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     BORDER SECURITY GADGETS, GIZMOS, AND INFORMATION: USING TECHNOLOGY TO
             INCREASE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL

    =======================================================================

                                     HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                                   BORDER AND
                               MARITIME SECURITY

                                     OF THE

                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 24, 2016

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 114-72

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

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                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                       Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
    Lamar Smith, Texas                   Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
    Peter T. King, New York              Loretta Sanchez, California
    Mike Rogers, Alabama                 Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
    Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice    James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
        Chair                            Brian Higgins, New York
    Jeff Duncan, South Carolina          Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
    Tom Marino, Pennsylvania             William R. Keating, Massachusetts
    Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania           Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
    Scott Perry, Pennsylvania            Filemon Vela, Texas
    Curt Clawson, Florida                Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
    John Katko, New York                 Kathleen M. Rice, New York
    Will Hurd, Texas                     Norma J. Torres, California
    Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
    Mark Walker, North Carolina
    Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
    Martha McSally, Arizona
    John Ratcliffe, Texas
    Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
                       Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
                        Joan V. O'Hara,  General Counsel
                        Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
                    I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
                                     ------

                  SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY

                       Martha McSally, Arizona, Chairman
    Lamar Smith, Texas                   Filemon Vela, Texas
    Mike Rogers, Alabama                 Loretta Sanchez, California
    Candice S. Miller, Michigan          Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
    Jeff Duncan, South Carolina          Brian Higgins, New York
    Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania           Norma J. Torres, California
    Will Hurd, Texas                     Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
    Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex             (ex officio)
        officio)
                  Paul L. Anstine, Subcommittee Staff Director
                        Kris Carlson, Subcommittee Clerk
             Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   Statements

    The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From
      the State of Arizona, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border
      and Maritime Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     1
      Prepared Statement.............................................     3
    The Honorable Filemon Vela, a Representative in Congress From the
      State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and
      Maritime Security..............................................     4
    The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
      Homeland Security:
      Prepared Statement.............................................     5

                                   Witnesses

    Mr. Ronald Vitiello, Acting Chief, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S.
      Department of Homeland Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     7
      Joint Prepared Statement.......................................    11
    Mr. Major General Randolph D. ``Tex'' Alles, (Ret.-USMC),
      Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine
      Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department
      of Homeland Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     8
      Joint Prepared Statement.......................................    11
    Mr. Mark Borkowski, Assistant Commissioner and Chief Acquisition
      Executive, Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition,
      U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland
      Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     9
      Joint Prepared Statement.......................................    11
    Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
      U.S. Government Accountability Office:
      Oral Statement.................................................    17
      Prepared Statement.............................................    18

     BORDER SECURITY GADGETS, GIZMOS, AND INFORMATION: USING TECHNOLOGY TO
             INCREASE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL

                                  ----------

                             Tuesday, May 24, 2016

                 U.S. House of Representatives,
                        Committee on Homeland Security,
                  Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:53 p.m., in
    Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Martha McSally
    [Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives McSally, Rogers, Duncan, Hurd,
    Vela, Torres, and Thompson (ex officio).
        Ms. McSally. The Committee on Homeland Security,
    Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to
    order. The subcommittee is meeting today to examine CBP's
    procurement and use of technology to secure the Southern
    Border. I recognize myself for an opening statement.
        First, let me say thanks for your patience. I know we are
    now nearly an hour behind. We will try to be as expeditious as
    possible. We value your time, but you never know when votes are
    going to come up. So I appreciate your grace and your patience
    with that.
        The Southwest Border of the United States is home to nearly
    2,000 miles of majestic, yet rugged and often treacherous
    terrain, terrain that makes Border Patrol access in some remote
    areas a mere impossible proposition. Manpower alone, while
    essential, will never be enough to secure the border. In order
    to enhance situational awareness, we need to leverage
    technological force multipliers that provide persistent
    surveillance across wide swaths of remote areas along the
    border.
        Technology such as cameras, night vision goggles, motion
    sensors, and surveillance equipment have become critical
    elements of our border security operations. These technologies
    have enhanced agent safety, provide a constant monitoring of
    difficult-to-access areas, and extended situational awareness,
    and the ability to interdict criminal activity faster.
        Aviation assets, such unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs,
    often considered UASs, unmanned aerial systems, equipped with
    advanced radar capabilities, have also refined our
    understanding of the significant threat that exists along the
    border, and help reposition and redeploy assets as the flow and
    the vulnerability shift. But technology cannot do any of these
    things if CBP's acquisition and procurement process cannot get
    these tools and the latest cutting-edge technology in the hands
    of the men and women on the ground in a timely fashion.
        Situation awareness is contingent on feeding information
    from centralized operation centers far from the border down to
    the individual agent level, so they can actually respond
    accordingly. Technology has to be focused on meeting the
    immediate needs of the agent, and not stovepiped into a command
    center. I speak to this from first-hand information. I have
    more experience than I would prefer to have in some cases on,
    you know, time-sensitive targeting, on operations centers in
    the military, and so these challenges are similar as far as
    merging together information providing a good common
    operational picture, situation awareness, but not just to the
    generals, but to the troops and those that are actually doing
    the mission. So that is always going to be my sort-of frame of
    mind. Although it is not the same as in the military, there are
    similar challenges as far as using technology, fusing
    information, and providing real-time, near-time decision
    quality information to leadership and to those that are out
    there on the front lines.
        CBP's border technology procurement efforts, to put it
    mildly, have a bit of a checkered history of not delivering
    timely acquisitions that include more failures than successes,
    including the Secure Border Initiative, coastal interceptor
    vessel, ultralight aircraft detection, and mobile surveillance
    capability, which have all become synonymous with a deeply
    troubled acquisition process. These procurements have run over
    budget, behind schedule, been subject to litigation, and wasted
    a good deal of taxpayer dollars to boot. In this time of
    limited budgets, we cannot afford to waste $1 billion on a
    failed system to learn what not to do. Border security cannot
    continue to be held back by a system that has an astonishing
    lack of urgency in getting it done for the people on the
    ground.
        Our agents and officers in the field desperately need the
    capability they have asked for to do the job. But on the whole,
    I don't believe CBP's Office of Technology Innovation and
    Acquisition, OTIA, has delivered. OTIA's mission is to identify
    and acquire products and services to improve CBP's performance
    in securing the borders.
        OTIA has been the lead agency responsible for acquiring
    technologies associated with the Arizona technology plant. As
    far as I can tell, the only procurement that is working well
    and is on budget is the integrated fixed tower program located
    principally in my district. However, this comes after chronic
    delays and the cancellation of SBInet. Now on track, Chief
    Vitiello recently certified to Congress that the program meets
    its operational requirements.
        With the exception of that outlier, industry officials we
    have spoken to tell us over and over again, CBP's requirements
    are often poorly drafted, ill-defined, and, perhaps, most
    alarmingly not stable. Transparency is also a challenge as the
    CBP's ability to forecast their needs so industry can spend the
    research and development dollars to mature technology for use
    in border security applications.
        The Government Accountability Office, GAO, has, on several
    occasions, criticized CBP for not following aspects of DHS's
    acquisition management guidance with the Arizona border
    technology plant and the lack of performance metrics to
    determine if the cost is worth the border security improvement.
        As a result of CBP's troubling procurement record, I
    authored the Border Security Technology Accountability Act that
    ensures border security programs are meeting costs, schedule,
    and performance thresholds, and that technology is subjected to
    a rigorous independent verification and validation process.
    This legislation is vital to restore accountability, but it is
    being held up for reasons unknown in the Senate, even though it
    passed unanimously in the House.
        I am interested to hear from our witnesses on how CBP
    conducts market research, forges for emerging technology,
    repurposes existing Department of Defense equipment, and
    collaborates with DHS's Office of Science and Technology to
    mature technology not quite ready for field deployment.
    Congress repeatedly asked a very simple question when it comes
    to border security: What will it take to gain situational
    awareness and operational control of the Southern Border? Up
    until now, the answer we received have been limited, or not
    backed up by a requirements process, similar to what the
    Department of Defense uses. In short, it was a guess.
        The Border Patrol and Air and Maritime Operations are
    involved in an effort called the ``capability gap analysis
    process,'' or CGAP. It is an aerial-based exercise designed to
    ferret out tactical weaknesses in our border security defenses
    and, hopefully, inform the technological budget process.
    Congress expects the Border Patrol and Air and Marines to be
    able to quickly identify and justify the resources needed to
    secure the border. I am optimistic the CGAP process is a much-
    needed step in that direction.
        Finding solutions to CBP's procurement woes and quickly
    meeting the technology requirements of the men and women
    charged with securing the border is the reason I am holding
    this hearing today. I look forward to the witnesses' testimony.
        [The statement from Chairwoman McSally follows:]
                     Statement of Chairwoman Martha McSally
                                  May 24, 2016
        The Southwest Border of the United States is home to nearly 2,000
    miles of majestic, yet rugged and often treacherous terrain. Terrain
    that makes Border Patrol access, in some remote areas, a near
    impossible proposition.
        Manpower alone, while essential, will never be enough to secure the
    border. In order to enhance situational awareness, we need to leverage
    technological force multipliers that provide surveillance across wide
    swaths of remote areas along the border.
        Technologies such as cameras, night vision devices, motion sensors,
    and surveillance equipment, have become critical elements of our border
    security operations. These technologies have enhanced agent safety,
    provided constant monitoring of difficult to access areas, and extended
    situational awareness and the ability to interdict criminal activity.
        Aviation assets, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, equipped with
    advanced radar capabilities, have also refined our understanding of the
    significant threat that exists along the border and has helped
    reposition and redeploy assets as flow and vulnerabilities shift.
        But technology cannot do any of those things if CBP's acquisition
    and procurement process cannot get these tools and the latest cutting-
    edge technology in the hands of the men and women on the ground in a
    timely fashion.
        Situational awareness is contingent on feeding information from
    centralized operations centers, far from the border, down to the
    individual agent level, so they can respond accordingly. Technology has
    to be focused on meeting the immediate needs of the agent and not
    stove-piped in a command center.
        CBP's border technology procurement efforts, to put it mildly, have
    a checkered history of not delivering timely acquisitions that include
    more failures than successes, including the Secure Border Initiative,
    Coastal Interceptor Vessel, Ultralight Aircraft Detection, and the
    Mobile Surveillance Capability, which have all become synonymous with a
    deeply-troubled acquisition process.
        These procurements have run over budget, behind schedule, been
    subject to litigation, and wasted a good deal of taxpayer dollars to
    boot. In this time of limited budgets, we cannot afford to waste a
    billion dollars on a failed system to learn what not to do.
        Border security cannot continue to be held back by a system that
    has an astonishing lack of urgency in getting it done for people on the
    ground.
        Our agents and officers in the field desperately need the
    capabilities they have asked for to do the job, but on the whole, I do
    not believe that CBP's Office of Technology and Acquisition or (OTIA)
    has delivered.
        OTIA's mission is to identify and acquire products and services to
    improve CBP's performance in securing the borders. OTIA has been the
    lead agency responsible for acquiring technologies associated with the
    Arizona Technology Plan.
        But as far as I can tell, the only procurement that is working well
    and on budget is the Integrated Fixed Tower program, located
    principally in my district, however, this comes after chronic delays
    and the cancellation of SBInet. Now on track, Chief Vitiello recently
    certified to Congress that the program meets its operational
    requirements.
        With the exception of that outlier, industry officials we have
    spoken to tell us over and over again that CBP's requirements are often
    poorly drafted, ill-defined and, perhaps most alarming, not stable.
        Transparency is also a challenge, as is CBP's ability to forecast
    their needs so industry can spend the Research and Development dollars
    to mature technology for use in border security applications.
        The Government Accountability Office has, on several occasions,
    criticized CBP for not following aspects of DHS's acquisition
    management guidance with the Arizona Border Technology plan, and the
    lack of performance metrics to determine if the cost is worth the
    border security improvement.
        As a result of CBP's troubling procurement record, I authored the
    Border Security Technology Accountability Act that ensures border
    security programs are meeting cost, schedule, and performance
    thresholds and that technology is subjected to a rigorous independent
    verification and validation process.
        This legislation is vital to restore accountability but is being
    held up, for reasons unknown, in the Senate.
        I am interested to hear from our witnesses how CBP conducts market
    research, forages for emerging technology, repurposes excess Department
    of Defense equipment, and collaborates with DHS's office of Science and
    Technology to mature technology not quite ready for field deployment.
        Congress repeatedly asks a very simple question when it comes to
    border security: What will it take to gain operational control and
    situational awareness of the Southern Border?
        Up until now, the answer we received was limited, or not backed by
    a requirements process similar to what the Defense Department uses. In
    short, it was a guess.
        The Border Patrol and Air and Marine Operations are involved in an
    effort called the Capability Gap Analysis Process, or C-GAP, a
    scenario-based exercise designed to ferret out tactical weaknesses in
    our border security defenses and hopefully inform the technological
    budget process.
        Congress expects the Border Patrol and Air and Marine to be able to
    quickly identify, and justify the resource needs required to secure the
    border. I am optimistic that the C-GAP process is a much needed step in
    that direction.
        Finding solutions to CBP's procurement woes and quickly meeting the
    technological requirements of the men and women charged with securing
    the border is the reason I am holding this hearing today.
        I look forward to the witness's testimony.

        Ms. McSally. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
    the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Vela, for a
    statement he might have.
        Mr. Vela. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I am pleased to join
    you for today's hearing, examining U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection's efforts to enhance border security through the use
    of technology.
        As a Member of Congress representing a district in the
    U.S.-Mexico border, I understand the importance of technology
    to achieving improved situational awareness, enhanced security,
    and improved facilitation of legitimate traffic along our
    Nation's borders.
        The Department of Homeland Security has, for years,
    attempted to delay various kinds of technology to the borders
    with mixed results. To be fair, identifying, acquiring, and
    deploying the right mix of border security technology is no
    easy task. Technology evolves over time. The flow of border
    crosses and illicit traffic changes. America's borders are
    varied places with different geography, terrain, and climate,
    meaning that what works in Arizona may not work in South Texas,
    and likely will not work on our northern borders. It is
    important that this committee conduct careful oversight of
    CBP's on-going border security technology efforts, including
    the Arizona border surveillance technology plan, and deployment
    of integrated fixed towers in Arizona, procurement of mobile
    surveillance technologies, and the use of Predator B unmanned
    aircraft.
        The Government Accountability Office has reported on the
    Arizona border surveillance technology plan identifying
    management, scheduling, and cost concerns similar to those that
    contributed to SBInet's problems.
        I hope to hear from our GAO witness today about whether and
    how those issues are being addressed by CBP. Given my
    particular interest in South Texas, I also hope to hear from
    our witnesses about the border security's technologies in use
    or planned for the South Texas region. For example, I
    understand that there was a protest with a contract award for
    mobile video surveillance system units which consist of short-
    and medium-range mobile surveillance equipment mounted on
    telescoping masks mounted on Border Patrol vehicles. Many of
    the projected 297 units are slated for deployment in the Rio
    Grande Valley, and I hope to learn what the revised time line
    is for deployment.
        I also know that the weather in Corpus Christi has proven
    challenging for flying CBP's Predator Bs prompting the agency
    to fly the aircraft from other locations.
        I hope to hear from CBP about how these issues have
    affected situational awareness along the border in South Texas,
    if at all.
        Finally, I hope we can have a frank discussion with our
    witnesses about how CBP can best position its on-going border
    security technology programs for success. I thank the witnesses
    for joining us today, and I yield back.
        Ms. McSally. The gentleman yields.
        Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
    statements may be submitted for the record.
        [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
                 Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                                  May 24, 2016
        This committee has conducted vigorous oversight of DHS's attempts
    to deploy security technology along our Nation's borders over the
    years--and with good reason. Beginning with the Integrated Surveillance
    Intelligence System (ISIS), later the America's Shield Initiative
    (ASI), and more recently Project 28 and SBInet, DHS has consistently
    over-promised and underdelivered border security technology.
        For example, at the time then-Secretary Janet Napolitano canceled
    SBInet, the program had been deployed to only 53 miles of border in
    Arizona at a cost of about $1 BILLION. This committee has been
    fortunate to have the Government Accountability Office (GAO) engaged on
    each of these procurements, contributing significantly to our oversight
    efforts.
        With respect to its on-going program, the Arizona Border Security
    Technology Plan, 2 years ago GAO reported that CBP was not following
    best practices for scheduling, verifying cost estimates with
    independent sources, testing technology to determine effectiveness and
    suitability, or establishing performance metrics for the technology. In
    short, GAO's initial work showed that the program suffers from some of
    the same deficiencies that ultimately led the Department to cancel the
    SBInet program.
        In March of this year, GAO reported on CBP's Integrated Fixed Tower
    (IFT) acquisition, a key component of the Arizona Border Surveillance
    Technology Plan. Announced in March 2012, the IFTs--53 fixed
    surveillance tower units equipped with ground surveillance radar,
    infrared cameras, and communications systems--were intended to address
    the capability gap left when SBInet was canceled.
        Unfortunately, DHS was forced to re-baseline the IFT program in
    December 2015, about 3 years after CBP determined the program could not
    meet its initial schedule goals. The program's full operational
    capability date has so far slipped from September 2015 to September
    2020, and acquisition costs have increased by $53 million. Those of us
    who participated in SBInet oversight had hoped CBP learned its lessons
    from that program and would be applying them to this newer effort in
    Arizona.
        I hope to hear from CBP and GAO today about the reasons for the
    cost, schedule, and performance changes for the IFTs. Similarly, I want
    to have a frank discussion about CBP's other major border security
    technology acquisitions and assets, including Mobile Surveillance
    Capabilities (MSCs), aerostats, and Predator Bs. I continue to support
    using technology as a force-multiplier along our Nation's borders.
        However, if there is anything our oversight of DHS's efforts have
    shown, border security technology must be procured, deployed, and
    utilized in an appropriate, cost-effective manner. Otherwise, CBP could
    be left with yet another border security technology system that fails
    to deliver as promised.

