    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                               TSA: SECURITY GAPS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                             COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
                             AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                NOVEMBER 3, 2015

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 114-99

                                   __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

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             Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

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                  COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

                         JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio                  Ranking Minority Member
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    JIM JORDAN, Ohio                     ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    TIM WALBERG, Michigan                    Columbia
    JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan               WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
    PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona               STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    TREY GOWDY, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas              MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania
    CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming           TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                TED LIEU, California
    MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina        BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey
    KEN BUCK, Colorado                   STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands
    MARK WALKER, North Carolina          MARK DeSAULNIER, California
    ROD BLUM, Iowa                       BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    JODY B. HICE, Georgia                PETER WELCH, Vermont
    STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma              MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
    EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
    GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin
    WILL HURD, Texas
    GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
                                     ------

                       Jennifer Hemingway, Staff Director
                     David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
                   Michael Kiko, Subcommittee Staff Director
                               Ari Wisch, Counsel
                               Willie Marx, Clerk
                               Sarah Vance, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on November 3, 2015.................................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Peter Neffenger, Administrator, Transportation Security
      Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
        Oral Statement...............................................     4
        Written Statement............................................     7
    Hon. John Roth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland
      Security
        Oral Statement...............................................    23
        Written Statement............................................    25
    Ms. Jennifer Grover, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
      U.S. Government Accountability Office
        Oral Statement...............................................    51
        Written Statement............................................    53

                                    APPENDIX

    Written Statement for the Record from Rep. Gerald E. Connolly....   116
    Peter Neffenger Responses to Questions for the Record............   118

                               TSA: SECURITY GAPS

                                  ----------

                           Tuesday, November 3, 2015

                      House of Representatives,
          Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
                                               Washington, D.C.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room
    2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz
    [chairman of the committee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Duncan, Jordan,
    Walberg, Amash, Gosar, Gowdy, Massie, Meadows, DeSantis, Buck,
    Walker, Blum, Hice, Russell, Carter, Grothman, Hurd, Palmer,
    Cummings, Maloney, Norton, Lynch, Connolly, Cartwright,
    Duckworth, Kelly, DeSaulnier, Welch, and Lujan Grisham.
        Chairman Chaffetz. The Committee on Oversight and
    Government Reform will come to order. Without objection, the
    chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time.
        I appreciate the participants today on an important topic
    that we need to have vigilant oversight on, dealing with the
    TSA and the security gaps in the critical part of our culture.
    The 9/11 Commission concluded in their report, ``The most
    important failure was one of imagination. We do not believe
    leaders understood the gravity of the threat.'' That report
    underscored the need for government leaders to do a better job
    of preparing for security threats that can only now be
    imagined. It's no secret that people interested in harming
    America are coming up with creative ways to circumvent the
    existing security measures.
        The battle for aviation security is fought daily by the
    thousands of men and women who serve in the TSA's workforce.
    Every day, 2 million passengers at nearly 440 airport across
    the country depend on TSA to help hold the line and keep them
    safe. That's why passenger screening at checkpoints are so
    important. State-of-the-art screening technologies are not
    necessarily the magic bullet. There's also a human component
    and other methods and things that are used throughout the world
    that we should be paying attention to and implementing
    ourselves, but all aspects of passenger screening process,
    including luggage and carry-ons, must be working in concert. It
    is a vital part of what we do to protect this Nation, and thus
    the hearing today.
        I'd like now to yield time to the former chairman of the
    Transportation Infrastructure Committee, he's the chairman of
    our subcommittee here, Mr. Mica of Florida.
        Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and our ranking member
    and our witnesses today. Having been around since we formed TSA
    and one of the original authors of the legislation, we have 14
    years behind us, and unfortunately, we don't have much progress
    and success of the major purpose that we set out for, and that
    was to make certain that we are safe and secure, and that we
    have a system of, particularly passenger and baggage screening,
    that ensures that for the traveling American public.
        Now, you heard what I just commented on. The GAO report
    from this week just confirms that in just about every area of
    operations. We'll hear in a few minutes from the Inspector
    General, and on page 3 is a sort of a summary. He says, ``Our
    most recent covert testing in September 2015, the failures
    included''--this is TSA failures--``included failures in the
    technology, failures in TSA procedures, and human error. We
    found layers of security simply missing. It would be misleading
    to minimize the rigor of our testing or to imply that our
    testing was not an accurate reflection of the effectiveness of
    the totality of aviation security.'' That is very alarming.
    This report is very alarming.
        And where we've come, we're back from, again, 2007, some
    information leaked, and this was in the--this reporting from
    USA Today that screeners failed 75 percent of the time in
    finding dangerous materials and items that posed a threat, 75
    percent of the time with 30,000 screeners. We're now at 46,000
    screeners. And most recently, we've had this leak where the
    failure rate had been as high, and this is a report publicly
    obtained, of 95 percent failure.
        I think we need a complete overhaul. I think we need to
    address risk. I think we are hassling 99 percent of the people
    who pose no risk and still have no means of differentiating. We
    need to get TSA out of the screening business. They will never
    be able to recruit, they will never be able to train, they will
    never be able to retain, they will never be able to manage, but
    what they should be able to do is set the standards. And we
    have private screening under Federal supervision for a host of
    other activities, our highly secure nuclear facilities, our DOD
    facilities, and other facilities, and we let the private sector
    do what it does best, and we set the parameters and then we
    audit and we make the changes. Because, again, I don't care
    what I hear today, I'm convinced that you cannot fix this
    system that will continue to fail.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
        The Administrator, along with the thousands of people who
    serve in the TSA, need to own the system, and if problems
    arise, then they must be attended to swiftly and appropriately,
    but we also ask that they work in a proactive way so those
    threats are mitigated prior to getting to the airport, and
    certainly prior to getting on an airplane. I look forward to
    the hearing testimony today.
        We'll now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings of
    Maryland, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
    holding today's very important hearing. And let me welcome Mr.
    Roth, the Inspector General. It's good to have you here again
    on this very critical issue. Let me also welcome Ms. Grover
    from the Government Accountability Office, which does very
    important and excellent work for the committee on this and many
    other topics.
        I also want to welcome Administrator Neffenger. When I
    served as the subcommittee chairman on the Coast Guard and
    Maritime Transportation Subcommittee, I admired Mr. Neffenger's
    technical expertise and the steady, determined leadership he
    brought to the Coast Guard's most significant challenges,
    including dealing with the horrible Deepwater Horizon oil
    spill.
        I am sure he remembers how we called the Coast Guard back
    again and again and again and again and again, to ensure
    accountability, and every single time, you were up to the task,
    and I am so, so glad that you've been chosen for this task. And
    I thank him for his decades of service, and I applaud President
    Obama's decision to appoint him to this very critical position.
        When it comes to the security of our airlines and our
    flying public, we must always push to stay ahead of the
    terrorists, and anyone else who would do us harm. We must take
    nothing for granted. We must test ourselves constantly, and we
    must put the lessons we learn into urgent action. I've often
    said that so often we spend a lot of time talking about
    testing, and how things are going to work when we have an
    emergency. And so often what happens, and we saw this, to some
    degree, Mr. Neffenger, in Deepwater Horizon, we constantly say
    there will come a time when you'll see it works when the rubber
    meets the road. And when that moment comes, so often, we
    discover there is no road.
        Above all, we must never become complacent. We must treat
    every single day as if lives depend on the urgency of our
    actions, because they do.
        Unfortunately, until last spring, it appeared almost
    routine for senior leaders at the Transportation Security
    Administration to receive reports of security gaps in the
    Nation's air passenger screening operations. These reports came
    from the Inspector General and GAO and specialized red teams at
    TSA itself, and they described that this round of testing
    revealing yet more gaps.
        The question today, I believe, is whether TSA and the
    Department of Homeland Security are responding with the urgency
    this situation demands. As the President often says, are they
    responding with the urgency of now? Based on their actions over
    the last several months, I believe they are. However, their
    work is far, far from complete, and it is incumbent on both the
    agency and this committee to continue our oversight efforts in
    order to ensure that improvements are put into place.
        Last spring, Secretary Johnson ordered a comprehensive top-
    to-bottom review of all of TSA's practices and procedures to
    understand why the agency's performance was falling short of
    its own standards, and our expectations here in Congress. He
    required senior leaders to report to him every 2 weeks about
    the root causes of these shortfalls, as well as the solutions
    being implemented to address them.
        Over the summer, TSA developed and began implementing a 10-
    point plan to revamp all aspects of the screening procedures,
    personnel training processes, and equipment maintenance
    practices. It is clear that the agency has been aggressively
    working to change its culture, and I am very encouraged by the
    steps DHS and TSA have taken to date.
        However, we are early in the process. This agency has more
    than 42,000 employees responsible for ensuring security at
    about 450 airports. Making comprehensive changes in an agency
    of this size is not easy, and ensuring that these changes are
    effective and efficient in improving the agency's day-to-day
    performance requires a sustained, long-term effort. We must
    ensure that TSA establishes a new baseline with clear and
    specific metrics to measure performance. This committee must
    hold TSA's leadership accountable for the achievement of these
    new metrics.
        As I close, Administrator Neffenger, I think you know what
    I'm about to say: Just like at the Coast Guard Subcommittee,
    you should get used to seeing us on a regular basis. This
    committee's job is to oversee the implementation of TSA's
    transformation. We're going to be inviting you back again and
    again, because the American people are depending on us to get
    it right.
        Finally, let me close by noting that the airlines and
    others also play a critical role in ensuring our security. We
    need to take a hard look at decisions by the airline industry
    that are making the TSA's job more difficult. For example, we
    have learned that the new fees airlines are charging to check
    bags are causing huge increases in the volume of carry-on
    luggage. Although this may result in significant new revenue
    for the airlines, it is also putting significant new strains on
    our screening operations, and I hope you will address that, Mr.
    Neffenger.
        I hope we will have an opportunity to discuss these issues
    in more detail today, and at future hearings before the
    committee. And I just want to be clear, I have full confidence
    that we will get this right. We have no choice.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I yield back.
        Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. We'll hold the
    record open for 5 legislative days for any members who would
    like to submit a written statement.
        We'll now recognize our panel of witnesses. First, we have
    Mr. Peter Neffenger, Administrator of the Transportation
    Security Administration at the United States Department of
    Homeland Security. We're also joined by the Honorable John
    Roth, Inspector General of the United States, Department of
    Homeland Security; and Ms. Jennifer Grover, Director of
    Homeland Security and Justice at the United States Government
    Accountability Office.
        We welcome you all. And pursuant to committee rules, all
    witnesses are to be sworn before they testify. If you will
    please rise and raise your right hands.
        Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are
    about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
    but the truth?
        Thank you. Please be seated. And let the record reflect the
    witnesses all answered in the affirmative.
        In order to allow time for discussion, we would appreciate
    it if you would limit your verbal testimony to 5 minutes. Your
    entire written statement will be entered as part of the record.
        Mr. Neffenger, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

                           WITNESS STATEMENTS

                      STATEMENT OF PETER NEFFENGER

        Mr. Neffenger. Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking
    Member Cummings, and distinguished members of the committee. I
    thank you for the opportunity to testify on my vision for
    evolving the Transportation Security Administration. My
    leadership perspective is shaped by more than three decades of
    military service and crisis leadership. Fundamental to my
    approach are a well-defined statement of the mission, clear
    standards of performance, training and resourcing that enable
    the workforce to achieve success, appropriate measures of
    effectiveness, and an unwavering pursuit of excellence and
    accountability.
        I want to thank Inspector General Roth and Director Grover
    for the oversight that they have provided at TSA. And I want to
    specifically thank Mr. Roth for his encouraging assessment of
    our new direction.
        That direction is a reflection of my vision on how we
    approach the continuing evolution of TSA. I'm now 4 months into
    the job, and I've traveled to dozens of airports and Federal
    Air Marshal offices across the country. I've also visited our
    European partners in the United Kingdom, France, and the
    Netherlands, and I've met with stakeholders from the airlines,
    travel industry, and airport operators. I've engaged surface
    stakeholders in passenger rail and light rail across the
    country and in Europe.
        I have been thoroughly impressed with the professionals who
    occupy our ranks, and I've been equally impressed with the
    collaboration across the transportation enterprise and the
    range of capabilities our Federal, State, and local partners
    bring to bear across every mode of our transportation system.
    These complex systems require that we examine them and consider
    them as a whole, that we integrate the wide range of public and
    private capabilities to close gaps, reduce vulnerabilities and
    counter threats, that we benchmark and apply best practices
    across the enterprise, and that we seek global consistency.
        However, as I have stated in previous hearings on this
    topic, my immediate priority has been to pursue solutions to
    the Inspector General's recent covert testing findings, which
    were, unfortunately, leaked to the media in May of this year,
    and we are making significant progress in doing so.
        The Inspector General's covert tests focused on an element
    of the aviation security system, specifically the Advanced
    Imaging Technology capability within the checkpoint. These
    tests identified areas for improvement, with which we
    concurred. The system, as a whole, remains effective, and as a
    result of these tests, has only gotten stronger.
        In response, TSA implemented an immediate action plan to
    ensure accountability, improve alarm resolution, increase
    effectiveness, and strengthen procedures. We've also responded
    vigorously by implementing Secretary Johnson's 10-point plan,
    as previously referred to. And to ensure we don't repeat past
    failures, of utmost concern, from my perspective, was
    determining root causes of the problem.
        Our conclusion is that the screening effectiveness
    challenges were not merely an office or performance problem,
    nor were they a failure of the Advanced Imaging Technology. The
    AIT has greatly enhanced our ability to detect non-metallic
    threats, and continues to perform to expected standards when
    deployed and used properly. As we look at the people,
    processes, and technology, strong drivers of the problem
    include leadership focus, environmental influences, and gaps in
    system design and processes.
        There was significant pressure to quickly clear passengers
    at the risk of not completely resolving alarms. Our analysis
    also revealed that our officers did not fully understand the
    capabilities of the equipment, and several procedures were
    inadequate to resolve alarms. We have trained our officers to
    understand and use equipment properly, and we have corrected
    our procedures.
        Solutions require a renewed focus on security, revised
    procedures, investments in technology, realistic and
    standardized training, a new balance between effectiveness and
    efficiency, and support for our frontline officers. We will
    continue to partner with the airlines, airport operators, and
    the trade and travel industry to identify solutions that can
    reduce the stress on the checkpoint, and we must right-size and
    resource TSA appropriately.
        We've begun that process in earnest, and I can report that
    we have a principled approach in place designed to correct the
    immediate challenges while ensuring that this problem doesn't
    happen again. Our mission essentials training conducted in
    August and September, with every frontline officer and leader
    across TSA, has helped reset our focus on security
    effectiveness, and most critically, we have enhanced our
    officers' knowledge and understanding of the screening system.
        Longer term, our self-examination has given insight into
    how we must evolve. We face a critical turning point in TSA,
    both to address these recent findings, and to begin our
    investment in a more strategic approach to securing the
    transportation sector. We need to measure security to drive an
    institutional focus, and what we measure is what our leaders
    and officers will pay attention to. Our approach needs to be
    adaptive and risk-based, constantly reassessing assumptions,
    plans, and processes, and we must be able to rapidly field new
    ways of operating. We must rethink how we invest in technology.
    Our adversaries remain intent on attacking the transportation
    sector, and our investment in new tools must exceed the speed
    of the enemy's ability to involve.
        Most importantly, we must deliver an effective system and
    earn the confidence of the traveling public through competence,
    disciplined performance, and professionalism. I've conveyed
    these standards to our workforce, and I commit to you that we
    will continuously pursue these objectives.
        Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, I want to
    assure you that TSA is an intelligence-driven, counterterrorism
    organization, and I know that we are up to the challenges we
    face. We are on the front lines of a critical counterterrorism
    fight, and our workforce is willing and able to do the job.
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Neffenger follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
        Inspector General Roth, you're now recognized for 5
    minutes.

