

**PROTECTING OUR PASSENGERS: PERSPECTIVES  
ON SECURING SURFACE TRANSPORTATION IN  
NEW JERSEY AND NEW YORK**

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**FIELD HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,  
RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION  
JUNE 21, 2016  
**Serial No. 114-77**

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

24-380 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2017

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**PROTECTING OUR PASSENGERS: PERSPECTIVES ON SECURING SURFACE TRANSPORTATION IN NEW JERSEY AND NEW YORK**

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**Tuesday, June 21, 2016**

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,  
RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS,  
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,  
*Jersey City, NJ.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in Room 202, Hepburn Hall, New Jersey City University, 2039 Kennedy Boulevard, Jersey City, New Jersey, Hon. Daniel M. Donovan, Jr. (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Donovan, Payne, and Watson Coleman.

Mr. DONOVAN. The Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications will come to order.

The subcommittee is meeting today to examine surface transportation security. I appreciate the effort taken on behalf of all those involved to have this important field hearing.

This is an official Congressional hearing, as opposed to a town hall meeting, and as such, we must abide by certain rules of the Committee on Homeland Security and the House of Representatives. I kindly wish to remind our guests today that demonstrations from the audience, including applause and verbal outbursts, as well as the use of signs or placards, are a violation of the rules of the House of Representatives. It is important that we respect the decorum and the rules of this committee.

I now recognize myself for an opening statement.

Thank you all for being here today. First, I would like to thank New Jersey City University for hosting us today, as well as Ranking Member Payne, who has focused a great deal on our shared priority of security for transportation.

Now, especially with a threat environment that is the highest since 9/11, it is critically important to examine our region's surface transportation security. We are here to learn how Federal partners, transit agencies, and first responders are working together to protect passengers from the type of hateful violence that hit Orlando last week.

As that attack tragically reminded us, the threats from terrorism and their sympathizers—terrorists and their sympathizers, are not going away. They are evolving and increasing. Now, more than ever, Congress needs to do everything it can to assist stakeholders

in building and sustaining their capabilities to prevent, protect against, and, God forbid, respond to a terrorist attack.

Today, stakeholders from State and local government, the private sector, and surface transportation networks are giving their time to share with us their perspectives on achieving our shared goal of protecting millions of regional commuters. We will look specifically at the preparedness and response capabilities of surface transportation systems in New York and New Jersey, one of the highest threat regions in the world.

Surface transportation networks serve more than 10 billion riders annually. MTA alone moves more than 8.7 million residents on their subways, buses, and commuter rails each day. It is no surprise then that nearly 15 years after the tragedy in lower Manhattan, our transportation systems remain a top target for international terror organizations.

This isn't a new threat. We have seen the devastating impacts of an attack against transportation systems, most recently a bombing in a metro station in Brussels. Since 2002, authorities have thwarted 6 terrorist plots against mass transit systems in the United States. Alarmingly, 5 of those 6 plots were against systems serving the New York metropolitan region.

As the threat grows, we need to ensure that surface transportation systems and first responders have the resources necessary to respond to acts of terrorism and other emergencies. That is why we convened this hearing today. We want to hear from the people here on the ground, not hundreds of miles away in Washington, about what is working and what is not.

Back in April, this subcommittee held a very informative roundtable discussion along with the Subcommittee on Transportation Security regarding this issue. We heard from multiple transit agencies, many of whom are represented on our first panel today, about how they have collaborated with Federal partners like the Transportation Security Administration to secure their infrastructures. I hope we could build upon that discussion today.

When I came to Congress and attended my first few hearings, I asked my staff what happens when these hearings are finished? Who uses this information that we have obtained, and how do we use it?

I assure you that the information gathered today will help form the policies we enact to improve security for our region's commuters. I am particularly interested in learning about how our witnesses use the Transit Security Grant Program and other Homeland Security grants, and if there are needs to change or enhance these programs that Congress should be addressing.

Also I am interested in hearing more about how security personnel for mass transit systems coordinate with Federal Government and local first responders to ensure everyone is prepared to respond to incidents. How are our witnesses working together with other transit agencies to share threat information and best practices?

I want to thank all of our witnesses for testifying today. We have two very distinguished panels before us, and I look forward to learning how they are protecting passengers and what we, as Congress, can do to help mitigate any gaps.

[The statement of Chairman Donovan follows.]

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR.

JUNE 21, 2016

Thank you all for being here today.

First, I'd like to thank the New Jersey City University for hosting us today, as well as Ranking Member Payne, who has focused a great deal on our shared priority of transportation security.

Now especially, with a threat environment that's the highest since 9/11, it's critically important to examine our region's surface transportation security.

We're here to learn how Federal partners, transit agencies, and first responders are working together to protect the passengers from the type of hate-filled violence that hit Orlando last week.

As that attack tragically reminded us, the threats from terrorist organizations and their sympathizers are not going away. They're evolving and increasing.

Now more than ever, Congress needs to do everything it can to assist stakeholders in building and sustaining their capabilities to prevent, protect against, and—God forbid—respond to a terrorist attack.

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Also, I'm interested in hearing more about how security personnel for mass transit systems coordinate with the Federal Government and local first responders to ensure everyone is prepared to respond to incidents.

And how are our witnesses working with other transit agencies to share threat information and best practices?

I want to thank all of the witnesses for testifying today. We have two very distinguished panels before us and I look forward to learning how they're protecting passengers and what we, as Congress, can do to help mitigate any gaps.

Mr. DONOVAN. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Mr. Payne, for an opening statement he may have.

Mr. PAYNE. Good morning. I would first like to thank Chairman Donovan, my neighbor from Staten Island, for agreeing to hold today's hearing on securing surface transportation here in Jersey City.

Our region is a National transportation hub with diverse assets, from rail to bus to ferries. Our transit operators, first responders, and workers are uniquely positioned to tell us what the Federal Government does well to keep our system secure and what it can do better. In light of the number of transportation systems running through this area, the people here are especially qualified to share perspectives on coordination among transit operators with emergency responders.

Since I joined the Committee on Homeland Security in 2013, I have focused my efforts on making sure people are safe in the places they should be safe, whether it is in a school, at a nightclub, a sporting event, or on a train, or getting to work. Two years ago, I hosted a hearing in Newark on securing mass gatherings, using New Jersey's impressive preparations for the 2014 Super Bowl as a case study. New Jersey had important best practices to share.

I am proud that the rest of the country was able to benefit from New Jersey's expertise in making a soft target safer. Nevertheless, there are still people, whatever their motivations, who want to exploit soft targets in our communities. The tragic events in Orlando are evidence of that, and let me again express my deepest condolences to the families and loved ones of the victims in Orlando.

The terrorist attacks in Belgium earlier this year also underscore the threats to soft targets. On March 22, the world was devastated when terrorists carried out 3 coordinated attacks at transportation facilities in Brussels.

As I was in Washington getting briefed on the attacks, I could not help but think of my district and my constituents. Every day, thousands of my constituents board trains to get to work or visit somewhere along the Northeast Corridor, whether it is New Jersey Transit, PATH, subway, or Amtrak. When I saw the footage of the devastation in Brussels, I could not help but ask myself how do we make sure nothing like that happens here, and how do we make sure that our first responders are prepared to respond if it does?

Congress took important steps to prevent attacks on our surface transportation systems nearly 10 years ago when it passed the 9/11 Act. It required the Transportation Security Administration to issue regulations to secure high-risk transit systems and improve training for front-line employees.

I am troubled the TSA is almost a decade behind in issuing these regulations and want to know why they have been held up and when we can expect them. Additionally, I am interested to learn how TSA coordinates with transit operators to improve security in the absence of the required regulations.

Today, we also have a distinguished panel of emergency responders who have spent well over a decade building robust capabilities to respond to full-spectrum—the full spectrum of events, from man-made and natural disasters to mass transit disasters. The 9/11 at-



tacks revealed significant gaps in the National response capabilities and the need for improved coordination among first responders and local stakeholders.

The remarkable progress this region has made is due in large part to the significant—to the significant Federal Homeland Security grant funding. Today, we will have an opportunity to learn how grant investments have made us safer and what more the Federal Government needs to do.

Once again, I would like to thank Chairman Donovan for holding today's hearing in Jersey City. I would also like to thank my New Jersey colleague, Congresswoman Bonnie Watson Coleman, for participating.

Finally, I would like to thank the New Jersey City University for hosting today's field hearing, and I look forward to the witnesses' testimony, and I thank them for being here.

With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.

[The statement of Ranking Member Payne follows:]

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER DONALD M. PAYNE, JR.

JUNE 21, 2016

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The remarkable progress this region has made is due, in large part, to significant Federal homeland security grant funding.

Today, we will have the opportunity to learn how grant investments have made us safer, and what more the Federal Government needs to do.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Payne.

We are pleased to have two panels of very distinguished witnesses before us today on this important topic. I will now introduce our first panel.

Ms. Sonya Proctor serves as the director for the Transportation Security Administration's Surface Division, where she is responsible for developing risk-based security policies in conjunction with stakeholders in surface transportation modes. Prior to joining TSA, Ms. Proctor served as chief of the Amtrak Police Department and served 25 years on the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Police Department.

Welcome.

Ms. PROCTOR. Thank you.

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Thomas Belfiore serves as the chief security officer for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, a position he has held since 2015. Prior to joining the Port Authority in 2012, Mr. Belfiore held several positions in law enforcement as well as security management, including director of security operations for Major League Baseball.

Mr. Raymond Diaz serves as the director of security for the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. In this capacity, he oversees the overall security of the MTA, including the coordination of MTA's security efforts with Federal, State, and local law enforcement. Prior to joining the MTA, Mr. Diaz was a member of the New York City Police Department for 41 years and retired in 2011 as the chief of the Transit Bureau.

Welcome, Chief.

Mr. Christopher Trucillo serves as the chief of New Jersey Transit, a position he has held since 2010. Prior to joining New Jersey Transit, Chief Trucillo served as the director of public safety for John Jay College of Criminal Justice and spent more than 20 years in the Port Authority Police Department, where he served as chief of department.

Welcome, Chief.

Chief TRUCILLO. Thank you.

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Martin Conway serves as the deputy chief of the Amtrak Police Department, a position he has held since August 2014. Prior to joining Amtrak, Chief Conway served on the New York City Police Department for 26 years. While with the New York City Police Department, he served as an inspector in the Counterterrorism Division responsible for coordinating counterterrorism measures within the New York subway system.

The witnesses' full written testimony will appear in the record. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Proctor for 5 minutes to testify.

**STATEMENT OF SONYA PROCTOR, DIRECTOR, SURFACE DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY POLICY AND INDUSTRY ENGAGEMENT, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION**

Ms. PROCTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning.

Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Representative Watson Coleman. I truly appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Transportation Security Administration's role in transportation security.

The transportation security network is immense, consisting of mass transit systems, passenger and freight railroads, highways, motor carrier operators, pipelines, and maritime facilities. The New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority, New York MTA, alone transports over 11 million passengers daily and represents just one of more than 6,800 U.S. public transit agencies for which TSA has oversight, ranging from very small bus-only systems in rural areas to very large multi-modal systems like the one in the New York MTA urban areas.

More than 500 individual freight railroads operate on nearly 140,000 miles of track, carrying essential goods. Eight million large-capacity commercial trucks and almost 4,000 commercial bus companies travel on the 4 million miles of roadway in the United States.

Surface transportation operators carry approximately 750 million intercity bus passengers and provide 10 billion passenger trips on mass transit each year. The pipeline industry consists of more than 2.5 million miles of pipelines owned and operated by approximately 3,000 private companies, which transport natural gas, refined petroleum products, and other commercial products throughout the United States.

These thousands of miles of transportation systems and millions of traveling people remain a target for terrorist activity, as evidenced by the recent attacks on mass transit and passenger rail carriers in France and Belgium. These attacks underscore the importance of building upon our surface transportation successes through stakeholder communication, coordination, and collaboration.

Securing such a vast surface transportation network requires a group effort. TSA's role is focused on security program oversight, while the direct responsibility to secure surface-specific transportation systems falls primarily on the system owners and operators. TSA works with State, local, and industry partners to assess risk, reduce vulnerabilities, and improve security through collaborative efforts.

Collaboration between TSA and industry occurs through daily interaction and engagement, as well as through formal structures, including the DHS-led Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council framework, sector coordinating councils, and other industry-centric organizations, such as the Mass Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group.

TSA, security agencies, industry associations, and the corporate leadership of industry and municipal operator stakeholders jointly pursue policies to secure surface systems, including implementation of exercises and training, physical and cyber protective measures, and operational deterrence activities. Working with our part-

ners, we develop resources for security training and exercises, such as TSA-produced training.

For example, our Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program, it is called I-STEP, helps surface entities test and evaluate their security plans and their ability to respond to threats along with other first responders. We also have the TSA First Observer Program, which trains highway professionals to observe, assess, and report potential security and terrorism incidents.

TSA coordinates with Amtrak and New York MTA to support rail safe operations in which Amtrak police and law enforcement officers from Federal, State, local rail and transit agencies deploy at passenger rail and transit stations and along the railroad rights-of-way to exercise counterterrorism and incident response capabilities. The coordinated effort involves activities such as heightened station and right-of-way patrols, increased security presence on-board trains, explosives detection canine sweeps, random passenger bag inspections, and counter-surveillance.

TSA also plays a role in surface transportation security through regulatory compliance inspections and voluntary assessments. We conduct thousands of inspections of freight railroads each year on rail cars carrying rail security sensitive materials as well as assessments on the 100 largest transit and passenger railroad systems, which account for over 95 percent of all users of public transportation. Results of these assessments translate into resource allocation decisions to ensure that the higher-risk entities with the greatest need receive priority consideration for available resources.

TSA remains dedicated to securing the Nation's surface transportation network from terrorist activities and attacks through close collaboration with our State, local, and industry partners. Moving forward, our goal working with our industry is to continually improve surface transportation security through the development and implementation of intelligence-driven, risk-based policies and plans.

We thank you very much this morning for the opportunity to discuss these important issues and appreciate the committee's support of TSA's goals.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Proctor follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SONYA PROCTOR

JUNE 21, 2016

Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) role in surface transportation security.

The surface transportation network is immense, consisting of mass transit systems, passenger and freight railroads, highways, motor carrier operators, pipelines, and maritime facilities. The New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (NY MTA) alone transports over 11 million passengers daily—and represents just one of the more than 6,800 U.S. public transit agencies for which TSA has oversight, ranging from very small bus-only systems in rural areas to very large multi-modal systems like the NY MTA in urban areas. More than 500 individual freight railroads operate on nearly 140,000 miles of track carrying essential goods. Eight million large capacity commercial trucks and almost 4,000 commercial bus companies travel on the 4 million miles of roadway in the United States and on more than 600,000 highway bridges over 20 feet in length and through 350 tunnels greater than 300 feet in length. Surface transportation operators carry approximately 750 million

intercity bus passengers and provide 10 billion passenger trips on mass transit each year. The pipeline industry consists of approximately 3,000 private companies, which own and operate more than 2.5 million miles of pipelines transporting natural gas, refined petroleum products, and other commercial products that are critical to the economy and the security of the United States. Securing such large surface transportation systems in a society that depends upon the free movement of people and commerce is a complex undertaking that requires extensive collaboration with surface transportation operators.

Recent terror attacks on mass transit and passenger rail carriers in France and Belgium remind us of the need to remain vigilant. While there is no known specific, credible terrorist threat to the U.S. passenger rail system at this time, the August 2015 incident in Paris and the March 2016 attacks in Brussels underscore the need to continue to build upon our surface transportation successes through stakeholder communication, coordination, and collaboration. Surface transportation passenger systems are, by nature, open systems. In the face of a decentralized, diffuse, complex, and evolving terrorist threat, TSA responds by employing cooperative and collaborative relationships with key stakeholders to develop best practices, share information, and execute security measures to strengthen and enhance the security of surface transportation networks.

Unlike the aviation mode of transportation, direct responsibility to secure surface transportation systems falls primarily on the system owners and operators. TSA's role in surface transportation security is focused on security program oversight, system assessments, voluntary operator compliance with industry standards, collaborative law enforcement and security operations, and regulations. Security and emergency response planning is not new to our surface stakeholders; they have been working under Department of Transportation (DOT) and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) programs and regulations for many years. Although DOT's regulations relate primarily to safety, many safety activities and programs also benefit security and help to reduce risk. In the surface environment, TSA has built upon these standards to improve security programs with minimal regulations.

TSA's spending on surface transportation realizes a massive return on its budgetary investment. TSA's resources and personnel directly support on-going security programs by committed security partners who, in turn, spend millions of their own funds to secure critical infrastructure, provide uniformed law enforcement and specialty security teams, and conduct operational activities and deterrence efforts. We have invested our resources to help security partners identify vulnerabilities and risk in their agencies. Surface transportation entities know their facilities and their operational challenges, and with their knowledge and our assistance, they are able to direct accurately their own resources in addition to the hundreds of millions of dollars in Federal security grant funding to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack.

#### FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, AND PRIVATE COORDINATION

Securing the vast surface transportation network requires a group effort. TSA oversees the development and implementation of risk-based security initiatives for surface transportation in coordination with our security partners.

TSA, on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is a co-Sector-Specific Agency alongside DOT and USCG for the transportation sector. DOT and TSA work together to integrate safety and security priorities. As part of the DHS-led Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) framework, TSA, DOT, and the USCG co-chair Government Coordinating Councils to facilitate information sharing and coordinate on activities including security assessments, training, and exercises. Additionally, TSA leverages its core competencies in credentialing, explosives detection, and intermodal security to support the USCG as lead agency for maritime security.

TSA works with State, local, and industry partners to assess risk, reduce vulnerabilities, and improve security through collaborative efforts. Collaboration between TSA and industry occurs through daily interaction and engagement, as well as through formal structures including the DHS-led CIPAC framework, Sector Coordinating Councils, and other industry-centric organizations such as the Mass Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group. TSA, security agencies, and the corporate leadership of industry and municipal operator stakeholders jointly pursue policies to secure surface systems, including implementation of exercises and training, physical and cyber hardening measures, and operational deterrence activities.

#### REGIONAL ALLIANCE INCLUDING LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL EFFORTS (RAILSAFE)

TSA coordinates with Amtrak and NY MTA to support RAILS SAFE operations, in which Amtrak police and law enforcement officers from Federal, State, local, rail,

and transit agencies deploy at passenger rail and transit stations and along the railroad rights-of-way to exercise counterterrorism and incident-response capabilities. This coordinated effort involves activities such as heightened station and right-of-way patrols, increased security presence on-board trains, explosives detection canine sweeps, random passenger bag inspections, and counter-surveillance. RAILS SAFE operations are conducted several times a year to deter terrorist activity through unpredictable security activities. On average, more than 40 States and Canada, and over 200 agencies participate in RAILS SAFE operations. The most recent RAILS SAFE operation was conducted on May 26, 2016, with more than 1,400 officers across 205 agencies representing 42 States and Canada participating.

#### EXERCISES AND TRAINING

TSA has developed multiple training and exercise programs to assist industry operators in directing their resources and efforts towards effectively reducing risk. With the support of Congress, TSA developed the Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP). TSA facilitates I-STEP exercises across all surface modes to help transportation entities test and evaluate their security plans, including prevention and preparedness capabilities, ability to respond to threats, and cooperation with first responders from other entities. TSA uses a risk-informed process to select the entities that receive I-STEP exercises and updates I-STEP scenarios as new threats emerge to ensure industry partners are prepared to exercise the most appropriate countermeasures. Since fiscal year 2008, TSA has conducted over 105 I-STEP exercises throughout 40 High-Threat Urban Areas (HTUAs), including 8 conducted so far this fiscal year, such as motorcoach exercises in Los Angeles, CA and Myrtle Beach, SC; mass transit exercises in Houston and San Antonio, TX; and maritime exercises in New York City and Washington, DC. Additionally, TSA conducted an I-STEP exercise in Philadelphia in August 2015 to help that region prepare for the Papal visit.

In fiscal year 2015, TSA developed and began utilizing the Exercise Information System (EXIS) tool, which examines a surface transportation operator's implementation of security measures in the areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. EXIS helps transportation operators identify areas of strength in an operator's security program, as well as those areas that need attention where they can then focus or redirect resources, such as security grant funding. TSA also is able to provide operators with several resources that can improve capability in areas such as training, public awareness campaigns, and best practices that other systems have implemented to address security concerns. Since program inception, TSA has facilitated 16 EXIS exercises with stakeholders in HTUAs.

TSA disseminates training materials and information to stakeholders through several avenues. Through the Security Measures And Resources Toolbox (SMARToolbox) and other security and public awareness training materials, TSA provides surface transportation professionals relevant insights into security practices used by peers throughout the industry and mode-specific recommendations for enhancing an entity's security posture. TSA developed the Surface Compliance Analysis Network (SCAN) to analyze daily incidents reported to the Transportation Security Operations Center to identify security-related trends or patterns. TSA disseminates SCAN trend reports to affected entities, as well as to the broader industry for situational awareness. SCAN reports have been able to identify incidents that when taken individually may not seem to be an issue or threat, but when compiled over time and analyzed locally, regionally, and Nationally, present activities that may be pre-operational activity aimed at detecting the response methods and/or capabilities of surface transportation systems. The number of similar incidents reported in relatively short periods of time may indicate the intent of a perpetrator to disrupt operations and potentially cause damage and injuries. These SCAN trend reports provide insight into those potential threats and operations.

