016
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:19 a.m., in
room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
(Chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Smith, King, Rogers, Duncan,
Perry, Katko, Hurd, Carter, Loudermilk, McSally, Ratcliffe,
Donovan, McCaul, Thompson, Jackson Lee, Langevin, Higgins,
Richmond, Keating, Payne, Vela, Watson Coleman, Rice, and
Torres.
Chairman McCaul. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to receive
testimony on stopping the next attack, in keeping our city
streets from becoming the battleground.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
This weekend, our Nation was shaken by terrorist attacks in
Minnesota, New York, and New Jersey. We are thankful that no
one was killed. Our thoughts and prayers go out to the injured
victims and their families.
We are still searching for answers in this investigation. I
appreciate your police department, Deputy Commissioner Miller,
being here today to update us on this case. Sir, thank you for
being here today.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. Our hearts go out to the good people of
New York.
The threat environment is as high as we have ever seen it,
especially from radical Islamist extremists. Last year, this
committee tracked the most home-grown jihadist plots ever in a
single year in the United States, and 2016 could be even worse.
Americans are rightfully worried that our city streets are
once again becoming the battleground. Fort Hood, Boston,
Chattanooga, San Bernardino, Orlando. Some have said this kind
of regular terrorism is the new normal. But I strongly reject
that argument. Complacency is not an option. Terrorists are
threatening American lives, our livelihood, and our way of
life. We cannot falter with so much at stake.
That is why yesterday I released a National strategy to win
the war against Islamist terror, with proposals for fighting
the enemy overseas and stopping radicalization in our
communities. My strategy explains that one of our highest
priorities must be to make sure our front-line defenders are
better prepared to stop acts of terror. This means the police,
fire, and other emergency professionals need to be able to
detect suspicious activity and catch potential terrorists
before it's too late. If a plot goes undetected, they must be
equipped to respond quickly to prevent loss of life. We saw
that play out this weekend when our first responders acted
heroically to protect their fellow citizens.
So to the witnesses testifying today, I want you to know
that this committee is grateful for your service to our
communities and your sacrifices for our country. I also want to
convey one message above all else, and that is that we have
your backs. We are committed to give you the tools to fight
terror. We are also committed to giving you the public support
that you deserve in these challenging times.
It has been a hard year, especially for law enforcement.
You have faced tough questions in the press, and you are
staring down violence in our streets every day. That is why
this committee has fought to protect important DHS grant
funding that you rely on. In fact, later today, the House will
vote on my bill to authorize an additional $30 million in
annual grants to help your communities guard against the
dynamic terror threat, including active-shooter attacks, IEDs,
and suicide bombers.
We have pushed Federal agencies to share intelligence with
you and share it more quickly and comprehensively. We need to
ensure the Federal Government properly incorporates the
valuable CT information that you develop from the streets, the
street intel, in the communities where you serve every day.
Today, I hope you will share with us what is working on the
front lines and what is not. In particular, we want to know how
we can better support you to respond to this unprecedented
terror threat.
Last week, I went to the 9/11 memorial service and listened
to all the nearly 3,000 names of those killed read aloud. We do
this each year to remember the fallen and to honor the heroism
we saw on that fateful day from first responders, from police,
and everyday citizens.
Like those brave Americans we lost, our witnesses this
morning have sworn an oath to protect our people. So before we
start, let me just say again thank you.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
Septmeber 21, 2016
This weekend, our Nation was shaken by terrorist attacks in
Minnesota, New York, and New Jersey.
We are thankful no one was killed, but our thoughts and prayers go
out to the injured victims and their families.
We are still searching for answers in this investigation, and I
appreciate NYPD Deputy Commissioner Miller being here today to update
us on the case.
The threat environment is as high as we have ever seen it,
especially from radical Islamist terrorists.
Last year, this committee tracked the most home-grown jihadist
plots ever in a single year in the United States. And 2016 could be
even worse.
Americans are rightfully worried that our city streets are once
again becoming the battleground: Fort Hood. Boston. Chattanooga. San
Bernardino. Orlando.
Some have said this kind of regular terrorism is ``the new
normal''.
But I strongly reject that argument. Complacency is not an option.
Terrorists are threatening American lives, livelihoods, and our way
of life. We cannot falter with so much at stake.
That is why yesterday I released a National strategy to win the war
against Islamist terror, with proposals for fighting the enemy overseas
and stopping radicalization in our communities.
My strategy explains that one of our highest priorities must be to
make sure our front-line defenders are better prepared to stop acts of
terror.
This means that police, fire, and other emergency professionals
need to be able to detect suspicious activity and catch potential
terrorists before it's too late.
If a plot goes undetected, they must be equipped to respond quickly
to prevent loss of life.
We saw that play out this weekend, when our first responders acted
heroically to protect their fellow citizens.
So to the witnesses testifying today, I want you to know that this
committee is grateful for your service to our communities and your
sacrifices for our country.
I also want to convey one message, above all else: We have your
backs.
We are committed to giving you the tools to fight terror. And we
are also committed to giving you the public support you deserve in
these challenging times.
It has been a hard year, especially for law enforcement. You have
faced tough questions in the press, and you are staring down violence
in our streets every day.
That is why this committee has fought to protect important DHS
grant funding that you rely on.
In fact, last night the House passed my bill to authorize $39
million in annual grants to help your communities guard against the
dynamic terror threat, including active-shooter attacks, IEDs, and
more.
We have pushed Federal agencies to share intelligence with you more
quickly and comprehensively.
We need to ensure the Federal Government properly incorporates the
valuable CT information you develop from the streets and communities
where you serve every day.
Today, I hope you will share with us what is working on the front
lines--and what is not.
In particular, we want to know how we can better support you to
respond to the unprecedented terror threat.
Last week I went up to the 9/11 memorial and listened to all of the
nearly 3,000 names of those killed read aloud.
We do this each year to remember the fallen . . . and to honor the
heroism we saw on that day, from first responders and everyday
citizens.
Like those brave Americans we lost, our witnesses this morning have
sworn an oath to protect our people.
So before we start, let me just say again: ``We thank you.''
Chairman McCaul. With that, the Chair now recognizes the
Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to
thank you for holding today's hearing.
In light of the recent terrorist attacks in Minnesota, New
Jersey, and New York, I would like to offer my sympathies to
the victims and their families. I believe we all agree that
terrorism and any other violence on our streets is an all-too-
common occurrence. We must act boldly to stem this tide. I
would like to thank the witnesses for their service.
Mr. Miller, thank you for coming to town. I know it is a
very busy time for you and, obviously, you are still doing your
work while you are before this committee today.
Sheriff Demings, thank you for your service. We still stand
with Orlando and have not forgotten about the victims of the
June terrorist attack.
Mr. Chairman, in just the past 4 months, incidents in
Orlando, Dallas, Minnesota, New York, New Jersey have brought
into sharp focus the complex, diverse, and confounding nature
of the lone-wolf threat. Those who are inspired to carry out
such attacks do not neatly fit a single profile or espouse a
single hateful or violent extremist ideology. We saw this
scenario in the Orlando attack where the perpetrator espoused
several conflicting ideologies and seemingly was not part of a
terrorist cell.
Just this past Saturday, a lone actor, who is being
investigated for possible ties to ISIL, attacked 10 people at a
mall in Minnesota. Also last weekend, in New Jersey and New
York, it is believed that the suspected bomber, who also shot
two police officers, may have been inspired by al-Qaeda, and
right now appears to have acted alone. In July, a perpetrator,
who had no formal affiliation with any particular group but may
have been inspired by a black separatist group, shot and killed
5 police officers in Dallas, Texas.
We know by now that our law enforcement is a target for
terrorists. We also know that law enforcement's job is made
more difficult by the availability of assault weapons. Earlier
this month, one of our subcommittees received testimony from
representatives of local law enforcement identifying the
availability of guns and the lone-wolf threat as serious
problems for police. In fact, I would note that one of our
witnesses today, Chief Acevedo, has gone further in describing
this challenge by stating that the wide-spread availability of
guns in this country makes it possible for potentially
dangerous persons to legally acquire weapons to cause mayhem
and colossal casualties. Chief Acevedo goes on to state:
Whether it is ISIS abroad or home-grown extremists, the threat
exists and haunts police chiefs every day. I look forward to
engaging Chief Acevedo on this point.
Even a terrorist knows that it is far easier to carry out
an attack in the name of that ideology on U.S. soil with a gun
than in Europe. A testimonial by one former member of ISIL
published this summer underscores this point. The former
terrorist explains ISIL's view on terrorist recruitment in the
United States as follows: For America, it is easy to get them
over the social network because Americans are dumb. They have
open gun policies. We can radicalize them easily. If they have
no prior record, they can buy guns. We don't need a contact man
to provide guns for them.
Mr. Chairman, we have seen the scenario the former ISIL
member mentioned unfold with assault weapons here in this
country. We saw it in San Bernardino where perpetrators
inspired by ISIL walked into a soft target and killed 14 people
and injured another 22 with an assault-style weapon.
Tragically, we saw it again this June in Orlando when a
perpetrator walked into a nightclub and killed 49 people with
an assault weapon.
Our witness, the sheriff of Orange County, immediately
recognized the impact that assault weapons was having on our
homeland security. As Sheriff Demings said in the aftermath of
the shooting: We have to look at some of our gun laws and make
a determination of what we stand for and just how prevalent
some of these assault rifles are available today. Otherwise, if
we don't make some modification, we are going to continue
seeing some of what you see happening here now, here in
Orlando.
Mr. Chairman, I wholeheartedly agree with you that
radicalization and recruitment is a problem. But after 9/11,
the Nation made a vow not to give in to terrorism. Therefore, I
will not concede that our city streets, the places where our
constituents live, work, and play are at risk of becoming
battlegrounds like Syria and Afghanistan. As lawmakers, we must
make it more difficult for terrorists to carry out attacks on
U.S. soil. Taking action to prevent terrorists from having
access to assault weapons would be a good start. However, it
seems that in the waning days of this Congress, there is more
appetite for advancing un-American and counterproductive
proposals, such as closing the borders to Muslims or ethnic
profiling whole communities.
Secretary Jeh Johnson testified before this committee,
noted that with the current threat picture, homeland security
cannot be achieved without sensible gun control laws. It is
time for us to rethink how we prevent terrorism.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
September 21, 2016
In light of the recent terrorist attacks in Minnesota, New Jersey,
and New York, I would like to offer my sympathies to the victims and
their families. I believe we all agree that terrorism and other
violence on our streets is an all-too-common occurrence. We must act
more boldly to stem this tide.
In just the past 4 months, incidents in Orlando, Dallas, Minnesota,
New York, and New Jersey have brought into sharp focus the complex,
diverse, and confounding nature of the ``lone wolf'' threat. Those who
are inspired to carry out such attacks do not neatly fit a single
profile or espouse a single hateful or violent extremist ideology. We
saw this scenario in the Orlando attack where the perpetrator espoused
several conflicting ideologies and seemingly was not a part of a
terrorist cell.
Just this past Saturday, a lone actor, who is being investigated
for possible ties to ISIL, attacked 10 people at a mall in Minnesota.
Also last weekend, in New Jersey and New York, it is believed that the
suspected bomber, who also shot two police officers, may have been
inspired by al-Qaeda and right now appears to have acted alone.
In July, a perpetrator who had no formal affiliation with any
particular group but may have been inspired by a black separatist
group, shot and killed 5 police officers in Dallas.
We know by now that our law enforcement is a target for terrorists.
We also know that law enforcement's job is made more difficult by the
availability of assault weapons. Earlier this month, one of our
subcommittees received testimony from representatives of local law
enforcement identifying the availability of guns and the lone-wolf
threat as serious problems for police.
In fact, I would note that one of our witnesses today, Chief
Acevedo, has gone further in describing this challenge by stating that
``the widespread availability of guns in this country makes it possible
for potentially dangerous persons to legally acquire weapons to cause
mayhem and colossal causalities''.
Chief Acevedo goes on to state ``whether it's ISIS a broad or home-
grown extremists, the threat exists and haunts police chiefs every
day''. I look forward to engaging Chief Acevedo on this point.
Even the terrorists know that it is far easier to carry out an
attack in the name of their ideology on U.S. soil with a gun than in
Europe. A testimonial by one former member of ISIL published this
summer underscores this point.
The former terrorist explained ISIL's view on terrorist recruitment
in the United States as follows: ``For America . . . it is easier to
get them over the social network because the Americans are dumb--they
have open gun policies.'' `` . . . [W]e can radicalize them easily and
if they have no prior records they can buy guns . . . we don't need a
contact man to provide guns for them.''
We have seen the scenario the former ISIL member mentioned unfold
with assault rifles here in this country. We saw it in San Bernardino
where perpetrators inspired by ISIL walked into a soft target and
killed 14 people and injured another 22 people with an assault-style
weapon. Tragically, we saw it again this June in Orlando when a
perpetrator walked into a nightclub and killed 49 people with an
assault weapon.
Our witness, the sheriff of Orange County, immediately recognized
the impact that assault weapons were having on our homeland security.
As Sheriff Demings said in the aftermath of the shooting, ``we have to
look at some of our gun laws and make a determination of what we stand
for and just how prevalent some of these `assault rifles' are available
today. Otherwise, if we don't make some modification, we are going to
continue seeing some of what you see happening in now here in [Orlando]
. . . ''.
Mr. Chairman, I agree with you that radicalization and recruitment
are a problem. But after 9/11, this Nation made a vow not to give into
terrorism.
Therefore, I will not concede that our city streets--the places
where our constituents live, work, and play--are at risk of becoming
battlegrounds like Syria and Afghanistan. As lawmakers, we must make it
more difficult for terrorists to carry out attacks on U.S. soil.
Taking action to prevent terrorists from having access to assault
weapons would be a good start. However, it seems that in the waning
days of this Congress, there is more appetite for advancing un-American
and counter-productive proposals such as closing the borders to Muslims
or ethnically profiling whole communities.
Secretary Jeh Johnson, testifying before this committee, noted that
with the current threat picture, homeland security cannot be achieved
without sensible gun control laws. It is time for us to rethink how we
prevent terrorism.
Chairman McCaul. I thank the Ranking Member.
Other Members are reminded opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Hon. Jackson Lee follows:]
Statement of Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
September 21, 2016
Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson, thank you for holding
today's hearing entitled ``Stopping the Next Attack: How to Keep Our
City Streets from Becoming the Battleground.''
I want to wish Linden Police Officer Angel Padilla, a 14-year
member of the force, and 12-year veteran officer Peter Hammer a full
recovery from their injuries sustained during the arrest of Ahmad Khan
Rahami.
My thoughts and prayers also to the 8 Minnesota victims and 29 New
York victims injured during the terrorist attacks this weekend.
I would like to thank our witnesses for today's hearing for sharing
their knowledge and experience with the committee:
Mr. John Miller, deputy commissioner, intelligence and
counterterrorism, New York City Police Department;
Chief Art Acevedo, chief of police for the city of Austin,
Texas, who is testifying on behalf of the Major Cities Chiefs
Association;
Sheriff Michael J. Bouchard Oakland County Sheriffs Office,
Oakland County, Michigan who is testifying on behalf of the
Major County Sheriffs Association; and
Sheriff Jerry I. Demings with the Orange County Sheriffs
Office for Orange County, Florida.
It is important for the committee to hear from local law
enforcement that represents our Nation's first line of defense in the
communities we represent.
They help to prevent, mitigate, and respond to as well as help
recovery efforts following a terrorist's incident as well as natural
and man-made disasters.
September 11, 2016 marked the 15th anniversary of the attacks that
killed 2,977 men, women, and children.
I stood on the East Front steps of the Capitol on September 11,
along with 150 members of the House of Representatives and sang ``God
Bless America.''
As a Member of the House Committee on Homeland Security since its
establishment, and Ranking Member of the Judiciary Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security today's hearing is of
importance to me.
I want to thank and commend your work as first responders and your
dedication to work in public service.
I know that each of you also know exactly where you were when the
planes hit the World Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon.
This was a defining moment in modern American history, but it
should not redefine who we are as Americans.
The focus of the work of this committee is to make sure that our
Nation is secure from the threat of terrorism by providing guidance,
oversight, and support for the work of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), which includes the agency's support for the work that
you and your members do every day to secure the Nation.
DHS has a vital mission: To secure the Nation from the many threats
we face.
This requires the dedication of more than 240,000 employees in jobs
that range from aviation and border security to emergency response,
from cybersecurity analyst to chemical facility inspector. Our duties
are wide-ranging, and our goal is clear--keeping America safe.
DHS requires the cooperation and assistance of local law
enforcement to accomplish its mission.
There are over 1 million firefighters in the United States, of
which 750,000 are volunteers.
Local police departments have an about 556,000 full-time employees.
Sheriffs' offices reported about 291,000 full-time employees.
There are over 155,000 Nationally-registered emergency medical
technicians (EMT).
Together, the Federal and local components working well together
makes the case for our capacity and capability to defeat terrorist who
seek to do us harm.
Recent events are an indication of what is possible when the
Federal, State, and local law enforcement work together.
The purpose of today's hearing is to receive testimony from law
enforcement officials regarding the evolving threats communities face.
Gun violence carnage that claimed the lives of more than 300,000
persons during the period 2005-2015, include the following:
1. On July 17, 2016, an offender shot and killed 6 police officers
in Baton Rouge, LA. Three of the officers died and 3 were
hospitalized.
2. On July 7, 2016, an offender shot and killed 5 police officers
and wounded 11 others (9 police officers and 2 civilians) in
Dallas, TX. The offender was killed by police with a remotely-
guided robot loaded with an explosive. (Domestic Extremist)
3. On June 12, 2016, an armed assailant shot and killed 49 people
and non-fatally wounded over 50 others in an Orlando, FL
nightclub. After a 3-hour standoff with police, the assailant
was killed by police. (Foreign Terrorist-Inspired Extremist)
4. On December 2, 2015, 2 offenders killed 14 people and wounded 21
others in San Bernardino, CA at a social services center. Both
offenders were killed by police while resisting arrest.
(Foreign Terrorist-Inspired Extremists)
5. On November 27, 2015, at a Planned Parenthood clinic, in
Colorado Springs, CO, a lone offender shot and killed 3 people
and wounded another 9 people with a semiautomatic rifle before
surrendering to the police after a 5-hour standoff. (Domestic
Extremist)
6. On July 16, 2015, in Chattanooga, TN, a lone offender killed 5
people and wounded another person at a military recruitment
office and naval reserve center, before he was killed by
police. (Foreign Terrorist-Inspired Extremists)
7. On June 17, 2015, in Charleston, SC, a lone offender shot and
killed 9 parishioners and wounded another parishioner with .45
caliber pistol at the historic Emanuel African Methodist
Episcopal Church. (Domestic Extremist)
Nearly 100 metropolitan areas have experienced mass shootings like
these since 2013.
Mass shootings occur more frequently in States that do not require
background checks for all gun sales, and analyses of mass shootings in
the United States between 2009 and 2015 document that the majority of
mass shootings occur in venues where the carrying of firearms is not
restricted.
I have introduced two measures that specifically address issues of
gun safety raised by the carnage over the last few years.
The first bill is H.R. 3125 ``Accidental Firearms Transfers
Reporting Act of 2015,'' which seeks to shed light on the gun purchase
loophole that led to Dylan Roof's tragic possession of the firearm used
to murder 9 innocent persons at Emanuel A.M.E. Church in Charleston,
South Carolina, as well as the numerous other cases where a firearm was
handed over to an unintended and potentially dangerous recipient.
The bill would require the director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigations to report to Congress the number of firearm transfers
resulting from the failure to complete a background check within 3
business days.
The FBI is further instructed to disclose and report on the
procedures in place and actions taken after discovering a firearm has
been transferred to a transferee who is ineligible to receive a
firearm.
This bill directs the FBI to report on the erroneous transfer of
firearms every 6 months to ensure internal oversight and effective
monitoring to expose any other patterns or practices in need of
administrative or legislative action.
I have also introduced, H.R. 5470, ``Stopping Mass Killings By
Violent Terrorists Act,'' gives our law enforcement agencies another
tool to help keep the most dangerous weapons out of the hands of home-
grown terrorists.
H.R. 5470, the ``Stopping Mass Killings by Violent Terrorists
Act,'' prohibit a firearms dealer from transferring a semiautomatic
assault weapon or large capacity ammunition clips to a purchaser until
the Attorney General has verified that the prospective transferee has
truthfully answered new questions on the firearms background check
questionnaire regarding contacts between the prospective purchaser or
transferee and Federal law enforcement authorities.
Specifically, H.R. 5470 requires and provides that:
(1) with respect too any firearm or large capacity ammunition
feeding device, the Attorney General update the Background
Check Questionnaire to include questions relating to the
existence and nature of any contacts with Federal law
enforcement agencies within the prior 24 months;
(2) for a purchaser questionnaire, affirming the existence of
contacts with Federal law enforcement agencies, that the
purchase of a covered firearm cannot be consummated until
affirmative approval is received by the FBI; and
(3) with respect to any firearm or large capacity ammunition
feeding device (LCAFD), any purchaser who refuses or fails to
provide the information required, the Transferor (Seller) shall
nevertheless submit the uncompleted questionnaire to the FBI
for further review or investigation.
On average gun violence claims the lives of 90 persons each day.
Since 1968, more than a million persons have died at the hand of a gun.
The homicide rate in the United States is about 6.9 times higher than
the combined rate in 22 other highly-developed and populous countries,
despite similar non-lethal crime and violence rates.
I will add that the challenges to Homeland Security is not a matter
of seeing the world as a binary choice--us against them whether we are
speaking of an ethnic group or a religion.
Our fight against terrorists is long-term and evolving--they adapt
as their ability to wage war on the battlefields abroad becomes more
difficult.
