[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
A PREPARED COMMUNITY IS A RESILIENT COMMUNITY
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 11, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-80
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
25-263 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York, Chairman
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Mark Walker, North Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Martha McSally, Arizona Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Kerry A. Kinirons, Subcommittee Staff Director
Kris Carlson, Subcommittee Clerk
Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., a Representative in
Congress From the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Michael Byrne, Deputy Regional Administrator, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, Region II, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Ms. Marion Mollegen Mc Fadden, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Grant
Programs, Office of Community Planning and Development, U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Mr. Daniel A. Zarrilli, Chief Resilience Officer, Office of the
Mayor, City of New York, New York:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Panel II
Mr. Vincent M. Ignizio, Chief Executive Officer, Catholic
Charities of Staten Island, Staten Island, New York:
Oral Statement................................................. 36
Prepared Statement............................................. 38
Mr. Brad Gair, Private Citizen:
Oral Statement................................................. 39
Prepared Statement............................................. 42
Ms. Donna Moravick, Executive Director, Southside Hospital, Bay
Shore, New York:
Oral Statement................................................. 45
Prepared Statement............................................. 46
Ms. Kelly D. Higgs, Disaster Recovery and Resiliency Coordinator,
New Jersey Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster:
Oral Statement................................................. 47
Prepared Statement............................................. 49
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., a Representative in
Congress From the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Prepared Statement of Ronald Castorina, Jr., Assemblyman, 62nd
District, The Assembly, Albany, State of New York............ 9
Prepared Statement of Nicole Malliotakis, Assemblywoman, 64th
District, The Assembly, Albany, State of New York............ 10
APPENDIX
Questions From Chairman Daniel M. Donovan, Jr. for Michael Byrne. 61
Questions From Chairman Daniel M. Donovan, Jr. for Marion
Mollegen McFadden.............................................. 62
A PREPARED COMMUNITY IS A RESILIENT COMMUNITY
----------
Monday, July 11, 2016
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Jersey City, NJ.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
the Staten Island University Hospital Regina McGinn Educational
Center, 475 Seaview Avenue, Staten Island, New York, Hon.
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr. (Chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.
Present: Representatives Donovan and Payne.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for attending
today. I just wanted to warn that at 10 o'clock the hospital
has some type of drill that is going to go on, so you are going
to hear alarms. It has nothing to do with the hearing, and it
doesn't mean it is over, to our witnesses. Thank you.
The Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications will come
to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine efforts to
ensure community resilience. I appreciate the effort taken on
behalf of all those involved to have this important field
hearing take place. This is an official Congressional hearing,
as opposed to a town hall meeting and, as such, we must abide
by certain rules of the Committee on Homeland Security and the
House of Representatives. I kindly wish to remind our guests
today that demonstrations from the audience, including applause
and verbal outbursts, as well as any use of signs or placards,
are a violation of the rules of the House of Representatives.
It is important that we respect the decorum and the rules of
this committee.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Thank you all for taking the time to appear today before
the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications, and I thank Staten Island University Hospital
for hosting us in this beautiful facility.
Nearly 4 years ago, a perfect confluence of circumstances
brought Superstorm Sandy and its devastating storm surge to our
doorstep. Dozens of New Yorkers lost their lives, thousands of
homes were damaged or destroyed, and billions of dollars have
been spent in the aftermath.
Oftentimes after a disaster like this, the public just
wants to see action--something, anything--being done to fix it.
Under the gun, Congress drafts legislation to allocate massive
sums to Federal agencies and to impacted jurisdictions, usually
with limited oversight.
Resources are, of course, necessary to recover and defend
against future disasters. But have the investments made after
Superstorm Sandy resulted in a stronger, more resilient New
York? Just as importantly, have the Federal agencies worked
together to maximize their individual investments? What can be
done to improve?
That is what we are here to talk about today. My opening
statement will discuss the rationale for Federal investments in
storm resiliency projects and then highlight a few examples of
Government working well, and also areas for improvement. I look
forward to hearing from each agency, delving into some more
specifics about their resiliency focus and how we can improve
upon the status quo.
First, it is a fact that $1 spent today to mitigate flood
risk will save many dollars after a disaster strikes. The
Federal Government's focus on risk mitigation, particularly the
concentrated focus after Sandy, will save lives and money in
the future. It is a missed opportunity to replace in-kind homes
and infrastructure after a disaster, only to leave them just as
vulnerable to destruction during future disasters. That is why
it is encouraging to see agencies like HUD place such a strong
emphasis on resiliency projects.
But the investments should have a cohesive strategy. Not
just HUD investments working together with other HUD
investments, or Army Corps projects tying into other Army Corps
projects. Where possible, HUD projects should complement FEMA
projects, and USDA projects should complement Army Corps
projects, and so on.
For example, it seems strange that differing FEMA and Army
Corps standards would result in no change in flood insurance
maps or premiums after the Army Corps completes a project
designed to reduce flood risk. Yet, that has actually happened
in some cases.
The response has not just been Federal. The city of New
York has also devoted tremendous resources to Sandy recovery
and has transformed the way it approaches disaster preparedness
and recovery over the last 4 years.
Here at home, the city of New York has acted aggressively
to advocate for Federal risk mitigation grants, coordinate
investments and projects, and work toward a city less
susceptible to storms like Sandy.
The Mayor's Office of Recovery and Resiliency, led by Dan
Zarrilli, has an entire team dedicated to this cause. In
general, an empowered office coordinating the different work
happening in the city will minimize missed opportunities, save
time, and maximize efficiencies. It's good to see that New York
City is operating in this way.
We can find a great example of the benefits of
collaboration right here on Staten Island. The Army Corps of
Engineers is planning and designing a $600 million line of
protection stretching from Ft. Wadsworth to Oakwood along
Staten Island's eastern shore.
There have been obstacles and setbacks, but through each
challenge the Mayor's Office, the Corps, and the National Park
Service, which has jurisdiction over some of the land that the
Corps is using, have worked collaboratively and productively to
overcome them.
My team, along with Senator Chuck Schumer's office and
Borough President James Oddo's office, is on the phone almost
every week with the involved agencies to keep track of its
progress and schedules.
While the Corps is not here today, this subcommittee will
continue to maintain focus on the status of that project to
ensure that it remains on time, on budget, and that it will
deliver the expected results to the residents of Staten Island.
Despite great partnerships, agency turf battles seem to be
unavoidable, and that's disappointing. The Corps and the USDA
have been squabbling over easements, which has jeopardized a
$32 million investment in Staten Island's ``Bluebelt,'' a
natural drainage system crucial to the borough's
sustainability. Oddly, each agency wants the same exact
outcome, a flood drainage easement. I understand differences of
opinion will arise across agencies, but collaboration must
trump retrenchment. It is what the public expects and, more
importantly, what they deserve.
We must also address the post-disaster housing recovery
strategies to effectively mitigate risk. After spending upwards
of $4.6 billion, New York City neighborhoods will be left with
a hodgepodge of housing types. A single block could see a
handful of elevated and rebuilt structures, a few empty lots,
and the rest repaired in-kind. Is this the best possible
outcome?
We must consider the question in the context of New York
City's unique housing stock. Mitigation standards that work for
single-family detached homes in the south don't work for multi-
family attached structures here.
In fact, Federal one-size-fits-all floodplain building
regulations actually prohibit repairing attached homes that
suffered the most damage. Floodplain regulations require homes
that suffered substantial damage to elevate during repairs, but
attached homes can't be elevated. Owners of attached homes are
stuck in this bureaucratic morass, unable to legally repair
their structures and unsure of options aside from elevation
that could reduce their flood risk. Urban areas like New York
require detailed alternative mitigation options with
commensurate flood insurance premium credits.
While inflexible Federal standards may impede urban post-
disaster housing mitigation, New York City has benefited from
creative new ventures like FEMA's 428 alternative process and
HUD's resiliency competitions. I'm sure we will hear more about
the successes of these programs from the agencies here today.
In particular, I am interested in hearing FEMA's assessment of
the Rapid Repairs program, which restored heat, hot water, and
electricity to 20,000 residential structures in 90 days.
Last but not least, we will hear from representatives of
charitable organizations and Southside Hospital. These
organizations worked tirelessly to assist the residents in
their communities after the storm, and each of them experienced
their own challenges in these efforts.
Non-profits are often the most effective responders because
they have deep local relationships and understand the needs of
their friends and neighbors. My friend Vinny Ignizio, who leads
Catholic Charities here on Staten Island today but was a
council member during and after Sandy, has a unique perspective
on how government and non-profits can improve their
coordination in response to disasters. I am sure Ms. Higgs will
also have a unique perspective on this issue.
Hospitals are among the most important critical
infrastructure during and after a major disaster. SIUH, where
we are here today, is in the 100-year floodplain, as is
Southside, which faced tremendous flooding during Sandy.
Three Federal agencies--FEMA, HUD, and the VA--have made
substantial resiliency investments in New York hospitals, and I
am interested in hearing how the agencies have coordinated
their investments to make them work together to maximize their
utility. In particular, I am also interested in hearing from
Southside Hospital in regard to their experiences working with
FEMA since the storm.
As the subcommittee meets today, we are at the start of
another hurricane season, and whether it is this year or in the
years to come, another disaster will strike New York City. Four
years after Sandy and the appropriation of more than $50
billion for the regional recovery effort, are we more prepared
today than we were before?
This hearing will point us in the right direction. Now is
the time to address any inadequate statutes, resolve any
interagency turf battles, and build the relationships to ensure
that we are a resilient community in the face of the next
disaster.
Before I yield to my friend, the Ranking Member from New
Jersey, Don Payne, for his opening statement, I want you all to
know that when I was appointed the chairman of this
subcommittee, I said that we wouldn't be holding hearings just
for the sake of holding hearings. After each hearing that we
have held this year since I became Chair, we have taken action
on the information provided by our witnesses, whether it was
successfully advocating for the restoration of homeland
security grants that are vital to New York City and major urban
areas around the country or introducing legislation to address
cybersecurity challenges.
Today's hearing will be no different. Many of the issues I
will raise today have been raised by my constituents, and I can
assure you that we will work to consider and take action on the
things we learn from today's hearing.
With that, I welcome our distinguished witnesses and yield
back the balance of my time.
[The statement of Chairman Donovan follows:]
Statement of Chairman Daniel M. Donovan, Jr.
July 11, 2016
Thank you all for taking the time to appear today before the
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications,
and thank you to Staten Island University Hospital for hosting us in
this beautiful facility.
Nearly 4 years ago, a perfect confluence of circumstances brought
Superstorm Sandy and its devastating storm surge to our doorstep.
Dozens of New Yorkers lost their lives, thousands of homes were damaged
or destroyed, and billions of dollars have been spent in the aftermath.
Oftentimes after a disaster like this, the public just wants to see
action--something, anything--being done to Fix It. Under the gun,
Congress drafts legislation to allocate massive sums to Federal
agencies and to impacted jurisdictions, usually with limited oversight.
Resources are, of course necessary, to recover and defend against
future disasters. But have the investments made after Superstorm Sandy
resulted in a stronger, more resilient New York? And just as
importantly, have the Federal agencies worked together to maximize
their individual investments? What can we improve?
That's what we're here to talk about today. My opening statement
will discuss the rationale for Federal investments in storm resiliency
projects, and then highlight a few examples of Government working well
and areas for improvement. I look forward to hearing each agency delve
into some more specifics about their resiliency focus, and how we can
improve upon the status quo.
First, it's a fact that $1 spent today to mitigate flood risk will
save many dollars after a disaster strikes. The Federal Government's
focus on risk mitigation--particularly the concentrated focus after
Sandy--will save lives and money in the future. It's a missed
opportunity to replace in-kind homes and infrastructure after a
disaster, only to leave them just as vulnerable to destruction during
future disasters. That's why it's encouraging to see agencies like HUD
place such a strong emphasis on resiliency projects.
But the investments should have a cohesive strategy. And not just
HUD investments working together with other HUD investments, or Army
Corps projects tying into other Army Corps projects.
Where possible, HUD projects should complement FEMA projects, and
USDA projects should complement Army Corps projects, and so on.
For example, it seems strange that differing FEMA and Army Corps
standards would result in no changes to flood in surance maps or
premiums after the Army Corps completes a project designed to reduce
flood risk. Yet, that has actually happened in some cases.
The response has not just been Federal, the city of New York has
also devoted tremendous resources to Sandy recovery and has transformed
the way it approaches disaster preparation and recovery over the past 4
years.
Here at home, the city of New York has acted aggressively to
advocate for Federal risk mitigation grants, coordinate investments and
projects, and work toward a city less susceptible to storms like Sandy.
The Mayor's Office of Recovery and Resiliency, led by Dan Zarrilli,
has an entire team dedicated to this cause. In general, an empowered
office coordinating the different work happening in the city will
minimize missed opportunities, save time, and maximize efficiencies.
It's good to see New York City operate this way.
We can find a great example of the benefits of collaboration right
here on Staten Island. The Army Corps of Engineers is planning and
designing a $600 million line of protection stretching from Ft.
Wadsworth to Oakwood along Staten Island's east shore.
There have been obstacles and setbacks, but through each challenge
the Mayor's Office, the Corps, and the National Park Service--which has
jurisdiction over some of the land the Corps will use--have worked
collaboratively and productively to overcome them.
My team, along with Senator Chuck Schumer's office and Borough
President James Oddo's office, is on the phone almost every week with
the involved agencies to track progress and schedules.
While the Corps is not here today, this subcommittee will continue
to remain focused on the status of that project.
To ensure that it remains on time, on budget, and that it will
deliver the expected results to the residents of Staten Island.
Despite the great partnerships, agency turf battles still seem
unavoidable, and that's disappointing. The Corps and the USDA have been
squabbling over easements, which has jeopardized a $32 million
investment in Staten Island's ``Bluebelt,'' a natural drainage system
crucial to the borough's sustainability.
Oddly, each agency wants the same exact outcome--a flood drainage
easement. I understand differences of opinion will arise across
agencies, but collaboration must trump retrenchment--it's what the
public expects and more importantly deserves.
We must also address the post-disaster housing recovery strategies
to effectively mitigate risk. After spending upwards of $4.6 billion,
New York City neighborhoods will be left with a hodgepodge of housing
types.
A single block could see a handful of elevated and rebuilt
structures, a few empty lots, and the rest repaired in-kind. Is that
the best possible outcome?
We must consider the question in the context of New York City's
unique housing stock. Mitigation standards that work for single-family
detached homes in the south don't work for multi-family attached
structures here.
In fact, Federal one-size-fits-all floodplain building regulations
actually prohibit repairing attached homes that suffered the most
damage. Floodplain regulations require homes that suffered substantial
damage to elevate during repairs, but attached homes cannot be
elevated. Owners of attached homes are stuck in this bureaucratic
morass, unable to legally repair their structures and unsure of options
aside from elevation that could reduce their flood risk. Urban areas
like New York require detailed alternative mitigation options with
commensurate flood insurance premium credits.
While inflexible Federal standards may impede urban post-disaster
housing mitigation, New York City has benefited from creative new
ventures like FEMA's 428 alternative process and HUD's resiliency
competitions. I'm sure we'll hear more about the successes of these
programs from the agencies here today. In particular, I'm interested to
hear FEMA's assessment of the Rapid Repairs program, which restored
heat, hot water, and electricity to 20,000 residential structures in 90
days.
Last but not least, we will hear from representatives of charitable
organizations and Southside Hospital. These organizations worked
tirelessly to assist the residents in their communities after the storm
and each of them experienced their own challenges in those efforts.
Non-profits are often the most effective responders because they
have deep local relationships and understand the needs of their friends
and neighbors. My friend Vinny Ignizio, who leads Catholic Charities
here on Staten Island today but was a Council Member during and after
Sandy, has a unique perspective on how Government and non-profits can
improve their coordination in response to disasters. I am sure Ms.
Higgs will also have a unique perspective on this issue.
Hospitals are among the most important critical infrastructure
during and after a major disaster. SIUH, where we are right now, is in
the 100-year floodplain, as is Southside, which faced extreme flooding
during Sandy.
Three Federal agencies--FEMA, HUD, and the VA--have made
substantial resiliency investments in New York Hospitals and I'm
interested in hearing how the agencies have coordinated their
investments to make them work together to maximize their utility. In
particular I am also interested in hearing from South Side Hospital in
regard to their experiences working with FEMA since the storm.
As the subcommittee meets today, we are at the start of another
hurricane season, and whether it is this year or in the years to come,
another disaster will strike New York City. Four years after Sandy and
the appropriation of more than $50.5 billion for the regional recovery
effort, are we more prepared for that eventuality?
This hearing will point us in the right direction. Now is the time
to address any inadequate statutes, resolve any interagency turf
battles and build the relationships to ensure that we are a resilient
community in the face of the next disaster.
Before I yield to the Ranking Member for his opening statement, I
want you all to know that when I was appointed Chairman of this
subcommittee, I said that we wouldn't be holding hearings just for the
sake of holding hearings. After each hearing we've held this year,
we've taken action on the information provided by our witnesses--
whether it was successfully advocating for the restoration of homeland
security grants that are vital to New York City and major urban areas
around the country or introducing legislation to address cybersecurity
challenges.
Today's hearing will be no different. Many of the issues I will
raise today have been informed by my constituents. And I can assure you
that we will work to consider and take action on the things we learn
from today's hearing.
With that, I welcome our distinguished witnesses and yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Donovan. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the subcommittee, Mr. Payne, for an opening statement.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Good morning. I am pleased to join my
good friend, Chairman Donovan, today in Staten Island to learn
how the New York-New Jersey region has built itself better and
stronger in the nearly 4 years following Superstorm Sandy.
But before I begin, I want to acknowledge the circumstances
we find ourselves in today. Last week, National tragedies
filled the headlines. My heart is heavy for the families of
those who were killed in Baton Rouge, Falcon Heights, and
Dallas. Although these tragedies happened far away from here,
our communities are not immune from this kind of heartbreak. I
hope that when we return to Washington this week, with only 5
legislative days remaining before a 7-week recess, the House
will do something meaningful about law enforcement's
relationship with diverse communities. I hope it will do
something about the irrational access to military-style
firearms that killed 5 brave police officers Thursday night,
which has always been my concern of these weapons being
available.
Our country can do better than this.
Turning the focus to today's field hearing, nearly 4 years
ago Superstorm Sandy pummeled this region, destroying homes and
communities and causing tens of billions of dollars in damage.
Our region is not accustomed to responding to and recovering
from storms of this magnitude, and our population density,
coupled with significant infrastructure damage, certainly
complicated the process.
I am proud of the hard work and compassion demonstrated by
our local emergency responders in the days and weeks following
the storm. I wish I could say the same for the government of my
home State of New Jersey. In the years that followed the
disaster, allegations surfaced that the Governor has played
politics with disaster relief money, and to this day people
complain that the State has been slow to distribute funds to
those who need it.
As of April, approximately $1 billion in Federal funds has
yet to be obligated. In the wake of the storm, people in low-
income communities were hit hardest and ultimately struggled
most to find affordable housing in the months that followed.
These recovery challenges were exacerbated by the fact that
many in low-income populations were not in a position to
advocate for themselves to access the resources necessary to
recover and become more resilient.
Today we are in the midst of hurricane season, and I am
wondering what would be different if a storm like Sandy hit us
today. Does the Federal Government have better measures in
place to ensure that State governments administer programs
supported by Federal dollars quickly and efficiently and not
play politics with disaster relief? Are low-income communities
as able to incorporate hazard mitigation and resilience
activities into the disaster recovery efforts as more affluent
communities are? If not, what are we doing about it?
Finally, what have we learned about how to best leverage
the capabilities of charities and non-profit organizations in
disaster response?
I look forward to the witnesses' testimony today and
thoughts on what Congress can do to help make communities more
resilient.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Payne follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Donald M. Payne, Jr.
July 11, 2016
Last week, National tragedies filled the headlines. My heart is
heavy for the families of those who were killed in Baton Rouge, Falcon
Heights, and Dallas. Although these tragedies happened far away from
here, our communities are not immune to this kind of heartbreak.
I hope that when we return to Washington this week--with only 5
legislative days remaining before a 7-week recess--the House will do
something meaningful about law enforcement relationships with diverse
communities. I also hope it will do something about the irrational
access to military-style firearms that killed 5 brave police officers
Thursday night. Our country can be better than this.
Turning to the focus of today's field hearing, nearly 4 years ago,
Superstorm Sandy pummeled this region, destroying homes and communities
and causing tens of billions of dollars in damage. Our region is not
accustomed to responding to and recovering from storms of that
magnitude--and our population density coupled with significant
infrastructure damage certainly complicated the process.
I am proud of the hard work and compassion demonstrated by our
local emergency responders in the days and weeks following the storm. I
wish I could say the same for the government of my home State of New
Jersey.
In the years that followed the disaster, allegations surfaced that
the Governor played politics with disaster relief money, and to this
day, people complain that the State has been slow to distribute
disaster funds to those who need it.
As of April, approximately $1 billion in Federal funds had yet to
be obligated. In the wake of the storm, people in low-income
communities were hit hardest and ultimately struggled most to find
affordable housing in the months that followed.
These recovery challenges were exacerbated by the fact that many in
low-income populations were not in a position to advocate for
themselves to access the resources necessary to recover and become more
resilient.
Today, we are in the midst of hurricane season, and I am wondering
what would be different if a storm like Sandy hit us. Does the Federal
Government have better measures in place to ensure that State
governments administer Federal programs supported quickly and
effectively--and do not play politics with disaster relief?
Are low-income communities able to incorporate hazard mitigation
and resilience activities into their disaster recovery efforts as more
affluent communities? And if not, what are we doing about it? Finally,
what have we learned about how to best leverage the capabilities of
charities and non-profit organizations in disaster response?
I look forward to the witnesses' testimony today and thoughts on
what Congress can do to help make communities more resilient.
Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields back.
We are pleased to have two panels of very distinguished
witnesses before us today on this important topic. I will now
introduce our first panel.
Mr. Michael Byrne serves as deputy regional administrator
for Federal Emergency Management Agency Region II. Prior to
joining FEMA, he spent 20 years with the New York City Fire
Department and served as first deputy director of the New York
City Office of Emergency Management. Mr. Byrne also served as
FEMA's regional operations chief after the 9/11 attack on the
World Trade Center. Following Hurricane Sandy, Mr. Byrne served
as the Federal coordinating officer for New York.
Ms. Marion McFadden serves as deputy assistant secretary
for grant programs in the Office of Community Planning and
Development, CPD, at the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Prior to joining CPD in August 2014, Ms. McFadden
served as chief operating officer and acting executive director
for the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force and was a founder
of the Rebuild By Design competition.
Mr. Dan Zarrilli serves as New York City's chief resilience
officer, overseeing the Mayor's Office of Recovery and
Resiliency, Office of Sustainability, and the city's OneNYC
Program, a position he has held since January 2016. Prior to
this, he was the first director of the Mayor's Office of
Recovery and Resiliency in March 2014 and served as the acting
director of the Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability
from February to December 2014. After Hurricane Sandy, he
served on the Special Initiative for Rebuilding Resiliency.
