[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE DISASTER OF CUTTING PREPAREDNESS GRANTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 15, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-59
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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22-623 PDF WASHINGTON : 2016
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York, Chairman
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Mark Walker, North Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Martha McSally, Arizona Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Kerry A. Kinirons, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., a Representative in
Congress From the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
WITNESSES
Panel I
Honorable Bill De Blasio, Mayor, New York, New York:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Panel II
Mr. Jim Butterworth, Director, Emergency Management Agency/
Homeland Security, State of Georgia, Testifying on Behalf of
the National Emergency Management Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 30
Prepared Statement............................................. 32
Ms. Rhoda Mae Kerr, Fire Chief, City of Austin Fire Department,
Austin, Texas, Testifying on Behalf of the International
Association of Fire Chiefs:
Oral Statement................................................. 37
Prepared Statement............................................. 38
Mr. George Turner, Chief of Police, Atlanta Police Department,
Atlanta, Georgia, Testifying on Behalf of the Major Cities
Chiefs:
Oral Statement................................................. 41
Prepared Statement............................................. 43
Mr. Mike Sena, Director, Northern California Regional
Intelligence Center, Testifying on Behalf of the National
Fusion Center Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 46
Prepared Statement............................................. 48
Sgt. W. Greg Kierce, Director, Office of Emergency Management &
Homeland Security, Jersey City, New Jersey:
Oral Statement................................................. 52
Prepared Statement............................................. 54
STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE DISASTER OF CUTTING PREPAREDNESS GRANTS
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Tuesday, March 15, 2016
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Daniel M. Donovan,
Jr., [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Donovan, Marino, Walker,
Loudermilk, McSally, McCaul (ex officio), Payne, and Rice.
Also present: Representative King.
Mr. Donovan. The Committee on Homeland Security's
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting
today to examine the proposed cuts to grant programs in the
President's fiscal year 2017 budget request.
Before we begin, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman
from New York, Mr. King, a Member of the full committee, be
permitted to sit on the dais and participate in today's
hearing. Without objection, so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent to insert in the record a
signed letter by 17 stakeholder organizations opposing the
proposed grant cuts.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information has been included as part of Hon. de Blasio's
statement included for the record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Communications, one of my fundamental
responsibilities is to ensure our Nation's first responders
have the tools they need to protect this country and, God
forbid, respond to the next terrorist attack. That is why my
first hearing is focusing on the dangerous cuts to homeland
security grants proposed in the President's fiscal year 2017
budget request.
The President's budget cuts more than $500 million from
programs that support States, cities, ports, transit systems,
and fire services. This funding helps provide the training and
equipment so critical to enabling our first responders to meet
threats as varied as active-shooter scenarios, mass casualty
events from a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack, and bomb
plots targeting civilians in high-traffic areas.
Such threats aren't just theories--in the nearly 15 years
since the tragic attacks in 2001, law enforcement has thwarted
sinister plots like these and more, including one involving an
ISIS sympathizer in my own district. As this committee
documented in a recent report issued by Chairman McCaul, there
have been 75 terrorism plots against the West since early 2014.
Forty-three percent of them were successfully executed, and the
United States is the top target.
Law enforcement, including the New York City Police
Department and Joint Terrorism Task Forces, deserve our thanks
for keeping Americans safe. So far, there have been 81 ISIS-
linked arrests in the United States, a number that will only
grow as the organization continues to spread viral terrorism
over the internet.
Proposing cuts to the programs that keep the homeland safe
would be foolish in any case, but they are particularly
outrageous at a time when our threat level is the highest it
has been since 2001. It would seem that either the President
doesn't believe these threats exist or he doesn't care. But
make no mistake: This is not the time for the Federal
Government to cut support to help our Nation's first responders
combat terror attacks.
In discussing the budget proposal with the administration,
we have heard various justifications for the cuts. They have
told us that the cuts are a result of, ``FEMA's successful
investments in prior years.'' They have claimed that it is a
result of unspent funding from prior years. They have told us
that the cuts are the result of difficult budget decisions, and
that this budget, ``funds all of our vital homeland security
missions in these challenging times.''
The truth of the matter is, they have chosen to balance the
budget on the backs of first responders knowing that many in
Congress will vociferously oppose those cuts. We have heard
time and again that these grant programs have made a
difference. We heard it after the Boston Marathon bombings. We
heard it after the natural disasters like Hurricane Sandy,
which devastated my district, and the tornadoes in Moore,
Oklahoma.
I am especially interested in hearing how the recent
investments made by New York City using Federal Homeland
Security grants, such as hiring additional counterterrorism
officers this year, could be hamstrung by the sudden drop in
Federal funds. New York City and other jurisdictions that
benefit from Federal security grants have made real
contributions to increasing our country's readiness to meet
terrorist threats.
However, for local efforts to be truly effective, there
must be a meaningful partnership with the Federal Government.
Congress, and this committee in particular, has a history of
bipartisanship when it comes to protecting our country and
supporting first responders. We did it last year when we came
together to permanently reauthorize the Zadroga Act to give 9/
11 first responders the health treatment and screenings they
earned, and I am pleased to be here today working with Ranking
Member Payne to oppose these dangerous homeland security cuts.
[The statement of Chairman Donovan follows:]
Statement of Chairman Daniel M. Donovan, Jr.
March 15, 2016
As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Communications, my fundamental responsibility is to
ensure our Nation's first responders have the tools they need to
protect this country and, God forbid, respond to the next terrorist
attack. That is why my first hearing is focusing on the dangerous cuts
to homeland security grants proposed in the President's fiscal year
2017 budget request.
The President's budget cuts more than $500 million from programs
that support States, cities, ports, transit systems, and the fire
services. This funding helps provide the training and equipment so
crucial to enabling our first responders to meet threats as varied as
active-shooter scenarios, mass-casualty events from a nuclear,
chemical, or biological attack, and bomb plots targeting civilians in
high-traffic areas.
Such threats aren't just theories--in the nearly 15 years since the
tragic attacks in 2001, law enforcement has thwarted sinister plots
like these and more, including one involving an ISIS sympathizer in my
district. As this committee documented in a recent report issued by
Chairman McCaul, there have been 75 terrorism plots against the West
since early 2014. Forty-three percent of them were successfully
executed, and the United States is the top target.
Law enforcement, including the NYPD and Joint Terrorism Task
Forces, deserve our thanks for keeping Americans safe. So far there
have been 81 ISIS linked arrests in the United States, a number that
will only grow as the organization continues to spread viral terrorism
over the internet.
Proposing cuts to the programs that keep the homeland safe would be
foolish in any case, but they are particularly outrageous at a time
when our threat level is the highest it's been since 9/11.
It would seem that either the President doesn't believe these
threats exist, or he doesn't care. But make no mistake: This is NOT the
time for the Federal Government to cut support to help our Nation's
first responders combat terror attacks.
In discussing the budget proposal with the administration, we've
heard various justifications for the cuts. They've told us that the
cuts are a result of ``FEMA's successful investments in prior years.''
They've claimed that it is a result of unspent funding from prior
years. And they've told us that the cuts are the result of difficult
budget decisions and that this budget `` . . . funds all of our vital
homeland security missions in these challenging times.'' The truth of
the matter is they've chosen to balance the budget on the backs of
first responders, knowing that many in Congress will vociferously
oppose the cuts.
We have heard time and again that these grant programs have made a
difference. We heard it after the Boston Marathon bombings. We heard it
after natural disasters like Hurricane Sandy, which devastated my
district, and the tornadoes in Moore, Oklahoma.
I am especially interested to hear how the recent investments made
by New York City using Federal Homeland Security grants, such as hiring
additional counterterrorism officers this year, could be hamstrung by
the sudden drop in Federal funds. New York City and the other
jurisdictions that benefit from Federal security grants have made real
contributions to increasing our country's readiness to meet terrorist
threats. However, for local efforts to be truly effective, there must
be a meaningful partnership with the Federal Government.
Congress, and this committee in particular, has a history of
bipartisanship when it comes to protecting our country and supporting
first responders. We did it last year when we came together to
permanently reauthorize the Zadroga Act to give 9/11 first responders
the health treatment and screenings they earned, and I am pleased to be
here today working with Ranking Member Payne to oppose these dangerous
homeland security cuts.
Mr. Donovan. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for an opening statement he may have.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I begin, I would like to congratulate Mr. Donovan on
his Chairmanship, and thank him for holding today's hearing to
explore the potential consequences of the proposed cuts to
State and local homeland security grant programs.
I represent the 10th Congressional District of New Jersey.
It is the home of Newark Liberty International Airport, the New
Jersey Transit Authority, the Port of Newark-Elizabeth Marine
Terminal, and a dense area of industrial facilities that the
New York Times has coined the most dangerous 2 miles in
America.
Over 100 potential terrorist targets are interspersed
between homes and commuter corridors along that stretch. Those
targets, coupled with the proximity to New York City, make the
Newark-Jersey City metropolitan area regularly ranked among the
most high-risk urban areas in the country.
Although it is a somewhat dubious distinction, it has
brought with it critical Federal funding. From the Urban Area
Security Initiative to port and transit security grants,
Federal funding has helped northern New Jersey improve
preparedness planning, achieve interoperable communication
capabilities, and harden infrastructure targets.
Most importantly, Federal funding has supported important
multi-jurisdictional exercises that challenge existing response
capabilities so we can make them stronger. These human capital
investments--planning, training, and exercises--cannot be one-
off investments. Rather, they must be repeated over time, both
to train new responders and to help seasoned responders know
how to take on emerging threats.
Like many of my colleagues on this panel, I am very
troubled by the administration's proposal to slash important
homeland security grants in fiscal year 2017. In the 3\1/2\
years I have served as the subcommittee's Ranking Member, I
have seen the domestic threat environment evolve, and our first
responders are on the front lines.
I understand that the administration has proposed to slash
Federal homeland security grant funds to comply with the budget
caps, and I take issue with that. We cannot afford to balance
the budget on the backs of our first responders. Instead,
Federal first responders' funding should be robust and
predictable so that the State and local governments can
effectively plan for the future investments.
I am sure that the testimony we hear today will help us
build the case to appropriators that strong homeland security
grant funding should continue. Together, we can fight these
cuts and win.
Additionally, I would be interested in learning the
witnesses' thoughts on the new grants to counter violent
extremism, or CVE, and the proposed Regional Competitive Grant
Program. The Department has failed to provide Congress with
much detail on either program, and I would be interested to
learn if DHS has conducted any outreach to the stakeholders and
community about them.
Particularly with respect to CVE grants, I am interested in
hearing the witnesses' thoughts on what can be done to guard
against certain populations being targeted or profiled. In the
past, mosques in my Congressional district were the subject of
surveillance by an out-of-State law enforcement agency.
Although the NYPD program was subsequently disbanded, it
showed us first-hand the dangers of profiling, and I want to be
sure that precautions to avoid such outcomes are taken as we
make the new money available for CVE.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here today,
particularly Sergeant Kierce, from Jersey City, New Jersey, and
I look forward to their testimony.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of
my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Payne follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Donald M. Payne, Jr.
March 15, 2016
I represent the 10th Congressional District of New Jersey. It is
home to Newark Liberty International Airport, the New Jersey Transit
Authority, the Port Newark-Elizabeth Marine Terminal, and a dense area
of industrial facilities that the New York Times has coined ``the most
dangerous 2 miles in America.''
Over 100 potential terrorist targets are interspersed between homes
and commuter corridors along that stretch. Those targets, coupled with
its proximity to New York City, make the Newark-Jersey City
metropolitan area regularly ranked among the most high-risk urban areas
in the country.
Although it is a somewhat dubious distinction, it has brought with
it critical Federal funding. From the Urban Area Security Initiative to
Port and Transit Security Grants, Federal funding has helped Northern
New Jersey improve preparedness planning, achieve interoperable
communications capabilities, and harden infrastructure targets.
Most importantly, Federal funding has supported important multi-
jurisdiction exercises that challenge existing response capabilities so
we can make them stronger. These ``human capital'' investments--
planning, training, and exercises--cannot be one-off investments.
Rather, they must be repeated over time, both to train new
responders and to help seasoned responders know how to take on emerging
threats. Like many of my colleagues on this panel, I was very troubled
by the administration's proposal to slash important homeland security
grants for fiscal year 2017.
In the 3\1/2\ years I have served as this subcommittee's Ranking
Member, I have seen the domestic threat environment evolve as our first
responders are on the front lines. I understand that the administration
proposed to slash Federal homeland security grant funds to comply with
budget caps and I take issue with that.
We cannot afford to balance the budget on the backs of our first
responders. Instead, Federal first responder funding should be robust
and predictable, so that our State and local governments can
effectively plan for future investments. I am sure that the testimony
we hear today will help us build the case to appropriators that strong
homeland security grant funding should continue. Together, we can fight
these cuts and win.
Additionally, I will be interested in learning the witnesses'
thoughts on the new grants to Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) and the
proposed Regional Competitive Grant Program. The Department has failed
to provide Congress much detail on either program, and I will be
interested to learn if DHS has conducted any outreach to the
stakeholder community about them.
Particularly with respect to CVE grants, I am interested in hearing
the witnesses' thoughts on what can be done to guard against certain
populations being targeting or profiled. In the past, mosques in my
Congressional district were the subject of surveillance by an out-of-
State law enforcement agency.
Although the NYPD program was subsequently disbanded, it showed us
first-hand the dangers of profiling and I want to be sure that
precautions to avoid such outcomes are taken as we make new money
available for CVE.
Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields.
The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the full
committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, for any
opening statement that he may have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Chairman Donovan. Let me
congratulate you on your first hearing, your inaugural hearing.
I kind-of like the sound of that.
Mr. Donovan. So do I.
Mr. McCaul. It seems like today's a New York day. I can't
think of a more important topic, though, for you to hold your
first hearing on.
I want to welcome the mayor of New York, and also my fire
chief, Chief Rhoda Mae Kerr, who is also the president of the
International Association of Fire Chiefs, and she's a friend of
mine back home.
As Chairman Donovan noted, we are at our highest threat
level since 9/11, and, in fact, I recently released a report
examining the 75 ISIS-linked terror plots against the West, to
date, up from 19 in 2014.
ISIS has reached an unprecedented level of terror plotting
against the United States and our allies. Despite this growing
threat, the President's budget falls short where we need it the
most. Our city streets have become the front lines in the war
against Islamist terror, yet the President proposes slashing
funding to State and local first responders.
Let me just say for the record, I have been to New York
many times. I know I am from Texas, but I know that New York is
perhaps the No. 1 target in the Nation. It is very important
that we keep New York safe from this very high-threat level
that is out there.
We cannot let these cuts stand. I look forward to working
with Chairman Donovan, and also the Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Appropriations for Homeland Security, and our
friends across the aisle to ensure that our first responders
have the tools that they need to get this job done.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields back.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
March 14, 2016
I have been responsible for overseeing how the Federal Government
supports State and local preparedness and response activities for well
over a decade--first as a Member of the Select Committee on Homeland
Security in the 108th Congress and now as the permanent committee's
Ranking Member.
It has been my job to make sure that we never forget about the
devastating events of September 11, 2001. I take seriously the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission that, should our first
responders be called upon once again to respond to a terrorist attack,
they have the training and equipment they need to do so more safely.
I have worked hard to ensure that the Federal Government works with
State and local governments to make the right investments with Federal
grant dollars--to make sure that money is spent on building lasting
capabilities rather than on equipment that may not last or work as
promised.
From where I sit, I can say with confidence that Federal grant
investments have worked. We saw the capabilities achieved with UASI
funds in action after the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013.
Boston had used its funding to train and equip tactical and
specialized response teams--including Explosive Ordnance Disposal
detection and disruption--SWAT, and maritime units. The region used
funds to host Integration of Bomb Technicians into Tactical Operations
Training, which trained Improvised Explosive Device (IED) teams to
operate with SWAT teams.
In 2011, Boston participated in a Joint Counterterrorism Awareness
Workshop. That exercise included more than 200 participants from
Federal, State, and local governments and involved an integrated
response to a 24-hour-long scenario in which multiple coordinated
assaults occurred, much like the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai,
India.
These grant investments were critical to Boston's successful
response to the marathon bombings. Indeed, former Boston Police
Commissioner Davis testified before this committee that without grant
funding, the ``response would have been much less comprehensive than it
was'' and without the exercises supported through UASI, ``there would
be more people who had died in these . . . attacks.''
Other cities and States across the country have echoed Commissioner
Davis' praise of the grant programs. From achievements in interoperable
communications capabilities, to emergency preparedness planning, to
bolstering our ability to respond to CBRNE events, it is clear that
homeland security grants yielded real results.
It is also clear that the threats we face are growing and evolving.
From the November terrorist attacks in Paris to the December attack in
San Bernardino, we have learned that first responders will be called on
to thwart and respond to more unconventional attacks.
We must do everything in our power to help them be prepared to do
so. That is why I was disturbed that the administration proposed
cutting the preparedness grants by nearly half a billion dollars in its
fiscal year 2017 budget request.
I would note that this is not the first time grants have been
raided to balance the budget.
In fiscal year 2011, the first year the Republicans regained the
Majority, targeted homeland security grants were cut from $2.75 billion
to $1.9 billion, and we have seen the cuts continue ever since. This
year, we have been told that the proposed grant cuts are the result of
the administration's attempt to adhere to the arbitrary budget caps
that continue to hamstring our ability to address evolving threats.
Cuts like these are penny-wise and pound-foolish. Until Congress
decides to act on meaningful budget reform legislation, we will
continue to find ourselves in a predicament of our own making: Deciding
whether to fund DHS operations or first responder grants.
I thank our witnesses for being here today, and I look forward to
their testimony. Their statements will serve as an important reminder
of the value of grant investments.
Mr. Donovan. We are pleased to have two panels of very
distinguished witnesses before us today on this important
topic. I will now introduce our first witness.
Mayor Bill de Blasio is the 109th mayor of New York City.
Prior to becoming mayor, Mr. de Blasio served 8 years on the
City Council. In 2010, Mr. de Blasio was sworn in as New York
City public advocate, the second-highest city-wide elected
office. Additionally, Mr. de Blasio served on District 15
school board in Brooklyn and worked as the Department of
Housing and Urban Development's regional director for New York
and New Jersey area.
The witness' full statement will appear in the record. The
Chair now recognizes Mayor de Blasio for 5 minutes.
Welcome, Mr. Mayor.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE BILL DE BLASIO, MAYOR, NEW YORK, NEW
YORK
Mr. de Blasio. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Donovan, I want to also congratulate you on behalf
of 8.5 million New Yorkers. We are very proud that you have
ascended to this role. It is important to our city, but it is
also important to our Nation.
I want to thank Ranking Member Payne and all the Members of
the subcommittee.
I want to also offer my thanks to Chairman McCaul, who has
been doing so much to protect the security of all Americans,
including all of us in New York City.
A special thanks to Congressman King and Congresswoman
Rice, who have been regular partners in the work we do
protecting New York City. We all are in this together in the
metropolitan area, so I thank you.
I do want to also note, Mr. Chair, I want to offer again
now publicly my condolences on the passing of your mother,
Katherine. I would just say for the record, she had a lot to be
proud of in the work that you have done in public service.
I want to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to
speak. This issue is so important to all of us. I am proud to
be the mayor of America's largest city. On top of that, New
York City is a crucial transportation hub, global economic hub;
the center, obviously, of the American financial industry,
among other industries; and one of the world's most visited
places. For these reasons and more, New York is the most
targeted city in the United States and one of the most targeted
cities world-wide in terms of terror efforts directed against
us.
Since 9/11, we have thwarted 20 terrorist plots--and I want
to give all credit to the men and women of the NYPD and all of
our other agencies who have done this extraordinary work--20
plots over 15 years, and that includes 4 in the past 2 years.
Mr. Chair, we have submitted this list to the committee of each
and every one of those plots to give some context.
We have also faced natural dangers, including Hurricane
Irene, Superstorm Sandy, Ebola, and now the Zika virus. We have
safely hosted every year the U.N. General Assembly and papal
visits, including the one most recently in September, and also
annually major National events like the New Year's Eve
celebration in Times Square.
Twenty-four hours a day, 7 days a week, thousands of brave
men and women are on the ground closely monitoring and pursuing
every potential threat, but they can't do it alone. The Urban
Area Security Initiative, or UASI, this funding is crucial to
our continued safety.
First, UASI helps us prevent terror. UASI funding helps
employ the people who keep us safe, like the NYPD intelligence
specialists who monitor incoming information all day every day.
Our new 500-plus officer Critical Response Command is a full-
time counterterror force highly-trained, well-armed to deal
with the challenges of today.
UASI is also critical to developing and acquiring the
technology that protects us in the world of 21st Century
threats, and that includes the Domain Awareness System, a web
of 8,000 cameras and sensors linked to technology that can read
license plates and detect radiation. It also includes the
NYPD's counterterrorism helicopter that scans nautical vessels
in our waters to guard against any nuclear devices. You have
images here to show you that helicopter.
Second, UASI funds are also critical to our ability to
vigorously respond to crises. UASI supports NYPD active-shooter
tactical training for 3,500 officers so they can confront
gunmen like those who brutally attacked people in Paris at
multiple locations.
The New York City Department of Health uses UASI funding to
identify and isolate diseases and bioterror.
The Fire Department of New York City has deployed UASI
funds to acquire a fire boat that can filter out chemical,
biological, and nuclear contamination to allow personnel to
work in the midst of an attack. We have an image of the fire
boat there.
So my message today is simple and urgent: We need the
Congress to do its part to protect New York City and, in fact,
all of the United States from security threats. That is why I
am deeply concerned about the proposed fiscal year 2017 budget
cuts to UASI.
New York State has roughly $600 million in UASI and other
funds from the fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015 allotment,
of which New York City received and spent about $311 million,
about half of the allotment for New York State.
Under the fiscal 2017 proposal, we are facing a 50 percent
cut, 50 percent cut across the Nation, which would likely, of
course, cut New York City's allocation in half as well, at a
time when we are seeing more severe and more complex terror
threats. We cannot reduce our commitment to public safety. We
simply can't afford to stand back when these threats are
becoming greater and more challenging. And remember, the
effects of a catastrophe in New York City affect the entire
Nation. After 9/11, the Dow dropped over 600 points, and the
2001 recession deepened.
Before concluding, I want to note that NYC taxpayers are
investing a great deal of their own dollars to fight terrorism.
For example, city funds are equipping our 36,000 police
officers with new technology they can use to receive terror
alerts, essentially giving us 36,000 counterterror officers at
any given moment when we need them.
We have always relied on the Federal Government to be a
strong partner. We need that partnership to continue. It is
essential, not just for 8.5 million New Yorkers that call New
York City home, but for all Americans.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify on this
crucial matter.
