[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
REBUILDING AFGHANISTAN:
OVERSIGHT OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 16, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-108
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
http://www.house.gov/reform
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
JIM JORDAN, Ohio ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
TIM WALBERG, Michigan Columbia
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania
CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TED LIEU, California
MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey
KEN BUCK, Colorado STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands
MARK WALKER, North Carolina MARK DeSAULNIER, California
ROD BLUM, Iowa BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
JODY B. HICE, Georgia PETER WELCH, Vermont
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin
WILL HURD, Texas
GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
Jennifer Hemingway, Staff Director
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
Art Arthur, Subcommittee on National Security Staff Director
Sang Yi, Counsel
Willie Marx, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 16, 2016................................... 1
WITNESSES
Mr. John Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction
Oral Statement............................................... 2
Written Statement............................................ 4
Ms. Christine S. Abizaid, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, U.S. Department of
Defense, Accompanied by Howard Strickley, Program Director,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Division, U.S.
Department of Defense, and Randy Brown, Director, Air Force
Civil Engineering Center, U.S. Department of Defense
Oral Statement............................................... 43
Written Statement............................................ 46
APPENDIX
Statement of Chairman Jason Chaffetz............................. 98
Opening Statement of ranking Member Elijah E. Cummings........... 103
Written Statement submitted by Rep. Gerald E. Connolly........... 111
March 2016 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction 16-22 Inspection Report titled, ``Department of
Defense Reconstruction Projects: Summary of SIGAR Inspection
Reports Issued from July 2009 through September 2015,''
Submitted by Chairman Chaffetz................................. 114
REBUILDING AFGHANISTAN:
OVERSIGHT OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
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Wednesday, March 16, 2016
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:01 a.m., in Room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Duncan, Jordan,
Walberg, Amash, Gosar, Massie, DeSantis, Buck, Walker, Hice,
Hurd, Palmer, Cummings, Maloney, Lynch, Cooper, Connolly,
Kelly, Watson Coleman, Plaskett, Welch, and Lujan Grisham.
Chairman Chaffetz. The Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform will come to order.
And without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess at any time.
We have an important hearing today, always good to be
talking about this topic. We have had a number of hearings on
this. We do appreciate all the panel members that are going to
be here. I do have an opening statement, but in the essence of
time, I am going to simply submit that for the record.
Chairman Chaffetz. And I am sure Mr. Cummings has an
opening statement that we will submit to the record as well.
Chairman Chaffetz. The United States of America has put a
lot of time, effort, money, and blood into making the world a
better place, and there is a lot of good work that has gone on,
but there is also something different we do in the United
States, and that is we are self-critical. We go back, we look,
and we determine what has gone right and what is not going so
right. And so today, we are going to have such a discussion,
and it will be a good, vibrant discussion.
So I would like to actually recognize the panel and then we
will swear you in and we will get right off to the statements.
Mr. John Sopko is the Special Inspector General for Afghan
Reconstruction. Ms. Christine Abizaid is the deputy assistant
secretary of defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central
Asia, the United States Department of Defense. It is my
understanding that you will give the one opening statement on
behalf of the Department of Defense and that the rest of the
panel will all participate in answering of the questions.
We also welcome Mr. Howard Strickley, programs director for
the United States Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic
Division at the United States Department of Defense; and Mr.
Randy Brown, director of the Air Force Civil Engineering Center
at the United States Department of Defense.
We welcome you all. We thank you for being here.
Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses are to be sworn
before they testify. If you will please rise and raise your
right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. You may be seated. And let
the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the
affirmative.
I think you all have experience here. In order to allow
time for discussion, we would appreciate your limiting
testimony to no more than 20 minutes, or 5, whatever suits you
best. I am just trying to make sure that we are--based on some
of our hearings, that would be record time. But we will give
you great latitude here. We would love to hear proactively your
perspective.
Mr. Sopko, you are now recognized.
WITNESS STATEMENTS
STATEMENT OF JOHN SOPKO
Mr. Sopko. Thank you very much. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking
Member Cummings, and members of the committee, it is a
pleasure, as always, to testify before this committee and to
testify about SIGAR's inspections of facilities and
infrastructure built and renovated by the Department of Defense
in Afghanistan. SIGAR has issued 37 inspection reports
examining 45 DOD reconstruction projects in Afghanistan with a
combined value of approximately $1.1 billion.
Although these projects do not constitute a representative
statistical sample of all DOD projects, they do provide us a
valuable insight into the challenges facing reconstruction
efforts in Afghanistan. And I would like to focus on five key
takeaways from our work.
First, my inspection team found that some of the projects
were well-built and met contract requirements and technical
specifications. However, most did not.
Secondly, we at SIGAR understand that reconstruction is
difficult in Afghanistan. We also recognize that DOD and its
components have taken steps to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of reconstruction projects. For example, DOD has
generally been responsive to the recommendations in our
inspection reports and has implemented 79 of the 100
recommendations we've made.
Thirdly, despite these efforts, many of the projects we
inspected had significant deficiencies caused in part by common
and recurring problems such as unqualified contractors, poor
workmanship, and inadequate oversight by DOD officials.
Fourthly, despite these problems, many contractors were
still paid the full contract amount and not held accountable
for their shoddy workmanship.
Fifth, we continue to be concerned--and I think this is an
important point--we continue to be concerned about the Afghan
Government's ability to sustain the numerous facilities DOD has
built or transferred for it. Although we're not focusing on
other agencies, we're also concerned about the buildings that
USAID has built for the Afghan Government and transferred to
it, as well as the State Department.
Looking at just the base transfers alone, DOD has donated
391 former U.S. military bases worth approximately $858 million
to the Afghan Government since 2010. They all have to be
maintained. The Afghan Government has proven itself unable to
operate and maintain its facilities on a wide scale. For Afghan
security forces facilities in particular, DOD is still spending
millions of dollars each year in operation and maintenance
services at many of them because the Afghans cannot do so
themselves.
In light of these concerns, I was troubled to learn during
my most recent trip to Afghanistan that our ongoing inspection
of the new Ministry of Interior headquarters complex in Kabul
uncovered extensive renovations being made to the headquarters
building after it was supposed to have been completed,
including installing dropped ceilings, tearing out recently
poured concrete floors, tearing out electrical fixtures, and
then replacing some of those floors with marble flooring in
certain VIP and VVIP offices.
It appears DOD has contracted for these and other
``enhancements'' which are, according to the Statement of Work,
``to improve the aesthetics of the internal finishes.'' These
enhancements are not only more costly and require more
expertise to maintain but also replace features the Army Corps
of Engineers originally constructed in accordance with DOD's
own contingency construction standards issued in 2009.
Examples like this, combined with the Afghan Government's
existing inability to operate and maintain its facilities,
means the U.S. taxpayer will continue to expend funds
indefinitely to sustain some of the facilities DOD has built.
And in conclusion, to enhance the administration and
oversight of its reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, DOD
should continue to improve its project planning and design
process, guarantee contractors are qualified and capable, and
conduct the oversight needed to ensure that facilities are
built correctly and contracts are held accountable.
DOD should also continue to work with the Afghan Government
to enhance its ability to operate, maintain, and sustain its
facilities.
SIGAR will continue to work with DOD and Congress as it
continues to oversee the critical work the United States and
its coalition partners are undertaking, and we thank you for
the opportunity to testify today about those efforts.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Sopko follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Sopko. And I appreciate
the diligent work that you and your team do in a very, very
difficult place.
And, Ms. Abizaid, I can't thank enough the men and women
who actually serve in the military, again, very difficult
conditions at best. We know how difficult it is. But we would
appreciate the Department of Defense's perspective, and so we
will now recognize you for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE S. ABIZAID
Ms. Abizaid. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. Can you move that mic--just bring it
right on down there.
Ms. Abizaid. How's that?
Chairman Chaffetz. Yes, much better.
Ms. Abizaid. Is that ----
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
Ms. Abizaid. Thank you, sir. Chairman Chaffetz, members of
the committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss the
Department of Defense infrastructure projects in Afghanistan
and for your attention to our mission there.
I'm honored to have the opportunity to update you,
alongside my colleagues who are present here today. All of us
take seriously our responsibility to be good stewards of
taxpayer dollars.
You have my longer statement for the record, so I will
focus my remarks on a couple of key points this morning.
Over the previous 14 plus years, U.S. forces have worked
with our international partners to improve security and
stability in Afghanistan. We are forever grateful to and honor
the 2,236 U.S. service members who have lost their lives while
serving in Afghanistan, the over 20,000 military personnel who
have been wounded, and the thousands of families who have
sacrificed for this important mission, a mission that is
fundamentally about preventing Afghanistan from once again
becoming a safe haven from which terrorists can plan attacks
against the United States homeland, U.S. interests abroad, or
our international partners.
Currently, DOD is conducting two complementary missions in
Afghanistan: a counterterrorism mission against the remnants of
al Qaeda and other extremist groups that threaten the United
States; and a NATO-led train, advise, and assist mission with
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, known as Resolute
Support.
The era characterized by large investments in
infrastructure projects, which coincided primarily with the
U.S. troop surge, largely concluded more than a year ago. At
the height of our combat mission, annual appropriations for the
Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the Commanders Emergency
Response Program (CERP), and the Afghanistan Infrastructure
Fund (AIF) reached about $12 billion. This fiscal year those
appropriations are down. Congress appropriated $5 million for
CERP and $3.7 billion for ASFF. One percent of this funding is
currently allocated for infrastructure, and we have not
requested any further funds for AIF since 2014.
Now, over the last 10 years DOD completed over $9 billion
in infrastructure projects for the Ministries of Defense and
Interior and their forces, including more than 1,000 projects
supporting basing requirements for the ANA, the Afghan National
Army, and the Afghan National Police. Development of this
basing footprint has been crucial to enabling the Afghan forces
to assume full responsibility for the security of Afghanistan
so that the United States and the coalition can end its combat
mission.
On a smaller scale, DOD also executed projects through AIF
primarily to address the lack of electricity that is impeding
Afghanistan's economic growth, and CERP, which local commanders
use to address urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs
such as repairing village wells or building security walls
around schools.
And for each source of funds, the Department developed
guidance on how projects were to be approved and managed.
Generally, smaller-scale projects were approved in theater. In
accordance with congressional requirements, many of the larger
projects were approved at the highest levels of the Department
and notified to the appropriate congressional oversight
committees. Once approved, projects were managed by executing
agencies in theater with oversight provided by various offices,
working groups, and councils within the Department of Defense.
Now, this is not to say that all projects were problem-
free. Afghanistan is a war-torn country with an active
insurgency, a history of corruption, poor transportation
infrastructure, and little production and manufacturing
capacity. Infrastructure development in this environment is
challenging, and we have learned many lessons over the last 14
plus years.
Now, as my colleagues can describe, we work closely with
contractors to manage problems and control costs. We're also
successfully using trained Afghan quality assurance personnel
to conduct onsite inspections and tests at locations that U.S.
personnel cannot regularly visit. I understand SIGAR does the
same with its inspections in the current environment.
Now, in some cases, projects have failed. For example,
SIGAR recently published a report about an Afghan police
training facility constructed in 2012 that cost nearly
$500,000. The walls dissolved in the rain. That is simply
unacceptable.
We appreciate the efforts of the inspectors general to
shine a light on these problems so we can take corrective
action. We have worked closely with auditors on more than 500
audit reports and oversight projects since 2008 and have taken
action to improve the execution of our reconstruction efforts.
In a recent compilation of SIGAR's past reports on
infrastructure, SIGAR noted that DOD addressed 90 percent of
its recommendations.
Now, no one in DOD is satisfied with a failed project. It
hurts the mission, it undermines the confidence in the
Department, and it wastes taxpayer funds. Fortunately, failure
is rare. Due to DOD personnel in theater who continue to work
tirelessly and often at great personal risk, the vast majority
of infrastructure projects were completed successfully and used
as intended to the benefit of the Afghan people and to long-
term U.S. interests. Notwithstanding some mistakes, overall,
I'd characterize it DOD's infrastructure programs, particularly
those that have focused on Afghanistan's core security needs,
as highly successful and critical to the Afghan Government's
ability to provide security across Afghanistan.
I do want to stress that we are committed to ensuring U.S.
taxpayer funds are used efficiently and invested wisely. The
American people have made a generous and important contribution
to the ANDSF and the future of Afghanistan, and the support has
been key in enabling the United States to step out of a large-
scale combat role as Afghans increasingly defend their country.
In closing, I want to again thank the committee for this
opportunity to discuss our efforts to develop necessary
infrastructure in support of our mission and to ensure that we
are doing so responsibly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[Prepared statement of Ms. Abizaid follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. I will now recognize the
gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To try to comprehend the scope of the spending that's gone
on in the U.S. money, I think the inspector general had said--
was it $110 billion from 2002 to 2013? Is that defense money or
is that all of the aid that has gone into Afghanistan?
Mr. Sopko. That's all reconstruction money.
Mr. Mica. So ----
Mr. Sopko. DOD has the bulk of that.
Mr. Mica. Okay.
Ms. Abizaid. The DOD money is about $60 billion over that
time period.
Mr. Mica. So about half. I was told that the budget for the
entire Afghan Government is about $5 billion a year. Is that
right?
