[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
LIBYA: FIVE YEARS AFTER GHADAFI
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JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 30, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-238
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina GRACE MENG, New York
TED S. YOHO, Florida LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
PAUL COOK, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESS
Mr. Jonathan Winer, Special Envoy for Libya, Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State...................... 3
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Jonathan Winer: Prepared statement........................... 6
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 22
Hearing minutes.................................................. 23
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the
Middle East and North Africa: Prepared statement............... 24
The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement................ 27
The Honorable Theodore E. Deutch, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida: Prepared statement.................. 29
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 32
Written responses from Mr. Jonathan Winer to questions submitted
for the record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen............ 34
LIBYA: FIVE YEARS AFTER GHADAFI
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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 11:26 a.m.,
in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and
North Africa) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittees will come to order. We
will start with our opening statements. Our good friends on the
other side are still caucusing. We have tried to wait as long
as possible, but when Mr. Meadows said that he was leaving,
that was it. We said we have got to start, time is of the
essence. So we will do a little bit of business and hear from
our witness. Thank you. And then we will wait for our
colleagues to come back.
So after recognizing myself, and when they come in, Ranking
Member Deutch and Ranking Member Keating for 5 minutes each for
our opening statements, I will recognize other members seeking
recognition for 1 minute. We will start with that process now.
We will then hear from our witness and, without objection, the
witness' prepared statement will be made a part of the record.
Members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for
the record subject to the length limitation in the rules.
Before beginning my opening statement, I would first like
to take a moment to acknowledge the other chairman of this
joint subcommittee hearing, Judge Poe, who could not be with us
this morning as he continues to undergo treatment for leukemia.
I know that all of our thoughts and prayers are with Judge Poe
as he fights this disease, we wish him the best. I have his
opening statement, without objection, it will be made a part of
the record now.
The Chair recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
December 17 marks the 1-year anniversary of the Libyan
Political Agreement, making this an opportune time to review
the administration's policy in Libya. While this administration
first participated in the intervention in Libya in 2011, many
of us expressed concern with the administration's lack of
clearly articulated objectives, a post-intervention plan, and
even an explanation about how it fit U.S. national security
interests. Many of our worst fears have come to fruition, as
more than 5 years after Ghadafi's death, Libya is embroiled in
a difficult civil war that shows no sign of abatement. If
anything, it has only gotten worse since the U.N.-brokered
agreement. Libya is more politically divided than ever, its
economy is in a free fall, and terrorist groups and criminals
continue to exploit the power vacuum.
Multiple governing entities and their allied militias and
armed forces compete for power while the U.N.-backed unity
government, known as the Government of National Accord, remains
unable to provide basic security and basic services to the
people of Libya. Criminals and terrorist groups, including
ISIS, al-Qaeda and so many others, take advantage of the chaos,
securing their own territory and using Libya as a launching pad
for smuggling, human trafficking, and terror attacks--
endangering Libya's neighbors, such as Egypt and Tunisia. Libya
is now the main transit point for migrants trying to reach
Europe, and with little border security or governance, many are
rightly concerned by the potential of terrorists reaching our
own shores. While reports say that forces are close to retaking
Sirte from ISIS, we should not allow this news to disguise the
sad reality: ISIS' presence in Libya is far from being
eliminated. ISIS, al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Sharia, the group
responsible for the 2012 Benghazi attack, as well as others,
all continue to maintain cells throughout the country.
In a positive development, I was relieved to see the
announcement last month that the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was able to remove Libya's
remaining chemical weapons equipment. Another welcome
development, if accurate, is the reported killing by French air
strikes of the Algerian jihadist known as the ``one-eyed
terrorist.'' He is said to have been responsible for organizing
terrorist attacks in Libya, Algeria and Mali, so many other
places, and had funneled millions of dollars to al-Qaeda.
France's air strikes highlight the stakes that many outside
actors have in Libya. Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and
others, continue to support Khalifa Haftar, the former Libyan
National Army general who recently claimed victory in Benghazi
and who was just in Moscow discussing Russian military
assistance. Reports indicate that at least four countries have
Special Forces on the ground in Libya right now, including our
own, and, in some cases, are assisting forces on both sides of
Libya's civil war. It is also worth noting that in recent
months Haftar has seized many of the ports in Libya's oil
crescent, which is Libya's main source of revenue.