        Ms. McSally. We are pleased to be joined by 4 distinguished
    witnesses to discuss the important topic today:
        Ronald Vitiello, the acting chief of the U.S. Border
    Patrol. As a chief operating officer, he is responsible for the
    daily operations of the U.S. Border Patrol and assist the
    commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in planning
    and directing Nation-wide enforcement. Chief Vitiello began his
    Border Patrol career in 1985, and has served in the Swanson,
    Tucson, and Laredo sectors.
        Randolph Alles is the executive assistant commissioner for
    CBP's Office of Air and Marine, a position he has held since
    January 2013.
        In this role, Mr. Alles is charged with overseeing the AMO
    mission of using aviation and maritime assets to detect,
    interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism, and the unlawful
    movement of drugs and other contraband from entering the United
    States.
        Before joining the AMO, he spent 35 years in the United
    States Marine Corps--Semper Fi--retiring in 2011 as a major
    general.
        Mark Borkowski became the assistant commissioner for the
    Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition, or OTIA, at
    U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, in July 2010. In
    this role, he is responsible for ensuring technology efforts
    are properly focused on mission, and well-integrated across
    CBP. Prior to his appointment as assistant commissioner, Mr.
    Borkowski was the executive director of the Secure Border
    Initiative, SBI.
        Rebecca Gambler is the director in the House U.S.--sorry.
    Let me do this again--is a director in the U.S. Government
    Accountability Office, Homeland Security and Justice team,
    where she leads GAO's work on border security, immigration, and
    the Department of Homeland Security's management and
    transformation. Prior to joining GAO, Ms. Gambler worked at the
    National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum or
    Democratic Studies.
        The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
    record. The Chair now recognizes Chief Vitiello for 5 minutes.

    STATEMENT OF RONALD VITIELLO, ACTING CHIEF, U.S. BORDER PATROL,
                  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Vitiello. Thank you, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member
    Vela, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is an
    honor to appear before you today on behalf of the dedicated men
    and women of the United States Border Patrol, and discuss the
    role of technology in our border security operations between
    the ports of entry. This Saturday, the 28th, marks the Border
    Patrol's birthday. Since 1924, the men and women of this agency
    have made significant contributions to securing the homeland,
    from mounted watchmen riding the line in 1924; to guarding Nazi
    prisoners of war; in 1961, securing domestic air flights as
    marshals; and integrating universities in Oxford and Montgomery
    in 1962.
        Proven to be a versatile and effective workforce, our
    agents have helped to capture escaped felons in New York in
    June of last year. On our borders, we try to innovate and use
    technology that enhances agent effectiveness and keeps them
    safe.
        In 1935, we were advanced enough to install and use two-way
    radios in cars and stations. Today, the advanced technology
    deployed along our borders not only enhances the security of
    our Nation by providing us with increased situational awareness
    of illegal activity, it also significantly increases the safety
    of our front-line agents. While the basic Border Patrol mission
    is to secure the Nation's border from illegal entry of persons
    and goods has not changed in the past 92 years, the operational
    environment in which we work and the threats we face have
    changed significantly.
        Today, our mission includes deterring acts of terrorism,
    detecting and intercepting human drug and weapon smuggling and
    trafficking, and preventing and responding to other criminal
    activity. The effective deployment of fixed and mobile
    technology is critical to the Border Patrol operations. With
    these resources, our front-line agents are better-informed,
    more effective, and safer. There is no doubt that technology is
    a critical factor of the Border Patrol strategic plan, which
    implements a security approach based on risk, and emphasizes
    unity of effort through integrated planning and execution with
    our partners.
        Detection technology extends the visual range and awareness
    of front-line agents. Ground sensors alert agents to movements
    and activity, while mounted cameras and sensors on fixed--on
    aircraft fixed towers and Border Patrol vehicles can be
    controlled remotely to verify a target.
        All of this technology works together, and ultimately
    enables the Border Patrol to gain situational awareness, direct
    a response team to the best interdiction location, and forewarn
    agents of any danger otherwise unknown along the way.
        The Border Patrol continually evaluates our situational
    awareness posture, adjusts our capabilities as required to
    secure our borders. We work closely with our operational
    intelligence and acquisition colleagues within CBP and DHS to
    identify and develop technology, such as tunnel detection, and
    monitoring technology, small unmanned aircraft systems,
    tactical communication upgrades, and border surveillance tools
    tailored for the Southwest Border and northern borders.
        In coordination with the DHS joint requirements process,
    the Border Patrol will continue to use the capability gap
    analysis process to conduct mission analysis and identify
    capability gaps and potential operational requirements over the
    short, medium, and long term.
        With all our border technology, CBP works closely with
    agents on the ground to develop operational requirements,
    conduct testing and evaluation, and obtain user feedback to
    ensure the right tools are applied to the right capability gap.
        Thank you, again, for the opportunity to discuss how
    technology enhances the Border Patrol's capabilities and
    strengthens our efforts in securing the border. I look forward
    to your questions.
        Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Vitiello.
        The Chair now recognizes Major Alles for 5 minutes.

      STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL RANDOLPH D. ``TEX'' ALLES, (RET.-
      USMC), EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF AIR AND
      MARINE OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S.
                    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Alles. Good afternoon, Chairwoman McSally and Ranking
    Member Vela and Members of the committee. It is an honor to
    appear before you today to discuss the critical role of
    technology, and specifically CPB's Air and Marine assets in
    securing our Nation's borders. CBP's Air and Marine Operations,
    or AMOs as we call ourselves is a critical component of the
    CBP's layered border security strategy. AMO's 1,272 law
    enforcement agents operate 243 aircraft and 360 vessels, and
    has sophisticated domain awareness network across the United
    States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. AMO's critical
    aerial and maritime missions fall under 4 core competencies:
    Domain awareness, investigation, interdiction, and contingency
    operations and National taskings. AMO is a vital contributor to
    the security of our borders interdicting illicit traffic in the
    air, on the land, and the littoral waters of the United States
    through the coordinated use of integrated Air and Marine
    forces.
        All our highly-specialized law enforcement agents provide
    unique expertise and capability domains in which we operate.
    Since the consolidation of Air and Marine assets within AMO 11
    years ago, we have transformed from a force composed primarily
    of light observation aircraft into a modern air and maritime
    fleet equipped with sophisticated surveillance sensors and
    communication systems. We are working to increase the
    connectivity and networking among all our Air and Marine
    assets. AMO is continuing the efforts to reduce the number of
    our aircraft types and position our assets for highest
    utilization, which will increase both efficiency and
    effectiveness of our operations.
        I would like to take this opportunity to highlight a few of
    our key assets and describe how this technology furthers CBP's
    capability to detect, identify, monitor, and appropriately
    respond to threats in our Nation's borders.
        First, our multi-role enforcement aircraft are highly
    capable and equipped with sophisticated technology systems that
    enable it to be effective over both land and water. These
    aircraft are replacing several older single-mission assets and
    enhance CBP's interdiction and investigative capabilities.
        Second, beyond our borders in the source and transit zone,
    CBP's P-3 long-range aircraft has been instrumental in
    countering narcotic operations, transnational criminal
    organizations, and vessels thousands of miles from the
    homeland. I might mention, they have just completed a rewinging
    of 14 aircraft, a $410 million program which came in under cost
    and ahead of schedule.
        Third, in the maritime environment working in conjunction
    with the aviation assets, our new coastal interceptor vessels
    are physically designed and engineered with the speed
    maneuverability, integrity, and endurance to intercept and
    engage in a variety of suspect noncompliant vessels in offshore
    waters as well as the Great Lakes and on the Northern Border.
        Finally, a vital component of our doing awareness is the
    Intermarine Operations Center. IMOC leverages advanced
    surveillance systems, integrates information from Federal,
    State, local, international, law enforcement, and intelligence
    sources to detect, identify, track, and direct the interdiction
    of suspect criminal use of noncommercial air and maritime
    conveyances approaching, crossing, or operating inside the
    United States--operating inside the borders of United States
    and Puerto Rico.
        We work closely with our operation and acquisition
    colleagues at CBP, including the DHS Science and Technology
    Directorate to identify and develop surveillance and detection
    technology. AMO is also working with Domestic Nuclear Detection
    Office at DHS to develop and test radiological and nuclear
    detection threats beyond--threats aboard our small vessels.
        Chairwoman McSally, and Ranking Member Vela, and
    distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for this
    opportunity to discuss AMO's technology assets, capabilities,
    and efforts in securing our borders. I look forward to your
    questions in a few moments. Thank you.
        Ms. McSally. Thank you, General Alles.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Borkowski for 5 minutes.

