[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SHUTTING DOWN TERRORIST PATHWAYS INTO AMERICA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 14, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-86
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
25-268 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
Statement of Francis X. Taylor, Under Secretary, Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; Accompanied by Leon Rodriguez, Director, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Huban A. Gowadia, Deputy Administrator,
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Kevin K. McAleenan, Deputy Commissioner,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; and Daniel H. Ragsdale, Deputy Director, U.S.
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 8
For the Record
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York:
Background/Previous TSA Engagements with Cuba.................. 30
Email.......................................................... 32
Article, US to Deploy Federal Air Marshals on Cuba Flights..... 33
Excerpt, Flying Blind: What Are the Security Risks of Resuming
U.S. Commercial Air Service to Cuba?......................... 35
Appendix
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for the
Department of Homeland Security................................ 41
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Huban A.
Gowadia........................................................ 43
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Kevin
McAlee- nan.................................................... 48
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Daniel H.
Ragsdale....................................................... 51
Questions From Honorable William Keating for Daniel H. Ragsdale.. 53
SHUTTING DOWN TERRORIST PATHWAYS INTO AMERICA
----------
Wednesday, September 14, 2016
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
(Chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul, Duncan, Katko, Hurd,
Carter, McSally, Ratcliffe, Donovan, Thompson, Jackson Lee,
Langevin, Vela, and Torres.
Chairman McCaul. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to receive
testimony regarding shutting down terrorist pathways into the
United States. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
This past weekend, we marked the 15th anniversary of one of
the darkest days in our Nation's history. On September 11,
2001, our people, our homeland, and our way of life came under
attack. I remember watching the television with my 5-year-old
daughter as the second tower was hit. Like many of you, I
realized this was not an accident. It was an act of war against
our country.
The world has changed since then, and today my daughter is
20 years old, but we cannot let the passage of time dull our
memories or temper our resolve. Those who don't learn the
lessons of history are doomed to repeat them.
That is why in the aftermath of 9/11, we made a solemn
pledge, ``Never again.'' The agencies represented here today
were brought together under one roof for exactly that purpose.
You have made counterterrorism your highest priority. You have
connected the dots and prevented terrorist attacks and you have
made it harder for them to infiltrate the United States
undetected.
But our enemies have come a long way. They see our
weaknesses and are always trying to exploit them. Unlike the 9/
11 hijackers, though, today's jihadists are using encrypted
apps to hide their communications and recruiting operatives
with the ease of a tweet. What is worse, groups like ISIS are
in the middle of an unprecedented global killing spree and they
are sending waves of foreign fighters back home battle-hardened
and ready to spread terror.
Already thousands of these fighters have come back,
including many with Western passports that can allow them to
enter the United States. So the burden falls on you, our front-
line defenders, to identify these fanatics and shut down any
pathway they can use to slip into our country. Let me be
clear--this is one of our most urgent National security
challenges.
That is why next week I will release a new National
counterterrorism strategy that highlights this issue and more
broadly explains how we can roll back Islamist terrorists
world-wide.
We know that jihadists are looking at every route into
America from sneaking across the Southwest Border, to flying in
as tourists and as refugees. Today we will examine how they are
trying to get in and what your agencies are doing to fight
back.
One year ago, this committee released the most
comprehensive report on terrorist travel since the 9/11
Commission. Our bipartisan findings were very sobering, yet the
administration has failed to address many of them. We still
don't have a National strategy to combat terrorist travel. Our
refugee program is not as secure as it needs to be. We are
struggling to bring our security checks into social media age.
Our allies are in worse shape, especially in Europe. I have
seen it first-hand. Their borders are not secure, they are not
sharing intelligence quickly enough, and they are failing to
screen travelers against terrorist databases. We cannot afford
to wait.
Today, I expect to hear what your agencies are doing to
help fix this mess. If our allies can't step up to the plate,
then terrorists will be one step closer to reaching us. I also
hope you will discuss any barriers here at home that might be
making it harder for you to secure our country against this
threat.
This time last year, our committee held the first-ever
Congressional hearing at Ground Zero in New York. We came
together on hallowed ground to remember those we lost in New
York, Washington, and Pennsylvania and those who have given
their lives to keep America safe.
We still have an obligation to those victims and to their
families, and I believe the best way to honor their memory is
to keep our pledge by doing whatever we can to stop terror from
reaching American shores.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
September 14, 2016
This past weekend we marked the fifteenth anniversary of one of the
darkest days in our Nation's history. On September 11, 2001, our
people, our homeland, and our way of life came under attack.
I remember watching the television with my 5-year-old daughter as
the second tower was hit.
Like many of you, I realized this was not an accident. It was an
act of war against our country.
The world has changed since then, and today my daughter is now 20
years old. But we cannot let the passage of time dull our memories or
temper our resolve.
Those who don't learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat
them.
That's why in the aftermath of 9/11, we made a solemn pledge: Never
again.
The agencies represented here today were brought together under one
roof for exactly that purpose.
You've made counterterrorism your highest priority. You've
connected the dots and prevented terrorist attacks. You've made it
harder for them to infiltrate the United States undetected.
But our enemies have come a long way, too. They see our weaknesses
and are always trying to exploit them.
Unlike the 9/11 hijackers, though, today's jihadists are using
encrypted apps to hide their communications and recruiting operatives
with the ease of a Tweet.
What's worse, groups like ISIS are in the middle of an
unprecedented global killing spree. They are sending waves of foreign
fighters back home, battle-hardened and ready to spread terror.
Already, thousands of these fighters have come back, including many
with Western passports that can allow them to enter the United States.
So the burden falls on you--our front-line defenders--to identify
these fanatics and shut down any pathway they can use to slip into our
country.
Let me be clear: This is one of our most urgent National security
challenges.
That is why next week I will release a new, National
counterterrorism strategy that highlights the issue and, more broadly,
explains how we can roll back Islamist terrorists world-wide.
We know that jihadists are looking at every route into America,
from sneaking across the Southwest Border to flying in as tourists and
refugees.
Today, we will examine how they are trying to get in--and what your
agencies are doing to fight back.
One year ago, this committee released the most comprehensive report
on terrorist travel since the 9/11 Commission.
Our bipartisan findings were very sobering, yet the administration
has failed to address many of them.
We still don't have a National strategy to combat terrorist travel.
Our refugee program is not as secure as it needs to be. We are
struggling to bring our security checks into the social-media age.
Our allies are in worse shape, especially in Europe. I've seen it
first-hand: Their borders are not secure, they are not sharing
intelligence quickly enough, and they are failing to screen travelers
against terrorism databases.
We cannot afford to wait.
Today, I expect to hear what your agencies are doing to help fix
this mess. If our allies can't step up to the plate, then terrorists
will be one step closer to reaching us.
I also hope you will discuss any barriers here at home that might
be making it harder for you to secure our country against this threat.
This time last year, our committee held the first-ever
Congressional hearing at Ground Zero in New York.
We came together on hallowed ground to remember those we lost in
New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania and those who have given their
lives to keep America safe.
We still have an obligation to those victims and to their families.
I believe the best way to honor their memory is to keep our
pledge--by doing whatever we can to stop terror from reaching American
shores.
Chairman McCaul. With that, the Chair now recognizes the
Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's
hearing.
I would also like to thank the witnesses for being here
today and their service to this great country.
Three days ago we paused to honor the memory of those who
lost their lives on September 11, 2001. After those horrific
attacks on American soil 15 years ago, we committed ourselves
as a Nation to be resilient and to ensure terror would not rule
our days.
The aftermath of those attacks led to the formation of the
Department of Homeland Security. In part because of that
decision, the Federal Government has strengthened its ability
to detect and thwart terrorist threats and has improved
information sharing between Federal, State, and local partners.
Our Government has more advanced overseas intelligence
capabilities and more stringent vetting processes for
foreigners entering this country.
The Department has been agile and able to respond and make
necessary policy changes to remain secure when humanitarian
crises arise or security vulnerabilities are exposed. However,
the Department's ability is limited by the dysfunctional
jurisdiction web in the House and Senate. I look forward to
continuing a bipartisan effort with the Chairman to give DHS
what the 9/11 commissioners recommended over 10 years ago--a
single principal point of oversight and review for homeland
security.
Despite our Nation's layered approach to security,
September 11 was not the last terrorist attack we had on
American soil, and certainly not the last attempted attack.
Most recently, attacks in Orlando and Charleston and attempted
attack in Garland, Texas, have illustrated that the terrorist
threat has changed.
Potential terrorists do not have to leave our borders,
undergo training in another country, and return to the United
States to commit attacks. Terrorist attacks do not have to be
financed or conducted at the direction of a terrorist group or
a particular leader. Today, potential terrorists can be
inspired by propaganda and rhetoric spewed over the internet.
But the internet is not the only avenue for radicalization.
Charged rhetoric in the public forums has fueled the
proliferation of both domestic and foreign-inspired terrorist
organizations. As DHS Secretary Johnson indicated last weekend,
our Government is able to connect the dots associated with
overseas terrorist-directed plots on our homeland.
However, we need to be vigilant about lone actors, people
who are self-radicalized and may not appear on a particular
watch list or be flagged at the border. In response to this
evolution to the terrorist threat, the Department and its
Federal partners have renewed its focus on countering violent
extremism.
DHS created the Office of Community Partnerships, chairs
the interagency CVE Task Force, and has established community-
based grants to counter violent extremism. The Department is
pursuing all these efforts and Congress is appropriating funds
for these activities. However, DHS has not issued a CVE
strategy or transmitted an implementation plan to Congress.
Moreover, the written testimony today and previous
statements by the Secretary give the impression that DHS CVE
programs may be designed to focus singularly on one ideology
and engaging one community.
The threat landscape is ever-evolving. It would be a shame
to, in the words of the 9/11 Commission, suffer from a failure
of imagination about what ideology or what group could be
behind an attempted attack on the United States because we have
a myopic view of the threat to our Nation.
I look forward to a robust decision with our distinguished
panel, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
September 14, 2016
Three days ago, we paused to honor the memory of those who lost
their lives on September 11, 2001. After those horrific attacks on
American soil 15 years ago, we committed ourselves as a Nation to be
resilient and to ensure terror would not rule our days. The aftermath
of those attacks led to the formation of the Department of Homeland
Security.
In large part because of that decision, the Federal Government has
strengthened its ability to detect and thwart terrorist threats and has
improved information sharing between Federal, State, and local
partners. Our Government has more advanced overseas intelligence
capabilities and more stringent vetting processes for foreigners
entering our country.
The Department has been agile and able to respond and make
necessary policy changes to remain secure when humanitarian crises
arose or security vulnerabilities were exposed.
However, the Department's agility is limited by the dysfunctional
jurisdictional webs in the House and Senate. I look forward to
continuing a bipartisan effort with the Chairman to give DHS what the
9/11 Commissioners recommended over 10 years ago--``a single, principal
point of oversight and review for homeland security.''
Despite our Nation's layered approach to security, September 11 was
not the last terrorist attack we have had on American soil and
certainly not the last attempted attack. Most recently, attacks in
Orlando and Charleston, and the attempted attack in Garland, Texas,
have illustrated that the terrorist threat has changed.
Potential terrorists do not have to leave our borders, undergo
training in another country, and return to the United States to commit
attacks. Terrorist attacks do not have to be financed by or conducted
at the direction of a terrorist group or a particular leader. Today,
potential terrorists can be inspired by propaganda and rhetoric spewed
over the internet.
But the internet is not the only avenue to radicalization. Charged
rhetoric in public forums has fueled the proliferation of both domestic
and foreign-inspired terrorist organizations. As DHS Secretary Johnson
indicated last weekend, our Government is able to connect the dots
associated with overseas terrorist-directed plots on our homeland.
However, we need to be vigilant about lone actors--people who are self-
radicalized and may not appear on a particular watch list or be flagged
at the border.
In response to this evolution in the terrorist threat, the
Department and its Federal partners have renewed its focus on
``countering violent extremism''. DHS created the Office of Community
Partnerships, chairs the Interagency CVE Task Force, and has
established community-based grants to counter violent extremism.
The Department is pursuing all these efforts and Congress is
appropriating funds for these activities; however, DHS has not issued a
CVE strategy or transmitted an implementation plan to Congress.
Moreover, the written testimony today and previous statements by
the Secretary give the impression that DHS CVE programs may be designed
to focus singularly on one ideology and engaging one community.
The threat landscape is ever-evolving. It would be a shame to, in
the words of the 9/11 Commission, suffer from a ``failure of
imagination'' about what ideology or what group could be behind an
attempted attack on the United States because we had a myopic view of
the threat to our Nation.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Ranking Member. Other Members
are reminded opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
before us here today. First, the Honorable Francis Taylor, he
serves as the under secretary for intelligence and analysis at
the Department of Homeland Security. Prior to this assignment,
he was vice president, Chief Security Office for General
Electric and served as the assistant secretary of state for
diplomatic security. Thank you, sir, for being here. He also
has 31 years of military service rising to the rank of
Brigadier General.
Next, we have the Honorable Leon Rodriguez, who serves as
the director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services since
2014. Prior to that time, he was director of the Office for
Civil Rights at the Department of Health and Human Services.
Next we have Dr. Gowadia. She is the deputy administrator
of the Transportation Security Administration, where she guides
implementation of the administrator's goals, as well as
oversees the TSA's day-to-day operations. Prior to that time,
she served as director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Then finally, we have Mr. Kevin McAleenan, who currently
serves as deputy commissioner of the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. Previously he served as acting deputy commissioner
at CVP and as the area port director of Los Angeles
International Airport where he directed CVP's border security
operations at LAX.
Then actually finally is Daniel Ragsdale, the chief
operating officer for ICE, where he executes oversight of the
agency's day-to-day operations of its 20,000 employees.
I want to thank all of you for being here given--in the
interest of time, Secretary Taylor will be offering his
statement on behalf of all the witnesses here today. The Chair
now recognizes Secretary Taylor for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF FRANCIS X. TAYLOR, UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; ACCOMPANIED BY HON. LEON RODRIGUEZ, DIRECTOR, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; HUBAN A. GOWADIA, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; KEVIN K. MC ALEENAN, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; AND DANIEL H. RAGSDALE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, U.S.
IMMIGRATIONS AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Thompson, distinguished Members of the committee. I have
submitted a statement for the record, a written statement for
the record.
We look forward to discussing our progress preventing
terrorist and terrorist-inspired attacks at home and preventing
terrorists and radicalized individuals from traveling to the
United States to launch attacks.
We continue to make extraordinary strides in adapting to
the evolving threat environment, pushing our borders outward,
and playing defense on their 1-yard line as opposed to ours.
Every day, we work with our Federal, State, local, Tribal,
and territorial and private-sector partners to protect our
critical and sensitive infrastructure and to prevent terrorists
from traveling within the United States. We combine passenger
and manifest data with intelligence and law enforcement
information to detect foreign terrorist fighters and others who
may pose potential threats before they reach our country.
Our pre-clearance program at foreign airports prevented
more than 10,700 travelers--that is 29 per day--from traveling
to our country and we are looking to expand this very
successful program further with our international partners.
We are taking aggressive steps to enhance aviation and
airport security here at home and around the world, reducing
airport employee access points and increasing random screening
of personnel within the secured areas of airports.
Several million more personnel will be screened by TSA this
year than last. With your support, we are surging resources and
adding personnel to address the increased volume of travelers.
Since 2014, we have enhanced security at overseas last-point-
of-departure airports and a number of foreign governments have
replicated those enhancements in other places other than last-
point-of-departure airports.
Our visa security program, where ICE agents are stationed
at embassies abroad, reviewed more than 2 million visa
applications last year, contributing to approximately 8,600
visa refusals. Of these refusals, over 2,200 had some known or
suspected connection to terrorism or terrorist organizations.
We continue to strengthen the security of our Visa Waiver
Program, screening Electronic System for Travel Authorization,
or ESTA, information against the same counterterrorism and law
enforcement databases that travelers with traditional visas are
screened and must be approved prior to the individual boarding
an airplane coming to the United States.
We have expanded the use of social media currently used for
more than 30 different operational and investigative purposes
within the Department, and we are expanding this further,
particularly in the screening and vetting mission set.
All refugees entering our country are subject to the
highest level of security check of any category of traveler to
the United States and admitted only after successfully
completing a stringent security screening process.
Syrian refugees undergo an additional layer of screening
referred to as the Syrian Enhanced Review. Through this
process, each Syrian refugee application is reviewed at USCIS
headquarters prior to interview and to determine possible
National security concerns.
For those cases with potential National security concerns,
CIS conducts both open-source and Classified research,
including social media research, on the facts presented in the
refugee's claim to inform their adjudication process.
Secretary Johnson has made preventing illegal special
interest alien migration a priority for the Department. We are
implementing a plan of action to enhance our ability to
identify and disrupt human smuggling networks that facilitate
illicit special interest alien migration to and across our
Nation's borders.
We are sharing more information and more intelligence with
Federal, State, local, and international partners than ever
before. Today the National Network of Fusion Centers serves as
the cornerstone for this information-sharing architecture
within our country, providing grassroots intelligence and
analytical capability at the local and National level. Using
the Department's unique information and sharing it with our
intelligence partners at an appropriate level of classification
is just as critical.
The DHS data framework initiative will integrate the
Department's most important data sets so that we can compare
DHS data with travel data, immigration, and other information
at the Unclassified and Classified levels.
Mr. Chairman, I will end my oral comments there and look
forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Taylor, Mr. Rodriguez,
Dr. Gowadia, Mr. McAleenan, and Mr. Ragsdale follows:]
Prepared Statement of Francis X. Taylor, Leon Rodriguez, Huban A.
Gowadia, Kevin K. McAleenan, and Daniel H. Ragsdale
September 14, 2016
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to
prevent foreign terrorist groups from traveling to the United States to
launch attacks. We look forward to discussing our joint progress in
preventing terrorist attacks directed at the homeland.
In the 15 years since the tragic attacks on September 11, 2001,
DHS, with critical support from our interagency partners, has
implemented comprehensive measures to enhance our immigration and
border management systems and prevent the travel of terrorists to and
within the United States, including:
Implementing robust, continuous, and timely screening and vetting
capabilities;
Preventing and disrupting illicit migration of Special Interest
Aliens to and across U.S. borders;
Expanding information sharing with our Federal, State, local, and
international partners;
Ehancing DHS aviation security efforts; and
Building community partnerships to Counter Violent Extremism.
DHS recognizes that the types of attacks we have seen at home and
abroad are not just terrorist-directed attacks, but also terrorist-
inspired attacks. These attacks are conducted by those who live among
us in the homeland and self-radicalize, inspired by terrorist
propaganda on the internet. Terrorist-inspired attacks are often
difficult to detect by our intelligence and law enforcement
communities. They can occur with little or no notice, and present a
complex homeland security challenge.