With additional violence on the horizon, potentially
between eastern and western forces, Haftar's role must be
addressed in Libya's political dialogue--a dialogue that should
come sooner rather than later. Since the unity government took
up residence in Tripoli in March, it has struggled to provide
the kind of basic services and security that could engender the
support that it needs in order to consolidate power. And as
long as it keeps struggling in the west while its rival
governing entities and security forces keep operating and
making gains in the east, any chance that the current peace
process had at succeeding will continue to be undermined.
As we approach the 1-year anniversary of the Libyan
Political Agreement, it is clear that the status quo in Libya
is unsustainable, and that there must be a new and revitalized
attempt at reconciling all Libyan stakeholders.
I look forward to hearing from our witness on exactly how
the administration is working to help get that peace process
back on track, the status of our counterterrorism operation
against ISIS and others, and what kind of changes to our Libya
policy and assistance we should expect moving forward.
And I am now pleased to yield to members for their opening
statements. I will turn to Mr. Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for holding
this important hearing. Despite Libya's obviously geopolitical
importance, it has really not received the public attention
that it deserves. President Obama has called his
administration's failure to adequately plan for a post-Ghadafi
Libya the worst mistake of his presidency. The word ``mistake''
really doesn't begin to capture the situation in Libya, which
is a catastrophic failure.
Back in August 2012, I spent the better part of a day and a
half with Ambassador Stevens in Tripoli. This was about a month
before he was brutally murdered along with three other brave
Americans. Of course the administration misled the American
people at that time by saying that this was caused by some
video. And we also later learned that Ambassador Stevens and
his people had sought help and better security and more
protection, and that they were basically ignored by their
higher-ups in the State Department.
Libya's now engulfed in not one but two civil wars, the
chaos has spread to Mali, and now both countries have become
safe havens for al-Qaeda and ISIS. When the so-called Arab
Spring spread to Libya in 2011, we were told a military
intervention to overthrow Muammar Ghadafi was essential to our
national security. We were told by the Obama administration
that we could, in effect, lead from behind, and the costs of
intervention would largely be borne by our allies. And finally,
we were told Libya could easily be rebuilt and stabilized
basically on the cheap. As it turns out, none of these things
were true and I eagerly await the administration's views on
these things and many others that we will question them.
And thank you, again, for holding this hearing.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot.
Do any members wish to make an opening statement?
If not, let me introduce our witness. I am pleased to
welcome Mr. Jonathan Winer who serves as the State Department's
special envoy for Libya, as well as senior adviser for MEK
resettlement. Thank you for your work on that. He was
previously the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
international law enforcement. We welcome you to our
subcommittee.
And for the record, Chairman Poe and I invited DOD
officials to testify at our hearing, but the Department of
Defense failed to respond to our invitation. Did not offer a
witness. So we thank you for being here, sir. And we will turn
to you for your opening statement, Mr. Winer.
STATEMENT OF MR. JONATHAN WINER, SPECIAL ENVOY FOR LIBYA,
BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Winer. You are welcome, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. If you could put that microphone a little
bit closer.
Mr. Winer. Sure. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman Poe,
Ranking Member Deutch, Ranking Member Keating, and
distinguished members of the committees, I am honored by the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss U.S. foreign
policy on Libya. Thank you.
During my service as special envoy for Libya, our policy
has centered on promoting the ability of Libyans to maintain a
stable, unified, and inclusive government that can both defeat
ISIL and other terrorist groups, and simultaneously meet the
security, economic, and humanitarian needs of the Libyan
people.
After 42 years of Muammar Ghadafi's erratic rule, and 5
years since the country cast off his shackles, Libya has made
some, but not enough progress in reaching these goals. Libya's
post-Ghadafi institutions have not provided sufficient
stability and opportunity for the Libyan people; but they have
made some visible progress against terrorism and they still
have an opportunity to move forward in securing a more
functional national transitional government. Libya needs to
move forward on both goals, neither objective is sustainable
without the other.
