[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET
REQUEST
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 2, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-58
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
---------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
John Katko, New York, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Mark Walker, North Carolina Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Krista P. Harvey, Subcommittee Staff Director
John Dickhaus, Subcommittee Clerk
Cedric C. Haynes, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Kathleen M. Rice, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Witness
Mr. Peter V. Neffenger, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
For the Record
The Honorable Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, a Representative in
Congress From the State of Georgia:
Letter......................................................... 26
Appendix
Questions From the Chairman John Katko for Peter V. Neffenger.... 35
THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET
REQUEST
----------
Wednesday, March 2, 2016
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Katko
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Katko, Carter, Rice, Keating, and
Thompson (ex officio).
Mr. Katko. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee
on Transportation Security, will come to order. The
subcommittee is meeting today to determine and examine the
fiscal year 2017 budget of the Transportation Security
Administration. I now recognize myself for an opening
statement.
Terrorists remain committed to attacking the West, and
every day these groups are recruiting new soldiers to their
cause. As
9/11 fades from the memory of many Americans, it is incumbent
upon Congress to look at tragic recent events and recognize
just how committed our adversaries remain to attacking us. The
harsh reality is that there are formidable new threats to the
safety and security of the traveling public, and it is
incumbent upon this committee to ensure that the Transportation
Security Administration has the resources it needs to protect
the American people against those threats and that it spends
those resources in an appropriate manner.
At the very beginning of my tenure at Chairman last year,
we witnessed a marked increase in the public visibility of
access control and employee vetting gaps at airports across the
country with the revelation that aviation workers were involved
in weapons and drug smuggling, and abusing their access to
secure and sterile areas of airports.
Then, in June, we learned of disturbing covert testing
results from the Department of Homeland Security's inspector
general on the effectiveness of passenger screening
checkpoints. Further, we saw tragedy with the downing of a
Metrojet flight over the Sinai Peninsula which by most accounts
was caused by a bomb likely planted by ISIS.
Finally, we saw a number of threats against aviation and
surface transportation systems across the globe due to
increased threats posed by extremists and foreign fighters and
the near tragedy aboard a Daallo airlines flight in Somalia.
Today, we look at how the resources requested in the
President's budget will mitigate these threats and make TSA a
stronger, better organization. Amidst a heightened threat
landscape, today's hearing will examine the recent budget
request submitted to Congress by the TSA for fiscal year 2017.
This hearing is a critical element of the subcommittee's
oversight of the TSA and an important opportunity for Congress
to provide feedback and input on the direction the agency is
taking.
As the subcommittee with primary jurisdiction over TSA, we
have a front row seat to the challenges and obstacles facing
the security of our Nation's transportation systems. While I am
heartened at a number of important steps taken by the recently
appointed administrator of TSA, Admiral Pete Neffenger, our
main concern is the sheer size and scope of the challenges
facing TSA as an organization amidst a proliferating threat
environment.
Because of this, I am eager to learn more about TSA's
proposed budget for the upcoming fiscal year and how the agency
plans to uses its resources efficiently to better secure our
transportation sectors.
The reality is that we must never become complacent in our
attempt to stay on the cutting edge of threat mitigation. It is
particularly incumbent upon this committee to remain steadfast
in its oversight of TSA so that the American people can be
confident that they can travel safely and securely.
Moreover, I would like to better understand how TSA will
continue to enhance its training and intelligence-sharing
efforts with its own employees, industry stakeholders, and
foreign partners. I am also interested in learning more about
developments of TSA's PreCheck program, which is a vital part
of advancing risk-based security screening at checkpoints.
TSA has to be right 100 percent of the time and the
terrorists only have to be right once. With a challenging and
ambitious mission, this subcommittee stands ready to continue
helping TSA in their efforts to obtain the necessary resources
to keep the traveling public safe from a wide array of threats
to their security.
However, we also intend to provide critical oversight of
TSA in an effort to avoid instances of waste, fraud, and abuse
of taxpayer dollars in the upcoming fiscal year and in years
ahead.
[The statement of Chairman Katko follows:]
Statement of Chairman John Katko
March 2, 2016
Terrorists remain committed to attacking the West, and every day
these groups are recruiting new soldiers to their cause. As 9/11 fades
from the memory of many Americans, it is incumbent upon Congress to
look at tragic recent events and recognize just how committed our
adversaries remain to attacking us.
The harsh reality is that there are formidable new threats to the
safety and security of the traveling public, and it is incumbent upon
this committee to ensure that the Transportation Security
Administration has the resources it needs to protect the American
people against those threats.
At the very beginning of my tenure as Chairman last year, we
witnessed a marked increase in the public visibility of access control
and employee vetting gaps at airports across the country with the
revelations that aviation workers were involved in weapons and drug
smuggling and abusing their access to secure and sterile areas of
airports.
Then, in June, we learned of disturbing covert testing results from
the Department of Homeland Security's Inspector General on the
effectiveness of passenger screening checkpoints. Further, we saw a
tragedy with the downing of a Metrojet flight over the Sinai Peninsula,
which by most accounts was caused by a bomb likely planted by ISIS.
Finally, we saw a number of threats against aviation and surface
transportation systems across the globe due to increased threats posed
by extremists and foreign fighters and a near-tragedy aboard a Daallo
airlines flight in Somalia.
Today, we will look at how the resources requested in the
President's budget will mitigate these threats.
Amidst a heightened threat landscape, today's hearing will examine
the recent budget request submitted to Congress by the Transportation
Security Administration for fiscal year 2017. This hearing is a
critical element of the subcommittee's oversight of the TSA and an
important opportunity for Congress to provide feedback and input on the
direction the agency is taking.
As the subcommittee with primary jurisdiction over TSA, we have a
front-row seat to the challenges and obstacles facing the security of
our Nation's transportation systems.
While I am heartened at a number of important steps taken by the
recently-appointed administrator of TSA, Admiral Pete Neffenger, I
remain concerned at the sheer size and scope of the challenges facing
TSA as an organization amidst a proliferating threat environment.
Because of this, I am eager to learn more about TSA's proposed
budget for the upcoming fiscal year and how the agency plans to use its
resources efficiently to better secure our transportation sectors.
The reality is that we must never become complacent in our attempt
to stay on the cutting edge of threat mitigation, and it is
particularly incumbent upon this committee to remain steadfast in its
oversight of TSA so that the American people can be confident that they
can travel safely and securely.
Moreover, I would like to better understand how TSA will continue
to enhance its training and intelligence-sharing efforts with its own
employees, industry stakeholders, and foreign partners. I am also
interested in learning more about developments in TSA's PreCheck
program, which is a vital part of advancing risk-based security
screening at checkpoints.
TSA has to be right 100% of the time and the terrorists only have
to be right once. With a challenging and ambitious mission, this
subcommittee stands ready to continue helping TSA in their efforts to
obtain the necessary resources to keep the traveling public safe from a
wide array of threats to their security.
However, we also intend to provide critical oversight of TSA in an
effort to avoid instances of waste, fraud, and abuse of taxpayer
dollars in the upcoming fiscal year and in years ahead.
Mr. Katko. With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member of
the subcommittee, the gentlewoman from New York, Miss Rice, for
any statement she may have.
Miss Rice.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank Chairman Katko for convening this
hearing and I want to thank Administrator Neffenger for coming
to talk with us about the Transportation Security
Administration's budget request for fiscal year 2017.
All of us here today recognize the importance of TSA's
mission, and it is imperative that we make sure that TSA has
the resources they need to fulfill that mission and that those
resources are deployed as effectively as possible.
I have reviewed TSA's budget request and found aspects I
agree with and a couple of aspects that I think warrant further
examination.
First, I am pleased to see that the TSO basic training will
continue at the TSA Academy at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center's headquarters in Glynco, Georgia. FLETC
conducts law enforcement training for more than 90 Federal
agencies and thousands of State and local law enforcement
agencies, and I think it is important for TSOs to know that
they are being trained by the best at the same facility as
officers and agents who are directly responsible for
maintaining United States National security. I think it
reinforces for new TSOs that the job they are training for is
equally important to our National security, it is a job that
our Government and the American people value, that we rely on,
and that we are willing to invest in.
Last year this subcommittee held a hearing to assess the
current state of the Federal Air Marshal Service. We learned
during that hearing that FAMS has not had an incoming class
since 2011 and their attrition rate has increased. That was
troubling to many of us, so I am glad to see that some of those
concerns have been resolved and there will be a new FAMS class
this year.
Of course, we know that in addition to aviation security,
TSA is also responsible for protecting several modes of surface
transportation. The United States now sees more than 10 billion
passenger trips on mass transit systems each year and nearly
800,000 shipments of hazardous materials every day. We have
seen evidence in recent years that ridership on mass transit
systems continues to grow even as gas prices decline.
So I was struck by the fact that this budget request seeks
only a $12 million increase in funding for surface
transportation. I think the attempted attack on a high-speed
train in France last summer served as a reminder to all of us
that securing our surface transportation system is just as
important as securing our aviation system. The threats are
constantly evolving and equally deserving of our full
attention.
Following that attempted attack, we held a hearing to
evaluate how we are safeguarding our surface transportation
systems against evolving terrorist threats, and it was during
that hearing that one witness testified that the greatest
threat to surface transportation systems is the fact that they
are, ``wide open,'' that they are more susceptible to attacks
and thus, one would think, more attractive as a target for
terrorists.
Another witness stated that reduced grant funding would
have a drastic effect on the many transportation systems that
rely on these additional funding sources, and yet TSA has not
found the need to seek significant funding increases for
surface transportation security in this budget request. I know
that you will do your best to answer those questions,
Administrator Neffenger, and I look forward to hearing that.
I would also like to talk to you about why TSA continues to
request funding or has not cut funding for their Behavior
Detection Program, which at the time of the 2013 GAO report had
cost $900 million since 2007 and yet has not, to my
understanding, been proven totally effective.
I address these concerns, I would like you to address these
concerns, given the fact that we are approaching a summer
season that we expect to be one of the busiest we have ever
seen with some of the longest checkpoint waiting times we have
ever seen. So I think that raises a serious question: Why would
TSA want to use their resources and manpower on a program that
has not yet proven effective?
Also, last week the subcommittee held a roundtable with
security manufacturer stakeholders to discuss the budget
request, and one thing that emerged from our discussion was
that there seem to be discrepancies between TSA's Strategic
Five-Year Technology Investment Plan and the fiscal year 2017
budget request. That is another thing I am sure that you are
going to address as well, Administrator Neffenger.
Thank you again for coming.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this hearing, and I
look forward to a productive dialogue today. I yield back the
balance of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Rice follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Kathleen Rice
March 2, 2016
All of us here today recognize the importance of TSA's mission, and
it's imperative that we make sure TSA has the resources they need to
fulfill that mission and that those resources are deployed as
effectively as possible. That said, I've reviewed TSA's budget request,
and found aspects I agree with and certain aspects that I think warrant
further examination.
First, I'm pleased to see that the TSO Basic Training will continue
at the TSA Academy at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers
(FLETC) headquarters in Glynco, Georgia. FLETC conducts law enforcement
training for more than 90 Federal agencies and thousands of State and
location law enforcement agencies. And I think it's important for TSOs
to know that they are being trained by the best, at the same facility
as officers and agents who are directly responsible for maintaining
United States National security. I think it reinforces for new TSOs
that the job they're training for is equally important to our National
security--it's a job that our Government and the American people value,
that we rely on, and that we're willing to invest in.
Last year, this subcommittee held a hearing to assess the current
state of the Federal Air Marshall Service (FAMS). We learned during
that hearing that FAMS has not had an incoming class since 2011, and
their attrition rate has increased. That was troubling to many of us,
so I'm glad to see that some of those concerns have been resolved, and
there will be a new FAMS class this year.
Of course, we know that in addition to aviation security, TSA is
also responsible for protecting several modes of surface
transportation. The United States now sees more than 10 billion
passenger trips on mass transit systems each year, and nearly 800,000
shipments of hazardous materials every day. And we've seen evidence in
recent years that ridership on mass transit system continues to grow
even as gas prices decline. So I was struck by the fact that this
budget requests seeks only a $12 million increase in funding for
surface transportation.
I think the attempted attack on a high-speed train in France last
summer served as a reminder to all of us that securing our surface
transportation systems is just as important as securing our aviation
systems. The threats are constantly evolving, and equally deserving of
our full attention. Following that attempted attack, we held a hearing
to evaluate how we are safeguarding our surface transportation systems
against evolving terrorist threats.
During that hearing, one witness testified that the greatest threat
to surface transportation systems is the fact that they are ``wide
open''--that they are more susceptible to attacks, and thus, one would
think, more attractive as a target for terrorists. Another witness
stated that reduced grant funding would have a drastic effect on the
many transportation systems that rely on these additional funding
sources--and yet TSA has not found the need to seek significant funding
increases for surface transportation security in this budget request.
So I would ask Administrator Neffenger to address those concerns.