[The prepared statement of Mr. de Blasio follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bill de Blasio
March 15, 2016
Good morning Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of
the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications. My thanks to the entire subcommittee for giving me the
opportunity to speak with you about the importance of homeland security
funding for America's cities.
While I can only speak for New York City specifically, I know the
27 other areas selected as Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)
recipients consider these dollars to be absolutely essential to keeping
their people safe. My message is simple and urgent: We need Congress to
do its part to protect New York City and the United States from terror
and other major security threats. That is why I am deeply concerned
about the proposed fiscal year 2017 budget cuts to UASI.
Of the fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015 allotment, New York
State has roughly $600 million in UASI and State Homeland Security
Grant Program funds. New York City represents $311 million of these,
the entirety of which have already been allocated to keeping our region
safe. Under the fiscal year 2017 proposal, we are facing a 50 percent
National level cut to $330 million. New York City's allocation would
likely be halved as well. We cannot afford as a city or a Nation to
reduce our commitment to public safety at a time when threats are
increasing--in both number and complexity.
And let us be clear, it is not just funding year-to-year that
matters here. Continuity over time is vital to keeping us safe.
Preparations require planning. For example, our counter-terrorism
assets such as ambulances, helicopters, and fire boats were carefully
designed and built for our needs.
Before the tragic events of 9/11, and since that terrible day, New
York City has statistically been the No. 1 most targeted city in the
United States and one of the most targeted cities in the world. Since
2001, we have thwarted 20 terrorist plots against New York City. We
have prevented 4 such plots in the past 2 years alone. This heightened
environment is widely recognized. The same week these cuts were
announced, the Director of National Intelligence testified to the
Senate Armed Services Committee that the threat from al-Qaeda and ISIL
was now more layered and complex than any other time since 9/11. And in
addition to man-made threats, New York has faced natural dangers--
including Hurricane Irene and Super Storm Sandy, Ebola, Legionella, and
the Zika virus.
Many of these challenges extend beyond the 5 boroughs. The UASI
allocation for the New York City area includes Nassau, Suffolk,
Westchester, Yonkers, with additional funds for the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey. We are the Nation's largest metro area, with a
population of about 20 million people, close to 60 million tourists
annually, and more than half a million hard-working Americans who
commute into our city each day. For context, the number of commuters we
receive daily is almost equal to the entire population of Baltimore,
Maryland.
Our nimble and complete action to prevent threats from striking and
to respond quickly and effectively in the event they do, depends on the
resources provided by UASI. I would like to take you through just some
of the ways that UASI helps us both prevent terror and be ready to meet
it head-on with the most vigorous, proactive, and sophisticated
response possible. And I want to acknowledge the extraordinary and
tireless efforts of the brave men and women from a number of agencies
who protect New York City--and clearly illustrate just how important
UASI funding is to their work.
Every day, New York City has thousands of professionals on the
ground constantly monitoring and working to prevent acts of terror. It
is a never-ending endeavor that permeates every corner of our city and
it starts with prevention.
For example, UASI provides the entire annual budget for vital
programs like the New York Police Department (NYPD) Domain Awareness
System. This web of 8,000 cameras--and growing--is linked to a network
of license plate readers, radiation detectors, and biological sensors
that act as an early warning system. We also use UASI funding to employ
a number of NYPD's intelligence research specialists who pore over
threat information 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
UASI funding supports NYPD's counter terrorism helicopter
specifically outfitted with radiation equipment that scans vessels
before they enter New York Harbor to detect the possibility of a
nuclear device--for example a dirty bomb hidden in cargo. This
helicopter also patrols critical infrastructure that runs across miles
of New York City like the Buckeye Pipeline that carries aircraft fuel
to John F. Kennedy International airport.
UASI funds pay for vital equipment that allows our Bomb Squad to
neutralize suspicious packages and live explosive devices every day.
And UASI funds have allowed us to train and deploy a dozen Vapor Wake
Explosive Detection K-9s, who can track a suicide bomber moving through
a crowd, on the subway, or in open spaces like Times Square.
Now, UASI funds are also critical for our preparedness to respond
to a crisis as it unfolds.
UASI funding sustains our new 500-officer Critical Response
Command, specially-trained police officers assigned full-time to
counter-terrorism. The same funds pay for the specially-designed NYPD
escape masks that every police officer is issued to protect them in the
event of a chemical attack on our streets and subways. Such a plot--the
subway cyanide plot--was already planned by al-Qaeda, but was uncovered
before it could be launched. And UASI funds support active-shooter
tactical training for 3,500 street cops who may have to confront gunmen
such as those who stormed the Bataclan Theater in Paris, or the office
party in San Bernardino. Our goal is to extend this important training
to 20,000 officers.
The New York City Fire Department (FDNY) Counter Terrorism Bureau
counts on UASI funds to maintain the special equipment and training
that would be used in a Mumbai- or Benghazi-type attack. It is
important to note our fire department is also responsible for the
city's ambulances. And Emergency Medical Service (EMS) is a vital part
of our response strategy. Fire EMS is using these funds with their
police partners to develop and train rescue task forces that can move
in and remove the wounded even while an attack may still be in
progress. FDNY has also used UASI funds to acquire a fireboat that
houses a protective room with Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and Explosive air filtration equipment allowing personnel to
continue operations even under hazardous conditions.
The New York City Department of Health uses UASI funding to quickly
identify and isolate diseases and acts of bioterror, and subsequently
respond with vaccinations and other efforts on a mass scale.
Our Office of Emergency Management (OEM) relies on these funds to
equip a state-of-the-art command center that would be the hub of
coordinating efforts to maintain operations across multiple city
agencies as well as consequence-management in the aftermath of a
crisis. OEM also facilitates drills and exercises that keep our
agencies at a level of preparedness for a threat that Federal officials
have characterized as something that is not an ``if'' but a ``when''
scenario.
And these are just a few examples. UASI funds have a profound and
wide-ranging impact on everything we do to prepare for, prevent,
mitigate, and recover from disasters. Since September 11, 2001 New York
City has been remarkably successful at staying ahead of those plotting
to harm our people and reducing the impact of natural disasters and
dangerous diseases. But we shouldn't be lulled into complacency by our
success. What we have been doing for the past 14 years has been nothing
short of cutting-edge and we cannot afford to let that edge get even
slightly dull. We must remember that disaster can strike any time.
We must also remember the effects of a catastrophe in New York City
would cause suffering across our entire Nation. That's why after the
September 11 attacks we saw the DOW drop more than 600 points, the 2001
recession deepen, and the beginning of the War on Terror, which has
cost the United States close to $2 trillion so far.
New York City is a target because it is our largest city; a major
port of entry; a hub for air, sea, rail, and road transportation; a
capital of the United States economy; a globally-recognized symbol of
democracy, and one of the world's most visited places. We are proud to
host large audiences at events such as the United Nations General
Assembly, the recent visit of the Pope, our annual Thanksgiving Day
parade, the Rockefeller Center Tree Lighting Ceremony and our New
Year's Eve celebration, and we are equally proud to have successfully
kept everyone safe.
Before concluding, I want to note that New York taxpayers are
contributing their fair share, investing a great deal of their own
dollars to fight terrorism. For example, city funds are equipping every
single one of our 36,000 police officers with a smartphone that will
allow them to instantly receive terrorism alerts. That will, in effect,
give us 36,000 counter-terrorism officers when we need them. Additional
investments include vehicles, helmets shields, and other equipment for
counter terror personnel, our shot spotter gunshot detection system
that will isolate a gun-related incident across 60 square miles city-
wide and the operations budget for the NYPD Harbor Unit that patrols
our vast coastline. But we simply can't maintain this posture without
help from the Federal Government.
Until now, we have been able to rely on the Federal Government to
be a true and strong partner. Today, we need that partnership to
continue. As elected officials, our primary and most sacred obligation
is to ensure the safety of those we serve.
That is as true in your districts as it is everywhere in our
Nation. So I ask you, no matter where you come from: Take bold action
to ensure the safety of cities across our Nation and fully fund UASI.
This is tantamount to protecting not just the safety and economic
vitality of New York City, but that of our region and the Nation as a
whole.
It is essential--not just to the 8.5 million Americans that call
New York City home--but to all Americans.
Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify on this critical
matter.
Attachment 1.--UASI Mayors' Letter
The Honorable Thad Cochran, Chairman,
The Honorable Barbara Mikulski, Vice Chairwoman,
Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Washington, DC
20510.
The Honorable John Hoeven, Chairman,
The Honorable Jeanne Shaheen, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, United
States Senate, Washington, DC 20510.
The Honorable Hal Rogers, Chairman,
The Honorable Nita Lowey, Ranking Member,
Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable John Carter, Chairman,
The Honorable Lucille Roybal-Allard, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, United
States House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Representatives Rogers, Lowey, Carter, and Roybal-Allard: We
write on behalf of cities across the nation that would be significantly
harmed by the deep funding cuts to the Urban Area Security Initiative
(UASI) as proposed in the President's FY 17 budget. As Mayors, we share
the strong belief that severe cuts to key homeland security grant
programs directly jeopardize the safety of the citizens we represent.
As the threat continues to grow, we ask Congress to restore these funds
that are essential for cities to adapt and remain nimble in responding
to evolving threats.
We are alarmed that the proposed cuts would translate into
reductions across the spectrum of security. The UASI program is facing
an almost 50 percent cut, from $600 million this year to $330 million
next year. This funding is essential to many ongoing counterterrorism
operations, investments in public safety communications, core
competency training for police and fire, public health readiness and
overall emergency preparedness.
These proposed reductions are particularly alarming in the wake of
mounting global attacks in major cities like Paris and here at home in
San Bernardino. In New York City, which continues to be the Nation's
number one terror target, twenty plots have been thwarted since 2001
alone. To date, the only explanation provided for the recommended
funding decrease is the need for hard choices in the current budget
environment. This statement is not reflective of the need we see in the
distinct communities we represent across the nation. Rather the
equipment, training, system development and best practices that have
resulted from access to UASI funds provide far reaching region wide
benefits.
Reducing UASI funding destabilizes on-going security and
intelligence gathering efforts that protect our citizens, commuters,
and businesses. Law enforcement requires this funding to continue to
procure the necessary equipment to detect potential chemical,
biological, and radiological weapons. First responders utilize funds to
train and develop innovative best practices to improve response and
save lives. These investments in security preparedness are crucial for
both the safety and security of our residents, as well as the countless
tourists who visit our cities.
We are united in urging you to reject these proposed cuts and fully
fund UASI. Heightened concern over terrorism and violent extremism at
home makes adequate funding more critical than ever. It is in the
interest of the security of our cities, and indeed the nation, to do
everything possible to prevent any potential attacks. When UASI is
fully funded, local governments across the nation are empowered to
better protect the people who call our cities home.
Sincerely,
Bill de Blasio,
Mayor of New York, NY.
Eric Garcetti,
Mayor of Los Angeles, CA.
Martin Walsh,
Mayor of Boston, MA.
Stephanie Rawlings-Blake,
Mayor of Baltimore, MD.
Muriel Bowser,
Mayor of Washington, DC.
Ed Lee,
Mayor of San Francisco, CA.
Francis Slay,
Mayor of St. Louis, MO.
Mike Rawlings,
Mayor of Dallas, TX.
Kevin Johnson,
Mayor of Sacramento, CA.
Chris Coleman,
Mayor of St. Paul, MN.
Jeff Williams,
Mayor of Arlington, TX.
Kevin Faulconer,
Mayor of San Diego, CA.
Sam Liccardo,
Mayor of San Jose, CA.
Miguel Pulido,
Mayor of Santa Ana, CA.
Carolyn Goodman,
Mayor of Las Vegas, NV.
Edward Murray,
Mayor of Seattle, WA.
Betsy Price,
Mayor of Fort Worth, TX.
Andy Hafen,
Mayor of Henderson, NV.
Attachment 2.--UASI Coalition Letter From Local Elected Officials, Law
Enforcement, and First Responders
February 22, 2016.
The Honorable Harold Rogers,
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable John Carter,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on
Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC
20515.
The Honorable Nita Lowey,
Ranking Member, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Lucille Roybal-Allard,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on
Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC
20515.
Dear Mr. Rogers, Ms. Lowey, Mr. Carter, and Ms. Roybal-Allard: We
write on behalf of local elected officials, emergency managers, port
operators, transit operators, police chiefs, sheriffs, and the major
fire service organizations to register our strong concern with the
severe cuts to four key homeland security grant programs proposed in
the President's FY (Fiscal Year) 2017 budget. In all these programs
would be cut by 44 percent below FY 2016 levels. The Urban Area
Security Initiative Program would be cut by 45 percent, from $600
million this year to $330 million next year. The State Homeland
Security Grant Program would be cut by 57 percent, from $467 million
this year to $200 million next year. Public Transportation Security
Assistance would be cut by 15 percent to $85,000 next year, Port
Security grants by 7 percent to $93 million next year.
There is a certain irony to the proposed cuts. They come in the
wake of terrorist attacks not just in cities abroad, but on our shores,
in Chattanooga, San Bernardino and Philadelphia, for example. Further,
the Department of Homeland Security's Budget in Brief highlights the
programs' accomplishments, and offers no explanation for the cuts:
``Through a suite of homeland security grant programs, (DHS) provided
critical support to the nation's preparedness for acts of terrorism and
other threats and hazards. In 2015, FEMA awarded more than 600 grants
to support state, local, tribal and territorial governments, transit
agencies, port operators, non-profit organizations, and other partners
in building and sustaining the 31 critical core capabilities described
in the National Preparedness Goal. As a result of those grants, states
and localities across the country reported capability increases in 12
of the 31 core capabilities compared to 2014. The federal investment in
those capabilities pays off each day in communities across the country
during incidents large and small. For example, much of the training and
equipment used in response to the May 2015 AMTRAK derailment in
Philadelphia, including lighting, tourniquets, and technical rescue
capabilities, were paid for with grants provided by FEMA.''
As you begin development of FY 2017 appropriations legislation, we
urge you to reject these proposed cuts and to fund these critical
programs at least at FY 2016 funding levels. At a time of heightened
concern about terrorism and violent extremism at home, increased
funding for them would certainly be justified. They play a vital role
in ensuring that state and local governments are prepared to respond to
future terrorist attacks and have the necessary resources to protect
their communities and their residents.
If we can provide further information or assistance, please contact
us through the U.S. Conference of Mayors' Public Safety Director[.]
Sincerely,
American Association of Port Authorities,
American Public Transportation Association,
The Association of State Criminal Investigative Agencies,
Big City Emergency Managers,
Congressional Fire Services Institute,
International Association of Fire Chiefs,
International Association of Fire Fighters,
Major Cities Chiefs Association,
Major County Sheriffs' Association,
National Association of Counties,
National Fusion Center Association,
National Homeland Security Coalition,
National League of Cities,
National Sheriffs' Association,
National Volunteer Fire Council,
The United States Conference of Mayors,
U.S. Council of the International Association of Emergency
Managers (IAEM-USA).
Attachment 3.--Terrorist Plots Targeting New York City September 11,
2001 to Present
1. brooklyn bridge
In 2002, Iyman Faris, a U.S.-based al-Qaeda operative, planned to
cut the Brooklyn Bridge's support cables at the direction of 9/11
mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. However, as a testament to NYPD
terrorism deterrence efforts, Faris called off the plot, indicating to
al-Qaeda leaders that ``the weather is too hot.'' NYPD's 24-hour
coverage of the bridge, much of which was put in place following 9/11
and intentionally made highly visible, played a large role in Faris'
decision to abandon the plot. Faris was arrested in 2003, pleaded
guilty, and sentenced to 20 years in Federal prison for providing
material support and resources to al-Qaeda, among other charges.
Knowing that the city's bridges and critical infrastructure remain
attractive terrorist targets, the NYPD maintains heightened security
around such facilities.
2. subway cyanide attack
In 2003, al-Qaeda had planned to release cyanide gas in New York
City's subway system, which carries more than 5,000,000 passengers on
an average weekday, as well as targeted other public places for attack.
According to a U.S. Government official familiar with the plot, the
plan was called off by Osama bin Laden's second-in-command, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, for unclear reasons. The NYPD took appropriate precautions
after becoming aware of the plot.
3. the parachas
In 2006, Uzair Paracha, a Brooklyn resident, was sentenced to 30
years in Federal prison after he was convicted of attempting to help
al-Qaeda operative Majid Khan enter the United States to attack gas
tanks in a plot developed alongside 9/11 planner Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed. In early 2003, Paracha impersonated Khan in dealings with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and agreed to use Khan's
credit card to make it appear Khan was in the United States rather than
in Pakistan. He also was in possession of several identification
documents in Khan's name, and written instructions from Khan on how to
pose as Khan in dealing with the INS. Paracha was found guilty in 2005
on charges including conspiracy to provide and providing material
support to al-Qaeda; conspiracy to provide, and providing funds, goods,
or services to al-Qaeda; and identification document fraud committed to
facilitate an act of international terrorism. Majid Khan pleaded guilty
in February 2012 in a military court at Guantanamo to charges stemming
from his involvement with al-Qaeda and admitted to the gas tank plot,
planning to assassinate Pakistan's President Musharraf, and complicity
in a 2003 bombing of a Marriot hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia. The NYPD
cooperated with Federal authorities through the Joint Terrorism Task
Force to uncover Paracha's plan.
Uzair Paracha's father, Saifullah Paracha, also was alleged to have
aided al-Qaeda. The senior Paracha worked with Khalid Sheikh Mohammad
to devise a way to smuggle explosives--including possibly nuclear
weapons--into the United States using the New York office of Paracha's
import-export business. Saifullah Paracha, who attended the New York
Institute of Technology and worked in the city for over a decade, was
arrested in 2003 after Uzair stated to authorities that his father was
a militant.
4. new york stock exchange & citigroup headquarters
Dhiren Barot (aka Issa al-Hindi) was sentenced to life in prison by
a United Kingdom court in 2006 after pleading guilty to planning to
attack several targets both in the United Kingdom and the United
States, including the New York Stock Exchange, Citigroup's headquarters
in Midtown Manhattan, and the Prudential Building in Newark, NJ. In
addition, Barot filmed reconnaissance video during a trip to the United
States in March 2001 that included shots of the World Trade Center. He
also targeted the offices of the International Monetary Fund and World
Bank in Washington, DC and hotels and railway stations in London. Barot
was arrested by British police in August 2004 shortly after U.S.
authorities raised the Terror Alert level based on intelligence that
al-Qaeda had conducted extensive reconnaissance of financial
institutions in the United States. NYPD responded to the alert by
reaching out to New York's financial companies to discuss security,
deploying tactical teams to high-threat locations, and increasing
vehicle inspections. Seven of Barot's accomplices were given long
prison sentences by a British court in 2007 for their involvement in
the plot.
5. herald square
Shahawar Matin Siraj and James Elshafay plotted in 2004 to place
explosive devices in the Herald Square subway station in Manhattan.
Elshafay had already given consideration to potential targets by the
time he met an NYPD informant in early 2004. In recorded conversations,
Siraj expressed desire to bomb bridges and subway stations, and cited
misdeeds by American forces in Iraq as a motivating factor. Siraj and
Elshafay conducted surveillance of Herald Square station in late August
2004 and drew a crude diagram to aid in placing the explosives; they
were arrested a few days later. Elshafay pleaded guilty to conspiracy
to damage or destroy a subway station by means of an explosive. Siraj
was found guilty in 2006 of conspiracy to place and detonate an
explosive in a public transportation system; conspiracy to damage and
destroy, by means of an explosive, a building or vehicle; conspiracy to
wreck and disable a mass transportation vehicle; and conspiracy to
place a destructive device in or near a facility used in the operation
of mass transportation. He was subsequently sentenced to 30 years in
prison. Shepherding the case from initial lead to Federal prosecution
required close cooperation with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Eastern District of New York.
6. path train and world trade center retaining wall
In July 2006, the FBI revealed it had uncovered a plot involving an
attack on a PATH commuter train tunnel connecting New York and New
Jersey, the placement of suicide bombers on trains, and the destruction
of the retaining wall separating the Hudson River from the World Trade
Center site in the hopes of causing massive flooding in the city's
Financial District. The plot was uncovered in its early stages through
a year-long FBI investigation that included the monitoring of internet
chat rooms frequented by extremists, and involved at least 8 suspects
spread over several countries. The plot's alleged mastermind, al-Qaeda
affiliated Assem Hammoud of Lebanon, was taken into custody by
authorities there. Hammoud said he was acting on orders from Osama bin
Laden and that he was planning to travel to Pakistan to receive
training at an al-Qaeda camp. Another suspect was arrested in Canada
and a third in England.
7. jfk airport
Beginning in 2006, 4 men plotted to detonate the jet-fuel storage
tanks and supply lines for John F. Kennedy Airport in order to cause
wide-scale destruction and economic disruption in an attack they
intended to dwarf 9/11. Through the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the
NYPD worked with the FBI, which placed an informant next to the
principle plotter, Russell Defreitas, a native of Guyana and Brooklyn
resident who was an airport cargo handler. Defreitas's accomplices were
Abdul Kadir, a former parliamentarian from Guyana with admitted ties to
Iran; Abel Nur of Guyana; and Kareem Ibrahim of Trinidad and Tobago.
Relying in part on Defreitas' knowledge, the men conducted extensive
surveillance of the airport, and traveled to Guyana and Trinidad and
Tobago to attempt to secure the support of Jamaat al-Muslimeen, an
Islamic extremist group operating in the region. The group also
discussed contacting Adnan Shukrijumah, an al-Qaeda explosives expert
believed to be in the Caribbean at the time. Kadir was sentenced to
life in prison in 2010; Nur was sentenced to 15 years in 2011 after
pleading guilty to material support the previous year; Ibrahim received
life in 2012. All 3 were extradited to the United States to stand
trial. Defreitas was arrested in New York and received a life sentence
in 2011 after being convicted of conspiracy to attack a public
transportation system; conspiracy to destroy a building by fire or
explosive; conspiracy to attack aircraft and aircraft materials;
conspiracy to destroy international airport facilities; and conspiracy
to attack a mass transportation facility.
8. transatlantic plot
In a series of 3 trials spanning 2008 to 2010, 8 men were convicted
in Britain of attempting to simultaneously detonate explosives in 7
airliners traveling from London to several North American metropolises,
including New York. British authorities also sought Rashid Rauf, a 27-
year-old Briton of Pakistani descent and prominent al-Qaeda operative,
as a main suspect in the plot. After Rauf's arrest in Pakistan in
August 2006, his detention led to the arrest of 25 additional suspects
in Britain. Authorities believed the plan involved the use of peroxide-
based liquid explosives that could evade air travel security measures
in place at the time. The discovery of the plot involved cooperation
between American and British authorities.