Since the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement in
Skhirat, Morocco on December 17, 2015, the Government of
National Accord, or GNA, led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj
has been a steadfast partner of the United States and the
international community against ISIL.
A year ago, before the Skhirat Agreement, ISIL was
expanding its presence in Libya, capturing 90 miles of prime
Mediterranean coastline around the coastal city of Sirte, a
stone's throw away from Europe's southern shores. A year later
the picture looks very different. Now, due to the bravery of
GNA-aligned Libyan soldiers supported since this summer by the
skill of U.S. forces, who have conducted more than 450 air
strikes coordinated with our Libyan partners, ISIL controls
just a few city blocks in Sirte. And its grasp on even this
sliver of Libyan territory is tenuous. In Benghazi and in
Libya's east, ISIL and other terrorist groups in other parts of
Libya have also been pushed back. In Benghazi and Libya's east,
this has been due to sustained efforts by equally brave Libyan
soldiers.
So we have seen Libyan soldiers in different parts of the
country and with different political orientations taking on
terrorism in different parts of Libya and what was a
substantial presence of ISIL in terms of its control of
territory in Libya is now all but eliminated. The gains against
ISIL are real. They could also be reversible if Libyans do not
come together to participate in the GNA and to help it perform
its work for the Libyan people, and to unify against the common
threat to all. This is true today for the transitional GNA, it
will be true for the next Libyan Government that is formed
after the country moves ahead with elections sometime next
year, or in early 2018.
If Libyans choose to fight each other instead of uniting,
they risk increasing the probability that ISIL and other
violent extremists in its mold will be back. Accordingly, we
are continuing our work seeking to broaden support for a common
political path forward to build a more capable government and
to unify and professionalize Libya's armed forces. We see no
military solution to Libya's political divisions; sustainable
security solutions require sustainable political solutions.
We also need to keep working with Libyans on getting oil
flowing and stabilizing its economy. If Libya can get back to
producing even 1 million barrels a day out of its previous 1.6
million barrel-per-day capacity, it could easily provide the
Libyan people the funds they need for food, health care,
education, and other basic needs. Sustainable economic success,
too, requires sustainable political solutions. Continuing
intensive mediation to ensure the political process moves
forward will be critical. Libyans will continue to look to the
U.S. for our help as the GNA moves forward in addressing these
challenges, and we must be prepared to give it.
Ms. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee,
the U.S. Government remains deeply engaged in Libya. We have
shared national security interests in defeating ISIL. The U.S.
supports the aspirations of the Libyan people for a united,
inclusive, and responsive national government capable of
overcoming the country's significant challenges and political
divisions.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Winer follows:]
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Mr. Chabot [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Winer.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen had to go out. I am filling in for her at
this time. So I will recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Her first question would have been, and I will ask it at
this time, please describe the various violent Islamist
extremist and terrorist groups currently operating in Libya.
Who are they? How many fighters does each group have? What are
their goals? And anything else that you think would be relevant
and helpful for this committee to understand.
Mr. Winer. Sure. There are four major groups that are U.N.-
designated terrorist groups that we pay attention to. It is
surely not the entire complete list because there are local
groups with different places in the spectrum of extremism who
are present in the environment as well who we have to pay
attention to, and Libyans have to pay attention to. Some of
them are purely domestic and I would distinguish those from the
ones that operate in a transnational way.
But the four groups are: Islamic State. I have seen
different numbers from the United States Government on how many
are present. Prior to the Sirte offensive, the range in
estimates were 3,000 to 6,500; I have seen numbers that many.
Hundreds of Islamic State fighters have been killed in the
Sirte fighting. Hundreds. Difficult to get an exact number but
it is in that range. What are the numbers today? I don't think
anyone knows. I would suspect they are at the lower end of that
spectrum but there you would need to get briefings in closed
session from people who are responsible for making those kinds
of assessments.
In addition to Daesh, you have al-Qaeda in the Maghreb,
which maintains an independent presence. They have been present
in Benghazi, though at this point they are down to a sliver, a
tiny sliver of territory in Benghazi. They have been basically
eliminated there, and it is not clear how much longer they will
hold the last block or two where they still have a presence.