Ms. Abizaid. I think that's generally accurate, sir.
Mr. Mica. Yes. And then I'm also told that there's other
money coming in. Is it NATO money or European money, aid money?
Ms. Abizaid. So, sir, the ----
Mr. Mica. On top of that?
Ms. Abizaid. The budget for the Afghan National Security
Force's ----
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Ms. Abizaid.--total is about $5 billion. There is
international funds to the tune of about $1 billion that is
coming in. The Afghan Government pays about $500 million and
the United States ----
Mr. Mica. So ----
Ms. Abizaid.--pays the rest.
Mr. Mica.--we are talking billions on top of billions,
right? Was it you, sir, that told me--I am trying to remember
who it was--that the Afghans did not have the ability to absorb
or steal any more money?
Mr. Sopko. Congressman, I don't know if I said they didn't
have the capacity to steal ----
Mr. Mica. Because I--well ----
Mr. Sopko.--but I think they had the--it's the capacity to
use ----
Mr. Mica. I was told by a representative--I am pretty sure
it was out of your office and I think we have it on the record
because I went back and said did you say absorb or steal?
Because I know when I went there I had been informed of, all
the way up to the presidency, what money was being stolen. But
is that still the case? They don't have the ability to absorb
or misappropriate any more money?
Mr. Sopko. Congressman, absorption is a problem. We spent a
lot of money there, gave them a lot of money, and they're not
able to spend it either.
Mr. Mica. And then--okay.
Mr. Sopko. Yes.
Mr. Mica. Another thing, too, is I am told that the Taliban
now are starting to control more areas, and I read where your
area of being able to conduct oversight has shrunken, is that
correct?
Mr. Sopko. That is correct.
Mr. Mica. So even where we have projects ongoing or we have
had projects, you don't have the ability to go in and see what
is going on, is that correct?
Mr. Sopko. That's correct. And it's not just us, it's
everybody in Afghanistan working for the U.S. Government.
Mr. Mica. When I was there, I was taken to Helmand
Province. I went to half a dozen provinces or whatever around
the country, and I remember the troops telling me look at the
school, Mr. Mica. The school they paid 5, 10 times. It is the
joke of the community of how the United States got ripped off,
and that is what you have seen in some of these projects, sir?
Mr. Sopko. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Mica. Okay. You report to both the Secretary of Defense
and also the Secretary of State on what you have seen, the
abuses, et cetera? Is that correct?
Mr. Sopko. That's correct ----
Mr. Mica. Okay.
Mr. Sopko.--and Congress.
Mr. Mica. Okay. And then I see that Mrs. Clinton was the
Secretary of State from--well, until 2013, and you reported not
only to the DOD Secretary but to her. Some of the biggest
abuses were in USAID money that I saw. Is that under Secretary
of State or is it under DOD?
Mr. Sopko. USAID is a separate entity I think ----
Mr. Mica. But is it under State or is it under DOD?
Mr. Sopko. It's a separate entity. It's a--has an
administrator ----
Mr. Mica. So no one--you did not report to her about those
abuses, the Secretary ----
Mr. Sopko. Well ----
Mr. Mica.--of State at the time?
Mr. Sopko. Congressman, we file our reports with Secretary
of State, Secretary ----
Mr. Mica. So she has had ----
Mr. Sopko.--of Defense ----
Mr. Mica. She had those reports. And are they required to
reply or they do reply? Now, you just told me you replied on 90
percent or something. Do we have a record of what came out of
State?
Mr. Sopko. On all of our reports to go to State Department,
we would ----
Mr. Mica. Can you ----
Mr. Sopko. We do. We do.
Mr. Mica.--supply us with copies of the responses? Because
it appears a lot of money was wasted and not attended to on
some of these projects not only under DOD but under the State
Department. And I want to see and have in the record the
response from DOD and State and what steps were taken. Can you
provide the committee with that?
Mr. Sopko. We definitely can do that, sir.
Mr. Mica. All right. And then lastly, Mr. Chairman, I am
very concerned about idle assets. You know, our Federal
Government should stop--I have always said should stop sitting
on its assets, and we have assets over there that you have
identified not only the ones you are spending money on that you
describe and renovations that are unnecessary or unwarranted
and costly but also assets that we have that are sitting idle
that we have transferred over to them. And if you could give us
a list of those for the record, I appreciate that, and yield
back the balance of my time.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. I will now recognize the
gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the
witnesses here today. Mr. Sopko, good to see you again.
I have got a couple of quick questions. Any of our panel
members, have you been dealing at all with the Kunduz situation
where we accidentally attacked that hospital in a firefight?
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, I'm generally familiar with it. It is an
investigation that's happening in the military chain of
command.
Mr. Lynch. Yes. So here is what I am worrying about. This
is just the interplay between hospital construction and we are
doing a bit of that. You know, the chairman and I have been to
Afghanistan way too many times, and oftentimes, the hospitals
look like every other building not only in Kabul but, you know,
Kandahar and in Kunduz. And I was wondering, as we are doing
this, it is not really reconstruction. We are doing
construction. It says Afghan rebuilding or reconstruction, but
in many cases there is nothing to reconstruct; we are
constructing.
And I am just wondering on the hospital construction piece,
are we building in structural components that would clearly
identify those as hospitals so we don't have that accident
happen again? I realize that we have very unreliable power
sources, so lighting and things like that that would be obvious
to us in the United States, they don't have those resources
there on a consistent basis. But it at least appears among some
of the reports that the hospital was indistinguishable. I know
the coordinates were provided, but visibly, visually I guess
the hospital was indistinguishable from some of the adjacent
buildings, and I am just wondering if we are curing that defect
within our protocol for hospital construction.
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, we haven't yet finalized the details of
what the reconstruction of the building that was mistakenly
struck will entail. I would say that I would fully expect that
at the time that we do decide to reconstruct a clinic if that's
in fact the case ----
Mr. Lynch. Yes, I am not talking about that one. I am
talking about we are doing a bunch of other hospitals, and so,
obviously, that opportunity presents itself with every
hospital. And I am just wondering--and we have got a bunch of
them in the report today, a bunch of hospital and clinic
reconstruction. Are we distinguishing these buildings from
other buildings so this doesn't happen again? That is all I am
asking.
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, I will take that for the record.
[The information follows:]
Ms. Abizaid. I would say that I am not aware of significant
DOD projects that are currently underway other than the rebuild
in Kunduz that include hospitals. The ones that were--the
clinics that were constructed in the past I'll need to check
for the record to make sure that we did do due diligence on the
distinguishing feature.
Mr. Lynch. I know in Iraq, you know, your counterpart Mr.
Sopko had, you know, the Red Cross or the Red Crescent on the
roof of these, the helipads, things like that, that clearly
identified the buildings were hospitals, and I am just
wondering ----
Mr. Sopko. Congressman, if I could add to what the
assistant secretary said, and this is an issue I think Congress
should address. DOD has been very good on having accurate
geospatial coordinates for the buildings they've built. We have
been publicly critical of USAID for having a rather sloppy and
flippant attitude to geospatial.
Mr. Lynch. Okay.
Mr. Sopko. And we have issued--and I'm happy to provide to
you--a number of critical letters to USAID administrators to
make certain that geospatial coordinates are accurate.
Mr. Lynch. Okay.
Mr. Sopko. I don't know if you read about it. We did a
survey. We found out some of the coordinates were in the
Mediterranean ----
Mr. Lynch. Yes.
Mr. Sopko.--some were in Turkmenistan and elsewhere. I
think you're onto a good point. I can't tell you about any ----
Mr. Lynch. All right.
Mr. Sopko.--crescent signals, but you need good geospatial
coordinates.
Mr. Lynch. Okay.
Mr. Sopko. DOD has done a good job at that. AID has been
less than ----
Mr. Lynch. I just spent 4 minutes on my quick question, so
let me just jump on the fact that these contractors are being
paid in full, in the United States, of course, we have a
different format where we get a performance bond and we hold
that back, and if they don't perform properly, we cash in on
that bond. We also do retention, 10 percent of the contract
price. They don't get that until we go in there and reaffirm at
the end that they have performed their contract. Are we doing
any of that?
Ms. Abizaid. My understanding is that, yes, we are in fact
doing that. Let me turn it to my colleagues.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Mr. Strickley. Yes, sir. We do use the same FAR procedures
in Afghanistan as we use in the United States or elsewhere in
the world. The difference is when we contract with these small
Afghan firms, we're trying to build construction capacity in
the country.
Mr. Lynch. Right.
Mr. Strickley. We're trying to help them learn how to do
responsible construction management. And if we hold much money
from them, they will financially fail. They just do not have
the resources in their company to--for us to withhold much.
Mr. Lynch. Okay. That is ----
Mr. Strickley. So where we can, we do, but it's project-
dependent.
Mr. Lynch. All right. Thank you very much. I see my time
has expired. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman
from Tennessee, Mr. Duncan, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Duncan. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for holding this hearing.
The easiest thing in the world is to spend other people's
money, and unfortunately, we have seen over and over and over
and over again that there apparently are no fiscal
conservatives at the Pentagon. They can say they are good
stewards of the public's money, but actions speak much louder
than words. And Mr. Sopko's 30-something reports have listed
hundreds of examples of just ridiculous waste. I mean, I have
got in front of me an NPR report with $770 million on aircraft
for Afghanistan that the military can't use, a report that was
in all kinds of papers, $34 million on a white elephant
headquarters that will never be used.
In fact, in the NPR report Mr. Sopko is quoted as saying
``the joke in my office is we will eventually see a base where
on one side of the base they are destroying it while on the
other side they are building it, and then they will probably
meet in the middle.'' It is really sad. One organization that
looked at this found $17 billion in waste.
There has been so much waste in Iraq and Afghanistan. I
know that a few days ago I think a Senate committee got very
upset about a hearing about $6 million spent on nine blond
goats from Italy. Are you familiar with the blond goats, Mr.
Sopko?
Mr. Sopko. Yes, unfortunately, I am. And it was a program
by the Task Force for Business Stabilization. It was basically
an attempt to rebuild or build a cashmere market, and as far as
we know, it was a failure. They did import goats. They sent a
team actually to Mongolia to try to bring back Mongolian goat
semen. We're still tracking that down.
As far as we know--we talked to a subject matter expert who
said they tried to do that they needed to be done in 20 years
in a 2-year period, and it was a total failure. We will be
issuing a report on that in more detail, but the problem is
there were no metrics and what type of metrics they had they
didn't even follow.
Mr. Duncan. Well, it is just really sad, and the American
people are disgusted about this. I represent a very pro-
military district, but I will tell you that I have been here a
long time, and I voted for the first war in Iraq because I
heard about Saddam Hussein's elite troops and how great a
threat they were, and then I saw those same elite troops
surrendering to CNN camera crews and empty tanks. So realized
then the threat had been greatly exaggerated.
So I became very skeptical about the second Iraq war, and
so they called me down to a little room at the White house with
Condoleezza Rice and George Tenet, the head of the CIA.
Lawrence Lindsey, the President's economic advisor had said
that day or the day before that a war with Iraq would cost us
$200 billion. He was fired. I asked about that. Condoleezza
Rice said, oh, no, it wouldn't cost us anything like that. It
will be $50 or $60 billion and we get some of that back from
our allies.
My point is all of these actions in Iraq and Afghanistan,
there has been so much waste, it is just unbelievable, and yet
we are still doing it after 15 years. And this estimate of $50
or $60 billion by Condoleezza Rice and then we end up spending
trillions. And it is just really, really sad.
I end up voting against the second war in Iraq, and it was
probably the most unpopular vote I have ever done for 3 or 4
years, but what was the most unpopular vote has, over the
years, turned into the most popular vote I have ever done
because the American people are just fed up with this waste,
and they are just feeling like we are long past the time when
we need to stop trying to run the whole world and we start
putting our own people in our own country first once again.
And I just want to say again, Mr. Sopko, I am very grateful
and thankful for the work that you have done over there
pointing out this so hopefully we won't keep doing these types
of things in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
I will now recognize the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs.
Watson Coleman, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lynch actually was starting a line of questioning I was
interested in, so I would like to just yield to him.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentlelady for yielding. I
appreciate that.
Mr. Sopko, I want to talk about Afghan defense force
training. There are a lot of reports both in the press and from
your office that the reliability of the data that we are
getting from the Afghan Government relative to the amount of
security forces they have on hand, especially in Helmand and
Kandahar Provinces are not reliable. There is one report that
says that up to 40 percent of the people we are paying in the
Afghan defense forces are ghost employees; they do not exist.
And so the commanders on the ground there are basically taking
that money for themselves. There aren't really people there to
be paid. And I just wonder if your own investigation supports
that premise.
Mr. Sopko. That figure I believe of 40 percent was quoted
by, I believe, a parliamentarian, an Afghan parliamentarian or
a provincial director I think down in Helmand Province, so we
have not been able to corroborate that.
The concern we have is we've seen ghost schools, we've seen
ghost teachers, we've seen ghost clinics, ghost doctors, ghost
civil servants, and we have heard of ghost soldiers. We
actually heard part of the problem in Helmand and part of the
problem in Kunduz were the units may not have been as fulsome
as we expected. Our concern is we don't really have the
capability of verifying that anymore because we don't have the
troops underground, we don't have the people. We're using
anecdotal information. And that is a concern I think we all
have, particularly based upon the history in Afghanistan.