9. sabrihan hasanoff & wessam el-hanafi
Co-conspirators Sabrihan Hasanoff, a dual-citizen of the United
States and Australia, and Wessam el-Hanafi, a Brooklyn resident who was
extradited after his 2010 arrest in the United Arab Emirates, pleaded
guilty to providing and attempting to provide material support to al-
Qaeda and conspiring to provide material support to al-Qaeda. Hasanoff
was sentenced to 18 years in prison in September 2013 and el-Hanafi was
sentenced to 15 years in prison in January 2015. Both men admitted to
supporting al-Qaeda in a variety of ways beginning in 2007 when the men
developed contact with individuals they knew to be members of the
group. Using aliases, Hasanoff and el-Hanafi funneled $67,000 to al-
Qaeda operatives overseas, and in 2008 El-Hanafi traveled to Yemen to
meet with his contacts, swearing an oath of allegiance to Osama Bin
Laden's organization. El-Hanafi also delivered money and electronics to
the men during this trip, while at the same time teaching the Yemen-
based individuals covert communication techniques using encrypted
software. At the request of their Yemen-based associates and as
directed by el-Hanafi, Hasanoff performed surveillance on potential
targets in the United States including the New York Stock Exchange. El-
Hanafi forwarded the report to al-Qaeda, which viewed both men as
operatives for a potential attack in the United States. The NYPD
Detectives assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force assisted in the
FBI investigation.
10. long island railroad
Bryant Neal Vinas, of Long Island, New York, traveled to Pakistan
with an intent to die fighting against American forces in Afghanistan.
He was later called to testify in the trial of Adis Medunjanin, one of
Najibullah Zazi's co-conspirators in the September 2009 subway plot
(see below). In his testimony, Vinas stated he was motivated by the
preaching of radical Yemeni-America cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. He spent
much of his time in Pakistan shopping for a group to join before
ultimately ending up in North Waziristan in Pakistan's tribal areas in
early 2008 and subsequently received over 5 weeks of terrorism training
from al-Qaeda. In summer of 2008, Vinas spoke to al-Qaeda about
targeting the Long Island Railroad using a suitcase bomb that would be
left in a car and set to detonate. He drew maps of Long Island and
showed that all LIRR trains passed through one tunnel when entering
Manhattan; suggesting that an explosion in the tunnel would cause the
most damage. Pakistani authorities arrested Vinas in November 2008 and
he pleaded guilty in the United States to Federal charges of conspiracy
to murder, material support to al-Qaeda, and receiving military
training from al-Qaeda.
11. bronx synagogues
In May 2009, 4 men placed what they believed were functioning bombs
outside of Jewish targets in the Bronx neighborhood of Riverdale and
additionally constructed plans to fire missiles at military transport
planes at Stewart International Airport near Newburgh, NY. Suspect
James Cromitie confided his desire to commit acts against the United
States to a Federal informant in 2008 and aspired to travel to
Afghanistan to become a martyr, and to join Pakistani extremist group
Jaish-e-Mohammad. Cromitie recruited Onta Williams, David Williams IV,
and Laguerre Payen to join him in the Riverdale attacks. By April 2009,
the 4 targeted the Riverdale Temple and nearby Riverdale Jewish Center,
and conducted surveillance at Stewart Airport. A Government informant
supplied the group with an inert missile system and fake explosives.
The group was arrested after they placed what they believed were
functioning bombs outside of their Riverdale targets, convicted in 2010
and subsequently sentenced to 25-year terms.
12. nyc subway plot
In September 2009, the New York City subway system was targeted for
attack by 3 individuals who planned to set off bombs in the subway
during rush hour shortly after the eighth anniversary of 9/11. Once
Queens residents Najibullah Zazi and Zarein Ahmedzay, of Afghan
descent, and Bosnian Adis Medunjanin had self-radicalized largely
through listening to on-line extremist material, including teachings by
Anwar al-Awlaki. The trio plotted to travel to Afghanistan to fight
alongside the Taliban against American and coalition forces, and said
they were motivated by American actions against Muslim populations
overseas. Although in Pakistan in late August 2008, Ahmedzay and
Medunjanin were turned around by Pakistani security forces while trying
to enter Afghanistan in a taxi. In looking for another approach, the 3
canvassed mosques in Peshawar, Pakistan until they were put in contact
with al-Qaeda representatives. They then traveled to tribal areas in
North Waziristan, where they received terrorist training from high-
ranking members who urged their return to the United States to carry
out an attack at home--a request to which they acquiesced. Zazi
received further explosives training from al-Qaeda and the 3 returned
to the United States separately. In January 2009, days after his return
to the United States, Zazi moved to Aurora, CO where he began to
experiment with explosives and eventually constructed the detonation
charges for the bombs that were to be used by the trio in attacking the
subway. He remained in contact with Ahmedzay and Medunjanin while in
Colorado, and drove to New York from Aurora in early September 2009
with the explosive charges in his vehicle.
The plot was thwarted through an intelligence tip received by the
FBI and with the cooperation of the NYPD through the Joint Terrorism
Task Force. Zazi and Ahmedzay pleaded guilty in 2010 to conspiracy to
use a weapon of mass of destruction; conspiracy to commit murder in a
foreign country; and providing material support to a foreign terrorist
organization; they are awaiting sentencing. Medunjanin was convicted in
2012 of conspiring to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiring to
commit murder of U.S. military personnel abroad, providing and
conspiring to provide material support to al-Qaeda, receiving military
training from al-Qaeda, conspiring and attempting to commit an act of
terrorism transcending national boundaries, and using firearms and
destructive devices in relation to these offenses. He was later
sentenced to life.
13. times square
Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistan-American residing in Connecticut,
attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times Square on May 1, 2010. Like
Vinas and the Zazi-trio before him, Shahzad received terrorist training
in Pakistan's Waziristan region during a trip he made to the country
from July 2009 until February 2010. The training was provided by the
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), generally referred to as the Pakistani
Taliban. Upon returning to the United States, Shahzad received $12,000
in 2 separate payments from a TTP-associated co-conspirator to aid his
plot. The bomb's failure to detonate had to do in large part with the
inferior components Shahzad used; Shahzad was concerned that purchasing
more effective ingredients as called for by his training would alert
law enforcement. Shahzad was influenced, in part, by the teachings of
Anwar al-Awlaki and in court, cited American foreign policy as a
primary motivator for his actions. Cooperation between NYPD and the FBI
led to his identification and arrest 53 hours after the attempted
bombing, as he attempted to flee the country. Shahzad pleaded guilty to
all charges against him and was sentenced to life in prison.
14. manhattan synagogue
Ahmed Ferhani, a Queens resident born in Algeria, along with
Mohammad Mamdouh, a Moroccan immigrant, were arrested in May 2011 in an
NYPD operation in which Ferhani purchased a hand grenade, 3 semi-
automatic pistols, and ammunition from an undercover detective. NYPD's
investigation into the pair revealed their desire to attack a synagogue
in New York City. Ferhani was indicted under New York State's anti-
terrorism legislation and pleaded guilty in December 2012 to charges
including conspiracy as a crime of terrorism and criminal possession of
a weapon as a crime of terrorism. In his allocution, Ferhani stated
that he agreed with Mamdouh to ``develop a plan to attack and damage a
synagogue in New York County or elsewhere in New York City using
explosives'' in an effort to coerce and intimidate the city's Jewish
population. He further clarified that his motivation was to avenge the
perceived mistreatment of Muslims worldwide. Ferhani was sentenced in
March 2013 to 10 years in state prison after his guilty plea in
December 2012 to terror-related charges for plotting to target New York
synagogues. The case marks the first application of New York's terror
laws in a terrorism case.
15. returning military targeted
Jose Pimentel, a native of the Dominican Republic and convert to
Islam, was charged with plotting to detonate bombs in and around New
York City in November 2011. He used instructions on how to build a bomb
published by al-Qaeda's Inspire magazine. After a 2\1/2\-year
investigation by the NYPD Intelligence Bureau, Pimentel was caught
while assembling 3 bombs. Pimentel's targets included members of the
Armed Forces who were returning from service in Iraq and Afghanistan.
He also considered traveling to Yemen to participate in terrorist
training and claimed to have emailed radical Yemeni-American cleric
Anwar al-Awlaki but received no response. However, Pimentel
successfully corresponded with Jesse Morton, the founder of the website
Revolution Muslim, who was sentenced in June 2012 to 11.5 years in
prison for using the internet to solicit violence against individuals
to include the writers of the popular TV-satire South Park. Pimentel
pleaded guilty and on March 25, 2014 was sentenced to 16 years in State
prison and 5 years of post-release supervision for constructing
improvised explosive devices to detonate in Manhattan, with the intent
to harm United States military personnel and civilians.
16. federal reserve
Quazi Mohammad Rezwanul Ahsan Nafis, a native of Bangladesh who was
residing in the United States on a student visa, was arrested in
October 2012 as he attempted to remotely detonate what he believed was
a bomb in front of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in lower
Manhattan. Nafis came to law enforcement's attention in July 2012 when
he unknowingly tried to recruit a confidential Government source to aid
in his plan to attack the United States at home. Nafis told the
Government source that he had al-Qaeda contacts abroad that could
assist in the planning and execution of an attack. Nafis also drafted
an article he hoped would be published in al-Qaeda's Inspire magazine,
in which he asserted his desire to ``destroy America'' by attacking its
economy. Nafis pleaded guilty in February 2013 to attempting to use a
weapon of mass destruction and was subsequently sentenced to 30 years
in prison. The NYPD worked with the FBI in the case through the Joint
Terrorism Task Force.
17. the brothers plot
Raees Alam Qazi and Sheheryar Alam Qazi, Pakistan-born brothers
from Florida, were arrested by Federal authorities in Florida in
November 2012 for charges relating to a plan to bomb popular New York
City landmarks including Times Square, Wall Street, and city theaters.
Raees Qazi had traveled to New York allegedly to gain employment to
finance the building of an explosive device and to select a target; he
and his brother both were charged with conspiring to provide material
support to terrorists and conspiring to use a weapon of mass
destruction. Authorities searched Raees' home and found material and
instructions related to the construction of an explosive device. Raees
was reportedly seeking retribution for the deaths caused by drone
strikes in Afghanistan. In March 2015, the Qazi brothers pleaded guilty
in Federal court in Miami to 1 count of conspiring to provide support
to terrorists and conspiring to assault 2 Federal employees. Raees Qazi
pleaded guilty to an additional charge of attempting to provide
material support to al-Qaeda. In June 2015, Raees and Sheheryar Qazi
were sentenced to 35 and 20 years in prison respectively.
18. zale thompson
On October 23, 2014, a 32-year-old resident of Queens named Zale
Thompson attacked 4 rookie New York City police officers in Jamaica,
Queens with a hatchet. Thompson ran at the men as they posed for a
photograph, hitting 1 officer on the arm and another in the head before
being shot and killed by the other officers. Thompson expressed a
variety of grievances in the years and months leading up to the attack,
including about incidents of alleged police brutality--particularly
against African Americans. Through frequent social media posts, he also
advocated for jihad and insurgency against the United States as a
response to the plight of Muslims globally. His social media activity
and internet searches became increasingly consumed by jihadist
propaganda in the days prior to his attack, as he frequented websites
associated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant
(ISIL), and viewed articles discussing ISIL's beheadings of hostages.
ISIL has lionized Thompson in 2 issues of its English-language
magazine, Dabiq, as an exemplar for lone-wolf attackers.
19. asia siddiqui & noelle velentzas
In April 2015, Queens residents Asia Siddiqui and Noelle Velentzas
were arrested and charged with conspiracy to use weapons of mass
destruction as well as other terrorism-related offenses following a
joint investigation by the NYPD Intelligence Bureau and FBI. The
defendants are alleged to have researched the construction of various
types of explosives devices, including the car bomb used in the 1993
World Trade Center bombing and pressure-cooker bombs such as those used
in the 2013 Boston Marathon attacks; they also allegedly acquired some
of the components to construct explosive devices, including propane
tanks. The complaint charges that the defendants, who allegedly made
statements backing violent jihad and supporting the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), sought to detonate explosive devices here
at home. The 2 pleaded not guilty in May 2015; their case is still
pending.
20. aspiring isil foreign fighters
In June 2015, following an FBI investigation, Queens resident
Munther Saleh and Staten Island resident Fareed Mumuni were arrested
for allegedly seeking to carry out an attack with pressure-cooker bombs
on behalf of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) prior to
joining the group overseas with other alleged co-conspirators,
including New Jersey residents Samuel Topaz and Alaa Saadeh, who were
also arrested. According to the criminal complaint, Saleh researched
information about the construction of a pressure-cooker bomb and viewed
images of various New York City landmarks and tourist attractions.
Prior to their arrests, Saleh and Mumuni allegedly attempted to attack
law enforcement officers before being subdued.
Mr. Donovan. Mr. Mayor, thank you for your insightful
testimony, and I can't agree with you more. I would also like
to publicly commend you for the team that you put together that
protects our city every day, Police Commissioner Bill Bratton,
Fire Commissioner Danny Nigro, and my good friend, who
accompanied you down here today, Joe Esposito, the head of OEM.
So thank you for that.
Mr. de Blasio. Thank you.
Mr. Donovan. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for
questions.
Mayor de Blasio, as I mentioned in my opening statement, we
have heard several reasons for the proposed cuts, one of which
was the amount of money that has yet to be spent in prior
funding cycles. Can you talk about the money that is in the
pipeline and how, while it may not have yet been spent and
drawn down, that money has already been obligated for various
projects that are vital for your efforts to secure our city.
Mr. de Blasio. Well, that is exactly right, Mr. Chairman.
Remembering that we are now seeing more threats than ever
before and more complicated ones, we continue to innovate. This
has been something that all our agencies do, and Commissioner
Bratton is particularly well-known for constantly creating the
concept of innovation in all we do in the NYPD, particularly in
our counterterror work. That is why we came up with a new
specially-trained, specially-armed counterterrorism group, the
Critical Response Command. No city in America has such a
developed apparatus at this point, and we need it because we
are the No. 1 terror target.
But the simple answer to your question is: All dollars that
have been provided are in the process of being spent. They have
been obligated, as you said. We all know that the process of
actually acquiring equipment, for example, requires a number of
steps. We have to very carefully follow those steps under
Federal guidelines, and we do. But that often takes several
years to be done properly.
Every dollar is being spent and being spent on the kind of
things that will prevent terror. Remember, our first mission,
of course, is to prevent terror. NYPD has done that
successfully now for 15 straight years, warded off those 20
attacks I mentioned.
But we also know if, God forbid, there was an instance of a
terrorist attack, our job is to contain it and minimize it.
That is why we put such an emphasis on the active-shooter
training, on technology that would allow the fastest alert
possible to our officers so they could intervene. We need to
keep making those investments so we are prepared. But the
bottom line is every dollar that has been allocated in the past
has been obligated, is being spent effectively.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mayor.
Commissioner Bratton has estimated that these cuts would
cost an approximate amount of $90 million reduction for the
funding to New York City for the police department. Could you
explain to the committee, what are some of the capabilities
that the New York City Police Department would no longer be
able to fund in the absence of the grant funding that is being
proposed now?
Mr. de Blasio. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
We have a substantial domain awareness system, but we need
to keep building on it as the threats intensify. If we did not
have this funding, we would not be able to build out that
domain awareness system further. We do have some explosive
detection equipment, but, again, we need to add to that
capacity.
One example I need to offer, in addition to all the other
reasons why New York City is a target and why New York City is
a challenging environment to protect and police, we just
announced this week that we expect over 59 million tourists in
the course of this year. It would be an all-time record. The
amount of traffic, the amount of human intensity that happens
on the streets of New York City every single day requires
constant vigilance, and we need the technology to allow us to
look for any and all threats.
Finally, I would say, you know that as the area around the
World Trade Center has come back to full life and economic
vitality, and that is growing every day, we know that that
site, sadly, remains a particular target of interest for
terrorist forces. We need to add additional vehicle screening
in that area. We would not be able to do that without the funds
that we have traditionally received from UASI.
Mr. Donovan. Wonderful. Thank you, Mayor.
My time is running out, so let me just ask one final
question: Secretary Johnson is testifying before our full
committee tomorrow on the Department of Homeland Security's
budget for fiscal year 2017. What message do you have for the
Secretary about any proposed cuts?
Mr. de Blasio. I will be seeing the Secretary later today.
I have immense respect for him. He has been a great partner.
But my message is we cannot protect New York City sufficiently
without this funding. I believe it is a fair National priority
to protect our largest city and a city that is so central to
our National life.
I would say to him that we in New York City invest heavily
in counterterrorism ourselves. For every dollar we receive from
the Federal Government, we spend one of our own dollars as
well. We spend the taxpayers' dollars of our city to protect
our people and all the people who visit, those 60 million
tourists, the 3 million people or so coming to town each day to
work during the week. We are definitely going to be shouldering
a big share of the burden, but we need our Federal partners to
take their part in this effort to protect.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Mayor.
My time is expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman
from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for questions.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mayor de Blasio, New York City has benefitted from
significant homeland security grant investments, and rightfully
so. What is your biggest fear if those programs are slashed?
Mr. de Blasio. My fear is we fall behind, Congressman. We
have, over the last 15 years, since that horrible day of 9/11,
innovated an approach to fighting terror, to preventing it
before it happens. It has become a very refined approach and a
very successful approach. It requires a close coordination of
all of our city agencies, police, fire, emergency management,
health, and others, but also close partnership with the Federal
Government. I have to say, I think it is at an all-time high in
terms of close cooperation and collaboration with FBI, Homeland
Security, et cetera.
But I think there is a phrase we use in New York City that
describes the situation: ``If it ain't broke, don't fix it.''
So far we have succeeded in preventing terror on a consistent
basis.
Mr. Payne. Absolutely.
Mr. de Blasio. But as we saw in Paris, as we saw in San
Bernardino, the challenges are greater. That is why we created
a stand-alone counterterror apparatus, and why we need ever
more commitment to technology and to a more refined approach.
If the bottom drops out of that, if the leg is taken out of the
stool and we are no longer able to invest in improving our
approach, sadly, we will be creating vulnerability.
So Congressman, I would say, if one day we believe that the
terror threats around the world are actually declining, well,
that would be a glorious day where we could talk about the
opportunity to reduce spending. But unfortunately, right now,
those threats are increasing. They are becoming more
complicated. Law enforcement is challenged to keep up with the
capacity of terrorist organizations and their use of
technology, which is one of the areas we most need to combat
them with.
So I would argue, we cannot perform that role or engage in
that fight against terror effectively without this funding.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Also, the fiscal year 2017 budget request cuts UASI and the
State Homeland Security Grant Program collectively by over $.5
billion. Port and transit security grants would also be cut.
There is no question that those programs yield real security
benefits. Meanwhile, the budget requests $49 million for
counter violent extremism grants, though we have no idea what
the program will look like or what benefit it will provide.
In light of these uncertainties, what activities do you
think CVE grants should support, and how can these programs be
carried out in a way that avoids profiling?
Mr. de Blasio. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
We do support the notion of the countering violent
extremism program. We believe that it is more important than
ever for government at all levels to engage all communities,
build partnerships, share information, create an atmosphere
that is more positive and hopeful than it may have been in the
past.
We do not support profiling of any form. As you know, we
have changed the policies of the previous administration to
both more effectively police--because we do not believe those
policies were the best way to counter terror--but also because
if we create inadvertently a rift with any of our communities,
it actually impedes the flow of information from the
grassroots.
So I want to make sure it is understood, we feel this about
all communities because there is different types of challenges
and threats and different types of violence that could emanate
from a variety of communities. But the common link is establish
deeper communication and respect, bring law enforcement and
community closer together, don't create a rift, and figure out
other things we have to do through Government, whether it is in
terms of education or efforts directed at young people to lift
them up that actually increase the security of everyone.
So that core philosophy we believe in, like you, we look
forward to more elaboration of the concept from the Federal
Government, but we believe in the philosophy.
Mr. Payne. Okay. Thank you.
I had another question, but in interest of time, I will
yield back and hopefully we have another opportunity to ask
questions.
Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair will now recognize other Members of the
subcommittee for questions they may wish to ask the witness. In
accordance with committee rules and practice, I plan to
recognize Members who were present at the start of the hearing
by seniority on the subcommittee. Those coming in later will be
recognized in the order they arrive.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, Mayor, thank you for your testimony here today. As
someone who was born and raised in New York City, my father was
in the NYPD for over 30 years, I really tremendously admire the
work that is done by all of the agencies, especially NYPD
emergency management, my good friend Joe Esposito there; FDNY,
Lieutenant Nigro. The job that you have is one which I don't
think any of us envy. Maybe it is great to march in the
parades, but other than that it's, you know, a lot of abuse and
a lot of attention.
Even though Miss Rice and I represent Long Island, the fact
is, people should realize that Nassau and Suffolk Counties, as
well as Westchester are all part of the UASI. It is New York
City, Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, even parts of Rockland, and
also, we have to closely coordinate with northern New Jersey.
Whenever you go to any of the mock drills they have, you see
how much coordination is involved.
Also, as you said, New York City and the region, New York
City region is the No. 1 target in the country. It is important
for the rest of the country to realize the tremendous expense
involved in that. I mean, you have well over 1,000 police
officers working full time in various types of
counterterrorism. They also work with the State police, Nassau
and Suffolk police, working with the FBI and the JTTF, and it
is a constant, really, state of war almost, at least a state of
preventing a war. So any cuts at all really can be catastrophic
to New Yorkers.
I have been on this committee since the start, and I don't
think there is any one method or any one line of defense that
is going to stop an attack. What you need are multiple defenses
out there, and you certainly train and hope that at least one
of those is going to work, is going to stop the next attackers.
You don't know where it is going to be coming from; it could be
Times Square; it could be the Brooklyn Bridge; it could be the
subway system; it could be anywhere.
So I just think all of us on the committee should stand as
one, not as Republicans or Democrats or from New York or from
the rest of the country, realizing how vital this is that the
funding be continued. Also, I think it is important to realize
that the NYPD or the FDNY or emergency management, when they
are out there doing the job, that is really not a New York City
function. That is the Federal Government's responsibility to
protect local governments and local municipalities from being
attacked. That is a Federal responsibility.
So if you are carrying out a Federal responsibility, at the
very least you should be compensated for the work that you do.
This isn't a gift. This isn't charity you are getting. I mean,
you are doing the work that the Federal Government should be
doing. The fact is, you are better equipped to do it in many
ways.
But, again, to be shortchanging you at a time like this,
when the ISIS threats have never been greater, when we still
have al-Qaeda, we still have al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
and we have the self-starters. We have the people at home
sitting in their apartment with the computer who, you know, can
become radicalized.