This means that we must also adapt to effectively cut off their
ability to influence those who are susceptible to their messages of
violence.
We must recognize that the threats are not just from outside of the
country, but also stem from domestic violent extremist groups.
It took September 11, 2001, for the world to fully understand the
danger posed by al-Qaeda.
ISIS/ISIL, a new, and unfortunately, much improved version of al-
Qaeda:
sought out the Syrian conflict--where it could ferment more
war and violence so that no governing order could be found;
turned on any moderate or tolerant Muslim group engaged in
conflict with Syrian government and murdered them; and
conducted a ``lightning war,'' or blitzkrieg attack, into
Iraq and formed the largest border disruption since World War
II.
The ISIS/ISIL's control stretches from the towns along the Syrian-
Turkish border to Raqqa, in northern Syria, that once stretched across
the obliterated Iraqi border into Mosul, Tikrit, and Falluja, through
farming towns south of Baghdad--involving one-third of the territory of
both Iraq and Syria are involved or impacted by this act of aggression.
As the tide has turned in the war against ISIS/ISIL they have
focused their efforts on engaging and recruiting people to carry out
violent acts in their name.
In the last year alone, ISIS has claimed responsibility for crimes,
atrocities, and terroristic attacks, and deaths in Saudi Arabia, Yemen,
Egypt, Beirut, Turkey, Paris, San Bernardino, California, and Orlando,
Florida.
Our efforts to counter the influence of domestic and international
violent extremist groups here at home we must recognize that this is
not a matter of what we call the threat, but how we respond to the
threat.
countering violent extremism
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) both domestic and international
in nature is a priority that the Nation and policy makers must face.
To succeed in the fight against violent extremism defined by the
actions of ISIS/ISIL and Boko Haram we must use every asset available
to stop the spread of the violence they perpetrate as well as their
ability to create safe havens in areas where government authority is
not enforced or consistent.
The reality of the threat is no longer a matter of governments
fielding armies or combatants--but the emergence of what is best
described as a new form of geo-military transnational gang activity.
The affiliations of violent extremists individuals and groups are
made up of loosely affiliated people who remaining independent--one
individual or small group may identify with al-Qaeda today, and switch
its identification to ISIL or al-Shabaab or Boko Haram depending on
which group is perceived to be the strongest.
These groups require chaos to function and they attack institutions
and people regardless of their religious or ethnic traditions to
destabilize regions.
It is ironic and sad that the single greatest casualty group of
ISIS/ISIL are Muslims--especially those who are women, children,
disabled, and elderly.
There is a global refugee crisis in large part because of the
upheaval in the region of the Middle East impacted by war that has
lasted more than a decade because the United States made a bad decision
to invade Iraq.
The repercussions of that one bad decision cannot be wiped away as
easily as some would have many believe.
There are refugees who are seeking safety and the United States
should be part of the nations taking in refugees.
A refugee to the United States is not the path a terrorist would
take because it is hard, takes a very long time, and offers too much
uncertainty regarding success.
Each applicant for asylum in the United States must:
1. register with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;
2. provide background information, including what caused him or her
to flee their home country (a ready means of comparing
information provided by more than 1 million refugees to further
verify the validity of the information provided);
3. meet 1 of 5 legal qualifications: Threat of violence based on
race, religion, or faith or national origin; political beliefs;
or membership in a targeted social group.
4. undergo a rigorous background check during which investigators
fact-check the refugee's biography to ensure consistency with
published or documented reports of events such as bombings or
other violence;
5. be subjected to biometric tests conducted by the Department of
Defense, in conjunction with other Federal agencies (the U.S.
military has an extensive biometric database on Iraqis from its
time in Iraq); and
6. sit for intensive in-person interviews, which may take months or
years before they are conducted.
If, during the screening process, a person from Syria gives a
response that raise red flags he or she is selected for more intense
examination by U.S. intelligence agencies.
The process for those refugees from the conflict area who have
entered the United States began with the High Commissioner for Refugees
who referred 22,000 applicants to the United States for consideration.
The United States through its process only allowed 7,000 for
further consideration for admittance and in its final decision
permitted 2,000 individuals to be cleared for entrance into the
country.
The demographic breakdown of those Syrians who have been
approved for refugee status to come to the United States is as
follows: Children, 50%; persons over the age of 60, 25%; Combat
age males, 2'%.
I understand, as does the Chair and Ranking Member of this
committee along with Members on both sides of the aisle that there is
much more to the work that first responders do than most could imagine.
That is why I introduced H.R. 2795, the ``First Responder
Identification of Emergency Needs in Disaster Situations,'' (FRIENDS
Act), which was passed by the House.
The FRIENDS Act embodies the important and fundamental idea that we
have an obligation to ensure that the first responders who protect our
loved ones in emergencies, have the peace of mind that comes from
knowing that their loved ones are safe while they do their duty.
The FRIENDS Act reflects stakeholder input and bipartisan
collaboration with the Majority.
I am passionate about the work of those who dedicate themselves to
public service.
As the Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Crime, Homeland Security, Terrorism and Investigations, I am working to
support the work of law enforcement on the streets and neighborhoods of
our Nation.
I hold in high regard the service of firefighters, law enforcement
officers, emergency response technicians, nurses, emergency room
doctors, and the dozens of other professionals who are the ultimate
public servants.
First responders are called to serve and few outside of their ranks
can understand why they do the work that they do each day--placing
their lives in harm's way to save a stranger.
Law enforcement officers, fire fighters, and emergency medical
technicians make our lives safer, while often at the same time putting
their own lives at risk.
I am grateful for your service and look forward to your testimony.
Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. We are pleased to have a distinguished
panel of witnesses here before us today on this topic. I want
to thank all of you for being here today.
First, we have Chief Art Acevedo. He is my police chief and
he is also my friend in my hometown of Austin, Texas. Next, we
have Sheriff Michael Bouchard from Oakland County Sheriff's
Office in Oakland County, Michigan. Next, we have Sheriff Jerry
Demings from the Orange County Sheriff's Office in Orange
County, Florida. Finally, Mr. John Miller, deputy commissioner
for intelligence and counterterrorism at the New York City
Police Department.
I want to thank all of you for being here, particularly Mr.
Miller, who I know is very busy with the work and task at hand
back home in New York. Thanks to all of you for being here.
I now would like to recognize Chief Acevedo for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF ART ACEVEDO, CHIEF OF POLICE, AUSTIN, TEXAS
Chief Acevedo. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking
Member Thompson, and Members of the committee. I come here
before you today as the first vice president of the Major
Cities Chiefs Organization, which really represents 68 of the
largest cities of the United States, and the chairman of the
homeland security committee.
I want to, first of all, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and your
committee for your outstanding leadership and your work in this
vital area at a time when I think the threat not only continues
to expand, but the consequences of terrorism are hitting our
communities every day.
I can tell you that the one thing that keeps us all up is
the issue of the lone wolf. We have been talking about lone
wolves for several years now, but just in the last few days, we
have seen the consequences of these needles in the haystack
that can become radicalized. We can no longer call this an
emerging threat. It is an imminent threat, it is an on-going
threat, and it is a threat that we must continue to fight.
We have witnessed the horror of these lone wolves, not just
this weekend, but in my own city. Although we are talking about
Muslim extremists, we also have to keep in mind that we have
our own home-grown extremists with very different views,
including extremely left or right. They are extremists no
matter which way you look at it and we can't lose sight of
that.
As you recall, Mr. Chairman, about 3 years ago now, three
Thanksgivings ago we had a young man by the name of Mr.
McQuilliams, who was part of an extremist movement called the
Phineas Priesthood, who on that Thanksgiving night went around
Austin trying to burn down the Mexican consulate with an AK-47
type of assault rifle, attacked the consulate, attacked the
Federal courthouse, and attacked our headquarters, firing 108
rounds into our occupied headquarters, nearly striking one of
our detectives, in the middle of the night. Fortunately, we had
an American hero, a Texas hero, that was able to stop the
threat with one shot. Only in Texas can a police sergeant take
a shot, while he is being shot at with an AK-47 from 312 feet
away, strike the suspect right in the heart, while holding two
horses with one hand. I think it speaks to the professionalism
of the American police officer and the courage, despite the
National discussion around policing today, which I can tell
you, as imperfect as it is, we still have the best Nation of
cops serving.
Now, the lone wolf. We know that they are out there, we
know that they are hurting us, we know that they are going to
continue to hurt us; and radicalization is how they get to that
point. It is important for this committee, especially for
elected officials, to temper our comments and temper our broad
brushes we are using to paint members of a community, of a
religion, of a race, of a national origin as criminals or as
terrorists. We know that individuals that feel marginalized or
feel that they are not welcome end up being much more
susceptible to radicalization, whether it is from a street gang
or an Islamist overseas that is using social media to
radicalize folks. So it is critical that we continue as police
departments and sheriff's departments and as a Nation to build
bridges, to make people feel welcome.
The communities that we serve, whether they are Muslim,
African American, Hispanic, Asian, Christian, Jewish, they are
our greatest force multipliers. They are the ones that are
going to spot the suspicious behavior. They are the ones that
have to feel that they are embraced and welcomed by law
enforcement and by this Nation, that they can come forward.
If you look at just what happened in New York City, it was
a community member that found one of the unexploded devices. It
was, I believe, a member of the Sikh community, that happened
to own a bar, that trusted the New York City Police Department,
that felt that they are included by the New York City Police
Department, embraced by the New York City Police Department,
and came forward and helped the New York City Police Department
capture that suspect before he can carry out more terror in our
Nation.
So again, outreach is key, and we look forward to
continuing to do just that for our community.
The criminal intelligence enterprise, Mr. Chairman, you
know, is really important to us. We continue to work on the
National level with the sheriff's departments, with their intel
commanders groups to really be able to tie some of the issues
that we see across the country to be able to not just disrupt
but to prevent terrorism. I look forward to talking about that.
One of the areas that we really need help is the Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program. There is really no
National coordination, no designated official at DHS with
responsibility to prepare and implement a terrorism prevention
plan, and LETPP really needs to be explored and, hopefully,
absolutely strengthened.
One of the biggest frustrations I have as a police chief,
and I think my colleagues will share this, is as it relates to
grant funding and the distribution of funds, FEMA is still not
the right organization to be spearheading that. FEMA is much,
much too--too much focused on response. Well, if we are
responding to a terrorism attack, we have already failed the
American people. We have got to have another office that
understands the importance of prevention and the importance of
disruption. Unfortunately, FEMA, despite our efforts as police
executives to put more effort in terms of funding for
prevention and disruption, continues to focus on response. My
response to that is, it is too late, not only in terms of the
psychological impact on this Nation and the economic impact. We
failed at that point. So we really want you to look really hard
at how those funds are being distributed and who is responsible
for those funds being distributed.
The law enforcement leadership position at DHS, the
assistant secretary of local law enforcement, was established
by Congress, but the position still cannot deliver the results
that I think was the vision of Congress, because it lacks
authority, budget, and staffing.
We hope that you will consider remedying this organization
by further directing DHS to put some teeth into that position.
Fortunately, the incumbent assistant secretary of law
enforcement, Heather Fong, continues to work with us. But she
is able to do so because of the efforts of Deputy Secretary
Mayorkas, who has played an integral role in helping her
despite those challenges.
Encryption, as we have discussed, Mr. Chairman, continues
to be a great challenge. I hope that we will look at having
industry, when we put in a search warrant, not sit on it, not
sit on it for days on end when we have seconds, hours, minutes
to try to disrupt the next attack, whether it is from a person
with mental illness, an Islamic radical, or some other radical.
We have to have laws that make these things a priority. I can
tell you that is extremely frustrating.
I want to also say that emergency communications is an
ongoing priority for us at the Major Cities. I want to thank
Congressman Donovan and Ranking Member Payne for your
leadership in making communications a stand-alone asset at the
Federal level.
Last, UASI. As you know, we were a UASI city in Austin. We
are no longer UASI. The funding has really been reduced to
about one-third. We hope and pray that, today, that your bill,
Mr. Chairman, 5859 passes, because it will be instrumental in
helping us to continue to prepare and disrupt and respond to
the next threat.
Mr. Donovan, I just want to say thank you and, Chairman
McCaul, for 5308, which is really doing what we should do. It
is kind of like asset forfeiture from drug traffic
organizations. We absolutely should take the interest from
terrorist organizations and invest that interest in the safety
of the American people and in the safety of our communities
from everyday crime and from terrorism.
So I thank you all for your leadership, and I look forward
to the discussion.
[The prepared statement of Chief Acevedo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Art Acevedo
September 21, 2016
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee: The central purpose of this hearing is the paramount
responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--to prevent
a terrorist attack on the American people. The events of this week
remind us that the threat is real and we must be more vigilant than
ever before.
I appear before you today on behalf of law enforcement executives
in every major urban area of our Nation, where each of us has taken a
solemn oath to protect the communities we serve.
It is my honor to serve as the first vice president and as the
chairman of the homeland security committee for Major Cities Chiefs.
Major Cities Chiefs is an organization of the 68 largest cities in the
Nation, representing virtually every significant target of a terrorist
attack.
I come before you today as the Chief of Police in Austin, Texas and
will begin by thanking my Congressman, your Chairman, for the
opportunity to testify about what is on the minds of every American,
``where will terrorism strike next and what measures will we take to
help keep us safe?''
the ``lone wolf''--an on-going threat
Radicalized persons living in the United States can no longer be
called ``An Emerging Threat.'' Everyone recognizes the threat of an
individual or a small group of radicalized individuals, who are either
acting alone or as agents, are inspired by a foreign terrorist
organization. Persons vulnerable to radicalization can be easy prey and
ISIS has made headway in recruiting via the internet. While we can
occasionally track those who go overseas for terrorist training, we
will never be able to determine how many here in the United States that
succumb to internet propaganda.
We have witnessed with horror how one or two armed terrorists can
prey upon the innocent public with catastrophic consequences. While the
incidents over the past weekend included explosive devices, we have
seen massive casualties without explosives and fully automatic weapons.
The wide-spread availability of firearms in our country makes it
possible for potentially dangerous persons to legally acquire weapons
to cause mayhem and colossal causalities. We have witnessed this
carnage in a California county office building and a Florida nightclub.
Whether it's ISIS abroad or home-grown extremists, the threat exists
and haunts police chiefs every day.
community engagement--our best defense
An isolated extremist or small group of radicals are likely to be
noticed during everyday community life. We must redouble our efforts to
form partnerships with community leaders, especially in the Muslim
community. Law enforcement executives like myself are reaching out
across the Nation to establish working relationships to counter violent
extremism. We commend the Appropriations Committee for establishing a
grant program that is now underway at the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to fund innovative community-based programs to counter
violent extremism. Best Practices must be replicated and pilot efforts
must become a wide-spread policy in every community.
Key actions to stop a ``lone wolf'' are less likely to come from
Federal intelligence or international communication intercepts. Our
defense against violent extremists is the community itself. Information
is received when we have the trust of the community we serve. We may
hear this information from neighbors, co-workers, and family members.
We have but to look back on the events of the past few days:
The explosive devices in New Jersey were found by members of
the public who called police; and
The suspect arrested on Monday was identified by a business
owner who called police.
These current cases show what police chiefs and sheriffs already
knew--nothing is more important than public awareness and public
reporting. Sadly, we have seen examples where information about
suspicious behavior came after the incident making it too late to
prevent an attack. More must be done to encourage the public to enforce
``See Something, Say Something.''
Suspicious Activity Reporting Program (SAR) was developed and
piloted with Major Cities Chiefs and provides critical information to
the FBI to this day. Mr. Chairman, we recommend that you consider how
to strengthen this vital program.
the criminal intelligence enterprise (cie)--local intelligence officers
Major Cities Chiefs has joined with Major County Sheriffs to form a
network of senior intelligence officers from every urban area, an
organization without precedent in this country. Each jurisdiction has
designated an intelligence commander. I am pleased to be with one of
them today at the witness table, Deputy Commissioner John Miller of New
York City. Working as a team, these intelligence commanders exchange
information and share intelligence about threats, how to prevent
attacks, and how to respond. We coordinate these efforts with the FBI
JTTF in each urban area, the fusion centers, and DHS. DHS I&A has
provided support to develop a system for sharing information between
the intelligence commanders.
How do our local operations relate to those of the FBI and DHS?
Chiefs and Sheriffs must determine how and where to deploy personnel
for both prevention and response.
If there is an attack in Europe on public transportation or
intelligence that we face such a threat, who decides if there
should be armed tactical teams to deter and respond at key
transportation points? Local law enforcement makes that
decision.
If there is an attack in Europe at a major sporting event or
intelligence that we face such a threat, who steps up
surveillance and ramps up security measures at these venues?
Local law enforcement makes that decision.
If there is an attack in the public area of a European
airport or intelligence that we face such a threat, who takes
measures to strengthen airport security? Local law enforcement
makes that decision.
While we are partners with DHS and the FBI, neither Federal agency
can take the steps I have described in these examples. That's why we
established the Criminal Intelligence Enterprise (CIE)--so we can
collaborate on measures to protect the public from harm--the very
purpose of this hearing.
law enforcement terrorism prevention--our common purpose
There is no more important and no more neglected program than
LETPP--the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program. Once a
hallmark of Congressional intent to prevent a terrorist attack on the
homeland, LETPP has become little more than a bureaucratic requirement,
Governors must ``check the box'' for their funding from the Federal
Emergency Management System (FEMA). There is no National coordination
and no designated official at DHS with responsibility to prepare and
implement a terrorism prevention plan. The committee must share in the
blame--because Congress has never empowered the Assistant Secretary for
Law Enforcement to assume this responsibility. Worse yet, FEMA has
downgraded terrorism prevention from the program established by
Congress to a bureaucratic definition now call ``Law Enforcement
Terrorism Prevention Activities''. FEMA has renamed LETPP to LEPTA,
merely ``Activities'', thus confirming there is no FEMA commitment and
no DHS program to coordinate local law enforcement efforts to prevent
terrorism.
law enforcement programs and funding at fema--an on-going mistake
So long as this committee leaves FEMA in charge of law enforcement
grants and programs, critical priorities will be neglected and public
safety will suffer. Consider the background, mission, culture, and
leadership at FEMA, and try to find anything that relates to law
enforcement and terrorism prevention.
Let me offer a recent and compelling example--the funding which the
Appropriations Committee has provided in response to recent terrorist
attacks in Paris, San Bernardino, Brussels, and Istanbul. Termed
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks, this is the worst of the worst.
But we heard nothing from FEMA about what has been planned and we were
given no opportunity for input. The Federal agency focused on natural
disasters did not have the right approach to stop terrorists. We
learned that FEMA had no plans to use any of the $50 million for law
enforcement operations or prevention of a terrorist attack. Thanks to
the Deputy Secretary and the Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement,
FEMA has been asked to reconsider and recast the planned program.
Neither the administration, nor DHS can correct this misplaced
responsibility. Only Congress can put law enforcement programs and
terrorism prevention on the right track, which is not under the
direction of FEMA. We turn to this committee today and ask that you
consider a new way forward where law enforcement and terrorism
prevention would be extracted from beneath the FEMA bureaucracy and
placed in an appropriate and prominent position at DHS--empowered to
address the highest priority for us all--protection of the American
people from any terrorist attack.
law enforcement leadership at dhs
Congress established the position of assistant secretary for local
law enforcement, but the vision of Congress remains unfulfilled to this
date. The position you created has been unable to realize even a small
fraction of the potential foreseen by Congress. The position cannot
deliver needed results because it lacks authority, budget, and
staffing. On behalf of every major city in America, we ask the
committee to consider legislation to remedy this critical weakness in
the organization of DHS. Unless Congress acts to empower this position,
the assistant secretary represents a token gesture toward public safety
and only a hollow shell of law enforcement at DHS. But this need not
continue, with your leadership and partnership, DHS can do so much more
for public safety. We implore you to legislate appropriate authority
and resources for this key position at DHS.
Incumbent Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement Heather Fong has
been extremely effective because her efforts have had the strong
support of Deputy Secretary Mayorkas. At the time of his nomination,
the Deputy Secretary pledged to law enforcement that he would listen to
us and direct needed changes at DHS. I am here to report that he has
kept his word on a wide range of critical issues, including his strong
support to empower the assistant secretary. Without his leadership and
personal commitment on law enforcement issues, the committee would hear
loud complaints indeed. So long as this committee leaves law
enforcement programs buried under the FEMA bureaucracy and fails to
grant authorities to the assistant secretary for law enforcement, our
priorities are addressed only when directed by the deputy secretary.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee--please know that our
successes at DHS are not because of the current organizational
structure--progress has been made in spite of it.
encryption--a threat to public safety
Law enforcement leaders embrace encryption and respect privacy
rights. Police agencies themselves have been the victim of unlawful
intrusions, cyber attacks, and the theft of sensitive data. To protect
privacy and unreasonable searches, police are trained to follow strict
procedures and required by law to obtain court orders when obtaining
protected evidence. These established laws and procedures have served
Americans well, and represent the balance between individual rights and
protection of the public.
New measures designed to safeguard data security and privacy have
thrown off the balance and have had an unintended result--they prevent
local emergency responders from helping persons in danger and
apprehending offenders who prey on the public. Both encryption
technologies and proposed privacy measures have crossed over the point
of balance and go to such extremes that police and sheriffs are
prevented from discharging our most fundamental duty--protection of the
public.
When police and sheriffs have a court-approved warrant, or there is
an immediate threat of grave harm, service providers should respond
with urgency, but that is not the reality we now face. Until the recent
refusal by Apple to assist the FBI with a phone recovered by the San
Bernardino terrorists, the public was not aware that police routinely
face delay and roadblocks when attempting to obtain information from
service providers and cellular device manufacturers--even when that
information is needed to save lives and has been directed to be
provided through a court order.