I would also like to understand why TSA continues to request
funding--or has not cut funding--for their behavior detection program,
which at the time of the 2013 report had cost $900 million since 2007.
It has yet to be proven effective. In addition to my concerns over the
cost and effectiveness of this program, we're approaching a summer
season that we expect to be one of the busiest we've ever seen, with
some of the longest checkpoint waiting times we've ever seen. So I
think that raises a serious question: Why would TSA want to use their
resources and manpower on a program that has not proven to be
effective, instead of expanding their screening capacity?
Finally, last week the subcommittee held a roundtable with security
manufacturer stakeholders to discuss the budget request. One thing that
emerged from our discussion was that there seem to be discrepancies
between TSA's Strategic 5-Year Technology Investment Plan and the
fiscal year 2017 budget request. I look forward to the administrator's
explanation of these discrepancies.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Miss Rice.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Homeland
Security Committee as a whole, the gentleman from Mississippi,
Mr. Thompson, for any statement he may have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this
hearing.
I would also like to welcome Administrator Neffenger for
appearing before the subcommittee today.
Mr. Administrator, your leadership and vision at TSA is
greatly appreciated. You and I share the goal of moving TSA in
a better direction. In your budget request there are areas that
are encouraging and show that resources, which seem to shrink
year by year, are being allocated to programs and areas where
they most needed.
On the other hand, there are areas that are cause for
concern. One such area involves the Transportation Security
Acquisition Reform Act and your plan for technology acquisition
in general. The act, of which I was an original cosponsor, was
signed into law in December 2014. It requires TSA to develop
and inform biennially a Five-Year Technology Investment Plan
that includes justification for acquisitions, as well as
performance baseline issues.
The Strategic Plan, which was introduced in August 2015,
was lauded by security technology manufacturers as it provided
a roadmap for technology priorities of TSA. These stakeholders
could then allocate their research and development resources
toward projects that align with the mission and intentions of
TSA.
This is especially important to small businesses who
attempt to compete in this space, who do not have the capital
to develop technologies that they believe meet existing needs
at TSA, only to have the agency in midstream go in another
direction. As a small business, you can understand what that
would do for the majority of it.
We were shocked to learn, however, from stakeholders that
the budget request did not align with the acquisition schedule
contained within the Five-Year Plan. For instance, within the
Five-Year Strategic Technology Plan TSA indicates its intention
to acquire 897 enhanced metal detectors for checkpoint
screening and no intent to purchase boarding pass scanners or
credential authentication technology systems.
In the budget request, however, there is no intent to
procure the enhanced metal detectors, and that fund will be
used to purchase 625 credential authentication technology
systems and 175 boarding pass scanners.
Another area of great concern is the staffing levels at our
Nation's airports, and I think you are aware that a number of
airports have already sounded the alarm that come this summer,
unless the modeling is changed, we can expect significant wait
times at airports. I am sure you have seen the letter from the
Atlanta airport director which I think is kind of where I am
coming from.
I want to see how you plan to address that, that is a real
problem, because he has some options, and I would prefer those
options not be utilized and we can maintain a Federal workforce
in its present form.
The Federal Air Marshal system, I am glad that we have a
new class underway. With our Ranking Member here, I want you to
understand that 5 percent female air marshals is just not
enough. I think we could enhance the recruitment to do that and
I look forward to hearing your answer on that.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
March 2, 2016
Administrator Neffenger, your leadership and vision at TSA are
greatly appreciated. You and I share the goal of moving TSA in a better
direction. In your budget request, there are areas that are encouraging
and show that resources, which seem to shrink year-by-year, are being
allocated to programs and areas where they are most needed.
On the other hand, there are areas that are cause for concern. One
such area involves the Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act,
and your plan for technology acquisition in general. The Act, of which
I was an original cosponsor, was signed into law in December 2014. It
requires TSA to develop and inform biennially a 5-year technology
investment plan that includes justification for acquisitions, as well
as performance baseline requirements.
The strategic plan, which was introduced in August 2015, was lauded
by security technology manufacturers, as it provided a road map for the
technology priorities of TSA. These stakeholders could then allocate
their research and development resources towards projects that aligned
with the mission and intentions of TSA.
This is especially important to small businesses who attempt to
compete in this space, who do not have the capital to develop
technologies that they believe meet an existing need to TSA, only to
have the agency go in another direction.
We were shocked to learn from stakeholders that the budget request
did not align with the acquisition schedule contained within the 5-year
plan. For instance, within the Strategic Five-Year Technology Plan, TSA
indicates its intention to acquire 897 enhanced metal detectors for
checkpoint screening, and no intent to purchase boarding pass scanners
or credential authentication technology systems.
In the budget request, however, there is no intent to procure the
enhanced metal detectors, and that funds will be used to purchase 625
credential authentication technology systems, and 175 boarding pass
scanners.
Another area of great concern is the staffing levels at our
Nation's airports. The Federal Aviation Administration is projecting
passenger growth at a rate of 2 percent per year, and this summer is
expected to be one of the busiest in recent years. We hear time and
again from large airports that have infrastructures capable of housing
many security lanes within their checkpoint areas, but due to staffing
shortages, they use only a fraction of the lanes.
Recent changes in the standing operating procedures resulting from
covert testing have forced TSOs to take steps to ensure that they are
performing their jobs as thoroughly as possible. We thank them for
being on the front lines in the aviation security effort.
Given the forecast of increased passenger volume, along with
underutilized checkpoints, I am concerned that congested screening
queues will create additional vulnerabilities.
I look forward to hearing from you today on ways the screening
allocation model can achieve greater efficiencies, or other ways in
which we might address the issue.
This budget request also contains funds to recruit and train the
first Federal Air Marshal Service class since 2011. I also look forward
to hearing about how you are working to address diversity issues within
the coming FAMS recruitment class and the instances of misconduct that
have plagued the agency.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. I appreciate your
interest in the committee and in the oversight of TSA.
All right. Members of the committee are reminded that
opening statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have us with us once again the
distinguished witness, Admiral Neffenger, on this important
topic. He currently serves as the sixth Administrator of the
TSA, where he leads security operations at more than 450
airports within the United States and a workforce of over
50,000 employees.
Prior to joining TSA, Admiral--Administrator Neffenger and
Admiral Neffenger, as I like to call him, served as the 29th
vice commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard and the Coast Guard's
deputy commandant for operations.
The Chair now recognizes Admiral Neffenger to testify.
STATEMENT OF PETER V. NEFFENGER, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Neffenger. Good morning, Chairman Katko, Ranking Member
Rice, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
behalf of the President's fiscal year 2017 budget, which
includes $7.6 billion for TSA. Thank you also for the support
that this committee has provided certainly during the 8 months
of my tenure.
This budget provides funding to sustain and strengthen the
critical mission of TSA: Protecting the Nation's transportation
system and ensuring the freedom of movement of people and
commerce. Transportation underpins the entire economic health
of this country. We depend upon it, and protecting it is one of
the most important services our Government provides the
American people.
It is now 8 months since I joined TSA on July 4 of last
year, and of the many positive impressions, the most profound
is the one I have gleaned from our workforce. TSA's nearly
60,000 security professionals are dedicated to a demanding and
challenging mission, and they are our most important resource.
They are incredibly patriotic and passionate about our
counterterrorism mission, and they will deliver excellence if
properly trained, equipped, and led.
This budget is a modest increase over last year and will
enable TSA to more fully renew its focus on security
effectiveness. It annualizes the investments made in our front-
line workforce, our screening technology, and the new TSA
Academy, and sets the foundation for the transformation of TSA
into the professional counterterrorism and security agency the
American people deserve.
I would like to thank this subcommittee for its commitment
to our mission and for holding front-line staffing levels
steady in the face of dramatic increases in passenger volume
and a dynamic threat environment. This budget also enables us
to hire air marshals consistent with a risk-based concept of
operations, modestly increases our intelligence capability, and
invests further in the TSA Academy.
We have made great strides in addressing the challenges
faced last summer. To ensure we do not repeat past mistakes,
determining root causes of the problems identified has been my
utmost concern. Delivered in a Classified report to Congress
and this committee in January, we concluded that strong drivers
of the problem included a disproportionate focus on efficiency,
environmental influences that create stress in the checkpoint
operations and gaps in system designs and processes.
I am proud to report that we have refocused on our primary
mission. We are restrained our entire workforce, corrected
procedures, improved our technology, and analyzed systemic
issues. We are emphasizing the values of discipline,
competence, and professionalism in resolving every alarm, and I
am confident that we have corrected the immediate problems, and
I am also confident that TSA is able to deter, detect, and
disrupt threats to our aviation system.
TSA will continue to partner with the airlines, with
airport operators, and the trade and travel industry to
identify solutions that can reduce stress on the checkpoint. We
must continue to rightsize and resource TSA appropriately to
ensure that we continue to be responsive to the public we
serve.
Moving forward, we are guided by a principled approach that
is central to successful enterprise leadership. We are
intensely focusing on the central unifying purpose of TSA,
which is to deliver transportation security. We are aligning
our strategic guidance, our operational plans, our measures of
effectiveness, system design, and performance evaluations to
this core purpose.
The unity of effort that I expect is memorialized in my
Administrator's Intent, which I published in January. I have
provided copies to this committee. Mission success is built on
a shared understanding of objective, unity of purpose, and
alignment of values and principles. My Intent articulates those
objectives, the approach we will pursue in accomplishing our
counterterrorism mission, and the values and principles that
define TSA. Simply stated, we will focuses on mission, invest
in people, and commit to excellence.
Our self-examination also gave us insight into imperatives
for change and how we must evolve. We must adapt faster than
the enemy, we must invest at the pace of the threat, build
resiliency into operations, and do so in a rapidly-growing
sector of the American economy.
We are undertaking a series of foundational efforts,
including a comprehensive assessment of our acquisition system,
building a planning, programming, budgeting, and execution
system, developing an enterprise-wide human capital management
strategy, reviewing our staffing model to ensure operational
focus and agility, and fielding an agency-wide training
strategy which includes new officer training, continuing
professional education, and leadership training and
development.
We are rethinking how we invest in technology, and we are
partnering with several airlines and airports to develop and
install in the near future a dramatically improved passenger
screening environment in a couple of key airports.
Of utmost importance, TSA must remain committed to the
values that public service demands, and I have challenged our
leaders at every level to commit themselves to selfless and
ethical service. As I discover questionable policies or
unjustifiable practices, I will fix them. I demand an agency
that is values-based and infused from character top to bottom.
This is my solemn duty, and it is what the American people
expect of their Government and those in whom they entrust their
security.
Many profound and important tasks lay ahead for TSA, but I
believe we are on a sound trajectory, and I am optimistic about
our future. As I have relayed in my Intent, we will focus on
mission, invest in our dedicated workforce, and commit to
excellence in all that we do.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Neffenger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter V. Neffenger
March 2, 2016
introduction
Good morning Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and distinguished
Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today on behalf of the President's fiscal year 2017 budget, which
includes $7.6 billion for the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA).
The fiscal year 2017 budget provides funding to sustain and
strengthen the critical mission of TSA--protecting the Nation's
transportation system and ensuring the freedom of movement of people
and commerce. Transportation, as you know, underpins the entire
economic health of this country. We all depend on it, and protecting it
is one of the most important services our Government provides the
American People.
Created 2 months after 9/11, TSA, and the underlying rationale for
its existence remain as compelling today as in 2001. We are challenged
by a complex and dynamic threat environment, one in which the global
terrorist threat has evolved from a world of terrorist-directed attacks
to a world that includes the threat of terrorist-inspired attacks.
In addition to expanding threats with a number of groups with whom
to contend, these groups have mastered social media to recruit members,
and inspire action against vulnerable and high-profile objectives.
Aviation remains a prime target for terrorist groups, as demonstrated
with the destruction of Metrojet Flight 9268 above the northern Sinai
on October 31, 2015, and most recently on February 2, 2016 during an
attack on Daallo Airlines, where explosives detonated during its ascent
from Adde International Airport in Mogadishu.
a national imperative
The security and economic prosperity of the United States depends
significantly on the effective and efficient operation of its
transportation system. We know terrorists, criminals, and hostile
nation-states have long viewed transportation sectors, particularly
aviation, as a leading target for attack or exploitation. Thus, our
mission remains a National imperative.
Our officers, inspectors, air marshals, canine handlers, and other
security professionals here in the United States and around the globe
are committed to our mission, and they are our most important resource.
While operating in the present, we also must envision the future,
seeking new ways to enhance our effectiveness across a diverse
transportation enterprise, challenged by a persistent threat.
the fiscal year 2017 president's budget
The fiscal year 2017 budget of $7.6 billion will allow TSA the
opportunity to more fully address the additional requirements
identified last year in response to findings from covert testing of
screening processes and procedures by the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Specifically:
$3.0 billion to support 42,848 FTE Transportation Security
Officers (TSOs), an increase of $72.1 million and 323 FTE over
fiscal year 2016, to ensure effective screening operations
while minimizing wait times. This funding will help to ensure
that TSA maintains an appropriate staffing level at our
checkpoints.