TSA's First Observer™ security domain awareness program delivers web-based training to surface transportation professionals, encouraging front-line workers to "Observe, Assess, and Report" suspicious activities. Approximately 100,000 individuals have been trained on the First Observer™ Program. Operators have credited First Observer™ Program training in their ability to disrupt a potential Greyhound bus hijacking situation in February 2011. Also in February 2011, a concerned Conway employee followed principles he received from the Program's training to alert authorities about inconsistencies regarding chemicals shipped and their intended use, which led to the arrest of an individual who was then charged with attempting to bomb nuclear power plants and dams along the West Coast. The investigation also revealed that the subject was planning to target the home of former President George W. Bush as well.

TSA strongly encourages the use of the *If You See Something, Say Something*<sup>TM</sup> public awareness campaign—which the NY MTA created using DHS security grant funding—to make the traveling public the “eyes and ears” of the transportation systems. Similarly, TSA’s *Not On My Watch* program is directed at the surface transportation community and designed to make employees of surface transportation systems part of awareness programs intended to safeguard National transportation systems against terrorism and other threats. TSA also works with industry to identify emerging security training needs, develop new training modules, and refresh existing training.

In September 2014, TSA began a program to provide senior-level industry transportation security officials with a detailed exposure to TSA’s surface security programs and policies. Once a quarter, a senior executive from a surface transportation operator or entity is invited to spend 4 to 6 weeks at TSA to gain first-hand experience in TSA’s counterterrorism and risk reduction efforts and foster beneficial relationships among TSA and industry stakeholders. Participants in the program have included Amtrak, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, NY MTA, and the Bay Area Rapid Transit District. Executives from these agencies were given a broad exposure to TSA operations in the surface and aviation modes, and left with a better appreciation for the scope and breadth of the services TSA provides for all modes of transportation. The program also allows TSA to use the senior executives as sounding boards for potential security programs and policies, to ensure that our initiatives not only address their greatest security concerns, but are feasible from an operational perspective at the local levels of transportation.

#### SECTOR-SPECIFIC PROGRAMS, ASSESSMENTS, AND INSPECTIONS

TSA performs regulatory inspections on railroad operations, and voluntary assessments of systems and operations within all of the surface transportation modes to ensure operator compliance with security regulations and adoption of voluntary security practices. TSA deploys 260 Transportation Security Inspectors for Surface (TSL-S) to assess and inspect the security posture of surface transportation entities.

TSA and its partners in the freight rail industry have significantly reduced the vulnerability of rail security-sensitive materials, including Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) materials, transported through populous areas by reducing urban dwell time. The National rate of regulatory compliance rate is above 99%.

In 2006, TSA established the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program, through which TSA Inspectors conduct a thorough security program assessment of mass transit and passenger rail agencies as well as over-the-road bus operators. These inspectors help local transit systems develop a “path forward” to remediate vulnerabilities identified in the vulnerability assessments, and identify resources that TSA or other areas of the Federal Government can provide to help transit systems raise their security baseline. The results of these assessments are analyzed to influence TSA policy and development of voluntary guidelines to ensure that our voluntary policies and programs are addressing the most critical vulnerabilities from a security perspective. TSA performs these voluntary BASE assessments with emphasis on the 100 largest mass transit and passenger railroad systems measured by passenger volume, which account for over 95 percent of all users of public transportation. TSA has conducted over 430 assessments on mass transit and passenger rail systems since 2006. In fiscal year 2015, TSA Inspectors completed 117 BASE assessments on mass transit and passenger rail agencies, of which 13 resulted in Gold Standard Awards for those entities achieving overall security program management excellence. In 2012, TSA expanded the BASE program to the highway and motor carrier mode and has since conducted over 400 reviews of highway and motor carrier operators, with 98 reviews conducted in fiscal year 2015. On average, approximately 150 reviews are conducted on mass transit and highway and motor carrier operators each year, with numerous reviews in various stages of completion for fiscal year 2016.

TSA also regularly engages transit and passenger rail partners through the Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group (PAG), which represents 26 of the largest public transportation systems in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and through regular monthly and as-needed industry-wide information-sharing calls, such as calls conducted after the attacks in Paris and Brussels. Our participation in forums such as the annual Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Security and Emergency Management Roundtable, and our continuing work with the PAG enable us to understand the security needs of our domestic and international security partners to collaboratively develop programs and resources to meet critical needs. Through the PAG and the Roundtables, we have restructured how security grant funds are awarded to high-risk transportation entities, ensuring that the

funding priorities address the current threat and risks that our surface transportation operators face. We also developed a list of Nationally critical infrastructure assets in order to better direct Federal and local resources to implement security measures to protect those assets. Since fiscal year 2006, over \$565 million in Transit Security Grant Program funding has been awarded for security projects specifically to harden these critical assets. We have also been able to enhance and refine the ways and time frames in which we share threat and intelligence information, through mechanisms such as Security Awareness Messages, and regular and as-needed industry information sharing and intelligence conference calls. TSA also hosts Classified briefings for cleared industry stakeholders when warranted.

TSA has established a productive public-private partnership with the pipeline industry to secure the transport of natural gas, petroleum, and other products. TSA conducts both physical and corporate security reviews (CSR) within the pipeline sector, with over 400 physical security reviews of critical facilities of the highest-risk pipeline systems completed since 2008 and over 140 corporate security reviews of high-risk systems since 2002. TSA completed 6 CSRs in fiscal year 2015; 4 have been completed in fiscal year 2016 with an additional 4 scheduled for completion by the end of the fiscal year. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53) required TSA to develop and implement a plan for inspecting the critical facilities of the top 100 pipeline systems in the Nation. TSA conducted these required inspections between 2008 and 2011 through the Critical Facility Inspection program and is now focused on regular recurring reviews through TSA's Critical Facility Security Review (CFSR) program. TSA completed 46 CFSRs in fiscal year 2015; 21 have been completed in fiscal year 2016 with 16 more expected to be completed by the end of the fiscal year.

TSA has developed pipeline security guidance with the assistance of pipeline system owners and operators, pipeline industry trade association representatives, and Government partners. Wide-spread implementation of this guidance by the pipeline industry has enhanced critical infrastructure security throughout the country. TSA is currently working with stakeholders to update these guidelines. There has been an increase in the quality of the company corporate security programs reviewed during CSRs, as the guidance has served as a template for establishing a corporate security program including a Corporate Security Plan. For pipeline critical facilities reviewed during CFSRs, there has been an increase in the number of facilities conducting security drills and exercises, an increase in coordination with local law enforcement agencies, and an increase in the number of facilities conducting security vulnerability assessments, all of which are recommended practices in the Guidelines.

#### SECURING SURFACE THROUGH GRANTS

TSA provides the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with subject-matter expertise to assist in the development of the Notice of Funding Opportunities for the Transit Security Grant Program. These FEMA grants support surface transportation risk mitigation by applying Federal funding to critical security projects with the greatest security effects. Between fiscal years 2006 and 2015, over \$2.3 billion in Transit Security Grant funding was awarded to freight railroad carriers and operators, over-the-road bus operators, the trucking community, and public mass transit owners and operators, including Amtrak, and their dedicated law enforcement providers. One-hundred million dollars was appropriated in fiscal year 2016 for mass transit, passenger rail, and motor coach security grants, which are currently in the application process. Applications were due April 25, 2016, and DHS expects to announce final award allocations on June 29, 2016.

TSA reviews the grant program framework and makes recommendations to FEMA, ensuring funding priorities are based on identified or potential threats and vulnerabilities identified through TSA assessment programs such as the BASE program, together with consideration of potential consequences. For instance, in 2007, TSA's review of the industry scores in the training category of the BASE assessments indicated a potential vulnerability, and TSA addressed the vulnerability by modifying the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) to prioritize front-line employee training. In fiscal year 2011, TSA's review of BASE scores and discussions with industry revealed that vulnerabilities at Nationally critical infrastructure assets were not being addressed as quickly as they could be. TSA worked with FEMA to overhaul the TSGP framework to prioritize these assets ("Top Transit Asset List") for funding through a wholly competitive process. As a result over \$565 million has been awarded to protect these assets, resulting in over 80% of them being considered secure from a preventative standpoint.



As a result of information gained from TSA activities, DHS is able to direct grant funds to activities that have the highest efficacy in reducing the greatest risk, such as critical infrastructure vulnerability remediation, equipment purchases, anti-terrorism teams, mobile screening teams, explosives detection canine teams, training, drills and exercises, and public awareness campaigns. For example, the NY MTA has received \$17 million in public awareness funding that helped create the *If You See Something, Say Something*<sup>™</sup> campaign, which was credited with preventing a potential terrorist event in Times Square in New York City. Over \$276 million in grant funds have been used to hire over 520 specialty transit law enforcement officers in the forms of K-9 teams, mobile explosives detection screening teams, and anti-terrorism teams. Transit systems in major cities including New York City, Washington, DC, Chicago, and Los Angeles use these grant-funded teams and patrols not only to conduct regular operations, but also to provide extra local security and deterrence in response to attacks across the world, including the recent attack in Brussels.

#### CYBERSECURITY

TSA supports DHS cybersecurity efforts based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology cybersecurity framework, including within surface modes. The cybersecurity framework is designed to provide a foundation industry can implement to sustain robust cybersecurity programs, and TSA shares information and resources with industry to support adoption of the framework. TSA also provides a cybersecurity toolkit designed to offer the surface transportation industry an array of available no-cost resources, recommendations, and practices. Additionally, within the pipeline sector, TSA is coordinating a voluntary cyber-assessment program with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to conduct cybersecurity assessments of pipeline entities. TSA works closely with the pipeline industry to identify and reduce cybersecurity vulnerabilities, including through Classified briefings to increase awareness of the threat. TSA's efforts in cybersecurity are critical to securing surface transportation modes from cyber intrusions.

#### IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION ACT OF 2007

TSA has worked diligently to implement the requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53). Under Administrator Neffenger's leadership, TSA has prioritized the few remaining outstanding requirements of the Act. These mandates include the issuance of regulations relating to security training (Sections 1408, 1517, and 1534) and security planning and vulnerability assessments (Sections 1405, 1512, 1531), as well as establishment of a program to complete name-based background and immigration checks for public transportation and railroad employees (Sections 1411 and 1520). TSA is making significant progress on all of these rulemakings, among others, and continues to dedicate substantial time and resources towards this effort. TSA will continue its prioritization of these rules notwithstanding the complexity and time-consuming nature of the rulemaking process.

#### CONCLUSION

TSA is dedicated to securing the Nation's transportation systems from terrorist activities and attacks. Through its voluntary programs and minimal regulations, TSA mitigates security challenges faced by an open-by-nature surface transportation system in collaboration with our industry and Government partners. We are focused on improving surface transportation security through the development and implementation of intelligence-driven, risk-based policies and plans, and we appreciate the committee's support of TSA's goals. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these important issues.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Ms. Proctor.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Belfiore for 5 minutes of testimony. Welcome, sir.

#### **STATEMENT OF THOMAS BELFIORE, CHIEF SECURITY OFFICER, THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY**

Mr. BELFIORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Members of the subcommittee. My name is Tom Belfiore, and I am the chief security officer for the Port Authority

of New York and New Jersey. I thank you for providing the opportunity to speak about this critically important topic.

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey conceives, builds, and operates infrastructure that is critical to the New York/New Jersey region's transportation and trade network. As you well know, the assets we protect include 6 airports, including JFK, Newark, and LaGuardia; 2 tunnels; 4 bridges—3 of them in Staten Island—and the George Washington Bridge, the busiest bridge in the world; the Port Authority bus terminal in Manhattan, the busiest bus terminal in America; the PATH rail system; the Ports of New York and New Jersey; and of course, the World Trade Center complex.

Brussels, Paris, and Orlando prove to us that we must now, more than ever, be prepared to address the ever-growing, ever-evolving, and more lethal threats. To do so, we employ a multi-layered security approach to protect our critical infrastructure and those who depend on them.

The layers in the methodology include intelligence-led policing, measuring risk through a layered assessment process, police prevention and interdiction methods, operation security measures and the use of contract security resources, the deployment of available and developing technologies, engineered-hardened solutions.

We have our own Office of Emergency Management. We depend on Federal, State, and regional partnerships like those we have with my esteemed colleagues at the table today. We measure effectiveness, we audit effectiveness, and we revise it.

This multi-layered security approach is applied to all of our facilities. But for today, we will talk about PATH, a rail system that has 13 stations and 26 miles of track. On any given business day, the system will carry 265,000 passengers.

Our policing strategy is intelligence led, as the Port Authority Police Department has a presence in 28 Federal, State, and local law enforcement task forces that most notably include the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force in both the States of New York and New Jersey. We are confident that we are connected to receive important and actionable intelligence and information.

Our PAPD is a highly competent, professional, and well-trained police agency that has police commands assigned around the clock at Port Authority critical infrastructure. Our policing methods, of course, include routine patrols, high-visibility Emergency Service Unit deployment, the deployment of dedicated counterterrorism teams, as well as the assignment of explosive detection canines and radiation detection capabilities.

It is important to note that police staffing at the PATH command has increased by 45 percent since 2002. Our police presence is supplemented by an unarmed contract security guard force at PATH of over 100 security officers who are trained in behavioral recognition techniques and counterterrorism awareness. These security officers are posted at critical locations throughout the system and also staff a 24/7 security operations center.

In addition to these human assets, we have made significant investments in our capital security projects, as directed by our periodic program of risk assessments that inform our investments that further strengthen our facilities. Since 2001, the Port Authority has

spent over \$1.2 billion in hardening its critical infrastructure, and for the coming years, we plan to spend nearly another \$1 billion to protect these assets. The Federal grant money that this delegation and others have made is vital to that effort.

For the PATH system, specific measures have been taken to harden and protect the system from a variety of man-made and natural hazards that include infrastructure strengthening that make PATH tunnels more resilient to man-made threats. The use of technology is paramount to our protection scheme.

In addition to over 800 CCTV cameras, the Port Authority has invested in a robust card access control system at PATH, intrusion detection systems that protect tunnel entrances, detection devices that help protect against chemical, biological, and radiological threats. We have enhanced the PATH radio communication system to allow for interoperable and intraoperable communications for PAPD and our mutual aid partners such as NYPD, FDNY, and New Jersey first responders that are so important to our response to emergencies at our facilities.

The Port Authority has its own Office of Emergency Management that is very important to this multi-layered protection approach. They lead our agency-wide business continuity program. They manage and administer agency-wide security grant programs.

Another very important role for OEM is to plan and execute agency-wide training and full-scale exercises. These remarkable training programs involve both agency personnel and our regional first responders. To date, over 27,000 Port Authority staff and regional first responders have been trained on such topics as incident command, active shooter, PATH rail emergencies, terror attacks, and other hazards.

In order to maintain a prepared, unified, and accountable security operation, we regularly measure, audit, and inspect programs and systems. These internal auditing programs allow us to proactively identify and mitigate issues and concerns before our adversaries can exploit them.

Further, in an effort to ensure independent third-party review, the Port Authority participates in Department of Homeland Security SAFETY Act program. In 2001, PATH received SAFETY Act designation for the protective system that is in place to protect PATH underwater tunnels.

The Port Authority also participates in the TSA Baseline Assessment and Security Enhancement Program. In 2015, the TSA awarded the PATH security program the gold standard for best practices in rail security. We are exceedingly proud of that achievement.

How the Federal Government can help. First and foremost, I thank, Chairman, this delegation for your advocacy for all of the efforts that the Port Authority tries to put forward. We keep security as a top priority. A critical resource is the Federal grant funding program. A large source of our funding comes from the Transit Security Grant Program.

In 2016, a maximum amount of funding through this program was set at \$87 million Nation-wide, an increase, if possible, of that funding could allow transit operators to pursue larger capital and operational security projects. Additionally, an increase in the pe-

riod of performance from 3 to 5 years would allow us to plan larger-scale and more effective security capital projects.

Additionally and last, perhaps DHS science and technology could publish a guide for review by decision makers relative to the investment and purchase of proven technologies that will better aid in the protection of transportation assets.

In closing, I would like to thank the Members of this subcommittee and our Congressional delegation for their continuing support that allows us to better serve our employees, customers, and better protect our regional critical transportation infrastructure and those that rely on them.

Thank you so much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Belfiore follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS BELFIORE

JUNE 21, 2016

ABOUT THE PORT AUTHORITY

The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey conceives, builds, operates, and maintains infrastructure critical to the New York/New Jersey region's transportation and trade network. These facilities include America's busiest airport system, including: John F. Kennedy International, LaGuardia, and Newark Liberty International airports, marine terminals and ports, the PATH rail transit system, 6 tunnels and bridges between New York and New Jersey, the Port Authority Bus Terminal in Manhattan, and the World Trade Center. For more than 90 years, the Port Authority has worked to improve the quality of life for the more than 18 million people who live and work in New York and New Jersey metropolitan region.

THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SECURITY OFFICER

Created in 2012, the Office of the Chief Security Officer (OCSO) is a department within the Port Authority and is responsible for providing the highest quality public safety, facility security operations, security program management, emergency management, and airport rescue and firefighting training and services. Together, over 2,000 employees ensure the security and safe movement of the Port Authority's customers, partners, employees, and stakeholders every day.

*I. Port Authority New York and New Jersey Transportation Assets*

The Port Authority builds, operates, and maintains critical transportation and trade assets that fall under our 5 lines of business:

- Aviation
- Rail
- Tunnels, Bridges, and Terminals
- Ports
- Commercial Real Estate

Our aviation assets include 6 airports: John F. Kennedy International Airport, LaGuardia Airport, Newark Liberty International Airport, Teterboro Airport, and Stewart International Airport. In 2015, Port Authority airports moved an estimated 124 million passengers.

Our rail and surface transportation assets include the: Trans-Hudson Rail System (PATH), George Washington Bridge, Bayonne Bridge, Goethals Bridge, Outerbridge Crossing, the Port Authority Bus Terminal, George Washington Bridge Bus Station, Journal Square Transportation Center, Holland Tunnel, and Lincoln Tunnel. Over 115 million vehicles travel over PA's bridges and tunnels annually.

Port Authority also manages ports that transport vital cargo throughout the New York and New Jersey region. The Port of New York and New Jersey is the largest on the East Coast and in 2015 moved over 3.6 million cargo containers.

The Port Authority also owns and manages the 16-acre World Trade Center site, home to the iconic One World Trade Center.

*II. Our Multi-Layered Approach to Securing Our Assets and Protecting the Public*

We utilize a robust multi-layered security approach to protect the Port Authority's customers, the general public, employees, and critical infrastructure by developing, implementing, and managing programs that preserve life and property, increase

safety and security, and support the agency's business objectives by strengthening our resilience and continuity of operations. With these measures in place—there is no single point of failure. Our multi-layered approach is explained in detail below.

#### *Intelligence-Led*

The Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) implements intelligence-led policing to ensure our resources are effectively deployed to prevent potential threats to our customers, employees, and facilities. The PAPD has presence in 28 Federal, State, and local law enforcement task forces, to include: The Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force (FBI JTTF) in New York and New Jersey which allows for shared intelligence across many agencies; The New York and New Jersey High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) taskforce and the New Jersey State Police Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC) that allows for the immediate exchange of important, timely, and actionable intelligence for both sides of the Hudson.

Additionally, we have a stakeholder representative assigned full-time to the New York Police Department's Lower Manhattan Security Initiative. This unit is a key provider of day-to-day actionable intelligence relative to routine conditions like large events and demonstrations to current and emerging threats.

These combined resources result in the agile, flexible, effective, and efficient deployment of security and law enforcement resources that are responsive to current and developing threats and conditions.

#### *Risk Assessments*

The protection of critical infrastructure is driven by all-hazards risk assessments which are performed on a regular basis to better understand changes in threats and vulnerabilities related to our facilities. Our periodic multi-hazard assessments look across all agency assets and prioritize our risk so we can guide our security investments accordingly.

#### *Police Interdiction Activities*

The PAPD is comprised of over 1,800 uniformed police officers operating across 13 Port Authority facilities. The department also includes a Criminal Investigations Bureau, Special Operations Division, which includes an Emergency Services Unit and a Canine Unit (K-9), and an Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting component at the Port Authority airports.

Through visible uniformed police presence and in partnership with other law enforcement agencies, the PAPD suppresses crime and utilizes counterterrorism measures to thwart potential adversaries seeking to cause harm or disruption by way of an attack. PAPD also deploys high-visibility patrols and specialized services to enhance basic patrol functions utilizing intelligence-led policing concepts.

#### *Operational Security Measures and Security Agents*

The Port Authority implements civilian security programs to supplement our police department activities and increase the levels of protection at our facilities. These programs safeguard Port Authority facilities from threats to physical infrastructure, unauthorized access to restricted areas, cybersecurity attacks, and breaches of protected security information.

Additionally, the Port Authority employs over 1,000 unarmed Uniformed Contract Security Agents to guard our facilities and keep our employees and customers safe.

#### *Technology*

A critical element of a robust multi-layered approach is the development and maintenance of advanced technology systems to support both security and resiliency. Significant investments have been made in the areas of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), access control systems, and our perimeter intrusion detection system (PIDS).

In addition, we have created a new Cyber Security program to better monitor and respond to suspicious activities occurring on our network, therefore strengthening our capability to protect our critical information and industrial control systems. The Port Authority operates a 24/7 cybersecurity operations center that can receive and respond to threats to our network and equipment.

#### *Engineered Hardening Solutions*

Since September 11, 2001, we have made over \$1 billion in asset-hardening investments. Although faced with the challenge of retrofitting security features into existing facilities, we have implemented a multitude of hardening solutions such as bollard placement, fencing installation, tunnel and guard post hardening, floating barriers, facade glazing, flood mitigation systems and no trespassing signage. Pro-

spectively, these protective measures are built into new developments or the renovations of existing assets.