And our concerns have been confirmed by the Ghani
government. They've done a number of studies at least on the
teachers and the clinics, and they're finding the same things
that we are finding. But so far we haven't been able to do
that.
Mr. Lynch. Now, Ms. Abizaid, do you have anything on that?
Ms. Abizaid. Yes, sir, I'd just like to respond briefly. I
fully acknowledge that there are reports of ghost soldiers and
sort of the volume of ghost soldier--the ghost soldier problem
is something that we desperately want to get our arms around. I
think the 40 percent figure is actually overrated, but, sir --
--
Mr. Lynch. Let me just ----
Ms. Abizaid.--we are ----
Mr. Lynch. Let me just suggest something.
Ms. Abizaid. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lynch. Okay. We don't have to count every single
soldier, but, look, just take a unit down in Helmand Province
or in Kandahar or Nangarhar, whatever we want to do, and just
do some samples. We have got payroll requests, and, you are
right, we don't have the resources anymore to do this, you
know, full-spectrum analysis of what they are doing, but you
can certainly pick two or three units where we are getting
requests for funding and then fly in there on payday and see
who picks up their checks, who is picking up their pay. And all
you need to do is do two or three of those and we will have a
good sample of what is going on and we might nip that in the
bud if they know we are going to do that on occasion.
Ms. Abizaid. Yes, sir. And we'll take that back to the
field.
I did want to say that we are instituting new systems and
processes to increase the accountability and our visibility
into the soldiers that are getting paid through an integrated
pay-and-personnel system and through the issuance of biometric
ID cards for the Afghan National Army. These are really
important systems to address the kind of accountability that
we're talking about, make sure the people that are supposed to
be getting paid are getting paid.
And for--you know, to the example that you raised about
increasing our visibility into specific units, we actually have
pretty good visibility now into the units in Helmand and the
kind of roles that they are keeping, and we have noted a
significant degree of absence from rolls, attrition rates that
are higher than we would have expected. Our engagement with the
Afghan National Security Forces and the Ministries of Defense
and Interior have enabled greater insight as we work to rebuild
and reconstitute that force in Helmand that is in the midst of
a fight.
Mr. Lynch. Okay. Mr. Sopko, what do you think we should
look at? Members of Congress will be going over to Afghanistan
fairly soon. Any areas that you think we should look at more
closely while we are there?
Mr. Sopko. Security is number one. Verify to yourself as
best as you can that the ANDSF has the capabilities, the Afghan
security forces have those capabilities. The second thing,
Congressman Lynch, is get outside of the embassy, get outside
of the command structure and talk to some of the people, talk
to some of the soldiers privately, talk to some of the people
in the NGO community privately and to get their assessment.
Every time I go there, I try to do that. Every time I go there,
I try to meet with Afghan soldiers ----
Mr. Lynch. And so do we. I have to give the chairman great
credit. We get outside the wire every time we go.
Mr. Sopko. Then you get the true picture. You don't get the
happy talk ----
Mr. Lynch. Yes.
Mr. Sopko.--that you'll find in the embassy.
And the other thing is, Congressman, I've been going there
now 4 years. Every time I go, I'm told we're winning and every
time I go I can see less of the country.
Mr. Lynch. Yes.
Mr. Sopko. It's so bad now I can't even drive from the
airport, and no American civilian can drive from the airport to
the embassy. We have to fly.
Mr. Lynch. Right.
Mr. Sopko. Last time I was there, I wanted to go across the
street to do an inquiry, and I was told I was going to have to
helo across the street ----
Mr. Lynch. Yes.
Mr. Sopko.--at the cost of $60,000. Now, if that's winning,
what is losing ----
Mr. Lynch. Yes.
Mr. Sopko.--in Afghanistan?
Mr. Lynch. Well, I would just in closing that if they are
advising you not to drive from the airport the embassy, you
should not drive. We have done that drive many times. That is
not a good situation, so you continue to fly, sir. Thank you. I
yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
I would now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
Walberg, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the
panel for being here.
Mr. Sopko, for the past two Congresses, as you know, the
House has passed multiple amendments to limit funding or reduce
funding for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund, some of my
amendments as well. Unfortunately, these bipartisan amendments
don't get through and into the spending packages because of the
insistence by DOD that additional funding sources are needed to
finish the projects.
I understand that we look to our commanders in the field.
We want their guidance. We want to know what they think is
necessary to finish the important job that they are doing, but
should DOD also fully analyze the costs of particular projects
and whether the Afghans will be able to maintain these projects
before we allocate additional resources?
Mr. Sopko. I agree wholeheartedly with that. They should.
Mr. Walberg. That is just expected.
Ms. Abizaid?
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, with respect to Afghanistan
Infrastructure Funds, I would note that this--most of the DOD
funds associated with that, first, we are no longer requesting
funds and haven't since 2014. We do want some funds to be able
to complete ongoing projects. Those projects are being turned
over to a self-sufficient Afghan entity known as DABS, which
has actually been quite successful in generating revenues and
actually being able to sustain many of the projects that we've
undertaken in coordination with ----
Mr. Walberg. Do you anticipate asking for additional
reallocated funds for these projects?
Ms. Abizaid. Not at this time. We are trying to use
portions of ASIF to finish out the projects.
Mr. Walberg. You are confident you have enough funding?
Ms. Abizaid. Once the projects are complete, we do not
expect any additional funds.
Mr. Walberg. Mr. Sopko, as a general matter, did DOD
conduct any risk-based analysis or feasibility studies before
undertaking any of the construction projects that SIGAR
inspected?
Mr. Sopko. I am not aware of that. I'm not saying they
didn't. I don't think they did, but I'm not absolutely certain.
I would have to ----
Mr. Walberg. Ms. Abizaid, could you answer that? Did any
feasibility studies to deal with the taxpayer funds?
Ms. Abizaid. Let me deferred to my colleagues in the
engineering.
Mr. Strickley. I can give you an example, sir, of an AIF
project ----
Chairman Chaffetz. You can move the microphone right up
under your--there we go.
Mr. Strickley. Yes, thank you. I can give you an example of
a project that we started to do in Helmand Province with AIF
funding at the Dahla Dam that would have been about $150
million, $175 million project. And as we got further into the
design, we eventually canceled the project because we did not
think we would be able to execute it in a responsible fashion.
It's an existing dam. We were going to increase its
capacity, and we were concerned because of a security situation
in that region that we--once we started construction, we
might--or our contractor might be forced off the site, and that
would have been a catastrophic situation.
Mr. Walberg. Has this then produced additional effort to do
feasibility studies and risk analysis before you even begin the
engineering and the expensive process?
Mr. Strickley. Yes, sir. I think we do, especially on those
large AIF infrastructure projects. We routinely did analysis of
the ability to execute the project. So most of them we're doing
now are electrical transmission lines, and we think we are able
to complete those in a reasonable time and a reasonable manner.
And so we proceeded on ----
Mr. Walberg. Well, you know, we would all, all I think feel
better if we knew that the process began first with a risk
analysis, feasibility study before we invested.
Mr. Sopko, do you believe that the Afghan Government is
prepared to take over full responsibility, operation, and
maintenance of DOD-constructed facilities in Afghanistan?
Mr. Sopko. If the question is are they capable, no, they
are not capable at this point. They can't--they don't have the
technical capability and they don't have the financial
capability so we're going to have to support them.
I mean, just to go back to a question one of your
colleagues asked, Congressman, they raise approximately $2
billion in revenue. The cost of the entire Afghan National
Security Forces is $5 billion approximately. The cost of the
rest of the government we've given them is another $4 billion,
$3-$4 billion. So there's a delta there. They can raise $2
billion. It's $8-$10 billion to support the government. That
delta is provided by the U.S. taxpayer and the coalition
taxpayers. So from a financial point of view, they cannot
maintain.
A good question to ask is how much money are we now giving
to the Afghan Government to do O&M for all the buildings we
just--we give them or build for them? And that's a significant
amount. And remember, every dollar of O&M, overhead and
maintenance that the Afghans spend is one less dollar they can
spend for hiring a trooper, for buying bullets, for guns, or
whatever. So we've got to realize we're stuck now of having
built an Afghan infrastructure that the Afghans cannot afford.
Mr. Walberg. I appreciate that. That is a question that we
need to keep asking, especially in context of how long we
continue to put ourselves in harm's way. That includes our
taxpayer funding as well. So thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sopko, welcome back. I have to say, listening to this
and reading your report, you know, there is a French expression
plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose, you know, the more
things change, the more they stay the same, echoes of Vietnam,
echoes of other large investments both by DOD and AID and the
same old story, can't keep track of it, billions wasted, had
to, you know, demolish it.
I am looking at your report, for example. Your report,
inter alia, on the inspection of six Afghan National Police
district facilities in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces in 2010,
one of the findings in that report was there was poor
contractor performance to say the least. One of your report's
recommendations was to ensure that identified construction
deficiencies of future projects be paid for by the responsible
contractor instead of the U.S. Government. By the way, was that
recommendation accepted?
Mr. Sopko. Congressman, I'd have to check on that.
Mr. Connolly. All right. In 2015, your inspection report
for the Afghan special police training centers dry fire range
found that the regional contracting center failed to hold the
contractor accountable for correcting deficiencies in
construction before the contract warranty expired. The Afghan
Government had to demolish the facility and rebuild it using
Afghan money. Is that correct, Mr. Sopko?
Mr. Sopko. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Connolly. Help us understand how that we could arrive
at that state of affairs. I mean, I listen to you talk about,
you know, if that is winning, what would losing be? I have got
to helicopter across the street. How in the world--if that is
the security situation, how can we with a straight face say
there is actually sufficient oversight on any investment we are
making in Afghanistan?
Mr. Sopko. It is difficult. I mean, I wish I could cite
some French back to you, sir, but it's--there's probably a
phrase of that. I mean, we are in a situation now where we have
built too much too fast with too little oversight. And I feel
like the detective that shows up and the body is not only gone
from the murder scene, the chalk outline has now disappeared
and I am trying to find somebody accountable.
Now, the good thing is you have a good team over in
Afghanistan with the CSTC-A and with Commander Campbell, a new
commander there, who really are taking this seriously and
they're trying to put conditions on it. The other good thing is
the National Unity Government under President Ghani really
wants to change things. So that is the positive side of this.
And you have, under the Assistant Secretary Abizaid, a good
team here that recognizes it.
But we've got 15 years of real problems. We have 15 years
of not applying the metrics, sir, that you and I had a long
conversation about. We didn't apply metrics. And to this day I
still have not heard back from the Secretary of Defense,
Secretary of State, and USAID to give me their top 10 successes
and why. Give me your successful programs and why. Give me your
failures and why. If anything, right now, you need to rack and
stack what worked and what didn't in Afghanistan ----
Mr. Connolly. Absolutely.
Mr. Sopko.--and nobody is able to say that to me.
Mr. Connolly. You know, in terms of when in doubt, it seems
to me--echoing Mr. Duncan's comments--I would rather pull the
plug and not make the risk of an investment than to expend U.S.
taxpayer dollars on a failing enterprise that has to be
demolished. I mean, I don't know what good is done by that
investment other than, I suppose, some people can pocket some
money and some people can be on the payroll. But the damage
done both to our prestige, you know, the symbolism of that
failed investment and the taxpayer here to me outweighs the
risk of making an investment.
Ms. Abizaid, do you want to comment on that?
Ms. Abizaid. Yes, sir. I appreciate your concerns, and I
also appreciate Mr. Sopko acknowledging all that we have done,
especially in recent years as the mission has changed to scope
the mission appropriately going forward.
I agree with you. I think that the melting walls on an
Afghan firing range are--is an unacceptable situation to have
found ourselves in. I would also say that that is one project
but not representative of the thousands of projects that we've
undertaken in Afghanistan. You know, some of the successes that
I can cite are having built a basing structure for a new Afghan
National Security Force from which they're fighting a live
counterinsurgency right now and, you know, with some problems
but also some successes.
And so, you know, as we look to carry less and less burden
ourselves both in dollars and American blood, we are trying to
shift responsibility as much as possible to the Afghan
Government. I think over the last year we've seen good success
in that, and the program now is to find the right balance in
terms of what we ask them to do, what we enable them to do, how
we can build their own capacity, and what's going to fall to us
to address our core national security interests.
Mr. Connolly. I appreciate that, but let me just echo what
Mr. Sopko said. If we are that confident that, yes, there are
some failures we can point to put there are also some
successes, then it ought not to be that difficult for Secretary
Carter to respond to Mr. Sopko's request, which I certainly
bless. Give us the top 10. You know, help us understand what
lessons were learned from these successes. If you want to throw
in some failures, that would be welcome, too, so that we are
not repeating.
And that is why I began by saying plus ca change. Nothing
changes in decades of these kinds of investments. Do we ever
learn from our experience in investing in, you know, very
difficult circumstances where corruption is rampant, where
government is inefficient, in the case of the previous
government, frankly, of questionable intent in a lot of cases?
And a lot hinges on that.