$200 million for transportation screening technology,
enabling TSA to continue improving the capabilities of its
checkpoint screening equipment throughout nearly 430 airports.
This amount continues the additional $15 million provided in
fiscal year 2016, and adds another $5 million for new
capabilities to enhance the checkpoint X-ray units, thus
increasing the TSOs' ability to find prohibited items in carry-
on bags.
$116.6 million to provide training for TSA front-line
employees, including new basic training initiated in January
2016 at the TSA Academy located at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. To date, 541 new hires have
graduated from this program, and TSA will train another 4,835
front-line employees this year. In fiscal year 2017 TSA will
complete construction of modular facilities to house this
effort, expanding capacity to 7,300 TSOs annually.
$83.5 million for TSA's intelligence operations, an increase
of $2.0 million to continue the expansion of intelligence
officers in front-line facilities to improve information
sharing.
$10 million to replace IT infrastructure, including network
components and outdated operating systems, that has not only
reached its end-of-life, but more critically has become
vulnerable to cybersecurity threats.
The fiscal year 2017 budget continues and builds on the investments
made in fiscal year 2016. As you understand from your review of last
year's budget, fiscal year 2016 was an austere budget year for the
agency and on behalf of TSA I would like to thank this committee for
its commitment to the DHS transportation security mission.
addressing immediate challenges
When I took office on July 4, 2015, the disturbing results of
covert testing of passenger screening operations conducted by the OIG
required immediate attention. Upon learning of these results, Secretary
Johnson directed TSA to implement a series of steps constituting a 10-
point plan to address the issues raised by the covert testing. These
included steps to ensure leadership accountability, improve alarm
resolution, increase effectiveness and deterrence, increase threat
testing to sharpen officer performance, strengthen operating procedures
and technology, and enhance training.
All of the actions directed in the Secretary's 10-point plan are
currently under way or have been completed.
As Secretary Johnson has stated, we must continually and
comprehensively evaluate and re-evaluate what is best for aviation
security. To ensure that we do not repeat past failures, determining
root causes of the problems has been our utmost concern. We have
concluded that strong drivers of the problem included leadership's
focus on efficiency, environmental influences that created stress in
checkpoint operations, and gaps in system design and processes. A
disproportionate focus on efficiency and speed in screening operations
rather than security effectiveness powerfully influenced organizational
culture and officer performance. As a result, there was significant
pressure to clear passengers quickly at the risk of not resolving
alarms properly. Our analysis also revealed that our screeners did not
fully understand the capabilities and limitations of the equipment they
were using, and several procedures were inadequate to resolve alarms.
We have addressed this by continuing the Mission Essentials training
initiated in fiscal year 2016 so that our TSOs can more effectively use
their equipment as threats evolve.
Systematic solutions to these challenges require a number of steps:
A renewed focus on TSA's security mission; revised procedures;
investments in technology; realistic and standardized training; a new
balance between effectiveness and efficiency; and support for our
front-line officers. We must also continue to partner with airlines,
airport operators, and the trade and travel industry to reduce the
stress on checkpoints. Further, we must right-size and appropriately
resource TSA and halt further reductions in officer staffing.
We have refocused TSA on its primary mission, re-trained our entire
workforce, corrected certain processes and procedures, improved our
technology, and analyzed systemic issues. I am confident that we have
corrected the immediate problems revealed by the covert testing. I am
also confident that TSA is able to deter, detect, and disrupt threats
against our aviation system.
We have renewed our focus on the fundamentals of security by asking
our officers and leaders to strike a new balance between security
effectiveness and line efficiency while also diligently performing
appropriate resolution procedures. Moreover, we have directed our
managers and supervisors to support our officers in performing their
difficult mission. Moving forward, we are guided by a principled
approach, with specific projects already underway to ensure we achieve
our mission goals.
We are in the process of ensuring our focus on security
effectiveness is well-defined and applied across the entire workforce.
We are aligning TSA around this renewed focus on security
effectiveness. From late July to early October 2015, we provided new
and enhanced training for every officer and leader in our screening
workforce, more than 42,000 in total. We have followed the initial
effort with a range of initiatives to convey these priorities to
leaders and officers, including a statement of the Administrator's
Intent, the National Training Plan, and our workforce messaging.
Refocusing on threat mitigation and improving TSO awareness and
knowledge of threats will provide a new and acute mission focus. We are
emphasizing the value of discipline, competence, and professionalism in
resolving every alarm. From my field visits, I can report that our
officers are hearing, understanding, and applying this new approach.
TSA will continue to partner with the airlines, airport operators,
and the trade and travel industry to identify solutions that can reduce
the stress on the checkpoint, and we must right-size and resource TSA
appropriately.
environment and objectives
Our operating environment presents broad National security
challenges that require highly-effective security measures now and in
the future. We will certainly face new challenges as our adversaries
continue to evolve their means to attack. Over the next several years,
estimates indicate adversaries will likely use variants of previously-
seen tactics, employing improvised explosive devices or firearms, and
could even resort to ground-based or in-flight attacks.
Our National strategy for combatting terrorism sets our objective
as stopping terrorist groups, hostile nation-states, and criminals
before they can threaten or engage in attacks against the United States
and its international partners, and TSA's aviation security mission is
part of DHS's contribution to achieving this objective.
TSA Risk Methodology
The current environment requires that TSA employ an intelligence-
driven, risk-based approach to secure U.S. transportation systems.
risk-based security strives to deter, detect, and disrupt attacks on
the Nation's transportation systems and critical transportation
infrastructure, while facilitating the movement of legitimate travel
and commerce. The vast majority of people, goods, and services moving
through our transportation systems are legitimate and pose minimal
risk. Thus, appropriately managing risk is essential in all areas of
security responsibility. To do this, we must understand intelligence,
as it drives our comprehension and assessment of that risk. As we make
decisions on policy, operations, and countermeasures across TSA, we
will apply risk-based methods to use our resources in ways that
minimize risk and ensure system resiliency. We cannot do this alone; we
must work closely with stakeholders in aviation, rail, transit,
highway, and pipeline sectors, as well as our partners in the law
enforcement and intelligence community.
To support our risk-based approach, it is critical to continue to
grow the population of fully-vetted travelers. At the same time, TSA
will continue to apply appropriate measures to address known threats,
unknown threats, and low-risk or trusted populations.
Securing the National Aviation Domain
To protect the aviation domain, our strategy nests with the
National Strategy for Aviation Security, forming the foundation of
TSA's mission. The strategy sets 3 National objectives:
First, the Nation must use the full range of its assets and
capabilities to prevent the aviation sector from being
exploited by terrorist groups, hostile nation-states, and
criminals to commit acts against the United States, and its
people, infrastructure, and other interests;
Second, the Nation must ensure the safe and efficient use of
the Air Domain;
Third, the Nation must continue to facilitate travel and
commerce.
TSA is committed to advancing the following strategic initiatives:
Maintain a strategic, intelligence-driven focus that allows
TSA to continuously adapt counterterrorism and
security operations to a persistent, evolving
threat
We will employ risk-based operations tailored to each environment
and transportation mode and will leverage intelligence, technology, the
experience of our front-line operators and our private sector and
international partners to ensure we employ effective and constantly-
evolving systems and capabilities.
Proper application of a risk-based approach requires strong cross-
modal domain awareness. TSA must integrate surveillance data, all-
source intelligence, law enforcement information, and relevant open-
source data from public and private sectors to accomplish this
objective. We will pay particular attention to the insider threat. In
addition, we will strengthen our capability to conduct deliberate and
crisis action operational planning, adjusting to new threats based on
mission analysis, intelligence-driven testing of existing systems, and
application of proven best practices and principles in the conduct of
operations.
Employing historically-proven practices and principles enhances
consistency and performance of operations. Common tasks for mission
success in screening, inspections, special mission coverage, and other
operations should be practiced in realistic conditions and rehearsed
frequently under the supervision of qualified and trained supervisors
or subject-matter experts. Frequent rehearsals reinforce tactics,
muscle memory, and sustain sharpness of perishable skills.
Invest in our workforce to ensure it is mission-ready,
expertly-trained, deliberately-developed, and led
by mission-focused and value-based leaders
The single greatest strength of TSA is its committed, professional
workforce. We must continue to recruit and retain highly capable
individuals whose talents and acuities are uniquely tailored to our
operating environments. Of particular value are experienced
specialists--such as explosives experts, air marshals, and canine
handlers--whose capabilities are invaluable to our mission success. For
them and for all our employees, we must invest in training and provide
a career path for growth and development.
I am committed to creating an environment where employees and
leaders can develop, employees have the tools to be successful, and the
workforce is motivated by TSA's mission, vision, and strategic
imperatives. To provide the most effective transportation security, the
workforce must be consistently learning and improving. I will strive to
ensure that each of us at TSA headquarters serves and supports all of
the officers, inspectors, marshals, employees, and private-sector
partners who are on the front lines each and every day and in whom we
entrust so much.
My expectations include a strong emphasis on values, performance,
customer service, and accountability. The traveling public expects
efficient and effective screening and to be treated with dignity and
respect, and we must ingrain these principles in agency culture by
continually reinforcing this message of dignity and respect in training
for our front-line workforce and management alike. I am confident each
of the men and women at TSA will achieve my expectations.
The TSA Academy, established at FLETC Glynco in January 2016,
offers all new TSO hires a common basic training program and an
environment to set foundational culture for TSA. Moreover, this
investment will serve to improve performance and morale, foster an
environment of growth and development, and develop future leaders.
Pursue advanced capabilities through continuous innovation
and adaptation to ensure our agency deters,
detects, and disrupts the adversaries of the United
States
Central to TSA's mission is deterring a rapidly evolving global
terror threat, with persistent adversaries who adapt their methods and
plans for attack. Given this dynamic threat landscape, we must employ a
strategic, systems-focused approach to ensure we evolve our ability to
detect and disrupt the latest threat streams. As our adversaries adapt,
so must we.
We will continue to invest in National aviation intelligence
systems, transportation sector vetting processes, enhanced explosives
detection equipment, and improved checkpoint technologies. We will
continue to train and develop our officers on technological and
procedural limitations to enhance system knowledge and improve the
human-machine interface.
We will make a concerted effort to strategically develop and
sustain a strong partnership with the homeland security enterprise
industrial base and work with them to deliberately develop and validate
capabilities. Every effort will be made to enhance the array of TSA's
security capabilities to ensure an increased likelihood of exposure and
experience to the traveling public. In the aviation sector, we will
pursue a system design that identifies a mission essential level of
capability that ensures deterrence as well as effective detection and
disruption of items on the prohibited items list.
The success of our core aviation security mission requires a
continuous cycle of operational evolution. We will work to develop a
system focused on identifying and addressing existing vulnerabilities.
The global transportation threat requires TSA to employ a systems-of-
systems strategy that will enable us to stay proactively informed and
connected to our industry partners.
To field and sustain an integrated requirements and acquisition
capability, I am committed to creating an efficient, effective, and
dynamic resource planning/deployment process for our agency. TSA is
focusing on building an acquisition strategy designed to counter
evolving threats while concentrating on prioritizing advanced
capabilities that are cutting-edge and adaptive.
imperatives for change
Our critical examination of our screening operations also gave us
valuable insight into imperatives for change--how TSA must evolve to
meet the security and customer service challenges ahead.
What do we do next? If we were rebuilding TSA from scratch today,
would we do everything the same, or is there a better way, given not
only the evolution of the threats we face but also the tremendous pace
at which the aviation industry is growing? Last year alone, passenger
growth was approximately 4 percent, nearly twice as much as
anticipated.
We have no choice but to explore different and innovative ways of
doing business, of delivering the safety and security that is crucial
to the operation of our transportation system. We have reached a
critical turning point in TSA, both in terms of addressing the problems
we have encountered and to begin our investment in a more strategic
approach to securing the transportation sector.
tsa and counterterrorism
One of my key objectives is to continue to position TSA as a
counterterrorism organization. In pursuing this objective, we have met
with key partners from the intelligence community and have repeatedly
met with officials from a number of our industry partners including
each of the major U.S. airlines, cargo carriers, and the key aviation
and transportation sector associations. The transportation security
system we are moving toward will require a collaborative, cooperative
effort among Government and industry partners.
We have met with our counterparts in other countries for thorough
discussions on aviation, surface, and rail security from a global
perspective. TSA maintains a strong relationship with the
transportation stakeholders in other countries, and a significant part
of our engagement has dealt with their concerns, priorities, and
opportunities to pursue further collaboration.
risk-based assessment
Over the last 4 years, we have made a significant shift to risk-
based security procedures. On January 12, 2016, TSA reached 2 million
total enrollments for the TSA PreCheckTM Application
Program. More than 6 million travelers are enrolled in a DHS trusted
traveler program, such as Customs and Border Protection's Global Entry,
and are eligible for TSA PreCheckTM. TSA is working
aggressively to expand the number of enrolled travelers, with the goal
over the next 3 years of enrolling 25 million travelers in the TSA
PreCheckTM Application Program or a DHS trusted traveler
program. This is a 4-fold increase from today. This is an important
security component for TSA as it shifts to a model where ``low-risk''
individuals are either directly enrolled or part of an eligible low-
risk population that is known to TSA.