#### *Office of Emergency Management*

The Port Authority enhances resiliency, response, and recovery through our Office of Emergency Management (OEM). The OEM champions programs that provide the Port Authority with the resources, support, and capabilities to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against all-hazards. The OEM is organized into 3 core mission areas:

- *Emergency Management.*—Supports the Incident Command response structure at Port Authority during events or incidents. Additionally, responsible for all-hazard planning and training for agency personnel and regional partners who will support our response activities to emergencies at our facilities located in New York and New Jersey. Through the use of table-top and full-scale exercise, over 27,000 Port Authority staff and regional partners have been trained on such topics as Active-Shooter response, PATH rail emergencies, terror attacks, and other hazards.
- *Grant Management.*—Administers and manages all Federal and State Homeland Security Grants that allows us to harden our assets, invest in technology, initiate new programs, and provide for enhanced police protective services.
- *Risk Management and Resiliency.*—Responsible for coordinating and implementing the agency-wide all-hazard risk assessment and oversees the Port Authority Business Continuity program.

These programs are regularly adapted to meet the needs of the Port Authority with an impact range that stretches from individual employee preparedness to agency-wide, corporate-level resiliency.

#### *Federal, State, and Regional Partnerships*

The Port Authority understands the importance of maintaining strong relationships with our Federal, State, and local partners. These cooperative partnerships are integral to our intelligence, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, technology, and training efforts. The support received through these partnerships helps us better secure our assets and the information exchange is mutually beneficial to all partners.

#### *Measuring Effectiveness and Performance Assurance*

In order to maintain a prepared, unified, and accountable security operation, the Port Authority regularly measures, audits, and inspects programs and systems. This practice instills a culture of evaluating the effectiveness and integrity of our systems and program performance. The OCSO also maintains its own Quality Assurance Inspections program that evaluates the physical protection strategies employed at the Port Authority. These internal auditing programs allow us to proactively identify and mitigate issues and concerns before our adversaries exploit them.

Furthermore, in an effort to ensure independent third-party review of our security programs, the Port Authority actively participates in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Safety Act program. To date, Port Authority received 6 awards for designation and 1 for certification at various facilities.

### *III. The Application of the Multi-Layered Security Approach to PATH*

In 2015, the PATH system carried over 76.5 million passengers; an average of 265,000 passengers per day. The security of those passengers is paramount.

#### *Human Assets*

We have a police command dedicated to patrolling the 13 stations and 26 miles of track. The PATH police command has grown by 45% since January 2002. Policing methods include: Routine uniformed patrols, high-visibility emergency service unit random anti-terrorism patrols, the deployment of dedicated counterterrorism teams, as well as the assignment of explosive detection canine (K-9) units. Police officers assigned to these teams and patrols are trained and equipped in the use of tactical weapons and equipment to include radiation detection capabilities.

PAPD efforts to secure the PATH system are further supplemented by a contract security guard force of over 100 security officers who are trained in behavioral recognition techniques and counterterrorism awareness. These security officers are posted at critical locations throughout the system. They also staff a 24/7 Security Operations Center whose core function is to monitor a multitude of CCTV cameras and access control and intrusion alarms that span the entire rail system. Suspicious activity or other emergency conditions are immediately dispatched to PAPD for response.

### *Physical Security*

As previously discussed, the Port Authority has made significant investments in capital security projects. Specific measures have been taken to harden and protect the PATH system from a variety of man-made and natural hazards. These projects include right-of-way fencing and perimeter protection through the use of bollards, as well as infrastructure strengthening to make the PATH tunnels more resilient to man-made threats. Redundancy is also a critical part of our methodology, and as such we have constructed a new train control center. The existing train control center serves as a redundant back-up facility and is also used for training personnel.

### *Technology*

In addition to CCTV, the Port Authority has invested in other security technology such as:

- A laser intrusion detection system that helps protect against trespassers entering tunnels from the track.
- An extensive and robust card access control system, which restricts access to critical areas to authorized personnel only.
- The deployment of sensor and detection devices to help protect against chemical, biological, and radiological threats.
- The use of detailed background and criminal history checks as part of a personnel assurance program to include outside contractors and service providers.
- The enhancement of public safety communication systems at PATH stations and underground portions of the system. PAPP's intra-operable 800MHz radio system has been installed throughout, enabling PAPP officers responding to an incident from a neighboring command (e.g. Holland Tunnel, Newark Airport, etc.) to talk seamlessly to other PAPP officers assigned to the PATH command. Further, we have deployed antenna networks carrying National Mutual Aid channels in both the UHF and 800MHz bands ("UTAC and STAC") into the PATH underground to assure radio inter-operability with our mutual aid partners, such as NYPD, FDNY, and the city of Jersey City first-responder agencies.

### *Quality Assurance and Independent Review*

In addition to our internal Quality Assurance Inspection program, the Port Authority participates in the Baseline Assessment and Security Enhancement (BASE) program, which is a voluntary program implemented by Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The BASE program assessment is composed of more than 200 questions that review a transit system's security and emergency preparedness posture regarding 17 Security and Emergency Preparedness Action Items. The TSA awards its "Gold Standard" to transit agencies and passenger railroads that achieve the highest rating on the BASE assessment and for building a strong security program.

For 2015, TSA has awarded the PATH Security program its Gold Standard for best practices in rail security.

Furthermore, in 2011, DHS awarded SAFETY ACT designation status to a protective system put in place to protect PATH underwater tunnels.

## *IV. How the Federal Government Can Help?*

### *Grant Funding*

The Port Authority keeps security as a top priority as evidenced by the investments in resources it makes to that purpose. Currently, agency-wide, 24% of personnel and 22% of the operating budget is allocated to security. Since 2002, \$1.2 billion dollars has been spent in capital security projects and another \$900 million in capital security projects have been identified for the coming years. A critical resource is the Federal grant funding program. This funding source is essential to help us continue to protect our facilities from evolving threats.

A large source of funds for our capital security projects comes from the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP). In 2016, the maximum amount of Federal funding through this program was set at \$87 million Nation-wide for all transit operators. This amount, when distributed, can only fund smaller capital security projects. An increase in TSGP funding would allow transit operators to pursue larger capital security projects that would better reduce the risk to those who use our facilities. Additionally, the period of performance for grant funding is limited to 3 years, which hinders our ability to plan, design, and construct larger-scale projects. An increase in the period of performance from 3 years to 5 years would allow us to plan larger-scale and more effective capital security projects.

*DHS Science and Technology*

It would be valuable if the DHS Office of Science and Technology would publish a guide for review by decision makers that will aid in their selection of effective and proven technologies and equipment that would better protect the public and the infrastructure they depend upon.

*V. Closing Remarks*

In closing, I would like to thank the members of the Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications subcommittee for inviting me to testify on behalf of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey regarding this critical topic of protecting our passengers.

The Port Authority operates the busiest and most important transportation facilities in the region, as such, we take on the tremendous responsibility of maintaining safety and security. The Port Authority will continue to make enhancements to its policing and security programs and systems in an effort to stay current and adapt to the ever-changing threat landscape. I would like to thank our Congressional delegation for their continuing support that allows us to better serve our employees and customers and better protect our regional critical transportation infrastructure.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, sir.

The Chair now recognizes Chief Diaz for 5 minutes.

**STATEMENT OF RAYMOND DIAZ, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY,  
METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY**

Mr. DIAZ. Good morning, Chairman Donovan and Ranking Members Payne and Coleman and other Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for holding this hearing today.

I want to also thank the entire committee for its continued support to surface transportation security and the opportunity to discuss security and preparedness at New York's Metropolitan Transportation Authority.

Joining me today is Michael Coan, the chief of department of the MTA Police Department.

I want to begin today by acknowledging the horrific attack in Orlando about a week ago. Speaking on behalf of the entire MTA, our thoughts and prayers go out to the entire Orlando community and everyone affected by the attacks.

There have been no specific threats to our system related to the attack, but we have nevertheless significantly stepped up our security efforts, increasing patrols and surveillance in order to provide heightened protection across all our agencies. The incident serves as a stark reminder that we must continue to be vigilant, continue to be alert to the possibility of a terrorist attack on our system.

It also reminds us that it is more important than ever for all of us to work together to keep each other safe. The idea is a central component of our "See something, say something" campaign, which we relaunched this year in February.

Our new campaign incorporates real stories from real New Yorkers who have reported suspicious packages or activities, and we have added a tagline, "New Yorkers keep New York safe." That resonates with me because it is so true. We all have a crucial role to play in keeping New York safe.

I am here representing MTA chairman Tom Prendergast. But before I get into some of the topics he suggested I discuss, I want to provide some context with some background information on my job and the MTA's operation.

As the MTA director for security, I am responsible for the security of the MTA, including coordinating MTA efforts with the De-



partment of Homeland Security, FBI, the National Guard, the NYPD, and the New York and Connecticut State Police. I oversee the MTA Police Department, which has jurisdiction in 14 counties in New York and Connecticut and patrols a 5,000 square mile rail network.

I am responsible for the implementation and execution of a security strategy that offers maximum protection to the public, MTA employees, and MTA property. It is a big responsibility. Every day, the MTA moves more than 8.7 million people on our subway, buses, and commuter rail lines. We are one of the few transit systems in the world that operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.

Our 7 bridges and tunnels carry nearly 300 million vehicles a year. If we were to build our network today, including about 9,000 rail cars, 5,000 buses, and millions of other assets, it would cost almost \$1 trillion.

Protecting millions of people a day and a trillion-dollar asset is an enormous task, and I could tell you this. The MTA's priority is crystal clear, ensuring the safety and security of our customers and employees.

To protect our customers and assets, the MTA employs a multi-layered security strategy. Some strategies, like policing, are highly visible. Others are less visible, like structural hardening, advances in technology, and improved communications.

The hallmark of our policing strategy is collaboration. Let me explain. The NYPD is responsible for patrolling most of our heavily-used portion of our network, the New York City subways and buses. We work closely with the NYPD to ensure that capital investments are consistent with the latest security and policing strategies.

The MTAPD polices our commuter rail system, including Metro North Railroad, Long Island Railroad, the two busiest commuter rails in the country. We are also responsible for policing the Staten Island Railway in Chairman Donovan's district.

Over the past 15 years, the MTAPD has grown from 494 uniformed officers to 722 today. In addition, the MTA chairman and board have approved the hiring of an additional 46 new officers for our counterterrorism deployments. We have 691 bridge and tunnel officers that patrol our 7 bridges and tunnels.

Fifty explosive canine teams are now deployed throughout our system, and we have significantly increased our presence on trains and at stations. In support of the canine program, the MTA recently opened up a State-of-the-art canine training facility. This facility will enhance the canine program and allow for training of canines from other law enforcement agencies as well.

In response to the growing threat of active-shooter attacks, every single MTA officer receives Transit Security Grant Program-funded active-shooter training. In addition, more than 60 officers have received on-going heavy weapons training.

As mentioned previously, we have a robust "See something, say something" campaign, coupled with security and awareness training for our civilians and front-line employees. These initiatives encourage vigilance and teach people what to do if they see a suspicious package or activity.

To date, the MTA has trained more than 35,000 front-line employees. Recent active-shooter incidents clearly illustrate the importance of these awareness initiatives and training. Transit Security Grant Program grants also support our “See something, say something” campaign and also the civil employee training.

Behind the scenes, one critical layer to our security is the structural and technological hardening of our infrastructure. Since 9/11, the MTA has invested close to \$1.4 billion of local funds toward an aggressive campaign to harden our subway and commuter rail systems, as well as our bridges, tunnels, and other infrastructure.

Critical stations in vulnerable areas have been secured with electronic security systems consisting of CCTV, intrusion detection, access control devices. In addition, we have deployed chemical, biological, and radiological detection technology at these locations.

Since 2003, we have benefited from more than \$470 million from DHS in support of our security program. TSA and FEMA have helped us immeasurably with grant allocations and reallocations. We are grateful for the support and pleased that the initial period of performance for transit security grants has been extended to 36 months, which affords us more time needed to complete these capital security projects.

Another layer of our MTA security strategy is communication and intelligence sharing. At the Federal level, we have excellent working relationship with our DHS partners, represented by FEMA and TSA. We regularly attend meetings, conference calls, and continually exchange information. When potential threats are identified, they are communicated immediately.

We share intelligence with many law enforcement agencies on a daily basis through our Interagency Counterterrorism Task Force. We also conduct joint patrol initiatives, tabletop exercises, and drills with other regional transportation services, including Amtrak, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, New Jersey Transit, the New York and Connecticut State Police, and the New York National Guard—State National Guard, and the NYPD.

MTA detectives represent MTA on a number of high-profile anti-crime and anti-terrorism groups, including the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, the FBI’s Cyber Crimes Unit, the High-Intensity Drug Traffic Area Program, and the Counterterrorism Intelligence Division Units. In addition, when activated, the MTAPD is represented at emergency operation centers at the city and local level and State level.

I am proud to oversee this system and its proactive and accomplished security personnel and look forward to continue to work with my colleagues in law enforcement and you in the House to keep our customers safe and our system secure.

Once again, thank you for inviting me to testify today, and I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Diaz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RAYMOND DIAZ

JUNE 21, 2016

Good morning, Chairman Donovan and Ranking Member Payne, and other Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for holding this field hearing today. I want

to also thank the entire committee for its continued support to surface transportation security and the opportunity to discuss security and preparedness at New York's Metropolitan Transportation Authority. Joining me today is Michael Coan, chief of department of the MTA Police.

I want to begin today by acknowledging the horrific attack in Orlando about a week ago. Speaking on behalf of the entire MTA, our thoughts and prayers go out to the entire Orlando community and everyone affected by the attacks.

There have been no specific threats to our system related to the attack, but we've nonetheless significantly stepped up our security efforts—increasing patrols and surveillance in order to provide heightened protection across all our agencies. The incident serves as a stark reminder that we must continue to be vigilant . . . continue to be alert to the possibility of a terrorist attack on our system. It also reminds us that it's more important than ever for all of us to work together to keep each other safe.

This idea is a central component of our “See Something, Say Something” campaign, which we relaunched this year in February. Our new campaign incorporates real stories from real New Yorkers who have reported suspicious packages or activities, and we've added a tagline—“New Yorkers Keep New Yorkers Safe.” That resonates with me, because it's so true—we all have a crucial role to play in keeping New York safe.

I'm here today representing MTA chairman Tom Prendergast, but before I get into some of the topics he suggested I discuss, I want to provide some context, with background information on my job and the MTA's operation.

As the MTA's director of security, I'm responsible for the security of the MTA, including coordinating MTA efforts with the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, the National Guard, the NYPD, and the New York and Connecticut State Police. I oversee the MTA Police Department, which has jurisdiction in 14 counties in New York and Connecticut, and patrols a 5,000-square mile rail network. I'm responsible for the implementation and execution of a security strategy that offers maximum protection to the public, MTA employees, and MTA property.

It's a big responsibility. Every day, the MTA moves more than 8.7 million people on our subways, buses, and commuter rail lines. We're one of the few transit systems in the world that operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. Our 7 bridges and 2 tunnels carry nearly 300 million vehicles a year. And if we were to build our network today—including about 9,000 railcars, 5,000 buses, and millions of other assets—it would cost nearly \$1 trillion.

Protecting millions of people a day and a trillion-dollar asset is an enormous task, but I can tell you this: The MTA's top priority is crystal clear—ensuring the safety and security of our customers and employees. To protect our customers and assets, the MTA employs a multi-layered security strategy. Some strategies, like policing, are highly visible. Others are less visible, like structural hardening, advances in technology, and improved communications.

The hallmark of our policing strategy is collaboration. Let me explain. The NYPD is responsible for patrolling the most heavily-used portion of our network: New York City subways and buses. We work closely with the NYPD to ensure that capital investments are consistent with the latest security and policing strategies.

The MTA PD polices our commuter rail system, including Metro-North Railroad and Long Island Rail Road—the two busiest commuter rail agencies in the country. We're also responsible for policing the Staten Island Railway—in Chairman Donovan's district. Over the past 15 years, the MTA PD has grown from 494 uniformed officers to 722 today. In addition, the MTA chairman and board have approved the hiring of 46 new officers for counterterrorism deployment, and 691 Bridge and Tunnel officers patrol our 7 bridges and 2 tunnels.

Fifty explosive detection K-9 teams are now deployed throughout the system, and we've significantly increased our presence on trains and at stations. In support of the K-9 program, the MTA recently opened a state-of-the-art canine training facility. This facility will enhance the K-9 program and allow for training of canines from other law enforcement agencies.

In response to the growing threat of active-shooter attacks, every single MTA PD officer receives Transit Security Grant Program-funded Active-Shooter Training. Additionally, more than 60 officers have received our on-going heavy weapons training.

As mentioned previously, we have a robust “See Something, Say Something” campaign, coupled with security awareness training for civilian front-line employees. These initiatives encourage vigilance, and teach people what to do if they see a suspicious package or activity. To date, the MTA has trained more than 35,000 front-line employees. Recent active-shooter incidents clearly illustrate the importance of these awareness initiatives and training. TSGP grants also support our “See Something, Say Something” campaign and civilian employee training.

Behind the scenes, one critical layer to our security is the structural and technological hardening of our infrastructure. Since 9/11, the MTA has invested close to \$1.4 billion of local funds toward an aggressive campaign to harden our subway and commuter rail systems, as well as bridges, tunnels, and other infrastructure. Critical stations and vulnerable areas have been secured with electronic security systems consisting of CCTV, intrusion detection, and access control devices. We've also deployed chemical, biological, and radiological detection technology at these locations.

Since 2003, we've benefitted from more than \$470 million from DHS in support of our security program. TSA and FEMA have helped us immeasurably with grant allocations and reallocations. We're grateful for this support, and are pleased that the initial "period of performance" for transit security grants has been extended to 36 months, which affords us the time needed to complete TSGP-funded capital security projects.

Another layer of the MTA's security strategy is communication and intelligence sharing. At the Federal level, we have an excellent working relationship with our DHS partners, represented by FEMA and TSA. We attend regular meetings and conference calls, and continually exchange information. When potential threats are identified, they are communicated immediately.

We share intelligence with many law enforcement agencies on a daily basis through our Inter-Agency Counterterrorism Task Force. We also conduct joint patrol initiatives, table-top exercises, and drills with other regional transportation agencies including Amtrak, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, New Jersey Transit, the New York and Connecticut State Police, the New York State National Guard, and the NYPD.

MTA PD detectives represent the MTA on a number of high-profile anti-crime and anti-terrorism groups, including the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, the FBI Cyber Crimes Unit, the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program, and the NYPD Counter Terrorism and Intelligence units. In addition, when activated, the MTA PD is represented at Emergency Operations Centers at the city and State level.

I'm proud to oversee this system and its proactive and accomplished security personnel, and look forward to continuing to work with my colleagues in law enforcement and you in the House to keep our customers safe and our system secure. Once again, thank you for inviting me to testify today. I'm happy to answer any questions you might have.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Chief.

The Chair now recognizes Chief Trucillo for 5 minutes.

**STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER TRUCILLO, CHIEF OF POLICE,  
NEW JERSEY TRANSIT POLICE DEPARTMENT**

Chief TRUCILLO. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Representative Payne, Representative Watson Coleman. I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the challenges of securing passengers utilizing surface transportation in New York and New Jersey.

As you mentioned, before joining the Transit Police in July 2010, I served and had the honor of being the chief of department for the Port Authority in New York and New Jersey. During my tenure with them, I served as the commanding officer of the bus terminal in midtown Manhattan, as well as the commanding officer of Newark Liberty International Airport.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing, which is aptly entitled Protecting Our Passengers: Perspectives on Securing Surface Transportation in New Jersey and New York. We appreciate the important role of this committee in matters related to transportation security, and we look forward to working with you on these issues.

New Jersey Transit is the third-largest transit system in the country and also the Nation's largest State-wide public transit system. Servicing an area of over 5,000 square miles, we provide al-

most 1 million weekday trips on 257 different bus routes. We have 3 light rail systems across the State, 11 heavy commuter rail lines, and our Access Link program, which serves our paratransit community.

We serve 166 different rail stations across the State of New Jersey, 62 light rail stations. We have got more than 19,000 bus stops linking major points in New Jersey, New York, and Philadelphia.

Mr. Chairman, the transportation services provided by New Jersey Transit are vital to the economic well-being of our State and this region. We provide an essential service to the nearly 10 percent of all New Jersey commuters who use and depend on the New Jersey Transit system.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, transit agencies have unique security challenges, due to the large numbers of people we serve in publicly accessible facilities traveling on advertised, predictable schedules. Just over a week ago, we saw the carnage inflicted in Orlando by a radicalized extremist on a crowd of people in a nightclub, and earlier this year, the attacks in Brussels reminded us once again how mass transit systems world-wide continue to be the preferred targets of terrorists.

Our most important priority is keeping our customers and employees safe as we continue to provide our essential transportation services. Safety and security are the top priority for all of us at New Jersey Transit and within the New Jersey Transit Police Department.

Counterterrorism is our department's No. 1 primary mission, and Mr. Chairman, we take that mission very seriously. New Jersey Transit uses a risk-based approach to maximizing our security efforts to protect our trains, buses, and light rail vehicles, and stations from all hazards and threats.