                      STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ROTH

        Mr. Roth. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz,
    Ranking Member Cummings, and members----
        Chairman Chaffetz. If you could maybe just bring the
    microphone straight up to your--that would be great.
        Mr. Roth. My apologies.
        Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings,
    and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me here to
    testify today.
        Throughout this year, I have testified, before this
    committee and others, regarding my concerns about TSA's ability
    to execute its important mission. I highlighted the challenges
    TSA faced. I testified that these challenges were in almost
    every area of TSA's operations: Its problematic implementation
    of risk assessment rules, including its management of the pre-
    check program; failures in checking--in passenger checkpoint
    and baggage screening operations; its control over access to
    secure areas, including management of its access badge program;
    its management of its workforce integrity program; its
    oversight of its acquisition and maintenance and screening
    equipment; and other issues we have discovered in the course of
    over 115 audit and inspection reports.
        We may be in a very different place now than we were in
    May, when I last testified about this before this committee. I
    believe that Administrator Neffenger brings with him a new
    attitude about oversight. Ensuring transportation safety is a
    massive and complex problem, and there is no silver bullet to
    solve it. It will take a sustained and disciplined effort.
    However, the first step to fixing a problem is having the
    courage to critically assess the deficiencies in an honest and
    objective light.
        Creating a culture of change within TSA and giving the TSA
    workforce the ability to identify and address the risks will be
    the Administrator's most critical and challenging task. I
    believe that the Department and TSA leadership has begun the
    process of critical self-evaluation, and aided by the dedicated
    workforce of TSA, are in a position to begin addressing some of
    those issues.
        In September, we completed and distributed our report on
    our most recent round of covert testing. While I cannot talk
    about the specifics in this setting, I am able to say that we
    conducted the audit with sufficient rigor to satisfy our
    professional auditing standards, and that the tests were
    conducted by our auditors without any specialized knowledge or
    training, and the test results were disappointing and
    troubling. We ran multiple tests using different concealment
    methods at eight different airports of different sizes,
    including large category X airports across the country, and
    tested airports who were using private screeners. The results
    were consistent across every airport. Our testing was designed
    to test checkpoint operations in real-world conditions. The
    failures included technology, TSA procedures, and human errors.
        The Department's response to our most recent findings has
    been swift. For example, within 24 hours of receiving
    preliminary results of OIG testing, the Secretary summoned
    senior TSA leadership and directed that an immediate plan of
    action be created to correct deficiencies uncovered by our
    testing. TSA has put forward a plan, consistent with our
    recommendations, to improve checkpoint quality in three areas:
    Technology, personnel, and procedures. This plan is appropriate
    because the checkpoint must be considered as a single system.
    The most effective technology is useless without the right
    personnel, and the personnel needed to be guided by the
    appropriate procedures. Unless all three elements are operating
    effectively, the checkpoint will not be effective.
        We will be monitoring TSA's efforts and will continue to
    conduct covert testing. Consistent with our obligations under
    the Inspector General Act, we will report our results to this
    committee as well as other committees of jurisdiction.
        I believe that this episode serves as an illustration of
    the value of the Office of Inspector General, particularly when
    coupled with the Department leadership that understands and
    appreciates objective and independent oversight. This review,
    like dozens of reviews before it, was possible only because my
    office and my auditors had unfettered access to the information
    we needed.
        I believe I speak for the entire IG community in expressing
    my gratitude to this committee for the legislation currently
    pending in the House, H.R. 2395, The Inspector General
    Empowerment Act of 2015. This legislation would fix the
    misguided attempt by the Department of Justice to restrict
    access to records, and would restore IG independence and
    empower the IGs to conduct the kind of rigorous, independent,
    and thorough oversight that the taxpayers expect and deserve.
        This legislation would also improve and streamline the way
    we do business. For example, my written testimony gives an
    example of the powerful results we can obtain from data
    matching, which the legislation would streamline.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I
    welcome any questions you or other members of the committee may
    have.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Roth follows:]

     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
        And Director Grover, we're pleased to have you here with us
    today, and you're now recognized for 5 minutes.

                      STATEMENT OF JENNIFER GROVER

        Ms. Grover. Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member
    Cummings, and other members and staff. Thank you for the
    opportunity to discuss how TSA can improve the effectiveness of
    airport passenger screening.
        In the past 6 years, GAO has made 80 recommendations to
    TSA. TSA has concurred with nearly all of them, and has taken
    action to address most of them; in fact, TSA has fully
    implemented more than three-quarters, yet every year, our
    reports continue to find vulnerabilities in the system, many
    related to questions of security effectiveness. Why is that?
        Our body of work over the past several years shows that TSA
    has consistently fallen short in basic program management in
    several aspects. Three shortcomings stand out: First, failing
    to fully and rigorously evaluate the effectiveness of new
    technologies and programs; second, not establishing performance
    measures that fully reflect program goals; and third, failing
    to use program data to identify areas for improvement.
        There are many GAO reports that illustrate the shortfalls
    in each area. I will provide one example for each.
        First, TSA should fully evaluate effectiveness prior to
    adoption, to ensure that acquisitions and programs work, and to
    make sure that monies are well spent. In one example, in our
    review of TSA's body scanning technology, known as AIT, we
    found that TSA evaluated these systems in the laboratory for
    effectiveness, but had not addressed how airport screeners were
    using the systems in the airport environment. If airport
    screeners don't carry out pat-downs properly to follow up on
    the potential threats that are signaled by the AIT, and we know
    that this is an ongoing challenge, then the effectiveness of
    the overall screening will be diminished.
        A related issue is that when TSA is designing studies of
    effectiveness, it's critical that they follow established study
    design practices to make sure that the results that they get at
    the end of the day are valid. TSA has struggled with this. In
    one example from 2013, we found that a DHS study of behavioral
    detection indicators did not demonstrate their effectiveness
    because of study limitations, including the use of unreliable
    data.
        My second point is that TSA should adopt performance
    measures that reflect program goals to make sure that the
    programs are operating as intended after they've been stood up.
    As an example, in 2014, we found that TSA did not have
    performance measures to determine the extent to which the
    secure flight program accurately identified passengers on the
    no-fly selectee and other watchlists, one of the programs key
    goals.
        My third point is that TSA should put systems in place to
    monitor the data it collects in order to identify areas for
    improvement. As an example, in 2013, we found that TSA
    officials collected data on the effectiveness of their canine
    program, but were only considering overall pass and fail rates.
    TSA was missing the opportunity to determine if there were
    specific search areas, or types of explosives in which the
    canine teams were more or less effective, and to identify
    training needed to mitigate deficiencies.
        TSA is consistently responsive to GAO's recommendations,
    and TSA has addressed, at least to some degree, most of the
    examples I just mentioned. For example, TSA has modified its
    AIT testing to more fully evaluate effectiveness, and has
    implemented new procedures to analyze canine testing data. In
    addition, TSA is in the process of testing its behavior
    detection activities and developing new secure flight
    performance measures. But addressing GAO's findings, one by
    one, will not solve the underlying problem of an organizational
    culture that has allowed programs to be stood up without
    sufficient evidence of their effectiveness.
        It is critical that TSA systematically address the cross-
    cutting program management weaknesses that I just described,
    through well-designed evaluations of their programs and
    acquisitions, and continuing reliance on appropriate
    performance measures that allow them to monitor key program
    goals over time, TSA would be well-positioned to achieve
    longstanding improvements in aviation security effectiveness
    and other operations.
        Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, this concludes
    my statement. I look forward to your questions.
        [Prepared statement of Ms. Grover follows:]