The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record. Before I recognize Administrator Byrne for testimony, I
ask unanimous consent to enter into the record written
testimony submitted by the elected officials from Staten Island
and Brooklyn. Without objection, this is so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ronald Castorina, Jr., Assemblyman, 62nd
District, The Assembly, Albany, State of New York
July 11, 2016
Thank you, Congressman Donovan, for soliciting my input concerning
the future use of Federal funds to aid Staten Island in the event of
another catastrophic storm like Hurricane Sandy (``Sandy''). While
Sandy may be a distant memory to many citizens in the area, to Staten
Islanders, and my constituents on its South Shore it never abated and
remains an on-going problem. The effects from Sandy manifest themselves
from zombie properties to small businesses that were forced to shutter
their doors due to inadequate coordination among the different branches
of government. It is clear that citizens, and local businesses cannot
afford a repeat of failings of Sandy.
I, however, submit this testimony with the benefit of hindsight. It
will neither serve my constituents nor will it aid in the process to
continue living in the past. Today, I implore this esteemed committee
to assure my constituents, and all Staten Islanders that we will not be
forgotten to the bright lights and titans of finance in Manhattan, or
the boardwalks of New Jersey.
Sandy taught us that a hurricane's storm surge is every bit as
deadly as its winds and rains. Staten Island requires the allocation of
substantial Federal funds to secure its coastline against the ravages
of future storm surges. Twenty-four Staten Islanders died as a result
of Sandy's rising tides accounting for more than half the deaths in New
York City. We need to remember it was Sandy's storm surge that ripped
little Connor and Brendan Moore \1\ from their mother's arms and
dragged their lifeless bodies to a marsh at the dead end of McLaughlin
Street in South Beach. While I am happy to see the Federal Government
plans to protect the residents and businesses of Lower Manhattan,
residents and businesses on Staten Island are entitled to the same
protections as the stock exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Photo of Connor and Brendan Moore appearing on silive.com 10/
29/2013.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Staten Island requires a total overall of its flood drainage
system, the construction of sea walls and temporary flood walls that
could be deployed before a storm, and the building grass berms that
could double as recreational areas. Essentially, Staten Island
requires, and deserves, all of the protections touted by Senator
Schumer to be afforded to the residents and businesses in Lower
Manhattan.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/nyregion/new-york-city-to-
get-176-million-from-us-for-storm-protections.html?_r=0 (accessed 7/12/
2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am fully cognizant of the importance Lower Manhattan plays in the
economy of this country and, undeniably, the entire world. Before we,
as a Nation, commit to restoring recreational areas and centers of
commerce, I believe we must ensure that people are safe in their homes.
To do otherwise reinforces a culture of fungible workers and consumers.
I ask the esteemed Members of this committee to remember the faces of
these 2 children when allocating Federal funds and implore you not to
send a message that the protection of commerce alone trumps the freedom
from fear in their homes.
______
Prepared Statement of Nicole Malliotakis, Assemblywoman, 64th District,
The Assembly, Albany, State of New York
July 11, 2016
First, allow me to express my enthusiasm and gratitude that a real,
robust coastal storm risk management project is being implemented in
Staten Island. After decades of fear and waiting, the people of these
shoreline communities will finally receive the protection they need and
deserve. It is unfortunate that it took a catastrophe like Hurricane
Sandy to move this project forward, but I am sure that all residents,
elected officials, and government agencies are eager to see this plan
finalized and commence with construction.
communication and timeliness are key.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) presently enjoy
overwhelming support from the community on the East Shore seawall
project. However, adequate communication with the residents and their
elected officials, along with a strict adherence to timetables, are
vital to maintaining this positive relationship. Most of the community
understands that a project of this magnitude will encounter
unforeseeable problems, but that level of understanding will go only so
far as what is timely and honestly communicated to them.
lowering flood insurance premiums must be a priority goal.
As you are likely aware, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) is in the process of developing updated flood maps for New York
City that will draw an increased amount of properties into the
Federally-designated floodplain and, accordingly, will require an
increased number of homeowners to purchase flood insurance policies.
Furthermore, those who already own flood insurance policies will see
their premiums increase. These changes approach steadily, and surely,
and promise a profound impact on a significant number of Staten
Islanders, many of whom are still struggling to recover from the
destruction wrought by Sandy. I implore that you work with FEMA to
ensure that the completion of this project is considered in the
calculation of flood insurance premiums and furthermore, meets FEMA's
requirements so homeowners indeed benefit from lower premiums.
this project must be scalable and flexible.
I was very pleased to learn that seawall project is being developed
with an eye toward the future and the ability to alter the physical
barriers for increased protection. This project is an investment in
Staten Island, and must come with the ability to properly conform to
changing weather patterns and future needs of our community.
phase ii of the seawall project.
The southern portion of my legislative district extends into the
neighborhoods of Great Kills and Eltingville, home to many residents
who shouldered the same devastation of their neighbors to the northeast
but beyond the reach of Phase I of the seawall project.
You are likely familiar with the beach mitigation program
implemented by the New York City Department of Parks & Recreation, with
guidance from the USACE, to provide temporary shoreline protection for
the communities most heavily impacted by Sandy. The project was
expeditiously completed and has been well-received by nearby residents,
with one particularly glaring exception. The shoreline terminus of
Goodall Street lacks public property upon which any natural protective
measure can be implemented, resulting in a gap in the berm as it runs
from the southern end of Great Kills Harbor along the South Shore.
Many residents on Goodall Street and surrounding blocks now feel as
if they reside in a ``bullseye'' for the next storm, and upon
completion of Phase I those feelings will only be exacerbated. As we
move toward finalization of Phase I, I respectfully urge you to begin
working on Phase 2 to protect the remainder of Staten Island while, as
mentioned above, properly communicating with those residents.
lost amenities must be replaced.
The shoreline property along Father Capodanno Boulevard has been a
recreational destination for more than a century and, sadly, the many
ballfields, picnic grounds, bocce courts, playgrounds, and even a skate
park, will also be displaced by this new construction. Additionally, we
have a successful small business that operates The Vanderbilt, South
Fin Grill, and a Ben & Jerry's concession that need to be preserved. I
respectfully urge Federal Government to work with the city of New York,
its agencies, and the owners of the aforementioned small businesses to
ensure that the community retains its ability to enjoy these amenities.
Thank you again for your diligence on what is an issue of
incredible importance in Staten Island's history. I look orward to
working with you and will avail my office to any needs that you
encounter.
Mr. Donovan. The Chair now recognizes Deputy Regional
Administrator Byrne for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL BYRNE, DEPUTY REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, REGION II, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Chairman
Donovan and Members of the subcommittee. My name is Michael
Byrne. I am the deputy regional administrator, and I am proud
to be back here in New York as the Region II administrator,
after serving as the Federal coordinating officer before in my
time at the New York City Fire Department.
I would like to take this opportunity to share some best
practices and lessons we learned from Sandy, and I will also
address some changes made by Congress that we have integrated
into those to promote resiliency and to expedite recovery from
a disaster.
Thanks to new authorities given to us by Congress through
the 2013 Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, or SRIA, we are now
armed with more flexibility to implement our programs and to
deliver Federal assistance; for example, in our Public
Assistance Program, which provides funds to States and local
governments and to eligible non-profits to cover debris
removal, emergency work, and permanent repairs. To date, we
have obligated over $14.5 billion in public assistance funding
to New York and New Jersey. Thanks to the flexibility provided
in SRIA and FEMA's internal commitment to make sure we
emphasize resiliency, we have seen a significant increase in
the project funding dedicated to mitigation. After Sandy, for
every dollar that we spent to repair and restore, we spent an
additional 34 to 85 cents to incorporate mitigation into these
projects to improve resiliency, not just to build it back the
way it was but to build it back stronger. This is a significant
increase from past practices.
In one example, the New York City Health and Hospitals
Corporation received more than $1.7 billion for permanent
repairs in critical building systems at Bellevue, Coler, Coney
Island, and Metropolitan Hospitals. Metropolitan strikes a
chord with me because that is where, when I was a kid growing
up, that is where they took me to get patched up after various
and sundry accidents. In this case, the Hospital Corporation
received $755 million of the total for hazard mitigation. That
is more than one-third of the total funding that went to
building back stronger and better. This additional resilience
will reduce the impact of future storms on these facilities
that serve more than 1 million people every year.
Another disaster program, the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program, or HMGP, which is one of our core programs, has spent
nearly $1 billion it obligated in New York and New Jersey. This
includes $45 million for this very hospital we are in today,
the Staten Island University Hospital campus. Its funding, in
coordination with funding from HUD, will elevate the utility
systems in the main building to mitigate against future floods.
Thanks to SRIA, we are also implementing advanced
assistance funding. These funds allow us to give out funds on
the front end to develop smarter mitigation plans and obtain
data to prioritize and develop projects for the remaining funds
to be used even more appropriately.
In our other program area, the Individual Assistance
Program, which is direct funding to families that are impacted,
we provided over $1.4 billion in assistance to nearly 180,000
individuals and households after Sandy. We worked closely with
the city and State partners to set up mobile teams that went
door-to-door to make sure survivors were reached and taken care
of. I am proud to say it was FDNY's management team that led
the effort and coordinated it, and we were proud to be a part
of it. This approach has been codified in the way FEMA does
business now to better protect survivors.
In April 2013, FEMA created the Disaster Survivor
Assistance Program, and these DSA teams have the training and
the technology not just to wait for the call but to go out to
the communities, to register, do case updates, and refer
clients to other support.
One of the biggest challenges in recovery is coordinating
across State, Federal, and local government to make sure that
we maximize the impact. In Sandy we established the New York-
New Jersey Federal Leadership Collaborative which provides an
unparalleled format for Federal partners to conduct
comprehensive, region-wide planning and identify opportunities
to leverage dollars. This type of enhanced Federal recovery
coordination continues to be implemented post-Sandy.
We have also seen as an example increased collaboration
amongst the departments and agencies for unified Federal
review. We are required to do environmental and historic
preservation reviews whenever we are using Federal funds, and
11 departments and agencies have signed a Memorandum of
Understanding to share that information so that each of our
departments can work in a more streamlined way and reduce the
review and duplication of effort.
Sandy was one of the largest, most complex disasters we
have responded to in the past decade. With the associated
challenges came the opportunity to develop innovations and
efficiencies, and we will continue to work with Congress and
other partners to build more resilient communities before and
after disaster.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Byrne follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Byrne
July 11, 2016
introduction
Good morning Chairman Donovan and Members of the subcommittee. My
name is Michael Byrne and I am the deputy regional administrator for
FEMA Region II. I was also the Federal coordinating officer in New York
during the Hurricane Sandy response. Thank you for the opportunity to
discuss lessons learned from Hurricane Sandy, and how best practices
have since been applied to promote resiliency and expedite the disaster
recovery process.
On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy made landfall along the East
Coast with impacts felt across more than a dozen States. The storm
battered the densely-populated New York and New Jersey coasts, with
heavy rain, strong winds, and record storm surges. In Sandy's immediate
aftermath, more than 23,000 people sought refuge in temporary shelters,
and more than 8.5 million customers lost power. The storm flooded
numerous roads and tunnels, blocked transportation corridors and
paralyzed the transit network in the Northeast, and deposited extensive
debris along the coastline.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinated the
Federal Government's immediate response and provided support for the
critical emergency needs of affected States. Before landfall, we staged
food, water, and equipment in the northeast. National Incident
Management Assistance Teams were deployed to New York and New Jersey
pre-landfall to work side-by-side with our local counterparts and
address their needs. Within 48 hours of landfall, FEMA had more than
1,200 people in the field going door-to-door in affected neighborhoods.
Our efforts did not stop after the initial response phase. Today,
FEMA Region II continues to coordinate the on-going recovery activities
in New York and New Jersey. Our focus is to not only build back
communities and the infrastructure serving them, but to help build them
back better so they are more resilient before the next event.
The magnitude of Sandy and its impacts reinforces the need to be
creative and innovative in the way we respond to and recover from
disasters to ensure we can be agile and get assistance to survivors and
our State and local partners as soon as possible.
On January 29, 2013, President Obama signed the Sandy Recovery
Improvement Act (SRIA) of 2013. Thanks to new authorities given to us
by Congress through SRIA, we are now able to deliver federal assistance
to survivors in new and improved ways. Some of these changes were
piloted for the first time throughout the Sandy recovery process.
In this testimony, I will highlight some best practices and lessons
learned during Sandy and how we have integrated those, as well as
changes directed by SRIA, to promote resilience and expedite recovery.
delivery of fema recovery programs
Public Assistance Program
As of June 2016, FEMA has obligated more than $14.5 billion in
Federal funding through the Public Assistance (PA) program to cover
debris removal, emergency work, and permanent work in both New York and
New Jersey. Of this amount, nearly $3 billion is dedicated to adding
mitigation measures to rebuilding projects to protect against future
damage, as authorized under Section 406 of the Stafford Act.
The PA program traditionally reimburses applicants for the actual
costs of completed projects. New legislative authorities granted to
FEMA in SRIA now allow applicants to request and obtain funding based
on certified cost estimates to repair, restore, or replace a damaged
facility. Once FEMA and the applicant agree on the damage assessment,
scope of work, and estimated costs, the PA grant obligation is
determined. The goals of these Public Assistance Alternative Procedures
(PAAP) are to reduce costs to the Federal Government; increase
flexibility in the administration of assistance; expedite the
assistance so funding can be obligated prior to a project's start; and
provide financial incentives for the timely and cost-effective
completion of projects.
The use of these alternative procedures is optional for States and
Tribes but allows them to retain funding when there are cost underruns
and utilize these funds for additional hazard mitigation measures and
for activities that improve future PA program permanent work
operations, such as training and planning for disaster recovery
operations.
Alternative procedures were used for more than 60 percent of PA
project funding for New York (New Jersey elected not to use PAAP).
Seventy-eight PAAP projects in NYC and Long Island to support repair
and restoration were approved and funded, totaling $9.9 billion. This
includes 33 projects for the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA)
which supports approximately $2.9 billion of work at more than 33
campuses with 250 buildings. These PAAP projects also include a
significant amount of mitigation. For every dollar spent on repair and
restoration efforts, an additional $.85 has been spent on mitigation
measures incorporated into the projects to help disaster-damaged
buildings be more resilient to withstand potential future disasters.
This number is nearly double the $.44 for non-PAAP permanent work
grants.
In one project, New York Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC)--
representing the largest public hospital system in the country--
received more than $1.7 billion for permanent repairs of critical
building systems at Bellevue, Metropolitan, Coler, and Coney Island
hospitals. Thanks to the flexibility of the alternative procedures, the
applicant was able to receive $755 million of the total project funding
for hazard mitigation measures. These measures include constructing
flood walls to protect the campus from flood inundation; elevating
critical components of the mechanical, electrical, piping and fire
systems; and installing additional pumping stations and enhanced storm
water management measures. This additional resilience will reduce the
impact of heavy rain, strong winds, and storm surge on these hospital
facilities that are critical to the more than 1 million people who are
served every year by this health care system.
New York University (NYU) Langone Medical Center also received
$1.13 billion under the PAAP program. Approximately $540 million was
allocated for permanent repairs and restoration to damage throughout
NYU's campus and $590 million for hazard mitigation against future
storms, which includes installing exterior flood doors/barriers and
additional sump pumps, and elevating the mechanical, electrical, and
piping systems. This assistance has not only helped the hospital
recover, but the increased resilience will help prevent the type of
damage and power outage that forced the hospital to evacuate nearly 300
patients including 45 critical care patients and 20 infants.
FEMA recently completed a SRIA PAAP pilot program evaluation to
capture best practices, lessons learned, and areas for improvement. The
evaluation focused heavily on permanent work projects in New York.
Initial conclusions show that alternative procedures allowed for
flexibility and an opportunity to ``build back better'' by increasing
the amount of hazard mitigation associated with projects. The
evaluation also captured some areas for improvement, which FEMA is in
the process of addressing for future disasters, including:
The need for clear and consistent guidance and tools to
effectively communicate the program.
Further streamlining processes associated with PAAP
projects, where possible, to lessen administrative burden.
Since Sandy, FEMA has made additional significant changes to the PA
program to more efficiently support our State, local, Tribal, and
territorial (SLTT) partners through the disaster recovery process.
These changes include the development and testing of a new PA program
delivery model which reorganizes how we review and validate project
requests to expedite funding to our partners for smaller, less-complex
projects. The new delivery model also allows PA field management to
determine the number of customer-facing program delivery managers
needed based on the size and complexity of the disaster. PA staff will
be assigned specialized tasks, will be given manageable workloads, and
will input all project notes into a customer relations management
system to ensure consistency of delivery and smooth transition in the
event of staff turnover.
The new process was recently implemented for the first time in
response to the flooding and mudslides in Oregon, and we are
incorporating lessons learned into continued implementation of the new
delivery model. FEMA is currently undertaking a significant training
effort to ensure all of our staff are trained on the new model before
we begin to scale implementation Nationally.
We also completed the new PA Program and Policy Guide which
consolidated information from 5 publications and 63 policies to clarify
processes and provide simplified direction to SLTT partners on how to
use the program.
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
Following a Presidentially-declared disaster, the Hazard Mitigation
Grant Program (HMGP) provides Federal funding to SLTT governments to
implement long-term hazard mitigation measures. The HMGP was created to
reduce the loss of life and property due to natural disasters, and
enables mitigation measures to be implemented during the immediate
recovery from a disaster. Unlike Stafford Act Section 406 mitigation
funding, HMGP projects do not need to be related to infrastructure
damaged by the Presidentially-declared disaster.
Under the HMGP program for Hurricane Sandy, nearly $1 billion in
funding has been obligated in New York and New Jersey for mitigation
projects prioritized by the States. This includes an HMGP grant to the
New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) to fund mitigation
measures for the State's most vulnerable bridges. NYSDOT conducted a
risk assessment and determined 106 bridges required repairs and
upgrades to mitigate against flooding and scouring (erosion due to
water). To date, more than $490 million has been obligated for repairs
and mitigation measures for these bridges.
SRIA directs FEMA to streamline HMGP activities and adopt measures
that will expedite the implementation of the program. Streamlining
actions include identifying: Minimum criteria for complete
applications; time frames for reviewing actions and decisions; phasing
of projects; industry cost guides for estimates; industry design and
construction standards; and pre-calculated benefits. SRIA also
authorizes the use of Advance Assistance, allowing FEMA to provide up
to 25 percent of the HMGP ceiling to applicants in advance of incurring
eligible costs, in order to accelerate the implementation of the HMGP.
Advance Assistance can be used to support a more strategic approach to
a State's mitigation efforts, this includes developing mitigation plans
and obtaining data to prioritize, select, and develop applications in a
timely manner.
FEMA published updated Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA) Guidance
in 2015 to provide comprehensive information about the 3 HMA programs:
HMGP, the Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) program, and the Flood
Mitigation Assistance (FMA) program. The Guidance includes information
about streamlined program delivery, the expedited methodology for
benefit-cost ratios for residential hurricane wind retrofit projects,
and 23 job aids and resources to assist internal and external partners
with implementing the programs.
Unified Federal Environmental and Historic Preservation Review
Prior to obligating Federal funding for a disaster recovery
project, Federal resource and regulatory agencies provide permits,
Federal determinations, and/or special knowledge and expertise to
inform the development of the project and ensure that environmental and
historic preservation (EHP) requirements under their jurisdiction are
met. All Federal agencies have a responsibility as stewards of the
environment to help communities rebuild while effectively managing the
use of natural, cultural, and historic resources.
To help streamline and coordinate these efforts, SRIA directs the
President--in consultation with FEMA, the Council on Environmental
Quality, and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation--to
establish a unified interagency review process to ensure compliance
with EHP requirements under Federal law relating to disaster recovery
projects, while expediting the review time line. Eleven departments and
agencies executed an interagency memorandum of understanding (MOU) on
July 29, 2014, committing to support the Unified Federal Environmental
and Historic Preservation Review (UFR) process.
The UFR is a framework designed to enhance the ability of Federal
agencies to expedite project environmental and historic preservation
(EHP) reviews during disaster recovery by promoting:
Consistency and coordination among multiple Federal agency
EHP reviews;
Collaboration and coordination among Federal, Tribal, State,
and local agencies;
Leveraged and efficient use of agency staff and funds;
Quick resolution of coordination challenges;
More informed Federal decision making; and
Expedited execution and implementation of disaster recovery
projects.
UFR Implementation During Hurricane Sandy Recovery
There were several situations during Hurricane Sandy recovery
operations in which the UFR concept was successfully used to expedite
the EHP review for Federally-funded projects. Roberto Clemente Park and
the Rockaway Boardwalk received funding from both FEMA and the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD completed an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for Roberto Clemente Park and an
Environmental Assessment (EA) for Rockaway Boardwalk to satisfy the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements for these
projects. FEMA was able to leverage the work already completed by HUD.
Using the information contained in HUD's EIS and EA, FEMA was able to
more rapidly complete its EHP reviews. This reduced overall review
time, expedited review requirements for two multi-million-dollar
projects, and eliminated duplication of effort.
Today FEMA continues to implement the UFR process during review of
long-term recovery projects associated with Hurricane Sandy. The New
York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) has 33 campuses that are receiving
both FEMA and HUD recovery grant funding. As part of the EHP review for
projects associated with these NYCHA housing complexes, FEMA invited
HUD and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to be cooperating
agencies on the development of the required Environmental Assessments.
Inter-agency collaboration at the beginning of this project's
formulation and EHP review has allowed for engagement of multiple
technical experts and resource agencies as part of a single,
coordinated review. This has facilitated a more comprehensive decision-
making process, and streamlined the review process for all of these
Federal funding agencies and the NYCHA.
On-going UFR Efforts
To further institutionalize the UFR to provide streamlined,
coordinated support to SLTT partners during future responses, FEMA and
Federal interagency partners have furthered the development and
implementation of the UFR process since the execution of the UFR MOU in
2014. We created new tools and mechanisms focused on improving and
expediting Federal agencies' EHP reviews. Additional resources have
been developed to better educate disaster applicants on the EHP
requirements for Federally-funded disaster grants, while new
coordination and data-sharing agreement documents help to promote and
codify new collaborative approaches to EHP review during disaster
recovery operations.
The creation of the new UFR Advisor position has also been a major
accomplishment in providing support to field recovery operations
following disasters. This position serves an advisor to the Federal
Disaster Recovery Coordinator (FDRC) whenever they are activated.
During FDRC-led inter-agency recovery operations, the UFR Advisor works
to identify and implement opportunities to expedite the EHP review
process for recovery projects following that disaster.
FEMA's UFR team, led by the National UFR Coordinator, continues
their efforts to further educate Federal, State, Tribal, and local
government partners on the UFR process. Full implementation of UFR is
scheduled for the end of calendar year 2017.
Individual Assistance Program
Through FEMA's Individual and Households Program, we provided more
than $1.4 billion in assistance to nearly 180,000 individuals and
households in New York and New Jersey after Hurricane Sandy. The
majority of this funding was dedicated for housing assistance ($1.2
billion), including costs for temporary housing needs and repair or
replacement of residences.