The current threat environment requires new types of responses. The
United States, along with our coalition partners, continues to take the
fight to terrorist organizations overseas. ISIL is the most prominent
terrorist organization on the world stage. As ISIL loses territory, it
has increased attacks and attempted attacks on targets outside of Iraq
and Syria. It continues to encourage attacks in the United States,
which makes our work ever more critical.
screening and vetting
Every day, the Department works within the scope of its diverse
authorities and programs to ensure that terrorists are denied access to
sensitive and secure locations and infrastructure, and stopped from
traveling to or within our country.
DHS is continually refining its risk-based strategy and layered
approach to border security, extending our zone of security as far
outward from the homeland as possible to interdict threats before they
ever reach the United States.
To mitigate the potential threat of foreign terrorist fighters who
attempt to travel to and from Syria, the Department uses intelligence
and law enforcement information in conjunction with advance passenger
information to detect foreign terrorist fighters and others who pose a
potential threat to the United States. Equally important, DHS works in
close partnership with carriers and international counterparts to
prevent passengers who may pose a security threat, or who are otherwise
inadmissible, from boarding flights to the United States. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) vets all passengers
traveling inbound to the United States against terrorist watch lists
and can adjust its vetting in a risk-based manner to provide additional
focus on specific travel patterns or locations. Since January 2016,
nearly 7,000 known or suspected terrorists were denied boarding or
received secondary screening at airports world-wide due to the rigor of
the Secure Flight program.
DHS has continued to push the borders outwards through the growth
of its pre-clearance program, managed through the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP). CBP personnel at 15 airports overseas pre-
clear air travelers before they board flights to the United States and
coordinate with TSA for boarding of aircraft. In fiscal year 2015,
preclearance allowed DHS to deny boarding to over 10,700 travelers (or
29 per day) before they could travel to the United States. TSA
personnel assist CBP by working with host governments to ensure all
pre-cleared flights are subject to security measures commensurate to
U.S. requirements. We are looking to expand this program--in May, CBP
announced an ``open season,'' running through August 1, for foreign
airports to express interest in participating in the next round of
preclearance expansion. CBP received 20 letters of interest and is
currently in the process of evaluating each location.
Through the Visa Security Program (VSP), U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel at diplomatic posts overseas
identify terrorists, criminals, and other individuals who pose a threat
or are otherwise ineligible for visas prior to their travel or
application for admission to the United States. ICE works
collaboratively with other U.S. agencies and host countries' law
enforcement counterparts to investigate suspect travelers, enhance
existing information, and identify previously-unknown threats instead
of simply denying visas and any potential travel. In fiscal year 2015,
VSP reviewed over 2 million visa applications, contributing input to
approximately 8,600 cases in which visas were refused. Of these
refusals, over 2,200 applicants had some known or suspected connection
to terrorism or terrorist organizations.
We have significantly strengthened the Visa Waiver Program (VWP)
vetting process. All VWP travelers must submit their data to the
Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) before they travel to
the United States. This screening now includes obtaining additional key
data elements from VWP travelers and greater collaboration with
interagency law enforcement and intelligence partners. ESTA information
is screened against the same counterterrorism and law enforcement
databases as traditional visas, and must be approved prior to an
individual boarding a plane bound for the United States for VWP travel.
This enhanced screening has identified more than 1,600 travelers as
presenting potential law enforcement or security risks in fiscal year
2016.
On December 18, 2015, the President signed into law the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, which included the Visa Waiver
Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015 (VWP
Improvement Act). The VWP Improvement Act codified VWP enhancements
implemented earlier that year. It also established new restrictions on
eligibility for travel to the United States without a visa for
individuals who visited or are dual nationals of certain countries. We
began implementing the new restrictions on January 21, 2016. Waivers
from these restrictions are only granted on a case-by-case basis, and
only when it is in the law enforcement or National security interests
of the United States. It is important to note that those who are no
longer eligible to travel to the United States under the VWP as a
result of the new law may still apply for a visa at a U.S. Embassy or
Consulate.
In February, pursuant to the VWP Improvement Act, the Secretary
added 3 additional countries--Libya, Yemen, and Somalia--to a list that
generally prohibits anyone who has visited these nations in the past 5
years from traveling to the United States without a visa. Most
recently, in April, we began enforcing the mandatory use of high-
security electronic passports for all VWP travelers. In both February
and June, CBP enhanced the ESTA application by requiring responses to
additional questions.
We have expanded our use of social media, which is currently used
for more than 30 different operational and investigative purposes
within the Department. Based upon the recommendations of a Social Media
Task Force within DHS, the Secretary determined, consistent with
relevant privacy and other laws, that DHS must expand the use of social
media even further, particularly in the screening and vetting mission
set. We note that our use of social media information is limited to
publicly-available information, consistent with DHS authorities, and
maintained and handled in accordance with the Privacy Act and relevant
System of Records Notices.
Working closely with the Science and Technology Directorate, we
conducted a number of pilots to automate the bulk screening of social
media information with human review across a number of our high-
priority populations, including refugee and ESTA applicants. These
pilots have shown promise, and we are now conducting operational
testing against live cases. The Science and Technology Directorate
continues to work with industry to leverage the billions of dollars of
private-sector investment in social media analytics to identify
solutions that can best support DHS screening and vetting.
DHS is doing its part to address the Syrian refugee crisis. U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), in conjunction with the
Department of State, have worked to admit more than 10,000 Syrian
refugees this fiscal year. All refugees, including Syrians, are
admitted only after successful completion of a stringent security
screening process. Refugees are subject to the highest level of
security checks of any category of traveler to the United States.
Additional enhancements to the standard refugee screening process
have been added for Syrian refugees. USCIS and the State Department
ensure that all refugees successfully complete extensive, multi-layered
and intense screening processes. These processes involve multiple law
enforcement, National security, and intelligence agencies across the
Federal Government. For certain categories of refugees, we have added
other security checks as warranted.
preventing illicit migration
Special Interest Aliens (SIAs) represent a relatively small
proportion of illicit migration to and across U.S. borders. However,
due to the potential threat posed by this group, Secretary Johnson has
made preventing illicit SIA migration a priority. On June 24, 2016, he
issued a directive establishing the DHS SIA Joint Action Group (JAG).
The JAG developed a consolidated plan of action to enhance and better
coordinate DHS's efforts to identify and disrupt human smuggling
networks that facilitate illicit SIA migration to and across U.S.
borders. The plan, which was signed by Secretary Johnson on August 31,
leverages Department-wide capabilities to both extend our borders and
to improve our processes to gather and share information on SIAs with
international, interagency, and State and local partners.
The plan contains five strategic goals:
1. Build an integrated screening solution with partner countries
along illicit migration routes;
2. Strengthen those countries' investigative capabilities;
3. Improve their detention and repatriation capacity;
4. Enhance DHS intelligence integration and coordination; and
5. More efficiently and effectively collect information from SIAs
who arrive at our borders.
information sharing
In response to the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, DHS has
worked closely with our Federal, State, and local partners to improve
our domestic information-sharing architecture. Today, the National
Network of Fusion Centers serves as the cornerstone of this
architecture, providing grassroots intelligence and analytic
capabilities to their customers at the State and local levels.
In addition to the benefits provided to State and local partners,
fusion centers are unique resources in the Homeland Security
Enterprise, providing subject-matter expertise and critical State and
local information to the Federal Government. Fusion centers help
identify previously-unknown threats or trends by contributing raw
information, including Suspicious Activity Reporting, to DHS, Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), and the intelligence community. They
collaborate with Federal partners to conduct joint analytic
collaboration to detect patterns in criminal and terrorist activities,
and support the JTTFs' terrorism-related investigations. The Department
supports their efforts by providing personnel, training and assistance,
security clearances, and connectivity to Unclassified and Classified
Federal systems.
The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is our primary
platform to share Unclassified information and facilitate real-time
collaboration and situational awareness. In particular, we share
Unclassified intelligence and analysis via the HSIN-Intelligence (HSIN-
Intel) Community of Interest. HSIN-Intel is a secure platform for
intelligence professionals and enhances collaboration, analytical
exchange, and timely information sharing with our State and local
partners.
Using the Department's unique information and sharing it with our
intelligence community partners at appropriate levels of classification
is critical. To achieve this, the ``DHS Data Framework'' initiative is
integrating the Department's most important datasets so we can compare
DHS data with travel, immigration, and other information at the
Unclassified and Classified levels. This will enable multiple, cleared
users from components with a need-to-know to more readily access the
information they need to make quick and informed security decisions. We
are building the Data Framework alongside our intelligence community
partners' technology modernization efforts, including the Intelligence
Community Information Technology Enterprise initiative. This will
maximize our ability to use, protect, and share information with our
partners consistent with all applicable laws, regulations, and policies
that protect privacy and civil liberties.
The Department has also expanded information sharing and vetting
cooperation with international partners. This work serves two purposes.
First to gain new insight into an individual's immigration application
including their identity and whether they pose an immigration, law
enforcement, or terrorism risk. Second to support our allies' National
vetting efforts, reducing the odds that terrorists or criminals may use
a partner's territory as a staging ground. To date, through our Secure
Real-Time Platform, we have vetted over 300,000 immigration
applications for international partners, helping them to identify
potential travel by known or suspected terrorists. We have also
recently begun to compare select refugee applications and enforcement
cases against foreign data.
aviation security
During the last year, attacks against aircraft and airports in
Egypt, Somalia, Belgium, and Turkey have underscored the continued
threat to aviation. The Department is taking aggressive steps to
enhance aviation and airport security globally. Despite increased
travel volume, DHS has not compromised aviation security. Instead, with
the support of Congress, we have surged resources and added personnel
to address the increased volume of travelers.
TSA has worked aggressively to refocus on security effectiveness.
Since last summer, TSA has retrained the entire Transportation Security
Officer (TSO) workforce, increased use of random explosive trace
detectors, tested and reevaluated screening equipment, enhanced certain
manual screening procedures, and eliminated the Managed Inclusion II
program, which randomly placed unknown travelers into TSA
PreTM lanes. TSA has also implemented centralized
new-hire training at the TSA Academy, located at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia.
Further, in April of last year, TSA issued guidelines to domestic
airports to reduce access to secure areas in order to address concerns
about insider threats. Today, employee access points have been reduced
and random screening of personnel within secure areas has increased. In
collaboration with our airport partners, we are continuing our efforts.
Earlier this year, TSA and airport operators completed detailed
vulnerability assessments and mitigation plans for over 300 airports
Nation-wide.
Finally, TSA has worked with foreign partners to strengthen
security overseas last-point-of-departure airports, and security at
these airports remains a focus area in light of recent attacks
overseas. Altogether, TSA's efforts have enhanced the security of our
Nation's aviation system.
countering violent extremism
Violent extremist threats come from a range of groups and
individuals, including domestic terrorists and home-grown violent
extremists in the United States, as well as international terrorist
groups like al-Qaeda and ISIL. The threat begins with recruitment,
inspiration, and winning the hearts and minds of potential terrorists.
Al-Qaeda and ISIL continue to target Muslim communities in our country
to recruit and inspire individuals to commit acts of terror. In
response to this threat, DHS formed the Office of Community
Partnerships (OCP) in 2015. Building bridges to diverse communities and
working to ensure families and communities are well-informed is the
best defense against terrorist ideologies. This work is a DHS
imperative. As the Secretary has testified, building communities is as
important as any of our other homeland security missions.
OCP is now the central hub for the Department's efforts to counter
violent extremism in this country as well as being the host for the
Countering Violent Extremism Interagency Task Force. OCP's work is
focused on partnering with and empowering communities by providing them
a wide range of resources to use in preventing violent extremist
recruitment and radicalization. Specifically, we are providing access
to Federal grant opportunities for community organizations and State
and local leaders, and partnering with the private sector to find
innovative, community-based approaches. DHS announced its first $10
million in grants in July of this year.
congressional oversight
We would like to take this opportunity to discuss the considerable
efforts DHS devotes to complying with oversight requests. Congressional
oversight requests to the Department come from 92 different committees
and subcommittees with jurisdiction over DHS. Secretary Johnson has
pledged transparency and candor with Congress, and has committed to
respond to Congressional inquiries in a timely fashion. Under his
leadership, the Department's responsiveness to oversight requests has
improved by over 60 percent. We have cut our average response time from
42 business days to 17.
We accomplished this in spite of a significant increase in
correspondence. During calendar year 2015, DHS received approximately
700 oversight letters and countless more oversight requests. At the
current rate, we expect numbers of inquiries and responses will be
significantly higher this year. Similarly, the hearing schedule has
accelerated. We recognize and appreciate Congress's legitimate
oversight responsibility, and we are making greater efforts to
accommodate Congress's increasing demands.
conclusion
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, we thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss these important issues. We look forward to answering
your questions.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Secretary Taylor, and I
recognize myself for questions.
First to Secretary and to Dr. Gowadia. We have had about
40,000 foreign fighters that have converged into Iraq and
Syria, 6,000 with Western passports. ISIS says they have sent
thousands of these fighters back home, in their words. The
French have reported that 15,000 potential extremists were in
their country.
As you noted, we passed the Visa Waiver Program last
Congress, marked up out of this committee, requiring these
participating countries to screen travelers against Interpol.
Are these countries complying with that requirement?
Mr. Taylor. Sir, they are complying with those
requirements, in addition, complying with the requirements to
have an HSPD-6 agreement with our Government in the exchange of
information on terrorists, terrorist investigations with those
countries.
Chairman McCaul. Because I know previously in my travels
abroad they were not, and it was a very disturbing fact to find
out. Dr. Gowadia, the last-point-of-departure airports concern
me. I have been to Cairo, I have seen the State security out of
that airport, it is not exactly stellar. Istanbul airport
concerns me. We had a markup yesterday on the Cuban flights
coming in.
My concern, we saw what happened with Sharm el-Sheikh, the
insider threat. If there is not proper vetting, a corrupted or
radicalized employee can put a bomb onto an in-bound flight
into the United States. Cairo has one into JFK every day.
Can you tell me what the requirements are for last-point-
of-departure airports in terms of the standards? Why can't we
hold them to the same standards that we hold our people in the
United States to?
Ms. Gowadia. Thank you, Chairman McCaul.
I don't want to get into the details of each of the
requirements, but I will tell you that at last points of
departure all across the world, for flights that come directly
to the United States from last-point-of-departure airports,
whether they are U.S. carriers or foreign carriers, we do have
in place not just international standards but additional
requirements that the U.S. Government levies on those air
carriers and those airports to ensure that the security
standards we need to feel safe and secure are in place. We
conduct assessments all around the world to make sure that that
happens.
Chairman McCaul. But my understanding is it is just sort-of
a minimal standard threshold they have to meet and in some
cases some airports are better than others, is that correct?
Ms. Gowadia. Well, so there are standards that the
international body places for all of us to ascribe to, but as
you are aware, TSA on behalf of the U.S. Government attaches
additional security requirements.
We also have the ability to use tools such as security
directives and emergency amendments to add additional
requirements based on the airport, based on the operation.
We work very closely with our foreign government partners,
as well as with the airlines and airports themselves so that
they can build their own capacity. We work with them to train
them, teach them, share best practices.
Chairman McCaul. But when it comes to vetting employees, I
know that we heard yesterday. Cuba will not allow us to assist
them to vet their employees and in Cairo, when I asked them are
you using our intelligence databases or are we able to help vet
your employees, I didn't get a very good response to that
question.
That very much concerns me, because I don't want to be
sitting here having a hearing a year from now where a bomb goes
off on an in-bound flight from Cairo into JFK or from Cuba into
Miami. It is just an area of concern for me.
Mr. McAleenan, the White House just announced today they
are going to increase the number of refugees into United States
to a number of 110,000. We know that the Democratic nominee,
Mrs. Clinton, has said that she would like to see the number of
Syrian refugees accepted into the United States increase from
the 10,000 that we have already let into the United States to
65,000 Syrian refugees.
We have heard testimony before this committee from the
director of the FBI to the Secretary of Homeland Security and I
received a letter from the director of national intelligence
warning us about the threat that these refugees pose. We know
that two of the Paris attackers came through the refugee
program. What is your level of concern with these refugees?
Mr. McAleenan. Mr. Chairman, I would defer to Director
Rodriguez on the Syrian refugee vetting process. It is
something that I got to witness in Istanbul with his personnel
doing very in-depth interviews, but I would offer just as you
noted your time in Europe that our process is very different
and more stringent than what we are seeing from some of our
partners.
From CBP's perspective, any refugee that is pre-approved by
USCIS goes through the same layers of pre-departure vetting as
any traveler to the United States. So we would check them once
again against all databases, coordinate with intel community,
look at any other risk factors as they are arriving, including
taking biometrics again and conducting an interview with an
officer----
Chairman McCaul. I understand. I think the concern at the
time was when the director of the FBI testified before this
committee that we can query, in his words, until the cows home
if you don't have the databases to vet them against.
When I was over there in Jordan, the Minister of Security
said, I don't know who these people are. So it is a very--we
passed a bipartisan bill in the House to put a pause in the
program and then have certification at the highest levels.
Mr. Rodriguez, can you assure the American people that they
do not pose a threat to the security of the United States?
Mr. Rodriguez. We can assure--and something that was
actually corroborated by Director Comey, by the director of the
National Counter-Terrorism Center, by the director of national
intelligence, that the vetting process that we undertake is the
highest level of scrutiny that any traveler to the United
States receives.
I think very critical and very specific is the interagency
check, which is one of six different batteries of screens that
are conducted. That queries against intelligence databases.
Several hundred people have been outright denied because of
derogatory information that comes up. A much larger number of
people have been placed on hold for further scrutiny.
So the reality is that the combination of those databases,
of the interview process, of the screening criteria in the
first place, the selection criteria for the refugee applicants
that are referred to the United States does indeed provide a
high level of security.
It doesn't eliminate all risk, and I think we have been
very candid about that. But it does create a very potent
process to really hinder anybody either who--if somebody coming
directly from a terrorist organization wanted to infiltrate,
this would certainly be quite a serious obstacle to them. We
also worry about an individual who perhaps harbors those
desires but has not necessarily manifested.
Chairman McCaul. My time is limited, but there are some
technologies out there that I think could help with the
screening in terms of detecting the truth, whether they are
lying during their interview or not, and I would ask that you
look at some of these technologies.
I have seen them myself, and I think that would go a long
ways, I think. A lot of them are mothers and children and I
understand that, but there are military-aged males in the Iraqi
refugee program. With good intelligence, we still had two
terrorists slip through the cracks in that program.
My final question, going back to Mr. McAleenan. In ISIS's
latest publication, Dabiq magazine, they talk about smuggling a
Pakistan nuclear device into this hemisphere and across the
U.S.-Mexico border.
That is them, in their own words, and I have to take that
seriously. Whether they have that capability is a whole other
question, but with respect to the U.S.-Mexico border, have you
seen any change or increase in chatter from these extremist
groups related to these routes that the smugglers have in this
hemisphere?
Mr. McAleenan. So that is something we track very closely,
Mr. Chairman, with the help of the Under Secretary and his team
as well as the I.C. We have seen the aspirational discussions
like you referenced in terrorist publications from time to
time, some scattered chatter that is usually debunked in
partnership with our government in Mexico counterparts, but not
seeing a ton of credible, validated intelligence that suggests
that ISIS is trying to exploit specific routes.