When lives are in danger and violent offenders seek to prey upon
the public, the industry should not be permitted to ignore court
orders--no entity is above the law and no business model purposefully
crafted to thwart criminal investigations should be acceptable to this
committee. We are grateful for the efforts of the Chairman to address
this issue and we pledge our continuing support to restore the balance
between privacy and public safety.
emergency communications--an on-going priority
We commend the committee and wish to express our appreciation for
your response to our concerns about the priority of emergency
communications. When 5 National associations, including the Major
Cities Chiefs, expressed our grave doubts about the proposed DHS
reorganization--you responded with legislation that did exactly what is
needed--your reorganization bill would remove emergency communications
from beneath cybersecurity and place it in the prominent position where
it belongs, with a line item budget so that first responders can see
the level of funding devoted to our lifeblood--emergency
communications. Our grateful thanks to Congressman Donovan and Ranking
Member Payne for their leadership on these vital issues.
urban area security initiative (uasi)--a greatly diminished resource
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) represents the responsibility
that each of you shares with a chief of police--protecting the American
people from harm. Major Cities Chiefs counts every one of the UASI
cities in our membership and that means we have a direct tie to the
important work of this committee, but the UASI program designed to
support preparedness and prevention efforts has been diminished as the
threat has increased. UASI is a small shadow of what it once was. The
President's budget cuts UASI to $330 million, if you add the State
Homeland Security Grant Program proposal for $200 million, that is a
total of $550 million, just a third of the more than $1.6 billion in
2009 and 2010. These cutbacks have severely hampered the critical
efforts of fusion centers and homeland security programs in the major
urban areas--at a time when they are needed more than ever before.
the way forward
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, chiefs of police and
sheriffs are grateful for all you do. We look to you for leadership, we
cannot accept the status quo, that is not leadership. Thanks to
Chairman McCaul and the committee, today's hearing is an opportunity to
take a fresh look at what can be done to strengthen the security of our
homeland. From here I will go to meet with Chairman Carter to encourage
the mutual efforts of your colleagues on the Appropriations Committee.
We call upon you to legislate needed changes that will strengthen the
partnership between law enforcement and the Department of Homeland
Security. Our common bond is the safety of the public we have sworn to
protect.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Chief Acevedo.
The Chair recognizes Sheriff Bouchard.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. BOUCHARD, OAKLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S
OFFICE, OAKLAND COUNTY, MICHIGAN
Sheriff Bouchard. Well, good morning, Chairman McCaul,
Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the
committee. My name is Michael Bouchard. I am the sheriff of
Oakland County and I have been in law enforcement for almost 30
years, and run one of the Nation's largest sheriff's offices. I
will be speaking briefly, but in my actual testimony I
submitted, I go into greater depths. So we will kind-of be at a
30,000 feet on this.
I am the vice president in charge of government affairs for
Major County Sheriffs' Association of America, and I am
testifying on their behalf. Like all of you and all of our
fellow Americans, on
9/11, our world was changed dramatically. I was proud to lead a
team to work at Ground Zero immediately after the attack. Over
the past 15 years, our country has made great progress in our
ability to prepare for, respond to, and prevent terrorist
attacks.
The men and women of law enforcement work every day to
ensure our individual communities and our local neighborhood
streets, as the Chairman said, do not become the next
battleground.
The nature of violence in America and around the world has
evolved, and as the good chief mentioned, the expansion of
encryption, the use of social media for mass propaganda,
inspiration of lone-wolf attacks, and selective recruitment is
very evident and very prevalent.
We in the law enforcement community find ourselves in a new
age where criminals and terrorists enthusiastically operate
beyond the confines of law through encrypted networks and
applications in mobile devices. The MCSA partnered with the
Major Cities Chiefs to examine that issue at depth of going
dark. I would like to submit our joint paper into the record,
Mr. Chairman, following this discussion.
Chairman McCaul. Without objection so ordered.*
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* The information has been retained in committee files and is also
available at https://www.majorcitieschiefs.com/pdf/news/
going_dark_april_2016.pdf.
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Sheriff Bouchard. The home-grown violent extremists are
another example of the evolving dynamic threat environment
facing local law enforcement. HVEs can come from a variety of
backgrounds and driven by either religious or ideological
factors. They present a uniquely dangerous situation for local
law enforcement because they are familiar with U.S. customs and
day-to-day activities.
Robust community engagement, as was mentioned by the chief,
is very important and a direct way of combatting violent
extremism. It requires commitment from the agency leadership to
meet with leaders of diverse communities. Through dedication
and consistency, those relationships become resilient.
As evidenced by recent radical Islamic terrorist attack in
San Bernardino and others, the threat to public safety and
National security posed by our Government's refugee and visa
programs are real. When a query is conducted and no information
is available from their home country, it is impossible to
verify the information needed to make an informed decision on
the threat level posed by an applicant.
The DHS OIG published a report on Monday that found the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services granted citizenship
to over 800 individuals from special interest countries who had
been ordered deported or removed under a different name. That
is the vetting process we are talking about. The Refugee Act
requires Federal Government to consult regularly with State and
local governments concerning sponsorship process and the
intended distribution of refugees to State and localities.
Despite this requirement, no one from the Federal
Government has made any effort to consult with my county or
members of our association on this issue. There has been over
1,200 refugees settled in my State, with the majority in my
county, and not one phone call.
With the increased threat environment, law enforcement has
been continually asked to do more with less. The President has
proposed a fiscal year 2017 budget that cuts UASI funding by 45
percent. The total amount of SCAAP reimbursements received have
been reduced every year.
Through executive action and not legislation the
administration recalled certain 1033 military surplus
equipment. On the same day as the San Bernardino terror attack,
my office received an order to return an armored personnel
carrier to be destroyed because it looks too militarized.
An armored vehicle pulls up every day at a bank or a
grocery store to protect money and it is viewed as normal. But
if law enforcement pulls up in the same vehicle at the same
building to protect lives, somehow it is bad.
In fiscal year 2016, Congress allocated $39 million to DHS
for a grant initiative specifically to help local governments
prepare, prevent, and respond to complex coordinated attacks.
Law enforcement stakeholders proactively offered suggestions to
FEMA to address law enforcement needs, and we are quickly
approaching fiscal year 2017 and no progress has been made on
that issue either.
After I self-deployed at the direct request of involved
agencies to Ground Zero and Hurricane Katrina, we engaged in
great dialog with FEMA about how to formulate, create, equip,
and train regional response teams. Where does that program
stand today? I don't know. It has been 2 years we worked on
that and it has completely fallen off the map.
Despite the administration claims, our borders are more
secure than ever. Undocumented individuals continue to
illegally enter the homeland. If we don't have border security,
we do not have National security.
I would like to thank the committee and its staff for all
of their work. Bipartisan and countless bills have passed this
committee with the aim to secure our homeland. I would also
like to thank the Chairman for his commitment and collaboration
and willingness to engage us in local law enforcement. It is
greatly appreciated and often not heard at other levels. I
would also like to thank the committee, and I look forward to
each of your questions. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Sheriff Bouchard follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael J. Bouchard
September 21, 2016
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished Members of
the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify this morning on
behalf of the Major County Sheriffs' Association.
I am currently serving my fourth 4-year term as Sheriff and have
been in law enforcement for almost 30 years. I run one of the largest
Sheriff's Offices in the country where I oversee 1,300 employees and
manage an annual budget of over $141 million dollars. We provide
police, jail, and court services for over 1.2 million people and nearly
1,000 square miles. In addition to serving the people of Oakland
County, I am also the vice president and chair of government affairs of
the Major County Sheriffs' Association of America (MCSA). The MCSA is
an association of elected Sheriffs representing our Nation's largest
counties with populations of 500,000 people or more. Collectively, we
serve over 100 million Americans.
I, like you, felt the world change on 9/11. I was proud to lead a
team to work at Ground Zero immediately after the attack. To me, it was
one of the worst days in our Nation's history and at the same time, was
also one of the proudest. In the depth of that pain, suffering, and
shock, we showed great support and love for each other.
Over the past 15 years, our country has made great progress in our
Nation's ability to prepare for, respond to, and prevent terrorist
attacks here in the United States. The men and women that make up the
local law enforcement agencies in the United States are committed to
this effort. We work every day, every night, and every holiday, to
ensure that our individual communities and our local neighborhood
streets are not the next battleground in this on-going effort. On 9/11
many selfless sacrifices were on display that day. Those kinds of
selfless sacrifices have continued to this day but unfortunately, we
don't see the unity or the laser focus on how we can defeat this
dangerous enemy. I thank you for making it your focus.
Threat Evolution.--The nature of violence in America and around the
world has evolved as has the expansion of encryption, use of social
media for mass propaganda, inspiration for lone-wolf attacks and
selective recruitment. It is no secret that social media has played a
primary role in the unprecedented uptick of ISIS sympathizers and
disciples. Through the George Washington University Program on
Extremism, over 300 American and/or U.S.-based ISIS sympathizers have
been identified on-line as actively spreading propaganda.\1\ Since
March 2014, 85 individuals across 24 States have been charged in the
United States with offenses related to ISIS and it has been reported
that since the fall of 2015, roughly 250 Americans have traveled or
attempted to travel to join ISIS.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/
ISIS%20in%20America%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf.
\2\ https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/
ISIS%20in%20America%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the influence of ISIS inspiring acts of abhorrent violence, we
are reaching a National crisis point. As ISIS and other terrorist
groups, such as al-Shabaab, reach out to individuals within the United
States, the threat of lone-wolf attacks on U.S. soil is increasing.
Instead of luring radicalized Americans overseas, the Islamic State
encourages actors to stay home and carry out their acts of terror on
the motherland.
LE Preparedness.--Law enforcement is the first group to respond to
areas in times of emergency, with the great responsibility to act
quickly and effectively in times of terror and uncertainty. This was
clearly shown in San Bernardino and Orlando. Securing the homeland
cannot be an afterthought--law enforcement regularly and proactively
prepares for the unthinkable and as the threat picture and nature of
violence has evolved, so too has local law enforcement.
After the attacks in Mumbai, I contacted all the chiefs in my area
of responsibility and called on us to train together on a regular
basis. Further, we needed to train on the same tactics so we could
respond and meld together immediately should a similar scenario develop
in my AOR. We have since trained thousands of police officers. Local
police are now directly responsible for responding to the changing
threat matrix.
HVE.--Home-grown Violent Extremists (HVE's) are an example of the
evolving and dynamic threat environment facing local law enforcement
today. HVE's can come from a variety of backgrounds and can be driven
by either religious or ideological factors. These individuals often
become radicalized though social media or other on-line propaganda.
HVE's present a uniquely dangerous situation for local law enforcement
because they are often very familiar with U.S. Customs and the day-to-
day activities of the community and neighborhood where they live. This
makes them hard to detect, and as their path to radicalization
advances, they are often able to commit their violent acts with little
or no warning for local law enforcement in their community.
Over the past year or so, we have seen incidents like this unfold
in Chattanooga, TN, San Bernardino, CA, and Orlando, FL.
Community Engagement.--Robust community engagement efforts are a
direct way of combating violent extremism in local communities.
Community engagement requires commitment at all levels in a local law
enforcement agency. It requires commitment from agency leadership to
reach out and meet with leaders from the diverse communities in their
jurisdiction. These relationships are not built overnight, but through
dedication and consistency, the relationships become resilient. Trust
is built one day at a time. Trust is built one situation at a time.
Furthermore, a robust community engagement effort also requires
commitment from dedicated engagement units/teams. These supervisors and
deputies are the faces of our law enforcement agencies in the
community. They attend the events; they host law enforcement-led
roundtables; they host citizen academy classes; they teach cultural
awareness to other law enforcement officers; and, most importantly,
over time, they become the first point of contact for family members,
teachers, or coaches if they observe something that is not right.
Encryption.--Law enforcement officials' ability to lawfully access
digital evidence has been severely hamstrung by technological
advancements and non-technological barriers to access. We in the law
enforcement community find ourselves in a new age where criminals and
terrorists enthusiastically operate beyond the confines of the law
through encrypted networks, applications, and mobile devices. The
encrypted applications used for preplanning and coordination among the
Paris attackers may have prevented the advance detection of the
attacks, but the cell phone of one of the terrorists recovered outside
the Bataclan theater helped investigators apprehend the ringleader of
the attack, Abdelhamid Abaaoud. When law enforcement officials
identified Abaaoud's cousin in the phone's call list and her location,
Abaaoud was finally located.\3\ It was later confirmed that Abaaoud
died in the detonation of a suicide bomb during the raid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/world/europe/a-view-of-isiss-
evolution-in-new-details-of-paris-attacks.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Refugees.--As the highest law enforcement officer in our counties,
our mandate and priority is to protect our communities. The communities
we serve are vibrant and encompass a myriad of nationalities,
perspectives, and cultures. As a Nation of immigrants, we are sensitive
to the humanitarian needs of refugees being persecuted in their home
country, but it must first be weighed against protecting the homeland
from those that seek to harm America.
The current administration claims Syrian refugees will be
sufficiently vetted via ``enhanced security screening'' and the
American people should not be fearful of ``women and children'' being
allowed entry into the country. However, FBI Director Comey sat before
this very committee and stated, ``We can only query against that which
we have collected. And so if someone has never made a ripple in the
pond in Syria in a way that would get their identity or their interest
reflected in our database, we can query our database until the cows
come home, but there will be nothing show up because we have no record
of them.''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ https://homeland.house.gov/press/nations-top-security-
officials-concerns-on-refugee-vetting/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The threat to public safety and National security posed by the
Federal Government's refugee and visa programs are real, as evidenced
by the recent radical Islamic terrorist attack in San Bernardino. The
female attacker entered the United States in 2014 on a K-1 Visa and
despite being ``vetted,'' the process did not uncover her intentional
use of a false address in Pakistan, her contacts with other radical
jihadists, or her own radical ideology--an ideology she openly
expressed on her Facebook page. Consequently, she was allowed into the
United States without any restrictions and was able to fly under the
radar without any red flags being raised prior to the attack.
The current vetting process for refugees is entirely insufficient.
When a query is conducted and no information is available from their
home country to help validate the information submitted on the
application, it is impossible to adequately verify all of the
information needed to make an informed decision on the threat level
posed by the applicant.
All refugees allowed to enter the United States should be closely
monitored by the Federal Government and their personal information and
resident address should be provided to local law enforcement agencies
(LEA) immediately upon their placement into a community to ensure
sufficient oversight and facilitate communication between Federal,
State, and local LEAs. In fact, the Refugee Act (Pub. L. 92-212)
specifically requires the Federal Government to consult regularly with
State and local governments and private nonprofit voluntary agencies
concerning the sponsorship process and the intended distribution of
refuges among the States and localities.\5\ Despite this requirement,
no one from the Federal Government has made any effort to consult with
my county or other members in our association. There have been over
1,200 refugees settled in my State with the majority in my county which
makes us the top 2 in the Nation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/96/212.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Political correctness should not prevent proactive compliance
protocols from being implemented and enforced on those allowed to enter
the country and participate in the refugee program. ISIS has stated
they intend to imbed terrorists in the refugee program and we should
take them at their word. Since the vetting process is demonstrably
insufficient to prevent terrorists from posing as true refugees, it
should be suspended from countries of interest until such time as its
process ensures not a single refugee enters the homeland under false
pretenses. Consequently, the Federal Government's plan to dramatically
increase the number of refugees into America from countries of interest
is extremely concerning and, in its current state, has the very real
potential to compromise National security.
Prison Radicalization.--Prison radicalization and recruitment is an
on-going concern. Former Director of the Bureau of Prisons, Harley
Lappin, testified back in 2003 before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security where he stated, ``We
know that inmates are particularly vulnerable to recruitment by
terrorists and that we must guard against the spread of terrorism and
extremist ideologies . . . In addition, our institutions work closely
with the Local Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) to share information
and intelligence about these inmates.''\6\ Many of our MCSA members
devote both personnel and resources to these JTTFs without Federal
reimbursement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
lappin_testimony_10_14_03.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Influential radicalized inmates pose a series of complex challenges
to law enforcement officials--they can encourage other prisoners, upon
release, to go to specific locations in an effort to further their
extremist ideologies and can urge inmates to incite violence within the
facility posing a substantial risk to prison security.
Grants.--With an increased threat environment, law enforcement has
continually been tasked to do more with less. Cost implications coupled
with a heightened security environment is simply unsustainable. In an
era of deep budget cuts and lack of Federal funding, State and local
law enforcement does not have the necessary funds, and most recently
access to necessary life-saving equipment.
Grant programs such as the State Homeland Security Grant Program
(SHSP) and the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) work to address
gaps in local agencies capabilities for responding to terrorist
threats. Other programs such as the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice
Assistance Grant Program (JAG) have a broader focus of providing
critical funding to support a range of different program areas. Over
the past few fiscal years, law enforcement has seen a steady decline in
Federal grant funding and most recently, President Obama's fiscal year
2017 budget request cut UASI funds by 45 percent. The amount of monies
we receive for these new and evolving threats is a trickle at best.
Also, our brothers and sisters in fire service receive grants for
personnel with no match. Police grants typically have at least a 25%
match so the communities in the greatest need due to financial distress
caused layoffs do not have the financial ability to accept the grant
due to cost implications.
In 1994 the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), U.S. Department of
Justice began to administer the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program
(SCAAP), which ``provides Federal payments to States and localities
that incurred correctional officer salary costs for incarcerating
undocumented criminal aliens who have at least one felony or two
misdemeanor convictions for violations of State or local law, and who
are incarcerated for at least 4 consecutive days during the reporting
period.''
Despite SCAAP program funding, it does not fully reimburse actual
detention costs associated with the incarceration of illegal criminal
aliens. Instead, data received by all applicant agencies is combined to
determine each applicant's relative percentage of the total SCAAP
allocation.
Consequently, it is not uncommon for most agencies to receive SCAAP
reimbursement of only a few percentage points of the actual costs
incurred. Historically, the total amount of reimbursements received
have been drastically reduced every year, especially since 2008. For
example, in San Bernardino County, the SCAAP reimbursement in 2008 was
$2,324,814. In 2015, the reimbursement was reduced by over 80% to
$425,559.
Military Surplus Equipment.--The Law Enforcement Support Office
(LESO) military surplus and Federal grant programs are examples of a
good partnership between the Federal Government and local government
entities. It is fiscally responsible and assists in equipping our
Nation's law enforcement with equipment that saves lives. In areas of
our Nation that are fiscally stressed, it is potentially the only way
their law enforcement officers would ever receive that type of support.
The transfer of equipment from Federal inventory saves taxpayers a
significant amount of money, simply because Federal surplus items have
already been purchased once. In fact, many of the same items that they
receive through Federal assistance programs have been used by law
enforcement agencies for decades.
Through executive action and not legislation, the administration
has recalled certain 1033-controlled military surplus equipment. While
the ultimate goals of law enforcement remain the same: To protect the
public; to solve, deter, and respond to criminal acts; and to enforce
the law in a responsible and Constitutional manner, the administration
has sought to inappropriately legislate through perception at the cost
of public safety.
On the very same day as the San Bernardino terror attack--our
Nation's worst attack since 9/11--my office received an order to return
an armored personnel carrier back to the Federal Government to be
destroyed because it looked militarized. We should focus on reality not
perception, and on that day America saw reality on live TV in San
Bernardino and how armored vehicles protect people. An armored vehicle
pulls up at a bank or grocery store every day to protect money and it's
viewed as normal. But, if law enforcement pulls up in the same vehicle
at the same store to protect people it's militarized and bad?
In San Bernardino, all items obtained through the 1033 program by
the Sheriff's Office are used solely by specialized divisions and
personnel. Prior to acceptance of this equipment, it receives Board of
Supervisor's approval.
The recall of certain types of controlled equipment will
undoubtedly leave America's law enforcement less prepared and at a
disadvantage to protect local communities against terror attacks and
dangerous situations.
Complex Coordinated Attacks.--In fiscal year 2016 under the banner
of responding to emergent threats from violent extremism, Congress
allocated $39 million dollars to the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) for a grant initiative to specifically help State and local
governments prepare for, prevent, and respond to complex, coordinated
terrorist attacks with the potential for mass casualties and
infrastructure damage.
LE stakeholders proactively offered suggestions to FEMA that
address current LE needs related to prevention and disruption,
realistic training and exercises, and training-related equipment. FEMA
needs to follow Congressional intent and not appropriate the funding
for non LE-focused administrative purposes. We are quickly approaching
fiscal year 2017 and no progress has been made.
FEMA Regional Assets.--I self-deployed at the direct request of
involved agencies to Ground Zero and Hurricane Katrina. Afterwards, we
engaged in great dialogue and discussion about how to formulate and
create, equip and train regional response teams that could be called up
for large situations and the units deployed be expanded out to other
regions as needed. Where does that program stand today? We worked on it
for over 2 years and it fell off the map.
Secure the Border.--Border security remains a top priority for the
MCSA. Our members are located in both Northern and Southwest border
States, where the most negative outgrowths of illegal immigration--from
drugs and gangs to human trafficking and exploitation and terrorist
infiltrations--impact our communities on a daily basis. Despite the
administration's claim that our borders are more secure than ever
before, waves of undocumented individuals continue to illegally enter
the homeland. If we do not have border security, we cannot have
National security.
Additionally, information sharing between Federal, State, local,
and Tribal law enforcement is absolutely critical to maintaining public
safety and combatting a wide variety of inter-State and international
threats that impact our communities. One specific area here that we
remain concerned about focuses on timely delivery of key information
from the Federal level to States and locals on known criminal aliens
that may reside in our communities. There is no direct access to ICE
databases when a person is queried on a traffic stop or as they come
into booking.