So I am just going to give you the opportunity to expand on
how essential it is that all of the city departments and the
neighboring locales receive the funding they need on homeland
security.
Mr. de Blasio. Thank you very much, Congressman.
Congressman, let me also thank you at the outset, and all
of your colleagues. I know you played a particularly crucial
role in finally passing the Zadroga Act. I want to thank you
for first responders in New York and all over America and so
many people who were affected by 9/11. That was such a profound
victory. Thank you for your leadership.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mayor.
Mr. de Blasio. You said it perfectly in that every single
one of our officers at any given moment any day could be
involved in counterterrorism activity. That means being aware
that the smallest clue could lead to something much bigger, and
that is why we put a big emphasis on training. So all of our
officers are being trained to prepare for a variety of
scenarios. That is why we need the active-shooter training,
because instantly there may be a crisis. It is also why we
emphasize technology, that now we are able with resources that
we provide at a local level to, for example, put a description
of a terrorist, an individual, out to all 36,000 officers
instantly and now they are all at that moment looking for that
individual. Or, again, an officer may see something on the
ground that indicates the potential of a threat that then
alerts everyone else to go into action.
So because we have been hit, we don't see this as an
abstraction. We feel it very personally. We know this threat is
very real because 20 times threats were attempted against us.
We know that every one of our officers has to be vigilant at
all times. So we will always pay our fair share, but I agree
with your core point. For the Federal Government to step back
and create a situation where a locality can't do all that is
needed to protect against terror makes no sense at this moment
in history.
It is such a pervasive threat that literally every one of
our officers--and that extends, of course, to emergency
management and fire as well--knows at any given moment they
have to be involved not only in preventing but, God forbid,
responding to an incident.
Mr. King. Mr. Mayor, my time is expired. I just would like
to add, I want to make sure we maintain the unity here today. I
do have some differences with you and Mr. Payne on the whole
issue of policing. But, again, you guys are doing a great job.
Today is not the day to bring that up. I just want to again
thank you for what is happening. Let's stay united today. We
worked together on other issues. We will do it on this. I just
want to put that on the record.
Mr. de Blasio. I thank you. My door is always open,
Congressman.
Mr. King. I know that as well. Thank you, Mayor. Thank you
very much.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. King.
The Chair now recognizes the Congresswoman from New York,
Miss Rice.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to echo what my colleague Pete King just said.
I think it is very clear the Federal Government is responsible
for protecting the homeland. New York City is the prime target
in the homeland, and it is really that simple.
So as someone who, like Pete, you know, whose district we
share a border with the city, and as a former homicide
prosecutor in Brooklyn, I just want to extend this committee's
full appreciation to you, Mr. Mayor, and to Commissioner
Bratton and the men and women of the NYPD. You have done an
extraordinary job making the city safer under your watch, and
that is a good thing for all of our nearby communities and for
me personally, and for all of the members of the NYPD who
happen to reside out on Long Island and in our district.
So I want to ask a question that I think goes to security
both in the city and locally in my district. I am talking about
the on-going dispute between Apple and the Justice Department.
I am troubled mostly by what I see as the unfortunately narrow
stance that has emerged in what is and should be a complex
debate.
As someone who cares more than anything about our security
but also values deeply the privacy protections that allow us to
live safely in the digital age, I wonder if the entrenched
nature of this debate really does it justice. Does one side
have to win and one side have to lose? Do we have to choose
between being digitally safe or physically safe? Just your
thoughts on that, Mr. Mayor.
Mr. de Blasio. Congresswoman, I think that is a fantastic
question because I agree with you 100 percent. I think
something has been missed here in this discussion. The
companies involved, Apple and others, and their customers
understandably want to protect their privacy, and that is an
American value too.
But I have to say, I couldn't agree more with Director
Comey and Commissioner Bratton and others who have said that if
law enforcement doesn't have appropriate information to pursue
terror threats and other violent crime, of course people will
be literally physically endangered. So we can't have these two
polar opposite sides staring at each other and not resolving
the problem.
What I hope there can be found is a third way, if you will,
wherein the Government has access to the information in a way
that is provided voluntarily by these companies, obviously
always with a court order and appropriate judicial process.
But I think the companies do owe it to the Nation to come
up with a procedure for providing that information to law
enforcement. I respect that they have some limitations that
they are concerned about. I believe there is a reasonable
process that can be determined to make sure that no piece of
information that could stop violence is ever withheld, but at
the same time respect privacy rights.
I believe there is a compromise that could be struck. I
think it begins with the company stating their willingness to
break out of the current paradigm and agree that they do have
more power to help law enforcement, that it does not implicitly
mean that they would be giving up privacy standards.
So that is what I hope we can all work on together, is a
different approach that gets us to that very simple end goal,
preventing violence.
Miss Rice. Couldn't agree with you more. The Chairman, one
of our former colleagues, Cy Vance, came down here a year ago
talking about just this whole encryption issue and what an
obstacle it is to law enforcement, which is particularly
problematic just given the daily threats that we face.
Just to go back to the money, so we are all talking about
how much of a cut has been proposed. In a perfect world, what
would you be asking for if the funds were--well, I shouldn't
say the funds were unlimited because they are not, but maintain
the status quo. Is that enough? Would you ask for an increase?
Slight? Big? Give us some perspective.
Mr. de Blasio. Look, I will state the obvious: The first is
to protect the consistent funding we have received, because we
have depended on it. We have bluntly assumed it would be
consistent given the environment we are all working in. I think
we clearly want to go farther and continue to innovate. I
talked to you about some of the areas that we need to do more
on in terms of technology, for example.
So additional resources would help us do better. It is as
simple as that. We want to continue this extraordinary work of
preventing terrorists. It is in the interest of the entire
Nation. So clearly, more resources would mean more technology,
more training, more ability to stop terror, but at minimum,
keeping consistent with previous funding.
I also want to say on the previous point, I thank you for
standing up on the issue of the information that law
enforcement needs. You understand as a former prosecutor. But I
do ask of you and your colleagues, please stand up for all of
us at the local level who are trying to prevent violence and
stand up for law enforcement. I would like to believe this
would be an area of bipartisan consensus. Let's work together
to help those companies find an outcome that they can live with
but that still prevents violence.
Miss Rice. Agreed. Thank you very much, Mr. Mayor.
I yield back.
Mr. Donovan. The gentlewoman yields back.
My colleague, Ranking Member Payne, had another question
if, Mayor, you have time to entertain.
Mr. de Blasio. Of course. Yes.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mayor de Blasio, I know that this isn't an issue
specifically within the scope of today's hearing, but I believe
that it is related. First responders in my district, as well in
New York, rely on T-band spectrum for radio communications.
Unfortunately, the legislation that authorized FirstNet
requires eleven jurisdictions, including ours, to relinquish
the spectrum by 2023, unless Congress acts to extend the
deadline.
Can you share some of the concerns New York City's first
responders have about their emergency communication
capabilities in light of the deadline and the associated cost
of transitioning off the T-band?
Mr. de Blasio. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, I share your
view. T-band is a critical part of the work we do in terms of
emergency communications. Disrupting that reality could prove
to be very dangerous.
We have, as you know, a very highly-developed apparatus in
New York City to protect our people and protect, again, the 60
million people who visit every year. It has to do with a number
of agencies constantly working together in a very crowded,
complex environment. The current communications structure
allows us to do that work.
If Congress doesn't act and we have to relinquish the
current approach, we fear a situation that is really
disruptive. I think this is a case where there should be real
care taken to not upset something that is working currently. We
all appreciate innovation. We all appreciate opportunities to
do things differently, but not if they undermine something that
is working currently and don't replace it in an appropriate
manner.
So right now, I would ask that, with your support, ask that
the Congress act to reverse the T-band give-back, because we do
fear the consequences otherwise.
Mr. Payne. Absolutely. You know, we talk about supporting
our first responders and then we find circumstances, situations
where something like this potentially could occur. I mean, we
have a saying in Newark: ``If you are going to be about it,
stay about it.'' So to change and disrupt that is very
troubling. So we want to continue to support our first
responders. We expect a lot of them and they do the job, and so
we need to give them the support they deserve.
Thank you.
Mr. de Blasio. Thank you very much.
Mr. Donovan. Mr. Mayor, I want to thank you for your
valuable testimony and for clarifying for the Members of this
committee the hollow excuses of the administration that there
is $600 million that New York City hasn't spent. I guess the
administration doesn't know about bidding process, VENDEXing,
and everything else that we have to do back home to assure that
the quality of the product we are purchasing and the
preparation and the training that we need takes time.
As one of the 8.5 million people who lives in the city that
you lead, I thank you for all you are doing to protect me and
my family.
Mr. King. Mr. Chairman, could I make one final statement?
Mr. Donovan. You sure can. You are my mentor. You can.
Mr. King. Mayor, you generously gave me credit for being
involved in the Zadroga 9/11 Act. Miss Rice was also involved.
But I know you think Dan Donovan is such a nice guy. As soon as
that bill was passed, he said, King, you were here for 14
years, you couldn't get it done. He was here 4 months and it
passed. So he is taking all the credit for Zadroga. I think
that should be on the record.
Mr. Donovan. I would have arrived earlier if I knew he
needed the help, Mayor.
Mr. de Blasio. That is right. You just should have asked,
right.
Thank you, Congressman.
Chairman, thank you for your very generous statement. I
just want to thank you for your leadership. As I said, it is
essential to the people of New York City that you are in this
role, and obviously, for all the people of this country. I want
to thank you for your leadership.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mayor.
This panel is dismissed. The clerk will prepare the witness
table for the second panel.
Again, we thank you, Mr. Mayor, for all of your
participation in this hearing.
Mr. de Blasio. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Donovan. I would like to welcome our second panel to
today's hearing and thank them for their participation.
Mr. Jim Butterworth serves as the director of the Georgia
Emergency Management Agency/Homeland Security, a position which
he was appointed to in January 2015. Prior to his appointment,
Mr. Butterworth served for 4 years as the adjutant general of
Georgia. Previously, he served as a State Senator representing
the 50th District in northeast Georgia. Mr. Butterworth is
testifying on behalf of the National Emergency Management
Association.
Welcome, sir.
Mr. Butterworth. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Donovan. Chief Rhoda Mae Kerr serves as the fire chief
of the Austin Fire Department and previously served in the same
position with the city of Little Rock, Arkansas. She was also
the deputy fire chief in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Chief Kerr
is the president and chair of the board of directors of the
International Association of Fire Chiefs, and she is testifying
in that capacity today.
Welcome, Chief.
Chief Kerr. Thank you.
Mr. Donovan. George Turner was appointed as the 23rd chief
of police for the city of Atlanta on July 9, 2010. He is a 32-
year veteran of the Atlanta Police Department and has worked in
all areas of the department, including the uniformed division
and investigations. Chief Turner previously served as the
deputy chief of the support services division, which consists
of the corporate services section, 9/11 communications center,
information services section, and training academy. Chief
Turner also serves as the second vice president of the Major
Cities Chiefs Association, and he is testifying in that
capacity today.
Welcome, Chief.
Mike Sena is the director of the Northern California
Regional Intelligence Center, the fusion center in the San
Francisco Bay Area. He currently serves as the president of the
National Fusion Center Association, which represents the 78
State and locally-owned and -operated fusion centers across the
country. Mr. Sena is testifying on behalf of the National
Fusion Center Association.
Welcome, sir.
Mr. Sena. Thank you.
Mr. Donovan. I now yield to the Ranking Member to introduce
our final witness.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is my pleasure today to welcome Sergeant Greg Kierce,
who serves as Jersey City's director of Office of Emergency
Management and Homeland Security. Sergeant Kierce's
professional background encompasses more than 30 years of law
enforcement. He maintains a successful record of achieving law
enforcement objectives, including reduced crime, greater public
safety and security, and stronger relationships with the local
community. He has demonstrated a proven ability to lead, coach,
and direct law enforcement professionals to maximize the
productivity and enhance workplace efficiency through process
improvement.
I want to thank you for the time that you have allowed us
to have you come down here before the subcommittee, and I look
forward to your testimony.
Mr. Chairman, just before I yield back, for full
disclosure, there is a possibility that Chief Kerr taught me to
swim as a child at Camp Kiamesha back in New Jersey. So I just
wanted to put that on the record. I yield back.
Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields back.
Chief, we are not going to hold you to his inability to
swim.
Welcome, Sergeant.
Thank you, Mr. Payne.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Butterworth for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JIM BUTTERWORTH, DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
AGENCY/HOMELAND SECURITY, STATE OF GEORGIA, TESTIFYING ON
BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
Mr. Butterworth. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, my name
is Jim Butterworth, and I am the director of the Georgia
Emergency Management Agency and Office of Homeland Security. I
am also the homeland security advisor to Governor Nathan Deal.
I am here on behalf of the National Emergency Management
Agency or NEMA. I appreciate the opportunity to come before you
today to discuss FEMA preparedness grants and the specific
impact proposed cuts in the fiscal year 2017 budget could have
on States across the country.
As stated, the administration's fiscal year 2017 budget
proposals include significant cuts to many of FEMA's grant
programs that support State and local disaster response. These
grants have been used to enact many programs that did not
previously exist in the scale needed, if at all, to address the
new and ever-changing threats facing our Nation. It is
impossible to imagine a scenario in which the significant
proposed cuts do not affect the operational capabilities at the
State and local level.
The threat of terror attacks here in the United States
continues to evolve and increase. Chattanooga, Fort Hood,
Boston, and now San Bernardino, all illustrate the need for
continued investments. The growing number of novel events that
can take unexpected turns has prompted greater involvement by
emergency management for its capability, experience, and
flexibility to deal with issues as they emerge. While the
country has made significant strides in our understanding of
and preparedness for these events, this is not the time to
scale back these efforts.
In Georgia, State homeland security grants have been
utilized to develop and grow specialized programs, fund
training and exercise, and build equipment caches that were
beyond the reach of State and local governments to fund in
traditional methods.
I have included several examples in my written testimony
that illustrate the numerous programs that have been
implemented in my State with support from these grants. These
are only a small portion of the resources within Georgia that
rely on homeland security grant funds for continued funding to
maintain and sustain the capability that has been built in our
State.
The issue we now face is that beginning with the decline
seen in fiscal year 2011 cycle, many of the programs that once
received annual funding are now only receiving funding on a
rotating basis, roughly every 2 or 3 years. If funding were to
drop further below their current levels, as they do in the
current proposed President's budget, we would begin to see a
contraction in the needed capability we have been able to
achieve in Georgia.
In addition to the proposed cuts to the State homeland
security grants, Georgia, like many States, would also feel the
effects of the reduction of funds provided through the Urban
Area Security Initiative, as has been discussed already.
GEMA/Homeland Security works in close conjunction with the
Metro Atlanta, UASI, and the separate but critical funding
allotment they receive allows GEMA/Homeland Security to
leverage more of a traditional State homeland security grant
funding to the benefit of lesser at-risk, yet still critical
cities and regions across the State, multiplying the
effectiveness of both grant programs in enhancing the
capability of both urban and suburban public safety.
Three final points I would like to make: First, impacts to
response and recovery capabilities do not stop at a State's
border. Through mutual aid facilitated by the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact, or EMAC, any decrease in funding
reverberates across the Nation. This year, the administration
proposes a 56 percent cut to the very platform that supports
the sharing of resources across the Nation in times of crisis.
Using EMAC, much of the assets and capability built with
homeland security grant funding is readily deployable to
support emergency or disaster operations throughout the
country. Funded at $2 million, this system saves the Government
money and is the backbone of a truly National response and
recovery network.
We truly appreciate the administration's support for a
fully-funded emergency management performance grant program.
EMPG is the only source of Federal funding directed to State
and local governments for planning, training, exercises, and
key professional expertise for all-hazards emergency
preparedness. EMPG stands as the beacon of Congressional
commitment to ensuring communities and States are more ready to
prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover from any number of
emergencies and disasters.
Last, Federal funding for homeland security grant programs
has decreased by more than 75 percent since the program's
inception in 2003, yet the structure remains unchanged.
Declining budgets at all levels of government have increased
the need to leverage resources and to facilitate cross-
jurisdictional coordination. We can no longer afford to operate
in separate silos. Given these on-going challenges and the
current fiscal environment, the need for reform of these
preparedness grants has never been more urgent.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to address these
critical issues in the emergency management community. It
speaks volumes that your first hearing as Chairman of the
subcommittee would be dedicated to the critical fiscal
challenges facing the emergency management and homeland
security community in these uncertain times.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here and to testify
before the committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Butterworth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jim Butterworth
March 15, 2016
introduction
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee. Mr. Chairman, I do want to take a moment
to congratulate you on your new position on the subcommittee and thank
Representative McSally for her commitment to emergency management and
public safety. We are looking forward to working with you in this new
capacity.
As stated, my name is Jim Butterworth, and I am the director of the
Georgia Emergency Management Agency/Homeland Security. I am here on
behalf of the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), which
represents the State emergency management directors of the 50 States,
territories, and District of Columbia. NEMA's members, many of whom,
like me, also serve as Homeland Security Advisors, are prepared to deal
with an ever-changing and increasingly complex set of challenges that
test traditional approaches to natural and man-made disasters. I
appreciate the chance to come before you today to discuss FEMA
Preparedness Grants at large and the specific impact proposed cuts in
the fiscal year 2017 budget could have on States across the country.
proposed cuts threaten progress since 9/11
In early February, the administration's fiscal year 2017 budget
proposal was released and was met with concern from State, Tribal, and
local emergency managers and homeland security officials. Significant
cuts are proposed to vital FEMA Preparedness Grants. Overall, these
programs would see a cut of 44 percent below fiscal year 2016 enacted
levels. The Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) Program would be cut
by 45 percent, from $600 million for fiscal year 2016 to $330 million
in fiscal year 2017. The State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP)
would be cut by 57 percent, from $467 million to $200 million. Public
Transportation Security Assistance would be cut by 15 percent to
$85,000 next year while Port Security grants are cut by 7 percent to
$93 million. It is impossible to imagine a scenario in which those
cuts, as significant as they are, do not, over time, affect the
operational capabilities at the State and local level.
The proposed cuts are incongruous with the current threat
environment. The threat of terror attacks here in the United States
continue to evolve and increase. While the country has made significant
strides in our understanding of and preparedness for these events, this
isn't the time to scale back those efforts. Chattanooga, Fort Hood,
Boston, and now San Bernardino all illustrate the need for continued
investments in strategic priorities. The Department of Homeland
Security recognized the need for funding aimed at addressing CVE and
coordinated/complex terror attacks through a new grant program funding
in the fiscal year 2016 Omnibus. By proposing similar funding in 2017,
it is clear this investment is not a fleeting effort and we are looking
forward to engaging with DHS and FEMA to better understand how that
funding will be distributed, what will be eligible, and how success
will be measured.
Emergency managers today, at all levels, must be prepared to deal
with an ever-changing and increasingly complex set of challenges that
test traditional approaches to disaster and emergency preparedness and
response. The growing number of novel events that can take unexpected
turns has prompted greater involvement by emergency management for its
capability, experience, and flexibility to deal with issues as they
emerge. Regardless of the amount of funding you push towards new
priorities, however, the systems, structures, personnel, and
capabilities built and sustained through years of dedicated investments
must not be neglected.
Homeland Security Grant Program
Since the inception of the State Homeland Security Grant Program
(SHSGP), NEMA has maintained support of these grants as critical
resources to help State and local governments build and sustain
capabilities to address various threats and hazards. As FEMA describes
it, this grant program plays an important role in the implementation of
the National Preparedness System (NPS) by supporting the building,
sustainment, and delivery of core capabilities essential to achieving
the National Preparedness Goal (NPG) of a secure and resilient Nation.
With the introduction and evolution of the Threat Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) process, States are becoming
increasingly aware of their risks and creating partnerships with all
critical stakeholders involved in addressing these challenges. As the
risk assessment process improves, measuring progress towards common
goals improves as well. The current process isn't perfect and the
National Preparedness Report will continue to be refined over time.
In Georgia, SHSGP is crucial in supporting investments that help us
in reaching the NPG and that have now been recognized as best-practice
activities. The challenge we now face is ensuring these programs are
funded at a level that allows them to continue to serve and protect the
State as threats to homeland security and critical infrastructure
increase and evolve. This challenge is only compounded by the dramatic
decrease in SHSGP funds the State now receives compared to past years.
Our funding for fiscal year 2015 is more than an 87 percent decrease
from the amount ($54 million) we received in the highest year of
funding. The following are an example of programs in Georgia that
utilized the SHSGP funding over several grant cycles to enact many
needed and noteworthy programs that did not previously exist in the
scale needed, if at all, to address the new threats facing our Nation:
Fifteen multi-jurisdictional regional Urban Search and
Rescue (USAR) teams, which give State-wide coverage for
complicated technical rescues (ex: collapsed buildings and
structures, wide-spread building and dwelling damage response),
and provide command-and-control capability of disaster response
assets for large-scale natural disasters or terroristic
activity.
Eight K-9 teams that assist in the recovery of the remains
of those who die in natural disasters or terrorist events.
Nine law enforcement teams that are trained and equipped to
respond to an event where the involvement of chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosives (CBRNE) would
bar unprotected law enforcement from entering the scene.
52 Hazardous Materials Response Teams (HAZMAT) that enable
local fire departments to detect, safely respond to, and
rapidly mitigate extraordinary chemical events.
16 Bomb Disposal Units (BDU) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD) response teams, to handle the rapidly-increasing threat
of bomb and explosive attacks across the State.
41 Bomb Dog Teams, to enable schools, colleges, Government
buildings and special events to be safely checked and rapidly
cleared of suspected explosives.
Logistical support for the Georgia Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (GISAC) facility, along with salary and IT
support for 5 terrorism analysts and 2 Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN) coordinators.
19 jurisdictions in the Georgia Terrorism Information
Program (GTIP) program, that enables local law enforcement in
the highest-threat urban areas of the State to communicate and
collaborate on terrorist threat activity.
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR) Protection
Team--a small team of GEMA/HS employees dedicated to providing
site surveys and technical security assistance to identified
CI/KR sites in Georgia.
70 local Citizen Corps teams, that have proven valuable in
preparing local citizens to be more self-reliant in the first
hours after a disaster or terrorist event, thus lessening the
burden of first responders.
The Georgia Interoperability Network (GIN), where 179 local
and disparate public safety radio systems have been given a
level of interoperability across the State not before possible.
Urban Area Security Initiative
The Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program is designed
to distribute Federal grant funding to an urban region composed of
multiple local governments and first responder agencies rather than a
single city. Our most critical urban centers are not islands unto
themselves and often rely on infrastructure and support mechanisms far
outside their city's political boundaries. According to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), the purpose of the UASI program is to
support regional collaboration among local jurisdictions and emergency
response organizations in order to build and sustain preparedness
capabilities vital to preventing, protecting, mitigating against,
responding to, and recovering from acts of terrorism. This regional
approach to preparedness is an efficient and effective use of
Government funding as it discourages an individualistic pursuit of
equipment and encourages collaboration in training and exercising.