Chairman McCaul. OK, thank you. My time is expired. Chair
recognizes the Ranking Member.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The goodness of this
country is that we have marketed ourselves as a bastion of
democracy and that if there are individuals who want to come
and meet our test for coming, then they are welcome. So I would
hope that as we pursue securing our country, we kind of
remember that we are basically a country made up of immigrants
from somewhere else.
Now, Mr. Rodriguez, can you just kind-of describe in short
order the kinds of scrutiny that someone who would want to come
to this country as a refugee? How long does that normally take,
that process?
Mr. Rodriguez. Sure, I will do it in short order, and I
will assure you that the longer order would also give you even
further comfort. First of all, each of those refugees has an
encounter with a Government official multiple times before they
even come to be interviewed by one of my officers. Those
officers who conduct those interviews are intensely trained,
including, importantly, in truth detection and in detection of
deception.
That is true of all of our officers, whether they are
refugee officers or not. In addition, there are six different
types of security database queries that are conducted. They
look at intelligence databases, law enforcement databases,
Department of Defense, consular databases, Customs and Border
Protection databases, all occurring incidentally at a time when
one of the highest priorities of our Government is in fact
knowing as much as we can know about the people who are seeking
to do us harm. So in fact when we query against those
databases, we do in fact find stuff when we do that.
In addition, we give certain selection criteria to the
United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, which means that
certain groups of people are prioritized. People who have
already themselves been victims of torture, victims of violence
in some way, domestic violence victims, families, particularly
mother-led families, and those screening criteria in many
respects also tend to give us further comfort about the kind of
individuals.
Now, I would not put a chronological duration on that. I
think you have heard of 18 to 24 months as a time line. That
has historically been true, but that doesn't--in fact, the real
important question from my perspective is the quality of each
of those activities that I describe, the quality of the
databases against which we are querying, the quality of the
work that we are doing in analyzing those results, the quality
of the interviews conducted by my officers.
I would also add, because I know you are going to ask about
this sooner or later, we have been, as General Taylor has
highlighted, on an increasing basis particularly with the
Syrian refugee applicants been looking at social media postings
by those individuals as a further tool in screening those
individuals prior to their being stamped ready for travel.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. If you missed something,
would you just kindly provide it to the committee?
Mr. Rodriguez. It would be my pleasure and happy to come
visit each of you individually, because we could talk for hours
actually about what my folks do.
Mr. Thompson. Right. Dr. Gowadia, we heard testimony
yesterday that somehow in Cuba the standards for planes
originating there coming to the United States should be
different than 280 other airports with flights originating
coming to the United States. Can you, in your position, verify
that Cuba flights originating from Cuba coming to the United
States meet the international standards that the 280 other
airports of last points of departure meet coming to the United
States?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, Mr. Thompson. I can definitely affirm
that we have been in Cuba multiple times and we have observed
that they are meeting the international standards as well as
some of the requirements the U.S. Government places at those
airports.
Now, we have had flights from there for 6 years that have
met all the same security standards that would be required of
the scheduled flights that are now resuming.
Mr. Thompson. So the fact that there is a Communist
government would be no different than Russia, China, or
Vietnam, for that matter, in terms of a Communist country?
Ms. Gowadia. So our assessment is of the security
environment at these airports and we go in and make sure that
they meet these standards, international and the additional
U.S. standards, requirements.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. General Taylor, there has been a
lot of conversation about election cybersecurity. Can you tell
us where DHS is moving in that area to assure the American
public that future elections will continue to be secure?
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Ranking Member Thompson. Admiral
Rogers mentioned yesterday and across the U.S. Government,
there is concern about reports of hacking into electoral
systems, voter systems and those sorts of things in a couple of
States so far. It is a concern for the Secretary. He has
conducted an outreach to election officials across the country
with advice on securing, how to secure, better secure electoral
systems.
But it is a continuing concern. We don't believe that the
results of the election are in jeopardy, but this is an area
that we have to make sure that our 6,000 jurisdictions across
this country that manage elections have all the tools that they
need to make sure those systems remain secure.
Mr. Thompson. So your testimony is that you were working
with some of those----
Mr. Taylor. We are working with all of those 60,000 across
cybersecurity as well as physical security to ensure that those
processes that are used in our election process are as secure
as they can be.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCaul. The Chairman recognizes the gentleman from
South Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for this
valuable hearing, especially as a follow-up to yesterday.
Ladies and gentlemen, I chair the the Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee on the Foreign Affairs Committee and I have
traveled extensively through Latin America, even with Chairman
McCaul when I was on the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Management Efficiency here.
What I have looked at and what I have learned a lot in the
last 6 years is the activity of Hezbollah, Iran, and other
foreign nationals, possibly FTOs in Latin America. In fact,
there is an area known as a tri-border region you are probably
very, very aware of. Just recently, Honduras apprehended, I
think it was October last year, apprehended 5 Syrians who were
caught at the airport trying to come to America, to the United
States using fake Greek passports.
Now, how did they get to Honduras? They traveled through
Latin America, by way of Brazil, and they got to Latin America
from Syria on fake Israeli passports. We know from
conversations we have had in Paraguay, with Paraguayan
intelligence, that that area is a hotbed for false documents
and fake documents.
We know that Syrians are traveling into Turkey and for as
little as $600 can change their identity with fake passports,
not falsified, doctored, but just it looks like you, here is
your new name.
So if Syrians from the war-torn area can obtain fake
Israeli passports and travel to Latin America, and for $25,000
there, exchange those passports for fake Greek passports to try
to come to this country, my question to you is this. The
hearing is about shutting down terrorist pathways into America.
There is one pathway they were trying to get into America and
those were just ones that were caught in Honduras because they
did not speak Greek.
But what if they had gotten by land into Mexico and worked
their way up through the Mexican country and walked across our
border like so many people do every day? There is a DHS term,
OTM, other than Mexican, people that come to the United States
and cross our border that are not of Mexican nationality. They
could be African, and they are, they could be Middle Eastern,
and they are, they could be Asian, and they are.
Based on testimony in this committee over the last 6 years,
verified that OTMs are apprehended. That is a pathway into this
country, so my question to you is, how do we shut down that
terrorist pathway if our Southern Border is unsecured?
Mr. Taylor. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
Mr. Duncan. If anything I said is wrong, feel free to
dispute it.
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir. I would defer first to my colleagues
from CBP and ICE. This is--the special interest alien issue is
a major emphasis by the Secretary looking at how human
smuggling organizations are trying to--or are taking money to
smuggle people from war-torn areas and into the Southern
Hemisphere and then attempt to cross our border.
We think we have an effective partnership with our partners
in Latin America to interdict that and, in fact, the Secretary
has asked us to redouble our efforts. So I would refer to
Deputy Commissioner----
Mr. Duncan. So let me just inject one other thing in this--
--
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duncan [continuing]. For this discussion purpose. We
learned yesterday that someone coming across our Southern
Border, apprehended by CBP can claim asylum and they are let
go. Too many times. San Diego TV station had a great video
about that.
So if they come through this terrorist pathway into this
country crossing our Southern Border and apprehended by our
security personnel, they claim asylum and are let go, how do I
assure folks in South Carolina that we don't have elements that
have nefarious purposes in mind now loose in America because
our Government let them go?
Mr. Taylor. Sir, again, I would refer to my colleagues from
CBP and ICE to address that specific concern.
Mr. McAleenan. Thank you, Congressman Duncan. This is a
pathway, and it is one that we are laser focused on, as the
under secretary indicated, from Secretary Johnson on down in an
inter-agency fashion across DHS and with partners.
To provide a little bit of context briefly, individuals
from regions or countries that have active conflict zones make
up less than 1 percent of all unlawful migrants interdicted
along our Southwest Border. Some of them enter between ports of
entry as you noted, but most present themselves at ports of
entry.
Mr. Duncan. Let me stop you right there. Active combat
zones, Syria, Iraq, where ISIS battle in Afghanistan, Boko
Haram is in Africa, Abu Sayyaf is in the Philippines, al-Qaeda
is global, ISIS is now global. I am not talking about just
people from Syria, of course you know that. I am talking about
people that have nefarious aims on hurting Western democracies,
specifically the United States of America and Americans.
That is who I am talking about. So don't just limit it to
combat zones, please.
Mr. McAleenan. So actually, my comment included the
countries that you specifically named and a specific
understanding about ISIS and al-Qaeda's global presence. But
just to give you some specifics about why your constituents
should know that we are very focused on this issue, it is very
similar to our approach on any lawful flow. We try to identify
threats and interdict them at the earliest possible point in
coordination with international partners.
From the places they are leaving from, to the arrival in
the Western hemisphere, you mentioned Brazil as an arrival
point, through the pathway up through Central America, the
Panama-Colombia chokepoint, as well as Mexico.
When they get to the U.S. border, we have usually seen them
or had an opportunity to take biometrics with partners multiple
times. At the U.S. border, once they are interdicted either by
a Border Patrol Agent or present themselves at a port of entry,
we go through a special process with these arrivals.
First, we check them against all CBP holdings and watch
lists. We check them through the National Targeting Center with
the intel community. We do an in-depth interview with trained
personnel, Border Patrol Agents and CBP Officers. We reach out
to our ICE, HSI partners, and JTTF.
We run biometrics against DHS, DOJ, DOD databases. It is a
very extensive process with people who specialize in the
region, who have the language skills to make sure that we are
vetting out any risk----
Mr. Duncan. OK, I am going to reclaim my time because I am
just about out, but let me just make something clear. Secretary
Johnson sat right there, Director Comey sat right there, the
director of the National Counter-Terrorism Center sat right
there at that same table, and they told us that we cannot
properly vet Syrian refugees. These are people that our
Government knows about, that applied for refugee status to come
to America, and we can't properly vet them.
So I don't believe that we can assure the people in South
Carolina that you can properly vet those that have transited
Latin America and come across our Southern Border that you have
apprehended, and now you have got them in front of you and you
are trying to see if that person is who they say they are, and
try to vet them right then in that little bit of time.
Because our own Government had told us that people applying
for refugee status cannot be properly vetted, told me I can't
assure my constituents that before we drop Syrian refugees in
our local communities, that our own Government can vet them and
tell us who they are because either records did exist, they
were destroyed in the civil war or were never very good to
begin with.
So if you can't vet Syrian refugees through the normal
Department of State process and Homeland Security process, I
struggle with your answer that you are vetting someone that
crossed our Southern Border through those same databases.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time has expired. Ms.
Jackson Lee is recognized.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the Chairman and Ranking
Member for continuing to project for the American people in
both reality and our actions the importance of oversight as it
relates to the security and safety of the American people.
I thank the witnesses for being here and would like to
personally offer my appreciation for your service to the Nation
and also to make the point that we are looking at a
multifaceted attack on the United States, maybe two prime ones,
and that is of course the threat that comes from without and,
as the FBI director said, the 50 terrorist cells that are in
our respective States.
I want to congratulate, compliment, take note, if I might,
because public servants don't take congratulations, they are
doing their job, that we have been fairly and good at those
coming into the Nation, coming into the country.
As I can recollect, since the heinous acts of 9/11, what
comes to mind is the shoe-bomber, thwarted, though it was on an
airplane, thwarted, the New Year's Eve potential threat from
the Northern border, thwarted, and certainly we have had
incidences of recent note that have been because of
individuals.
So let me go to General Taylor, because I think what we
need to be doing here is as well listening to you but seeking a
pathway to collaborate to ensure that we stay at the highest
level that we have ever been.
Before I do that, General, let me just say that my
recollection, Director Rodriguez, of the comments of Secretary
Johnson was not using the word threat as related to refugees,
because I think what you left out is the long time that
refugees are in camps before they come to the United States,
how the selection process comes, the 2-year waiting period, the
right of the United States to reject those individuals before
they even leave the soil of the refugee camp.
So by the time--the vetting is not the day they step on the
soil of the United States. The vetting is an on-going process
from the time that they are in the United Nations refugee camp.
That is my understanding of the--and you might say, yes, that
that is a pool upon which any 110,000 or 70,000 would be coming
from.
Mr. Rodriguez. No, that is absolutely correct. Really from
the moment that they register with the United Nations to the
time that they are approved to travel, frankly even past the
time----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So they are not on the highway hailing a
cab and then getting on an airplane to the United States?
Mr. Rodriguez. No, no, Congresswoman, absolutely not.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think that is important. Let me just
continue. So then the vetting process is a building block
process coming forward, I think that is important for our
constituents to know so that however we seek to help you,
whether more resources for vetting that they know that these
individuals are vetted pre-leaving and then continued vetting
if necessary, but pre-leaving the foreign soil, is that
correct?
Mr. Rodriguez. The process that occurs before they leave
foreign soil is a multi-agency, multi-step, multi-layered
process that occurs over a very long period of time. It has--I
described the elements in response to the Ranking Member's
questions. It is a very ordered, very lengthy, very intense
process to which these applicants are subjected. That is
absolutely correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. It has been enhanced, thank
you. Deputy Commissioner, Deputy Administer, TSA, just a brief
question on Cuba. Cuba will have on-going oversight by the
Transportation Security Administration, is that not correct?
You are in and out of Cuba and in and out of surveying those
airports, is that correct?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, ma'am. We will continue our collaborative
partnership with the Cuban airports as well as the airlines
that go in and out of there.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But the collaborative partnership is an
intense oversight that answers any questions about whether
there is any fracture in their security protocols?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, ma'am. We are seeking to even have
somebody permanently stationed in Cuba to be able to facilitate
rapid action if necessary.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You feel that those on-going negotiations
are going well?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, ma'am, they are.
Ms. Jackson Lee. General Taylor, may I ask, we know that--
and I have questions for the last two if you would be indulged
for just a moment. We know that we are facing a new phenomenon
in terrorism. ISIL is certainly, unfortunately, on the lips
probably of a kindergartener. They might be able to give us a
definition of ISIL.
So my question is in terms of looking at the Homeland
Security Department, founded just 16 years and some months
maybe ago, or 16, 15-plus post-9/11 ago, bringing in so many
different entities. Do you feel comfortable that the American
people have a Department that is integrated enough, cooperating
enough and collaborative that you can face the threat of ISIL,
along with, there are other agencies, meaning defense and
others, but the Homeland Security that you can face the threat
of ISIL because you are integrated enough to be communicating
with ICE, CBP, TSA, Secret Service, et cetera, and the many
agencies?
Mr. Taylor. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman
Jackson Lee. I was the U.S. coordinator for counterterrorism on
9/11 at the State Department, had responsibility for working
with our foreign partners. I left Government in 2005 from the
State Department, returned to this position in 2013.
I have been awe-struck by the integrated nature of how we
approach counterterrorism in the Department of Homeland
Security, and I wanted to come back to Representative Duncan's
question. We have pushed the borders of this country to the far
reaches of the Earth in terms of where we start vetting, where
we work with our partners to understand the threats and risks
that come at our homeland, and through that pushing of the
border out, we get better data, better information, better
opportunities to vet, not at the point of attack on our 1-yard
line, but on their 1-yard line in Central and South America, in
Europe and in other places around the world.
So I think we are better integrated than we have ever been.
Are we satisfied with where we are? No, because we continue to
evolve our vetting capability based upon the new risks and
threats that come at us from ISIS and other organizations that
attempt to attack the United States of America.
Ms. Jackson Lee. To the director of ICE, thank you very
much. Then I will just give you another question in writing
that I will submit to the record regarding the nuclear capacity
that ISIS may have and our capacity to deal with, but if I can
just get into the deputy director of ICE. Internal
investigation that you are responsible for, I would hope----
Chairman McCaul. If we can make--because I want to get to
all the Members before.
Ms. Jackson Lee. OK, and I will just finish up, thank you
for your indulgence, I will finish up very quickly. Are you
working well with the issue of priority--since we are talking
about terrorism and terrorist acts, I want to make sure that
the ICE team understands or is comfortable with the priorities
that have been established for prosecution are going after that
you are looking to those individuals that may be directly
related to potential terrorist activities in the United States.
Mr. Ragsdale. So absolutely, Congresswoman. We are directly
focused on that. First of all, we work tremendously well with
our partners in the Department of Justice, the amount of effort
we put in our own investigations that relate to
counterterrorism. Using our authorities, working with the
bureau, we have been able to disrupt a substantial percentage
of acts in the United States so it is absolutely our top focus.
Our visa security program as it is, as the under secretary
mentioned, is a way to push that border out. It is not simply a
question of using a screening or an automated solution to check
data. It is really the talent of our special agents being
placed overseas----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Excellent.
Mr. Ragsdale [continuing]. Working side-by-side with our
consular officers. That is a powerful tool and a much better
situation to be in post-9/11.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you. I
yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
Arizona, Ms. McSally.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate this
hearing.
I had the privilege to be on the bipartisan task force last
year from this committee, appointed by the Chairman and led by
our colleague, Mr. Katko, for combating foreign fighters and we
took a deep dive into this issue that we are talking about
today, identified over 50 findings and 32 recommendations, and
many of them have been working their way through Congress and
being signed into law.
One I would like to follow up on, which was actually in
that law, was directing DHS to review and consider investing in
deception-detection technology. The Chairman brought this up; I
feel a bit like a broken record.
I bring this up at every hearing, I bring it up at every
meeting, I bring it up at every Classified discussion. Look,
the best operatives' reports and research show even the best
most highly-trained operatives can only detect deception in
about 50 percent of the cases, when a human being is lying to
them.
There is off-the-shelf technology out there, some of it
developed at the University of Arizona that we have
demonstrated to your agencies but others out there as well,
that can very cheaply and easily help detect deception while
you are doing interviews overseas and other places and all the
different ways that could be exploited, whether that is filling
out the ESTA form or doing the K1 interview process.
There is technology out there. I just, I feel like we are
moving at the speed of bureaucracy while the bad guys are
moving at the speed of broadband. So I am asking again what
since the law was signed last year, directing DHS to
investigate the use of deception detection technology, what has
been done?
Mr. Taylor. Congresswoman, I am embarrassed to say that I
am not prepared to answer that question, but I will take it for
the record in terms of where we are.
Ms. McSally. OK, Mr. McAleenan, can you answer for your
organization?
Mr. McAleenan. I am familiar with the work we have been
doing with the Office of Science and Technology in the pilot
with the University of Arizona and others on this technology.
It is something we are very interested in.
Ms. McSally. Right.
Mr. McAleenan. Something we invest a lot in training our
personnel on detecting deception eliciting responses in their
questioning, but you are right. Anything that can enhance our
capabilities, we want, so that is something that we will take
back and continue to pursue.
Ms. McSally. Thank you. I just--I hear this every single
time I ask it, just to be frank with you. I understand, I
worked in the military, it is a big bureaucracy.
It doesn't move quickly, but especially given the
indications that we have, with Tashfeen Malik and others that
clearly are in interviews lying, I mean this stuff needs to be
looked at and employed I think very quickly and thoughtfully.
This can be--it is a manpower-intensive process that we are
trying to do to shore up these vulnerabilities, we get that.
But if we can use the technologies to help, we will really be
able to address these vulnerabilities.