And what is the price we have paid? A deteriorating
security--a badly deteriorating security situation and a lot of
wasted dollars, and that is not without consequence. If I were
the Taliban, I would point to that. If you want to throw your
lot in with those people, let me take you to this demolished
police training facility or whatever. And so it is not without
consequences beyond even dollars.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
I am now going to recognize myself.
Mr. Sopko, let's go to 60,000 feet here for a second. Give
us the big numbers and dollars spent. And I want our colleagues
and everybody to understand the numbers that we are going to
talk about here have nothing to do with the war fight, okay?
They don't have anything to do with our fighting, the men and
women, feeding them, housing them, tanks, airplanes, whatever
else we need to fight the war. This is the construction part of
the aid that we are giving them. How much money have we spent
in just Afghanistan? It is north of $100 billion, is it not?
Mr. Sopko. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It's actually $113 billion.
Chairman Chaffetz. So of the $113 billion that has been
spent, how much if it has been appropriated but not yet
allocated or not yet spent?
Mr. Sopko. We have approximately--let me get that figure. I
think it's $11.45 billion in the pipeline as of the end of
2015, so $11 billion is in the pipeline.
Chairman Chaffetz. So $11 billion in the pipeline. So to
the three representatives from the Department of Defense, how
much is enough? How much more money does it take from the
United States taxpayers, from the men and women who actually do
the jobs and make the money and pay their taxes, how much more
money do we have to pour into Afghanistan for just the
reconstruction? Or is this just going to go on in perpetuity
with no end? How much more do you need?
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, I think we are around a steady-state
amount of about $3.4 billion, $3.5 billion. That might go up
given some Afghan security ----
Chairman Chaffetz. So if you have 4 billion more dollars,
you are going to be fine?
Ms. Abizaid. In the next year, sir, the cost to sustain the
Afghan National Security Forces is about $3.4 billion, $3.5
billion ----
Chairman Chaffetz. Annually?
Ms. Abizaid.--a year. Yes, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. That is just to continue to stand up the
Afghan Government?
Ms. Abizaid. That's ----
Chairman Chaffetz. And that would come from this fund is
what you want?
Ms. Abizaid. That's right, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. So yesterday and tomorrow, we are having
a hearing about Flint and water. I just don't understand how we
pour $100 billion into Afghanistan and we have got people who
can't turn on a faucet in Michigan and drink the water. And so
we are in tough financial straits in our own country. We are
$19 trillion, trillion in debt. And it sounds to me like we
have got some $7 billion that is sitting on the sidelines that
has already been appropriated. This is not new money. It has
already been set aside that you don't need next year, correct?
Is that accurate? If you have $11 billion that has been
appropriated but not yet allocated and you need less than $4
billion a year to stand up the Afghan Government, what are you
doing with the other $8 billion?
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, that is total appropriation. The part
that is for DOD is the $3.5 billion. The $11 billion is total
U.S. Government, and that is State, AID, and other agencies.
Mr. Sopko. Chairman, the $3.45 billion is just supporting
the Afghan military and police. You've still got to pay for the
rest of the Afghan Government, okay, the teachers, the health
clinics, the roads, and everything else.
Chairman Chaffetz. How much does that cost?
Mr. Sopko. Well, as I said before, that's about $8-$10
billion total, subtract out the $5 billion, $4 billion for the
police. So we're talking about $6 billion.
Chairman Chaffetz. So help me with the math here. What is
the annual expenditure the American Government needs to spend
in--or that the military and the State Department and everybody
else wants to spend every year?
Mr. Sopko. I'd go back to ----
Chairman Chaffetz. This is just the reconstruction, no
fighting.
Mr. Sopko. Reconstruction. I'd go back to the figure I told
you. The Afghans raise about $2 billion in legal taxes ----
Chairman Chaffetz. Right.
Mr. Sopko.--legal taxes. They do illegally tax our
contractors, but let's just say legal taxes. It costs about $4-
$5 billion for the military. So we've got a $3 billion delta.
Chairman Chaffetz. Yes.
Mr. Sopko. And then another $3-$4 billion above that. So
it's $7 billion that somebody has to pay. Up to now, it's the
U.S. taxpayers and the coalition per year. Per year I'm talking
about.
Chairman Chaffetz. And what percentage is the United States
paying versus the rest of the world?
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, for the Afghan National Security Forces
we're talking about $1 billion from the rest of the world. The
development aid I think--I would need to check with State, but
I think they're shooting for $1 billion as well.
Chairman Chaffetz. So, sorry, Mr. Sopko, help me get the
top line number here. How much money are we putting in and how
much is the rest of the world putting in, DOD plus State
Department, USAID, all that?
Mr. Sopko. It sounds like the rest of our coalition is
giving about $2 billion and we're picking up the other $6-$7
billion.
Chairman Chaffetz. And how much--is there any extra money
just floating around because, Mr. Sopko, last time we talked
about, it was nearly $20 billion. We were doing more projects
in Afghanistan than we ever were in the history of Afghanistan,
correct?
Mr. Sopko. Yes. I mean, actually, the amount of money we're
spending on reconstruction in Afghanistan is more we're paying
for reconstruction in any other country in the United States
and I think we've ever done anywhere. I mean, it's more than we
spent on the entire Marshall Plan for Europe after the war.
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, so $60 billion total in terms of ASIF,
the fund that supports the Afghan National Security and Defense
Forces. They're--at its height it was about $10 billion a year
appropriation. We have worked very hard as our mission has
changed to move away from building up the ANDSF and the costly
experiences associated with that and getting it to a better
steady-state level at the $3.5 billion rate that we are
currently at.
As a means of increasing the efficiency of our investment
in Afghanistan, we are looking to slope that cost of the force
down. Security costs are very high both for the Afghan
Government and for ourselves, and so one of the keys here is
reducing violence levels in Afghanistan in a reasonable amount
of time. And the ANDSF is going to ----
Chairman Chaffetz. Well, We have been at it for 14 years,
so where are we at?
Ms. Abizaid. The Afghan Government has been in full lead
for security responsibility over the last year. They had mixed
success, but there was success, and they are--we expect them to
continue to develop and improve your ----
Chairman Chaffetz. You can't drive from the airport to the
embassy. I have driven that. It is not a long distance. But you
can't do that today. So are you telling me it is more secure or
less secure?
Ms. Abizaid. The international presence is certainly under
threat in Afghanistan.
Chairman Chaffetz. Yes, it is less ----
Ms. Abizaid.--that is what ----
Chairman Chaffetz.--secure.
Ms. Abizaid.--we're trying to do to protect ourselves.
Chairman Chaffetz. With indulgence here from the rest of
the committee, I have a couple other questions. You know what,
let me go back. I will have to ask a second round, but let me
ask one other really quick question.
How many people do we have in Afghanistan? I want to know
how many DOD personnel and contractors do we have there, not
just so-called boots on the ground but I think this boots on
the ground is a facade because really when you go and you hire
thousands or hundreds of--I don't know what the number is--of
contractors, I don't know how those aren't human beings as
well. How many people does the Department of Defense have on
the ground in Afghanistan?
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, I'll have to get back to you on the full
number, but you're right, our contractor-to-boots-on-the-ground
ratio is high. I think it's at about four to one, but I'll have
to confirm that for the--and get it back to you for the record.
Chairman Chaffetz. You have got a lot of staff sitting
behind you, so if somebody could work on that number before the
end of this hearing, that would be really helpful.
Mr. Sopko. Mr. Chairman, I think I can give that number to
you.
Chairman Chaffetz. Sure.
Mr. Sopko. Our best guesstimate--and again, it changes
every day--is 39,609 total contractors. It's not just for DOD;
it's also for AID and State. Fourteen thousand two hundred and
twenty-two approximately are U.S. citizens or 36 percent. So
we've got about 40,000 contractors.
Chairman Chaffetz. And how many employees or--whether they
be military, USAID, State Department?
Mr. Sopko. I'll have to get back to you on that.
Chairman Chaffetz. All right. A lot of staff back there.
Ms. Abizaid. We're working on it.
Chairman Chaffetz. Bust out those smartphones. We are going
to come up with this number before we leave this hearing.
Now, let's recognize the gentlewoman from Illinois, Ms.
Kelly, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Today, SIGAR released a report looking back at 6 years of
DOD reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. Reports such as
these, as well as those by various inspectors general and GAO,
are critical to our ability to learn lessons from problems
today and improve our efforts in the future. In fact, although
U.S. forces in Afghanistan were critical about parts of SIGAR's
report in their comments, they highlighted, ``the value of this
report lies in consolidating lessons which may benefit
organizations charged with construction efforts in similar
environments.
Mr. Sopko, how else would you suggest DOD ensure lessons
such as these are incorporated into their mission? And I have a
cold. Excuse me.
Mr. Sopko. I think the--I think what I recommended is take
those lessons and apply them for every new contract, but I
think the best thing to do right now is to do a thorough,
complete assessment of the needs for any new construction, and
that has been done in the past and I'm just saying we should do
it now. It's probably a good time to do that again. General
Dunford did that, and we actually commended him when he was
commander of ASIF for saving close to half-a-billion dollars by
canceling programs. So I think that's the way to do it. Now is
the time to do an assessment, and not only DOD. AID and State
should do it, too, and that's a way to incorporate that.
Ms. Kelly. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Abizaid. Ma'am, can I just address ----
Ms. Kelly. Sure.
Ms. Abizaid. --through the help of inspectors general,
including Mr. Sopko, we have learned quite a few lessons
through--in our 14 plus years in Afghanistan. You know, some of
the lessons that we have learned specifically about
reconstruction and infrastructure projects include having a
continual review of the projects at hand so if they are
unneeded we can actually stop construction on those projects
and return taxpayer money, working closely with the inspectors
general to identify problems to take corrective action, as we
have done in 90 percent of the recommendations that we heard
from this report, including engineering experts on the front
end of projects so we make sure that we're not only undertaking
a project that's needed but building it right the first time
around. That's been something that I think we've done
increasingly well over time.
And balance the need for urgency in a contingency war
environment with the kind of analysis that's going to be
appropriate in that environment. And so, you know, these are
some of the lessons. There are many others that we've learned
through cooperation with the inspector general.
Ms. Kelly. You kind of answered--I was going to ask you
questions about that, but I wanted to give Mr. Brown and Mr.
Strickley a chance to describe how their experiences in Iraq
have impacted contracting efforts in Afghanistan.
Mr. Strickley. Yes, ma'am. I appreciate that question. So
the Corps of Engineers has done an extensive lessons-learned
study of our experiences in Iraq and now in Afghanistan, and we
have just published a special study of the Corps of Engineers'
experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Army Center
for Lessons Learned is adopting this, and it will be
incorporated into Army engineer training in the future and it
will become a part of--it is a part of how we organize
ourselves and manage our work in Afghanistan now, and we will
apply it to other contingency operations in the future.
One of the things that Ms. Abizaid said that we--that is a
huge lesson for us is that we were probably overly optimistic
at the beginning in Afghanistan with how rapidly we could build
things. And lots of things from the security situation to the
border problems with Pakistan conspired against us. So we had
good intentions when we awarded contracts, you know, 6, 7 years
ago, and then the contractors, through no fault of their own
and no lack of effort on their own, they just could not achieve
the schedules that we set out for. So that was a huge lesson
learned for us is ----
Ms. Kelly. Can I add ----
Mr. Strickley.--be a little more skeptical.
Ms. Kelly. Being overly optimistic, how much money did that
cost being overly optimistic?
Mr. Strickley. I couldn't begin to estimate that. I don't
know. In many cases what happened was the contractor was just
unable to perform, so the buildings were not delivered when we
wanted them to be delivered. So in some cases you see that
facilities were completed and then never used. Well, that's
part of the--what caused that. The Corps of Engineers simply
was not able to do the--complete the construction in the time
that we wanted to. Thank you.
Mr. Brown. Yes, ma'am, I just would like to address, in
addition to what the Corps has already mentioned, a couple
other things. I think for us some of the lessons learned that
were critical what is that we need to adapt the facilities to
the local needs, and so looking at what is available in the
local market that can be sustained over time.
So sometimes we may look at bringing in a U.S. construction
technique or design and put it into a country where maybe those
materials aren't available in that country or its--it will be
very difficult to sustain. So while we are sure that we used
the right standards for safety, we've learned that we need to
adjust what we do, especially with the finishes, to make sure
that that's sustainable over time.
Also, there's a code that we use, the Unified Facilities
Code that all of DOD uses that we've recently just in late '13
have released that. And that addresses the kinds of things that
we need to consider when we go into contingency operations.
For us within AFCEC we've also updated what we call our
playbooks, which is our internal processes, so that both from a
contingency perspective and work we do for military
construction, we've bounced those lessons learned off each
other so that we understand from a standards perspective what
we should be doing and also what we've learned from these
contingency operations to make sure that in the future, as we
support the military, that we've captured those lessons
learned, they're in our processes, and they'll be there when
the next folks are called upon to do something like this.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you. I know my time is up.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
I will now recognize the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr.
Massie, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Massie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sopko, did you testified that $113 billion has been
spent in Afghanistan since 2002?
Mr. Sopko. For reconstruction only.