During the response, FEMA, along with Federal and State partners,
set up fixed and mobile Disaster Recovery Centers where survivors could
register for assistance and get their questions answered. We also had
Community Relations staff working in affected communities assisting
survivors and providing situational awareness back to disaster
operations leadership.
In April 2013, following lessons learned from Hurricane Sandy and
in an effort to focus on a survivor-centric approach to providing
disaster assistance, FEMA transformed the Community Relations function
and developed the new Disaster Survivor Assistance (DSA) Program.
DSA teams provide on-site registration, case status updates, and
on-the-spot needs assessments including referrals to other Federal
agencies and whole community partners. They address immediate and
emerging needs by meeting survivors at their homes or in their
communities, and use portable technology to maintain mobile operations.
Teams use a GIS-based application to report and capture data that is
instantly replicated to the FEMA GeoPlatform, ensuring that real-time
information is available to support operations.
DSA teams are a professional ``force multiplier'' that support SLTT
and Federal requirements in the field. They address survivors'
immediate needs while collecting targeted information that supports
operational decision making and resource allocation. By leveraging in-
person, tailored information and referrals to whole community partners,
DSA teams help FEMA best support the survivors who need the most help
in heavily-affected areas.
In addition to program delivery enhancements, a best practice that
arose from Hurricane Sandy was increased coordination across Federal
and SLTT stakeholders to incorporate resiliency and improve
collaboration for long-term recovery projects.
federal disaster recovery coordination
The National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), first published in
2011, is a guide to enable effective Federal long-term recovery support
to impacted SLTT jurisdictions. It provides a flexible structure that
enables disaster recovery managers to operate in a unified and
collaborative manner to most effectively restore, redevelop, and
revitalize the health, social, economic, natural, and economic fabric
of a community after a disaster.
NDRF Implementation During Hurricane Sandy
Hurricane Sandy was one of the first disasters following the NDRF's
publication for which the new Federal recovery coordination structure
was fully implemented. The 6 Recovery Support Functions outlined in the
NDRF were activated and staffed to facilitate Federal recovery
coordination: Economic Recovery; Health and Social Services; Housing;
Infrastructure Systems; Natural and Cultural Resources; and Community
Planning & Capacity Building.
A New Jersey/New York Federal Leadership Resilience Collaborative
(the Collaborative) was established and meets regularly to share
information on key infrastructure projects and promote regional
resilience. The Collaborative is comprised of Regional Administrators
and other senior staff from FEMA, the U.S. Department of Interior, U.S.
Department of Transportation, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, EPA, and
HUD. The Collaborative provides an unparalleled forum for Federal
officials to develop a strategic approach to foster a more
comprehensive region-wide planning for risk reductions and provides
opportunities for leveraging Federal dollars.
This early activation of the NDRF structure informed many lessons
learned including further NDRF training for Federal personnel involved
in the recovery, and synchronization of efforts between response and
recovery activities.
Since Hurricane Sandy, the Federal coordination mission has further
evolved. In 2012, the Federal Government established the Recovery
Support Function Leadership Group (RSFLG), a senior-level entity that
meets monthly to coordinate responsibilities and resolve operational,
resource, and preparedness issues relating to interagency recovery
activities at the National level. The RSFLG led the interagency
Readiness Assessment initiative to identify capabilities and gaps for
the execution of Federal recovery mission in terms of budget, training,
staffing, experience and other resources to enhance coordination,
establish priorities, and drive decision making. Since September 2011,
FEMA has appointed 23 Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinators (FDRC)
after major disasters. FEMA continues to hire and train FDRCs and cadre
staff Nation-wide to ensure FEMA is prepared to assist States with
extraordinary disaster recovery needs to ensure effective coordination
of Federal resources and support of SLTT goals to build back more
resilient communities.
FEMA and other Federal agencies continue to provide outreach to
SLTT partners to help them apply NDRF concepts and principles in their
own recovery preparedness efforts. FEMA hosts approximately 4 NDRF
leadership workshops for Federal and SLTT officials each fiscal year.
In 2015, FEMA published ``Effective Coordination of Recovery Resources
for State, Tribal, Territorial and Local Incidents.'' This guide
highlights the critical tasks and coordination challenges that State,
local, Tribal and territorial governments most commonly face when
managing a recovery process. It describes processes, considerations,
and interdependencies of key actors in the recovery process to enhance
coordination.
The second edition of the NDRF was published in June 2016. This new
edition highlights and further defines 8 recovery core capabilities--
critical functions to enable preparedness and recovery--as identified
in the National Preparedness Goal. The primary value of the NDRF is its
emphasis on preparing for recovery in advance of a disaster. The
ability of a community to accelerate the recovery process begins with
its efforts in pre-disaster preparedness, including coordinating with
whole community partners, mitigating risks, incorporating community
planning, identifying resources, and developing capacity to effectively
manage the recovery process, through collaborative and inclusive
planning.
national flood insurance program
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is undergoing
significant changes to strengthen the program, thanks in part to
lessons learned from Hurricane Sandy. Historically, most insurance
companies have excluded flood damage from homeowners' insurance. To
address this need, Congress established the NFIP in 1968, which is
administered by FEMA's Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration
(FIMA). The NFIP works with participating private insurance companies
to market, sell, administer, and adjust claims for policyholders. By
encouraging sound floodplain management efforts, the NFIP is estimated
to save the Nation $1.7 billion annually in avoided flood losses. The
NFIP helps homeowners, renters, and non-residential property owners to
understand their risk and take action to protect themselves financially
against the most common and costly type of disaster in the United
States.
The NFIP is currently $23 billion in debt due to major events like
Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, as well as subsidized rates to many
policyholders that did not reflect their true risk. Recognizing the
need for reforms, in 2012 Congress acted by passing the Biggert-Waters
Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW12) which required major changes
to strengthen the fiscal soundness of the NFIP. In March 2014, Congress
passed the Homeowners Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014
(HFIAA), repealing and modifying certain provisions of BW12 while still
requiring changes to major components of the NFIP including flood
insurance, flood hazard mapping, grants, and flood plain management.
After Hurricane Sandy, allegations arose that private insurers
involved with NFIP underpaid thousands of homeowners on their flood
insurance claims. To address these concerns, FEMA subsequently set up
an unprecedented Sandy Claims Review process and contacted 142,000 NFIP
policyholders offering a review of their claim, with nearly 19,300
policy holders requesting one. To date, more than $70 million in
additional funds have been paid to policy holders. Throughout this
process, FEMA began identifying areas for NFIP reform, including:
Implementing changes to the appeals process that will allow any
homeowner who is disputing a claim to have access to their files and
have full visibility on the adjudication process; and updating the
arrangement between FEMA and private insurers to allow for more
oversight and operational adjustments.
To address legislative requirements and to further advance the
program's goals, the NFIP established 5 key priorities for 2016:
Improve customer service.--FIMA is coordinating with the
Flood Insurance Advocate's office, outside customer experience
industry experts, and individual policy holders to identify
recommendations to improve the customer experience. Specific
initiatives include simplifying products, redesigning the risk
rating system to help customers clearly understand their flood
risk, and improving program and mapping change communications
to customers.
Improve understanding of risks.--To properly mitigate risk
through insurance, we must first get an accurate picture of the
current and future risk profiles of our communities. In
accordance with HFIAA requirements, FEMA is updating the flood
mapping program for the NFIP. This program will be reviewed by
the Technical Mapping Advisory Council (TMAC). When the updated
program is applied, it will result in technically credible
flood hazard data in all areas where Flood Insurance Rate Maps
are prepared or updated.
Reduce risks.--Mitigation projects can help improve
community resilience, reduce future loss of life or property
from flooding, and reduce future claims payments by the NFIP.
The Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) program provides grant
funds on an annual basis to SLTT governments for projects that
reduce or eliminate the long-term risk of flood damage to
structures insured by the NFIP. In fiscal year 2015, FEMA
obligated more than $71 million in FMA grant funds for
mitigation activities affecting approximately 293 properties.
These measures are expected to provide a savings to the NFIP of
approximately $142 million in reduced claims payments. For the
fiscal year 2016 FMA Grant Program, $199,000,000 is available
to SLTT governments. The application period closed on June 15
and applications will be reviewed to determine eligibility and
priority.
Engage private-sector insurers.--Survivors of flooding can
recover more quickly and more fully when they are insured
against losses, whether they purchase that insurance from the
NFIP or through the private market. Our priority is to ensure
that as many citizens as possible are covered for flood damage.
To better diversify financial risk in the future, FEMA is
exploring reinsurance and insurance-linked securities as a way
to improve the financial stability of the flood insurance
program. We are currently working with the reinsurance industry
on catastrophic flood modeling, gathering quotes to pilot
reinsurance for the NFIP, and exploring how to pay for
reinsurance.
Continue to implement legislative reforms.--FEMA has made
significant progress towards implementing BW12 and HFIAA
requirements. In addition to the initiatives previously
discussed, our current key priorities include:
Compiling data and beginning analysis of NFIP reform impacts
on small businesses, non-profits, and houses of worship;
Completing reports on policy holders whose premiums exceed 1
percent of their coverage value;
Continuing work on regulation changes, including but not
limited to installment plans and Write Your Own expense
allowance with actual costs;
Evaluating reinsurance options and developing a pilot
program; and
Designing an Affordability Framework that will provide
policy options for an affordability program supported by
qualitative and quantitative analyses.
conclusion
Hurricane Sandy was one of the largest, most complex disasters we
have responded to in the past decade. With the associated challenges
comes the opportunity to develop innovations and efficiencies. We have
been able to take lessons learned from the Sandy response and
institutionalize changes and best practices to provide more streamlined
delivery of assistance programs while incentivizing mitigation. Thanks
to Congressional action and the passage of SRIA, FEMA now has
additional authorities and more flexibility to administer programs and
expedite recovery. We continue to work with Congress and our SLTT
partners to build more resilient communities before and after a
disaster.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look
forward to any questions the subcommittee may have.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Byrne.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. McFadden for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARION MOLLEGEN MC FADDEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, GRANT PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF COMMUNITY PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Ms. McFadden. Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and
Members of the subcommittee, I am Marion Mollegen McFadden,
deputy assistant secretary for grant programs. On behalf of
Secretary Julian Castro, I appreciate the opportunity to
testify before you today.
My testimony will cover 3 areas: The status of HUD's work
to support long-term recovery from Hurricane Sandy; HUD's use
of Federal disaster funds to increase resilience; and Federal
and regional coordination after Sandy.
Sandy was one of the most devastating and costly National
disasters in the Nation's history, causing tens of billions of
dollars in damage, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, and directly
affecting more than 17 million people from Puerto Rico to
Maine. Since enactment of the Disaster Relief Appropriations
Act in January 2013, HUD has moved aggressively to ensure that
homeowners and businesses received assistance, and that
critical infrastructure investments are made with an eye toward
future storms.
The HUD Sandy recovery effort has resulted in new rules to
better protect Federal recovery investment, requiring, for
example, higher elevation of repaired homes located in areas
prone to flooding, and requiring that larger infrastructure
projects become more resilient. To date, Sandy grantees have
worked together to assist more than 14,000 single-family
households across the region, to fully repair their homes, or
to help them find new housing. Billions of dollars of CDBG-DR
assistance will also be invested in more resilient
infrastructure.
Recovery, however, can never be fast enough. There remain
areas where homeowners are still waiting to return to their
homes, and HUD is working vigorously and continuously to find
ways to accelerate the recovery. For example, for the first
time HUD is allowing grantees to advance funds to homeowners to
start reconstruction while withholding final payment until
project completion. HUD has also used its authority to grant
dozens of Sandy-specific waivers in order to meet local
recovery needs, including allowing the development of protected
infrastructure investment on private property.
Historically, disaster recovery has both done returning
community assets to the location and condition that existed
before the storm, but today extreme weather events demand a new
focus on ensuring the resiliency of communities. HUD is
investing new Federal resources in resiliency initiatives to
serve as models for communities to prepare for the next
disaster. Through the Rebuild By Design, or RBD initiative, HUD
has allocated $930 million for flood mitigation projects to
increase resilience throughout the Sandy-affected region.
Through a competitive process, Rebuild By Design led to the
selection of 7 projects across the region, including one
particularly innovative project now underway here on Staten
Island.
Through RBD, New York State is investing $60 million of
CDBG-DR funds in the Living Breakwaters project in Tottenville
to construct a system of breakwaters that will span the South
Shore. In New Jersey, $203 million of Rebuild By Design
investments are also helping the cities of Hoboken, Weehawken
and Jersey City to develop a new urban water strategy, with
$146 million of Federal transit funds, and providing another
example of Federal and local coordination of resilient
investment.
Similarly, to the National Disaster Resilience Competition,
HUD has allocated nearly $1 billion of CDBG disaster recovery
funds to support 13 State and local governments and their
investment in new resilient infrastructure and housing,
including $176 million for the city of New York to build new
coastal flood protection for the neighborhoods of Southern
Manhattan.
Beyond the city's investments, across the country, Shelby
County, Tennessee will invest $60 million to create new
greenways to reduce flood risk in future storms. Iowa will
receive more than $96 million for watershed improvements and
more resilient housing. California will invest more than $70
million for development of a biomass facility in response to
wildfire damage. These and other initiatives growing out of the
Sandy recovery have led to unprecedented new partnerships for
HUD and other Federal, State, and local agencies. One of the
most successful examples of those partnerships, as Mr. Byrne
mentioned, is the Sandy Regional Infrastructure Resilience
Coordination Group and Collaborative, led by FEMA.
[Alarm.]
Mr. Donovan. We didn't know who was going to be speaking at
the time.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Donovan. You get a set of steak knives.
[Laughter.]
[Alarm.]
Mr. Donovan. It is only going to last 45 minutes.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Donovan. That was some way to show off that they used
the $45 million to put a new alarm system in.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Donovan. Are we good, Lou?
Let's try, Ms. McFadden. I apologize.
Ms. McFadden. Thank you, sir.
The regional coordination body is comprised of Federal,
State, and local officials with responsibility for coordinating
development of Sandy infrastructure projects. The South Shore
has benefited from this new level of coordination. HUD has
supported residential buyouts, replenishment of dunes and
breakwaters. FEMA has supported repairs and mitigation at a
wastewater treatment plant and medical center. The National
Park Service has supported remediation and improvement in Great
Kills Park. Federal Highway Administration grants have been
provided for road repairs and improvements. The Army Corps of
Engineers has launched a coastal storm risk management study.
Perhaps the best part about this regional coordination is
that it has redefined how Federal agencies are working
together. As a result of our work in assisting the Sandy
recovery effort, Federal, State, and local partners are now
better positioned to hit the ground running in the future in
ways that were previously unknown.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I would be
pleased to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McFadden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marion Mollegen McFadden
July 11, 2016
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee, I am Marion Mollegen McFadden, deputy assistant secretary
for grant programs. On behalf of Secretary Julian Castro, I appreciate
the opportunity to testify today regarding disaster recovery efforts
related to Hurricane Sandy and how those investments in recovery are
helping New York City and communities Nation-wide become more resilient
and better prepared to withstand the next, inevitable extreme weather
event. As former chief operating officer and acting executive director
of the President's Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, and as a
native of Connecticut with friends and family affected by Hurricane
Sandy in New York and New Jersey, I have a deep understanding of the
recovery needs of this region. In my current position, I am responsible
for overseeing key programs that promote affordable housing and
community development, including the Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) program and CDBG-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) grants. These
grants help communities recover from and rebuild after natural
disasters like Hurricane Sandy and, in doing so, to become more
resilient.
Today, I will cover 3 subjects: (1) The status of HUD's work to
support long-term and resilient recovery from Hurricane Sandy; (2) the
Department's initiatives to use disaster recovery resources to foster
increased resilience; and (3) Federal and regional coordination of
Sandy recovery efforts and how those efforts may serve as a template
for future Federal coordination in response to major disasters and
assist in building communities across the Nation that are better
prepared to withstand those disasters.
status of long-term and resilient recovery from sandy
Almost 4 years after Sandy, I am sure you need no reminder that
this storm was one of the most devastating and costly natural disasters
in the Nation's history. Sandy caused tens of billions of dollars in
damage and had immense varied impacts across much of the eastern United
States, with damage most severe in New York, including the city of New
York, as well as New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Maryland.
Thousands of businesses and more than 650,000 homes were damaged or
destroyed. The storm was directly responsible for over 150 fatalities
across 8 countries; more than 70 in the United States alone. It yielded
major flooding, structural damage, and power loss to over 8.5 million
homes and businesses, directly affecting more than 17 million people
from Puerto Rico to Maine.
The Disaster Relief Appropriations Act (the Act) was signed into
law on January 29, 2013, providing $15.2 billion in CDBG-DR funding to
address Hurricane Sandy and other qualifying events that occurred in
2011, 2012, and prospectively, 2013.\1\ HUD moved aggressively to
implement the Act and to ensure that the specific requirements of the
law are met. HUD allocates CDBG-DR funds to States and local
governments who in turn, working with HUD and the community, design and
implement customized recovery programs. HUD and Sandy grantees have
worked together to ensure that homeowners and businesses receive timely
and needed assistance in often densely-populated, urban environments;
and that critical infrastructure is not only repaired but is located,
relocated, or redesigned to meet the challenges posed by extreme
weather events arising from climate change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The law provided $16 billion, however since these funds were
appropriated in fiscal year 2013, they were subject to sequestration.
This reduced the amount of CDBG-DR funds available under the Act to
$15.2 billion, a 5 percent reduction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 6, 2013, HUD announced the first allocation of $5.4
billion of CDBG-DR funds to 5 States and the city of New York to
support Sandy recovery efforts. On March 5, 2013, HUD published a
Federal Register Notice outlining the requirements for the use of those
funds.
As of July 2016, HUD had fully allocated the $15.2 billion
available under the Act to address the damage caused by Sandy and other
disasters in 2011, 2012, and 2013. Through a series of Federal Register
Notices, HUD also established new rules to better protect these Federal
investments, requiring, for example, higher elevation of repaired homes
located in areas prone to flooding and requiring that larger
infrastructure projects be built or rebuilt to be more resilient and to
better withstand future storms.
The Act required that HUD obligate all funds by September 30, 2017
and recipients expend funds within 2 years of obligation. Congress also
provided authority to extend this expenditure deadline, if needed. In
prior appropriations of CDBG-DR funds, Congress set no limits on the
time in which State and local governments must spend funds for
recovery. This new provision introduced both an imperative among HUD
grantees to expedite the commitment of funds, but has also caused
grantees to move cautiously in ``obligating'' funds because each new
obligation triggers the ``2-year clock'' on that portion of their
grant.
To date, Sandy grantees have used CDBG-DR funds to assist more than
14,000 single-family households across the region to fully repair their
homes or to help them find new housing. Thousands of small businesses
have completed their repairs or have been provided with working capital
or other assistance needed to return to operations. When fully
expended, billions of dollars of CDBG-DR assistance will also have been
invested in infrastructure repair, including investments to make
communities more resilient when the next disaster strikes.
Recovery, however, can never be fast enough for affected families,
homeowners, and other victims. There remain areas where too many
homeowners are still awaiting the housing assistance needed to return
to their homes. HUD is working continuously with its Sandy grantees to
explore ways to further expedite recovery. In housing rehabilitation,
for instance, for the first time, HUD is allowing grantees to advance
funds to homeowners to start reconstruction and to make interim
payments during construction, while withholding the final payment until
project completion. Also for the first time, HUD allowed homeowners to
be reimbursed for work they completed before applying to CDBG-DR funded
housing programs operated by New York State and the city of New York.
HUD has also used authority under the Act to grant dozens of
program-wide and grantee-specific waivers and to establish alternative
statutory and regulatory requirements related to income documentation
requirements, new housing construction and rental assistance--all
geared to meeting local recovery needs and to remove unnecessary
barriers to recovery. In the area of environmental regulation, the Act
provided new authority to use the environmental reviews adopted by
other Federal agencies to meet HUD's requirements, and HUD and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have executed an agreement
that allows our grantees to use FEMA environmental reviews. Grantees
have made good use of this authority.
For HUD and any Federal agency charged with providing funds to
assist in disaster recovery, the challenge is always balancing the
imperative to provide timely assistance to storm-ravaged communities
with the equally important priority of ensuring that funds are used
appropriately and to maximum effect. Working with HUD's Office of the
Inspector General (OIG), we have taken several important steps to
strike this balance in Sandy recovery. The Sandy recovery has afforded
HUD and the OIG new opportunities to collaborate in efforts to ensure a
timely and fiscally sound recovery, including monthly conference calls
to identify shared areas of concern and to coordinate monitoring and
auditing strategies.
resilience initiatives
Historically, disaster recovery has focused on returning community
assets to the location and condition that existed before the storm. The
increased frequency and extreme nature of weather events, however,
demands a new focus on disaster mitigation and ensuring the resiliency
of Federal investments in housing, business, and infrastructure. The
resilience policies arising from Sandy recovery include the elevation
of substantially damaged homes above the base flood elevation
requirements and resilience performance standards for infrastructure.
HUD is also investing new Federal resources in disaster mitigation
initiatives to serve as models for communities Nation-wide as they
prepare for the next disaster.
Rebuild by Design
HUD allocated $930 million under the Act for flood mitigation
projects developed through Rebuild by Design or ``RBD.'' RBD was a
planning and design competition to increase resilience in the Sandy-
affected region. RBD was administered by HUD under the America COMPETES
Reauthorization Act, in partnership with philanthropic, academic, and
nonprofit organizations. HUD solicited the best talent and ideas from
around the world to seek innovative solutions for communities working
to rebuild and adapt in response to the disaster and to the future
risks presented by natural hazards and climate change.
The RBD competition resulted in the selection of 7 projects across
the region, including one particularly innovative project that is
underway right now, here on Staten Island.
Sandy was particularly devastating for the Island's South Shore,
with Tottenville, on the Island's southernmost point, experiencing some
of the region's most destructive waves. Today, through RBD, New York
State is investing $60 million of CDBG-DR funds to construct a system
of in-water breakwaters in Tottenville. These breakwaters will be
constructed of a concrete and recycled glass composite and will be
seeded with oysters that will proliferate and physically grow the
breakwater over time. This project, ``Living Breakwaters,'' is designed
to provide the risk reduction associated with breakwaters along with
environmental benefits--including improved water quality and new marine
habitat. Once completed, Living Breakwaters will form a ``necklace'' of
in-water structures along this stretch of Staten Island's South Shore.
Living Breakwaters is also notable for its connection to other
CDBG-DR investments that are underway here and are designed to make
Staten Island more resilient to the next storm. Through its CDBG-DR-
funded Community Reconstruction program, the State is investing $6.75
million in the Tottenville Shoreline Protection Project, which entails
new flood risk management features as an additional coastal resiliency
strategy for the area. These investments are in addition to the tens of
millions of dollars in CDBG-DR funds expended by the State on Staten
Island to buy out homeowners whose homes remain in harm's way and the
tens of millions more in CDGB-DR funds expended by the city of New York
to elevate homes on the Island and to make them more resilient.