     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Chaffetz. We thank you. We'll now move to the
    question portion. We're going to start by recognizing the
    gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the ranking member.
        Administrator, I'm pleased to have you aboard. You come
    aboard when there's been unprecedented amount of criticism and
    findings of failure with your agency, so--and I know you're
    very intent, I had a chance to talk to you, on trying to
    improve things and correct these things. But I think what--
    again, looking at this over 14 years and our objective, our
    objective is to keep the American people safe. In your
    statement, I guess, and statements we've had, you screened 660
    million passengers last year, I guess it was?
        Mr. Neffenger. That's right.
        Mr. Mica. Yeah. And what percentage of those folks actually
    pose a risk? It's got to be less than 1 percent. Would you
    agree with that?
        Mr. Neffenger. A very small percentage of people pose a
    risk.
        Mr. Mica. Yes. It's a very small percentage. But most of
    our resources are spent on building a bureaucracy, and there's
    over $2.3 billion on TSA bureaucracy to manage the 46,000
    screeners that Congress has put a cap on. We've actually seen a
    failure rate disclosed publicly with--from 30,000 screeners to
    46,000 screeners where things have gotten worse.
        You stated in your testimony, there are a number of actions
    that have been completed, including the following: Requiring
    screening leadership at each airport, oversight AIT operation,
    and training and things of that sort. I'm telling you, even
    when you get this done, you've just--you have created a system
    that doesn't address the risk. Your chances of failure are
    almost 100 percent with the current system, even with the
    training that you employ. I can thwart the AIT machines.
        It took me 2 years to get TSA just to look at the AIT
    machines, you don't know the history of that, because I knew
    what we had in place. The puffers didn't work, and I knew the
    threat was there for explosives, and it's still there, but we--
    you all--and we've tried to put in different programs to make
    up for the layers that fail.
        Behavior detection. $1 billion was spent on behavior
    detection. We have hundreds, thousands of officers. And here's
    a report here by the Freedom to Travel USA, it says, ``In the
    airports where it's used, 50,000 travelers have been flagged.
    Zero of these were terrorists. Sixteen known terrorists passed
    through the behavior detection airports on at least 24
    occasions.''
        My whole point here is that you need to get out of the
    personnel business, back into the security business, turning
    TSA back into doing the things that will save us, the
    intelligence gathering, setting the parameters for someone
    else. You're not a very good personnel agency, nor will you be.
    The turn--the recruitment's horrible, the training's horrible,
    the retention is horrible. It just goes on and on.
        So, again, no matter what you do, if you don't address the
    risk and put our resources--we should be putting our
    resources--every instance in which we've stopped them has been
    first the public, the public. Since 9/11, since that--that
    morning when they found out on Flight 93, they attacked those
    terrorists and took them down. Richard Reid, it was the crew
    and passengers that stopped him, in every instance. The liquid
    bombers, they woke me up in Texas and told me about that. That
    was British and Israeli intelligence. But it's got to be our
    intelligence that saves the day. Refocusing that, get you out
    of the personnel business, get back into the security business,
    addressing that 1 percent.
        What's scary, too, is the 1 percent, the no-fly list and
    the other lists, we still don't have that right, according to
    some of the folks who have testified, some of the evidence that
    I've seen.
        So, again, I don't mean to give you a hard time, but, I
    think, please consider this. I sat, when we devised this system
    with the head of--and I told you this story, of maximum
    security facilities, and they--when you go into those, you get
    body cavity searches. And they told me even with that, which
    you're not going to do to 659,000--or 659 million Americans,
    this still--stuff gets through, contraband, drugs, weapons.
        So, again, I look forward to your response. You don't have
    to give it today, but I think if we change that out, get you
    out of the personnel business, into the security business,
    that's the best use of our resources.
        Mr. Chairman, too, I'd like to put this report in the
    record, if I may. It's the Freedom to Travel USA, TSA Failures
    by the Numbers. I think it's very enlightening, if you would
    grant that request.
        Chairman Chaffetz. Without objection, so ordered.
        Chairman Chaffetz. We'll now recognize the gentleman from
    Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair, and I thank the
    distinguished ranking member, my friend, Mr. Cummings.
        Administrator Neffenger, welcome. And I really welcome your
    ascension to this office. My confidence in you was reinforced
    when I read your testimony about the determination of TSA on
    root causes. And you said the underlying screening
    effectiveness and technology challenges, you've said, a
    disproportionate focus on the past has been on screening
    operation's efficiency rather than security effectiveness,
    which is, after all, the mission. Would you expand on that?
        Mr. Neffenger. Thank you, Congressman. As I mentioned in my
    opening statement and in my written statement, the--as we
    looked at root causes--and you really do have to look at root
    causes in trying to determine, you know, why it is that we saw
    the same failures repeatedly over time. So when you--when you
    have an operating agency that observes the same things over and
    over, it tells me that you haven't really figured out what the
    problem was.
        And so, when you look at root causes, it goes beyond just
    whatever happened at the checkpoint that failed. You have to
    determine what--what is it in your culture and in your
    organizational approach.
        If you recall in the early days of TSA, there was a great
    concern about the wait times, and there was a great deal of
    pressure on TSA to get people through the screening checkpoints
    faster. And there's a good reason for that. You don't want a
    lot of people packing up outside the sterile area. I think you
    have to be very careful, though, when you change--when you
    inject a concern like that to an organization, because what you
    measure is what you're going to get for performance.
        And, so, I really do believe that over time, what happened
    was a great deal of effort to ensure wait times were kept to a
    minimum, people were pushed through the checkpoint, that puts
    pressure on the screeners to clear passengers versus resolving
    the alarms that they present.
        And, so, in that slight nuance of difference between
    clearing a passenger versus resolving something that the
    passenger presents can change the effort you've put into
    looking for that, and we found that.
        Mr. Connolly. I think it's really important the point
    you're making, because it's very easy, bureaucratically, to
    check a box and say, well, what do you mean? We've improved
    efficiency 600 percent. Yeah, but that isn't the goal. That's a
    means toward reaching the goal. And keeping one's eye on the
    mission, making the main thing the main thing, is really
    important, and I thank you for doing that.
        Mr. Roth, and/or Ms. Grover, GAO has issued more than 25
    TSA-specific reports in the last 5 years. The catalyst for this
    hearing was covert tests that your agency, Mr. Roth, conducted
    of passenger screening process. What--what did you find from
    that covert operation?
        Mr. Roth. The specific results, of course, are classified,
    so I can't discuss them in this hearing, but what we found in a
    series of tests, which took place across the country at
    different airports of different sizes, using a variety of
    concealment methods by individuals who are auditors with no
    specialized training or skill, is a universal, disappointing
    performance by the TSA screening checkpoint.
        And, again, what we look at is the entire screening
    checkpoint system. It's not just the AIT, it's not just the
    people, it's not just the procedures, but how they work
    together.
        Mr. Connolly. Would it be fair to say, without compromising
    security, that some significant breaches occurred?
        Mr. Roth. Yes.
        Mr. Connolly. Very troubling.
        And, Mr. Neffenger, presumably you're aware of those
    findings?
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, I am.
        Mr. Connolly. And has the agency taken corrective steps to
    try to address what Mr. Roth and his team discovered covertly?
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir, we have. One of the first things I
    did--actually, when this became public, it became public during
    my confirmation process between the first and second
    confirmation hearings, I had a chance to meet with Mr. Roth,
    and then I met with Mr. Roth again after swearing in as
    Administrator, after being confirmed and swearing in. And one
    of the first things I wanted to do was understand the exact
    nature of the failures that occurred, how they represented, and
    so that we could begin to address the root causes, as you had
    mentioned earlier.
        We have put a tremendous amount of effort into not just
    determining the instant failures, but reaching back through the
    organization to figure out what systemically was going on that
    brought this to it, because as you may also be aware, we have
    had other such discoveries of failures in the past.
        Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, it may be useful at some point
    to have a classified briefing where we get fully briefed on
    that.
        One final question I'm going to sneak in in my last 18
    seconds. But Mr. Neffenger, one of the problems, and you've
    raised it, too, that has occurred is, you know, because it's
    now a lucrative business to charge for baggage, it has forced
    passengers to try to compensate by bringing in overhead luggage
    as much as possible. This affects your business and your
    mission. Could you just address that?
        Mr. Neffenger. There's a lot more baggage coming through
    the checkpoint now than there used to be, and that baggage is
    much more packed with gear than it used to be. This is a
    challenge for anybody to screen it. I know that the airlines
    have been trying to--trying hard to enforce their one-plus-one
    rule, but sometimes that enforcement doesn't take place until
    you get to the actual loading gate and that--and so, multiple
    bags have come through the checkpoint.
        So we've been working very closely with the airline
    industry and with the airports to see what we can do to reduce
    some of that stress on the checkpoint, but it's just a fact of
    modern life that there's more stuff arriving at a checkpoint
    than used to arrive.
        Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
        I now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg,
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Walberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the panel
    for being here.
        I wasn't--I wasn't here in Congress when TSA was
    instituted, and I don't have a lot of answers to how you do it.
    I just know that when I enter the airport in Detroit, I go
    through multiple contacts with multiple agents, including TSA.
    I would also hasten to say at a meeting like this, while there
    are concerns and there are problems we have to deal with,
    overwhelmingly, I've been treated well by TSA even when they
    didn't know I was a Member of Congress. And the fact of the
    matter is that only two incidences can I remember the exact
    airport where I was not treated well: Los Angeles and Dulles.
    That says, for the most part, your personnel, doing a job I
    wouldn't want to do, are at least attempting to work with--and
    I want to applaud you for that. We can--we can jump on you, but
    I think there is also something to say about having an
    untenable job to do, where you have to be right all the time.
        And fortunately since 9/11, as a result of TSA's efforts
    and others' efforts, including airlines and passengers, we have
    not had a downed plane, and we want that to continue.
        But I do want to ask you some questions. Mr. Neffenger, in
    our hearing today, you have pledged to fix some things. During
    other public crises, other TSA administrators have pledged to
    fix things. What will be different this time?
        Mr. Neffenger. Thank you for that question. It really goes
    to what I was saying earlier, and that is, when you have--so my
    experience is--I've been in operating--an operator my whole
    career. I spent 34 years in the United States Coast Guard. In
    many respects, a lot of similarities between the Coast Guard
    and the TSA in this sense: both have--are mission-based
    organizations, both have, in some respects, missions that have
    a no-fail quality to them, both have a distributed frontline
    workforce that's responsible for carrying out that mission.
        So in my experience, what--what makes operating agencies
    challenging and exciting at the same time is, challenging in
    that you have something you have to do every single day, and
    that tyranny of the right now can lead you to simply address
    the problem in its--in its presentation. By that, I mean you
    have a failure at a checkpoint, you work with the team at that
    checkpoint, you work with the team at that airport and you say,
    Look, you failed, here's how you failed, don't do it again.
    That may seem like it fixes the problem, but it really doesn't
    over time.
        What you find is that--is that typically, if you have
    failures like that in a dedicated frontline workforce, and I
    really appreciate the words you had to say about that
    workforce, then it means you've got something more systemic
    going on, and it's hard sometimes for an operating agency to
    take the time to do that. I really----
        Mr. Walberg. How will you monitor that bigger picture,
    then?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, it starts by recognizing that there is
    a bigger picture, and saying it out loud, so that's something I
    said when I first came in. Any time you have multiple failures
    that look the same over time, that means something else is
    going on. And, so, we're going to stop, we're going to look at
    the entire approach of the organization, how well do we
    understand our mission? How well have we articulated that
    mission in terms of what it needs to succeed? How well have we
    deployed the equipment that we think addresses that need? How
    well have we trained our people to work that equipment? And
    what kinds of processes have we given them and procedures? For
    example, we found that there were 3,100 independent tasks that
    we expected a screener to memorize. That's an impossible task.
    You can't do that.
        So we--it gets additive over time. So you've got to step
    back to first principles and say this is about the mission,
    first and foremost, and it's about the performance of that
    mission in an environment in which we have so much at stake. It
    pays--you have to look at what's already been done by third-
    party independent auditors. I greatly value the work of the GAO
    and the IG's offices, because they give me a third-party
    independent assessment of what are some of those challenges,
    and I can use that as a way to go back and begin to dig into
    the deeper issues in the organization.
        Mr. Walberg. Let me add on to what my friend, Mr. Connolly,
    started with you, and I think it goes to this idea of bigger
    picture. How will you work with airports, airlines, and others
    to disrupt the incentives that can emphasize speed over
    security?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, as I mentioned, I've met with a number
    of those of the--actually, all the major airlines in the U.S.
    as well as their associations and other stakeholders. It starts
    by recognizing that this is an interactive system. TSA doesn't
    work alone inside the aviation system. It works in conjunction
    with all the other players, and everyone has a role to play in
    the security of the system.
        And, so, it's not simply a hand-off in a transaction from
    one entity in the system to the other. It's a continuous
    interaction. And that interaction requires that they be aware
    of the challenges that their system imposes upon our
    responsibility for security, just as we have to be aware of the
    challenges that our security responsibilities impose on them. I
    will tell you that they've been very receptive to that.
        There's a lot more work we can do to connect more
    effectively to the various players in the system. And so, I've
    established a number of regular meetings now with my
    counterparts in the private sector as well as across the system
    to begin to address what I think are these longstanding,
    overarching issues that have been, not necessarily ignored, but
    have not been attended to appropriately.
        Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Walberg. I yield back.
        Chairman Chaffetz. I now recognize the ranking member, Mr.
    Cummings, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
        Director Grover, when you were talking about the problems,
    I wrote two words, and I wrote the words ``culture gap.'' In
    other words, I think from just listening to you, a culture has
    been established, and I think that culture is, in part--and I
    want you all to comment on this. I'm just listening and
    reading. You know, the chairman will tell you again when we,
    when dealing with the Coast Guard--not the Coast Guard, but the
    Secret Service, one of the things that we worried about was a
    culture of complacency. Not just people are not good people,
    but you get used to nobody jumping over the fence at the White
    House, so you--because everything's going to be all right.
        And, so, what happens is that people get sort of lulled and
    slow, but it's a culture, and they--things are going to be all
    right. And then, Administrator, when you combine that with this
    thing about making sure you get the people through quickly and
    you put the quickness over, you know, the mission, then, I
    think, you have a combination for problems, and I think those
    kind of problems are very difficult to address, and I'm trying
    to figure out--first of all, would you comment on that, Ms.
    Grover?
        Ms. Grover. Yes, sir. Thank you for the opportunity.
        So TSA was originally stood up in a culture of crisis,
    where they had to be responsive, and they had to be responsive
    fast. But at this point, it is time to transition to a culture
    of accountability for effectiveness. I am--TSA definitely is
    aware of the importance of ensuring their programs are
    effective, and I appreciate Administrator Neffenger's remarks
    about enhancing that culture throughout the workforce. But at
    the end of the day, for GAO, it comes down to a very simple
    question, which is: Does the program work? And how do you know?
    And no matter how much the staff are educated in the current
    failures or retrained, no matter how much there is an emphasis
    on new SOPs, at the end of the day, there has to be
    measurement, like the Administrator said, and they have to have
    a systematic process to follow through to make sure their
    programs work, and that is what lies beneath a strong culture
    of accountability for effectiveness.
        Mr. Cummings. You don't know what you've just said. I think
    you hit--you just hit the nail quite well. So they started with
    a culture of emergency, and so everybody's, we got to make sure
    that we protect ourselves, and then when the emergency seems to
    wane, you can slowly move into what I talk about, the culture
    of complacency. But now we've got to change our whole dynamic
    and create a new normal, and that is a new normal of
    accountability.
        Now, you--you've got a plan, right? You have a plan?
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir, I do.
        Mr. Cummings. And you plan to implement it by March of
    2016? Is that right?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, there are a number of steps in that,
    but----
        Mr. Cummings. That's what I wanted to ask you. What will
    we--what will the status of the screening process be at that
    date? Will it have reached what you envision as peak
    effectiveness, or will it still be in the process or improving
    mode?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, so in answer to that question, let me
    say, I think that you have to always be in a continuous
    improvement mode, I think you hit it on the head, otherwise you
    do go complacent. The day you think you get the screening
    process or security process right is the day you'll be
    defeated, and I believe that entirely. So this is continuous
    focus on the mission, continuous focus, and continuous
    evaluation through key measures of your performance of that
    mission.
        Now, that said, what have we done to address these
    immediate challenges? We've retrained the entire frontline
    workforce. And I know that sounds easy to say, but let me
    explain what that means. We went--we called it mission
    essentials threat mitigation, and we called it--I wanted to
    call it mission essentials for a reason. It's about reminding
    people that we have a mission, first and foremost, and it is
    truly a no-fail mission in the aviation system, and to remind
    them and to reactivate that desire in them that they exhibited
    when they raised their hand and said, I swear to support and
    defend the Constitution of the United States.
        Mr. Cummings. And how do you do that? How do you do that,
    what you just said?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, I think you do--first, you say it out
    loud.
        Mr. Cummings. Right.
        Mr. Neffenger. It starts by at the very top of the
    organization saying what you do is critically important, and
    I'm going to make sure that everything I do is designed to make
    sure you succeed at your mission, to focus, first and foremost.
    So I start at the mission every day and I work backwards. That
    means I start with the junior-most person in this organization
    that's standing on a screening line, and I think about what it
    means for that individual to do their job effectively, and what
    do I need to do and what does everybody between me and that
    individual need to be focused on to make that happen? This
    isn't about me as an individual, it's not about making myself
    look good or anybody between me and that person; it's about
    every one of us remembering that we serve a higher order here,
    and we engage in a higher order.
        That is surprisingly important for a frontline workforce to
    hear. I learned that in my years in the Coast Guard. That--it
    may seem simple, but that's the most powerful thing you can--
    you can tell somebody, is what you do is important, and it's so
    important that I'm going to spend every waking moment paying
    attention to getting that done right.
        Mr. Cummings. Just one last comment, Mr. Chairman.
        I hope that you took note of what Director Grover said, and
    I hope that in your discussions with your staff, that you--that
    you remind them about this, what she said: One time it was a
    culture that was about emergency, now it's about