Information-sharing responsibilities are binary meaning that
information should not just flow from the bottom up. Frankly, State and
local law enforcement need to know critical information regarding
illegal immigration, as it affects the safety of our officers and the
communities they protect. MCSA has raised this issue for years going
back to the 9/11 commission report component urging information sharing
and we have yet to see any progress made.
I want to thank the committee and its staff for all of their hard
work--countless bills have passed this committee on a bipartisan basis
all with the aim to secure the homeland. National security should not
be a partisan issue; we all have a vested interest. The MCSA seeks to
be a positive source of ideas and I thank the Chairman for his
commitment to collaboration and willingness to engage local law
enforcement.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Sheriff Bouchard.
The Chair recognizes Sheriff Demings.
STATEMENT OF JERRY L. DEMINGS, ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,
ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA
Sheriff Demings. Good morning, Chairman McCaul and Ranking
Member Thompson and Members of the committee. It is indeed an
honor and a privilege for me to provide testimony today during
this hearing to discuss ways to stop the next attack.
I am not here today to be a doomsday reporter, but I do
believe that our Nation has experienced a paradigm shift in our
global war on terror. I agree with the Chair and Ranking Member
that we should not accept the current state of affairs as the
new normal.
There have been numerous recent violent incidents on U.S.
soil which indicates that terror subjects have brought the
fight to our homeland. They are now focusing on soft targets in
our cities and counties, which puts local law enforcement
officers squarely in the crosshairs of violent extremists.
My community, the metropolitan Orlando area, experienced
such an attack on June 12. Members of my agency responded to
assist the Orlando Police Department in the initial response
involving an active shooter. The incident remains under
investigation by the FBI, but it is believed that a lone gunman
killed 49 innocent people and injured another 53 persons in the
Pulse nightclub incident. The incident began shortly after 2
a.m., when Omar Mateen began randomly firing at patrons of a
club that catered to the LGBTQ community on a night dedicated
as Latin night.
Like no other time in our history, if we are going to be
successful at reducing attacks on American citizens by violent
extremists, Federal, State, and local law enforcement
authorities must improve our working relationships in 3 ways.
No. 1, we must improve the access to information, the sharing
of actionable intelligence information that can be used to
identify and arrest subjects involved in plotting attacks
before an attack occurs. No. 3, funding for counterterrorism
efforts, to include training and equipment, must be increased.
As it relates to information, the Department of Homeland
Security, DHS, should reassess its policy on precluding State
and local law enforcement agencies from having access to the
ICE database that identifies individuals as being in this
country illegally. Officer and public safety become a major
issue in instances when law enforcement officers do criminal
history checks in the field through the National Crime
Information Center, NCIC, and they are not made aware of a
subject's immigration status. Immigration enforcement is
clearly a function of the Federal Government and sheriffs do
not seek this authority. We have enough on our plates already.
Our concern is for the safety of our officers. When
officers or deputies encounter someone, and the person is here
illegally, that person assumes the police already know they are
illegal and have the authority to arrest and deport them. Local
and State law enforcement should know who they are dealing
with, even if they cannot arrest for immigration violations.
As it relates to sharing information, Florida sheriffs have
seen increased communication from the Department of Justice and
DHS to State and local law enforcement concerning critical
incidents. Assistant Secretary Heather Fong at DHS's Office of
Partner Engagement has been a driving force behind this, and
most sheriffs and police chiefs have been invited to
participate in conference calls following significant National
and international events affecting law enforcement and public
safety.
I am the current president of the Florida Sheriffs
Association and give credit to DHS Secretary Johnson and FBI
Director Comey for increasing communication with State and
local law enforcement and for pushing facts to sheriffs
directly as opposed to sheriffs receiving information from the
National news media.
In order for American law enforcement to prevent, respond
to, and mitigate domestic terror attacks, analytics, and
training will be integral to stopping the attacks from
proliferating. Central Florida has been the benefactor of
numerous projects funded in previous years by the Urban Area
Security Initiative, or UASI, grant program.
We have been working for the past 2 years to get DHS
funding restored to our region. Primarily, Members of Congress
from both the House and Senate have worked with Orlando Police
Chief Mina and me in these efforts. We have petitioned DHS and
FEMA to reassess the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, Florida MSA and
the need to strengthen and secure Central Florida from another
terror attack like the Pulse nightclub incident.
The Central Florida region has been fortunate to receive
approximately $45.5 million in U.S. funding since 2004. The
Orange County Sheriff's Office has managed the funds. The
funding received prior to 2013 was critical to our region's
ability to prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from, not
only terrorism, but a broad range of other threats and hazards.
We are only as good at preventing a terror attack as the
quality of information we receive about that attack.
I will briefly discuss one of our most notable regional
partnerships in Florida called the Central Florida Intelligence
Exchange, or CFIX for short. It is located in Orlando and is
only one of three fusion centers in Florida. It serves as a
central repository of databases that are currently being used
by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and other Federal,
State, and law enforcement agencies.
In addition to its counterterrorism focus, CFIX serves as
an all-hazards fusion center, assisting agencies in the
mitigation and assistance needed to recover from hazards such
as hurricanes and natural disasters. CFIX assists with the
investigation of crimes that possibly contain a nexus to
terrorist activity or other homeland security issues. In other
words, fusion centers located throughout the country are
pivotal to our Nation's mission of stopping terror attacks.
Due to the lack of funding, some critical needs of our CFIX
or fusion center have been lost. We have reduced a number of
analysts, which could have worked to provide intelligence
information that could prevent a terror attack.
Through the National Infrastructure Protection Program, we
received UASI funding for a video camera surveillance project
in the tourist quarter, downtown Orlando, and in areas near the
University of Central Florida. Due to a loss of funding, we
have not been able to expand the project into areas around our
top tourist destinations.
Prior to June 12, 2016, we held more than a dozen UASI-
funded training exercises over the past 12 years. I believe the
agency's responding to the Pulse incident flawlessly initiated
an active-shooter response because of training paid for through
historical UASI funding. You have a list of the training
exercises in your material.
We train to respond, as a region, to a terror attack or
other disaster. About 150 of my deputies, along with multiple
other law enforcement, fire, and EMS agencies, responded to
assist the Orlando Police Department during the Pulse incident.
Because of the infrastructure connections in our region, it is
a natural thing to have regional capability and vulnerability
assessment. Regional preparedness, response and recovery
efforts are also pivotal to the mission of stopping and/or
reducing terror attacks.
Presently, FEMA uses the Office of Management and Budget's
geographical boundaries defined in the Federal Register when
calculating risk scores for MSAs. We believe that the
boundaries of our Orlando MSA should be expanded to include the
Brevard area to the east and the Volusia County MSA to the
north. We realize that that is a heavy lift.
In September 2015, we began the process of lobbying the
Federal Government to combine the metro Orlando MSA with
Brevard and Volusia. This was broadly supported by Federal,
State, and local elected officials, and numerous letters were
written to the FEMA assistant administrator of grants programs,
the OMB statistician, and the OMB Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs. You have a list and copies of the letters
in your materials.
With attacks in places like Boston, San Bernardino,
Orlando, Dallas, and other places, most recently in New York,
New Jersey, and Minnesota, there is a need to have an overall
increase in UASI funding across the Nation. An overall increase
in UASI funding would expand DHS's ability to fund the top 100
high-risk areas from 85 percent to 90 percent or better of the
areas with the most risk. Areas like Central Florida would no
doubt make the list. Congressman Mica has expressed support to
increase funding Nation-wide.
In 2016, the Orlando MSA was 34 on the list of 100 when
only 29 were funded. Local and State agencies have equipment
needs and the requisite training for use of the equipment,
including mobile command centers, surveillance equipment,
tactical weapons, armored vehicles, and explosive ordnance
detection is important.
In closing, I thank you for allowing me to speak, and I ask
the committee to analyze the current MSA methodology formula
and the data used in the formula to reflect current threats and
vulnerabilities.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Sheriff Demings follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jerry L. Demings
September 21, 2016
Good Morning Chairman Michael T. McCaul and Members of the
committee.
It is indeed an honor and a privilege for me to provide testimony
today during this hearing to discuss ways to ``Stop the Next Attack:
How to Keep Our City Streets from Becoming the Battleground.''
I am not here to be a doomsday reporter, but I do believe that our
Nation has experienced a paradigm shift in our global war on terror.
There have been numerous recent violent incidents on U.S. soil, which
indicate that terror subjects have brought the fight to our homeland.
My community, the Metropolitan Orlando area, experienced such an attack
on June 12. Members of my agency responded to assist the Orlando Police
Department in the initial response involving an active shooter. The
incident remains under investigation by the FBI, but it is believed
that a lone gunman killed 49 innocent people and injured another 53
persons in the Pulse Nightclub incident. The incident began shortly
after 2 a.m. when Omar Mateen began randomly firing at patrons of a
club that catered to the LGBTQ community on a night designated as
``Latin night.'' Like no other time in our history, if we are going to
be successful at reducing the attacks on American citizens by violent
extremists, Federal, State, and local law enforcement authorities must
improve: (1) Access to information, (2) the sharing of actionable
intelligence information that can be used to identify and arrest
subjects involved in plotting attacks before an attack occurs, and (3)
funding for counterterrorism efforts to include training and equipment.
As it relates to access to information, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) should reassess its policy on precluding State and local
law enforcement agencies from having access to the ICE database that
identifies individuals as being in this country illegally. Officer and
public safety become a major issue in instances when law enforcement
officers do criminal history checks in the field through the National
Crime Information Center (NCIC) and they are not made aware of a
subject's immigration status.
Immigration enforcement is clearly a function of the Federal
Government, and sheriffs do not seek this authority. Our concern is for
the safety of our officers. When officers/deputies encounter someone
and the person is here illegally, that person assumes the ``police''
already know they are illegal and have the authority to arrest and
deport them. Local and State law enforcement should know who they are
dealing with even if they cannot arrest for immigration violations.
As it relates to sharing of information, Florida sheriffs have seen
increased communication from the Department of Justice and DHS to State
and local law enforcement concerning critical incidents. Assistant
Secretary Heather Fong at DHS' Office of Partner Engagement has been a
driving force behind this and most sheriffs and police chiefs have been
invited to participate in conference calls following significant
National and international events affecting law enforcement and public
safety. I am the current president of the Florida Sheriffs Association
and give credit to DHS Secretary Johnson and FBI Director Comey for
increasing communication with State and local law enforcement and for
pushing facts to sheriffs directly as opposed to sheriffs receiving
information from the National news media.
In order for American law enforcement to prevent, respond to, and
mitigate domestic terror attacks, analytics, and training will be
integral to stopping the attacks from proliferating. Central Florida
has been the benefactor of numerous projects funded in previous years
by the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program. We have
been working for the past 2 years to get DHS funding restored to our
region. Primarily, Members of Congress from both the House and Senate
have worked with Orlando Police Chief Mina and me in these efforts. We
have petitioned DHS and FEMA to reassess the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford,
Florida MSA, and the need to strengthen and secure the Central Florida
region from another terror attack like the Pulse Night Club incident.
The Central Florida region has been fortunate to receive
approximately $45.5 million in UASI Funding since 2004. The Orange
County Sheriff's office has managed the funds. The funding received
prior to 2013 was critical to our region's ability to prevent, protect,
respond to, and recover from not only terrorism, but a broad range of
other threats and hazards. We are only as good at preventing a terror
attack as the quality of information we receive about that attack.
I will briefly discuss one of our most notable regional
partnerships in Florida called the Central Florida Intelligence
Exchange, also known as the CFIX Fusion Center. It is located in
Orlando and is 1 of only 3 Fusion Centers in Florida. It serves as a
central repository of databases that are currently being used by the
Florida Department of Law Enforcement and other Federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies. In addition to its counterterrorism
focus, CFIX serves as an ``all hazards'' fusion center, assisting
agencies in the mitigation and assistance needed to recover from
hazards such as hurricanes and other natural disasters. CFIX assists
with investigation of crimes that possibly contain nexus to terrorist
activity or other homeland security issues. In other words, fusion
centers located throughout the country are pivotal to our Nation's
mission of ``stopping terror attacks.''
Due to lack of funding, some critical needs of CFIX have been lost.
We have reduced the number of analysts, which could have worked to
provide intelligence information that could prevent a terror attack.
One example of a success story involving CFIX occurred when CFIX
assisted the U.S. Marshalls, the United States Secret Service and Coast
Guard in locating a disgruntled citizen who made concerning statements
about the President prior to the launch of a space Shuttle Endeavor
mission and numerous other instances in which they provided information
with a nexus to National security.
Through the National Infrastructure Protection Program (NIPP), we
received UASI Funding for a video camera surveillance project in the
tourist corridor, downtown Orlando, and in areas near the University of
Central Florida. Due to a loss of funding, we have not been able to
expand the project into areas around our top tourist destinations.
Prior to June 12, 2016, we held more than a dozen UASI-funded
training exercises over the past 12 years. I believe the agencies
responding to the Pulse incident flawlessly initiated an active-shooter
response because of training paid for through historical UASI funding.
(You have a list of the training exercises in your material.) We train
to respond as a region to a terror attack or other disaster. About 150
of my deputies along with multiple other local law enforcement, fire,
and EMS agencies responded to assist the Orlando Police Department
during the Pulse incident. Because of the infrastructure connections in
our region, it is a natural to have a regional capability and
vulnerability assessment. Regional preparedness, response, and recovery
efforts are also pivotal to the mission of stopping and/or reducing
terror attacks.
Presently, FEMA uses the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB)
geographical boundaries defined in the Federal Register when
calculating risk scores for MSAs. We believe that the boundaries of the
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA should be expanded to include the Brevard
county area to the east and Volusia County MSA to the north.
In September 2015, we began the process of lobbying the Federal
Government to combine the Metro Orlando MSA with Brevard and Volusia.
This was broadly supported by Federal, State, and local elected
officials and numerous letters were written to the FEMA assistant
administrator of grant programs, the OMB statistician and the OMB
office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. You have a list and
copies of the letters in your materials. I don't have time today to get
into the details of the methodology used in assigning risk, but we
suggest that DHS include domestic and international visitors in the
equation and not just permanent resident population in the scoring.
With attacks in places like Boston, San Bernardino, Orlando, and
Dallas, there is a need to have an overall increase in UASI funding
across the Nation. An overall increase in UASI funding would expand
DHS's ability to fund the top 100 high-risk areas from 85% to 90% of
the areas with the most risk. Areas like Central Florida would no doubt
make the list. Congressman Mica has expressed support to increase
funding Nation-wide. In 2016, the Orlando MSA was 34th on the list,
when only 29 were funded.
Local and State agencies have equipment needs and the requisite
training for use of the equipment including mobile command centers,
surveillance equipment, tactical weapons, armored vehicles, and
explosive ordinance detection.
In closing, thank you for allowing me to speak and I ask the
committee to analyze the current MSA methodology formula and the data
used in the formula to reflect current threats and vulnerabilities in
Central Florida.
fema/homeland security/regional training and exercises since 2004
Training
USAR Tech Search Course
USAR Structural Collapse Training
HazMat 160-Hour HazMat Tech Training
USAR Rail Rescue at TEEX
USAR Wide-Area Search Course
HazMat CBRNE Medical Tech Course
At the Point of the Spear: Fire Service Leadership
USAR Safety Officer Course
Hazardous Material Tech Course
HazMat Officer Competency Lab Course
FLETC Internet Protocol Camera Traininig
OnSSI Ocularies Basic Certification
Hazmedic Course
Hazardous Materials Incident Command
USAR Training Props
Intel Training
Community Health Training
FBI HazMat Training
Exercises
UASI Evacuation Plan Tabletop Exercise
UASI Brevard County Full-Scale Exercise
UASI Osceola County Full-Scale Exercise
UASI County Full-Scale Exercise
UASI PRND Functional Exercise
UASI Tabletop Exercise
UASI NBA Functional Exercise
UASI Community Medical Surge Tabletop Exercise
Operation Crash & Surge Full-Scale Medical Exercise
HazMat & USAR Plume of Doom Tabletop Exercise
Urban Search and Rescue ADSAR Mobex Exercise
HazMat and USAR Operation Vanishing Mosquito FSE
support letters for increased uasi funding and reassessment of the
orlando central florida metro statistical area for the risk of
terrorism attacks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Letter
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8/22/16................................... Letter to Congressman John
Mica from Orange County
Sheriff Jerry L Demings
7/28/16................................... Letter from Congressman John
Mica to Orange County
Sheriff Jerry L Demings
7/25/16................................... Letter to John Roth,
Inspector General, DHS,
from Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform
Chairman and Members, Jason
Chaffetz, John Mica, Ron
DeSantis, Elijah Cummings,
Tammy Duckworth, and
Stephen Lynch
6/29/16................................... Letter from Congressman John
Mica to Orange County
Sheriff Jerry L Demings
6/17/16................................... Letter from Congressman John
Mica to Orange County
Sheriff Jerry L Demings
6/15/16................................... Letter to Jeh Johnson,
Secretary DHS from Senators
Marco Rubio/Bill Nelson
1/29/16................................... Letter to Jeh Johnson,
Secretary DHS from
Congressman Alan Grayson
1/27/16................................... Letter to Jeh Johnson,
Secretary DHS from
Congressmen John Mica/
Daniel Webster
11/4/15................................... Letter to Brian Kamoie,
Assististant Administrator,
FEMA Grant Programs, DHS
from Orange County Sheriff
Jerry L Demings
3/27/14................................... Letter to John Carter,
Chairman, House Committee
on Appropriations, DHS,
from Congressman Daniel
Webster
2/12/14................................... Letter to Jeh Johnson,
Secretary DHS from
Congressmen Bill Posey,
Corrine Brown, Daniel
Webster, Alan Grayson and
John Mica
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Sheriff.
The Chair recognizes Commissioner Miller for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF JOHN MILLER, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERTERRORISM, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
continued help and support with our programs, as well as our
New York delegation, Peter King, who we are always in close
touch with, and Dan Donovan, who comes right out of the New
York City law enforcement community, as does Kathleen Rice.
Good morning to the Members of the committee.
First, I would like to thank the Chairman for giving us
this opportunity to talk about this. When we talked about this
testimony several weeks ago, the idea was to talk about the
emerging and changing threat and how we might respond to a
terrorist attack. Nobody had any idea that we would be sitting
here within days of an actual terrorist attack talking about
how we did respond.
New York City has been the target of more than 20 terrorist
attacks, including this one. Some have succeeded, but most have
been prevented through the use of good intelligence and a
robust counterterrorism program.
The threat we face today has grown out of a group called
al-Qaeda that morphed into an international network of
affiliates, one of which turned into a movement on its own
called ISIL that has pioneered exploiting every advantage of
globalization.
Today, while al-Qaeda operates in the shadows, occasionally
sending out one-way videos to adherents, ISIL operates out of
Syria using the internet and social media tools to deliver a
call to arms to those who would travel to Syria and fight for
ISIL, there or in Iraq, but also understanding how to leverage
propaganda that includes compelling videos, two-way
conversations over social media applications, both encrypted
and unencrypted, an on-line magazine filled with messages
extolling violence, giving useful, tactical critiques on
attacks that have already happened, including the Orlando
shooting, and giving instructions on how to make bombs.
These are specific custom-designed messages to urge people
who could not come to Syria to fight, or Iraq, to kill
Americans here. The message is hold the promise, to those who
are receiving them, of valor, of belonging, of empowerment.
These messages containing these false promises resonate
particularly with recruits who are failing in life, living in
the margins, who have low self-esteem, or feel isolated.
No city in America has been the target of as many plots and
attacks as New York City. No city has paid as much in blood as
we did on 9/11. In the 15 years since, no city has invested as
much human capital and money in the effort to prevent, if
possible, or respond, if necessary, to a terrorist attack.
We thank this committee. We thank our appropriators on
other committees. We thank the Department of Homeland Security
and Secretary Jeh Johnson for steadfastly continuing to support
those efforts with funding. That said, the NYPD and the city of
New York invest significant amounts of our own budget to
support those efforts.
This year alone, the NYPD created the Critical Response
Command. The CRC is a highly-trained, specially-equipped
uniformed force of over 500 officers that work full-time every
day as a counterterrorism force in the streets of New York
City. They protect critical locations and shift between key
potential terrorist targets, depending upon the intelligence we
have evaluated that day in the global threat stream.
We have provided the same weapons and training to our
strategic response command, the SRG, a city-wide flying squad
that can be called on to assist our emergency service unit,
which is a rescue-oriented but SWAT-capable unit that is our
go-to first responders for any crisis. That adds up to
approximately 1,800 officers with special weapons and tactics
capabilities who are in the streets of the city of New York.
That is unmatched by any municipal police department on the
globe, as far as we know.
We have also trained over 8,000 regular patrol officers in
tactics to counter the active shooter, as we have seen this
trend grow over recent years. Those are the officers who are
most likely, because of their proximity in number, to arrive at
such a scene first.
The NYPD has also built what is widely regarded as the most
sophisticated intelligence bureau outside of the Federal
Government. That bureau works hand-in-hand with our Federal
partners, particularly the FBI, the Joint Terrorism Task Force,
and Homeland Security. Over at the JTTF in New York, we have
over 100 detectives assigned inside the JTTF that are
integrated and operating cross-designated as Federal law
enforcement officers.
The NYPD has spent over $300 million over the last 8 years,
combined city and Federal funds, to build and maintain the DAS,
or the Domain Awareness System. This combines a network of
cameras across the city, over 8,000 of them, with data from our
9-1-1 call system, with license plate readers, with radiation
detection sensors across the city, with law enforcement
databases.
In the last year, under former Commissioner Bill Bratton,
that data, which faced inwards to people like me at police
headquarters, was pushed outward. It was turned outward to the
people who needed the most and could use it the most, and that
is the cop on the street. Every police officer in New York has
access to that information from their department-issued
smartphone. This phone is able to assess the DAS network.