In the State of Georgia, we work with the Metro Atlanta UASI, to
further the goals and objectives of DHS and the State in building an
enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, protect, respond to, and
recover from disasters and threats or acts of terrorism in the densely-
populated and critically-vital metropolitan Atlanta area. GEMA/HS
serves as a pass-through for DHS grant funding that supports the Metro
Atlanta UASI's activities. Its governance is executed in the form of a
senior policy group which consists of the mayor of the city of Atlanta
(who serves as chairman) and the chairpersons of the county
commissions, which make up its jurisdiction. The Metro Atlanta UASI was
originally comprised of the city of Atlanta, Fulton County, and DeKalb
County; however, in 2009, its jurisdiction expanded to include Clayton,
Cobb, and Gwinnett Counties to better encompass the region and leverage
the capabilities being built and sustained with traditional SHSGP
funds.
The separate but critical funding allotment for the Metro Atlanta
UASI allows GEMA/HS to leverage more of the traditional SHSGP funding
to the benefit of other lesser at-risk, yet still critical, cities and
regions across the State--multiplying the effectiveness of both grant
programs in enhancing the capability of both urban and suburban public
safety.
The Metro Atlanta UASI has built a great deal of capability and
capacity with funds from past grant cycles to address the unique
homeland security needs of this high-threat, high-density urban area,
and to assist the surrounding local governments in the Atlanta region
in building and sustaining their vital public safety capabilities.
However, funding levels for recent years represents a dramatic
reduction in funds compared to what was previously made available. Over
the past few years, the Metro Atlanta UASI received approximately $5
million annually in UASI-specific grant funds, compared to a high of
more than $18 million in 2006. These extensive cuts in funding mean
that the UASI can only maintain and sustain existing programs,
training, and equipment; it can no longer make new investments or
expand outside the region. Any further reductions will cause a
cascading effect on both grant programs, as established programs could
no longer be continued at the basic maintenance levels they are at now.
If we were the target of a terroristic attack or if struck by a major
disaster, failure to sustain these vital programs could have
catastrophic effects on the ability of the region to properly protect
the infrastructure, economy, and the local populace so critical to our
State and Nation.
mutual aid supports national response capability
As explained above, cuts to critical preparedness grant programs
impact individual States in substantial ways. Impacts to response and
recovery capabilities, however, do not stop at a State's borders.
Through mutual aid, facilitated by the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact (EMAC), any decrease in funding for building homeland security
and emergency management capacity reverberates across the Nation. EMAC
was the first National disaster-relief compact ratified by Congress
since the Civil Defense and Disaster Compact of 1950. Since
ratification in 1996, every State, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have enacted legislation to
become EMAC members. All resources in a State can deploy through EMAC
(fire-hazmat, law enforcement, public health, medical, mass care,
animal response, emergency medical services, National Guard, public
works, search & rescue, transportation, human services, engineering,
agriculture & forestry, emergency/incident management).
Coupled with cuts to preparedness grants, the administration
proposed a massive cut to the very platform that supports the sharing
of resources across the Nation in times of crisis. FEMA's proposed 56%
cut of funding to EMAC would effectively roll EMAC back to 2003-2007
administrative levels. The 2008 increase in administrative funds was a
direct result of the post-Katrina report completed in 2007 by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO). Since that time, the EMAC
structure has matured and evolved, and has played a crucial role in
disaster response to thousands of events.
While the primary focus on EMAC training is inter-State mutual aid,
EMAC is built upon a State's intra-State mutual aid program and
resource inventory. Nationally, States have been working with the
resource providers to inventory their resources and capabilities for
both intra-State and inter-State use and pre-plan the sharing of
resources through EMAC, using the Threat Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment (THIRA) process to help identify resource shortfalls. The
direct impacts of budget cuts on EMAC are easy to visualize but what is
less obvious is the resounding impact these cuts would have across the
Nation. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) has built their J-3 Operations
and Defense Support for Civil Authority (DSCA) around the use of EMAC
for the deployment of State National Guard resources between States.
EMAC truly is the DSCA backbone within NGB. Without a strong EMAC
interface the Guard would have a hard time both deploying resources
timely and efficiently thus delaying vital resources to disaster-
affected areas.
NORTHCOM Director of Military Support (DOMS) process also relies on
the EMAC process. DOMS is the Department of Defense's representative on
the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG). The CDRG is the
National-level coordinating group that addresses policy issues and
support requirements during a disaster, emergency, and/or terrorist
event from NORTHCOM.
As this committee knows, all assets supported in part or entirely
with fiscal year 2016 Homeland Security Grant Program funding that will
be distributed this year must be readily deployable to support
emergency or disaster operations through EMAC. To ensure a ``National''
system for use of that equipment EMAC is the only solution. The
proposed budget cut to EMAC would be devastating for this essential
program that facilitates efficient and effective resource sharing
across the Nation.
building capacity with empg
While NEMA is concerned with the cuts to critical preparedness
grant programs like SHSGP and UASI, we did want to highlight a grant
program that continues to be invaluable to the emergency management
community. States and locals build capacity and enhance their
capability to respond to disasters when they utilize the Emergency
Management Performance Grants (EMPG). The fiscal year 2017 proposal
requests sustained funding for this program at $350 million.
EMPG is the only source of Federal funding directed to State and
local governments for planning, training, exercises, and key
professional expertise for all-hazards emergency preparedness. The
money is often used to conduct risk and hazard assessments and support
emergency operations centers which are the coordination hubs for all
disaster response. The program also provides public education and
outreach, enhanced interoperable communications capabilities, and the
ability to manage State-wide alerts and warnings.
For example, in fiscal year 2015, EMPG significantly contributed
to, among other things, planning, exercising, and mutual aid efforts.
In total, 1,707 State and 5,733 local plans were developed, maintained,
or updated using EMPG funds. EMPG supported 1,143 State-wide and 4,756
local and Tribal workshops, drills, and functional full-scale
exercises, which benefited 96,361 State and 447,707 local participants.
Without a comprehensive exercise program to complement the training
efforts, the preparedness cycle would be compromised. Support from EMPG
is crucial in maintaining mutual aid efforts across the various levels
of government. In fiscal year 2014, EMPG supported 6,453 local and
Tribal and 4,819 State-wide mutual aid agreements, memorandums of
understanding, and memorandums of agreement with neighboring
jurisdictions, non-profit agencies, Volunteer Organizations Active in
Disasters (VOADS), and the private sector.
Recipients of this grant continue demonstrating a strong
commitment; for every dollar of Federal funds invested, at least that
much is matched by both grantees and sub-grantees. In the absence of
these funds, State and local governments would struggle to maintain the
personnel or capabilities necessary to build and sustain an effective
emergency management system. EMPG stands as the beacon of Congressional
commitment to ensuring communities and States are more ready to
prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover from any number of emergencies
and disasters. EMPG does far more, however, than provide funds for
planning, training, exercises, and communications. EMPG must continue
to be strengthened and maintained through shared investments.
grants structure of the future
Federal funding for homeland security grant programs has decreased
by more than 75 percent since the program's inception in 2003, yet the
structure remains unchanged. Congress has recognized this continuing
disconnect and included language in annual appropriations bills as
recently as fiscal year 2012 to push for ``long-overdue'' and ``bold''
reform of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)
administration of its State and Local Programs. (House Report 112-91
accompanying the Fiscal Year 2012 Homeland Security Appropriations bill
(H.R. 2017), part of Public Law 112-33; September 30, 2011)
Important improvements have been made to processes for assessing
risk and strategic planning, but the current grant program design can
no longer achieve the type of accountability Congress demands and
support the preparedness capabilities our communities need. Given these
on-going challenges and the current fiscal environment, the need for
reform of these preparedness grant programs has never been more urgent.
In the fiscal year 2013 budget, FEMA provided a proposal to consolidate
grant programs into a new National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP).
While not a perfect proposal, it did succeed in fostering a dialogue on
our enduring challenges with the suite of 16 separate preparedness
grant programs. After unsuccessful attempts in 3 consecutive budget
proposals, the administration did not include the proposal in their
fiscal year 2017 proposal but some consolidation has occurred over
time. The tenants of comprehensive reform, however, remain just as
important as they were in 2012.
Since 2003, the grant programs have allocated more than $40 billion
to State and local governments to build and sustain preparedness
capabilities. The successful outcomes supported by this investment must
be acknowledged. At the same time, the need to better align these grant
programs with today's fiscal realities and operational challenges must
also be recognized. At their inception, the grant programs were
required to address an unknown threat environment after September 11,
2001. More than $4 billion in funding was made available through State
and local preparedness grants in fiscal year 2003 alone. In addition to
fiscal changes, the environment now incorporates the new ``all-
hazards'' focus stemming from lessons learned after Hurricane Katrina
in 2005 and subsequent multi-State disasters. A key lesson from those
events is the importance of intergovernmental collaboration and
integrating preparedness planning and response activities to ensure
unity of effort.
Declining budgets at all levels of Government have increased the
need to leverage resources and facilitate cross-jurisdictional
coordination. We can no longer afford to operate in separate silos.
Unfortunately, the current suite of grant programs perpetuates such
separations and no longer reflects on-going efforts to align State and
local capabilities with National preparedness objectives.
Today's dynamic threat environment requires a grants program that
prioritizes investments based on risk while maintaining State and local
ability to sustain prior investments that support National goals. Grant
programs must be flexible and agile to address changing hazards and
ensure local investments synchronize with State-wide and regional
priorities.
Duplicative reporting requirements and increased administrative
burden under the current framework also diminish return on investment
(ROI) as more time and money must be spent on grants administration and
management. Comprehensive reform would better facilitate maximum
efficiency of taxpayer dollars and better enable accurate measure of
ROI over time. This flexibility with accountability can represent the
face of these reformed grant programs. For only through comprehensive
changes to the existing structures can we achieve a more effective
preparedness program for States and locals.
conclusion
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to address these issues
critical to the emergency management community. This committee
regularly affirms support for ensuring preparedness for our Nation's
vulnerabilities against all hazards. It speaks volumes, that your first
hearing as Chairman of this committee would be dedicated to the
critical fiscal challenges facing the emergency management and homeland
security community in these uncertain times.
Regardless of our country's fiscal situation, physical security,
and economic security are not mutually exclusive. Emergency managers
have been absorbing budget cuts at the State level for years and
understand they must do more with less on a consistent basis. Under the
current risk stature, however, reducing available funds under the State
Homeland Security Grant Program could reverse much of the progress our
Nation spent decades building.
As you develop the fiscal year 2017 budget for the Department of
Homeland Security, we encourage you to utilize our membership as a
resource and continue efforts to build a strong and robust emergency
management baseline in our country. Together, we will carry on the
initiatives so thoughtfully developed and supported by this committee
over the years.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA and
appreciate your continued partnership.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Butterworth. The Chair now
recognizes Chief Kerr.
STATEMENT OF RHODA MAE KERR, FIRE CHIEF, CITY OF AUSTIN FIRE
DEPARTMENT, AUSTIN, TEXAS, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE CHIEFS
Chief Kerr. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member
Payne, and Members of the subcommittee. I am Chief Rhoda Mae
Kerr of the Austin Fire Department. I also am president and
chair of the board of the International Association of Fire
Chiefs. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
behalf of the fire and emergency services.
The IAFC is greatly concerned by the Draconian cuts to
FEMA's grant programs in the fiscal year 2017 budget proposal.
We also oppose attempts to convert the AFG and SAFER grant
programs into terrorism preparedness programs. In the wake of
an evolving terrorist threat, now is not the time to break a
system that works.
The American taxpayers have spent more than $40 billion
since 9/11 on grant programs to improve the Nation's
preparedness and response system. Overall, this funding has
been spent wisely to make the Nation safer. By using the State
Homeland Security Grant and the UASI programs, State and local
governments have been able to develop terrorism preparedness
capabilities that did not exist before 9/11. Local
jurisdictions have used these grant funds to build and staff
intelligence fusion centers, develop mass casualty response
units, and construct regional interoperable communication
networks. We would not have had the funding for these projects
without Federal assistance.
In Austin, we were able to use FEMA-preparedness grants to
fund annual CBRNE exercises. These exercises brought together
all stakeholders: Fire, EMS, law enforcement, public health,
city management, private sector, Federal and State partners,
surrounding jurisdictions, et cetera. We were able to learn
together how to respond to a potentially catastrophic threat.
Also, we were able to make the necessary changes to improve our
planning and operations for the future.
Federal funding is important. As Austin demonstrated,
Federal grants incentivize regional cooperation and
coordination among all the Federal, State, local, and private-
sector stakeholders. These grants also support the
implementation of NIMS, which allows multiple agencies to
communicate and function effectively. The incident scene should
not be the first time for everyone to meet. We are better
prepared for responding to a future terroristic attack due to
the planning and training supported by the State Homeland
Security Grant Program and UASI.
The AFG and SAFER grant programs helped localities prepare
for all hazards. The AFG grant program provides matching grants
for equipment and training. The SAFER grant program provides
support for firefighter staffing. Both of these programs have
improved the operational capabilities of fire departments
across the Nation. When a major disaster or catastrophe occurs,
the Nation relies upon neighboring local fire departments to
provide critical mutual aid.
As Federal funding for FEMA's grant program has declined
over the years, our main focus has been on sustaining the
National preparedness and response system. That is why the IFC
members are concerned by the proposed cuts in the President's
fiscal year 2017 budget. The budget proposal would cut the
State Homeland Security Grant Program by more than half, the
UASI program would receive a 45 percent cut. Even the AFG and
SAFER programs each would be cut by $10 million from last
year's appropriation. These grant programs are achieving their
goals, and it is unwise to cut them. We must realize that the
proposed cuts would occur in a dangerous and evolving threat
environment.
Last year, the Nation witnessed terrorist incidents in
Garland, Texas; Chattanooga, Tennessee; and San Bernardino,
California. Each of these attacks involved different tactics
and techniques. FEMA preparedness grants help us to analyze
threat information at the State and local level and develop
capabilities for these new threats. We are also concerned by
the budget proposal's effort to convert the AFG and SAFER grant
programs into terrorism response programs.
These programs are aimed at helping fire and EMS
departments prepare for incidents as diverse as structural
fires, HAZMAT incidents, wild land fires, and even acts of
terrorism. We ask that Congress protect the funding for the
State Homeland Security Grant Program and UASI program by at
least maintaining the fiscal year 2016 appropriations level of
$467 million and $600 million, respectively. For the AFG and
SAFER grant programs, we ask that you fund each program at $405
million, the fiscal year 2011 level. We also ask that Congress
reauthorizes the AFG and SAFER grant programs before they
expire in 2018.
Overall, the IAFC can attest to the fact that FEMA's grant
programs play an important role in developing and sustaining
the Nation's preparedness system. We ask that Congress maintain
its support for these programs.
Thank you again for the opportunity to explain the
importance of these programs to America's fire and emergency
service, and I look forward to answering any questions that you
may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Chief Kerr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rhoda Mae Kerr
March 15, 2016
Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members
of the subcommittee. I am Rhoda Mae Kerr, fire chief of the Austin Fire
Department, and president and chair of the Board of Directors of the
International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC). The IAFC represents
more than 11,000 leaders of the Nation's fire, rescue, and emergency
medical services. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the effects
of cutting the preparedness grant programs at the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA).
It is important to emphasize to the American taxpayers that the
more than $40 billion spent on FEMA grants have been used to develop a
strong National preparedness and response system. From the fire and
emergency service's perspective, I would like to highlight a few grant
programs with the most relevance. The State Homeland Security Grant
Program (SHSGP) and the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) help
local fire and EMS departments to prepare for potential acts of
terrorism by supporting planning, training, and equipment. The
Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) grant program\1\ (including the
SAFER and Fire Prevention and Safety grants) help fire departments
improve their baseline emergency response capability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Popularly known as the ``FIRE'' grant program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The IAFC is greatly concerned by the administration's fiscal year
2017 budget proposal. It would include Draconian cuts to the SHSGP and
UASI program. Also, it would attempt to re-classify the AFG programs as
homeland security grants. Additionally, the new budget would remove
many of the separate accounts funding these programs and combine them
under a new ``Federal Assistance'' account. Considering the growing
threat of coordinated, complex attacks sponsored by foreign terrorist
groups, we ask Congress to reject the administration's budget proposal.
Now is not the time to break a system that works.
It is important to point out that the majority of the investments
in preparedness are still made by local communities. As Federal grant
funding continues to decline, local emergency response agencies will
have to focus on sustaining our existing capabilities and using Federal
funds wisely by learning from other grantees' past experience.
successes of the current dhs grant system
The current suite of FEMA preparedness grants are critical to
building a National preparedness system. The great success of the
Federal homeland security grant programs is that they provide an
incentive for Federal, State, Tribal, territorial, and local
jurisdictions to work together. By planning, training, and conducting
exercises together, local fire chiefs, police chiefs, sheriffs, public
health officials, emergency managers and State and Federal officials
are able and ready to work together when an incident happens. This pre-
planning and coordination prevents confusion during an incident and
directly saves lives.
In Austin, UASI-funded training brought together all of the
regional stakeholders, including smaller neighboring jurisdictions,
surrounding volunteer fire departments, the U.S. Attorney's office,
public health officials, and the city manager for annual exercises in
response to mock chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or
explosive (CBRNE) events. The UASI funds allowed the Austin region to
complete training that it would not otherwise have been able to do, and
brought all of the stakeholders together to learn how to work together
in a catastrophic situation. In addition, Austin was able to purchase
props and develop expertise with the initial Federal funding, so that
the region could continue to host these annual exercises after the UASI
funding expired.
The SHSGP and UASI grants also help local jurisdictions develop
capabilities for responding to terrorist attacks. In the National
Capital Region (NCR), UASI funds have been used to help the area
prepare for a future mass casualty incident. The NCR used its funds to
develop 8 Medical Ambulance Buses and Mass Casualty units, which can
each transport 40 patients and treat up to 100 patients. In addition,
learning from the lessons of the response to the 9/11 attack on the
Pentagon, the NCR also used UASI funds to develop a patient tracking
system. This system allows EMS personnel to use hand-held devices to
scan a victim's triage tag, enter basic information about the patient's
identity and pre-hospital care, and transport the patient to the
appropriate area hospital.
In Clark County, Nevada, SHSGP, and UASI funds are used to support
fusion center activities within the Southern Nevada Counterterrorism
Center. These activities include suspicious activity analysis and
reporting; evaluation and support of special events; multi-agency
intelligence and information sharing; and the hardware and software to
support these programs. The Federal funding also supports community
outreach and education programs like ``See Something, Say Something''
campaigns; training and exercises; and the development of public/
private partnerships to help protect the region.
These preparedness grants also support regional coordination.
Jurisdictions that receive FEMA grants must certify that they are
compliant with the National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS is
based on the fire service's incident command system and allows multiple
agencies to communicate and function effectively during an incident
response. The need for effective NIMS implementation is vital,
especially in the case of a complex, coordinated attack like the one in
Paris which took place in multiple locations. As Austin's fire chief, I
have found the Federal grant funds to be an effective catalyst for
helping Federal, State, and local stakeholders to plan, train, and
conduct threat-based exercises together. During the first hours of a
major incident response, it is important that all responding agencies
are familiar with each other and basic command-and-control functions to
ensure an effective response and prevent confusion.
I also would like to highlight the important role that the AFG
program plays in improving the Nation's preparedness. The AFG program
uses a merit-based, peer review process to provide matching grants to
local fire and EMS departments for equipment and training. The SAFER
grant program uses a similar process to provide matching grants for
hiring career firefighters and helping to recruit and retain volunteer
firefighters. Here are some examples from the National Fire Protection
Association's (NFPA) Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service of
how the AFG and SAFER grants are helping local fire and EMS
departments:
51 percent of all fire departments that answered the NFPA
survey do not have enough portable radios to equip all
emergency responders on a shift. This percentage is down from
77 percent in 2001 and 75 percent in 2005.
48 percent of all fire departments that are responsible for
EMS have not formally trained all of their personnel involved
in EMS. This percentage is down from 54 percent in 2001 and 53
percent in 2005.
51 percent of all fire departments cannot equip all
firefighters on a shift with self-contained breathing
apparatus. This percentage is down from 70 percent in 2001 and
60 percent in 2005.
65 percent of all fire departments that are responsible for
hazardous materials response have not formally trained all of
their personnel involved in hazmat response. This percentage is
down from 73 percent in 2001 and 71 percent in 2005.
As you can see, FEMA's homeland security grants are meeting their
goal in providing training and building capabilities that local fire
and EMS departments could not otherwise develop. It is important to
recognize that Federal homeland security grant funding has decreased
over the years. Currently, preparedness grants like the UASI and SHSGP
programs are focused on sustaining existing capabilities. Meanwhile,
the AFG and SAFER programs have shown remarkable progress in improving
baseline emergency response capabilities, but a lot of work remains.
the administration's fiscal year 2017 budget proposal
The IAFC has serious concerns about the administration's fiscal
year 2017 budget proposal. It drastically reduced many of these
important grant programs: The SHSGP program would be cut by more than
half to $267 million and the UASI program would be cut by 45% to $330
million. In addition, the AFG and SAFER grant programs would be cut by
$10 million each and be classified as terrorism preparedness grants
with a priority given to applications that ``enhance capabilities for
terrorism response and other major incidents.''
As my testimony demonstrates, the SHSGP and UASI programs are
achieving their missions of building terrorism response capabilities
that a jurisdiction would not otherwise be able to afford and serving
as an incentive to bring together all stakeholders for major training
and exercises. Because of the steady decrease in SHSGP and UASI funding
over the years, most of these funds are being used to sustain existing
capabilities. It is unwise to cut programs that actually are achieving
their objectives.
It also is important to recognize that these cuts are proposed in a
more dangerous threat environment. Last May, we witnessed an incident
at the Curtis Culwell Center in Garland, Texas, involving 2 individuals
inspired by communications with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
(ISIS). In July, an active shooter attacked a U.S. Naval Reserve Center
and a military recruitment center in Chattanooga, Tennessee. In
December, a husband and wife used active-shooter tactics with potential
pipe bombs in San Bernardino, California. ISIS continues to threaten
the U.S. homeland and we have learned that acts of terror can occur
anywhere in the Nation. Grants like the SHSGP and UASI program help us
to analyze threat information and develop capabilities to prepare for
these new threats.
We also have concerns about the administration's attempts to
convert the AFG and SAFER grant programs into terrorism response
programs. These programs are meant to improve baseline capabilities for
all-hazards response. Many fire departments around the Nation still
have trouble meeting basic response requirements and the AFG and SAFER
grant programs have proven successful at helping these departments.