The police department's intelligence section provides the agency with strategic-level risk management tools in support of our counterterrorism efforts and coordinates all of our intelligence collection, analysis, and production efforts, including the reporting and monitoring of suspicious activity and individuals. We do this in collaboration with the FBI's Newark, New York City, and Philadelphia Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, our partners at the NYPD and my partners at this table, and the New Jersey State Police Fusion Center run by the New Jersey State Police and other partners.

Mr. Chairman, almost all of our 11,000 employees have received security awareness training. From conductors to bus operators to office staff, our employees are force multipliers. Extra eyes and ears, if you will, for our police department.

We also work in cooperation with the thousands of businesses that are located near all our train stations to know what suspicious activity is and to report it. In addition, we continue to work closely with first responding agencies at the municipal, county, and State levels.

To give you just an example, several times per year, members of New Jersey Transit's police operations and administrative staff partner with local police, fire, and EMS agencies in advanced incident command training at Texas A&M University. To date, more

than 500 Transit employees from across all business lines and an equal number of our partners have participated in these joint exercises.

In fact, right now this week, we have 65 people at Texas A&M and training for the entire week in advanced incident command. We are partnering with New Brunswick, New Jersey, first responders this week.

New Jersey Transit also promotes a campaign urging customers who see suspicious activity or unattended packages at stations, aboard trains or buses, or near facilities to call the New Jersey Transit security hotline or to text us at our NJTPD text line.

The New Jersey Transit mobile app for smartphones includes convenient one-touch access to call or text the New Jersey Transit Police Department directly. So not only can customers purchase digital tickets on-line, but with that same app, they can also report suspicious activity.

We investigate all calls. We get back to those who alert us, and all information is kept confidential.

Mr. Chairman, while we do not release details about police deployments or specific countermeasures, our uniformed patrol officers remain vigilant in monitoring our system, and they are supported by plainclothes detectives, anti-crime officers throughout the New Jersey Transit system. Our Special Operations Division provides enhanced capability to protect and respond to terrorism on our system.

We perform random baggage screening. We also have the capability to detect and respond to incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, and explosive materials. Our Emergency Service Unit, along with our train patrol units and conditions unit, also provides specialized tactical response capability and have unique training and capabilities specific to the mass transit environment.

Our canine unit officers, along with their explosive detection dogs, perform perhaps some of our most important functions. These officers, along with their canine partners, do not just work to detect explosives throughout our system, but their presence, as we have come to learn, provides an effective, visible deterrent against our adversaries.

To ensure that we are prepared and are able to respond adequately to a terrorism incident, the police Office of Emergency Management conducts regular drills and exercises that ensures that our response to terrorism incidents is both effective and well-coordinated with our local, State, regional, and our Federal partners. Every member of the department is equipped with radiation pagers, and Mr. Chairman, we have tripled the number of officers trained in the use of long guns. We continue to work closely with TSA's Office of Science and Technology as a testbed to test the next generation of technology that may be utilized to secure surface transportation.

Mr. Chairman, in light of our Nation's heightened security needs, we believe that the increased Federal investment in public transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical. New Jersey Transit has made great strides in transit security improvements in recent years, but much more needs to be done. We look forward to building on our cooperative working relationship with the Depart-

ment of Homeland Security and Congress to further address these needs.

On behalf of New Jersey Transit and the New Jersey Transit Police Department, I again thank you and the committee for allowing me to submit testimony on these critical issues, and I look forward to working with you on safety and security issues.

[The prepared statement of Chief Trucillo follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER TRUCILLO

JUNE 21, 2016

Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, I welcome this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the challenges of securing passengers utilizing surface transportation in New Jersey and New York.

Before joining New Jersey Transit in July of 2010 as the chief of police for the New Jersey Transit Police Department, I served for 5 years as the chief of department for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department. During my 23 year career with the Port Authority I served as the commanding officer of internal affairs and special investigations, the commanding officer of the Port Authority Bus Terminal in midtown Manhattan, as well as the commanding officer of Newark Liberty International Airport.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing, which has been aptly entitled “Protecting our Passengers: Perspectives on Securing Surface Transportation in New Jersey and New York”. We appreciate the important role of this committee in matters relating to transportation security, and we look forward to working with you on these issues.

ABOUT NJ TRANSIT

NJ TRANSIT is the third largest transit system in the country and also the Nation’s largest State-wide public transportation system serving an area encompassing 5,325 square miles. We provide more than 938,500 weekday trips on 257 bus routes, 3 light rail lines, 11 commuter rail lines and through Access Link, our paratransit service. We serve 166 rail stations, 62 light rail stations, and more than 19,000 bus stops linking major points in New Jersey, New York, and Philadelphia.

Mr. Chairman, the transportation services provided by NJ TRANSIT are vital to the economic well-being of our State and the region. We provide an essential service to the nearly 10 percent of all New Jersey commuters who use and depend on the NJ TRANSIT system.

OVERVIEW

Mr. Chairman, as you know, public transit agencies have unique security challenges due to the large numbers of people we serve in publicly accessible facilities, traveling on advertised predictable schedules. Just a few days ago we saw the carnage inflicted in Orlando by a radicalized extremist on a crowd of people in a publicly accessible space, and earlier this year the attacks in Brussels reminded us once again how mass transit systems world-wide continue to be preferred targets of terrorists.

Our most important priority is keeping our customers and employees safe as we continue to provide our essential transportation services. Safety and security are the top priority for all of NJ TRANSIT and within the New Jersey Transit Police Department—counterterrorism is our primary mission, and we take that mission very seriously.

NJ TRANSIT utilizes a risk-based approach to maximizing our security efforts to protect our trains, buses, light rail vehicles, and stations from all hazards and threats. The Police Department’s Intelligence Section provides the agency with strategic level risk management tools in support of our counterterrorism efforts and coordinates intelligence collection, analysis, and production efforts, including the reporting and monitoring of suspicious activity and individuals, with the FBI’s Newark, New York City, and Philadelphia Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the TSA, the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, the NYPD, the New Jersey State fusion center, and other partners.

Almost all of our 11,000 employees have received security awareness training. From conductors to bus operators to office staff, our employees are “force multi-

pliers”—extra eyes and ears for our police. We also work in cooperation with the thousands of businesses located near train stations to report suspicious activity.

In addition, we continue to work closely with first responding agencies at the municipal, county, and State levels. To give you just an example, several times per year members of New Jersey Transit’s police, operations, and administrative staff partner with local police, fire, and EMS agencies in Incident Command Training at Texas A&M University. To date, more than 500 transit employees and an equal number of our partners have participated in these joint exercises.

NJ TRANSIT also promotes a campaign urging customers who see suspicious activity or unattended packages at stations, aboard trains or buses, or near transit facilities to call the NJ TRANSIT security hotline at 1-888-TIPS-NJT, text us at NJTPD or notify a New Jersey Transit Police officer. The NJ TRANSIT mobile app for smartphones includes convenient one-touch access to call or text the New Jersey Transit Police Department directly. So, not only can customers purchase digital tickets by using the app, they can also easily say something if they see something. All calls are investigated, and all information is confidential.

Mr. Chairman, while we do not release details about police deployments or specific countermeasures, our uniformed police patrol officers remain vigilant in monitoring our system and they are supported by plainclothes detectives and anti-crime officers throughout the NJ TRANSIT system.

Our Special Operations Division provides enhanced capabilities to protect and respond to terrorism on our system. Random baggage screening performed by our Emergency Services Units provides us with the capability to detect and respond to incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, and explosive materials. ESU along with our Train Patrol Units and Conditions Tactical Unit also provide a specialized tactical response capability with unique training and capabilities specific to the mass transit environment.

Our canine unit officers along with their explosive detection dogs perform perhaps some of our most important functions. These officers along with their canine partners do not just detect explosives throughout the NJ TRANSIT system but their presence provides an effective visible deterrent against our adversaries.

And to ensure that we are prepared for and are able to respond adequately to a terrorism incident, the NJTPD Office of Emergency Management conducts regular drills and exercises that ensures that our response to terrorism incidents is both effective and well-coordinated with our local, State, regional, and Federal partners.

Every member of the department is equipped with radiation pagers and we have tripled the number of officers trained in the use of long guns. We continue to work closely with the TSA’s Office of Science and Technology to test the next generation of technology that will be utilized to secure surface transit.

#### CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, in light of our Nation’s heightened security needs, we believe that increased Federal investment in public transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical. NJ TRANSIT has made great strides in transit security improvements in recent years, but much more needs to be done. We look forward to building on our cooperative working relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and Congress to further address these needs. On behalf of NJ TRANSIT and the New Jersey Transit Police Department, I again thank you and the committee for allowing us to submit testimony on these critical issues, and look forward to working with you on safety and security issues.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Chief.

The chair now recognizes Chief Conway for 5 minutes.

#### **STATEMENT OF MARTIN CONWAY, DEPUTY POLICE CHIEF, NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION—AMTRAK**

Mr. CONWAY. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the committee.

I am Deputy Chief Martin Conway, and it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss our region’s coordinated preparations to secure vital transportation systems.

Amtrak is America’s railroad, serving more than 500 communities in 46 States, carrying over 30 million travelers a year. The



Amtrak Police Department was created to protect employees, passengers, stations, rolling stock, and critical infrastructure.

Uniformed patrol is our most visible presence, and they perform traditional policing. Our special operations unit performs station searches, performs counter surveillance, conducts random passenger bag screening, patrols the rights-of-way, and provides dignitary protection. Our canine program, which consists of both conventional and vapor-wake detection dogs, average over 1,000 train rides a month.

We coordinate with numerous local, State, and Federal agencies. Members from APD's intelligence unit are assigned to the FBI National Joint Terrorism Task Force, as well as regional joint terrorism task forces, including the New York JTTF.

Major stations like Newark Penn Station and New York Penn Station connect with buses, subways, and commuter rail. The porous environment, meaning easy access, is an advantage for travelers, but a vulnerability from a security point of view. It is, therefore, of critical importance that we work closely with our transportation partners and their police forces to ensure that our information sharing and quick reaction capabilities are sufficient to keep us ahead of any threat.

While small stations are frequently unstaffed, they provide access to major cities, and we must work closely with local police to ensure the same type of cooperation. This is a particularly important function here in the Northeast, where 5 of Amtrak's 10 busiest stations are located. The Northeast Corridor carries more than 220 million riders a year.

Many railroad stations are a part of the urban fabric of city centers, with a tremendous volume of pedestrian traffic. New York Penn Station, for example, hosts more passengers than LaGuardia, JFK, and Newark airports combined.

To ensure the necessary level of coordination and information sharing, Amtrak has partnered with the NYPD and TSA to form Operation Rail Safe, a regional and now National alliance that includes Federal, State, local railroad and transit police agencies. Operation Rail Safe, started in May 2010, functions at several levels, the most visible being tactical deployments at stations and along the right-of-way to exercise our incident response and counterterrorism capabilities.

Operation Rail Safe has significantly improved cooperation among participating agencies, and that relationship has, in turn, provided a foundation for training opportunities that have so far been extended to over 250 public safety agencies.

Screening every passenger prior to boarding a train, as the airports do, would require resources and technologies that rail properties don't possess and probably could not afford. We do, however, employ a multi-layered approach while retaining robust capability to surge our resources and leverage our partnerships.

We coordinate with other law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community to respond to threats and adapt tactics in anticipation of potential new threats. We have also trained Amtrak employees and passengers to spot and report suspicious behaviors via phone or text.

The ability to leverage our skilled work force contributes significantly to our safety and security. Our chief often says aviation gets billions and rail gets millions. Over the years, Amtrak has received varied levels of funding from Congress. Prior to 2012, Amtrak received over \$20 million a year from the Intercity Passenger Rail Grant Program. But in the past several cycles, that has been reduced to about \$10 million a year.

Amtrak security would benefit from a restoration of these funds to the \$20 million level and a discussion on future investment and eligibility for other programs. I look forward to answering any questions you might have regarding rail transportation security.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conway follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARTIN CONWAY

JUNE 21, 2016

Good morning Chairman Daniel Donovan, Ranking Member Donald Payne, Jr., and Members of the committee. Thank you very much for the invitation to speak today. Amtrak takes its responsibility to protect its riders seriously, and on behalf of Mr. Boardman, and the men and women of the Amtrak Police Department (APD), I'm Martin Conway, deputy of chief of police for Amtrak and it's an honor to appear before you today on behalf of the men and women of Amtrak to discuss our region's coordinated preparations to secure vital transportation systems. I've been with Amtrak for 5 years and prior to that, I was with the NYPD for 26 years. While with NYPD, I served as commanding officer of several commands within the bureaus, including the Transit Bureau; my last assignment was a 5-year stint as an inspector in the Counterterrorism Division, where I was responsible for coordinating all counterterrorism measures within the city subway system.

Amtrak is America's Railroad, serving more than 500 communities in 46 States, carrying over 30 million travelers a year. APD was created to protect employees, passengers, stations, rolling stock, and critical infrastructure. Uniformed officers are the most visible presence, but a Special Operations capability performs station surges and counter surveillance, conducts random passenger bag screening, patrols rights-of-way and protects dignitaries. Our K-9 program which consists of both conventional and vapor-wake detection dogs averages 1,000 train rides a month. We coordinate with numerous other local, State, and Federal agencies, and officers from Amtrak's Intelligence Unit are assigned to the FBI National Joint Terrorism Task Force at the National Counter-Terrorism Center, as well as regional Joint Terrorism Task forces and the police and security organizations for connecting transit modes.

A high level of cooperation and coordination is particularly important, because more than half of all Amtrak stations feature some form of connecting transportation service, and major stations like Newark Penn or New York Penn Station are multi-modal, hosting busses, subways, and commuter rail. Passenger rail security differs fundamentally from aviation security. The nodal aspect of our stations, combined with offices, food courts, and retail establishments, makes a major urban station into a high-traffic location. Daily commuting cycles require a fundamentally different security solution than airports, because urban terrain is different, and rail journeys are an organic part of our travelers' daily schedule. The very high degree of connectivity between our modes is an advantage for travelers, but a vulnerability from the security point of view, and it is therefore of critical importance that we work closely with our modal connections and their police forces, to ensure that our information-sharing and quick reaction capabilities are sufficient to keep us ahead of any threat.

While small stations (both rural and outlying commuter stops) are frequently unstaffed, they provide access and connectivity to major cities, and we must also work closely with local police to ensure the same type of cooperation. This is a particularly important function here in the Northeast, where 5 of Amtrak's 10 busiest stations are located; the NEC carries more than 220 million riders a year. Amtrak serves more than 520 stations in 46 States, about a hundred more than the total count of airports that host scheduled domestic air service in the 48 contiguous States. Many railroad stations are a part of the urban fabric of city centers, with a tremendous volume of traffic. New York Penn Station, for example, hosts more rail travelers annually than the La Guardia, JFK, and Newark Airports together,

a combination of Amtrak and commuter rail passengers—and that total doesn't include all of the subway and bus riders who pass through the station without taking a train.

To ensure the necessary level of coordination and information sharing, Amtrak has partnered with NYPD and the TSA to form "Operation RAILS SAFE," a regional alliance that includes Federal, State, local, railroad, and transit police organizations. RAILS SAFE functions at several levels, the most visible being tactical deployments at stations and along the right of way to exercise our incident response and counterterrorism capabilities, and we also conduct coordinated efforts such as heightened station patrols, increased security presence on trains, K-9 explosive sweeps, random bag inspections, and countersurveillance in an effort to reassure the public, display our capabilities, and make it more difficult for a would-be attacker to what the environment will look like at any particular time or place. RAILS SAFE has significantly improved cooperation among participating agencies, and that relationship has in turn provided the foundation for training opportunities that have so far been extended to 56 separate agencies.

Terrorist tactics continue to evolve, and we must keep pace. U.S.-based extremists will continue to pose the most frequent threat to the U.S. homeland. As the tragic attacks in Boston, Garland, Texas, and in New York have shown over the last several years, the new terrorist threats are already here. Either alone or in small groups, with the ability to mask the extent of their radicalization, these individuals represent the most lethal of threats. U.S.-based jihadist terror cases increased more in 2015 than in any full year since 2001. From "lone-wolf" attackers to ISIL radicals, we see a greater likelihood of attack than we have in years. The internet and cyber space have become the new recruiting ground and the new battle-space. Aided by the internet and social media, ISIL has featured plans to kill U.S. soldiers or law enforcement personnel and the recent attacks in France and against tourists in Tunisia demonstrate the threat is increasing.

Screening every passenger prior to boarding a train, as the airports do would require resources and technology that rail properties don't possess and probably couldn't afford. We do however, employ a variety of tactics to surveil key infrastructure and stations, while retaining robust capability to surge our resources and leverage our partnerships in unpredictable ways to complicate the task for a would-be attacker. We coordinate with other law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community to respond to threats and adapt tactics in anticipation of potential new threats. We have also trained Amtrak's employees and passengers to spot and report suspicious behaviors via phone or text. The ability to leverage our skilled workforce contributes significantly to our safety and security.

Our chief often says ". . . aviation gets billions and rail gets millions" and the *New York Times*, recently noted that TSA's \$7.55 billion annual budget translates into a cost of about \$10 per passenger-trip; that's almost twice Amtrak's total annual budget last year. Over the years Amtrak has received varied levels of funding from Congress. Prior to 2012 Amtrak received over \$20 million from the Intercity Passenger Rail grant program but in the past several cycles that has been appropriated at \$10 million level. Amtrak security would benefit from a restoration of these funds and a discussion on further future investment and eligibility for other programs.

I look forward to answering any question you might have regarding rail transportation security.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Chief.

Let me thank all of you not only for your testimony, but for the vital service that you provide for all of our commuters.

I remember one time when being on time was the No. 1 concern for a transportation system. Now it is the protection of their commuters, and I thank each of you.

I recognize myself for questions now, and I throw this out to the panel. When I gave my opening statement, I talked about how when I first got to Congress I didn't know if we utilized the information that we received at hearings from experts like yourselves and assured you that your testimony today would be brought back to Washington, and myself and other committee Members would put it to good use.

One example of that is Chief Diaz spoke about how we expanded the time frame in which you could utilize the moneys that you are

granted through the Federal grants. Used to be a 2-year program. Through testimony, through hearing from the people on the ground, witnesses, we expanded that to 3 years.

Now, Chief, I understand that an expansion of up to 5 years would be even more beneficial. This way, you could plan for long-term projects, and we will bring that back as well.

Is there anything in the grant program that we could do to better it, to enhance it, to make your jobs easier besides more resources? Because we could all use more resources, and we understand that. But are there things in the program that hinder you? Is the program flexible enough for you to utilize the moneys to your specific needs, or is it too stringent, too structured, that what may be good for the MTA might not apply for the Port Authority Police?

I would like to ask the entire panel this because each of you have a different agency that you are trying to get these grant moneys for. Sonya, is there?

Ms. PROCTOR. Mr. Chairman, at this point, I would defer because I think the grantees might have a better perspective at the moment.

Mr. DONOVAN. Then we will let you respond.

Mr. PROCTOR. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you.

Mr. BELFIORE. So I think the Port Authority is finding the flexibility that it needs, thank you, other than the items that we talked about. We are able to leverage those available funds for operational measures in supporting PAPD counterterrorism measures, as well as asset hardening. So, so I have no additional recommendation.

Mr. DONOVAN. The expansion of time, though, would be very helpful?

Mr. BELFIORE. It would. You know, the Port Authority has its own process for moving large-scale capital projects through, which, you know, would help us accommodate that. But it would allow us to take on, you know, larger-scale and longer, more forward-looking capital projects if possible.

Mr. DONOVAN. I always thought that the people who set the time frame never went through a procurement process with the city of New York.

[Laughter.]

Mr. DONOVAN. Chief, is there anything other than the time frame that would be helpful to you?

Mr. DIAZ. The time frame was it for us, and if it could be expanded it would be great because by the time you do design and then you build the project, it takes a lot of time. So sometimes in some grant periods, we will just put in for design, and then, hopefully, for the next grant period, we can then put in for construction. So if that time frame is expanded, that would be helpful.

The other thing is we have a great relationship with our DHS partners, FEMA and TSA. So we have a lot of conversations we put in for our grant applications, and they are very, very good at giving us guidance and where we should put our moneys.

Mr. DONOVAN. The definition of the grants is flexible enough that you are not trying to squeeze something in that wouldn't be your preference? The grant definitions are flexible enough that you could utilize it for different projects?

Mr. DIAZ. Yes, they are. Yes, sir.

Mr. DONOVAN. Chief, do you have anything?

Chief TRUCILLO. I concur with my colleague from the Port Authority that in capital investment, the increase from 3 to 5 years would make a significant difference and enable us to look at more capital infrastructure protection than we presently do.

I also would be remiss if I didn't commend TSA for not treating our region as a cookie cutter the same as across the entire Nation. They have been very good about allowing us to look at where our needs are operationally and to utilize our specific grants to help us cover operational costs that would otherwise be very problematic within our individual agencies.

The only other thing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention is that we have done a tremendous job in our individual agencies with the grant program to buy down risk. We—I know I could speak for my agency—have seen a tremendous drop in risk based on what we have been able to accomplish and only accomplish through the grant program.

I will give you an example. Cameras. But those cameras, over 4,000 of them, which we have across our system, have a lifespan. So the ability to replace, sustain, maintain becomes very critical. So to be able to do that with the grant program, for my purposes, would be very significant and helpful.

Mr. DONOVAN. Be able to replace perishable items?

Chief TRUCILLO. Correct.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Chief.

Chief, is there anything?