Mr. Massie. On reconstruction. And this includes building
the Afghan National Security Forces, to promoting good
governance and engaging in counter narcotics?
Mr. Sopko. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Massie. All right.
Mr. Sopko. Among other things, yes.
Mr. Massie. So let's talk a little bit about the counter
narcotics side of this. Has opiate production gone up or down
since 2002 in Afghanistan?
Mr. Sopko. It's one of the most popular crops. It's been a
success, yes. Opium production is up.
Mr. Massie. And what percent of the world's supply of non-
pharmaceutical opiates come from Afghanistan?
Mr. Sopko. I think, sir, it's 80 to 90 percent.
Mr. Massie. That is what I hear, too, from the United
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. They say about 90 percent of
the world opiates, non-pharmaceutical opiates. So how much of
this $113 billion have we spent on counter narcotics efforts
there?
Mr. Sopko. Approximately $8.4 billion. That's billion with
a B.
Mr. Massie. And how much has opiate production gone up
since 2002 or since some benchmark that you can ----
Mr. Sopko. I don't have the exact number, but I think
they're producing well more now than they did during the
Taliban years, and it has been the only successful export from
Afghanistan for the 15 years we've been there.
Mr. Massie. Ms. Abizaid, is this consistent with what you
know about opiate production in Afghanistan?
Ms. Abizaid. I'd need to check and get back to you on how
numbers today compare to 2002. I know over the last year,
mostly due to weather, there was a decrease in the poppy crop.
I think that the weather patterns this year mean that that'll
likely increase. But whether it's a full increase since 2002,
I'd need to take that for the record, sir.
Mr. Massie. So I have read reports that opiate production
has as much as tripled since we invaded Afghanistan in that
country. How much do you think it has gone up, Ms. Abizaid? Has
it gone up or down?
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, I'll need to take that for the record. I
don't have an impression that it has tripled, but that is not
something that I follow on a daily basis as part of my
portfolio, so I'll check with those that do.
Mr. Massie. So the counter narcotics effort is not within
the DOD?
Ms. Abizaid. Yes, sir, it is within the DOD ----
Mr. Massie. How do you measure success if you don't know --
--
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, the counter narcotics money that the
Department of Defense has been in Afghanistan has primarily
been to support the special mission wing, which is an Afghan
aviation program. That's actually one of the most successful
programs in Afghanistan. Now, whether that's affected the
overall levels of opiates and poppy cultivation, I don't have
those numbers for you. I will say that reporting standards have
increased widely over the last, you know, 14 plus years in
Afghanistan as more and more credible sources have come in. So
whether in 2002 that were accurate figures are not is something
I just can't speak to, sir.
Mr. Massie. Would you testify today that opiate production
has gone up since you started the counter narcotics effort or
that it has gone down? This is a very simple ----
Ms. Abizaid. I understand, sir. I don't--I'm sorry. I don't
have the answer for you.
Mr. Massie. You don't know if it has gone up or down?
Ms. Abizaid. I am sorry, I do not.
Mr. Massie. How can you account for--I mean, I trust you
have had a lot of activity because you have spent $8 billion
there, but what about progress?
Ms. Abizaid. The progress that DOD has made in the use of
its counter narcotics funds are represented by the success of
the special mission wing, which is an Afghan aviation program.
The total levels of opiate production, I will ask my staff to
engage and get that answer and I will try and have that before
the end of the hearing as well, sir.
Mr. Sopko. Congressman, can I just add ----
Mr. Massie. Yes, please, Mr. Sopko.
Mr. Sopko. I think what you're focusing on is so important.
We tend to focus on inputs. That's the amount of money we
spend, and outputs, you know, we bought a whole bunch of
airplanes and we have a nice special mission wing, but we never
looked the issue that you're looking at. What is the outcome?
The outcome, sir is that opium production is higher today. Two
thousand and fourteen was the highest production year in
Afghanistan. So if you look at any metrics for success or
failure--and I've been doing counter narcotics--I did it for
Sam Nunn when I was on his committee. For 15 years I looked at
counter narcotics activities in the United States. You look at
arrests, you look at seizures, you look at amount of crops
underproduction, hectares under production, you look at the
number of addicts.
If you look at every one of those metrics, we have failed.
The arrests are down, seizures are down, production is up,
hectares under production is up, the amount of money being
gained, and more important for Afghanistan, the amount of money
going to the insurgency has increased since we've been there.
So, sir, to you--and I'm just a simple country lawyer--I
don't think we've succeeded in Afghanistan. I make this
statement like I did before about winning. If this is winning,
what is losing the drug war?
Mr. Massie. Just to close out here and to summarize what I
am hearing, the war on drugs in Afghanistan, to the extent
there is a war on drugs, has been a failure. We have spent $8
billion over there. Production is the highest it has ever been.
And here in the United States we have a heroin epidemic. I
think these two things might be related.
And, you know, next week we are going to have a hearing in
this exact committee to talk about the heroin epidemic. I think
it is time to reevaluate our strategy and our tactics in the
war on drugs in Afghanistan.
With that, I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. He makes a good
point. And I would also add to that that this is how the
insurgency is funded, right, is it not? I mean, this is where
they get their money, their assets to fight and kill and take
down America, correct?
Mr. Sopko. That is correct. It's one of the sources. There
are other sources. And I would note, Congressman, Mr. Chairman,
is that a lot of the activities we're seeing, the fighting
we're seeing in Helmand and up in the Kunduz area is drug-
related. These are terrorists groups fighting over the drugs
and these are local police and local Afghan officials fighting
over drug control.
Ashraf Ghani warned us before he was President if we didn't
do something and if the Afghans didn't do something, his
country would become a narco terrorist state. And I think his
prediction is coming true.
Mr. Massie. Department of Defense, you want to add anything
to that?
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, I'd only say that we absolutely
acknowledge that narcotics trafficking is a major funder of the
insurgency. Counterinsurgency operations that go against
insurgent strongholds do so and try and address some of those
smuggling routes, some of that poppy cultivation, but it is a
serious problem and it's one that we are very focused on, which
is why we funded the special mission wing to engage in both
counterterrorism and counter narcotics missions.
I will acknowledge and do have information from my staff
that counter narcotics--that poppy cultivation has generally
gone up over the last 10 years. We'll get more specifics for
you, sir. And while it has fluctuated year by year, again,
often weather-dependent, I would not claim that we have
significantly degraded the kind of funding that comes from
those illegal substances.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
I now recognize the gentlewoman from New York, Mrs.
Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. This is one of the most depressing hearings I
have ever sat through. It is just terrible what we are hearing.
And I think at the very least you can start a policy that you
don't build any more buildings unless you have proof that they
can operate them and maintain them. That is ridiculous that you
have to build a building and then operate and maintain it for
additional cost. That is insanity to continue doing that. I
don't see why we don't immediately stop that process.
And Mr. Sopko's statement that he's trying to get a list of
what works and what doesn't and can't even achieve that, I
think Mr. Chairman or some of us should write a letter to
support your efforts, and if they can't still give you that
list, we should legislate it, put the force of law that they
have got to give you this information. And it seems to be a
lesson in mismanagement.
And my first question is to Mr. Brown from DOD. And I would
like you to briefly explain the difference between a cost plus
fixed fee and a firm fixed price contract. And I note an IG
report of the Afghan Ministry of Defense, the Air Force Civil
Engineers Center awarded a $48 million cost plus fixed fee
contract to construct the building by 2010, and it ended up
after 14 contract modifications, the cost was more than double
at $107 million. Is that right, Mr. Brown? It is almost
unbelievable.
Mr. Brown. Yes, it is.
Mrs. Maloney. And then you go back with a firm fixed price
and they are able to complete it on time ahead of schedule for
$47 million. So just from that one example, it looks like we
should be going with a firm fixed price contract and stop the
cost plus fixed fee. But your comments on it, please, Mr.
Brown.
Mr. Brown. I'd be happy to. Yes, cost plus fixed fee is
usually used when you have risks that you just don't feel that
you can bound them properly, right, so if you can't guarantee
what the material pipeline may look like. So it's a shared risk
between those who hold the contract and those who you contract
with.
When we go into a firm fixed price contract, that is where
we're much more comfortable that we can set a price and it can
be delivered for that price, that there is appropriate risk
being carried by both the government and by the contractor.
I will say, as we looked back over the history of the work
we did in Afghanistan, we saw early on--I think as respective
to what was the status of the affairs early on--that we used a
fair amount of cost plus fixed fee contracts early when we were
early involved. But from about '11, '12 on, we switched most of
our work to firm fixed price because at that point we felt we
could better guarantee the price and hold the contractor to
that.
In the case of the headquarters, let me just kind of walk
back through what happened there. That was a cost plus fixed
fee ----
Mrs. Maloney. Yes, I read that so ----
Mr. Brown. Okay.
Mrs. Maloney.--I just wanted to get to your comments.
So I just would like to go to Mr. Sopko. You know, do you
believe that one contract type is better than another? And do
you believe that the cost overruns and other issues associated
with this project could have been prevented by just using a
firm fixed price contract?
Mr. Sopko. Absolutely. I would never use a cost plus
contract in Afghanistan. You're basically asking for the
American taxpayer to end up getting fleeced, and that's what
you had here. I mean, there is no risk. And I take umbrage with
the colleague that somehow we're sharing risk in a cost plus
contract. The only person sharing the risk is the U.S.
taxpayer. The contractor doesn't have to do anything. He's
going to get the additional funding, and that's what you see
here, 5 additional years to do the contract and a cost overrun
of hundreds of millions of dollars. So I would never use a
cost-plus contract in a place like Afghanistan.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, why don't we stop that policy right
now?
I would like to ask Mr. Sopko, what do you think we should
do now with these out-of-control costs?
Mr. Sopko. As I said before, I think we need to reassess
what we've done up to now, and by ``we'' I mean not SIGAR.
We're going to do our own lessons learned on this. I think that
each agency has to do it, rack and stack what's worked, what
hasn't, and what do we need to do in Afghanistan. But we have
to prioritize.
Now, we have talked about promising a decade of transition.
That means at least for the next 10 years the billions of
dollars that the chairman has been trying to figure out with us
that we're going to spend, we've promised 10 more years of
this. The other thing you have to consider if we stop funding
the Afghan Government, it will collapse and the bad guys will
take over.
So we're between a rock and a hard spot, but you really
need, from a policy point of view, make a decision and go
forward on that. But I think we need to start by doing racking
and stacking and prioritizing what the Afghans really need.
Ms. Abizaid. Ma'am, with respect to that prioritization, I
do think that we are engaged in that. If you look at the amount
of money we are going to be spending on infrastructure projects
in the next year, it's 1 percent of the total request, which
the total request is already quite a bit lower than it was. And
it is on those priority efforts that are about increasing
Afghan National Security Force capability in ways that we don't
have to it expand U.S. resources to make up for.
So in particular, they have a fixed wing aircraft that
needs infrastructure, storage for munitions. We're spending
money on that. We're not spending money on building schools or
large-scale new builds. We are mostly in a place where 95
percent of the infrastructure build is over, and we are
prioritizing our efforts to sustain and to have very clear
objectives in what new projects we seek to undertake.
Mrs. Maloney. Okay. My time is expired.
Chairman Chaffetz. If the gentlewoman would yield, I wish
what you said was true, but it is not because when we look at
the American taxpayer dollars, you are a portion of it. Then,
you go over to the USAID, you go to State Department, you go to
the others, you start to quickly realize that all these other
spends on building, you know, goat farms and other things like
that, we are spending money on all those things.
And if the Department of Defense was just focused on
helping secure Afghanistan, I think that that would be a
different equation, but it is not. And I will come back to it.
But let's recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hice.
Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sopko, you made, to me, a powerful statement. Earlier
you said in regard to the reconstruction that we built too much
too fast with too little oversight. And unfortunately, it
appears that that is a nagging, negative principle that it
seems as though, at least many feel the pain that that is a
principle our entire government right now seems to embrace. At
least many people feel that way.
But within the context of that statement, we built too much
too fast, too little oversight, how many infrastructure
projects in Afghanistan are currently in development?
Mr. Sopko. Congressman, I wouldn't have that number. I will
try to find it. But the problem we have is--and this is
something we've pointed out for a few years--we don't even know
what we built in Afghanistan ----
Mr. Hice. Okay.
Mr. Sopko.--so I can't tell you how many are under ----
Mr. Hice. That is just what I was saying. We don't know
what we have built.
Ms. Abizaid. Congressman ----
Mr. Hice. We don't know what is under construction right
now, we don't know what we have done ----
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, we do know what's under construction now.
Mr. Hice. Okay. What is under ----
Ms. Abizaid. I mentioned the munitions storage facility for
the A-29. We also have ----
Mr. Hice. How many? I don't need the details, just how many
projects?
Ms. Abizaid. I would say it's a handful, sir. I can get the
details for you on the specifics. But as I mentioned, it's 1
percent of the planned budget, and we're not talking about very
many new builds at all.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Please, if you would get that to me, I
would appreciate it.
Mr. Hice. So it seems again that the overarching problem
here is lack of oversight. Where there has been oversight--is
it fair to say where there has been oversight, we have had a
better outcome?
Ms. Abizaid. That is absolutely fair to say, sir.
Mr. Sopko. That's correct.