There is likely al-Qaeda cells elsewhere in the country.
There have been a couple of different groups calling
themselves Ansar al-Sharia. One has been present in Darnah in
the Far East. Another has been present in the far west of
Libya, sometimes called Ansar al-Sharia Tunis. They have been
responsible in significant part for attacks in Tunisia at the
Bardo Museum and at the Sousse Beach area. So that is a third
group.
A fourth group, Al-Mourabitoun, is present to some extent
in Libya. They were Algerian-based originally, and they move
around within countries to the west and south of Libya as well.
Those are the principal four groups. Beyond that, you get
into constellations of militias with different types of ties.
Some of whom disagree with and fight other Libyan militias and
other Libyan military forces and that gets more complicated
pretty quickly. The situation in Benghazi has been made
complicated by the presence of some of those groups, along with
people who are clearly Islamic State and people who are al-
Qaeda in the Maghreb.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. My next question is this:
There was a significant amount of criticism of the Bush
administration for inadequately planning, shall we say, after
the overthrow of Saddam in Iraq. Even after all that criticism,
why did this administration fail to perhaps learn from that?
And I think most people would agree there was a lack of
planning for the power transition after Ghadafi and the
situation that we have today. How could that happen and what
can we learn in the future to avoid that type of thing from
future administrations, including the current one, or the next
administration, which will be coming in in about 2 months.
Mr. Winer. Mr. Chabot, it is an absolutely excellent core
question and it is a question that deserves a lot of thought. I
will do the best I can extemporaneously to respond.
In both Iraq and in Libya, you had dictatorships that had
been in place for a very long time. When you have
dictatorships, they tend to live in a bubble and not to have
good political feedback mechanisms to have institutions
function in ways other than by the command of the dictator.
So, in both cases, the institutions that were left
following the military actions did not function in the absence
of the authoritarian leader telling everybody what to do. They
probably did not function tremendously well previously, but
they certainly functioned very terribly afterward. So I think
there needs to be a recognition any time one goes after a
dictator that the societies, that the dictators have led for
decades, are going to have underdeveloped political
institutions.
In the case of Libya, there are technocratic institutions
that functioned very well under Ghadafi and have functioned
well since. The National Oil Corporation functioned very well
to get oil pumped, to keep track of oil, and to handle all
elements of Libyan oil production. Central Bank, technically,
is capable of functioning to move money for salaries, to be
able to follow budgets and make payments in that way similarly,
and to operate as other central banks do. The National
Telecommunications and Postal Service, same kind of technical
capacity.
But political institutions, not so much. In politics, you
have different people whose view is: I am the one who should
decide, not that gentleman or woman over there. And no accepted
agreed-upon mechanism for power sharing. So there have been
disagreements pretty much nonstop on how to share power, how to
deliver services at the local level, how to make the key
decisions to move ahead. Constant negotiations and efforts to
get alignment among the different geographies, geographical
regions, the different tribes, the different cities, as well as
the different political parties and ideologies. So it has made
for a very, very difficult transition for Libya, as it did for
Iraq.
So I think anytime one is going to engage in trying to
undertake an intervention in another country, you have to do so
with a lot of humility, with an appreciation of risk and of
uncertainty, and with constant review before, while you're
doing it, and afterward to be able to correct course as you go.
You also need alignment from neighbors. If you have neighbors
with different visions on the future engaging in a country,
different regional players, for example, you can wind up with
different domestic groups being backed by different regional
forces, and, thereby, believing that they are going to be
victorious as a result of having their patron. So it has been
critical, in the case of Libya, to try and get regional players
aligned with one another in support of a joint and unified
solution, that is what we have been working on.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. My time has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Cook, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chair. By the way, thank you very
much for your patience with everything that is going on today.
I wanted to just get your thoughts on the relationship with
Egypt and the el-Sisi government. A number of years ago, going
way back, the relationship between Libya and Egypt was
strained, to say the least. I know that Egypt is concerned with
the Sinai and its own economic development, but it would seem
that Egypt could have a tremendous influence in that region
there going back to historic times. Do you have any comments or
thoughts on that?