It also means during a terrorist incident, as we saw just
this week, that having 1,500 people who work full-time on
counterterrorism can quickly be changed to 36,000 in the
street. We are able to push law enforcement information,
pictures of the suspect, information we had, to every police
officer in the street who was working when we decided to go out
with a picture of a suspect we had probable cause to arrest.
All of that with the power of just hitting a send key.
Every element of those tools and tactics that we have
discussed here today was fully exploited in the moments
starting after
8:30 p.m. on Saturday night when two bombs were placed in New
York City on that evening. I also have to say that the seamless
cooperation between the FBI and the NYPD and our Homeland
Security partners, whether that was FBI ERT, evidence response
technicians, working in a post blast with our crime screen
investigators, bagging and tagging the same way, sending
everything to the same lab, the FBI lab at Quantico; whether it
was our NYPD bomb squad detectives working side by side with
their SABT, Special Agent Bomb Techs, from the FBI, our
detective bureau, our intelligence bureau, the JTTF, it was a
force multiplier that worked that case as if they did it every
day together, because they do.
Thank you, and I will be happy to take questions.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Commissioner Miller.
I now recognize myself for questions.
I think the last time I saw you, John, we were in New York
at the 9/11 ceremony. The next day, we received an intelligence
briefing at the intelligence unit at NYPD. Little did we know
that within days, there would be a terrorist attack in the
streets of New York.
I was presented a video that I wanted to share with the
committee that was put together by the New York Police
Department that I think really encapsulates the threat moving
forward, and in many ways is prophetic in terms of what we saw
happen last Saturday.
[Video shown.]
Chairman McCaul. Commissioner Miller, thank you for that
video. We saw that, obviously, last week before the tragic
events in New York Saturday.
What I was struck by is stay home and fight. It used to be
come to Syria and join the fight. Are we seeing a changing,
evolving message now coming out of ISIS, Syria to stay home and
attack in the United States?
Mr. Miller. I think we are. I think that the messages from
Sheikh Adnani, especially the pre-Ramadan message which called
on people to attack where they were, has shifted from come to
Syria and fight with us on the battlefield to, as one of the
messages had clearly written, it said: We love you more doing
actions in their countries--referring to countries other than
Syria--meaning, we would rather have you fight at home than
come here and fight on the battlefield.
Chairman McCaul. Which concerns me from a homeland security
perspective because I think, as we have some success militarily
in Iraq and Syria, we are going to see the battleground coming
more here to the United States.
This is a copy of Mr. Rahami's journal that was found on
his person when he was taken into custody. I know you are
familiar with it. He talks about the sounds of bombs will be
heard in the streets. Praised Osama bin Laden as brother.
Talked about Anwar al-Awlaki in Fort Hood, Texas. He talked
about pressure cooker bombs and pipe bombs in the streets as
they plan to run a mile. He talks about, God willing, the sound
of bombs will be heard in the streets. Gun shots to your
police. Death to your oppression. You continue your slaughter
against the Mujahedeen. Be in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria,
Palestine. He wrote, according to his complaint--and in another
section of the notebook he wrote that his guidance come from
the man that you mentioned, Mr. Adnani, who was the chief ISIS
spokesman and external operations chief who was killed by an
air strike. He talks about killing where you are. Precisely, I
think the evolving threat that we are facing.
Commissioner Miller, I have to ask you this question, was
the suspect, Mr. Rahami, at any point in time under the radar?
Is there anything we could have done differently to have
stopped him?
Mr. Miller. I am sure, as in after every incident, our
Federal partners will go backward through this case and
reevaluate that. But based on what I have seen so far as part
of the investigation, he seems like many suspects who came into
contact with the system at various times and was handled to the
extent that the system, the law and the guidelines that we
operate under, would allow them to.
Chairman McCaul. It is unfortunate, in many of these
incidents--and we stop most of these things, as you know. But
the ones that we miss, it seems like it is always after the
fact that somebody comes forward and says, oh, I noticed he was
radicalizing, or I saw this or that, but they fail to report it
to authorities. I think that is probably what we will find out
to be the case here.
Chief Acevedo, we have a bill on the floor today
authorizing nearly $40 million for grants to train in active
shooting, to train in IED, to train with suicide bombers. Can
you tell me how that could help your city and my city, the city
of Austin, help better prepare for this type of event?
Chief Acevedo. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
As you know, that training is really key to being prepared
to respond. Unfortunately, with the tightening budgets around
the country, one of the first things that goes away is the
training budget. So, from the perspective of the Major City
Chiefs, your bill will go a long way in preparing our resources
throughout the Nation and the big cities and throughout the
counties.
Without it I don't think that we can prepare to the extent
that we need to. Fortunately for us in Austin, we make it a
priority, and so we sacrifice, but not every city has that
ability. I think that, for us, we desperately need the funding.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, sir.
My time has expired. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking
Member.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much.
I think, from the outset, there is no question this
committee is absolutely committed to keeping America as safe as
it can possibly be. A hundred percent is what we strive for
every day. The men and women in various departments, we salute
you for that work.
One of the things we struggle with is when these incidents
of the lone wolves appear. You get a lot of people after the
fact trying to say, well, you should have done this, you should
have done that. So now there is a discussion that, well, maybe
we need to put more surveillance on individuals and, to some
degree, even profile individuals.
I think, Mr. Miller, since New York is kind of the melting
pot, and as a practitioner of this, especially in light of the
bartender dialing 9-1-1, saying, ``I think we got a problem,''
can you just kind-of explain that kind-of engagement with those
communities, what your experience has been?
Mr. Miller. We have worked very hard to strengthen the
NYPD's engagement with our partners in the Muslim community.
You cannot profile the community that you also, at the same
time, count on to help you in these cases. We have had many
people from the Arab-American community, from the Muslim
community come forward and help us in various investigations
over various times.
In the context of that video, we have also kind-of sat down
with a core group of our best community partners and played all
the same propaganda to them, on the idea that most mainstream
community leaders aren't on their computers watching these
things, but we wanted to be able to expose them to the type of
clever messaging and powerful propaganda that some of their
young people might be susceptible to and work with them to try
and figure out, how do you counter that message and what do you
use?
So this is a conversation with a community of partners that
has to keep going, and you can't keep it going by separating
them.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much.
A lot of my opening statement talks about the proliferation
and ownership of assault weapons. Some of us have even promoted
the notion of, why should you be able to buy an assault weapon,
being on the terrorist watch list?
What we are trying to do is close every potential
vulnerability that we know of. It has nothing to do with the
Second Amendment. It is just that if you are too bad to get on
a plane, then it is clear in the minds of a lot of people you
ought to be too bad to own a gun, or you should have some
opportunity to prove that you are not.
So, Chief Acevedo, can you kind-of comment on where that
assault weapon and exotic guns come to play in your area?
Chief Acevedo. Yes, sir. I mean, clearly, one of the
challenges we have in this Nation is the proliferation of
firearms and the fact that we use the Second Amendment as an
excuse to not pass common-sense laws that will help keep
firearms in the hands of law-abiding Americans of sound mind.
I can tell you, coming from the State of Texas where the
Second Amendment is king, I spend a lot of time talking to
conservative members of our community; they are in favor of
universal background checks. They are in favor of closing the
gun show loophole, where we can watch people going in there and
if you have the cash, cash is king, you can buy whatever you
want.
We have a responsibility as a Nation, I think. As
policymakers, I would urge this body, which is the only body
that can get it done at a National level, to celebrate the
Second Amendment by ensuring that we take steps to ensure that
responsible people are gun owners and not people that will do
harm to their fellow Americans and, quite frankly, as it
relates to mental health, that might do harm to their fellow
Americans and themselves.
So we need help. I know that the support is out there. I
think that the surveys show that from the American people. At
the end of the day, it is the will of the people, and I hope
that this body will put the politics aside and really join the
American people in being pragmatic and taking steps to keep
those firearms out of the wrong hands.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Sheriff Demings, you had 49 people killed in your county by
someone with one of these weapons. But, more importantly, that
individual was what we call a lone wolf, in terms of somebody
who we could not really bring a nexus to somebody overseas or
something like that.
Can you, in your law enforcement experience, explain what
the challenge is for identifying extremists in communities,
whether you are a member of the Ku Klux Klan, whether you are a
member of ISIL or any other entity? How does that play into
your day-to-day law enforcement experience?
Sheriff Demings. Thank you for the question.
I can tell you that it is a challenge for us to identify
the individuals who mean harm to our Nation. We are only as
good as the information that we receive. So I believe that we
have got to improve our analytical capabilities in sharing
criminal intelligence information across the Federal, State,
and local authorities.
We sometimes see where we operate in silos. All of these
issues tend to happen in local communities. What we say to our
residents is that, if you see something suspicious, we want you
to tell us about it. They are often giving information to us at
the local level, and we push it to the Federal level. But
sometimes, once it gets there and it is analyzed, it doesn't
come back in a systematic way so that we can use that
actionable intelligence information in thwarting a probable
terror attack.
In some cases, even as it relates to our gun laws,
sometimes it doesn't make sense, what happens. I will give you
an example. Just a couple of days after the Pulse nightclub
incident in Orlando, there was a reporter who came to town, an
international reporter from the United Kingdom, who was writing
a story, and to prove his point, how easy it is to acquire an
assault weapon in America, he bought one. He went to a local
licensed gun dealer and was able to buy an assault weapon. He
was not a U.S. citizen but at some point had been in our
country and had some form of legal status at some point.
Before he returned to the United Kingdom, he brought the
assault weapon that he had lawfully purchased to one of my
sheriff substations, and he said, ``I don't want it. I can't
take it back into my country. The reason I bought it was to
prove a point, how easy it is. And I am not even a U.S.
citizen.''
So I have said to people like Director Comey and others
that, to me, that makes no sense. Because, as American
citizens, if we were in the United Kingdom, we couldn't go
there and buy an assault weapon, and so why should he have been
allowed to buy one in our country? So somehow we have to look
at those types of, I think, situations that occur.
The other thing I see gaping holes in is as it relates to
mentally ill. We have a National database that is supposed to
have information about individuals who have been certified
through the courts to have some form of mental illness that
disqualifies them from buying a firearm. But, quite frankly,
the information isn't being put into the database because of
this lack of, I think, understanding within the mental health
community of what constitutes mental illness. So we have to
improve there as a country as well.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
New York, Mr. King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony.
Mr. Miller, again, congratulations on a very successful
weekend. I know the investigation is on-going, but I was
actually down on 23d Street the morning after, and what you
said about the FBI and the NYPD is true. You couldn't tell one
from the other, they were working so closely together.
What I would like to follow up, though--and I really
wouldn't want this to get caught up in the semantics, but from
the Ranking Member, if we use terms like ``profiling'' or
whatever, there is also good police work, though.
I mean, you and I are old enough to remember--I am older
than you, but--that when they were going after the mafia in New
York, the FBI and the NYPD were in the Italian American
community, not because they didn't trust Italian Americans;
they knew that was where the threat was coming from.
Also, when they were going after the Westies, whether it
was Hell's Kitchen or every bar on the west side of Manhattan,
there were police undercovers, there were FBI undercovers to
try to get information. I think, as an Irish American, I didn't
consider that profiling. I mean, that is where the threat was
coming from. It was coming from the Irish American community,
certain elements of it, even though 98, 99 percent are, you
know, law-abiding.
I just think, in New York, where you have a number of
Muslim communities and neighborhoods, even if--and they are--
the overwhelming majority are cooperating and are supportive,
but if there is going to be something happening, I don't see
how it is considered unconstitutional or bad police work to
have undercovers, to have informers, the same as is done when
you are tracking down any other type of crime where it is
coming from a particular community or organization.
Mr. Miller. We operate under the Andrew guidelines, and the
Andrew guidelines specifically say that we operate on
information, on behavior, on actions, but we do not place
undercovers or spies or people into the community to watch
people who are engaged in completely Constitutionally-protected
activities, whether that is at a restaurant, a house of
worship, or a meeting.
We are also not lacking for business. I think,
Representative King--and there are very few in Congress who
know as much about this as you do, given the time that you have
spent in this field--that, in the 15 years since 9/11, through
every suspicious encounter that has been reported, we have
amassed a large number of names, incidents, reports. When they
are filed away, as you see in the other day or in the Orlando
case or--you can pick your case--there are two schools of
thought on that.
One is, well, if you already knew about this person, why
weren't they stopped? That is one that often doesn't consider
the thresholds that we have to operate under. The other is
that, if you have that many contacts with that many people over
that period of time, it is increasingly likely that the next
time something happens it is going to involve somebody that you
knew, heard about, investigated, bumped, or otherwise checked
out.
Now, that is a good thing, in that when you are assessing
who to look at first and they come up in those records, it
gives you a basis to go forward. Well, it is also a liability,
in that people have somewhat of a misconception about our
ability to put someone under surveillance, leave them there
indefinitely.
You know, in the case of the New York case, these were
contacts that happened in 2014 with no demonstrable thing that
happened in between that time and this time. That is not--and I
am not prejudging this. Somebody will go back through it with a
fine-tooth comb, because we always do. But it is not realistic
to say every time someone comes on the radar you are going to
be able to follow them or their friends and associates for an
extended period of time while you have investigations that are
on the front burner involving people who are demonstrably
dangerous.
Mr. King. Would it violate any guidelines, for instance,
with Rahami--and we are assuming a hypothetical here--there
were at least, I believe, two encounters with the FBI, one
because of the travel, one because of the assaults against
family members and his father saying he was a terrorist--for
the local police to be told about that so that they would be
alert to anything else they might hear?
I am not saying any warrantless search, I am not saying
hounding the guy, but I am just saying for the street cop to
say, ``Keep your eyes and ears open on this guy'' in case you
hear something about him, that he would be at a different level
than just the ordinary citizen walking down the street.
Mr. Miller. Based on my understanding of our guidelines, it
wouldn't. Based on my recollection of the Attorney General
guidelines and the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Operations
Guidelines, I don't believe it would either.
Mr. King. OK. Thank you, Commissioner. My time is just
about up. I just wanted to get that on the record because of
many of the unfair allegations that have been made against the
NYPD over the years from certain organizations and from the
media.
Thank you for your outstanding service. Appreciate it.
Thank you.
Mr. Miller. Thank you.
I would just point out for the record that the independent
inspector general of the NYPD just completed an audit of 10
years of Intelligence Bureau records and determined that 100
percent of the records they evaluated showed that there was a
proper purpose and basis for every investigation and that they
were carried out within those guidelines.
Mr. King. I would just make the editorial comment that
reporters got the Pulitzer Prize for talking about the abuses
by the NYPD, even though they have been cleared on all those
charges.
I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
New York, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, just let me say, with respect to the New York City
Police Department, the literature since 9/11 has clearly
established that the New York City Police Department
counterterrorism intelligence is probably the most effective in
all the world. It is extraordinary work that is done in
counterterrorism.
Unfortunately, you never get credit for what didn't happen.
What you do every day is preventing things from, in fact,
happening. So it is great, great work. As I say, the terrorists
only have to be lucky once; counterterrorism officials have to
be lucky all the time.
But it is also worth noting here that, since 9/11/2001, a
period of 15 years, 94 people were killed by Islamic
terrorists; 157,000 Americans have been killed with guns. You
are 3,000 times more likely to be killed by an American with a
gun than a terrorist.
Every day in America, 90 people die from gun violence. In
Orlando, 49 people dead, 53 people wounded--deadliest attack on
U.S. soil since 9/11. One shooter, semiautomatic rifle,
semiautomatic pistol, legally purchased. One shooter, 49 people
dead, 53 people wounded.
Newtown, Connecticut, 26 people dead, 20 kids between the
ages of 6 and 7, first- and second-graders, dead. Most had
multiple wounds in them. Six adults were also killed, most of
whom were diving in front of the kids to shield them from the
shooter. One shooter, legally purchased guns.
Sensible gun safety, as has been mentioned here, has been
rejected by this Congress despite the fact that 90 percent of
the American people support sensible gun safety legislation.
You know, people often invoke the Second Amendment to justify
the continuation of this hell, but the Framers of our
Constitution, in establishing the Second Amendment, could never
have anticipated this kind of hell.
The topic today is ``Stopping the Next Attack: How to Keep
Our Cities from Becoming a Battleground.'' Well, they are
already a battleground. There is a moral contradiction. When
you have, as the Ranking Member said previously, a terror watch
list, these are individuals that are known to be involved, in
some degree, in terroristic activity, yet at the same time they
are allowed to purchase guns--semiautomatic rifles,
semiautomatic pistols, the very guns that are found in all of
these mass shootings.
So you can't, with any credibility, hold a hearing with the
topic ``Stopping the Next Attack: How to Keep Our Cities from
Becoming Battlegrounds'' without fundamentally addressing what
most people on this panel agree with, and that is very
commonsensical gun safety measures.
I would ask you, first of all, Deputy Commissioner, to
respond.
Mr. Miller. Well, I think that the broad law enforcement
support for the assault weapons bill at the same time as the
crime bill that was signed on the White House lawn and then
expired and the conversation that came out of that for years
with no change was one indicator.
Cynical people would have said, when a Member of Congress
is shot down in a public place, that would change. But the
conversation after the shooting of Gabby Giffords went on for
about 3 weeks and faded away.
Some might have argued that when our citizens are being
killed in their movie theatres, at a Batman movie, that that
would have ended the discussion. Colorado passed a tough gun
law, and the Governor was run out of the State after that.
Some might have said, when they kill our kindergarten
children in their schools, that that would be the straw that
broke the back. But we have talked about that for a while and
nothing happened there either.
So, in some measure, when you consider the fact that the
greatest loss of life on U.S. soil since 9/11 and the
terroristic attack happened at 2 o'clock in the morning on a
place off the main path, an LGBT club, on Latino night by a
lone-wolf gunman, you have to ask yourself, have we figured out
who we are, and do we want to change?
Chairman McCaul. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rogers from
Alabama.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses for being here and their
participation.
I also want to commend New York. If you look at what
happened with the recent investigation after this attack and
previous attacks and then what happened with the London
bombings and the Spain bombings, closed-circuit television was
critical in the investigation and the quick apprehension of the
suspects in every case. I would urge all of our major
metropolitan areas to emulate New York in the placement of
those closed-circuit cameras.
But I did want to ask you all, my experience has been, just
as was case here in New York, that local law enforcement really
has to have a good relationship with the Federal officials for
everybody to be successful. What do you see as ways that we can
improve communication between State and local officials and the
Feds that you need to interact with? Do you get a chance to
exercise regularly with them? If not, why not?
Just start with Mr. Bouchard and Mr. Demings.
Sheriff Bouchard. Thank you, Congressman. That is a very
good question.
We do interact and work extremely well with our Federal
partners, but the communication is a salient point that we have
raised for a number of years. In fact, on many of the
conference calls, the preamble is, ``Well, you have probably
heard more already about this incident in the news than we are
going to talk about today.''
You know, most of us, I presume, have a Top Secret
clearance sitting at this table, if not at least Secret. There
is a need, I think, for real-time information sharing on that
capability. That is not in place.
Years ago, probably a decade ago, I suggested that they
create such a platform, and an encrypted cell phone was created
as such. I paid for it for my Homeland Security Division chief,
myself, and we had a few of them. Lo and behold, find out they
don't really work. So we no longer have a device to communicate
real-time on a direct, pressing need. We almost have to go back
to the days of runners, where somebody has to go----
Mr. Rogers. You are talking more about equipment. I am
talking more about personal relationships. Do you all have a
chance to interact and develop personal relationships so you
know Bob at the FBI or whoever is the key guy----
Sheriff Bouchard. Yes.
Mr. Rogers [continuing]. You need to get in touch with? Do
you have a chance to do that?
Sheriff Bouchard. We do. We do. We have great
relationships. But when I am talking about the equipment, if
there is a timely need for sharing information, there is a lag
because, literally, we have to go to the same location to
communicate that.
I had a meeting in my State and the sheriff from Los
Angeles was there and had something unfolding that was at a
Secret level, and we were looking for Coast Guard stations to
get him in communication. That is a problem, when terrorists
can communicate on an encrypted platform and we can't.
So the relationships are there. I would say that one of the
challenges that we face, though, across the country is we build
a great relationship with our SACs, and then they are moved,
usually about every 2 years. They come and go very frequently.
I know professional development and organizational needs are
important, but it is a challenge once you develop a deep
relationship. I think I have been through probably six SACs in
my tenure.
Mr. Rogers. OK.
Sheriff.
Sheriff Demings. The only thing that I would add is I
talked about the fact that we have a fusion center in Orlando,
and, because of that fusion center, it forces us on a daily
basis to work across jurisdictional lines. That is not the case
in most cities around America. We only have 3 in the State of
Florida when we have multiple large metropolitan areas.
So I do believe that there is a need to increase the number
of fusion centers, because, again, they work on the prevention
side, collecting information and data that can be used to
prevent an attack. This whole conversation today is about
preventing an attack, so I believe that that has to be part of
the solution. It forces us to work together, and it also allows
us to gather better information--actionable intelligence
information, that is.
Mr. Rogers. Chief.
Chief Acevedo. In terms of our relationship in Austin, we
have a phenomenal relationship with our local SAC.
Mr. Rogers. Do you have a chance to exercise with these
folks?
Chief Acevedo. We have not exercised because funding is an
issue. That is why, again, I hope that 5859 passes, so we can
actually do some more exercising with them.
But in terms of information sharing, it is better today and
the relationship is better today than it has ever been for my
region. However, I think that that depends a lot on the SAC.