Even more promising in terms of risk-based security procedures is
the work we are doing on developing the Dynamic Aviation Risk
Management Solution, or DARMS. The objective of DARMS is to unify,
quantify, and integrate information across the aviation sector in order
to comprehensively assess risk on an individual, on a per flight basis.
DARMS will integrate information on passengers, checked baggage and
cargo, aircraft operators, and airports and airport perimeters.
This kind of system-side application of risk-based principles will
allow greater screening segmentation and a more efficient, effective,
and agile reallocation of resources.
Early this year, TSA will finish the initial proof of concept of
DARMS for passenger screening. Within the next 1 to 3 years we plan to
finish the design and create a prototype that incorporates the complete
aviation security ecosystem and which tests and evaluates the approach
at a few select airports. And within 4 to 10 years, we plan to
gradually introduce DARMS at airports. We look forward to sharing these
plans in more detail with Congress.
We have actively worked with industry throughout the process to
leverage their knowledge and expertise, solicit their feedback, and
refine the approach. TSA is committed to continuing that collaboration
and strengthening those partnerships.
training and mission capabilities
As mentioned previously, and thanks to help from Congress in our
appropriations last year, we started conducting new hire training for
TSOs at the TSA Academy. Previously this training was decentralized and
conducted at individual airports.
The TSA Academy connects TSA's front-line workforce with other DHS
partners and provides a consistent training experience that improves
performance and professionalizes the officer workforce. Delivered in a
dedicated, high-quality environment conducive to realistic, scenario-
based learning, the Academy will help instill a common culture and
esprit de corps at the beginning of an officer's career, and enable us
to instill core values and raise performance standards across the
screening workforce.
The dividends are already apparent. Training in this manner ties
the individual to mission. It ties the employee to the larger
organization with a critical mission--to something bigger than
themselves--and it ties them to a sense of what the oath they took to
protect this country really means.
technology and acquisition innovation
We also are rethinking how we invest in technology to better ensure
that our investments are driven by threat and not by life-cycle.
While we continue to improve detection capabilities on our existing
equipment, our investment in new technologies must exceed the speed of
the enemies' ability to evolve. Our recently-published Strategic Five-
Year Technology Investment Plan for Aviation Security is an example of
thoughtful planning toward these ends. Interaction with industry in
developing the report was insightful, and we are optimistic that this
increased collaboration will prove beneficial.
The Defense Acquisition University is conducting an independent
analysis of our acquisition management processes, programs, and
organizations to address this challenge, which will inform future
adaptations to our acquisition governance. This effort is complete and
TSA is reviewing and developing an implementation strategy.
In addition, TSA is partnering with the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate (S&T) to further align research and development (R&D)
projects to acquisition needs. Improving this critical process will
better enable us to identify capability gaps and to coordinate R&D to
close those gaps.
The Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act (Pub. L. 113-
245), signed into law in 2014, has helped us by mandating increased
transparency and the use of best practices for security technology
acquisitions. The law also allows TSA to advance small business
contracting goals and expand our partnership with industry and aviation
security stakeholders.
TSA is also partnering with S&T and several private entities to
develop the potential future of passenger screening models. Future
private-public collaboration in curb-to-gate security systems may offer
the leap forward in aviation security that can absorb system growth,
increase effectiveness, provide operational resiliency, and improve the
passenger experience.
staffing models and right-sizing tsa
Rightsizing our staffing, training, and equipment needs are
critically vital investments, and sets a firm foundation for the
continuing evolution of TSA. I appreciated the committee's support and
funding for each of these important priorities as part of the Fiscal
Year 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Pub. L. 114-113)--and
request continued support in our fiscal year 2017 budget. As traveler
traffic volume grows, it is crucial we re-examine our assumptions and
models for future fiscal years, which is underway now.
We are a smaller organization than we were 4 years ago, with about
6,000 fewer TSOs in the screening workforce. The fact is we cannot
build a workforce indefinitely. We have a limited geographic footprint
in every airport--some large, some small. Only continuous innovation at
the checkpoint will meet the challenges posed by passenger volume
growth. Eventually, we will reach capacity, and in some places we
already exceed capacity during peak travel periods.
tsa senior leadership
Good leadership requires good people who are committed to the
mission. Last September, I convened a meeting of TSA's executive
leadership. The meeting allowed me to lay out my vision for evolving
TSA into the counterterrorism organization our mission demands. The
dialogue at this 2-day event was spirited, and we wrapped up with a
work list of items that will move our agency forward.
In addition to the range of projects supporting screening
operations improvements, we are examining discipline, empowerment of
front-line leaders, expanding information sharing, improving training,
and exploring ways of consolidating operations and support activities
in TSA headquarters. We have also changed the metrics that leadership
collects and uses to focus more on effectiveness than efficiency at the
checkpoint.
In addition to the standardized training for our front-line
employees, I am also committed to continued development of our agency's
leaders. I have begun a Leadership Speaker's Series for senior
leadership that covers topics such as ethical leadership, leadership in
action, and leading effective operations. We will be sending senior
leaders to leadership courses to strengthen their skills. Additionally,
I have reformed guidelines regarding SES special act awards.
administrator's intent
Mission success is built on a shared understanding of objectives,
unity of purpose, and alignment of values and principles. In January
2016, I published my Administrator's Intent, an effort to articulate
those objectives, the approach we will pursue in accomplishing our
essential counterterrorism mission, and the values and principles that
define TSA.
Central to our success is a commitment to a common set of values.
We will operate with the core values that define us as an agency--
integrity, innovation, and team spirit. Building on these, my Intent
outlines the principles we care about as an agency.
Simply stated: We will Focus on Mission, Invest in People, and
Commit to Excellence.
Focus on Mission.--Since my first day at TSA, I have
stressed the importance of putting our mission first. Focusing
on our mission helps us prioritize our resources and operations
to meet the threat. It also informs how we must invest in our
workforce to achieve mission success.
Invest in People.--Our culture, effectiveness, and mission
readiness are a direct result of consistent and career-long
investment in people and set the foundation for agency success.
Our people are our most important resource, and I am committed
to ensuring they have the tools and resources to succeed.
Value-based leadership, a foundation of training, recruiting,
and retaining talent, and appropriate recognition are core
elements of our approach.
Commit to Excellence.--Our standard is excellence in all
mission areas. We operate in a global environment where the
threat remains persistent and evolving. As we pursue our
counterterrorism mission, we will relentlessly pursue
excellence, through a culture of constant improvement,
organizational adaptation, and a disciplined pursuit of
professionalism.
Of the many positive impressions from my early tenure as TSA
administrator, the most profound is the one I have gleaned from our
workforce. They are incredibly patriotic and passionate about our
counterterrorism mission and will perform well if properly trained,
equipped, and led.
Many profound and important tasks lay ahead for TSA, and we are
committed to leading this agency guided by these values and principles.
It is a noble mission for which the men and women of TSA are prepared.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look
forward to your questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Admiral Neffenger. I appreciate your
being here today. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of
questions.
As I have said many times and in many different scenarios,
TSA was born out of a tragedy, that being 9/11, and it was an
agency that was cobbled together to address deficiencies with
respect to airport screening and security at airports in
general across this Nation and other areas as well.
It appears to me and it appears to everyone that there are
a lot of growing pains within the agency and administration,
but it also is apparent that you are the right person for the
job. We commend you on the job you have been doing, you have
been doing a wonderful job, and there is a lot more you need to
do.
With that being said, I want to delve right into some of
the questions that I have, because in my old days as a
prosecutor, if you didn't ask a question right away, the judge
would smack you. So I am not prone to making long statements.
So I am looking up at the screen here. As you see, there
are some discrepancies between the planning and what is being
requested in the budget and in the Five-Year Plan. The Five-
Year Plan was instituted to force TSA to have a blueprint going
forward, and part of it was because of procurement issues that
they have sustained, and it seems like there are some anomalies
here. In no particular order of importance, I would like to
kind-of take a look these.
One thing that jumps out to me really is the enhanced metal
detectors. They submitted a plan to us in August, the Five-Year
Plan, they testified to it in January talking about these
things. It is in the 2016 request. Now for the procurement for
2016 there is zero, in 2017 there is only 70. Can you explain
that?
Mr. Neffenger. Chairman, I had the same question when I saw
this, because, as you know, that plan came out as I came on
board and was developed. It was developed to, as I understand
it, to fiscal year 2014 baseline numbers across the Department.
So that is one challenge, is that you are building it to
numbers that are in the past.
The basic answer, and it is an answer that makes sense to
me, although it is challenging to parse it all out, but the
basic answer is that you have got a couple of things going on.
First of all, we took a look at the existing state of metal
detectors across the system. As it turns out, they are
operating much more efficiently and effectively than we were
expected at this stage of their life cycle. Part of that is
because they aren't used as often as they were before now that
we have AIT machines out there. So one aspect is you have got
metal detectors that are operating to standards and they are
performing well and we haven't seen the maintenance costs go
up.
The second piece at work is the Department is in the
process of looking at strategic sourcing across the Department
for metal detectors. TSA is not the only component within the
Department of Homeland Security that has a demand or a
requirement for metal detectors. So we have been asked to take
a pause as the Department looks at its strategic sourcing. As
that is being worked through, we put a pause on our procurement
while we are waiting to see what the Department comes up with.
So that is the general response there.
That said, I think the roadmap and the Technology
Investment Plan is sound. It does address the need to identify
follow-on procurements for the metal detectors going into the
future, and we are working right now with the Department to
rebaseline that so we know exactly what we will be purchasing.
Mr. Katko. I understand the answer, but just preliminary,
before I get into what I want to really want follow up with,
are these the same metal detectors, these new ones, are they
the same technology or are they enhanced, better technology
than the ones that currently exist?
Mr. Neffenger. It is roughly the same technology. It is a
little newer and it might have some more advanced processors in
it, but it does the same thing.
Mr. Katko. Okay.
Mr. Neffenger. What we are finding is that we are able to
detect to the right standards with the current technology.
Mr. Katko. So the whole idea of this Five-Year Plan was for
you to make some decisions, tell us about them. And it seems
like this identifies one of the systemic problems at TSA, and
that is, you say one thing and you do another. I am not saying
you in particular, but the agency. That is part of the concern
that we have, and it is a concern we have had repeatedly from
industry. So while their concerns are part of the equation,
safety is paramount.
But the concern I have is the agency can't even stick to a
Five-Year Plan and give it to Congress because within a few
months they are changing it and changing it quite dramatically.
Then you look at the credential authentication technology,
there is none in the Five-Year Plan, and all of a sudden out of
nowhere comes 1,100 in the 2016 procurement. So can you explain
that to me?
Mr. Neffenger. I think you are familiar with what that is.
That is the ID reader that would replace what is currently done
by a travel document checker.
The big challenge with that is that that is a--as you know,
we prototyped that in a couple of large airports last summer.
The prototype, or the pilot project, went very well, it did
exactly what it was supposed to do. But then we had a number of
big data breaches in the Federal Government, the OPM being the
most egregious. That changed everything with respect to when
you plug systems into secure databases.
So we have had to go back, and we are working very closely
with the manufacturer, to ensure that it meets the new
cybersecurity standards and the cyber vulnerability standards
that it has to meet before. I personally believe that this is
important that we do. I do not want to plug that into the
Secure Flight database, for example, and not be certain that I
can monitor whether or not somebody is trying to access it.
So it set us back about 6 months or so on that project
because we have to install--there is software that has to be
installed on each device to monitor the interactions that are
happening. Then there is a card reader that has to be put in
for somebody to log into the device.
It is actually on a good track, but as I said, it set us
back about 6 months in that procurement, which is why it got
pushed into fiscal year 2016 and further.
Mr. Katko. All right. I appreciate that. When was that
decision made to update these credential authentication
technology devices? Was it made recently or was it made 6
months ago or----
Mr. Neffenger. No, it has been recently, because, as you
know, the Department has been working on the approach to take
to cyber standards and cyber vulnerability. The Department has
what they called cyber sprint, which is a series of near-term
measures that have to be taken to ensure that we are doing
across the board, both in the Government, as well as in
industry, the things we need to do to protect.
We are part of that sprint. This falls right underneath
that. So they are very interested in ensuring that systems that
we plug into databases that are owned and operated across the
Government don't inadvertently make those databases vulnerable.
Mr. Katko. Last, before I turn my questions over to the
Ranking Member, the Five-Year Plan is supposed to mean
something, and it was passed because it was a piece of
legislation that was meant to force GSA to have a track.
Now, they were just here a month ago and there is no
mention of these things. So I would really appreciate it, and I
would ask going forward that when people come to testify before
Congress and there are major changes in the Five-Year Plan,
that they notify us, because that is really important to help
us know that we are given proper oversight.