Mr. Hice. Okay. So what are we doing to ensure
accountability to the American taxpayer that there will be
oversight on these current projects and future?
Ms. Abizaid. So we have increased oversight over the years.
I think that if you look at the scope of Mr. Sopko's most
recent report, it's relating projects that were from 2009 and
some current projects. I think you even see in that report the
kind of improvement that we've done in terms of processes and
procedures for oversight. There's oversight that happens in the
field through CSTC-A. There's also oversight that happens in
the Department.
Mr. Hice. How many ----
Ms. Abizaid. But my colleagues ----
Mr. Hice.--of these things that you are describing, how
long have those been in place?
Ms. Abizaid. They have increased over time. For instance,
in the Department we have an Afghanistan Resources and
Oversight Council that is co-chaired by me, comptroller, and
one of my colleagues from AT&L. That's been in place for since,
I think, 2013. And we have to approve projects that are above a
certain dollar amount to make sure that it's consistent with
our policy ----
Mr. Hice. Okay.
Ms. Abizaid.--our strategy.
Mr. Hice. All right. Excuse me for interrupting. I just
have a couple more questions. So with that, I mean, time is
going to be the test to confirm whether or not these new
programs being implemented will provide the accountability
needed.
But of the projects that have already been built that
failed to meet our requirements, did I hear correctly that
those contractors were paid in full? I believe that was
mentioned earlier.
Ms. Abizaid. I don't ----
Mr. Sopko. Many of them. I said that. That's what we've
been ----
Ms. Abizaid. Not all of them, sir.
Mr. Hice. All right. Not all of them, but many of them were
paid in full for inadequate jobs, so again, taxpayer dollars
wasted. How many of those projects--both the ones that were
completed properly and improperly, how many are currently
occupied percentagewise or are they all occupied?
Ms. Abizaid. So, sir, of the projects that were
specifically for the MOI and MOD, which I think Mr. Sopko in
his report listed 27 of them, 26 of those are currently
occupied and currently being used by the Afghan National
Security Forces. One of them was canceled actually by the
Department of Defense and saving, I think, up to about $10
million in taxpayer ----
Mr. Hice. I thought I heard earlier that there were several
buildings that were built that were not occupied. Again, part
of the ``we built too much too fast.''
Mr. Sopko. Oh, yes. And remember, the universe--we only
looked at a few of these buildings. What you really need to do
is ask the Department of Defense to tell you of all the
buildings built they've ----
Mr. Hice. Can I ask that ----
Mr. Sopko.--how many are occupied ----
Mr. Hice. Okay.
Mr. Sopko.--how many are being used for the purpose that
they ----
Mr. Hice. Can I ask that we get that number?
Ms. Abizaid. Yes, sir. We'll get that to you ----
Mr. Hice. I mean, it is stunning to me that--amazing at
least that we don't even know what all we have built.
Ms. Abizaid. So, sir, I ----
Mr. Hice. How can we know what is occupied if we don't even
know what we have built?
Ms. Abizaid. For those projects that we've built for the
Afghan military, I think we do know and have good record of
what was built. I think where there is less certainty is--are
those projects that are--that were directed under the
Commander's Emergency Response Program, which is an
appropriation that's gone down over time and has been managed
by individual units in the field, captains, colonels depending
on the size of the unit to undertake immediate-need projects
like building a well, like walls for a school.
And so I think that our records on that go to the amount of
appropriation that was given to a particular unit, not
necessarily all specific projects. But we have good data on
that and we'll certainly get it to you as a question for the
record, sir.
Mr. Hice. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
I will now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sopko, first of all, welcome back. It is good to see
you again.
One of the largest infrastructure projects in Afghanistan
was the new Ministry of Defense headquarters, which has been
dubbed a mini-Pentagon. This project cost about $200 million
with a significant portion of that coming from U.S. taxpayers.
In your report you say this project took almost 5 years longer
to complete than anticipated and cost more than three times the
original estimate. You found that one of the key reasons for
this delay was security issues. In fact, there were multiple
reports of suicide bomb attacks at or near the site during
construction, is that correct?
Mr. Sopko. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Cummings. You indicated that the headquarters building
is well-built but it has some issues that need to be assessed
relating to its ability to withstand earthquakes. At the time
of your report, you were still waiting for documents to close
out these recommendations. Has the DOD provided you with the
information you need to close out those recommendations?
Mr. Sopko. Well, to close out the recommendations, but we
never received the assessments that they did. We said they
should do assessments, but we have not received those
assessments prior to issuing that report. We still haven't
received those assessments.
Mr. Cummings. And do you have any idea when you might get
them?
Mr. Sopko. We have no idea.
Mr. Cummings. Have you been pressing them for them?
Mr. Sopko. We've asked repeatedly, but we couldn't hold the
report any longer. We held it for a long time to get those
assessments. We still have not gotten written assessments. Our
concern is the assessments aren't in writing; they were oral.
That's a concern we have maybe because we're suspicious, but we
still haven't gotten written assessments.
Mr. Cummings. Why would you be suspicious?
Mr. Sopko. Oh, I've been doing this for 20-some years, sir.
After a while, I get suspicious when I ask for something that's
pretty simple to get and I don't get it.
Mr. Cummings. Yes, we are very familiar with that concept.
Mr. Sopko. Yes. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. You also noted that as of January 7, 2016,
the building was not fully occupied. Is that right?
Mr. Sopko. That is correct.
Mr. Cummings. Do you know if it is fully occupied now?
Mr. Sopko. I don't know.
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, it is.
Mr. Cummings. It is?
Ms. Abizaid. At 90 percent occupancy, I believe.
Mr. Cummings. Ninety percent? As of when?
Ms. Abizaid. That is the update I got from the field over
the last 2 weeks, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
So let me turn to Mr. Brown. The project was managed by the
Air Force Civil Engineer Center. Mr. Brown, how did the
security situation in Afghanistan impact the budget and
construction costs of the headquarters building?
Mr. Brown. Yes, sir. I'd say there were probably two
contributing factors there. One was the security you mentioned
with the general security around the area. And we saw that that
impacted us both in dollars and in time. The other thing is the
proximity of that facility to the presidential compound, and so
we--when we would see that there would be delays and there were
fairly extensive delays whenever the President would be moving,
we would have to clear the work area of all the workers until
the President--Afghanistan President was back in place or had
left the compound. And so that cost us about 10 months and
about ----
Mr. Cummings. Whoa, whoa, whoa, the President moving around
cost you 10 months? Is that what you just said?
Mr. Brown. Well, cumulative over the whole time. I'm
talking ----
Mr. Cummings. What?
Mr. Brown. Cumulative--the cumulative impact of that.
Mr. Cummings. All right.
Mr. Brown. Of having to clear the work area of all the
workers and then bring them back on once we were allowed to
bring the workers back on the worksite.
Mr. Cummings. Had that been anticipated?
Mr. Brown. No.
Mr. Cummings. Okay.
Mr. Brown. I don't think we understood that we were going
to have to clear the work area as the head of government moved
around.
Mr. Cummings. So what were some of the other factors that
led to the delays and increased costs?
Mr. Brown. Probably the biggest factor was that when we
went to start the project, the area that we were going to work
in was in the control of the Afghan National Army. It took
about 14 months for us actually secure it to get access to that
area. So from the beginning the project was delayed because we
could not get access to there to begin to do the construction
work. That was the largest single delay that we had.
I mentioned the security issues in there. The other one we
talked a little bit earlier. When we were into the project and
we decided that, amongst all of the folks, including the in-
country leadership, that we should convert this from a cost
plus contract to a fixed price contract, we actually stopped.
That took about 7 months to do that conversion while we did
that. So that added to that also. So between the three things
I've mentioned, security, the ability to get access to the
property, and then the conversion from a cost-plus contract to
a fixed price contract, that--that equated to about 27 months.
Mr. Cummings. So are you confident in the structural
integrity of the building and its ability to withstand
earthquake and terrorist attacks?
Mr. Brown. Yes, we are. I will say that with respect to the
concerns that were raised, we appreciate that we--we did
provide information to CSTC-A to address the concerns. With
respect to the seismic joints, we--we've gone back and that was
part of our assessment to make sure that those were installed
correctly, that those were designed correctly. Again, we use
U.S. standards for that, so these are built to U.S. code so
that we are assured that we are building something that is
seismically sound, and they are. And so we are confident of
that.
We are in large part, not only through our assessment
because just in this last October there was a 7.5 earthquake in
the general area. There was inspections done after the
earthquake. That building held up very, very well. Only minor
superficial damage was done to it. So we believe that the
building is constructed properly and it has been turned over
and is in use, as was mentioned earlier today.
Mr. Cummings. Ms. Abizaid, this facility has cutting-edge
communications security equipment, including security cameras,
key cards access, computers, and x-ray scanners. How will these
features improve operations and security for the Afghanistan
National Defense and Security Forces?
Ms. Abizaid. To the extent that those features make, one,
the ministry more secure, and two, the ministry able to connect
more effectively with the units outside of Kabul, we think that
those are important features of any kind of headquarters
element, including the Pentagon. So we do think that it is
important to have a fully functioning building for the Ministry
of Defense so we can have the kind of leadership over its
security forces that are important for their effective
function.
Mr. Cummings. Do you believe investing in projects like the
new headquarters furthers our national security goals, and if
so, explain that.
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, yes, I do. The need for the Afghan
Ministry of Defense to have a secure building in a secure
location and be able to effectively communicate with their
forces has been an important feature for just making sure that
that minister functions and increasingly on its own so that
we're not taking the slack and doing the work for them
ourselves, which has features of enabling dependence as opposed
to enabling independence. So I do think it's an important part
of what we do.
I think to do it well is very important. I know that there
were some--the cost overruns are a feature of the security
environment unfortunately in Afghanistan. They're also feature
of bad contracting on the--in the early part of the contracts,
maybe some underestimates about how much this was going to
cost, and so while I think these investments are important,
it's also important that we do them right.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. I now recognize myself here.
Mr. Sopko, tell me about the Kabul Bank. I had asked you
previously about the Kabul Bank. Is there any sort of update on
that?
Mr. Sopko. Yes, there is. And I know, Mr. Chairman, you've
been very interested in this, and I know the ranking member has
been very interested, and I think it's because of your interest
that I actually have some good news to report. We have been
working with the new Unity Government, the National Unity
Government, and on my recent trip to Afghanistan on February 22
I met with President Ghani about the Kabul Bank and other
matters.
The President indicated he wanted SIGAR to work with his
new task force that he is creating to find the assets. And so
he is giving us complete access to all relevant bank and
financial records, as well as other individuals. So this is a
tremendous breakthrough. It should have been done years ago,
but President Ghani has focused on this, so we are very happy
about that.
Mr. Cummings. Great.
Mr. Sopko. We have no guarantee we're going to get the
money. It should have been done, like I say, 5 years ago, but
the President is very eager for us to help him and recover the
assets for the Afghan people.
Chairman Chaffetz. Very good. Thank you.
Somebody from the Department of Defense, what is the Task
Force for Business and Stability Operations? What does that do
and why is the Department of Defense doing it?
Ms. Abizaid. We are not any more, sir. The Task Force for
Stability--for Business and Stability Operations closed its
doors in--at the end of 2014, and we are no longer engaged in
the kind of business that TFBSO did.
The reason TFBSO was stood up was as part of our
counterinsurgency mission. Commanders in the field felt that
there was a high demand for DOD to be able to invest in
economic development in a way that would complement those
efforts of State and USAID.
Chairman Chaffetz. So ----
Ms. Abizaid. And that was the theory behind the case, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. Look, I believe in our United States
military. I think that they can do anything if they are given
the mission and the tools to do it. But I worry that we ask the
Department of Defense to go in and do things that is not core
to their mission. We are great war fighters at the Department
of Defense, but to go in and start doing business operations is
maybe a bridge too far.
Of all the projects you have on your plate, of all the
projects moving forward, what is not related to military or the
building up of security forces in Afghanistan?
Ms. Abizaid. So with the closing of TFBSO, I think that the
projects that I'm most aware of are those that are associated
with the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund, and those are about
infrastructure projects associated with the electric grid and
completing power transmission lines, for instance. Those are
projects we undertook starting several years ago, and we're
just trying to finish out those projects. And they're projects
that we do in coordination with USAID given the security
environment and the expertise that the Corps of Engineers
brings to the table.
I think, sir, also just one addendum. We are also doing--
continuing to do work on the Kajaki Dam, which is also a core
competency of the Corps of Engineers.
Chairman Chaffetz. Do you have a list of everything that
you have built? I understand that the CERP funds are very
difficult at that level, but do you have a list of things that
you have actually built?
Ms. Abizaid. We do have a list, sir. I can get that for
you.
Chairman Chaffetz. Mr. Sopko, do you have that list? No.
And what we're talking about, I think, is the CERP. CERP is the
big--is the black hole. We built a lot, and it's not just
digging ditches. We built schools, clinics, and a bunch of
other things, and we don't really have that central database.
We don't have a central database. Nobody does of all the work
that was done in Afghanistan. GAO has found that, and we have
repeatedly found that, and we have made recommendations there
should be a central database of all reconstruction projects.