     STATEMENT OF MARK BORKOWSKI, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER AND CHIEF
      ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND
         ACQUISITION, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S.
                    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Borkowski. Thank you, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking
    Member Vela, and distinguished Members of the committee. It is
    a pleasure to be back before you.
        As you suggested, Chairwoman McSally, it certainly has been
    a challenging few years, and I share your frustration with the
    delays. The procurement system is very frustrating, I think, to
    all of us. I look forward to a discussion of that.
        When I was last here before you 2 years ago, we were just
    getting to the point where we were awarding contracts, and in
    many cases, there were 2 years of delays in getting to those
    contract awards. A number of reasons for that, some of it is
    cultural, some of it is structural, but that has been a
    continuing frustration. However, since that time, actually, the
    performance on these contracts has been relatively good.
        You cited the IFT, the Integrated Fixed Towers. As you may
    recall, that contract was awarded at a 75 percent cost savings
    compared to our original estimate and continues to perform
    consistently with that, and has performed pretty well against
    its schedule.
        The remote video surveillance system is the other large
    significant program in Arizona. That program also has clicked
    along with--it was awarded at a reduced cost compared to our
    estimate. We have already deployed 4 AORs, the fifth will be
    completed by this year, and it has performed well on its cost.
        The mobile surveillance capability is completely deployed
    to Arizona and is now extending its deployment outside of
    Arizona. That was awarded below its estimated cost and
    performed on cost. In addition, those systems have delivered on
    their performance.
        So I think one of the things I would say is that is as an
    acquisition person, I essentially have 4 degrees of freedom
    that I play with: Cost, schedule, performance, and risk.
        For the most part, I think we have not done well on
    schedule. I would have to acknowledge that. We have failed on
    schedule. We are trying to attack that. I am still looking for
    more ways to do that. But on the cost, schedule, and
    performance on these systems, I actually think we have done
    well once we got them going.
        So Arizona is well under way compared to the baseline. The
    next area of emphasis on the Southwest Border has been Texas.
    Because of the money we saved, we were actually able to free up
    resources to do what our--they started out as pilots with DOD
    reuse, Department of Defense reuse systems. I think the most
    visible of those are the tactical aerostats. We now have 6
    flying in Texas. We are putting up 17 of the towers that are
    associated with those--with cameras and potentially radars in
    areas that, frankly, would not have had technology until
    probably 2018, 2019 because we were able to generate savings,
    and by working with the Department of Defense, we are able to
    get a little more speed in delivery.
        Having said that, though, that is not the long-term plan
    for Texas. The long-term plan for Texas has been remote video
    surveillance systems, mobile video surveillance systems. Those
    contracts are underway. The challenge in Texas has to do with
    environmental land clearances, land acquisition. Those are
    challenges. We are working through those, but that is an 18- to
    24-month problem that we are working through.
        We have gotten tremendous support from Congress on funding
    for that. We are working our way through that.
        Sir, Congressman Vela, with respect to the mobile video
    surveillance systems, those are also, as you suggested,
    designated for Texas. They are very critical there.
        The current contract will provide about 127 of those. The
    protest has been resolved in our favor. The contract is under
    way. We expect to deliver the first 4 of those toward the end
    of this year for testing, and then, over the next 2 years,
    deliver 127 that will be covered under the contract.
        So I think we have made some progress. Am I completely
    satisfied? No. We do have some work to do in terms of, how do
    we handle this very, very slow acquisition process? How do we
    improve that? I look forward to discussions on that.
        Having said that, I do think the programs that we have
    awarded have largely been successful once we have gotten over
    that procurement hump. I look forward to questions going
    forward.
        [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Vitiello, Mr. Alles,
    and Mr. Borkowski follows:]
     Prepared Statement of Ronald Vitiello, Randolph D. ``Tex'' Alles, and
                                 Mark Borkowski
                                  May 24, 2016
        Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members
    of the committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today on behalf
    of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to discuss the acquisition
    and deployment of border security technology between our Nation's ports
    of entry (POE).
        Along the more than 5,000 miles of border with Canada, 1,900 miles
    of border with Mexico, and approximately 95,000 miles of shoreline, CBP
    secures our borders and associated airspace and maritime approaches to
    prevent illegal entry of people and goods into the United States. The
    border environment in which CBP works is dynamic and requires continual
    adaptation to respond to emerging threats and changing conditions. We
    appreciate the partnership and support we have received from this
    committee, whose commitment to the security of the American people has
    enabled the continued deployment of advanced technology assets needed
    to secure the border.
        In the acquisition and deployment of border security technology,
    CBP ensures that investments are effective and that procurement
    processes are efficient, transparent, and compliant with Federal law
    and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy. With all our
    programs, operations, and activities, we welcome oversight and embrace
    our responsibility as stewards of American taxpayer resources.
        When CBP was formed in 2003, it was an organization comprised of
    components that had different approaches, methods, and policies
    regarding acquisition and management activities. Although our
    operations had been integrated under one mission, CBP, and in a broader
    context DHS, lacked a standardized and unified acquisition structure,
    including governance and oversight, strong requirements development
    process, and centralized resource allocation. In order to strengthen
    and streamline acquisition management throughout the Department,
    Secretary Johnson launched the Unity of Effort initiative, which
    established a more collaborative process for decision making, including
    those that shape acquisition and resource allocation.
        A key element of the Unity of Effort initiative is the
    establishment of the Joint Requirements Council (JRC), designed to
    improve the quality and validity of the Department's requirements
    generation and oversight process. The JRC creates a stronger focus
    earlier in the investment life cycle--at the requirements development
    stage--to better position DHS components, including CBP, to effectively
    and efficiently execute acquisition strategies and budgets that
    ultimately close capability gaps.
        As part of this initiative, CBP is the sponsoring component for DHS
    Joint Task Force West and a participating component in Joint Task Force
    East and Joint Task Force for Investigations. These Joint Task Forces
    are conducting the DHS Southern Border and Approaches Campaign Plan
    (SBAC), launched in early 2015, which put the assets and personnel of
    the Department to use in a combined and strategic way to
    collaboratively plan and execute multi-component DHS operations to
    better protect the border. Aimed at leveraging the range of unique
    Department roles, responsibilities, and capabilities, the Campaign
    enhances our operational capability to address comprehensive threat
    environments in a unified way. Together, the DHS Unity of Effort
    initiative and the Campaign will drive border security investments and
    direct DHS resources in a much more collaborative fashion to address
    the range of threats and challenges, including illegal migration,
    smuggling of illegal drugs, human and arms trafficking, the illicit
    financing of such operations, and threat of terrorist exploitation of
    border vulnerabilities.
        Our testimony today will discuss CBP's technology investments
    between the POEs, highlight some of CBP's deployed border technology
    assets, and describe the agency's path forward to ensure that CBP's
    acquisition strategies and structure is in place to meet the challenge
    of a dynamic border threat environment.
                 technology investments between ports of entry
        For CBP, the use of technology in the border environment is an
    invaluable force multiplier to increase situational awareness. Thanks
    to the support of Congress, CBP continues to deploy proven, effective
    technology to strengthen border security operations between the POEs--
    in the land, air, and maritime environments. With enhanced surveillance
    capabilities, CBP can improve its situational awareness remotely,
    direct a response team to the best interdiction location, and warn the
    team of any additional danger otherwise unknown along the way. As a
    result, these investments increase CBP's visibility on the border,
    operational capabilities, and the safety of front-line law enforcement
    personnel.
        It is imperative that DHS and CBP promote operational agility by
    leveraging technological advances and innovative practices. A key
    element of CBP's acquisition strategy, innovation is not simply the
    process of buying the newest technology; rather, it is the product of a
    collaborative culture that supports creativity, optimizes resource
    allocation and pursues the greatest return on investment and delivery
    of prioritized operational capabilities.
        This committee is familiar with the outcome of CBP's SBInet
    program, an earlier component of the DHS Secure Border Initiative (SBI)
    that was designed as a comprehensive and integrated technology program
    to provide persistent surveillance across U.S. borders. The program
    experienced significant schedule delays and cost overruns because it
    did not allow necessary flexibility to adapt to differing needs in the
    various regions of the border. SBInet eventually delivered systems to 2
    Areas of Responsibility (AORs) in Arizona that continue to operate
    successfully. Nevertheless, DHS cancelled SBInet on January 14, 2011,
    because it was too costly and the idea of one, all-encompassing program
    was unnecessarily complex for border technology.
        Since 2011, DHS and CBP have approached our border technology
    requirements, ranging from small to large, simple to complex, in more
    manageable pieces tailored to specific regions on the border. For
    example, CBP's Arizona Technology Plan (ATP), which focuses on
    technology that specifically meets the needs of border conditions in
    Arizona, is the first of many phases in a multi-year effort to provide
    a cost-effective mix of fixed and mobile technology across the
    Southwest Border. The ATP acquisition strategy leverages ``non-
    developmental'' technology to the greatest extent possible, providing
    more flexible, less risky, and less costly procurements and
    deployments. Using the non-developmental approach, most of the programs
    within the ATP are on contract and many systems have already been
    deployed. Although it is too early to declare complete success, the
    early indications of the acquisition strategy are quite positive and,
    in some cases, far exceed our expectations.
        There is no one-size-fits-all approach to border security
    technology acquisition. CBP's Office of Technology Innovation and
    Acquisition (OTIA) works collaboratively with the U.S. Border Patrol
    (USBP) and Air and Marine Operations (AMO) to develop requirements,
    test and evaluate technology, and deploy effective technology in
    support of CBP's border security mission.
    Fixed, Persistent Surveillance
        Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems are one of the technologies
    that are in the process of being acquired and deployed to the Southwest
    Border in Arizona as part of the ATP. IFTs are fixed surveillance
    assets that provide long-range persistent surveillance. These systems
    cover very large areas and incorporate a Common Operating Picture
    (COP), a central hub that receives data from one or multiple tower
    units. The tower systems automatically detect and track items of
    interest, and provide the COP operator(s) with the data, video, and
    geospatial location of selected items of interest to identify and
    classify them. In February of this year, the USBP conditionally
    accepted the IFT system and is currently looking to develop
    improvements for the already-deployed system.
        Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) are another fixed
    technology asset used in select areas along the Southwest and Northern
    borders. These systems provide short-, medium-, and long-range
    persistent surveillance mounted on stand-alone towers, or other
    structures. The RVSS uses cameras, radio, and microwave transmitters to
    send video to a control room and enables a control room operator to
    remotely detect, identify, classify, and track targets using the video
    feed.
        Without fixed-system technology such as IFT and RVSS, the Border
    Patrol's ability to detect, identify, classify, and track illicit
    activity would be decreased. Fixed systems provide line-of-sight
    surveillance coverage to efficiently detect incursions in flat terrain.
    The Border Patrol integrates mobile and portable systems to address
    areas where rugged terrain and dense ground cover may allow adversaries
    to penetrate through blind spots or avoid the coverage areas of fixed
    systems.
    Mobile Capabilities
        The border environment between the ports of entry is dynamic.
    Working in conjunction with fixed surveillance assets, CBP's mobile
    technology assets provide flexibility and agility to adapt to changing
    border conditions and threats. Mobile technologies are deployed in
    California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas as well as several Northern
    Border locations. Along the Southwest Border, Mobile Surveillance
    Capability (MSC) systems provide long-range mobile surveillance and
    consist of a suite of radar and camera sensors mounted on Border Patrol
    vehicles. An agent deploys with the vehicle to operate the system,
    which automatically detects and tracks items of interest and provides
    the agent/operator with data and video of the observed subject.
        Mobile Vehicle Surveillance Systems (MVSS) provide short- and
    medium-range mobile surveillance equipment mounted on telescoping masts
    and consist of a suite of camera sensors mounted on Border Patrol
    vehicles. An agent deploys with the system, which detects, tracks,
    identifies, and classifies items of interest using the video feed. The
    agent/operator observes activity on the video monitor to detect
    intrusions and assist agents/officers in responding to those
    intrusions.
        Another system, which does not need to be mounted to a vehicle, is
    the Agent Portable Surveillance System (APSS). These systems provide
    medium-range mobile surveillance, and are transported by 2 or 3 agents
    and mounted on a tripod. Two agents remain on-site, one to operate the
    system, which automatically detects and tracks items of interest and
    provides the agent/operator with data and video of selected items of
    interest.
        In some areas along the Southwest Border, CBP also uses Unattended
    Ground Sensors (UGS), which provide short-range persistent
    surveillance. These sensors support our capability to detect, and to a
    limited extent, track, and identify subjects. Sensor capabilities
    include seismic, passive infrared, acoustic, contact closure, and
    magnetic, although these capabilities are not necessarily available in
    all deployed UGS. When a ground sensor is activated, an alarm is
    communicated to a data decoder that translates the sensor's activation
    data to a centralized computer system in an operations center. Some UGS
    are used in conjunction with Imaging Sensors (IS). The UGS/IS include
    an imaging capability to transmit images or video back to the
    operations center. As with UGS, UGS/IS are monitored in a centralized
    system and geospatially tracked.
        CBP's Tactical Aerostats and Re-locatable Towers program,
    originally part of the Department of Defense (DOD) Re-use program, uses
    a mix of aerostats, towers, cameras, and radars to provide Border
    Patrol with increased situational awareness through an advanced
    surveillance capability over a wide area. This capability has proven to
    be a vital asset in increasing CBP's ability to detect, identify,
    classify, and track activity.
        The absence of mobile surveillance technology would limit the
    Border Patrol's ability to detect, identify, classify, track, and
    rapidly respond to illicit activity. These technologies not only
    provide significant security benefits and multiply the capabilities of
    law enforcement personnel to detect, identify, and respond to
    suspicious activity, but they also assist with public safety along the
    border. Mobile surveillance technology systems enable agents to
    position the technology where it is needed at a specific moment, extend
    our observational capabilities, and increase the accuracy and speed of
    our response.
        Technology is critical to border security operations. A tailored
    blend of fixed, mobile, and portable surveillance systems that
    complement one another increases the Border Patrol's effectiveness in
    targeting a response to high-risk areas, enabling rapid response
    strategies to maximize limited manpower, and adjusting to seasonal/
    periodic traffic patterns.
    Air and Marine Capabilities
        AMO increases CBP's situational awareness, enhances its detection
    and interdiction capabilities, and extends our border security zones,
    offering greater capacity to stop threats prior to reaching the
    Nation's shores. Through the use of coordinated and integrated
    surveillance capabilities--including aviation, marine, tethered
    aerostats, and integrated ground-based radars--AMO detects, interdicts,
    and prevents acts of terrorism and the unlawful movement of people,
    illegal drugs, and other contraband toward or across the borders of the
    United States. These assets provide multi-domain awareness for our
    partners across the Department, as well as critical aerial and maritime
    surveillance, interdiction, and operational assistance to our ground
    personnel.
        AMO's maritime assets are tailored to the conditions of the threat
    environment in which we operate, and equipped with the capabilities
    required to interdict attempted illicit smuggling of drugs and
    undocumented aliens. Often there is little time to interdict inbound
    suspect vessels and AMO has honed its maritime border security response
    capability around rapid and effective interception, pursuit, and
    interdiction of these craft. AMO employs high-speed Coastal Interceptor
    Vessels (CIV) that are specifically designed and engineered with the
    speed, maneuverability, integrity, and endurance to intercept and
    engage a variety of suspect non-compliant vessels in offshore waters,
    as well as the Great Lakes on the Northern Border.
        CBP's aerial surveillance capabilities are enhanced through recent
    investments and deployments of Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft (MEA).
    The MEA has a multi-mode radar for use over water and land, an electro-
    optical/infrared camera system, and a satellite communications system.
    The MEA replaces several older, single-mission assets and remains the
    only asset customized to provide maritime support in the near-shore
    customs waters. With its sophisticated technology systems, the MEA is a
    highly capable, twin-engine aircraft and a critical investment in CBP's
    maritime, land, and aerial surveillance capabilities.
        P-3 Long-Range Trackers and Airborne Early Warning Aircraft provide
    critical detection and interdiction capability in both the air and
    marine environment. Sophisticated sensors and high-endurance capability
    greatly increase CBP's range to counter illicit trafficking. AMO P-3s
    are an integral part of the successful counter-narcotic missions
    operating in coordination with the Joint Interagency Task Force--South.
    The P-3s patrol in a 42-million-square-mile area that includes more
    than 41 nations, the Pacific Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and
    seaboard approaches to the United States. In fiscal year 2015, CBP's P-
    3s operational efforts led to the total seizure or disruption of more
    than 204,464 pounds of cocaine with an estimated street value of $15.3
    billion.
        Another important asset is the DHC-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft
    (MPA). It bridges the gap between the strategic P-3 and Unmanned
    Aircraft System (UAS) assets and the smaller assets providing support
    in the littoral waters. This tool allows AMO an unprecedented level of
    situational awareness in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean.
        AMO's tactical resources have also received a number of
    technological upgrades to add to their utility. The AS-350 helicopter
    has received avionics upgrades to allow the operators to focus more of
    their attention on the mission, making them more effective. AMO has
    also added detection technology to its fixed-wing light observation
    aircraft, greatly increasing its tactical capabilities.
        Additionally, UAS are increasingly instrumental in CBP's layered
    and integrated approach to border security. The UAS consists of an
    unmanned aircraft, sensors, communication packages, pilots, and ground
    control operators. UAS are used to meet surveillance and other mission
    requirements along the Southwest Border, Northern Border, Southeast
    coastal area, and in the drug source and transit zones. Four of CBP's
    UAS are equipped with Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER)
    sensor systems, which are capable of detecting human movement along the
    ground and increase CBP aerial surveillance, enforcement, and security
    to prevent potential threats from illegally entering the United States.
    Since 2012, VADER has detected over 40,000 people moving across the
    Southwest Border. Since 2006, this versatile platform has been credited
    with interdicting/disrupting 13,144 pounds of cocaine and 321,330
    pounds of marijuana worth an estimated $1.8 billion. The UAS program
    has achieved over 35,900 flight hours since program inception in fiscal
    year 2006.
        UAS and P-3 aircraft are equipped with technology that provides
    full-motion video capture and provides real-time and forensic analysis.
    This advanced detection and communication system enables CBP to
    disseminate images and other sensor data to operational users in real
    time, increasing response effectiveness and speed.
        Perhaps the most important advancements come in the area of data
    integration and exploitation. Downlink technology, paired with the
    BigPipe system, allows AMO to provide a video feed and situational
    awareness to its law enforcement partners in real time. In addition,
    the Minotaur mission integration system will allow multiple aircraft to
    share information from multiple sources, providing a never-before-seen
    level of air, land, and sea domain awareness. As the Minotaur system
    evolves, it will provide even greater awareness for a greater number of
    users.
        AMO also combats airborne and maritime smuggling with an integrated
    long-range radar architecture comprised of ground-based radars and
    elevated radars deployed on tethered aerostats. AMO, in partnership
    with DOD, operates and maintains a large network of terrestrial radars
    to establish and maintain wide-area, persistent surveillance of
    commercial and non-commercial aircraft flying toward, arriving at, or
    passing through our borders. With the awareness generated by this
    sensor network, CBP can detect and respond to air and maritime movement
    anomalies that could pose a threat to our homeland, including
    trafficking organizations attempting to deliver contraband across the
    border by flying beneath the radar field of view of our ground-based
    radars.
        AMO's Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) monitors the low-
    altitude approaches to the United States and denies this airspace for
    illicit smuggling. With 8 aerostat sites--6 along the Southwest Border,
    1 in the Florida Keys, and 1 in Puerto Rico--the TARS' elevated sensor
    mitigates the effect of the curvature of the earth and terrain-masking
    limitations associated with ground-based radars, enabling maximum long-
    range radar detection capabilities. In fiscal years 2014 and 2015 TARS
    recorded nearly 1,000 suspected cross-border attempts, approximately 85
    percent of all Southwest Border radar detections.
        A vital component of DHS's domain awareness capabilities, CBP's Air
    and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) integrates surveillance
    capabilities and coordinates with other CBP operational components,
    including the USBP, Federal, and international partners \1\ to detect,
    identify, track, and support interdiction of suspect aviation and
    maritime activity in the approaches to U.S. borders, at the borders,
    and within the interior of the United States. Coordinating with
    extensive law enforcement and intelligence databases and communication
    networks, AMOC's command-and-control operational system, the Air and
    Marine Operations Surveillance System (AMOSS), provides a single
    display that is capable of processing up to 700 individual sensor feeds
    and tracking over 50,000 individual targets simultaneously. The 8 TARS
    sites represent approximately 2 percent of the total available radars
    in AMOSS, yet were able to account for detecting 53 percent of all
    suspect target detections.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ AMOC partners include the Federal Aviation Administration
    (FAA), the Department of Defense (including the North American
    Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)), and the governments of Mexico,
    Canada, and the Bahamas.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As we continue to deploy border surveillance technology,
    particularly along the Southwest Border, these investments in fixed and
    mobile technology, as well as enhancements of domain awareness
    capabilities provided by the AMOC allow CBP the flexibility to shift
    more officers and agents from detection duties to interdiction of
    illegal activities on our borders.
                   cbp's acquisition strategy and realignment
        Since its establishment in 2010, OTIA has led CBP's acquisition
    oversight and coordination efforts and has been recognized as the
    primary point of contact for CBP acquisition activities. While CBP's
    intent was for all mission offices' acquisition program management,
    requirement development, and oversight to be integrated and
    consolidated under OTIA, because of the broad scope of CBP's mission
    and diversity of operating environments, the management of several of
    CBP's large acquisition programs were not migrated to OTIA. However, in
    the past 5 years, OTIA has aligned CBP's acquisition policies,
    procedures, and practices with DHS Department standards, consolidated
    CBP's acquisition governance and accountability structure, brought
    multiple high-impact programs back on track, and has contracted,
    deployed and sustained critical border security technology assets.
        In 2015, as part of on-going headquarters realignment efforts, CBP
    Commissioner R. Gil Kerlikowske engaged the Defense Acquisition
    University (DAU) to provide a review and recommendations of the state
    of CBP acquisition management. The key DAU alignment-related findings
    and recommendations included clarifying and strengthening the Component
    Acquisition Executive (CAE) independent oversight authority on behalf
    of the Commissioner; separating OTIA's key roles of oversight,
    requirements, and program management; and aligning programs and
    accountability with operational offices. To ensure that these
    recommended improvements are possible, and to ensure CBP's acquisition
    construct aligns with the DHS acquisition oversight framework, CBP is
    in the process of redirecting acquisition, program, and requirements
    management responsibilities.
        This realignment is the next step forward in building off the
    achievements OTIA has made possible, including the standardization of
    acquisition policies, processes, and oversight and the development of
    acquisition expertise in the CBP workforce. The separation and
    redistribution of CBP's acquisition functions--including requirements
    development and program management--from OTIA to other areas within
    CBP's operational structure, increases acquisition effectiveness and
    efficiency, and strengthens agency oversight of acquisition activities.
    CBP's requirements function will be managed under the Operational
    Support (OS) division, where technical experts will work directly with
    front-line operators in the execution of a holistic, strategy-led
    requirements development program. The execution of acquisition programs
    will be aligned directly under CBP's operational components--USBP, AMO,
    and the Office of Field Operations--to tighten the link between
    acquisition programs, users, and funding. Acquisition program
    oversight, policy and procedures promulgation, and acquisition
    workforce management--under the leadership of the Chief Acquisition
    Officer--will be part of CBP's Enterprise Services (ES) division to
    create an even stronger alignment with the DHS acquisition framework.
    The realignment will result in stronger management much earlier in the
    acquisition investment life cycle, increased oversight, as well as
    better integration of CBP personnel and operational expertise.
        CBP works closely with other elements of DHS headquarters and
    fellow Department components to ensure strategy-led, operationally-
    informed requirements development. In coordination with the DHS joint
    requirements process, the USBP and AMO will continue to use the
    Capability Gap Analysis Process (CGAP) to conduct mission analysis and
    identify capability gaps. From this analysis, OS will work with USBP
    and AMO to identify and plan operational requirements over the short-,
    mid-, and long-term and to identify potential solutions, which may (or
    may not) include fencing, roads, or other solutions depending on the
    nature, scope, severity, and geographic location of a given capability
    gap. AMO began C-GAP in October 2015 using best practices and lessons
    learned from the USBP process. The AMO process examines aviation and
    maritime mission spaces and capabilities, while taking advantage of the
    analytical models and processes the USBP has established. AMO and USBP
    gap analyses inform the OS-led requirements process and are prioritized
    and linked to Department activities and strategies. With all
    technology, CBP works closely with agents on the ground to develop
    operational requirements, conduct testing and evaluation, and obtain
    user feedback to ensure that the right tool is applied to the right
    capability gap. Terrain, threat, socio-economic, and political
    considerations vary greatly across sectors and regions, making a ``one
    size fits all'' approach ineffective.
        CBP works closely with the DHS Science & Technology (S&T)
    Directorate to identify and develop technology to improve our
    surveillance and detection capabilities along our land and maritime
    borders. This includes investments in tunnel detection and tunnel
    activity monitoring technology; tactical communication upgrades, Small
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems (SUAS); low-flying aircraft detection and
    tracking systems, land and maritime data integration/data fusion
    capabilities, and border surveillance tools tailored to the Southwest
    and Northern Border, including unattended ground sensors/tripwires,
    upgrades for mobile Surveillance Systems, slash camera poles, and wide-
    area surveillance.
        In addition to collaboration with our DHS partners, as part of
    CBP's efforts to seek innovative ways to acquire and use technology,
    CBP formed a partnership with DOD to identify and reuse excess DOD
    technology. To date, CBP has acquired several types of technology,
    including thermal imaging equipment, night vision equipment, and
    tactical aerostat systems, which increase CBP's situational awareness
    and operational flexibility in responding to border threats. We will
    continue to pursue additional opportunities to leverage DOD excess
    equipment. We will do this in a sustainable way by considering the full
    life-cycle costs of the DOD equipment we are considering before
    acquiring it.
                                   conclusion
        Technology is a primary driver of all land, maritime, and air
    domain awareness. The information obtained from fixed and mobile
    surveillance systems, ground sensors, imaging systems, and other
    advanced technologies enhances domain awareness, informs situational
    awareness, and better enables CBP to monitor, detect, identify, and
    appropriately respond to threats in the Nation's border regions.
        As we look to sustain and recapitalize our border security
    technology assets, we will look to the DHS joint requirement process to
    validate our mission requirements and the strengthened DHS budget and
    acquisition processes to ensure we have the funding and sustainment to
    operate existing equipment to maximum capacity and that we receive new
    assets with the capabilities we require on time and on budget.
        While there is always more work to do, CBP has made significant
    strides to improve acquisition planning, management, and execution.
    These efforts have produced more effective governance and significant
    improvements to current and future acquisitions. Going forward, CBP
    will work with its DHS management partners to improve oversight;
    develop and increase our acquisition workforce; and improve the
    quality, timeliness, and transparency of CBP contracting processes.
        Knit together by the DHS SBAC and the joint requirements processes,
    CBP's acquisition and rapid deployment of technology allows us to
    achieve our strategic and operational objectives in effectively and
    efficiently securing U.S. borders and the approaches.
        Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify today. We look forward to your questions.

        Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Borkowski.
        The Chair now recognizes Ms. Gambler for 5 minutes.

     STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
             JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. Gambler. Good afternoon, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking
    Member Vela, and Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the
    opportunity to testify at today's hearing to discuss GAO's work
    reviewing DHS's efforts to acquire and deploy various
    technologies and other assets along U.S. borders. DHS has
    employed a variety of assets in its efforts to secure the
    Southwest Border, including various land-based surveillance
    technologies, unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, and tactical
    aerostats.
        My remarks today will summarize some of GAO's past work on
    management and oversight of various surveillance technologies.
    I will also share some preliminary observations from our on-
    going work for this subcommittee reviewing CBP's use of UAS and
    tactical aerostats.
        First, GAO has issued numerous reports on DHS's efforts to
    plan for, deploy, and manage land-based surveillance
    technologies under the former Secure Border Initiative and the
    current Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan.
        CBP has made progress in deploying programs under the plan,
    including fixed and mobile surveillance systems, agent portable
    devices, and ground sensors, and these technologies have aided
    CBP's border security efforts. However, we have also reported
    that CBP could do more to strengthen its management of the plan
    and technology programs and better assess the contributions of
    surveillance technologies to apprehensions and seizures.
        For example, CBP has previously experienced delays in some
    of its surveillance technology programs, and CBP's planned
    dates for initial and full operational capability for the
    Integrated Fixed Towers, for example, have slipped by several
    years.
        We have previously reviewed CBP's schedules and life-cycle
    cost estimates for the highest-cost programs under the plan,
    and compared them to best practices. Overall, the schedules and
    estimates for the plans programs reflected some, but not all
    best practices, and we found that CBP could take further action
    to better ensure the reliability of its schedules and cost
    estimates by more fully applying those best practices.
        CBP has taken steps towards addressing our recommendations
    in these areas, such as recently providing us with updated
    schedules for some of the planned programs, and we will be
    reviewing them going forward to determine the extent to which
    they address our recommendation.
        Further, CBP has identified the mission benefits of its
    surveillance technologies such as improved situational
    awareness and agent safety. CBP has also begun requiring Border
    Patrol to record data within its database on whether or not an
    asset, such as a camera, assisted in apprehension or seizure.
    These are positive steps toward helping CBP assess the
    contributions of its surveillance technologies to border
    security. However, CBP needs to develop and implement
    performance measures and analyzing data it is now collecting to
    be able to fully assess the contributions of its technologies
    to border security.
        Second, with regard to UAS and tactical aerostats, based on
    our on-going work for the subcommittee, CBP is currently
    operating 9 Predator B aircraft from 4 locations across the
    country. These aircraft may be equipped with video and radar
    sensors, and they are used for a variety of functions,
    including patrol missions to support Border Patrol and other
    law enforcement agencies and to monitor natural disasters, like
    wildfires or floods.
        CBP operates the aircraft in designated airspace, and more
    than 80 percent of flight hours from fiscal years 2011 to 2015
    were associated with designated air space along border and
    coastal areas.
        CBP also operates 6 tactical aerostats along the border in
    South Texas, as Mr. Borkowski mentioned, and these aerostats
    assist Border Patrol in apprehension and seizures.
        CBP's use of both UAS and tactical aerostat can be affected
    by various factors, such as airspace access and weather.
        In closing, we are continuing to examine CBP's use of UAS,
    tactical aerostats, and other assets and technologies as part
    of our on-going work. We will also continue to follow up on
    actions taken by CBP in response to our recommendations for
    improving management and measurement of technologies deployed
    under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan,
        This concludes my oral statement, and I am happy to answer
    any questions Members may have.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Gambler follows:]
                     Prepared Statement of Rebecca Gambler
                                  May 24, 2016
                                 gao highlights
        Highlights of GAO-16-671T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
    Border and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
    Representatives.
    Why GAO Did This Study
        CBP employs surveillance technologies, UAS, and other assets to
    help secure the border. For example, in January 2011, CBP developed the
    Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, which includes 7
    acquisition programs related to fixed and mobile surveillance systems,
    among other assets. CBP has also deployed UAS, including Predator B
    aircraft, as well as tactical aerostats to help secure the border. In
    recent years, GAO has reported on a variety of CBP border security
    programs and operations.
        This statement addresses: (1) GAO findings on DHS's efforts to
    implement the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and (2)
    preliminary observations related to GAO's on-going work on CBP's use of
    UAS and tactical aerostats for border security. This statement is based
    on GAO products issued from November 2011 through April 2016, along
    with selected updates conducted in May 2016. For on-going work related
    to UAS, GAO reviewed CBP documents and analyzed Predator B flight-hour
    data from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the time period when all
    Predator B centers became operational. GAO also conducted site visits
    in Texas and Arizona to view operation of Predator B aircraft and
    tactical aerostats and interviewed CBP officials responsible for these
    operations.
    What GAO Recommends
        GAO has previously made recommendations to DHS to improve its
    management of plans and programs for surveillance technologies and DHS
    generally agreed.
    border security.--dhs surveillance technology, unmanned aerial systems
                                and other assets
    What GAO Found
        GAO reported in March 2014 and April 2015 that U.S. Customs and
    Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS), had made progress in deploying programs under the Arizona Border
    Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan), but could take additional
    actions to strengthen its management of the Plan and its related
    programs. Specifically, in March 2014 GAO reported that CBP's schedules
    and life-cycle cost estimates for the Plan and its 3 highest-cost
    programs--which represented 97 percent of the Plan's total estimated
    cost--met some but not all best practices. GAO recommended that CBP
    ensure that its schedules and cost estimates more fully address best
    practices, such as validating cost estimates with independent
    estimates, and DHS concurred. As of May 2016, CBP has initiated or
    completed deployment of technology for each of the 3 highest-cost
    programs under the Plan, and reported updating some program schedules
    and cost estimates. For example, in May 2016, CBP provided GAO with
    complete schedules for 2 of the programs, and GAO will be reviewing
    them to determine the extent to which they address GAO's
    recommendation. GAO also reported in March 2014 that CBP had identified
    mission benefits of technologies under the Plan, such as improved
    situational awareness, but had not developed key attributes for
    performance metrics for all technologies, as GAO recommended in
    November 2011. As of May 2015, CBP had identified a set of potential
    key attributes for performance metrics for deployed technologies and
    expected to complete its development of baselines for measures by the
    end of 2015. In March 2016, GAO reported that CBP was adjusting the
    completion date to incorporate pending test and evaluation results for
    recently-deployed technologies under the Plan.
        GAO's on-going work on CBP's use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS)
    for border security shows that CBP operates 9 Predator B aircraft in
    U.S. airspace in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
    requirements. Specifically, CBP's Air and Marine Operations operates
    the aircraft in accordance with FAA certificates of waiver or
    authorization for a variety of activities, such as training flights and
    patrol missions to support the U.S. Border Patrol's (Border Patrol)
    efforts to detect and apprehend individuals illegally crossing into the
    United States between ports of entry. Predator B aircraft are currently
    equipped with a combination of video and radar sensors that provide
    information on cross-border illegal activities to supported agencies.
    CBP data show that over 80 percent of Predator B flight hours were in
    airspace encompassing border and coastal areas from fiscal years 2011
    through 2015. CBP officials stated that airspace access and hazardous
    weather can affect CBP's ability to utilize Predator B aircraft for
    border security activities. GAO's on-going work shows that CBP has
    deployed 6 tactical aerostats--relocatable unmanned buoyant craft
    tethered to the ground and equipped with cameras for capturing full-
    motion video--along the U.S.-Mexico border in south Texas to support
    Border Patrol. CBP operates 3 types of tactical aerostats, which vary
    in size and altitude of operation. CBP officials reported that airspace
    access, hazardous weather, and real estate (e.g., access to private
    property) can affect CBP's ability to deploy and utilize tactical
    aerostats. Border Patrol has taken actions to track the contribution of
    tactical aerostats to its mission activities.
        Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the
    subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department
    of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to acquire and deploy various
    technology and assets to secure U.S. borders. Within DHS, U.S. Customs
    and Border Protection's (CBP) U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) is the
    Federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the National
    borders between U.S. ports of entry (POE).\1\ CBP's Air and Marine
    Operations (AMO) has primary responsibility for detecting,
    interdicting, and preventing acts of terrorism and the unlawful
    movement of people, illegal drugs, and other contraband toward or
    across U.S. borders utilizing aviation and maritime assets. In the last
    3 fiscal years, over 70 percent of all annual apprehensions of illegal
    entrants by Border Patrol have occurred along the Arizona and south
    Texas borders.\2\ Seizures of marijuana and cocaine (in pounds) along
    the Arizona and south Texas borders reported by Border Patrol, as a
    percentage of all annual seizures, has ranged between 88 to 91 and 24
    to 55 percent over the last 3 years, respectively.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Ports of entry are facilities that provide for the controlled
    entry into or departure from the United States. Specifically, a port of
    entry is any officially designated location (seaport, airport, or land
    border location) where DHS officers or employees are assigned to clear
    passengers and merchandise, collect duties, and enforce customs laws,
    and where DHS officers inspect persons applying for admission into the
    United States pursuant to U.S. immigration law.
        \2\ These apprehensions were reported by CBP for fiscal years 2013
    through 2015 in the Tucson, Laredo, and Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol
    sectors.
        \3\ These seizures of marijuana and cocaine (in pounds) were
    reported by CBP for fiscal years 2013 through 2015 in the Tucson,
    Laredo, and Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol sectors.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        DHS has employed a variety of technology and assets to assist with
    its efforts to secure the border. For example, in November 2005, DHS
    announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program,
    which was responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection
    system using technology, known as the Secure Border Initiative Network
    (SBInet). In January 2011, in response to internal and external
    assessments that identified concerns regarding the performance, cost,
    and schedule for implementing the systems, the Secretary of Homeland
    Security announced the cancellation of further procurements of SBInet
    systems. After the cancellation of SBInet, CBP developed the Arizona
    Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan), in January 2011, which
    includes a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras to help provide security
    for the Arizona border to support Border Patrol. Additionally, AMO
    operates a fleet of air and marine assets in support of Federal border
    security efforts, including surveillance through Predator B unmanned
    aerial systems (UAS).\4\ CBP also operates tactical aerostats along the
    border, which are relocatable unmanned buoyant craft tethered to the
    ground and equipped with surveillance technologies.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ CBP uses the term ``unmanned aircraft systems'' for these
    assets. A UAS is composed of a remotely piloted aircraft, a ground
    control station, a digital network, and other ground support equipment
    and personnel required to operate and maintain the system.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Over the years, we have reported on the progress and challenges DHS
    faces in implementing its border security efforts. My statement
    discusses our findings on: (1) DHS's efforts to implement the Arizona
    Border Surveillance Technology Plan and (2) preliminary observations
    related to our on-going work for this subcommittee on the use of UAS
    and tactical aerostats for border security.
        This statement is based on reports and testimonies we issued from
    2011 through April 2016 that examined DHS efforts to secure the U.S.
    border. It also includes selected updates we conducted in May 2016 on
    DHS's efforts to address our previous recommendations related to its
    Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan. Our reports and
    testimonies incorporated information we obtained and analyzed from
    officials from various DHS components. More detailed information about
    our scope and methodology can be found in our reports and testimonies.
    For the updates on our Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan
    work, we reviewed documents from DHS on actions it has taken to address
    findings and recommendations made in our prior reports on which this
    statement is based.
        For on-going work related to UAS, we analyzed CBP policies,
    reports, requirements, and Predator B flight-hour data from fiscal year
    2011 through 2015, covering the time period when all Predator B centers
    became operational. We also interviewed CBP officials responsible for
    Predator B and tactical aerostat operations. To assess the reliability
    of Predator B flight hour data, we reviewed guidance for reporting
    flight hours, interviewed CBP officials about their policies and
    procedures related to tracking flight hours, and compared monthly
    report data with data from other CBP flight hour reports. We found the
    data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting how CBP
    allocates its Predator B flight hours. As part of our on-going work, we
    also conducted site visits to Arizona in February 2016 and south Texas
    in March 2016 where we observed Predator B and tactical aerostat
    operations and interviewed CBP officials that operate and utilize these
    assets.
        We conducted our past and on-going work in accordance with
    generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards
    require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
    appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
    conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
    obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
    based on our audit objectives.
     cbp has made progress in implementing the arizona border surveillance
       technology plan, but could take additional actions to strengthen
                             management of the plan
    CBP Has Initiated or Completed Deployment of Technologies Under the
            Plan and Has Taken Actions To Update Program Schedules and Cost
            Estimates
        In March 2014 and April 2015, we reported that CBP had made
    progress in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance
    Technology Plan, but that CBP could take additional action to
    strengthen its management of the Plan and the Plan's programs.\5\ As of
    May 2016, CBP has initiated or completed deployment of technology to
    Arizona for each of the programs under the Plan.\6\ Additionally, as
    discussed further below, CBP has reported taking steps to update
    program schedules and life-cycle cost estimates for the 3 highest-cost
    programs under the Plan. For example, in May 2016, CBP provided us with
    complete schedules for 2 of the programs, and we will be reviewing them
    to determine the extent to which they address our recommendation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional
    Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-
    14-368 (Washington, DC: Mar. 3, 2014), and Homeland Security
    Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal Actions Needed to
    Improve Accountability, GAO-15-171SP (Washington, DC: Apr. 22, 2015).
        \6\ The Plan's 7 acquisition programs include fixed and mobile
    surveillance systems, agent portable devices, and ground sensors. Its 3
    highest-cost programs, which represent 97 percent of the Plan's
    estimated cost are the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT), Remote Video
    Surveillance System (RVSS), and Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC).
    The IFT consists of towers with, among other things, ground
    surveillance radars and surveillance cameras mounted on fixed (that is,
    stationary) towers. The RVSS includes multiple color and infrared
    cameras mounted on monopoles, lattice towers, and buildings and differs
    from the IFT in, among other things, the RVSS does not include radars.
    The MSC is a stand-alone, truck-mounted suite of radar and cameras that
    provides a display within the cab of the truck.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In March 2014, we found that CBP had a schedule for deployment of
    each of the Plan's 7 programs, and that 4 of the programs would not
    meet their originally-planned completion dates. We also found that some
    of the programs had experienced delays relative to their baseline
    schedules, as of March 2013.\7\ Further, in our March 2016 assessment
    of DHS's major acquisitions programs,\8\ we reported on the status of
    the Plan's Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) program, noting that from March
    2012 to January 2016, the program's initial and full operational
    capability dates had slipped.\9\ Specifically, we reported that the
    initial operational capability date had slipped from the end of
    September 2013 to the end of September 2015, and the full operational
    capability to the end of September 2020. We also reported that this
    slippage in initial operational capability dates had contributed to
    slippage in the IFT's full operational capability--primarily as a
    result of funding shortfalls--and that the IFT program continued to
    face significant funding shortfalls from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal
    year 2020.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ The baseline schedule is to represent the original
    configuration of the program plan and to signify the consensus of all
    stakeholders regarding the required sequence of events, resource
    assignments, and acceptable dates for key deliverables. The current
    schedule is to represent the actual plan to date.
        \8\ GAO, Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Strengthened
    Management, but Execution and Affordability Concerns Endure, GAO-16-
    338SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 31, 2016).
        \9\ Initial operational capability is defined as the deployment of
    7 IFT systems in the area of responsibility for the Nogales Border
    Patrol station. Full operational capability is defined as deployment of
    the IFT system in the additional areas of responsibility of the
    Sonoita, Douglas, Ajo, Casa Grande, and Wellton Border Patrol stations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Despite these delays, as of May 2016 CBP reported that it has
    initiated or completed deployment of technology to Arizona for each of
    the 3 highest-cost programs under the plan--IFT, the Remote Video
    Surveillance System (RVSS), and the Mobile Surveillance Capability
    (MSC). Specifically, CBP officials stated that MSC deployments in
    Arizona are complete and that in April 2016, requirements to transition
    sustainment from the contractor to CBP had been finalized. CBP also
    reported that the RVSS system has been deployed, and testing on these
    systems is on-going in 4 out of 5 stations. Further, CBP reported it
    had initiated deployment of the IFT systems and as of May 2016 has
    deployed 7 out of 53 IFTs in one area of responsibility. CBP
    conditionally accepted the system in March 2016 and is working to
    deploy the remaining IFT unit systems to other areas in the Tucson
    sector.
        With regard to schedules, we previously reported that CBP had at
    least partially met the 4 characteristics of reliable schedules for the
    IFT and RVSS schedules and partially or minimally met the 4
    characteristics for the MSC schedule. Scheduling best practices are
    summarized into 4 characteristics of reliable schedules--comprehensive,
    well-constructed, credible, and controlled (i.e., schedules are
    periodically updated and progress is monitored).\10\ We assessed CBP's
    schedules as of March 2013 for the 3 highest-cost programs and reported
    in March 2014 that schedules for 2 of the programs at least partially
    met each characteristic (i.e., satisfied about half of the criterion),
    and the schedule for the other program at least minimally met each
    characteristic (i.e., satisfied a small portion of the criterion).\11\
    For example, the schedule for the IFT program partially met the
    characteristic of being credible in that CBP had performed a schedule
    risk analysis for the program, but the risk analysis did not include
    the risks most likely to delay the project or how much contingency
    reserve was needed. For the MSC program, the schedule minimally met the
    characteristic of being controlled in that it did not have valid
    baseline dates for activities or milestones by which CBP could track
    progress. We recommended that CBP ensure that scheduling best practices
    are applied to the IFT, RVSS, and MSC schedules. DHS concurred with the
    recommendation and stated that CBP planned to ensure that scheduling
    best practices would be applied, as outlined in our schedule assessment
    guide, when updating the 3 programs' schedules. In May 2016, CBP
    provided us with complete schedules for the IFT and RVSS programs, and
    we will be reviewing them to determine the extent to which they address
    our recommendation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project
    Schedules, GAO-16-89G (Washington, DC: Dec. 2015). We developed this
    guide through a compilation of best practices that Federal agencies and
    industry use. According to this guide, for a schedule to be
    comprehensive, among other things, the schedule should: (1) Capture all
    activities, as defined in the work breakdown structure; (2) reflect
    what resources are needed to do the work; and (3) establish the
    duration of all activities and have specific start and end dates. To be
    well-constructed, among other things, a schedule should have all of its
    activities sequenced in the order that they are to be implemented with
    the most straightforward logic possible. To be credible, the schedule
    should reflect the order of events necessary to achieve aggregated
    products or outcomes, and activities in varying levels of the schedule
    map to one another. Moreover, a schedule risk analysis should be
    conducted to predict a level of confidence in meeting the program's
    completion date. For a schedule to be controlled, the schedule should
    be updated periodically using actual progress and logic to
    realistically forecast dates for program activities, and a baseline
    schedule should be maintained to measure, monitor, and report the
    program's progress.
        \11\ GAO-14-368.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In March 2014, we also found that CBP had not developed an
    Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan in accordance with best
    practices. Rather, CBP had used separate schedules for each program to
    manage implementation of the Plan, as CBP officials stated that the
    Plan contains individual acquisition programs rather than integrated
    programs. However, collectively these programs are intended to provide
    CBP with a combination of surveillance capabilities to be used along
    the Arizona border with Mexico, and resources are shared among the
    programs. According to scheduling best practices, an Integrated Master
    Schedule is a critical management tool for complex systems that involve
    a number of different projects, such as the Plan, to allow managers to
    monitor all work activities, how long activities will take, and how the
    activities are related to one another. We concluded that developing and
    maintaining an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan could help
    provide CBP a comprehensive view of the Plan and help CBP better
    understand how schedule changes in each individual program could affect
    implementation of the overall plan.
        We recommended that CBP develop an Integrated Master Schedule for
    the Plan. CBP did not concur with this recommendation and maintained
    that an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan in one file undermines
    the DHS-approved implementation strategy for the individual programs
    making up the Plan, and that the implementation of this recommendation
    would essentially create a large, aggregated program, and effectively
    create an aggregated ``system of systems.'' DHS further stated that a
    key element of the Plan has been the disaggregation of technology
    procurements. However, as we noted in the 2014 report, collectively
    these programs are intended to provide CBP with a combination of
    surveillance capabilities to be used along the Arizona border with
    Mexico. Moreover, while the programs themselves may be independent of
    one another, the Plan's resources are being shared among the programs.
    We continue to believe that developing an Integrated Master Schedule
    for the Plan is needed. Developing and maintaining an Integrated Master
    Schedule for the Plan could allow CBP insight into current or
    programmed allocation of resources for all programs as opposed to
    attempting to resolve any resource constraints for each program
    individually.
        In addition, in March 2014, we reported that the life-cycle cost
    estimates for the Plan reflected some, but not all, best practices.
    Cost-estimating best practices are summarized into 4 characteristics--
    well-documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible. Our analysis of
    CBP's estimate for the Plan and estimates completed at the time of our
    review for the 2 highest-cost programs--the IFT and RVSS programs--
    showed that these estimates at least partially met 3 of these
    characteristics: Well-documented, comprehensive, and accurate. In terms
    of being credible, these estimates had not been verified with
    independent cost estimates in accordance with best practices. We
    concluded that ensuring that scheduling best practices were applied to
    the programs' schedules and verifying life-cycle cost estimates with
    independent estimates could help better ensure the reliability of the
    schedules and estimates, and we recommended that CBP verify the life-
    cycle cost estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs with independent
    cost estimates and reconcile any differences. DHS concurred with this
    recommendation, but stated then that it did not believe that there
    would be a benefit in expending funds to obtain independent cost
    estimates and that if the costs realized to date continued to hold,
    there may be no requirement or value added in conducting full-blown
    updates with independent cost estimates.
        We recognize the need to balance the cost and time to verify the
    life-cycle cost estimates with the benefits to be gained from
    verification with independent cost estimates. CBP officials stated that
    in fiscal year 2016, DHS's Cost Analysis Division would begin piloting
    DHS's independent cost estimate capability on the RVSS program.
    According to CBP officials, this pilot is an opportunity to assist DHS
    in developing its independent cost estimate capability and that CBP
    selected the RVSS program for the pilot because the program is at a
    point in its planning and execution process where it can benefit most
    from having an independent cost estimate performed as these
    technologies are being deployed along the Southwest Border, beyond
    Arizona. CBP officials stated that details for an estimated independent
    cost estimate schedule and analysis plan for the RVSS program have not
    been finalized. CBP plans to provide an update on the schedule and
    analysis plan as additional details become available, and provide
    information on the final reconciliation of the independent cost
    estimate and the RVSS program cost estimate once the pilot has been
    completed at the end of fiscal year 2017. Further, CBP officials have
    not detailed similar plans for the IFT. We continue to believe that
    independently verifying the life-cycle cost estimates for the IFT and
    RVSS programs and reconciling any differences, consistent with best
    practices, could help CBP better ensure the reliability of the
    estimates.\12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ GAO, 2015 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce
    Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial
    Benefits, GAO-15-404SP (Washington, DC: Apr. 14, 2015).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CBP Has Made Progress Toward Assessing Performance of Surveillance
            Technologies, but Has Not Fully Applied Performance Metrics or
            Assessed the Contributions of Its Technologies
        We reported in March 2014 that CBP had identified mission benefits
    of its surveillance technologies to be deployed under the Plan, such as
    improved situational awareness and agent safety. However the agency had
    not developed key attributes for performance metrics for all
    surveillance technologies to be deployed as part of the Plan, as we
    recommended in November 2011.\13\ Further, in March 2014, we found that
    CBP did not capture complete data on the contributions of these
    technologies, which in combination with other relevant performance
    metrics or indicators, could be used to better determine the impact of
    CBP's surveillance technologies on CBP's border security efforts, and
    inform resource allocation decisions. Although CBP had a field within
    its Enforcement Integrated Database for data on whether technological
    assets, such as SBInet surveillance towers, and nontechnological
    assets, such as canine teams, assisted or contributed to the
    apprehension of illegal entrants and seizure of drugs and other
    contraband, according to CBP officials, Border Patrol Agents were not
    required to record these data. This limited CBP's ability to collect,
    track, and analyze available data on asset assists to help monitor the
    contribution of surveillance technologies, including its SBInet system,
    to Border Patrol apprehensions and seizures and inform resource
    allocation decisions. We recommended that CBP require data on asset
    assists to be recorded and tracked within its database, and once these
    data were required to be recorded and tracked, that it analyze
    available data on apprehensions and technological assists--in
    combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, as
    appropriate--to determine the contribution of surveillance technologies
    to CBP's border security efforts. CBP concurred with our
    recommendations and has implemented one of them. Specifically, in June
    2014, CBP issued guidance informing Border Patrol Agents that the asset
    assist data field within its database was now a mandatory data field.
    Agents are required to enter any assisting surveillance technology or
    other equipment before proceeding.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ See GAO-14-368, and Arizona Border Surveillance Technology:
    More Information on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding, GAO-
    12-22 (Washington, DC: Nov. 4, 2011).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Further, as of May 2015, CBP had identified a set of potential key
    attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed
    under the Plan. However, CBP officials stated that this set of
    performance metrics was under review as the agency continued to refine
    the key attributes for metrics to assess the contributions and impacts
    of surveillance technology on its border security mission.\14\ In our
    March 2016 update on the progress made by agencies to address our
    findings on duplication and cost savings across the Federal Government,
    we reported that CBP had modified its time frame for developing
    baselines for each performance measure and that additional time would
    be needed to implement and apply key attributes for metrics. According
    to CBP officials, CBP expected these performance measure baselines to
    be developed by the end of calendar year 2015, at which time the agency
    planned to begin using the data to evaluate the individual and
    collective contributions of specific technology assets deployed under
    the Plan. Moreover, CBP planned to use the baseline data to establish a
    tool that explains the qualitative and quantitative impacts of
    technology and tactical infrastructure on situational awareness in
    specific areas of the border environment by the end of fiscal year
    2016. While CBP had expected to complete its development of baselines
    for each performance measure by the end of calendar year 2015, as of
    March 2016 the actual completion is being adjusted pending test and
    evaluation results for recently deployed technologies on the Southwest
    Border. Until CBP completes its efforts to fully develop and apply key
    attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed
    under the Plan, it will not be well-positioned to fully assess its
    progress in implementing the Plan and determining when mission benefits
    have been fully realized.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ GAO-15-404SP.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    cbp utilizes unmanned predator b aircraft and tactical aerostats for a
                     variety of border security activities
    Preliminary Observations on CBP's Utilization of Predator B Aircraft
        Our on-going work shows that as of May 2016, CBP operates 9
    Predator B from 4 AMO National Air Security Operations Centers (NASOC)
    located in Sierra Vista, Arizona; Grand Forks, North Dakota; Corpus
    Christi, Texas; and Jacksonville, Florida.\15\ Three Predator B
    aircraft are assigned to the NASOCs in Arizona, North Dakota, and Texas
    while the NASOC in Florida remotely operates Predator B aircraft
    launched from the other NASOCs. AMO began operation of Predator B
    aircraft in fiscal year 2006, and all 4 NASOCs became operational in
    fiscal year 2011. See figure 1 for a photograph of a CBP Predator B
    aircraft.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ AMO's NASOCs perform specialized missions Nation-wide and in
    the Caribbean, eastern Pacific, and Central America, using Predator B,
    long-range patrol aircraft, and other aircraft. From 2010 to 2013, AMO
    operated a NASOC in Cape Canaveral, Florida, for UAS operations.