    accountability, because I think that that makes a lot of sense.
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Cummings. And hopefully we'll get another chance to ask
    a few questions. Thank you.
        Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
        I now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
    Gowdy, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Neffenger, we're all, I guess, kind of creatures of our
    own personal experience, but I'll tell you, having--most of us
    travel on a regular basis. And the airports that I use, which
    are primarily Greenville, Spartanburg, and South Carolina,
    Charlotte, and DCA, I have never had anything other than
    professional encounters with TSA folks, ever. There's not a
    single instance where I can think of where it wasn't A-plus in
    terms of professionalism.
        So, you know, we're only creatures of our own--and I don't
    wear a member pin, so don't anybody think it's because they
    figured out what I do for a living. They didn't. And I don't,
    thank the Lord, look like most of my colleagues, so I don't
    think that it was for that reason.
        I think it's tough being in law enforcement, period. I
    think, quite frankly, without digressing into a broader
    conversation about that, I think it's become even tougher in
    the last couple years to be in law enforcement.
        So what I want you to tell me is where are your applicants
    coming from? What is the source of the poor morale, other than
    that you only make the news when something goes wrong? If
    there's a TSA agent who is involved in stealing, or if there's
    a TSA agent that does something wrong, that's when you make the
    news. But you don't ever make the news for just simple
    professionalism. So what's the source of the morale issues?
    Where do you draw your applicants from? And what is your plan
    on bolstering morale?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, thanks for your question, Mr. Gowdy,
    and thank you for your good words about our workforce.
        I will echo the fact that I think the majority of the TSA
    workforce, particularly the screening workforce, are truly
    dedicated, responsible and--and patriotic Americans. These are
    people who, as somebody has already mentioned, have taken an
    oath to do a job that many people in this country would not
    want to do and very few people would choose to do.
        That said, so what's the source of morale? Again, my
    experience, it's a well-defined mission statement and a clear
    mission of importance. I think we have a clear mission of
    importance. I don't know that we've always clearly defined that
    to our workforce. So it's reconnecting the workforce to the
    desire that they had in the first place to join, to become part
    of something that's important, that means something and that
    means something to our Nation. That's first and foremost.
    That's what--that's what--that's what the military is all
    about, and that's what my experience there tells me.
        Then it's having clear and unequivocal standards of
    performance. And what I mean by that is what causes high morale
    is if people know that they're held to a high standard of
    performance, and that people who don't meet those standards
    aren't going to be part of your workforce anymore. So I think
    you have to--and you have to be consistent across that, across
    the organization.
        And then you have to train them appropriately; that is, you
    train them, train them in not just how to do their job, but how
    to engage the system, how the system works. I think we need to
    do some work on that score.
        One of the things that we discovered in the course of the
    root cause analysis after the covert testing failures was that
    we actually had not explained to the majority of the frontline
    workforce what the technology capabilities were, so what can
    the machines do, what can't they do.
        No one ever did that to me when I was in the military. They
    never handed me a piece of equipment and said, just go figure
    out how it works. So when you connect them to their system--and
    we never asked their opinion on what they thought of the
    challenges of working that checkpoint. You need feedback from
    your frontline workforce. This isn't just a one-way
    transmission. You've got to engage them.
        So I think the components of morale are clearly important
    mission; support for that mission; training to accomplish the
    mission; understanding of the equipment that we give you to do
    that; and then engaging you and getting some feedback from you
    and letting you be part of the solution that goes forward.
    There's nobody who knows that mission better than the people
    who are conducting it every day.
        So those are the things that we're start--that we're
    putting into place. It takes some time to see the results of
    that, but I see lots of opportunity on those points to really
    reengage the workforce in a much more effective way and to
    actually activate, as I said, that--that which brought them to
    the job in the first place.
        With respect to recruiting, we currently use a third-party
    contractor to help screen recruits, but we recruit from all
    over the country and we recruit from all walks of life. The
    astonishing thing is the talent that exists within the
    workforce. I have people with Ph.D.'s who are frontline
    screeners who have retired and come back into the workforce, I
    have people with music degrees, I have people from all walks of
    life. So there's a--as you might expect in a workforce of
    44,000 screeners, you have a broad range of people at all ages.
        Mr. Gowdy. One last question, because my time's almost up.
    If we were to interview 100 folks who had left, not for cause,
    but just left, what would be--what would be the dominant reason
    they cited for why they--either their expectations weren't met,
    or they lost interest? Why do folks leave?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, I'll give you some thoughts I have,
    because I haven't--I haven't done those interviews myself. I
    think it's probably a combination of factors. You always have
    some people who just decide that it's not the job for them, and
    they move on. But let's address some of those concerns that you
    have with morale. I think it's not feeling like you've--you're
    doing the mission that you thought you were going to be hired
    to do.
        So I think if I'm a screener and I think it's about
    effectiveness and screening properly, and I'm being told to
    move people through the line more effectively, that's probably
    going to cause me to say I'm not sure that this organization
    cares about the things that they said they did. It's, did I get
    the proper training? Do you feel like I'm being supported? Do I
    feel like I have advancement opportunities? And do I get
    continuous development over the course of my career.
        I think all of those are the things that go into deciding
    whether or not you're with an employer you'd like to stay with,
    or you want to move on and look for some other opportunity.
        Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
        We'll now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
    Lynch, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the ranking
    member. Thank you to our panelists, Mr. Neffenger and Inspector
    General Roth and Ms. Grover. Thanks for your help. I think
    you've been very honest in your testimony, both with the
    strengths and failures.
        Just following up on Mr. Gowdy's questions, Mr. Neffenger,
    have you ever thought about offering a bonus or a bounty for a
    screener that actually gets somebody with a gun coming through
    the checkpoint or with some malicious intent?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, you know, we've actually looked at all
    sorts of new incentive--potential incentive programs. I'm a big
    fan of incentivizing the right behavior.
        Mr. Lynch. Okay. I want to move on, because I have got some
    other questions. This is such a target-rich environment; we
    have so many problems. I actually reviewed the--I went to the
    classified briefing with the chairman and other members, the
    ranking member. And while Inspector General Roth has used the
    word, you know, ``disappointing'' and ``troubling,'' I would--I
    would use ``pathetic'' in looking at the number of times people
    got through with guns or bombs, you know, these covert testing
    exercises. It really was pathetic.
        And when I say that, I mean pitiful, the number of times
    people got through. I mean, I fly a lot, my family flies a lot,
    and just thinking about the breaches there, it's--it's
    horrific. So one of the things we can do is just be honest
    about the degree of the breaches and the scope of it, and I
    think you've got at that. I think you've really looked at the
    cultural problems here and what we've got to get at, and I
    appreciate that. So I'm supporting you. I'm not just
    criticizing you. I'm supporting you in your changes.
        Mr. Lynch. But the nature of the threat has evolved as
    well. So now you have ISIS asking for lone wolf attacks which,
    you know, probably presents a greater vulnerability to rail,
    passenger rail security, than it does to airlines perhaps. But
    I just--I'm just wondering about what we're doing to evolve
    with that threat? And the other big gap that I see is in terms
    of people with credentials in airports in secure areas, we're
    having major gaps there. We're letting people in that have
    connections with terrorism. There's indicia of connections with
    terrorism, and they're getting through our screening process
    and getting into secure areas of the airport, and being awarded
    credentials. I think we had 73 instances of that.
        Are we re-doing this? And also, you know, I'd like
    Inspector General Roth also to speak to that issue, because I
    know you've been relentless and you've been very good about
    this. In the past, there's been denial. I don't think we're
    hearing that from you, Mr. Neffenger, I don't think we are at
    all. But in the past, there has been a culture of denial. And
    we need to get at this. We're going to have a major, major
    disaster here on a commercial airline or on a train, and we're
    not going to be able to--well, people will say we didn't see
    that coming, but we did, we did, we have, we see it now. And
    I'm just wondering what our response is going to be to address
    that issue?
        Mr. Neffenger. Let me see if I can address a couple of the
    points you made there with respect to what we're doing. Let me
    start with the last point first, on the insider threat concern,
    people with badges in airports. As you know, there's been some
    concern about the security of the badge population. This is a
    trusted population, or should be a trusted population. So how
    do you determine whether your trusted population is truly to be
    trusted? So what safeguards do you put in place? I think
    there's work to be done there. And I'm encouraged by Secretary
    Johnson's reach to, earlier this year, prior to my
    confirmation, he had asked the Aviation Security Advisory
    Committee, which is a standing statutory committee of industry
    members that advise the Department and the Administrator.
        They took a hard look at this problem, and they came up
    with 28 recommendations, with which TSA fully concurred and is
    in the process of looking for an implementation plan for that.
    That said, what did they say was the challenge? First of all,
    it's having real-time access to the appropriate databases to
    screen people. TSA does, in fact, recurrently vet against
    terrorist databases. One important point to note with respect--
    --
        Mr. Lynch. We've got gaps in that. You're taking an awful
    lot of time to give me very little answers.
        Mr. Neffenger. With the 73 members, it's actually 69
    discreet individuals, they were not actually on the terrorist--
    any terrorist watchlist, but they had incomplete indicia in
    what is called the Terrorist Information Datamark Environment.
    But their--but that information wasn't sufficient to raise to
    known or suspected terrorist status. I'm not just mincing
    words. It's just clear that they were not--and we don't make
    those determinations, that's an FBI determination.
        With respect to ensuring that we pay attention to the
    evolving threat, I am directly connected to my counterparts
    across the intelligence community. I get a daily intelligence
    briefing. It's a synthesis of what everyone is seeing. I'm very
    concerned about how complex and dynamic the threat environment
    is. I think, in some respects, it's the most complex we've seen
    since 9/11. And what makes groups like ISIL particularly
    concerning is that they are intending to inspire, and the
    intent to operation phase is compressing.
        Mr. Lynch. Mr. Chairman, could I ask the Inspector General
    if he would give his version of that? I didn't hear a lot
    there. But I still think we've got a problem. And I'm still
    worried about it. And I'm not hearing, you know, decisive
    action being taken in that regard.
        Chairman Chaffetz. We're well over time. But if the
    Inspector General would care to comment.
        Mr. Roth. Just briefly. And thank you for the question.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. I
    appreciate that.
        Mr. Roth. This goes to sort of what I call beyond the
    checkpoint. Certainly, our focus has been on the checkpoint.
    But there's a lot of security risk that is out there that is
    beyond the checkpoint. Aviation worker vetting is one of them.
    For example, we did an audit of TSA's job as a regulator. In
    other words, the airports have the duty to manage the sight of
    badges, the restricted access badges and adjudicate criminal
    histories of those aviation workers. And, yet, what we found in
    a recent audit, for example, is that as a regulator, TSA only
    examines, perhaps, 1 percent of all the adjudications that the
    airports do.
        So any time you have an issue where the airports have part
    of the responsibility, and TSA has part of the responsibility,
    you have those seams in there. That's what worries me. So the
    fact that you have those seams, as well as how TSA is doing as
    a regulator, I think we're going to be paying more attention to
    that as time goes on.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. I'll now recognize myself for
    5 minutes. And, Administrator, quick, quick answers if we
    could. If you try to bring a gun through a checkpoint and you
    get caught, what happens to that person?
        Mr. Neffenger. Depends on the State that you're in and the
    airport you're at, but it's turned over to local law
    enforcement.
        Chairman Chaffetz. But do they go on a database that you
    administer? Do you note that person in your database?
        Mr. Neffenger. We do, we do note that individual's name,
    yes.
        Chairman Chaffetz. Do they go on a no-fly list?
        Mr. Neffenger. They do not necessarily go on a no-fly list.
    It depends upon the nature of the, of how they present it. The
    no-fly list, as you know, is a terrorist watchlist.
        Chairman Chaffetz. Right.
        Mr. Neffenger. And it's managed by, primarily by the FBI.
    So the no-fly list, you specifically put on based upon your
    connection as a known or suspected terrorist.
        Chairman Chaffetz. So trying to bring a gun onto an
    airplane does not put you into a category of potentially a
    nefarious terrorist type of person, correct?
        Mr. Neffenger. It will ensure that you get increased
    scrutiny when you travel. And you'll lose--if you're a pre-
    check member or an expedited screening member, you'll lose
    that. And you'll lose that----
        Chairman Chaffetz. For how long?
        Mr. Neffenger. For a minimum of 90 days. It depends upon
    the nature of the incident.
        Chairman Chaffetz. So you try to bring a gun on a plane,
    whether it's an accident or not, and just for 90 days you just
    don't get pre-check, that's the penalty?
        Mr. Neffenger. You'll get additional, you'll get
    significant additional screening, which will include----
        Chairman Chaffetz. But you go day 91, you get back into
    pre-screen. I saw somebody who was pretty well-known in Utah,
    they were found to have a gun. They said it was an accident.
    I'm sure it was. But I also saw that person back in pre-check
    pretty quick. And life goes on. If you're on a no-fly list,
    does that mean you can't fly?
        Mr. Neffenger. Unless they're given a specific waiver
    request that comes from the FBI, yes, sir, that's correct.
        Chairman Chaffetz. So if you're on the no-fly--how many
    people are on the no-fly list?
        Mr. Neffenger. I'll have to get you that number. I don't
    know. I don't know off the top of my head.
        Chairman Chaffetz. What percentage of the TSA's time is
    spent on aviation? And where are the other areas in which
    you're allocating resources?
        Mr. Neffenger. The vast majority of our effort is spent in
    the aviation security system, because it's the Federal
    responsibility.
        Chairman Chaffetz. Right.
        Mr. Neffenger. So if you're just looking at allocation of
    resources, you've got a large personnel component of that,
    which takes a great deal. It's over 90 percent of our resources
    are on the aviation----
        Chairman Chaffetz. But what other things is the TSA
    spending their time on?
        Mr. Neffenger. We have a responsibility across all surface
    modes of transportation, so passenger and light rail, over-the-
    road motor carriers and buses, pipelines, and maritime. But
    maritime we do in conjunction with the U.S. Coast Guard.
        Chairman Chaffetz. Tell me a little bit more, if you could,
    I want to go Director Grover. There are some things that have
    been on this list that you've been concerned about for year
    after year after year. And I really did like, as Mr. Cummings
    did, how you solve that cultural problem. But does anybody have
    any consequence if they fail in this mission? I mean, are they
    holding people accountable?
        Ms. Grover. We have a study underway on that issue right
    now. There are annual exams that the screeners have to pass in
    order to keep their jobs. Beyond that, there are requirements
    for retraining if there are errors.
        Chairman Chaffetz. What about--and maybe the Inspector
    General or the director can answer--the behavioral profiling
    part of this, the SPOT part of the program, can you comment on
    this real quick, how well that's being implemented?
        Ms. Grover. Sure. This is about $200 million a year, and it
    is for behavioral detection activities. And the premise is that
    the officers will be able to spot individuals who pose a threat
    to the Nation's security.
        Chairman Chaffetz. Does it work?
        Ms. Grover. TSA doesn't have evidence that is sufficient
    for GAO. So we don't know.
        Chairman Chaffetz. We don't know?
        Ms. Grover. We don't know.
        Chairman Chaffetz. Inspector General, have you looked at
    this at all?
        Mr. Roth. We looked at this in May of 2013. What we found
    is that there were no metrics that TSA had provided as far as
    what success looks like in the program. They had very poor data
    collection. They had insufficient training of the BDOs. I mean,
    keep in mind what the whole idea behind this is, that you're
    going to be able to take this population and figure out who it
    is that's the greatest risk.
        Chairman Chaffetz. Now, are they putting too many--sorry,
    I'm jumping because my time has run out. Are they putting too
    many people into the TSA pre-lines?
        Mr. Roth. That was our concern. And based on several, sort
    of, audits that we did in the spring of this year, we believe
    that the administrator has taken fairly significant and drastic
    action to reduce the number of individuals in the pre-check who
    had not been individually vetted. We made a number of
    recommendations. The prior administrator had rejected those
    recommendations. But since Administrator Neffenger has come in,
    there has been a change as to whether or not those
    recommendations are adopted.
        Chairman Chaffetz. And this is--again, my concern here is
    that the behavioral profiling is an important part of what
    we're doing. But how to train and implement that is a critical
    component. I'm also a big fan of the K-9 teams. They're mobile.
    There's a perception that they are able to detect things that I
    think would make somebody very nervous. The presence of a K-9
    in conjunction with behavioral profiling, going through a metal
    detector, would be much more effective and efficient. It's
    certainly what the military came to the conclusion of doing.
    And I think we need to pay keen attention to that. My time has
    expired. I now recognize Ms. Kelly for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Good morning. Screening
    lanes designated as pre-check lanes are available at more than
    150 airports, according to TSA's Web site. Travelers who go
    through such lanes receive expedited screening. There are
    several ways that travelers can access the pre-check lanes.
    Under one procedure, individuals apply to the program, pay a
    fee, provide data on themselves, and undergo background checks.
    If an applicant is determined to be a low-risk flyer, the
    applicant is enrolled in the pre-check program. However, TSA
    has been directing some travelers to the expedited pre-check
    lines, even if they did not enroll in the program.
    Specifically, travelers can be directed to the pre-check lanes
    through procedures that have been called managed inclusion 1
    and managed inclusion 2.
        Administer Neffenger, in your testimony, you wrote that at
    your discretion, TSA has phased out the practice known as
    managed inclusion 2. Can you discuss what this program was and
    why it was ended, and what has been the impact of the
    elimination of this program on passenger volume in expedited
    screening lines?
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes. The managed inclusion 2 program that
    you referred to was a term given to the practice of randomly
    assigning people that were in a standard screening lane to the
    expedited screening lane. And it was simply done with a random
    generator. You would get a yes/no, and they would move people
    in. That was pushing at its peak about 14 percent of average
    daily travelers through expedited screening lanes. And these
    are people who had not been through the pre-check, through any
    kind of a pre-check vetting. There were some things that were
    done that were intended to buy down the risk of those
    individuals, some additional randomized measures that were
    taken after you got pushed into that lane.
        It was my opinion, when I took over, that that was an
    untenable risk. And so I discontinued that practice. And as of
    September 12, it was eliminated completely. We had to ramp it
    down slowly so we didn't shock the system. But we eliminated
    that completely.
        Ms. Kelly. How long did that go on?
        Mr. Neffenger. How long did that process go on? I think it
    was about a year and a half or so that that was run. There's
    another form of moving of people into expedited screening
    lanes, a much smaller number, you referred to it as managed
    inclusion 1. But what it really is is the use of passenger-
    sniffing K-9s to randomly assign some people from standard
    screening into the expedited screening lanes, but using the K-
    9s. And then additional screening measures are applied to each
    of them. That's a very small percentage of the daily travelers,