So I am kind-of a little bit tired of the, we will get back
to you and I really want to hear a report. Maybe we can have a
follow-up meeting, see how we can push to implement this in a
faster way. It is in the law.
Mr. Taylor. We will get back to you in very short order.
Ms. McSally. Great.
Mr. Taylor [continuing]. On where we are----
Ms. McSally. Thank you.
Mr. Taylor [continuing]. And what the plan is moving
forward.
Ms. McSally. Great, thank you. I want to ask--the next
question is, I chair the Border and Maritime Security
Subcommittee. We had a committee hearing a few months ago where
we talked about visa overstays and the report that was
submitted last year related to visa overstays showed that if
you extrapolate the number of people that we believe, not just
apprehensions, but those who came over the Southern Border for
the year, actually more people overstayed their visa than
actually came over the Southern Border.
So this was somewhat I think alarming information to some
people, and again, we had a full hearing on the issue but can
you give us an update in this hearing on what is going on with
addressing the visa overstay issue and then also specifically,
the student visa issue seems to be one that is exploited a lot.
Is it not unreasonable to make students report and re-
certify every single year that they are still on student
status, otherwise their visa is revoked? Because this is
another vulnerability.
Mr. McAleenan. I will start briefly and turn it over to my
colleague, Director Ragsdale. So we have made strides and
submitted the overstay report last year. As you note, about 1
percent of those traveling on non-immigrant visas or Visa
Waiver Program did overstay their visas, and we have seen over
the subsequent months, a number of those people have left, but
not within their compliant time frame.
Next year, we will be submitting an expanded report that
includes student visa categories as well as skilled workers to
cover about 99 percent of those who have come as non-
immigrants. When we do see an overstay, we refer those to ICE
through a prioritized, automated mechanism based on
intelligence for further follow-up and action.
Ms. McSally. Yes, and the 1 percent number sounds small,
but again it is hundreds of thousands of people. I don't know
the number in my head right now but it is a significant number
of people. The other thing we wrote up in that hearing was also
for the countries that are routinely having these overstays, we
are still actually issuing visas to their citizens to come over
here.
Can we tie some sort of disincentive or incentive carrot
and stick related to our other elements and leverage that they
have got to shore this up otherwise we are going to stop or
limit their ability to continue to violate this?
Mr. Ragsdale. So I would defer to the Department of State
on the issue----
Ms. McSally. Yes.
Mr. Ragsdale [continuing]. Visa issuance piece. What I
would say in terms of enforcement, as the Deputy Commissioner
said, we do take the prioritized leads over to ICE.
The first bit of vetting we would do is obviously our
counter-terrorism nexus. We sent about 10,000 leads out to our
special agent field offices. For vetting, we had about 2,000
arrests last year of people that posed the greatest threat.
The remainder of those cases are obviously taken through
our Secretary's priorities for immigration enforcement, and
that is really agnostic as a terms of manner of entry. Folks,
we find folks in a jail, in a place where they have been
convicted of a crime, they obviously are a priority.
As far as the students, the student visa population between
the folks that are actually in school and their dependents is
about a little over a million folks.
They are regularly sort-of monitored by our student and
exchange visitor program. So not only does the institution that
is certified by--excuse me, CBP, have to be accredited and
monitored, but the actual school officials themselves have to
make sure that the students are in fact maintaining a full
course of study and the other requirements.
So there is actually a great partnership between the
academic institutions and the SVP program to make sure that we
do have good capability of keeping students in check.
Ms. McSally. Just to clarify, I mean a couple of the 9/11
hijackers used the student visa program, so what you are saying
is, in the last 15 years, this is now at a place that you think
that that, the student visa program cannot be further
exploited?
Mr. Ragsdale. We have made tremendous strides since then.
There is no doubt about that. We went from a very antiquated
system to monitor students to a much more robust system and
there is more modernization to do there.
We also have sort-of made sure that we have great
collaboration between our CBP partners at the ports of entry to
make sure that they know, because students are admitted for
duration of status and not for a particular of time as they
study, that if someone has fallen out of status as a student,
it is available to our colleagues at CBP immediately.
Ms. McSally. OK, thank you. I am way over my time, thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
and the Ranking Member for holding this hearing and for
everything that you are doing to make sure that we are closing
down any and all pathways from potential terrorists from
getting into this country.
To the panel, thank you for your testimony here today. One
of my chief concerns in stemming the flow of terrorist travel
is information sharing among our allies.
We have seen instances in Europe, for example, where one
country's intelligence community had a suspect on their radar
but that information was not shared with another country where
he eventually actually carried out a terrorist attack. General
Taylor, I will start with you, but I welcome input from the
panel. Are we getting better intelligence from our partners so
that similar scenarios don't play out on U.S. soil?
Mr. Taylor. We are getting better intelligence,
Congressman. To the issue of sharing within particularly in the
European Union, the director of national intelligence held a
conference with several of our E.U. intelligence partners. They
have now formed an organization where they do share that
information more regularly among themselves, as well as with
us, and the other change in Europe since the last hearing here
has been the creation of Europol and the European Counter
Terrorism Centre, where that law enforcement information is
also being shared.
We are closely aligned with Europol and with the
intelligence services within the European Union and other
intelligence partners and the flow of that information has been
steady and even getting better since last year.
Mr. Langevin. I know that European privacy laws are in many
ways stricter than even those in the United States. Is it your
assessment that those restrictions are not a factor anymore?
Mr. Taylor. I wouldn't say that they aren't a factor
because governments share information under their legal
systems, but I don't believe that it has hindered our ability
to get the necessary information that are required of our
partners so that we can better understand what the threats are
that are coming at us and it continues to get better.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. In your joint testimony, you
referenced using the secure real-time platform to vet
immigration applications for international partners. I
certainly strongly support efforts to help our allies keep
terrorists from entering their countries.
Again, I will start with you, General Taylor, but we
welcome input from the panel. Can you delve into some more--
into the functioning of the platform and are there
complimentary programs being stood up by our partners to allow
us to use their data?
Mr. Taylor. Well, the secure real-time platform allows our
partners across the world to share directly information with
us, biometric information of interest that we can give them
information back on what sits in our biometric databases. We
now work with Canada and Australia. We have offered it to other
countries across the world for this purpose of better quickly
sharing that data in a systematic way.
Several countries are considering whether to use the secure
real-time platform or not. We think it is an important piece of
our information exchange with those countries. I would ask
Deputy Commissioner McAleenan to speak a little bit about ATSG,
because that also ties into the sort of information-sharing
regime that we are trying to have with our international
partners.
Mr. McAleenan. Sure. Thank you, Congressman, I think you
are very right to focus on the information sharing as a
critical piece both within and among our allies and also with
the United States.
In addition to the secure real-time platform, we are
pursuing any opportunities to directly share information with
partners and allies around the world, especially in Europe,
especially in countries where there could be pathways from the
conflict zone.
We don't stop just with a request to share direct
biographic or biometric information. We also offer capacity
building, we offer methodology for analyzing data such as
reservation data or manifest data that air carriers use, and we
also, as General Taylor indicated, offer our systems developed
over decades actually, at a lot of expense to be able to
appropriately take in data, analyze it, and produce results
that can operationalized by border and law enforcement
authorities.
We have had great partnerships developing in these areas
with different countries. So it is a high priority for us.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. My final question, this hearing is
focused on terrorist pathways into the homeland, and both your
testimony and your questions are focused on keeping the
physical presence out to prevent kinetic effects that could
destroy American lives and property or harm people in any way.
However, as we all well know, cyber attacks on physical systems
can cause similar damage.
How are your agencies working to ensure terrorists do not
have a foothold on American networks to use cyber space as a
pathway into America?
Mr. Taylor. Well, whether it is terrorists, foreign
countries, international criminals, the effect is the same. Our
National Programs and Protection Directorate, NPPD, has been
given the responsibility to protect the dot gov environment, as
well as to inform our private-sector partners on threats and
risks in cyber space. They work very closely with NSA and the
Department of Defense and the FBI in ensuring that our
cybersecurity posture is strong across the Nation.
We don't talk a lot about it--we don't often speak about
cybersecurity, but it is as high a priority for our Department
from a terrorist perspective as it is from a nation-State or
criminal actor perspective as a threat to our homeland.
Mr. Langevin. Anybody else with any comments? Thank you,
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Katko [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. The Chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Carter.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you
for being here and thank you for what you do to help protect
our country. I want to start with you, Mr. McAleenan--help me
out.
Mr. McAleenan. McAleenan. I thought Dr. Gowadia was beating
me on the tough name today, but McAleenan.
Mr. Carter. I am sorry, we don't have many McAleenans in
south Georgia, just--yes, go figure. But, anyway, you know, one
of the things that a lot of my constituents and I think a lot
of Americans are concerned about is the flow of fighters
traveling to Syria and this has continued for years and
continues to this day. It is a concern that we have here in
Congress and we are very concerned about it, especially giving
the lack of complete data on the issue.
Do you believe that Customs and Border Protection and that
the Department of Homeland Security have properly addressed
this threat? I mean, this is a real concern among Americans.
Mr. McAleenan. I think it is an appropriate concern and the
Chairman started our hearing with the numbers, 40,000 foreign
fighter to the conflict zone, 6,000 from the West, it is a
major concern, and our highest priority throughout all of our
mission sets at CBP.
Mr. Carter. Well, given that, what is CBP doing to combat
it? Tell me what they are doing to combat this issue and detect
those looking to join ISIS?
Mr. McAleenan. Absolutely. On Monday, I was pleased to join
our commissioner and others in opening up our new National
targeting center, which is our hub for analyzing data on
potential foreign fighters and terrorists that might be headed
toward the United States or toward allies and partners, and we
mentioned the information sharing with the Congressman's last
question. We have either targeting system collaboration or
methodology in direct exchange with other 25 partner nations at
this point and that is continuing to expand.
So what we try to do is identify the threats and address
them at the earliest possible point. We take the traveler from
their first contact with the U.S. Government when they apply
for permission to travel to the United States, a visa, with our
partners at State and with ICE and ESTA, which is Electronic
System for Travel Authorization for our visa-waiver program
partner. When they reserve a ticket to the United States, when
they show up to check in and before they take off and upon
arrival, at each of those stages, we are evaluating all the
information available to the U.S. Government, both to CBP and
our partners, as well as the intelligence community to identify
risks and prevent people from boarding.
Mr. Carter. OK.
Mr. McAleenan. We do that 10,000-plus times a year just on
data alone and another 10,000 at our pre-clearance airports
around the world.
Mr. Carter. OK, and you are comfortable we are doing
everything we can do as far as that goes, because, again, I am
telling you this is a major concern in my district and all
districts throughout this country.
Mr. McAleenan. I am comfortable that it is our top priority
that we need to continue to improve. The areas that we are
continuing to work are on those international partnerships and
building capacity with our allies----
Mr. Carter. OK.
Mr. McAleenan [continuing]. As well as with their intel
community.
Mr. Carter. Let me move to you, Mr. Ragsdale. Visa
overstays, this is something that we are often asked about and
this is something that is an issue that is becoming
increasingly recognizable. I mean it is just something that
everyone is talking about. What sort of program have we got to
measure this? Explain that very quickly if you can.
Mr. Ragsdale. So, from a security standpoint, which I know
is the focus of this hearing, we have our counterterrorism
criminal enforcement units. So, in other words, we have what I
will say is an inter-agency methodology we use to look at data
on visa overstays that we get from our partners at Customs and
Boarder Protection to make sure that we are prioritizing that
number, which is a fairly large number, for action.
So in other words, any person that presents a threat to
National security is targeted by our special agent offices and
homeland security investigations for potentially analysis and
location and arrest.
Where we can make criminal cases, we do that. Where we have
to make administrative immigration arrests, we would also do
that.
Mr. Carter. Are you tracking the reasons for the overstay?
Mr. Ragsdale. These are human beings, so you can imagine
the reasons are as varied as the number of folks. We are
certainly working in a way that the--what I will say is the
history is used to inform our partners.
Mr. Carter. OK, I am running short on time. I don't mean to
interrupt you. Let me ask, are you sharing this information
with Congress?
Mr. Ragsdale. On overstays?
Mr. Carter. Yes.
Mr. Ragsdale. Yes, in fact, the CBP produced the first
report last year and as the Deputy Commissioner said, there
will be more data in the report this coming year.
Mr. Carter. OK, thank you, Mr. Ragsdale. Mr. Taylor, very
quickly and I am sorry I don't have much time here. I just want
to talk very quickly about the travel of foreign fighters, and
particularly through Europe. What are we doing in
communicating, when you are working with European nations to
try to coordinate our efforts here?
Mr. Taylor. We are doing quite a bit. As a matter of fact,
I leave tomorrow night for Slovakia to meet the current
presidency of the European Union to further the work that has
been done by the Dutch in collaborating on the sharing of
information among the European Union on foreign fighters and
other terrorist operations in Europe. We have a very strong
relationship with the European Union, both European Union
bilaterally and the individual members of the European Union,
as well as with Europol, as I mentioned earlier.
We have several members of the DHS team that are co-located
at Europol, work extensively with European police agencies on
their investigations, our investigations in a collaborative
fashion. Is it perfect? Not yet, but it is a work in progress
and it is a high priority for our Secretary to sustain that.
Mr. Carter. OK. Well, thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, you
have got a very important job and a very tough job, and we
understand that. All of us understand that. We want to help
you. We here in Congress want to help you. So please understand
that, please understand that we have got to work together to
make this work. I hear and I read where, oh, they want to shut
the borders down. Nobody has said that.
What they have said is we want the best vetting system that
we can possibly have. We want to make sure that those people
who are coming here are not coming here to hurt us. The No. 1
responsibility of our Federal Government is to protect our
homeland, to protect our citizens. We in Congress want to help
you to perform your jobs in that respect. Thank you very much.
Mr. Taylor. Sir, if I might just very quickly respond. It
is also our top priority and has been the top priority of the
leadership of the department and the administration to ensure
that the quality of vetting is the best possible and we
continue to work to enhance it as we move forward.
Mr. Carter. Thank you.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Carter, and thank you, General. I
want to note at the outset that I am not Chairman McCaul. He
had to go to another hearing and he asked me to take over for
him, and he also asked me to express his sincere thanks for
your testimony today, and I will do the same, so thank you very
much, gentlemen and Doctor.
General Taylor, when you were testifying, answering a
question from Ms. McSally, you answered it candidly.
I have got to tell you, I appreciate that. I appreciate
when someone comes before Congress, if they don't have the
answer, they tell you they don't have the answer, and it is
very important to understand that we are all on the same side
trying to keep this country safe.
We different jobs--ours is oversight, yours is action--and
I appreciate when if you don't know the answer, you say it,
because when someone comes before Congress and they try to
deflect or they do not answer the question directly, it does
impact our view of what is going on, so thank you very much. I
very much appreciate your professionalism, so thank you.
Now, I want to read you a quote, General, briefly and tell
me if you agree with this. I presume you do but I am going to
make sure. ``Federal air marshals serve as an active last line
of defense against terrorism and air piracy and are an
important part of the multi-layered strategy adopted by the
U.S. to thwart terrorism in the civil aviation sector.'' Do you
agree with that?
Mr. Taylor. I do.
Mr. Katko. OK, it is self-evident, is it not? I believe in
intelligence circles. Now, Dr. Gowadia, how are you?
Ms. Gowadia. I am well sir, thank you.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much. Yesterday prior to our
hearing on various issues, we had a--on Cuba, a bill I was
trying to pass we got--an issue of Cuba. There was a time line
that was produced by the Department of Homeland Security. Do
you have that in front of you?
Ms. Gowadia. I just received it, sir.
Mr. Katko. OK, thank you. Accompanying that time line--and
it lists various events happening with Cuba since 2010, various
security-related events and what they have done in that regard,
TSA and Homeland Security, is that right?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, sir.
Mr. Katko. OK. We also received in connection with that an
e-mail from the Department of Homeland Security making sure
that there is no sensitive security information in that report
so I feel comfortable talking about everything in there.
I will ask that both of these documents be entered into the
record.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Background Submitted For the Record by Hon. John Katko
background/previous tsa engagements with cuba
November 2010 to Present
TSA continues to enjoy a robust and effective working relationship
with the Cuban Institute of Civil Aviation (IACC). Listed below are
highlights of the past 5+ years.
Accomplishments:
November 2010.--Transportation Security Administration
Representative (TSAR) Mizell's first assessment in Cuba with
visits to Havana, Santiago, Camaguey, Cienfuegos, and Holguin.
Prior to 2010, the last Office of Global Strategies (OGS) last
visit was to Havana in October 2007.
August 2011.--Because of the positive relations established
during the first visit in 2010 by TSAR and Miami ROC
inspectors, the TSAR was able to facilitate a reciprocal visit
by Cuban representatives to observe security measures at the
last-point-of-departure (LPD) airports at John F. Kennedy
International Airport (JFK) in New York and Miami International
Airport (MIA) in Miami in August 2011. During this visit, the
Cuban delegation presented TSA with a copy of its Civil
Aviation Security Program, which was a big step in sharing
sensitive information, all due to the newly-established
professional rapport.
October 2011.--TSAR facilitated TSA Inspector visits to
Santa Clara and Manzanillo.
January 2012.--Assessment and air carrier inspections were
conducted in Havana.
February 2012.--TSA/OGS shared information with Cuba to
assist with Liquids Aerosols and Gels (LAGs) implementation.
February 2012.--The Chief of Mission and First Secretary of
the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, DC, visited TSA
Headquarters and met with OGS to discuss IACC's earlier visit
to JFK and MIA in August 2011.
May 2012.--Assessments were conducted in Holguin and
Santiago.
July 2012.--Assessments were conducted in Camaguey and
Cienfuegos.
July 2012.--LAGs restrictions were fully implemented at all
LPD airports throughout Cuba.
January 2013.--A Cuban delegation visited airports in Ft.
Lauderdale and Tampa.
February 2013.--Secure Flight was implemented for all Cuban
LPD airports to the United States.
March 2013.--TSA arranged Ground Security Coordinator
training for 25 Cuban aviation security personnel in Havana.
April 2013.--TSA hosted a visit at TSA Headquarters by the
Chief of Mission, Cuban Interests Section, Washington, DC.
June 2013.--TSA completed startup assessments/air carrier
visits for Santa Clara and Manzanillo.
June 2013.--Discussions began on the possibility of mail
service between Cuba and the United States.
May 2014.--A Cuban aviation security delegation visited JFK
and the TSA Systems Integration Facility (TSIF) in the District
of Columbia.
September 2014.--The TSAR and representatives from the
Office of Chief Counsel and the Federal Air Marshal Service
(FAMS) traveled to Havana to explain and propose a F AMS
arrangement.
November 2014.--TSA met with IACC personnel in Havana to
discuss Secure Flight implementation.
February 2015.--Assessment and air carrier inspections were
conducted in Havana.
February 2015.--Ground Security Coordinator Training was
completed in Havana by American Airlines.
March 2015.--TSA participated with other representatives
from the interagency in meetings with a Cuban delegation.