Mr. CONWAY. Probably nothing to add that hasn't already been said. But I do know from attending meetings that time constraint for people who write these grants, as we know, things don't happen as quickly as we would like them, especially when it comes to capital improvements, cameras, bollard systems. And as you said, in New York City and Penn Station, it is time-consuming. So I think that would help all of us.

Mr. DONOVAN. All right. Great. Thank you.

Many of you mentioned the "See Something, Say Something." Is the program successful? Do people report things? I was just very curious about it, and I have all of you here. Do we have any success stories?

Mr. DIAZ. Well, Congressman, just this past weekend, one of our MTA employees saw somebody suspicious on a platform wearing an MTA Metro North vest, called the police, and it turned out it was somebody that shouldn't have been where he was, and we challenged them. He wound up being arrested. So people definitely see things, call us, and we take action on it.

Mr. DONOVAN. That is great. Thank you.

My time has expired. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of this committee, my good friend from New Jersey, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Proctor, as we discussed yesterday in my office, I am really concerned about the delay in the TSA's implementing surface transportation security regulations under the 9/11 Act, and you were able to explain where we are and what is in. Just for the com-

mittee and testimony, could you just explain where we are in the time line and the anticipated completion, whatever the challenges have stalled this process?

Ms. PROCTOR. Yes, sir, Representative Payne.

We recognize, obviously, the delay that you are addressing, and the completion of those requirements in the 9/11 Act are a high priority for Administrator Neffenger. As we discussed yesterday, we have under way now the effort to complete the remaining portions of those requirements.

I think it is important to note that the 9/11 Act included 42 requirements, some which had more than one section. Of the 42, we have completed 91 percent of those requirements, and we are working on the remaining 3 at this point.

The administrative rulemaking process in the Federal Government is a lengthy, complex process, and it doesn't just apply to TSA. It applies to all Federal agencies. But it is a very—it is a very cumbersome process, and we are working through that process now. The standards for rulemaking are very high. So we are working to meet those standards.

We recognize that implementing standards will have an economic impact as well. So we have to take all of that into consideration, but we are working diligently to complete the requirements in the 9/11 Act.

But in the interim, while we are working on those, we also have in many ways met the spirit of the 9/11 Act with the agreement that we have with our industry partners on the security action items, which have heightened the level of security in all of our transit systems. Those 17 security action items form the basis of the assessments that have been referenced here, the base assessments.

Those 17 security action items have helped to raise the security bar across mass transit Nation-wide. So while we work to complete those requirements of the 9/11 Act, it is important to note—we would certainly like to note for everyone that we have been working hard to raise the security bar, and we believe that we have done that with the security action items while we continue to work to complete the 9/11 Act requirements.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

You know, as I think about this, our transit employees are on the front lines identifying and responding to incidents on our systems. What kind of security training do you provide for your employees, and how do you leverage them in your plans to prevent and respond to transit incidents? Mr. Conway.

Mr. CONWAY. Well, I know Amtrak, all of our employees receive a daily bulletin. We send out daily tips, what things to look for. That is sent out email. So in crew rooms, for example, at New York Penn Station, those would be posted before crews take their assignments on a train.

Over the last 2 years now or so, we have started active-shooter training for our employees, both train crews and office workers. That was in response to, obviously, things that we are seeing in the terrorism world and workplace violence type-of situations.

Can we do more? I think we need to do more. Funding, obviously, would help something like that. Because even when we provide free

training, we need—we have got to backfill people. A training crew comes off a train to go to training, somebody has got to take their place. So even free training costs. So, again, funding—I know we are probably all looking for additional funding, and everyone is always asking for it. But there is a legitimate reason for that.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mr. Trucillo.

Chief TRUCILLO. Congressman, as I had mentioned, New Jersey Transit has over 11,000 employees. To date, we have trained close to 10,000 of our employees in behavioral detection. Again, this is not looking at who a person is, but this is about what a person is doing. Is their behavior suspicious?

We also, after the events in Orlando, will get our intelligence unit to put a relevant bulletin out, and that goes out to all 11,000 employees to make them aware of the circumstances, to remind them in this case about their training, which they have all received about active shooter—run, hide, fight—and reminding them what they need to look for and what their protocols are, God forbid they find themselves in that situation.

I think we need to continually engage. Last week, we were involved with the rail side of New Jersey Transit in gaming out an incident, an active-shooter incident on one of our trains. As you know, Congressman, our trains, on a typical rush hour, move upwards up to 1,200 to 1,300 people on a train on the Northeast Corridor that moves into and out of Penn Station in New York.

So those are the kind of things that we are continually working on. We are continually trying to look at what our response would be in those situations.

I mentioned to you that we have a group down at TEEEX now, and that is the exact scenario, Congressman, that they are working on now as we sit here today.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mr. DIAZ. Congressman, we look at our employees and our ridership as a force multiplier. We have a limited number of law enforcement personnel, but we have large numbers of ridership, large numbers of employees that see things out there.

So we have an aggressive training program. We have trained over 35,000 of our front-line employees to identify suspicious behaviors and how to report those suspicious behaviors. We keep refreshing our “See Something, Say Something” campaign for our ridership, which is effective.

For our office employees, we have our workplace violence instructions on what they should do—the run, hide, and fight procedure and other things that we put in place for our office employees.

Mr. BELFIORE. So our facility operators and employees are trained through our exercises and drills in response. But taking a page from Chief Trucillo and Chief Diaz is in post-Brussels environment, we are going to go forward and train our employees in 3 components of a training.

One will be what to see, what to say, who to say it to, and how to say it so that we have more effective kind of force multipliers that are looking—you know, who truly understand what to look for and what to report. To provide each employee with what to do in

an active-shooter situation. So the run, hide, fight curriculum that DHS has put forward.

Then finally, an OEM component that would be how to take care of yourself and your family in the event of a natural weather emergency so that you can, you know, respond to take care of others. That is grant-funded, by the way. We have the approval to spend grant funding to support that effort.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. Thank you for your graciousness in allowing me the extra time.

Mr. DONOVAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Representative Watson Coleman, for 5 minutes.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Proctor, you are—your agency is responsible for surface transportation. So that not only includes commuter transportation, but that is, you know, the freight that goes on the rails, right?

Ms. PROCTOR. Yes, ma'am. That is correct.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Buses?

Ms. PROCTOR. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. What about trucks on the highways?

Ms. PROCTOR. Commercial trucks, yes, ma'am.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So what is the point, what is the touch point for coordination in overseeing possible problems and risk associated particularly with the commercial trucks? Because I will tell you, coming here, I was in traffic, and all around me was trucks.

I am thinking this is a great opportunity for some nefarious activities if someone had that in mind. What is the coordinating element with that part of the surface transportation network?

Ms. PROCTOR. In Surface Division, one of the areas that I am responsible for, it is a highway motor carrier office, which comes under Surface Division, and we work with the Federal highway motor carrier unit to coordinate our efforts. Their primary function is safety. So they design the safety regulations, hours of work and the safety-focused regulations.

We have security-focused regulations. So we work very closely with the trucking associations, American Trucking Association, for example, the Operators of Independent—OIDA, Operation of Independent Drivers Association.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Let me ask you a question. How do you know who is driving these trucks?

Ms. PROCTOR. The drivers of those trucks are required to have commercial driver's licenses and their CDL licenses. So there is a process that they have to go through, a testing process to acquire that. Every State regulates that.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Do you know whether or not they have got background checks that would give us any indication of, you know, sort-of associations, affiliations of that nature that could be harmful or dangerous?

Ms. PROCTOR. There are some truck drivers that are required to have Transportation Worker Identification Credentials, TWIC, cards if they serve a maritime facility, a port facility. Other than those that are required to have the TWIC card, they would not have a required vetting process, but many do have that TWIC card.



Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So another interesting thing I read is that you also have responsibility for oversight of the transporting of natural gas through pipelines.

Ms. PROCTOR. Yes, ma'am. That is correct.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So how do we do that?

Ms. PROCTOR. We have a pipeline office as well, and we work very closely with the pipeline associations. We recently had a hearing in Washington on the pipeline transportation issue. But we work very closely with the pipeline associations, and through our work with them, voluntary guidelines have been developed. So they have agreed to follow guidelines that were developed in conjunction with the pipeline operators, and those guidelines function as essentially standards.

We conduct assessments with them. We conduct assessments at critical facilities, and we conduct corporate security reviews. So we have both corporate security reviews and critical facility security reviews with the pipeline community.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you.

I have a question for New Jersey Transit and Amtrak. I represent the 12th Congressional District. So I have the Princeton station, train station. I also have the large capital station in Trenton, and Trenton is a station that has New Jersey Transit, Amtrak, and it has SEPTA. But we don't get the kind of grants and support in that part of the State as we do in the northern part of the State.

So my question to Amtrak and to New Jersey Transit is to what extent are resources being utilized to protect those stations and the riders of those stations, particularly the Trenton train station?

Chief TRUCILLO. All of the training that we give to the agency is given to the cadre of officers and civilian employees who work in Trenton as well, and we are able, we being New Jersey Transit, to participate in the grant program for the greater Philadelphia region. So we get that opportunity.

Congresswoman, we also train with SEPTA and our greater Philadelphia partners, to include Amtrak in Trenton, in drills and exercises in that region. So what we are doing in the north part of the State, we are mirroring in the Trenton area as well for that key transportation facility in our State's capital.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Mr. Conway.

Mr. CONWAY. Yes, from Amtrak, we are pretty limited in our responsibilities at Trenton. Our police officers will take train rides and pretty much turn around at Trenton. The policing of the station itself is left to New Jersey Transit police. In return, what happens in New York Penn Station, although we serve thousands of New Jersey Transit commuters, the Amtrak polices the New Jersey Transit side of Penn Station.

So you won't—unless there is a special event or something special going on, you will not see New Jersey Transit police in Penn Station. They come over for special events—the Pope, Super Bowl, New Year's Eve, St. Patrick's Day, events like that.

So, again, New York Penn Station, New Jersey Transit side policed by Amtrak. The opposite is true for the most part at Trenton.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. OK. Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. DONOVAN. The gentlewoman yields back.

I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony. Beside your testimony, though, I want to thank you for the efforts that you perform every day on behalf of our commuters and our families, and I want you to bring back, on behalf of this Congress, our thanks for the men and women who work for you, the members of the service. Tell them to continue to do the great job they are doing, to do it safely.

This panel is dismissed. The clerk will prepare the witness table for our second panel.

Thank you.

[Pause.]

Mr. DONOVAN. I would like to welcome our second panel to today's hearing and thank them for their participation.

Mr. Greg Kierce serves as director of Jersey City—excuse me. Serves as the director of the Jersey City, New Jersey, Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security. In this capacity, he is responsible for the city's response to disasters and manages the city's homeland security grant funds.

Sergeant Kierce previously served in the New Jersey State Police—excuse me, Jersey City's police department, and I also want to note that this is his third appearance before our subcommittee, actually the second in this Congress.

Welcome again, Sergeant.

Mr. KIERCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Rick Sposa oversees emergency medical service operations at the Jersey City Medical Center. In this capacity, he is responsible for the dispatch center and the hospital's emergency preparedness program.

Additionally, Mr. Sposa is an adjunct professor at the Texas A&M Engineering Extension Services and a member of the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium. He previously served in the Borough of Norwood Office of Emergency Management.

Welcome, sir.

Mr. DONOVAN. Lieutenant Vincent Glenn serves as commander of the Jersey City Police Department's Emergency Services Unit. He is also a member of the New Jersey State Render Safe Task Force, the FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Stabilization Team, and the Jersey City Medical Center Paramedic Education Advisory Board.

Welcome.

Mr. GLENN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Richard Gorman serves as a captain in the Jersey City Department of Fire and Emergency Services. In this capacity, he is responsible for the Jersey City Metropolitan Medical Response System and New Jersey Task Force One Urban Search and Rescue Team.

Welcome, sir.

Mr. GORMAN. Thank you.

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Mike Mollahan serves as trustee and legislative director on the board of the Port Authority Police Benevolent Association. Mr. Mollahan joined the Port Authority Police Department in 2002. He began his law enforcement career with the NYPD in 1998.

Welcome, sir.

Mr. MOLLAHAN. Thank you.

Mr. DONOVAN. The witnesses' full written testimony will appear on the record. The Chair now recognizes Sergeant Kierce for 5 minutes.

**STATEMENT OF SERGEANT W. GREG KIERCE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY, CITY OF JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY**

Mr. KIERCE. Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, Members of the subcommittee, Representative Bonnie Watson Coleman, thank you for affording me the opportunity to appear before you this morning.

After every major terrorist attack in any part of the world, security officials and the American public alike turn to the question of what can be done to deter, prevent a similar attack from occurring here? Unfortunately, it requires a major disaster to arouse concern sufficiently to mobilize the political will to take needed action.

Useful things are often accomplished in the shadow of tragedy. It is not because those charged with security are unable to imagine what terrorists might do. It is rather that people seldom support costly and potentially disruptive measures to protect them against things that haven't occurred.

The reality is because terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, anytime, while we cannot protect everything, everywhere, all the time, security tends to be reactive. Certainly, we must try to protect the targets that terrorists show a proclivity to attack.

Terrorist attacks on public transportation are nothing new. Since the early 1990's, those concerned with security of public surface transportation have been increasingly worried that trains and buses were becoming highly-attractive targets for terrorists bent on body counts. For those determined to kill in quantity and willing to kill indiscriminately, trains, subways, and buses are ideal targets. They offer terrorists easy access and escape, and congregations of strangers guarantee anonymity.

Approximately one-third of terrorist attacks world-wide target transportation systems, with public transit the most frequent. An analysis of more than 22,000 terrorist incidents from 1968 through 2014 indicated that assaults on land-based transportation targets, including mass transit, had the highest casualty rates of any type.

Although major terrorist attacks like those on transit systems in other parts of the world have not occurred in the United States, chances prove exceedingly high. Heavily-populated systems that operate on predictable schedules with passengers having little or no chance to escape crowded stations, buses, trains, and other conveyances make public transportation susceptible to acts of terrorism.

Moreover, many systems are expanding and ridership has generally increased, raising more policing concerns. Vehicular gridlock, air pollution, expensive parking, and higher gasoline prices have made mass transit an attractive option for urban dwellers in metropolitan areas.

Numerous individuals have chosen to leave their vehicles at home and subsequently have logged millions of more daily rides on mass transit and regional rail. Terrorists and criminals continue to think of new schemes in attempts to adjust their tactics to thwart

law enforcement officials, who, in turn, must remain relentless when developing and integrating strategies to safeguard the public.

Surface transportation cannot be protected in the ways that commercial aviation is protected. Trains, subways, and buses must remain readily accessible, convenient, and inexpensive. The deployment of metal detectors, X-ray machines, explosive sniffers, and armed guards, which have become features of the landscape at airports, cannot be transferred easily to subway stations or bus stops. The delays would be enormous and the cost-prohibitive. Public transportation would effectively shut down.

Transportation facilities are open public places. Other public places that offer terrorists similar body counts—shopping malls, crowded streets, or the lines of people just waiting to get through security measures—are just as vulnerable.

This does not mean that nothing can be done to increase surface transportation security. Security officials in countries that have been subjected to terrorist attacks have developed some effective countermeasures. Good security can make terrorist attacks more difficult, can increase their likelihood of being detected, can minimize casualties and disruption, can reduce panic and reassure passengers.

Visible security patrols and staff have a deterrent effect. Closed-circuit television coverage has been used extensively in Europe with good results. Enlisting employees and the public in surveillance could also be very effective.

Much can be done through the design of vehicles and facilities to eliminate hiding places, facilitate surveillance, and reduce casualties by removing materials that explosions may turn into shrapnel or burn with toxic fumes. Adequate ventilation to remove deadly smoke, a leading killer in tunnels, must be ensured. Safe areas can be created to protect passengers during bomb threats.

Transportation operators, either public commissions or private companies, have the front-line responsibility for implementing security measures and responding to threats, crisis planning, and restoration operations. We must all do what we can to enhance the ability of our intelligence efforts and law enforcement officials to uncover and thwart terrorist plots, increase security around vulnerable targets, and improve our ability to respond to attacks when they occur.

At the same time, we must be realistic about the acceptance of risk. We cannot allow fear to become the framework of American governance. Ensuring the security of this country's critical infrastructure has become even more a priority since September 11, 2001.

To that end, public transportation systems must continuously develop and implement programs to protect passengers, employees, and property from those individuals who wish to do harm. We should be wary of slouching toward a security State in which protected perimeters, gates, and guards dominate the landscape and irrevocably alter everyday life.

On behalf of Mayor Steven M. Fulop and the citizens of Jersey City, I once again thank you for inviting me here today and look forward to working with you in providing a safe and secure environment for the citizens which we serve.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kierce follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF W. GREG KIERCE

TUESDAY, JUNE 21, 2014

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Although major terrorist attacks like those on transit systems in other parts of the world have not occurred in the United States, chances prove exceedingly high.

Heavily-populated systems that operate on predictable schedules, with passengers having little or no chance to escape crowded stations, buses, trains, and other conveyances, make public transportation susceptible to acts of terrorism.

Moreover, many systems are expanding and ridership has generally increased, raising more policing concerns. Vehicular gridlock, air pollution, expensive parking fees, and higher gasoline prices have made mass transit an attractive option for urban dwellers in the metropolitan.

Numerous individuals have chosen to leave their vehicles at home and, subsequently, have logged millions of more daily rides on mass transit and regional rail.

Terrorists and criminals continue to think of new schemes and attempt to adjust their tactics to thwart law enforcement officials who, in turn, must remain relentless when developing and integrating strategies to safeguard the public.

Surface transportation cannot be protected in the same way commercial aviation is protected. Trains, subways, and buses must remain readily accessible, convenient, and inexpensive.

The deployment of metal detectors, X-ray machines, explosive sniffers, and armed guards, which have become features of the landscape at airports, cannot be transferred easily to subway stations or bus stops.

The delays would be enormous and the costs prohibitive—public transportation would effectively be shut down.

Transportation facilities are public places. Other public places that offer terrorists similar body counts—shopping malls, crowded streets, or the lines of people waiting to get through security measures—are just as vulnerable.

This does not mean that nothing can be done to increase surface transportation security.

Security officials in countries that have been subjected to terrorist attacks have developed some effective countermeasures.

Good security can make terrorist attacks more difficult, can increase their likelihood of being detected, can minimize casualties and disruption, can reduce panic, and can reassure passengers.

Visible security patrols and staff have a deterrent effect. Closed-circuit television coverage has been used extensively in Europe with good results. And enlisting employees and the public in surveillance can also be very effective.

Much can be done through the design of vehicles and facilities to eliminate hiding places, facilitate surveillance, and reduce casualties by removing materials that explosions may turn into shrapnel or that burn with toxic fumes.

Adequate ventilation to remove deadly smoke, a leading killer in tunnels, must be ensured. Safe areas can be created to protect passengers during bomb threats.

Transportation operators, either public commissions or private companies, have the front-line responsibility for implementing security measures, responding to threats, crisis planning, and restoring operations.

We must do all we can to enhance the ability of our intelligence efforts and law enforcement officials to uncover and thwart terrorist plots, increase security around vulnerable targets, and improve our ability to respond to attacks when they occur.

At the same time, we must be realistic about the acceptance of risk. We cannot allow fear to become the framework of American governance.

Ensuring the security of this country's critical infrastructure has become even more of a priority since September 11, 2001.

To that end, public transportation systems must continuously develop and implement programs to protect passengers, employees, and property from those individuals who wish to do harm.

We should be wary of slouching toward a "security state" in which protected perimeters, gates, and guards dominate the landscape and irrevocably alter everyday life.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Sergeant.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Sposa for 5 minutes.

**STATEMENT OF RICHARD SPOSA, OPERATIONS COORDINATOR, EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES, JERSEY MEDICAL CENTER**

Mr. SPOSA. Chairman Donovan, Members of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, on behalf of Barry Ostrowsky, president and chief executive officer of RWJ Barnabas Health, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to come before you today to discuss first responders and their role in supporting the efforts to secure transportation in the region.

I would like to thank the subcommittee for its dedication to seeking input from a wide range of stakeholders, including first responders, on this critical issue. I hope to show how your financial commitment to emergency preparedness have better prepared the region and how continued appropriations will continue to support the medical surge needs and prepare health care systems for any disaster we could face, including a transit disaster or attack on its infrastructure.

Today, I will speak both from the perspective of the pre-hospital EMS provider, as well as the emergency preparedness role in front-line acute care hospitals, and I would not think of a more fitting setting to discuss the topic than the city of Jersey City, New Jersey.

It has been nearly 15 years since the deadliest terrorist attack on American soil, which occurred a mere 4 miles from this spot. I can tell you that we are most certainly better prepared today than we were in 2001 because of the development, funding, and implementation of Federal programs and local initiatives to bolster response capabilities.

But I would be remiss if I told you there wasn't more work to do, more goals to accomplish, and more loops to close. To begin, I would like to give you a snapshot of programs that exist within the health care community today because of the Federal Government's

commitment to better preparing the community to protect the residents, visitors, and workers in New Jersey.

Since 2003, the Federal Government has invested more than \$33 million in bolstering health care preparedness in the North Jersey UASI region, which includes Jersey City. This money has built new programs and provided the basis for some of the most unique and forward-thinking solutions to deal with medical surge and mass casualty incidents that exist in the country today.

I would like to highlight some significant accomplishments, both in the hospital and EMS worlds that indeed make this region safer and more resilient in the face of an attack or large-scale incident. These programs enhance the ability of EMS and hospitals to respond to mass casualty events, pandemic events, and acts of terrorism and would have not been possible without the funding that was supplied by these important UASI grants.