        CBP's Predator B aircraft may be equipped with video and radar
    sensors utilized primarily to support the operations of other CBP
    components, and Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies.\16\
    CBP's Predator B operations in support of its components and other law
    enforcement agencies include patrol missions to detect the illegal
    entry of goods and people at and between U.S. POEs and investigative
    missions to provide aerial support for law enforcement activities and
    investigations. For example, CBP's Predator B video and radar sensors
    support Border Patrol activities to identify and apprehend individuals
    entering the United States between POEs. CBP collects and tracks
    information on the number of assists provided for apprehensions of
    individuals and seizures of contraband, including narcotics, in support
    of law enforcement operations by Predator B aircraft. In addition,
    CBP's Predator B aircraft have been deployed to provide aerial support
    for monitoring natural disasters such as wildfires and floods. For
    example, CBP's Predator B were deployed in 2010 and 2011 to support
    Federal, State, and local Government agencies in response to flooding
    in the Red River Valley area of North Dakota.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ Predator B sensors include: Electro-optical and infrared
    camera that collects full-motion video, Vehicle and Dismount
    Exploitation Radar (VADER) which collects radar images of moving
    objects, synthetic-aperture radar that collects radar images that show
    terrain and structures and allow for analysis to detect change over
    time, and SeaVue radar which collects radar images of maritime vessels.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        CBP's Predator B aircraft operate in the U.S. National airspace
    system in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
    requirements for authorizing all UAS operations in the National
    Airspace System.\17\ In accordance with FAA requirements, all Predator
    B flights must comply with a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization
    (COA). The COA-designated airspace establishes operational corridors
    for Predator B activity both along and within 100 miles of the border
    for the Northern Border, and along and within 25 to 60 miles of the
    border for the Southern Border, exclusive of urban areas. COAs issued
    by FAA to CBP also include airspace for training missions which involve
    take-offs and landings around a designated NASOC and transit missions
    to move Predator B aircraft between NASOCs. As of May 2016, CBP has
    utilized the NASOC in North Dakota as a location to train new and
    existing CBP Predator B pilots. For our on-going work, we analyzed CBP
    data on reported Predator B COA-designated flight hours from fiscal
    years 2011 to 2015 and found that 81 percent of flight hours were
    associated with COA-designated airspace along border and coastal areas.
    For more information on Predator B flight hours in COA-designated
    airspace, see figure 2.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ See Federal Aviation Administration, Notice N JO 7210.889:
    Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System (Oct. 27,
    2015). The National Airspace System is the network of United States
    airspace that includes the interconnected and interdependent network of
    systems, procedures, facilities, aircraft, and people.

        Based on our on-going work, we found that airspace access and
    weather can impact CBP's ability to utilize Predator B aircraft.
    According to CBP officials we spoke with in Arizona, Predator B flights
    may be excluded from restricted airspace managed by the Department of
    Defense along border areas which can affect the ability of Predator B
    to support Border Patrol. CBP officials we spoke with in Arizona and
    Texas told us that Predator B missions are affected by hazardous
    weather conditions that can affect their ability to operate the
    aircraft. According to CBP officials we spoke with in Texas, CBP took
    steps to mitigate the impact of hazardous weather in January and
    February 2016 by deploying one Predator B aircraft from Corpus Christi,
    Texas, to San Angelo, Texas, at San Angelo Regional Airport which had
    favorable weather conditions. CBP's deployment of a Predator B at San
    Angelo Regional Airport was in accordance with a FAA-issued COA to
    conduct its border security mission in Texas and lasted approximately 3
    weeks. We plan to evaluate how these factors affect CBP's utilization
    of Predator B aircraft as part of our on-going work.
    Preliminary Observations on CBP's Utilization of Tactical Aerostats in
            South Texas
        Our on-going work shows that as of May 2016, CBP has deployed 6
    tactical aerostats along the U.S.-Mexico border in south Texas to
    support Border Patrol. Specifically, CBP deployed 5 tactical aerostats
    in Border Patrol's Rio Grande Valley sector and 1 tactical aerostat In
    Laredo sector. CBP utilizes 3 types of tactical aerostats equipped with
    cameras for capturing full-motion video: Persistent Threat Detection
    System (PTDS), Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS), and Rapid
    Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID). Each type of tactical aerostat
    varies in size and altitude of operation. See figure 3 for a photograph
    of a RAID aerostat. CBP owns the RAID aerostats and leases PTDS and
    PGSS aerostats through the Department of Defense. CBP operates its
    tactical aerostats in accordance with FAA regulations through the
    issuance of a COA.\18\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ See 14 C.F.R. pt. 101. These rules govern operation in the
    United States of, among other things, any balloon that is moored to the
    surface of the earth or an object thereon and that has a diameter of
    more than 6 feet or a gas capacity of more than 115 cubic feet. Id. at
     101.1(a)(1).

        Tactical aerostats were first deployed and evaluated by CBP in
    August 2012 in south Texas. CBP's Office of Technology Innovation and
    Acquisition manages aerostat technology and the operation of each site
    through contracts, while Border Patrol Agents operate tactical aerostat
    cameras and provide security at each site. As of May 2016, Border
    Patrol has taken actions to track the contribution of tactical
    aerostats to its mission activities. Specifically, agents track and
    record the number of assists aerostats provide for apprehensions of
    individuals and seizures of contraband and narcotics.
        Based on our on-going work, we found that airspace access, weather,
    and real estate can impact CBP's ability to deploy and utilize tactical
    aerostats in south Texas.
       Airspace access.--Aerostat site placement is subject to FAA
            approval to ensure the aerostat does not converge on dedicated
            flight paths.
       Weather.--Aerostat flight is subject to weather
            restrictions, such as hazardous weather involving high winds or
            storms.
       Real estate.--Aerostat sites utilized by CBP involve access
            to private property and land owner acceptance, and right of
            entry is required prior for placement. In addition, CBP must
            take into consideration any relevant environmental and wildlife
            impacts prior to deployment of a tactical aerostat, such as
            flood zones, endangered species, migratory animals, among
            others.
        We plan to evaluate how these factors affect CBP's utilization of
    tactical aerostats as part of our on-going work.
        Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the
    subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to
    answer any questions you may have.