Mr. Winer. Sure. Egypt is a tremendously important actor in
relationship to Libya. It has a long-shared border, a long-
shared history, and Egyptian officials very much want to see a
stable and secure Libya. The question for the United States as
we work closely with Egypt--and we work closely with literally
all of Libya's neighbors across the Mediterranean, as well as
on land, and with other regional players--is what is going to
produce stability and security for the long term?
As I mentioned in my testimony, we are convinced that you
have to have a viable national government as well as viable
national security forces working together in a way that is
sustainable. That means a government that is inclusive--it
can't just be a government from the east or representing
Easterners, for example--it has to include people from
Misurata, people from Tripoli, people from the south.
The United States and Egypt talk about Libya all the time;
I have been to Cairo, I don't know how many times in recent
months, meeting with very senior officials. And to date, we
have been able to achieve alignments in supporting the Libyan
Political Agreement, in a series of U.N. Security Council
resolutions, and even on stopping flows of illicit oil when
they have happened. We have had cooperation and integration.
There are differences in perspective in some areas. Egypt
wants to see a very strong Libyan army, we want to see a strong
Libyan army too. I think our focus has been on how you get that
integrated across the whole country in a way that is under
civilian rule, civilian control, but also maintains the ability
to do its job properly. We continue to work with them on that.
Mr. Cook. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis, didn't I hear
that you just had an addition to your family?
Mr. DeSantis. That is right.
Mr. Chabot. A little girl?
Mr. DeSantis. It is a little girl. A bundle of joy.
Mr. Chabot. Congratulations.
Mr. DeSantis. Oh, no, it is tremendous. Thank you so much.
You mentioned Ansar al-Sharia, they were widely regarded as
perpetrating the Benghazi attacks. I know that the
administration has indicted one individual from that. Has there
been any other efforts made or actions taken to hold anyone
else accountable who was involved with those attacks?
Mr. Winer. The FBI has active engagement in trying to bring
the perpetrators of those attacks to justice. The Department of
State and every element of the Obama administration, whenever
there is an opportunity to try and advance those
investigations, work away at it. One of the most important
things to me, as special envoy, when we worked on the formation
of the Government of National Accord was being able to talk to
the new members of the presidency council about this case and
to say how much it matters to us. They said, It matters to us,
Mr. Winer, at least as much as it matters to you. Libyans loved
Chris Stevens, they knew Ambassador Stevens very well. The
other three victims of that attack also require and deserve
justice. The Libyans raise this issue with me when we are
talking about other things, they want to see us back in the
country and they want to see this episode brought to a close
with justice. I have never heard any Libyan I have talked to
take a different position. There is an emotional element to
this that is important to the future of both countries, I thank
you for raising it.
Mr. DeSantis. And just judging by your response and
mentioning the FBI, am I right to assume that the response is
legal/investigatory rather than kinetic in conjunction with,
say, the Department of Defense?
Mr. Winer. The FBI has had the lead on this issue since
those attacks took place. I personally believe that if we have
the ability to go after terrorists in Libya, or anywhere, who
have been involved in the killing of Americans, that we should
exercise that. In the case of Libya, this administration has
done so on multiple occasions. We went after and killed ISIL's
emir, who was located at that time in the eastern half of
Libya's coastal region. We went after a group of terrorists in
western Libya, a very, very successful attack that killed a
number of them. And we should be prepared to do that when it
meets the objective test of people who are threatening
Americans or have killed Americans.
Mr. DeSantis. Well, good. Well, I am glad to hear you say
that. I think that is true and I think it has been a little
frustrating with the Benghazi response just simply because we
had identified a group, and I view that very much as an act of
war. You know, the law enforcement component I get, but I think
when that was done in the 1990s that probably wasn't as
effective. I certainly support the other strike that you had
mentioned, I think that those were absolutely justified.
Let me ask you this: Of the folks who are kind of on the
ground in Libya, the various groups that the U.S. is working
with, what are they seeking? Are they seeking just to put an
end to a lot of the turmoil? Do they want a more democratic
pluralistic society? Do they want a more Islamic-based society
where you would have a Sharia-type system? What would you say
are kind of in the mix?