Hospitals are, by their very nature, considered to be a soft target for a number of reasons. The mission of all hospitals is to be available to their community 24/7/365. Because those in need of aid must have immediate access to life-saving care, entry to these facilities can't be hampered or restricted.

Our lights are always on, our doors unlocked, and our prominent role in the surrounding community unquestioned. This could easily be exploited, and therefore, the need to protect an open campus is paramount and a necessary first step to providing excellent patient care.

The trauma centers in the UASI region have been able to harden their structures and better protect themselves from unwanted attacks through the trauma center target hardening grants. These improvements include increased closed-circuit television capabilities, the creation of blast buffer zones around the structures, the installation of radiation detection, and the placement of better access control systems to aid in that mission.

Our hospitals are also better prepared for medical surge events as a result of the receipt of the UASI grants. For example, each of the 34 hospitals in the New Jersey UASI region has been provided with a medical surge trailer designed to provide the necessary supplies, tools, and protective equipment that would be needed in the face of a medical surge event. The coordination and uniform outfitting to each facility would not have been possible without an overarching mission directive like that from the UASI grant stream.

In any medical surge event, communication systems and modalities will play a crucial role. If you read any after-action report from an incident or exercise, you will almost certainly find multiple references to communication gaps that occurred during the event, and UASI has allowed the hospitals to bolster their communications capabilities. The implementation of a mass notification system that allows hospitals to communicate and recall their staff was a key to building more resilient hospitals.

Another major step forward for interoperability and communications that was undertaken was the Mutualink system that allows for cross-platform, multi-discipline communication in real time. This tool will assist with the overall response coordination by allowing multiple disciplines' radios, phones, and even video feeds to

be shared in real time and increase capabilities of communications instantly.

As you can see through these examples, the health-care community in the New Jersey UASI region has dramatically improved its response capabilities and resiliency since the inception of the UASI grant process, and these initiatives directly support securing the infrastructure of mass transit in the region. Through regular interfaces and exercises with the transit community, relationships are built and responses refined. The UASI program has directly impacted and improved these relationships through mutual training and cross-discipline planning.

Turning specifically to our role in protecting and responding to emergencies within the transit systems, I want to focus on two collaborative endeavors. Our efforts in the creation of the passenger rail security plan, as well as our work through UASI grants to furnish our partners with specialized equipment geared toward transit events.

First, the passenger rail security plan, which represents the most comprehensive initiative undertaken by EMS in New Jersey related to the transit system. The plan was developed by the New Jersey EMS Task Force, which is a stakeholder group of specialized resources, of which Jersey City Medical Center's EMS is a charter member.

The creation of the plan began with a kick-off meeting in October 2009 and included nearly 80 representatives from local EMS agencies and the State Office of Emergency Management, as well as State, Federal, and private planning partners. The task force reviewed and analyzed response guidelines, best practices, and lessons learned from authorities such as Madrid's Emergency Services, the London Ambulance Service, District of Columbia Fire and EMS, the Los Angeles Fire Department, Jersey City Medical Center EMS, and the Hudson County Office of Emergency Management.

Completed in March 2011, the plan is an unprecedented 1,238-page detailed document, and as I have mentioned, it represents the largest EMS planning project in New Jersey's history. Its authors invested more than 10,000 hours of work, and more than 70 agencies collaborated between its inception and completion. This plan incorporates more than 300 stations throughout the State overall.

The most vulnerable stations, of which there are 38, spanning 10 counties, have either ridership of at least 500,000 per year or attached to critical infrastructure, such as an airport, sporting event, or entertainment venue. This plan made unprecedented strides in terms of EMS coordination and integration with our transit partners.

Next, we have equipped our partners with specialty equipment designed to enable remote access to patients, support mass casualty events, and aid in the mass transportation of patients. This is critically important, as one of the largest challenges that EMS face during mass transit events is the availability of access to remote locations.

When an event occurs away from a station, it can be incredibly difficult—it can be incredibly difficult to access the incident location. To address this issue in New Jersey, we have amassed a fleet



of off-road ambulances built specifically to access remote locations and remove patients to central locations for further treatment and transport.

These assets allow for the quick extraction of patients from remote locations and in time/life critical circumstances will mean the difference between life and death. New Jersey EMS has assembled the largest known fleet of medical ambulance buses, which are designed to meet the needs of mass casualty events and are capable of transporting up to 22 patients with one trip.

These assets would not have been obtainable without the support of UASI dollars coming through the region, and these assets have been proven time and time again in the region and continue to be a valued resource. Regularly assisting with nursing home evacuations and large-scale incidents throughout the State, these assets have been put into action on countless occasions and transported thousands of patients, allowing for quick evacuation and relocation with much less manpower during a disaster response. This fleet has become an indispensable asset in the region and a model for other locations to emulate.

Based on some of the examples I provided with you today, you can see that hospitals, emergency medical providers, and other partners in the region are better prepared to handle adverse surge events, such as those that could be created by large-scale transit attacks or accidents, as a direct result of Federal dollars supplied. But there is more work to do in order to continue to ensure we are exceptionally prepared for any emergency response.

This is particularly important as we see our terror threats evolving, such as the recent tragedy in Orlando. Our focus must be given to new threats, and training and equipment must change to meet those new threats.

We are prepared for the all-hazards approach and have already refined our mission to include the latest trends throughout the EMS and hospital community by bolstering our bleeding control equipment and training and working with our partners in law enforcement and fire. To date, the New Jersey UASI has already invested nearly \$4 million in the rescue task force concept and getting the right equipment into the hands of those who need it. This is another successful example of how these dollars prepare us for these events.

We are cognizant of the limited resources available and the difficult decisions that you must make in Congress on how to allocate resources. However, because of the changing landscape, we are hopeful that the recent trend to reduce homeland security grants is reversed.

In closing, I would like to once again offer my sincere appreciation for the opportunity to speak with you today. The region is most certainly prepared for an emergency of any kind than it was 15 years ago, but the job is not done. The threat is not gone, and the realities are continually changing.

I urge you to work with the vast group of stakeholders here today and others to begin planning how to make and continue us to make safer, more resilient, and more ready to face what seems to be a never-ending threat stream.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sposa follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD SPOSA

JUNE 21, 2016

Chairman Donovan and Members of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, on behalf of Barry Ostrowsky, president and chief executive officer of RWJBarnabas Health, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to come before you today to discuss first responders and their role in supporting efforts to secure surface transportation in the region.

RWJBarnabas Health is the largest not-for-profit integrated health care delivery system in New Jersey. The system includes 11 acute care hospitals, 3 children's hospitals, a pediatric rehabilitation hospital, a freestanding behavioral health center, ambulatory care centers, geriatric centers, the State's largest behavioral health network, comprehensive home care and hospice programs, and several accountable care organizations. As the second-largest private employer in New Jersey, RWJBarnabas Health includes more than 32,000 employees and over 9,000 physicians and we train more than 1,000 residents.

Jersey City Medical Center's Emergency Medical Service (EMS) has served the city of Jersey City uninterrupted as its ambulance and emergency service provider for more than 130 years. In fact, April 2016 marked our 133<sup>rd</sup> year of providing 24/7/365 Basic and Advanced Life Support ambulance service to this great city. JCMC EMS has utilized many Nationally-recognized best processes and practices and has found that this has been instrumental in our system's success.

I would like to thank this subcommittee for its dedication to seeking input from a wide range of stakeholders, including first responders, on this critical issue. I hope to show how your financial commitment to emergency preparedness have better prepared the region and how continued appropriations will continue to support the medical surge needs, and prepare health care systems for any disaster we could face, including a transit disaster or attack on its infrastructure.

Today I will speak from both the perspective of the pre-hospital EMS provider as well as the emergency preparedness role of front-line acute care facilities. And I could not think of a more fitting setting to discuss this topic than the city of Jersey City, New Jersey. It has been nearly 15 years since the deadliest terrorist attack on American soil, which occurred a mere 4 miles from this spot. I can tell you that we are most certainly better prepared today than we were in 2001 because of the development, funding, and implementation of Federal programs and local initiatives to bolster response capabilities. But I would be remiss if I told you there wasn't more work to do, more goals to accomplish, and more loops to close.

To begin, I would like to give you a snapshot of programs that exist within the health care community today because of the Federal Government's commitment to better preparing the community to protect the residents, visitors, and workers in New Jersey. Since 2003, the Federal Government has invested more than \$33 million in bolstering the health care preparedness in the North Jersey UASI region, which includes Jersey City. This money has built new programs and provided the basis for some of the most unique and forward thinking solutions to deal with medical surge and mass casualty incidents that exist in the country today.

I would like to highlight some significant accomplishments both in the hospital and EMS worlds that indeed make this region safer and more resilient in the face of attack or large-scale incident. These programs enhance the ability of EMS and hospitals to respond to Mass Casualty Events, Pandemic Events, and Acts of Terrorism and would not have been possible without the funding that was supplied by these important UASI grants.

Hospitals are, by their very nature, considered to be a soft target for a number of reasons. The mission of all hospitals is to be available to their community 24/7/365 and because those in need of aid must have immediate access to life-saving care, entry to these facilities can't be hampered or restricted. Our lights are always on, our doors unlocked, and our prominent role in the surrounding community unquestioned. This could easily be exploited and therefore the need to protect an open campus is paramount and a necessary first step in providing excellent patient care. The trauma centers in the UASI region have been able to harden their structures and better protect themselves from unwanted attacks through the Trauma Center Target Hardening grants. These improvements include increased closed circuit television capabilities, the creation of blast buffer zones around the structures, the installation of radiation detection and the placement of better access control systems to aid in that mission.

Our hospitals have also become better prepared for a medical surge event as a result of the receipt of UASI grants. For example, each of the 34 hospitals in the NJ UASI region has been provided with a medical surge trailer, designed to provide the necessary supplies, tools, and personal protective equipment that would be needed in the face of a medical surge event. The coordination and uniform outfitting to each facility would not have been possible without an overarching mission directive like that of the UASI grant stream. These trailers have been utilized for many events, such as during Hurricane Sandy, and are easily shared within the hospital community for more isolated incidents that don't involve all the hospitals.

In any medical surge event, communication systems and modalities will play a crucial role. If you read any after-action report from an incident or exercise you will almost certainly find multiple references to communication gaps that occurred during the event. And UASI has allowed the hospitals to bolster their communications capabilities. The implementation of a mass notification system that allows hospitals to communicate and recall their staff was a key to building more resilient hospitals. The other major step forward for interoperability and communications that was undertaken is the MutualLink system that allows for cross-platform, multi-discipline communication in real time. This tool will assist with the overall response coordination by allowing multiple disciplines, radios, phones, and even video feeds to be shared in real time and increase capabilities communications instantly.

As you can see through these examples, the Emergency Medical Services community in the NJ UASI has dramatically improved its response capabilities and resiliency since the inception of UASI grant process. And these initiatives directly support securing the infrastructure of mass transit in the region. Through regular interfaces and exercises with the transit community, relationships are built and responses refined. The UASI program has directly impacted and improved these relationships through mutual training and cross discipline planning.

Turning specifically to our role in protecting and responding to emergencies within transit systems, I want to focus on two collaborative endeavors—our efforts in the creation of the Passenger Rail Security Plan as well as our work, through UASI grants, to furnish our partners with specialized equipment geared toward transit events.

First, the Passenger Rail Security Plan, which represents the most comprehensive initiative undertaken by EMS in New Jersey related to the transit system. The Plan was developed by the New Jersey EMS Taskforce, which is a stakeholder group of specialized resources of which Jersey City Medical Center's EMS is a charter member. The creation of the Plan began with a kickoff meeting in October 2009 and included nearly 80 representatives from local EMS agencies and the State OEM, as well as State, Federal and private planning partners. The Task Force reviewed and analyzed response guidelines, best practices, and lessons learned from authorities such as Madrid's emergency services, the London Ambulance Service, District of Columbia Fire and EMS, the Los Angeles Fire Department, Jersey City Medical Center EMS, the Hudson County Office of Emergency Management. Completed in March 2011, the Plan is an unprecedented 1,238-page detailed document and, as I mentioned, it represents the largest EMS planning project in New Jersey's history. Its authors invested more than 10,000 hours of work, and more than 70 agencies collaborated between its inception and completion.

The Plan incorporates more than 300 stations throughout the State overall. The most vulnerable stations, of which there are 38 spanning 10 counties, have either a ridership of at least 500,000 per year or are attached to critical infrastructure such as an airport, sporting arena or entertainment venue. This Plan made unprecedented strides in terms of EMS coordination and integration with our transit partners.

Next, we have equipped our partners with specialty equipment designed to enable remote access to patients, support mass casualty events, and aid in the mass transportation of patients. This is critically important as one of the largest challenges that EMS faces during mass transit events is the availability of access to remote locations. When an event occurs away from a station it can be incredibly difficult to access the incident location. To address this issue, in New Jersey we have amassed a fleet of off-road ambulances built specifically to access remote locations and remove patients to central locations for further treatment and transport. These assets allow for the quick extraction of patients from remote locations and, in time life critical circumstances, will mean the difference between life and death.

New Jersey EMS has assembled the largest known fleet of Medical Ambulance Buses, which are designed to meet the needs of mass casualty events and are capable of transporting up to 22 patients with one trip. These assets would not have been obtainable without the support of the UASI dollars coming to the region, and these assets have been proven time and time again in the region and continue to

be a valued resource, regularly assisting with nursing home evacuations and large-scale incidents throughout the State. These assets have been put into action on countless occasions and transported thousands of patients allowing for quick evacuation and relocation with much less manpower during a disaster response. This fleet has become an indispensable asset in the region and a model for other locations to emulate.

NJ also has a large fleet of mass care response units (known as "MCRUs"), spread throughout the State to meet the ever-evolving threat profile and these units will play a critical role in providing the much-needed supplies, equipment, and transport devices at an event. There are 5 large-scale MCRU's capable of treating 100 patients each and an additional 7 smaller units that can each treat 50 patients. Should a large-scale transit event occur, these assets would be a critical asset that will be mobilized quickly and allow for adequate supplies to be delivered to the scene.

Based on some of the examples I've provided you with today, you can see that hospitals emergency medical providers and other partners in the region are better prepared to handle adverse surge events, such as those that could be created by large-scale transit attacks or accidents, as a direct result of Federal dollars supplied. But there is more work to do in order to continue to ensure we are exceptionally prepared for any emergency response necessary. This is particularly important as we see terror threats evolving.

As the challenges we are facing change, our needs to meet those challenges will change as well. We are talking about protecting our transit systems and how different aspects of the health care continuum support that. What we see unfolding is a new disturbing trend of active-shooter and mass-shooting events, such as seen in Orlando last weekend. Of course we need to be prepared for the next threat, but there is a benefit to the tasks already undertaken. We are prepared for the "all hazards" approach and are already refining that mission to include the latest trends in EMS and Hospital care by bolstering our bleeding control equipment and training and working with our partners in Law Enforcement and Fire. To date the NJ UASI has already invested nearly \$4,000,000 in the rescue task force concept and getting the right equipment into the hands of those who need it this is another successful example of how these dollars prepare us for these events.

We are cognizant of the limited resources available and the difficult decisions that you must make in Congress on how to allocate resources; however, because of the changing landscape, we are hopeful that the recent trend to reduce homeland security grants, is reversed.

In closing, I would like to once again offer my sincere appreciation for the opportunity to speak with you today. The region is most certainly more prepared for an emergency of any kind than it was 15 years ago. But the job is not done, the threat is not gone, and the realities are continually changing. I urge you to work with the vast group of stakeholders here today, and others, to begin planning how to continue make us safer, more resilient, and more ready to face what seems to be a never-ending threat stream.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you.

The Chair recognizes Captain Gorman for 5 minutes.

**STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. GORMAN, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF FIRE AND EMERGENCY SERVICES, JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY**

Mr. GORMAN. Thank you, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Honorable Donald Payne, and respective Members of the subcommittee.

On behalf of the Jersey City Fire Department and the Emergency Response Partnership of the Northern New Jersey Region, please accept my deepest gratitude to appear and present testimony regarding the protection of our passengers on surface transportation.

On February 9, 1996, at 8:40 a.m., the emergency response community of Jersey City, Hudson County, and New Jersey State and Federal agencies converged to a remote section of the Jersey City-Secaucus border. I was—as a young firefighter/EMT, I was one of

the first responders, and I was presented with a horrific crash of two commuter trains.

Our society was beginning to worry about terrorist events with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, which was right in our neighborhood, Jersey City. First thing you ask yourself, was this a terrorist event?

As highlighted in the articles that I have submitted, you could review that for your future reference, as the police, fire, rescue, and EMS crews began to triage and treat the injured, we were quickly exhausted of our resources we had on hand. We were already beyond our capabilities, and we hadn't even transported a single patient to the hospital. In order to accomplish that, command and control had to be established, and multi-discipline mutual aid to be summoned on an unprecedented scale for our area.

Unfortunately, we measure our response by stating our losses, and that day, 3 people lost their lives, the 2 engineers and 1 passenger. But 162 passengers were injured, 16 severely, and we should begin to realize that we were successful in that every passenger that we treated on that day did survive, largely due to the rapid response, on-scene operations, due to the extensive training and superior knowledge, skill, and ability of many emergency response personnel, both on scene and in the hospitals.

That day ended for us, and we were proud to say that we saved many from death and further injury, but the lessons learned continued to evolve. The executives of many agencies gathered and conducted very comprehensive evaluations and post-incident analysis of many aspects of this incident. There were models presented to many committees, which included natural and man-made disasters related to rail and surface mass transportation.

Different target locations were introduced to include transportation hubs and terminals, as well as hard-to-access remote locations that is described in this incident. The State of New Jersey and Jersey City has come a long way since that day.

As Director Kierce has testified to the attraction of attacks on our infrastructure, we in the emergency management and response community are well aware that any place is a potential target, and we respond to each and every one of them to protect the lives of the citizens we are sworn to protect.

Many programs have been developed to support our response to terrorism and enhance our ability to operate in these large-scale events. To highlight a few, the Metropolitan Medical Strike Team; the Urban Area Security Initiative funding, or the UASI; SAFER grants, which is Staffing to Adequate Fire and Emergency Response; AFG, which is the Assistance to Firefighter Grant; the Port Security Grant Program.

These work to enhance communications, develop threat analysis groups and fusion centers, form specialized teams, enhance training and exercise to include our working with FEMA for National exercise pilot programs, and the most recent exercise was the Bakken crude oil transport within Hudson County. Special trained law enforcement teams and rapid deployment forces and information-sharing committees were formed.

MMRS was developed and was one of the first National grant programs to support emergency response agencies to address gaps

in equipment and training. This funding has been discontinued. However, many other programs, such as UASI, has replaced it and has a more detailed, focused structure to provide a better-defined overall system.

The on-going interagency communication of radio, data, and live-streaming to enhance situational awareness from on-scene operation to senior commanders and executive decision-making officials continues to evolve. Secure radio communications have become better and will continue to grow with the demand.

Systems like NJ NET and Mutualink are becoming common. Local, county, and State emergency operation centers, fusion centers, and coordination centers are in virtually every city and township, which are used for planned events and natural and man-made disasters. These systems and locations are extremely useful. However, they do have a price tag in the new and evolving technical support that they require.

Additionally, challenges in permissions of being able to share frequencies with other agencies is becoming or has been a problem, and we seem to be overcoming that. The inception of dual and tri-band radios and the complicated user training that we will need to use them is going to be apparent.

Specially-trained units, such as the New Jersey Task Force One Urban Search and Rescue Team, due to the large commitment of manpower and equipment, we were recently the latest to be accepted into the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System. This team began its journey in 1998. From that unit, a new concept was introduced in this region called the Metro Urban Strike Team.

Based on a gap analysis from a first responder operating on a collapse to the time that the task force could arrive on scene, it was estimated to be a 1- to 6-hour window. The MUST team, or the Metro Urban Strike Team, fills that gap, and these teams are lined throughout the UASI region. Their capabilities are structural collapse, trench rescue, technical rescue, and we seek to train and respond in new disciplines as that committee unfolds.

As Mr. Sposa stated, the New Jersey EMS Task Force is also a system born from this UASI subcommittee, and it has proven itself to be invaluable. New Jersey Transit provides also evacuation transport in stricken localities, such as Jersey City, to self-shelter areas.

So if we had a shelter in Jersey City and we were in a danger zone, New Jersey Transit would mobilize buses, and we would move then to another section of the State which is safe. I would like to thank you for your support and commitment and our elected officials at many levels of government for that.

Training and exercise programs in basic to advanced operations from initial arrival to advanced command-and-control have also been developed. These programs are world class, delivered by the very best instructors in the field. Many are sponsored by the National Office of Domestic Preparedness in similar agencies.

These are invaluable. However, they are scaled down by departments due to operating at minimum staffing levels and budgetary concerns to pay for the venues and the expensive cost of replacing personnel.

Additionally, the allocation or allowance of Federally-funded training centers and staff should be seriously reconsidered. Hudson County does not have a fully-functional, fully-staffed, multi-disciplined training academy and training ground, and this area, being as compressed as it is, severely lacks that. The personnel must be placed off-duty and often replaced to attend training academies in other counties, leading to delays in response should they have to be recalled for an emergency within Hudson County.

Other programs were the rapid deployment force and information-sharing component, such as the JTTF, which will be addressed by other capable persons here. But the most important thing that we have today, which we didn't have, is the relationships with the mutual aid partnerships, the police departments, the EMS. Imagine a cop and a fireman getting along and getting things done.