        Ms. McSally. Thanks, Ms. Gambler.
        I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
        I want to start off with Ms. Gambler. Are you familiar with
    our Border Security Technology Accountability Act?
        Ms. Gambler. I am, yes, Chairwoman.
        Ms. McSally. Can you share, from your perspective and your
    expertise, and whether that is going to assist in any of the
    challenges that you have raised in the past and continue to be
    issues?
        Ms. Gambler. Absolutely. That bill is very consistent with
    the findings and messages from GAO's prior work looking at
    CBP's efforts to deploy surveillance technologies. For example,
    the bill calls for making sure that technologies have
    acquisition program baselines in place, that the programs are
    monitored according to cost schedule and performance, and those
    address a number of the key findings that we have had related
    to CBP's technology programs. I might also add that it is
    reflective of leading practices and best practices for
    acquisition management.
        Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
        I just want to say, again, this has unanimously passed in
    the House. It is being held up in the Senate. It was reported
    out of committee. I mean, we are hearing, you know, rumors that
    it is being held up because our colleagues don't want us to
    have a win on any border security issue. I hope from, just your
    comments today and looking at the bill, that they would realize
    that this is a win for the taxpayers; this is a win for our
    improvement and processes for it being able to secure our
    border, and I hope we can get past the partisan bickering, and
    actually move this thing forward so we can put it into force.
        Okay. Next question I want to ask, really, Chief Vitiello,
    General Alles, Mr. Borkowski. As I opened up, I mentioned, I
    think, some of the initiatives you are doing are increasing a
    good common operational picture and providing good information
    that might be good for intelligence assessment to understand,
    kind-of, you know, where the cartels are operating. But if we
    are not getting it into the agent's hand, if they are not
    getting the information that the people back in the operation
    center have, then, you know, we still have more steps to make,
    right? So that they can, not have information overload, but
    actually have the best situation awareness possible.
        So of the technologies mentioned, or maybe some that are
    under development, which ones are actually in the hands of the
    agents that are out there intercepting the activity, or are
    they getting information over a radio? I want to--I just want
    to have a sense of, like, where they are in getting that
    information and what other initiatives might be in the pipeline
    in order to improve situation awareness for the agents that are
    out there?
        Mr. Vitiello. Thanks for that question.
        A lot of what the agents, and what we have invested in, and
    what we have been able to take from the DOD reuse, are
    association with the Department of Defense to take some of
    their excess material and equipment and put that in the hands
    of agents. So, obviously, the things that they use, the
    terminal binoculars, the long-range assistance to their vision,
    those are all hand-held. Some of those are truck-mounted, so
    those are all in the hands of the agents. So the agents that
    are operating that equipment can, in real time, inform response
    teams that are deployed with them in close proximity, the
    towers, the cameras, the RVSS. There is a combination of some
    of that being deployed at the sector level. So there is a
    command center in Tucson where the sector is, and that activity
    is then dispatched for response in that location.
        Ms. McSally. But is that by voice? That is what I am trying
    to get at. You might have a ground sensor; you have got a
    predator flying; you have got the information from the IFTs. We
    have perfect situational awareness in the command center.
    Again, I have been there in the military, where you understate
    exactly where the traffic is, but then you are telling the poor
    guy, poor gal on the run on a radio, like, here is what is
    happening. Are there tools that is actually getting that
    situation awareness to the agent that is not just a voice call?
        Mr. Vitiello. Yes. So it is via voice, but there are
    precise measurements being taken by the hits that the sensors
    get on the aircraft. Our own towers, our own sensors are
    deployed. All of that material and those sensors are geo-
    referenced, and the agents are getting precise details about
    where that activity is occurring, and then the classification,
    you know, what kind of threat do they face, how big are the
    groups, et cetera, that does go over voice to them. But they
    are deployed in that same proximity as well.
        So there is a balance that has to be struck in terms of how
    much goes over the air and how much they get in their--in their
    hands as far as using tablets and all those kinds of things. We
    are doing some experiments about getting the information closer
    to them as it is occurring. There is also an information stream
    that they need to be aware of. Right? So when the
    classification comes through, that they prioritize the threat
    information versus just activity writ large.
        Ms. McSally. Great.
        Is there anything, Mr. Borkowski, in the works? Again, when
    I was flying my A-10, I am actually talking to guys on the
    ground that are seeing what I am seeing, my targeting pod, so
    their situational awareness increased.
        Mr. Borkowski. We are clearly, as you suggest, getting
    kind-of, demand for, give me blue force tracking, give me the
    picture that the camera is showing. We don't have that today.
    There are a couple of reasons. One is we don't have the
    infrastructure to send it. So that is one of the things we are
    struggling with.
        Having said that, both with DHS and with DOD, which has
    some of these technologies, our agents have been exposed and
    are piloting those things. I still have to figure out how to
    get the pipe, you know, to send it. But we are creating a
    demand from that. We are looking at technologies that DOD has.
    We have a project with DHS and border security awareness, which
    will look at this question. We have to handle the pipeline.
        One other thing I would add is, one of the things that
    broke badly on SBInet was there was a tremendous investment in
    this particular question that was not tightly defined. We
    actually had to pull away from that in order to build the
    hardware. Now that we have the hardware, we believe we are
    starting to get a tighter definition. But you are right. We
    need to crack that. There are a couple things that are really
    in the way. The biggest one that bothers me is the bandwidth to
    get the signal across.
        Ms. McSally. Yes. Okay. Thank you.
        All right, we are going to do a couple of rounds here, but
    I wanted to give opportunity for others, including the Ranking
    Member of the full committee.
        Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you,
    Ranking Member.
        Some of us have been around a little while, and we have
    seen procurements come and go. I guess I will ask Ms. Gambler:
    Your review of the systems, can you share with the committee
    your analysis of whether or not we are getting better at
    procurements? Or we are about where we have been all the time?
        Ms. Gambler. I think in this area, as it relates to border
    security, I think there has been some progress made, even
    relative to what we reported on 2 years ago as it relates to
    technologies under the Arizona Surveillance Technology Plan.
        CBP has been updating their schedules for some of the
    programs. They--what is called rebaselined the IFT program late
    last year. They are working on piloting an independent cost
    estimate for the RVSS program. So I think in certain areas,
    Ranking Member Thompson, they have made progress. I think there
    are still some key areas where we would like to see some
    additional progress, including for them to be able to assess
    what they are getting out of the systems. We are also, as we
    are starting some new work in these areas interested to see the
    results of some of the testing that's been done on the systems
    that has been recently deployed. So that is still, I think, an
    open question for us.
        Mr. Thompson. Thank you. I would--Mr. Borkowski, were you
    around with SBInet?
        Mr. Borkowski. Yes. I was brought in to try to clean up
    SBInet, but yes, I was around for----
        Mr. Thompson. So you know where I am going, right?
        Mr. Borkowski. I have a suspicion, sir.
        Mr. Thompson. Can you tell me if your clean-up has been
    complete? Can you give the committee assurance that the
    missteps made with SBInet won't be made again?
        Mr. Borkowski. Well, I could never assure you that we would
    never make another misstep. I can tell you that the odds of
    such a misstep are much lower, the risk of such a misstep is
    much lower than it was.
        We learned a lot from SBInet, and you know, we accommodated
    as much of that lesson as we could into this process. Having
    said that, we are still in the process of training people to be
    skilled acquisition program managers. They are getting better,
    but we are still in the process of training people.
        We are still----
        Mr. Thompson. How much of a reliance--excuse me. Are we
    relying on outside contractors to do that? Have we been able to
    pull that capacity within the organization?
        Mr. Borkowski. We do have contractors supporting us, but we
    have built organic, you know, Government employee skills that
    probably did not exist 4 years ago.
        So we do have program managers who are skilled. I wish I
    had more of them. I think that is part of the challenge is
    having enough people to meet all of the demands. So we have a
    mix of contractors, but in the past, we were much more reliant
    on those contractors to augment our own lack of skills. We have
    spent a great deal of time, both in CBP and in DHS in building
    up the Government employee workforce skills.
        Mr. Thompson. So is building up the Government workforce
    capacity an issue of you not being able to find the people, or
    you don't have the money if you found them, to employ them?
        Mr. Borkowski. I think it is both. But there are people out
    there. The money is a challenge. We compete, obviously, for
    Border Patrol Agents, CBP Officers, and frankly, if you had to
    ask what the priority is, I think it is Border Patrol Agents
    and CBP Officers. So we compete. We come after that, as I think
    we should. Money is an issue. There is also the hiring process
    is very long for a whole variety of reasons.
        So when we do identify people, sometimes it is very
    difficult for them to wait out the hiring process. So there are
    those kinds of issues as well.
        Mr. Thompson. So how long does it take to hire somebody?
        Mr. Borkowski. It can take a year-plus in some cases,
    depending on where--you know, how many people are in the queue.
    We are talking about Border Patrol Agents, CBP Officers, our
    own mission support people. We have background investigations.
    There are a whole bunch of people who are competing for the
    resources to do background investigations, so it could be
    months, and go to a year.
        Mr. Thompson. Have you highlighted your lack of being able
    to get people in a reasonable period of time as one of the
    weaknesses in the operation?
        Mr. Borkowski. I think as CBP corporately has spent a great
    deal of time on that question and issue about being able to
    hire people. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Thompson. Madam Chair, I think at some point, we might
    order from a human resources standpoint look at it, because all
    of us running the people all the time who are very qualified,
    who want to work for the Government----
        Mr. Borkowski. Yes.
        Mr. Thompson [continuing]. But if you tell them it takes a
    year, something like that, we ought to be able to come up with
    a better way of vetting people and getting them into the
    system.
        Mr. Borkowski. I agree.
        Mr. Thompson. I guess the last point is, it costs more to
    have outside contractors, right?
        Mr. Borkowski. Not always, sir. It is actually a case-by-
    case, so not always. But I believe it is--if I had my druthers,
    I would have kind of a 2-1 ratio, Government-to-outside
    contractors, and right now I am about 50-50. There are some
    skills that are very difficult to get, frankly, at Government
    salaries, but it depends. It is not always cheaper to have
    Government than contractors. It depends on case-by-case.
        Mr. Thompson. So you wanted two-thirds or one-third?
        Mr. Borkowski. My sense is that would be about ideal. The
    reason for that is I want the capacity to, first of all have,
    surge, right? Government employees are good, steady state. I
    want to be able to surge, and contractor employees are very
    good for that.
        The other reason that I think contractors sometimes help is
    there are some very kind of scarce highly technical skills that
    are more accessible through contractors in many cases than
    through Government employees.
        Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. McSally. Thanks. I want to thank the Ranking Member of
    the full committee.
        In our last hearing here in the District of Columbia, we
    highlighted some of these manning issues for the CBP Officers
    at the port of entry. It took about 18 months. The Border Jobs
    for Veterans Act, which we passed, such as my bill, supposed to
    fast-track our veterans. The goal would be 90 days, but there
    is still a lot of work to do and lot of concerns and
    challenges. But, really, everybody on the subcommittee and
    across the committee that we have heard, so I think we still
    have a lot of work to do.
        Mr. Thompson. Right. I am just trying to make sure that we
    don't lose sight of the fact that that process is still--and
    what have you, and I would like my full statement to be
    admitted into the record.
        Ms. McSally. Without objection. Thank you, Ranking Member.
        Ms. McSally. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
    the subcommittee, Mr. Vela.
        Mr. Vela. So General Alles, what can you tell us about the
    issues in Corpus Christi with the predator being the weather?
        Mr. Alles. So for Corpus Christi, sir, that actually, for
    the predator overall, weather is a challenge for the system.
        Generally, it runs about a 20 percent higher cancellation
    rate than our manned aircraft for weather. So one of the
    efforts we are making currently, system-wide, is we are working
    with General Thomas on our automatic take-off and landing
    system which will improve the cross limitation of the aircraft.
    That is one. Then, second, we are looking at working out of
    divert fields, for instance, we used San Angelo this last year
    that are better winter weather operating locations. We have
    also deployed the asset to the transit zone during the
    wintertime. We get more effective operation out of the
    platform. We have two platforms right now in Columbia and
    Barranquilla operating. So that is how we look at the
    challenges there in Corpus Christi. We get efficiencies out of
    the site. It is a P-3 site also, so the P-3 pilots not only fly
    the P-3, but they fly the predator UAS at the same time. That
    is a great efficiency force in terms of operations, and if we
    split those sites up, we lose that efficiency. So that is how
    we tackled it so far, sir.
        Mr. Vela. So is the fog the issue basically, or----
        Mr. Alles. Generally, it is ceilings. In the wintertime I
    went through flight school actually in Kingsville, and I
    remember on many days sitting there playing AC/DC in the
    waiting room while the fog and whatever it was hung over. So
    getting out of that kind of coastal interference zone, I think
    is advantageous. San Angelo has been a good location.
        Our challenge, honestly, has been the FAA there. We have
    worked through those issues with them. They are very adverse to
    us operating out of civilian airfields. That is the first time
    an unmanned aircraft has operated out of a civilian airfield.
    That has worked well.
        Mr. Vela. Now, with respect to these tactical aerostats,
    how are you dealing with the landowners?
        Mr. Vitiello. So all of the sites need preparatory work, a
    little bit of what my colleague, Mr. Borkowski, said as it
    relates to our towers, real estate acquisition and permission
    to enter lands, et cetera. So all of the sites that are
    operating now are within--in conjunction with the landowners.
    Sometimes that is via a lease, sometimes that is a different
    kind of agreement. But it is all structured and scheduled so
    that they are aware of our presence. So far, we haven't had any
    challenges. It was difficult to move a couple of ones that were
    up north. There was a couple operational decisions, we wanted
    to move the ones closer to the border because of their effect,
    and the efficiency that the agents were getting, but all is
    going well so far.
        Mr. Vela. So, Chief, I think you are well aware of the
    challenges that we have on the other side of the border in
    Tamaulipas, Mexico with respect to cartel activity,
    kidnappings, and murders that have, you know, the State's
    deteriorated, over, you know, the last several years. What I am
    curious about, is there anything that we can do from your
    standpoint, technologically, to help in that area?
        Mr. Vitiello. It is a difficult challenge. We feel bad for
    the people who are a part of those communities. It is such--it
    is unfortunate that they face that situation. I think as it
    relates to help from here is to strengthen our relationship and
    provide Mexico with the mentorship, sharing of best practices,
    mechanisms to exchange information quickly, and then support
    their efforts to reform their domestic and their Federal law
    enforcement.
        Mr. Vela. So following up on that, what kind of shared
    practices are you currently using with law enforcement in
    Mexico?
        Mr. Vitiello. In its best form, we have programs underway
    under the border violence prevention protocols. It is a
    systematic way for us to sit down and understand where the
    violence is taking place, what it means to our deployments at
    the border, between the ports and at the ports as well, and
    then sharing information where it is critical and then it is--
    in a deployment form, we do joint patrols with authorities in
    Mexico, in places where we know that violence or smuggling is
    occurring. It is a great benefit for them to have us close by
    on our side and then doing the same in Mexico. Those have
    worked out very well when they have the resources available to
    do it.
        Mr. Vela. Well, thank you.
        Before I yield, I would just add that I agree with, Madam
    Chair, with your perspective on the use of veterans. I think we
    need to have a much more robust approach around the country
    with respect to educating our veterans about the availability
    of these jobs. I think it is something that I surely look
    forward to working with you on.
        Ms. McSally. I agree with the Ranking Member. As long as it
    doesn't take 18 months for them to get a job. If we can get to
    that in less than 90 days and while they are still on active
    duty, that would be ideal. We have to keep working on that bill
    being implemented for the intent that it was supposed to be. So
    I appreciate it.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rogers from Alabama.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        I want to revisit this issue of the aerostats. Can you tell
    me how many aerostats you have in--that are deployed at
    present?
        Mr. Vitiello. We have 6 deployed in the South Texas area.
        Mr. Rogers. Are they the same model or version or do they
    differ?
        Mr. Vitiello. There are 2 separate versions, they are both
    what we call the tactical version. They are both supported by
    mobile towers that also work the border environment that give
    us cameras and----
        Mr. Rogers. What do you mean supported by mobile towers? I
    see the tower on the truck here. Does that have to go somewhere
    closer to the aerostats?
        Mr. Vitiello. The aerostats, it is a deployment package.
    They come with towers that could be put up remotely. So when
    the envelope is flying, when the balloon is up in the air, it
    has sensors hanging off of it, the EOIR and day cameras, high-
    definition cameras, and then there are towers that support in
    the area as well that can monitor the border for us that----
        Mr. Rogers. They receive signals from the aerostat?
        Mr. Vitiello. The signals go to a small command post, and
    then the information that is obtained there is then dispatched
    to response units in the field.
        Mr. Rogers. So it doesn't go to the truck that is carrying
    the tower?
        Mr. Vitiello. So there are other vehicles that we have that
    are Government equipment that are not DOD reuse; the MVSS, the
    MSS, which are--have similar equipment on masks in the back of
    mobile vehicles. Those are operated by Border Patrol Agents,
    who can then obtain the information from the screens and then
    distribute it via radio to response teams as well.
        Mr. Rogers. Are all 6 of the aerostats deployed at present?
        Mr. Vitiello. They are.
        Mr. Rogers. How long do they stay up?
        Mr. Vitiello. There is maintenance that is required,
    recurring maintenance that is required. We are constantly
    evaluating the readiness rate. They have to be brought down to
    change envelopes when something happens, when the wind is too
    high, things like that. But, generally, I think we talked about
    the other day, they are in the neighborhood of 80 percent up
    time, so while they are available. They are available 80
    percent of the time that they are deployed. But there are
    conditions which cause us to either do maintenance or bring
    them down for weather events, et cetera.
        Mr. Rogers. Are you keeping these in a particular sector?
        Mr. Vitiello. Right now they are deployed in South Texas,
    in what we call the Rio Grande Valley sector, which is the
    McAllen Rio Grande City area. They are there because as my
    colleague, Mr. Borkowski, said because we have a planned
    deployment there for integrated fixed towers for RVSS, for
    planned mobile trucks, et cetera. That stuff has to catch up
    our work on the ground to get those sites ready to purchase
    land, to do the environmental work is underway. In the mean
    time, we have deployed the aerostats to fill that gap given the
    activity levels that are in that part of the border.
        Mr. Rogers. Are all 6 of these from the DOD?
        Mr. Vitiello. They are all DOD reuse equipment that we have
    gotten from them.
        Mr. Rogers. Are there any remaining DOD aerostats available
    that you have not accepted?
        Mr. Vitiello. I believe they have more, but I am not aware
    of any that they have that we are actually asking for. I think
    we have 2 that we are getting ready to deploy elsewhere.
        Mr. Borkowski. Sir, there are--there are 3--3 incarnations
    of this, 2 large ones. DOD owns them, has not accessed them,
    but basically leases them to us. The smaller ones, which are
    called Raid. We own, I think, 8 of them. Two of them are
    deployed, so we have additional ones in storage. We also have
    towers that we can deploy independently of the Raid. So there
    are additional aerostats available that we have in storage.
    They cost, in like $3 million a year to run, so we are pretty