And I think my colleague even agrees. With the exception of
CERP, they have a pretty good idea, but the CERP funds, we have
no idea what we have built.
Chairman Chaffetz. How much money did we spend there?
Mr. Sopko. Billions, I think. I can get the exact number.
Chairman Chaffetz. Okay.
Mr. Sopko. CERP was a rather large program.
Ms. Abizaid. CERP has changed over time. It looks like it's
at $2.2 billion over the course of the campaign, which is much
different than ASIF or the other funds.
Chairman Chaffetz. You made an assertion that we have--you
said, ``we have increased oversight.'' Really? How do you make
that case because it doesn't seem like that is the case. What
is the metric you used to come to that conclusion that you have
increased oversight?
Ms. Abizaid. Well, sir, I talked earlier about some of the
lessons learned that we have undertaken to increase the kind of
oversight that we have provided for various projects. I think
in the field, given the volume of projects that we're
undertaking, we have better oversight and we have a more
competent Afghan partner who's grown their capability over
several years.
I don't know if my colleagues from the engineering world
would be able to tell in more specifics how they have done that
with specific projects.
Mr. Strickley. Yes, sir. So for the construction projects,
they're--when we arrived there in 2002, there was almost no
construction industry in Afghanistan in the sense that we would
think about construction contracting, and there was very little
engineering--construction engineering capability.
Chairman Chaffetz. Let me ask you a simple question. Do you
have a picture of every project that we have ever done?
Mr. Strickley. I suspect the Corps of Engineers has a
picture of every project we've built, yes.
Chairman Chaffetz. That is one thing I have been asking for
for years, more, quite frankly, from the State Department. It
just seems that in today's digital world we can take a picture.
That is at least some oversight that we actually built
something.
The concern is the drawdown of the forces and the ability
to even get outside the walls is greatly diminished. Mr. Sopko,
perhaps you can give perspective here as I wrap up this line of
questioning.
Mr. Sopko. It's harder to do oversight now. We have the
largest oversight presence of any of the IGs or the GAO, but
it's a security situation we're dealing with.
Now, we haven't just given up and walked away. We have come
up with some innovative techniques, and one of them is using a
number of Afghan civilian organizations and vetting them to get
out and take a look at schools and clinics, and then we double-
check that. And that's how we're getting out to do it. But it's
extremely difficult because of the security situation.
Chairman Chaffetz. All right. Let's now recognize Mr.
Carter of Georgia for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Abizaid--I am sorry--the report that was released today
by SIGAR points to many issues about contractor performance in
Afghanistan. And would you agree that the poor contractor
performance has hindered the Department of Defense's rebuilding
efforts?
Ms. Abizaid. In some ways, yes, it has. Again, I would just
say that Mr. Sopko's report details 44 projects, which is among
over 1,000 that we've actually undertaken in the country.
Mr. Carter. Okay. Let me ask you something. On these
projects, are there any provisions in your reconstruction
contracts that require the contractor to complete the project
before they are paid?
Ms. Abizaid. Let me turn to my colleague ----
Mr. Carter. Sure. Sure.
Ms. Abizaid.--in engineering.
Mr. Strickley. Yes. Yes, sir. We use the exact same Federal
Acquisition Regulations to do contracting in Afghanistan that
we would use in the United States. So they are paid--the
contractors are paid based on placement. Every month, every 2
months they send us an invoice, we confirm they've done the
work, and if they have, then we pay them ----
Mr. Carter. So it is not the ----
Mr. Strickley.--for the work performed.
Mr. Carter.--complete project, it is just that portion of
the project that you are paying for?
Mr. Strickley. Yes. Yes, sir. We pay them progress. As they
make progress, we pay them, same as we would here ----
Mr. Carter. Do you ever hold back any in anticipation of,
you know, you have got to complete this project, not this
portion of the project but this project has got to be completed
before you get the last check?
Mr. Strickley. Yes, sir, absolutely. And so when a
contractor falls behind schedule, the FAR, the Federal
Acquisition Regulation, allows us to withhold up to 10 percent
of the value of the project until they either catch up their
schedule or they finish.
But, as I said earlier, many of these firms that we're
contracting with in Afghanistan are very small businesses.
We're trying to build an industry there. If we withhold much of
a payment from them, they will simply fail as a business. They
do not--they don't have the capital to carry the projects, and
when they fall behind, they won't pay their subcontractors, and
then we have security problems on the jobsite if the
subcontractors ----
Mr. Carter. And I am understanding of that and I am
appreciative of that, but at the same time, this is interfering
with the Department of Defense's rebuilding efforts. I mean,
that has been acknowledged. We have got to do something. I
mean, you know, we are getting reports that we are continuing
to contract with firms that aren't finishing the work.
Mr. Strickley. The firms in Afghanistan that we do business
with have gotten better and better over the years. We've
literally had hundreds of Afghan construction firms perform
satisfactorily on our projects. We've completed about 1,200
projects for DOD in Afghanistan, and we've literally done
business with hundreds of small Afghan firms. So we've created
a credible construction capacity there, and they are performing
quite well.
Security obviously is not within the control of the
construction contractors, so as workers are driven off the site
or if we can't get material to the site, there's little we can
do about that.
Mr. Carter. Okay. Mr. Sopko, let me ask you. Let me ask you
your opinion of the oversight that the Department of Defense
does on these projects. Do you think that it is adequate?
Mr. Sopko. No. No, it is not. Part of it is because of
security. It's not adequate. We have seen time and time again,
and even on recent projects, somebody can't get out and check
and see if the project was finished, you know, and it was
completed in a proper manner.
Mr. Carter. Yet they are continuing to pay them?
Mr. Sopko. Of course. If no one goes out and kicks the
tires, you make the payment. So, no. And again ----
Mr. Carter. Okay. You all have got me confused here. Okay.
I have got somebody telling me, yes, we were doing good and we
are doing better and then I got somebody else telling me, no --
--
Mr. Strickley. Sir, we employ--right now, we have 30--I
think we have 39 projects still under construction in
Afghanistan. We employ about 200 Afghan engineers who are
capable of visiting all of those project sites and do on a
regular basis.
Mr. Carter. Okay. I am sorry to interrupt you but I want to
get back to Mr. Sopko. I have got a report that the Ministry of
Defense building took 5 years, 5--1, 2, 3, 4, 5 years times the
original budget to complete, yet it is still not fully
complete. Is that true? Mr. Sopko, is that ----
Mr. Sopko. Well, yes, I think the construction is completed
as a--when we ended it, I don't think it was fully occupied. I
think it's finished but it's not fully occupied.
Mr. Carter. Five years?
Ms. Abizaid. It's now complete and fully occupied. Mr.
Brown's organization took care of that construction.
Mr. Brown. It was complete last summer and turned over to
the CSTC-A and has been ----
Mr. Carter. But I am correct, 5 years?
Mr. Brown. Approximately 5 years, yes. And we kind of went
through ----
Mr. Carter. Is that acceptable?
Mr. Brown. No, it is not.
Mr. Carter. Then what can we do to make it--what can we do
to improve? I mean--and out of all due respect, I don't need to
hear just, oh, it is security concerns.
Mr. Sopko. Mr. Chairman, this is--I mean, Congressman, this
is in the most secure location in Afghanistan. This isn't
downtown Kabul. You can see the building from our embassy. This
is a thing that was done recently. Now, we have MOI. You can
see that from the airport.
And so if the security situation is bad, and I recognize
there are security problems, if they can't do it under time and
on budget there, what do you expect if they're doing something
in Kajaki where no American can get to? And that was one of the
things that they're still working on, the Kajaki Dam. We have
been trying to finish the Kajaki Dam since 1950. It is the
longest public works projects in the history of the United
States. It makes the Big Dig look like a real short dig.
Now, we are putting money and money in it. I heard somebody
refer to dams the--use decided to go on budget because we
couldn't do the product--project ourselves. So we gave it to
the Afghans to do it. But there's no Americans checking to see
if they're doing it. Last time we heard, the turbine parts had
been sitting out there for years and been rusting in a bone
yard. They don't fit. They don't work together. But I was
assured by USAID it's going to be completed in my lifetime.
Mr. Carter. You know, maybe what we ought to do is just get
some helicopters and get money and just, you know, drop it over
the country. I mean, seriously. This is totally unacceptable.
Mr. Sopko. Kajaki Dam is now totally surrounded by the
insurgents, and even when we finish Kajaki Dam, sir, most of
the--I wouldn't say most, probably a good percentage of
electricity is going to be diverted to the insurgents. So we
are basically paying for a power plant for the insurgents.
Mr. Carter. Mr. Sopko, thank you, but I will be quite
honest with you, I could have gone all day without hearing
this. This is really disappointing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your indulgence.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. And it is about time we get
USAID and the State Department back up here because so much of
the waste, fraud, the abuse is found within their
organizations.
Mr. Carter. Yes. Absolutely.
Chairman Chaffetz. I would now recognize the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Well, I don't mean to belabor the point, Mr.
Sopko, but I have the transcript from 4/29/15, and we had you
in and I was asking at that time what the amount was you had
cited they couldn't absorb or--and I said steal, but here is my
words there. I believe the amount was $20 billion in
Afghanistan money that was backed up. They had neither the
ability or capacity to spend or steal. I think it was--was that
an accurate statement? I was asking that.
Mr. Sopko, I think you are correct. It is about--actually
it is more than $20 billion right now that has been
appropriated, authorized, but not yet spent. And I guess in a
subcommittee hearing on April 3, 2014, I had asked you for
information on a list of Afghan nationals who you found were
held criminally accountable for some of the theft, and you
provided a response to me at that point.
You also said as of March 31, 2014, $18 billion remained to
be spent. It was either backed up and couldn't be absorbed or
if you want to attribute the stolen to me, I will say that.
What is the amount now, would you estimate?
Mr. Sopko. I think that it's down to 11--approximately $11
billion.
Mr. Mica. But they still can't absorb or, I believe, they
can't absorb that money. They don't have the capacity to absorb
it. So the good news is some of that has been cut off. We are
not giving them more.
Then, I went into prosecutions. Did DOD or State go after
money that was defrauded or criminally expended? Are there any
instances? I mean, there's a lot of fraud, waste, and abuse
going on, but we could go after fraud and criminal action, and
that has been cited.
Mr. Sopko. Well, DOD doesn't actually prosecute cases ----
Mr. Mica. Okay. But have there ----
Mr. Sopko.--nor do we--we ----
Ms. Abizaid. Yes, sir, we have.
Mr. Sopko.--investigate them and then turn them over to --
--
Mr. Mica. Can you give us cases?
Ms. Abizaid. There are examples of us holding to account
those that we have evidence of fraud, waste, and abuse.
Mr. Mica. But I want to know ----
Ms. Abizaid. I think--and that's been enabled by Mr.
Sopko's ----
Mr. Mica.--how many criminally have been held accountable
in United States courts? And then you outline some of the
difficulty in prosecuting within Afghan courts. Can anyone give
me a number, 10, 20, 30? I can tell you over 140 in New York on
the Sandy project.
Ms. Abizaid. I can get that for the record, sir.
Mr. Mica. Okay. I want that in the record and the response.
I follow up on these things.
Mr. Mica. Okay. Then, you went on to cite in your letter to
me that one of the difficulties was prosecuting in Afghan
courts, right? And you actually got one person in to testify, I
guess an American law enforcement person in a case there. But
at that time, 2014, we didn't have an extradition treaty. The
United States has extradition treaties with 110 countries. Who
negotiates the extradition treaty, the Secretary of State?
Mr. Sopko. I believe it's ----
Ms. Abizaid. The State Department.
Mr. Sopko.--State Department.
Mr. Mica. So we never--do we have one now in place?
Mr. Sopko. No.
Mr. Mica. We still do not have an extradition treaty so we
can't go after them there.
Then, there was another handicap you cited, the Afghan
First Initiative. U.S. contractors were restricted so they are
giving the stuff to Afghan contractors who we really couldn't
monitor or go after criminally. Is that still in place, this
Afghan First requirement?
Mr. Sopko. I believe so. I mean ----
Mr. Mica. Do you know?
Ms. Abizaid. No, I'm not--I do not think it is still in
place. The Department ----
Mr. Mica. Well, that would be good to know because we have
no recourse.
Any percentage of what you think has been wasteful or--you
don't like me to use stolen, but ----
Mr. Sopko. Again, I ----
Mr. Mica.--fraud?
Mr. Sopko. Billions, sir ----
Mr. Mica. I mean, $10 billion ----
Mr. Sopko.--billions, just billions.
Mr. Mica. Billions and--yes.
Mr. Sopko. Yes.
Mr. Mica. And we have not been able to go after them or, if
we have, it has been, well, limited both in Afghan courts or
U.S. courts.
Mr. Sopko. Well, Mr. Mica, can I just add ----
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Mr. Sopko.--we have--SIGAR has worked very closely with the
National Unity Government and the President and his people.
Mr. Mica. And you got one person to ----
Mr. Sopko. Well, since then.
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Mr. Sopko. Since then, we actually uncovered a scheme to
defraud a billion-dollar contract that was going to be issued
by the Afghan Government. It was U.S. money. And we brought
that to the President's attention and he did something. He
fired generals, he opened an investigation on it. So this is --
--
Mr. Mica. And ----
Mr. Sopko.--the difference with this new government versus
the old government.