The Port Authority Police, the Port Authority OEM, New Jersey Transit Police, their special operations group, their OEM group, New Jersey State Police, Amtrak, Conrail, and Norfolk Southern, we work with many different partners to do training and district familiarizations.

In closing, on behalf of the Director of Public Safety Shea and the Chief of Department Darren Rivers, the men and the women of the Jersey City Fire Department, the men and women of the New Jersey Task Force One, and of course, the Jersey City Mayor Steven M. Fulop, I thank you again for your interest in the most important aspect of our business, keeping the citizens of the United States and her visitors safe and secure.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gorman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. GORMAN

JUNE 21, 2016

Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Honorable Donald M. Payne Jr., and the respected Members of this subcommittee, On behalf of the Jersey City Fire Dept and Emergency Response partnership of the North New Jersey Region, please accept my deepest gratitude to appear and present testimony regarding the protection of our passengers on surface transportation.

On February 9, 1996 at 8:40 a.m., the emergency response community of Jersey City, Hudson County and N.J. State, and Federal agencies converged to a remote section of Jersey City and Secaucus Border. As a young firefighter/EMT and one of the first due responders, I was presented with a horrific crash of 2 commuter trains.

Our society was beginning to worry about terrorist events after the 1993 WTC Bombing.

Was this a terrorist event?

As highlighted in the *New York Times* article provided, there were many obstacles to overcome.

As the police, fire rescue and EMS crews began to triage and treat the injured, we quickly exhausted the resources we had on hand. We were already beyond our capabilities, and we haven't even transported a single patient to a hospital yet. In order to accomplish that, Command and Control had to be established, and multi-discipline mutual aid had to be summoned in an unprecedented scale for our city.

Unfortunately we measure our response by stating our loses. Three people lost their lives, the 2 engineers and 1 passenger, 162 passengers were injured (16 severely). We should begin to realize that we were successful in that all the passengers treated survived largely due to the rapid response, on-scene operations due to extensive training and superior knowledge skill and ability of many emergency response personnel both on scene and in hospitals.

That day ended for us, and we were proud to say that we saved many from death and further injury that day. But the lessons learned continue to evolve.

The executives of many agencies gathered and conducted very comprehensive evaluation (Post-Incident Analysis) of many aspects of this accident.

There were models presented to many committees, which included natural and man-made disasters related to rail and surface mass transportation. Different target locations were introduced, to include transportation hubs and terminals, as well as hard-to-access remote locations as described.

The State of New Jersey and Jersey City has come a long way from that day.

As Director Kierce has testified to the attraction of attacks on our infrastructure, we in the emergency management and response community are well aware that any place is a potential target. And we respond to each and everyone of them to protect the lives of the citizens we are sworn to protect.

Many programs have been developed to support our response to terrorism, and enhance our ability to operate in these large-scale events.

- Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMRS)
- Urban Area Security Initiative Funding (UASI) on a regional basis
- Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) Grants
- Assistance to Firefighter Grant (AFG)
- Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)
- Enhancement in the Communications
- Threat Analysis Groups, Fusion Centers
- Specially Trained Teams and Groups (NJ-TF 1, MUST, NJEMSTF, NJ Transit Police Special Operations)
- Training and Exercise
- Command and Control
- Special Trained Law Enforcement Teams (RDF)
- Information-Gathering Sharing committees

MMRS was developed and was one to the first National Grant programs to support the emergency response agencies to address gaps in equipment and training. This funding has been discontinued, however many other programs such as the UASI has replaced it and has a more detailed, focused structure to provide a better-defined overall system.

The on-going inter agency communication of radio, data, and live-streaming to enhance situational awareness from on-scene operation to senior commanders and executive decision-making officials continues to evolve. Secure radio communication have become better and will continue to grow with the demand.

Systems like NJ NET and Mutual Link are becoming common. Local, county, and State Emergency Operations Centers, Fusion Centers, Coordination Centers are in virtually every city and township, which are used for planned events, and natural and man-made disasters.

These systems and locations are extremely useful, however they do have a price tag in the new and evolving technical support they require.

Specially-Trained units such the NJ-TF 1 USAR team. Due to a large commitment of manpower and equipment was recently the latest to be accepted into the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System. This team began it's journey in 1998. From that unit, a new concept was introduced in NJ. The Metro Urban Strike Team (MUST), Funded by the UASI program, local departments have received equipment and training to fulfill the first response operational period of the first 4-6 hours in structural collapse, trench rescue, technical rescue, and seek to train and respond in enhanced disciplines. The NJ EMFS Task Force is also a system born of the continued UASI subcommittees.

I would like to thank you for your support and commitment and that of our elected officials from many levels of government.

Training and Exercise Programs in basic to advanced operations. From initial arrival to advanced Command and Control have also been developed. These programs are world-class, delivered by the very best instructors in the their field. Many are sponsored by the National Office of Domestic Preparedness and similar agencies.

These are invaluable, however often are scaled down due to departments operating at minimum staffing levels and or budgetary concerns to pay for venues and cost of replacing personnel.

The allocation or allowance of Federally-funded training centers and staff should be seriously reconsidered. Hudson County does not have a fully functional, fully-staffed multi-discipline training academy training ground. The personnel must be placed off duty and often replaced to attend training academies in other counties leading to delays in response should they be recalled.

RDF and Information Sharing Components (JTTF) have or will be addressed by other capable persons here.

In closing, on behalf of Director of Public Safety Shea and Chief of Department Datten Rivers and the men and women of the Jersey City Fire Department, The men and women of the NJ Task Force 1, and of course Jersey City, City Mayor Steven M. Fulop, I thank you again for your interest in the most important aspect of



our business, keeping the citizens of the United States and her visitors safe and secure.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Captain.

The Chair now recognizes Lieutenant Glenn for 5 minutes.

**STATEMENT OF VINCENT GLENN, COMMANDER, EMERGENCY SERVICE UNIT, POLICE DEPARTMENT, JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY**

Mr. GLENN. Good morning. I am Lieutenant Vincent Glenn from the Jersey City Police Department, and I appreciate the opportunity to speak before you today.

I am currently the commander of the Emergency Service Unit. The Emergency Service Unit, ESU, oversees the bomb squad, the scuba team, maritime operations, and the CBRNE response unit, CBRNE meaning chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives.

Our specially-trained and equipped personnel are responsible for prevention and response to terrorism events, including those in our local port areas, industrial facilities, transit hubs, and commuter corridors. Officers who are assigned to ESU include FBI-certified bomb technicians, Coast Guard credentialed boat operators, hazardous materials technicians, and fully-certified scuba divers.

ESU officers are capable of responding with a full complement of CBRNE equipment to assist in the response and recovery of criminal incidents, terrorism events, and other emergencies.

Please let me share some relevant details of our city. Jersey City is situated on a peninsula, with the Hackensack River and Newark Bay on its western shore and the Hudson River and New York Bay on its eastern shore. The city's population is nearly 270,000 residents, and it is estimated that daytime commuters more than double that number.

Our officers continually collaborate with emergency management officials, law enforcement partners, and first responders throughout the New York/New Jersey metropolitan region in a whole community approach to carefully manage resources and response activities. Some of our partnerships include participation in the New Jersey State Render Safe Task Force, Urban Area Security Initiative, Securing the Cities Program, WMD Stabilization Team, and FBI Electronic Countermeasures Task Force.

Some of the critical infrastructure, buffer zones, and soft targets that fall within our area of responsibility include the Jersey City waterfront, financial district, the Holland Tunnel, 5 separate commuter ferry terminals, the Port Jersey shipping terminal, and various railways.

Additionally, ESU's incident prevention and response equipment is utilized along Newark Bay and the Hackensack River for security risk mitigation of the numerous bridge crossings for inter-State highways and railways running in and out of the New York/New Jersey region.

My fellow officers and I take pride in our training and preparedness. One of the most fundamental aspects of responding to an emergency incident is interoperability. On a daily basis, the Jersey City Police Department, particularly ESU, is constantly working to foster partnerships and improve interagency communications.

Training courses, multi-jurisdictional drills, and interdisciplinary exercises prepare us to be ready to respond to every perceived threat to public safety, regardless of whether that threat is predictable or emerging. Because the skill set to meet an all-hazards approach is perishable, training and education must be on-going and repeated for new and seasoned responders alike. As complex threats intensify, it is our duty to lead, coach, and direct our first responders.

ESU officers dedicate a significant number of hours to specialized training. For example, bomb technicians attend 6 weeks of training at the FBI's Hazardous Devices School. They then continue their education with monthly in-service classes and periodic multi-jurisdictional drills.

Our scuba divers spend hundreds of hours in initial training to attain skills such as advanced open water diving, rescue diving, and evidence recovery. Their training continues as they perform practical exercises in hazardous environments such as the Hudson River and Newark Bay.

Boat operators are fully credentialed by the National Maritime Service, as they learn to pilot our 37-foot CBRNE rescue patrol boat. This credential mandates that operators maintain hundreds of hours on the water per year to ensure proficiency.

Our emergency responders prepare and experience tremendous local support during drills conducted at public locations in sensitive areas. These drills, which are frequently covered by the media, give first responders an invaluable opportunity to work with stakeholders and other officials in demonstrating the interoperability that is so essential to managing a crisis. Within Jersey City, these drills have recently been carried out at the Holland Tunnel, the JP Morgan Chase building, and even right here at NJCU.

It is not only emergency response agencies that need the ability to work cohesively, but it is important that the public be empowered to unite with first responders in achieving coordination and preparedness. For example, the police department's bomb squad conducts community outreach to our partners in the public and private sector with lectures and demonstrations in such topics as IED awareness, evacuation procedures, response to bomb threats, and active-shooter safety.

Our scuba team visits junior police academies to demonstrate water safety, and our canine officers provide question-and-answer sessions at local schools. It is because of the skills afforded to us by advanced training that we as professionals can continue to raise standards, improve planning, and build partnerships.

Another important component to consider is equipment. Not only is training and education perishable, but the tools to meet emerging threats are perishable as well. Ordering specialized equipment often takes many steps and incurs considerable expense over time.

Equipment and tools often require everything from rudimentary maintenance and repair to advanced technological upgrades. Some of these tools include radiation detectors, X-ray systems, air monitors, and bomb disposal robots. The specialized equipment that I just mentioned, among many other tools, demonstrate the multiple defenses that are needed to improve our approach to pervasive threats and targets of interest.

With pride, let me relate a few noteworthy incidents that occurred within the last year and concluded with positive outcomes. I responded to a report of a suspicious package on the PATH train in Jersey City during prime commuter hours. Upon assessing the situation, the item, a pressure cooker, was remotely dismantled with minimal disruption to the public.

On another occasion, a radiological source was detected near the Hoboken waterfront and deemed to be nonhazardous by using an advanced isotope identifier.

Recently, police divers retrieved a piece of sensitive homeland security equipment from the waters surrounding the Port Jersey marine terminal. It was through the cooperation of a variety of agencies that these incidents were quickly resolved.

In summation, we need not be reminded that our area has been labeled as a target-rich environment, perhaps even the most high-risk urban area in the country. It is because of the constant vigilance of public safety professionals who operate in challenging environments all day, every day that allow for a robust response to disruptions and emergency events of all types.

On behalf of the quarter-million residents of Jersey City, my professional partners, and our government officials, I thank you for affording me the opportunity to testify before you on these important matters.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Glenn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VINCENT GLENN

JUNE 21, 2016

INTRODUCTION

I am Lieutenant Vincent Glenn from the Jersey City Police Department and I appreciate the opportunity to speak before you today. I am currently the commander of the Emergency Service Unit. The Emergency Service Unit (ESU) oversees the Bomb Squad, SCUBA team, maritime operations, and the CBRNE response unit (CBRNE meaning response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive incidents).

Our specially-trained and equipped personnel are responsible for prevention and response to terrorism events, including those in our local port areas, industrial facilities, transit hubs, commuter corridors, and residential neighborhoods. Officers who are assigned to ESU include FBI-certified Bomb Technicians, Coast Guard-credentialed boat operators, State-certified hazardous material technicians, and fully certified SCUBA divers. ESU officers are capable of responding with a full complement of portable CBRNE equipment to withstand and assist in the response and recovery of criminal incidents, terrorism events, and emergencies due to natural disasters.

BACKGROUND

The city of Jersey City is situated on a peninsula with the Hackensack River and Newark Bay on its western shore and the Hudson River and New York Bay on its eastern shore. The city's residential population is nearly 270,000 residents and it is estimated that daytime commuters raises the populace to approximately half-a-million people. Jersey City's 21 square miles and population density of nearly 17,000 people per square mile makes it the third most-densely-populated large city in America and it is ranked as one of the top 120 cities vulnerable to a terrorist attack.

Our officers continually collaborate with emergency management officials, law enforcement partners, and first responders, through the New York/New Jersey metropolitan region, in a whole-community-approach, to carefully manage resources and response activities. Some of our partnerships include participation in the NJ State Detect and Render Safe Task Force, Urban Area Security Initiative, Securing the Cities program, and FBI Level III WMD Stabilization Team, and FBI Electronic Countermeasures Task Force.

We, as first responders are dedicated to enhancing emergency preparedness and enabling rapid recovery from terrorist events, natural disasters, and other emergencies. Some of the critical infrastructure, soft targets, and buffer zone responsibilities include the Jersey City waterfront financial district, the Holland Tunnel, 5 separate commuter ferry terminals, 3 separate public marinas, Cape Liberty Cruise Port, Port Jersey Shipping Terminal, Global Container Terminal, Claremont Terminal, Public Service Electric Hudson Generating Station, Liberty State Park, and Ellis Island. Additionally, ESU incident prevention and response equipment is utilized along Newark Bay and the Hackensack River for security risk mitigation of the numerous bridge crossings and support stanchions for inter-State highways and State thoroughfares running in and out of the New York/New Jersey metropolitan area. The JCPD Emergency Service Unit has existing MOU's with UASI and the USCG to respond with personnel and CBRNE equipment to areas along the Hudson River, Hackensack River, New York Bay, Raritan Bay, Kill Van Kull, Port Elizabeth, and Port Newark.

#### TRAINING/PREPARATION

One of the most fundamental aspects of responding to any emergency incident is interoperability. On a daily basis, Jersey City Police Department, particularly ESU, relies on partnerships with all local agencies to ensure the safety of everyone. We are constantly working to foster these partnerships and improve our interagency communications. Training courses, multi-jurisdictional drills, and inter-disciplinary exercises, prepare us to be ready to respond to every perceived threat to public safety, regardless of whether that threat is predictable or emerging. And because the skill set to meet an all-hazards approach is perishable, training and education must be on-going and repeated—for new and seasoned responders alike. As complex threats intensify it is our duty to lead, coach, and direct our first responders.

Members of ESU dedicate a significant number of hours to specialized training. Bomb Technicians earn certification after an initial 6 weeks of training at the FBI's Hazardous Devices School, the only school in the country certified to train Bomb Technicians. They then continue their education with monthly in-service classes, periodic multijurisdictional exercises and drills, and continuing professional development at HDS. Our SCUBA divers spend hundreds of hours in initial training to attain skills such as advanced open-water diving, rescue diving, and evidence recovery. Their training continues as they perform practical exercises in hazardous environments such as the Hudson River, Hackensack River, Newark Bay, and New York Bay. Boat operators are fully credentialed by the National Maritime Service as they learn to pilot our 37-foot CBRNE rescue and patrol boat, which is also equipped with radiation detection equipment. This credential mandates that operators maintain hundreds of hours, on the water, per-year to ensure proficiency. Their skills are particularly necessary when operating under harsh conditions, which is likely to occur when responding to those in need of assistance. All of these disciplines practice response to, and recovery from, criminal incidents, terrorism events, and disruptions due to emergencies. However, just as important is the prevention and mitigation of security threats that these officers accomplish by routinely conducting critical infrastructure surveys and safety checks.

Emergency response preparation has experienced tremendous local support during drills conducted at public locations and sensitive areas. These drills, which are frequently covered in the media, give first responders an invaluable opportunity to work with stakeholders and other officials in demonstrating interoperability that is so essential to managing a crisis. Within Jersey City, these drills have recently been carried out at the Holland Tunnel, the JP Morgan Chase building, St. Peter's University and New Jersey City University. An upcoming drill is scheduled to test emergency response to the Newport Mall. In addition, on-going radiological training exercises are conducted at maritime chokepoints in the area of the Verrazano Bridge, George Washington Bridge, and Bayonne Bridge.

It is not only emergency response agencies that need the ability to work cohesively, but it is important for the public to be educated and empowered to unite with first responders to achieve coordination and preparedness. For example, the Police Department's Bomb Squad conducts community outreach to our partners in the public and private sector with lectures and demonstrations in such topics as IED awareness, evacuation procedures, response to bomb threats, and active-shooter safety. Our SCUBA team visits junior police academies to demonstrate water safety, and our K-9 officers provide question & answer sessions at local schools. It is because of special skills afforded by advanced training that we as a profession can continue to raise standards, improve preparedness planning, and build partnerships between local government and the public.

## EQUIPMENT

Not only is training and education perishable, but the tools and equipment to meet emerging threats and mitigate disruptions due to emergencies are perishable as well. Not only does ordering specialized equipment take many steps, it more-often-than-not incurs reoccurring expenses over time. Many of the tools to which I refer, require everything from rudimentary maintenance and repair, to advanced technological upgrades and expansion—this, in addition to running day-to-day operations. Some of the highly special tools needed to perform the task of protecting the public and enhancing emergency preparedness include radiation detectors, counter-IED X-ray systems, suspicious powder test-kits, chemical air monitors, interoperable communications gear, and bomb disposal robots. The specialized equipment that I just mentioned, among many other tools, demonstrate the multiple defenses that are needed to improve our approach to pervasive threats, targets of interest, critical infrastructure.

## REALIZATION

With pride, I can relate a few incidents that occurred within the past year that concluded with a positive outcome. We responded to a report of a suspicious package on the PATH train in Jersey City, during prime commuter hours. Upon assessing the situation, the item, a pressure cooker, was remotely dismantled with minimal disruption to the public. On another occasion, a radiological source was detected by police near the Hoboken waterfront and ruled out as hazardous by the Jersey City Emergency Service Unit with the use of advanced isotope identification equipment. Recently, a piece of sensitive Homeland Security equipment was safely retrieved by Jersey City Police divers in the area of the Port Jersey Marine Terminal. It is through the cooperation of a variety of agencies and the public, that these incidents were quickly resolved without incident.

## SUMMARY

In summation, we need not be reminded that the New York/New Jersey metropolitan area has been labeled as a target-rich environment, perhaps even the most high-risk urban area in the country. It is the constant vigilance of public safety professionals who operate in a challenging environment, all day every day, that allow for a robust response to disruptions and emergency events of all types. On behalf of the quarter-million Jersey City residents, my professional partners, and our government officials, I thank you for affording me the opportunity to testify before you on these important matters.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Lieutenant.

The Chair now recognizes Officer Mollahan for 5 minutes.

**STATEMENT OF MIKE MOLLAHAN, TRUSTEE, PORT  
AUTHORITY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION**

Mr. MOLLAHAN. Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, Representative Watson Coleman, thank you for convening this important hearing and giving me the opportunity to appear before you today.

My name is Mike Mollahan. I am the legislative director and a trustee of the Port Authority PBA.

Our police officers patrol some of the most terrorist-targeted infrastructure and landmarks in the world, including the 6 bridges and tunnels between New Jersey and New York; the world's busiest airport system of JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark; marine terminals and ports, including Port Newark, Elizabeth, and Brooklyn Piers; the largest and busiest bus terminal in the Nation, the Port Authority bus terminal in Manhattan; the sacred ground of the World Trade Center; and most relevant to this hearing, the PATH trains.

The PATH heavy rail, rapid transit system serves as the primary transit link between Manhattan and neighboring New Jersey urban communities and suburban commuter railroads. PATH car-

ries approximately 244,000 passengers each week day and is growing.

In 2015, PATH carried approximately 76.6 million passengers. I have worked the PATH system for the last 12 years, and during this time, passenger loads have increased, trains have become more crowded, and threat incidents have risen.

For today's hearing, I would like to highlight two areas that are important to fortifying the security of PATH trains, training and resources for police officers and coordination with other agencies. Over the past 3 years, biannual training, which involves active-shooter and tactical weapons training, pistol requalification, legal updates, and a host of other important refresher training has gone down from 5 days of training to 2, which directly impacts officers' readiness.

In particular, active-shooter and tactical weapons training previously entailed a full day of training but has been cut to only a few hours. Tactical training involves using specialized weapons and equipment to breach doors in our "tac house" structures that are built to simulate rooms within buildings or train cars and mimic active-shooter and mass shooting situations.

This type of training is more important now than ever in the aftermath of assault weapons attacks in Newtown, Connecticut; Aurora, Colorado; as well as the recent shootings in Orlando, Florida, and San Bernardino, California, which have now become all too frequent. To this end, heavy weapons and heavy weapons-trained officers need to be increased throughout the Port Authority facilities, along with the number of vehicles that can properly secure these weapons.

Furthermore, the support services provided to our patrol units, including the Emergency Service Unit and canine unit, have been diminished. The ESU provides SWAP, sniper, and specialized response capabilities to issues that arise at all Port Authority facilities. ESU staffing levels have been cut for budget savings, and current ESU officers need better refresher training. The Port Authority canine unit, which covers PATH, the bus terminal, and the World Trade Center has also suffered.

Last, while the camera systems at PATH have been updated, they lack enhancement capability, which can make identifying and apprehending suspects difficult. The cameras at Port Authority bridges, tunnels, and bus terminals are also outdated when compared to readily available and common technology on the market.