    and I'll get you the exact number on that. But I'm a big fan
    and a big proponent of a fully-vetted population in an
    expedited screening lane. I think the only way we can--going
    back to the earlier comments about risk-based security, I
    really want to know as much as I can about an individual
    traveling as they come through, given that the vast majority of
    people are safe to do so.
        So the goal is to significantly expand the truly vetted
    pre-check population over the coming months, and to completely
    eliminate the random assignment of anyone in the pre-check lane
    who's not already been vetted precise.
        Ms. Kelly. Maybe I missed this, but do you feel that more
    people are going through the pre-check program so they are,
    they can go through the faster lines? Because it seems like the
    last couple of times I've traveled, there's been many more
    people on the pre-check line, and I'm at O'Hare, so.
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, we're seeing a huge spike in
    enrollments over the past couple of months. So we're averaging
    about 50,000 enrollments a month right now, which is
    encouraging to me. And that's before the response to our recent
    request for proposals to expand the marketing opportunities for
    up to three additional private sector vendors to look for more
    retail opportunities to enroll in pre-check.
        I know that I've worked with--talked with the airlines and
    the travel industry. They're advertising, and if you've flown
    recently, you may have seen on the in-flight screens
    advertisements for pre-check. So the industry is working very
    hard to increase enrollments as well.
        Ms. Kelly. Thank you. Inspector General Roth, you wrote
    that you were pleased to report that we have recently made
    significant progress in getting concurrence and compliance with
    recommendations. The Inspector General's Office has made
    regarding pre-check, but that TSA is continuing to use some
    risk-assessment tools you have recommended that they
    discontinue. To that extent, can you--in this open setting, can
    you discuss the recommendations your office has made to the TSA
    regarding access to expedited screening processes that TSA has
    not acted on at this point?
        Mr. Roth. Certainly. And thank you for that question. Just
    as an overlay, we had a number of open recommendations, or
    recommendations that TSA did not agree with. And those are set
    forth, I think, starting at about page 20 of the appendix of my
    testimony. And one of the things that I wanted to do was
    highlight in bold those that have changed in the last 6 months.
    And it is significant. There's almost no disagreement now
    between TSA and the Office of Inspector General as to what
    needs to be done.
        There is a fairly narrow point, and unfortunately, because
    this is an open setting, it's not possible to discuss it, but
    there's a certain risk profile, a certain type of passenger
    that we believe should not be on expedited screening. But we
    are in discussions with TSA about it. These are good-faith
    discussions as to what is an appropriate level of risk. And I'm
    highly confident we're going to get to a place that both
    protects the American people but also moves passengers in an
    expedited way.
        Ms. Kelly. I have one more. And does TSA--am I past the
    time?
        Chairman Chaffetz. Yes.
        Ms. Kelly. Oh, I'm sorry. I yield back.
        Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman
    from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank each of you
    for your testimony. Inspector General Roth, I'm glad to hear
    that you say that a lot of the disagreement has disappeared.
    Because previously, that was a major concern, as we had GAO and
    the IG making recommendations, and yet, TSA somehow believes
    that they had their Carnac hat on, and they're able to figure
    out what to anticipate and what not to anticipate.
        So I would encourage that continued, I guess, partnership.
    But speaking of partnerships, I want to focus on the
    partnership for public service, and specifically, with regards,
    Administrator, to low employee morale. We have held hearings in
    this very room about some of the worst places to work, which,
    perhaps, that title was not the best title to pick. But we've
    also found that there is a tremendous opportunity in terms of
    employee morale on how to encourage the workforce. Your survey
    has consistently--well, let's just say that it's not something
    that you would try to attain.
        Do I have your commitment today to reach out to some of
    those agencies that get good marks on that survey to find out
    the best practices that they have? NASA, in particular,
    continues to get high marks? Do I have your commitment to do
    that?
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir. And so does the workforce.
        Mr. Meadows. Okay. Let me go a little bit--Director Grover,
    let me come to you, because I'd like you, if you could, briefly
    summarize some of your concerns as it relates to the AIT
    machines, and the procurement thereof, and some of the
    challenges that we've had there.
        Ms. Grover. That's a really important issue because it is
    one of the main technologies that TSA relies on for screening
    passengers. What we originally found was that TSA had
    considered the effectiveness of the technology in a laboratory,
    but hadn't considered the broader picture of the employees who
    use them in the airport environment. And they have taken steps
    to address that in the procurement of the next version of the
    AIT systems.
        They have begun measuring the effectiveness of the entire
    system, and looking at the detection rate of the entire system
    working together, and that's really important. One
    recommendation that we still have open is that TSA should pay
    close attention to its understanding of the false alarm rate on
    those machines. It is significant. And it has repercussions for
    both security effectiveness, because if screeners are used to a
    high false alarm rate, then they begin to think that there may
    not be anything there when the alarm goes off.
        And it also has repercussions for financing. Because every
    time the machine alarms, that person has to go through a pat-
    down. So if the false alarm rate could be reduced, then it
    would have financial implications as well. And that is
    something that TSA is working on. But they do not yet have
    system-wide understanding of the operational false alarm rates.
        Mr. Meadows. So, Administrator, I see you shaking your
    head. You're willing to work with GAO on that and make sure
    that we come up with a matrix on how to--here's one of the
    concerns I have. We all talk about how we're going to work on
    it. And, yet, we don't really put parameters in there to judge
    whether we're successful or not. So will you work on a matrix
    that satisfies GAO as it relates to false alarms?
        Mr. Neffenger. Not only that, but we're actually, we've
    been working very hard to completely restructure the process we
    use for doing this. I think that Director Grover has raised
    some important points. And they're key to--they are the key
    challenges that we face. But you can't do it unless you change
    the way you do business. So it's really given us an
    opportunity, it's given me an opportunity to completely
    restructure the way we do business.
        Mr. Meadows. All right. Let me, when we talk about
    restructuring the way that we do business, one of the things
    that happens a lot is administrators come here and say we just
    need more money. And I think that on, in a bipartisan fashion,
    we're willing to give you the resources necessary to do it if
    you're willing to look at not only the recommendations that the
    IG and GAO have looked at, but look at recreating the way that
    you do business from a security standpoint.
        The chairman mentioned K-9 units. Is there a plan to look
    at K-9s, to bring them in during those high-peak, high times of
    travel, you know, not 1 a.m. In the morning, you know, when you
    have two TSA personnel there, but during those--to help
    alleviate some of the backlog? Are you willing to come up with
    a proposal and submit to this committee on how you might
    implement that?
        Mr. Neffenger. I will. In fact, I think I have a good story
    to tell this committee with respect to K-9s. One of the first
    things I did was look at the current disposition of K-9s units,
    K-9 teams across the Nation, repositioning a number of those
    from small, lesser-traveled airports to the large, high-volume
    airports. We're bringing a number of new teams on board this
    year. I will get you a full report for the committee, because I
    think it's a good report, and it shows that we're moving, I
    believe, in the right direction with respect to thinking of the
    system.
        And I just want to make one comment with respect to your
    comment, I absolutely agree with you that you have to take a
    systemic view of this. If you look at discrete elements of the
    system, all you'll do is look at discrete elements of the
    system, and you won't think about how they interact with one
    another. So it's looking at the entire environment that we call
    aviation security, and understanding how all of these
    components interact with one another and how effective they
    are. It speaks to everything from false alarm rates to the
    proper use of K-9s to other things. And I'm happy to provide a
    much fuller brief at the committee's discretion on how we're
    doing that.
        Mr. Meadows. I yield back.
        Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. I will now
    recognize the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia, Ms.
    Norton, for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is an
    important hearing. Before I ask my questions, Administrator
    Neffenger, this is a copy of the District of Columbia license.
    We've had to have the Administrator in, the Deputy
    Administrator in, because it changed from saying Washington,
    D.C. to saying District of Columbia. And, apparently, this
    really befuddled the screeners. And so some of them asked for
    their passport because they--this license had no sense of the
    place where you are now wasn't recognized. So I want to provide
    you with a copy of this before you leave so that kind of
    periodic reminders can be made. This was a change. I understand
    it was changed from Washington, D.C., and there was an attempt
    by the Administrator, the Deputy Administrator worked closely
    with me. Since you're new, I want to make sure that this
    doesn't have to come up on your watch.
        Mr. Neffenger, I have sat, for example, and seen what we
    have experienced at the airport, mentioned with respect to
    screeners who try to get, who sit, for example, at the Capitol
    or in Federal buildings. I must say, I think this needs a study
    by psychologists, people who know something about the human
    mind and how it operates, because all you have to do is ask for
    a GAO study, and you will always get that they, in fact, don't
    catch bombs, they don't catch pistols.
        We need to learn more, instead of just trying to catch
    people, because we are getting the same results no matter where
    they are, whether they're magnetometers or whether they are
    TSA. For example, for TSA, we have had people who bring bombs
    in shoes to try to detonate their shoes. We've had a so-called
    underwear bomber. And it's interesting to note that with
    respect to those items, that they went through multiple layers
    of security. And it was passengers, not TSA, who, in fact, were
    called on to put down those very dangerous people.
        This leads me to ask whether or not TSA is really
    equipped--for example, to discover these, we had this matter
    before the Congress, these plastic handguns. I mean, if they
    can't find ordinary items like bombs and pistols, and they are,
    as you can see, very inventive, what I'm wondering is, does TSA
    have access to the intelligence to meet their adaptiveness in
    light of emerging threats?
        They're not going to do the same thing that passengers took
    them down for before. Do you have access to that intelligence?
    Or do you have to depend upon some other agency? And if so, how
    do they relay to you what the emerging intelligence reveals?
        Mr. Neffenger. Thank you for that question. And, first,
    just to be clear, the underwear bomber and the Richard Reid
    shoe bomber, those were not screened by TSA because they came
    from overseas in.
        Ms. Norton. Yeah. I understand that.
        Mr. Neffenger. So those--and it's one of the reasons that
    we were--we became concerned about the non-metallic threat. I
    do have access to intelligence. And as I noted earlier, every
    morning I get an intelligence briefing. And it's a compilation
    of intelligence from across the intelligence community. I meet
    regularly with other members of the community. And we have
    people embedded in all of the major intelligence components, so
    the National Counterterrorism Center, the National Targeting
    Center, the CIA, NSA.
        Ms. Norton. Do you screen yourselves instead of waiting for
    an outside agency to do it?
        Mr. Neffenger. We do. We do the recurrent vetting of the
    trusted populations, as well as the current vetting of people
    in the secure flight--that enter into secure flight, put a
    passenger reservation in, and then continuous recurrent vetting
    of individuals who are in the trusted traveler programs.
        Ms. Norton. No, I understand that your screeners often pass
    their own tests when you do your own internal vetting. That is
    why I ask this question about trying to understand,
    particularly people who have to stand in one place for several
    hours, doing the same thing, seeing the same thing. Don't we
    need to know more about how the human brain operates with
    respect to that kind of work, so that we can better equip
    screeners to do this, frankly, very boring job?
        Mr. Neffenger. I think that's a key point, and one of the
    things that we looked at, as we looked at the--at what are the
    repeated causes of these things that we keep seeing over and
    over again?
        Ms. Norton. So who was looking at that?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, we initially looked at it through an
    assigned team. The Secretary referred to it as the tiger team,
    but I've inherited it. It's really the team--the root cause
    analysis team. And the next thing you have to do then is say,
    okay, now that I've found these root causes, can we correct
    them ourselves, or do we need help in doing so?
        Ms. Norton. I'm just going to ask you, finally--I know my
    time is up--if you would consider getting an outside study from
    people equipped to understand the human brain and how it
    operates after repetitiveness of this kind, so that we can get
    ahold of this?
        Mr. Neffenger. Yeah, I think it's important to look at
    human factors. You're absolutely right. So I would consider it.
        Ms. Norton. Thank you.
        Chairman Chaffetz. I now recognize the gentleman from
    Georgia, Mr. Carter, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you
    for being here today. We appreciate your presence. Mr. Roth, I
    understand that some of this information may be classified.
    And, certainly, if I overstep my bounds, I'm sure you'll let me
    know. But I would appreciate your cooperation. I would like to
    ask you what I would consider a little bit more detailed
    question. And that is, first of all, it's been reported that
    the undercover investigators were, what areas were they
    specifically looking at? Was it the typical area that a
    passenger goes through?
        Mr. Roth. For this round of covert testing, what we did was
    simply act like an ordinary passenger and try to get prohibited
    items through the checkpoint. So, that would be either the AIT
    machine, the Advanced Imaging Technology machine, or, for
    example, if they were part of managed inclusion, through no
    sort of action on their own but was simply sent to a
    magnetometer, going through that way as well. So they just
    acted like normal passengers, except they had things concealed
    on them.
        Mr. Carter. So this particular operation did not really
    look at where the employees are going or anything outside, it
    was just typical passengers?
        Mr. Roth. Correct. We did some covert testing 2 years ago
    on that very issue, that is, trying to get into the very secure
    areas, you know, sort of unguarded access to aircraft or jet
    baggage and that kind of thing. And the results were
    disappointing.
        Mr. Carter. You mentioned the imaging machines. Were there
    actually guns or simulated bombs that you were able to get
    through? Did they go through the imaging machine as well?
        Mr. Roth. I can't talk about the specifics unfortunately.
    But we did test the imaging machine, and we did test it with
    significant numbers of prohibited items. And, again, the
    results were disappointing.
        Mr. Carter. As well as the X ray machines?
        Mr. Roth. Correct.
        Mr. Carter. Okay. Mr. Roth, earlier this year, you
    testified before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security. And
    during that time, you said that your office, the testing found
    layers of security simply missing. And then you seemed to
    indicate that those results were expected. Is that true?
        Mr. Roth. One of the things that--yes, the results were
    expected. The degree of the results, I think, were a bit
    surprising to us. But keep in mind that we've done covert
    testing over the years with very similar results to the ones
    that we did this year. And I would add that once we did the
    results this year, we discovered that TSA itself had done
    covert testing with very similar results. So everything had
    been consistently poor for a number of years, which, of course,
    was both exasperating and troubling to us.
        Mr. Carter. Mr. Neffenger, given these results and these
    findings, what are your plans? What do you plan to do to
    address what has been called missing layers of security?
        Mr. Neffenger. First, it's a full-system review. It started
    with understanding the nature of the failures that existed, to
    look at how those were similar to other discoveries in past
    years, and as I had mentioned before, to really figure out
    what's the systemic reason for this? Because if you have, if
    you assume you have a generally talented workforce that really
    wants to do a good job, but they're failing, then it tells me
    that there's something else going on. And I do think we have a
    generally talented workforce that wants to do a good job, that
    wants to come to work to protect this Nation on a daily basis.
        So there must be a reason or something for repeated
    failures of the same type system-wide. First of all, it's
    recognizing that it's a system that operates, and not just a
    point failure at a given airport, or a given number of
    airports. Second, it's looking back over the way in which
    your--what is your leadership of the organization? What are the
    environmental influences? And so on and so forth. And then
    beginning to reevaluate from core essential mission facts, you
    know, what is it we are supposed to do? Do we understand our
    mission the way we should? So we're in the process of doing
    that right now.
        Mr. Carter. And all that is good and fine. But what about
    specifics? Can you tell me something specifically, we changed
    this or we changed that?
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir. So proper use of the technology.
    So we dramatically changed the way people use that technology.
    Because as it turns out, we hadn't taught them how important it
    was to use it properly. And without getting into classified
    details, and I would be happy to provide those in a closed
    session, I could tell you specifically why some of those
    failures existed. So we fixed that. We actually told them how
    the equipment works. That was something we had never done
    before. We streamlined the number of procedures that we
    expected them to memorize. I mentioned there were 3,100
    separate tasks, and 88 different forms of pat-downs. So that
    was just, it's impossible. There's no one who can do that. So
    we've now streamlined that down to about a 25-page quick-
    response guide which outlines in very specific detail with
    pictures, here's exactly what you do. And we've significantly
    improved our ability. So we trained specifically to do things
    very differently at the checkpoint.
        Mr. Carter. My time has expired. Mr. Chairman, I yield
    back.
        Mr. Palmer. [presiding.] The chair recognizes Mr.
    Cartwright for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Cartwright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, TSA
    is a frontline counterterrorism organization. And its
    transportation security officers, those TSOs we've been talking
    about, they have to get it right every time. Mr. Neffenger,
    thank you for being here. I want to ask you, do TSOs receive
    annual performance review testing?
        Mr. Neffenger. They do.
        Mr. Cartwright. Do the TSOs typically know when they're
    going to be tested for their annual employee performance
    reviews?
        Mr. Neffenger. Typically, yes.
        Mr. Cartwright. Okay. And on average, how do they perform
    during these annual performance review tests?
        Mr. Neffenger. On average, they perform well.
        Mr. Cartwright. But, yet, what we find out is that the
    covert tests conducted by the Inspector General, GAO, and your
    own internal teams, revealed significant problems in screener's
    performance. It seems as though TSOs tend to bring their A game
    when they know the test is coming, but not so much at other
    times. Inspector General Roth, nice to have you back in our
    committee room. Would you say covert tests of screener skills
    and knowledge bear out this concern I'm talking about?
        Mr. Roth. Yes.
        Mr. Cartwright. Now, according to TSA documents, of the 38
    metrics used to assess the performance of field leadership at
    airport checkpoints, the majority have been focused on wait
    times for passengers, rather than safety concerns. And I want
    to ask all of our witnesses, including you, Director Grover,
    would you agree that if TSA employees were told they're being
    judged, at least in part, on how expeditiously they move
    passengers through the system, this may signal to screeners
    that speed takes priority over other considerations?
        Mr. Neffenger. Is that question for me? You're absolutely
    right. I couldn't agree with you more. That's exactly what I
    found in the course of our analysis of the issue.
        Mr. Cartwright. And I note that under TSA's new plan, it
    appears to put the focus back on security. Am I correct in
    that?
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir. You're correct.
        Mr. Cartwright. In responding to the new ``safety before
    speed'' goals, one TSA employee was reported to be glad that,
    ``The agency finally is going back to basics, emphasizing
    security over customer service and wait times.'' But another
    employee doubted the new plans will be implemented. And he or
    she thought that management will still be very focused on wait
    times and throughput. And I want to ask you, Mr. Neffenger, how
    will you convince frontline employees that the metric on which
    they will be evaluated will be security?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, I suppose, I mean, you have to get a
    little trust up front and you teach them over time. But I will
    assure you that one of the first things I did was to eliminate