Across the Arthur Kill and the Kill Van Kull in New Jersey, $230
million of RBD investments are also helping the cities of Hoboken,
Weehawken, and Jersey City develop a new urban water strategy through
the ``Resist, Delay, Store, and Discharge'' project. The project will
include flood barriers designed to blend into the urban environment,
green infrastructure elements and water pumping and discharge systems
to better protect these low-lying communities from future flooding
events. HUD's investment there is being further supported by $146
million of Federal Transit funds to better protect the critical
transportation infrastructure that is so important to not only New
Jersey, but to New York as well. Federal and local coordination on
these investments ensures that transit planning and investment is
integrated with community development and resilience efforts.
Across the harbor, the city of New York will invest $335 million of
CDBG-DR funds for an RBD project to protect the vulnerable communities
located in the floodplain on Manhattan's eastside, including thousands
of public housing residents Through the Eastside Coastal Resiliency
project, the city will build a flood risk management system that will
include: (1) A landscaped berm or related risk reduction methods in
East River Park and its adjacent areas; (2) permanent and deployable
walls and pavilions within East River Park and its adjacent areas; (3)
new or improved bridges over the Franklin D. Roosevelt East River
Drive; and/or (4) related public amenities.
national disaster resilience competition
In January 2016, Secretary Castro announced the winners of the
National Disaster Resilience Competition (NDRC), which exemplifies an
expanded commitment by HUD to support State and local efforts to better
prepare for the next disaster. NDRC projects are the result of an
extensive community-led planning process and reflect an understanding
by those communities that: (i) The costs of recovery from future
disasters can be reduced by investments today in innovative and
workable mitigation and resilience strategies; and (ii) investments in
mitigation and resilience can also grow the local economy.
HUD allocated nearly $1 billion of CDBG-DR funds provided under the
Act to the NDRC in order to support grassroots-driven investment in new
resilient infrastructure and housing, including $176 million for the
city of New York and $35 million for New York State.
The NDRC took place in two phases, with final winners selected from
40 States and local communities that were designated as finalists. The
40 finalists were asked to submit specific projects that would advance
their community's resilience plans. More than 25 Federal agencies or
offices, and 100 industry experts were involved in the implementation
of the 16-month long competition. In the end, 13 State and local
governments were selected to receive funds for innovative resilience
projects that will not only help them recover from a recent disaster,
but to better prepare for the next one. The effort benefitted from a
philanthropic partnership with the Rockefeller Foundation, which
dedicated $8 million to teaching competing jurisdictions best practices
in the growing field of resilience and assisting them with planning.
The range of ideas and strategies emerging from the competition has
been simply remarkable. Initially, $181 million was set aside for
projects in New York and New Jersey, but the Sandy NDRC proposals were
so strong that they were awarded a combined total of $231 million for
the city of New York, New York State, and New Jersey.
Shelby County, Tennessee will invest $60 million of CDBG-DR funding
to create new recreation areas and greenways in the floodplain to
reduce the flood risk in future storms. Minot, North Dakota will use
$74 million of CDBG-DR funds to buy out homes that are in harms' way,
restore open space, and construct new affordable housing away from
high-risk areas but with better access to transit, jobs, and services--
strengthening community prospects for economic growth and mobility. The
State of Iowa will receive more than $96 million to monitor and improve
nine watersheds State-wide that were impacted by flooding, while also
rehabilitating flood-damaged housing to make it more resilient.
NDRC also recognizes that preparing for natural disasters is not
just about flooding. California will invest more than $70 million of
CDBG-DR funds in response to the 2013 Rim Fire. Since that 2013 event,
large wildfires throughout the State have burned nearly 400,000 acres
and destroyed hundreds of homes and structures. The California NDRC
project will pilot a Community and Watershed Resilience program in
Tuolumne County, through development of a biomass and wood products
facility for biomass removed from the forest through restoration and
thinning. The project also includes community resilience centers to
meet the needs of rural communities in times of disaster while also
providing job training opportunities in forest and watershed
management.
federal and regional coordination in disaster recovery
RBD and NDRC both represent initiatives growing out of the Sandy
recovery that have precipitated new partnerships for HUD and other
Federal, State, and local agencies. Following a disaster, HUD has
historically partnered with FEMA and the Small Business Administration,
to access those agencies' data to determine the unmet housing, economic
revitalization, and infrastructure needs that remain to be addressed
using CDBG-DR funds. Sandy recovery efforts, however, have resulted in
an unprecedented unified Federal and regional recovery effort.
One of the most tangible and successful examples of that
coordination is the Sandy Regional Infrastructure Resilience
Coordination Group (SRIRC), led by HUD and FEMA. The SRIRC is comprised
of Federal, State, and local officials with responsibility for
coordinating the development of Sandy public infrastructure projects.
Beginning in January 2014 and prior to the identification of specific
State and local infrastructure projects, the SRIRC met monthly to
better understand agency funding streams, statutory and regulatory
requirements and other mandates that could impact Federal interagency
coordination to support various types of infrastructure investments.
The SRIRC developed an evolving database that allows it to identify
Federally-supported projects, and to map those projects to identify
geographic areas of overlap where interagency coordination is needed.
The SRIRC has also formed sector-specific teams of Federal, State, and
local officials in the areas such as transportation, energy, and
coastal resilience to focus on project scope and time lines, including
the Federal permitting process and construction sequencing. Grantees
have praised the SRIRC as a useful forum for coordinating the most
complex infrastructure projects, which touch multiple Federal, State,
and local agencies for review and permitting.
The South Shore of Staten Island has benefitted from this new level
of coordination. Federal agencies have taken an area-wide look at
resilience that considers and coordinates short-term and long-term
Federal investments. HUD has supported residential buyouts, dunes, and
breakwaters; FEMA has supported repairs and mitigation at a wastewater
treatment plant and medical center; the National Park Service has
supported remediation and improvements at Great Kills Park; Federal
Highways Administration grants have been provided for road repairs and
improvements; and the Army Corps of Engineers has launched a coastal
storm risk management study.
Perhaps most exciting about this regional coordination is that it
has redefined how Federal agencies are working together. As a result of
our work in assisting the Sandy recovery effort, Federal, State, and
local partners will now be more able to hit the ground running in the
future, in ways previously unknown, because agency staff have a vastly
greater understanding of each other's programs and procedures and we
know the right people to contact for speedy resolution of issues. HUD
has played an important role, working with FEMA to establish the
Unified Federal Review. The UFR was established by 11 Federal
departments and agencies to expedite environmental and historic
preservation reviews for future disaster declarations.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I would be
pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Ms. McFadden.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Zarrilli for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL A. ZARRILLI, CHIEF RESILIENCE OFFICER,
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK
Mr. Zarrilli. Good morning, Chair Donovan and Ranking
Member Payne. My name is Daniel Zarrilli. I am the senior
director for climate policy and programs at the New York City
Mayor's Office. I would like to congratulate Chairman Donovan
on his appointment as Chair of this committee, and on behalf of
Mayor Bill de Blasio I want to thank the Members for this
opportunity to speak about our efforts to build a more prepared
and more resilient city.
Nearly 4 years ago Hurricane Sandy hit New York City with
unprecedented force, tragically killing 44 New Yorkers and
causing over $19 billion in damages and lost economic activity
in the city. Here on Staten Island we saw some of the worst of
Sandy. In the Staten Island University Hospital, where we are
having this discussion today, it was nearly inundated, which is
why we were proud to support the hospital with $28 million for
a resiliency program, and why we are working with so many
partners on critical resiliency investments on Staten Island
and across the city.
Today I plan to briefly describe the city's resiliency
program and how we are investing to ensure that our city will
be ready to withstand and is much stronger from the impacts of
climate change and other 21st Century threats. I also plan to
offer suggestions for how Congress and our Federal partners can
continue to support cities like New York with disaster recovery
and preparing for the inevitable impacts that climate change
will bring.
In the aftermath of Sandy, we put forth a comprehensive
plan to rebuild the neighborhoods hardest hit by Sandy and to
also prepare our city for the impacts of climate change. That
plan, ``A Stronger, More Resilient New York,'' launched our
over $20 billion resiliency program, improving our coastline,
upgrading our buildings, rebuilding homes, improving our
infrastructure, and generally improving our neighborhoods
across the city.
In April 2015, Mayor de Blasio expanded and accelerated
that work through OneNYC program. With OneNYC, we are putting
in place a multi-layered resiliency plan, making our city
safer, and we are holding ourselves accountable for these
results by publishing an annual progress report of that work,
the last of which was published in April 2016.
In so many ways, Federal support has been critical to these
efforts. We have been blessed with the necessary funding, we
have seen innovation, and we have witnessed challenges along
the way. In the spirit of constructive feedback, I would like
to offer several recommendations for how Congress and our
Federal partners can better support cities as we continue to
recover from Sandy and prepare for the future.
First, in response to Hurricane Sandy, the city and FEMA
developed a hotel sheltering program and our Rapid Repairs
Program, two innovative sheltering solutions tailored to an
urban environment where traditional approaches like trailers
are unworkable. Between November 2012 and September 2013, the
hotel program provided emergency shelter in city hotels to over
1,300 displaced households. Rapid Repairs restored basic
services to over 20,000 flooded homes and helping those
households avoid long-term displacement. Both programs could be
a model for responding to displacement in the future.
Second, Congress authorized an innovative FEMA public
assistance pilot program called Section 428. To date, the city
has been the single biggest user of this program, with nearly
$5.9 billion worth of infrastructure investments underway. This
more flexible and accountable program should be made a
permanent feature of the Federal Government's disaster response
and resiliency toolkit.
Third, FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program requires
fundamental reform. Congress should act to expand mitigation
options and funding, including increasing pre-disaster
mitigation funding and offering partial credit on insurance
premiums for partial mitigation measures; and No. 2, to ensure
the affordability of flood insurance for those most in need of
its coverage.
Fourth, the city is working toward a successful resolution
to its appeal of FEMA's 2015 flood insurance rate maps, which
we have demonstrated overstate the size of the city's 100-year
flood plain due to inaccuracies in FEMA's underlying analysis.
We urge FEMA to resolve the appeal and adopt accurate flood
maps for the city.
Fifth, FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program has been a
mechanism for the city to fund long-term and cost-effective
resiliency projects, but to ensure that funds go where they are
needed most, FEMA should consider issuing guidance to States to
direct a fair share of HMGP dollars to local jurisdictions most
affected by disaster.
Sixth, climate change is proving we need to improve Federal
coordination to expedite implementation of key projects. For
example, as you noted, although $32 million in USDA funds have
been secured for bluebelts here on Staten Island, it is
stalling because USDA and Army Corps can't agree on
conservation easements. Benefit/cost ratios could be
rationalized across agencies since each agency has its own
methodology. These methodologies should be amended to support
faster recovery and improved so as not to disadvantage low-
income communities when comparing mitigation projects.
Similarly, Congress should also urge Federal agencies to
coordinate environmental reviews when multiple agencies
contribute funding to a single project.
Finally, as we all know, fuel shortages plagued the city
for weeks after Hurricane Sandy, and the lack of information
sharing regarding the fuel supply made decision making
difficult. Congress should urge the Department of Energy to
establish data-sharing requirements for the industry to report
critical facility-specific information.
To conclude, as our understanding of the impacts of climate
change continues to improve, we are improving now to reduce
risk and prepare for the future. This requires even greater
partnership with Congress and the Federal Government to support
local climate adaptation. We thank our Federal partners here
today for their tireless work to support recovery and
resiliency in New York City and urge them to continue to help
us maintain our momentum as we build a more resilient city.
I would like to thank Chairman Donovan and Ranking Member
Payne for their leadership as we work together to confront the
challenges that climate change will bring to our Nation. Thank
you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Zarrilli follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daniel A. Zarrilli
July 11, 2016
introduction
Good afternoon. My name is Daniel Zarrilli and I am the senior
director for climate policy and programs and the chief resilience
officer at the New York City Mayor's Office. I want to congratulate
Congressman Donovan on his recent appointment as chair of the
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications.
On behalf of New York City, we are honored to have a New Yorker in this
unique position of leadership. I would like to thank the Chairman and
all the Members for the opportunity to speak today about New York
City's experience building a more prepared and resilient city.
Nearly 4 years ago, Hurricane Sandy hit New York City with
unprecedented force, tragically killing 44 New Yorkers, and causing
over $19 billion in damages and lost economic activity. Neighborhoods
were devastated: 88,700 buildings were flooded; 23,400 businesses were
impacted; and our region's infrastructure was seriously disrupted. Over
2,000,000 residents were without power for weeks and fuel shortages
persisted for over a month. In short, Sandy highlighted New York City's
vulnerability to climate change and rising seas and underscores the
actions we've taken since then to build a stronger, more resilient
city.
It is particularly meaningful that we here on the East Shore of
Staten Island at Staten Island University Hospital (SIUH) discussing
resiliency. This neighborhood saw some of the worst of Sandy, and this
hospital was nearly inundated, which is why we were proud to support
the hospital with $28 million for its resiliency program, and why we
are working with many partners on critical neighborhood infrastructure
investments, coastal protections, and housing recovery efforts.
Today, I aim to accomplish two things. First, I would like to walk
the committee through our multi-layered resiliency plan and how we are
making investments to ensure that our neighborhoods, economy, and
public services will be ready to withstand and emerge stronger from the
impacts of climate change and other 21st Century threats. Second, I
would like to offer suggestions on how Congress and our Federal
partners can better support cities with preparing for the inevitable
physical and humanitarian disasters that climate change will bring.
plans for the future
Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency
In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, it was imperative that New
York City emerge from Hurricane Sandy a stronger and more resilient
city--one that did not just prepare for the next storm, but one that
invested against a wider range of threats--all guided by the best
available science. We turned to the New York City Panel on Climate
Change (NPCC), an independent body of leading climate scientists who
advise the Mayor on the latest climate change projections. The latest
projections are challenging.
By the 2050s, according to just the middle-range projections by the
NPCC, average New York City temperatures are projected to increase
between 4.1F and 5.7F, annual precipitation is projected to increase
between 4 and 11 percent, and sea levels are projected to rise between
11 inches and 21 inches, on top of a foot of sea level rise that we
have already witnessed since 1900. And extreme events, like flooding,
are becoming more frequent and more intense. What this means is that a
similar Sandy-like event in 2050 could cause $90 billion in damage and
lost economic activity--compared to Sandy's $19 billion.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For an in-depth look at the NPCC's projections, see, Building
the Knowledge Base for Climate Resilience: New York City Panel on
Climate Change 2015 Report, vol. 1336 of Annals of the New York Academy
of Sciences, January 2015, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
nyas.2015.1336.issue-1/issuetoc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2013, based on these NPCC projections, the Special Initiative
for Rebuilding and Resiliency (or SIRR) put forth a comprehensive plan
to rebuild neighborhoods hardest hit by Sandy and to prepare our city-
wide infrastructure for the future. The resulting document, A Stronger,
More Resilient New York, described the city's $20 billion resiliency
program that is now well underway.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The full version of A Stronger, More Resilient New York can be
found at: http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/html/report/report.shtml.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One New York: The Plan for a Strong and Just City
In April 2015, Mayor de Blasio released the ground-breaking One New
York: The Plan for a Strong and Just City (OneNYC), a strategic plan
for inclusive growth and climate action.\3\ OneNYC, supported by our
partnership with 100 Resilient Cities, expanded and accelerated that
SIRR program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The full version of One New York: The Plan for a Strong and
Just City can be found at: http://www.nyc.gov/html/onenyc/downloads/
pdf/publications/OneNYC.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It also injected a focus on equity into the city's climate
resiliency program. Equity and climate change are inescapably linked.
Although climate change affects everyone, its impacts are not equally
felt. Simply put, the poorest and most vulnerable are the hardest hit
and least able to recover. That is why addressing the growing economic
and social inequality facing the city's most vulnerable communities is
now at the heart of our resiliency work.
Putting Our Plans into Action
With OneNYC, our multi-layered approach to resiliency encompasses 4
key areas--neighborhoods, buildings, infrastructure, and coastal
defense. I will briefly describe a few key highlights of our
accomplishments in those areas.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ One April 22, 2016, Mayor De Blasio released the OneNYC 2016
Progress Report, detailing the city's year-to-date progress delivering
on our OneNYC commitments. The full version of the report can found at:
http://www1.nyc.gov/html/onenyc/downloads/pdf/publications/OneNYC-2016-
Progress-Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Neighborhoods
Our neighborhoods--the places where we live, work, and play--are
the first layer of our resiliency efforts. Our goal is to make every
single New Yorker safer by strengthening the social and economic
resiliency of their communities.
We have improved risk communication and emergency preparedness by
updating our evacuation maps, releasing a new comprehensive hazard
mitigation plan, and expanding neighborhood-based programs. We are
investing to make emergency shelter sites accessible to New Yorkers
with disabilities.
We are also focused on small business resiliency. To date, we have
invested over $54 million in Sandy impacted small businesses. We have
also created over 2,000 jobs and hired over 900 residents from Sandy-
impacted areas, continuing our commitment to ensure that New Yorkers
have opportunities to participate in the recovery process in their
neighborhoods.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ For an extensive list of city's resiliency projects currently
underway, please visit: https://maps.nyc.gov/resiliency/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Buildings
The second layer is working to upgrade the city's buildings to
withstand climate change impacts. Sandy showed us that structures built
to the latest codes perform well in storms and better protect their
inhabitants. We have learned from this and have already upgraded the
city's building codes, including 16 new local laws to account for
vulnerabilities related to extreme weather and climate change.
Infrastructure
The third layer of the city's multilayered resiliency strategy is
adapting the city's infrastructure and supply chains to climate
impacts. We are directly investing billions of dollars into the city's
infrastructure and we are collaborating with our many regional
infrastructure partners to ensure that their investments align with the
city's vision for resiliency and affordability.
Coastal Defense
Finally, the fourth layer of our OneNYC resiliency program is
strengthening our coastal defenses against sea level rise, wave action,
and storm surge. When Sandy struck, our coastal defenses were nearly
non-existent. In response to the devastation, the city released and
began implementing its first-ever comprehensive coastal protection
plan. Using this as a foundation, OneNYC aims to further reduce the
city's coastal vulnerabilities.
supporting cities
As we seek to implement this recovery and resiliency program,
Federal support has been critical. Throughout the recovery process, we
have seen the innovations that Federal agencies can make to adjust to
the specific challenges of urban disasters, and we have also witnessed
their limitations. The converging effects of urbanization and climate
change present an enormous challenge to cities, which in turn, will
require even greater Federal support. I would now like to offer several
options for how Congress and our Federal partners can better support
cities with preparing for the magnitude and urgency of climate change.
Support Urban Mass Shelter Programs
First, the city's FEMA-funded programs to shelter New Yorkers
displaced by Hurricane Sandy is a clear example of what works.
Sheltering survivors displaced by a disaster is a challenge
anywhere, but is often made far more complex in a densely-populated
urban environment, like New York, where traditional approaches (such as
trailers) are unworkable.\6\ Sandy displaced nearly 70,000 people
across the city, completely overwhelming our emergency shelter options.
In response, the city in partnership with FEMA developed the Hotel
Essential Sheltering Program (HESP) and the Rapid Repairs Program
(RRP), two innovative sheltering solutions tailored to an urban
environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ For in-depth look at the success of the Rapid Repairs Program
see Danielle Baussan and Miranda Peterson, Lessons from the Storm,
Center for American Progress, October 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Between November 18, 2012 and September 30, 2013 HESP, provided
safe emergency shelter in hotels across the city to over 1,300
households displaced due to the storm. RRP restored heat, hot water,
and power to affected residences and sealed up damaged building
envelopes, thereby reducing the demand for other shelter options and
allowing individuals to return to or remain in their homes. In total,
RRP helped 20,000 households avoid long-term displacement by restoring
basic services in less than 4 months and significant savings to the
taxpayer.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ A study by FEMA's chief economist found that temporary housing
in three events prior to Sandy cost on average $173,000 per unit. The
unit cost for RRP was approximately $30,700 per unit. See Darlene
Bouma, Chief Economist to Brad Kieserman, Chief Counsel, December 3,
2012, FEMA Preliminary Business Case for Sheltering and Temporary
Essential Power (STEP) Pilot Program. FEMA-4085-DR-NY.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Both programs allowed the city to prevent a public health crisis
and provide sheltering in a cost-effective way.\8\ And although Rapid
Repairs was ad hoc, it worked. Had the city not been limited by red
tape, it would have worked even better since we are now returning to
some of these same homes in our Build it Back program. Nevertheless,
Rapid Repairs was a clear success and, with the right support, could be
a model for responding to mass displacement in urban contexts in the
future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\[Sic.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Make FEMA's 428 Program Permanent
Second, Congress authorized an innovative Public Assistance pilot
program called Section 428, designed to expedite disaster recovery,
improve flexibility to support better mitigation investments, and
reduce overall administrative costs.
To date, the city has been the single biggest user of this program,
with nearly $5.9 billion worth of Section 428 projects. From our point
of view, this program has been a success; the capped grants incentivize
efficiency while providing flexibility to reprogram funds when needed
for enhanced mitigation. We support the Section 428 Program and believe
it should be made a permanent feature of the Federal Government's
disaster response and resiliency toolkit.
Reform FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program
Third, FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) requires
fundamental reform. Thanks to Congressional action in 2014, devastating
rate increases have been slowed down, but the risks of continued
premium increases, foreclosures, and loss of value remains.
The NFIP is due to be reauthorized in 2017. Congress should act to:
(1) Better protect ratepayers and taxpayers by mandating FEMA to expand
mitigation options and funding, including increasing pre-disaster
mitigation funding and offering partial credit on insurance premiums
for partial mitigation measures that make sense for the building stock
of a dense urban environment, and (2) ensure affordability of flood
insurance for those least able to pay for this vital financial product
based on the National Academy of Sciences affordability reports. This
is an urgent matter given that flooding is the fastest-growing and most
costly natural disaster in the country, a problem which climate change
will only make worse.
Ensure FEMA's Flood Maps are Accurate
Fourth, the city is working towards a successful resolution to its
appeal of FEMA's 2015 Preliminary Flood Insurance Rate Maps, which
overstate the size of the city's 100-year floodplain due to
inaccuracies in FEMA's underlying analysis, which ultimately affects
not just the city and Westchester, but much of coastal New Jersey as
well. Conveying flood risk accurately to our residents is among the
city's top priorities. Inaccurate FIRMs would not only undermine the
integrity upon which the city's resiliency program rests. They would
place an unnecessary financial burden on low and moderate income
residents. Accurate flood maps are also critical to the success of the
NFIP. That is why the city is urging FEMA to resolve the appeal and
adopt accurate flood maps, consistent with the city's appeal, as
quickly as possible.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The city has been collaborating on this issue with regional
partners including the Port Authority of NY & NJ, who recently won
their mapping appeal at Newark Liberty International Airport.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improve FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
Fifth, FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) has been a
useful mechanism for New York City to fund long-term and cost-effective
resiliency projects. Through Section 404 of the Stafford Act, this
post-disaster grant is available after a Presidential declaration, and
funds are awarded to States based on a percentage of State-wide damage.