The Five-Year Plan is not something that can be ignored. I
would ask that moving forward, that they take the Five-Year
Plan with the seriousness with which it was passed into law.
Okay?
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir. If I can add to that, I concur
with you completely, and my concern is that we bring you things
that make sense and things that we can actually do.
Concurrent with this, one of things I have looked at hard
since I have been on board is our current acquisition program
across the whole spectrum. All of this is tied to the way in
which you analyze missions, set requirements, and then post
those requirements in a way that is responsive to the industry
and the industry participation.
I asked the Defense Acquisition University to come in
shortly after I came on board and said: I want you to take a
hard look. DAU, as you know, is an adjunct to the Defense
Department that takes an independent, objective look at the way
in which Federal agencies procure and acquire.
I asked them to pull the covers off and see whether we are
doing things as we should. My suspicion was that we had gaps
and we had some places we can improve.
I have just received their report. Not surprisingly, they
identified that we had some gaps and some things we could do to
improve. It ties directly to our ability to properly forecast
and determine where we are going. As I said, I think the
Technology Investment Plan is a sound roadmap, but I think we
need a better requirements-generation process on the front end.
So what I hope to do is come forward to the committee, once
I analyze that report that I got from the Defense Acquisition
University, and outline for you where I think we can make some
dramatic improvements in the entire approach to acquisition.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Admiral.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member for 5 minutes
of questioning, Miss Rice.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, what is the agency doing to increase the number of
people who actually go through the TSA PreCheck application
process? Because now that you are doing away with Managed
Inclusion, the lines are going up. Now that need to kind of
reach-out to the public and increase the number of people who
take advantage of the system is even more critical.
Mr. Neffenger. Well, thanks for that question. There are a
number of things that we are doing, so I will try to just
highlight the categories of things.
First is making sure that we have identified all the
already vetted and cleared populations that we could bring into
the expedited screening program, the PreCheck program. As you
know, we have members of the military who hold clearances, we
have Members of Congress, members of other Federal agencies. So
we have expanded that population to what we think is the
reasonable expansion given the extent to which we know people
are vetted for security clearances. So that is the first thing
that we did.
We have also worked very closely with airlines, with
airline associations, with the travel industry to improve their
marketing of the availability of PreCheck, and there are a
number of airlines that have done a superb job of doing that.
So if you have flown on United recently, for example, you will
see on their in-flight entertainment systems there will be
advertisements for that. We worked with the existing vendor,
which is the vendor that provides services in airports, to
expand their opportunities to the extent possible to streamline
the enrollment process.
All of that has resulted in a dramatic increase in daily
enrollments. So we are about double the daily enrollments this
time this year than we saw at this time last year. So we have
gone from about 3,200 daily enrollments to about 6,200 daily
enrollments. So that has helped considerably. That puts the
PreCheck population now at around 2 million people. When you
add in those vetted populations, already-vetted populations,
and the people who are part of Global Entry, that brings it up
to about 9 million people.
Miss Rice. So what number do you want to hit?
Mr. Neffenger. We would like to hit 25 million. That is
considered to be the key number to dramatically change the way
the system operates.
We have also got a request for proposal that closed
recently that sought opportunity for other private-sector
businesses to enter the enrollment opportunity process. So this
would provide a number of different opportunities for private-
sector entities to come in, provide enrollment services. TSA
always maintains the vetting of the individuals, but this would
be a front-end enrollment, verifying their identity, verifying
the basic documents and that sort of thing, and then providing
us with the names.
That process is going through bid evaluation right now. So
we had a pretty robust response to that request for proposal.
That is going through bid. Assuming all goes well, given the
way in which the acquisition process works, we should be able
to award by midsummer, which means that you could by
conceivably before the end of the calendar year have additional
opportunities. That would put it out in the retail environment
so that you wouldn't have to necessarily go to an airport. You
might see it in a kiosk in a local shopping mall or a shopping
center or something like that.
So that is part of it. We are also working with and I have
been talking to my counterparts within the Department, people
who have other Trusted Traveler programs, like CBP, to look to
see whether we can conform our Trusted Traveler program with
theirs more effectively so that it just becomes easier for
people. I am concerned that it is still a little cumbersome to
enroll, and it is not always clear, if you are enrolling in
one, whether you are getting the other one. So we are looking
to combine that, and the Department right now is helping us to
manage a little more unified approach.
I think that we are on a good track right now given the
limited opportunities that are available. As you know, you
can't enroll everywhere, and even if you try to enroll on-line
there are some challenges associated with that. But I am
encouraged that we are seeing a lot of growth.
I think that people who were getting this through Managed
Inclusion and aren't getting it anymore, that has been one of
the biggest improvements to our marketing, they want to get
back in that line. But it is not growing as fast as I would
like to see it grow, which is why I am very interested in
seeing if we can get this RFP bid determined soon and start
offering more opportunities.
I think 2016 is going to be a challenging year still, but I
think in 2017 we could see dramatic improvements assuming that
this opportunity presents itself in the way we hope.
Miss Rice. So can you tell us what you are doing to
mitigate threats to the surface transportation sector?
Mr. Neffenger. As you know, surface is one where we don't
have direct security responsibility, but we do set standards
and we work very closely with them. I have got about a little
over 300 people total that are dedicated to surface
transportation across the Nation. They work with about a
thousand different corporate entities, and then a few thousand
additional public entities that provide everything from school
bus services to over-the-road buses, local rail, light rail,
metro, passenger rail, and the like.
So there are a couple of aspects that we have. You have an
inspection program that works collaboratively with varying
entities to set base assessments. There is a series of
standards established for what a security program needs to look
like. We inspected that, it is a voluntary program, but almost
everybody participates. It sets a baseline assessment, and then
they hold collaborative work to determine what needs to be done
and how to target some of the improvements. There is also an
exercise program that is run on a periodic basis to determine
their readiness to respond to incidents.
Depending upon the sophistication of the entity, and you
have some very sophisticated entities like the New York transit
system, with the transit police and so forth, a very robust
security program. That is one that you can actually take best
practices from and import to other places. Amtrak has a very
robust security program and the like.
Miss Rice. The communication between your agency and other
agencies is good and everyone understands they need to----
Mr. Neffenger. I think so. In my travels, I meet with
people in the surface world, and the overwhelming response I
have been receiving is that they like the way we have been
pushing information out to them. We have a pretty good sharing
arrangement for moving intelligence in and out, both sensitive
intelligence to the law enforcement agencies, as well as tear
sheets for the private sector people that need information.
The upside is that the overall threat environment is still
relatively low, but we do modal assessments. I think we provide
copies to the committee, but I will make sure you have the
latest round of intel assessments that we have done across each
of the modes of the surface world. Low doesn't mean no risk,
but it means that if you can address what you know to be the
key vulnerabilities across the system, that we can watch for
developments that may pose a potential problem.
We also work very closely with FEMA to determine the
distribution of grants. So we help FEMA evaluate grant
proposals or proposals for grant funding. Congress appropriated
$100 million in fiscal year 2016 for surface transportation
grants, $10 million was directly for Amtrak, another $3 million
for over-the-road buses, and then the remaining $87 million is
yet to be determined because those grant proposals are coming
in right now.
Miss Rice. So I am way over my time. I just want to end by
saying you have got one the toughest jobs. But I appreciate
your vision and your willingness to try to bring this agency up
to the standards that we all expect it to be at. I really can't
think of anyone better to lead the agency than you, and I am
just echoing the Chairman's comments before.
So thank you very much, and I yield back my time.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Miss Rice.
I will note with respect to the PreCheck that we had in my
airport in Syracuse, they used to have to drive 45 minutes
north to Oswego, New York, to the port to get PreCheck, and now
we got a kiosk put in the airport, and it is jammed all the
time with people signing up. So it is a perfect example of
making it convenient for the travelers. It is going to work. I
dearly hope we get to the goal you are talking about. But it is
a program that should be expanded and it is going great.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Homeland
Security Committee, Mr. Thompson, for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am glad
you had a chart to go with my comments about the procurement
plan.
Mr. Katko. Would you like it back up?
Mr. Thompson. No, I just want to reiterate to the
administrator that we passed that. That is an intent of
Congress for you to you do that. I think you have to get your
team to follow the instructions of Congress. That is real
important.
The other thing is, you asked for money to do procurements,
but I am wondering a small business, how can a small business
follow the procurement process and at the end of procurement,
because they don't have a bottomless pit of money, what are you
going to do to make sure that we don't unnecessarily deny small
businesses an opportunity to do business with TSA?
Mr. Neffenger. Well, thank you, Mr. Thompson, for the
question. As you know, you and I have had this conversation a
number of times, I actually am very concerned and I am very
interested in getting as much competition and as much small-
business involvement as possible. My personal belief is that
some of the most innovative and creative work being done,
particularly in the area of software and hardware development
in the security world, is being done in small businesses.
So there are a couple of things at play here. That
Acquisition University study I brought in is directly related
to how well you can entice people to participate and how easy
the participation is. So that is one piece of it, is to make
sure that you have a front-end process that provides the
incentive and the research and development incentive on the
front end, tied very clearly to clearly stated requirements and
capability gaps, and then hold small-business seminars and
industry seminars to determine that. So we have done a little
bit of that already. I think there is more of that that we need
to do.
I am pleased that we have attained nearly all of our small-
business participation targets for this last year. I want to
set a larger stretch goal for our targets. But I also want to
find a way to incentivize more effectively, and we can do that.
Actually, the DAU had I think some sound recommendations for
how you build that into the way you do acquisition. So I look
forward to providing more a detailed example of that.
But I met recently with a number of small-business
representatives, and I also met with the national Security
Manufacturers Coalition which included quite a few small
businesses. They identified this as a challenge that they have
faced with us for some time.
Mr. Thompson. So you do understand that probably every
Member of Congress is approached by businesses in their
district wanting to do business.
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. But they always talk about how complicated it
is.
Can you provide us the latest small-business statistics----
Mr. Neffenger. I will.
Mr. Thompson [continuing]. With TSA that you just alluded
to?
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir, I will.
Mr. Thompson. I have referenced the FAMS program and that
only 5 percent of the FAMS are female. Have you challenged your
team to address that problem?
Mr. Neffenger. I have. As you know, part of the challenge
has been we haven't been able to hire since 2011. So I thank
Congress for the opportunity to begin to replace. The average
age of FAMS right now is 43, and 30 percent or more will time
out on mandatory retirement over the next 5 years. But the fact
that we can hire this year gives us an opportunity to address
this diversity problem. I know it is Director Rod Allison's No.
1 priority.
So there are a couple of things we are doing. We are
marketing it internally in TSA under a ``Why not you?''
campaign, and we are especially targeting underrepresented
groups and women. We think that there is an untapped resource
out there that will find its way into this program if they have
the opportunity.
It is hard to overestimate how much you lose by not hiring
for a period of time. Nobody even thinks about the FAMS anymore
and you have no opportunity to address this problem. But we
have some targeted recruiting efforts going on right now that
are targeting, as I said, underrepresented groups. What I would
like to do is provide you with that recruitment plan that we
have, and I will send that to the committee so that you have
that.
Mr. Thompson. Please. I would look forward to it. We will
respond accordingly.
Most agencies tend to recruit in the capital region.
Mr. Neffenger. This is a Nation-wide recruiting pool.
Mr. Thompson. Good, good.
The other thing I talked about was airports having put TSA
on notice already about the summer months, the anticipated long
lines, and they are asking TSA to look at it and provide some
relief. What have you done to address those concerns?
Mr. Neffenger. Well, I think we have got a number of
projects underway right now and a number of efforts underway.
Let me underpin it by saying, we have seen record travel volume
over the past couple of years. Atlanta, in particular, the
airport that you are referencing, has seen a 14 percent growth
in passenger volume just in the past year. That is on top of 10
percent the year before.
So that is a challenge in anybody's book. It is a challenge
for the entire system. It is one of the reasons I asked to hold
staffing steady to stop the further reduction of the front-line
TSOs. As you know, we have come down 5,600 people since 2011 in
our front-line staffing. So we have held steady now, and I
wanted to hold steady because I knew that the combination of
focusing more effectively on our mission and moving people back
into standard screening lanes was going to put a lot of
pressure on the wait times.
So what are we going to do in the near term? The larger
story is we have to get staffing right, and we are in the
process of looking very hard right now. Within the next week or
2, I am going to get a number that shows a little bit more
effectively what the staff level should be to meet the
challenges that we are facing. But in the face of that you have
still got to deal with what is going to be a very large travel
season.
So in addition to talking to all my--personally, I have
spoken with the CEOs of each of the major airlines. I convened
a conference call about a week-and-a-half ago of the top 20
airports, the airlines that service those airports, and TSA.
These were the operations managers, the people who are
responsible for figuring schedules and the like. We are putting
in airport by airport at each of the--those 20 airports, by the
way, represent about 85 percent of the daily population. So if
you can get that right, you will alleviate the problem.