Mr. Mica. Okay. Well, again, an extradition treaty would
probably help, too. That sounds like there is still going to be
spending money. Maybe we could request that or Secretary of
State to do that.
Finally, what does it look like as total assets left behind
value? Since we don't have an inventory of the projects, which
is astounding, is there any guesstimate as to our--I know we
are leaving billions behind, but is it--and we spent $110--I
would have another question, Mr. Chairman, if you--and then I
am very concerned about in Iraq, you know, we spent a billion,
gazillion dollars training these guys and then they cut and
run. Has anyone done an evaluation of our programs there? And
do they have the ability either as a police or defense force to
hold things together?
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, I would say that the Afghan National
Security Forces are actually one of the most nationalist
institutions in Afghanistan, and we've actually seen them fight
very well over the last year ----
Mr. Mica. Well ----
Ms. Abizaid.--obviously with some challenges.
Mr. Mica. But that is not a good answer because I am the
best Representative in the 7th Congressional District. I am the
only one.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Abizaid. I understand, sir. I would say that what we
have seen is a strong ANDSF ----
Mr. Mica. Yes, but ----
Ms. Abizaid.--and a strong commitment to defending their
country. How are they compared to Iraqi security forces is not
something that I have an answer for you.
Mr. Mica. Okay. Well, again, and then the assets, the
amount, maybe somebody could calculate what we are leaving
behind. I know some things, it costs you more to take the asset
out, but there are some infrastructure that you can't remove
that we are leaving behind that they can't maintain or where
they have taken control of where we are spending more money to
renovate it that we don't need to spend.
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, we are engaged in a dialogue with the
Afghans about excess infrastructure that we do not think that
they need and they think--we think that they should divest of.
Mr. Mica. For the record ----
Ms. Abizaid. And we will ----
Mr. Mica.--staff can get that ----
Ms. Abizaid. We will give you a list of ----
Mr. Mica.--in the record, yes.
Ms. Abizaid.--that information for the record, sir.
Mr. Mica. And then maybe we will have an inventory, too.
Mr. Sopko. Congressman ----
Mr. Mica. Don't feel bad, though, because we don't have
inventory of the public assets, the property that we have in
our own agencies in the United States, let alone some place
that is under attack.
Mr. Sopko. Congressman, just so you know, this week my
Special Projects Unit just issued a report that partially
answers your question. It discussed that between January 2010
and October 2015 DOD transferred or closed 616 of 715 bases in
Afghanistan, and the value the DOD put on it was $851 million,
and that consists of 11,900 ----
Mr. Mica. And that is bases so ----
Mr. Sopko. Bases and excess property ----
Mr. Mica. We have got lots of USAID that--tens of billions
----
Mr. Sopko. Yes.
Mr. Mica.--going in to a country that only has a $5 billion
annual budget.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Just a few questions. Speaking of training,
Ms. Abizaid, some of the construction projects have been
constructed as training facilities, is that right?
Ms. Abizaid. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. And they were to house the Afghan National
Police and the Afghan National Army. Are the Afghan soldiers
and police being trained in the facilities that were
constructed with U.S. dollars?
Ms. Abizaid. That's right, sir, yes.
Mr. Cummings. I mean, and how is that going? Is it adequate
for what they are trying to accomplish?
Ms. Abizaid. The training ----
Mr. Cummings. Do you know?
Ms. Abizaid. The training effort that's ongoing is
extensive. It is one that happens in the midst of a
counterinsurgency fight. But my understanding is that, yes, the
training that they're--that is ongoing, some of which we advise
but don't do ourselves because Afghans are now doing it for
themselves is going generally well.
Mr. Cummings. Now, Mr. Sopko, one of the facilities that
you inspected was the Qala-i-Muslim medical clinic in Kabul
Province?
Mr. Sopko. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. Which was built with funds from the
Commander's Emergency Response Program. Your report concluded
that the clinic was serving the community well, is that
correct?
Mr. Sopko. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. And why did you say that?
Mr. Sopko. Well, it had met its contract requirement to
build it, it was well-built, it was being used as intended. So
it was a success story.
Mr. Cummings. So, in fact, you found that in 2013 clinic
records that showed over 1,500 outpatient consultations, 63
prenatal patients, and 63 newborn deliveries since the clinic
opened in 2011, is that right?
Mr. Sopko. I believe so, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And you also found that the Ministry of
Public health was sustaining the facility and inspectors noted
clean floors, well-kept bedding, working heating and electrical
systems and a well-stocked pharmacy. Would you call this a
success story?
Mr. Sopko. Yes, it is a success.
Mr. Cummings. And that is one of the exceptions, I take it?
Mr. Sopko. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. Just listening to today.
Mr. Sopko. Yes.
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, I would disagree a little bit with it
being one of the exceptions, that a success is an exception to
the rule. It might be an exception in the world of Mr. Sopko's
44 projects that he reviewed, but we've undertaken thousands
and we do have other successes. And we're happy to answer Mr.
Sopko's questions about those.
Mr. Cummings. Are there are a number of medical facilities?
Ms. Abizaid. We have constructed some clinics and some
medical facilities over the years, usually through CERP funds,
but that is more now the business of USAID and the State
Department.
Mr. Cummings. Well, going back to this particular clinic, I
think I would conclude that it's a success story. According to
USAID, the percentage of women in Afghanistan receiving
prenatal care has increased from 16 percent in 2002 to 60
percent in 2010, and this has coincided with an infant
mortality rate that has decreased by 53 percent. That is
significant.
Ms. Abizaid. That's right, sir. Life expectancy and
generally quality of life in Afghanistan has improved quite a
bit over the last 14 years.
Mr. Cummings. And you would attribute that to our efforts?
Ms. Abizaid. To U.S. Government and coalition efforts, yes,
I would.
Mr. Cummings. And why do you say that?
Ms. Abizaid. The amount of enabling capacity we've built
for the Afghans, the amount of skills that we have developed
within the Afghan workforce has been significant in terms of
increasing literacy rates, increasing the amount of women that
are in the workforce, increasing the amount of girls that go to
school, education is much better, Afghan security forces exist
in a way that they didn't previously so they can provide for
the security of the Afghan people. So in large part,
Afghanistan is a much better country than it was when under
Taliban rule and when we got there originally.
Mr. Cummings. So do you know what the life expectancy was?
Do you have any comparison numbers?
Ms. Abizaid. I--comparison numbers exist. I don't have them
with me, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Chairman Chaffetz. Just a couple of questions here as we
wrap up.
Ms. Abizaid, if the SIGAR is asking for the top 10
projects, is that something you can get for him?
Ms. Abizaid. Yes, it is.
Chairman Chaffetz. When? By when? When is a good reasonable
time to get him that?
Ms. Abizaid. We will get it to him in a matter of a month.
Chairman Chaffetz. All right. Fair enough.
You mentioned biometric IDs. Explain to me how you are
doing biometric IDs.
Ms. Abizaid. So we have instituted a biometric ID card
system for the Ministry of Defense and the Afghan National
Army. It'll likely be extended to the Afghan National Police.
But this is an ID card much like DOD civilians, DOD military
have that have critical biodata about individual soldiers and
is what is going to be a key piece of requiring that we pay who
has the ID and, you know, increases the accountability of our
paying personnel system.
Chairman Chaffetz. You can go ahead and leave that
microphone on because I am going to keep asking you a few more
questions. When you say biometric information, what would that
include?
Ms. Abizaid. So it includes a number of things. I mean, I
think date of birth, you know, ethnicity. I think that there is
a particular--like Social Security number that is associated
with each--the details of the biometric ID card I can certainly
get to you ----
Chairman Chaffetz. Will it include a picture?
Ms. Abizaid. It does include a picture, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. Do you take fingerprints? I mean ----
Ms. Abizaid. I'm not ----
Chairman Chaffetz.--our own government here, I mean, the
FAA can't seem to do this so I am just fascinated that you
think you can actually execute this. It is not like they can go
to a local Kinko's and get a picture taken and then go get a
real ID.
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, I think they will be issued as part of
the in-processing and the recruitment and training aspect of
when--of the intake ----
Chairman Chaffetz. But don't most people get paid through a
hawala system? I mean they are not going to a Wells Fargo bank
or Bank of America to go cash their checks.
Ms. Abizaid. That's a system that we're changing, sir. I
mean, there was a culture of trusted agents in far provinces
where banks were not available, where Afghan soldiers would
have to rely on them and often get skimped in terms of their
monthly pay ----
Chairman Chaffetz. Where ----
Ms. Abizaid.--but we've actually moved to a mobile money
system, which has had significant success and it's--it connects
soldiers to actual bank accounts, and they can see on their
phone what their balance is and how much they have--they are
due for ----
Chairman Chaffetz. Okay. We are fascinated with the--and,
Mr. Sopko, I hope you can help follow up on this because I
think that is laudable but I think it is--I can't imagine that
you can actually pull that off. I think that is probably the
standard we should get to, but we have a hard time executing
that here in the United States with an awful lot of
infrastructure. In a place like Afghanistan I have a hard time
believing that they can actually execute on that. But more luck
to you but I don't know how much it is going to cost. I mean,
we are dealing right now with the homeland security that has a
very difficult time with this at best. And, Mr. Sopko, if you
can follow up on that, that would be great.
Mr. Sopko. We will. We've monitored it. And actually, in
support of the assistant secretary, it is an improvement. We're
at least having unique identity cards ----
Chairman Chaffetz. Great.
Mr. Sopko.--but, you know, this is 15 years into this we're
finally getting that. And we're asking for people, when they
leave, to give their identity cards back, and we hadn't been
doing that. We've issued a number of reports on it, but we are
glad to see CSTC-A is moving out on that.
Chairman Chaffetz. Great.
Mr. Sopko. It's an improvement.
Chairman Chaffetz. Very good. Mr. Sopko, we have talked
about this in the past, but the $100 billion plus, how much do
you actually think got to Afghanistan? How much has been
siphoned off? How much can we actually point to and verify?
Mr. Sopko. Mr. Chairman, as before, I'm in an awkward spot.
I can't give you an answer. All I know is billions have been
wasted or stolen. But I can't tell you the exact number. We
don't even have a number of all the projects and then know
where they're located, so it's very difficult for us to do
that. No one can.
Chairman Chaffetz. How much--and tell me about--you have
cited, Ms. Abizaid, about the fixed wing. Explain that project
and why you think it is a success. And how much did we spend on
it?
Ms. Abizaid. So we are in the process of delivering fixed
wing platforms for close air support for the Afghans to have as
an organic capability. They are--they have four A-29s, Super
Tucanos they're called, and we will eventually build to 20.
This has been a critical piece in enabling the Afghans to
independently fight the counterinsurgency fight and one where
the burden on U.S.--the U.S. assets has been--will be
significantly decreased as they increase their capacity for
their own close air support missions and aerial fires missions.
Chairman Chaffetz. All right. So I want to try to tackle
this one again. How many people do we have working for the
United States in Afghanistan?
Ms. Abizaid. So, sir, my crack staff did get the answers
for you. So we will confirm these for the record, but what we
could find out in the time allotted, we have 9,800 troops in
Afghanistan, 11,542 U.S. contractors. There are more third-
country nationals and Afghan contractors that the United States
is spending money on.
Chairman Chaffetz. And that's just for the Department of
Defense?
Ms. Abizaid. This is for the Department of Defense, sir. I
don't have ----
Chairman Chaffetz. Right.
Ms. Abizaid.--other numbers. And then in terms of civilian
manning, we're talking about 290 now but I think that the
requirement for civilian manning will likely increase as our
military footprint decreases.
Chairman Chaffetz. And, Mr. Sopko, when you cite nearly
40,000 contractors, is that in addition to her 11,000 or does
that include--when you say 40,000, it includes the Department
of Defense?
Mr. Sopko. That would include. That would include.
Chairman Chaffetz. So we have just less than 10,000 troops.
In addition to that, we have roughly 40,000 contractors,
correct, for ----
Mr. Sopko. That's our best estimate.
Chairman Chaffetz.--a grand total of just less than 50,000
people, correct?
Ms. Abizaid. In terms of U.S. citizens or contractors that
work for the United States?
Mr. Sopko. Yes ----
Ms. Abizaid. It's a different number, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. Yes. We are paying close to 50,000
people to be there, correct? Between contractors and troops,
some of them are Americans, some of them are not Americans, it
is roughly 50,000 people ----
Ms. Abizaid. I think that's a good rough ----
Chairman Chaffetz.--to keep our mission moving?
Ms. Abizaid.--estimate, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. Okay. All right. Listen, thank you so
much. There are a lot of good people in very difficult,
dangerous situations. They are away from their family. I have
been there several times. I need to go back again. But it is a
difficult mission, but it is also a vital mission, and I cannot
thank the men and women enough who are putting their lives on
the line to do this.
So we thank the four of you for your dedication and your
patriotism and your commitment to the country. This is a
valuable exercise. A lot of work goes into these reports and
the analysis, and I don't want to do think that it just goes up
on some shelf. It is very, very helpful as we try to figure out
from our component or our vantage point, you know, what it is
we should do or where we should go next.
So thank you again very much for that, and the committee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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