April 2015.--Assessments and air carrier inspections were
completed in Santiago and Holguin.
May 2015.--Cuba implemented a requirement for all travelers
to remove their shoes during the screening process on flights
from Havana to the United States.
September 2015.--TSA hosted a 7-member Cuban delegation for
visits to U.S. airports in Atlanta, Tampa, Ft. Lauderdale, and
Miami.
September 2015.--The TSAR participated as part of a 15-
member U.S. delegation for technical talks in Havana.
October 2015.--Meeting in Havana regarding the FAMS
arrangement.
November 2015.--Assessment and air carrier inspections
conducted in Camaguey, Santa Clara, and Cienfuegos.
December 2015.--USG meeting with Cuban Postal Service
personnel in Havana to finalize plans for the start-up of
direct mail service between the United States/Cuba. USG
participants included reps from USPS, TSA, and CBP.
December 2015.--TSAR participated in a 10-member U.S.
delegation for a third round of technical talks that resulted
in approval of scheduled air carrier service between Cuba and
the United States.
February 2016.--Air carrier inspection in Havana; initial
focus visit to Matanzas Airport.
February 2016.--On February 16, the U.S.-Cuba Civil Aviation
Arrangement was signed in Havana for the official re-
establishment of scheduled air services between the United
States and Cuba.
March 2016.--TSAR arranged for American Airlines to conduct
refresher training.
May 2016.--TSAR Mizell briefed IACC in Havana on upcoming
changes to responsibilities by the airlines and the impact it
will have on operations at Cuban international airports.
June 2016.--Air carrier inspections in Holguin, Santiago.
Start-up inspection in Cienfuegos. Airport assessment at
Matanzas Airport (VAR).
July 2016.--FAMS arrangement approved for charter flights.
August 2016.--FAMS mission for charter flights began in
Cuba.
August 2016.--TSA Assistant Administrator Mr. Paul Fujimura
visited two Cuban airports and met with several officials from
the Cuban government.
August 2016.--Inaugural scheduled flight between the United
States and Cuba with TSAR and TSA compliance inspector present.
August 2016.--FAMS arrangement for commercial service--
drafted, approved by Department of State, forwarded to Cubans
for comment.
September 2016.--Meeting in Havana to discuss Ground
Security Coordinator roles. Participation by IACC, TSA, and air
carriers.
Upcoming Engagement:
October 2016.--Airport assessments in Cayo Coco, Manzanillo.
Air Carrier inspection in Varadero.
December 2016.--Air carrier inspections in Santa Clara,
Manzanillo, and Camaguey. Airport assessment in Cayo Largo.
______
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Katko. Now, if you look to the third page, in July
2016, there is an entry which States that Federal air marshals
service arrangement approved for charter flights, do you see
that?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. Katko. OK, and so that means that for charter flights,
there has been an agreement between the Federal air marshals
and Cuban government to have Federal air marshals on some of
those flights, is that correct?
Ms. Gowadia. Indeed, sir.
Mr. Katko. OK, now if you go down to August 2016, the
second entry for August 2016, it says Federal air marshals
arrangement for commercial service drafted approved by
Department of State and forwarded to Cubans for comment, do you
see that?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, sir.
Mr. Katko. So for the non-chartered flights in August 2016,
there was a draft sent to the Cuban government, is that right?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, sir.
Mr. Katko. OK, has that Cuban government signed that
agreement?
Ms. Gowadia. Not to date, sir.
Mr. Katko. OK, so as of today are there any Federal air
marshals allowed on any non-charter flights between the United
States and Cuba?
Ms. Gowadia. No, sir.
Mr. Katko. OK. Now, so--there is another document here,
ma'am, that I read from, it is an article from August 11, 2016.
In that article, it quotes, it states a quote from the TSA
which indicates that there was an agreement between the Cuban
government and the TSA for Federal air marshals. Do you recall
that article?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, sir.
Mr. Katko. OK, and I have this article----
Ms. Gowadia. I have just received it.
Mr. Katko. OK, and I believe you spoke about it before and
that is dated August 11, 2016, is that right?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, sir.
Mr. Katko. I ask that that be entered into the record, as
well. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Article Submitted For the Record by Hon. John Katko
U.S. to Deploy Federal Air Marshals on Cuba Flights
By: Amanda Vicinanzo, Online Managing Editor
08/11/2016 (10:05 pm)
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) announced this
week that the United States and Cuba have reached an agreement which
will allow federal air marshals on board certain flights to and from
Cuba. TSA released a statement on the decision at the request of the
US-Cuba Trade and Economic Council.
TSA explained that In-Flight Security Officers (IFSOs), also known
as federal air marshals, play a crucial role in aviation security. The
agency plans to continue to work with Cuba to expand the presence of
IFSOs on flights to and from Cuba.
``This agreement will strengthen both parties' aviation security
efforts by furnishing a security presence on board certain passenger
flights between the United States and The Republic of Cuba,'' TSA said
in the statement, adding, ``IFSOs serve as an active last line of
defense against terrorism and air piracy, and are an important part of
a multi-layer strategy adopted by the US to thwart terrorism in the
civil aviation sector.''
Commenting on the announcement, Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas),
Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, warned that
despite the presence of federal air marshals on flights between the two
countries, Americans traveling to Cuba remain at risk.
``While the agreement to allow federal air marshals on-board
flights between the United States and Cuba is a positive step, the
American people should have grave concerns about the level of security
currently in place at any foreign airport where the host government
refused to allow Congress to visit,'' McCaul said.
President Obama's plan to open regularly scheduled commercial air
service to Cuba has been met with significant reservations. As Homeland
Security Today previously reported, lawmakers have expressed concerns
that terrorists could use Cuba as a gateway to the United States.
``The Administration is telling us that we should entrust the
safety and security of American citizens to the Cuban government,''
Rep. John Katko (R-NY), who chairs the House Homeland Security
Committee's Transportation Security subcommittee, said in a May 2016
statement. ``A country that was just removed from the state sponsors of
terrorism list one year ago on May 29. A country whose leaders have
repeatedly derided the values and principles for which our great nation
stands.''
In July, Katko introduced legislation to prohibit all scheduled
commercial air travel between the United States and Cuba until TSA
certifies that Cuban airports have the appropriate security measures in
place to keep Americans safe.
Just weeks beforehand, Katko and other members of the House
Homeland Security Committee were blocked by the Cuban government from
entering the country to assess security risks associated with resuming
air travel between the United States and Cuba.
The first of the more than 100 daily roundtrip flights between the
two countries is slated to begin at the end of this month.
http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/daily-news-analysis/single-article/us-
to-deploy-federal-air-marshals-on-cuba-flights/
9a674c2ceb5d4329c7a857aa4e4a81dc.html.
Mr. Katko. In that article, they note a TSA release which
said that there will be Federal air marshals on select
commercial flights, is that correct?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, sir.
Mr. Katko. Isn't it true that they are really referring to
just the charter flights?
Ms. Gowadia. Sir, it is important for us to realize that
the compromise, the strategy, the exact operations of our
Federal air marshals is not in the best interest of aviation
security.
We try to be very careful in allocating our FAMs to flights
based on risk, based on threat, and certainly based on
agreements. We will continue to try to expand our FAMs coverage
on all flights out of Cuba and we have no reason to believe
that this will not proceed on scheduled flights at this time.
To the best of my knowledge, I don't know that they will
resist the ability to place FAMs on scheduled flights.
Mr. Katko. I understand, Doctor, but if you can give me a
direct answer, I would appreciate it. Then the question is
simply, when you submitted that quote, there was no agreement
to have any Federal air marshals on that non-charter flights,
is that correct?
Ms. Gowadia. That is----
Mr. Katko. So you are referring to the charter flights, is
that correct?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, sir.
Mr. Katko. Thank you. All right, so, General Taylor. In a
hearing we had on May 17, 2016, a Mr. Stodder from Homeland
Security testified before us. In that hearing, he stated that
there will be no flights between the United States and Cuba
until Federal air marshals are allowed to be on those flights.
I ask that that be entered into the record as well. Without
objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
EXCERPT.--Flying Blind: What Are the Security Risks of Resuming U.S.
Commercial Air Service to Cuba?
Tuesday, May 17, 2016
Mr. Katko. Thank you. With respect to the Federal Air Marshal
Service, is it your testimony that there will be no flights from the
United States--from Cuba to the United States unless the Federal Air
Marshal Service has been allowed to be on those flights, like they
normally do elsewhere in the world?
Mr. Stodder. Yes.
[Additional information follows:]
supplemental information submitted by dhs
DHS encourages countries with Last-Point-of-Departure air carrier
service to the United States to enter into agreements or arrangements
regarding the deployment of Federal Air Marshals, but it is not a legal
requirement. There are many additional passenger flights to the United
States from countries with which there is no such agreement or
arrangement in place. DHS is exploring the possibility of negotiating
an agreement or arrangement in place. DHS is exploring the possibility
of negotiating an agreement or arrangement with Cuba regarding the
deployment of Federal Air Marshals on scheduled flights. DHS recently
completed negotiations of an arrangement that would cover charter
flights.
Mr. Katko. OK. Thank you. You just don't know what that time frame
is?
Mr. Stodder. I mean, that agreement is still being under
negotiation, but it is being negotiated now.
Mr. Katko. So there will be no flights until that--until the
Federal Air Marshals are allowed to be on the flights?
Mr. Stodder. Correct.
[Additional information follows:]
supplemental information submitted by dhs
DHS encourages countries with Last-Point-of-Departure air carrier
service to the United States to enter into agreements or arrangements
regarding the deployment of Federal Air Marshals, but it is not a legal
requirement. There are many additional passenger flights to the United
States from countries with which there is no such agreement or
arrangement in place. DHS is exploring the possibility of negotiating
an agreement or arrangement in place, including current flights between
the United States and Cuba. DHS is exploring the possibility of
negotiating an agreement or arrangement with Cuba regarding the
deployment of Federal Air Marshals on scheduled flights. DHS recently
completed negotiations of an arrangement that would cover charter
flights.
Mr. Katko. Can you explain to me why that decision was
changed and to allow these flights to have without any Federal
air marshals on them?
Mr. Taylor. I would like to defer to Dr. Gowadia to answer
that on behalf of the TSA.
Mr. Katko. Well, OK, so you don't have an answer with that,
General?
Mr. Taylor. No, sir.
Mr. Katko. OK, thank you. Well, before Dr. Gowadia answers,
I will just note for the record that we are again--I make it
very clear like I did yesterday, we do not oppose flights to
and from Cuba. That is not my job, OK? That is not--whether I
do agree with it personally or not is not the question. My job
is to make sure that things are as safe as possible.
In this instance, we have General Taylor agreeing with me
that Federal air marshals are an integral part of the multi-
layered security apparatus. Indeed, the last line of defense
for terrorism and air piracy, and we have opened up service to
Cuba without having that last line of defense in place, and I
think anyone who is in their right mind would tell you that is
not a good idea.
That is what I am very concerned about. What I am concerned
about as well is that TSA sent out a document in August before
the flights started, which indicated to some extent that--or at
least shaded the fact that there is going to be Federal air
marshals on select commercial flights.
That gave the misimpression to the public that select
commercial flights included the commercial flights, the non-
charter commercial flights. Maybe Americans took solace in that
into saying it is OK to going to and from Cuba, but I think
that is the type of thing that causes rifts in relationships
and trustworthiness between agencies and oversight persons such
as myself, and I am concerned about that going forward.
There has been a rush to open up the airports in Cuba, I
understand that. But we have to do our due diligence and with
not even having Federal air marshals allowed on the flights
categorically is not a good idea. We all know Federal air
marshals aren't on every single flight and that is part of the
risk base. When a bad guy gets on a flight, he knows or doesn't
know of whether somebody is on it. That is important.
When they know there is nobody on it, that is a bad thing,
and it pains me to bring this up in a public setting, but I do
it as an example of why we need more openness and more
collaborations instead of obfuscation between the agencies.
With that, I don't have any further questions.
Mr. Taylor. Sir, if I might ask Dr. Gowadia to respond to
your earlier question with regard to why that service is moving
forward.
Ms. Gowadia. Sir, I could not agree with you more. It is
important that the exact deployments, the types of flights that
are covered by FAMs be retained for the security enterprise of
which you are definitely a part, which is why we have as many
meetings with you and your staff on a regular basis. In fact,
we are going to meet later this afternoon to further discuss
the situation and what we are seeing and what we are learning.
As regards to the statement of my colleague from policy, he
did misspeak. That is exactly why, sir, you afford us the
opportunity to correct the record. Secretary Johnson did
testify later, explaining that we would be continuing to work
to get that memorandum in place, but just as in many other
countries across the world where we do not have FAMs
agreements, we will continue to pursue that. We will continue
to attempt to get as many FAMs on as many flights from as many
last points of departure as possible.
But we need the partnership of our international
colleagues, our nation-State partners, the airlines, the
airports, and we must continue to work with them in a
collaborative way so that we can negotiate those agreements,
share the right kinds of information, and be able to raise the
level of security across the globe. That desire is constant
between you and us, there is no daylight there.
Mr. Katko. Dr. Gowadia, I agree with everything you said
except one thing. You misled the American public when you
issued that press release saying that it was going to be on
select commercial flights.
It did it at a time right before the flights were about to
start, OK? Now, overlay that with the fact that we have no idea
how the Cuban employees, all Communist Party employees, that
work at the airports, there are no airline employees allowed to
work there, that the Cuban government vets the employees and
hires them, and we have no idea about their background or what
their vetting process is to any appreciable amount other than
what they tell us. We have no idea how much they are paid, we
have no idea whether or not to any reasonable degree of
certainty whether the machines work.
We have no TSA people on the ground in Cuba, zero,
permanently stationed. You are asking permission from the Cuban
government to have one stationed at the embassy. That is it. On
top of that, you don't have anybody, Federal air marshals on
the commercial flights, the non-charter flights. On top of
that, independent sources including the Washington Post have
said that within the last 6 to 8 months, there is been a spate
of fake Cuban passports, presumably being produced in Iran
being circulated in the Middle East.
So forgive us if it causes us a security concern. I agree
with what you are saying, but when you directly mislead people,
like that press release did, that is when I have a concern and
that is when the trust between agency and oversight is
deteriorated.
I ask going forward that that be fixed and I have talked to
Admiral Neffenger about that, as well. With that, I yield back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ratcliffe,
for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Chairman, I know as many folks
have mentioned this past Sunday was the 15th anniversary of
9/11, a day that I know none of us will forget.
It was a day for me that changed my life, it caused me to
become a terrorism prosecutor, and as the United States
attorney and the chief of anti-terrorism and National security
for the Eastern district of Texas, I had the responsibility of
handling dozens of international and domestic terrorism
investigations involving some of the Nation's most sensitive
National security matters.
So that is something that continues to influence my
perspectives now as a Member of Congress. So, first of all, let
me start off by thanking all of you for your dedicated service.
The things that you and your employees do on a daily basis to
secure our homeland from the threat of terrorism, I know it is
a full-time job and then some. Because we know that terrorists
are ever-adapting and constantly probing for new ways to commit
the kind of atrocities that happened 15 years ago Sunday.
One of those new ways was highlighted yesterday in some
news reports involving the arrests of three suspects in
Germany. According to those reports, the suspects traveled from
Turkey to Greece posing as Syrian refugees in Germany. This is
a reason for particular concern because as we have discussed
previously in hearings before this very committee, ISIS has
told us that it planned to exploit the refugee system as a way
to execute terrorist attacks.
Those three individuals that were arrested are reportedly
associated with ISIS and therefore we are no longer talking
about a hypothetical situation.
We also know that--or at least I am going to assume that
none of you can provide an assurance, or I doubt that you can
provide more assurance that the FBI Director and Secretary
Johnson gave us in prior hearings here about immunizing us from
the possibility that ISIS is infiltrating our refugee program.
So for all of those reasons, I am troubled by what the
administration had announced previously about accepting 10,000
Syrian refugees and now its announcement that it has in fact
met that number. But I think what is most disturbing is the
news just yesterday that the President plans to set the refugee
ceiling for next year at 110,000, which would be an increase of
30 percent from the 85,000 that we had in the last fiscal year.
So it would appear that despite warnings from our own top
National security officials, and then independent events like
what happened in Germany, that the administration is
essentially doubling down on this Syrian refugee program, and
so I want to ask some questions here because I will remind
folks of what Director Comey said before this committee.
He said we can query our database until the cows come home
but there will be nothing that shows up because we have no
record of them. So let me start with you, Secretary Taylor, and
maybe Director Rodriguez, you, as well. How are we making a
determination that a refugee from Syria right now doesn't pose
a threat to the United States if we don't have substantial
information on them?
Mr. Taylor. Congressman, let me allow--ask Director
Rodriguez to respond to that and then I will come back to this
whole issue of vetting and the effectiveness of it.
Mr. Rodriguez. So the first thing that I would note is
110,000 was set as an overall ceiling, so that is the whole
world. So that does not necessarily tell us what the Syrian
target or whether there will be a Syrian target in the future.
Although I think the administration is very, very clear that we
do want to provide relief there.
The fact is that many, many people, literally hundreds of
the refugees that we have screened, both utilizing the various
counterterrorism and law enforcement databases that we use,
using our highly-trained officers who conduct interviews, using
the multi-layered process that also serves as an obstacle to
those wishing to exploit or seeing the refugee flow as an
opportunity of something to exploit, all of those provide us a
number of very powerful safeguards.
In fact, many, many people have been denied precisely
because of information that has been identified in law
enforcement and counterintelligence databases. An even greater
number have been placed on hold because we are not comfortable.
Because my officers, their supervisors are not comfortable with
allowing that individual, whether they are Syrian, whether they
are from Africa, whether they are from Central America, they
have been denied travel because we are not comfortable. So that
is the assurance that I can provide to the American people.
In fact, let's talk for a second about what Director Comey,
what my boss, Secretary Johnson had said, what National
Counterterrorism Center Director Rasmussen said, what Director
of National Intelligence Clapper said.
They certainly spoke to what was in the databases at the
time that they spoke, but they also, every single one of them
corroborated the fact that the process that we conduct, the
multi-layered, multi-feature process that we conduct is, in
fact, a robust, intensive process that deserves the praise that
it has received as the most intense vetting that any traveler
to the United States receives.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, let me comment on that. I will concede
that I take some measure in comfort in knowing that our process
for screening refugees is more stringent than some of our
European counterparts, but despite the multi-layered process as
you describe it, again, not having some assurance about being
able to know for 100 percent certainty that these folks don't
have terrorist ties that are coming from Syria.
I guess my follow-up question would be, once they are here,
what is DHS doing to continue monitoring the refugees after
they are in the United States, if anything? Again I want to
give you, Secretary, a chance to comment as well.
Mr. Rodriguez. Let me see if I can get it out real fast. So
first of all, the individuals are subject to something called
an interagency check, which is initiated prior to their being
interviewed by our officers.
That is now being done as a recurrent process so that if
new derogatory information arises about that person, either
before or frankly even after travel, we and our law enforcement
intelligence partners will be notified about that new
information so that we can act on it.