In practice, this means that funds may not necessarily be directed
to areas that suffered the greatest damage. For example, New York City
incurred nearly 70 percent of Sandy-related damage in New York State
but received less than 30 percent of HMGP funds. To ensure funds go
where they are needed most, FEMA should consider issuing guidance to
States to direct a fair share of HMGP dollars to jurisdictions affected
by the applicable disaster declaration.
Improving Federal Coordination
Sixth, climate change is proving that we need every tool at our
disposal to mitigate its effects. This means cities like New York are
looking to Congress to expand funding eligibility and improve Federal
coordination for flood mitigation strategies, like stormwater pumps and
storage tanks, as well as non-structural measures like bluebelts and
green infrastructure, to manage the risks from coastal flooding and
heavy rainfall.
For example, although $32 million in Federal USDA Emergency
Watershed Protection funds has been secured for an award-winning
Bluebelt Project here on Staten Island, it is stalling because the USDA
and USACE cannot agree on conservation easements at the project site.
Both Federal agencies want to use the land for the exact same thing.
Congress should continue to underscore the imperative that both Federal
agencies come to an agreement immediately.
We are also looking to Congress to help rationalize how Federal
agencies calculate their benefit-cost ratios, since each agency has its
own methodology. These methodologies should be streamlined to support
faster recovery and mitigation investments. Furthermore, benefit-cost
ratios are biased by higher property values, placing lower-income
communities at a disadvantage when comparing mitigation projects.
Similarly, Congress should also urge Federal agencies to coordinate
environmental review policies. For example, HUD and FEMA fund the same
projects here in the city. However, despite HUD performing an
environmental review, FEMA may not allow a project to move forward
until its own review is complete. As a result, vital housing resiliency
projects are often delayed by these duplicate efforts and
administrative burdens.
Improve Situational Awareness of the Liquid Fuel Supply
And finally, New York City experienced fuel shortages for weeks
following Hurricane Sandy. The lack of data and information sharing
regarding the fuel supply and movements created a situation where
public-sector officials were unable to maintain adequate situational
awareness to make sound public safety decisions. Congress should urge
the Department of Energy to establish data-sharing requirements for the
industry to report critical information on a facility-specific basis.
Federal agencies should also consider conducting regional exercises and
drills to address fuel supply product emergencies or shortages.
conclusion
To conclude, our understanding of the impacts of climate change
continues to improve, highlighting the actions that we must take to
reduce risk and prepare for the future. To do this, we will require an
expanded partnership with Congress and the Federal Government to better
support local climate preparedness and resiliency. We thank our Federal
partners here today for their tireless work to support recovery and
resiliency in New York City and urge them to help us maintain our
momentum as we build a more resilient city. And I'd like to thank
Chairman Donovan and the committee Members for their leadership as we
work together to confront the challenges that climate change will bring
to our Nation. Thank you.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Zarrilli.
I thank each of you not only for your testimony today but
for your service to our Nation, particularly the communities
which Don and I represent.
We have a few questions for the panel. I will begin just by
asking Mr. Byrne, one of the big projects that I spoke about
that Staten Island is very concerned with is the sea wall that
is being constructed by the Army Corps of Engineers. It is our
understanding that they are building this to specifications
that FEMA has set, standards that FEMA has set, so that the
people who live in the flood maps will see reductions in the
premiums to their flood insurance. It would also include
mitigation in those premiums for people who still live in the
parts of the flood zone that still need the wall to be built.
Is that coming along as we all believe it to be?
Mr. Byrne. Yes, Mr. Chairman. First of all, we are working
closely with the Corps on this. The Corps clearly understands
what the threshold is to allow us to act. It is really what we
call the
50/100 percent rule. It is 50 percent complete, 100 percent
funded. The Corps is well aware of this. We are in regular
contact with them on this, and we will take the actions that
are appropriate once those two thresholds are met.
Mr. Donovan. Wonderful. Thank you.
I would like to ask yourself and Ms. McFadden if you could
explain to me, as I said also in my testimony, that the housing
stock in New York is different than it is in other parts of our
country. Many of our residents live in attached housing,
whether it be in row houses or townhouses, or whether it be in
an apartment building. It is near impossible for the residents
of those types of housing to be able to abide by the elevation
standards that are required in order to find relief in their
premiums for their insurance.
Is HUD, is FEMA, is anybody working on factors that those
folks can mitigate to protect their homes without elevating
that will allow them to see the same relief in their flood
insurance premiums as others who are elevating are seeing?
Ms. McFadden. Yes, Congressman, I agree that this is a real
problem, and we are working very closely with FEMA, as well as
with the city of New York, to see what flexibility we can find.
But it is a tough problem in that we want to be careful about
not putting people back in harm's way, but also be sensitive
about the fact that people want to return to their homes, and
there is a shortage of housing here in the region.
Mr. Byrne. We certainly recognize that. In fact, a program
that you and Mr. Zarrilli pointed out, the Rapid Repair
Program, is an example where we recognized that. We came into
the city. We had our toolbox of ways that we dealt with
transitional housing, and it just didn't work here. We had to
come up with something innovative. We certainly pushed the
edges of our authority to do so, and we are really proud of
working with the city and the State that that was a success. We
have to do something similar here with these issues.
The important thing about our programs when they are
related to that type of hazard mitigation program is they are
locally-driven. New York is really a grouping of neighborhoods,
and each neighborhood has got to get involved in what the right
solution for them will be, and that is how our programs are
designed, that the local community gets a say, the State gets a
say, and then we try to find the solution together.
Mr. Donovan. I understand that, aside from elevation, there
are measures that a community can take to protect not just an
individual home but a community as a whole that would, first of
all, reduce the risk of flood in those homes, and second allow
those folks to see a reduction in their insurance. I think what
our residents need is some guidance on what are those measures
a community could take, and we look forward to hearing from
you, not today but in the future. I have written to the
administrators of both of your agencies asking for some
guidance on what our residents can do to mitigate when it is
impossible to elevate their home.
My time is running out. I just wanted to ask my friend Dan
Zarrilli--Dan, I know there were some difficulties coordinating
grants. I know a lot of our residents were misinformed or not
informed particularly with taking out SBA loans and then later
on finding out that they were ineligible for other relief
because they had taken out a loan. When they asked can we pay
the loan back and get the grant relief, they were told no,
since you took the SBA loan. That was, I think, the fault of
all of us for not informing people who were trying to do the
right thing and be responsible, taking out loans to start the
repair work, that if they hadn't taken that loan out they would
have been eligible for money that they wouldn't have had to pay
back.
So I don't know if through your experience, in all the
projects you have worked on, when you found that information
being passed down from various Federal agencies makes it more
difficult if information wasn't being passed down to you, if
information was being passed down that was not coordinated with
every agency that was involved, I just want to open that up to
you.
Mr. Zarrilli. Well, I think one thing that I was talking
about the challenges, that those dollars that come, the CDBG
dollars that come without the payback provisions were not
authorized until 3 months after the storm. So the timing, I
think, was the challenge, that people were out telling
residents here are the different sources available to you. The
other sources were not yet known, and so there was an
information disconnect on how those programs could work
together ultimately.
So I think in an ideal world we would know what the full
Federal response would be at that moment and we could advise
accordingly.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
My time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from New
Jersey, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am just kind-of piggybacking on what the Chairman's
questions were. Mr. Byrne and Ms. McFadden, that process for
individuals applying for assistance after a disaster is fairly
complicated. It is really a paperwork nightmare, chock-full of
different eligibility criteria and document requirements and
often requires trips to various offices.
What efforts are underway to simplify this process for
disaster survivors after this experience with Superstorm Sandy?
Mr. Byrne. We recognize that, first of all, all these
programs are designed to try to help, and that is our guiding
light as we go into it. Early on in the disaster we tried to
house all the organizations in the same place. Certainly we
worked with the city. The city set up some locations, and we
set up what we called Disaster Recovery Centers, where we will
bring everybody together to try to make the process easier.
We do have, each of our agencies, responsibility to have
internal controls, and to the extent that we can make those
similar to make it easier, we are committed to doing so. One of
the ways we do it, because one of the things that makes this a
bit of a challenge is the privacy restrictions on people's
personal information, we do have ways that, especially when it
comes to working with non-profits, that we have what we call
Routine Use Agreements, where our lawyers get together and they
work out where we can share this information and that the
people are OK with us sharing this information.
But there is certainly more work we could do. We are
committed to doing that. We recognize that speed to target,
speed to assistance is one of the greatest impacts of having a
faster recovery, and we are committed to do what it takes to do
that.
Mr. Payne. Yes, because you would think in a disaster such
as this, flooding or a hurricane, that there is accessibility
to some of the documentation that you are going to require was
probably lost in the disaster. So it kind-of exacerbates the
expediting of this help.
Ms. McFadden.
Ms. McFadden. At HUD, our program money goes to the States
and local governments who set up their own programs. One of the
challenges we hear is the amount of time it takes them to set
up those programs. So we have invested in a toolkit that
includes sample documents for them to set up, including
applications for assistance for individuals. We also have been
encouraging greater outreach from the beginning of the
disaster. We certainly learned lessons in New Jersey about the
importance of getting to particularly low- and moderate-income
communities and people of limited English proficiency. So we
are working more closely to ensure that those recommendations
are made to grantees right at the front end.
Mr. Payne. My next question kind-of piggybacks on that.
With the funding going to the State and local governments, many
have called into question New Jersey's ability to effectively
carry out disaster recovery programs following Superstorm
Sandy. In light of allegations that the Christie administration
played politics with the disaster relief money and dragged
their feet on distributing funds to those who needed it most,
how does FEMA and HUD oversee administration of State and
Federal disaster funds and ensure that the investments are not
politically motivated? How can you help ensure that the funds
are spent efficiently and go to where they are needed?
Mr. Byrne. Representative Payne, all of our programs have
rigid guidelines of criteria for eligibility and for what types
of things they can be spent on. There has to be loss when it
comes to some of the areas that are impacted. Probably the
program that we have that has the most flexibility for the
State and local governments is the Hazard Mitigation Program
where a portion, 25 cents on the dollar, is put into a pool and
the State can have a look State-wide as to what their major
risks are. That is not to say that there aren't still
requirements, that there aren't still things that have to be
looked at, there aren't still criteria that we evaluate
regularly and routinely to make sure that we are getting the
best bang for the buck.
Ms. McFadden. The design of the CDBG program puts the
controls in the State's hands to design the program, and once
that program is designed and set up, HUD is monitoring it very
closely, as well as our Office of Inspector General, to get on
the ground to make sure that those funds are being done. We
meet with the State at least quarterly, either for a monitoring
visit or for a technical assistance visit, and more frequently
than that have conversations with them to check on updates. We
also talk with community groups to get their input to see how
things are going.
Mr. Payne. I would hope that there could be a mechanism
that determines, based on past experience and criteria, that
the State is moving, that you see efforts for them moving
forward, as opposed to not dragging their feet with these
funds. You would know best whether they are trying to work in a
timely manner or not, and then suggest to them that they move
forward in a more expeditious manner. So hopefully that can be
something that is incorporated into the milestones that they
need to meet.
With that, Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Donovan. I thank the witnesses for their valuable
testimony today. I thank you for sharing your expertise in the
measures that we took before, during, and after Superstorm
Sandy. I certainly appreciate your suggestions for what we
should do in the future.
This panel is dismissed. I will ask the clerk to arrange
the table for the next panel. Thank you.
[Pause.]
Mr. Donovan. I would like to welcome our second panel to
today's hearing and thank them for their participation.
Mr. Vincent Ignizio serves as the chief executive officer
of Catholic Charities of Staten Island, a position he has held
since July 2015. Prior to joining Catholic Charities, Mr.
Ignizio served as the minority leader of the New York City
Council and as a New York State Assemblyman representing
southern Staten Island.
Welcome, Mr. Ignizio.
Mr. Ignizio. Thank you, Chairman Donovan, esteemed Members
of the subcommittee--oh, I'm sorry, pardon me. I am already
rolling right into it.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Donovan. A very aggressive witness.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
Mr. Brad Gair currently serves as the vice president of
emergency management and enterprise resilience at NYU Langone
Medical Center. He previously served as the founding director
of the Mayor's Office of Housing and Recovery Operations and
was the local recovery manager in the aftermath of Hurricane
Sandy. He also served as deputy commissioner of the New York
City Office of Emergency Management and as Federal recovery
officer for the World Trade Center after 9/11. Mr. Gair is
testifying today as a private subject-matter expert. He is not
representing any agency.
Ms. Donna Moravick serves as the executive director of
Southside Hospital. She previously served as vice president of
Cardiovascular Services for Northwell and director of the North
Shore University Hospital and Long Island Jewish Medical Center
Department of Cardiovascular and Thoracic Surgery.
Ms. Kelly Higgs serves as the disaster recovery and
resiliency coordinator for the New Jersey Voluntary
Organizations Active in Disaster, a position she has held since
October 2013. Prior to her current role, Ms. Higgs served for
more than 20 years in non-profit management and consulting.
The witnesses' full written testimony will appear in the
record.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Ignizio for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF VINCENT M. IGNIZIO, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF STATEN ISLAND, STATEN ISLAND, NEW YORK
Mr. Ignizio. All right. Thank you, Congressman, for the
second time. I beg your indulgence. I am having a vision issue,
so if you see me squint or look funny, I am having a problem
with my contacts, so bear that in mind. I will paraphrase some
of my testimony, and my testimony is submitted for the record,
Mr. Chairman.
I believe I have the unique position of being in the non-
profit sector after having been an elected official during
Sandy over 3\1/2\ years ago. I can't believe it has been that
long, and yet it feels like yesterday.
I am grateful for the invitation to speak before you, Mr.
Chairman, as I have before the U.S. Senate on recovery. As the
representative for the South Shore, I first-hand saw what
worked, saw what didn't work, and what needs improvement out
here on Staten Island.
During the evening of the storm, I found myself, as Staten
Island quite often does, alone, because what happens is they
shut the bridges down, and then Staten Island is on its own.
The best efforts of the pre-deployed assets only worked so much
depending on what was pre-deployed here. What we found is that
there was not a sufficient amount of pre-deployed assets in the
borough, and then when they shut the bridges down because of
the winds, because of the rain, Staten Island is really on its
own.
This is not a criticism. It is just a fact of life of being
on an island.
Borough president and then-New York City Councilman and I
found ourselves on Facebook trying to assist the police and
fire department about where people were stuck in their homes.
9-1-1 either was not working or was overburdened, causing an
issue for the police department to try to find and assist
people.
The surge was what was the greatest impact here on Staten
Island, as you know, Mr. Chairman, and a countless amount of
homes were damaged. The morning after, eerily quiet. With much
of the power on Staten Island out, the internet, phones and
smartphones were inoperable. Even as an elected official, I
couldn't communicate the plight of my constituents with City
Hall, as there were no ways to communicate with them. I
actually found a way at the end of Arden Avenue to finally
reach a cell tower in your home State, Mr. Payne, of New
Jersey. We actually picked up a signal from Keansburg. I wonder
to today why our cell system was out and some duplicative
systems that need to be in place to ensure that emergency
communication would occur in those situations.
Emergency shelters were soon swamped with donations and
neighbors trying to help each other. It actually became a
burden to the shelter system itself, and Catholic Charities
really became the assistance in that. They agreed to set up a
distribution center which would help provide assistance to the
citizens in supplies, everything from water, which subsequently
became sheetrock, which subsequently became helping rebuilding
their homes. It is appropriate to note that New York City has a
hazy remembrance of this scenario in that we have been working
very hard with the city administration to try to receive some
sort of reimbursement for the time that our facility was
utilized with the massive amount of trucks and the
infrastructure cost that we absorbed. We are working with them.
We hope to have a solution in short order.
Since Hurricane Sandy dealt a blow to our community, we
have all been working together for a better Staten Island
response, non-profit organizations overall. We at Catholic
Charities became the distribution center to the South Shore to
build a rapid repair center, as well as the case management
center for people in need. Our board chairman, Jerry McEnerney,
Monsignor Sullivan, who leads all of Catholic Charities for the
New York Archdiocese, played a vital role in ensuring this
partnership would serve the community needs first and foremost.
We knew we needed to act expeditiously, and that is the
real lesson that we learned. The first people on the ground,
Mr. Chairman and Congressman, were the non-profit
organizations. They go out--your churches, your local churches,
your faith-based organizations, they go out and they help
people first while Government has to work through the processes
that are mandated by the system.
What we are doing now is we have learned to plan, to pre-
deploy even in the communities in the non-profit organizations.
Toward that end, we have partnered with Guyon Rescue, a local
organization that helps communities and families after Sandy
house a trailer on our campus, which would be stocked with
needs, God forbid, of a future emergency that would allow for a
quick and rapid deployment.
Staten Island organizations as a whole have been working
together to better understand the resources we each have and
how we can use them more efficiently. Non-profit organizations
like the Jewish Community Center, Project Hospitality, and
local churches have been working on emergency preparedness
planning individually in their own group, and then as a group,
on how we can all work together.
Working together with government on all levels will ensure
that we learn the lessons from the past while making us ready
for the future, God forbid a storm comes our way. With just 1
year of this job under my belt, I can say that non-profit
organizations are working very hard. Having this committee
meeting on Staten Island is a strong statement, Mr. Chairman,
and I commend you for doing so.
So much has changed on Staten Island, but Staten Island has
really come out stronger than it was before. We still have much
to learn and hope your commitment and great staff can assist us
in making sure that we are better prepared.
In closing, I wanted to thank the great corporate partners
that we had during Sandy to assist us as well, everything from
Tyson Chicken to Walmart to faith-based organizations from
across the country. There are too many to name, but they were
here and they were assisting us when we needed it most. The
massive allocation of Federal funds was and is appreciated. We
have made and will continue to make Staten Island stronger and
more resilient than it was prior to the storm. We only hope
that the larger projects still in the planning stages will come
sooner than later and, God forbid, a storm hits again.
We at Catholic Charities of Staten Island fully intend on
being part of the solution and welcome any questions and
feedback you have for us.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ignizio follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vincent M. Ignizio
July 11, 2016
Chairman Donovan, esteemed Members of the Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications, my name is Vincent Ignizio
and I am currently the CEO of Catholic Charities of Staten Island. I
have the unique position of being in the non-profit sector now having
been an elected official when Sandy struck our shores over 3 years ago.
I am grateful for the invitation to speak today as I previously have
before the United States Senate on Sandy Recovery matters as well.
As the NYC Council representative for the south shore of Staten
Island, I saw first-hand what worked, what didn't work, and what needs
to be improved god forbid another storm comes our way.
During the evening of the storm Staten Island found itself as it
quite often does--alone. Despite the best hopes of pre-deployed city
and State assets, when a major storm is at its height our bridges
close, the ferry stops running, and Staten Island is virtually on its
own.
Let me be clear, this is not a criticism, it is the fact of being
an island when a serious storm comes our way. What made matters worse
that infamous night is that the 9-1-1 system was either inoperable,
congested, or both.
Borough President Oddo, then a NYC Councilman like myself was using
Facebook throughout the night to help police and fire officials find
those in need and/or trapped in their homes. What made matters worse is
that Hurricane Irene came and went without the damage predicted. This
led people into a false sense of security that sadly cost some their
lives.
The surge is what was the greatest impact on Staten Island and with
more than 2 dozen deaths and countless amounts of homes damaged, the
morning after was eerily quiet.
With much of the power out on Staten Island, cell towers, internet,
phones, and smartphones were inoperable. As an elected official I could
not communicate the plight of my constituents to City Hall in that we
had no access to any communication devices that would work.
Gasoline was difficult to come by in that most pumps utilize
electricity to operate as well.
I myself went out to the end of Arden Avenue to try to get a signal
on my cell phone from NJ--which I was fortunately able to do. I ask to
this day, why did the towers in Keansburg work and not ours?
Emergency shelters were soon swamped with donations and neighbors
trying to help each other. This actually became a burden to the shelter
system and the city reached out to Catholic Charities to ease the
burden. They agreed to set up a distribution center which would help
provide assistance to citizens in need of supplies from water to sheet
rock and everything in between.
It is appropriate at this point to advise the committee that NYC
has a hazy memory as of late when it comes to this point and we have
been unable to secure any reimbursement funding for the time our
buildings were off line due to the city's requested need. We as a local
non-profit were happy to help and yet disappointed at the current
administration which has refused to offset the costs we incurred and
damage to our physical plant while assisting.
Since Hurricane Sandy dealt its blow to the community we have all
been working hard to strengthen Staten Island's response. Sadly the
storm itself allowed us to look at what would be needed as institutions
and individuals alike.
We at Catholic Charities became the distribution center for the
south shore, the build-it-back center, the rapid repair center, as well
as the case-management site for those seeking assistance in our area.
Our Board Chairman Gerard McEnerney and Monsignor Sullivan, who leads
all of Catholic Charities in the New York Archdiocese, played the vital
role in ensuring the partnership was one that served the community and
its needs first and foremost. We knew we needed to act as expeditiously
as possible as the need for assistance grew with every hour after the
storm hit.
We learned the vital and rapid role NPOs play in the community when
governments are just beginning to ramp up responses or unable to
address one's specific needs in short order.
In fact we have learned that having a plan to pre-deploy supplies
in case of emergencies is beneficial to both Government and the NPO
alike in case of a future disaster.
Towards that end we have partnered with Guyon Rescue a local
organization that helped countless families after Sandy store a trailer
on our campus that will be stocked with emergency supplies. This will
allow for rapid deployment should the need arise.
Staten Island organizations have been working together to better
understand the resources we have and how we can use them more
efficiently. NPOs like the Jewish Community Center, Project
Hospitality, and local churches have been working on emergency
preparedness and planning individually and as a group.
Working together with Government on all levels will ensure we
learned the lessons from the past while making us ready for the
future--one that we hope will never come.
With just 1 year on the job this coming week I can say that we in
the NPO world recognize the need and vital role we play in helping our
neighbors when emergencies strike. Having the committee on Staten
Island is a strong statement and I want to thank you Mr. Chairman for
your relentless efforts in making this hearing happen and ensuring we
are prepared and receiving our fair share.
So much has changed and yet Staten Island has come out of all this
stronger than before. We still have much to learn and hope your
committee and great staff can assist us in making sure we are in fact
better prepared.
In closing I want to thank all the great corporate partners that
came to assist as well. From Tyson chicken to Walmart to faith-based
organizations from across the country. There are too many to count and
mention here today. Staten Island was fortunate to have such support
and kindness from its neighbors from across this great nation.
The massive allocation of Federal funds was/is appreciated as well.
We have made and will continue to make Staten Island stronger and more
resilient. We only hope the larger projects still in the planning
stages come sooner than later and before we get hit again.
We at Catholic Charities of Staten Island fully intend on being a
part of the solution and welcome any feedback or questions that I have
the ability to field.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Ignizio.
Mr. Gair.