Fortunately, I have a good SAC and I have had good SACs, but I
also push back pretty hard when they are not sharing
information. But I don't think that that is still the case
Nation-wide, that it is not even across the country.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
My time has expired. Thank you all for what you do for our
country.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank the witnesses for their testimony
this morning.
I also would like to recognize the 29 individuals that were
injured this week and pray for their speedy recovery, and also
the two brave officers in Linden, New Jersey, who engaged the
culprit, Officer Hammer and Officer Padilla of the Linden
Police Department, which is in my district.
Many gun safety laws are enacted at the State level. So
while you might live in a State with strict gun laws, such as
mine, your communities might remain vulnerable because of the
lax gun laws in neighboring States. How does this patchwork
approach to gun control affect your policy efforts?
Mr. Miller, if you could take a stab at that?
Mr. Miller. We have, if not the toughest gun laws in the
Nation, in New York City, certainly one of them. But none of
our guns come from New York City. That has been true for many
years. We have mandatory minimum sentencing. We have a rigorous
permitting process. But most of our guns come from out of
State.
Mr. Payne. The ability and the access to these assault
weapons in other States really poses a great potential for acts
such as we have seen over the course of the last several years.
When I talk about it with my colleagues that feel that there
could be a potential infringement on the Second Amendment
rights, you know, getting an understanding of what we end up
against in our communities is something that can be horrific,
as we saw in Orlando.
Always my argument to people in law enforcement that
sometimes do not see the wisdom in trying to get these weapons
off of the streets is, you know, what happened in Dallas was my
greatest fear, that--you know, I would try to tell them, one
day, these weapons are going to return and be used against you.
In Dallas we saw that happen.
That is the reason that we fight to try to make sure that
these weapons are not available to people that should not have
them and, really, I don't think should be available to the
public. They are only going to be used against law enforcement.
To think that a terrorist would have the upper hand on our law
enforcement does not bode well with me.
The events of last weekend, you know, really have put the
country on edge. The information we received was constantly
being updated, and, you know, the situation was very fluid. I
think lessons learned from Boston helped us in this situation,
and it is really incredible to hear how fluid the situation has
become through interagencies.
Can you talk about the Federal Government and how it shared
relevant information with you with respect to, you know, the
different law enforcement organizations involved?
Mr. Miller. From the moment the explosion happened, I
called the police commissioner and I called my FBI counterpart.
In the time it took me to drive to the scene, my FBI
counterparts were there. We came up with a game plan.
We received continuous information throughout that night
with the development of every clue--a phone that led to a
subscriber name, a fingerprint that led to an individual,
devices that were connected from the New Jersey case to other
devices, people who were connected to devices through physical
evidence. There was nothing hidden, nothing held back, nothing
too Classified.
We sat together in the same command post. Customs and
Border Protection and DHS played a vital role in helping us
understand who was who, through their records and contacts. I
would say it was a model of cooperation.
To respond, in part, to Mr. Rogers' question, do we
exercise together, we train together all the time, particularly
in the active-shooter realm because it is the emerging threat
with our Federal partners, but we work together every day. We
eat together, we drink together. We don't sleep together yet,
but that is just because we don't sleep much.
Mr. Payne. Well, thank you.
As I yield back, Chief Acevedo, thank you for acknowledging
the hard work that Mr. Donovan and I have done in
interoperability and communications for all of your
departments.
I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, the four of you all are in law enforcement. Do
you all carry firearms? Not in here, but do you carry a firearm
daily?
Sheriff Demings. Yes.
Mr. Duncan. I think I am getting a head shake ``yes'' from
everyone. There wasn't a hand raised or a----
Chief Acevedo. I do on duty, but a lot of times I don't off
duty.
Mr. Duncan. OK. Thank you.
The Ranking Member injected gun control into this because
that is the narrative of the left. For the record, he is an
avid participant in the shooting sports. He is actually a great
shot. I have shot competitively against him. So he exercises
his Second Amendment rights.
We are here in these ivory towers of Government protected
by law enforcement. There is a guy outside the door in a
uniform, the Capitol Police, with a firearm to protect us.
If more gun laws were the answer, more restrictive gun laws
that are affecting the Second Amendment rights of Americans,
the south side of Chicago would be the safest place on Earth.
You could leave your doors open, you could walk the streets at
night, and you could allow your children to play in the front
yard. But yet that is not the case. More gun laws are not the
answer.
There are 357 million Americans--or 357 million firearms in
America in the hands of law-abiding citizens. The problem we
need to look at--and let me tell you about the law-abiding
citizens. When seconds count, the police are just minutes away.
They have the ability to draw a firearm to protect themselves,
their families, their property, their neighbors, their
Constitution, if necessary.
So we have had gun control injected into this debate, but
let me tell you that I think the problem is gun-free zones,
because we are restricting where law-abiding citizens can carry
firearms. A gun-free zone, San Bernardino, State property,
prohibited from having a firearm. No one in that room could
protect themselves. Orlando, it was a bar. Nobody could carry a
firearm in there. Charleston, South Carolina, mass shooter,
gun-free zone. Columbine, Sandy Hook, they were all gun-free
zones.
No one had access to a firearm, so we were counting on law
enforcement to be there. Law enforcement can't be everywhere,
nor would we want you to be there. So the Second Amendment is
there for us to protect ourselves and our family.
So we have had the No-fly list injected into this. There
are 200,000 people on the No-fly list, 80 percent of which are
foreign nationals. So the other 20 percent are United States
citizens. We can look hard at them. But when you think about
the No-fly list, how in the world do you get on the No-fly list
and how in the world do you get off the No-fly list? Where is
the due process afforded Americans under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment to know what your accusation is, what the charges
are, who is accusing you, have a chance to interview witnesses,
have a chance to defend yourself, and get off that? But too
many Americans are on the No-fly list and they don't even know
it until they go try to fly somewhere. That is Fifth and Sixth
Amendment due process rights that are guaranteed us.
So we are relying on Big Government to actually take care
of us, to find these terrorists. But guess what? They missed
it, America. They missed it in Orlando. That guy was suspected
of terrorism. They missed it in New Jersey. Dad said, ``I think
my son is involved in terrorism.'' FBI investigated him for 2
months and said, ``Oh, your son is not involved in terrorism.''
Dad said yesterday, ``Hello?''
They missed it in Fort Hood. He had ``Soldier of Allah'' on
his business card. There were signs and signals for Major Hasan
all over. Missed it in San Bernardino, because the wife was
actually--there were a lot of questions about how she even came
into this country. They missed in Boston. The FBI was informed
by Russia, for all intents and purposes, that somebody had been
traveling over there and possibly been in contact with
terrorist organizations and may have gotten some training.
Missed it, and we had loss of lives.
What we continue to do is talk about gun control debate
when we need to talk about the Second Amendment and the
Constitutional rights, the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to
due process. But yet we will continue to allow unfettered
immigration from unvettable countries? They just granted
citizenship to 858 individuals who were ordered deported or
removed under another identity when, during the naturalization
process, their digital fingerprint records weren't available.
Just gave them citizenship.
We cannot rely on the Federal Government and this big
bureaucracy to continue to try to keep us safe. We have to
revert back, I believe, to the individuals, the law-abiding
citizens in this country. We have to look at the gun laws that
are out there now that prohibit law-abiding citizens from being
able to carry firearms in areas where they could protect
themselves. We need to allow school marshals and some sort of
program in schools that are now gun-free zones so somebody in
that school will have access to a firearm to protect our
children.
You know, we will continue to allow terrorists to come in
here, we will continue to attack the Constitutional rights of
Americans, we will continue to have restrictive gun control
laws in the State and an effort in the country. If you look at
Mr. Higgins' statistics and you take out suicides, the number
goes way down. If you take out criminal violence related to
drugs, that number goes way down. But yet we will continue to
have this debate, and we will continue to have a sit-in on the
floor of Congress to shut down the process over this issue. We
will continue and invite somebody who made something that
looked like a bomb, brought it to school, but now it is a
clock, and we invite him into the White House. It is a good
thing the guy in New Jersey didn't say, ``Oh, that is just a
clock.''
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this hearing, but we have gotten
off track from the get-go, talking about violating the Second
Amendment rights of Americans, when we won't have a real
conversation about the gun-free zones, the people that are on
the terrorist watch list and how they get off, the No-fly list
and how that might be used.
I got a novel idea. If you are on the No-fly list and you
are a foreign national--80 percent are--goodbye. No-fly,
goodbye. Let's get them out of the country. They are identified
as terrorists, they are foreign nationals, why are we keeping
them in this country?
But I don't think a single person on the terrorist watch
list or the No-fly list committed any of these acts of terror
that we are talking about. If I am wrong, correct me.
Gentlemen, I am going to look at you right now, and I am
going to thank you for what you do to keep our citizens safe.
Law enforcement in this country is under attack, but we have
got your back, as the Chairman said. We appreciate the men and
women in blue that are walking that thin blue line. Thank you
for what you do. It is not an easy job. People in the Third
congressional District of South Carolina appreciate what you
do. God bless you.
I will yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Richmond from
Louisiana.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just start with, people make the assertion all the
time that more guns are the answer--guns in schools, guns in
churches, guns in movie theatres. We have armed guards in
banks, and banks get robbed every day, and people get killed in
banks every day. So, to the extent that people think that is
the solution, I think you are dead-wrong.
But, as we talk about law enforcement, we talk about having
your back. Let me tell you what having your back means. We had
a committee meeting about combating terrorist recruitment and
about dispelling the propaganda that comes from ISIS, or ISIL.
I simply wanted an amendment that said, why don't we target
sovereign citizens? They shot me down. Well, let me tell you
what sovereign citizens did in the mean time. They shot down
three officers in Baton Rouge, injured another couple.
So when we start talking about having your back, it is
making sure that we have the intelligence and we focus on
everything. We are smart enough to do two and three things at
one time--that is, to combat lone actors, to combat terrorism,
to infiltrate cells and track them. But it is also to see what
is the real threat to your officers and deputies on the street.
If you want to talk about your officers and your deputies,
you have to talk about sovereign citizens that have killed more
police officers than anybody else. But this committee doesn't
want to talk about it. In fact, this committee went out of its
way to ignore the issue.
Let me just tell you about Baton Rouge, as we talk about
having our law enforcement's back. You had one actor, one sick
individual, with a long gun. He was better armed than the
police officers that responded, because his long gun, the
bullets would go through our police officers' vests, and our
police officers who responded responded with pistols that
wouldn't go through his vest.
So the question becomes, are we funding our police
departments like we should? Are we making an investment in our
law enforcement in an extent to help them protect lives?
So, as we do this today--and you still have to talk about
the Department of Homeland Security and this committee, combine
it with Judiciary. We had two unfortunate incidents this week
where, again, an African American male was killed in an
incident involving law enforcement. But we spend more time
talking about whether Colin Kaepernick is standing for the
National Anthem, but we don't want to talk about why he is
kneeling.
So, in this committee, we are having this hearing, which is
not a new hearing; we have it all the time. In Judiciary, the
other committee with jurisdiction over something like this, we
are talking about impeaching the IRS Director. At some point,
we have to be bigger than this and we have to be focused on
issues that we see.
No one is diminishing terrorist attacks, because I think
there is one common goal between everybody, and that is to
figure out a way to stop them. But when you start titling our
hearing with ``Stopping the Next Attack: How Do We Keep Our
Cities from Becoming the Battleground,'' duh, wake up. It has
been the battleground. It is a battleground on a number of
fronts.
But if we are going to truly talk about how we fix it, we
are going to have to put the resources so that we can share
intelligence, we can arm our law enforcement. We have to make
sure we have the capabilities to stop an attack before it
happens. But we also have to realize the magnitude of the
incident gets exaggerated if the person has an assault weapon.
So I will ask one question, and whoever wants to answer it,
please have at it.
The attack in Minnesota, where 10 people were injured, tell
me what that looks like if, instead of a knife, he has an AK-47
or an AR-15 with a high-capacity magazine. Does anyone want
to----
Chief Acevedo. It looks like a lot of dead Americans that
were simply shopping.
I won't even respond to Mr. Duncan, because I don't think
it needs to be responded to here today. I will respect this
office and this institution; I will just take the Fifth and
leave it at that.
Mr. Richmond. Well, let me just ask this last question. Do
sovereign citizens pose a real threat to your officers that
answer traffic stops, serve subpoenas, and just walk around
every day?
Sheriff Demings. I believe sovereign citizens pose one of
the most significant threats to civilian law enforcement today.
A couple of years ago, I had one of my sergeants shot. He
survived. Was shot by an individual who fancied himself as a
sovereign. Many of these incidents that you have referred to,
in which there were lone gunmen, if you delve into their
background, you will see that perhaps they, too, subscribe to
the sovereign ideology.
Mr. Richmond. If no one else wants to answer, I will yield
back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair now recognizes Ms. McSally from
Arizona.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you are doing your jobs and outreach and trying to
address this new threat that is metastasizing and we have
individuals being radicalized on the internet to take action
into their own hands, one of the things I would like to focus
on is specifically the phenomenon of girls and women becoming
radicalized, becoming jihadists, trying to travel to Iraq and
Syria.
I held a roundtable with my colleague Kathleen Rice on this
phenomenon months ago because there is a very specific dynamic
going on here that we haven't seen before, where we have girls
and women not just being victimized and recruited but also
being hardened jihadists themselves and actually leading some
of those efforts.
Just for some numbers, of the 250 Americans who have
attempted to go to Syria, 1 in 6 are women. Almost a fifth of
them are teenagers, but more than a third of the teenagers are
girls.
So we are seeing this new phenomenon. We have seen some
cases in the media: Three teenage girls from Colorado who were
intercepted in Germany trying to travel over there; a 19-year-
old from Minnesota who we found when she was in Syria; a
Mississippi former cheerleader, honor student, whose father is
a police officer and a Navy veteran, trying to plot to head
over to Syria with her fiance. This is a new phenomenon.
So do your outreach efforts in your communities have
anything focusing specifically on women and girls that are
becoming radicalized, or are they just part of the general
efforts for outreach? Any of you who would like to answer.
Mr. Miller. We have watched this very closely, certainly
mindful of the number of travelers we have seen. As you see
from the propaganda videos we have kind-of collected and put
together for the Chairman, they are very sophisticated in their
pitches, in their outreach. You can't ignore the San Bernardino
case as an example of----
Ms. McSally. Right.
Mr. Miller [continuing]. Radicalization targeting females
in the United States. We also have an active prosecution now
involving two women in New York City who were planning to use
pressure-cooker bombs to launch a plot that we interdicted last
year in a year-and-a-half-long undercover operation.
So this is something we are very concerned with and part of
our discussion with the community while we kind-of struggle
with them to come up with what is the counter-narrative and who
can deliver it.
Ms. McSally. Right.
Anyone else want to----
Chief Acevedo. In Austin, Texas, a couple of years ago, we
actually had a family--a husband, wife, and children--with
JTTF, arrested at the Houston International on their way to
Syria through Turkey.
So, for us, the key is not specifically addressing women
but addressing young people through educational programs,
through economic opportunities. I don't think you see too often
people that are educated wanting to blow themselves up. That is
the exception, not the rule. So youth programs and educational
and economic opportunities is one of the things that we do in
our department.
Ms. McSally. Right.
What we learn now is ISIS is using a very specific and
different message to recruit girls and women.
Sheriff Bouchard, do you have something to share?
Sheriff Bouchard. You are correct, and that is clearly a
concern on many levels because it brings in a whole demographic
that typically is less likely to be as scrutinized because so
many of the bombers and terrorists in the past have been
fighting-age males.
I worked on a case study in the Middle East, a suicide
bomber attempt of a female. As they broke it down, they
actually analyzed the psychological reasons why she was put
into that position and thought it was her only thing that she
could do to, I guess, feel better about herself.
So the disaffected and those that are vulnerable to a
message of ``this is a higher purpose, and you will be valued
if you do this'' are the ones, generically, I think, that we
need to have more outreach and more connectivity to to look to
interdict that message and bring them away from that siren
call, if you will.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
My second question is about, Sheriff Bouchard, you
mentioned you don't have real-time information sharing. This is
a real concern to me.
We have broken down some stovepipes since 9/11 across the
Federal agencies. We have done some work between Federal,
State, and local, but I think we have a long way to go. Fusion
centers are an important part of that, but some fusion centers
are not as good as others, and it comes down to relationships.
I actually had a bill, H.R. 3503, to address improving our
fusion centers and giving higher access to security clearances
to you all and your teammates so that you have better
information out on the front lines. It was passed unanimously
in the House, being held up in the Senate right now.
But if you were in charge, what would you do to--and I only
have a little bit of time, Sheriff Bouchard--break down those
stovepipes? Some of it is policy, some of it is clearances,
some of it is equipment. But what you would you do in order to
make sure you have all the information that you need?
Sheriff Bouchard. Well, I think you have touched on a lot
of the important issues as it relates to how we better
communicate, but it gets back to, you know, the methodology
sometimes in an urgent situation. As I mentioned, I have a Top
Secret clearance, but I don't have an instantaneous ability to
receive information without actually physically bringing us
together. In this day, in terms of the technology that is
available and we see used by terrorists, it is a bit
frustrating to literally have to drive some place to get, you
know, actionable information.
Ms. McSally. Yes, that is insane, and we need to work on
that together.
I know I am out of time. Does anyone else have anything to
say on that issue? We can follow up.
Chief Acevedo. Yes, ma'am. I think it is really important
that--police chiefs have gone through a background
investigation presumably, have been licensed peace officers.
They are known entities. I don't think we are any threat to our
Nation. Sadly, the majority of police chiefs in this country do
not have a Top Secret clearance.
Ms. McSally. Right.
Chief Acevedo. I think one of the things that we need to
look at is, if there is an investigation or an issue in an area
of responsibility for a police chief, we need to look at how we
can provide that information for that person who ultimately is
responsible for the safety of that community outside of the
clearance process.
So that is just food for thought.
Ms. McSally. Absolutely.
Chief Acevedo. Because the truth of the matter is a lot of
police chiefs are in the dark about investigations in their
area of responsibility.
Ms. McSally. That is something we definitely need to
improve, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
If I could, a quick follow-up. I know in Boston the Boston
police commissioner told me that he could not even talk to his
4 police officers on the Joint Terrorism Task Force about the
investigations. We have made efforts to change that. There has
been talk of an MOU to change that.
Chief, has that changed?
Chief Acevedo. I don't have a TS clearance, and so I will
just say this: That I am still the police chief in Austin,
Texas, and whether my people work for the JTTF or not, they
work for the people of Austin. My direction to them is that the
day that they don't tell me something that we needed to know--
they don't work for the Federal Government, they work for
Austin, and they are withholding information at their own
peril.
Fortunately, we have a pretty good relationship with our
local SAC, but it still is an issue. I think the answer is that
we not only have a right to know, we have a need to know,
regardless of the clearance level of that investigation, for
our areas of responsibility.
Chairman McCaul. I couldn't agree more.
I mean, Commissioner Miller, is that the state of play in
New York?
Mr. Miller. In New York, we don't have those issues. I
think it is in part because, with over 100 detectives on the
Joint Terrorism Task Force, there is very little information
that we are not either handling ourselves or have access to.
However, understanding the discussion that occurred after
Boston, Major City Chiefs, Intelligence Commanders Committee,
Chuck DeWitt worked together with partners to draw up--to
redraw, Mr. Chairman, the MOU about how a Joint Terrorism Task
Force operates with its local partners in terms of access they
are entitled to, clearance levels, computer access, and so on.
That new MOU, I believe, is in effect now. So that should
bring improvement to the situation. I think we can count on
Major City Chiefs to kind of anecdotally check on that to make
sure it is being enforced.
Chairman McCaul. Let me just pledge my support to help you.
I have talked to the FBI about this MOU. I know it has gone
back and forth. But it just seems to me that any commissioner
or police chief that has officers on the task force should--at
least the chief should be briefed on those cases. You have the
street intel. You have the intelligence on the streets.
The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To each of you, let me just say that I am profoundly
grateful, because I can just listen to all the challenges that
you are experiencing on so many different levels from so many
different areas and how safe we are, relatively speaking. I
know it is because you all are dedicated. You interact with
your colleagues wherever you need to. You are smart at what you
do, and you are keeping us safe. I thank you from the bottom of
my heart.
I also want to recognize that the great State of New Jersey
and the Linden Police Department was very helpful in addressing
the situation that we encountered this weekend, working with
New York. Sometimes my wonderful State gets overlooked, Mr.
Chairman. We are small, but we are mighty.
The other thing I would just like to say, two things
quickly, and I have one question.
No. 1 is that I can't hardly believe that more guns
anywhere should be the answer to a safer community or society,
school, or any other place. That is just an absolute ludicrous
thought on anybody's part.
No. 2 is I think that you all have expressed in some way,
shape, or form that the proliferation of illegal guns in the
communities are harmful not only to the community but even to
your law enforcement and that that is not the direction in
which we should continue to go.
Following up on that, I wanted to highlight something with
you, Chief Acevedo. In today's testimony and at a meeting with
the Homeland Security Advisory Subcommittee, you stated that
right-wing extremism is as much of a threat as the threat
inspired by foreign terrorist organizations.
In fact, I have an article that goes back, I guess, to 2014
in which you express that as it relates to someone who was part
of an association, a self-defined associate of some priesthood,
some Phineas----
Chief Acevedo. Phineas.
Mrs. Watson Coleman [continuing]. Phineas Priesthood.
Do you still believe that that is one of our greatest
threats, coming from right-wing extremism? Also, do you
recognize and feel that extremism even on the left is as much
of a great threat? May I have your comments on that?
Chief Acevedo. Thank you. Absolutely. I get beat up in my
great State because any time you mention right-wing anything
you get beat up. But extremism, whether it is left or right, is
just that, extremists.