    wait time as a primary measurement. Now, it's not that wait
    time isn't important. There's some issues associated with
    people packing up outside the sterile area. But effectiveness
    and security is the primary measure. And what I've said to, not
    just my leadership team, but to everybody in the organization,
    and I've done it through direct contact, through video
    messages, through weekly messages from me, I've said, Your
    number one job, if you're a screener, is to screen effectively.
        I will let management--it's management's responsibility to
    work with the airports and the airlines and others to do queue
    management. But we were putting that burden on the backs of the
    screeners. And it's no surprise to me that if you hold them
    accountable for moving people more effectively, more
    efficiently through the line, that they're going to do just
    that. You get what you measure. And you get what you emphasize.
    It's also no surprise that they do really well on the
    performance test and do poorly in the other way, because that's
    about keeping your job. So it tells me they're capable of doing
    their job well. We just have to give them that--we have to back
    them in that score 100 percent.
        Mr. Cartwright. All right. Fine. Let me ask you this,
    Administrator Neffenger: When will performance assessments
    using the new metrics begin to be used? And will any aspects of
    the performance evaluation process change to track performance
    over time rather than performance on a single test? In other
    words, how are you going to ensure TSOs are at the top of their
    game every day, not just when their job performance reviews are
    happening?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, those performance metrics have already
    changed. And they've been explained and announced to the
    workforce.
        Mr. Cartwright. All right. Now, finally, let me ask you how
    will you balance increased wait times with the focus on
    security, and ensure that security considerations don't give
    way when balanced against increased wait times, particularly
    during busy travel periods like the upcoming holiday season?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, we are seeing an increase in wait
    times, not, not--and it's SPOT-significant. But, two things:
    One, I really want to grow this trusted traveler population.
    And I want to do it in the smart way, which is a true vetted
    population. And so we're working very hard with the--both with
    the current vendor, who you may have seen some of the
    opportunities in the airports, and we're looking to expand it
    considerably through a request for a proposal that's out. Also
    working with the industry itself to look for opportunities to
    market it more effectively. And we are seeing a significant
    increase in enrollments. That's one way of doing it. The second
    is to provide surge staffing to those airports that we know are
    going to be under the greatest pressure during the upcoming
    travel season. But at the same time, not to put any of that
    burden on the backs of the screeners, but to move that into the
    management team where it belongs.
        Mr. Cartwright. All right. I'm out of time. And I yield
    back, Chairman Palmer.
        Mr. Palmer. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Hice from Georgia.
        Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you
    for being here with us here today. In my short time in
    Congress, I have already seen and heard far too many reports,
    be it from the Office of the Inspector General or GAO,
    wherever, dealing and detailing TSA's prohibitively expensive
    technology, either not working to properly screen passengers,
    or the TSA agents not properly reading the technology one way
    or the other in the various red tests, red team tests that have
    taken place.
        As you well know, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International
    Airport, hundreds of thousands of people every day flying out
    of there, one of, if not the most busiest airport in the world.
    I fly out of there myself almost every week. And I could not
    agree any more with my colleagues here today that the
    recommendations that have come from OIG and GAO, it's just
    vitally critical for these to be implemented.
        And you, Mr. Neffenger, just being in this position 4
    months, hats off to you. I thank you for your comments here
    today and your willingness to admit the problems that you're
    facing, and the willingness to attack those head on.
        As some of the results have come back from some of the
    various tests, a word was used earlier describing those results
    as ``pathetic.'' And you, yourself, I think, are fully aware of
    that. Another word that hit me earlier is the word ``culture''
    that's been within TSA. And I believe Inspector Roth said that
    culture is the most important issue that you saw that needs to
    change immediately. So that being said, what have you done to
    this point to transform the culture at TSA in such a way that
    the vulnerabilities are adequately addressed?
        Mr. Neffenger. Mr. Hice, thank you for that question. And
    that is a key point. You know, as I looked at TSA, I tried to
    understand, so I come from an agency with 225 years of culture,
    the United States Coast Guard. And that's a lot of time to
    build an identity for an organization in the sense of who you
    are. TSA is still largely an amalgam of the cultures of the
    places that everybody came from. It really hasn't had time to
    grow a leadership core from within. And so you have this
    combination of people.
        So what do you do to jump start the culture in an
    organization? I think there's a couple key things you can do,
    and it comes from both the top and the bottom. Let me start
    with the bottom. First, I think one of the greatest challenges
    TSA has amongst its workforce is that we train on the job
    across 75 different airports. So if you hire into TSA right
    now, if you hire into Atlanta, you actually just join the
    Atlanta-Hartsfield workforce. It's not clear to me that there's
    a--that there's a real engagement with the broader sense of who
    you're part of.
        So one of the things I've proposed and I've asked for in
    the FY '16 budget, is to begin almost like a boot camp training
    at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco,
    Georgia, so that I can conduct all new hire training there.
    That's one way to begin to engage from the bottom up this
    connection to a larger organization and a sense of culture, and
    to begin to inculturate people.
        At the top level, it takes somebody at the very top of the
    organization, and that's me right now, saying this is
    important--first of all, saying the word ``culture'' out loud,
    and identifying where the culture isn't connected, and then
    identifying what you expect that culture to be. So I'm about to
    issue my administrator's intent in which I, very clearly, in a
    few succinct pages, outline what the culture of our
    organization is, and what I intend it to be, and how we intend
    to work towards that.
        And then you have to then begin working on that on a daily
    basis. So there's a series of efforts that I have planned over
    the coming months to begin to talk and train in the culture
    that you expect.
        I think that's the best way to begin to jump start it. And
    then it has to take root and grow over time. But it takes
    continuous attention. This is one of these things that will
    fade away if you don't pay attention to it.
        Mr. Hice. Well, and it is a huge task. And in the middle of
    that, you have both the safety issue and the efficiency issue
    trying to get passengers through. You mentioned some metrics a
    while ago that you are currently already implementing. I want
    to know from Mr. Roth and Ms. Grover, do you believe those
    metrics are adequate to both provide safety, security that we
    need, and also efficiency?
        Mr. Roth. I agree with the Administrator that you get what
    you measure. So, certainly, if you measure the right things,
    you're going to get the right things. As part of our audit
    process, what we'll do is 90 days after the completion of our
    report, we're going to look back on it in sort of a rigorous,
    systematic way to determine whether or not these metrics are
    going to work. Until then, we're going to be skeptical about it
    because that's our job is to be skeptical. So we will keep the
    Congress informed as we go forward.
        Ms. Grover. Time will tell. Our biggest task for TSA at the
    moment would be to make sure they put in place a systematic,
    coherent approach to measuring the outcomes that they want to
    achieve, and then monitoring them and following up on them with
    the workforce. Because that's the only way to make sure that
    they get improved, consistent effectiveness.
        Mr. Hice. Again, I thank each of you for your
    accountability and working, partnering together. Mr. Chairman,
    thank you for the time. I yield back.
        Mr. Palmer. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair now
    recognizes Mr. DeSaulnier.
        Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Neffenger, let
    me just say how encouraging it is to hear your forthrightness,
    and also your comments about going to root cause and human
    factors. So when we look at human factors, I know when I talk
    to people in my district in the national laboratories, or, I
    should say, in the edges, who do studies on human factors in
    different environments and all they're learning from
    neuroscience, one of the things that comes up is making sure
    that those individuals can focus on what their jobs are.
        And that also reinforces the things you say about culture,
    that you're trying to eliminate things that are distracting
    them. So, for individuals who aren't getting paid a lot of
    money but are dealing in a stressful retail environment where
    the customers aren't always the great--always in the best mood,
    I wanted to ask you questions about your relationship with the
    airline industry.
        So it strikes me that, having been a frequent traveler for
    many years, going through the experience, you don't go to TSA
    to find out what's the best way for you as a customer to go
    through wherever you're going, whether it's the general
    customers going through, or pre-check. But the more we
    continually reinforce this is what you should expect, this is
    what you need to do; and on the back end, your conversations
    with the airline industry, and specifically, for charges for
    checked baggage, which you have mentioned, stated that this
    trend, and more checked baggages creates a stressed screening
    environment at airport checkpoints.
        So both of those things. How do you deal with the airlines
    so that when some of the airlines start charging for check
    baggage, and we have more and more people trying to carry on
    more, it seems to--just as an observer--create more stress for
    the screeners. And then, secondarily, how do you help with the
    airline so that when we're going to our apps to understand for
    people who don't fly frequently, they are helping you reinforce
    how to get customers and educate customers how they can best be
    prepared to get through the line?
        Mr. Neffenger. Thank you for that question. And I think
    that--so I'm still relatively new in the game, but I've been--
    I've met--I've spent a lot of time over the past 4 months
    meeting with both industry representatives, the association
    that represent them, as well as the individual CEOs of each of
    the major U.S. airlines. I've been very encouraged with their
    openness and their response. They recognize some of these same
    challenges. I think that there's a great deal of work we can do
    to tie ourselves more closely together. There's nobody with a
    higher vested interest in security of the system than the
    people who are flying in the system. And I think that
    recognizing that, that gives you a lot of grounds for, we have
    the same objective in mind, even if we approach it from
    different motivations and different requirements.
        So I'm encouraged that a number of airlines and the travel
    associations that support them have begun to do more to
    advertise the trusted traveler programs like global entry and
    pre-check. I think there's a lot we can do to simplify the
    application procedures and to make them more common across the
    various programs that the Government offers. I think that you
    can never market that enough.
        But I do believe that it really comes down to understanding
    that we're all in the same system together. We have different
    roles to play, but we can play those roles in a complementary
    fashion. The airlines have been working very hard to enforce
    the 1+1 rule, meaning the one carry-on bag and one handbag or
    one briefcase. They're challenged as well.
        You know, it's not my business to address their business
    model, but I can tell you it's just a fact that a lot more
    stuff is arriving. It's packed more--full of more things.
    People have electronics in there. All of that poses a challenge
    for the screeners to deal with. And they have to be very
    attentive to it.
        Mr. DeSaulnier. But you work with the airline industry, so
    that you knew these changes were coming, or your predecessor
    knew, that it had the potential to put more pressure on the
    screeners when they were going to start charging for checked
    baggage?
        Mr. Neffenger. I mean, I think that would have been the
    expectation.
        Mr. DeSaulnier. Do we have a mechanism to do that going
    forward?
        Mr. Neffenger. Absolutely. I've asked the--and the airlines
    have promised to work closely together. I think both sides have
    to be aware of the impact of the decisions they make. And I'm
    interested in the decisions and the business models of the
    airline industry and how it affects our business, because we
    support that business.
        Mr. DeSaulnier. And also they may be transferring costs
    that you might pick up that they would normally expect to be
    part of their costs?
        Mr. Neffenger. At a minimum, to let them know what the
    consequence of that decision will be, that it may, indeed, lead
    to slower throughput at checkpoints, because we have to screen
    and clear these bags.
        Mr. DeSaulnier. But, in this instance, would there be some
    kind of analysis that they are making more money by checking--
    charging for checked bags, but it's costing us more money,
    either because it's putting more stress on the system, you're
    adding more people, they're working overtime? And do you have a
    relationship with the revenue stream that's going in there?
    Should they compensate you for that if there's a cost benefit
    that shows that there is?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, I have not looked at the specific cost
    analysis. So I would have to take that back for action. But I
    think that, certainly, I would want to know what the impact is
    on me; if it requires me to have additional resources, then I
    need to be aware of that.
        Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you, Mr. Neffenger. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Palmer. The chair recognizes Mr. Russell from Oklahoma.
        Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for
    being here today and your dedication for trying to help secure
    our republic. And, Administrator Neffenger, thank you for your
    long and dedicated service to our republic. With regard to some
    of the issues on the screening partnership program, would you
    say that the partnerships have been better or worse performers
    than TSA? And what concerns do you have about that, if any?
        Mr. Neffenger. In my initial look at the difference, or the
    potential differences between private sector screeners and the
    public, we haven't seen any significant differences in
    performance, assuming that they're trained appropriately and
    the like. If I have any concerns at all, it's that we have a
    clear set of standards and expectations, and that those are
    consistently maintained across that program. But, again, I
    don't see any evidence that there's any particular performance
    differences between the two.
        Mr. Russell. Thank you. With regard to the turnover, what
    percentage of new hires would you say turn over within 1 year,
    or 2 years, just a ballpark?
        Mr. Neffenger. You know, I just saw these numbers. I'll
    have to get you the exact number. But it's a fairly high
    turnover rate. Well, it depends. Part-time is different from
    full-time. So in the full-time workforce, it's about 10 percent
    I think is the number. And in the part-time workforce, it's
    been as high as about 25 percent.
        Mr. Russell. And you had mentioned some of the reasons
    before. But, obviously, that's got to be a drain on your
    experienced, long-time personnel because they're constantly
    having to break in new employees, and you have the expense of
    training them. So these are really dollars that are lost. How
    will you mitigate that in the future?
        Mr. Neffenger. I think some of it goes back to that
    overarching discussion we had about connection to mission,
    connection to agency. As I think about what is it that would
    make somebody decide that this is not for them, aside from the
    odd individual who just says that's just not what I thought I
    was signing up for. It's typically, did the thing I thought I
    was going to do, is that what the agency actually expects me to
    do? So am I connected to the mission? Am I connected to my
    agency? And do I see a future in the agency? Are there
    opportunities for training? Further advancement? And so forth.
        I think all of those are components of turnover, I think,
    some of which can be addressed, are beginning to be addressed
    by establishment of a common training program, and an engaged
    sense of belonging to something larger than you. I think it
    continues with a clearly-defined sense of progression in the
    organization, an understanding of what your opportunities are,
    and incentivizing performance, understanding if I perform well,
    I'll get rewarded for it, and a feeling of engagement with my
    leadership.
        Mr. Russell. Thank you. What concerns do you have with
    cargo screening?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, cargo, as you know, has been a concern
    for some time. There have been a number of procedures put in
    place for that. I think that the question is a recognition of
    the fact that this is a much larger system than just the
    checkpoints. Even assuming you get the checkpoint 100 percent
    right, there are many other potential vulnerabilities in the
    aviation environment, cargo being one of them.
        We have a very robust set of requirements for cargo on
    domestic aircraft, as well as cargo that is coming inbound to
    the U.S. on foreign and domestic carriers coming from outside
    the U.S. And that reaches all the way back to the individuals
    who are actually packing the cargo container for shipment. It
    is an ongoing challenge. It's an ongoing threat. And it's one
    that you can't take your eyes off at any point.
        Mr. Russell. I guess on the TSA pre-program, a lot of
    issues have been addressed with that. I mean, I understand the
    benefits of certainly having low-risk travelers set aside for
    expedited screening. And you made it a point to, in your
    testimony here today, to try to stop the managed inclusion
    where people are benefiting from the program, but really have
    no vetting whatsoever. Based upon the needs and the shortfalls
    of the pre-program, how much of that was from managed inclusion
    by vetted passengers?
        Mr. Neffenger. Are you speaking with respect to the covert
    testing failures?
        Mr. Russell. Yes.
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, I think that it is the case that some
    of the--without getting into details--that, as Inspector
    General Roth noted, some of the people who were coming through
    the system were diverted into it. And that may have contributed
    to some of the failures that we saw.
        I felt that the managed inclusion, as I said before,
    injected unacceptable risk into the system. I didn't know
    anything about these individuals. And I thought that they were
    best put back into standard screening until such time that they
    presented themselves in a direct way for vetting to come into
    the program.
        Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.
        Mr. Palmer. The chair recognizes the gentlelady from New
    Mexico, Ms. Lujan Grisham.
        Ms. Lujan Grisham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
    all very much for your testimony today. Mr. Neffenger, I'm a
    big supporter and proponent of evaluative testing and review of
    large employee organizations, because it can be very difficult,
    particularly when it's so broad-based, and it's a national
    organization, to really get at the heart of what is occurring
    at a day-to-day basis; and in my own State, created undercover
    or anonymous care evaluations of long-term care facilities. I
    think today it's still the only State-authorized, or I think
    the authority exists, but we have a statute that re-confirms
    that not only does the authority exist, but it should be
    encouraged, and you should undertake these anonymous care
    evaluations.
        And I appreciate very much that your leadership recognized
    that this might be a way to either confirm the data that you
    have, which, at the time, suggested that things were operating
    fairly well, and you might have some complaints, or an anomaly,
    or you would have the opposite, right, which is exactly what
    occurred here that you've identified that you've got
    significant issues.
        And in the course of your responses to questions, and
    certainly in your testimony, you've--and I appreciate that--
    have accepted that there's a culture problem in the
    organization that needs to be addressed. And you've got a 10-
    point plan.
        And so I'm really interested in, even implementing that
    plan, it is very difficult--it's challenging to create, in
    large organizations, I think, a kind of top-to-bottom, bottom-
    to-top culture shift, because I think too often, people believe
    that it's a temporary investment, and then it's easier to kind
    of go back to the way that it was, particularly if you think
    random efforts at looking at one region, or one area, or one
    airport, or one screening system versus another. It really
    depends on the leadership in that particular organization.
        What have you learned from this experience that, A, we can
    help you with in terms of really having a sustainable culture
    change shift with the leadership and rank and file employees?
    What can we take from that and use it for other Government
    entities that we have the same issues, Secret Service, the
    Veterans Administration, several others in Federal Government
    that I think could really use this kind of approach?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, thank you. There's a lot in that
    question, but I think it's really important, and you've hit on
    a number of the key concerns and thoughts that I've had with
    respect to this. You're absolutely right, that it's challenging
    to do cultural change. But, you know, but we have one great
    benefit, we have a really, really important mission, and it's a
    very defined and very specific mission. And so, that's a huge
    rallying point to begin cultural change, unlike an organization
    that might have, you know, a couple hundred different things to
    do.