With today's technological advancements, the Port Authority police should have been able to have a photo of a suspect within minutes to be able to broadcast to all PAPD, NYPD, and MTAPD in proximity to the bus terminal. It is worth noting that the Port Authority has installed State-of-the-art cameras on the JFK Air Train and should deploy this camera technology to the rest of its facilities.

We are still unsure if these incidents were pranks or tests of vulnerability by terrorists. Either way, it is unacceptable.

The Port Authority Police attend New Jersey Transit Police training tools and tactics training, which is a step in the right direction. However, the Port Authority needs to expand this training

to more officers or similar training with other departments to ensure a seamless, multi-agency response.

Further, when we train in multi-agency drills, the Port Authority staffs these drills at significantly higher levels than we staff on a daily basis, making the drills less realistic. Thus, multi-agency drills should be conducted with the regular number of officers assigned during the shift for the time of the drill.

With regards to interagency communication, the PBA, along with Jersey City Office of Emergency Management, has made numerous requests to the Port Authority to install a Mutualink radio system, which allows multi-agency communications during emergencies. While the system has been installed at the PATH police desk, our officers are not trained how to use this capability.

Training on this system should be made available to officers immediately so that in the event of a multi-agency response, our officers are able to relay information to mutual aid forces in order for a seamless and unified response. The Mutualink is a good communication system that needs to be placed at all Port Authority facilities, and we need to be trained in how to use it.

Those seeking to disrupt travel and inflict harm are constantly working to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in our system. So we must remain vigilant and aggressive in our posture. Our officers also patrol the World Trade Center, where we witnessed the worst terrorist attack in American history, and I know that men and women who patrol and secure this area never want to let another tragedy like this happen on our watch.

In this regard, the most important actions that can be taken to help secure PATH are to increase officer training and resources and to continue to enhance interagency coordination among the various first responder entities within our region.

I would request that Members of this committee join me on a visit to the PATH facilities and other important Port Authority infrastructure to inspect these issues first-hand and see what needs to be done immediately to address these concerns and properly protect the public.

Thank you again for inviting me to appear before your subcommittee, and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mollahan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MIKE MOLLAHAN

JUNE 21, 2016

Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for convening this important hearing and giving me the opportunity to appear before you today.

My name is Mike Mollahan and I am legislative director and a trustee of the Port Authority Police Benevolent Association (PBA). Our police officers patrol some of the most terrorist-targeted infrastructure and landmarks in the world, including the 6 bridges and tunnels between New Jersey and New York; the world's busiest airport system of JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark airports; marine terminals and ports including Port Newark/Elizabeth and Brooklyn Piers; the largest and busiest bus terminal in the Nation, the Port Authority Bus Terminal in Manhattan; the sacred ground of the World Trade Center; and most relevant to this hearing, the PATH trains.

The PATH heavy rail rapid transit system serves as the primary transit link between Manhattan and neighboring New Jersey urban communities and suburban

commuter railroads. PATH carries approximately 244,000 passengers each weekday and is growing; In 2015, PATH carried approximately 76.6 million passengers. I have worked the PATH system for the last 12 years and during this time, passenger loads have increased, trains have become more crowded and threat incidents have risen.

For today's hearing, I would like to highlight two areas that are important to fortifying the security of PATH trains: Training and resources for police officers and coordination with other agencies.

#### TRAINING AND RESOURCES

Over the past 3 years, biannual training, which involves active-shooter and tactical weapons training, pistol re-qualification, legal updates, and a host of other important refresher training, has gone down from 5 days of training to 2 days of training which directly impacts officer readiness.

In particular, active-shooter and tactical weapons training previously entailed a full day of training but has been cut to only a few hours. Tactical training involves using specialized weapons and equipment to breach doors and "tac house" structures that are built to simulate rooms within buildings or train cars and mimic active-shooter and mass-shooting situations. This type of training is more important than ever in the aftermath of assault weapons attacks in Newtown, CT and Aurora, CO, as well as the recent shootings in Orlando, FL, and San Bernadino, CA, which have now become all too frequent.

To this end, "heavy weapons" and "heavy weapons trained" officers need to be increased throughout the Port Authority facilities, along with the number of vehicles that can properly secure these weapons.

Furthermore, the support services provided to our patrol units, including the Emergency Service Unit (ESU) and K-9 Unit, have been diminished. The ESU provides SWAT, sniper, and specialized response capabilities to issues that arise at all Port Authority facilities. ESU staffing levels have been cut for budget savings and current ESU officers need better refresher training. The Port Authority K-9 unit, which covers PATH, the Bus Terminal and the World Trade Center, has also suffered.

Lastly, while the camera systems at PATH have been updated, they lack enhancement capability, which can make identifying and apprehending suspects difficult. The cameras at the Port Authority bridges, tunnels, and Bus Terminal are also outdated when compared to readily-available and common technology on the market. With today's technological advancements, the Port Authority Police should have been able to have a photo of the suspect within minutes to be able to broadcast it to all PAPD, NYPD, and MTA PD in proximity to the bus terminal. It is worth nothing that the Port Authority has installed state-of-the-art cameras on the JFK Air Train and should deploy this camera technology to the rest of its facilities. We are still unsure if these incidents were pranks or tests of vulnerability by terrorists. Either way this is unacceptable.

#### INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

The Port Authority Police attend New Jersey Transit Police Transit Tools and Tactics Training which is a step in the right direction. However, the Port Authority needs to expand this training to more officers, or similar training with other departments, to ensure a seamless multiagency response to incidents. Further, when we train in multiagency drills, the Port Authority staffs the drills at significantly higher levels than we staff on a daily basis, making the drills less realistic. Thus, multiagency drills should be conducted with the regular number of officers assigned during the shift time for the drill.

With regards to interagency communication, the PBA, along with the Jersey City Office of Emergency Management, has made numerous requests to the Port Authority to install a Mutualink Radio System which allows multiagency communications during emergencies. While the system has been installed at the PATH Police Desk, our officers are not trained on how to use this capability. Training on this system should be made available to officers immediately so that in the event of a multiagency response, our officers are able to relay information to mutual aid forces in order for a seamless and unified response. Mutualink is a good communication system that needs to be placed at all Port Authority facilities and we need to be trained in how to use it.

Those seeking to disrupt travel and inflict harm are constantly working to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in our system, so we must remain vigilant and aggressive in our posture. Our officers also patrol the World Trade Center where we witnessed the worst terrorist attack in American history, and I know that the men and women



who patrol and secure this area never want to let another tragedy like this happen on our watch. In this regard, the most important actions that can be taken to help secure PATH are to increase officer training and resources and to continue and enhance interagency coordination among the various first responder entities within our region.

I would request that Members of this committee join me on a visit to the PATH facilities, and other important Port Authority infrastructure, to inspect these issues first-hand and see what needs to be done immediately to address these concerns and properly protect the public.

Thank you again for inviting me to appear before your subcommittee and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you for your testimony, Officer.

Not that we need a reminder of the dangerous times we are living in, but as we were all sitting here, two men and a woman carrying multiple loaded weapons have just been arrested at the New Jersey entrance to the Holland Tunnel.

So the men and women who work for you are out there protecting us as we are sitting here right now. We don't have any further detail on it, but thank you for that.

I would like to, before I ask my questions—and I wanted to note that our colleague Congresswoman Watson Coleman had another engagement, but she didn't want to leave before your testimony was over. It was that important to her.

Before I ask my questions, I just want to comment, first of all, our committee is known as the Committee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, and so many times, the communication part of that gets lost. Many of you spoke about how important the communication is.

Captain, you did. Mr. Sposa, you did about how important in your efforts in communicating now compared to where they were back in 1993, 1998 are so much more better. So I was certainly glad to hear that.

Also I was very glad to hear that many of your successes you share with other agencies. So we are learning from best practices of our colleagues. So that was refreshing, too.

I had two quick questions, and then I am going to yield to my friend from New Jersey. One is what can Congress do to help you and the members of your various services to do your job better? The second thing I want to know is, are you getting sufficient information and readily getting the information about threats to our rail system?

So let me open that up to the panel. No. 1, what can we do to help you, and No. 2, are you getting the information that you need to do your job?

Mr. KIERCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Two things. I think, you know, the UASI grant program, I know how hard you have fought to keep the dollars coming at the current funding levels. I think one thing that would benefit us all is a little more flexibility as far as the use of those dollars for backfill when it comes to training.

As Captain Gorman had alluded to, many of the specialized training events out there necessitate replacing of on-line fire-fighters and on-line police officers to attend these events. Unfortunately, on the budget restrictions today, that has greatly been diminished.

I think many times we have seen that there have been a significant amount of UASI dollars remaining at the end of the funding cycle, which many times folks like yourself question, well, if the money isn't being spent, why do we, you know, keep throwing money into the system?

I think if there was more flexibility as far as allowing agencies to utilize some of that funds specific for backfill, that would greatly enhance the training capabilities of all the first responders in the area.

As far as the information sharing, I have to say there has been great improvements. In Jersey City's case, we have representatives assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force. I coordinate any terrorist events impacting Jersey City, and I have to say over the last couple of years, the flow from the Federal level down to the local level has greatly increased.

Mr. SPOSA. Chairman, I would echo a lot of the comments of Director Kierce. The flexibility assigned to the grant dollars that come down would certainly assist in procuring the needed things and getting the backfill that is just so important. When it comes to—

Mr. DONOVAN. May I ask, is like the directive that comes down with the grant money is so stringent that you are only permitted to use it for certain purposes, and if that was expanded and made more flexible, we would get better use out of our dollars?

Mr. SPOSA. I think we would, Chairman. Not only if it was more flexible, but to allow for the backfill as well, it would help. One of the other things that—

Mr. DONOVAN. That is not permitted now?

Mr. SPOSA. Correct.

Mr. DONOVAN. OK.

Mr. SPOSA. One of the other things that would assist us greatly would be breaking down a few of the silos. You know, the partners here in Jersey City, we don't have silos. We are all a forward-thinking agency, even though we are multiple agencies.

But certainly amongst even the different grant streams within UASI, I think there are still silos that exist, whether it is fire-fighters talking to hospitals or hospitals talking to public health and different things. So I think a few of those silos, breaking them down would be a great help in the region.

As far as communication with our transit partners, I will speak for myself and my agency. We work closely with our partners at Port Authority, closely with our partners at New Jersey Transit, certainly through the Jersey City Office of Management, we have representation with the Joint Terrorism Task Force as well with our Federal partners.

So getting the information that we need is not—is not a problem right now. Getting it down to the troops could probably be done in a more efficient fashion.

Mr. DONOVAN. That is not a problem of classification because we have heard from other witnesses at other hearings that if you don't have somebody who has clearances, it is hard to pass that down. We have to scrub down that information so that people with proper clearances can receive that information. That is not what you are talking about?

Mr. SPOSA. I think that does play into a little bit. Speaking for myself, I have clearances. So I can get information that I don't necessarily know what I can release, where I sort of err on the side of caution of not releasing Classified information versus getting the information to the masses. So I will "dumb it down" or smooth it out and get out a general awareness about a problem rather than say the problem is here.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you.

Mr. GORMAN. Sir, the only thing I would—two things I would like to add to my colleagues would be the current grant system does not allow for a brick-and-mortar kind of allocation. So using grant money, we cannot build a new facility, and we believe that that should be reconsidered.

To have a state-of-the-art—Lieutenant Glenn, my department, the EMS department, Jersey City Fire Department has a double-wide trailer for our training facility. I don't want to say it is an embarrassment because good work comes out of that, but we can do better. We go to any place in the State of New Jersey and around the country, and they have state-of-the-art amphitheatres, extrication equipment, trench rescue equipment.

In Task Force One on Lakehurst, we have what is called the "rubble pile" that was built, and that is an incredible facility, if you have ever been there. But in Jersey City or in something that we can share with Essex County, we should look to allocate that money to a brick-and-mortar facility.

Mr. DONOVAN. Good recommendation. Thank you. Lieutenant, yes?

Mr. GLENN. Sir, we have had a lot of success being able to assign personnel out to the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, Emergency Management. To be able to speak to them on a peer-to-peer basis enhances information sharing, and that has only come about within the past few years, I am happy to say.

So, but there is a limitation to that, that, of course, when you lose personnel to another area, you have to backfill those people, which takes time and money.

Mr. DONOVAN. Officer.

Mr. MOLLAHAN. I think speaking about grants is a little outside my scope, but the one thing I have noticed is that everything always comes down to budget when it comes to training. Even if the money is there to budget for the training, like my colleagues have said, backfilling those people is the reservations that the agency always seems to have.

Mr. DONOVAN. I mean, you were saying before like if the training could be free, but it is costing you manpower, it is costing you resources—

Mr. MOLLAHAN. Because you pulled them for the training.

Mr. DONOVAN. Right. To pull them for the training. Grant money, as far as any of you know, is not permitted to use for that?

Mr. KIERCE. It is specific to a program, Mr. Chairman. For instance, if it is an initiative that is coming out through the Department of Homeland Security, sometimes they will permit it. But the day-to-day training that is required, as Lieutenant Glenn and Rick and Captain Gorman had alluded to, it is not available.

For instance, we have one officer in particular was—paid for his own way to go to bomb school, and you know, we since were able to compensate that and get it done. But I think you can have all the equipment in the world, but unless you have qualified people to operate that equipment and sustain that equipment, it is for naught.

Mr. DONOVAN. I yield whatever time I don't have remaining to my colleague, Representative Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. I thank the Chairman.

I will ask each of you this question. You know, as I stated, mentioned in my opening statement, the attacks in Brussels earlier this year really had an impact on me and reminded me, reminded all of us—me and all of us the vulnerabilities inherent in our surface systems.

Can you talk about how you had to adjust your operations and the communication in the days following those attacks?

Mr. KIERCE. Well, Congressman, in Jersey City, and this would come out of Lieutenant Glenn's house, we would do an uptick of high uniform presence, particularly members of the Emergency Services Unit. There again, it goes back. We still have a huge city to police. Our day-time population is over 500,000 people.

So there, again, you know, when you have these type of events, you really haven't got time to look at the budget and deal with it, you know, the effects of the additional manpower. You just have to do it.

I think the public, the perception of the public requires it. They have to have a feeling of safety and security, and it is incumbent upon us to be able to deliver that service.

Mr. SPOSA. Congressman, I would speak actually prior to the Brussels attacks. The attacks in Boston, the bombings in Boston is where we really saw an uptick and a change in our response modalities on a day-to-day basis. Since then, I have deployed nerve agent antidote kits on the bodies of our EMTs and paramedics here in Jersey City 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

Since the more recent attacks, we have deployed body armor to our emergency medical personnel and issue it to them on a daily basis. We are in the process right now of deploying bleeding control kits to face those type attacks and tourniquets and things like that to stop the bleeding to save lives in a mass attack or mass shooting or mass bombing event or transit event.

Our roles are changing. The EMS role in particular is changing where we were on the sidelines for a while in these events, and that is just not the case anymore. The public's perception and, quite frankly, what is needed is for us to be on the front lines and in that second wave of responders inside of a potentially dangerous situation.

So we went from being on the sidelines to being in the front lines, and the equipment needed to do so is much different. A stethoscope won't protect you inside an active-shooter event, but a bulletproof vest will. So we are changing every day. In fact, we are in the process right now of working with our partners to go to the next level and become part of that wave.

Mr. PAYNE. Captain Gorman.

Mr. GORMAN. I think you wanted to see the communication. Our situational awareness comes from many, many things. Director Kierce and I, we share an office, and we monitor all the radios. We have become what you would call a news junkie, and we listen to everything.

Even an inflection in a voice. Now I know Lieutenant Glenn very well. We grew up together. If I hear stress in his voice on the radio, I know something is not right, and we respond to that.

That is the interpersonal relationships that we have, and then we have phone calls. New Jersey Transit OEM, they call me all the time with Hudson light rail problems, and we start to say what do you have on your camera? What if we look at our camera system?

In fact, New Jersey Transit is in our office as often as they are in their own, getting video surveillance for crime follow-ups. So that is what we get. But the cell phones. The cell phones and the media, that is where we get a lot of our information.

But I have that in the office. The guys responding don't have the luxury of having information. They have to go in harm's way. As Rick said, they are no longer watching. They no longer have the ability to wait for police and ESU to secure a scene before we have to go in.

By virtue of our job, we have to go in and investigate. We have run active-shooter drills in Jersey City, and a lot of the scenarios have brought down first responding EMS and fire crews. Once you lose that command-and-control at a local level on a single unit, it complicates your problem.

I would think that trying to get something as a computer-aided dispatch out to the guys to get updated information, to get response, better response information prior to arrival, I think that would help with our interoperability and our communications.

Moving forward, how do we respond to this? Even tomorrow, we are going up to Morris County to deal with a Fire subcommittee on how to deal with active shooters. Now that also is going to take a lot of the groundwork that we have learned in looking for secondary devices when we respond to surface incidents. So a lot of the different trainings that we have over the last 20 years is really starting to coalesce.

Then it goes back to the training. We have to release the people to get the training, but we can't afford to do it. So there are some changes that need to be made.

Mr. PAYNE. To your point, I know that you are familiar with my work around interoperability.

Mr. GORMAN. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. PAYNE. The whole question of that communication, and we continue to try to strive to give you the resources and the equipment you need in order to do this quickly and safely for the community and yourselves as well. I have even been approached in terms of trying to help Hudson County get a frequency that all of you can use to that end, and I am still working on it.

So, but most of my work has been around interoperability question and understand what it means to you in these times of response. So, Lieutenant Glenn.

Mr. GLENN. Sir, I would just like to add that we have been very proactive on the police side of the service in deploying those inter-

operable radios, using the frequencies given to us in the spectrum, and we are very privileged to have that opportunity.

Mr. MOLLAHAN. As far as the Port Authority, specifically PATH, anytime there is an attack or after the attack, response is usually pretty strong. We deploy a lot of our SOD units, you know, ESU, canine, commercial vehicle inspection unit. The issue is in between attacks, we tend to get very lackadaisical.

So you have mentioned, you know, how we react after an attack such as Brussels. Our response after the attack is usually pretty good. It is in between attacks where we are most vulnerable.

Mr. PAYNE. You know, since we are on the—it seems like it has come up a couple of times and, naturally, because of the, you know, the incident that we had last weekend in Orlando, you know, guns can be used to breach security at soft targets to inflict great harm to innocent Americans. So it is critical that we are able to thwart naturally those kind of events and respond to them.

I am not sure, but your agencies have been dealing with scenarios involving active shooters. I believe you have mentioned you are doing one tomorrow.

Mr. GORMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. PAYNE. So how much has that grown over the last year or 2 in light of what we have seen in South Carolina and San Bernardino and the myriad of issues that we—

Mr. KIERCE. Well, Congressman, I sit on the UASI executive board for Newark and Jersey City, which also oversees the seven contiguous counties, which in our case represent approximately 4.3 million people, almost, if not more than half of the population of the State of New Jersey. It is a severe target-rich environment.

For fiscal year 2015, we dedicated specific funding to training and equipping our various first responders in active-shooter operations. In Jersey City, we have undertaken a significant—conducted a significant amount of training both in the public and private sector.

As Lieutenant Glenn alluded to, we recently conducted an active-shooter drill here on campus, and to say the least, it is an eye-opening experience. I think the days—in my experience, 30 years as a Jersey City police officer, the days of responding to a call like that and waiting for the specialized units to arrive is long gone. You know, the mindset is now is to engage the actor and neutralize him and then, you know, work on getting the injured and sick and, unfortunately, killed out of there.

I hope that more money will be coming through the system. We had recently just purchased all of the IFAK kits for our police officers. We will be training them, and they will be issued and carried. We are working with Rick to buy them the bulletproof vests that they need.

Then after that, we are moving toward our fire service. What we are looking to do here is to engage all of our first responders in an active-shooter situation. The years of them and us is no longer here. It is one operation to combat these types of events.

Mr. SPOSA. Congressman, I would echo Director Kierce's statements in that it is a partnership unlike any I have ever seen, and it is a necessary partnership. The recent events just underline that need.

These events aren't going away, and we need to be prepared for them, and the way to save lives is to work together to have the right equipment in the right hands at the right time. We are doing that in this region.

Mr. GORMAN. Yes, I would concur with my colleagues. It is an eye-opening experience. When I was hired, I didn't suspect I would be fitted for a bulletproof vest to put fires out, but this world has changed, and so do we. Our tactics have to change as well.

We will work on this committee tomorrow, and we will come up with a solution to keep our members safe in the fire service, our brothers and sisters in other agencies, and our citizens. So we will—we have a lot of work to do tomorrow.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Vinny.

Mr. GLENN. Sir, I could say first-hand that not only has the frequency of our active-shooter drills increased maybe even three-fold from just 10 years ago, but perhaps even more importantly, there has been a large increase in the participants and the partners that we work with at these drills.

Mr. MOLLAHAN. Our drills shifted a little bit. We used to do a lot of active-shooter within the department. That has decreased. We now do more interagency drills. So to say if our drilling has gone up or gone down, it has probably stayed about the same. It has just kind-of shifted in how we do it.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Well, I appreciate all the witnesses' testimony and answers today. We really appreciate it.

Mr. DONOVAN. Absolutely. I would like to also thank our witnesses not only for their testimony, but for your service to our communities particularly because the purpose of this committee are commuters, and I would also like to thank our members of the panel for their questions.

The Members of the subcommittee may have additional questions for each of you, and we ask that you respond to those in writing. The hearing record will remain open for 10 days.

This subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