STATEMENT OF BRAD GAIR, PRIVATE CITIZEN
Mr. Gair. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Representative Payne.
My name is Brad Gair. I am currently vice president of
emergency management and enterprise resilience at NYU Langone
Medical Center. After Hurricane Sandy, I was the director of
Housing Recovery Operations in the Mayor's Office, and also
coordinated the city's multi-billion-dollar FEMA recovery
program. Previously I served as deputy commissioner with the
New York City Office of Emergency Management and as a FEMA
Federal coordinating officer, during which time I worked on
numerous large-scale disasters, including serving as the
Federal Recovery Officer in New York City after 9/11 and in
Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina.
I am grateful for this opportunity to address the
subcommittee today. Based upon more than 2 decades of
experience in the business of disaster recovery and resilience,
I offer the following four points for your consideration.
No. 1. We need a National dialog to agree upon recovery
values. As citizens of a caring Nation, we have a natural
inclination to want to help and assist our neighbors after the
devastating losses that accompany large-scale disasters.
Unfortunately, we have yet to agree at the National level upon
how much we should do to aid disaster survivors. As a result,
we have created a series of programs that, in the end, serve
neither the taxpayers nor those families who may have lost
everything. Every time a major disaster occurs in this country,
the same unanswered questions plague recovery efforts: How much
help is fair and reasonable? Should the taxpayers across the
Nation share this burden? Who is responsible for getting
families back into their homes? Why not require insurance? How
much should we invest in making communities more disaster-
resilient, and are there areas where we should not build back
at all? The answers to these questions and many similar ones
depend upon whom you ask.
FEMA's mantra is: ``We are not here to make you whole.''
Does that represent the collective wisdom of our Federal
agencies and our Nation's lawmakers, or is it simply a
rationale for inadequate programs that have filled a vacuum
created by a lack of consensus, unclear guidance, and muddled
authorities? Until we agree upon the basic parameters of post-
disaster assistance grounded in consideration of these types of
issues, even the best-conceived programs would fail to meet the
expectations of the Government, the disaster survivors, and the
American people.
No. 2. Existing recovery programs and resilience programs
are poorly structured and badly implemented. The Federal
Government often speaks of the sequence of delivery and
disaster assistance as if there is a coherent plan behind it
all when in reality it is a series of patchwork programs that,
more than anything else, confuse, frustrate, and demoralize
both those in need of aid and those trying to provide it. Our
existing recovery programs do not work for the majority of
families impacted by disasters, not individually and not
collectively.
The National Flood Insurance Program is broken, possibly
beyond repair. FEMA's cap on assistance to families at barely
$30,000 makes little economic sense. Asking families to take on
new debt through Small Business Administration loans is always
a hard sell to those who have already lost so much. Charitable
organizations trying to fill the gap without sufficient data on
the needs and very little coordination with Government agencies
end up wasting millions of donated dollars, and the HUD CBDG
program, when authorized, is expected to be the magic bullet,
and instead ends up being just another self-inflicted wound for
the Federal Government.
From the Road Home program in post-Hurricane Katrina
Louisiana, to Build-It-Back in post-Sandy New York City, HUD
CBDG programs have generally been categorical failures in
supporting timely and effective housing recovery. Once Congress
authorizes the funds, the process for getting these funds from
the Federal Treasury to those in need is unacceptably long,
inexplicably convoluted, and inexcusably wasteful. It would be
very easy to simply blame bumbling bureaucrats and greedy
contractors, and no doubt we must all do better. But the root
of the problem is that no State and no local government,
regardless of its capability, can successfully create and set
up in a few months what amounts to a multi-billion-dollar
corporation with hundreds of employees and contractors,
numerous store-front locations, a broad-based marketing
campaign, and integrated customer service operations while tens
of thousands of desperate customers must anxiously wait for
help as their hope dwindles.
HUD touts the flexibility of the CDBG-DR, which does indeed
give communities considerable latitude in program design, but I
would trade much of this flexibility for a pre-approved, off-
the-shelf program, complete with reasonable environmental
waivers, a unified damage inspection process, unrestricted data
sharing across the Government to minimize the paperwork burden
on our customers, and a proven electronic case management
system that could be quickly and efficiently operationalized. A
properly-designed recovery program would be integrated with all
other Federal programs to avoid the twin obstacles of excessive
bureaucracy and unavoidable duplications of benefits that
currently lead to extensive delays and universally bad results.
No. 3. Post-disaster coordination across the Federal
agencies is insufficient. In the 10-block stretch along the
East River in Manhattan in the area known as Hospital Row,
FEMA, HUD, and the VA have individually funded hundreds of
millions of dollars of resilience improvements without making
any attempt whatsoever to coordinate these critical
infrastructure projects at NYU Langone Medical Center, Bellevue
Hospital, the VA Hospital and the Rebuild By Design East Coast
Resiliency Project, formerly known as the Big U.
Similarly, right here on Staten Island, one Federal
agency's funds are being used to buy out homes and convert the
land to open space due to the extreme long-term flooding risk,
while another Federal agency is designing a seawall that will
ultimately provide substantially increased flood protection for
this exact same property.
I am not saying that anything has been done wrong in these
cases or any other countless similar cases, and at NYU Langone
we are extremely grateful for the Federal assistance. The point
is that maybe with better coordination, we could have done even
more right. As a result, the Federal Government continues to
miss opportunities to enhance flood protection, maximize the
use of tax dollars, and ensure that investments in resilience
are properly integrated.
The challenge is that no single Federal agency has the
appropriate authority to directly coordinate these recovery
programs in the way that FEMA does during the disaster response
process. The second version of the National Disaster Recovery
Framework was just issued last month and still does not include
any formal mechanisms empowering FEMA or any other Federal
agency to oversee and manage across the Federal recovery
programs. Until this occurs, each agency will continue to work
in isolation, and hundreds of millions of dollars in missed
opportunities to leverage Federal funding will continue to
accrue.
Fourth and last. We need a comprehensive National
resilience strategy. FEMA has 4 different hazard mitigation
programs and has devoted billions of dollars to resilience
post-Hurricane Sandy. HUD does encourage resilience in its CDBG
programs by State and local governments, and separately
dedicated $1 billion to the Rebuild By Design resilience
competition. The Federal Transit Administration awarded $3
billion of resilience grants to local and State governments,
and Army Corps of Engineers received authorization for $4
billion of Hurricane Sandy-related projects.
While this commitment to resilience is commendable, each
agency is left to establish its own ideas of what resilience
means and how best to achieve it. As a result, there is no
coherent overarching National resilience strategy in place to
guide our investments.
In the months after Hurricane Sandy, New York City devoted
significant time and resources to devising the Special
Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency to guide recovery
based upon locally-derived resilience values. In a completely
separate initiative at the Federal level, 23 agencies
comprising the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force developed
a Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy, including 69
recommendations, many of which were focused on resilience but
few of which have been implemented. These initiatives are a
good start, but a few months of hard work in the immediate
aftermath of a single major hurricane should not be expected to
set long-term National policy.
We need the Federal Government, in cooperation with State,
Tribal, and local governments, and the private sector, to
develop a comprehensive National resilience strategy,
establishing clear and measurable resilience objectives, and
taking into account the latest scientific evidence, the values
that communities hold dear, and everything in between.
Furthermore, this Federally-driven resilience strategy must
include an implementation plan and be tied directly to Federal
funding assistance, or else it will be summarily ignored.
We are all here today for the exact same reason that many
similar Congressional committees and subcommittees have been
convened in the aftermath of virtually every major disaster
over the past several decades: The system is broken, everyone
is mad, and billions of dollars continue to be wasted. The
Post-Hurricane Katrina Reform Act reformed next to nothing, and
the Hurricane Sandy Improvement Act improved far too little.
Now let's try something different. Let's start over, decide who
and how much we want to help, establish a comprehensive policy
for disaster resilience and recovery, devise an implementation
strategy, build an integrated set of programs that get the job
done, and empower our hard-working public servants to lead
genuine, sustainable, cost-effective efforts that restore
communities and support families in their time of need.
Thank you very much, and I would be happy to answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gair follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brad Gair
July 11, 2016
Good morning. My name is Brad Gair. I am currently vice-president
of emergency management & enterprise resilience at NYU Langone Medical
Center. After Hurricane Sandy, I was director of housing recovery
operations in the Mayor's Office and also coordinated the city's multi-
billion dollar FEMA recovery program. Previously, I have served as
deputy commissioner with the New York City Office of Emergency
Management and as a FEMA Federal coordinating officer, during which
time I worked on numerous large-scale disasters, including serving as
Federal recovery officer in New York City after 9/11 and in Louisiana
after Hurricane Katrina.
I am grateful for this opportunity to address the subcommittee
today. Based upon more than 2 decades of experience in the business of
disaster recovery and resilience, I offer the following 4 points for
your consideration:
we need a national dialogue to agree upon recovery values.
As citizens of a caring Nation, we have a natural inclination to
want to assist our neighbors after the devastating losses that
accompany large-scale disasters. Unfortunately, we have yet to agree at
the National level upon how much we should do to aid disaster
survivors. As a result, we have created a set of programs that in the
end serve neither the taxpayers nor those families who may have lost
everything.
Every time a major disaster occurs in this country, the same
unanswered questions plague recovery efforts. ``How much help is fair
and reasonable?'' ``Should taxpayers across the Nation share this
burden?'' ``Who is responsible for getting families back into their
homes?'' ``Why not require insurance?'' ``How much should we invest in
making communities more disaster-resilient?'' ``Are there areas where
we should not build back at all?"
The answer to these questions and many similar ones depends upon
whom you ask. FEMA's mantra is ``We are not here to make you whole.''
Does that represent the collective wisdom of our Federal agencies and
our Nation's lawmakers, or is it simply a rationale for inadequate
programs that have filled the vacuum created by a lack of consensus,
unclear guidance, and muddled authorities?
Until we agree upon the basic parameters of post-disaster
assistance grounded in full consideration of these types of issues,
even the best-conceived programs would fail to meet the expectations of
Government, the disaster survivors, and the American people.
existing recovery and resilience programs are poorly structured and
badly implemented.
The Federal Government often speaks of the sequence of delivery in
disaster assistance as if there is a coherent plan behind it all, when
in reality it is a series of patchwork programs that more than anything
else confuse, frustrate, and demoralize both those in need of aid and
those trying to provide it.
Our existing recovery programs do not work for the majority of
families impacted by disasters, not individually and not collectively.
The National Flood Insurance Program is broken, possibly beyond repair;
FEMA's cap on assistance to families at barely $30,000 makes little
economic sense; asking families to take on new debt through Small
Business Administration loans is always a hard sell to those who have
already lost so much; charitable organizations trying to fill gaps
without sufficient data on the needs and little coordination with
Government agencies end up wasting millions of donated dollars; and the
HUD CDBG-DR program, when authorized, is expected to be the magic
bullet and instead just ends up being another self-inflicted wound for
the Federal Government.
From the Road Home program in post-Hurricane Katrina Louisiana to
Build-it-Back in post-Hurricane Sandy New York City, HUD CDBG-DR
programs have generally been categorical failures in supporting timely
and effective housing recovery. Once Congress authorizes the funds, the
process for getting funds from the Federal treasury to those in need is
unacceptably long, inexplicably convoluted, and inexcusably wasteful.
It would be easy to simply blame bumbling bureaucrats and greedy
contractors--no doubt we must all do better--but the root of the
problem is that no local or State government, regardless of its
capability, can successfully create and set up in a few months what
amounts to a multi-billion dollar corporation with hundreds of
employees and contractors, numerous store-front locations, a broad-
based marketing campaign, and integrated customer service operations
while tens of thousands of desperate customers must wait anxiously for
help as hope dwindles.
HUD touts the flexibility of CDBG-DR, which does indeed give
communities considerable latitude in program design, but I would trade
much of this flexibility for a pre-approved, off-the-shelf program,
complete with reasonable environmental waivers, a unified damage
inspection process, unrestricted data sharing across Government to
minimize the paperwork burden on our customers, and a proven electronic
case management system that could be quickly and efficiently
operationalized. A properly-designed recovery program would be
integrated with all other Federal programs to avoid the twin obstacles
of excessive bureaucracy and unavoidable duplications of benefits that
currently lead to extensive delays and universally bad results.
post-disaster coordination across the federal agencies is insufficient.
In the 10-block stretch along the East River in Manhattan in the
area known as Hospital Row, FEMA, HUD, and VA have individually funded
hundreds of millions of dollars of resilience improvements without
making any attempt whatsoever to coordinate these critical
infrastructure projects at NYU Langone Medical Center, Bellevue
Hospital, the VA Hospital, and the Rebuild by Design East Side Coastal
Resiliency Project (formerly known as the Big U).
Similarly, right here on Staten Island, one Federal agency's funds
are being used to buy out homes and convert the land to open space due
to the extreme long-term flooding risk, while another Federal agency is
designing a seawall that will ultimately provide substantially
increased flood protection for this exact same property.
I am not saying that anything has been done wrong in these or any
other countless similar cases--and at NYU Langone, we are extremely
thankful for the Federal assistance--the point is that maybe with
better coordination, we could have done even more right. As a result,
the Federal Government continues to miss opportunities to enhance flood
protection, maximize the use of tax dollars and ensure that investments
in resilience are properly integrated.
The challenge is that no single Federal agency has appropriate
authority to directly coordinate these recovery programs in the way
that FEMA does during disaster response. The second version of National
Disaster Recovery Framework was just issued last month and still does
not include any formal mechanisms empowering FEMA or any other agency
to oversee and manage across the Federal recovery programs. Until this
occurs, each agency will continue to work in isolation, and hundreds of
millions of dollars in missed opportunities to leverage Federal funding
will continue to accrue.
we need comprehensive national resilience strategy.
FEMA has 4 different hazard mitigation programs and has devoted
billions of dollars to resilience post-Hurricane Sandy. HUD encourages
resilience in its CDBG-DR programs by State and local governments, and
separately dedicated $1 billion to the Rebuild by Design resilience
competition. The Federal Transit Administration awarded $3 billion of
resilience grants to local and State governments after Hurricane Sandy,
and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers received authorization for $4 billion
of Hurricane Sandy-related resilience projects.
While this commitment to resilience is commendable, each agency is
left to establish its own ideas of what resilience means and how best
to achieve it. As a result, there is no coherent overarching National
resilience strategy in place to guide our investments.
In the months after Hurricane Sandy, the city of New York devoted
significant time and resources to devising the Special Initiative for
Rebuilding & Resiliency (SIRR) report to guide recovery based upon
locally-derived resilience values. In a completely separate initiative
at the Federal level, 23 agencies comprising the Hurricane Sandy
Rebuilding Task Force developed a Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy,
including 69 recommendations, many of which are focused on resilience
but few of which have been formally implemented. These initiatives are
a good start, but a few months of hard work in the immediate aftermath
of a single major hurricane cannot be expected to set long-term
National policy.
We need the Federal Government, in cooperation with State, Tribal,
and local governments and the private sector to develop a comprehensive
National resilience strategy, establishing clear and measurable
resilience objectives, and taking into account the latest scientific
evidence, the values that communities hold dear and everything in
between. Furthermore, this Federally-driven resilience strategy must
include an implementation plan and be tied directly to all Federal
funding assistance--or else it will be summarily ignored.
We are all here today for the exact same reason that many similar
Congressional committees and subcommittees have been convened in the
aftermath of virtually every major disaster over the past several
decades--the system is broken, everyone is mad, and billions of dollars
continue to be wasted. The Post-Katrina Reform Act reformed next to
nothing; the Hurricane Sandy Recovery Improvement Act improved far too
little. Now let's try something different. Let's start over, decide who
and how much we want to help, establish a comprehensive policy for
disaster resilience and recovery, devise an implementation strategy,
build an integrated set of programs that get the job done, and empower
our public servants to lead genuine, sustainable, cost-effective
efforts that restore communities and support families in times of need.
Thank you very much, and I would be happy to answer any questions
that you may have.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Gair.
The Chair recognizes Ms. Moravick for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DONNA MORAVICK, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SOUTHSIDE
HOSPITAL, BAY SHORE, NEW YORK
Ms. Moravick. Hi. I want to thank you both for allowing me
to be here today.
Southside Hospital is a 341-bed tertiary facility on the
South Shore of Long Island in western Suffolk. We are a
relatively new tertiary facility. We provide cardiac surgery
care, cardiac care. We are a level-2 ACS, the American College
of Surgeons, trauma center.
On October 29, as we all know, 2012, we were really
securing our borders and our entire campus for Hurricane Sandy.
But we didn't start on the 29. We started 3 days earlier.
I am actually a nurse and a nurse practitioner, and I
believe in primary prevention as the treatment of choice, so we
went into gear. We rallied the staff. We told them, bring your
clothes, you are staying here for a good 2 to 3 days, and we
are not leaving, even though they too may have had homes that
would be destroyed during the hurricane. We went into action.
We secured our core business. We have low-lying electric gear.
We have our switch gear, and our generators are on the ground
floor. We had purchased doors which I call the dam doors, but
they are doors that dam the water out of that area. I am very
visual, I have to see everything. So during the hurricane, we
had administration there 24/7, all surgeons in-house, all
cardiac surgeons, trauma, emergency room staff, and we were
prepared for anything. We knew that if any other hospital in
the community went down, we would have to be open.
Our emergency room is there for our patients. We serve a
very diverse community, which is really extremely important,
and we are about $900 million of economic impact to our
community.
So our doors were open, and we were not shutting them at
any cost. We identified those high-acuity patients that were
requiring intubation or being on a respirator, and we put them
in ambulances and transported them to higher ground, a tertiary
facility in our health system. We had constant calls every 4
hours, every 2 hours at times during the height of the storm.
But as an executive director of a hospital, I never thought I
would have to know high tide and moon phase, which hit
simultaneously on the South Shore of Long Island.
We are within 1,000 feet of tributaries that empty into the
Great South Bay, and it was very scary seeing the water rise up
to the doors of the hospital, sandbags. We really had to put a
lot of people outside during this event to be sure that we had
pumps going and our generators were working.
Power was lost in the community, and what people do not
recognize is the hospital is a safe haven for everyone. We had
those worried well older patients, moms with their babies who
had no light who would come into the hospital. We had a bar of
oxygen across the emergency room with people breathing in our
emergency room because they could and they needed to.
So it was really a difficult time. The roads were shut down
at one point in time. But I believe we persevered. We were
prepared. We were ready to rumble. Whatever we could mitigate,
we did at that time. We were backing up other institutions who
were flooded and needed help. We were available for any other
institution. We received calls from the Town of Islip, and we
worked collaboratively with them.
But I do believe that hospitals are an integral part of our
community, and we are there in times of need. Patients who are
well, patients who are sick, we are the place to go. Our
emergency room was jam-packed with people who just were scared
and didn't want to be home in their homes.
So again, I think preparedness for hospitals is key, and we
are the place where people will come during catastrophic
events.
Thank you for letting me speak.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Moravick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Donna Moravick
July 11, 2016
Southside Hospital (SSH) is a 341-bed tertiary hospital, located in
south shore of western Suffolk County in Bay Shore, NY, and has been
serving over 1.4 million residents. Southside Hospital has over 2,500
employees and has an economic impact of approximately $900 million
(Health Association of New York State). Southside Hospital is
regionally recognized for its specialized services, including the
American College Surgeons first verified trauma program in Long Island,
cardiac surgery, neuroscience, and obstetrics & gynecology. In
addition, SSH has a broad array of hospital-based ambulatory services.
Moreover, Southside Hospital services a diverse community and is the
safe haven for many, seeing over 71,000 emergency visits and having
approximately 21,000 discharges per year.
Southside sits within 1,000 feet of 3 major tributaries that flow
into the Great South Bay. Southside's proximity makes is extremely
vulnerable to storms, tides, and heavy rainfall. On October, 29 2012,
Southside Hospital faced one of the worst storms of the century called
Superstorm Sandy, which produced an even higher level of challenge
given its landfall during a high tide cycle and corresponding full
moon.
The hospital immediately acted to protect its core hospital
infrastructure assets including electrical switchgear, its generators,
as well as telephone and IT rooms. On the eve of the storm,
extraordinary efforts and costs were incurred to mitigate the high risk
of this storm. At a great expense, the hospital implemented protective
measures such as bringing in pumpers and installing storm doors to dam
the water and protect the electrical gear. Fortunately, water levels
rose but halted before they breached these protective measures. As a
result, Southside was one of the only health care facilities in the
Southwestern portion of Suffolk County that remained opened and
continued to provide care to our patients and the community we serve.
At all times, hospital staff performed heroically and was able to
treat patients during and after the storm. Critical patients were
identified and transferred to one of the other tertiary hospitals in
the Northwell Health system. The hospital also became a safe haven for
those who needed shelter, especially those dependent on electrically-
powered devices in their homes.
Fortunately, through significant efforts, the hospital was able to
weather the storm successfully despite record water levels. If the
protective measures were breached, not only would Southside's main
infrastructure be impacted long-term but its patient and the
communities we serve would have been compromised.
Subsequent to the storm, the hospital has taken many actions
including infrastructure improvements and continual emergency
management training to lessen the impact of future storms.
Nevertheless, a continued investment in storm mitigation infrastructure
protections is still required.
Post-storm, Southside, at its own expense, began to invest in
necessary remediation infrastructure protections. During the past 4
years, the hospital has spent approximately $6 million dollars in these
capital improvements.
With the recently-awarded FEMA grant funds, Southside is now able
to elevate critical equipment to secure elevated locations.
Additionally, with the help of the grant, the hospital will be
hardening the building envelope including windows, roofing, and other
points of access.
Finally, in addition to assessing new preventive infrastructure
improvements, we continue to train all staff on emergency management
and regularly explore best practices to protect against a future storm
event. We thank you for allowing us to tell our story.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Ms. Higgs for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF KELLY D. HIGGS, DISASTER RECOVERY AND RESILIENCY
COORDINATOR, NEW JERSEY VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE IN
DISASTER
Ms. Higgs. Thank you very much, Chairman Donovan and
Ranking Member Payne, for convening this hearing on the
importance of preparedness and resiliency and inviting me to
testify on this critical topic.
New Jersey Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, or
NJVOAD's mission is to bring together New Jersey organizations
in disaster response and recovery in order to offer more
effective services to people and communities affected by
disaster. Our success derives from strong relationships built
on the foundation of the four C's, which are cooperation,
communication, coordination, and collaboration.
It is my belief that these same foundational building
blocks have contributed to many successful partnerships,
projects, and outcomes in the aftermath of Sandy. Conversely,
when these key ingredients were not present, programs struggled
and/or failed.
There have been many lessons learned throughout Sandy
recovery, but my testimony today will focus on 4 areas.
First, the need to build partnerships and relationships at
the local, county, and regional level before disaster strikes.
Second, the need for early education and outreach to
impacted households.
Third, the importance of building partnerships with the
philanthropic community and advocating for funding allocation
decisions which sustain true long-term recovery efforts.
Fourth, the need for coordination and continuity in the
development and implementation of State-managed programs
utilizing community development and social service block grant
funds.