We are looking at any way possible to mitigate collectively
to deal with this as a system instead of just a series of hand-
offs in the system. So that is the first step, is a true
collaborative effort, airport by airport, and looking for any
innovative solutions and importing those around. As we learn
best practices, we will move it. If we have people who do
things really well, then we are going to put teams together
that will move from airport to airport to optimize.
The other thing we are doing is I am husbanding as much
overtime resource hours as I can right now and pushing those
into the summer, and we are front-loading our hiring so that we
are hiring as fast as we can and we are pushing people through.
We are adding classes to our new TSA Academy. We are running 8
concurrent classes right now, starting every week. We started
another 8 classes.
So my goal is to do as much as possible and hire to our
staffing levels, our authorized staffing levels, as fast as
possible. I hope to get that done before the summer season
starts and then deploy those people. We are also targeting it
to those airports where we know there to be the biggest
challenges.
Mr. Thompson. So your testimony is that, now that you are
aware of the problems, by summer you will have those problems
addressed.
Mr. Neffenger. Well, we will address them. I am not saying
that we are going to get it perfect across the board, because I
think we are still going to have some challenges. But we are
addressing those problems across the board. In fact, I am going
down to Atlanta next week to meet with the director of the
airport and my Federal security director to directly address
some of those concerns. I will be bringing a team that will be
evaluating how they do it. So we have done that. We are doing a
lot of work at Newark, JFK, Dallas, LAX, and the like.
I think you are going to still see some increased wait
times. I had to get better at the primary mission. Part of the
problem that we had is we were actually moving people very
effectively through the system, but we weren't actually doing
our job well. So you had to do the job well, and that increased
wait times by definition.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
Carter.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Neffenger, for being here. I want to
continue with the theme specifically for the Hartsfield-Jackson
Atlanta International Airport.
Mr. Neffenger, I hold in my hand the letter that has been
referred to that was sent to you by the general manager of
Hartsfield, Mr. Miguel Southwell. In this letter here, he of
course, as you know, expresses concern about the long wait
times and actually attributes it to understaffing of the TSA
personnel and asks that to be addressed.
Mr. Chairman, without any objection, I would like to have
this letter introduced into the record if that is okay.
Mr. Katko. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Letter Submitted For the Record by Hon. Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter
February 12, 2016.
Hon. Peter Neffenger,
Transportation Security Administration, 601 12th St., Arlington, VA
22202.
Dear Administrator Neffenger: The purpose of this letter is to
update you on the status of the passenger screening process and
relationship with the TSA at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International
Airport (ATL).
I'll begin this letter by saying that in terms of the partnership
between the Airport and the TSA, I can confidently say that no closer
coordination exists than that between ATL and Atlanta FSD Mary
Leftridge Byrd and her team.
There is a cohesive and respectful relationship that helps ensure
successful operations. Local TSA is very insightful and always willing
to assist. ATL security staff and executive leadership meet almost
daily, and formal meetings are scheduled bi-weekly.
However, Hartsfield-Jackson is still plagued by inadequate TSA
staffing. ATL struggled with TSA staffing shortfalls in 2015, and the
Airport is dreading the outcome of summer 2016. The TSA did execute a
7.5 percent increase in staffing. This increase--while appreciated--was
late and inadequate.
We started 2015 woefully understaffed. Through the persistent
efforts of FSD Mary Leftridge Byrd, the recognition of the domestic
checkpoints as three separate and distinct checkpoints (6 lanes
Terminal North, 4 lanes Terminal South and 18 lanes Main Terminal)
came, but later in the summer. This was compounded by the fact that in
your agency's fiscal year ending September 2015, Atlanta's TSA
passenger traffic grew 10 percent over the previous fiscal year. As a
result, several times throughout the day from May to October 2015, wait
times exceeding 35 minutes were not uncommon. This morning as I write
this letter, wait times up to 52 minutes were experienced between 6:00
am and 6:30 am. This is unacceptable as reflected in the customer
service surveys of our hub carrier Delta Air Lines.
We fear an even busier summer this year. In the first quarter of
your agency's current fiscal year that began Oct. 1, 2015, Atlanta's
passenger traffic has jumped 14 percent over the first quarter ofthe
previous fiscal year. And we know of no staffing plans to service this
mammoth growth in demand.
We are working hard to do our part. We have been collaborating with
the FSD and have launched a joint local campaign to boost the number of
pre-check passengers. This includes tapping into the membership of
Atlanta's local-area chambers of commerce to promote the pre-check
program amongst their membership, and asking large corporations to
follow the City of Atlanta Department of Aviation's lead to promote and
fund their traveling-employees' application for Global Entry or TSA
Pre-Check Program. We have pushed for, and have been made a part of,
the joint program by Airports Council International (ACI World) and the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) to join their Smart
Security Program, so that we may, in collaboration with TSA and our
airline partners, participate and invest in leading-edge technology and
process realignments, to facilitate more effective and efficient
screening at ATL's security checkpoints.
Even with all of our efforts, however, as the airport's experience
demonstrates, things appear to be only getting worse. It is for this
reason that we are giving serious consideration to your agency's
Screening Partnership Program (SPP), which allows airport operators to
apply to have passenger and baggage screening perfonned by qualified
private contractors--essentially privatizing the security screening
process. We have been conducting exhaustive research with current SPP
airports, weighing both the pros and the cons, and barring the
implementation of some transformational technology or a dramatic shift
in the staffing allowances in the next 60 days, Hartsfield-Jackson will
take steps to launch SPP at the world's most-traveled airport.
It would be my privilege to speak with you more on these issues
with the goal of arriving at a solution to boost the effectiveness and
efficiency of Atlanta's passenger screening.
Sincerely,
Miguel Southwell.
Mr. Carter. So, Mr. Neffenger, you are aware of this
letter, of course, you are familiar with it.
Mr. Neffenger. I am.
Mr. Carter. Well, in that letter Mr. Southwell actually
says if there is not an increase in TSA personnel at the
airport, that he will have no other choice but to apply for the
Screening Partnership Program.
Now, the Screening Partnership Program, it is my
understanding that this committee has been working with you and
working with TSA to try to get accurate cost estimates of
exactly how much it would cost to implement this program and to
run this program at the airports. Is that correct?
Mr. Neffenger. That is. As you know, GAO did a study, a
recent study, and the general gist of that was the direct cost
to TSA versus the additional costs associated----
Mr. Carter. Okay. But I am not talking about GAO's report
right now. I am talking about, are you working with the
committee in trying to get cost estimates as to how much it
would cost?
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir, we are.
Mr. Carter. Okay. So you are working with our committee now
on that, and that is very important.
Do you have any idea when that will be submitted, when that
will be finished?
Mr. Neffenger. To be honest, I think we are done with that
now. So I don't think there is any reason why we can't--we have
accepted the GAO recommendations. We have changed the way we
display those costs. I am required by law to display the direct
cost to TSA, but we have added what are called the imputed
costs, the things that are outside the TSA budget but include--
--
Mr. Carter. Okay. So you have accepted GAO's report that
estimated there would be a 17 percent cost savings on this if
this were implemented, correct?
Mr. Neffenger. Well, what we have done is we have accepted
their recommendation that we adjust the way we display costs so
that we include those costs outside our budget but still cost
to the Federal Government.
Mr. Carter. But still there would be a savings realized of
about 17 percent.
Mr. Neffenger. It actually runs from 2 to 17 percent
depending upon which airport they looked at. GAO said it is
difficult to draw large conclusions because there is a
relatively small sample group. But we have said that--certainly
in the first year that is what they say. What they asked us to
do was track it over time to see if those savings hold----
Mr. Carter. Okay. But with this in mind, with the fact that
it will save in mind, are you encouraging this program?
Mr. Neffenger. If an airport wants to go into the Screening
Partnership Program, I have no objection to it. In fact one of
the things I asked to do when I first came on board was to
streamline that process so that it is transparent, it is
available, and it is understood. Just the way in which the
procurement runs, it takes about 18 months to go from request
to contract award. But remember that the TSA awards a contract
on behalf of and they still have to work for the Federal
Government.
Mr. Carter. I understand. Well, again, I didn't get the
answer. Yes or no, are you encouraging airports to use these
programs?
Mr. Neffenger. Yes. Well, I mean, if by encouraging you
mean we advertise it, we make it available, we tell people how
it works.
Mr. Carter. Okay. Are you offering any kind of financial
incentives to them to use this program?
Mr. Neffenger. I don't really have any financial incentives
to offer.
Mr. Carter. Well, if you could save 17 percent, if you
could save 17 percent, I mean, even if you offered them just
half of that to improve their facilities at their airport,
don't you think that would encourage them to use the program?
Mr. Neffenger. I am not sure I have the authority to do
that. But there may be some ways to incentivize it if we wanted
to do so. I think my primary job is to ensure that we provide
services at or below the cost that it would provide, the
Federal services would be.
Here is what I would say, though. Regardless of the way you
do it, the challenges are the same for everybody. Remember it
has to be at or below my cost. So----
Mr. Carter. But GAO has said that this would be below your
cost, you would recognize a cost savings for it. It just seems
to me like you would offer that incentive, that financial
incentive to the airports, I mean, just to help.
Because obviously we have got a serious problem. Listen, I
can attest to it, I have recognized it personally. I have to
stand in those lines at the Atlanta airport. They are, they are
just terribly long, and we have got to have some relief here.
Any time we can get the private sector involved, I am all for
it.
Mr. Neffenger. What I will tell you is that we are seeing
roughly the same challenges whether it is a private or Federal.
The challenge is caused--it is an arithmetic problem, but
primarily you have a lot of people traveling, you have more
peak periods than we have had in the past, and you have a
certain level of staffing that you can't get beyond.
Mr. Carter. I accept that, and I know you do too, which
means that we have to try some different things.
Mr. Neffenger. That is right.
Mr. Carter. This is a different thing.
So what I want to know is this specifically: Do you have
personnel that are dedicated to this program, that are pushing
this program?
Mr. Neffenger. I do. I have an entire office that handles
the Screening Partnership Program. I have a new person that has
come in, started just before I started, and has dramatically
changed--I believe dramatically improved the program, made it
more apparent, more accessible, more understandable,
streamlined, and has--and we respond to anybody who wants to
know about it. In fact, I asked them to reach out to Miguel
Southwell.
Mr. Carter. I know you respond to it. My hope is that you
are marketing it as well. I mean, I would hope that you are
pushing this program. Again, we are looking for any way that we
can cut lines, any way that we can save money, and still do it
efficiently and do it effectively.
Mr. Neffenger. Well, it is a goal that I have as well.
There are a couple things. I mentioned in my opening statement
that we are also looking at what I think are some very dramatic
improvements we can make to the entire development of the
screening environment.
It has really about how you process people through more
efficiently while still doing an effective job at security. I
think there are some things that we can do that we are doing
right now that will make a huge difference in that, whether or
not you are private or public.
Mr. Carter. But including pushing this program, which is
what I am appealing to you, okay?
Mr. Neffenger. Okay.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Carter.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts,
Mr. Keating, for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Administrator.
I just want to focus on something that I realized is an
area of resources that are difficult. But you already addressed
and are working on the issue of access to data by TSA where
there were 73 people that were on the TIDE database on radical
sites.
I want to take that a step further. We had a hearing in
Boston just this week, and Mr. Mellon was there representing
TSA. But on the surface-area issues, which I understand usually
it is the local security forces, the local transport forces
that deal with that, not TSA employees directly, and they work
with FEMA in that regard, but TSA is still responsible for the
safety and security in those areas.
One of the things that is a concern on the surface area
transport area, if you look at that issue, the 73 people that
were identified and TSA didn't have the data, access to the
data network with them, it is even more difficult when you are
dealing with local area transport security forces because you
are a step removed.
For rail and buses and the people that work around those
areas, I have great concerns about the screening of those
employees. I will take it even a step deeper than that. There
is a GAO report, a September 2013 report, where they were
looking at the contracting out, the private contracting out of
services. In that GAO report they were talking about those
private contractors were doing less training, and I suspect
less screening. I really think that is an area of great
susceptibility.
Now, I know you are stretched and I know the way you
currently operate you are relying on those local transit
authorities to do that kind of work. But is there something we
can do in terms of oversight? Because I look at
vulnerabilities, and on surface area transport security it is
so accessible and it is mass transit. But one of the areas we
do have control over is screening those workers there that have
all this access and access that could be dangerous in the wrong
hands.
So could you just comment or at least agree if that is an
area of concern, and if it is, maybe look at that area, even
with diminished resources, even with the difficulty? I think
that is a real area of concern.
Mr. Neffenger. Well, I would concur with you. Any time you
have a population that you need to trust, you need to have some
means of verifying that trust. We directly concern ourselves
with that for people who hold transportation workers cards,
other credentials associated with those, as well as people in
the aviation industry and access. We rely heavily, as you
noted, upon State and local law enforcement to do some of that
background vetting across the surface modes.