The other critical thing to understand is we encounter
these people 1 year after they arrive when they present
themselves for adjustment of status. We do a whole new round of
checks on them at that time. So new information has arisen, at
that time, there is, in fact, an encounter between those
individuals and one of our field office immigration officers,
and that becomes an opportunity to further deal with the
prospect that one of these individuals might present a problem.
Mr. Taylor. I wanted to just comment on the whole issue of
vetting, and certainly I think both the Secretary and Director
Comey were correct in stating we have less information on these
individuals than let's say we would have on Iraqi refugees
coming to our country just because we were involved in a war
there for 10 years and there was information more readily
available.
The absence of specific information on these refugees does
not mean we don't have any information. In fact, the
connections--I won't get specifically into how we do this, we
can do that in a closed session, in terms of analytics that are
used to spot connections that aren't readily apparent. So it is
not that we don't have perfect information on the individuals,
if some of that information is destroyed. It does not mean we
can't check other data sets for data that helps us better
understand who we are dealing with and to validate their
stories.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you all. Again, I was sincere in my
appreciation for the work that you do and for all of you being
here today to testify about these issues and I appreciate the
Chairman's indulgence with respect to the time.
Mr. Katko. Well, we were all indulged quite a bit today
so--I think it led to some productive testimony, so that is no
problem.
I want to thank all the witnesses for your testimony today
and the Members for their questions, and my colleague as
always, Mr. Thompson. The Members of the committee may have
some additional questions for the witnesses and we will ask you
to respond to those in writing.
Pursuant to Committee Rule VII(e), the hearing record will
be held open for 10 days, and without objection, the committee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for the Department of
Homeland Security
Question 1. Parallel to your time serving as the director of USCIS,
Europe has faced an unprecedented number of migrants and asylum seekers
reaching its borders. This has resulted in wide-spread criticism among
the public and politicians here in the United States. Do you feel our
refugee vetting process is stringent enough to identify possible
terrorists which may be hiding among incoming refugees to the United
States?
Answer. Security checks are an integral part of the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program (USRAP) for applicants of all nationalities. The
refugee vetting process in place today employs the highest level of
security measures of any immigrant or non-immigrant travel program to
protect against risks to our National security. U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) continues to engage with law enforcement
agencies and the intelligence community (IC) to ensure that vetting for
all refugee applicants, including Syrians, is as robust as possible.
While simultaneously advancing humanitarian and National security
mandates can be a challenge, they are not at odds with one another.
Instead, by adopting a strong, unequivocal position on National
security, the USRAP is able to ensure that vital resettlement
opportunities stay available to those truly in need of protection while
remaining vigilant in safeguarding the security of our Nation.
Question 2. Some have expressed concern about our ability to vet
Syrian refugees due to a perceived lack of information about this
population in U.S. Government holdings, saying we should ``pause'' or
eliminate the program entirely. Can you explain what special measures
USCIS implemented to ensure the security of the integrity of the Syrian
refugee program?
Answer. The Department and USCIS have been working with the IC to
identify additional screening opportunities leveraging unique holdings
and capabilities. Security screening continuously evolves, and new
enhancements to security screening practices continuously come on-line
and get refined, including during the course of fiscal year 2016. USCIS
is currently testing automated processes, with manual review, for the
screening of refugee applicant information against public-facing
portions of specific social media platforms. Additionally, USCIS has
operationalized manual social media checks for certain Syrian and Iraqi
refugee cases. Additional details can be provided in a Classified
setting.
Refugees are subject to the highest level of security checks of any
category of traveler to the United States. Screening procedure have
been expanded over time to include a broader range of checks and
applicants. Screening partners include the National Counterterrorism
Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense (DoD), and other IC
and law enforcement members.
We continually evaluate whether additional enhancements to the
vetting process are necessary. Mindful of the particular conditions of
the Syria crisis, the USRAP undertakes additional forms of security
screening for Syrian refugees. If National security concerns are
revealed during the interview or through the screening process, Syrian
refugee applications are handled according to the same adjudicative
processes as all other refugee benefit applications with identified
National security concerns. We continue to examine options for further
enhancements for screening Syrian refugees, which can be discussed in a
closed setting.
Question 3a. Some may argue that the questionnaires and interview
methods used in the visa application process may be out of date,
incomplete, or in need of revision to best identify possible security
concerns.
What sort of information should we consider gathering from foreign
nationals?
Answer. USCIS remains committed to ensuring that individuals posing
a National security or public safety threat are not granted immigration
benefits, and the information we currently adduce during the visa
application process satisfies any potential security concern. USCIS is
also committed to preventing fraud. In keeping with this commitment,
USCIS has instituted a robust system of programs, procedures, and
security checks, led by the Fraud Detection and National Security
Directorate (FDNS). FDNS Immigration Officers work with adjudicators in
every USCIS Center, District, Field, and Asylum Office, and with our
Refugee Affairs Division, to identify and investigate cases with
potential National security concerns. Adjudicators are trained to
identify indicators of National security concern and to refer cases to
FDNS for further investigation. Officers investigating National
security concerns have security clearances to allow them to access
relevant derogatory information and conduct their investigation. In
addition to questions related to statutory eligibility for benefits
being sought, USCIS engages in comprehensive interviewing and vetting
of applicants within its jurisdiction. Questions are often tailored to
the facts of individual cases.
If USCIS discovers fraud in an application for an overseas
beneficiary during our adjudication process, it does not forward the
case to the Department of State (DoS) for consular processing. These
cases are denied. USCIS documents the fraud in TECS for each case.
Criminal concerns are documented in TECS, which are communicated to DoS
via the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS). National Security
Concerns are communicated to DoS both via TECS to CLASS, and USCIS
includes a memorandum outlining the National security concerns that
were identified.
DoS has jurisdiction over interviewing overseas applicants seeking
visas to travel to the United States. USCIS defers to DoS to explain
their full process, but DoS Consular Officers do use a variety of
methods to elicit information from applicants during the interview
process to determine their eligibility for the visa being sought.
Additionally, prior to issuing a visa overseas, the State Department
conducts its own background checks.
Question 3b. Does your agency have enough flexibility in its
existing authorities to modernize the information we collect from
foreign nationals?
Answer. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) empowers USCIS
officers to consider any evidence when adjudicating applications and
petitions. Additionally, USCIS is able to leverage a variety of
different technologies during the adjudication process to identify
information relevant to adjudication. As methodologies, tools, and
resources all improve, expansion of investigative tools, to include
social media vetting, to further scrutinize high-risk populations is
planned.
USCIS screens applicants against available law enforcement and
National security lookouts and records, as well as FBI biographic and
biometric records. Much of this screening is automatically triggered
when USCIS receives a new application or petition. In support of these
screening efforts, USCIS works closely with DoS, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and other
partners in the IC and law enforcement community. USCIS engages with
law enforcement and IC members for assistance with identity
verification, acquisition of additional information, and deconfliction
to ensure USCIS activities will not adversely affect an on-going law
enforcement investigation.
With the advances in transforming our systems, eventual full
capture of data in an electronic environment will allow the agency to
conduct searches and run analytics against combinations of data that
the agency previously could not do without a very labor- and
logistically-intensive process. The electronic system also allows for
security checks to be automatically generated at any time throughout
the process, ensuring updated information is always available to USCIS
personnel. Finally, all information will be accessible from one
location and available immediately to those who need it.
Question 3c. Are additional resources necessary to do so?
Answer. At this time USCIS has not identified any distinct
additional costs, beyond what is already included in USCIS's budget, to
modernize the information it collects from foreign nationals. With the
exception of the E-Verify employment status verification program, the
USCIS budget is derived from user fee collections rather than
discretionary appropriations. Approximately 95% of USCIS's annual
budget comes from the Immigration Examinations Fee Account (IEFA),
which was established under the INA by adding Sections 286(m) and (n).
As authorized under INA 286(m) and (n), USCIS sets its immigration and
naturalization application and petition fees at a level intended to
recover the full cost of providing adjudication and naturalization
services, including the costs of similar services provided without
charge to asylum applicants and other immigrants. In addition, as
required by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, USCIS conducts
biennial fee reviews of the IEFA to determine if fees being charged are
sufficient to recover full costs or whether a fee update is needed.
When fees need to be adjusted to recover full cost, USCIS publishes a
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register with a 60-
day comment period. This is then followed by a final rule addressing
the public comments received. Based on its biennial fee review of IEFA
for the fiscal year 2016/2017 period, USCIS proposed a fee schedule
adjustment through an NPRM published in the Federal Register on May 4,
2016. USCIS published the final rule on October 24, 2016 addressing
public comments received on the NPRM. The revised USCIS fee schedule
will be effective December 23, 2016. If additional costs associated
with modernizing the information USCIS collects from foreign nationals
are subsequently identified, they will be considered in the next IEFA
biennial fee review for the fiscal year 2018/2019 period.
Question 4a. Does USCIS have sufficient resources to effectively
adjudicate refugee and visa applications?
Are your fraud detection resources sufficient?
Question 4b. What more can be done to ensure you have the tools you
need to adjudicate applications in a timely and thorough manner?
Answer. As noted in the response to Question 3, the biennial fee
review conducted for the IEFA for the fiscal year 2016/2017 period
indicated that a fee schedule adjustment is necessary for USCIS to
recover the full costs of adjudications. Therefore, USCIS published a
notice of proposed rulemaking on May 4, 2016, to adjust the fee
schedule. The biennial fee review projected the anticipated level of
resources necessary to achieve the agency's mission and goals, which
include the effective adjudication of refugee applications and visa
petitions, fraud prevention and detection, and adjudication of
applications and petitions in a timely and thorough manner. USCIS
published the final rule on October 24, 2016 addressing public comments
received on the NPRM. The revised USCIS fee schedule will be effective
December 23, 2016. USCIS is confident in the tools and processes used
to adjudicate all applications and petitions.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Huban A. Gowadia
Question 1. Dr. Gowadia, according to the testimony TSA vets all
passengers travelling inbound to the United States against terrorist
watch lists and that the agency can adjust its vetting in a risk-based
manner to provide additional focus on specific travel patterns or
locations. It is my understanding that this is the process at all last-
point-of-departure airports, including those based in Cuba. Am I
correct?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight
Program vets all passengers on flights which are traveling into, out
of, and over the continental United States, and all flights by U.S.-
flagged carriers. This includes all U.S.-flagged carriers which have
now begun flights to or from Cuba.
Secure Flight does have the capability to adjust vetting parameters
to increase the number of passengers receiving enhanced screening at
specific airports and in certain geographical areas in response to
specific threat information. This capability includes any last-point-
of-departure airport, including those in Cuba. If information is
developed which relates to an individual passenger, Secure Flight is
able to respond appropriately so that sufficient security measures can
be taken.
Question 2. Currently, there are more than 100 scheduled flights
between the U.S. and Cuba. Some people believe that terrorists will use
Cuba as a gateway to gain entry into the United States. Does TSA have
the capability, including access to intelligence, to vet passengers who
are departing from Cuba?
Answer. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) authorized up
to 100 daily scheduled flights between the United States and Cuba. The
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Secure Flight Program
prescreens all passengers who are traveling between the United States
and Cuba in the same manner as is done for all other flights from
international last-point-of-departure locations. TSA checks all
passengers on these international inbound flights against the Terrorist
Screening Database (TSDB). Intelligence data collected world-wide by
the United States is reviewed by the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC) and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) to identify individuals
for proper placement on the TSDB. TSA utilizes a real-time TSDB
information feed via TSC's Watchlist Service (WLS) for these vetting
activities, including prescreening of individuals traveling between the
United States and Cuba or individuals traveling through United States
airspace on their way to or from Cuba.
Question 3. According to the testimony, TSA has completed detailed
vulnerability assessments and mitigation plans for over 300 airports
Nation-wide. How often do these assessments and plans reoccur?
Answer. Airport operators conducted these vulnerability assessments
and produced mitigation plans in collaboration with the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) to better address insider threat
vulnerabilities. At this time TSA has not made a determination on the
frequency of these assessments. However, TSA continues to work with
airports to assess vulnerabilities via routine inspections and
assessments.
Question 4. Following an Office of Inspector General report, which
exposed TSA's screening deficiencies, TSA committed to retraining the
entire Transportation Security Officer workforce. Please highlight some
of the changes within the TSO training program.
Answer. In response to the Inspector General's report on covert
testing and the subsequent Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Tiger Team findings, TSA pursued several avenues to improve Officer
training. The primary efforts include:
Starting in January 2016, TSA transferred Transportation
Security Officer (TSO) Basic Training from individual airports
to the TSA Academy established at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center in Glynco, Georgia in April 2012. This
centralized training provides TSA with the opportunity to
ensure a consistent training experience that supports the
professional development and enhanced performance of its
officer workforce. Additionally, it:
Allows training to be delivered in a dedicated, high-
quality learning environment conducive to realistic,
scenario-based training;
Establishes a common culture and esprit-de-corps within
TSA at the beginning of a TSO's career; TSOs feel part of a
larger DHS counter-terrorism organization, develop a deeper
sense of mission; and
Ensures that training is standardized across the Agency.
The creation of the Mission Essentials Training Series to
reinforce Officers' technical skills, facilitate the sharing of
best practices, and provide current intelligence as it applies
to Officer screening functions. To date, the training includes:
Mission Essentials.--Threat Mitigation--Released July 2015
Mission Essentials.--Organics for the Advanced Technology
X-ray--Released January 2016
Mission Essentials.--Equipment and Security Capabilities--
Released April 2016
Mission Essentials.--Advanced Image Interpretation--
Released August 2016.
Initiation of Instructor-led X-ray training:
Developed, piloted, and trained the first ever instructor
led recurrent X-ray training.
This training uses images based on known weaknesses,
threats, and intelligence.
The training incorporates student participation so that
skilled TSOs can share best practices with their peers. The
training is quarterly, with proficiency assessments. If TSOs
cannot demonstrate proficiency, they receive structured
remediation.
Question 5a. Dr. Gowadia, TSA's Basic Training Program requires
that newly-hired TSOs participate in a 2-week long basic training
program in Glynco, Georgia.
Are you noticing improvements in testing and evaluation performance
following graduation from the academy?
Answer. Since the opening of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Academy for Transportation Security Officer Basic
Training, internal covert testing results are trending up. However, the
long-term effectiveness of the training can only be assessed once TSA
has a large enough pool of graduates to provide statistically
significant results.
Since start-up in January 2016, TSA has graduated over 5,100 new
hires, which comprises approximately 14 percent of the workforce spread
across the network of 440+ airports. As the numbers of Academy
graduates continues to increase, TSA is looking at other ways to assess
the impact that Academy training is having on TSO performance. During
covert testing, reviewing when and where a TSO received basic training
will allow TSA to determine if there are notable differences in Academy
graduates' detection capabilities. In addition to reviewing this data
as it connects to the on-going covert testing program, TSA also plans
to assess what impact Academy training has on the annual performance
assessment (APR) scores for its officer workforce. The Academy
graduates will only begin to enter into the APR cycle in the second
quarter of fiscal year 2017. At the conclusion of the 2017 performance
assessment cycle TSA will be able to determine if the Academy graduates
score higher in their APR than was previously achieved by those
officers trained in the field. TSA will continue to use the information
derived through the covert testing and APR assessment programs to
update and possibly expand and/or adjust the curriculum associated with
TSO basic training.
Question 5b. For single parents or those with familial needs, such
as child care or they have a family who is dependent on their care,
does TSA offer any sort of childcare stipend?
Answer. TSA does not have a child care stipend at this time.
Question 6. Since the retraining of all TSOs, have you noticed a
significant change in TSOs feeling more united and connected to TSA's
core values which includes integrity, innovation, and team spirit?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has made
concerted efforts to help strengthen the culture, mission, and
operational knowledge through training programs specifically designed
for front-line employees. In August 2015, TSA launched the Mission
Essentials Training Series to reinforce Transportation Security
Officers' technical skills, dedication to TSA's mission, and to share
best practices in Standing Operating Procedures and detection. In
addition, in January 2016, TSA began basic training for new hires at
the TSA Academy at FLETC in Glynco, GA, and the Academy has a 97
percent passing rate.
Due to the recent workforce training efforts, conclusive data is
not yet available to attest to a rise in Transportation Security
Officers' connection to TSA's core values. TSA will measure the front
line's connection to TSA's mission and core values by closely analyzing
and taking action on results from the annual Federal Employee Viewpoint
Survey, which is a comprehensive indicator of employee satisfaction and
engagement.
Question 7a. In August, false reports of an active shooter at LAX
resulted in multiple terminals being evacuated. LAX circulated a public
statement to media outlets stating that, due to initial reports of an
active shooter in Terminal 8 at LAX, passengers in several LAX
terminals self-evacuated onto the tarmac and rushed through Federal
security screening without being properly screened.
What is the process of resterilizing the secure area after it has
been breached?
Answer. Each Federal Security Director in consultation with their
Regional Director, the local airport authority, and other stakeholders
is required to develop a Security Breach Containment Plan to include
detailed evacuation and re-sterilization procedures and clearly defined
procedures to isolate and immediately contain possible threats.
Question 7b. When events like at mass evacuation occur, or any
event that requires passengers to seek refuge by any means necessary,
how does TSA ensure that passengers are rescreened once normal business
resumes?
Answer. Once a sweep of non-public locations is conducted, local
Transportation Security Administration management work closely with
local law enforcement and airport stakeholders to prioritize and re-
screen all passengers that wish to re-enter the non-public area.
Question 8a. In August, terminals within LAX in Los Angeles,
California, and JFK in New York City were evacuated due to reports of
an active shooter; both were proven to be false.
When an airport needs to be evacuated, what role do TSOs play?
Answer. Federal Security Directors collaborate with airport
authorities, law enforcement, and other stakeholders to support
airport-wide education and to exercise evacuation plans. In addition to
publishing a minimum recommended standard for airport operators to
conduct bi-annual active-shooter training and exercises, TSA has
distributed more than 500 copies of the ``Active Shooter Incident
Response Training'' to airport directors and airlines and encouraged
them to provide the airport-specific training to airport and airline
employees.
Question 8b. Are TSOs considered first responders in an emergency
situation?
Answer. TSOs are not considered first responders in an emergency
situation. TSOs are instructed to give way to law enforcement and other
emergency personnel during an active-shooter event. Afterwards, the law
enforcement agency in control of the situation will deem the area safe
and turn operational control back over to TSA, or the Airport
Authority, as necessary.
Question 8c. How often do TSOs practice evacuation plans or have
evacuation drills?
Answer. Federal Security Directors are required to conduct
emergency evacuation drills for all assigned personnel a minimum of
twice a year.
Question 9a. During the recent JFK evacuation, security guards and
custodial workers revealed that they were not made aware of airport
evacuation plans. How often are airport employees and contract workers
trained on airport evacuation plans?