With the support of the Corporation for National Community
Service, grants utilized VISTAs, or Volunteers in Service to
America, to build capacity. NJVOAD has been able to establish a
VOAD presence in every county in New Jersey, and this is pretty
remarkable because there were only 6 in place before Sandy
struck. We saw the benefit of this in Bergen County, where the
VOAD had a strong network of area non-profits and a solid
relationship with the Office of Emergency Management prior to
Sandy. As a result, they were able to quickly mobilize non-
profit resources for response and recovery efforts in impacted
communities.
Sadly, Hudson County, Essex County, and Union, and many of
the most impacted counties to the south of Bergen, did not have
a VOAD in place prior to Sandy, and as a result they needed a
tremendous amount of support in identifying partners and
resources, which delayed the speed and efficiency of service
delivery to impacted individuals.
NJVOAD worked in these and all 21 counties throughout the
State to identify non-profit and governmental partners to join
the VOAD to coordinate outreach events, to identify leadership
to ensure regular meetings and training, and to organize
individual structures that meet the unique needs of each of
these communities.
Other States are looking at NJVOAD's program as a model for
resiliency, and we are working with our Corporation for
National Community Service and our FEMA Region 2 partners to
replicate these efforts through a regional pilot program.
Almost 4 years post-Sandy, the need for recovery support
far outweighs the remaining non-profit resources. The remaining
cases consist primarily of low-income households with limited
means for recovery, or moderate-income households that
encountered several challenges navigating the complicated
recovery road. Many of these households began recovery work
before documenting the damage, and they have not been able to
provide sufficient proof of that damage to receive the funds
they should be entitled to through the National Flood Insurance
Program. Others signed contracts they could not afford or hired
disreputable contractors to complete recovery work.
NJVOAD is developing educational resources to be utilized
in future disasters so that impacted homeowners can make
informed decisions before beginning their recovery.
NJVOAD is also working closely with the philanthropic
community to identify collaborative solutions which will
provide for a more effective and sustainable funding stream for
future disasters. Education extending to our Government
partners and the public is critical to ensure better
understanding of the need for funding to sustain recovery
efforts long term.
The majority of money is donated in the days and weeks
following a major disaster, with the expectation and sometimes
the mandate that these funds get out immediately, but that is
not when donated dollars are most needed. NJVOAD hopes to
establish a State-wide advisory group with representatives from
the philanthropic, Government, and non-profit communities to
provide guidance and expertise specific to the disaster at
hand.
The struggle to navigate the State recovery programs
remains one of the biggest challenges faced by New Jersey Sandy
survivors and non-profit organizations. For instance, RREM,
which is New Jersey's Rebuild program, was developed without
consideration of funding for rental assistance, which can and
should be covered by block grants. Millions of non-profit
donated dollars were expended on rental assistance so that
Sandy survivors could maintain mortgages on uninhabitable
homes. Attempts to advocate with State and Federal agencies to
address this and other deficiencies were not productive, as
each held the other accountable for roadblocks to progress.
NJVOAD has forged relationships with the New Jersey
Division of Consumer Affairs, and we have seen small
concessions, but much improvement is needed in how these
programs are designed and integrated into the overall disaster
recovery framework. A stronger citizen action plan should be
mandated which requires input and involvement by disaster
survivors and recovery entities during the formation of any
proposed disaster recovery action plan. Additionally, better
integration and staffing of the joint field offices to include
State decision makers responsible for the development and
implementation of recovery programs could go a long way in
future coordination and integration of Governmental programs.
NJVOAD is committed to working with our public- and
private-sector partners to be part of the solution in
implementing lessons learned from Sandy and preparing our
communities to weather whatever storms might lie ahead.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to answering any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Higgs follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kelly D. Higgs
July 11, 2016
My name is Kelly Higgs, and I am honored to serve as the Disaster
Recovery and Resiliency Coordinator for New Jersey Voluntary
Organizations Active in Disaster (NJVOAD). I was hired post-Sandy to
provide support for long-term recovery in impacted communities
throughout NJ, while also building resiliency and preparedness efforts
in all 21 counties throughout the State. I am thrilled that the House
Committee of Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications has convened a hearing
around the importance of preparedness and resiliency, and I am honored
to be invited to testify on this critical topic.
NJVOAD's mission is to bring together New Jersey organizations
active in disaster assistance, and to foster cooperation and
coordination in preparedness, response, and recovery in order to offer
more effective services to people and communities affected by disaster.
Our success is built upon strong relationships with non-profit, and
Government partners which are built on the foundation of the ``Four
C's'': Cooperation, communication, coordination, and collaboration. It
is my belief and testimony that these same foundational building blocks
have contributed to many successful partnerships, projects, and
outcomes in the aftermath of Sandy. Conversely, when these key
ingredients were not present, programs struggled and or failed.
lessons learned
There have been many lessons learned throughout Sandy recovery, but
NJVOAD has prioritized these five:
1. The need to build partnerships and relationships at the local,
county, and regional level BEFORE disaster strikes;
2. The importance of a coordinated effort to broadcast and organize
the needs for donated goods and volunteer support;
3. The need for early education and outreach to impacted
households;
4. The importance of building partnerships with the philanthropic
community and advocating for funding allocation decisions which
sustain true long-term recovery efforts;
5. The need for coordination and continuity in the development and
implementation of State-managed programs utilizing Community
Development and Social Services Block Grant funds.
One of the very early lessons learned was the need to build
partnerships and relationships at the local, county, and regional level
BEFORE disaster strikes. NJVOAD saw the benefits of this in areas like
Bergen County, where the Bergen VOAD had a strong membership of area
non-profits and a solid relationship with the Office of Emergency
Management (OEM) prior to Sandy. They were able to quickly mobilize
non-profit resources for response and recovery efforts in Moonachie,
Little Ferry, and other impacted communities. Sadly, Hudson, Essex, and
Union Counties, 3 of the 9 most impacted counties just to the south of
Bergen, did not have a VOAD in place prior to Sandy. These and other
communities without a VOAD needed a tremendous amount of support in
identifying partners, finding resources, building relationships and
gaining trust, which delayed the speed and efficiency of resource and
service delivery to impacted individuals.
Another significant challenge New Jersey encountered was the lack
of a coordinated effort to broadcast and organize the needs for donated
goods and volunteer support. So many organizations found themselves
overwhelmed with clothing or canned goods that were dropped on their
doorstep immediately following Sandy's arrival. Time and money was
spent sorting, storing, distributing, and disposing of these
unsolicited donations while communities lacked many other items which
were needed to support response and recovery efforts, such as
construction materials, protective masks, etc.
When Sandy struck, there was no centralized platform for volunteers
to receive direction about how to help, or for communities and groups
in need of volunteer labor to identify and coordinate volunteer
efforts. Many volunteers appeared spontaneously in communities which
were not equipped to deploy them, while other communities were longing
for additional support but did not have the means to reach people to
organize efforts. More than 18,000 calls and texts were received on the
cell phone of the executive director of the NJ Governor's Office of
Volunteerism in the days immediately following the storm, but there was
no established mechanism in place to connect this desire to help with
the needs in affected communities.
Almost 4 years post-Sandy, the need for support far outweighs the
non-profit resources which remain in place to meet that need. This is
not due to lack of desire on the part of non-profits, but to lack of
funding. There are a limited number of Disaster Case Managers and non-
profit builders who are continuing to work with some of the most
challenging Sandy-recovery cases. These cases consist primarily of
people who fall into two categories: Low-income households with limited
means for recovery and moderate-income households that encountered
several challenges navigating the complicated road to recovery. Many of
these households began recovery work in their home before documenting
the damage, and they have not been able to provide sufficient proof of
damage to receive the funds they should be entitled to receive through
the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Others signed contracts
they could not afford or hired disreputable contractors to complete
recovery work. There are many lessons we have learned from working
alongside these individuals, but the two primary lessons are: The need
for early education and outreach to impacted households and the
importance of building partnerships with the philanthropic community
and advocating for funding allocation decisions which sustain true
long-term recovery efforts in the wake of a major disaster such as
Sandy.
One of the biggest challenges faced by NJ Sandy survivors and non-
profit organizations supporting recovery work has been the lack of
coordination and continuity in the development and implementation of
State-managed programs utilizing Community Development Block Grant--
Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) and Social Services Block Grant (SSBG)
funds. For instance, NJ's rebuild program, Rehabilitation,
Reconstruction, Elevation, and Mitigation Program (RREM) was developed
without consideration of funding for rental assistance. Rental
assistance has been provided through other Federal and State programs,
but the coordination and timing of these programs left significant
gaps:
FEMA's Individual and Households (IHP) program provided up
to 18 months of rental assistance (or until the maximum grant
amount was awarded), which carried most households through the
late winter/early spring of 2014.
NJ's Sandy Homeowner/Renter Assistance Program (SHRAP)
launched in November 2013 and covered a maximum of 6 months of
rental assistance (or coverage for other necessities such as
utility payments, furniture, or household appliances) to a
maximum of $15,000. This money was first-come, first-served, so
many individuals receiving IHP rental assistance applied for
SHRAP concurrently and utilized SHRAP funds to cover other
expenses to avoid duplication of benefits. Most people had
exhausted their SHRAP award or had received the maximum 6
months of service by summer--early fall of 2014.
There was no Governmental program in place to cover rental
assistance until the Tenant-Based Rental Assistance (TBRA)
program was introduced in March 2015 with first rental payments
being disbursed in May 2015. This 12-month program was extended
to cover a maximum of 24 months.
Non-profit funding is supposed to be the dollar of last resort to
address unmet needs. However, the above time line left many displaced
homeowners turning to the non-profit community to cover their rent for
periods of 6-9 months. Millions of non-profit donated dollars were
expended on rental assistance, so that Sandy survivors could maintain
mortgages on their uninhabitable homes. Attempts to advocate with State
and Federal agencies to address this and other deficiencies were not
productive as each held the other accountable for any roadblocks to
progress.
resolution efforts and recommendations
NJVOAD members have worked closely with existing partners such as
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the New Jersey Office
of Emergency Management (NJOEM), the NJ Department of Human Services
(NJDHS), and the Governor's Office of Volunteerism to create and
implement collaborative solutions to these lessons learned. We have
also developed new partnerships with the Corporation for National and
Community Service (CNCS), the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the
Council of NJ Grantmakers, and many others to build a network which
strengthens the preparedness and resiliency of NJ communities.
NJVOAD has been very fortunate to receive grants to support
recovery and resiliency throughout the State. We were able to expand
the scope of this work through a CNCS grant to utilize VISTA
(Volunteers in Service to America) members to provide capacity-building
support for long-term recovery in Sandy-affected communities while
building and strengthening preparedness and resilience efforts in all
21 counties. Over the course of 2 years, NJVOAD has been able to
leverage these resources to support on-going recovery work and
establish a VOAD presence in every county in NJ. NJVOAD pioneered the
utilization of the VISTA program for capacity-building in the areas of
disaster recovery and community resiliency and preparedness efforts.
For example, our team of VISTA members worked in Union County to
provide community outreach events for long-term recovery efforts and
identify non-profit and Governmental partners to be part of the VOAD.
VISTA efforts supported long-term recovery efforts in Hudson County,
then planned events to transition those relationships into an active
VOAD that meets regularly for training and planning purposes. Essex
County had a strong showing for the launch of its VOAD group, and has a
core team in place which is identifying leadership and organizing a
structure that will meet the unique needs of this diverse county. This
work has been repeated in all 21 counties throughout NJ where the VOAD
movement has been developed or strengthened to ensure greater community
preparedness and resiliency. Because of the great work of the two VISTA
teams we have had in place, NJVOAD received National recognition and
was awarded the 2016 State VOAD of the Year Award. Other State VOADs
and relief organizations are looking at this as a model to support
disaster response and recovery efforts in the future, and NJVOAD is in
discussion with our CNCS and FEMA Region II partners about developing a
regional pilot program for New York, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands.
NJVOAD partnered with NJOEM and the Governor's Office of
Volunteerism to develop HELPNJNOW.ORG, a web-based solution to address
the secondary disasters which result when there is no system to manage
unaffiliated volunteers and unsolicited donations. When New Jersey is
not responding to a declared disaster (the ``blue sky'' mode), the
focus of this site is on personal preparedness with information and
links for people to prepare themselves and their families for potential
threats. The site also provides education about the best ways to help
when a disaster strikes. One primary focus is to encourage people to
register and train as a disaster volunteer before a disaster strikes,
as trained volunteers are critical to successful disaster relief
efforts. Education about donated goods is also a critical focus, as
many people don't realize the burden of shipping, sorting, storing, and
distributing items.
When a large-scale disaster impacts New Jersey, the site will
operate in ``gray sky'' mode with links to 4 key resources:
Monetary Donations.--Cash is the best way to help in any
disaster, as organizations can purchase what is needed locally
and help rebuild the economy in impacted communities. NJVOAD
utilizes GuideStar and Charity Navigator to vet the
organizations listed on HELPNJNOW.ORG to minimize potential for
fraud or mismanagement.
Material Goods.--Information about items needed will be
posted, as well as a portal for people to offer donated goods
which will be shared with organizations serving impacted
communities.
Volunteers.--The site becomes a virtual volunteer reception
center where people who want to help can complete an on-line
application and skills inventory and sign up for volunteer
opportunities.
Information/Assistance.--For those in need of help, links
and numbers to NJ 2-1-1 are provided as well as a link to
Google Crisis Maps that includes evacuation routes, shelter
locations, street closures, and other critical information.
NJVOAD convened a Call to Collaboration last October to review
lessons learned, strengthen partnerships, and identify resources to
implement many of the proposed solutions born out of our collective
recovery experience. One of these initiatives is the development of
educational resources to be utilized in future disasters so that
impacted homeowners can make informed decisions before beginning their
recovery. We will be looking to our Government partners to assist with
methods to disseminate this information publicly in future disasters.
NJVOAD is working closely with the philanthropic community to
identify collaborative solutions which will provide for a more
effective and sustainable funding stream for future disasters. A big
component in the future success of any changes in funding patterns will
require education extending to our Government partners and the public
to ensure a better understanding of the need for funding to sustain
recovery efforts long-term. The majority of money is donated in the
days and weeks following a major disaster with the expectation, and
sometimes mandate, to get the funds out immediately. The reality is
that these donated dollars should be disbursed in a calculated manner
to ensure that funding is not front-loaded during response and early
recovery stages when it is needed least. NJVOAD hopes to establish a
State-wide advisory group, with representatives from the philanthropic,
Government and non-profit communities, to provide guidance and
expertise specific to the disaster at hand.
The one problem area that NJVOAD has been unable to address with
any lasting impact is perhaps one of the biggest issues at hand: The
lack of coordination and continuity in the development and
implementation of State-managed programs. NJVOAD has forged
relationships with the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs (NJDCA),
the State Agency with responsibility for development and implementation
of the majority of these programs. After initial resistance, the
current leadership has opened up to hearing feedback from the VOAD
community and making modest adjustments to existing programs, such as
allowing Disaster Case Managers (with written consent) to talk with the
Housing Advisors and Project Managers who are managing RREM cases.
However, these small concessions don't begin to fill the tremendous gap
that exists in how these programs are designed and integrated into the
disaster recovery framework. We have seen our VOAD partners in Colorado
and other States have a role and input in working with their State
government to design and implement programs that are logical and
survivor-focused. NJDCA has held public hearings on how they are
spending the billions of CDBG-DR funds they have received, but the
feedback provided in these hearings has not resulted in any
programmatic changes of note. A stronger citizen action plan should be
mandated which requires input and involvement of disaster survivors and
recovery entities during formation of any proposed disaster recovery
action plans.
The Joint Field Office (JFO) model is an inspired structure
designed to enhance communication and coordination between Federal and
State entities in disaster response and recovery. Better integration
and staffing of the JFO to include State decision makers responsible
for the development and implementation of recovery programs could go a
long way in minimizing duplication of efforts, misunderstanding,
miscommunication, and lack of integration of Governmental programs.
NJVOAD is committed to working with our public and private-sector
partners to be part of the solution in implementing lessons learned
from Sandy and preparing our communities to weather whatever storms
might lie ahead. Thank you for convening this hearing and providing me
the opportunity to share this testimony.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Ms. Higgs.
The Chair now recognizes myself for a few moments to ask
some questions.
You spoke about trying to coordinate efforts among non-
profits, yet there is nobody who oversees all the not-for-
profits. So I want to ask you, Vin, on the Federal level, do we
need another layer of bureaucracy? No one likes bureaucracy, or
another layer of it. But should there be some kind of
oversight? This may overlap, Ms. Higgs, with what you were
talking about. Should there be some oversight or coordination
of all activities so that we're not doing duplicative services
and making sure we are satisfying everyone's needs?
Mr. Ignizio. Well, I can speak to Staten Island from both
sides. Look, my concern is that it occurs, if that does occur,
on a county level, on the closest level to the people. If you
have the Federal Government coordinating it--I mean, it was
quite some time before we saw any assistance from the Federal
Government. It was several days, and those first couple of days
are the ones that mean the most to the Staten Island community.
There were times when they were literally out of their homes,
literally don't have water. There were people who were stuck in
their attic, as you will recall. There were some very scary
times during the initial 48 hours and thereafter. So I would be
reticent to support a large organization or a large
Governmental entity that is going to oversee.
What needs to occur is--and I think our president has been
working on this, and non-profits on Staten Island have been
meeting to say, OK, we are going non-profits, what resources do
we have geographically, and then what resources do we have to
be able to support in case of another emergency. Those
conversations have been on-going and continue to be, and I
think we are more prepared for the future just in case. We know
now that if something happens, the South Shore, the Mount
Loretto campus, which is 170 acres, which has massive
abilities, has the ability to act as a distribution center, has
the ability to act. We know that the JCC is always there in
mid-Island. I don't mean one juxtaposed to another. We know
geographically that there are folks who want to help throughout
Staten Island.
I think county-based is the way to go, and I think the
borough president has been trying to bring that together as
well, and I think that is the more appropriate forum for it.
Mr. Donovan. Do the other panelists agree?
Ms. Higgs. I think that what we did in New Jersey is where
there wasn't a VOAD present at the county level previously, we
worked with long-term recovery organizations as they started to
sort-of get defunded, and made sure that we maintained those
relationships around the table so that all the things that you
learned from Sandy, you will keep those relationships in place
and know them for the next disaster, whatever that might be. So
the VOAD movement was born out of the desire to reduce the
amount of duplication of benefits and services and resources
that are out there, because we know that non-profits have very
limited resources. We don't want to all be doing the same
thing. Let's work together and divide and conquer.
Mr. Donovan. You testified about how FEMA, HUD, and the VA
all helped hospitals at the same time. Again, how do you
coordinate that, especially at a time of a disaster when there
is chaos? I suspect you have to be prepared for that before the
disaster occurs so everybody knows what they are doing. You
have many suggestions in your testimony about how we can
improve our efforts after the lessons we learned from Katrina
but didn't implement, the lessons we learned after Sandy that
we are trying to implement. How do you do that without putting
another layer of bureaucracy on top?
Mr. Gair. I am not sure you need another layer of
bureaucracy, Mr. Chairman. This is FEMA's job. FEMA's job is to
coordinate, and it is just hit or miss sometimes. They get very
caught up in delivering their standard programs, which require
a lot of effort and have a lot of money involved. But the
coordination of those is just as important, and it is missing
out. They are very good at giving individual grants to Bellevue
Hospital or to NYU Langone, and they may have completely
different project officers working on those, but they are not
talking together. They are not stepping back and saying is it
better for Bellevue to build a wall around themselves and VA to
build a wall around themselves and Langone to build a wall
around themselves, or can we build a wall that might be more
cost-effective and more effective by talking to everybody?
Coordination doesn't make things harder, it makes it
easier. You just have to make it a central part of what you do
and not an afterthought.
Mr. Donovan. My time has run out, but I would love to ask
you about hospitals because this hospital, like I said, is in
the flood zone. You were clobbered, but yet you remained open
and were caring for patients. Can the Federal Government help
you? You can't move your hospital. The walls that you spoke
about, maybe someone could build one around your hospital, but
in the interim is there a role for the Federal Government to
help you provide the services that you provided during Sandy?
Ms. Moravick. Sure. I think what is really important is,
before we get to a disaster, is what do we need to do? One size
does not fit all. I think that it is really identifying what
those risks are at the hospital level. Is there a role for
FEMA? Yes, there is a role for FEMA at the local level.
Mr. Donovan. My time has expired. I can't yield any more to
Don because I don't have any myself.
The Chair recognizes my friend, Don Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just to comment quickly on Ms. Moravick's testimony, that
you had the foresight 3 days in advance to start getting ready
should be considered a best practice, and we should learn that
the storm potentially has the possibility to turn our way and
wreak devastation.
Mr. Gair, tell us how you really feel.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Payne. We learned a great deal from your testimony
there, and I appreciate it.
But let me ask Ms. Higgs and Mr. Ignizio, each of you
shared important information on how charities and non-profit
organizations can assist in disaster response and recovery
efforts. Can you talk about how State and local emergency
responders coordinate with your organizations?
Mr. Ignizio. Well, I can speak for myself. Currently, they
don't. We have not had the level of outreach that we would
like, and that is why we are happy to learn of the county role.
We are working amongst each other, the other non-profits on
Staten Island, to identify resources we have and how to
redeploy them or deploy them as needed to help Staten Island.
The reality is that non-profits do it better. We do it
faster. We are on the ground that day. Waiting for the cavalry
to arrive is fine, but you need help immediately, and I think
we do it better, more efficiently and, quite frankly, more
cost-effectively. So I would encourage the Federal Government
to invest, not necessarily with funds but to invest in helping
non-profit organizations become that safety net for when real
disaster strikes to be there on the ground immediately.
Mr. Payne. So basically to hold the fort until we show up,
the Federal Government.
Mr. Ignizio. Yes, sir.
Mr. Payne. Ms. Higgs.
Ms. Higgs. I would echo that. The non-profits are really
the first to be there and the last to leave. So any additional
support that can be given to provide additional financial, as
well as infrastructure support for that to be in place I think
is really important.
In New Jersey at the State level, there is a State VAL, or
voluntary agency liaison, that is the representative that
connects the Office of Emergency Management, which is run
through the State Police, with the State VOAD and other non-
profit organizations. So we enjoy a good relationship with the
State Police, who is our Office of Emergency Management, and
when disaster strikes NJVOAD has a seat at the rock, which is
our State emergency operation center. We were there for weeks
during Sandy. Then when other smaller-scale disasters have been
on the horizon, when winter storm Jonas was hitting, and when
Joaquim was sort-of threatening last October, we were convening
calls in advance and working with our OEM partners.
What we are trying to do is make sure that that same
relationship is replicated at the county level as well, to echo
some of what Mr. Ignizio was saying before. We want to make
sure that those relationships are there in place, and when we
set up VOADs at the local level, at the community level, we
have been successful in most of our counties. For example, in
Hudson County and in Union County, the OEM coordinators are
very active in the VOAD and getting that established, and we
are hoping to have that repeated in Essex County as well as we
are looking to start there.