The sovereign citizen movement in this Nation is alive and
well. If you look across the landscape, you will see police
officers that have been shot and killed by members of this
movement.
The only reason I mentioned that in the Homeland Security
Advisory Council to the Secretary and to this body is that we
don't want to be myopic as we look at the threat picture and
the threat domain around our country. It is not just from
foreign extremists; it is alive and well in our own Nation. If
you look at the totality of the victims of the threat, those
right-wing extremists really do, just like left-wing extremists
with bombs in the 1970's and so forth, do pose a significant
threat.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So I believe that this committee has
certainly given the attention to the foreign extremists. I am
wondering if, from your vantage point, are there sufficient
resources available to you in support, even in grants and other
funding, that help you with identifying those threats that are
posed by both--by extremists who are not foreign-born
extremists?
If you would all just give me yes, no and, you know, what
you would like to offer, because I only have a few minutes, I
would appreciate that also. Starting with you, Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. The grants make no distinction as to domestic
terrorism versus foreign, so they can be applied equally. So it
is not an issue for us.
Chief Acevedo. For us, funding continues to be an issue. We
were a UASI city that lost its funding, and any funding that we
can get. I mean, we are down to one-third. Unfortunately, we
know that there are a lot of competing interests and a lot that
you all have to fund, but we need help.
The militia movement and the sovereign citizen movement is
alive and well in our Nation, and I think it is an absolute
threat to the safety of our communities.
Sheriff Bouchard. As the commissioner said, the grants and
the training relates to any kind of threat. All threats, all
hazards was actually some of the verbiage we worked on many
years ago, so we apply that standard when we do our training.
Sheriff Demings. Funding remains an issue for us as well. I
believe that it is absolutely pivotal that we continue the work
across the silos, if you will, to get information. So I am
looking forward to it. Again, in our community, we had a home-
grown violent extremist who attacked a nightclub there in
Orlando.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
As I close, it is good to know that we could use these
resources on any of the areas that we have talked about. I
guess the question then becomes where there is no problem
because you can, is it applied appropriately?
Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes Mr. Carter from
Georgia.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of you for
being here. Obviously, this is extremely important and the work
that you do is extremely important. I want to preface my
remarks, my questions by saying I am not trying to be
adversarial or ask you to be adversarial. I am just trying to
get to the root of the problem or just to improve things. Maybe
there is not really a problem, but how can we improve things?
I would like to start with you, Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller, I
can only imagine, being in the high-threat environment that New
York City is, that you probably deal with a greater number of
threats than we truly realize. I suspect that is the case. My
question to you is this--and it is about communication. We all
understand how incredibly important it is, particularly in this
area, particularly between the Federal authorities and the
local authorities. I just want to ask you, has the Department
of Homeland Security supported your mission? Have they done
that and especially in regards to emergency communications?
Mr. Miller. So the Department of Homeland Security,
particularly under Secretary Johnson, has been the most
accessible Department of Homeland Security I've known since 9/
11, having done this job in both Los Angeles, when Art was in
California, and New York City. So that is in terms of our
ability to work with DHS. If we ask them for something, they
work hard to get it for us.
When you are part of communications, are you talking about
the passing of information or are you talking about actual
interoperability?
Mr. Carter. I am talking about everything.
Mr. Miller. We get a steady stream of products from DHS. I
am fortunate enough, and it may be because of the size and
scope of New York, to have two DHS intelligence advisers
assigned to the NYPD to make sure that that feed and flow is
early and often.
Mr. Carter. OK. Let me put it this way. How can we improve
it? I am always, you know, telling my staff we have got to get
better, we have got to get better. How can we make it better?
Mr. Miller. I am, unfortunately, a satisfied customer. I
have got nothing.
Mr. Carter. OK. Fair enough.
Mr. Miller. I mean, from that Department on that issue.
Mr. Carter. Fair enough.
Mr. Miller. I will talk about money till the cows come
home, but on that issue, I am good.
Mr. Carter. Look, I understand that. I understand it takes
money, but it also takes implementation, it takes
communication. It takes so much more. That is what I am trying
to get to here, is the communication factor.
Mr. Miller. I would suggest one answer to that question,
which is Heather Fong, who is the assistant secretary for law
enforcement was a police chief. She understands what we need,
she understands how we need it, she understands what we need it
for. The history of that position, before Heather and Louis
Quijas, had been a long line of people who did not come from
law enforcement: Assorted generals and military people and
other appointees.
Mr. Carter. Right, right. OK.
Mr. Miller. I would urge, in the future, that for the sake
of communications, that person always be a law enforcement
officer.
Mr. Carter. All right, good. I think that makes perfect
sense.
Chief Acevedo--I am sorry, whatever--it is just not a
popular name in south Georgia. I apologize. Nevertheless--chief
of the Austin, Texas, police department, over 2,500 law
enforcement officers and personnel to protect your city. Have
you ever worked with the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center? Are you familiar with FLETC?
Chief Acevedo. Yes, sir. I have actually worked there and I
have actually instructed there. It is a great facility, and I
think they offer a lot of support to State, county, and local
law enforcement. Yes, I have.
Mr. Carter. Have any of the others had any experience with
any of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers? We have
got one in our district, in the first Congressional district in
Glynco, Georgia. We are very proud. I have toured it, I have
seen it. I have seen the work that they do. It is a great
facility, a great opportunity to utilize resources. I am just
wondering if you have had that experience.
Sheriff Demings. We have had that experience, and I have
completed training there as well as members of my staff. But
going back to your question about DHS and perhaps----
Mr. Carter. Please.
Sheriff Demings [continuing]. What can be done. The
metropolitan Orlando area, when we were on the list to receive
UASI funding, we did so when the Secretary had the discretion
to select different metropolitan areas to receive funding. He
no longer has that discretion. It is rank ordered. Perhaps it
would be good for the Secretary to have some discretion,
particularly when you have an incident like what we had. When
we are 34 on the list and only the top 29 receive funding, if
the Secretary has some discretion there to fund different
regions based on what has occurred most recently, I think that
would assist in many ways.
We are similarly situated as Austin in that we once
received funding and then it was discontinued.
Mr. Carter. Right. Well, again, let me----
Yes? Is it OK, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman McCaul. Yes.
Sheriff Bouchard. I would like to also thank you for the
question. Obviously, we have heard a bit about the real-time
communications. New York is probably a little bit different
because they are collocated. Even though we are part of the
fusion center and I have people assigned there, it is not
collocated with my headquarters. Therefore, the real-time
communication gap necessitating a drive.
But there is other kinds of communication information that
does not and has not for years taken place that Sheriff Demings
mentioned about information coming to the deputy on the street
that stops somebody. That is an officer safety issue. Even if
we are not empowered, and we are not asking to be empowered, to
be in charge of deportation, we should be empowered with
information----
Mr. Carter. Absolutely, absolutely.
Sheriff Demings [continuing]. To let the deputy know that
that person may be an additional threat to him or her on the
side of a dark road for reasons that they don't even know. It
goes deeper than that. I have been bringing this same topic up
for over a decade.
When someone gets booked into our jails--sheriffs Nation-
wide run the jails--we don't get real-time information, in most
of those facilities, the status of anybody, or information as
it relates to even criminality being illegally in this country.
When it comes to reimbursement for someone that is and
comes from the Federal Government, it is still a phone call to
find out--unless you are participating in certain programs--a
phone call to find out if anybody is eligible for
reimbursement, but they won't even tell you who.
Mr. Carter. That is great.
Sheriff Bouchard. Unjointed.
Mr. Carter. Thank you for your answers. That is exactly
what I wanted to hear. That is exactly the kinds of things we
need to be working on to get better. We always want to get
better. Thank you for what you do. It is extremely important.
We want to help. That is why we had this hearing today, is
to find out what you just described to us. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your indulgence.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, who
represents San Bernardino, Mrs. Torres.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to thank all of you for working so
hard and diligently to keep our communities safe. I know that
your job is not easy and I know that you are--there are critics
of the work that you do every single day, but we do appreciate
everything that you do.
For Deputy Commissioner Miller, you talked about data from
9-1-1 systems in New York and how that is part of the
intelligence that you have on potential terrorist members of
the community. Can you explain what that entails and how is
that data collected? Does it come through the 9-1-1 system? 9-
1-1 dispatchers are also a part of that communication system.
Can you talk to us a little bit about how that process works?
Mr. Miller. So in the NYPD, like most police departments,
the 9-1-1 system feeds into a computer-assisted dispatch system
where calls are summarized on a keyboard as they come in and
sent to computers in police cars over the police radios and now
to these handheld devices.
As the calls come in and the call takers take them, they
can stack up in a dispatcher's queue as they are received.
Whereas where the officers are receiving them directly, they
are going direct to this device even before they come over the
radio. It has reduced our response time by a full minute and
change in certain areas of the city. That is one element.
The second element is the ability to harness the power of
this data as it is correlated, which is you get a 9-1-1 call of
an assault in progress in an apartment, possible domestic
violence. When you look at the call on the phone, instead of
just what you get over the police radio, it will tell you who
called, what is the callback number. If you touch that callback
number, you get the complainant on the phone. You can----
Mrs. Torres. Critical information about the location and
who may live there, if it is a targeted member or someone that
has been identified?
Mr. Miller. Yes. It is more about that information than
terrorist intelligence. It is a daily tool the police can use.
However, in the throes of a terrorist incident, it can become
vital, because now you can push information instantly, and
pictures and videos, to the police.
Mrs. Torres. How are your 9-1-1 dispatchers trained to pull
this information out of your callers during the interview
process?
Mr. Miller. They go through their PCTs, police
communications technicians. They go through an extensive
training process of their own and an extensive vetting process
in being hired about working under pressure, being able to
multitask, and so on.
Mrs. Torres. Being able to interview potential suspects and
potential victims of crime, nosey neighbors that may have
intelligence on what is happening next door, someone who may be
potentially targeting their neighborhood, correct?
Mr. Miller. I think an example is when we were looking for
the suspect in this latest bombing. On the floor of the 9-1-1
center, every operator who was working that day was told, we
are going out with this picture, you can expect a lot of
potential sightings to come in. When you get those calls, ask
where is the person? What are they wearing right now? Are they
carrying any packages, parcels, backpacks, bags, that kind of
thing, and to keep that caller on the line till you have the
rest of the information. Then to transfer them to the
intelligence operations desk so my detectives can get more.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you so much. The reason why I am asking
you this, if you don't know, there has been a push to
reclassify
9-1-1 dispatchers by the Office of Management and Budget. I
think it is a very short-sighted decision, not understanding
that this is a critical position for first responders. As a
former 9-1-1 dispatcher, this is a very important issue to me.
Mr. Miller. The 9-1-1 operator/dispatcher/call taker is the
very first line. It is the person who gets the call for help
first.
Mrs. Torres. So now, let's talk about the radio system. I
am very concerned about the San Bernardino incident. As
officers are responding and as the dispatchers are giving them
directions on which way to travel and suspect information,
there was no way for them to switch to an encrypted radio
channel. This is really important because the suspects, had
there been more than two people involved, they could have
positioned themselves in a place to target the officers as they
are responding.
What do you think that we need to do from that perspective?
Chief Acevedo. We are very fortunate in our region, is that
our interoperability is absolutely where it needs to be and we
have the ability to move to a unified encrypted channel. As a
matter of fact, with our F1, Formula 1, event in November, DHS
is going to come out and look at our inoperability. But the
truth of the matter is that a lot of jurisdictions don't have
that capability. It is something that needs to be worked on.
Mrs. Torres. They don't have that capability and there is
not enough funding for them to be able to purchase the radios
and the systems that they need.
I have exceeded my time. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman
from New York, Mr. Katko.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Miller, you may not remember this, but I had the
pleasure of attending a briefing with Chairman McCaul and Mr.
King about a year ago in New York with you and the chief and
some others. I was thoroughly impressed by the professionalism
and the ability to get the job done, and I just want to commend
you for that.
One of my colleagues on the other side had mentioned that
you don't often get credit for what you stop, but I can assure
you that, were it not for your great leadership, that there
would be much more problems in New York City. So I really
applaud your efforts and I hope to continue.
One of the things I would like to explore and one of the
things I think this committee is uniquely positioned to help
you all with is something I hear again and again. That is the
lack of information sharing and the lack of breaking down lines
of communications on the Federal, State, and local level. I
have had a bird's-eye view of this for 20 years as a Federal
organized crime prosecutor, first in El Paso, then in Puerto
Rico, and then in New York State in the Syracuse area. So
everywhere you went, one of the biggest problems was getting
the team to work together and breaking down those barriers.
Now, it seems like in New York necessity is the mother of
invention. You have to break down those doors, you have to get
working seamlessly. That is the only way you are going to even
remotely be able to do your job.
So I would like to have--I kind-of examined what Mr.
Miller's situation is, it really is the exception to the rule
because everywhere else I understand is quite different.
Mr. Demings, I think you mentioned that you have to improve
our analytical capabilities. You also mentioned that there is
some--you were getting access to ICE databases, for example.
Those are the types of things I am concerned and want to hear
about.
So perhaps if you could tell me, Mr. Demings, Mr. Bouchard,
and Mr. Acevedo, what is the biggest problems that you see with
respect to the information sharing? One the things I see first
and foremost is how long it takes to get a background check
done for someone joining the task force, which is maddening,
and that has got to get changed. But what else do you see that
we can help work on? Then perhaps at the end we can have Mr.
Miller comment on, you know, ways we can fix it.
The MOU system seems to be one of them. Maybe using the
model that New York is trying to implement Nation-wide. It
might be something we can help for us. But I would like to hear
from Mr. Demings first, if I may.
Sheriff Demings. Well, I will say that we enjoy a pretty
good relationship with our Federal authorities there in the
metropolitan Orlando area because of what we have there in
terms of the theme parks. We have Federal agents who are
embedded within our theme parks. So that forces us to
communicate.
I do believe that there is still room for improvement,
however. The situation I talked about earlier in which a law
enforcement officer stops someone on the streets of our Nation
when they do--typically, we are trained to check for--run a
National check to see if the person has any type of warrants or
what have you we run it within our respective States as well.
But there is nothing that comes back from that National
database that tells us whether or not that person that we have
encountered is illegal or not. That is something that we have
suggested. It is a policy within ICE that perhaps that needs to
change where we want to have access to that type of real-time
information.
Mr. Katko. That is something we can definitely take a look
at. My staff, I hope, is taking notes.
Yes, they are. Good.
All right. Go ahead.
Sheriff Bouchard. I would dovetail on that. I have asked
the same question when we have had meetings with senior
leadership with the Major County Sheriffs. Is it a policy
issue, is it a funding issue, or is it a communication
technology issue that the different systems don't communicate
and integrate well? For years, we have been getting, well, it
could be part of all three. So we have been asking these same
questions for literally a decade at this point.
Again, you know, some folks have said, well, we don't want
you to have that information about status or immigration,
because it allows you to profile. I understand the only time
that database is queried is when we have already stopped an
individual, and even worse, when they are already in our jail
and we are still not told.
So, you know, we think it is long overdue that we at least
have access to the information for situational awareness and
for an understanding of who we have and who is in our jail, and
that is not there.
Mr. Katko. Mr. Acevedo.
Chief Acevedo. I want to take it from the Criminal
Intelligence Enterprise for the Major Cities Chiefs and the
Major County Sheriffs. We have been working with DHS now. I
have been on that body for 9 years trying to get this
enterprise up and running. It is still not where it needs to
be. Quite frankly, we need support for our intelligence
commanders. We have 68 intelligence commanders throughout the
Nation. Each one of those organizations--and that is just the
Major Cities Chiefs. Then we have how many members from the
sheriff's department.
We desperately need funding to support at least two
meetings a year with these commanders because relationships
matter. We all know that that needle in the haystack we are
looking for is more than likely going to be found by a State or
local or county law enforcement official. If we don't support
our intelligence groups so they can build those relationships,
share the information and the intelligence enterprise that is
still not where it needs to be, and support that enterprise to
continue to build out--we were just whispering to each other--
we are going to be dead at the rate we are going. I don't mean
by a terrorist attack; I think of old age.
So we want to put that on your radar, the CIE and the
Intelligence Commanders Group, in finding funding. You know, $2
million seems like a lot of money, but in the grand scheme of
things, that is a drop in the bucket. DHS has the funding, but
we need you all to, yourselves or the appropriations committee,
to actually order them to peel off that money so we can, at the
State, county, and local level, do what we need to do to keep
our community safe.
Mr. Katko. Thank you.
Mr. Miller, now, you have a much different posture than
your colleagues at the table. It is because of, I think, the
fact that ground zero really is New York City for the terrorist
targets. That helps break down some of the barriers. But can
you share with us some of the ways in which you have been able
to effectively share information with the local agencies that
other jurisdictions may struggle doing?
Mr. Miller. We engage in extensive liaison efforts, some
programmatic. But as Chief Acevedo said, a lot of this is
people-to-people and networking.
First, we have the SHIELD program, which has thousands of
members, and it is our outreach to the private security. It is
the public-private partnership where we provide them regular
briefing materials, constant alerts on breaking events, and
training.
Second, we have a Sentry program. That is not on the
counterterrorism side, but on the intelligence side, where we
have developed a network of partnerships in the surrounding
areas from New Jersey to Nassau, Suffolk County, up-State, as
far as Boston, a virtual northeast corridor of law enforcement
partners who we bring together at a major conference once a
year and go through a series of presentations and information-
sharing exercises, but we also communicate with regularly.
When something happens somewhere, we pick up the phone. We
will call that place, we have a point of contact. The same
thing in reverse when something happens here. Both of those are
based on email platforms, cross-communications, and information
that we send out.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much.
Before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, I just want to note for
the record that I did not engage in the gun debate during my
questioning.
Chairman McCaul. We thank you for that. I think the title
of the hearing was the threat that we face post-9/11.
So the Chair recognizes Ms. Jackson Lee from Houston,
Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
Again, let us acknowledge the work of all of you as first
responders. Some of you I have had the privilege and
opportunity to meet and maybe thank you personally for your
work.
Let me put on the record that the United States--DHS, for
example, is 240,000 employees that have a range of
responsibilities from aviation to border security. I believe
there are 1 million firefighters, 750,000 are volunteers; and
18,000 police departments, 556,000 full-time employees.
To Chief Acevedo, let me thank you personally. We know the
great work you are doing in the State. I want to commend to the
Major Chiefs, the legislation that we submitted to a number of
individuals called the Law Enforcement Trust and Integrity Act.
That is just a little note for myself for you to look at it,
dealing with police community relations. Even that has
something to do with us working together.
Let me also say that I think the record deserves the
clarification on a little 12-year-old in northern Texas, if you
will. That 12-year-old had a clock. I think what is important
in order for us to embrace all of those who are going to help
us solve this problem, we must understand where to direct our
anger and questions. I want to say to the educators who saw
something and said something, that is what we say in the
Department of Homeland Security. But what we also want to have
occur is that you balance it against the knowledge that you may
have as to the individual, the family, or in this instance, a
12-year-old child. So if you knew that you had a bright 12-
year-old child, you could have asked the child what is that and
also see something and say something. That is how we really
solve problems.
I would like to also add into the record, the ``Sikh man
who found bombing suspect, I did what everybody American would
have [to do].'' So Sikh, obviously a faith that many Americans
have, and could have just as well been in Oakland, Michigan, a
Muslim, could have been a store owner.
So I ask unanimous consent to put this into the record.
Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Article Submitted For the Record by Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
sikh man who found bombing suspect: `i did what every american would
have done'
By Kait Richmond, CNN
Updated 12:46 PM ET, Tue September 20, 2016
(CNN) What Harinder Bains did isn't unusual: He saw something
suspicious and called police.
But who Harinder Bains is makes this story special.
Bains is the bar owner who led police to Ahmad Rahami, the suspect
in the New York and New Jersey blasts.
While officials haven't pinned an exact motive to the Afghanistan-
born Rahami's act, a handwritten note is said to have contained
ramblings, including references to previous terrorists, such as the
Boston Marathon bombers.
That's what makes Bains actions remarkable.
Bains is a Sikh American. And every time an attack has been carried
out by an Islamic extremist, Sikhs--mistaken for Muslims because of
their turbans and beards--have borne the backlash. And 15 years after
9/11, Sikhs don't feel any safer. The hate spewed toward them, as
immigrants, has only spiked because of the xenophobic tenor in some
quarters these days.
Which brings us to Bains--a Sikh man, an immigrant--who had a hand
in stopping a suspect--another immigrant--from getting away with a
crime.
``Not for nuthin' the guy who recognized & called the police on the
bomb suspect was an IMMIGRANT named Harinder Bains. IMMIGRANT=HERO!''
tweeted Cecile Kazemi, echoing a sentiment repeated over and over on-
line.
But talk to Bains and he'll tell you his actions had nothing to do
with his Sikh faith.
``I did what I think every American would have done,'' Bains told
CNN's Chris Cuomo. ``My neighbor would have done the same thing. Any
Jewish, Christian, Sikh, Muslim. Anybody would have done the same
thing.''
``I'm from Sikh faith,'' he added. ``I've been taught always stand
up against the atrocities, any kind of persecution.''
The discovery
On Monday morning, Bains spotted Rahami sleeping in the doorway of
his bar in Linden, New Jersey.
At first, Bains said he thought Rahami was a ``drunk guy''
wandering the streets.
``This has happened before also--somebody loitering in front of the
bar. And always I go there and confront people and I yell at them. But
somehow maybe [because] it was raining, I didn't do anything. I felt
bad for him.''
Later, as he was watching CNN from another business across the
street, he recognized the 28-year-old as the person wanted for
questioning in this weekend's bombings.
He called 911.
``I just told them the guy looks a little suspicious and doesn't
look good to me,'' Bains told ``Anderson Cooper 360.''