What I will tell you is that it is of concern to us, and
what I owe you is a fuller explanation of how we intend to
continue to approach that and some of the things that we could
potentially do in the future.
Mr. Keating. Great. I think it is just not an area of
concern for safety in terms of terrorist activity. I think it
is a real area in terms of basic safety. Because that same GAO
report talked about the lack of safety training and it talked
about the buses and the equipment, the assets they use not
being as safe either. So is there a way for us to do a little
more oversight on that?
Mr. Neffenger. As you know, DOT covers a lot of that with
some of their oversight programs, but I think it implies a
stronger linkage perhaps between what is being done in the
safety world and what needs to be done in the security world as
well.
Mr. Keating. If that is an area that you could provide the
committee some more information on, we would be grateful for
that.
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir, I will.
Mr. Keating. Thank you for your hands-on approach thus far
trying to dig in and deal with these very difficult issues.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Keating.
I just wanted to follow up with one area that hasn't been
covered, which I anticipated that it was going to be covered,
and that is the behavior detection officers. Could you tell me,
what is the budget for those this year?
Mr. Neffenger. The BDO budget this year, I know that we
have come down by 15 percent from fiscal year 2015 numbers. So
we have reduced it by $33.6 million. Off the top of my head, I
don't have the exact number for that. I know it is a reduction
of $33.6 million over the fiscal year 2015 number.
What I would like to do is talk to you about how I view
that program and what I think that program is and can become
going into the future.
Mr. Katko. Yeah. I guess I am looking at it from the--now
that Managed Inclusion is kind of going by the wayside, which
it should be, I am wondering if, you know, some of those
resources might be better allocated towards the high-density
airports and trying to get more staffing at those airports.
Mr. Neffenger. Well, we are doing that. That is one of the
reasons for bringing the numbers down, is to reallocate
staffing to other front-line screening.
But if you think about the screening environment in its
total sense, there are a lot of things that are going on from
the time you enter to the checkpoint queue to the time you
exit. There is a successive attention to detail as you come
through and kind-of an increasing attention to detail as you
are moving through the environment.
There is sort of the general overview of the environment.
You need somebody paying attention, some group of people paying
attention to the general tenor of the environment. So how are
people acting? What does it look like? You need an awareness of
the activities in the environment.
Then as you get closer and closer to the actual checkpoint
or to the X-ray machine and the walk-through metal detector,
the AIT machine, you want some very detailed attention paid to
each individual coming through.
So that is the whole idea behind how you layer in things
like behavior detection.
I don't like separating out that capability and isolating
it. I spent a fair amount of time in Israel earlier this--
actually, at the end of last year, because I wanted to look at
the way they do behavior detection. So they embed that
throughout their whole system. There is greater or lesser use
of the behavior detection techniques, depending upon what your
role is in the system. But everybody kind-of has an awareness
of it.
So we have begun to do that, to actually train behavior
awareness to all of the people who work in the checkpoint
environment, because if you look at law enforcement agencies
around the world, they all use some form of behavior awareness
testing and behavior awareness detection.
In fact, the program that we have was built with input from
law enforcement agencies like the New York Police Department,
the FBI, LAPD, the Israelis, and the like. In fact, the
Israelis have come back and given us some advice.
We have also tried to validate that, in fact recently sent
a report to Congress, which I think does validate the science
behind the behavioral indicators. It is not a 100 percent
program, not intended to be, it is an indicator, and you look
for certain types of behaviors.
But you have got to get the numbers right. What we have
done is we brought them in closer to--we have integrated them
more effectively into the checkpoint environment. That is why I
think you can bring the numbers down. I don't need them
wandering around the airport. I need them paying attention to
an environment in which you are trying to determine whether
anybody at the last minute is trying to get past you and get
something into the aircraft.
So I think we are on a good trajectory with behavior
detection, I think there is some more adjustment that needs to
be done. Again, what I asked was let's hold--we came down by 15
percent in the numbers in the fiscal year 2016 budget. I just
want to hold steady as we look at the modifications that we are
making to that program, because I think that it all plays into
the way you staff more efficiently the checkpoint environment.
I like having people paying attention to the broader crowd,
and they make thousands of referrals a year that have resulted
in hundreds of arrests, mostly criminal arrests, but the
behavioral indicators for criminal activity are the same
behavioral indicators for anybody trying to do something bad.
So I am comfortable that it has a sound basis. What I don't
know is whether we have got the numbers right yet. As I
mentioned to Mr. Thompson, I am very concerned about our
ability to address what I know will be a very challenging
summer travel season.
Mr. Katko. A quick question for you. Are they being
implemented outside--let me ask a better question. So, I
understand it, the BDOs are being implemented just at the
checkpoint, not throughout the airport, just at the checkpoint?
Mr. Neffenger. There is still some use around--I mean, we
still--they serve on VIPR teams, so they are moving around.
Again, if you think about it, you are moving around,
particularly the VIPR teams that are doing the random
inspection of badge personnel. As I think I mentioned before,
we have increased that by almost 5-fold, the number of
inspections that we are doing within the airport environment.
So we have some BDOs on that team, because they are watching
behaviors in and around the aircraft and the baggage handling
areas and the like. So it is not solely there, but we have
focused on the checkpoint with our BDOs for current.
Mr. Katko. All right. Thank you.
Miss Rice has no further questions, but Mr. Keating may.
So, Mr. Keating, please.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a couple of quick questions. No. 1 is the
responsibility for staffing the exit lanes, how is that
reflected in your 2017 budget request? No. 2, and last, we have
talked about perimeter security, and you are going to dig into
that issue, you said. Is there any progress thus far to
communicate to this committee on that?
Mr. Katko. I will note for the record that Mr. Keating's
record is now still intact to mention perimeter security at
every hearing.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad you are
keeping track, and I hope you are not alone in keeping track of
this issue.
Mr. Katko. That is right.
Mr. Keating. Because it dates back to the 9/11 Commission
Report.
If we could on perimeter security, see what actions you
might have taken so far, and also what plans you have going
forward in that respect. Those are the two points I wanted to
make.
Mr. Neffenger. On exit lanes, we are staffing to the lanes
that we are required by law to staff to. As you know, Congress
passed a law that said you must continue to maintain exit lane
staffing. So I don't have the exact number, but this budget
reflects the requirement to continue to staff those exit lanes.
We are also working with various airports to look at exit
lane technology. Technological solutions to exit lane
management takes the human out of the equation, one-way doors
and that sort of thing.
Mr. Keating. We saw some of that in a field hearing in
Syracuse.
Mr. Neffenger. There is some promising stuff out there. Not
all of it is cheap, but there are some good solutions out
there, and we are looking at trying to get those approved and
on a list that could be used.
With respect to perimeter security, there is actually a lot
going on right now. I hope you will be pleased with what we are
doing. I pay attention to it, not just because you ask me
questions about, but because it is a real concern.
As you know, last year, this was before I came on board,
but in the wake of the incident in Atlanta and some follow-on,
the Secretary had asked the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee to take a look at specifically insider threat and
perimeter security. They came out with, among other things,
some recommendations with respect to that.
TSA, again, had put out a requirement to do some work with
respect to reducing access points and the like. Personally, I
wasn't comfortable with both the nature of that request as well
as the response that we got. I mean, there was some good work
done, it is not to suggest that people didn't take it
seriously, but it wasn't really well-defined.
So over the past 2 months, and then ending at the end of
this month, we are looking airport by airport across all the
Federal airports in the country. I put out a very detailed
vulnerability assessment requirement.
So our FSDs, working with the airport directors and then
the airlines and employers in there, their requirement, among
other things, is to identify every single access point, airport
by airport, the purpose of the access point, the people who use
that access point, and what the nature of the access is, what
does it allow to have happen, in addition to identifying the
number of employees that have badged access, who the employers
for those employees are, and what the nature of their badged
access is.
Because I wanted to get a better understanding of what
access means. I have heard people tell me: Well, you can't get
below a certain number. But yet, that number will be
significantly higher than a similar-sized airport that says: I
can get to a lower number.
So I didn't, to be honest, I didn't feel like I had enough
information to actually answer your question effectively, or to
answer this committee's question.
Those reports are starting to come in now. We should have
all of those by the end of this month. We will have to evaluate
them. My goal is to, first of all, get a better understanding,
airport by airport, of what it looks like, what are we talking
about in terms of access points----
Mr. Keating. Are you just doing this within the context of
the vulnerability assessment request? Because that has dropped
from 17 percent of airports to 13 percent, down to, like, 3
percent of airports.
Mr. Neffenger. No, no, this is the entire system.
Mr. Keating. Good. Thank you.
Mr. Neffenger. This is all 450-plus Federalized airports.
So this is every single airport that we have responsibility
for.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Mr. Neffenger. So that is going to take some time to
compile that, but my intent is to provide that report. It will
probably be a Classified report, but we will provide it to the
committee, and then we can have a discussion about now what do
we do and what does it mean, in terms of how you manage that
going forward.
I suspect we will learn some good things and we will learn
some things that are disturbing in that. But it will give us a
much clearer picture. I just didn't think I had a clear
picture, and the only way to get it is to actually go out and
draw the picture airport by airport.
Mr. Keating. That is great. You said you would do that, and
you are doing it. I appreciate that.
I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
Do you have any more questions? You all set?
I would like to thank Administrator Neffenger for his
thoughtful testimony, very helpful.
Members of the committee may have some additional questions
for the witness, and we will ask you to respond to those in
writing. The hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Honorable John Katko for Peter V. Neffenger
Question 1a. As you may know, TSA--as part of DHS--has special
acquisition authority to use ```other transactions'' agreements, or
OTAs. It is my understanding that these types of agreements are
generally used for research and development purposes--they do not
substitute for open and competitive contracts, for example.
Can you describe how TSA has used these OTAs?
Also, can you tell me if your on-going acquisition and procurement
review is, or anticipates, reviewing how OTAs are used, and how they
should be used, by TSA?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's other transaction
authority (OTA) is delegated by Congress and primarily covers research
and development and prototype activities. However, the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA, Pub. L. 107-71, November 19, 2001)
provides the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) with a
different authority for use of OTAs where a conventional competitive
procurement would not be able to achieve the functions of the program.
TSA primarily utilizes OTAs for the following programs/projects:
Inline Checked Baggage Inspection Systems (CBIS).--
Currently, TSA's primary use of OTAs is for the design and
construction of inline CBIS. The OTA establishes a funding cost
share percentage with the airport authority, defines the roles
and responsibilities of TSA and the airport, and serves as the
contract vehicle to fund the airport's allowable project costs.
The airport uses established contracting processes to award
contractors to perform necessary structural, electrical, and
mechanical work necessary to support the installation of the
checked baggage screening equipment.
Advanced Surveillance Program.--TSA utilizes OTAs to support
transportation authorities' expansion of closed circuit
television surveillance systems. These systems enable the
ability to observe and detect people and property moving
through the security screening process and facilities.
Law Enforcement.--TSA also utilizes OTAs to fund the costs
of local law enforcement officers who provide security services
to TSA.
Canine program.--TSA utilizes OTAs to fund local and State
participants who provide law enforcement officers to serve as
dog handlers at airports, mass transit systems, maritime, and
other facilities.
Parking and Janitorial Services.--TSA utilizes OTAs to fund
airport janitorial services and airport parking for
transportation security officers. These services are typically
contracted directly by the airport.
TSA has an existing and active policy to conduct quarterly sample
reviews of prior quarter contract actions to include OTAs.
Question 2a. A number of concerning threat streams and attacks,
such as the MetroJet incident, demonstrate that the international-
inbound risk to aviation remains concerning. The budget does not appear
to show any major investments or initiatives in stemming the overseas
threat, and ascertaining the resources devoted to TSA's Office of
Global Strategies has been difficult.
What is TSA doing to ensure that international inbound aviation is
secure from terror attacks?
Answer. The threat to international civil aviation is evolving;
therefore, it is more important than ever that the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) focus on the fundamentals of aviation
security internationally. To mitigate this threat, TSA assesses
security at international airports, analyzes the aviation security
attack scenarios posing the greatest risk, and develops mitigation
plans to address the highest-priority areas. This mitigation depends on
intelligence information, embracing innovation in technology, processes
and training; and sharing information and best practices with our
international partners.
TSA is integrated into the intelligence community to ensure the
availability of the latest threat information, particularly with regard
to overseas threats. Threat information is briefed to the TSA
administrator and senior staff daily, and it is used to inform TSA's
policies with regard to international engagement, inspections,
assessments, and mitigation efforts.
TSA is required by law to assess foreign airports and inspect
foreign air carriers that fly into the United States, along with U.S.
aircraft operators. TSA conducts these assessments at approximately 280
Last Point of Departure airports, and in fiscal year 2015, TSA
conducted 289 air carrier inspection visits and 146 foreign airport
assessments. Additionally, TSA has the authority to issue Security
Directives (SDs) and Emergency Amendments (EAs) to foreign and U.S. air
carriers operating from those airports to add additional security
requirements that further mitigate threat. Through SDs and EAs, TSA is
able to enhance the overall security posture by requiring airports and/
or air carriers to elevate the level of security to address both
specific threats and general areas of concern in the regions of the
world with terrorist activity.