Mr. Payne. OK. Well, let me know how that is moving along
in terms of Essex County.
Ms. Higgs. OK.
Mr. Payne. Being the composition of my district, as I
mentioned in my opening statement, I am really concerned about
what we are doing to address the unique impact of disasters on
low-income communities that normally have the most difficult
time in these emergencies. Can you talk about what resources
are available for low-income communities affected by disaster,
and what we can do to make them more prepared and resilient?
Mr. Gair. Mr. Payne, the challenge is that all the same
resources are available in low-income communities as everywhere
else, and what we need to do is make more of an effort to
penetrate into those communities. A lot of times the
communications are not as easy, the languages may be different
than English, and while information is put out in many
languages, we really don't make that extra effort to get out to
the communities to make sure that people understand the
opportunities and then use the funds to try and make things
better.
The HUD CDBG-DR program springs from the HUD CDBG program,
which is for low- and moderate-income families. So we need to
take those funds and look for opportunities not just to fix
those things that were damaged by the hurricane but to find
ways to make those communities more resilient as a whole. There
is tremendous flexibility there, and I don't think it gets used
as much as it could in the low-income areas.
Mr. Ignizio. Can I make a point with that? I mean, Brad
will remember when we had the issue in New Dorp, we had members
of the Mexican population, many of which were undocumented, who
refused to take any assistance at all because they were afraid
that writing their name and their address on a piece of paper
would end up with them having issues with the Federal
Government thereafter. So it wasn't until I think it was Make
the Road who came in and started going door to door with help
to let people know we are just here to help, we are just here
to triage, there is no issue with regards to your status in the
country, that they started accepting some assistance; because,
if you recall, that was a big problem that we had primarily, as
I recall, in the New Dorp area.
Mr. Payne. OK. Ms. Higgs.
Ms. Higgs. I think when it comes to low-income households,
they are the most vulnerable. Unfortunately, when disaster
strikes, they are usually the hardest hit and the last to be
able to start the recovery process. We have certainly seen that
in New Jersey, especially in the urban communities that were
impacted. I think anything that we can do--the non-profits are
really sometimes the network where they feel most comfortable.
What we found, especially in Newark, in the city of Newark, is
that people went to their local churches and their houses of
worship because that was where they felt most comfortable.
So again, I sort-of feel like I am preaching the VOAD
mantra here, but having those community organizations and those
local churches, being part of that network, is important
because that is one of the ways to get that information out to
a large network of people that would not necessarily hear the
message otherwise.
Mr. Payne. Yes, I appreciate that. The churches in Newark
really played a pivotal part.
Ms. Higgs. They were instrumental.
Mr. Payne. Even serving 10,000 to 15,000 meals a day during
that time.
But with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Don.
One of the advantages of being the last panel is that I can
actually give you an opportunity if there was something that
was stirred up in your minds during our conversation, questions
that we didn't cover with you that you think would be important
for us to bring back to the District of Columbia. We would
welcome anything else that was not in your testimony or may
have come to your mind hearing the other witnesses speak or
that was stimulated by--not that any of our questions were
stimulating, but----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Donovan. But if there is something that came up, we
allow you this opportunity now before we close down.
Mr. Ignizio. I will just add one thing. Some ways the
Federal Government can be helpful is with their vast amount of
resources. So we have a 170-acre campus. You have a storm
coming. We can welcome, if you will, redeployed assets onto our
campus for, God forbid, if it is needed and hope that it is
not. That type of pre-coordination is something that we as
Catholic Charities of Staten Island would welcome at both of
our sites, either at Port Richmond or at Mount Loretto. The
vast amount of resources that the Federal Government has, if it
is placed there at the beginning of the season or a week before
we hear a hurricane is coming, we would be happy--we want to be
a part of the solution. We don't want what occurred to occur
again.
I recall us looking for buses to be able to bring people to
and from the shelter system, and where are we going to get them
from, from the MTA, from the school system, things like that.
Maybe the Federal Government has ways of being helpful, we have
supplies, we have buses, we have apparatus in place that we can
bring in before a disaster strikes that can be helpful. Should
the storm not occur or it not be as serious, then it just goes
back to where it was.
Mr. Donovan. You want to be helpful. You just want to get
reimbursed.
Mr. Gair. I think I would just like to reiterate the fact
that the real challenge here is that everybody is trying to do
the right things. The Federal agencies have programs. They are
trying to deliver the aid. The cities are trying to take the
rules and use the rules and make them work. The voluntary
agencies are trying to fill the gaps. The private sector is
standing ready. But we are not putting it all together, and I
think that is because we don't have all the right programs tied
together the way that they should be, so we end up with people
not getting the help that they need.
So we really have to work on that piece of it. After 9/11,
when I was the Federal recovery officer and people said, well,
the FEMA acts really were designed for natural disasters, and
this is an act of terror, so what are we going to do in New
York and New Jersey? Do we need a new FEMA Stafford Act just
for that? As we looked at it, the answer is it is all there. It
is all there in the Stafford Act because it is so flexible.
Basically, the President can direct agencies to do whatever
needs to be done to get places back to where they were. But
then we build a lot of regulations around that that tie our own
hands.
So I think we need to go back and look at what we can do
with the authorities that we have in place to let these people
do what they do best if you let them, and that is get the job
done. That is why people join the Federal Government, the State
government, and the city government. They want to help. We just
keep tying their hands in ways that make it harder to do so.
Mr. Donovan. Some people even join Congress for that.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Gair. Thank God.
Mr. Payne. I resemble that remark.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Donovan. I think we all are saying that, we all agree
with my friend Mr. Ignizio, who said that preparing ahead of
time, because during a chaotic situation like a natural
disaster or a terrorist attack is not the time to figure out
who is supplying the buses.
Ms. Moravick.
Ms. Moravick. We put an application in for the HMPG grant,
and it took quite a bit of time to get it. We went through at
least 3 more hurricane seasons. So I think a little more
coordination of who is doing what would be helpful, because as
I hear and listen to the news of the wind and the weather and
the rain, we even had a subsequent rain storm, a 500-year event
which flooded out our first floor in August 2014, which was a
disaster. In our ICU, we had mulch coming down the hallways. So
we really need to strengthen and support our campus, and I
think we started on our own. We invested $6 million, but it is
to a point where we really need to make that huge investment of
$25 million to harden the campus. Thanks.
Ms. Higgs. Thank you for the opportunity to have a final
word here. Coordination has sort of been straining throughout
this whole thing, better coordination among our Federal
agencies with the States, with the non-profits, just better
coordination and cooperation throughout. I think one of the
things that we have seen with what we have been able to do in
New Jersey with some funding for our VOAD, we have been able to
really see that happen at the State level and at the county
level. When we presented on this at a National conference, all
the other States were saying, how do we do this? We have been
fortunate to get funding that we had from Hurricane Sandy that
we have been able to use to leverage to do preparedness and
resiliency work throughout the State.
VOAD is not a funded organization. I am the only staff
person of a VOAD throughout the whole Nation. The National VOAD
has staff, but none of the other States do. So the work that we
have been able to do we were able to do through private funding
that we were able to raise and a Corporation for National
Community Service grant. I think what we would like to see is
that effort replicated on a National level because we have
shown that it really does work in New Jersey. We haven't--knock
on wood--had the ability to test it in a live situation, but we
are in a much better position now than we were 3\1/2\ years
ago. It is because of an investment of funds in the non-profit
structure throughout New Jersey to strengthen resiliency and
preparedness throughout.
Mr. Payne. Ms. Higgs, would the CDBG-DR funds be something
that you could use?
Ms. Higgs. We certainly could, and it is something we have
looked at. From what I understand, they are generally applied
State-by-State. So we as an organization could apply through
the State of New Jersey. What we are really trying to do--we
obviously want to continue to find some funds that would
sustain on-going, but we really want to help the other 49
States and the territories to be able to replicate what we have
been able to do in New Jersey because that just strengthens the
overall infrastructure when it comes to that. So, yes, CDBG-DR
funds are certainly an answer, but anything that we can do to
really try to bring this outside of New Jersey's confines to
help the Nation is something that we are hoping to do.
Mr. Donovan. Well, I thank the witnesses for your testimony
and your suggestions. I guarantee they have not fallen on deaf
ears. This is the fourth hearing that I have conducted. The
three other hearings that were conducted resulted in
legislation to improve the systems which were already in place.
We will take back your suggestions and your testimony with us
to the remainder of the committee. There are other committee
Members from all parts of the country, and I guess they didn't
want to come to Staten Island for the pizza. They are so
unlucky.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Donovan. But I thank you all for your testimony.
The other Members of the subcommittee may have questions
when we get back to Washington, and they may submit those. I
would ask that you submit answers to those within 10 days. The
hearing record will be held open for an additional 10 days.
The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Daniel M. Donovan, Jr. for Michael Byrne
Question 1. A common theme from witnesses on the second panel at
the field hearing was the need for better coordination and
collaboration--between and among Federal agencies and with State and
local governments and non-profit and private-sector agencies.
We are in the early months of another hurricane season. How are
FEMA and HUD working to ensure that any response and recovery efforts
will be appropriately coordinated?
Answer. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has primary
oversight for Federal response, recovery, and mitigation operations,
for all hazards, including hurricanes. FEMA is the coordinating
authority for all Federal interagency partners in support of incident
operations. Federal departments and agencies along with local, State,
Tribal, and territorial governments and others, such as non-profits and
private-sector entities, must understand each other's roles and
responsibilities and cooperate to achieve shared goals.
The Federal Government organizes and coordinates response and
recovery resources and capabilities under the Emergency Support
Function (ESF) and Recovery Support Function (RSF) constructs. ESFs and
RSFs are groups of organizations that work together to manage resources
and deliver capabilities that support resiliency and response and
recovery. By not focusing on the capabilities of a single department or
agency ESFs and RSFs support effective interagency coordination.
FEMA works with its National-level partner ESF and RSF agencies to
develop risk-specific, coordinated interagency operational plans and
exercises for all hazards, including hurricanes. Within this construct,
each partner agency prepares its own plans for how it will execute its
portion of the coordinated response mission. The ESF coordinating
agencies met at the start of the 2016 Hurricane Season to discuss new
plans, procedures, forecasting, and storm surge modeling capabilities
as well as to identify potential capability gaps and other concerns of
each ESF for the 2016 hurricane season.
As one example of this on-going coordination, FEMA and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) support the
coordination of interagency efforts for all hazards in addition to
hurricane planning. HUD is the coordinating agency for the Housing RSF,
and has taken a major role in 2016 Recovery Support Function Leadership
Group (RSFLG) planning and operational initiatives, e.g. RSFLG annual
strategic planning session, RSFLG Readiness Assessment, and Flint, MI
assessment and coordination efforts.
HUD and FEMA recently held two coordination meetings with the FEMA
Individual Assistance Division, FEMA Interagency Coordination Division
(ICD), and HUD to enhance outreach and on-the-ground coordination in
preparation for any potential natural disasters. HUD is also working on
earlier engagement with FEMA as illustrated with the recent West
Virginia (WV) flooding. Prior to receiving any mission assignments for
WV, HUD staff and resources were made available during the response to
initiate planning and preparation for the eventual recovery effort.
These efforts are ensuring HUD is better coordinated and is providing
consistent advice/technical support to State, local, and private-sector
agencies.
Further, the President's fiscal year 2017 budget proposal requests
statutory authority to transfer the responsibilities for the Emergency
Food and Shelter Program (EFSP) from FEMA to HUD for fiscal year 2017.
FEMA and HUD believe that this transition will improve program mission
alignment, improve coordination, increase accountability and
transparency, and maximize the effectiveness of the use of these funds.
Additionally, Regional FEMA Readiness Assessment Program (F-RAP)
efforts have focused on interagency coordination to further facilitate
implementation of the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF). A
component of these efforts is identification of potential best
practices to be shared across regional, State, local, Tribal, and
territorial stakeholders. An example recently identified from the
Region II F-RAP pertaining to housing recovery efforts after Hurricane
Sandy is the New Jersey/New York Federal Leadership Resilience
Collaborative (``the Collaborative''). The Collaborative was referenced
in Deputy Regional Administrator Michael Byrne's July 11, 2016
testimony.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* ``A New Jersey/New York Federal Leadership Resilience
Collaborative (``the Collaborative'') was established and meets
regularly to share information on key infrastructure projects and
promote regional resilience. The Collaborative is comprised of Regional
Administrators and other senior staff from FEMA, the U.S. Department of
Interior, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, EPA, and HUD. The Collaborative provides an unparalleled
forum for Federal officials to develop a strategic approach to foster a
more comprehensive region-wide planning for risk reductions and
provides opportunities for leveraging Federal dollars.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2. What additional changes to current law would you
recommend to enhance your ability to prepare for, respond to, or
recover from storms like Superstorm Sandy?
Answer. On June 6, 2016, FEMA transmitted a legislative proposal
titled the ``Disaster Workforce Flexibility Act'' to Congress. The
proposal would grant competitive status to allow certain temporary FEMA
employees to apply for permanent positions under merit promotion
procedures. A significant portion of FEMA's response and recovery
capabilities resides in its Reservist workforce and Cadre of On-Call
Response/Recovery Employees (COREs). FEMA Reservist and CORE personnel
provide valuable and essential services at FEMA headquarters, regional
offices, and disaster Joint Field Offices, in the immediate lead-up to,
during, and after an emergency or major disaster. However, unlike
permanent Federal employees, these vital personnel currently are not
eligible to compete for vacant Federal permanent positions under merit
promotion procedures. This change would allow FEMA the flexibility to
potentially fill competitive service vacancies at FEMA with COREs and
Reservists through merit promotion procedures.
Additionally, this change would provide a strong incentive for
people to join FEMA through these programs because this status would
allow for a greater opportunity to attain a permanent, competitive
service position in the future. This incentive would serve to attract
more applicants who aspire to a career in the Federal service,
particularly in the field of emergency response, recovery, and
management. A larger pool of candidates for the FEMA Reservist and CORE
programs would potentially provide FEMA with access to applicants with
a broader array of skills, qualifications, and experience than may
exist currently.
FEMA welcomes the opportunity to provide technical assistance
regarding this legislative proposal and looks forward to continuing to
work with Congress as they develop proposed legislation relating to
FEMA's Stafford Act authorities.
Questions From Chairman Daniel M. Donovan, Jr. for Marion Mollegen
McFadden
Question 1a. In response to Superstorm Sandy, Congress appropriated
$16 billion in CDBG funds for disaster relief. In the legislative
language of the Disaster Appropriations Act, 2013, Congress
specifically elected not to restrict eligibility for CDBG funds for
for-profit entities. Congress did, however, authorize the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development to specify alternative requirements for
CDBG disaster assistance funds.
When HUD issued its Notice providing guidance for the initial
allocation of $5.4 billion in funding under the CDBG Program for
Hurricane Sandy relief, the HUD press release announcing the initial
allocation of funding stated that ``CDBG Disaster Recovery funding
gives grantees significant flexibility in determining how best to use
their funds to meet the greatest unmet needs.'' Despite this language,
however, the HUD guidance imposed a new restriction on the use of CDBG
funds for repairs to utility infrastructure. The Notice imposed an
alternative requirement that HUD disaster relief funds may ``not be
used to assist a privately-owned utility for any purpose.'' The
alternative requirement also limited assistance to for-profit
businesses only to small businesses.
How is HUD's ``alternative requirement'' not inconsistent with
existing law? Under 42 U.S.C. Section 5305(a)(17)(C), CDBG funding can
be used to provide assistance to ``private, for-profit entities, when
the assistance . . . meets urgent needs.'' Under existing HUD
regulations (24 C.F.R. Section 570.201(1), CDBG funds may be used ``to
acquire, construct, reconstruct, rehabilitate, or install the
distribution lines and facilities of privately-owned utilities,
including the placing underground of new or existing distribution
facilities and lines.'' Neither this existing law nor these regulations
were changed by the Disaster Appropriations Act, 2103.
Answer. Benefit to low- and moderate-income persons is the primary
objective of the CDBG program (Section 5301(c) of Title 42 of the
United States Code). While the required overall low- and moderate-
income threshold for CDBG-DR funds was reduced by Public Law (Pub. L.)
113-2 in comparison to the annual CDBG program, the Department is
acutely aware that low- and moderate-income households are the least
likely to recover in the wake of a major declared disaster. In
implementing CDBG-DR supplemental appropriations, HUD seeks to ensure
that adequate resources are available to assist this population. HUD
uses multiple strategies to ensure that the recovery needs of low- and
moderate-income households are prioritized, one of which is ensuring
that entities with insurance and financial resources that may be
devoted to recovery are, in fact, used to fund recovery activities. The
decision to use the CDBG-DR ``alternative requirement'' authority of
Pub. L. 113-2 to limit the use of CDBG-DR assistance to small business
entities is in keeping with the goals of maximizing assistance
available for low- and moderate-income populations while also
maximizing private financial resources. The appropriation required HUD
to publish any such alternative requirements in the Federal Register.
The Department's March 5, 2013 Federal Register Notice implemented
CDBG-DR funding appropriated by Pub. L. 113-2 and contained an
alternative requirement to Section 5305(a) of Title 42 of the United
States Code that limited the broader, usual eligible use of CDBG funds
under Sections 5305(a)(14) and (17). The regulation cited in the
question, Section 570.201(1) of Title 24 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, is an implementation of the statutorily-eligible uses of
CDBG funds under Section 5305(a)(14) and (17), which were limited
through the March 5 Notice. The March 5 Notice states that ``For each
waiver and alternative requirement described in this Notice the
Secretary has determined that good cause exists and the action is not
inconsistent with the overall purpose of the HCD Act.''
These provisions of the March 5, 2013, Notice reflect the
administration's December 7, 2012 transmission to then Speaker of the
House John Boehner requesting an appropriation of Federal funds in
response to Hurricane Sandy. In outlining the HUD portion of that
request, the administration noted: `` . . . business repair funds
should be directed to unmet small business damage only, and except for
small businesses that face long-term business disruption, funds should
not be used to restore lost revenue.'' (see page 29, paragraph 6 of the
Appendix to the December 7, 2012, submission, available athttps://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
supplemental_december_7_2012_hurricane_sandy_funding_needs.pdf.
Question 1b. Do you agree that the alternative requirements
established by HUD under the 2013 Disaster Relief Appropriations Act
should not be treated by HUD as a precedent for the repair or
rebuilding of privately-owned utility infrastructure?
Answer. HUD has maintained the prohibition on assistance to private
utilities in its most recent Federal Register Notice implementing the
fiscal year 2016 appropriation of $300 million in CDBG-DR funding to
address the impact of 2015 flooding in South Carolina and Texas (81
Fed. Reg. 39707). Grantees under the fiscal year 2016 appropriation or
under the appropriation made by Public Law 113-2 may also seek a waiver
of HUD requirements. To date, the sole request for a waiver of the
private utility prohibition under either appropriation has been from
the State of New Jersey, for the purpose of implementing its Energy
Resilience Bank. HUD approved the State's waiver request in a Federal
Register Notice published on August 25, 2015 (80 Fed. Reg. 51590).
Question 2. A common theme from witnesses on the second panel at
the field hearing was the need for better coordination and
collaboration--between and among Federal agencies and with State and
local governments and non-profit and private-sector agencies.
We are in the early months of another hurricane season. How are
FEMA and HUD working to ensure that any response and recovery efforts
will be appropriately coordinated?
Answer. As part of the long-tem recovery efforts following
Hurricane Sandy, FEMA and HUD leadership initiated a number of joint
interagency teams and meetings in the region to ensure on-going
relationships, information sharing, and collaborative effort. These
teams and meetings include appropriate experts and responsible
officials in disaster response and recovery across Federal, State, and
local government levels. FEMA and HUD have also worked closely on
preparedness and training to enhance the awareness of critical
information and operations needs in disaster response and recovery.
HUD participates in the Unified Federal Environmental and Historic
Preservation Review Process that was directed by the Sandy Recovery
Improvement Act of 2013 and established by a Memorandum of
Understanding on July 2014. This process enhances the ability of
Federal agencies to expedite environmental and historic preservation
reviews for disaster recovery projects through tools and coordination
resources.
Question 3. What additional changes to current law would you
recommend to enhance your ability to prepare for, respond to, or
recover from storms like Superstorm Sandy?
Answer. CDBG-DR funds.--There is no standing legislative
authorization for HUD's CDBG-GR assistance following a disaster, or,
indeed several other important programs such as DOT's transit emergency
relief program. Each appropriation of CDBG-DR funds has been a
supplemental appropriation enacted after the disaster has struck--often
with nuanced differences in the appropriations language--and after the
Federal response from FEMA, SBA, and other agencies is well underway.
The administration and HUD recognize this mismatch and thus included
the following statement in the President's fiscal year 2017 budget
request: `` . . . To ensure a more orderly and efficient recovery
process, in 2016, the administration will work with agencies across the
Federal Government, as well as public stakeholders to develop a
standing authorization proposal for the provision of CDBG-DR funds.
This proposed authorization would incorporate lessons learned from
previous disasters, provide clarity and predictability over CDBG-DR
funding and program guidelines, and improve the alignment of CDBG-DR
funds with other Federal programs'' (Fiscal year 2017 President's
budget appendix, HUD). The Department is currently engaged in executing
this directive and may use the information gathered to develop a future
proposal.
Improve data sharing between Federal agencies.--In order to provide
disaster assistance through any Federally-funded program, CDBG-DR
grantees must have access to Federal data to allow them to adequately
document eligibility and need. These data contain personally
identifiable information about individuals receiving assistance and the
challenges associated with obtaining this data can result in
significant delays for grantees and beneficiaries. Exploring ways for
HUD and other Federal agencies to more readily share data between the
agencies and with grantees would improve the Federal response. The
Department is currently working with FEMA to implement a data-sharing
agreement that would allow the Department to provide timely information
about recipients of disaster assistance to CDBG-DR grantees.
Consistently apply Federal requirements.--Many disaster recovery
activities have multiple Federal funding sources that in turn introduce
Federal requirements that are specific to each source. When HUD funds
are used in conjunction with other Federal funds, for the same project,
differing requirements are triggered at different times. For example,
HUD funds for most housing and community development projects require
compliance with Section 3 of the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1968, which requires grantees to demonstrate that economic
opportunities arising from the project are provided, to the greatest
extent possible, to low- and very-low income persons. This is a
requirement that is unique to HUD-funded projects and grantees
routinely face challenges in incorporating Section 3 provisions into
agreements with other Federal agencies when attempting to use HUD funds
for a project that is also funded with other Federal sources. Providing
consistent cross-cutting requirements across all Federal sources of
disaster assistance would improve coordination of the Federal response.
Streamline environmental review requirements.--Basic housing
rehabilitation projects are subject to the same Federal environmental
review requirements that apply to more complex and impactful recovery
projects. Two recent CDBG-DR appropriations authorized grantees to use
the environmental review of one Federal agency to satisfy the
environmental review requirements of another agency. Further exploring
ways to expedite environmental reviews for housing rehabilitation and
other less complex recovery projects could also accelerate recovery.
[all]