When officers confronted him, Rahami pulled out a handgun and shot
one of them.
``He shot twice and the glass splinters almost hit my store,''
Bains said.
A shootout ensued, and then the world watched as cameras caught
Rahami being loaded into an ambulance on a stretcher.
It was a stunning end to a two-day manhunt.
Bains insists he is not a hero.
But he is using the spotlight to promote a message of inclusion:
``We will be more stronger like this if we do everything together.''
http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/20/us/harinder-bains-sikh-faith-trnd/
Chairman McCaul. Would the gentlelady yield? Commissioner
Miller has a meeting with the Department of Homeland Security
and has to----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, can I talk quickly and get a
question out to him before----
Chairman McCaul. Well, if you have a very quick question
for him----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, before he departs.
Chairman McCaul [continuing]. Because he has to depart.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Miller. The Department of
Homeland Security is important, but let me quickly say that my
focus on the questioning after you leave is on intelligence. So
my point to you is, give us the level of cruciality that good
intelligence is coming from civilians, coming from the Muslim
community, coming from neighbors, and as well coming from
fusion centers or in fusion centers, and of course, JTTF, which
is an investigatory arm. Level, the height--what level do you
put the right intelligence at?
Mr. Miller. I put it at the top, because having the right
intelligence, the right partnerships, the right sources is the
difference between having prevented 20 attacks or having had 20
attacks.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I congratulate you on that. I will pursue
my other line of questioning with the other gentlemen.
Please let me put on the record my appreciation for the
service of Commissioner Bratton, who I know you had the
privilege of working under and we worked with. Thank you very
much for your service.
Let me go to Chief Acevedo and all the other chiefs that
are here. Thank you. My focus is to get you the money, to get
you the money that you need and that you have come here using
your time to come up and explain to us what we need not to look
backward but to look forward.
So first, Chief, tell me how effective the fusion center is
in the State of Texas. Chief Acevedo. I am sorry.
Chief Acevedo. Thank you for that question, and great to
see you. Our fusion center is absolutely key. Prior to the
fusion center and the Austin Regional Intelligence Center, we
really didn't have a mechanism by which, when we spotted
threats or we saw something going on, to quickly act on it. I
can tell you, just last weekend, a member of--a former Member
of Congress received a threat and we were able to very quickly
track that down because of our fusion center. Then we were
smart enough to leverage our relationship with the State of
Texas and the Department of Public Safety where we have
actually placed our fusion center at DPS headquarters and pay
them $1 a year for the next 10 years, thank goodness. As a
result, we leveraged the relationship, the assets.
Although we don't get UASI funding, when we received that
funding back I believe in 2008, we enter it knowing that we as
a community and as a region were going to commit it to
maintaining that fusion center. We are doing so at a great cost
locally because it is that important to us and our community.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask Mr. Bouchard and Mr. Demings
the same question. Do we need more resources for the fusion
center? Fusion centers, because Michigan and Florida.
Sheriff Bouchard. Thank you, ma'am. Yes, I think Nation-
wide the fusion centers are in need of resources, because while
all this has been going on, certainly the country has gone
through a recession and that affected all the police agencies
in terms of their budgets and their personnel. I cut 165
positions during the downturn, which I still don't have back.
Yet, you know, I want to have a commitment to the fusion
center, but I have to fund 100 percent of it. So I have to pull
someone out of our budget and out of our deployment and put
them into the fusion center.
It certainly would be helpful if there was a way to, on a
combined platform, if they are going to be assigned basically
to a Federal joint terrorism or joint effort, that there should
be some funding stream. We believe it would be helpful to----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I agree, Chief.
Sheriff Bouchard. Add to the interaction and grow that.
Because a lot of agencies can't afford it and even I, you know,
find it challenging because we are asked to be on the JTTF, we
are asked to be on identity theft with the Secret Service, we
are asked to be on the fugitive with the U.S. Marshals, we are
asked to be on all these different things----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Allow me to get Mr. Demings. Thank you. I
support you in that.
Mr. Demings, my sympathy to you for what your community
experienced. Your experience and what you need in a fusion
center to gather the intelligence that you need.
Sheriff Demings. The fusion centers, again, they play a
very pivotal role in our State and really as it relates to
National security. Last year, we had 66.1 million visitors who
came to Orange County, where I am from, and that was No. 1 in
the Nation.
But with our fusion centers, while the primary focus is on
counterterrorism efforts, it also has assisted in allowing us
to manage natural disasters and also all crimes. So it is
pivotal to preventing terror attacks but also preventing crimes
from occurring in our community as well.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I have one last question and
I----
Mr. Katko [presiding]. It is a brief one, I hope.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, it is. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Katko. OK.
Ms. Jackson Lee. First of all, I will just make this
statement. I do think getting guns off the street will help all
of you, including officers, as we move toward dealing with this
question of police community relations. But I offer a note
about many of us who have a bill to close the gun show
loophole. I have one that indicates to report any time guns are
sold and you don't have the background check completed. Then
also I think it's important to take note of the fact that we
need to report when guns are transferred without that
background check done. Guns do kill.
Let me ask this last question as how you draw your
information. That is how we keep these dangerous issues from
happening. Tell me how valuable it is to have relationships
with diverse communities, diverse faiths. Obviously, I am going
to say Muslims, but a variety of people. If you talk about
right-wing attacks, how valuable it is to have information for
you to do your job and have people willing to talk to you to do
your job?
Sheriff Demings. I indicated earlier that we had 66.1
million visitors. Well, they come from everywhere. So it is
absolutely important for us to have relationships in the broad,
diverse communities that we have. So we really focus on that.
Before an incident occurs, we try to have establish
relationships. We are depending on those relationships to
provide the information in advance to us to perhaps assist in
preventing an attack.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Bouchard and then Mr. Acevedo. Thank you.
Sheriff Bouchard. Thank you. I think relationships are key
on many levels, whether it is--we talked all threats, all
hazards. Whether it is traditional crime or counterterrorism,
you have to have relationships so people feel comfortable to
call and tell you they see something odd. Maybe it is related
to terrorism or maybe it is a drug house. They have to have
that confidence in that relationship, you know. Everyone has
got their own kinds of platforms, I think, to try to do that.
I launched a thing called the Sheriffs' Relations Team,
SRT. We try to put together community members to be a funnel,
because sometimes, people don't feel comfortable calling the
police, but they may feel comfortable calling people that are
on that team that can then connect to us, and also create
platforms that allow anonymous information to flow to us in an
uninhibited manner.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Chief.
Chief Acevedo. Relationships absolutely are key. I spoke to
this earlier, Congresswoman, whether it is the immigration
debate or whatever debate, we have to stop painting people with
broad brushes because it puts up fences and tears down trust.
In my community, I spend a lot of time speaking in English and
Spanish to my immigrant community, to my Muslim community, to
all communities, that the Austin Police Department, the only
ones that need to fear us are those that would do harm to
members of our community. So I think that as we move forward,
we have to continue to build bridges to all segments of society
instead of tearing them down.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Ratcliffe.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would like
to thank each of you for your service to our country and to all
of our communities. I know that Deputy Commissioner Miller had
to leave, and I was hoping to have an opportunity to commend
and thank him and his folks for what was a truly remarkable and
amazing response to the terrorist events in New York and New
Jersey this past weekend and the incredible speed at which they
were able to identify and apprehend the suspect, Mr. Rahami. I
think that that probably saved the lives of countless
Americans. Of course, we are all grateful that Officer Padilla
and Investigator Hammer are both expected to make a full
recovery from their injuries sustained during their heroic
actions.
But these events really only underscore how every day
members of our law enforcement community, your teams, say good-
bye to their loved ones and then go out and put their lives on
the line to protect their neighbors.
Now, unfortunately, you all are being asked to do not just
the traditional jobs that we have always asked law enforcement
to do, you now have to answer the call when terrorists attack.
In that respect, you truly are the first line of defense in
ensuring that our streets don't become battlefields. It seems
to me that if we are asking you all to go to battle, then the
very least that we can do is make sure that you get the type of
equipment that you need to protect yourselves and to protect
all of us.
Now, I will tell you, it is not very often that I get a
chance to talk about a Federal program that serves a noble
purpose like that, and does so effectively, efficiently, and at
essentially no cost to taxpayers. Those types of Federal
programs are about as rare as a $3 bill. But the 1033 surplus
program is exactly that kind of program. I think you all know
that.
It is a program that allows the Department of Defense to
transfer certain surplus defense equipment, which has already
been paid for, and in many cases already been used to protect
our troops, and to repurpose that for our State and local law
enforcement to use in counterterrorism activities and counter
drug activities and in emergency situations that arise in our
communities all the time. That was the case anyway, until
unilateral executive actions by President Obama, which cut
access to that type of critical equipment that agencies like
yours depend on.
In fact, many of you have had, I assume, to send back some
of the equipment that you had already received from the
program. Equipment like tracked armored vehicles, the kind that
law enforcement officers in my district say have saved lives in
crisis situations and which double as rescue vehicles in some
circumstances. Because of the President's action here, some of
the SWAT teams that have had the benefit of life-saving body
armor and ballistic helmets won't have that benefit anymore,
because they can't afford that equipment without this program.
So I think the President's actions here are, frankly,
inexcusable. I think he has put the safety of your officers and
his politics ahead of the public safety.
So in response to all that, earlier this year, I introduced
the PLUS Act, the Protecting Lives Using Surplus Equipment Act
of 2016, which would reverse the President's Executive Order
and restore that program to law enforcement agencies like all
of yours.
Sheriff Bouchard, I want to start with you, because I
notice you mentioned it in your opening statement. I really
want to get your perspective on the administration's unilateral
decision to strip this type of equipment from agencies like
yours. In answering that, I am interested in the policy, of
course, but I am less interested in hypotheticals. I want to
know how this is really affecting officers like the ones that
you manage out in the real world.
Sheriff Bouchard. Well, thank you. Thank you for your
leadership on this.
We have, I think, pretty much across the board found 1033
extremely helpful in assisting law enforcement in challenging
days and times. I think we saw real-time evidence of that in
San Bernardino, the use of armored vehicles and tactical
equipment to save lives.
In a real-life example, the day that was playing out, we
received an order from Washington to return our tracked vehicle
that day. It was loaded on a flatbed and the attempt is to blow
it up. The tracked vehicles around the country are used, not
just for dangerous armored situations, but there are also
diverse terrain across this country: Sand and snow. Northern
Michigan can get, you know, 5 feet of snow, and a tracked
vehicle is the only way to get to certain situations.
I know San Bernardino found themselves with a running
fugitive hunt who had killed a number of people. They had to
actually borrow I think Park's CATs to be able to drive through
some of the deep snow. My real-life example is we had a running
gun battle that lasted almost 12 hours with an individual who
had killed a police officer and barricaded himself in a house.
He was firing a fully automatic weapon, not just out the
windows, but through the walls and striking all the neighbors'
homes. We used armored vehicles to evacuate the neighbors and
to obviously protect our deployed deputies around the scene as
we continued that running gun battle all night long.
Toward the end of that battle, we wanted to insert into the
second story. The only way we could do that was with an armored
vehicle that actually had a ramp to a second story. That
armored tracked vehicle was recalled by the Federal Government.
Our region no longer has the ability to have a ramp to a second
story in an armored capability. So that literally was saving
lives that night, and was taken and is intended to be
destroyed. So that is the kind of situation we are facing.
I will just go a step further. I think most of the real
problems are now coming from the rule makers. I said I am the
point person on this for Major Counties Sheriffs of America and
I have been in more meetings that I can count. In one of the
meetings, there were 37 people in the room, two of us were
full-time law enforcement.
So the people making rules actually was asked the question
in one of these meetings, what caliber is 223? The people
making the decisions don't know the equipment or the tactics
used with this equipment, and they get to decide how and when
and where we use that. I think that is a problem. They are
writing rules that are rather extensive. They keep changing
them. They have changed them a number of times. They haven't
been formalized, but they are going to be backdated to October
of last year, and we don't know what the rules are yet. At one
point, it was we had to train our whole agency on a specific
set of training, department-wide. Not the people that used it
or were authorized to call it out, but the whole agency. So
much of this is driven by perception. It is incredibly
frustrating.
You know, they talk about--militarized tracked vehicles
were removed because the looked too militarized, but you can
still get armored vehicles with wheels. Well, that doesn't go
to the tactics necessary or the terrain. I had to turn in 12
bayonets because they thought we were fixing bayonets, I guess,
and charging homes. They were 12 chrome bayonets used by the
honor guard at funerals. So we had to go out and buy the
bayonets for the honor guard that the Federal Government
recalled. So much of this is driven by perception, not by the
reality of use or by who is making those decisions. It is
incredibly frustrating.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Sheriff. Based on the answer that
you just gave me, would you agree with me that the President's
decision to eliminate this program is jeopardizing the safety
and well-being of your officers?
Sheriff Bouchard. I certainly would agree with that
statement. In fact, I said that, after San Bernardino, the
sheriff, a friend of mine, said they came prepared and America
is less prepared, as we sent back our armored vehicles that
same day.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Sheriff. I am out of time.
Chief, I saw you nodding your head in response. So I want
to give you a chance to comment on this if you----
Chief Acevedo. I will be very brief. But whether it is a
1033 program or asset forfeiture, we need to deal with
individual departments if they abuse or misuse the equipment or
the assets, and not paint the entire profession and hold the
entire profession accountable with a broad brush.
You remember the MRAPs? Everybody hates them. Oh, they
invoke images of Iraq. And Chairman McCaul and I had a press
conference in Austin where--we didn't get one for Austin
because my SWAT team said it is too big for our city
configuration. But I said, when you have floods, and we are a
State prone to flooding, we need those MRAPs to rescue people.
Not a month passed when we had some major flooding in Central
Texas. Guess what the PD just south of me used? An MRAP, to
rescue kids that were stuck inside an elementary school that
had basically flooded all around it.
So it is not the equipment, it is--which needs to be used.
So, absolutely, the 1033 and asset forfeiture, hold the
departments accountable that misused the equipment, and let's
not paint the entire profession with a broad brush.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Chief.
I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe.
I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony
and for the Members for their questions.
Before I conclude, I want to, first of all, thank all of
you. Being in law enforcement for 20 years, when I hear what
you discuss, I kind-of miss it, to be frank. But I want you to
get some comfort out of this that your words are not falling on
deaf ears. We have heard time and again over the last several
months in other hearings about we need to do a better job of
sharing information. We need to do a better job of getting
State, local, and Federal agencies on the same page, especially
with respect to background checks and information sharing. We
are mindful of that and we are in the process of doing things
about that. So your testimony does help.
The fusion center issue really bothered me. I did not
realize that was such--there were so many cuts from the fusion
centers. That is very troubling, given the fact in the last few
years, where we are now up to over 1,000 ISIS-related
investigations Nation-wide in all 50 States. It is not a time
to be paring it down, it is time to be plussing it up. We need
to take a look at that and we need to find the funding to make
that happen.
Last, with respect to your colloquy with Mr. Ratcliffe, we
have to give you all the tools you need to make things
necessary--to keep you as safe as possible and to make you do
as an effective job as you possibly can. We can't do that when
you start cutting things. So we have to be mindful of that. No
matter what happens going forward with the election, we need to
convince the administration, whomever it is, that you need to
be properly supported. This is not a time for cuts. This is a
time for at least maintaining what you have or plussing it up,
because the American people deserve to be safe. We have to give
you the tools to keep them safe.
So I commend you all for the job you do. To find that
needle in the haystack every day is a brutal task. You know, I
wake up every day worried about things I learned on the
committee. I can't imaging what you all go through every day.
So I thank you for what you do.
The Members of the committee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses, and we will ask them to respond to
these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule 7(e), the hearing
record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. Thank
you, gentlemen.
[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Art Acevedo
Question 1. This year, Texas implemented its open-carry law. Do
open-carry laws, and other lax gun laws, create additional demands on
police resources? How so?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. You note in your testimony that the availability of
firearms ``haunts police chiefs every day.'' Do you think that the
increased threats posed by the proliferation of firearms deters
qualified individuals from joining law enforcement or serves as an
incentive to leave law enforcement?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Chief Acevedo, Austin no longer receives UASI funding.
Can you expand on some of the capabilities you have lost or have had to
pursue less ambitiously because Austin is no longer a UASI city?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. The International Association of Chiefs of Police has
previously distributed officer vulnerability tips to limit assaults
against police officers while on duty. These tips ranged from officers
wearing their vest, proper vest fit, physical readiness, mental
readiness, situational awareness, and officers getting to know their
community. How effective is this kind of guidance when police officers
are essentially out-gunned by people with illegal and military-style
firearms?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Michael J.
Bouchard
Question 1a. In wake of the 2015 attack at the military recruiting
center in Chattanooga, Tennessee, you called on members of the military
to carry concealed weapons to combat possible threats. Your department
assisted in offering classes to military members to obtain a concealed
carry license.
Is this still an on-going initiative by your department?
Question 1b. How much does it cost your department to perform this
kind of services?
Answer. The Oakland County Sheriff's Office was proud to offer
Concealed Pistol License (CPL) classes to those who were active
military. Along with that, many veterans participated in the program as
well. In August 2015, we held three classes which served over 60
individuals to receive the training that is mandated in the State of
Michigan for someone to receive a CPL. While we have not held any
additional classes specifically for the military, we offer regular
monthly CPL classes at our agency taught by our firearms instructors.
Further, the Sheriff's Office has been working with the legislature on
legislation that would mandate military personnel to be on-duty at all
times with a firearm at military installations. As of now, many
military bases are still not equipped to face a threat as they did in
Chattanooga. It is imperative that we provide our armed forces who are
sworn to protect our country with the tools necessary to also protect
themselves.
These classes were put on through partnerships and sponsorships
from the community. The firearms instructors volunteered their time,
the range was donated by a local business, and the food was donated
through a local restaurant. Without these donations, it would cost us
$1,200.00 per class for the instructors, $500+ for the facility, and
another $400+ for the food for the 8-hour class required by law.
Question 2. The International Association of Chiefs of Police has
previously distributed officer vulnerability tips to limit assaults
against police officers while on duty. These tips ranged from officers
wearing their vest, proper vest fit, physical readiness, mental
readiness, situational awareness, and officers getting to know their
community. How effective is this kind of guidance when police officers
are essentially out-gunned by people with illegal and military-style
firearms?
Answer. Vulnerability tips can be helpful however, the fact of the
matter is that the recall of certain types of controlled life-saving
equipment has undoubtedly left America's law enforcement less prepared
and at a disadvantage to protect local communities from active
shooters, terror attacks, and dangerous situations. As noted in the
August 2, 2016 COPS/LEOMF report, ``Deadly Calls and Fatal
Encounters,'' in all of examined Officer Needs Assistance calls,
officers were shot as they manned perimeters when a suspect barricaded
themselves, as they assisted in the search for an armed fleeing
suspect, or as they attempted to rescue a wounded officer. Suspects
were wielding rifles in 7 cases, and of those, 4 were ambush-style
attacks. Three of the cases involved multiple officers being shot and
killed. Standard soft body armor such as level III-A, worn by most
patrol officers, will not stop a rifle round. The increasing use of
assault-style rifles against police has given rise to the issuance of
AR-style patrol rifles, body armor with hard armor plates, and
ballistic helmets, to be deployed during high threat responses.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ http://www.nleomf.org/assets/pdfs/officer-safety/Primary-
Research-Final-8-2-16.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Jerry L. Demings
Question 1a. Recently, we saw two separate instances of lone-wolf
actors conducting attacks on communities in Minnesota and New York
City. After the devastating terrorist attack that happened in Orange
County this summer, how do you go about training for and prevention of
lone-wolf attacks?
Question 1b. How does the availability of guns affect the
complexities involved in protecting against lone-wolf terrorist
attacks?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. In the past, you expressed concerns about the growing
number of stolen weapons within your community. Your department has
been involved in a gun buyback initiative to limit the amount of guns
falling into the wrong hands.
Can you tell us how this initiative has worked in your community so
far?
Question 2b. How should additional agencies across the country
participate in similar programs to encourage further gun safety and
crime prevention?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. According to DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, homeland
security can not be done without sensible gun control legislation. Do
you agree with the Secretary?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4a. The market for illegal firearm trafficking should
remain a major concern for law enforcement officials to better address.
Unfortunately, in your community, as well as across the Nation,
officers have been killed due to suspects' possession of illegal
firearms.
How do law enforcement officials deal with individuals who are able
to possess firearms via straw-buyer purchases?
Question 4b. Do these individuals pose any unique threats to those
in their communities?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. The International Association of Chiefs of Police has
previously distributed officer vulnerability tips to limit assaults
against police officers while on duty. These tips ranged from officers
wearing their vest, proper vest fit, physical readiness, mental
readiness, situational awareness, and officers getting to know their
community. How effective is this kind of guidance when police officers
are essentially out-gunned by people with illegal and military-style
firearms?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for John Miller
Question 1. Mr. Miller, as we saw after 9/11 and as we saw just
this week after the Chelsea bombing, New York City is resilient. How
does the NYPD foster and promote a culture of resiliency?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Mr. Miller, thank you for coming. In the wake of this
weekend's incident in Chelsea, please tell us what type of assistance
you have received from the Federal Government. Do you consider it to be
sufficient?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Mr. Miller, in light of the recent police shootings in
Dallas and the mass shootings in Orlando and San Bernardino, what type
of changes has NYPD made for its officers?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. The International Association of Chiefs of Police has
previously distributed officer vulnerability tips to limit assaults
against police officers while on duty. These tips ranged from officers
wearing their vest, proper vest fit, physical readiness, mental
readiness, situational awareness, and officers getting to know their
community. How effective is this kind of guidance when police officers
are essentially out-gunned by people with illegal and military-style
firearms?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
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