Mr. Winer. Are you talking about the terrorist groups?
Mr. DeSantis. No, no. I am talking about just groups that
we are working with.
Mr. Winer. Oh, sure.
Mr. DeSantis. What are their orientations?
Mr. Winer. First, I think most Libyans want to see a
stable, prosperous, secure Libya. They want good lives, like
people want in any other country in the world. So most people
in the first instance, that is what they want. It is getting
there that is so hard. Getting the leaders to negotiate with
one another, compromise with one another to create a unified
government based on reconciliation that can build trust by
performing. That is what most Libyans, I believe, want. And the
many, many, many groups of Libyans, different Libyan leaders I
talk to, profess to want the same thing. Libyans that we are
working with on the battle over Sirte did not like and did not
want to be threatened by a foreign brutal repellent ideology
and organization that was milking Libyan resources to accrete
power and to stifle all alternatives. They felt very strongly
that that needed to be stopped.
In Benghazi, prior to the Libyan National Army commanded by
General Haftar coming in, there were assassinations in civil
society that were really significantly affecting the ability of
ordinary people to live. The goal is to get the forces that we
have supported in the west, the forces that General Haftar has
brought together in the east, and other forces, including those
being put together in Tripoli now from people who used to work
for the Libyan Army in the past, together to form an integrated
military that is non-ideological, that is technocratic, that is
impartial and neutral, nonpolitical, whose goal is to stabilize
Libya and make the country safe for people to carry out their
business and live normal, good lives in safety. A political
agreement is going to be necessary to further political
negotiations and discussions within the framework of the
Skhirat agreement is going to be necessary to get there, we
believe. And we have been working on that intensively and will
continue to.
Mr. DeSantis. So is that more of an Egyptian model, then,
you are looking forward with how their military has operated
through the years?
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. But you can
go ahead and answer the question.
Mr. Winer. Yes, sir. I wouldn't call it an Egyptian model.
It needs to be a Libyan model. Libyans will need to have, we
believe, a joint defense leadership at the top in some way.
There can be one person who is in the lead and others as part
of it, but it is going to need to be joint because it needs to
knit the country together. You know, Egypt has had a strong,
strong leadership out of Cairo for thousands of years, for a
long, long time, out of one city. Long tradition in the 20th
century of Egyptian military. Libya has a more geographically
diverse population, and it is going to need to be something
that brings people together.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Yoho, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you being
here, and sorry for the delay. You were talking about the flow
of oil; the operation of it, the production, and the sale
operated well under Ghadafi, is that right?
Mr. Winer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Yoho. All right. And now it is kind of happenstance? It
is not working as well?
Mr. Winer. What has happened, in essence, is the different
Libyan factions have shut down oil production as a means of
trying to get their way. You could call it extortion, if you
wanted to, in some cases but, essentially, they have simply
turned off the spigots. Libyan oil flows from fields to pipes
to terminals.
Mr. Yoho. Right.
Mr. Winer. So you can shut it off at the terminal, you can
shut it off at the pipe, you can shut it off at the oil field.
Mr. Yoho. And then you were talking about we need to have a
viable national government, an inclusive government. Is that
possible when you have a tribal mentality, or a country with a
tribal mentality versus a strong arm of a leader like a Ghadafi
or a Hussein in Iraq? Is that possible in that kind of a
country with that kind of mentality?
Mr. Winer. The aftermath of dictatorship is very hard on
people almost anywhere it happens. In the case of Libya,
Libyans need to come together to form a government that
represents----
Mr. Yoho. Well, that is what I am asking. Is that possible?
We have seen this story played out in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
what I see is America trying to correct a wrong from the no-fly
zone that we know was a mistake; a terrible mistake, and we
almost repeated this again in Syria. Here we are entangled in
another Middle Eastern country with not a quick resolve and I
just want to see what your thoughts are on how do we get
through this? And as a unity government, and I know that would
be the ideal situation, but how feasible is that and how
realistic is that?
Mr. Winer. I believe that Libyans don't like people from
other countries telling them what to do.
Mr. Yoho. I agree.