Fire departments depend on each other to provide mutual aid in response
to incidents as diverse as high-rise fires, wildland fires, and even
acts of terrorism. It is important that fire departments around the
Nation have basic emergency response capabilities, so that they can
effectively aid each other during these incidents. The AFG and SAFER
grant programs help support a Nation-wide response system that can
escalate and respond to all hazards, not just acts of terrorism.
Also, we oppose the administration's attempts to set a priority for
AFG and SAFER applications focused on terrorism response. As described
in statute,\2\ the major National fire service organizations meet
annually to discuss the criteria for the upcoming year's AFG and SAFER
grants. One complaint with the SHSGP and UASI programs is that FEMA
changes funding priorities every year without much explanation.
Priorities for the AFG and SAFER grant programs should be based on
stakeholder-driven criteria and not bureaucratic whims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 15 U.S.C. 2229(l)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The IAFC also opposes the fiscal year 2017 budget proposal's
attempts to consolidate a number of programs, including FEMA's
preparedness grants, the U.S. Fire Administration, the AFG and SAFER
grant programs, the Emergency Management Performance Grants and other
programs into one ``Federal Assistance'' account. Historically, these
programs have been funded under separate accounts to ensure that the
appropriations were spent in a transparent and accountable manner. Our
concern is that this transparency and accountability will be lost if
these programs are merged into a single ``Federal Assistance'' account.
conclusion
I thank you today for the opportunity to testify about the
importance of FEMA's SHSGP, UASI, AFG, and SAFER grant programs. This
suite of grants plays an important role in building and sustaining the
National preparedness system. The changes proposed in the fiscal year
2017 budget proposal would hurt the ability of the Nation's local fire
and emergency service to protect their communities.
For fiscal year 2017, the IAFC urges Congress to at least continue
to fund the SHSGP program at the fiscal year 2016 level of $467 million
and the UASI grant program at the fiscal year 2016 level of $600
million. For the AFG and SAFER grant programs, we ask you to fund these
programs at the fiscal year 2011 level of $405 million each. This
request is based on the steady increase in the cost of equipment. For
example, the cost of personal protective equipment has increased by
11.4% since 2011 and the cost of self-contained breathing apparatus has
increased by 15%. In addition, the cost of fire apparatus also has
increased: The cost of pumper trucks, which represent 60% of the
apparatus market, has increased by 14.6% since 2011 based on increased
labor and materials' costs. To ensure continued transparency and
accountability, we also recommend that Congress continue to fund these
programs using the same appropriations account structure that has been
used in the past. In addition, we urge Congress to reauthorize the AFG
and SAFER grant programs which otherwise will sunset in January 2018.
I am grateful for the committee's leadership in addressing the
needs of first responders as we prepare for an evolving terrorist
threat. The IAFC looks forward to working with you during the fiscal
year 2017 appropriations process to ensure that local fire and EMS
departments are ready to protect their communities.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Chief Kerr. The Chair now
recognizes Chief Turner.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE TURNER, CHIEF OF POLICE, ATLANTA POLICE
DEPARTMENT, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE MAJOR
CITIES CHIEFS
Chief Turner. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Donovan,
and Ranking Member Payne. I appear before you today as the
chief of police of Atlanta, the largest metropolitan region in
the South. It is also my privilege to serve on the board of
directors for Major City Chiefs as the second vice president. I
represent every major urban area in our Nation, the communities
that would suffer most from further reduction in Federal
assistance for law enforcement.
I speak today as one police chief on behalf of my
colleagues from the 68 largest police departments in our
country. I also received a letter of support from 17
organizations that represent local elected officials, emergency
managers, port and transit operators, sheriffs, and major fire
associations that have strong concerns about several severe
cuts to 4 key homeland security grant programs. We ask the
committee to consider the responsibility that each of you share
with the chiefs of police protecting the American public from
harm.
As we reflect on the events of Paris and San Bernardino,
here at home, it is evident that preparedness for a terrorist
attack is the highest priority than ever before. There is a
certain irony to the proposed cuts. They come in the wake of
terrorist attacks not just in cities abroad, but on our own
shores, in Chattanooga, San Bernardino, and Philadelphia, for
an example.
The proposed budget of DHS would reduce from $41.1 billion
to $40.6 billion, a reduction of more than $500 million. But
the 2 grant programs which assist States and local agencies
would be cut by $537 million, more than the entire amount of
the reduction of the Department of Homeland Security.
As a police chief, I have assigned personnel to Federal
task forces and our regional fusion center. Every day we are
asked to assist one of our Federal agencies or another. But
funding from Washington does not even take up a small portion
of the amount of money that Atlanta and the city police
department provides. The same is true in every other major city
in America. We are really subsidizing the Federal Government,
because what we receive from Washington does not begin to pay
the bill.
The world's busiest airport, Hartsfield-Jackson Airport, is
protected by Atlanta personnel and a team effort from DHS that
includes the model K-9 program we conduct with TSA. The Urban
Area Security Initiative program funds purchases of specific
equipment, including a robot that is equipped to board
aircrafts. The Federal investment pays off each day in
communities across the country during incidents both large and
small. For example, much of the training and equipment used to
respond to the May 2015 Amtrak derailment in Philadelphia were
paid for with grants provided by FEMA.
Chairman Donovan and Ranking Member Payne, chiefs of police
are grateful for all you do, and we look to you for leadership.
To accept the proposed cuts would forfeit so much of what we
have already invested in since the inception of DHS, and leave
local agencies like mine on the fence to fend for themselves,
with Federal agencies continuing to grow.
As a police chief, we have our common bonds with you. It is
the safety of the public we are sworn to protect and serve. To
this end, we implore that you restore balance to the
partnership with DHS by protecting the funds which sustain the
work of the subcommittee.
It is my pleasure to testify today. I look forward to any
questions that you might have. I do want to talk about the fact
that we need to continue to sustain the efforts that we have
already pushed forward thus far in this partnership. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Chief Turner follows:]
Prepared Statement of George Turner
March 15, 2016
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee, I appear before you today as the chief of police for
Atlanta, the largest metropolitan region in the South. It is also my
privilege to be on the board of directors and 2nd vice president for
the Major Cities Chiefs, representing every major urban area in our
Nation--the communities which would suffer most from further reductions
in Federal assistance for law enforcement. I speak today as one police
chief on behalf of my colleagues from the 68 largest cities in the
United States.
needed support for the front lines of public safety
As Mayor De Blasio has noted, local police and public safety
officers today stand on the front lines of both preparedness and
response, just as they did in New York and Washington, DC on September
11, 2001. But the proposed 2017 budget reductions represent the most
drastic cuts in a downward spiral of declining help from Washington. In
the face of the current threat, police chiefs agree with the title of
today's hearing--it is indeed a disaster.
As the law enforcement witness in this hearing, I appeal to
Congress not to abandon the officers who put their lives on the line
every day. Forgive me if a term like ``abandon'' sounds like hyperbole,
but for police officers in every major American city, I can tell you
this is not empty rhetoric. There is no other way to describe the
dramatic decreases in DHS support for local police and first
responders. DHS funding for the combined grant programs in 2010 was
more than $3 billion. By 2016, the current fiscal year, it had fallen
to half that amount. If Congress were to approve the cuts proposed for
the coming year, law enforcement agencies could receive as little as a
third of what was once provided by Washington.
Federal agencies and other parts of DHS have not suffered any sort
of comparable reductions. Speaking for men and women in uniform on the
front lines, we implore the committee to reverse this alarming trend
and to strengthen support for public safety in your own communities
back home.
urban area security initiative (uasi)
We ask the committee to consider the responsibility that each of
you shares with a chief of police--protecting the American people from
harm. Major Cities Chiefs counts every one of the UASI cities in our
membership and that means we have a direct tie to the important work of
this subcommittee. As we reflect on the events abroad in Paris and in
San Bernardino here at home, it is evident that preparedness for a
terrorist attack is a higher priority than ever before. Major Cities
Chiefs hosted San Bernardino officials at our last meeting and we heard
first-hand what comprised their preparedness and response to the
attack. It was a case study in the work of this subcommittee--it was
all about preparedness. Whether from ISIS abroad or home-grown
extremists, the threat is real and it haunts police chiefs every day.
But the DHS programs designed to support preparedness and prevention
efforts have been diminished as the threat has increased. UASI is a
small shadow of what it once. The proposed budget cuts UASI to $330
million. If you add the State Homeland Security Grant Program proposal
for $200 million, that is a total of $550 million, just a third of the
more than $1.6 billion back in 2009 and 2010.
partnerships to prevent terrorism
In spite of these budget cuts, our work with the Department of
Homeland Security and the Department of Justice is stronger than ever
before. We share intelligence, work joint cases, conduct preparedness
exercises and all of these efforts make us stronger. Yet, funding for
our Federal partners has grown while support for our partnership with
DHS has been slashed to a fraction of what we received in the past.
We ask the subcommittee to consider if this a balanced partnership.
The proposed budget of DHS would be reduced from $41.1 billion to $40.6
billion, a reduction of $500 million. But the 2 grant programs which
assist State and local agencies would be cut by $537 million, more than
the entire amount of the reduction for the Department of Homeland
Security.
As a police chief, I have assigned many personnel to Federal task
forces and our regional fusion center. Every day we are asked to assist
one Federal agency or another. But funding from Washington does not
even cover a small part of the cost to the Atlanta Police Department.
The same is true in every other major American city--we are really
subsidizing the Federal Government--because what we receive from
Washington does not begin to pay that bill.
law enforcement terrorism prevention program (letpp)
Congress intended for law enforcement to have a law enforcement
set-aside comparable to line item programs for Fire Chiefs, Emergency
Management, Ports, and other top priorities. But the intent of Congress
has not been followed when it comes to LETPP, as it is no longer a
stand-alone program and no longer a priority. Congress directed that
LETPP should be funded at not less than 25% of the sum of SHSGP and
UASI. Rather than maintain LETPP as a program and fund it at the
required level, FEMA eliminated the program and merely applied the
percentage to broad definitions in the other programs. For the proposed
budget, that would represent about $137 million, less than a third of
the amount now proposed for cybersecurity and less than a third law
enforcement funding in 2009 and 2010.
Unlike the other programs called out in legislation, terrorism
prevention and law enforcement have somehow disappeared. There is no
line item, no set-aside, and no separate program. Unlike the past
practice where an LETPP amount was separately designated for each
State, now only 2 programs appear--the State grant program and UASI.
Following Paris and San Bernardino, LETPP is gone at a time when it is
needed more than ever before.
funding consistency and continuity
The process used by DHS to determine UASI funding continues to be
both vexing and contradictory. For many of the major cities it has been
a roller coaster ride of ups and downs. Police chiefs cannot even
consider a preparedness budget when they do not know if they are ``in
or out''. Take the case of Las Vegas, obviously an iconic terrorist
target with more and more venues growing each year. But according to
the formula process, Las Vegas is a threat some years and not others.
We would ask the committee to investigate how these decisions are made,
in order to ensure consistency and continuity for preparedness planning
in the years to come.
investment and sustainment
Official reports indicate that Congress has invested upwards of $40
billion across the Nation since DHS was established. As you look
forward into 2017, I would suggest to the committee that you also look
back on what you have already invested. I have been with the Atlanta
Police Department every day since the September 11 attacks and I have
witnessed all that DHS has done to help my department and our
community. These efforts were never planned as one-time events.
Baseline capabilities were reached, Federal standards were satisfied--
but it's my job to ensure that these preparedness capabilities are
sustained. I cannot do so if the proposed cuts were to be approved by
Congress.
An example of a success partnership is our work with TSA and other
DHS components at the Atlanta Airport. The world's busiest airport, the
Hartsfield Jackson Airport is protected by Atlanta personnel in a team
effort with DHS that includes a model canine program we conduct with
TSA.
Sustainment is an on-going challenge. Exercises must be repeated
for new and changing personnel. Equipment must be serviced and updated.
Even batteries must be replaced. Virtually none of the DHS investments
will last indefinitely. Mr. Chairman, to sustain those capabilities
must be the highest priority for preparedness--the top priority of this
subcommittee. Much will be lost without adequate resources for
sustainment.
training and technical assistance
The September 11 attacks in New York and Washington, DC will always
serve as a tragic reminder of critical gaps. Communications is a major
responsibility for this subcommittee and it is a continuing challenge
for chiefs of police and sheriffs across the Nation. We should never
forget that hundreds of New York's first responders perished without
radio interoperability on September 11, 2001, and the agencies
responding to the Pentagon were likewise unable to communicate with
each other.
Investments in communications preparedness are also sustained by
training and technical assistance provided by DHS. I call your
attention to the DHS Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) which
falls under your jurisdiction. Atlanta and other major cities have
benefited greatly from efforts to sustain our mobile radio
capabilities. Boston officials reported that emergency communications
did not falter during the bombings, and attributed their success to
preparedness training, exercises and technical assistance. Atlanta area
agencies have received OEC training and technical assistance on
multiple occasions, attached as an appendix to my testimony, as a key
example of the important work of this subcommittee. While the
interoperable communications grant program came to an untimely end in
2010, we need to strengthen current communications capabilities and
migrate to new broadband technologies. We recommend that the
subcommittee continue to ensure that DHS has resources to sustain and
strengthen vital assistance programs such as OEC.
law enforcement intelligence and information sharing
We are grateful for the work of the Office of State and Local Law
Enforcement (OSLLE) at DHS. Congress established that office to
coordinate law enforcement activities and I can report to the
subcommittee that it fulfills the intent of Congress every day.
Likewise, we are working closely with the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis (I&A) to strengthen our partnership with DHS, especially
regarding the operation of our regional fusion centers.
In Georgia, we have had a number of militia cases and we are deeply
concerned about home-grown extremists. For this reason, we strongly
support DHS efforts to Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) and Major Cities
Chiefs will engage with DHS leadership to roll out CVE initiatives in
urban areas. To this end, Major Cities Chiefs has established a network
of Intelligence Commanders from every major urban area, working
together as our Criminal Intelligence Enterprise (CIE). Our
intelligence personnel have designed a common approach to threat
assessment and they share information to prepare and analyze similar
and common threats. We are grateful to DHS officials for their
partnership in this unprecedented endeavor to prevent and interdict the
terrorist threat in our communities.
the way forward
Chairman Donovan and Ranking Member Payne, chiefs of police are
grateful for all you do, and we look to you for leadership. To accept
the proposed 2017 cuts would forfeit so much of what you have invested
since the inception of DHS, and leave local agencies like my own to
fend for themselves while Federal agencies continue to grow.
As chiefs of police we know our common bond with you is the safety
of the public we have sworn to protect. To this end, we implore you to
restore balance to our partnership with DHS by protecting the funding
which sustains the work of this subcommittee.
Appendix A.--UASI Funding History
2009
UASI $798,631
SHSP $861,265
2010
UASI $832,520
SHSP $842,000
2011
UASI $662,662
SHSP $526,874
2012
UASI $490,376
SHSP $294,000
2013
UASI $558,745
SHSP $354,644
2014
UASI $587,000
SHSP $401,346
2015
UASI $587,000
SHSP $402,000
2016
UASI $580,000
SHSP $402,000
Proposed 2017
UASI $330,000
SHSP $200,000
Appendix B.--DHS Office of Emergency Communications Assistance to
Atlanta
July 2009.--Supported the development of an SOP for the Georgia
Interoperability Network (GIN). Representative of Atlanta attended and
provided comments on the draft (Held in Athens, GA).
May 2010.--Performed a Communications Unit Leader (COML) training
in downtown Atlanta. Included attendees from various disciplines.
July 2010.--Performed an engineering coverage assessment for the
State including the Atlanta Metropolitan area.
August 2011.--Presented an overview of the National
Interoperability Field Operations Guide (NIFOG) and its underlying
principles to 60 attendees in the Atlanta Metropolitan area from
various disciplines.
August 2012.--Presented an overview of the National
Interoperability Field Operations Guide (NIFOG) and its underlying
principles to over 70 attendees in the Atlanta Metropolitan area.
September 2012 to April 2013.--Worked with personnel from the city
of Atlanta to update their current Tactical Interoperable
Communications Plan and then utilized the components of that plan to
develop a Communications Field Operations Guide for the Atlanta
Metropolitan area.
April 2013.--Performed a Communications Unit Leader (COML) Train-
the-Trainer course in downtown Atlanta. This training is intended to
build a cadre of instructors who are locally-based across the State so
that the State may carry out their own COML courses.
June 2013.--Carried out a Public Safety Communications Center
Operations Workshop in the city of Atlanta attended by and focused on
personnel from public safety answering points (PSAPs) and dispatch
centers across the State and city of Atlanta.
August 2015.--Performed a pilot delivery of the All-Hazards
Incident Communications Center Manager Training, designed to prepare
COMLs and Dispatch Supervisors and public safety communication
professionals for managing all functions in the Incident Communications
Center.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Chief Turner. The Chair now
recognizes Mr. Sena.
STATEMENT OF MIKE SENA, DIRECTOR, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA REGIONAL
INTELLIGENCE CENTER, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL
FUSION CENTER ASSOCIATION
Mr. Sena. Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and
Members of the subcommittee, I would like to thank you very
much for inviting me to speak on behalf of the National Fusion
Center Association. FBI Director Comey testified last month
that there were more than 1,000 active home-grown violent
extremism investigations across the United States. In light of
that, the President's fiscal year 2017 budget request for FEMA
preparedness grants left us scratching our heads. I want to
share some of the reasons why the proposal doesn't make sense.
Last month, more than 100 million Americans watched Super
Bowl 50. The game was played in Santa Clara, which falls in my
fusion center's area of responsibility. With the Santa Clara
Police Department in the lead, our fusion center played a
central role, coordinating with all public safety partners in
protecting the Bay Area Super Bowl venues. Thousands of law
enforcement, fire, EMS, critical infrastructure security, and
private-sector personnel from all surrounding jurisdictions and
at all levels of government had access to interoperable video,
voice, and data capabilities in one communications platform. We
all were looking at the same common operating picture, with
suspicious activity reports, positive license plate reader
hits, and threats popping up in real time for analysis and
response.
Our fusion center was able to give the National Operations
Center at DHS headquarters here in the District of Columbia the
exact same view throughout the event to ensure real-time
situational awareness. Most of this capacity was built with
UASI and SHSGP grant funds provided through our Governor's
Office of Emergency Services, led by Mark Ghilarducci.
The Wisconsin State-wide Information Center has trained
thousands of fusion liaison officers, also called terrorism
liaison officers, across the State in how to recognize and
report suspicious activity. Privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties considerations are a centerpiece of the training, and
the result has been the establishment of a trusted information-
sharing network across the State. That same model has been
built at fusion centers across the country.
After the attacks in Paris, in my home town of San
Bernardino, suspicious activity reporting through the fusion
liaison network skyrocketed in Wisconsin and across the Nation.
Analysts at fusion centers have been able to quickly receive
those reports, vet them, and share information with the
appropriate partners, including the FBI. They are connecting
crucial data residing in State and local law enforcement
databases to the Terrorist Screening Center encounters. That
data would otherwise be out of reach for the FBI. It is now
routinely shared quickly through fusion centers.
Those capabilities in Wisconsin and across the country were
built on and are sustained through, today, the SHSGP and UASI
funds. At the Boston Regional Intelligence Center, or the BRIC,
9 positive investigative leads were generated over the past
year through analysis of publicly-posted social media. Three of
these leads resulted in FBI full field investigations. Two of
the leads, 1 to the FBI and 1 to the Rhode Island fusion
center, proved to be critical in investigation of ISIL-inspired
terrorists, leading to indictments by the U.S. Attorney's
Office. Nearly all of the BRIC's counterterrorism analytical
capabilities, which generate critical intelligence in these
cases, are supported by UASI funds.
Immediately after the San Bernardino terrorist attack,
analysts at the Joint Regional Intelligence Center, or JRIC,
were developing intelligence on suspects and sharing it
directly with the San Bernardino Police Department, sheriff's
office, and the FBI. An alert sheriff's deputy, who had
recently received training through the JRIC, called the fusion
center to report that an individual matching the description of
the person wanted in connection with providing weapons to the
shooters was about to check out of a local area hospital. The
fusion center immediately passed the information to the task
force that was about to launch a manhunt for the individual,
enabling them to call it off before it even started. Much of
that capacity of the JRIC, used every day in support of
criminal and terrorism investigations, was built and sustained
by UASI and SHSGP funding.
To be blunt, Mr. Chairman, any reduction in these grants,
let alone hollowing them out with a 50 percent cut, would be a
devastating blow to the capability built in this country for
threat detention, prevention, intelligence analysis, and
information sharing. It would be a repudiation of the reality
that everyone in public safety knows, that the State and local
data, intelligence and community relationships, are the
cornerstone of homeland security. Federal agencies, including
the FBI, are asking fusion centers for more information and
more partnerships and expect more capability all the time to
support their missions at the Federal level, including
terrorism.
Given all this, we have a hard time understanding why these
cuts were proposed. The examples above are just a few of
thousands of instances where my colleagues across the fusion
center network are doing difficult but critically important
work on behalf of the Federal taxpayers.
This committee has advanced some important legislation over
the past year that would strengthen fusion center partnerships
and capabilities. We hope that the Senate acts on those bills
soon. But I can tell you for sure that if the SHSGP and UASI
programs are cut, the objectives of those bills would be
impossible to achieve. Congress should reject the budget
request.
Mr. Chairman, now is the time to shore up those
capabilities we've built, not to tear them down. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sena follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mike Sena
March 15, 2016
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify on this important
topic. My name is Mike Sena and I am testifying today in my capacity as
president of the National Fusion Center association (NFCA). I am
currently the director of the Northern California Regional Intelligence
Center (NCRIC), one of the 78 fusion centers in the National Network of
Fusion Centers (National Network).
The President's fiscal year 2017 budget request for preparedness
grants was shocking to us and all of our public safety stakeholders. We
strongly oppose the drastic cuts because they would destroy
capabilities that have developed across the National Network of Fusion
Centers to rapidly gather, analyze, and share threat-related
information, especially information related to terror threats. If
Congress enacts the cuts into law, several fusion centers would likely
close. Many would continue to exist, but their missions would focus
almost exclusively on State and local priorities. This would create a
massive blindspot for Federal homeland security and counterterrorism
partners related to information gathering, analysis, and dissemination.
In other words, we would wipe out many of the gains in terrorism
prevention capabilities that have been built since 9/11 at a time when
the threat picture--according to every CT leader in the Federal
Government--has never been more dynamic.