        So I like that. And it's a mission that people care
    passionately about and you can tie them to it. And I never
    forget that everybody in this workforce raised their hand and
    took an oath of office, and you can activate that. So that's
    one great advantage that you have, but it's not enough. And
    it's not enough for me to say I want cultural change, but no
    one individual makes it happen. But it is important for me to
    say it, because it has to start at the very top of the
    organization. The organization that raised their hand and took
    the oath has to believe that the person leading that
    organization took the same oath and cares about it. And so I
    have yet to say that out loud.
        And then you have to build some institutional structures
    that actually support it. I mentioned a couple today. I think
    it's critical that I begin to do new hire training in a
    consistent, standardized, you know, singular way. And I think
    that that will do great value in building culture over time.
    It's not immediate, but as you do that----
        Ms. Lujan Grisham. I agree with that, and I hope you're
    going to, and I think that's a great idea, but that you--the
    accountability balance with incentivizing and creating long-
    term shifts, having an immediate shift that people believe is
    really taking place, is the harder part, I think, and I'm
    really interested to hear more about that.
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, the other thing I did is, and
    apparently for the first time ever, I brought the entire, what
    I termed the leadership of TSA together, that is, both the
    senior leaders at the headquarters office here in the D.C.
    area, as well as all of the Federal security directors, the
    regional directors, and then my--my regional directors, who are
    posted in overseas locations together, that was about 175
    people.
        So first time in the history of TSA we've done that. I
    spent 2 days with them, and it was 2 days of connection to
    culture. And during that 2 days, we talked about how we
    collectively define the culture of the organization. So I can
    say----
        Ms. Lujan Grisham. I'm out of time. I applaud your efforts.
    And I would, with the chair's discretion, just encourage you
    balance accountability with incentivizing and creating a clear
    operating system, because I don't believe it's sustainable
    unless you do. Thank you very much for your leadership.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Mica. [Presiding.] I thank the gentlelady. I recognize
    Mr. Palmer.
        Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We've had a lot of discussion about equipment technology,
    and we've gotten into the personnel issue as well. The
    Inspector General has stated that the TSA's problems come, I
    think, largely from a lack of training. Mr. Roth, is that
    correct?
        Mr. Roth. That is certainly one aspect of it.
        Mr. Palmer. Mr. Neffenger, how do you plan to address the
    training issues?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, we did immediate address of the
    current results, and we--we did what were called mission
    essentials training, it was an 8-hour block of training across
    the entire workforce. And it started with the frontline
    workforce, we did this over the course of August and September.
    We trained every single screener, and now we're in the process
    of doing the same for the leadership of the organization. And
    that was designed specifically to talk about what were the
    nature of the failures, and then to talk about systemically why
    those failures existed and how they existed across the
    organization.
        Now we have to go back and measure the effectiveness of
    that training, and we're in the process of doing that now, and
    we'll do that going forward. That is a program that we're
    putting into place for--on a routine basis now. We are going to
    do quarterly mission essentials training. And then we're
    looking at across the organization at all levels, what are the
    progressive levels of developmental training and repeated
    training that has to be done to ensure that you--that you
    identify problems before they become systemic, before you get
    into massive failures like we saw earlier. I think that time
    will tell as to how effective it is, but I'm encouraged that
    some initial anecdotal results show that significantly improved
    performance in those areas where we recently tested.
        Mr. Palmer. Now, are you referencing the use of the Federal
    Law Enforcement Training Center? Is this your front--training
    for frontline people?
        Mr. Neffenger. It's one--it's one aspect of that training
    that--we used it to--to bring all of our trainers in during the
    month of July to train them and then push them out to on-the-
    job training for our workforce. The--what I'd like to do at the
    Federal Law Enforcement Training Center is really move our new
    hire academy full-time to there--beginning in 2016, and then
    develop additional training opportunities and developmental
    training throughout someone's career in the TSA.
        Mr. Palmer. Mr. Roth and Ms. Grover, you both can respond
    to this, but do you believe this basic training will help? Is
    it going to get us where we need to be?
        Mr. Roth. It absolutely will help, both in the sense of
    mission and community that Administrator Neffenger referenced,
    but also some of the very basics that we found weren't being
    followed with regard to checkpoint operations. So I'm a firm
    believer in training, and that is one of our recommendations,
    so we're gratified that Administrator Neffenger is following
    through on that.
        Ms. Grover. I agree it is necessary and critical to both
    the development of an appropriate culture and enhancing
    knowledge to support security effectiveness, but it is not
    sufficient. Administrator Neffenger mentioned the plan to
    follow up to make sure the training itself was getting the
    desired results, and that is critical.
        Mr. Palmer. Mr. Russell of Oklahoma asked a question about
    cargo security. I want to ask about checked bags. Mr.
    Neffenger, are you aware of the leak that occurred earlier this
    year where all of the Travel Century luggage keys, which TSA
    uses, have been released to the public?
        Mr. Neffenger. I'm aware. I think you're referring to the
    photograph of a key that was published in a major newspaper.
        Mr. Palmer. Right. That apparently they can reproduce those
    keys. Are you aware of that?
        Mr. Neffenger. I am. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Palmer. Can you provide the committee with any
    Memorandum of Understanding between your agency and the Travel
    Century regarding the master key program? Would you--could you
    do that for us?
        Mr. Neffenger. I'll see if we have one, yes, sir.
        Mr. Palmer. All right. And then my last question will be,
    how do you plan, or will you be able to address this issue of
    baggage locks if these Travel Century keys have been
    compromised?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, I think that--the first thing I would
    say is that it's clearly a compromise for a potential--for
    locking that bag outside the aviation environment. Those bags
    are still secure to go through the system, because they go
    through screening into the aviation system, so I don't see it
    as a threat to the aviation security system, but it's clearly a
    potential theft issue outside of the aviation environment. I
    think I need to see what the potential solution is from the
    Travel Century folks, and then look to see what we can
    institute in the future, but clearly we have to address that as
    a problem.
        Mr. Palmer. And that's the context of my question. You have
    travelers who think--who are not using locks, because you use
    bolt cutters, and they want to know that their luggage is
    secure.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
        Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Grothman, the gentleman from Wisconsin.
        Mr. Grothman. Okay. Well, I'd like to thank you for coming
    over here. I know it's a tough job. You know, you're--it's got
    to be a difficult thing to work. I assume you can work there
    for 30 years and never catch somebody who has ill intent. So
    you must sometimes wonder what you're doing is worthwhile, and
    you're also dealing with a public that, you know, usually does
    not consider this a wonderful thing, so you're dealing with
    people who aren't particularly happy to have you there.
        First question I have, in general, say, in the last 5
    years, have you folks caught anybody who you believe, not
    somebody who accidentally was slipping in, you know, a
    fingernail clipper or something, but somebody who really had
    bad intent in the last 6 or 7 years that you feel----
        Mr. Neffenger. Within the entire system, I would say yes.
    Remember that there's a--there's a security environment in
    which you enter when you--when you first put your name into a
    reservation system. So I would say we have repeatedly
    identified people with connections to known or suspected
    terrorists over the years.
        Mr. Grothman. I mean, people who you believe at the
    airport, when I go through these things, if you guys didn't
    stop them, they were going to try to do a bad thing; not
    somebody who was one of thousands of people on a terrorist
    watchlist. I mean, somebody who you believed that if you were
    not there, they would have done bad things.
        Mr. Neffenger. I believe we've caught--we had a few
    instances that I've been--that I've been aware of. I hope that
    the vast majority are deterred from trying in the first place.
        Mr. Grothman. Right, right. That's the goal, right. If you
    could maybe forward to the committee later the examples where
    you really feel----
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Grothman. --that you caught somebody who would have
    done a horrible thing if you hadn't caught them.
        Second question, we had a hearing a while ago on this
    stuff. At least what I took out of it is that, you know, maybe
    dogs would be a better way to go about this, and there were
    slip-ups. Have you done any work with dogs, or used them as a
    trial?
        Mr. Neffenger. We do. Actually we have quite a few K-9
    teams deployed throughout the aviation system. I noted in an
    earlier question that--I'm in the process of moving some of
    those teams from what I consider to be smaller, lower risk
    airports to the large airports. I don't really--I think the
    exact number is somewhere around 112 teams currently. We've got
    another dozen or so teams coming on this coming year.
        I think dogs are a very important additional element of
    security in the system. They provide a lot of capability, both
    for cargo screening as well as for passenger screening, so I'm
    a big proponent of the use of canine teams.
        Mr. Grothman. Could you see the day when we use more dogs
    and less people?
        Mr. Neffenger. I don't know that dogs will ever replace the
    people component.
        Mr. Grothman. Not entirely, but I mean----
        Mr. Neffenger. But I think that--I think I can see a day
    for using more dogs, and we're doing that as we go forward.
        Mr. Grothman. Would they ever--would they replace some
    people? Do you see the day where, you know, rather than I go
    through there and I see eight uniformed people, I see two
    uniformed people and a dog? Do you see that day?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, I think there's a potential, but
    that--that really speaks to the larger question of how that
    checkpoint evolves over time.
        What I do see is a day when the checkpoint looks very
    different from what it does today. We're still largely dealing
    with, with the exception of the AIT, we're still largely
    dealing with the same kind of checkpoint we've had for the past
    decade or more, and I think we're on the cusp of a very
    different-looking checkpoint experience in the next 5 years.
        Mr. Grothman. Okay. A while back, I know a guy who worked
    for you, and he felt it was a very top heavy organization, or
    at least at the airport this guy worked at. Are you doing
    things over time to reduce the number of administrative staff
    as opposed to people doing the work?
        Mr. Neffenger. We have. We've come down about a total of
    6,000 people in TSA since the spring of 2013, so in the past 2
    years, almost--now 3 years almost, we've reduced the workforce
    by about 13 percent. I think we'll continue do so. I've asked
    to hold steady for the coming year as we look at the impact of
    the elimination of managed inclusion, and I look to correct
    what I see to be systemic issues in the organization, and then
    we'll revisit the staffing standards following--following this
    year, but I do see that there are more efficiencies to be
    gained always in an organization. I think you have to look at
    that continuously.
        Mr. Grothman. Okay. What do you pay your people starting? I
    mean, one of the guys that I see, or gals I see, what is the
    compensation they get?
        Mr. Neffenger. It varies by location, because there's
    locality pay associated with it, but it's--it's roughly
    equivalent to--to the incoming level for a----
        Mr. Grothman. What is--how much is it?
        Mr. Neffenger. You know, I think it runs somewhere around
    28- to $30,000, but I'll get you the exact figure.
        Mr. Grothman. Do you have a hard time finding people or
    not?
        Mr. Neffenger. We're challenged like any organization to
    find a workforce. We've met our recruiting goals every year,
    but the turnover's higher than I'd like to see it be.
        Mr. Grothman. Is there any reason why somebody 60 to 65
    couldn't do that job, or do you discriminate against them or
    you'll get----
        Mr. Neffenger. Oh, not at all. We have quite a few people
    who are retirees that are working in the screener workforce.
        Mr. Grothman. I guess I'm out of time. We'll get one more
    question.
        Sure. I ran into a guy this weekend who was on your
    whatever list, the trouble list, okay, and he'd been on it for
    quite a long period of time. He wasn't as mad about it as I
    would be. I mean, one time he walked through the thing, and
    apparently the people all ducked down and they called the
    police on him and, you know, people came in with their guns
    drawn. He was somebody if you just looked at the guy, you'd
    think, what? I mean, this is some guy who lives in a little
    town in Wisconsin. It was like, really?
        How quickly does it take people to get off this list? I
    mean, when you guys make a mistake like this, how quickly
    should it be?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, there's--there's a redress process
    that we--that we partly manage. It's managed also by others in
    the--in the law enforcement and intelligence community. What I
    would say is I'm not familiar with that specific. If I can get
    the specifics on that, we can look at that specific case, but
    there is a process for if you think that you have been--been
    inaccurately placed on a list, there's a redress process. And
    it's a pretty fast redress process, as I understand it,
    although it's a process that you have to go through.
        Mr. Grothman. Long time for this guy, but I'll----
        Mr. Neffenger. Yeah. But I'd be--I'd certainly take it for
    action if you've got the details for me.
        Mr. Grothman. Okay. Thanks much.
        Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman.
        Mrs. Maloney.
        Mrs. Maloney. I thank the gentleman for calling this
    hearing.
        TSA relies on many different pieces of equipment to carry
    out its screening tasks. For example, it uses Advanced Imaging
    Technology machines, walk-through metal detectors, explosive
    trace detection machines, bottled liquid scanners, and x-ray
    machines, among other pieces of equipment.
        In May of this year, the IG's office issued a report that
    concluded TSA is not properly managing the maintenance of its
    airport screening equipment, and one of the IG's key findings
    was that TSA relies on self-reported data provided by the
    maintenance contractors, and does not validate the data to
    confirm that required preventive maintenance actions have been
    taken. TSA also does not validate the corrective maintenance
    data reported by its contractors.
        So my question is to Inspector General Roth. If TSA has not
    been validating the data reported by its contractors, can it be
    sure that all required maintenance has been performed, and that
    its machines are operating correctly?
        Mr. Roth. No, they can't. And you accurately summarized
    what those reports are. It's the functional equivalent of
    giving your car to the mechanic, but not checking to see
    whether or not they've changed the spark plugs.
        Mrs. Maloney. Yeah. Well, that's important.
        And, IG Roth, do any of the contractors responsible for the
    maintenance of TSA equipment have sole source contracts? Is it
    competitively bid, or is it a sole source contract?
        Mr. Roth. My understanding is it's competitively bid, but I
    think I'd need to get back to you to give you a full and
    accurate answer.
        Mrs. Maloney. Could you get back to me and the chairman,
    would you, please----
        Mr. Roth. Absolutely.
        Mrs. Maloney. --and the ranking member?
        IG Roth, have any contractors ever been penalized for
    failing to perform any type of maintenance tasks?
        Mr. Roth. I'm not aware of any, but, again, let me take
    that back and be sure of the answer.
        Mrs. Maloney. And what recommendations did your office make
    to TSA to improve maintenance of its equipment, and what is the
    status of these recommendations?
        Mr. Roth. We did make a number of recommendations with
    regard to the process that TSA uses to verify this maintenance.
    That is still in process. We typically allow them some time to
    be able to institute those changes, but, again, I will get back
    to you with the specifics on that.
        Mrs. Maloney. And I'd like to ask Administrator Neffenger:
    Are you confident that TSA now has the systems in place to hold
    its contractors accountable for providing proper maintenance of
    its equipment? And are you confident TSA's equipment is being
    maintained and repaired properly?
        Mr. Neffenger. Thanks for that question. Let me first say
    that I concur completely with the Inspector General's findings,
    and I did find that we had--not that the maintenance wasn't
    being done, but we had no way to verify that it was, in fact,
    appropriate and done, so we put the processes in place to do
    so. We have to--we now have to measure whether those processes
    are adequate to do that, but I'm confident that--that certainly
    I get it, and that the person I have is tasked as responsible
    for ensuring that it happens, understands the importance of
    having an auditable follow-up trail for everything that's done
    to ensure that this equipment is maintained to its standards.
        Mrs. Maloney. Well, I just must underscore, which I know
    you feel, the responsibility that you have to the American
    people. We know that there are many who want to harm our
    citizens, and that they try to do it for some reason through
    the airplanes, and they are continuing to break our system.
    Because I check with the airlines in my area, and they have
    incidents where they're trying to break through. So having the
    oversight and the audit and making sure that this is happening
    is critically important.
        And I look forward to you getting back to the committee,
    Inspector General Roth, on the answers that you needed to
    review more for us. I think they're important questions, and I
    look forward to seeing what your response is.
        Again, I thank you for your public service. Thank you for
    being here today. And I thank the chairman for calling the
    hearing on a very important safety issue.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Mica. I thank the gentlelady. And I'll finish with a
    round of summary questions here.
        First of all, Mr. Administrator, in previous response to
    me, we discussed who poses a risk, and it's less than 1 percent
    of the travelers that are examined of the 660 million. Is that
    still your position?
        Mr. Neffenger. I couldn't put an exact number on it, but I
    would agree with you that----
        Mr. Mica. The vast majority.
        Mr. Neffenger. --the vast majority of travelers are----
        Mr. Mica. You're probably dealing with 20- to 50,000 people
    on some sort of a watchlist or no-fly list that we're looking
    to not board who may pose a risk, but we're spending about 95
    percent of our resources, again, on folks who pose no risk.
        You talked about where you're going, and I saw some of your
    report and I was pleased to see that you're looking to the
    future. Here's my boarding pass. I've been to Europe. Last year
    I was there twice, once in Italy and once in Germany. There was
    no TSA-type screener at the entry point. I have pictures of it.
    I'd be glad to show you. You go up and you put your boarding
    pass on, and the stile lets you through. If it doesn't let you
    through, there is a person who would subject you to additional
    screening. That's almost commonplace now in Europe in the
    domestic arena. Maybe you saw that when you----
        Mr. Neffenger. I did, yes. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Mica. Yeah. We have people going through this. Some of
    the dumbest things I've ever seen--where's your cell phone? Let
    me borrow your cell phone a second. You go up and put your cell
    phone down and they let you through, but then you've got
    another TSA--if you don't have it on your electronic device,
    then you have someone who takes time and they go through and
    circle each thing. I mean, it--there's just--just things like
    that, and where we are not.
        Can you name any countries, other than Bulgaria, Romania,
    or Poland, sort of in the more sophisticated countries, that
    have all Federal screening?
        Mr. Neffenger. I'll get back to you. I know----
        Mr. Mica. There are none.
        Mr. Neffenger. --most of the----
        Mr. Mica. There are none.
        Mr. Neffenger. --European countries do private screening.
        Mr. Mica. Israel. Yeah, but it's under Federal supervision.
        Mr. Neffenger. Right.
        Mr. Mica. I have never said do away with TSA. I have said
    change your role, change the resources to connecting the dots,
    to security. That's what's going to get us. And every time
    we've been successful in stopping someone, it's connecting the
    dots. But, again, we are--you said it may be 5 years before we
    could get to this. This should be tomorrow.
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, actually, I think we'll get to that
    much faster.
        Mr. Mica. Yeah. And we should be embedding the information
    here. I saw that in German--in Nuremberg demonstrated in 2003,
    completely operational. It will stop people, they won't be able
    to board. The systems exist. We just keep falling further
    behind, adding more people.
        Now you're saying you're training them, you're sending them
    back to basics to a law enforcement training program?
        Mr. Neffenger. No. It's at the Federal Law Enforcement
    Training Center. It's not a law enforcement training program.
    It's usual----
        Mr. Mica. Well, I have to make it clear. And some of my
    colleagues don't even know that TSA screeners are not sworn
    personnel, right?
        Mr. Neffenger. That's correct. This is not----
        Mr. Mica. Okay. They are not sworn personnel.