Mr. Winer. And they don't much like other Libyans telling
them what to do. But they would rather be in the end, working
things out among other Libyans than having foreigners in
charge. One of the reasons the Islamic State has been pushed
out of geographic control so quickly, in the scheme of things,
is because Libyans, even the extremists in the east who invited
them into Darnah, started saying: We don't want them telling us
what to do. We don't want those people out of Iraq or Syria
telling us what to do. We are going to be extremists, we will
be local extremists; we don't like other people telling us what
to do.
Mr. Yoho. Well, and that brings up another point then. If
ISIS got a foothold in there because of the no-fly zone,
because of the failed state, and now that we are trying to side
with different militias to defeat ISIS, are we not going to
create the same thing that we did in Afghanistan?
Mr. Winer. Our goal is not to side with any militia. It is
to help Libyans get together to form unified forces that are
professional, impartial, neutral.
Mr. Yoho. Is that possible though?
Mr. Winer. Yes, I think it is possible. Sometimes things
that are hard are still possible.
Mr. Yoho. I agree.
Mr. Winer. Just because something is hard does not mean it
is impossible.
Mr. Yoho. No, I agree with that.
Mr. Winer. It was considered to be really hard to create a
political framework in 2015 to try and bring the country
together. Ultimately, we were able to work with other
countries, countries with very different takes and perspectives
on the Libyan issue throughout the region--Middle Eastern
region and throughout North Africa--were able to say: Yes, we
agree, this is the way forward. As well as western European
countries, the United States, and the P5 and the U.N. Security
Council. We had an awful lot of Libyans aboard, too. The goal
now is to try and see if we can continue to get Libyans
together, to find further solutions to implement that long
enough to then get a referendum on a constitution and elections
in place, so that you can have the country then move forward on
that basis, with unified national institutions. If the country
winds up breaking up into pieces, it is going to be very bad
for Libyans and it is not going to be good for anybody else.
Mr. Yoho. Do you see a strong person that could be elected
in there that people would unify right now? Or do you see it
still going through the struggling--somebody trying to vie for
the power, so that they are the person that can be elected? Or
are they going to just kind of take the country over through
force?
Mr. Winer. We do not believe that any Libyan can bring the
country together through force. We just don't believe it. We
look at it and say: Is it possible? Conclude it is not going to
work. It will bring other Libyans into play against it if
anyone tries to do that, and our partners and working on Libya,
international partners, pretty much, conclude the same thing.
It is going to be a process of getting there; promoting
alignment, getting people to work with one another, preventing
the efforts to commandeer resources, that is the ongoing work.
And it is going to need to continue with some intensity for the
foreseeable future.
Mr. Yoho. I appreciate it. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Ribble, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Ribble. Good afternoon, I guess.
Mr. Winer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ribble. It is good to have you here. I want to go back
to the economy, to some of the very early statements you made.
Because I think ultimately, I couldn't agree more with you when
you talk about that the citizens want an economy that
functions, they want families that are safe, they want their
children to do well. They really want all the same things that
families around the world want. Can you share with us a little
bit of your perspective of what the Libyan economy looked like
under Ghadafi----
Mr. Winer. Sure.
Mr. Ribble [continuing]. And what it looks like today? You
talked a bit about oil, but what are the other economic drivers
in the country? And then also talk to us about what those
obstacles are. Are they religious? Is it a Sunni/Shia battle?
Is it economic? Is it just dispirit----
Mr. Winer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ribble. So just kind of take us through what you see
the economic----
Mr. Winer. Thank you for another great question. Ghadafi's
strength and weakness was building the Libyan economy on oil
and almost exclusively oil. There is essentially no revenue to
the government meaningfully other than oil. There are small
amounts from telecommunications payments, that kind of thing,
postal payments, some excise taxes but it is basically oil. So
when the price of oil was high, Libya under Ghadafi socked the
money away. When the price of oil was lower, it managed.