Fusion centers bring together law enforcement, public safety, fire
service, emergency response, public health, critical infrastructure and
key resources (CIKR) interests, and private sector security personnel
to understand local implications of National intelligence, as well as
add State and local information and context to Federal intelligence,
thus enabling local, State, and Federal officials to better protect our
communities from terrorism and other criminal threats.
Federal support to fusion centers includes assignment of
intelligence officers and analysts, technical assistance, training and
exercises, linkage to key information systems, grant funding, and
security clearances. These tools add critical value to the resources
committed by State and local governments to make the National Network a
foundation of homeland security information sharing. Over the past
several years, the State and local share of budget resources allocated
to fusion centers has grown substantially. In fact, State and local
governments now provide well over half of all operating funding for
fusion centers.
Still, Federal support through FEMA Preparedness Grants--primarily
the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and Urban Areas
Security Initiative (UASI)--remains essential. State and local budget
models vary widely across the National Network--from nearly 100 percent
grant funded to nearly 100 percent State- or local-funded. The
administration's proposal to cut SHSGP by 57 percent, and UASI by 45
percent, would have a devastating impact on our ability to keep our
States and Nation safe.
SHSGP dollars have helped establish and maintain Terrorism Liaison
Officer (TLO) or Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO) networks throughout the
country. Through these efforts, fusion centers have trained tens of
thousands of first responders Nation-wide regarding appropriate
recognition and reporting of suspicious activity with full recognition
of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties requirements. These are
the individuals walking beats, responding to incidents, working around
critical infrastructure sites, and developing relationships in every
community every day. The TLO/FLO networks have helped to enhance our
ability to share critical threat information by increasing our
dissemination capabilities across our States, thus building a trusted
information-sharing network. The information shared among these
networks includes Officer Safety Bulletins, BOLOs, cybersecurity
alerts, intelligence products, and numerous other informational
products that further enhance our ability to keep our States safe. Our
Federal partners often leverage this dissemination network to get
critical threat information into the hands of State and locals.
Preparedness grant funds have also helped to improve dramatically
our analytic capabilities across the country. Fusion centers provide
local context and information to Terrorist Screening Center encounters,
many times providing critical intelligence from State and local
databases that is unavailable to our Federal partners. We also provide
critical case support to criminal investigations that are transnational
in nature, which in turn enhances our ability to provide these same
services during a major criminal or terrorist event. Everything we do
each day hones our ability to gather information from the field,
rapidly analyze it, rapidly share it, and rapidly disseminate important
information.
In short, the capabilities and relationships that we exercise daily
in support of criminal investigative purposes are identical to those
required for dealing with issues of Federal consequence like a
terrorist attack. Preparedness grants helped build this capacity, and
this capacity is put at risk by the fiscal year 2017 budget request.
Following are a few of the hundreds of examples across the country
of how FEMA preparedness grants are enabling fusion centers to
contribute to homeland security and public safety.
In 2014/2015, 9 positive investigative leads were generated by the
Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC) through analysis of publicly
posted social media. The postings exhibited behaviors indicative of
terrorist radicalization specifically related to ISIL. Three of these
leads resulted in FBI ``full field'' investigations, and 1 preliminary
investigation. Additionally, 2 of the leads, 1 to the FBI, and 1 to the
Rhode Island Fusion Center, proved to be critical during an
investigation of ISIL-inspired terrorists, leading to indictments by
the U.S. Attorney's Office.
Fusion centers have also used grant funds to establish, maintain,
and enhance cyber threat coordination programs. Given persistent cyber
threats and the threat of home-grown violent extremism, these funds are
essential in building, maturing, and sustaining capacity across the
country. For instance, the Alabama Fusion Center recently added a cyber
mission and has conducted a Cyber Liaison Officer (CLO) training event
where they brought together over 40 law enforcement, DOD, academia and
private-sector professionals to discuss our mission, collaborate on
cybersecurity, and gain a better understanding of the roles we all have
in cybersecurity awareness, reporting, analysis, and investigation.
This training could not have happened without the SHSGP grant awarded
to Alabama.
At the Southwest Texas Fusion Center in San Antonio, FEMA
Preparedness Grants are used by the fusion center to fund a platform to
coordinate and exchange intel with fusion centers' FLO networks, add
functionality to tactical operations centers where fusion partners are
exchanging all calls/all hazards information, provide joint law
enforcement and fire department training on event planning and other
media-driven events like active shooters, develop an advanced
capability to house requests for information and intelligence, critical
intelligence reports, and SARs, and maintain technology subscriptions
and hardware used in delivering intelligence to fusion partners and the
FLO network.
In Austin, Texas the Austin Regional Intelligence Center invests
FEMA Preparedness Grant funding to support continual enhancement of
analytical capabilities. This includes systems that enable analysts to
utilize the latest technology to analyze open sources for threats to
the Austin region as well as gather information on large events that
could impact LE resources, provide a local context and information to
Terrorist Screening Center encounters often from State and local
databases that are unavailable to our Federal partners, and provide
critical case support to criminal investigations.
The proposed cuts to the FEMA Preparedness Grants would result in
the loss of analysts who are subject-matter experts in a number of
topics that include terrorism, human trafficking, and critical
infrastructure protection. Additionally, much of the infrastructure we
have worked to establish by way of software and other technology we use
to accomplish analytical tasks would not likely be possible to
maintain.
Most recently my center played a key role in the facilitation of
communication between local, State, and Federal agencies during Super
Bowl 50 in the San Francisco Bay Area. This was no easy task, but
because UASI grant funds have enabled our investment in various
technological capabilities, we were prepared to identify potential
situations and empower security personnel to rapidly coordinate and
respond. For instance, we deployed equipment that provided real-time
collaboration and communications capabilities among all stakeholders
including law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services, hospitals,
and private entities including the NFL on any device that was being
used by that particular agency. I know interoperability has been an
important issue for this committee, and with the capabilities we
acquired using UASI funds, we were able to make that happen in reality
during the Super Bowl. Additionally, as you can imagine, we had an
enormous amount of data coming in from all agencies involved with a
security or emergency response component. Using software capability
acquired using UASI grant dollars, we were able to rapidly filter and
analyze that data for potential threats and make that information
instantly available to all security stakeholders through a common
operating picture. Without UASI funding, I do not believe that we would
have been able to bring the same level of confidence in the security
and preparedness that we had for Super Bowl 50.
Last year across the network, fusion centers processed thousands of
requests for information (RFIs) which supported criminal investigations
from homicide, human trafficking, and narcotics to terrorism-related
cases and all things in between. Hundreds of those requests were from
our Federal partners, which demonstrates how integral State and local
data and intelligence is to the Federal Government's ability to
identify, investigate, and prevent threats.
No other organizational structure can provide faster or more
efficient access to State and local information that may support
National counterterrorism investigations, or enable faster or more
efficient situational awareness across relevant jurisdictions than that
of the National Network of Fusion Centers. Each fusion center has
methods of distribution across local, regional, and State-wide
technical and personal networks that Federal investigative and
intelligence agencies could not possibly build or maintain with their
own resources.
To ensure that grant funding is being used for its intended
purpose, the NFCA has joined other law enforcement associations on a
letter to Congress urging that the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention
Activities (LETP) requirement in the Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 110-53) be strengthened. The
law requires that 25% of SHSGP and UASI funding be used for ``law
enforcement terrorism prevention activities'' and specifies some of
those types of activities including support for fusion centers. While
States have latitude to allocate funding according to risk and
priorities, we agree with the intent of the 2007 law and believe that
terrorism prevention activities should be constant priorities,
especially as grant funds have declined over the past 5 years. The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found in its November 2014
report on information sharing and fusion centers that in 2012 States
inaccurately categorized about $60 million in projects as ``related to
fusion centers'' when in fact those funds did not support fusion
centers. As we have suggested in our letter to Congress, requiring a
Governor-designated State law enforcement executive to review the LETP
portion of grant plans would help to ensure those funds truly support
terrorism prevention activities.
Thanks to fusion centers we are sharing more information more
effectively than ever before. This is happening despite the fact that
no single entity has the authority to enforce effective information-
sharing practices. Because of the decentralized nature of public safety
in America, policies on sharing information cannot be dictated by any
one organization. Common policies and practices have been developed by
consensus through multilateral and interagency policy bodies--including
the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) and the
Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) and must be
continually reinforced through day-to-day engagements between Federal,
State, and local partners. As you might imagine, this is
extraordinarily difficult to achieve in practice, but we have made
excellent progress and are continuing to build on that progress. We are
assisted in this work by the program manager for the information-
sharing environment (PM-ISE), which provides critical leadership and
resources enabling development of standards across multiple law
enforcement and intelligence stakeholders. Congress should bolster
support for the PM-ISE function to ensure this coordination can
continue.
The National Network of Fusion Centers has come a long way since
this committee's 2013 report called for the development of a National
Strategy for the National Network of Fusion Centers. We worked with
various stakeholders to develop and publish our National strategy in
2014, and continue to develop the implementation plan that will
prioritizes our actions through 2017 to achieve objectives under the
strategy. In addition, this committee's 2013 report called for a
Federal strategy to support the National Network of Fusion Centers.
Working together with our Federal partners, we identified a dozen
initiatives that will be joint priorities over the next several years.
For the first time, there is a clear Federal strategy that directly
supports the State and locally-driven National Network.
I am still often asked whether fusion centers duplicate the FBI's
JTTFs. Given the extensive work done by this committee, you understand
this difference, but I must reiterate the differences. As you know,
JTTFs are Federally-run investigative bodies that support the FBI's
unique mission to investigate terrorism threats in this country. Fusion
centers play a much different role; they're not only information-
sharing hubs in States and metropolitan regions. Fusion centers are
where we train a cadre of terrorism liaison officers (TLOs), including
police officers, firefighters, EMS workers, and our private-sector
partners on indicators and warnings of terrorism. Fusion centers have
the ability to catalogue critical infrastructure in each State and
region and analyze incoming suspicious activity reports (SARs) against
the National threat picture and against what we know about our critical
infrastructure. We have the ability to then rapidly share information
and intelligence among the entire National Network and with the FBI and
DHS.
A case in point occurred during the lead-up to President Obama's
second inauguration. In the National Capitol Region, multiple fire
departments received suspicious inquiries about fire and EMS stations,
equipment, and operations. These inquiries consisted of in person and
email individuals asking how one becomes a volunteer and what it would
take to drive a fire truck or other emergency vehicle. The incidences
were submitted to the Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center
and SARs were developed. Working with our Federal partners, it was
determined that the same individual was involved in all the instances,
and an emergency intelligence bulletin was developed. Without the
analytical training and close working relationships that we have with
developed with our first responder partners--through the Northern
Virginia Regional Intelligence Center in this case--the pieces of this
puzzle could have very easily not have been put together.
But often that SAR information has no nexus to terrorism. It's
about drug dealing or gang activity or firearms trafficking or mortgage
fraud. So the all-crimes approach gives us the ability to analyze that
information and funnel it to the right place. And we know that,
sometimes, information that at first blush appears to be criminal in
nature--the Torrance, California gas station robberies, the smuggling
of cigarettes in North Carolina, the sale of pseudoephedrine in
California--actually is linked to terrorist activity. It does not make
sense to try to separate crime and terror in our daily work of
analyzing threat information and criminal activity. We have to knock
that wall down. If we're going to continue to improve, we have to
understand that the sharing of information makes communities safer. Our
ultimate goal is to prevent terrorism. But in every community across
the country there are violent crimes that terrorize neighborhoods and
families and affect lives and businesses every day. Fusion centers are
uniquely situated to do things that JTTFs or no other program can do.
And FEMA Preparedness Grants ensure that these advances are maintained.
In another example from the Boston Regional Intelligence Center,
last year the BRIC received information that on-line harassment and
threats were made by individuals who were scheduled to attend the
Pokemon World Championship being held at the Haynes Convention Center.
The convention center notified the BRIC of this threat because of its
long-standing partnership. BRIC analysis and the sharing of information
with other agencies enabled quick validation of the threat. Extra
precautions were put in place immediately, and as a result, the
individuals making threats were arrested at the event. Found in their
vehicle were multiple weapons with hundreds of rounds of ammunition.
UASI funding helped to build those capabilities and sustains them
today. Without it--or with a 50% cut--these capabilities would likely
be destroyed.
I would like thank this committee for its work on improving
information sharing, and strengthening the mission of the National
Network of Fusion Centers. This committee has advanced 3 bills through
the House that would provide critical tools to aid in our abilities to
keep the Nation safe. Specifically, H.R. 3598, the Fusion Center
Enhancement Act, sponsored by Congressman Barletta, H.R. 3503, the DHS
Support to Fusion Centers Act, sponsored by Congresswoman McSally, and
most recently, H.R. 4401, the Amplifying Local Efforts to Root out
Terrorism Act, sponsored by Congressman Loudermilk. You have done your
job to move these bills forward, and hope your Senate colleagues
consider these bills as soon as possible.
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the National Fusion Center Association,
thank you for inviting me to testify today. I commend your focus on
ensuring that State and local governments receive the support necessary
through the FEMA Preparedness Grants to keep our Nation safe. Federal,
State, and local agencies must continue to be partners in this dynamic
threat environment. We look forward to continuing to work closely with
the committee to help meet those expectations.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Sena. The Chair now recognizes
Sergeant Kierce.
STATEMENT OF W. GREG KIERCE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT & HOMELAND SECURITY, JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY
Mr. Kierce. Chairman Donovan, Members of the committee, on
behalf of Jersey City Mayor Steven M. Fulop, I wish to extend
my sincere appreciation to Congressman Donald M. Payne, Jr.,
and Members of the committee for the opportunity to appear
before you this morning.
The intent of the Urban Area Security Initiative program is
to enhance regional preparedness in major metropolitan areas.
The UASI program provides funding to address the unique
multidiscipline planning operations, equipment, and training
and exercise needs of high-threat high-density urban areas and
to assist in building and sustaining capabilities related to
terrorism prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and
recovery.
The Jersey City-Newark UASI includes Jersey City, Newark,
as well as the counties of Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Middlesex,
Morris, Passaic, and Union. The mission of the Jersey City UASI
is to ensure the sustainment and enhancement of
counterterrorism capabilities and planning and responding to
natural and man-made disasters. According to the FBI and the
director of the national intelligence, the United States faces
a significant and growing threat from individuals in this
country who are willing to conduct domestic mass casualty
attacks inspired by terrorist ideology. In fact, the DNI has
said he anticipates ISIS-inspired attacks within the United
States in the year ahead.
The threat of violent extremism poses a great risk to the
Jersey City-Newark UASI region due to its dense population,
geographic importance, and target-rich environment. The total
population associated with the Jersey City-Newark UASI is
approximately 4,792,594, which equates to more than half of the
entire population of the State of New Jersey, making this
region one of the most densely-populated areas in the United
States.
In the middle of all this is a section of the New Jersey
Turnpike in Union and Essex Counties that run through what the
FBI and Government officials from New Jersey have dubbed the
most dangerous 2 miles in America for terrorist targets. This
area includes the largest port on the East Coast, Newark
Airport, major rail lines, densely-populated cities, and
chemical and petroleum plants. Former director of the New
Jersey Office of Security and Preparedness Charlie McKenna
described it best: ``If you want to make New Jersey the heart
of America or the heart of the northeast, the Turnpike is the
aorta.''
The Jersey City-Newark UASI region ranks 7 in the top 10
UASIs, based on DHS vulnerability and threats assessments. In
addition to Port Newark and Newark Airport, the region is home
to rail lines, bridges, and tunnels to New York City. Wall
Street and other financial service firms house important front
and back operations, including clearance and settlement
services and other operations essential to the functioning of
America's capital marketing, in Jersey City and Newark.
Since 2002, funding provided through the Department of
Homeland Security Urban Area Security Initiative has afforded
Tier 1 UASI regions to accomplish the following 10 goals. Goal
1 is strengthen CBRNE preparedness and response capabilities by
acquiring the necessary equipment, training, and other
resources needed by first responders to effectively detect,
interdict, and respond to acts of terrorism or accidents
involving CBRNE materials or agents.
No. 2, protect critical infrastructure and key resources
along the region based on a systemic process of identifying and
cataloguing infrastructure, conducting site visits and risk
assessments, investing in target-hardening projects, and
providing additional protective mitigation measures based on
the current threat level.
No. 3, strengthen the information and sharing capabilities
through collaborative partnerships with Federal, State, and
local and private-sector stakeholders to better protect against
and respond to terrorist threats, both foreign and domestic,
incidents such as the active-shooter incidents.
No. 4, strengthen counterterrorism and law enforcement
capabilities by continuing to improve our counterterrorism
operations and partnerships across the region and by building
specialized capabilities to address threats and acts of
terrorism.
No. 5, enhance emergency management and response
capabilities through the implementation of a proactive posture
to prepare for the worst-case catastrophic scenarios at all
levels of government.
No. 6, advance interoperability emergency communications
through the efficient utilization and development of
communication resources and procedures to ensure that our first
responders can effectively communicate with each other during a
major incident in order to protect lives and property.
No. 7, promote citizen and community preparedness by better
preparing the Jersey City-Newark UASI region citizens and
communities to be ready for disasters and other emergencies,
including the ability to sustain themselves for 7 to 10 days
after an event to assist their neighborhoods in the aftermath
of a disaster.
No. 8, build back better from disasters and become more
resilient against future events through thoughtful resiliency
planning and by developing long-term recovery capabilities,
mitigation initiatives, and other efforts to ensure the
continuity of critical systems during a crisis.
No. 9, support health and emergency preparedness by
readying the Jersey City-Newark UASI for a potential pandemic,
and preparing local communities to distribute medical
countermeasures on a large scale, supporting the ability of the
health care community to surge bed capacity and other resources
to manage large numbers of sick and injured during an incident.
No. 10, enhance community security capabilities through
outreach and education, as well as by implementing programs and
policies to prevent, protect, and respond to, recover from
cyber attacks or other major cyber incidents in collaboration
with key partners and stakeholders.
The proposed cuts to DHS UASI funding would have a
significant negative impact on our UASI region's disaster
preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. Hurricane Sandy
and the continued threat of home-grown terrorism demonstrate
how we must remain vigilant and prepared. Threats from
terrorism and response and recovery efforts associated with
natural disasters will not diminish because of the proposed
budget cuts to the DHS UASI program. Even in the current fiscal
climate we do not have the luxury of making significant
reductions to our capabilities without placing our Nation at
risk. If we continue to prepare for, respond to, and recover
from evolving threats and disasters, we will need sufficient
resources to sustain and adapt our capabilities accordingly.
In closing, I wish to offer a quote from your colleague and
Ranking Member committee Member, Congressman Donald M. Payne,
Jr. These grants are essential to making New Jersey a safer
place for families to live and work, and they are critical to
bringing economic security to the State. Following Hurricane
Sandy, it is clear that we need to invest more to prepare for
disasters and mitigate casualties as well as reduce the
economic damages that result from these tragedies.
Thank you for affording me the opportunity to appear before
you today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kierce follows:]
Prepared Statement of W. Greg Kierce
March 15, 2016
Chairman Donovan and Members of the committee: On behalf of Jersey
City Mayor Steven M. Fulop I wish to extend my sincere appreciation to
Congressman Donald M. Payne Jr. and Members of the committee for the
opportunity to appear before you this morning.
The intent of the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program is
to enhance regional preparedness in major metropolitan areas.
The UASI program provides funding to address the unique multi-
discipline planning, operations, equipment, and training and exercise
needs of high-threat, high-density urban areas and to assist in
building and sustaining capabilities related to terrorism prevention,
protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.
The Jersey City/Newark UASI includes Jersey City and Newark, as
well as the counties of Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Middlesex, Morris,
Passaic, and Union. The mission of the Jersey City/Newark UASI is to
ensure the sustainment and enhancement of counterterrorism capabilities
and planning for and responding to natural and man-made disasters.
According to the FBI and the director of national intelligence--the
United States faces a significant and growing threat from individuals
in this country who are willing to conduct domestic mass casualty
attacks inspired by terrorist ideology. In fact, the DNI has said he
anticipates ISIS-inspired attacks within the United States in the year
ahead. The threat of violent extremism poses a great risk to the Jersey
City/Newark UASI region due to its dense population, geographic
importance, and target-rich environment.
The total population associated with the Jersey City/Newark UASI is
approximately 4,792,594 which equates to more than half of the entire
population of the State of New Jersey making this region one of the
most densely-populated areas in the United States.
In the middle of it all is a section of the NJ Turnpike in Union
and Essex counties that runs through what the FBI and Government
officials from New Jersey have dubbed ``the most dangerous 2 miles in
America'' for terrorist targets.
This area includes the largest port on the East Coast, Newark
Airport, major rail lines, densely-populated cities and chemical and
petroleum plants.
Former director of the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security &
Preparedness Charlie McKenna described it best ``If you want to make
New Jersey the heart of America or the heart of the Northeast, the
Turnpike is its aorta.''
The Jersey City/Newark UASI region ranks 7 in the top 10 UASI
Regions based on DHS vulnerability and threats assessments.
In addition to Port Newark and Newark Airport, the region is home
to rail lines, bridges, and tunnels to New York City.
Wall Street and other financial service firms house important front
and back office operations, including clearance and settlement services
and other operations essential to the functioning of America's capital
marketing in Jersey City and Newark.
Since 2002, funding provided through the Department of Homeland
Security Urban Area Security Initiative has afforded ``Tier 1 UASI
regions'' to accomplish the following 10 goals;
Goal 1.--Strengthen CBRNE Preparedness and Response Capabilities by
acquiring the necessary equipment, training, and other resources needed
by first responders to effectively detect, interdict, and respond to
acts of terrorism or accidents involving CBRNE materials or agents.
Goal 2.--Protect Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources across
the region based on a systematic process of identifying and cataloging
infrastructure, conducting site visits and risk assessments, investing
in target hardening projects, and providing additional protective and
mitigation measures based on the current threat environment.
Goal 3.--Strengthen Intelligence and Information Sharing
Capabilities through collaborative partnerships with Federal, State,
local, and private-sector stakeholders to better protect against and
respond to terrorist threats, both foreign and domestic, and other
incidents, such as active-shooter situations.
Goal 4.--Strengthen Counter-Terrorism and Law Enforcement
Capabilities by continuing to improve our counter-terrorism operations
and partnerships across the region and by building specialized
capabilities to address threats and acts of terrorism.
Goal 5.--Enhance Emergency Management and Response Capabilities
through the implementation of a proactive posture to prepare for worst-
case/catastrophic scenarios at all levels of government.
Goal 6.--Advance Interoperable and Emergency Communications through
the efficient utilization and development of communication resources
and procedures to ensure that our first responders can effectively
communicate with each other during a major incident in order to protect
lives and property.
Goal 7.--Promote Citizen and Community Preparedness by better
preparing Jersey City/Newark UASI Region citizens and communities to be
ready for disasters and other emergencies, including the ability to
sustain themselves for 7 to 10 days after an event and to assist their
neighborhoods in the aftermath of a disaster.