TSA's Secure Flight program conducts passenger watch list-matching
for more than 270 U.S. and foreign air carriers with flights into, out
of, within, and over the United States, as well as covered U.S. flights
between 2 international points, to identify individuals who may pose a
threat to aviation or National security, and designate them for
enhanced screening or prohibit them from boarding an aircraft, as
appropriate. All international inbound passengers are vetted through
Secure Flight. Through a collaborative partnership with CBP, TSA is
able to implement risk-based, intelligence-driven, scenario rules in
the Automated Targeting System-Passenger to identify additional
international travelers and designate them as requiring enhanced
screening. These rules are based upon potential terrorist travel
patterns and current threats.
In 2015, TSA identified a number of known or suspected terrorists
who attempted to travel on commercial aircraft, and who represented the
highest threat to transportation, some of whom were identified as
potential foreign fighters. In these instances, TSA took action to
address the threat, which included, as appropriate, denial of boarding
to prevent overseas travel to participate in foreign fighting or to
conduct other nefarious activities.
To address potential insider threats, all foreign air carriers and
U.S aircraft operators flying to/within/over the United States are
required to submit their Master Crew Lists to TSA for vetting against
the watch lists. When directed by TSA, air carriers and aircraft
operators must remove any crewmember from their Master Crew List.
Question 2b. In what ways is TSA working with foreign partners,
such as the European Union?
Answer. TSA collaborates closely with foreign partners, including
foreign governments, foreign air carriers, foreign all-cargo air
carriers, international organizations, as well as foreign airport
authorities. TSA maintains close relationships internationally through
our network of Transportation Security Administration Representatives
(TSARs), International Industry Representatives, and TSA inspectors.
TSA also coordinates with a robust network of foreign partners through
bilateral, multi-lateral and industry organizations, such as the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Air
Transport Association (IATA), Airports Council International (ACI),
QUAD, and G7 groups. TSA serves as the lead U.S. Government agency on
matters of aviation security within ICAO and represents the United
States on the Aviation Security Panel of Experts (AVSEC Panel) and in
its various working groups.
As an example of TSA's close collaboration with foreign partners,
TSA and the European Union Directorate General for Mobility and
Transport participate in a bi-annual U.S.--European Union
Transportation Security Cooperation Group designed to align key
aviation security policy initiatives, while also ensuring close
coordination on operational objectives. Amongst other achievements,
notable successes include mutual recognition of National cargo security
programs; continued work to align explosive detection standards; and
the sharing of best practices on the screening of non-metallics.
Additionally, TSA assists foreign governments in resolving
outstanding security vulnerabilities identified through TSA's airport
assessment program by providing assistance in the form of training,
technical assistance, on-the-spot remediation, and other forms of
direct engagement.
Question 3a. The committee understands that, for the first time,
the front-line workforce has been provided with more detailed
intelligence information concerning threats to transportation security.
Do you believe this has helped Transportation Security Officers
(TSO) understand the importance of being effective and focused in
detecting threat items?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) believes
providing the front-line workforce with more consistent and detailed
intelligence information concerning threats to transportation security
enhances the front-line workforce's understanding of the importance of
being effective and remaining focused in detecting threat items. The
screening system is composed of three parts: Technology, processes, and
people. Understanding the threat, appreciating the limitations of the
technology, and recognizing the importance of procedures enhances the
overall ability of the workforce to detect threat items. As a result,
Transportation Security Officers (TSO) receive the intelligence portion
of the Mission Essentials and Threat Mitigation training on a quarterly
basis. This training is regularly updated to focus on new tactics, such
as the way terrorists hid explosive devices in innocuous items to bomb
the Metrojet flight in Egypt and the Daallo flight in Somalia.
Question 3b. How does TSA intend to continue providing such
information to the workforce? Will briefings occur on a regular basis?
Answer. TSA will continue to update and deliver Mission Essentials
training on a quarterly basis, while also providing ad-hoc intelligence
briefings on emergent threat issues. Emergent threat concerns are also
conveyed to the workforce via the weekly National Shift Brief, a
communications mechanism used by TSA front-line supervisory staff to
provide information directly to the front-line workforce at the
beginning of a shift. In addition, in fiscal year 2017, TSA will
incorporate a baseline intelligence briefing into the curriculum at
basic training for all incoming TSOs. The main tenets to be presented
include the current threat, threat groups, and tactics used by said
groups.
Question 4. This committee has previously held hearings on the
cumbersome and difficult process that companies are having when having
their technologies tested by TSA. While some of this also lies in the
hands of the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, how are you
working to lower the barrier for entry for small business with security
solutions to today's threats?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has met
its small business goals and continues to seek additional opportunities
to increase small business participation. TSA is focused on
diversifying the industrial base and providing small businesses with
access to environments and integration into screening systems that have
not been historically available. TSA is pursuing 3 initiatives that
should increase competition for all businesses:
Third-Party Testing.--TSA has observed challenges with
transportation security equipment passing qualification testing
and operational testing, resulting in delayed acquisition
processes and increased test and evaluation costs. TSA is
working to address these challenges by developing a Third-Party
Test Program, which is intended to streamline the acquisition
process by requiring vendors to provide more mature systems in
response to procurement opportunities. Third-Party Testing will
identify standardized testing criteria, testing requirements,
and standardized test scenario templates for transportation
security equipment. TSA anticipates that this will make the
testing process more accessible and transparent for all
vendors, including small businesses. Small businesses could
also become authorized third-party testers.
Open Architecture.--TSA has identified the need to shift to
an open architecture for capability development. As part of
this open architecture concept, TSA is moving to a ``systems-
of-systems'' perspective, which integrates technology, data,
and processes within and across airports. Establishing an open
architecture will result in a higher level of interoperability
and allow for the acquisitions, repair, and upgrade of
individual components, thereby increasing competition and
potentially creating new business opportunities for small
business. The fiscal year 2017 President's budget request calls
for $5 million for this purpose.
Innovation Lanes.--TSA is pursuing the establishment of
innovation lanes at various airports. An innovation lane would
be a partnership with manufacturers and industry to demonstrate
emerging capabilities in an airport environment. This program
would provide an opportunity for businesses, including small
firms, to gather data in an operational environment, which will
better enable vendors to understand the screening process and
also inform the evolution of screening technology.
Question 5. The homeland is facing new and growing threats from
ISIL-affiliated extremists and home-grown extremists targeting critical
infrastructure, such as transportation. However, the committee is
concerned that TSA does not have an adequate means of proliferating
threat information to its regulated partners. While the budget request
does include additional resources for the Transportation Security
Operations Center, how will those resources be used to better inform
the traveling public and transportation partners?
Answer. In the 2017 budget, the Transportation Security Operations
Center (TSOC) has requested a cost of living increase. This increase,
and other resources that support the TSOC, enable operations to
continue.
The TSOC provides numerous reports--real-time, daily, weekly, and
monthly--to over 700 recipients. These reports are sent to
representatives from the Transportation Security Administration's
Office of Public Affairs and Office of Security Policy and Industry
Engagement for their pertinent use with regulated partners.
The TSOC is constantly analyzing security-related events and
threats to align its reporting with evolving information. In the last
12 months, TSOC has created new reports, overhauled existing reports,
and improved reporting efficiency.
Additionally, in the last 6 months, TSOC evaluated its ability to
produce timely effective reporting and written communications. This
evaluation revealed an opportunity to improve in this area by
recruiting professional writers to add to the TSOC skill sets. Within
TSOC's approved staffing levels, and once vacancies occurred 4 watch
officer positions (positions that historically prepared written
products) were converted to writer/editor positions. These skills add
to the TSOC professionals a cadre specifically capable of better
designing, preparing, and transmitting information related to
transportation security events.
In addition, other Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
offices also provide threat information to TSA's regulated partners.
TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), has produced 50
products so far in fiscal year 2016 (22 Unclassified, 28 Classified),
which we shared through email, web postings, or personal engagements.
In fiscal year 2016, OIA has already conducted more than 400 unique
engagements with transportation stakeholders; these numbers include
more than 100 engagements each with our aviation and mass transit
partners, more than 90 with freight rail, 37 with highway, 36 with
pipeline, and 57 cyber threat engagements across all modes. In fiscal
year 2016 OIA begins an expansion of its Field Intelligence Officer
(FIOs) program by about 20 percent, from 68 to 81, and is expected to
be fully implemented in fiscal year 2017. FIOs support Federal Security
Directors at airports across the United States and routinely interact
with other airport officials, passenger and cargo airlines, and other
local transportation stakeholders to provide relevant threat and
intelligence information. In fiscal year 2017 OIA will continue efforts
to enhance information sharing through infrastructure enhancements as
well as targeted information-sharing improvement initiatives.
Question 6. Approximately 1 year ago, the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee submitted a much-needed report on mitigating the
insider threat to aviation security with 28 recommendations. What is
the status on TSA's action regarding those recommendations and
addressing the insider threat, which is now more concerning than ever?
Answer. As of March 23, 2016, 12 of the 28 Aviation Security
Advisory Council (ASAC) recommendations have been completed. All
remaining recommendations are being actively addressed and are on
schedule for completion. Two of the most significant and major projects
are the ``Rap Back'' program for recurrent criminal history records
checks, and the establishment of a National database of employees who
have had airport and/or aircraft operator-issued badges revoked. In
response to both the Office of Inspector General and the ASAC
recommendations, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
been working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to initiate a
proof of concept for the Rap Back program that is planned to begin in
late spring 2016. Once completed, the program will continually assess
the criminal history of aviation workers, and notify TSA with any
changes in status. In addition, TSA has established a working group
with industry partners to explore options to establish a National
database of aviation workers who have had badges revoked. Areas of
review will cover policy, operational processes, technical
modifications, and possible clearinghouse to support the effort. An
implementation plan is set for completion by June 2016.
Question 7. The fiscal year 2017 budget request includes plans to
update and install new in-line baggage screening systems at several
airports across the country. Is TSA working to further improve these
systems' technical capabilities and is there a way of making checked
baggage more risk-based, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues
to procure, install, and integrate new technologies and capabilities
into in-line baggage screening systems to meet evolving security
requirements and enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of screening
equipment at airports Nation-wide. TSA collaborates with the Department
of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate and industry
to pursue enhanced system capabilities, such as expanded threat
detection capabilities, higher detection rates, lower false alarm
rates, higher throughput rates, and reduced life-cycle costs. These
capabilities will result in improved effectiveness and efficiency of
airport screening operations in the checked baggage environment.
TSA is evaluating the integration of risk-based security
capabilities into checked baggage screening systems. Newly-developed
explosives detection systems possess the capability of storing multiple
threat detection algorithms and dynamically switching between
algorithms during live operations. TSA is collaborating with airports
and industry to determine the applicability and effectiveness of this
capability.
Also, in July 2015, TSA published the Planning Guidelines and
Design Standards (PGDS) for Checked Baggage Inspection Systems Version
5. TSA collaborated with industry in the development of these
guidelines, which outline performance and risk-based design
requirements, lessons learned, and best practices for designing a
checked baggage inspection system.
Question 8. Recently, the committee was informed that TSA does not
plan to share its updated cost estimate information for the Screening
Partnership Program until June 30, 2016. Unfortunately, this directly
contradicts the testimony Administrator Neffenger provided our
committee at the budget hearing on March 2, and the testimony provided
by Ms. Dorgham at our November 17, 2015 hearing. In response to Rep.
Rogers asking when updated cost estimates would be available, Ms.
Dorgham said that they would be provided in their next semi-annual
report in mid-2016. When asked by Chairman Katko if we would have cost
estimates within 6 months, Ms. Dorgham said ``that's correct.'' At the
budget hearing on March 2, when asked by Rep. Carter about providing
SPP cost estimates to the committee, Administrator Neffenger, replied,
``To be honest, I think we are with that now.'' Providing the committee
with accurate cost estimates is essential to our ability to conduct
proper oversight, and have a clearer understanding of the impact of
this program. Please detail for the committee why TSA is no longer able
to honor the commitment it made in its previous testimony.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agrees
that providing the committee with accurate cost estimates is essential.
As a result, TSA is currently conducting a thorough internal review of
the cost comparisons to ensure that they conform to the best practices
of the Government Accountability Office and that Congress receives the
most accurate information possible.
In the November 17, 2015, hearing, Ms. Dorgham stated that TSA had
already begun making changes to the cost methodology and would provide
the first cost comparisons in TSA's next semi-annual report to
Congress. Although TSA was not directed to provide a semi-annual report
with the passage of the Fiscal Year 2016 Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act in December, TSA still remains committed to
providing its Screening Partnership Program cost comparisons to
Congress within the same time frame. TSA is on track to provide the
cost comparison to Congress as planned in June 2016.
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