    judicious in how we apply them and where we apply them, but we
    do have smaller ones.
        Mr. Rogers. Do you have a need for more than the 6?
        Mr. Vitiello. We prefer to deploy the mobile technology
    that is on its way to us.
        Mr. Rogers. Why?
        Mr. Vitiello. Excuse me?
        Mr. Rogers. Why?
        Mr. Vitiello. The aerostats are a good gap filler. We see
    them as a temporary asset. We may not continue to use them in
    south Texas as the technology plan, the fuller requirement gets
    deployed. We will take them and use them in a place where the
    technology has to catch up. So they are a good gap filler. But
    because of the expense of their operation, operations and
    maintenance is quite high, so we are looking forward to a time
    where we have a more permanent infrastructure that is not
    dependent on the kinds of costs that these bring to us.
        Mr. Rogers. All of these are tethered, correct?
        Mr. Vitiello. They are.
        Mr. Rogers. At what altitude?
        Mr. Vitiello. I believe there is one that is at 1,800 feet,
    and the other one is something less than that, 12----
        Mr. Borkowski. The smaller ones are around 1,000 feet.
        Mr. Rogers. Have you all considered using some of the non-
    tethered aerostats, then they can loiter for a longer periods
    of time?
        Mr. Borkowski. Like essentially blimps?
        Mr. Rogers. Correct. The Marines use those?
        Mr. Borkowski. We have looked at that. Right now, and the
    problem is we probably have to buy those. Those haven't been
    assessed. The advantage of these tethered aerostats, is that
    although we have to pay the operation and maintenance, we
    didn't actually have to buy the aerostat; we didn't have to buy
    the tower; we didn't have to buy the camera. That is why these
    were so attractive to us, and they seem to be the sensible
    thing for the time being.
        Mr. Rogers. One of the reasons I am so focused on these, is
    in my trips to the Southwest Border, we have had just a world
    of trouble with cameras, whether cameras on poles or trucks or
    whatever. To my knowledge, those problems still exist. Also, I
    like the fact that they are up high, and you can see further
    across the border where there is people gathering.
        So I am just curious, and this would be my final question,
    I know my time has expired: What is the downside?
        Mr. Borkowski. There are two. One is the cost. We are
    trying to drive those costs down. But it is $3 million or more
    for the bigger ones a year for these things.
        The second thing is that they are very weather-dependent.
    The Chief talked about 80 percent, but there are times of the
    year where we can have availability down to 60 percent
    depending on the weather. So you really have to kind-of have to
    trade their availability for the mission and their cost. So our
    sense is that there are probably areas where aerostats will
    make sense, but they are probably not the right long-term
    solution. We are using them like very high towers, as you
    suggested. And there are areas where they see over foliage, but
    in the areas where we are using them, we actually think the
    lower cost, more permanent, more highly-available fixed
    infrastructure makes more sense for the long term. We are still
    studying where the aerostats might have a long-term future, but
    it will probably be in spots.
        Mr. Rogers. I won't ask any more questions, but I would,
    Madam Chairwoman, like to, at some point, revisit the idea of
    micro sats to see if they are using any of those.
        With that, I yield back.
        Ms. McSally. The gentleman yields.
        The Chair now recognizes Ms. Torres of California for
    questions for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Chairwoman.
        How is CBP measuring the effectiveness of the technology
    deployed at the border, and what matrix are used and how does
    that compare over time?
        Mr. Vitiello. So we are collecting all--several elements of
    what you might call output measures, the number of arrests that
    have been made, how often in a particular area, agency
    assaults, the kinds of seizures that are being made, and we
    look at that in conjunction with the kinds of deployments that
    exist in those areas. As our colleague from the GAO reported,
    we are looking at systems that allow us at the time of arrest,
    as we are recording activity, to then attribute the--when there
    is a seizure or an arrest made, attribute the assist of the
    technology in those areas. Over time, you can start to look at
    the effect of certain kinds of deployments and how they
    contribute to seizures and arrests. That way, we can see which
    are the most valuable kinds of assets and how they are deployed
    or whether we need to make changes to those deployments.
        Mrs. Torres. So over time, is this technology going to be
    able to utilize over actual manpower?
        Mr. Vitiello. So we--our experience is, is that when we
    deploy in an area with the technology, be it mobile or fixed,
    we start to see more activity, because we turn the
    information--the information is more available. You know more
    about an area once these deployments occur. So there is usually
    more activity in the beginnings of those deployments.
        But over time, smuggling patterns change. The activity
    changes, the arrest and the effectiveness of the deployments of
    the agents themselves and the responses start to change that
    activity, and the smugglers look for other locations to enter
    in. So we have seen that sort of a spike in activity in the
    immediate aftermath of a robust deployment, and then we see the
    traffic shift and move, and then we--that is why it is
    important to have these gap fillers, that is why it is
    important to have mobile technology so we can be assured to be
    in the right place at the right time.
        Mrs. Torres. I understand that they are--there is a need to
    make a serious commitment, financial commitment, and it is
    going to be a lot more--it is a lot more costlier in the
    beginning, but over time, you know, my question really is, is
    it smart to spend this much money upfront? Are we going to save
    it in having actual personnel costs, you know, a few years down
    the road, and how long? Are we really looking at that, at those
    statistics?
        Mr. Vitiello. When you look at where we have gotten to on
    how we decided on the deployment, the Arizona Technology Plan
    is one, our plans for the other border deployments, we looked
    at--and Mark can speak more precisely about the analysis of
    alternatives--we looked at which technologies would be most
    advantageous. We used our experience and the feedback from
    users to decide in the CGAP process what technologies to use.
        But you are going to have to have--it is our opinion and
    our experience that you are going to have to have a mix. It
    might be more expensive on the front end to install the
    technology, but over time you see benefits of that. Sometimes
    that is fewer deployments in particular areas so that we can
    use the workforce more efficiently.
        Mrs. Torres. Yeah. Over time, I can see where you can
    modify equipment a lot easier than personnel habits.
        How is CBP defining situational awareness and operational
    control?
        Mr. Vitiello. So, on the situational awareness side, we are
    looking at the border in a couple of different ways.
    Situational awareness, as defined, is us being able to
    understand what is happening, have a predictive analysis, like,
    know where particular areas of the border are going to be
    problematic or where we know we are going to have traffic, and
    then have the kind of assets that are available, technology and
    the resources, agents on the line, in those locations to give
    ourselves real-time information about what is going on in that
    area.
        Mrs. Torres. Are all of these metrics that you are
    utilizing public, made public, this information?
        Mr. Vitiello. So, on the CBP site, the CBP.gov, there are
    output statistics about the kinds of activities, arrests. Those
    are usually posted at the end of each month, and so people can
    see that there.
        Mrs. Torres. So this is where the public can better
    understand whether these investments are actually paying out in
    ensuring, you know, that we are minimizing the number of
    crossings?
        Mr. Vitiello. So the statistics that are typically on the
    site don't attribute the work to the technology. It is more
    sort of an output measure of what is happening month by month.
        Mrs. Torres. Okay.
        Thank you.
        Ms. McSally. All right. Great. I am going to continue on
    with another round here. I have a lot of questions now that I
    have you all here.
        So I want to follow up, the Arizona Technology Plan, when
    fully complete--well, let me start with this, actually, Chief
    Vitiello. Our first hearing I had when I took over, you stated
    that, of the 2,000 miles of the border, you have situational
    awareness of about 56 percent of that border, Southern Border,
    right now.
        So for the Arizona Technology Plan, what percentage of
    that, of the miles of the Arizona border, did we have
    situational awareness of? Then, when complete, when it is fully
    rolled out, are we going to have 100 percent situational
    awareness so if it moves we see it, when the whole plan is
    implemented?
        Mr. Vitiello. Yeah, so last time I was here I might not
    have been as precise as I wanted to be as it relates to
    situational awareness.
        The 56 percent measure, at that time--and this changes
    quarter by quarter--was the areas of the border where the
    deployment itself advises the workforce, advises the response
    agents, advises us of what is happening in real time. So, at
    that time, about 56 percent of the border had a deployment that
    was responsive enough to know in real time when activity
    occurred at the border.
        So a response in real time--within, you know, a shift,
    agents knew about an entry and were able to mount a response.
        Ms. McSally. Okay. So I think maybe that is a definition
    issue. To me, that is operational control. Situational
    awareness is, if you see it--I mean, if it moves, you see it.
    That is, like, you know, metric No. 1. The second metric is,
    when you see it, you can get to it and stop it. That is the
    operational control piece, right?
        So we were just trying to get a sense of, of the 2,000
    miles of the border, if it moves and it is coming across the
    border, it is trying to breach, you actually see it. You may
    not be able to get to it, but you at least see it. So is there
    a different number that is not 56 percent?
        Mr. Vitiello. What we are trying do in this state of the
    border reporting that we are putting in our system and using
    for things like CGAP and using to inform our deployments, there
    is a level of situational awareness across the entire border.
    So the 56 percent number, that is happening in real time; the
    sensors, the agents themselves, the deployments are picking up
    that activity in real time and being able to respond to it.
        The rest of the border, we are using other technology to
    monitor it regularly, but there is not an immediate response in
    each of those cases. That other part of the border, where we
    are using GEOINT, where we are using change detection to
    monitor the border, it is not solely that. We have other
    methods of being able to monitor what is going on in those
    areas. But there is not necessarily a deployment or a sensor
    that picks up that activity. It is more of this change
    detection, using the UAS, using other assets to monitor the
    border.
        But I would say that, as it relates to situational
    awareness, how we see it, each and every zone of the border has
    some level of monitoring that occurs in it, whether it be our
    assets directly deployed, whether it be the community informing
    us of things that are going on or our own assets that are doing
    a monitoring that verify to us that there is or isn't activity
    going on.
        Ms. McSally. Okay. Yeah, I think we just have different
    definitions of situational awareness. I mean, I appreciate that
    some of the VADER stuff and change detection you are doing is,
    after the fact, being able to look back and kind of see some of
    the changes that have happened, which is really important for
    intelligence and, you know, predictive analysis and all that.
        Again, I am just a fighter pilot, and I am just trying to
    get down to, like, a simple metric of, if it is breaching, if
    it is about to cross the border, we see it in real time. In
    2,000 miles of the border, where do we have--we may not be able
    to get to it, we may lose it, but we see it happening real
    time.
        So, I mean, I don't want to waste a lot of time going back
    and forth on this, but I think that is one of the frustrations,
    I would say, of this committee and definitely of my
    constituents, is we don't know what the answer is as far as
    what can we see and then what can we actually get to? The price
    of drugs on the street is the best indication that supply and
    demand--there is still a lot of stuff that is getting through.
    I think that is fair enough.
        I think you said it yourself. Once we deploy technology, we
    all of a sudden see all the stuff that we didn't see before. It
    is not that they just started coming; it is just you can now
    see it. Is that a fair statement?
        Mr. Vitiello. I think it is fair as it relates to the state
    of the border reporting and when we are using the GEOINT and
    when we are using our own deployments.
        Ms. McSally. Yep.
        Mr. Vitiello. So it is accurate to say that the 56 percent
    number, that is a real-time deployment, so we know when it is
    happening in real time and can respond directly.
        Ms. McSally. Okay.
        Mr. Vitiello. In those other parts of the border, you may
    or may not need that kind of deployment, but, in the aggregate,
    you are aware of what is occurring over time.
        Ms. McSally. Okay.
        So, going back to my original question, when the Arizona
    Technology Plan is complete--which I definitely want to make
    sure I understand when that is going to be complete, based on
    all the different parts of it--what level of, what you are
    kind-of calling situational awareness, but I guess what I am
    calling operational control--like, what will you be able to--
    real-time, you can see it moving across the border, what
    percentage of the, I think it is, you know, 360 miles of the
    Arizona border--it is the Arizona Technology Plan, so you are
    focusing on better technology for situational awareness in the
    Arizona border. What is the end goal? What is the end state?
        Mr. Vitiello. So that deployment is informed by agents on
    the ground that know how the technology works and know our own
    tactics for deployment and are aware of what the threat picture
    is. So, when those AORs are complete, we will have 100 percent
    monitoring of that border and being able to react in real time
    to all activity.
        Now, there are limits to the technology. There are deep
    canyons. You have been to these places in Nogales where it is
    really difficult to see on the ground even with the technology.
        Ms. McSally. Right.
        Mr. Vitiello. But those deployments are designed for us to
    be 100 percent successful.
        Ms. McSally. Okay. So 100 percent is the goal.
        So can you give me the time line of when all of the
    elements of the Arizona Technology Plan will be complete, as of
    right now?
        I don't know if that is for you to answer or you, Mr.
    Borkowski.
        Mr. Vitiello. I think Mark is probably better----
        Ms. McSally. Okay.
        Mr. Vitiello [continuing]. To tell us the precise detail.
        Mr. Borkowski. The long and short of it is we believe
    Arizona will be done by fiscal year 2019.
        Ms. McSally. The end of fiscal year 2019?
        Mr. Borkowski. Yes.
        Ms. McSally. Okay.
        Mr. Borkowski. That is due to 2 specific areas of
    responsibility in the Tohono O'odham Nation. Except for those,
    the remote video surveillance system will be done by the end of
    this year; 3 out of the 5 AORs in Arizona for IFT will be done
    by the end of fiscal year 2017. Then it is those 2 areas of the
    Tohono O'odham Nation that lag in getting complete.
        Ms. McSally. Okay.
        Just for expectations, too, for our constituents, in this
    fiscal year, what else is going in? I mean, the ranchers I was
    talking to last week----
        Mr. Borkowski. Right.
        Ms. McSally [continuing]. You know, the IFTs--can we just
    get a rundown of what is going in this fiscal year?
        Mr. Borkowski. Sure. So all of the remote video
    surveillance system, which are cameras and towers, the last
    area for that is Yuma. That is the last one to go in. That will
    be done by the end of this year.
        For IFT, we are starting Douglas. Douglas should be
    complete toward the end of this year. Sonoita will start going
    contract this summer, so it should be done in about a year from
    that. So those are the key activities going on between now and,
    say, the summer of 2017.
        Ms. McSally. Okay.
        So, fiscal year 2019, if everything is on track, the
    Arizona Technology Plan will be complete.
        I know, Ms. Gambler, one of the points that you have
    pointed out is there has not been an integrated schedule. They
    have been sort of the piecemeal schedule. Is that still
    something you think is needed for the Arizona Technology Plan
    or for additional plans moving forward in Texas or other areas?
        Ms. Gambler. Yeah, two points there, Chairwoman McSally.
        No. 1, we still continue to believe that an integrated
    master schedule for the whole plan would help CBP better
    oversee the extent to which it is completing all of the
    programs under the plan within expected time frames. I know CBP
    disagrees with that. We continue to believe in that
    recommendation.
        Second, as I mentioned earlier, for 2 of the programs under
    the plan, CBP has updated their schedules just for those
    programs. We will be looking at those 2 schedules going
    forward--we just recently received them--to see the extent to
    which they meet best practices, which has been some of our
    other recommendations. So, again, that is sort of an open
    question for us, but it is progress that they have updated the
    schedules.
        Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
        I want to switch to a different topic, which is the use of
    tactical unmanned aerial systems or aerial vehicles. I know we
    talked about this in the first hearing I held.
        I realize the Predator provides situational awareness sort-
    of at the operational or strategic level, but there are tools
    that are out there that we are currently using in the military
    where the agents could launch something that gives them
    situational awareness tactically.
        I know you all mentioned that it is being looked into, but
    can I get a very specific answer as to whether there is a
    requirement and a move to provide tactical UAVs to our agents
    on the ground to improve situational awareness?
        Mr. Vitiello. So we do have an operational requirements
    document. So the Border Patrol at CBP, our partners in CBP writ
    large are convinced that this is a technology that needs to go
    into the hands of agents. We have made an operational
    requirements document, sort-of the official recognition of
    that. We are working with OTIA to understand what resources are
    available and how we would deploy them. We are in discussions
    with CBP Air and Marine to make sure that we are not in
    conflict as it relates to the airspace issues.
        Then we have 2 projects, the same project underway with the
    Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology
    Directorate, in which they have helped us identify what
    resources are available, what the limitations for some of that
    resource is, so we can start to narrow on which platforms will
    be available to us.
        We are in discussions for a memorandum of understanding
    with the FAA on the certificate of authorization. Again, that
    is part of the deconfliction piece. We are in a relationship
    with Naval Systems Command about contracting vehicles and about
    their own experience and best practices with using these
    elements.
        We believe that we are very well on our way to start these
    deployments, because we think they are necessary for agents in
    the field.
        Ms. McSally. I agree.
        Is one of the options--I don't know if there is any excess
    property from the DOD. Is one of the options excess property or
    just manufacturing capabilities that already are being deployed
    with the DOD as opposed to reinventing the wheel?
        Mr. Vitiello. So we are narrowing with S&T on what they
    call the RVSS program to decide which of the things are
    available either through DOD or through other vehicles for us
    to use.
        Ms. McSally. So what is the time line we are looking at for
    that?
        Major General Alles, you can jump in.
        Then, Ms. Gambler, I want to make sure there is a--you
    know, we don't want to have lessons identified that are
    actually lessons learned from past procurement buffoonery. So
    is this going along based on the lessons learned from previous
    procurement issues?
        General Alles, do you want to pipe in?
        Mr. Alles. I was just going to mention one. We are going to
    do a near-term program with Border Patrol soon. But that is
    really to develop a COA in a particular area and apply the
    technology and see how it works before we move forward to any
    kind of procurement. So that would be step 1 in the process.
        Just to note, the main problem here is the FAA still. So we
    can probably work out a COA and carve out a piece of airspace
    to work these smaller platforms in, but there are still no
    rules issued to actually operate these things, big picture,
    across the board. That still is coming and needs to be taken
    care of.
        Ms. McSally. Okay. Great.
        Ms. Gambler.
        Ms. Gambler. Yep, this is something that we are touching on
    as part of some of our on-going work, looking at, you know,
    this kind of small UAS program. So that is something we can
    certainly follow up with you on and try to give you some more
    information on going forward.
        But it will be, you know, important for them to proceed,
    you know, in line with kind-of good acquisition management, you
    know, good testing, best practices, to ensure that, you know,
    to the extent that they do end up deploying some type of a
    system, that it meets requirements and that it is rolled out
    according to cost, schedule, and performance expectations.
        Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
        I know I mentioned it last time, but Cochise College in
    southern Arizona is co-located there, and they have a great UAV
    program on the civilian side. They really want to have a
    conversation to partner on anything that might be rolled out,
    just to be able to, you know--not again having to reinvent
    training schools and operations that they already have on-
    going.
        So I just want to lay that out there again, that I think
    these types of innovative partnerships like that would be
    really important if you are rolling anything like that forward.
        I want to switch to ultralight detection. I think it was my
    first week in office, when I went back home, I got a full day
    with the Border Patrol team in the Tucson sector, to include a
    Black Hawk ride where a radar picked up a potential ultralight
    crossing, and we flew around in circles trying to find it. I
    was helping looking out the window, using my fighter pilot
    eyes, trying to help. It was like, you know, a needle in a