Goal 8.--Build Back Better from Disasters and Become More Resilient
Against Future Events through thoughtful resiliency planning and by
developing long-term recovery capabilities, mitigation initiatives, and
other efforts to ensure the continuity of critical systems during a
crisis.
Goal 9.--Support Health Emergency Preparedness by readying the
Jersey City/Newark UASI Region for a potential pandemic and preparing
local communities to distribute medical countermeasures on a large
scale, and supporting the ability of the health care community to surge
bed capacity and other resources to manage large numbers of sick or
injured during any incident.
Goal 10.--Enhance Cyber Security Capabilities though outreach and
education as well as by implementing programs and policies to prevent,
protect against, respond to, and recover from cyber attacks or other
major cyber incidents in collaboration with key partners and
stakeholders.
The proposed cuts to DHS UASI funding would have significant,
negative impacts on our UASI regions disaster preparedness, response,
and recovery efforts.
Hurricane Sandy and the continued threat of home-grown terrorism
demonstrate how we must remain vigilant and prepared. Threats from
terrorism and response and recovery efforts associated with natural
disasters will not diminish because of proposed budget cuts to DHS UASI
program.
Even in this current fiscal climate, we do not have the luxury of
making significant reductions to our capabilities without placing our
Nation at risk.
If we are to continue to prepare for, respond to, and recover from
evolving threats and disasters, we will need sufficient resources to
sustain and adapt our capabilities accordingly.
In closing I wish to offer a quote from your colleague and Ranking
committee Member Congressman Donald M. Payne:
``These grants are essential to making New Jersey a safer place for
families to live and work, and they are critical to bringing economic
security to the state. Following Hurricane Sandy, it is clear that we
need to invest more to prepare for disasters and mitigate casualties as
well as reduce the economic damage that results from these tragedies.''
Thank you for affording me this opportunity to appear before you
today.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Sergeant Kierce. I now recognize
myself for questions. I will ask all of you if you could just
comment on this. I asked the mayor in the first panel the same
question. I would ask all of you just to give me your opinion
on this.
Secretary Johnson is going to be testifying before the full
committee tomorrow on the Department of Homeland Security's
fiscal year 2017 budget request. What message would each of you
give to the Secretary about these proposed cuts?
Mr. Butterworth. You could just go down the panel. Just
your opinion.
Mr. Butterworth. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think
the year-over-year investment has historically, especially
since 2011, has been in somewhat of a decline. We have seen in
recent years a holding steady, and that reflects very much a
maintenance mode that we are in. We are not capable of
expanding in the current environment from the local level to
the State level. But the maintenance that we are doing, the
recurring maintenance on a 2- to 3-year basis is critical. To
further decrease those funds would change that cycle from a 2-
to 3-year refreshment of any number of different forms of
training, resources, hardware, to a 5- to 6-year cycle. I think
those types of things, the wrong time right now to do that
based on the current threat level.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, sir.
Chief.
Chief Kerr. Thank you. I really would like to echo what Mr.
Butterworth said, that the threat is still changing, the threat
is still increasing, and yet we are going to cut back the
funding that allows us to prepare and respond to those events.
I have just a couple of numbers here that I wanted to repeat.
Fifty-one percent of all fire departments that answered a
survey conducted by NFPA do not have enough portable radios to
equip all emergency responders on a shift. This percentage is
down from 77 percent in 2001. Fifty-one percent is still way
too high.
So it just proves that the grants are working, but we have
to continue to be aggressive and assertive at making sure that
things like that are not happening across the country.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Chief.
Mr. Sena. I am sorry, Chief Turner. I am sorry.
Chief Turner. Just really quick, sir, I would just echo
both Chief Kerr and also Mr. Butterworth's comments. But I
would just say this: We have to continue to build on our
partnerships. If we are in a partnership, we have to provide
the funding that is necessary for us to sustain what we are
doing in the local areas. Then to take that further, as we
continue to move into a different space, that technology
continues to change, we have to be able to expand our network
of intelligence, and we have to do that with funding at the
local level.
Mr. Donovan. Chief, you will be assured that we will relay
your message to the Secretary tomorrow.
Mr. Sena.
Mr. Sena. Sir, since September 11, we have built the
capacity across the country that we have never had before in
information sharing and fusion centers, data collection. All
this capacity relies on grant funding to be effective. Although
the State and local agencies that support and own fusion
centers have given over half the money that goes toward fusion
centers, we still need that support. It seems like every day we
get farther away from September 11, I feel like they want to
bring us back to September 10. There are too many lives that
have been lost. We can't go there. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, sir.
Sergeant.
Mr. Kierce. Just to echo my colleagues, and I think too the
fact that we are fighting an unconventional level of domestic
terrorism today shows the need that we have to at least sustain
these grants at current levels. I would hope that Director
Johnson fully understands, after hearing from my colleagues
today and your folks, that we have to maintain this level of
readiness.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Sergeant. I also would like to ask
each of you to comment on how FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate
had noted that the skills attained with these grants and
programs are perishable, and that we have to constantly plan,
train, exercise, refresh equipment, as you have pointed out, to
ensure that we don't lose the capabilities that we have gained
since September 11, 2001.
Would you be able to continue the training that you have
been able to do so far with personnel in the absence of any
Federal funding or in the absence of the funding that is being
proposed to be cut?
Mr. Butterworth. The short answer is no, sir, we would not.
We would have to drastically reduce the recurrence of that
training and basically do more with less. We fully understand
the idea of caps and the necessity to find efficiencies. I
would submit to you, Mr. Chairman, that we have done that. The
National Emergency Management Association, emergency managers
across the country, and Homeland Security advisers as well,
have found ways to do that. To further task the team with that
would definitely get to the point of increasing the adversarial
opportunities.
Mr. Donovan. My time is running out. I suspect that that
would be true with all of you with purchasing and maintaining
the equipment that you need to protect the jurisdictions which
you are responsible to protect. Would that be accurate to say?
Chief Kerr. I will just say that is absolutely accurate. I
totally endorse Administrator Fugate's remarks about losing
that capability and the capacity. It is really important that
we maintain that and even build upon that.
Mr. Donovan. Chief Turner, you were going to say something?
Chief Turner. Yes. I will just add that our problem is the
attrition that we face. How do we train our individuals to get
to the level that we need them to be? Without these funds, we
fall short of that. We are doing everything we can to partner
with our local and State partners and Federal partners. But the
challenge with maintaining that becomes difficult without
funds.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you very much, Chief.
As I said, my time has run out. The Chair now recognizes
the gentleman from New Jersey, the Ranking Member, Mr. Payne,
for questions.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This question is for
all the witnesses as well. As I mentioned in my opening
statement, I am concerned about the administration's proposal
to cut the existing homeland security grant programs and divert
funding to programs we know little about. Has DHS engaged with
you on this vision for either the Regional Competitive Grant
Program or the Countering Violent Extremist grants to this
date? Are there thoughts or concerns about either program you
would like to share with the committee? Mr. Butterworth.
Mr. Butterworth. Yes, sir. Thank you, Ranking Member Payne.
I appreciate the opportunity to comment on both of those. No.
1, we have not been contacted directly about the competitive
grants. Quite frankly, how that process would play out remains
a bit of a mystery at our level. To transition to the CVE
program, we saw the value with our deputy director of Homeland
Security in Georgia. We began conversations several months ago
to have discussions about the countering violent extremism,
where it would be placed, what level would be appropriate. We
have built a program in Georgia, and we are excited to see the
opportunity.
We are encouraged by the investment that Congress and the
administration has made to the end of countering violent
extremism. We look forward to the opportunity of a productive
conversation. But to this point, unfortunately, we haven't had
those at the Federal level. We continue to do that at the State
level, and look forward to those conversations. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Chief Kerr. I would echo the fact that there have not been
any conversations and we have not been consulted or asked what
we think about that or how it could be more effective. I would
just say that, you know, at this time, it is so important that
we are involved in our destiny and involved in how we can best
prepare our responders, who then in turn can best protect the
community. We can't do that if we don't know what is happening
and we don't know where the funding is going to come from.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Chief Turner. I would just simply say this, that through
Major City Chiefs, I do not believe that we have been
approached and briefed. Then second, as it relates to the CVE,
I think that one thing that we have done, we have to continue
to celebrate our diversity, as we do in Atlanta. But the
question is is how we work more aggressively with those
communities. We do that through community policing initiatives.
We will need additional funds to be able to expand the programs
that we put in place.
Atlanta is the third-most visited city in America, most
diverse city in the South. It is clear for us that we have got
to do more than less, and being able to communicate with all
the various different communities.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Sena. Sir, CVE is a big core of what fusion centers do,
and what we are built to do is to identify those threats. We
haven't been consulted on this project or this grant proposal
for a program. It is one of those things that we don't want to
see the current situation where the grants we are looking at
are being cut for a new program that we know nothing about. We
know what we are doing here as far as that coordination and
effort. We need to expand that and we need more resources to do
it. But I am in great fear that they will be taking money from
one side to fund another side that we know nothing about.
Mr. Kierce. Pretty much echoing my colleagues, Congressman.
I think that we, through the UASI group, have had no
interaction with the Federal Government as far as how these new
programs are planned out. I think, you know, from the CVE
perspective, if that developed, that is home base, it is law
enforcement working within the community, knowing the people
that you serve, and developing relationships and ensuring that
the trust between law enforcement and the people that you serve
is there.
I think that we have to maintain--the current level of
readiness is critical. Depending on the local taxpayers to bear
the burden of substituting the dollars that we would be losing
by Homeland Security I think is just intolerable.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. I will yield back at this time.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
At this time the Chair recognizes Mr. Loudermilk from
Georgia.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize I
missed the earlier part of the committee. I was chairing
another committee hearing. But this is something very important
to me. I am going to direct my questions to my good friend Mr.
Butterworth, as we both served in the State Senate together. He
was also the adjutant general of the Georgia National Guard,
and now in his current position is fully aware of the emergency
preparedness, the status, and the threats that face the State
of Georgia.
Let me kind of summarize what we face here in Georgia. We
have the busiest airport in the world, Atlanta Hartsfield. We
have 130-plus medium- and small-sized airports throughout the
State, 2 of the busiest import-export ports in the Nation in
Savannah and Brunswick, Georgia. Atlanta is the headquarters of
many Fortune 500 companies. We also have the Center for Disease
Control in Atlanta, the home of several top research
universities, as well as the financial center of the southeast.
Weather is also a consideration in Georgia, as we are
susceptible to tornadoes, as well as hurricanes coming from the
Gulf Coast or the Atlantic Ocean.
Mr. Butterworth, with your knowledge of these, as well as
the growing threat that we face from terrorism, how significant
are these cuts in our ability to prepare and respond to whether
it is a natural disaster, violent extremism, or a target
against our citizens?
Mr. Butterworth. Thank you, Congressman. The first answer
is it is highly disastrous. The first thing I would say, it is
nice to see you. Thank you for the job that you do for Georgia
in representing us very, very well.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you.
Mr. Butterworth. We certainly appreciate your time in that
regard.
Detrimental would be another term that I would use. Urban
search and rescue teams would be cut in half. We currently have
15. K-9, or explosive ordnance disposal teams, we currently
have 9 in regional areas. Those will be cut in half, if not
larger. The Information Sharing and Analysis Center, the fusion
center in Georgia would largely go unfunded. Currently, we put
$1.4 million of Department of Homeland Security funds into that
facility. That would largely go unfunded because of other areas
that would have to be shored up, for lack of a better term. It
is highly detrimental to the end result.
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact. I was
encouraged in the earlier discussion, earlier panel,
Congressman, Mayor de Blasio used the term that we coined in
Georgia, ``if it ain't broke, don't fix it.'' I was encouraged
to hear him say that. I would also apply that to the EMAC
operation itself. EMAC would largely go unfunded as well.
As you know, if an area is impacted, it is typically not
defined in one State, it is across State borders in many cases.
There is the opportunity, as we saw in South Carolina last fall
with the flooding, we provided individuals specifically to help
them in the recovery process. All of those things would be
detrimentally impacted. We certainly would appreciate your help
in that regard. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you. It is interesting that you
brought up the fusion centers. Two weeks ago, we passed on the
House floor the ALERT Act, a bill that I authored, and that was
a strong bipartisan support in this committee, as well as no
opposition on the floor. The ALERT Act was in response to the
Task Force on Foreign Fighter Travel that I served on. When we
realized that we needed to have a force multiplier for our
Federal agencies regarding countering terrorism and CVE
efforts, and that our local law enforcement were perfectly
positioned to do that, but there were bureaucratic hurdles in
the way. The ALERT Act removed those bureaucratic hurdles, but
yet all of the training and resources would be funneled through
the fusion centers as the center.
So even though we are making great strides with providing
better engagement with local and State resources with our
Federal regarding terrorism, what I am understanding is if we
lose the funding for the fusion center, then none of this would
have any effect. Is that true?
Mr. Butterworth. Yes, sir. That is exactly true. The fusion
center is definitely the focal point for intelligence--
obviously, intelligence gathering, information sharing, and
analysis. I think that impact would basically force us to go
blind in many respects. I defer to my panel colleague Mr. Sena
in that regard, specifically on the fusion center topic. But we
would definitely be operating largely in the blind.
Mr. Loudermilk. Mr. Sena.
Mr. Sena. Yes, sir. Every year we train hundreds of
thousands of officers across the country on suspicious
behaviors, the things to look for. If we lost this funding,
that training wouldn't exist. We would not have the eyes and
ears of State and local law enforcement to support us in
gathering that information, nor would we have the training on
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections for the
folks on what they can legally collect. All that would be gone.
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chair.
Chief Turner.
Chief Turner. Thank you. I would just really add 2 things.
The funding from Homeland Security allowed us to do something
very unique in the city of Atlanta, and that is to begin the
stand-up of a video integration center that allows us to bring
cameras into one centralized location. Since that initial
funding, we have expanded that network of cameras above 6,000
cameras that come into one centralized location. It gives us
the kind of situational awareness that we need to make strong
decisions as we partner with GEMA and all of our Federal and
local agencies to deal with challenging issues.
As you know, we host the largest 10K road race in the
world. The Peachtree Road Race is a challenge for us in that we
entertain more than 60,000 runners and more than 300,000
spectators. How do you deal with that without the kind of
situational awareness that we need from programs that are
provided by the homeland security grants that we previously
received?
Mr. Loudermilk. Chief Kerr.
Chief Kerr. Thank you. I just wanted to add that, besides
all of your law enforcement personnel that are trained on
suspicious activity reporting and all those things, in Austin,
Texas, we are also a part of our fusion center, and we have a
member that sits on the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, and
that there are many more eyes out there that can be part of
like a threat liaison officer program. We wouldn't have those
things if we didn't have the funding and the support of the
Austin Regional Intelligence Center. I just wanted to add that
it is more than just our law enforcement people that are
helping, but there is firefighters out there that are your eyes
on the ground.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has
expired. I yield back. But I encourage our Members, it looks
like we have a lot of work to do to correct this problem.
Mr. Donovan. You are absolutely right. Just to continue in
the vein that you were just speaking, Chief Kerr, Chief Turner,
and Mr. Sena, last week the American Enterprise Institute
released a report that claims that fusion centers are redundant
to Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and that eliminating fusion
centers or incorporating them into JTTFs would strengthen State
and local information-sharing and intelligence activities.
Fusion centers, my understanding is, fusion centers serve
as a focal point for gathering and sharing vital homeland
security information between Federal Government, State, and
front-line law enforcement and first responders, including fire
service, as you said, Chief, emergency managers, public health,
as well as the private sector. The primary mission of the JTTFs
is to conduct terrorism-related investigations, which means the
ability to share information with first responders would be
limited because of the fear that leaked information could
compromise an open investigation.
So eliminating fusion centers or combining them with JTTFs
doesn't make sense to me. You are the experts. Have any of you
seen the AEI report? If you have, I would appreciate your
comments about their proposal. I open that up to the panel.
Mr. Sena. Sir, I did read the report and was as dumbfounded
as the budget. You know, this budget proposal doesn't make any
sense to us, and neither did the report. Very ill-informed. It
did not have the details in that report that show what fusion
centers really are. They are State and locally-owned and -
operated. As Chief Kerr reported, you know, it is more than
just law enforcement.
We have lots of folks that work with fusion centers. We
bring those people together, and we look at a broad range of
threats to our communities, everything from narcotics
trafficking to threats in the community, from criminal gangs
and organized crime groups. We don't know, and my experience
has been where are we going to find that CVE threat? Where are
we going to find the terrorist threats? Oftentimes I have found
them through regular criminal activity, or through sources of
information from criminal activity. That is the role of fusion
centers, to bring all those pieces together.
There is no way that State and local law enforcement,
anyone sitting on this panel is going to say, you know, our
partners in the FBI should take over this mission. Even our
partners in the FBI don't believe they should take over this
mission. This is a State and local mission where we leverage
all of our authorities, and we also bring our Federal partners
along to work with us in our fusion centers. We do a great job,
and it is through collaboration. It is not just focused on
terrorism. Although it is a key cornerstone of what we do, we
look at all the threats to our local community, and we serve
every member, fire, emergency medical personnel, emergency
management, and the law enforcement community.
Mr. Donovan. I agree you do do a great job.
Chief Turner.
Chief Turner. I would just really echo what he just said
and then just add this: That both our fusion center in the
State of Georgia as well as our Joint Terrorism Task Force, we
have to work continually together. They have 2 separate
missions, but at the same time they work very closely together.
The Atlanta Police Department has members in both of those
centers. Quite frankly, if we did not have those 2, then we
would be trying to do what our largest city in America does
regularly, and that is do it on their own. The New York City
Police Department has a tremendous amount of resources that
they provide to the homeland.
Cities like Atlanta, with more than 2,500 employees, cannot
do this work alone. We have to rely on the joint centers, as
well as the Joint Terrorism Task Force and the fusion centers,
so that we can work collectively to be able to resolve the
challenges that face each and every one of us.
Mr. Donovan. I think, Chief, you hit a vital point that
dispels the argument, the fact that these are 2 distinct
responsibilities that are undertaken by these 2 entities, and
that the elimination of 1 or joining the 2 could jeopardize our
ability to protect our Nation.
The Chair now recognizes our Ranking Member for our final
questions.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to talk about
a topic that is very important to me. This question is, once
again, for all the witnesses. Since I joined this panel in
2013, I have worked hard to promote programs and policies that
advance interoperable communications capabilities.
Unfortunately, the Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant
has not been funded in half a decade. I suspect the cuts to
homeland security grants will only further undermine
interoperable communication efforts.
Can each of you talk about how the elimination of the
Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program has
affected interoperability efforts and how grant cuts might
further hinder interoperability goals? Sergeant Kierce.
Mr. Kierce. Congressman and Mr. Chairman, interoperability
communication still is a challenge among the public safety
folks. In Jersey City, Hudson County alone, with the 12
different municipalities you have operating on different
frequencies, and there again, when you are called to a major
event, many times basic fire services aren't able to
communicate with firefighting ground operations. It is the same
thing with the police departments.
In Jersey City alone, we have several law enforcement
agencies, both the sheriff's department, Port Authority Police,
Jersey City Police, and other law enforcement agencies, all
operating under different frequencies and bandwidths. Since my
involvement with UASI in 2002, interoperability has been a
communications nightmare. The cuts in funds has led towards a
failure in communications as a whole.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Chief Turner. I would just simply add that one of our
biggest challenges in interoperability is not just--in large
cities we do fairly well. The investment has been made, and we
have systems that are in place that we can communicate.
However, the challenges are those small agencies, even
university police.
Just recently, we had a conversation with some of our
Atlanta university-centered police departments that really do
not have the network to be able to communicate in a crisis. So
we have to expand the program to be able to bring all of those
smaller agencies into the network.
Chief Kerr. I would echo my former colleagues here, their
comments, but then add the University of Texas into that, and
make sure that we include the capital and all the different
police agencies that do not have interoperable communications
in the Austin-Travis County area. We are fortunate in regard to
the fire service in that we dispatch for all 15 fire
departments that are part of Travis County. So we do have that
interoperable communication and we are able to make that work.
It is a huge difference when you have that. But when funding
starts getting cut and you are not able to enhance that
interoperable communications, things are going to happen, and
we are not going to be able to address them as we should.
Mr. Butterworth. Thank you, sir. A quick comment. Going on
some of my previous background as an Air Force aviator, I have
seen the issue that having interoperability is--the problem of
not having that interoperability brings. One airplane that I
flew had 8 different radios in order to facilitate different
communications, immediate communications, with individuals both
in the air and on the ground. I saw on more than one occasion
the operation worked to a detriment because first-hand
communication was not capable. I have also seen in the first
responder world in Georgia, multijurisdictional problems, just
like Chief Turner has referenced, across the State is a
challenge.
We, to that end, have initiated and perpetuated a recurring
training cycle of interoperability, where we bring
jurisdictions from all over the State of Georgia and put those
interoperability capabilities in a close geographical location
to facilitate better communication. That has made an incredible
difference in the State of Georgia. I know my peers in other
States have done the same thing.
If these cuts become reality, those training opportunities
would be minimal, and it would be an extremely detrimental
impact to interoperability capabilities. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Payne. Yes.
Mr. Sena. From my perspective, voice, video, and data,
textual data, are critical to saving lives. Without these
grants, the equipment that we currently have in use would no
longer be able to be maintained and we would lose that
capability. So it is something that for me, during the Super
Bowl, was an incredible asset to be able to share information,
both the voice capability and actually video and textual, show
them in real time, not only showed people in our region what
was going on, but showed people in District of Columbia what
was happening in real time. That would be gone.
Chief Turner. If I could just make one last point. In my 34
years of policing, when I first came on the police department,
we had a radio that had 6 channels. Our problem is there are so
many channels and talk groups on our radios. If we don't have
these funds, we don't have the ability to continue to train the
individuals that are coming into this business. Funding for
training is absolutely essential for us to be able to be
effective as we move to try to mitigate challenges that come
our way. Thank you.
Mr. Payne. Well, I would like to thank all of you for your
testimony today. It has been very enlightening and informative
as well. You are our eyes and ears and the people on the ground
and first responders, and we appreciate the work that you do
and the testimony that you have brought today.
So with that, Mr. Chair, I will yield back.
Mr. Donovan. I join my friend, Congressman Payne, in
thanking you for what you do for the citizens of our Nation and
your commitment to protecting them and their safety. I want to
thank you all for your valuable testimony today, and for my
fellow Members for their questions.
The Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions of the witnesses. We will ask that you respond to
those in writing.
Pursuant to Committee Rule VII(e), the hearing record will
be held open for 10 days. This subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]