Answer. Airport evacuation plans are developed by airport
authorities in concert with stakeholders. TSA is one of these
stakeholders. Approximately 80 percent of Federalized airports have a
schedule of exercises and training, which are conducted jointly with
TSA and other stakeholders including airport and airline tenants, law
enforcement officers, and fire and medical personnel. Additionally, 90
percent of airports have a plan for establishing a unified command. TSA
has also published a minimum recommended standard for airport operators
to conduct bi-annual active-shooter training and exercises.
Question 9b. What efforts has TSA taken to work with airports to
ensure that airport employees and contract workers are properly
educated on airport evacuation protocol?
Answer. Federal Security Directors collaborate with airport
authorities, law enforcement, and other stakeholders to support
airport-wide education and to exercise evacuation plans. In addition to
publishing a minimum recommended standard for airport operators to
conduct bi-annual active-shooter training and exercises, TSA has
distributed more than 500 copies of the ``Active Shooter Incident
Response Training'' to airport directors and airlines and encouraged
them to provide the airport-specific training to airport and airline
employees.
Question 10. When an airport does table-top exercises regarding
active shooting situations, are other DHS entities such as Customs and
Border Protection Immigration and Customs Enforcement involved?
Answer. Airports are encouraged, but not required, to exercise in
all emergency situations with other Department of Homeland Security
entities, local stakeholders, and State and local law enforcement, as
deemed appropriate for the purposes of that specific exercise. Although
it is not required, these entities do coordinate closely with each
other. Pursuant to the Gerardo Hernandez Airport Security Act of 2015
(Pub. L. 114-50), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
conducted outreach regarding security incident response at airports,
and determined that approximately 80 percent of Federalized airports
have a schedule of joint exercises and training, and conduct them with
TSA and other stakeholders to include airport and airline tenants, law
enforcement officers, and fire and medical personnel. Additionally, 90
percent of airports have a plan for establishing a unified command.
Question 11. On November 1, 2013, a lone gunman entered a terminal
within the Los Angeles International Airport killing 1 TSO and wounding
3 others. How has active-shooter training for TSOs been updated since
the tragedy that occurred at LAX?
Answer. In response to the tragic incident at Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX), the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) mandated all employees view the Run, Hide, Fight video created by
the Houston Police Department. TSA also mandated that all employees
take the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Active Shooter
course that also addresses response techniques in the case of an
active-shooter event.
In 2014, TSA developed a new training video titled, Active Shooter
Incident Response Training, specifically depicting active-shooter
incidents in an airport environment. The interactive video was
developed in partnership with industry partners, and captures a joint
training exercise between the TSA, airport and airline tenants, as well
as law enforcement, airport police, and other stakeholders. The
training is designed to reinforce the widely-accepted active-shooter
response reactions of Run-Hide-Fight and built upon materials presented
in previous training courses. Also included was information that would
help the workforce recognize how to respond when an active shooter is
in the vicinity, and identify how to interact with Law Enforcement
Officers who are responding to an incident. This training is an annual
requirement for the entire TSA workforce and is geared towards airport
environments. This training is required annually of all TSA employees.
Further, in July of 2014, TSA incorporated a scenario-based
exercise into its training course for its Lead Transportation Security
Officers (LTSOs) that is delivered at the TSA Academy at the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia. The
exercise for the LTSOs is designed to allow the officers to experience
a simulated active-shooter incident. TSA will introduce this same type
of simulated exercise into the new hire TSO Basic Training delivered at
the TSA Academy in January 2017.
Question 12. TSO morale has been historically low. These
individuals perform a thankless job day in and out, yet often they
receive ridicule and harsh criticisms in hard times, and little praise
when things are going right. Just recently, Secretary Johnson praised
their efforts in addressing wait times without compromising security
throughout the peak travel period. What are you doing to boost morale
and ensure it stays high?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is taking
many steps to improve morale among the workforce. TSA analyzes results
from the workforce opinion surveys, such as the Federal Employee
Viewpoint Survey (FEVS), on an annual basis and targets high-priority
areas for improvement through local (e.g. airport, office, corporate)
and TSA-wide action plans. TSA focuses on improving overarching
leadership communication to the workforce and employee engagement in
problem solving. TSA has responded to employee feedback in the
following ways:
Solicited input on agency improvements from the workforce
through its IdeaFactory, an on-line forum for TSA employees to
engage and share ideas.
Conducted action planning at the corporate, local, and team
level. Recently launched at 10 large airports, these teams have
seen improvements in key areas such as communication and career
development.
Built competency-based performance management systems for
all employees that allow supervisors and managers to recognize
and reward high performers through salary increases and
performance awards.
Implemented the Operations Network for Employees (ONE)
initiative to foster collaborative and productive working
relationships between headquarters and the front-line
workforce. This is a multi-phase initiative, which includes
bringing field employees to TSA headquarters to act as a voice
for their peers and to gain a better understanding of how
decisions are made and how programs are deployed to the field.
Established the TSA Academy at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center (FLETC), Glynco, Georgia, at which newly-hired
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) receive basic training
in screening operations.
Introduced a series of training courses for its front-line
TSA leadership team, to include Leads, Supervisors, and
Managers. These courses focus on helping the leadership team
understand how to use communications tools and practices to
build a strong professional screening team at the checkpoint
and baggage screening areas. The use of TSA's Training Academy,
located at FLETC has yielded positive feedback from the
attendees and has demonstrated TSA's commitment to the
development of a professional workforce.
Modified the staffing model to add time at the start of each
shift, for airport shift briefings to encourage consistent
communication to front-line employees.
Increased transparency of the criteria for making screening
workforce performance awards, and worked to ensure rating
fairness among airports.
Created a learning, engagement, and career development web
site called Success U, to give employees the information and
resources necessary to build their skills. Nearly 50,000 unique
employees visited the site in its first year of operation.
Launched a blog called ``LEAD!'' targeted towards mid- and
senior-level leaders to stress the importance of communication,
collaboration, and motivation and to provide examples of good
engagement practices.
Implemented the TSA Mentoring Program to provide interested
employees with mentors who can provide career coaching and
other support.
Expanded the eligibility of the Leadership Education Program
to include lower-banded employees and increased the course
offerings from prestigious universities around the country in
order to make the program more accessible, effective, and
relevant.
Established an Associate's Program that allows TSA personnel
to continue their education and obtain an AA degree. TSA
established agreements with several educational institutions,
mostly community colleges, across the country to allow the
workforce, primarily TSOs, to continue their education. As of
January 2016, 240 airports, including their spokes, have
partnered with colleges offering distance learning courses, and
the program continues to grow.
Revised time frame from 2 years to 1 year for being promoted
from the D-Band TSO to E-Band TSO. TSA recognized that
requiring individuals to serve an additional year to be
eligible for promotion impacted the recruitment and retention
of qualified staff.
Initiated action during the summer of 2016 to convert part-
time TSOs to full-time status. This action supported TSA's
operational needs at select airports and it also resulted in
providing part-time TSOs the opportunity to convert to full-
time status. TSA's goal is to have a 90%/10% ratio of full-time
to part-time TSOs at these locations.
Approved paid parking for the screening workforce at all
airport locations (individuals receiving transit subsidies are
not eligible for this program).
Continued the retention incentive program for TSOs at hard-
to-hire locations. These incentives allow TSA to compete with
the private sector in the recruitment and retention of
qualified staff.
Question 13. TSA was able to address the wait times issue through
increased overtime and the conversion of TSOs from full-time to part-
time due to increased funding from Congress. Knowing that travel is
expected to steadily increase, are you concerned that funding is needed
year over year to ensure the number of employee continues to be
sufficient to match travel trends?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will
carefully monitor passenger growth and the ability for the workforce to
accommodate future operational demands. With support from Congress, TSA
was able to realign funding to bring on additional Transportation
Security Officers and is better positioned to handle volume growth for
fiscal year 2017. In addition, Congress approved TSA to maintain
current staffing levels during the fiscal year 2017 Continuing
Resolution. However, a baseline adjustment is required to posture TSA
for the long term in order to avert yearly requests. TSA is in the
process of evaluating resource requirements for next summer and future
years based on operational needs to ensure security effectiveness while
maintaining passenger efficiency. As part of the evaluation process,
TSA is in coordination with its stakeholders, such as the Federal
Aviation Administration, airport operators, and airlines, to obtain
predictors of passenger volume; So far the results provided identified
continued passenger growth in fiscal year 2017 and beyond. TSA
constantly performs analysis of alternatives that include possible
technological and process-related improvements for checkpoint
efficiency that do not risk degrading security effectiveness.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Kevin McAleenan
Question 1a. Earlier this summer, CBP issued a 60-day public notice
and request for comment on the collection of social media information
for individuals traveling to the United States under the Visa Waiver
Program. We understand that on August 31, 2016, CBP extended the period
for public comment for an additional 30 days. The notice indicates that
providing this information would be optional, and that the data
elements collected will enable CBP to screen visitors for potential
risks to National security and admissibility to this country, as well
as serve as contact information for travelers.
Can you please describe the responses you have received thus far
for this request for comment?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) received 3,991
comments from the public on the 60- and 30-day notices. The comments
covered: General support for or opposition to adding social media
handles to the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA)
application; the authority and process for collecting and using this
information; and, most frequently, the potential impact it could have
on privacy and speech.
Question 1b. How does CBP intend to use this feedback?
Answer. As it does with any other public feedback, CBP will
evaluate all comments and determine if any provide substantive
information that might be useful in changing the proposed question that
is pending incorporation within the ESTA application. CBP will also
publicly post comments to the comments in accordance with the
established process for responding to Paperwork Reduction Act notices.
Question 1c. How would CBP authenticate or confirm that the social
media identifiers provided are truly associated with the person seeking
to enter the United States?
Answer. Information found in social media will enhance the vetting
process and be used, along with a range of other information provided
by the traveler, to review ESTA applications to validate legitimate
travel, adjudicate Visa Waiver Program (VWP) ineligibility waivers, and
identify potential threats. CBP has a layered approach to security and
social media identifiers collected via the ESTA application would only
be one component. While there may be the potential for an applicant to
provide false or inaccurate information, CBP verifies identity though a
variety of mechanisms.
Question 1d. Will these identifiers be protected in a similar way
as other personally identifiable information?
Answer. Yes. CBP will handle social media identifiers in the same
manner as other information collected through ESTA. DHS has documented
these procedures in the updated ESTA System of Records Notice (SORN)
and Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), which are available on the DHS
website (www.dhs.gov/privacy).
Question 1e. Can you please explain how this data would be used to
enhance the screening of foreign travelers?
Answer. Information found in social media will enhance the vetting
process and be used to review ESTA applications to validate legitimate
travel, adjudicate VWP ineligibility waivers, and identify potential
threats. If an applicant chooses to answer these questions and an
initial vetting by CBP indicates possible information of concern, a
highly-trained CBP Officer will have timely visibility of the publicly
available information on those platforms, consistent with the privacy
settings the applicant has chosen to adopt for those platforms, along
with other information and tools CBP officers regularly use in the
performance of their duties.
Social media may help distinguish individuals of additional concern
from those individuals whose information substantiates their
eligibility for travel. For example, social media may be used to
support or corroborate a traveler's application information, which will
help facilitate legitimate travel by providing an additional means to
adjudicate issues related to relevant questions about identity,
occupation, previous travel, and other factors. It may also be used to
identify potential deception or fraud.
Question 2. I understand that DHS plans to house a social media
``cell'' at CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) in the near term. Can
you please share the progress of establishing this social media cell at
the NTC?
Answer. In December 2015, the Department stood up a Social Media
Task Force, which has explored options to improve the Department's use
of such data for vetting purposes. As part of this effort, DHS is
creating an organizational structure to oversee, coordinate, and
facilitate Department efforts to expand social media screening and
vetting use across DHS mission sets. DHS intends to deploy this
capability from the National Targeting Center (NTC). To date, Social
Media Task Force members have completed multiple successful pilots. DHS
has partnered with industry to push technology forward to meet
Department needs. The Task Force is finalizing an implementation plan
and funding strategy that uses a fee-for-service model to guarantee all
DHS components will benefit from the expertise and technology
innovation to ensure mission success.
Question 3a. Secretary Jeh Johnson directed CBP to redouble its
effort to establish a biometric entry-exit system and to begin
implementing a biometric exit system at airports, starting at those
with the highest passenger volume, by 2018. I understand that over the
past year CBP launched four targeted biometric entry-exit pilot
projects at the top international airports and at one pedestrian
crossing on the Southwest Border.
What time line has CBP adopted to evaluate and consolidate the
results of these pilots?
Answer. CBP completed the technical evaluation of the facial
comparison pilot at Dulles International Airport earlier this year. The
success of the facial comparison pilot prompted CBP to operationally
deploy the technology to both JFK International Airport and Dulles
International Airport. The technical evaluations for Biometric Exit
Mobile and Pedestrian Entry/Exit in Otay Mesa are still both being
compiled and should be completed by the end of the 2016 calendar year.
CBP is also currently testing the ability of our IT infrastructure to
support future biometric operations with technology in Atlanta. The
results of these pilots will inform the concept of operations for
biometric exit as we move forward with implementation.
Question 3b. What is the time line for implementing the use of
biometric exit technology at ports of entry?
Answer. CBP will begin deployment of biometric exit in fiscal year
2018, starting with the largest gateway airports.
Question 3c. What roles will CBP's partners and stakeholders in
private industry, including airlines and airports, play in this
process?
Answer. CBP's vision is to work extensively with airlines and
airports in implementing a biometric exit process in order to minimize
the impact on legitimate trade and travel. CBP does not plan to develop
a biometric exit solution without private-sector involvement, and will
use other successful public/private partnerships such as Automated
Passport Control kiosks in order to deploy this new capability.
Question 3d. How does CBP intend to memorialize the findings from
these various pilots for use by the next administration?
Answer. CBP will continue to work toward deployment of a biometric
air exit capability through the transition and into the next
administration.
Question 4a. Secretary Johnson has committed to working toward
enhancing maritime cargo security. Most notably, in May 2016, DHS
published a Request for Information (RFI) entitled ``Strategies to
Improve Maritime Supply Chain Security and Achieve 100 percent Overseas
Scanning,'' which sought recommendations and information to achieve the
mandate for 100 percent scanning (both NII imaging and radiation
detection) in foreign seaports of all U.S.-bound maritime containerized
cargo.
Could you please describe the response received to this RFI?
Answer. On May 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), via
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) issued a ``Request for
Information (RFI): Strategies to Improve Maritime Supply Chain Security
and Achieve 100 percent Overseas Scanning,'' which sought
recommendations from a broad range of responders, including industry,
providers of supplies and services, as well as the non-vendor
stakeholder community and non-traditional contractors to improve the
security of maritime containerized and non-containerized cargo
departing foreign seaports bound for the United States and protect
against radiological and nuclear threats. Specifically, DHS requested
information from industry on various systems and alternative
approaches, not limited to a single technology or single deployment
strategy, that could be an innovative solution to maritime cargo
screening and/or scanning. DHS received 25 submissions from the
private-sector and academic institutions. Most of the responses
addressed some aspect of the RFI, provided solutions that met the
overarching goal, addressed ways to achieve 100 percent scanning,
improve global radiological/nuclear detection capabilities, and reduce
the amount of nuclear and radioactive materials out of regulatory
control in the shipping environment.
Question 4b. Since this RFI is one of the first steps in its
procurement process, what is DHS's time line for moving forward with
its next steps?
Answer. An RFI may or may not be the first step in a procurement
process. Its purpose is market research, not necessarily to begin a
procurement. On occasion the RFI demonstrates that the marketplace does
not yet have a solution to the agency's needs. In September 2016, DHS
conducted follow-up discussions with 12 RFI respondents who
demonstrated viable solutions that can help achieve the 100 percent
scanning mandate. In particular, DHS met with responders who had a
technical solution we were previously unfamiliar with, a potentially
unique, paradigm-shifting idea, or who discussed certain aspects of
maritime security (data integration/analysis, data fusion, image
transfer, etc.). DHS will now begin reviewing the additional
information and discuss options and next steps for pursuing 100 percent
scanning. This includes identifying and prioritizing near-term vs.
long-term strategies, identifying where we are already piloting
enabling technologies that could be leveraged for 100 percent scanning,
and exploring new policy ideas which could facilitate 100 percent
scanning. This information, as well as ideas for how progress toward
100 percent scanning could be made will be conveyed to the next
administration. In late calendar year 2017, DHS could be in a position
to potentially test viable solutions, ideas and technologies as
appropriate and as feasible. Any potential activities or pursuits will
be subject to resource availability and industry engagement.
Question 4c. How is DHS going to ensure that these efforts are
carried on in the next administration?
Answer. DHS will ensure that the RFI-related efforts (e.g.,
potential or viable solutions, pilot program considerations, etc.) are
briefed to the current administration, as well as the next
administration via internal discussions, transition memos, etc. DHS
will also respond to requests for briefings from Congressional
committees and staff.
Question 5a. Recently, the committee has learned of complaints from
airline pilots and crew who have been sent for secondary inspection
upon arrival in the United States, alleging the CBP Officers conducting
the examinations were not professional in their conduct.
What factors might prompt pilots and crew to be identified for
additional screening upon arrival?
Answer. CBP takes allegations of employee misconduct very seriously
and has instituted policies pertaining to abuses of authority.
Complaints of unprofessional conduct are recorded, investigated, and
appropriate action is taken against CBP Officers who are found to have
violated policy. However, the Privacy Act of 1974 generally prohibits
the disclosure of records reflecting discipline toward CBP personnel.
All persons, baggage, and other merchandise arriving in or leaving
the United States are subject to inspection and search by CBP Officers.
Various laws enforced by CBP (including 8 U.S.C. 1A 1357 as well as
19 U.S.C. 482, 1433, and 1459) authorize such inspections. As part
of the inspection process, CBP Officers, among other things, verify the
identity of persons, determine the admissibility of travelers, and look
for possible terrorists, terrorist weapons, controlled substances, and
a wide variety of other prohibited and restricted items.
Similar to any other person entering the United States, crewmembers
may be potentially referred for secondary inspection. The reasons may
include having the same or similar name as a wanted person,
verification of crewmember identity and status, expired passport and/or
visa, undisclosed merchandise, other items, or agricultural issues As
for concern about being referred for inspection, in fulfilling its
inspectional responsibilities under the law, CBP cannot guarantee that
any traveler, whether a commercial air crewmember or otherwise, will
not be referred for a secondary inspection. However, for any travelers
that have difficulties or questions related to undergoing inspection,
they may ask to speak with a supervisor, who is always available to
address any CBP processing issues.
Question 5b. Can you please describe the standards, protocols, or
guidance CBP Officers are to adhere to when conducting secondary
inspections like these?
Answer. Secondary inspections are conducted as efficiently as
possible to minimize the time a passenger or crewmember spends in the
secondary inspection area waiting to be cleared. Although priorities
exist as to the threat level of those referred for secondary
inspection, every effort is made to clear secondary passengers in the
order they are referred. It is important to note that crewmembers
usually receive priority processing in secondary as operational
conditions allow.