    haystack. It is impossible, as you know, very difficult to be
    able to detect these low-flying lightweight ultralights.
        You know, the intended program to address that pretty much
    failed. So is there any additional technologies and programs we
    are looking at in order to solve this problem of the ultralight
    detection?
        Mr. Borkowski. Yes.
        First of all, the ultralight threat when we started was
    high-urgency. So we went after this program that was not
    successful. If the ultralight threat were as urgent as it was,
    though, we would probably use those, because they actually
    could detect the ultralights; it is just they were very labor-
    intensive.
        So we are looking for options to that. The urgency for the
    program is not as high as it was, but one of the things we are
    looking at is a DOD reuse system. There is a----
        Ms. McSally. Why is it not urgent anymore?
        Mr. Borkowski. We are seeing a tremendous decline in the
    number of ultralights.
        Mr. Alles. I will just mention the numbers. The high was in
    fiscal year 2010, 235. So far this year, 19.
        Ms. McSally. Do we know why that is?
        Mr. Alles. There are other methods of crossing the border
    to move the drugs, ma'am.
        Ms. McSally. Okay.
        Mr. Borkowski. So, again, I think if it jacked back up, we
    would probably go pull those ultralight aircraft detection
    systems and use them, because they would be worth it for that
    threat, but the threat has gone down.
        Having said that, we have identified a couple of systems,
    one of which we have access to from DOD--it requires some
    modifications of software, and it is called a lightweight
    counter-mortar radar--that shows some potential here.
        We also continue to do market research with industry. I
    don't always want to immediately go to DOD and, you know,
    foreclose opportunities for industry. There are other radars in
    industry as well.
        But that is what we are looking at, and that lightweight
    counter-mortar radar looks very promising.
        Ms. McSally. Okay. Great. Thanks.
        Do we know--I guess this would be to Mr. Borkowski.
        Are there any other DOD excess property or any other
    technology that we know exists within the DOD that you all are
    looking at to get your hands on in order to help with the
    situational awareness?
        Mr. Borkowski. For situational awareness? Well, they
    obviously have kind-of common operating picture command-and-
    control-type systems that we look at. In fact, they have
    something called ART/TSOA, if you are familiar with that--
    Adaptive Red Team--where they bring a bunch of these industries
    in and plug them in. So we participate in those, and we look at
    those technologies.
        With respect to, though, situational awareness, DHS S&T has
    what is called an Apex Program, because they are trying to get
    their arms around. As you can imagine, there is all kinds of
    stuff to sort through. So DHS S&T is doing a border situational
    awareness Apex Program basically to help us put all of that
    information together and to choose what is the right approach.
    I think that is where we will rely to make some smart decisions
    going forward.
        Ms. McSally. Okay. Great. Thank you.
        Sorry. I am just firing off a bunch of questions here.
        But I think it was in our first hearing I also asked a
    question about looking at putting VADER on manned aircraft.
    This is something that has been done in the past in other
    departments. Is there any looking into that, due to the
    limitations, both airspace and weather, of, you know, the
    Predator ops?
        Mr. Alles. So what we are looking at as an S&T effort is a
    lighter VADER-type system to put on our smaller aircraft, not
    necessarily the VADER operating on the UAS now. So that has
    been kind of the current direction we are looking at. We are
    looking at that, you know, through different, you know,
    technological venues.
        So nothing substantial yet on that. We are really exploring
    the options at this point.
        Ms. McSally. Okay. Thanks.
        Then, in between the tactical UAVs and the Predator, are
    there any other UAVs? There is a whole swath in that middle
    area there that are smaller and potentially cheaper. Is there
    any investigation or requirement that you are looking at to
    procure any, sort-of, mid-level UAVs? I just made up that
    terminology, but you know what I am saying--not quite the ones
    that the agents are deploying but not quite the Predator.
        Mr. Alles. So I think, to answer that, until we get full
    use out of the Predator in the airspace, I would actually not
    want to move in that direction. So, in my mind, the Predator
    actually fills the high and medium gap. What Chief Vitiello
    wants to do on the small side, which I think is a good effort,
    will fill the low-altitude gap.
        But the real issue is I can get a Scan Eagle or something
    like that, I can't operate it in the airspace. The FAA won't
    let me.
        Ms. McSally. Yep.
        Mr. Alles. So the rules still prevent that. Until we can
    move beyond those and really get open use of the airspace with
    the Predator, that is going to be the limitation.
        We are moving in that direction with the due-regard radar.
    We have a single Predator now equipped with that. We are going
    to test that and see if that is going to help open up the
    envelope with the FAA.
        Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks.
        I want to move into the, kind-of, procurement process big
    picture. I know a lot of the things that Ms. Gambler, the GAO
    has pointed out, trying to move DHS more in line with practices
    in the DOD. Although I serve on the Armed Services Committee,
    and I will tell you, you know, there are good things about the
    DOD acquisition process, but that can also be quite painful and
    slow and bureaucratic and not nimble. By the time we get
    through all the machinations of the process, the technology has
    already changed, and, you know, we are late to the game.
        So we are actually putting in, you know, the defense bill
    and additional legislation some changes to that process. So you
    don't necessarily want to mirror all of the DOD. You want to
    take the best of it but not the painful amounts of it. So, I
    mean, is that part of what is being looked at? Or are we just
    trying to mirror the DOD?
        One of the issues in the DOD is getting project managers,
    contracting officers. It is basically human resources, human
    development, making sure we are recruiting, training,
    equipping, and keeping, retaining, you know, those that have
    this unique expertise that, thank God, I never had to have in
    the Air Force myself.
        But on the manpower side and the development of expertise,
    I just wanted to hear perspectives on that and what is being
    done to address that issue.
        Ms. Gambler. Sure.
        So your first question first, on kind-of the DHS
    acquisition management process. I think the bottom line of
    GAO's reporting on this has been that, across the Department,
    not just with CBP but across the Department, DHS has a fairly
    sound, knowledge-based process for managing its acquisition. So
    that kind of foundational process, from our perspective, is in
    place.
        Where DHS has fallen down has been on the execution. So
    what I mean by that is ensuring that acquisition programs go
    through that process, have approved acquisition documents
    before they move to the next phases in the process. That is
    where, kind-of, DHS has fallen down in terms of implementation.
    Again, they are making progress, but they still have a ways to
    go.
        I might add that DHS acquisition management challenges are
    part of the reason why DHS management more broadly is part of
    GAO's high-risk list. So that is point No. 1.
        The other point that I would make with regard to having the
    right acquisition management personnel in place to manage these
    programs, that also has been a challenge that GAO has reported
    on across the Department. It has also been something we have
    reported on related to CBP.
        Some of the challenges that we identified in our last
    report regarding why some of the programs under the Arizona
    Technology Plan were not meeting schedule had to do with CBP
    and OITA not always having the resources in place they needed
    to manage the acquisitions, review some of the proposals, and
    that kind of thing.
        So that, I think, has been a challenge in the past for DHS
    and for CBP.
        Ms. McSally. Mr. Borkowski, do you want to add anything to
    that?
        Mr. Borkowski. Yes, I think that is exactly right.
        Now, certainly, obviously, DHS is working on this. So, for
    example, I understand this issue about documentation, but I
    will tell you that Under Secretary Deyo and Deputy Under
    Secretary Fulghum have, frankly, been beating the, you know,
    stuffing out of us. A lot of emphasis on getting that document
    current. We had a big push at the end of last year. Mr. Fulghum
    made a commitment to the Congress, and we all got that word,
    and we did that. So that is clearly an area of emphasis.
        This area of expertise in program management is a big
    threat issue. We have spent a great deal of time on it. We have
    a Homeland Security Acquisition Institute; we have sent people
    to school. But the experience is the big thing.
        A lot of my time is occupied on running reviews of
    programs, not so much to collect status but to start getting
    people to understand what it means to review a program. What
    does cost even mean? You know, for example, cost in acquisition
    really means, did you get for a dollar what you expected to
    get? But you will get a lot of conversation about, do I have
    the budget? That is a different question. So understanding what
    a baseline is, the basics of program management.
        I will tell you I think we have made tremendous progress
    over the last few years. But you can imagine what that does to
    acquisition, when you are doing the training while you are
    deploying. Those have been challenges.
        Then, of course, getting enough people and not burning
    people out, as we discussed with Mr. Thompson, is another
    issue.
        Ms. McSally. Are you actively recruiting from the DOD those
    that are separating or retiring?
        Mr. Borkowski. In terms of acquisition positions, we don't
    actually go to DOD and ask for people. However, we get a lot of
    DOD applicants to our open applications. So I think the word
    gets out.
        Ms. McSally. It seems like that is where the experience
    would be, right?
        Mr. Borkowski. Yes.
        Ms. McSally. So, I mean--although maybe they are leaving
    and they want to go do something else. But, certainly, if they
    have the experience in program management, that would be, you
    know, transferable skills.
        Mr. Borkowski. Right.
        Ms. McSally. Okay.
        I am going to keep going here. I have a couple more.
        Chief Vitiello, I don't know if it is for you or General
    Alles or both. Can you let us know when the CGAP analysis is
    going to be available or to be shared with us here in Congress?
        Mr. Vitiello. So we are happy to work with you on a
    schedule to catch you up to where we think we are. But CGAP, by
    its design and the work that we did with applied physics at
    Johns Hopkins, is an iterative process.
        Ms. McSally. Okay.
        Mr. Vitiello. So what we have done up until now is sort-of
    learn the process and learn the best practices, which comes
    from our own experience plus what they have learned, along with
    DOD, to help us identify what the mission needs are, how to
    fill capability gaps, and what the use case is for identified
    technologies or changes in tactics, et cetera.
        So what we have done is we have trained a majority of the
    workforce that are deployed in an effort to understand the
    process, what CGAP is, how to apply it in their own AOR, and
    then feed us that information at the headquarters to then turn
    in to requirements. Then we can push over with our requirements
    folks in our office and then over to OTIA to move the process
    forward.
        So we would be happy to come back and give you sort-of a
    detailed brief about the number of people that have been
    trained, the kinds of discoveries that we have made, and asking
    agents for their feedback, how they would solve particular
    problems; look at the material resources, like we need a tower,
    we need a sensor, we need a tripwire, and then the other, the
    non-material things, like consequences and things that happen
    maybe post-arrest or information exchange with other
    departments, et cetera.
        So we would be happy to come back and give you sort-of the
    full range of what has been trained and what it is designed to
    do and then what the roll-up report looks like, but recognizing
    that it is iterative. As the threats change, as conditions
    change----
        Ms. McSally. Right.
        Mr. Vitiello [continuing]. We want to be able to update
    those plans so that we are not investing in last year's problem
    but are working ahead.
        Ms. McSally. Great.
        General Alles.
        Mr. Alles. I think on the Air and Marine side we are in the
    early stages of it. We would expect our really first
    substantial output to be about a year away. So they are
    currently early in the process, as discussed. As the chief
    mentioned, it is an iterative process, but we would expect a
    more substantial output here really next summer.
        Ms. McSally. Okay. Great. Thank you. Yeah, let's follow up.
    I don't know if some of it is Classified, but maybe with a
    briefing we could do later on, just to kind-of see where we are
    at.
        You mentioned it, Chief Vitiello, but the actual agents are
    part of that process, right? It is not just the sector
    leadership and above?
        Mr. Vitiello. That is correct. So the people who are
    involved in the planning for their particular area.
        Ms. McSally. Yeah.
        Mr. Vitiello. So the station level, the people who are
    actually deploying on the ground, are taking feedback from the
    people who are making the arrests, who are deploying and they
    are looking at the line each and every day. That feeds up into
    the station, rolled up to the sector each, and then that comes
    back to us. People are trained in each of those processes to
    then feed to us. Then that turns into requirements, it turns
    into forecasts for budgets and programming, et cetera.
        Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks.
        General Alles, I want to follow up on my earlier question
    on getting information to the agents. I know the Big Pipe
    allows the Predator feed to get to a desktop, but is there
    something in the works to actually get it to an iPad or
    something that is more mobile for the agents?
        Mr. Alles. Yes, ma'am. A couple things there.
        So, first off, we are pursuing the Minotaur system. This is
    a Naval Air Systems Command system that is used on their patrol
    aircraft to distribute information. So that is essential for us
    to take information off our platforms--radar information, the
    EOIR, signals information--and actually put it into a system
    that can redistribute it to other assets that have Minotaur. It
    goes back to the AMOC in Riverside and can be sent back out.
        In terms of local agents, part of that is what Chief
    mentioned in terms of looking down the Blue Force Tracker
    route. We can already send video. We can distribute what is
    called a carry viewer to agents on the ground so they can
    actually see video if that is desired. Typically, we are using,
    you know, actually, radio information to cue the agents.
        There is a system we are looking at, which the name eludes
    me, which will allow us to put that information on something
    like an Android phone or an iPhone, which can actually form its
    own local network, which could be advantageous for us in terms
    of sending video from aircraft down to actual agents on the
    ground.
        So those are the directions we are going. I would say there
    is a lot of work to be done there.
        I think on the, kind-of, investigation side, supporting his
    or those, we are able to move the video very easily in those
    areas and give it to agents on the ground. In the more remote
    areas, that is still an area that we need substantial work in.
        Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks.
        I also want to ask you, General Alles, about--the National
    Guard has been supplementing with, you know, some of the air
    assets, but this last year my understanding is that their
    number of hours or support was cut in half.
        When you guys are doing the CGAP analysis, are there
    assumptions made on National Guard capabilities that are a part
    of your plan, or are they assumed to not be there? How is that
    impacting your operations or the gaps?
        Mr. Alles. So, I mean, from our standpoint, a couple
    things. First off, in the areas where we were using the
    National Guard hours, we have made a substantial move of our
    assets into those locations. So, in the south Texas area in
    particular, we have increased our assets by over 50 percent,
    along with our flight hours have gone up proportionally also.
        In actually doing the CGAP analysis, we are not necessarily
    counting on their support. As you are aware from the Armed
    Services side, they have had substantial cuts in the DOD
    budget. I mean, I have been reading the articles on the Marine
    Corps and getting 30- or 40-percent readiness rates on their
    aircraft. So they have major challenges there.
        So we aren't necessarily looking for that in the analysis.
    We are looking to support the Border Patrol and our other
    operations with our own internal assets and analyze the gaps in
    that method.
        Ms. McSally. Okay. Great. Thanks.
        Mr. Borkowski, can you talk about how you are sharing
    requirements with industry so they can spend their R&D dollars
    to meet, you know, agents' needs? Or how do you engage with
    industry earlier in the process, you know, searching for new
    technology?
        Mr. Borkowski. Well, we do that through a whole bunch of
    ways. So, first of all, when I am in town, I have probably a
    meeting a day with anybody who wants to come and talk to me.
    Sometimes they want to tell me what they have got; sometimes
    they want us to discuss generally our issues.
        We have reverse industry days, where we talk to industry
    about our requirements. We speak at any number of conferences,
    where we list our technology interests for industry. We also
    work very closely with DHS S&T that has a very extensive
    outreach program, including to nontraditional industry, right?
    Because it is kind of easy to get to the traditional people
    because they know how to connect with us, but the
    nontraditionals.
        Ms. McSally. Right.
        Mr. Borkowski. So we have a whole bunch of ways that we
    talk to them.
        Now, the tricky thing is when we are getting ready for an
    acquisition. That is where we have a more focused discussion
    about: What are the requirements, how should we depict them,
    what would industry be able to respond to. Then things get a
    lot more detailed.
        But in advance of that, it is a more general discussion of,
    these are our interests in technology areas, this is what we
    think we plan to do over the next few years. We do that through
    a number of mechanisms.
        Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks.
        All right. I am about to wrap up, but I want to give the
    opportunity for all the witnesses, if there is anything else
    that you didn't get to share in your opening statement or
    through the questions that came out. Is there anything else
    that any of you want to present on the record for the
    committee?
        Chief.
        Mr. Vitiello. Well, thank you for this opportunity. Just to
    reiterate some of the testimony and what is in the prepared
    remarks, we are interested in having the most effective and
    efficient sustainable technology that is available.
        I think it is important--and I think we have heard this
    today--that we will never be as fast as the market to bring
    these things into the hands of agents. We have wonderful men
    and women out there that have really great ideas about how to
    do the job more efficiently, but the bureaucracy doesn't always
    support that rapid acquisition and putting those things in
    their hands as quickly as even we would like them to.
        But they are our best assets as it relates to that last--
    what we call the last 50 meters. You have to have people on the
    ground that support the technology, that the technology has to
    support them. But, at the end of the day, they are the ones
    that have to make contact with whatever that threat is.
        So we appreciate them for that work. We appreciate you, in
    your oversight role, in helping us prepare them to give us the
    tools that they deserve to be successful. So thanks for that.
        Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks, Chief.
        General Alles.
        Mr. Alles. I would just like to thank the committee
    generally for the, you know, support they give to the agency in
    terms of us performing our mission. You know, not only the
    oversight part of it, but also the interest of the committee
    Members--multiple trips and, you know, looking at the stuff
    that we are working on.
        I could list a list of things that we want. We can provide
    that off-line. But just appreciate the participation of the
    committee.
        Ms. McSally. Absolutely. Thanks, General Alles.
        Mr. Borkowski.
        Mr. Borkowski. I would just add that, recognizing the
    committee's frustration, we certainly have appreciated the
    continued support despite the frustration. It has been very
    significant to us, and it has helped us a great deal.
        As we do go forward, I would like to have continued
    discussion about what do we do about the cultural and
    structural impediments, because the biggest beating I get is on
    time. Yes, cost and performance are important. I think we have
    done okay there. But the time is killing us all.
        Some of that, I think, will require a different thinking
    about how we accept risk. Because to innovate takes risk, and
    that means occasionally we will have failures. What is the
    right risk tolerance? Frankly, the community that works in this
    business is very risk-averse, and that is one of the things we
    really have to crack.
        But I appreciate the opportunity to testify, and I
    appreciate the committee's continued support.
        Ms. McSally. Absolutely. Those are the same types of
    discussions we are having, by the way, on the Armed Services
    Committee related to the DOD.
        Ms. Gambler.
        Ms. Gambler. I just want to say thank you for inviting us
    to testify today.
        Just some of the last items that we were talking about
    here, in terms of ultralight detection, the CGAP process,
    technology metrics, we do have on-going work for the
    subcommittee in a number of those areas. So we would be happy
    to follow up with you and your staff to brief you at any time,
    and look forward to that work coming out in the future here as
    well.
        Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks, Ms. Gambler. I appreciate it.
        All right. I want to thank all the witnesses for your
    valuable testimony and the Members for their questions.
        The Members may have some additional questions for the
    witnesses. We will ask you to respond to these, please, in
    writing. Pursuant to committee rule 7(e), the hearing record
    will be held open for 10 days.
        Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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