In the first days after the revolution, Libya continued to
pump as much oil as it ever did. They started fighting with one
another, oil production went down. They then resolved things
for a while, oil production went up to where it had been pre-
Ghadafi again. So the reason why oil is not being pumped at an
adequate level is political. It is not technical. It is not due
to deterioration of the system, though Islamic State did damage
some infrastructure that needs to be repaired, if they had
complete political agreement, maybe they could get up to 1.2 or
1.3 million barrels a day instead of 1.6. They would be in
excellent shape with that. So it is the failure to reach
political agreements that is creating the problems. It is this
pattern of extortion, holdups, people refusing to allow oil to
be pumped for political reasons. That is what has to stop. It
is a cancer threatening Libya's future when people shut down
the oil.
Then the money from the oil has to be distributed in ways
that ordinary Libyans throughout the country say: Our city, our
town, our tribe, our people, our region, are being taken care
of. Ghadafi was good at that; he wasn't necessarily fair, he
didn't distribute it in a way that everybody else would have
distributed it, but there was free education, there was low-
cost health care, low cost utilities. So while there were haves
and have-nots that were substantial and that played a part in
the revolution, I believe, he basically had his Ghadafi system
down. Without him acting as the leader, that system is broken
down and you have these people shutting down the oil, which he
never would have permitted. They need to get the oil pumped.
There is no solution near-term other than getting oil pumped so
they can generate the revenues they need to then distribute it
by political agreement. So what we are working on right now, in
addition to urging Libyans to allow oil to be pumped, and right
now, there is 440,000 barrels a day that could be pumped from
the west by a small number of people saying yes----
Mr. Ribble. Is there an effective telecommunications system
in the country where citizens can communicate easily through
the Internet and cell phones?
Mr. Winer. Yes. It is not as robust as it needs to be
because there hasn't been investment in it in the last 5 years,
and Islamic State, at various times, tried cutting the cords,
as it were, shutting down elements of it, but it still exists.
It could be stronger and needs to be stronger.
Mr. Ribble. Because it is important economically for the
people to communicate.
Mr. Winer. Yeah. Libya needs to diversify beyond oil, but
first it needs to turn the oil on, agree on budgets, agree on
fiscal and monetary policy in light of current conditions, and
reach further political agreements that would strengthen and
build confidence among the Libyan people, thus shutting off the
losses due to the parallel or black market. We are working
closely with the U.S. Department of Treasury and with Libyans
in trying to promote their agreement on those issues, as well
as with IMF and the World Bank.
Mr. Ribble. One final question. In hindsight, and I
recognize hindsight is generally 20/20, what should the U.S.
have done differently, if anything? Did we learn anything
there?
Mr. Winer. As I mentioned before, and I will repeat this
core point, anytime that you go into a country that has been
run by a dictator, the aftermath could be very complicated
because that is a particular type of system. Getting to a
system that is more pluralistic and more representative, which
is essential for countries to be sustainable. There is a reason
why dictators fall, eventually their systems rot and they no
longer meet the needs of their people and they can't maintain
control. When you do that, you have to go in with humility,
persistence, and commitment, you have to know a lot, listen a
lot, be prepared to revise your initial thinking, consult with
other people, and recognize that it can be a bunch of years.
I worked on issues in the Americas in the 1990s in the
Clinton years. My rule of thumb used to be that after a civil
war or the fall of a dictatorship or anything of that nature,
and military or security forces becoming discredited, no longer
being in place, you have to think about a decade for
rebuilding, not a year or 2 years, but a decade. That is not a
very perfect rule but it is order of magnitude what I have seen
now over decades of being in this work. The other line I
sometimes use is: Don't try to do in Baghdad what you would
never dare try to do in Baltimore, because you know it wouldn't
work if you tried to do it in Baltimore. So I use the word
again, ``humility.'' Governance is hard and the further away
you are from a society, the harder it is. You can still help by
being very attuned to a society and consulting and learning but
it is difficult, painstaking work that takes time.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank the
gentleman.
We want to thank you, Mr. Winer, for you testimony here
this morning and now this afternoon. In my Democratic
colleagues' defense, their absence is not due to a lack of
interest, but they had leadership elections, which apparently
went a little longer than they anticipated. So their absence,
of course, is excused.
We want to thank everyone for being here. Thank you for
your testimony. Members will have 5 legislative days to submit
statements or questions or to extend their remarks. And if
there is no further business to come before the committee, we
are adjourned. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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