Question 6a. The Committee has received complaints regarding a lack
of professionalism among CBP employees conducting secondary inspections
of airline pilots and crew, particularly at Miami International
Airport. I understand that preventing dangerous people and goods from
entering the United States, particularly on flights returning from
high-risk locations, is an essential part of CBP's mission and strongly
support your efforts in this regard. At the same time, the traveling
public, including airline personnel, should be treated with
professionalism by CBP personnel conducting such inspections.
With that in mind, how does CBP determine when additional
inspection of airline personnel is necessary?
Answer. All persons, baggage, and other merchandise arriving in or
leaving the United States are subject to inspection and search by CBP
Officers. Various laws enforced by CBP authorize such searches,
including 8 U.S.C. 1357 and 19 U.S.C. 482, 1581, and 1582. As
part of the inspection process, CBP Officers must verify the identity
of persons, determine the admissibility of travelers, and look for
possible terrorists, terrorist weapons, controlled substances, and a
wide variety of other prohibited and restricted items.
Crewmembers could potentially be referred for secondary inspection
for many of the same reasons as regular passengers such as, same or
similar name as a wanted person, verification of crewmember identity
and status, expired passport and/or visa, merchandise or other
undisclosed items, or need for agricultural inspection. As for concern
about being referred for secondary inspection, CBP cannot guarantee
that any traveler (including crew), will not receive a protracted CBP
inspection. However, if difficulties persist, travelers may ask to
speak with a supervisor who is always available to address any CBP
processing issues.
Question 6b. Are there protocols for conducting such inspections?
Answer. The protocols are the same as indicated above.
Question 6c. What specific steps does CBP take in the secondary
environment to ensure that inspections of airline personnel, and the
traveling public generally, are conducted appropriately?
Answer. The secondary inspection area, along with primary
inspection and other areas of CBP processing, is closely monitored by
Supervisory Customs and Border Protection Officers to ensure that
officers are properly conducting all inspections in an effective and
efficient manner. Management oversight of all operations, to include
secondary inspection operations, is critical to an effective and
professional process.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Daniel H. Ragsdale
Question 1a. ICE's Visa Security Program currently operates at 26
high-risk or high-volume visa issuing posts overseas, helping to screen
visa applications for possible security, criminal, or inadmissibility
concerns. I would like to see the program operational at as many posts
as necessary to help ensure security, as well as implementation of
remote vetting of visa applications by your agency where it is not
possible or practicable to have ICE personnel physically present.
Is ICE considering further expanding the program?
Answer. As of September 30, 2016, the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) Visa Security Program (VSP) screens nonimmigrant visa
applications at 30 visa-issuing posts in 25 countries, the locations of
which are Law Enforcement Sensitive. fiscal year 2016 saw the expansion
of VSP operations to 5 additional posts in 5 countries. Coupled with
the fiscal year 2015 VSP expansion, which consisted of 6 expansion
posts, ICE has expanded the VSP by 11 posts in 2 years. ICE is
committed to expansion of the Visa Security Program.
Question 1b. How many additional posts should be a priority?
Answer. ICE VSP conducts an annual site selection process to
determine expansion; this list of potential sites is constantly
changing due to emerging threats and situational intelligence. ICE
considers a number of factors, including a country-based risk
evaluation, the operational value of deployment, and the feasibility of
establishing operations. ICE further narrows the list of potential
sites by considering regional need and post support to ensure
deployment to posts that would be most effective and valuable to the
VSP mission. Once expansion post sites are identified, ICE submits a
formal request to the Department of State for deployment and approval.
Question 1c. What resources would be necessary to deploy additional
locations and implement remote vetting?
Answer. On average, it costs ICE approximately $2.7 million to
establish an overseas post. It is important to note that the cost of
opening a post can vary greatly depending on location and timing. Once
established, the annual cost of maintaining an overseas post is
approximately $2.2 million to $2.3 million. Section 6(a) of the 2003
``Memorandum of Understanding Between the Secretaries of State and
Homeland Security Concerning Implementation of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002'' specifies that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
shall identify the diplomatic and consular posts where VSP posts are to
be established and provides that such decisions be made in accordance
with National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 38. This gives the
Chief of Mission (COM) control of the size, composition, and mandate of
overseas full-time mission staffing for all U.S. Government agencies.
Currently, physical expansion to a post, which is often governed by
space limitations, is ultimately approved by the COM pursuant to the
NSDD-38 process. Additionally, as VSP continues to expand its
operational footprint, additional domestic support elements will be
required, such as program managers, analysts, and mission support
personnel.
Expansion of VSP operations with a dedicated ICE Special Agent
remains the program's stated model. ICE VSP has evaluated multiple
remote screening and vetting scenarios and found that the investigative
value of remote screening is limited, and that operations are often
unsustainable without a dedicated VSP Special Agent. Further, the ICE
VSP is more than a screening program. A post that is serviced by a
dedicated ICE special agent enables direct coordination at post with
other law enforcement, intelligence, and host government entities to
exploit and investigate suspect visa applicants instead of simply
denying travel. Without leveraging these capabilities, the VSP's
ability to operate as a counterterrorism tool designed to identify,
investigate, and disrupt illicit travel and illicit pathways is
compromised. Consequently, at this time ICE VSP seeks expansion via
deployment of a trained ICE Special Agent only.
Question 2. According to your written testimony, in fiscal year
2015, the VSP reviewed over 2 million visa applications, including
approximately 8,600 cases in which visas were refused. Of these
denials, over 2,200 applicants had some suspected connection to
terrorism or terrorist organizations. Based on ICE's first-hand
interaction with visa applicants and your partner agencies at visa
issuing posts overseas, how can we improve the visa vetting process to
enhance security and prevent those with terrorist ties from exploiting
the visa process to travel to the United States?
Answer. As of September 30, 2016, the VSP screens nonimmigrant visa
applications at 30 visa-issuing posts in 25 countries, the locations of
which are Law Enforcement Sensitive. In fiscal year 2016, the VSP
expanded operations to 5 additional posts in 5 countries. Coupled with
the fiscal year 2015 VSP expansion, which consisted of 6 expansion
posts, ICE has expanded the VSP by 11 posts in 2 years. These efforts
resulted from an $18 million enhancement appropriated to the VSP in
fiscal year 2015.
Concurrently, the VSP's capabilities further enhance the visa
screening process by utilizing ICE's broad authorities. The VSP is
unique among screening efforts in that it does not simply recommend the
denial of travel; instead, it leverages ICE's capabilities during the
visa application process to exploit suspect travelers in an effort to
identify unknown threats and potential violations of criminal law. The
VSP is currently working to utilize analytical resources to identify
trends and patterns from VSP vetting efforts, to further enhance the
investigative mission of the VSP.
Question 3a. DHS, through CBP and ICE, has partnered with the
Department of State to develop the Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition
Intelligence Operations Team, or PATRIOT-an automated program used to
vet all on-line visa application data through CBP's Automated Targeting
System prior to visa application adjudication.
To what extent does PATRIOT play a role in preventing misuse of the
visa application process by terrorists or other high-risk or
inadmissible travelers?
Answer. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Pre-
Adjudicated Threat Recognition Intelligence Operations Team (PATRIOT),
an interagency endeavor with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
and the Department of State (DOS), enhances the Visa Security Program's
(VSP) ability to maximize the visa process as a counterterrorism tool
to identify and investigate potential terrorists, criminals, and other
aliens ineligible for a visa prior to travel. VSP PATRIOT significantly
expands ICE's investigative and intelligence capabilities through
focused rules-based screening of non-immigrant visa (NIV) applicants at
VSP posts. VSP PATRIOT provides deployed ICE Special Agents with
relevant information prior to conducting interviews and other
investigative activities, to focus their efforts on those applicants
who pose the greatest risk without adversely impacting individuals
seeking to engage in legitimate travel. VSP PATRIOT bolsters the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) investigative scope and
capabilities to provide actionable leads to ICE offices, both domestic
and abroad.
Question 3b. Why is PATRIOT an important part of the vetting
process?
Answer. Through PATRIOT, the VSP screens 100 percent of NIV
applications at VSP posts prior to DOS Consular Affairs (CA)
adjudication. VSP PATRIOT utilizes law enforcement, open-source, and
Classified systems to identify and address intelligence gaps prior to
an applicant being interviewed by CA. Via the PATRIOT platform, the VSP
provides a unified DHS response to DOS on both eligibility and
admissibility concerns prior to a visa being issued. VSP PATRIOT
assists DOS in the reduction of Security Advisory Opinions submitted by
addressing potential concerns in the pre-screening process.
Question 3c. Does ICE have plans to expand the PATRIOT program to
meet changes in the visa application threat stream?
Answer. Since fiscal year 2009, ICE has expanded VSP operations to
an additional 20 visa issuing posts in 18 countries. As a result, VSP
now screens 30 visa-issuing posts in 25 countries, representing nearly
a three-fold increase to VSP's footprint in that time; at each of these
posts, VSP operations include PATRIOT screening and vetting.
Question 4a. Your shared testimony includes a general description
of the new DHS Special Interest Alien Joint Action Group, which was
established in June of this year and has produced a plan of action
signed by Secretary Johnson just a few weeks ago.
What role do CBP and ICE have on this Joint Action Group?
Question 4b. What other agencies participate?
Question 4c. How does this new Joint Action Group coordinate with
other interagency task forces or working groups both within and outside
the Department?
Question 4d. What differentiates its mission from other groups,
such as the Southern Border Joint Task Force?
Question 4e. Is there an overlap in activities?
Question 4f. Are there protocols or measures in place to minimize
redundancy?
Answer. The Deputy Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) is a Principal of the Special Interest Aliens Joint
Action Group. ICE also has operations and intelligence personnel as
members.
The Special Interest Alien (SIA) Joint Action Group (JAG) was
formed at the direction of Secretary Johnson in late June to ensure
that the Department was maximizing its ability, internally and in
partnership with other U.S. Government and foreign partners, to disrupt
human smuggling networks and the ability of SIAs to reach U.S. borders.
The JAG briefed the Secretary on its recommendations in August 2016.
While the JAG will continue to operate to ensure implementation of its
recommendations, it is not envisioned as a long-term or permanent body
with an operational role, and therefore is not expected to duplicate or
be redundant with other bodies.
In response to your specific questions, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection and ICE are represented in the JAG through their Deputy
Commissioner and Deputy Director, respectively; along with the Deputies
from the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Office of Policy, the
U.S. Coast Guard, the Office of Public Affairs, and U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services, with participation from the Joint Task
Forces. The JAG focused its deliberations internally within the
Department, but the Department is conducting outreach with other key
departments and agencies, to include the Departments of Defense, State,
and Justice, the Office of Management and Budget, and the intelligence
community to discuss issues of shared responsibility or where
departments other than DHS have a lead role in addressing human
smuggling. Participants in the SIA JAG and other DHS personnel also
participate in a number of interagency task forces and working groups,
many of which provide venues to discuss, and seek to implement, the
JAG's recommendations.
We would be pleased to brief the committee on the SIA JAG
recommendations and plans for implementation.
Questions From Honorable William Keating for Daniel H. Ragsdale
Question 1a. The recent high-profile hacking conducted by Russia on
the Democratic Party, and cybersecurity attacks claimed by the Islamic
State Hacking Group earlier in the year, highlight the dangers of
nefarious actors infiltrating U.S. computer systems. One area that is
of great concern is that of our general election systems. While the
director of the Homeland Security Department has publically stated he
is not aware of any cyber threats against voting machines, many cyber
experts claim our machines remain vulnerable.
How is the Department of Homeland Security working with States to
ensure that our voting machines remain immune to hacking or tampering?
Question 1b. What relationship does the Department have with the
U.S. Election Assistance Commission or the Federal Election Commission?
Question 2a. Last month, Director Johnson suggested the Federal
Government label election systems as official U.S. critical
infrastructure.
How would such as a classification help improve the Department's
ability to protect elections?
Question 2b. What are some of the criticisms to classifying
elections as critical infrastructure?
Answer. We have confidence in the overall integrity of our
electoral systems. It is diverse, subject to local control, and has
many checks and balance built in. Nevertheless, we must face the
reality that cyber intrusions and attacks in this country are
increasingly sophisticated, from a range of increasingly capable actors
that include nation-states, cyber hacktivists, and criminals. In this
environment, we must be vigilant.
Since August, Secretary Johnson of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has hosted several phone calls with election officials
from across the country and representatives from the U.S. Election
Assistance Commission, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, and the Department of Justice to discuss the cybersecurity
of election infrastructure. The Secretary began by recognizing the
important work State and local officials across the country have
already begun to reduce risks and ensure the integrity of their
elections. He also emphasized that cyber experts at DHS are available
to assist State and local election officials in securing their systems,
just as we do for businesses and other entities across the spectrum of
the private and public sectors. This includes the most cybersecurity
sophisticated businesses in corporate America.
It is important to emphasize that, DHS's assistance is strictly
voluntary and for support only. And, DHS's assistance does not entail
regulation, binding directives, and is not offered to supersede State
and local control over the process. The following DHS services have
been offered to State and local officials.
Cyber hygiene scans on internet-facing systems.--These scans are
conducted remotely, after which we can provide State and local
officials with a report identifying vulnerabilities and mitigation
recommendations to improve the cybersecurity of systems connected to
the internet, such as on-line voter registration systems, election
night reporting systems, and other internet-connected election
management systems. Once an agreement to provide these services is
reached, DHS can complete this scan and provide the report within 1
week. This can be followed by weekly reports on an on-going basis. Many
State and local agencies are already employing DHS cyber hygiene scans
on parts of their networks.
Risk and vulnerability assessments.--These assessments are more
thorough and done on-site by DHS cybersecurity experts. They typically
require 2-3 weeks and include a wide range of vulnerability testing
services, focused on both internal and external systems. When DHS
conducts these assessments, we provide a full report of vulnerabilities
and recommended mitigations following the testing. Given resource and
time constraints, we can only conduct these assessments on a limited,
first-come, first-serve basis.
Incident Response.--The National Cybersecurity and Communications
Integration Center (NCCIC) is DHS's 24 7 cyber incident response
center. We encourage State and local election officials to report
suspected malicious cyber activity to the NCCIC. Upon request, the
NCCIC can provide on-site assistance in identifying and remediating a
cyber incident. Information reported to the NCCIC is also critical to
the Federal Government's ability to broadly assess malicious attempts
to infiltrate election systems.
Sharing of best practices.--DHS is publishing best practices for
securing voter registration databases and addressing potential threats
to election systems from ransomware.
Field-based cybersecurity advisors and protective security
advisors.--DHS has personnel available in the field who can provide
actionable information and connect election officials to a range of
tools and resources available to improve the cybersecurity preparedness
of election systems and the physical site security of voting machine
storage and polling places. These advisors are also available to assist
with planning and incident management assistance for both cyber and
physical incidents.
Physical and protective security tools, training, and resources.--
DHS provides advice and tools to improve the security of polling sites
and other physical election infrastructure. This guidance can be found
at www.dhs.gov/hometown-security. This guidance helps to train
administrative and volunteer staff on identifying and reporting
suspicious activities, active-shooter scenarios, and what to do if they
suspect an improvised explosive device. Officials can also contact a
local DHS Protective Security Advisor.
Finally, DHS is working to raise the level of cybersecurity in our
electoral infrastructure over the long term. To help develop this plan,
DHS has established an experts group comprised of academics,
independent cybersecurity researchers, and Federal partners. A number
of States have reached out to us with questions or for assistance. We
strongly encourage more State and local election officials to do so.
Question 3a. One of the ways the Homeland Security Committee, and
the Terrorism Subcommittee in which I am Ranking Member, has sought to
degrade ISIL, is through ensuring that the group's diversified revenue
streams are eliminated. Alarmingly, the terrorist group is using looted
antiquities to finance its activities across the region. For example,
last May, U.S. Special Forces conducted an operation in Syria against
Abu Sayyaf, described as ISIL's Chief Financial Officer, which revealed
some of the clearest evidence yet that ISIL is directly involved in the
trafficking of artifacts and other cultural objects. Last week, the
House Ways and Means Committee passed a bill which I authored entitled
the ``Prevent Trafficking in Cultural Property Act'' which ensures that
law enforcement personnel watching our borders, including ICE and CBP
personnel, are properly trained and equipped to prevent looted
antiquities from entering the United States.
What steps has the Department taken to ensure that its workforce is
trained in recognizing stolen antiquities?
Question 3b. How often does ICE and CBP coordinate efforts to stop
trafficking in cultural property?
Answer. To the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and
other terrorist organizations, these objects of invaluable cultural and
historical worth are one more source of revenue to exploit. The
Department of Homeland Security law enforcement officers and agents
have a heightened awareness of goods, especially those that may be
cultural property, being imported or suspected of being imported from
conflict areas.
(a) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) law enforcement personnel have undergone
training that would prepare them for any kind of encounter, including
one related to cultural property. However, since 2009, ICE has
partnered with the U.S. Department of State's (DOS) Cultural Heritage
Center and the Smithsonian Institution to provide specialized training
on the handling, investigation, and seizures of items believed to be
another nation's cultural property.
Almost 400 agents, officers, and prosecutors representing 26
domestic and 67 international locations in 48 countries have been
trained so far, and the demand for training both domestically and
abroad is increasing. Each workshop--entitled ``Preventing Illicit
Trafficking/Protecting Cultural Heritage: ICE Training Program''--
includes presentations and discussions on legal authorities, case
histories, and resources by myriad partners including multiple offices
within ICE, CBP, the Smithsonian, DOS, the National Park Service, the
Department of Justice, and INTERPOL. ICE and CBP are working closely
together to explore additional options for enhancing our joint cultural
property training and border enforcement operations in this space.
Additionally ICE collaborates with DOS in conducting international
workshops with foreign partners on the preservation of cultural
heritage. Workshops were held in Canada in September 2015 and in Greece
in April 2016. ICE is developing additional international workshops for
fiscal year 2017.
(b) ICE routinely coordinates efforts with CBP to stop trafficking
in cultural property at the field operations, targeting, and program
management levels. ICE special agents work side by side with CBP
Officers at ports of entry and express mail facilities to investigate
suspected trafficked cultural property discovered as part of the import
process. Results of these investigations are incorporated into shared
law enforcement information systems where they inform targeting efforts
to identify other potential cases.
ICE personnel collaborate with CBP Officers in the field and
personnel at the National Targeting Center, routinely sharing
information on suspected illicitly trafficked cultural property. ICE
also provides results of these investigations to CBP's Fines,
Penalties, and Forfeiture program in support of CBP's forfeiture of
intercepted cultural property activities. Additionally, CBP assists ICE
Homeland Security Investigation's (HSI) repatriation of forfeited items
to their lawful owners, and CBP Officers regularly share best practices
related to cultural property investigations.
ICE and CBP are members of the Cultural Antiquities Task Force
(CATF), which is managed by the DOS Cultural Heritage Center. The CATF
brings Federal Government agencies together in an effort to provide
leadership in international cultural heritage protection.
ICE and CBP are also members of the Cultural Heritage Coordinating
Committee, an interagency coordinating committee referenced in the
Protect and Preserve International Cultural Property Act (Pub. L. 114-
151) and first formally convened by the Department of State on November
4, 2016.
[all]