        Mr. Neffenger. That's right.
        Mr. Mica. They are screeners.
        Mr. Neffenger. That's correct.
        Mr. Mica. And, again, you have this huge bureaucracy trying
    to recruit. And maybe you've gotten better, you know, I--this
    goes, we're hiring them off of pizza box ads, and above
    discount gas pump advertisements for screeners, that hopefully
    has stopped. But you can recruit all you want, you can train
    all you want. You have actually trained more people than you
    employ, and--at this time. You know that? You've actually
    trained more people. They're gone. Your turnover has been--some
    places it's horrendous, other place--and granted, some markets
    are very difficult, but--okay.
        So we've got equipment, and this is about equipment. I've
    heard--and the AIT failures to maintain, to operate, to train
    people for it, Advanced Imaging Technology. The deployment is a
    disaster. How many machines do we have? 700 and what?
        Mr. Neffenger. About 750 machines currently.
        Mr. Mica. 750 machines. They're at how many airports?
        Mr. Neffenger. They're at----
        Mr. Mica. 160 is the answer. How many airports do you have?
    Say over 400----
        Mr. Neffenger. About 400 over--about 450.
        Mr. Mica. So about 300, 290 airports that don't even have
    an AIT machine. I'm Mr. Dumb Terrorist. Okay? Where am I going
    to go under the system? AIT is the best equipment we have, but
    it can be thwarted. I know it can be thwarted. I'll get it in
    the airport, but it's the best device we have available. You've
    made some refinements to it, but personnel are human beings,
    they're going to fail. I will bet the staff a dollar--okay,
    Mike, I'm going to bet you a dollar, they'll be back here,
    we'll do it next September, we will do the same hearing, we'll
    have covert testing. Maybe you'll improve slightly, but it will
    still be a disaster. It's been a disaster in every classified
    hearing I've sat in, the failure rate. If it was publicly
    known, people would scream for some change.
        So, again, I want to get you out of the personnel business,
    which is that huge--again, they're not law enforcement, but
    screening team. Again, you need to be in intelligence and
    connecting the dots and security, setting the protocols, the
    standards, seeing who is not performing, getting rid of them if
    it's a private firm that's operating.
        Okay. So here's our AIT's, we have 450 airports, we're at
    160 locations. Then you go to the locations when they put them
    out. It was mind boggling. And how are you going to change
    that? It costs hundreds of thousands of dollars for the
    equipment, then it costs the airports and you a fortune to put
    them in place.
        You go to some concourses, and they've got two or three of
    them in one concourse. It was never intended for that. It's
    intended to be a secondary screening device. And then in other
    concourses, even at National you go to, one of our airports in
    some of the concourses have none. So you have started--I mean,
    God bless you, you're trying to change a mess, but even the
    deployment of that important machine has been a disaster.
        When we spoke, I asked you about reducing some of the
    overhead. You've got thousands of people in overhead, 46,000
    screeners. It was up to 15,000, we found either within the 46
    over here in Washington. One time there were 4,000 making
    $103,000, on average, just within 20 miles of where we're
    sitting. And some of those may be important responsibilities,
    but, again, paring that down.
        We have the public-private screening partnership, and I'm a
    firm believer in that. They probably--well, I know they perform
    a little bit better than you, because I've had that tested. And
    they came back and told me, you know what the response was when
    there was a fair, open testing? They said that private
    screening performed--under Federal supervision, private
    screening under Federal supervision performed statistically
    significantly better.
        Now, I don't care how polite your agents are. It's nice to
    have them polite, you've impressed some of the members. What I
    care is if they are able to deter a terrorist from getting
    through. And they are not law enforcement personnel, they are
    screening personnel. You've got your whole billions of dollars,
    billions of dollars focused on people who don't pose a risk. So
    we need to get away from that model.
        A Member of Congress, Mr. Walberg, who testified, he's got
    an ID card. Sometimes they don't even recognize a Federal ID
    and ask you for a driver's license. But I've had hearings here
    on driver's license and ID's, TWIC cards and others that can
    and have been duplicated. That's one of the easiest things you
    can do. And I can take and make you the fanciest boarding pass,
    I'll challenge you, be glad to go out and take one, and I can
    get through any of your gates at National, or anyplace else,
    with just a little bit of work on a computer.
        So, again, we've set up a system that is destined to fail.
    You'll be back here, maybe slight improvement, training some
    more folks, maybe a little bit better retention.
        Back to the partnerships. In Rochester, one of several
    dozen public-private partnerships, I told you they had, at one
    time, 15 to 18 people, most of them making between 60 and 100-
    and-some thousand dollars. They have 1.1 million passengers. I
    went to Canada and looked at similar operations. They have one
    Federal person. And I think you need a Federal person, someone
    who's charged with the intelligence, someone who's charged with
    conducting the oversight audit on a daily basis and making
    certain it works.
        Is there any hope of getting a reduction of some of the
    people we don't need at these programs where we have the
    public-private partnership?
        Mr. Neffenger. As you know, we actually have reduced the
    number of oversight directly for the partnership, but there's
    a--the additional responsibility of TSA has members, there's a
    surface inspection in transportation, so a number of those
    people are involved in compliance examinations and the surface
    examinations.
        Mr. Mica. And there's anything that can't be done through a
    contract----
        Mr. Neffenger. Well----
        Mr. Mica. --written in a contract? But okay. Two, three,
    four people at an airport like Rochester, not 15 or 16. Again--
    and I know the game. You pack it so it makes it look like it
    costs more or as much for private screening under Federal
    supervision. We're going to have a report that will be released
    soon and show some of the costs. At least it costs less under
    that. Not that I'm trying to do it on the cheap. They're just
    more efficient. I support Federal wages, no change in that. I
    support union membership. I put that in the bill in the
    beginning bill. In fact, in the private screening in San
    Francisco, they had folks belonging to unions long before the
    most recent signup of folks across the area.
        I have another question the chairman wants me to get in.
    Will you let the committee know today, or within the period we
    keep the record open, we want a complete response on when you
    will--will you--you will finish and address all of the
    recommendations that the IG and GAO have put forward. Could
    you--could you give us that today, do you think? Or do you want
    to give it to us for the record?
        Mr. Neffenger. I'll give you a schedule for the record.
    What I will tell you is what I told both the Inspector General
    and Director Grover, and that is, that I'm committed to
    addressing all the remaining open recommendations as well as
    any that remain that are nonconcurrers and getting those
    closed.
        Mr. Mica. And if you can get the committee in the next--
    what are you going to leave this open, 10 days, Mr.----
        Mr. Cummings. Yes, 10 days.
        Mr. Mica. 10 days. Without objection, so ordered. We'll
    leave it open for 10 days.
        Mr. Cummings. No. I have----
        Mr. Mica. No, I'm not finished. I was just leaving it open
    and I'm making certain they comply with your wishes, too.
        Mr. Cummings. Okay. That's fine.
        Mr. Mica. Okay. But in any event, 10 days, and we would
    like that made part of the official record, and as exact a
    date, because, again, I'm going to--I'm going to hold a
    subcommittee hearing if we don't hold a full one within a year,
    give you a chance. You're here, and I love your attitude, I
    love your willingness to be open with the committee. You've
    inherited one of the most difficult tasks.
        You're the, what, sixth Administrator? I've dealt with them
    all, and I think you're one of the most capable that we've--
    we've been fortunate to have, but we need to look at rewriting
    the ship on this whole security thing, get you out of the
    business that gives you the headaches.
        And I know you'll go back and people will say, oh, Mica's
    full of it and don't listen to him, but as long as you keep
    trying to manage a $46,000 HR department, you are going to have
    problems with recruiting, with training, with retaining, with
    managing. You will never get it right, I can assure you. Not
    that it's your fault. You're dealing with human beings. And
    then using all of that resource to go after 99 percent of the
    people who don't pose a risk, not expediting their passage, and
    not redirecting those resources towards the bad guys,
    connecting the dots, security, making certain that you set the
    standards.
        And then as the Inspector General and Director Grover have
    said, that you--you bear down on those that are not meeting the
    standards that you have, you kick their butts out, you fire
    them, you--and terminate their contract. That's your--I
    believe, your role.
        So, again, welcome. Isn't this great? You want to
    reconsider? No. He's--no. You're--but you are a true hero to
    come forward. I have the greatest respect for you and what
    you're going to try to do. I'm trying to get you to see a year
    from now what you're going to face when you--when you come back
    here and where we'll be.
        With that, thank you. And I want to yield to the ranking
    member, Mr. Cummings.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    thank all of you for your patience. I know it has already been
    a long morning, and I only have a few questions.
        As all of you know, our Nation has one standard credential
    for merchant mariners and employees who need access to secure
    areas of ports, it is called the Transportation Worker
    Identification Card, or TWIC card. You said the TWIC was
    required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act, and each
    TWIC is issued by the TSA.
        Administrator Neffenger, I'm curious, given your background
    with the Coast Guard, which model do you think is better?
    Should credentials for access to facilities, secure areas be
    issued by each individual facility, or should they be issued by
    a national entity like TSA?
        Mr. Neffenger. I don't know if I have a good direct answer
    to that. And by that, I mean this: When you have a nationally
    issued ID card, that creates a lot of challenge in managing it
    and issuing it, and introduces some concerns with respect to
    its--its viability across a large organization.
        That said, I think that both systems can work effectively
    if they're--if they're--if the oversight is what it should be.
    I think as I look at the badging environment in the airports,
    airports would argue that they like the fact that the badges
    are different, because it means you can't move from one airport
    to another and show up and get access. You have--you have to
    have something that says your airport on it.
        I think that we can do a lot more to ensure the security of
    those--of those badges, and to ensure the accountability of
    those badges as we move forward. There was an awful lot of
    information that came out of what the Aviation Security
    Advisory Committee study told us about the--the way to manage
    and to ensure the integrity of those badges going forward, as
    well as to look at the oversight of those. I think the
    Inspector General has pointed out some important areas for us
    to consider.
        So I don't--I don't really know which--which approach is
    better. I think both approaches can work very effectively, but
    they need a lot of oversight no matter which way you take it.
    As you know, there have been some challenges in the TWIC
    program as well.
        Mr. Cummings. Yeah. Yeah. The--are you confident that full
    implementation of your plans will ensure that TSA's screening
    systems will pass future covert tests by the Inspector General
    and TSA's own covert testing teams?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, testing will tell, but I--I'm
    confident that we're on the right track. I hope it means that
    we will--we will see dramatic improvement in the future. I
    believe it will, but I don't believe that we can just declare
    it done and move forward. I think that this is a continuous
    process, and it's a continuous attention. This is one of these
    things that, as I said before, you can't just fix this and
    assume you've got it right. This is--what it's allowed us to do
    is see that this is a--this is an ongoing attention that needs
    throughout the entire life of the organization. There is no
    fixing it. There is addressing the challenges, learning from
    what you've addressed, testing yourself, learning from those
    testing and that continuous improvement as we go forward.
        So what I will tell you is that, certainly for the duration
    of my tenure, that I don't ever take my focus on continuing to
    test this system, evaluating the processes and training that we
    put in place, the procedures, continuing to adjust them as we
    discover whether they work or don't work, and then looking for
    how to distribute those--the best practices that we find across
    the whole system, and that includes looking to our
    international partners for anything that they might be doing
    that can inform the way we do business, because this global
    system relies on global standards and global consistency.
        Mr. Cummings. Now, as you've heard GAO state today, TSA has
    not always established performance--performance measures that
    clearly align with its goals. How will you know if you have
    altered the pervasive cultural problems in TSA and what
    performance metrics will confirm it?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, we took a look at the--I took a look
    at the entire measurement system, and essentially said, look,
    the current--the current way we're measuring isn't leading us
    to improving the system. So I think there's a readiness
    component. I want to know if the workforce is ready, meaning
    are they trained, do they know what the mission is, do they
    have the support of the leadership, and is there ongoing
    attention to that, and then I want to look at their
    performance. Then I have to test them. Did all that stuff work?
    Did what I think about their readiness actually show itself in
    their performance?
        The system has to have the same sort of measures. You need
    to know is the system ready, meaning, have we maintained it
    appropriately? Can we verify that we've maintained it
    appropriately? Is it meeting the standards before we deploy it
    that we expect it to meet? And all those other things that go
    into does it work? And then the second piece is how well does
    it perform when you plug it into the system? And so then you
    have to go back and you test that as well.
        So you're testing the people, the processes, and the
    technology, both its readiness to do its mission as well as the
    actual production of that mission, and it's a continuous
    process. I will tell you that right now I get a report on a
    weekly basis directly to me on those measures. We have a ways
    to go yet. We're putting--we're getting the organization used
    to a new way of thinking, it's measuring effectiveness, it's
    focusing on the security component and the effectiveness of
    that; it's defining that mission in a very clear way, and then
    looking to see what we're learning as we're--as we're studying
    it.
        So we've actually learned quite a bit already about--about
    system readiness, both in the workforce as well as in the--in
    the technology, and it's leading to some things that we have to
    do to improve that on both scores, and it's also beginning to
    point the way towards how we're going to effectively measure
    performance, and that will include working with the Inspector
    General and the GAO as we go forward.
        I see this as a very valuable partnership, even--even
    recognizing that they have to be independent and they're
    skeptical, and I want them to stay that way, but they give me
    valuable information about how my system's working.
        Mr. Cummings. Well, let me say this, that the--one of the
    things that I have pushed with the Coast Guard, with the Secret
    Service and the Baltimore city police, is I've said that I want
    them to create an organization which is the elite of the elite.
    In other words, a feeling that we are the best and that our
    standards are high. And I believe that when you have--when you
    get there, the people who are caught up in a culture of
    mediocrity will fall off, because they won't feel that they
    belong, period. You won't have to fire them; they'll leave.
    Some of them you may have to fire, but most of them will just
    back off.
        So, you know, as I've heard the testimony today, one of the
    things that just gnaws at me is the idea that we have now an
    agency that's willing to accept the recommendations. And,
    Director Grover, I keep going back to some of the things you
    said about accepting these recommendations and then trying to
    do them. But we're still having those gaps. And, you know, as I
    was sitting here and I was listening to all of this, I was
    saying to myself, well, maybe it's not just all the things that
    you've just said, but you have to add something else to it.
    See, I think that when you--when we have recommendations, and
    then your agency looks at them and says, Oh, yeah, we got to do
    this, yeah, we missed that, we got to do that, it may go back
    to that whole idea of trying to impress or get it done, but not
    concentrating on why they're doing it, you know, why that's
    important. And some kind of way I think to get to the elite of
    the elite, I think people have to have a full understanding of
    why it is and the fact that bad things can happen, and perhaps,
    if you're not on guard, they will.
        And I keep--for some reason, I keep going back to Katrina.
    I'm telling you, I think about Katrina almost every day,
    because it's one of those situations, Director Grover, where we
    claimed that we were ready. We couldn't even communicate across
    town. And like I said, when they said the rubber meets the
    road, we didn't have a road. And our country is so much better
    than that.
        And so I think one thing is leadership, I think another is
    metrics, and I'm hoping that--I will talk to Chairman Chaffetz,
    and we--he has been very open to accepting the model that we
    used in the Coast Guard Subcommittee where we constantly
    brought folks back so that we could actually, you know, see
    where we were going, because one of the things that you heard
    me say many times, a lot of times agencies, and I'm not
    bringing--I'm not saying you did this, but agencies will wait
    out a Congress and then, you know, and so there's no real
    accountability, going back to what you said, Ms. Grover,
    Director Grover, you've got to have accountability. One of the
    best ways to have accountability is set deadlines, and then can
    come back and report. And it may be that you don't achieve
    every single thing you want to achieve, but hopefully, we can
    get in--you know, see our progress. And by the way, I think
    when the agency sees its progress, that, again, helps them feel
    like the elite among the elite.
        And finally, you know, I just--I thank all of you for
    working together, and I thank you for having the attitude that
    you have. I think one of the biggest mistakes that we make is
    sometimes we act like, you know, the Inspector General and
    Director Grover, that we're all on different teams. But what
    you're saying is that we're all on the same team trying to lift
    up the American people and keep them safe. That's the team that
    we're on. That's our team.
        And so if I've got a member of the team that can see things
    that I can't see, and can bring them to my attention and help
    me become better, and, again, become the elite of the elite, I
    think that's what we ought to be about. And I thank you for
    having that kind of attitude, because that's what--that's
    what's going to get us where we've got to go. And I think
    we're--and I go back to what Mr. Gowdy said a little bit
    earlier. I'm going to tell you, I have had nothing but good
    experiences with TSA, I mean, everywhere I go. And I know that
    we've got some great men and women working for that
    organization, and--but at the same time, I know they're also
    very--they're human.
        And so I think we have to constantly find those ways to
    keep the work exciting to keep it--you know, refreshing their
    skills and reminding them of how important their job is and how
    we appreciate them, because I can tell you, when you've got
    somebody--you've got hundreds of people every day trying to
    rush to get to a flight, that some of them are very upset,
    they've got the kids, they got the stroller and all this, and
    then they've got to be checked, I'm sure that's just an
    opportunity for people's frustrations to get out of hand, but,
    yet, it's still--I've seen over and over again where TSA
    officers have just been very patient, understanding, and tried
    to do the right thing at all times and, at the same time,
    protect us.
        And so again, I thank you all. We look forward to seeing
    you again. Your testimony has been extremely meaningful, and I
    think it can lead us into effectiveness and efficiency. I've
    often said that there's nothing like having motion, commotion,
    and emotion and no results. We have to have results, and I
    think we can get there and I think you all are--have given us a
    roadmap to get there. Thank you.
        Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman. I thank the members for
    participating today. We've--we've gone through all the
    membership, and you all have been most accommodating. I realize
    the task that you have, Administrator, but I particularly want
    to thank the Inspector General and also the Director. You have
    an important role with your oversight. The committee conducts
    some oversight, we rely on you and your independence in going
    forward. And the goal here is to keep the American public safe,
    to make certain that we don't have another 9/11, and that we do
    the best that we can with the resources given to us by the
    taxpayers.
        So with that being said, there being no further business
    before the committee--I will mention, too, the staff has said
    that we will be submitting to you, all as witnesses, additional
    questions in this interim time for response, so we want you to
    know those responses will also be made part of the record.
        There being no further business, this hearing of the
    Government Reform and Oversight Committee is adjourned. Thank
    you.
        [Whereupon, at 12:51 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

                                    APPENDIX

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